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Press Release:
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2004/2004.03.25.gcr_relaunch.html
Plundering politicians and bribing multinationals undermine economic development, says TI

Transparency International's new Global Corruption Report 2004 charts the flow of stolen assets, recommends ways to recover money looted by despots, and sets out new Standards on Political Finance and Favours

London, 25 March 2004



Political corruption undermines the hopes for prosperity and stability of developing countries, and damages the global economy," said Peter Eigen, Chairman of Transparency International (TI), launching the TI Global Corruption Report 2004 (GCR 2004 ) today. "The abuse of political power for private gain deprives the most needy of vital public services, creating a level of despair that breeds conflict and violence. It also hits the pockets of taxpayers and shareholders worldwide. The problem must be tackled at the national and international level," he said.

"The GCR 2004 , with a special focus on political corruption," said Eigen, "is a call to action to bring integrity and accountability into governance, to stop bribery by multinational companies, and to curb the flow of stolen assets into secret bank accounts in the west." TI is the leading international non-governmental organisation combating corruption worldwide.

"Democracies can no longer tolerate bribery, fraud and dishonesty," states former US President Jimmy Carter in a foreword to the GCR 2004 , "especially as such practices disproportionately hurt the poor."

The GCR 2004 details funds allegedly embezzled by political leaders of the past two decades. During his misrule, Mohamed Suharto, President of Indonesia from 1967-98, is alleged to have stolen US$15-US$35 billion in a country where the GDP per capita hovers at around US$700. Suharto tops the table of corrupt politicians.



Where did the money go? - The top 10

Head of government Estimates of funds allegedly embezzled GDP per capita (2001)
1. Mohamed Suharto President of Indonesia, 1967-98 US$ 15 to 35 billion US$ 695
2. Ferdinand Marcos President of the Philippines, 1972-86 US$ 5 to 10 billion US$ 912
3. Mobutu Sese Seko President of Zaire, 1965-97 US$ 5 billion US$ 99
4. Sani Abacha President of Nigeria, 1993-98 US$ 2 to 5 billion US$ 319
5. Slobodan Milosevic President of Serbia/Yugoslavia, 1989-2000 US$ 1 billion n/a
6. Jean-Claude Duvalier President of Haiti, 1971-86 US$ 300 to 800 million US$ 460
7. Alberto Fujimori President of Peru, 1990-2000 US$ 600 million US$ 2,051
8. Pavlo Lazarenko Prime Minister of Ukraine, 1996-97 US$ 114 to 200 million US$ 766
9. Arnoldo Alem?n President of Nicaragua, 1997-2002 US$ 100 million US$ 490
10. Joseph Estrada President of the Philippines, 1998-2001 US$ 78 to 80 million US$ 912




Transparency International Standards on Political Finance and Favours

1. Donations to political parties and candidates to elected office must not be a means to gain personal or policy favours. Parties and candidates must practise transparency. Governments must implement adequate conflict-of-interest legislation.

2. Political parties, candidates and politicians should disclose detailed information about assets, donations, in-kind donations, loans and expenditure, on an annual basis as well as before and after elections, to an independent agency.

3. Independent public oversight bodies endowed with the necessary resources must effectively supervise the observance of regulatory laws and measures. Together with independent courts, they must ensure that offenders are held accountable and duly sanctioned. 4. Diversified funding should be sought through: state funding and subsidised access to the media; the encouragement of small donations and membership fees; and controls on corporate, foreign and large individual donations. Spending limits should be considered.

5. Candidates and parties must be given fair access to the media. The media should play an independent role, free from political interference, both in election campaigns and in the broader political process.

6. Civil society should have the opportunity to actively participate in promoting adequate legislation in the field of political finance and in the monitoring of political finance and its impact on political representation.

The full text of the TI Standards is available in the TI Global Corruption Report 2004






http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download.htm


Part one
Political corruption
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TI 02 chap01 7/1/04 11:39 Page 10
1 Introduction
Robin Hodess1
What is political corruption?
Political corruption is the abuse of entrusted power by political leaders for private gain,
with the objective of increasing power or wealth.2 Political corruption need not involve
money changing hands; it may take the form of `trading in influence' or granting
favours that poison politics and threaten democracy.
Political corruption involves a wide range of crimes and illicit acts committed by
political leaders before, during and after leaving office. It is distinct from petty or
bureaucratic corruption in so far as it is perpetrated by political leaders or elected
officials who have been vested with public authority and who bear the responsibility
of representing the public interest. There is also a supply side to political corruption -
the bribes paid to politicians - that must be addressed.
Political corruption is an obstacle to transparency in public life. In established
democracies, the loss of faith in politics and lack of trust in politicians and parties
challenge democratic values, a trend that has deepened with the exposure of corruption
in the past decade.3 In transition and developing states, political corruption threatens
the very viability of democracy, as it makes the newer institutions of democracy
vulnerable.
Political corruption is a primary focus of Transparency International's work. Indeed,
one reason for selecting political corruption as the theme of this year's Global Corruption
Report is the priority of this issue in TI's network of national chapters around the world,
many of which hold political corruption to be a major concern in their country and
have made political corruption a focus of their advocacy efforts.
The impact of political corruption
The revelation of political corruption often sends shockwaves through a society. Yet,
despite strong demands for justice, prominent world leaders who are suspected of
corruption prove difficult to prosecute or convict. Many leaders are out of office or dead
before their crimes come to light. TI has put together a list of alleged embezzlers from
Sani Abacha to Mohamed Suharto (see Table 1.1, page 13), showing estimates of the
money they allegedly stole as compared with per capita income. This list is a powerful
reminder of just how massive and devastating the scale of abuse can be.
Introduction 11
TI 02 chap01 7/1/04 11:39 Page 11
The general public around the world has taken note of political corruption. TI's
Global Corruption Barometer (see `Global Corruption Barometer 2003', Chapter 11,
page 288), a new instrument that assesses the general public's experiences of and
attitudes towards corruption, finds that if citizens could wave a magic wand to eliminate
corruption from just one institution, more would choose to clean up political parties
than any other institution. For parties, which play a crucial role in public life in any
democracy, the message is clear: there must be absolute probity of party members and
officials, and parties themselves must clean up their internal practices.
Business people also sense the effects of political corruption. A survey by the World
Economic Forum shows that business people believe that legal donations have a high
impact on politics, that bribery does feature as a regular means of achieving policy
goals in about 20 per cent of countries surveyed, and that illegal political contributions
are standard practice in nearly half of all countries surveyed (see Box 2.4, `Political
corruption: a global comparison', page 30).
Political corruption points to a lack of transparency, but also to related concerns
about equity and justice: corruption feeds the wrongs that deny human rights and
prevent human needs from being met. Former UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights Mary Robinson argues that corruption hinders participation in political life and
proper access to justice (see box `Corruption and human rights', page 7).
Focus of the report
This year's Global Corruption Report focuses on corruption in the political process, and
on the insidious impact of corrupt politics on public life in societies across the globe.
It addresses the following areas in the context of political corruption:
* the regulation of political finance
* the disclosure of money flows in politics and the enforcement of political finance
laws
* elections - specifically vote buying
* the private sector - with a focus on the arms and oil sectors, and
* tackling the abuse of office - including reducing conflicts of interest, limiting
recourse to immunity, pursuing extradition and repatriating stolen wealth.
The report also evaluates various mechanisms that can curb corruption in politics,
from citizen action to the creation of new international norms and standards, such as
Transparency International's Standards on Political Finance and Favours (see below).
By focusing on the above topics, the Global Corruption Report addresses particular
weak spots in political life: the abuse of money in the political system by candidates
and political officials; the lack of transparency about money flows in politics; the
potential of the private sector to purchase influence, distorting both the marketplace
and the fair representation of the public interest; the corruption of the electoral process;
and the ways the legal system can affect the ability of states to pursue justice in major
corruption crimes.
Political corruption 12
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We chose these areas for a number of reasons. First, the prominence we give to
political finance (whether campaign finance or political party finance) reflects the
fact that often political corruption starts here, with financing. There is a great deal of
concern about the cost of elections in both new and established democracies as well
Introduction 13
Box 1.1: Where did the money go?
Table 1.1 illustrates the scale of the problem of alleged political corruption through
estimates of the funds allegedly embezzled by some of the most notorious leaders of the
last 20 years. To put the figures in context, the right-hand column gives the GDP per capita
of each country.
The 10 leaders in the table are not necessarily the 10 most corrupt leaders of the period
and the estimates of funds allegedly embezzled are extremely approximate. The table is
drawn from respected and widely available sources. In general, very little is known about
the amounts allegedly embezzled by many leaders.
Table 1.1
Head of Estimates of funds GDP per
government allegedly embezzled capita
(2001)
Mohamed Suharto President of Indonesia, 1967-98 US $ 15 to 35 billion US $ 695
Ferdinand Marcos President of Philippines, 1972-86 US $ 5 to 10 billion US $ 912
Mobutu Sese Seko President of Zaire, 1965-97 US $ 5 billion US $ 99
Sani Abacha President of Nigeria, 1993-98 US $ 2 to 5 billion US $ 319
Slobodan Milosevic President of Serbia/Yugoslavia,
1989-2000 US $ 1 billion n/a
Jean-Claude Duvalier President of Haiti, 1971-86 US $ 300 to 800 million US $ 460
Alberto Fujimori President of Peru, 1990-2000 US $ 600 million US $ 2,051
Pavlo Lazarenko Prime Minister of Ukraine, 1996-97 US $ 114 to 200 million US $ 766
Arnoldo Alem?n President of Nicaragua, 1997-2002 US $ 100 million US $ 490
Joseph Estrada President of Philippines, 1998-2001 US $ 78 to 80 million US $ 912
Sources:
GDP figures: UN Human Development Report 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); IMF Country Report
No. 02/269 (2002).
Suharto: Time Asia, 24 May 1999; Inter Press, 24 June 2003.
Marcos: CNN, February 1998; Time Asia, 24 May 1999; UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Anti-Corruption
Toolkit, version 5, available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption_toolkit.html
Mobutu: UN General Assembly, `Global Study on the Transfer of Funds of Illicit Origin, Especially Funds Derived
from Acts of Corruption', November 2002; Time Asia, 24 May 1999.
Abacha: UNODC, Anti-Corruption Toolkit; BBC News (Britain), 4 September 2000; see also `Repatriation of looted
state assets', Chapter 6, page 100.
Milosevic: Associated Press, 2 December 2000.
Duvalier: Robert Heinl, Nancy Heinl and Michael Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People 1492-1995
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1996); Time Asia, 24 May 1999; UNODC, Anti-Corruption Toolkit; L'Humanit?
(France), 11 May 1999.
Fujimori: Office of the Special State Attorney for the Montesinos/Fujimori case, Peru.
Lazarenko: Financial Times (Britain), 14 May 2003; Chicago Tribune (United States), 9 June 2003.
Alem?n: BBC News (Britain), 10 September 2002.
Estrada: CNN, 22 April 2001; Inter Press, 24 June 2003.
TI 02 chap01 7/1/04 11:39 Page 13
as about the influence of private money on political outcomes and the lack of public
information on the real sources of political funding.
In looking at corrupt forms of political finance, we demystify the topic (see Table
2.1, `Major types of political finance-related corruption', page 20) and expose the legal
and systemic obstacles to cleaning up political finance. Our report presents the pros
and cons of bans, limits, disclosure rules and public funding as remedies to corruption
in political finance - and provides evidence from a number of countries where these
measures are in place.
We then feature one remedy to corrupt political finance - disclosure - that is central
to the philosophy and approach of Transparency International. Disclosure of the flow
of money in politics, whether financing parties or candidates or spent on elections or
on public contracting, is critical. Political finance needs to be accounted for and, above
all, clean. There is very little justification for anything but maximum transparency
about political funds. This emphasis on disclosure tends to be a point of consensus for
politicians and activists alike. Yet the reality of disclosure rules, and their enforcement,
tells a different story - one in which there are numerous ways to limit disclosure.
Enforcement is the linchpin of a successful political finance regime: even the best
laws are valuable only if they are enforced. In nearly every country, enforcement has
proved perhaps the most difficult element to realise in a framework designed to stop
political corruption. Effective enforcement requires appropriate powers of investigation
on the part of the agencies involved, an independent and competent judiciary as well
as the necessary political will. We include reports that look at enforcement in practice,
via various types of sanctions, providing a sense of what works and why.
In addition to evaluating rules for candidates, parties and governments, we also assess
what role the private sector plays in political corruption. We feature experts on the
arms and oil sectors who evaluate recent revelations of political corruption with an eye
to what made corruption possible. We endeavour to analyse current reforms of business
practices, particularly those pursued as a result of civil society efforts.
Political corruption is not limited to political finance. We use this special section
to consider a form of political corruption that affects the election process the world
over: vote buying. Our contributors assess why and how vote buying occurs and how
it changes not only elections and their outcomes, but also the relationship between
elected officials and voters. As a number of other institutions are dedicated to the
assessment of practices such as the rigging of ballots, we decided to focus on vote
buying, a corrupt political practice that has received less systematic analysis.4
To complete this special section, we sought to capture how justice is often difficult
to pursue. Contributors reflect on the use (and abuse) of immunity and laws on conflict
of interest, obstacles to repatriation and the cumbersome process of returning stolen
public assets. In all of the above, contributions focus on the legal hurdles faced by
prosecutors and populations in many alleged crimes of political corruption. They also
detail the way forces of change are emerging at both the international and national levels.
Throughout the section on political corruption, we feature Transparency
International's 2003 Integrity Awards winners. Many of these individuals - some of whom
paid for their integrity with their lives - demonstrate that it is possible to fight the system,
Political corruption 14
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to stand up to political corruption and to demand an end to the damage it causes to
all people.
`Corruption. Moral decay. Political parties. Opportunism.'
Rac, Panama
Transparency International: shining a spotlight on political corruption
Political corruption can elicit a number of responses. One is voter apathy, accompanied
by public disillusionment with democracy and its capacity to limit corruption. Another
response, the one we at Transparency International aim to capture in our report, is
the ignition of citizen action - and, in some cases, positive government and private
sector measures.
How can society address the issue of political corruption? One answer, which builds
on an idea presented in the Global Corruption Report 2001, is to set standards of probity
in political finance.5 This volume introduces Transparency International's own Standards
on Political Finance and Favours (see Box 1.2, page 16), which can serve as benchmarks
for policy-makers and activists, to be adapted to national (or local) settings. They provide
a normative framework. TI's Standards go further than many of those currently available,
as they include civil society's critical role in monitoring political transparency.6
Political leaders, elected by the public and vested with the power to shape public
life, owe it to citizens to set better standards regarding their use of money, and their
conduct, both in and out of office.
Transparency International will continue to speak out against political corruption
- and will remain resolute in its commitment to greater transparency in the political
process. TI's Standards on Political Finance and Favours are one aspect of our global
advocacy efforts, which also include the following aims:
* The ratification and enforcement of the UN Convention against Corruption.
TI will monitor the ratification and enforcement of the convention, encouraging each
signatory to adopt and apply national legislation that complies with the convention.
The convention requires ratification by 30 countries before coming into effect.
Introduction 15
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Political corruption 16
Box 1.2: Transparency International's Standards on Political Finance and Favours
The TI Standards on Political Finance and Favours are based on the values of integrity, equity,
transparency and accountability. They arise out of concern about the influence of money and
favours in politics, which undermines democratic processes and the rule of law. They are
presented against the background of an international commitment to countering corruption
expressed in the UN Convention against Corruption, at this writing due to be adopted in
December 2003, and they are anchored in the global recognition of human rights endorsed
in the Universal Declaration and related conventions.
1. Curbing influence peddling and conflicts of interest
Donations to political parties, candidates and elected officials should not be a means
to gain personal or policy favours or buy access to politicians or civil servants. Parties
and candidates must themselves practise transparency and demonstrate commitment
to ethical standards in public life. Governments must implement adequate conflict of
interest legislation, including laws that regulate the circumstances under which an
elected official may hold a position in the private sector or a state-owned company.
2. Transparency through disclosure and publication
Political parties, candidates and politicians should disclose assets, income and
expenditure to an independent agency. Such information should be presented in a
timely fashion, on an annual basis, but particularly before and after elections. It should
list donors and the amount of their donations, including in-kind contributions and
loans, and should also list destinations of expenditure. The information should, subject
to consideration of demonstrable security risks to donors or recipients, be made
publicly available in a timely manner so that the public can take account of it prior to
elections.
Furthermore, publicly held companies should be required to list all donations to
political parties in any country in their annual reports to shareholders and consideration
should be given to requiring shareholder approval for such donations.
3. Effectiveness in the enforcement and supervision of regulatory measures
Public oversight bodies must effectively supervise the observance of regulatory laws
and measures. To this end, they must be endowed with the necessary resources, skills,
independence and powers of investigation. Together with independent courts, they
must ensure that offenders be held accountable and that they be duly sanctioned.
The funding of political parties with illegal sources should be criminalised.
4. Diversity of income and spending limits
Careful consideration should be given to the benefits of state funding of parties and
candidates and to the encouragement of citizens' participation through small donations
and membership fees. Consideration should also be given to limiting corporate and
foreign support, as well as large individual donations.
To control the demand for political financing, mechanisms such as spending limits
and subsidised access to the media should be considered.

TI 02 chap01 7/1/04 11:39 Page 16
TI is particularly concerned that the convention's provisions on asset recovery be
realised. Stolen wealth must be returned to its rightful owners. This aim dovetails with
TI's campaign to trace laundered money, launched at Nyanga in March 2001.7
In addition to setting standards for its signatories to stop bribery, the UN itself must
be vigilant, targeting unfair practices (such as vote buying) within the UN system.
* The strengthening of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
Not only must the Anti-Bribery Convention be better enforced, but it must also be
amended to include a ban on bribery of foreign political parties and their officials (see
`Will the OECD Convention stop foreign bribery?', Chapter 7, page 128).
* The establishment of political corruption on the donor agenda.
International financial institutions and bilateral donor agencies must consider more
carefully political corruption in countries to which they lend or grant money, yet
establish sensitive evaluation criteria regarding corruption levels (see `Governance,
corruption and the Millennium Challenge Account', Chapter 7, page 135). Recipients
of international aid need incentives to improve their records on transparency and
enforcement of political finance rules, conflict of interest legislation and the granting
of immunity.
* The enhancement of legislation at the national level on political funding, disclosure
and conflict of interest, and the strengthening of institutions in the area of enforcement.
TI will promote better legislation as well as its enforcement at both national and
international levels, in the hope that stonger and more comprehensive legal regimes
against political corruption will have a direct impact on the achievement of justice.
Transparency International demands that civil society actors around the world be
Introduction 17
5. Fairness and integrity in access to the media
Candidates and parties should have fair access to the media. Standards for achieving
balanced media coverage and media integrity must be established, applied and
maintained. The media should play an independent and critical role, both in election
campaigns and in the broader political process. Instruments such as conflict of interest
legislation should be used to prevent political control of public and private media
from creating a bias in the coverage of politics.
6. Civil society participation
Civil society should actively participate in promoting adequate legislation in the field
of political finance and in the monitoring of political finance and its impact on political
representation. The legal framework, both regulatory and institutional, must enable
civil society organisations, in conjunction with independent media, to undertake such
activities. This framework should also provide access to information, the opportunity
for civil society input on pending legislation, and legal remedies, among other measures.
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