Blog Tools
Edit your Blog
Build a Blog
RSS Feed
View Profile
« March 2004 »
S M T W T F S
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
28 29 30 31
You are not logged in. Log in
Entries by Topic
All topics  «
BULLETIN
Saturday, 13 March 2004


>> WISE WOMEN CONTINUED...
Curing the 'Dark Side' of Globalization
http://www.npr.org/rundowns/segment.php?wfId=1765082
?
from All Things Considered, Saturday , March 13, 2004
NPR's John Ydstie talks to economist Catherine Mann about her proposals to remedy the dark side of globalization.




>> KIM JONG-IL ENDORSEMENT CONTINUED...

Kerry endorses longstanding North Korean demand to cut Seoul out of direct U.S. talks
Special to World Tribune.com
EAST-ASIA-INTEL.COM
Tuesday, March 9, 2004
Democratic presidential hopeful Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., at a town meeting in Houston on March 6.
U.S. Democratic Party presidential candidate John Kerry appears well on the way to winning the North Korean vote.
The Pyongyang media quoted Kerry as criticizing what North Korea sees as the "hard-line" policy of President Bush.
The reports have focused on Kerry's call for bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. - something the North had demanded for decades before agreeing last year to multilateral talks that gave South Korea a place at the table along with China, Japan and Russia.
The North Korean media have also quoted Kerry as criticizing Bush's policy on Iraq. North Korea strongly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, apparently seeing a precedent there for a preemptive strike against the North's nuclear facilities. Bush in January 2002 included Iraq and North Korea in the same "axis of evil," along with Iran.
The North Korean reports on Kerry have been brief and factual. That's seen as proof that North Korean leaders place a certain confidence in Kerry reflecting the good will engendered by the Clinton administration. Clinton's secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, visited North Korea in late 2000 and Clinton was considering a visit to the North his administration ended in January 2001.
North Korean rhetoric has regularly castigated Bush, denouncing him as a "charlatan" and worse.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


European intelligence: Al Qaida sleepers planned attack
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Friday, March 12, 2004
LONDON -- Western intelligence sources believe Al Qaida employed insurgents from North Africa for the train bombings in Spain that killed about 200 people.
The sources said Spanish and other European intelligence and security agencies believe that sleeper cells established by Al Qaida-aligned groups helped designate the targets and provide logistics and safe haven for operatives who detonated 10 backpack bombs aboard commuter trains in Madrid on Thursday. The cells were established by organizations that stem from Algeria and Morocco and employed local insurgency operatives, including Basque separatists.
"These attacks were the result of years of liasion and planning between North African groups aligned with Al Qaida and Basque separatists and other local terrorist operatives," a European intelligence source said. "Everybody knew a major attack was coming, but nobody expected it to be this lethal."
On Thursday, an Al Qaida cell, called "Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades," asserted that the bombings in Madrid constituted an Islamic attack against U.S. allies in Europe, Middle East Newsline reported. The letter termed the strikes "Operation Death Trains."
The North African groups believed to have been involved in the Madrid attacks include the Salafist Jihadiya in Morocco and the Salafist Brigade for Combat and Call in Algeria. Salafist Jihadiya was said to have been contracted by Al Qaida for the May 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca in which 44 people were killed. Algeria's Salafist Brigade has been regarded as the chief subcontractor for Al Qaida in Europe and North Africa.
"We have succeeded in infiltrating the heart of crusader Europe and struck one of the bases of the crusader alliance," the letter, sent to the London-based Al Quds Al Arabi daily, said. "This is part of settling old accounts with Spain, the crusader, and America's ally in its war against Islam. Where is America, O [Spain's prime minister] Aznar? Who is going to protect you, Britain, Japan, Italy and other collaborators from us?"
The Abu Hafs group is named after a late Al Qaida commander. Abu Hafs is a pseudonym of Mohammed Atef, a relative by marriage to Osama Bin Laden and killed in a U.S missile strike in 2001.
"We bring good news to Muslims of the world that the expected 'Winds of Black Death' strike against America is now in its final stage," the letter said.
The Abu Hafs Brigades claimed responsibility for the November 2003 suicide bombings of two synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey and the August bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad. Abu Hafs also claimed responsibility for Monday's suicide bombing of a Masonic Lodge in Istanbul.
At first, the Spanish government attributed the explosions to ETA, a Basque separatist group. But on late Thursday Spanish Interior Minister Angel Acebes appeared to confirm the assessment of Western intelligence agencies that Al Qaida was involved in the blasts.
Acebes said a van found near the scene of the bombings contained seven detonators and an Arabic tape with verses from the Koran. "I have just given instructions to the security forces not to rule out any line of investigation," Acebes said.
Intelligence sources said most Western agencies regard Abu Hafs as a fictitious group used by Al Qaida in its psychological warfare campaign against the West. They said Abu Hafs has been used by Al Qaida in attacks coordinated with local insurgency cells.
Spain, which broke up an Islamic insurgency network linked to the Al Qaida strikes against the United States in 2001, has been a target of Osama Bin Laden since last year, apparently because of Madrid's participation in the U.S.-led military coalition in Iraq, the sources said. A Bin Laden message on Oct. 18, 2003 cited Spain as a target along with Australia, Britain, Italy, Japan and Poland.
U.S. intelligence analysts dismissed the prospect that ETA was behind the Madrid bombings. They said ETA appeared to lack the capability and motivation for such an attack, but added that an emerging young leadership was believed to be forming links with Islamic insurgency groups aligned with Al Qaida.
"Neither ETA nor Grapo [another Spanish insurgency group] maintains the degree of operational capability it once enjoyed," the State Department said in its annual report on terrorism released in 2004. "The overall level of terrorist activity is considerably less than in the past, and the trend appears to be downward."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

FBI hid Oklahoma bombing files, court told
Judge reviews allegations of tainted jurors
The Associated Press
March 11, 2004
Terry Nichols, serving time on federal charges in the Oklahoma City bombing, also faces state charges.
CREDIT: Associated Press
Terry Nichols' attorneys say more than a dozen FBI documents that raise the possibility of additional accomplices in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing weren't turned over by state prosecutors or the federal government for Nichols' murder trial defence.
The documents, cited in a recent series of Associated Press stories, include two 1990s teletypes from then-FBI director Louis Freeh's office citing possible connections between Timothy McVeigh and a gang of white supremacist bank robbers, the lawyers said.
Nichols, in federal prison, began trial this month on Oklahoma state murder charges alleging he assisted McVeigh in building the deadly bomb.
The judge has said he will dismiss the charges with prejudice -- making it very hard for prosecutors to resurrect the case -- if Nichols' lawyers can prove documents that could have aided their defence were withheld.
Under a Supreme Court ruling, prosecutors and the government are obligated to turn over to defence lawyers all materials that could help clear a defendant, such as evidence that points to other suspects or casts doubt on prosecution witnesses.
Nichols' attorneys agreed to review the materials cited in the AP story and identify which they could not find among the massive files prosecutors and the government provided them. In all, they identified 13 FBI documents and a handful of other materials.
"To our knowledge, we have not received these documents from the state or federal government," lead attorney Brian Hermanson said Wednesday.
In addition, the lawyers said they did not receive any information from prosecutors concerning the FBI's unsuccessful efforts to get permission to interview McVeigh in 2001 to resolve lingering questions before his execution.
The prosecutor, Oklahoma County District Attorney Wes Lane, said, "Everything the federal government has provided to us has either been given or made available to the Nichols' defence team."
Nichols, 48, is serving a life prison sentence for the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building that killed 168 people.
The eighth day of jury selection in Nichols' trial began Wednesday amid revelations that some prospective jurors said they would lie to be selected to possibly convict and sentence the bombing conspirator.
Judge Steven Taylor said a new line of questioning will be developed to address allegations by one prospective juror that others were willing to lie to get on the jury. "I'm going to deal with this," Taylor said.
The issue was revealed as the prospective juror said she overheard other possible panelists say they would say anything to get on the jury. The woman was retained on the panel.
"I'll do whatever it takes to get up there," she paraphrased one of them as saying. "I'm going to say what I can to get on the jury. My decision is already made."
? The Calgary Herald 2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. sees 'historic potential' in PM's disengagement plan
By Aluf Benn and Mazal Mualem
The U.S. government believes that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan poses risks, but has "historic potential." Top-level consultations last week with President George Bush culminated in a decision to support Sharon's plan as much as possible, pending clarification of details with Israeli officials.
The U.S. administration believes it is important that any pullout from the Gaza Strip, and also perhaps from parts of the West Bank, not be perceived as a concession to terror.
Visiting Israel in recent days, U.S. envoys Steve Hadley, Elliott Abrams and William Burns emphasized that an Israeli withdrawal should implement "Bush's vision" and the road map, which calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The envoys also clarified that Washington views the disengagement proposal as an Israeli plan; the Bush administration, they said, will not dictate to Israel details regarding the scope of the pullout or the settlements to be evacuated. Washington will decide how to respond based on the policies Israel puts into action, the three envoys said. The nature of American support will be determined when Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Bush meet, which is planned for March 31 or April 1.
The Bush administration wants to add to the ceremony of Sharon's visit, unlike earlier ones. One of the possibilities being considered is inviting Sharon to the presidential retreat at Camp David.
Sharon's bureau chief, Dov Weisglass will leave for Washington at the start of next week, for another round of preparatory talks with U.S. officials. These contacts should finalize Sharon's visit, Israeli sources said this weekend. Weisglass and U.S. officials will work on drafts of a statement to be issued at the end of Sharon's visit, which will outline assistance to be furnished by the U.S. in exchange for Israeli withdrawal.
The three U.S. envoys met in Israel with Sharon, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom and Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The meetings focused on whether an Israeli pullout from the Gaza Strip is to be supplemented by dismantling settlements on the West Bank.
Sharon was originally inclined toward a relatively large-scale withdrawal from West Bank settlements, but in the face of strong opposition from Likud colleagues, he is now considering a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip alone.
Sharon decided Saturday to postpone a meeting scheduled for tomorrow with Likud ministers about the disengagement plan. His spokesmen said this was necessary because some Likud ministers are overseas; but sources said last night that postponement reflects Sharon's concern about mounting opposition in the Likud to disengagement.
Of 13 Likud ministers in the government, three (other than Sharon) are certain supporters of the plan: Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Minister of Industry and Trade Ehud Olmert and Minister Gideon Ezra. The Likud ministers known to oppose the plan are Uzi Landau, Yisrael Katz and Tzachi Hanegbi.
Netanyahu met with the envoys at Sharon's request, and told them that the Gaza Strip must not become a base for Hamas or Al-Qaida terror groups and asked the envoys about security and diplomatic guarantees. Bush, said the envoys, has devised a policy of beating terror, and not surrendering to it; this rule applies to the Gaza Strip, just as it applies to every part of the world, the envoys insisted.
The U.S. envoys wondered whether an Israeli withdrawal would calm events on the ground, comparing a pullout with the Israel Defense Forces withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Netanyahu objected to the comparison, saying that conditions are different in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
After their meeting, Netanyahu released a statement saying "the [disengagement] plan which is being considered is complex and problematic;" Netanyahu indicated in the statement that the nature and scope of guarantees and assistance to be provided by the U.S. remain unclear.
Meeting with American officials last Thursday, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz emphasized that differences that separate the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The security model to be followed regarding Gaza is simple, since the region is surrounded by a fence, Mofaz said. On the West Bank, events are more complicated, Mofaz said, and the timetable must be different, due to the need to complete the separation fence.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Posted by maximpost at 11:46 PM EST
Permalink



The mother of parliamentary rows
Mar 9th 2004
From The Economist Global Agenda
In Britain's biggest constitutional tussle for decades, the unelected House of Lords has sabotaged Tony Blair's bill to give Britain a proper supreme court and an independent body to select judges
Get article background
BRITAIN has long been an anomaly among the developed nations. It is one of the world's oldest and most exemplary democracies, yet it has no formal constitution and has an unelected head of state who simply inherited the job from her dad. Britain's courts are widely admired around the world, yet the country lacks the separation of powers evident in most countries with a rule of law. The head of the judiciary, the Lord Chancellor, also serves in the executive as a cabinet minister while moonlighting in the legislature as speaker of its upper chamber, the House of Lords (the majority of whose members, until recently, inherited their seats). In the Lords, a committee of legislators, known as the "law lords", doubles up as Britain's court of final appeal.
Since becoming prime minister in 1997, Tony Blair has been making mostly well-intentioned but usually ham-fisted attempts to modernise Britain's creaking constitutional arrangements. His latest proposal--a Constitutional Reform Bill, to abolish the Lord Chancellor's job and create a separate supreme court and an independent body to recruit judges--resulted in another fiasco on Monday March 8th. The Lords voted to delay the bill by sending it to a committee for detailed consideration, making it unlikely to pass before the next election. A furious Mr Blair, who had warned that he would not be held "hostage" by the unelected upper house, may now ram the measure through using the Parliament Act. This law was passed during a constitutional tussle almost a century ago, to stop the Lords frustrating the will of the elected House of Commons. It has only been used three times in the past 50 years. If he invokes it now, Mr Blair could simply pass his bill in the Commons (where his Labour Party currently has a big majority) and it would become law without the Lords' consent.
To try to get the bill through, the current (and probably the last) Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, offered some last-minute concessions to allay worries about how genuinely independent the new body to select judges would be--though it can hardly be less independent than the current system, in which they are chosen by either the Lord Chancellor or the prime minister. However, the opposition Conservatives argued that it was an unnecessary extravagance to set up a separate supreme court, and won the support of enough Lords to force a delay in Mr Blair's proposals. If the prime minister does use the Parliament Act to ram through his reforms, he risks a running battle with the upper house, which could retaliate by delaying much of the government's legislative programme until the next election.
The seeds of the current confusion were sown last June when Mr Blair was forced, by the unexpected resignation of a senior minister, to reshuffle his cabinet. He combined this with an attempt to abolish the Lord Chancellor's job and make other constitutional changes. This caused ructions because he had failed to consult other political parties--or, in fact, anyone outside his close circle. On finding that he could not get rid of the Lord Chancellor without passing a law, he backtracked.
Britons seem to have a congenital fear of any changes to their ramshackle constitutional arrangements. But many observers say Mr Blair has made things worse for himself by failing to think through the consequences of the changes he has proposed. Among his earliest ones were the restoration of a parliament in Scotland (after almost three centuries' absence) and a quasi-parliament for Wales. Though these have been modestly successful, the transfer of powers to them, without the creation of an equivalent assembly for England, has led to the undemocratic spectacle of Scottish and Welsh parliamentarians voting at Westminster on matters that only concern England, while English parliamentarians have little say in Scottish and Welsh affairs.
The prime minister's efforts to reform the House of Lords itself have also been erratic. Before taking power, Labour had promised to democratise the Lords, and in 1999 most of the upper house's 750 hereditary peers were expelled. The government then set up a commission to consider the next stage of reform. The commission suggested that the Lords' members be mainly chosen by an independent committee. This proved unpopular, so Mr Blair asked a parliamentary committee to suggest another plan. Last year, no fewer than seven options were put before the House of Commons, which rejected all of them. Mr Blair is now threatening a bill to expel the remaining 92 hereditary peers. Critics say this would leave the upper chamber as predominantly an appointed House of Cronies (though opposition parties get to install some of their cronies too).
One criticism of Mr Blair's proposed supreme court is that, unlike those elsewhere, it will be unable to strike down legislation that offends basic constitutional principles (though the courts already can do so where a law offends the European Convention on Human Rights). Not having a written constitution in the first place makes this tricky. Despite his reforming zeal, Mr Blair is not proposing to end this aberration and give Britain a formal constitution. But many feel that his government's current proposals to limit asylum seekers' rights show why a written constitution, and a supreme court to enforce it, are needed. The government wants to restrict the courts' ability to hear appeals from asylum seekers rejected by the new tribunals that will consider their cases. Seeking to restrict the judiciary's oversight of legal process in this way would be unthinkable if Britain had a supreme court with constitutional backing, like America's.
Iraq's rival factions have now agreed a constitution. Even the quarrelsome Afghans have done so. Surely, say Mr Blair's critics, the time has come for Britain to follow suit. A written guarantee of basic rights, enforced by a truly independent judiciary, and a properly democratic (ie, elected) upper house are, they say, all needed to make Britain the "modern" country that the prime minister promised on coming to power.

Copyright ? 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>>

Roh goes, for now
Mar 12th 2004
From The Economist Global Agenda
South Korea's President Roh Moo-hyun has been forced to step down after being impeached by parliament, ostensibly for breaking election rules ahead of next month's general election. The move has proven extremely divisive and will increase political instability
AP
Parliamentary democracy, Korean-style
Get article background
ROH MOO-HYUN has never commanded the support of South Korea's political establishment. Even after his surprising nomination by the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) for the presidency in 2002, conservative elements in the party itself tried to undermine the former human-rights lawyer. The split in the MDP last September--between a small band of Roh supporters and the majority--left the president without a party. Worse, the opposition, helped by the country's conservative newspapers, has been trying to bring down the president for months. Even so, there was widespread surprise that the opposition managed to secure the required two-thirds majority for an impeachment bill on Friday March 12th. The vote, which Mr Roh's supporters had tried to block by occupying the speaker's podium for two days, produced scenes of chaos in the chamber, with the speaker having to be escorted out under a hail of shoes, nameplates and other improvised missiles. The bill has bitterly divided the country. At worst, it could lead to years of political turmoil.
In the short term, it is not clear if Mr Roh's impeachment will stand. The bill must go to the constitutional court, whose judges must approve it by a two-thirds majority. The court will probably take at least a month, and possibly up to six months, to deliver its verdict--so this may not come until well after the election, due on April 15th. In the meantime, the country will be run by the prime minister, Goh Kun, who is normally a ceremonial figure. The nightmare scenario, in terms of policy paralysis, is that Mr Roh is reinstated to serve the remaining four years of his term but his new party, Uri, fails to make big gains in the election. It currently has 47 seats in the 273-seat parliament.
The transgression that led to the impeachment vote was surprisingly minor. Mr Roh is not accused of Nixonesque lying or Clintonesque sexual peccadilloes. He is guilty simply of pledging to do his utmost to secure votes for Uri in the general election. In South Korea, where the president, even when he has a party, is a public official deemed to be above grubby party politics, this is against the rules. Nevertheless, Mr Roh refused to apologise. He finally relented on Friday morning, just before the vote, but his opponents said it was too late.
Although the opposition has focused on the election-rules violation for the purposes of impeachment, there are bigger worries, particularly corruption. A recent scandal has touched Mr Roh's closest aides, a number of whom are either behind bars or under investigation for accepting illegal donations. But the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) has also been caught out. In December, Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP's leader, admitted that the party had accepted 50 billion won ($42m) in illegal funds from big companies, and turned himself in to state prosecutors. The scale of illegal donations may be much greater for the GNP than for Mr Roh's lot, but it is the president who has suffered most from this scandal.
Campaigning on a platform of rooting out endemic political corruption and infighting, Mr Roh was elected on a wave of optimism. However, he has struggled to build on the goodwill. Some problems, like North Korea's nuclear shenanigans, were outside his control. South Korea's economic troubles, too, were evident before Mr Roh's inauguration in February 2003. The country's growth was already slowing before the SARS virus dampened business activity throughout Asia. The government's economic pump-priming in response to the outbreak has helped to stimulate a recovery, but this has not been entirely painless. The previous government's policy was to underpin economic growth by encouraging consumer spending. But that has left many South Koreans struggling with huge credit-card bills.
What happens next? Some of those protesting outside the parliament on Friday night welcomed the impeachment; others accused the opposition of pre-election opportunism and bemoaned the move as the death of South Korea's youngish democracy. When Mr Roh offered to hold a national referendum on his presidency last autumn, admitting that he himself had lost confidence in his ability to govern, polls showed that more than half of voters would support him. But his popularity rating has since slipped to less than 30%. Whatever effect the current crisis has on the public's view of Mr Roh, he seems to have succeeded in widening, rather than eliminating, the divisions in South Korea's politics.
Copyright ? 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.

---------------------------

It's Korea's Economy, Debt, Stupid: William Pesek Jr. (Update1)
March 12 (Bloomberg) -- Few world leaders would relish running South Korea. Asia's No. 4 economy is grappling with a debt crisis, a tough job market and threats from the North.
And what are elected officials doing to reassure investors? Trying to remove the president.
Lawmakers today voted to impeach President Roh Moo Hyun for alleged election law violations. Roh is suspended for as long as six months as Korea's Constitutional Court considers the case. Prime Minister Goh Kun will be acting president.
It's highly uncertain whether Roh will be removed from office permanently. This is, after all, Korea's first impeachment process. Roh's alleged misdeed is so minor that election officials can't agree on whether he did anything wrong. It's anyone's guess if the court will validate the impeachment vote.
Yet whether Roh survives isn't the point. Such political shenanigans -- and television images of lawmakers scuffling -- sent troublesome signals to investors about the volatile state of Korea's democracy. They also showed the government is too distracted to fix the economy or calm tensions with North Korea.
`Turmoil'
``The impeachment will throw not only the economy but South Korea as a whole into turmoil,'' says Jang Hasung, professor at Korea University and the nation's best-known shareholder activist.
Roh gets some blame, too. Forces trying to remove him say an apology would've cleared up his alleged violation. Roh refused to back down, claiming he did nothing wrong in January when he voiced support for the campaign of a political party. As a civil servant, Roh is supposed to appear neutral.
The lessons from former U.S. President Bill Clinton, another leader who faced removal from office, come to mind. Clinton's 1992 election campaign slogan was ``It's the economy, stupid.'' For Korea, it's not only the economy, but debt, too.
To boost growth after the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, Korea encouraged banks to lend less to companies and more to households. The dark side was that individuals, most with little experience with debt, got in well over their heads.
One in 13 of South Korea's 48 million people is three months or more behind on debt payments. Fast-rising delinquencies are crimping consumer spending, which makes up more than half of Korea's $477 billion economy. Companies borrowing too much caused Korea's meltdown in the late 1990s; now it's consumers imperiling things.
Saving some Borrowers
Among the more striking side effects, bad loans at 19 banks, including Kookmin Bank and Shinhan Financial Group Ltd., owed by households and corporations rose by 3.5 trillion won to 18.6 trillion won in 2003, according to the Financial Supervisory Service.
Now, the government is bailing out at least 400,000 individuals who can't pay their debts to boost an economic growth rate that fell by half last year to about 3 percent. The plan applies to people who borrowed less than 50 million won from at least two lenders. About 1.5 million Koreans meet that criteria.
At a time when Korea needs to hone its global image, it's bizarre to see lawmakers try to impeach Roh. It's also bizarre that Roh wouldn't just apologize.
``Politicians are acting stupid, businessmen are just waiting and seeking which side will be in their own interests and the public is just sick to death about what's going on,'' Jang says.
Politicians need to keep their eyes on the big picture. China's dynamic economy is hogging most of the foreign investment flowing to and around Asia. Korea needs to convince a skeptical world that its economy shouldn't be ignored. It also must reassure investors it's on top of the North Korea issue.
Hostage Economy
While this may be domestic politics gone awry, there's a serious risk of it filtering into Korean markets, which, let's face it, aren't exactly booming. You also have to wonder how all this is playing in Pyongyang. Can North Korea still take the South's government seriously?
``This whole impeachment threat shows how politicians are willing to take the economy hostage for their own survival in the election,'' said Lee Phil Sang, an economics professor at Korea University in Seoul. ``The Korean people don't want to impeach the president they elected one year ago. They want stability and economic prosperity.''
While challenges remain, things are looking up in the economy. Exports grew 46 percent from a year earlier in February, their fastest pace in 15 years. Business confidence reached a 17- month high in February, suggesting companies are becoming more willing to invest.
That Roh's detractors said they wouldn't try to impeach him if he showed remorse makes the whole thing a joke. An action egregious enough to warrant impeachment shouldn't be something the words ``I'm sorry'' can clear up. And it's quite a coincidence that all this comes a month before parliamentary elections.
Voters know that and polls show a majority of them are against impeachment. The average Korean would prefer that the government focus on raising living standards and keeping North Korea's nuclear missiles in their silos.
The same is true of investors, many of whom may now have yet another reason to avoid Korea.
To contact the writer of this column:
William Pesek Jr. in Seoul, or wpesek@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editor of this column:
Bill Ahearn in New York, or bahaearn@bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: March 12, 2004 01:20 EST
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korea

Through a glass, darkly

Mar 11th 2004 | PYONGYANG AND PUKCHANG
From The Economist print edition
So far as a visitor can tell in this secretive land, North Korea's economic reforms are starting to bite. But real progress will require better relations with the outside
Get article background
COMMUNIST North Korea has started to experiment with economic reform, and opened its door a crack to the outside world. Though its culture of secrecy and suspicion stubbornly persists, it was deemed acceptable for your correspondent to visit Pyongyang's Tongil market last week. Here, stalls are bursting with plump vegetables and groaning with stacks of fresh meat. You can even buy imported pineapples and bananas from enthusiastic private traders.
But how about a photograph? Most foreigners think of North Korea as a famished nation, and the authorities are evidently keen these days to tell the world about the great strides their economy has made since reforms were introduced in July 2002. Logic might seem to suggest that a snap showing the palpable result of the reforms would be acceptable too. But it is not. The officials were friendly but firm: no pictures of fat carrots.
The July 2002 reforms were ground-breaking for North Korea: the first real step away from central planning since the dawn of communism there in 1945. The government announced that subsidies to state-owned enterprises were to be withdrawn, workers would be paid according to how much they produced, farmers' markets, hitherto tolerated, would become legal and state enterprises would be allowed to sell manufactured products in markets. Most of these enterprises, unless they produced "strategic items", were to get real autonomy from state control.
Almost two years on, how to assess the success or failure of these reforms? That climate of secrecy makes it deeply frustrating. Even the simplest of statistics is unavailable. Li Gi Song, a senior economist at Pyongyang's Academy of Sciences, says he does not know the rate of inflation. Or maybe he is not telling. After all, he says, "We can't publish all the figures because we don't want to appear bare before the United States. If we are bare then they will attack us, like Afghanistan or Iraq." So what follows can be little more than a series of impressions.
The indications are that the reforms are having a big impact. For a start, North Korea has recently acquired its first advertisement (pictured above)--for foreign cars, assembled locally by a South Korean majority-owned company. Or, to be more basic, take the price of rice, North Korea's staple. Before the reforms, the state bought rice from state farms and co-operatives at 82 chon per kilo (100 chon make one won, worth less than a cent at the official exchange rate). It then resold it to the public through the country's rationing system at eight chon. Now, explains Mr Li, the state buys at 42 won and resells at 46 won.
North Korea's rationing system is called the Public Distribution System (PDS). Every month people are entitled to buy a certain amount of rice or other available staples at the protected price. Thus most North Koreans get 300g (9oz) of rice a day, at 46 won a kilo. According to the UN's World Food Programme (WFP), that is not nearly enough. Anything extra has to be bought in the market.
In theory, even in the market the price of staples is limited. Last week, the maximum permitted rice price was marked on a board at the entrance to Tongil as 240 won per kilo. In fact, it was selling for 250. WFP officials say that in January it was selling for 145 won, which points to significant inflation, for rice at least. This is not necessarily a bad thing, since it means that the price is coming into line with the market.
The won's international value is also adjusting. Since December 2002, the euro has been North Korea's official currency for all foreign transactions. In North Korean banks, one euro buys 171 won. In fact, this rate is purely nominal. A semi-official rate now exists and the price of imports in shops is calculated using this.
Last October, according to foreign diplomats, a euro bought 1,030 won at the semi-official rate. Last week it was 1,400. A black market also exists, in which the euro is reported to be fetching 1,600 won--which implies that the won is approaching its market level. It also means, however, that imported goods have seen a big price-hike. For domestically-produced goods, like rice, prices may well go on rising for a good while longer.
What about earnings? Before the 2002 reforms, most salaries lay in the range of 150-200 won per month. Rent and utilities, though, were virtually free, as were (and are) education and health care. Food, via the PDS, was virtually given away. Now, pay is supposed to be linked to output, though becoming more productive is not easy for desk-bound civil servants or workers in factories that have no power, raw materials or markets.
Rents and utilities have gone up, though not by crippling amounts. A two-bedroom flat in Pyongyang including electricity, water and heat costs just 150 won a month--that is, about a tenth of a euro.
Earnings have gone up much more: a waitress in a Pyongyang restaurant earns about 2,200 won a month. A mid-ranking government official earns 2,700. A worker at a state farm earns in the region of 1,700, a kindergarten teacher the same, and a pensioner gets between 700 and 1,500. A seamstress in a successful factory with export contracts can earn as much as 5,000 won a month. Since that seamstress's pay equates to barely three euros a month, wages still have a long way to adjust.
The prices of food and other necessities, to say nothing of luxuries, has gone up much more than rent has. According to the WFP, some 70% of the households it has interviewed are dependent on their 300 gram PDS ration, and the WFP itself is targeting 6.5m vulnerable people out of a total population of some 23m. Not all suffer equally: civil servants in Pyongyang get double food rations from the PDS.
There are some encouraging stories. In Pukchang, a small industrial town 70km (40 miles) north-east of Pyongyang, Concern, an Irish aid group, has been replacing ancient, leaking and broken-down water pipes and pumps, and modernising the purification system. This has pushed the amount of clean water available per person per day from 80 to 300 litres. Kim Chae Sun is a manager at the filtration plant, which is now more efficient. Before July 2002 she earned 80 won a month. Afterwards she earned 3,000 won. Now she earns 3,500.
As Mrs Kim speaks, three giant chimneys belch smoke from the power station that dominates the town. All workers have been told they can earn more if they work harder, but certain groups have been told they will get even more money than everyone else. In energy-starved North Korea these include miners and power workers. Mrs Kim says her husband, who works in the power plant, earns an average of 12,000 won a month. Her rent has gone up from eight to 102 won a month, and in a year, she thinks, she will be able to buy a television or a fridge.
A lot of people, in fact, are buying televisions. The women who sell the sets from crowded Tongil market-stalls get them from trading companies which they pay after making a sale. The company price for an average set is 72,000 won, the profit just 1,000 won. After they have paid for their pitch, the traders can expect an income of 10,000-12,000 won a month.
Mystery sales
Which makes for a puzzle. Who can afford a good month's salary for a locally made jacket in Tongil, costing 4,500 won? How come so many people are buying televisions, which cost more than two years of a civil-servant's pay? How come the number of cars on the streets of the capital has shot up in the past year? Pyongyang still has vastly less traffic than any other capital city on earth, but there are far more cars around than a year ago. Restaurants, of which there are many, serve good food--but a meal costs the equivalent of at least a white-collar worker's monthly salary. Many of these restaurants are packed.
Foreign money is part of it. Diplomats and aid workers say many new enterprises seem to have opened over the last year. Nominally they are state-owned, but sometimes they have a foreign partner, often an ethnic Korean from Japan. The majority are in the import-export business. Some have invested in restaurants and hotels and some in light industry. Thanks to the 2002 reforms, these firms have a degree of autonomy they could not have dreamed of before. An unknown number of people also receive money from family abroad, but there are still no North Korean-owned private companies.
Oh for a tractor
Farmers are among the other winners: they can sell any surpluses on the open market. But two out of three North Koreans live in towns and cities, and only 18% of the country is suitable for agriculture. The losers include civil servants, especially those outside Pyongyang who do not get double food rations and have no way to increase their productivity.
Factory workers have it the hardest. A large proportion of industry is obsolete. Though Pyongyang has electricity most of the day, much of the rest of the country does not. Despite wild talk of a high-tech revolution, the country is not connected to the internet, though some high-ups do have access to e-mail service. In the east of the country lies a vast rustbelt of collapsing manufacturing plants.
Huge but unknown numbers of workers have been moved into farming, even though every scrap of available land is already being cultivated. The extra workers are needed because there is virtually no power for threshing and harvesting and no diesel for farm vehicles. This requires more work to be done by hand. Ox-carts are a common sight.
The innocent suffer
Markets are everywhere. But this does not mean that there is enough food everywhere. In Pyongyang, where there are better-off people to pay for it, there is an ever-increasing supply. Outside the capital, shortages are widespread.
No one knows how many died during the famine years of 1995-99; estimates range from 200,000 to 3m. In Pukchang, officials say that 5% of children are still weak and malnourished. In Hoichang, east of Pyongyang, schools and institutions tell the WFP that about 10% of children are malnourished. Masood Hyder, the senior UN official in North Korea, says that vulnerable households now spend up to 80% of their income on food.
And yet some things are improving. Two surveys carried out in 1998 and 2002 by the North Korean government together with the WFP and Unicef showed a dramatic improvement in children's health between those years. The proportion of children who fail to reach their proper height because of malnutrition fell from 62% to 39%, and the figures are thought to be still better now. However, Unicef says that though children may no longer die of hunger, they are still dying from diarrhoea and respiratory diseases--which are often a side-effect of malnutrition.
North Korea's 11-year-old victims
To a westerner's eye, a class of 11-year-olds in Hoichang is a shocking sight. At first, your correspondent thought they were seven; the worst-affected look to be only five. Ri Gwan Sun, their teacher, says that apart from being stunted some of them still suffer from the long-term effects of malnutrition. They struggle to keep up in sports and are prone to flu and pneumonia. They are also slower learners.
Pierrette Vu Thi of Unicef says that North Korea's poor international image makes it hard for her agency, the WFP and others to raise all the money they need. The country is in a chronic state of emergency, she says, and to get it back on its feet it would need a reconstruction effort on the scale of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Such bleak talk is echoed by Eigil Sorensen of the World Health Organisation. He says that health services are extremely limited outside the capital. Medicines and equipment are in short supply, large numbers of hospitals no longer have running water or heating and the country has no capacity to handle a major health crisis.
None of this is likely to change very fast. With no end yet to the nuclear stand-off between North Korea and the United States, American and Japanese sanctions will remain in place. And nukes are only part of it. Last week the American State Department said it was likely that North Korea produced and sold heroin and other narcotics abroad as a matter of state policy. North Koreans who have fled claim that up to 200,000 compatriots are in labour camps. North Korea denies it all.
Reform, such as it is, has plainly made life easier for many. But rescuing the North would take large amounts of foreign money, as well as measures more far-reaching than have yet been attempted. At present, there is no way for the government to get what it needs from international financial institutions like the World Bank. Such aid as comes will be strictly humanitarian, and investment in so opaque a country will never be more than tentative. Domestic reform on its own cannot fix an economy wrecked by decades of mismanagement and the collapse of communism almost everywhere else.
Copyright ? 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> ORGANIZED CRIME? WHERE?
Between the Lines / Pyramid dealings

By Hannah Kim
Denials of the existence of organized crime in Israel set a record this week. No, there is no organized crime, but only crime that goes on in the ghetto of "the underworld." Extortion of protection money and illegal gambling - yes. Sending tentacles into politics, the economy and other establishment areas - no.
There is no organized crime in Israel, but the explosive that, according to the police, was set to go off in Ezra (Shuni) Gavrieli's car was discovered after Gavrieli went to Grigori Lerner's office in the Azrieli Towers in Tel Aviv, where he met with Sofa Landver, formerly a Labor Party member of Knesset.
If we are looking for a story that characterizes the attempt to infiltrate organized crime into Israel, the story of Grigori Lerner is a fine example. He was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison in a plea bargain on three attempts to bribe elected officials and civil servants, fraud, five acts of forgery, three false statements on corporate documents, bribing two Bank Hapoalim employees and currency violations.
His arrest by the police in 1997 dragged a parade of politicians to the National Unit for Serious and International Crimes Investigations. Among them were Natan Sharansky (currently Likud Minister without Portfolio) to whose now defunct Yisrael b'Aliyah Party Lerner contributed $100,000; Labor Party MK Shimon Peres, who had promoted the career of Sofa Landver, from being his Russian teacher to being a Knesset member, during which time she knew Lerner; Yuri Stern, who moved from Sharansky's party to (now Transportation Minister) Avigdor Lieberman's party; and Nissim Zvilli of the Labor Party.
Then too, Landver and Stern protested that Lerner was being persecuted because he was an immigrant from Russia; then too, Lieberman attacked the police and the head of the Serious and International Crimes Unit, Moshe Mizrahi.
Lerner tried to make use of his political connections in order to establish a bank in Israel. He tried to set himself up as a candidate for the Knesset, registered at the Ashkelon branch of the Likud and possibly might have succeeded in getting elected to the Knesset had the police not embarked on an open investigation of him.
After the Bank of Israel refused to approve his plan to open a bank in Israel, Lerner opened a bank in Cyprus, a kind of proxy bank, which he ran from a branch of Bank Hapoalim in Israel. In 1997, in a police raid of his offices, a letter was confiscated that Lerner had sent by fax to one of the heads of the Solntsevo syndicate, one of the biggest crime organizations in Russia. In this letter, which was included in the police evidentiary material, the word "pyramid" is used:
"(...) and the main thing, the pyramid, which will start at the Tuku Bank, is stable. Although it will not be easy. It is necessary to work hard and toughly. But I know how to do this. With respect to your decision, report to me successfully because without your cover I will not hold out. My aim is simple: to settle accounts with you for $15 million, to keep $15 million for myself, to enter politics, the Parliament (Knesset), to get my profit from the newspaper and the television channel. All the transactions will be signed by Smolniasky and Haimovitch and also Cypriots. And my hands are clean, and there are no proofs, and if they want to talk nonsense, let them. In Israel everybody talks nonsense about everyone else, and there is no consciousness. Everything is fine; Chernoy [Lerner is referring to Mikhail Chernoy, whom the Prosecutor's Office decided to try on charges of fraud in aggravated circumstances in the Bezeq shares acquisition affair - H.K.] and Luchinsky [Grigori Luchinsky, whose Israeli passport the High Court of Justice and the Interior Ministry refused to renew, and who according to police information is involved in international arms dealing and crime syndicate money laundering - H.K.] and so on. This is the truth; I need the month's delay and your cover."
There you have it, written by the man himself: Lerner's aim was to enter the Knesset and from there to promote and legitimize his businesses. To this man came Shuni Gavrieli, in whose car an explosive charge was found before it blew up.
Lerner, in an interview with the mass circulation daily Yedioth Ahronoth, said that he had been told that "Shuni Gavrieli is a kind of godfather." Gavrieli has denied any connection to illegal activity and Sofa Landver has again said that there is persecution, this time of Gavrieli and not just the immigrants from Russia.
There is no organized crime in Israel. Of course there isn't. It is true that David Appel is accused of bribing the foreign minister at the time, Ariel Sharon (now prime minister), the mayor of Jerusalem at the time, Ehud Olmert (now minister of industry and trade), the mayor of Lod, Benny Regev, and the mayor of Givat Shmuel, Zamir Ben-Ari. It is true that the latter goes around closely accompanied by bodyguards. It is true that Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin and former (Herut) Knesset member Michael Kleiner were employed as legal consultants in one of Appel's companies, and it is true that Likud MK Michael Eitan did business with that same Appel (organizing group tours abroad). And it is also true that in the state prosecutor's report on the Hebron/Bar-On affair Appel was called a "switchboard," for having held conversations with Ronny Bar-On (now Likud MK) and Aryeh Deri about the appointment of the attorney general.
All this is true, but there is no organized crime, there is only "organized criminal activity" by all kinds of Rosensteins.
Zohar Argov's patron
Shuni Gavrieli is an authoritative figure whom everyone obeys. Like Mantsch - Mordechai Tsarfati - the big mediator from the 1960s and '70s, who all in all was responsible for arranging the chairs at Mapai conventions. A kind of conference organizer, whom everyone knew had the final word in the gang wars.
Shuni Gavrieli is not responsible for arranging the chairs at Likud meetings. He organizes meetings of his own, in his club, the former Ariana, today Hatzerot Yaffo. Gavrieli was always the silent brother of the family, whom everyone respected and admired. His name has never been linked to illegal activity. In contrast to his older brother, Reuven, his connections with politicians have been extremely limited - up until about a year ago. Then he decided to run his daughter, Inbal, for Knesset.
Gavrieli was the patron of many Mizrahi (Jews originating in Muslim countries) singers. He tried to wean Zohar Argov from heroin, and frequenters of the Ariana remember well how Argov collapsed during a performance. Gavrieli tended him personally, with devotion. At the Halleluyah club he established near the Ariana, Shimi Tavori, Eli Louson, Aviva Avidan and Boaz Sharabi appeared. This was the period when Mizrahi singers had not yet burst the bounds of the ghetto. Eli Louzon sang "What a Country" in his wonderful tenor voice at a time when Gavrieli was conducting a struggle with the mayor of Tel Aviv at the time, Shlomo Lahat, and the municipal engineering authority.
Those were the days of polarization between North and South Tel Aviv. Shimon Yehoshua was shot dead by a policeman after he tried to stop a municipal bulldozer that was trying to demolish the balcony his family had enclosed, illegally, in its Kfar Shalem home. At the same time, businessman Rafi Unger added one and a half stories without a license to his Pyramid House on Hamasger Street, former Knesset member Avraham Shapira (Agudat Yisrael) converted the car-park at his villa into an office and ritual bath without a permit and Rehavam Ze'evi erected seven illegal buildings at the Land of Israel Museum, with the help of contractor Bezalel Mizrahi. These things were published at the time in the now defunct newspaper Al Hamishmar.
The municipal engineering authority wanted to apply the law in Kfar Shalem and Jaffa and ignored these three cases, which were a representative sample of building violations in the northern part of the city. At the time Gavrieli wanted from the city what Unger and Shapira were given - the opportunity to pay for the building violation and legitimize it. He was answered with an absolute no.
Gavrieli's first encounter with politics was in this context. The patron of Mizrahi singers sought a political patron of his own. He formed an alliance with Rehavam Ze'evi, who was very close to Lahat. Ze'evi mediated between Lahat and Gavrieli and the Ariana was made legitimate and legal. After that Gavrieli helped Ze'evi set up his political party, Moledet, and after Ze'evi was murdered, he turned openly to the area where his brother Reuven had been playing behind the scenes.
Instead of forming ties with politicians, he sent his daughter Inbal, who lacked any background in public activity, to the Knesset. His other daughter, Maya, studied law. Maya became a close legal advisor, Inbal a Knesset member and Gavrieli a real estate entrepreneur.
Gavrieli's position as the proprietor of a leading Mizrahi music club has been taken over by Shlomi Oz, who, in contrast to Shuni Gavrieli, does have a criminal past. Oz began to run the Plaka Club, behind Hamasger Street in Tel Aviv, in proximity to the illegal casino and bingo clubs, which are continuing to operate today as if there were no police. Oz, who maintained silence during his investigation by the police in the Greek island affair, hosted Likud MK Omri Sharon on the evening when David Spector gave his interview to Nissim Mishal's program on Channel 2 television. Omri and Shlomi are good friends. Inbal and Omri are also good friends.
Between the days of the Ariana and the days of the Plaka, the ghetto burst its bounds. It is worthwhile being the friend of a politician, it is worthwhile for the politician to be a friend of the club owner, and it is very worthwhile to be a Knesset member.
At Etti Alon's house
A short while before it became clear how Etti Alon had transferred about a quarter of a billion shekels from the Trade Bank to her brother, the chronic gambler Ofer Maximov, a great deal of material about illegal soccer gambling came into the hands of the Central Unit of the police. Among the other evidence that was gathered by a private investigator who was hired by the Council for Betting Arrangements in Sport there was also testimony by a woman called Etti, who ran a soccer betting station in her home from the beginning of the 1990s until 1995.
Meretz MK Avshalom Vilan, who gave the material to the police, says that only after the affair of the embezzlement at the Trade Bank was made public did he discover that this was Etti Alon, who according to the evidence did what quite a few enterprising citizens of Israel do who run betting shops from their apartments or stores. The prizes are paid by the "bank" which is of course an illegal bank, run by innocuous shell companies that were registered at the end of the 1980s.
Only in recent months have the police also begun to take an interest in illegal soccer betting, which is another flourishing branch of illegal gambling in Israel, turning over about NIS 2 billion annually, according to MK Vilan. "Today there are people sitting in the Knesset who got there thanks to gambling money," he says.
About a year and a half ago, when the police commissioner and the head of Police Intelligence appeared before one of the Knesset committees, they declared that they were certain of one thing: There is no organized crime in Israel, because there has been no infiltration of such crime into politics. This was a strange declaration, in light of what had been discovered in the Grigori Lerner case. Today, there is already recognition of the existence of "organized crime" in Israel, but the existence of crime that sends tentacles into politics, the economy and the law is denied.
This denial creates scenes that never occurred in the past, such as Ariel Sharon's attack on the police, on the day that police investigators raided the office of accountants Goldman and Co., and confiscated papers connected to the offshore Charington, Ltd. company in the Virgin Islands, which according to the suspicions was a straw company that Gilad Sharon and Cyril Kern used at the beginning of 2002 for turning around funds that were supposed to be used to pay back the fine that the State Controller had imposed on Sharon.
If the police have succeeded, on a miserable budget, in capturing the quartet of mercenaries who were brought to Israel from Russia, it is interesting what they would have succeeded in capturing if they had a realistic budget and a focused target. A few months ago Public Security Minister Tzachi Hanegbi was still talking about a budget of approximately a quarter of a billion shekels for this purpose. In the latest budget it turned out that not only had the police not received a single shekel of this, but its budget had been cruelly cut.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Sharon postpones meeting of Likud ministers
By Aluf Benn, Haaretz Correspondent
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon postponed on Saturday a meeting planned for Monday, in which the Likud ministers were to discuss the prime minister's disengagement plan.
The official reason for the postponement was the absence of several of the ministers who are overseas, including Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz.
According to Friday media reports, Sharon was worried of growing opposition to the plan which entails a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of several West Bank settlements.
Sharon, in recent days, has been considering the possibility of reducing the scope of the plan withdrawing only from the Gaza Strip, and at most from a small number of West Bank settlement. The United States and Egypt both insist on a significant withdrawal from the West Bank, so that the move does not appear as a "Gaza only" plan.
Sharon met representatives of the U.S. administration on Thursday, and discussed the details of the disengagement plan and what Israel would receive in exchange. The three envoys also met Foreign Minister Shalom, the prime minister's bureau chief Dov Weisglass, and National Security Advisor Giora Eiland.
Israel is seeking U.S. recognition of West Bank settlement blocs as well as an "exemption" from holding negotiations with the Palestinian leadership until it cracks down on terrorism.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Syrian police said to have killed dozens in clashes
By Yossi Melman, Haaretz Correspondent
Syrian security forces killed dozens of people and injured hundred during violent clashes over the weekend, in the north of the country, according to reports that reached Haaretz on Saturday. According to the reports, by relatives of witnesses, the violence started during a soccer game and later spread to demonstrations throughout the Kurdish regions in the country.
Associated Press reports claim at least nine people were killed, although Kurdish sources state the death toll reaches 80. Kurdish sources also claim their forces killed six Syrian officers and three Syrian police officers in the exchange of fire.
According to the Kurdish sources, on Saturday Kurdish insurgents took over most of the Syrian administration buildings in the northern city of Qamishli, on the Turkish border.
The Kurdish sources added that 29 victims were buried on Saturday at a Qamishli cemetery.
According to the reports, on Friday security forces at the soccer game in Qamishli fired live ammunition at the crowd, killing some 30 people.
Shots were also fired from within the crowd, injuring several Syrian officers, including a colonel.
The protests continued on Saturday, with tens of thousands of people demonstrating in Qamishli, populated mainly by Kurds.
Two local hospitals, one private and one governmental, reported hundreds of injuries. The report also claims protestors burned pictures of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Another report claimed demonstrators in the nearby town of Amuda burned an installation of the Syrian security services.
The local Jihad soccer team, comprised of mostly Arab and Kurd players, was playing the Fituwya group from the city of Dar el-Zur, near the Syrian border with Iraq, when Fituwya fans began calling out "long live Saddam Hussein." The Jihad team responded with "long live Barazani" shouts, referring to one of the Kurdish leaders in Iraq.
Clashes ensued between the two camps inside the stadium, which contained some 5,000 people at the time, and three children were trampled to death during the ruckus.
Following the stadium incident, violent demonstrations spread on Friday to other cities in Syria's Kurdish regions. During the protests, signs and slogans slamming Assad's regime as well as the ruling Ba'ath Party were displayed. A demand was also raised for an international investigation into human rights violations during the incident.
Syrian loyalist forces, accompanied by tanks, were sent to the region, and a curfew was imposed in some areas. Efforts were also being made to calm the situation on Saturday. Syrian opposition groups, especially Kurdish ones operating outside the country, were attempting to raise public awareness to the incident, and were planning to hold demonstrations in various European cities.
Friday's incident represents the most violent wave of protests in Syria in recent memory. They follow U.S. threats to take sanctions against Damascus for its support of terror organizations, coupled with American suspicions that Syria is not do all it can to prevent Saddam loyalists from entering Iraq through its border.
Television images of smoke billowing from buildings in the Syrian town of Qamishli. (Al-Arabiya)


--------------------------------------------------------
U.N. Nuclear Watchdog Condemns Iran
1 hour, 35 minutes ago
By Louis Charbonneau
VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. atomic watchdog condemned Iran on Saturday for withholding sensitive nuclear information, in a resolution that diplomats said left open the option of U.N. sanctions if Tehran did not cooperate.
Reuters Photo
AP Photo
Slideshow: Iran Nuclear Issues
Iran hit back, saying the reason it had suspended U.N. nuclear inspections on Friday was to show its displeasure at the resolution, then in draft form. The inspectors were barred "for the time being," chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rohani said.
"The reason for postponing the inspectors' visit was the approval of this resolution and we wanted to show that we are not satisfied," said Rohani, who had earlier said the document was "like an ugly demon with dangerous horns and sharp teeth."
The resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "deplores" Iran's omissions of key atomic technology from an October declaration, including undeclared research on advanced "P2" centrifuges that can make bomb-grade uranium.
It said the board of governors would decide in June how to respond to the omissions -- a clause that several diplomats said keeps the door open for a possible report to the U.N. Security Council and economic sanctions.
The resolution passed after a week of haggling over a tough text drafted by Australia and Canada and backed by Washington, which says Iran is trying to build atomic weapons. European and non-aligned states, Russia and China wanted milder wording.
A compromise was struck after the U.S.-led camp agreed to soften some language, although U.S. ambassador Kenneth Brill said it remained a strong warning to Tehran.
"This information calls for Iran to provide proactive cooperation instead of having information dragged out of it," he told reporters after the meeting.
Iran says its program is for peaceful purposes only.
"DECEPTION AND DELAY"
In remarks prepared for delivery in the closed-door meeting of the IAEA governing board, Brill said: "Iran...is continuing to pursue a policy of denial, deception and delay."
"Is it possible that, even as we meet, squads of Iranian technicians are working at still undeclared sites to tile over, paint over, bury, burn or cart away incriminating evidence so that those sanitized locations can finally be identified to the agency as new evidence of Iran's full cooperation and transparency?" he asked.
The head of Iran's delegation dismissed the resolution as a result of U.S. "diplomacy of force" and pressure on the IAEA.
"A resolution is being imposed...on the board by a single country," Amir Zamaninia, a senior foreign ministry official, said in remarks prepared for the board meeting that approved the resolution.
Zamaninia told reporters the halt to inspections was partly due to Iran's New Year's holiday beginning next week. "Another part is that this resolution was a bad one, a bad resolution," he said. "We need to work in Tehran to try to digest this."
On a more conciliatory note, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said Washington had been forced to compromise. "We hope that the remaining ambiguities are resolved and the situation becomes normal so that Iran can use this technology for peaceful purposes," he said.
One of the points the U.S.-led camp had insisted on in the resolution was a paragraph detailing the military connection to Iran's nuclear, but the final version left this out -- a victory for the NAM, Russian and Chinese negotiators.
IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei also voiced cautious optimism.
"I am pretty confident that Iran will understand that we need to go within (our) time schedule and that the decision to delay the inspections will be reviewed and reversed in the next few days," he said.
But Brill called the suspension "very troubling" and said he was concerned this could undermine the effectiveness of the checks once the IAEA returned to Iran.
"That speaks volumes about the intentions of this government in Tehran which says it has pledged full cooperation," he said.
(Additional reporting by Francois Murphy in Vienna and Parinoosh Arami in Tehran)





Iran fury over 'US resolution'
VIENNA: In a clear reference to the US, Iran blasted the UN nuclear watchdog yesterday for letting "a single country" impose a resolution against Tehran's nuclear programme.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ended a week-long deadlock yesterday by adopting a US-backed resolution condemning Iran for hiding nuclear activities.
"A resolution is being imposed, and I think I am using the expression with true definition of the word, on the board by a single country," senior foreign ministry official Amir Zamaninia told an IAEA meeting in Vienna, according to a copy of his speech.
Iran imposed yesterday an indefinite freeze on international inspections of its nuclear facilities in protest against a critical resolution passed by the IAEA.
Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, described the IAEA resolution as "unfair and deceitful." Hours earlier, a meeting of the UN agency in Vienna had censured Iran for hiding suspect activities, but praised it for increased nuclear openness.
A senior Western diplomat said the compromise text worked out after non-aligned states sought to soften the resolution was "still an important signal for the Iranians to continue and intensify cooperation" with the IAEA. But Zamaninia said the resolution was "a serious setback" as it portrayed" a rather benign progressive situation as a condition of high alert." He said IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei has already reported "the positive trend of active co-operation by Iran and also a process of resolving issues that is gaining pace exponentially".
The resolution that was adopted came a day after Iran had put off a UN inspection mission until the end of April in what one diplomat close to the IAEA described as "potentially a large problem in the verification process."
But Iranian ambassador to the IAEA Pirooz Hosseini said yesterday that IAEA inspectors could in fact visit Iran earlier than the end of next month.
Hosseini said his country had put back the inspection mission, scheduled to start this week, "due to the approach of the Iranian New Year" but that if people were back in their offices soon after the holiday, which starts next week, then IAEA inspectors could come.
The IAEA, which verifies the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has since February 2003 been working to determine whether Iran's nuclear programme is peaceful, or devoted to secretly developing atomic weapons, as the United States has charged.
"Today IAEA inspectors were expected to arrive in Iran," Rowhani said. "We will not allow them to come until Iran sets a new date for their visit. This is a protest by Iran in reaction to the resolution."
Asked whether the freeze was indefinite, Rowhani said "yes."
ElBaradei said he was confident Iran would reverse a decision to temporarily suspend inspections of its suspect nuclear facilities.




Iran freezes int'l inspections of nuclear facilities
By The Agencies
TEHRAN - Iran imposed Saturday an indefinite freeze on international inspections of its nuclear facilities in protest against a critical resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, described the IAEA resolution as "unfair and deceitful."
Hours earlier, a meeting of the UN agency in Vienna had censured Iran for hiding suspect activities, but praised it for increased nuclear openness.
The head of the UN nuclear watchdog agency said on Saturday he believed Iran would reverse its decision to halt UN inspections of its atomic sites
"I am pretty confident that Iran will understand that we need to go within [our] time schedule and that the decision to delay the inspections will be reviewed and reversed in the next few days," International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] chief Mohamed ElBaradei said.
The resolution welcomed Iran's agree to open its facilities to pervasive inspection, but said it "deplores" recent discoveries of uranium enrichment equipment and other suspicious activities that Iran had failed to reveal.
"Today IAEA inspectors were expected to arrive in Iran," Rowhani told a press conference in Tehran. "We will not allow them to come until Iran sets a new date for their visit. This is a protest by Iran in reaction to the passage of the resolution."
Asked whether the freeze was indefinite, Rowhani said "yes."
Under an agreement that Iran signed last year, and which the IAEA resolution welcomed, IAEA inspectors are empowered to inspect Iran's all nuclear facilities at any time and without notice.
Rowhani, who chairs the Supreme National Security Council, made clear this dispensation had been suspended. Asked when IAEA inspectors might visit again, he replied: "It could be less than six weeks. It could be more than six weeks. we have not set a date."
He accused the IAEA board of governors of passing a resolution that failed to take account of Iran's behavior toward the UN agency.
"Iran's comprehensive cooperation with the IAEA has not been properly reflected in the resolution, and there is a big gap between realities on the ground and what is said in the resolution. Unfortunately, the views of nonaligned countries, as well as China and Russia, have not been taken into consideration," Rowhani said.
Nonaligned members of the IAEA are known to have tried to tone down the language of the resolution. Western powers, foremost the United States, wanted to send a strong warning to Iran.
The United States suspects Iran is undertaking a secret program to build nuclear weapons. Iran denies this, argues that its nuclear program is only for the generation of electricity.


--------------------------------------------------------------------
>> QUOTE "The investigation is ongoing and politically sensitive."


For sale: nulcear expertise
Emerging details about a Pakistani scientist's network raise questions about how far it spread sensitive technology - and why authorities didn't stop it sooner
BY DOUGLAS FRANTZ AND JOSH MEYER
Los Angeles Times Service
VIENNA, Austria -- Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan presided over a nuclear smuggling operation so brazen that the government weapons laboratory he ran distributed a glossy sales brochure offering sophisticated technology and shipped some of its most sensitive equipment directly from Pakistan to rogue countries such as Libya and North Korea.
The brochure, with photos of Khan and an array of weapons on the cover, listed a complete range of equipment for separating nuclear fuel from uranium. Also for sale were Khan's ''consultancy and advisory services,'' and conventional weapons such as missiles, according to a recently obtained copy of the brochure.
Although Pakistan has stopped Khan, the brochure is among the emerging details of the scope of his enterprise. They raise new questions about how far Khan's network spread nuclear know-how and why authorities didn't move against it sooner.
The extent of the ring remains unknown, and even some of Khan's suppliers might not have known they were involved. Inspectors from the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency and intelligence and law enforcement authorities on three continents are trying to reconstruct what they consider the worst nuclear proliferation network in history, and to dismantle it.
Top diplomats in Vienna and senior U.S. officials say they are urgently trying to determine whether blueprints for a nuclear warhead and designs to build the device, which were sold to Libya, and highly sensitive data and equipment shipped to Iran and North Korea, might have spread beyond those countries. In addition, investigators have not been able to account for much of the equipment the network bought.
''Who knows where it has gone?'' said a senior U.S. intelligence official, who described the Bush administration as deeply worried. ``How many other people are there? How widespread was it, and how much information has spread?''
Questions also are being asked about whether the United States missed opportunities to stop Khan. The Pakistani scientist's full-service nuclear trafficking network operated for nearly two decades, often under the cover of his government lab, even as Western intelligence agencies grew more suspicious of him and senior U.S. officials repeatedly protested to Pakistan.
CIA director George J. Tenet said last month that the agency penetrated elements of the smuggling ring in recent years but needed proof to stop it. Other administration officials and outside experts suggest, however, that at least parts of the enterprise could have been shut down.
''If you have penetrated the system, why not stop it before Libya got the weapons design?'' a senior European diplomat based in Vienna asked. ``There is no limitation on a copying machine.''
The investigation is ongoing and politically sensitive. Among the new details that have emerged:
* Sensitive equipment discovered at nuclear-related sites in Libya carried the name of Khan Research Laboratories, adding to what authorities describe as irrefutable evidence that his center illicitly shared its technology with a country under United Nations sanctions for supporting terrorism.
* Evidence indicates that Khan provided Pakistan's state-of-the-art centrifuge machines to North Korea in the late 1990s. Two Western diplomats described the information as preliminary, but they said it deepens concerns about North Korea's progress in enriching uranium for atomic weapons.
* Authorities at the IAEA last month reopened an investigation of an alleged offer by Khan to sell nuclear technology and a weapons design to Saddam Hussein in 1990. The inquiry started in 1995 with the discovery of memos in Iraq, but it hit a roadblock when Pakistan called the offer a hoax.
CONCERNS WERE RAISED
U.S. intelligence officials and diplomats say they have known the broad outlines of Khan's activities since at least 1995.
Three times from 1998 to 2000, President Clinton raised concerns about nuclear technology leaking from Pakistan to North Korea during private meetings with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Pervez Musharraf, the general who replaced him in a 1999 coup.
In each case, President Clinton was assured that these concerns would be looked into and would be dealt with appropriately, recalls Karl Inderfurth, who as assistant secretary of State was Clinton's chief South Asia troubleshooter.
''To my knowledge, we did not receive any satisfactory responses to our concerns. It is now clear the smoke we saw at the time was indeed the fires being set by A.Q. Khan,'' Inderfurth said.
The U.S. concerns were inherited by the Bush administration, and fears escalated after disclosures in late 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists had met twice that year with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.
In response to U.S. pressure, Musharraf removed Khan in March 2001 as head of Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, where he had developed fissile material for atomic weapons as well as long-range missiles. Musharraf continued to deny that nuclear secrets had leaked, and Khan continued to hold international nuclear conferences and to travel widely.
The denials finally collapsed late last year after Iran was forced to open portions of its nuclear program to IAEA inspectors and Libya voluntarily renounced its weapons program.
Although the Iranian disclosures provided strong hints, reams of documents and nuclear hardware turned over to the United States and IAEA by Libya pointed the finger squarely at Khan.
The most alarming documents were blueprints for the nuclear warhead, say diplomats and U.S. officials involved in the process.
The plans were for a warhead developed in the 1960s by China, which provided early help to Pakistan's nuclear program. Two diplomats in Vienna said Khan sold the blueprints to Libya in late 2001 or early 2002 for as much as $20 million.
Inspectors in Libya also found the equipment from Khan's laboratory and components for two generations of Pakistani centrifuges. Diplomats in Vienna said complete versions of the earliest type of centrifuge, known as the P1, were obtained directly from Pakistan and components for the next generation P2, which was faster and more efficient, were manufactured for the network at a Malaysian plant.
CENTRIFUGES' USE
Centrifuges are used to purify uranium for use as fuel for nuclear power plants or to enrich it to high levels for use in bombs. Experts say obtaining highly enriched uranium or other fissile material is the most crucial step in building an atomic weapon.
Weeks before Libya gave up its secrets, Iran had made a more limited disclosure to the IAEA of how it obtained drawings and components for 500 P1 machines through middlemen associated with Khan's network.
Iran acknowledged in January that it also had received plans for the more advanced P2 from Pakistan. Diplomats said Tehran had taken halting steps to develop those machines.
''What the Iranian and Libyan cases did was produce actual items so that you can't deny them,'' said another diplomat in Vienna. ``Until this breakthrough, I don't think anyone had real hard evidence.''
By the time Pakistan was forced to move against Khan, however, Iran had used his technology to develop its own uranium enrichment cycle, moving closer to what the United States says is an effort to build a nuclear bomb. And Libya had the warhead designs for more than a year.
-----------------------------------------------------------------

Poverty and inequality
A question of justice?
Mar 11th 2004
From The Economist print edition
The toll of global poverty is a scandal. But deploring economic "injustice" is no answer
Corbis
HUNDREDS of millions of people in the world are forced to endure lives of abject poverty--poverty so acute that those fortunate enough to live in the United States, or Europe or the rich industrialised parts of Asia can scarcely comprehend its meaning. Surely there is no more commanding moral imperative for people in the West than to urge each other, and their governments, to bring relief to the world's poorest. And what a tragedy it is, therefore, that many of the kind souls who respond most eagerly to this imperative bring to the issue an analytical mindset that is almost wholly counterproductive. They are quite right, these champions of the world's poor, that poverty in an age of plenty is shameful and disgusting. But they are quite wrong to suppose, as so many of them do, that the rich enjoy their privileges at the expense of the poor--that poverty, in other words, is inseparable from a system, capitalism, that thrives on injustice. This way of thinking is not just false. It entrenches the very problem it purports to address.
Symptomatic of this mindset is the widespread and debilitating preoccupation with "global inequality". Whenever the United Nations and its plethora of associated agencies opine about the scandal of world poverty, figures on inequality always pour forth. (Such figures, though, are always higher than the likely reality: see article) It is not bad enough, apparently, that enormous numbers of people have to subsist on less than a dollar a day. The claim that this makes in its own right on the compassion of the West for its fellow men is deemed, apparently, too puny. The real scandal, it seems, is that much of the world is vastly richer than that. The implication, and often enough the explicit claim, is that the one follows from the other: if only we in the West weren't so rich, so greedy for resources, so driven by material ambition--such purblind delinquent capitalists--the problem of global poverty would be half-way to being solved.
Equity at a price
Certain ideas about equality are woven into the fabric of the liberal state, and quite inseparable from it: first and foremost, equality before the law. But equality before the law, and some other kinds of liberal equality, can be universally granted without infringing anybody's rights. Economic equality cannot. A concern to level economic outcomes must express itself as policies that advance one group's interests at the expense of another's. This puts political and ethical limits on how far the drive for economic equality ought to go. (Strictly practical limits, as well, since too noble a determination to take from the rich to give to the poor will end up impoverishing everyone.) It also means that perfect economic equality should never be embraced, even implicitly, as an ideal. Perfect economic equality is a nightmare: nothing short of a totalitarian tyranny could ever hope to achieve it.
The preoccupation bordering on obsession with economic equality that one so often encounters at gatherings of anti-globalists, in the corridors of aid agencies and in socialist redoubts in backward parts of the world reflects a "lump of income" fallacy. This remarkably tenacious misconception is that there is only so much global income to go around. If the United States is consuming $10 trillion worth of goods and services each year, that is $10 trillion worth of goods and services that Africa cannot consume.
But goods and services are not just lying around waiting to be grabbed by the greediest or most muscular countries. Market economics is not a zero-sum game. America consumes $10 trillion worth of goods and services each year because it produces (not counting the current-account deficit of 5% or so of the total) $10 trillion of goods and services each year. Africa could produce and consume a lot more without America producing and consuming one jot less. It so happens that the case for more aid, provided of course that it is well spent, is strong--but the industrialised countries do not need to become any less rich before Africa can become a lot less poor. The wealth of the wealthy is not part of the problem.
To believe otherwise, however, is very much part of the problem. For much of the 20th century the developing countries were held back by an adapted socialist ideology that put global injustice, inequality and victimhood front and centre. Guided by this ideology, governments relied on planning, state monopolies, punitive taxes, grandiose programmes of public spending, and all the other apparatus of applied economic justice. They also repudiated liberal international trade, because the terms of global commerce were deemed exploitative and unfair. Concessions (that is, permission to retain trade barriers) were sought and granted in successive negotiating rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. A kind of equity was thus deemed to have been achieved. The only drawback was that the countries stayed poor.
Towards the end of the century, many developing countries--China and India among them--finally threw off this victim's mantle and began to embrace wicked capitalism, both in the way they organised their domestic economies and in their approach to international trade. All of a sudden, they are a lot less poor, and it hasn't cost the West a cent. In Africa, too, minds are now changing, but far more slowly. Perhaps that has something to do with the chorus that goes up from Africa's supposed friends in the West, telling the region that its plight is all the fault of global inequality, "unfair trade" and an intrinsically unjust market system.
Heed the call
People and their governments in the West should heed the call of compassion, and respond with policies to help the world's poor, and indeed to advance the opportunities of the (much less desperately) poor in their own countries. Expressed that way, the egalitarian impulse is a good thing, worth nurturing. But a compassionate regard for the poor, as any good Marxist will tell you, is a very different thing from a zeal for economic "justice". That zeal, despite the exemplary fate of the socialist experiment at the end of the 20th century, guides a great deal of thinking still. And it continues to do nothing but harm.
Copyright ? 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.


Posted by maximpost at 8:23 PM EST
Permalink

Welfare Mouse

How Michael Eisner succeeded in turning Disney into the subsidized kingdom

RiShawn Biddle



Michael Eisner doesn't have a whole lot going for him these days. First he endured Walt Disney Co. heir Roy E. Disney's effort to push him out as Chief Mousketeer, then cable giant Comcast Corp.'s attempt to snap up the Walt Disney Co. on the cheap. Then last week came the annual meeting, where a record 43 percent of shareholders voted against keeping him as chairman of the board. He promptly resigned the post, but still maintains control of the unhappiest place on earth--for now.

Whatever eventually happens to Eisner, one thing is assured: He has helped Disney achieve a place as one of its biggest beneficiaries in the annals of corporate welfare.

Scrooge McDuck would be proud. Few have panhandled for taxpayer dollars as successfully as Disney during Eisner's reign. It has received at least $4.5 billion in subsidies, low-interest loans, land grants and "joint venture" investments from governments in Florida, Pennsylvania and Hong Kong. It even managed to get a handout from the French government--not exactly a fan of things American--which sold 4,800 acres just outside of Paris to Disney at a 90 percent discount so the company could build Euro Disneyland.

Disney has gotten even sweeter deals closer to its home base in Southern California. In Glendale, just a short trip from its Burbank headquarters, Disney's 125-acre Imagineering campus and studio development is being financed with the help of the city's redevelopment agency. Further away in Anaheim--home of Disneyland--the company got the city fathers to fork over another $550 million on new roadways and create a special tax district in exchange for building its now-floundering California Adventure park.

It has even become adept at getting financial help from Washington in the indirect form of copyright protection. To keep Mickey Mouse, Pluto and other characters out of the public domain, it successfully lobbied Congress for the Sonny Bono Act, which extended the life of its copyrights from life plus 50 years to life plus 70--restraining free speech in the process. Funny since Beauty and the Beast and Aladdin draw heavily from works that have long ago become fodder for public use.

Disney doesn't exactly need the welfare cheese. Last year, it generated $27 billion in revenues from its sprawling collection of studios, theme parks, and television channels. But Eisner has admitted some of its projects wouldn't work out as stand-alone private sector operations. "Disney's America wasn't economically viable without government subsidies," he wrote about one such plan in Work in Progress, his 1998 biography.

The company has been able to wrangle subsidies through promises of revitalizing communities, along with the mystique that comes with being in the House of Mouse. Helping out, of course, is the penchant for city officials to hand over the treasury for any hare-brained scheme. "It's the pixie-dust factor," said Rollins College Professor Richard Foglesong, the author of the aptly-titled Married to the Mouse, which chronicles Disney's dealings in Florida.

When it announced it was looking to build a second theme park in California, Disney used promises of economic improvement to get officials in Anaheim and Long Beach to offer it sweet subsidy packages (Anaheim won.). To garner subsidies for an indoor theme park project in Philadelphia, it even convinced then-Mayor Edward Rendell, now governor of Pennsylvania, to co-star in a promotional video, in which he bounds around with Goofy. It worked.

With his penchant for micromanaging, Eisner dons the mouse ears of chief rainmaker for the big projects. During Disney's failed effort to build an American history-themed amusement park near the Bull Run battle site in Manassas, Va., Eisner worked with then-Gov. George Allen to get a $160 million package of subsidies and "tourism marketing" dollars through the state legislature. When it had to back out of the project after outcry from historians and local residents, Eisner flew to Richmond to tell the governor the bad news.

Disney had certainly done some wheeling and dealing with government officials before Eisner came along. To get Walt Disney World off the ground in 1967, it convinced Florida officials to create the Reedy Creek Improvement District under the premise that it would develop a residential community, according to Foglesong in Married to the Mouse. That concept, called EPCOT, wound up being just a golf ball-shaped attraction at the theme park. But Reedy Creek remained, shielding Disney from local land use laws enacted by Osceola and Orange counties, in which sprawls the district and Disney World.

After Eisner took over in 1984, the company began to garner more generous subsidies. In 1989, it got $57 million in bond money that was originally slated by Orange County for affordable housing projects, then got $57 million more a few years later to finance a turnpike extension that leads straight onto Disney property--and nowhere near that county's boundary line.

These deals have worked out for Disney. For the municipalities themselves? A mouse trap. Disney abandoned the Philadelphia project in 2001 after years of delays, leaving the city on the hook for $55 million, according to one estimate. In January, Osceola County issued bonds to repay $35 million to Disney's Reedy Creek for guaranteeing bonds on the turnpike extension on Disney's property.

Now with Eisner's future in question, Disney may end up losing its key tool in getting more taxpayer dollars. But it'll probably be okay in that department. Besides its name and its own group of lobbyists, it also has its new chairman, George Mitchell, to step in and help bring in more subsidies. After all, if the former Senate Majority Leader can bring peace to Northern Ireland, he can probably get Mickey more cheese.



RiShawn Biddle, Reason's Burton Gray Memorial Intern in 1999 and the proprietor of www.rishawnbiddle.com, has written for Forbes and The Weekly Standard.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For the Want of a Bra

The Senate Commerce Committee vs. Free Speech

Nick Gillespie





For the want of a bra, free speech was lost.

Well, not exactly, but if the recent actions by the U.S. Senate's powerful Commerce Committee are any indication, the future of free speech may be hanging by threads as sheer as the ones in a Victoria's Secret mesh babydoll.

The Washington Post reports that the Commerce Committee is paving "the way for a broad crackdown on offensive radio and television programming, including extending stiff fines to artists, limiting violence and temporarily preventing broadcasters from owning more stations until potential links between media consolidation and indecency on the airwaves can be studied."

The Senate committee followed the lead of its counterpart in the House of Representatives and has agreed to increase fines for "indecency." If things go Congress' way, first-time offenses by broadcasters will draw a maximum fine of $275,000, or 10 times the current amount. The per-incident fines will then increase to as much as $500,000. Going beyond restrictions being developed by the House, the Senate committee is also pushing to double all fines if the offending material is "scripted or planned in advance, or if the audience [is] unusually large" (no more Super Bowl botch jobs, thank you). On top of all that, the committee wants the Federal Communications Commission to set rules disallowing "violent" shows when kids are likely to be listening or watching. And then there's that moratorium on the loosened ownership caps passed last year until the General Accounting Office nails down the specifics of the "relationship between indecent programming and media consolidation."

The good news? The committee voted down, by a slimmer-than-slim 12-11 vote, a provision that would have given the FCC the right to regulate the content of basic cable and satellite programs in the same way it does TV and radio broadcasts.

So it turns out that the outraged pols and social critics were absolutely right when they fumed that Janet Jackson's notorious Super Bowl half-time show nipple-baring really did drive some Americans stark raving nuts. It's just that they were talking about themselves more than the population at large, which seems mostly willing to move on (after all, there's a new season of the violence-and-sex-drenched The Sopranos to catch). But for all too many members of America's political and chattering classes, beholding the slutty songstress's galvanized areola was the psychic equivalent of staring directly into a total eclipse of the sun, blinding them with indignation, outrage, and national shame.

Of course, the Nasty Girl didn't inspire such righteous apoplexy all on her own. She's had help over the past few months from "categorically indecent" Victoria's Secret lingerie shows; the foul-mouthed award-show ejaculations of U2's Bono; the verboten utterances of public radio monologuist, middle-aged housewife, and admitted knitter Sandra Tsing Loh; and the unmediated racism of Howard Stern callers, among others.

How seriously should we take any of this new congressional and regulatory activity? Given the unprecedented level of free expression we have and the ineffectiveness of past regulatory schemes such as the V-chip and past threats of content crackdowns from elected officials, it's easy to laugh off these latest legislative efforts. At best, they represent election-year pandering and, at worst, they will act as a minor drag on an unstoppable culture boom that gives all of us greater and greater opportunities to produce and consume more and more media.

Yet as Buzzmachine's Jeff Jarvis reminds us, "Once the government gets in the business of content [regulation]...then there is no stopping them. Slide down that slippery slope. Today, Howard Stern is offensive. Tomorrow, Sandra Tsing Loh on knitting is. Tomorrow, they try to regulate cable and not just broadcast. The next day, they go over the Internet (where, after all, there's lots of dirty, nasty, offensive stuff). This isn't about Howard. It's about you." If Jarvis seems a bit overanxious, it's worth remembering that it's only been a few years since the federal government almost succeeded in applying stultifying content regulation to the Internet. And it's only been a few decades since such obscene garbage as Lady Chatterley's Lover, Tropic of Cancer, and Fanny Hill (among others) were fully cleared for publication in these United States.

I'm far more confident than Jarvis that audiences and producers will always be able to route around censorship and regulations, especially the relatively mild sort of restrictions that would eventually pass constitutional and popular muster. This is especially true because technology continues to make it harder for all sorts of suppression. But he's right to emphasize the underlying logic behind the sorts of legislation and policy that are making the rounds in Washington, D.C. Just because censorship is unlikely to work is no reason not to stand against it in the first place. And in the second and third place, too.



Nick Gillespie is Reason's editor-in-chief.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Meet Hizbollah

The Party of God's MP talks about Islam, Iraq, and the war on terror. A Reason interview

Tim Cavanaugh



Mohammed Fneish is a Hizbollah (Party of God) representative in Lebanon's parliament. Fneish represents the Bint Jbeil district. He spoke with reason late last year at Hizbollah's office in Beirut.



reason: Hizbollah's originally stated mission was to drive the Israeli military out of south Lebanon. The Israelis have been gone for four years. What do you see as your purpose now?

Mohammed Fneish: It's true that Hizbollah began as a resistance movement, and it still is. In the process of carrying out our mission we've been able to build foundations that met the society's educational and social needs--and even political needs, by participating in elections.

It's true that Israel left parts of Lebanon's territory, but not all of it. It also hasn't stopped its attacks on Lebanon. Lebanon's problem from the beginning has not been a local one only. Its troubles have been nourished by the conflict with Israel, and that has created an ongoing national security problem for us. For as long as there is no security in the region, Lebanon will never be at peace. We can't take lightly the need for our organization.

reason: Saddam Hussein brutally repressed the Shi'a Muslims in Iraq--your co-religionists. Now that he's gone, the Shi'ites have more freedom than they've had in 20 years. Why does Hizbollah remain so strongly opposed to the U.S. mission in Iraq?

Fneish: The party has nothing to do with Iraq. The party had an opinion on Iraq, as did every other group--the whole world had an opinion about Iraq. And in general, the majority of opinion around the world opposed the war, because people were not convinced by the reasons given. And as has been proven, all of these reasons given by the American administration were false. Of course, before he attacked Kuwait, Saddam received much support from the U.S. In general, nobody is sorry to see Saddam go. His regime was unjust, harsh, and homicidal.

But we have to distinguish between whether Saddam was overthrown for the good of the Iraqi people or for the good of American ambitions.

In terms of the new situation in Iraq, that's the Iraqis' responsibility. But we would like to ensure and protect international laws. The occupation shouldn't go on, but more important, the U.S. shouldn't act apart from the international community. And the current occupation shouldn't go on at all without the will of the Iraqi people. In the end, only they can decide their future, and their political system.

reason: Does Hizbollah have any contact with the resistance fighters in Iraq?

Fneish: No. The party has an opinion on the U.S. occupation, but it is up to the Iraqi people to determine how to react to that presence. Do they want to throw roses on them? Rocks? Whatever they decide, that's their right. We as Hizbollah have nothing to do with what other nations do. We can't be a resistance party for other nations. We only represent our own people and country. Other than that, it's not our business.

reason: The resistance in Iraq has been extraordinarily violent toward the Shi'ites.

Fneish: This is absolutely unacceptable. I've been speaking about resistance, but I did not mention anything about tactics or principles. I'm not speaking about murdering Iraqis, aiming at government organizations, or killing civilians. That is not resistance, and it's not legitimate.

reason: So you say the party has not been providing any assistance--financial or military--to the resistance in Iraq?

Fneish: None at all. Anybody who says so, let him show some proof. The party's primary mission is to resist the Israeli occupation.

reason: Hizbollah is widely viewed in the United States as a potent anti-American force. Can you imagine ever having better relations with the U.S.?

Fneish: The party is not against the United States. To be clear: The American administration has sided with Israel and makes false accusations against Hizbollah. We don't have any problem with the United States other than its position on Israel. We have not attacked the United States. We grew up with the Israeli occupation in Lebanon, so we formed a resistance movement. The U.S. considered that movement an opponent of the United States. Just to be clear, I'm speaking of the American administration, not the American people. Our problem is with the American political decision to side with Israel and oppose our people and our concerns. The future of our relationship with the United States depends on a change in American policies; if there's ever a change, we have no problem with the United States.

reason: Do you seek to improve relations with the U.S.?

Fneish: In the near future, I don't think it's possible for relations to improve. There is a very unnatural conflict. We're resisting an occupation, and the U.S. wants to stop the resistance rather than the occupation. We're trying to liberate our land and the U.S. supports Israel in taking our land. So how is an improvement in relations possible?

reason: Do you consider the United States hostile toward you?

Fneish: Of course. The United States is totally against us, but it's the United States that decided to take that position. That position isn't only against Hizbollah. Look around the entire Arab and Islamic world. What's the proportion of people who believe the U.S. is hostile toward them and undermines their concerns? But Hizbollah is an active force, and that's why there's a particularly heavy American hand against us. Because what is Hizbollah's crime? That we stood up to Israel and didn't let Israel achieve its goals in Lebanon? That we caused Israel its first defeat? Is that all of our crime?

reason: Right now the United States is fighting against terrorist groups of global reach and anybody affiliated with them.

Fneish: The claim that Hizbollah has relations with any other group is a lie--among many other lies, all aiming to taint the image of the resistance and to distort the facts. There is a problem here, and that is called occupation. Where is the evidence of Hizbollah's having a role with anybody in any activities outside our conflict with Israel?

It's easy to make accusations. If we want to total up all the lies the United States has told about Iraq alone, it's a huge sum. So any language that doesn't depend on proof is just an accusation. These accusations are part of a hostile agenda involving media and politics.

reason: Do you try to do anything to change that opinion?

Fneish: Of course, we try as much as we can.

reason: Current U.S. policy would seem to be good for Shi'a Muslims. The overthrow of Saddam has freed the Shi'ites in Iraq, and the U.S. is also opposing Osama bin Laden, whose group considers Shi'ites heretics. Even if you disagree with or suspect the motives of the United States, wouldn't you have to agree that these policies have been helping your fellow Shi'ites?

Fneish: The United States is trying to take advantage of all the mistakes in the Muslim world to benefit itself. The U.S. gives itself the right to attack other countries and bypass all international laws. We can recognize that there is a certain political regime that is dangerous. But nobody has the right to appoint himself the world's police force. If the U.S. really wants to face terrorism, then it has to define terrorism. Because there's a difference between terrorism and resistance, but the U.S. never wants to see a distinction.

The other thing is that initially, when Osama bin Laden was serving its agenda against the Soviet Union, the U.S. was in accord with him. Back then the U.S. had no problem with how bin Laden thought about the Shi'a, or about Muslims, or about people in general.

So we need to clarify what you said in your question: We cannot separate the motives from the actions. As a man of principle, I see the American administration doing the same thing bin Laden was doing. Bin Laden wants to bring back the law of the jungle, and the United States is trying to bring it back with him. This does not help humanity.

Are the Americans a human rights organization trying to serve the rights of the people in the region? Of course not; even they're not claiming that. They're establishing a new empire in the world. Why haven't the prisoners in Guantanamo received trials? There are laws of civilization, and the United States is breaking all of them.

reason: What about relations with Israel? You've conducted complicated negotiations over exchanging prisoners with the Israelis. Would you be willing to negotiate with them on other matters?

Fneish: The party has its own belief and its own founding vision. Israel was formed at the expense of the Palestinian people and their rights. For us, this existence is immoral and illegitimate, because it creates great hardship and suffering for a downtrodden people. And all this is so Europeans can ease their own guilt about what they did to the Jews. So indirectly, the Europeans are the cause of the Palestinians' suffering. Of course, not all of this was done for moral reasons; there was also a predetermined political plan for the region. Therefore, as long as the Palestinian people can't go back to their land, there will be a problem in the region. So for sure, Hizbollah can't have relations with an entity formed out of crimes against other people.

We are seeing negotiations and discussions. Despite all the circumstances, the Arabs have always tried to negotiate, but those efforts have always been ridiculed and undermined. All we see are more settlements, more hostility, more evictions, and more destruction of homes.

reason: It sounds like you could never have normal relations with Israel under any circumstances.

Fneish: We as a party have our own opinion and our own role. Our views are for the interest of the whole country, and we oppose any relations. But we're only speaking for the party; the government speaks for itself.

reason: When you say you oppose, do you oppose Israel's existence, or just having relations?

Fneish: Both.

reason: Would you continue to fight Israel just on the basis of that existence?

Fneish: That's another issue. We're trying to make Israel step back as an enemy that is attacking us. We fought the Israelis only on Lebanese soil. Before we talk about fighting their existence, there is a problem here. There's a Zionist project. Let's be realistic. It's clear there is a Zionist mentality, which is clannish, sectarian, and belligerent.

I didn't say I want to fight Israel on the basis of its existence. I spoke of a position. There is a difference. If today a country in the world occupied another country, and I said that country is aggressive and I want nothing to do with that country, that doesn't mean I want to fight that country. The subject of war is a different thing. But nobody can force me to say that country is legitimate.

reason: Lebanon is a pretty permissive society, where people drink alcohol, women do whatever they want, people wear whatever they want, and so on. Would you like to change that?

Fneish: In Lebanon there is freedom. We respect the freedom of the Lebanese, and the freedom of any people. We have our own views about personal conduct, but those views concern us. We try to convince others of our views, but we don't impose them on anybody. It's our right to try to persuade others of our views, but it's also the right of others to share their own views and opinions.

But that does not mean that if we disagree we will resort to imposing our views. For example, right now people see us as dominant in a particular region of the country. Did we impose our way of living on anybody? You see in the [majority Shi'ite] suburbs of Beirut those who are committed and those who are not. You find women with hijabs and others without, and we have no problem with that.

reason: If you could, would you establish an Islamic state in Lebanon?

Fneish: Nobody can force a political system on a society that doesn't have the characteristics proper for that system. Lebanon is a country with freedoms and a variety of ways of living. We respect that variety and we live with it. The Lebanese political system will reflect that variety. We can exchange views on what we believe, but not once has our party said it wants to create an Islamic political system in Lebanon. All we ask for is a government that has the principles I've mentioned: respect for people's freedom, justice, equality, and leadership that express the will of the people.

reason: Gibran Tueni, the editor of al-Nahar newspaper, commented to me recently that Hizbollah always says it won't establish an Islamic state by force, but doesn't rule out establishing one through political means.

Fneish: Today in Lebanon there are native people of Christian origin. There are 18 different religions. Inside each of these, different political groups support different views, political programs, and agendas. We are one of these groups. It's possible that we differ from these others in our commitment to what we believe in as Muslims. But the way we deal with our society is not by aiming to force Islam on anybody, or to bypass reality. In the society of Lebanon, with all its freedoms, could I stop a Christian from converting to Islam, or a Muslim from converting to Christianity? Nobody could. Could I stop anybody from agreeing with Hizbollah's views? Nobody could. The government does not come from above the people. It comes up from the people. We don't have any plan for an Islamic government because a government can't be separated from its people.

reason: What did you think of Afghanistan, where the Taliban did force their system on the country?

Fneish: The Taliban movement was the greatest threat to Islam. In their way of understanding, believing, and practicing, they were very bad for Islam. We were never in accord with them or their beliefs.

reason: If you had agreed with their way of practicing Islam, would you have favored their way of running the country?

Fneish: No, that's not possible. To agree with them on practices is one thing. To agree with them on forcing your authority is another. Authority does not exist without the will of the people. And beyond that, their understanding, their school of Islam, was not true.

reason: So in your opinion, there is no country where an Islamic political system has been forced on the people?

Fneish: Let me tell you something. Today there are Islamic nations and political systems, for sure. And there are, worldwide, very few political systems that reflect the will of the people. In my opinion, among the Islamic governments, only the system in Iran came as an expression of the will of the people. This is a system that I agree with to a large degree, in my principles and in my thoughts and beliefs. But I don't agree necessarily with all the political and administrative decisions in Iran.

reason: What do you think when you see how many Lebanese consider your group a threat to the country? In the place where I'm staying, everybody seemed pretty nervous when I told them I was interviewing somebody from Hizbollah.

Fneish: Where are you staying?

reason: In the Koura [a majority Orthodox Christian region in North Lebanon].

Fneish: (Laughs) The Koura! I thought people were a little more open up there.

There are responsibilities on both sides. We have a responsibility to be clear with people about who we are. It's possible that in the beginning the nature of our situation kept us from being open with the media. We did not have a media presence and weren't interested in having it, because our mission in the beginning was very hard. More recently, we have come to recognize the importance of being out there: We have seats in the parliament, a media presence, and a political presence. I tell you, those who read and who communicate with us can find out what they want to know.

But we ask of others that they not form a premature opinion of us that never changes. Because how did that opinion form? Did it form by communicating with us or reading our literature? It's possible that this opinion was formed by listening only to propaganda or rumors. You know how rumors go around in Lebanon; and we had a pretty unusual war here. Things are much better today.

reason: Hizbollah has close relations with Iran. Based on recent developments and statistics, it seems the Islamic movement in Iran has run out of steam. The economy is weak; the people are expressing a lot of dissatisfaction, and the government is using harsher means to control dissent. Do you think there's a future in this model of politics?

Fneish: There was a horrendous war forced on Iran. The system never had a chance to function under normal conditions. Look at the United States: After September 11, you came up with all sorts of new laws and emergency procedures to address the threat. Iran had 10 years of war, and 15 years of being surrounded by enemies. Of course that has an effect on the country.

Despite that--and I don't want to get too deeply into this because ultimately this is the business only of the Iranian people, and they're the ones who have to decide their own future--what I see is that there hasn't been a single election in Iran that failed to take place, even during the war. I see many different newspapers publishing. Today in Iran, all sides are having discussions. There are agreements and disagreements, obviously. There is no ideal system in the world. It's possible that the Iranian people have complaints--or, not to generalize, let's say some of the Iranian people have complaints, and ambitions for faster improvements. That is their right, but the way to get to that is through democratic and peaceful solutions, and not by demolishing the system. You can't blame everything on the system.

reason: There aren't many success stories among the Muslim countries, particularly in the Arab world. What do you think of a country like Malaysia, a majority Muslim country that has enjoyed a lot of economic success? What do they have that Syria or Jordan doesn't?

Fneish: Every nation has its own circumstances. A nation has its own history, culture, and traditions. Malaysia for sure has set a great example, and provides proof that progress isn't limited to a certain type of country or religion. All nations have the capacity for improvement, but sometimes they lack the right programs, the right politics. It's unfair to compare Malaysia to any of other Islamic countries, because the circumstances differ.

In general, Islamic countries have not had political freedom and have mismanaged their resources. The policies in most countries have not promoted an active population. In the countries you mentioned, the situation has been worse because of the conflict with Israel.

reason: By most accounts, Hizbollah is good at providing public services--schools, hospitals, orphanages, and so on--that the government has failed to provide. What is the difference now that you're working from inside the government?

Fneish: There was a war in Lebanon when the party started providing these services. There was not a functioning government, and you couldn't wait for the government to get back on its feet to start fixing the problem. So as much as possible the party responded to the people's needs.

However, that doesn't eliminate the need for government services. In any democracy, the civil society has an important role. The vision that the government does everything for the people is the wrong vision. The government should be taking a limited role in social services. It's human nature that people will help each other out, but when the government takes control of providing social services, people lose that instinct. We're an organization like many in Lebanon that provide services. We didn't add anything new; we just responded to a situation.

reason: What is Hizbollah's view on Syria's military presence in Lebanon, and its involvement in Lebanon's political affairs?

Fneish: I'm not going to recite all the historical stages of the war. Let us start with the Ta'if agreement [that ended Lebanon's civil war]. According to the Ta'if, Syria would end its occupation when the boundaries of Lebanon were secure. Israel's withdrawal from the south of Lebanon didn't happen according to the Ta'if but because they were forced out. Internal security never happened in Lebanon. All that affected the Ta'if schedule. Today, this has become a matter between Lebanon and Syria. There is a government in Lebanon; the government decides with whom it wants to have relations. The Syrian presence was, for sure, a consequence of the internal situation in Lebanon and the conflict with Israel. When these situations end, Syria will not stay another day. There is no disagreement on this point. At any rate, if you go today from North to South, you won't find any Syrian checkpoints in Lebanon.

reason: Was Hizbollah involved in the bombing of the Marines' barracks in Beirut in 1983?

Fneish: Our group wasn't even formed until 1985. There were many groups active in Lebanon in 1983.

reason: How do you pronounce the name of your organization? People say HizBOLLah and HizbollAH. Which one is correct?

Fneish: (Laughs) Whichever way it comes out of your mouth, we'll accept it.

More Reason interviews

Tim Cavanaugh is Reason's Web editor.


Posted by maximpost at 12:19 AM EST
Permalink
Friday, 12 March 2004

American Jihad Continues
by Robert Spencer
Posted Mar 11, 2004
Although most media attention has been focused on Martha Stewart, gay marriage, and the national waistline, the jihad continues in America.
The FBI and Coast Guard announced last Thursday that they have discovered nine members of the Merchant Marine who may have links to terrorist groups. This is the fruit of Operation Drydock, an anti-terror investigation that has lasted more than a year. These efforts, while laudable, only underscore the fact that terrorists have already begun to try to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of American seaports.
On the same day, three members of the "Virginia jihad network" were found guilty of conspiracy. Masoud Khan, Seifullah Chapman, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem, played paintball in 2000 and 2001 with a deadly serious purpose: they were training with the hope of joining the Taliban and waging jihad against the United States. Khan was also convicted of attempting to wage war against the U.S.
Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, formerly a high profile Muslim student activist at the University of Idaho, was charged, also on Thursday, with ties to Hamas. He maintains his innocence. FoxNews reported that he "was charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism after federal prosecutors said he helped run Web sites that urge people to contribute money to Hamas."
In San Diego on Wednesday, March 3, Ilyas Ali, an American citizen, and Muhamed Abid Afridi, a Pakistani national, admitted to drug trafficking in order to raise money for weapons for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. They were selling heroin and hashish to raise money for Stinger missiles.
On the same day, five Muslims were convicted in Buffalo of trafficking in untaxed cigarettes in order to get money for jihad. Mohamed Abuhamra, Aref Ahmed, Ramzy Abdullah, Nagib Aziz, and Azzeaz Saleh could get twenty years and $500,000 fines for using the smokes to try to raise money to help the the six jihadists from the Lackawanna, New York mosque -- the notorious "Lackawanna Six" journey to Afghanistan to join up with Al-Qaeda.
A member of the Kashmir jihad was arrested last week in Pennsylvania. Mohammad Aslam, a British citizen, was originally arrested for staying in the U.S. after the expiration of his visa. Through his fingerprints, however, he was identified as a member of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, wanted for the kidnap and murder of the Indian diplomat Ravindra Mhatre in England in 1984. Mhatre was seized and killed in an attempt to secure the release from prison of the group's founder, Maqbool Bhat.
Sgt. Hasan Akbar is the Muslim soldier who attacked his own commanding officers in Kuwait last year while crying out, "You guys are coming into our countries, and you're going to rape our women and kill our children" -- a clear indication that his attack grew out of his identity as a Muslim. After a long period of silence, the Army announced last Thursday that it is going to go ahead with a court martial. Akbar could get the death penalty.
The Islamic Society of Boston (ISB) is building a new mosque which they intend to be one of the grandest in the country. Arabic-language brochures boast that the project has the backing of the radical Sheikh Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian now based in Qatar.
In English, the ISB claims that al-Qaradawi "has never played any role in the ISB." However, the Boston Herald reports that "records show al-Qaradawi's name was listed on federal tax forms as recently as 2001 as a member of the society's board of directors." The ISB is not alone in embracing Qaradawi: establishment Islamic scholar John Esposito has praised him as a champion of a "reformist interpretation of Islam."
Yet Qaradawi has justified suicide bombings, specifically praising such attacks against Israeli civilians. In this he works from tenets of Islamic law that forbid attacks against civilians unless they are aiding the war effort -- and Qaradawi sees everyone in Israel in this category. Also, according to the Herald, Qaradawi exclaimed at a Muslim youth group convention in Toledo in 1995: "We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through (the) sword, but through Da'awa [preaching]." The Herald adds that "in March 2003, al-Qaradawi issued a religious ruling, a fatwa, encouraging Muslim women, as well as men, to become suicide bombers in the name of Allah and jihad."
With the biases of the major media abundantly established, it will be interesting to see how much attention such stories receive as the election season kicks into high gear.

Copyright ? 2003 HUMAN EVENTS. All Rights Reserved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> MULLAHWATCH...


The IAEA and Iranian cheating
The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), currently meeting in Vienna, faces a tremendous challenge: what to do about a systematic, ongoing campaign of cheating and deception by Tehran.
It is already clear that once again, Washington and the European Union disagree about whether to take a forceful stance against Iran's refusal to tell the truth about its nuclear program. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton sent a sharply worded letter to Britain, France and Germany stating that their soft stance toward Iran was undercutting common efforts to force the regime to give a full accounting of its efforts to produce atomic weapons.
Germany, France and Britain, representing the European Union, want to emphasize what they euphemistically term Iranian progress toward opening up and eventual dismantling these weapons programs. But their recent performance record is hardly encouraging.
Back in the fall, the three European countries announced that Iran had agreed to stop constructing uranium-enrichment centrifuges, which are used to build nuclear weapons. Then in January, Iran announced that it was building the centrifuges after all. In a remarkable act of impertinence, the regime claimed that the deal did not require that it stop all enrichment-related activities and that it had the right to continue amassing centrifuges. In short, the "EU 3" were hoodwinked.
Unfortunately, such behavior on Iran's part isn't new. In November, the IAEA issued a report documenting Tehran's cheating on nuclear weapons dating back to the mid-1980s. As a Feb. 24 IAEA report explained: "It should be noted that, given the size and capacity of the equipment used, the possibility cannot be excluded that larger quantities of nuclear material could have been involved than those declared by Iran as having been consumed and produced during this testing and experimentation. However, it is very difficult to account precisely for the uranium involved in these processing activities after the passage of many years, especially when some quantities have been discarded."
Tehran, emboldened by the willingness of the EU 3 to run interference against Washington, is digging in its heals. At the start of the IAEA parley, Iran's chief delegate predicted that U.S. efforts to get the agency to pursue a more assertive approach toward his government would fail. The government-controlled press denies that Iran has done anything wrong, and, on Sunday, threatened to stop any cooperation with the IAEA. Hassan Rowhani, a senior official with the country's Supreme Council for National Security, also demanded that Iran be recognized -- along with the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France -- as part of the world's nuclear club.
But this would be an intolerable outcome. The world would be a much more dangerous place if a violent, paranoid regime like that in Tehran were to become a recognized nuclear power. The clock continues to tick on a successful diplomatic conclusion -- and the hour is late.



-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran Postpones Visit by U.N. Inspectors
Fri Mar 12, 9:20 AM ET
By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press Writer
VIENNA, Austria - Iran postponed a planned visit by U.N. nuclear inspectors Friday, and American and European delegates at a key atomic agency meeting debated how harshly to censure Tehran for not fully opening its nuclear activities, diplomats said.
The inspectors were to be in Iran next week as part of the International Atomic Energy Agency's examination of the Iranian nuclear program, which the United States and other countries claim is trying to make nuclear weapons.
Pirooz Hosseini, the chief Iranian delegate to the IAEA, denied that Iran was trying to pressure the agency's board of governors, telling The Associated Press the scheduled inspections were postponed because they would conflict with next week's celebration of the Iranian New Year.
When asked why the celebrations were not taken into account when the invitations were first issued, Hosseini said officials made "a simple mistake."
The IAEA declined comment, but diplomats, speaking anonymously, said the postponement appeared to be an attempt by Iran to tone down an agency resolution addressing Tehran's spotty record of revealing past nuclear secrets and cooperating with the IAEA probe.
Iran, which insists its nuclear intentions are peaceful, has threatened repeatedly over the past few days to reduce cooperation with the U.N. agency if its 35-nation board of governors comes down hard on the Islamic republic.
Consultations were set to resume later Friday, and Hosseini indicated some progress was being made.
"Step by step, there are some better understandings among the parties," he said without elaborating.
On Thursday, the nonaligned bloc at the board of governors watered down a draft resolution backed by the United States, Canada, Australia and European countries. The Western group then rejected the draft as being too gentle on Iran.
The deadlock left Australian, Canadian and Irish diplomats shuttling between U.S. and nonaligned representatives trying to bridge the differences. A Western diplomat said on condition of anonymity that U.S. patience was wearing thin.
Another diplomat said the United States and the Europeans considered the nonaligned modifications unacceptable because they did not sufficiently criticize Iran's record on nuclear openness.
Recent discoveries by IAEA inspectors of undeclared items and programs have cast doubt on Tehran's assertions that it has no more nuclear secrets.
An IAEA report last month accused Tehran of hiding evidence of nuclear experiments and noted the discovery of traces of radioactive polonium, which can be used in nuclear weapons.
The report also expressed concern about the discovery of a previously undisclosed advanced P-2 centrifuge system for processing uranium.
Iran asserts its now-suspended enrichment plans are geared only toward generating power.
But on Wednesday, Iran announced plans to resume enrichment, eliciting a negative response from Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA chief, who said it would hurt Tehran's chances of proving it has no interest in nuclear weapons.
On the Net:
International Atomic Energy Agency: http://www.iaea.org
-----------------------------------------------------------------

>> OUR FRIENDS IN JAPAN...

Japan Company Sold Atomic Plant to Libya

By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press Writer
VIENNA, Austria - A Japanese company supplied Libya with technology essential to the production of nuclear weapons, diplomats revealed Friday, adding a new piece to the nuclear black market puzzle.
One of the diplomats called the 1984 sale of a uranium conversion plant a "flagrant example" of the failure of export controls meant to keep such equipment away from rogue nations and terrorists.
He also noted that the parts for such plants are so large and expensive, it would have been difficult to ship them out of the country without the knowledge of the Japanese government.
The officials, who declined to be named, spoke to The Associated Press on the sidelines of a board of governors' meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog.
In a report earlier this week, the agency mentioned that Libya ordered a "pilot scale uranium conversion facility" in 1984, but did not specify the country of origin.
Such plants are used in the process of enriching uranium that at lower levels can be used to generate power but at levels above 90 percent -- or weapons grade -- can be used in nuclear warheads.
Japan's top government spokesman, Yasuo Fukuda, said Tokyo was already looking into the matter.
"We are conducting an investigation. But we can't discuss the details of our investigation due to our previous agreement with the IAEA not to disclose anything," Fukuda said.
Libya admitted in December to having programs for weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear arms, and pledged to scrap them. Progress has been rapid since then, with a ship leaving the country for the United States last weekend carrying 500 tons of cargo -- the last of the equipment Moammar Gadhafi's government had used for its nuclear weapons program.
Among the most startling discoveries in Libya were blueprints of a nuclear warhead from Pakistan supplied by the black market network that also sold technology and know-how to Iran and North Korea (news - web sites).
The IAEA report also said Libya had managed to process minute quantities of plutonium that -- in much larger quantities -- are used in the cores of nuclear warheads.
The diplomats declined to identify the Japanese company involved, but described the conversion plant sale as unusual in several respects.
Unlike other deals made by Libya, Iran and North Korea, the sale was apparently directly arranged with the Japanese instead of through middlemen linked to a loose international nuclear sales network headed by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. But other countries were involved because the packing material originated from outside Japan.
One of the diplomats said Japan's export controls were generally considered effective, suggesting the government must have known about the sales.
"Had Japan reported such a deal to the IAEA earlier, that could have helped to get an earlier start on" investigations of the nuclear black market, which was only exposed in recent months, he said.
If confirmed the transaction would be a violation of Japan's strict export controls and its long-standing policy against possessing or trading nuclear weapons. Japan was the target of the only atomic bomb attacks.
Another diplomat with expert knowledge of Libya's nuclear program said the sheer size of the shipment should have rung alarm bells with Japanese customs authorities.
"It was huge," he said, describing the plant components as filling numerous containers and weighing "tons and tons."
He said the bulkiness of the plant components meant they were probably delivered by ship and not flown in.
Japan was named earlier by investigators active in the probe into the black market network, which also extends from Pakistan to Dubai, Malaysia, South Korea (news - web sites), Switzerland, Germany, Britain, the Netherlands and beyond -- with potential ties to Syria, Turkey and Spain.
Earlier this week, the IAEA's board of governors passed a resolution praising Tripoli for its admission, but criticizing it for its earlier nuclear weapons plans. Libya also signed an agreement with the agency opening its nuclear program to far-reaching agency inspections.
Libya did not manage to make enriched uranium or achieve other substantial progress toward making nuclear weapons, the agency said.
Investigators expect to complete the probe by June, eight months after U.S. officials confronted the Pakistani government with suspicions about Khan, setting into motion events that led the father of Islamabad's nuclear program to confess last month.
------------------------------------------------------------

Is Pakistan's nuclear programme dying?
Analysis
By Paul Anderson
BBC correspondent in Islamabad
In all the heat generated by Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist, AQ Khan, confessing to nuclear proliferation, relatively little attention has been paid to the future of the country's nuclear weapons programme.
AQ Khan dramatically confessed to leaking nuclear secrets in February.
In the 1970s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto famously declared that Pakistanis would go to any sacrifice to match India's nuclear weapons programme, even if it meant the people being reduced to eating grass.
Now they have a nuclear programme, they are discovering that weapons technology is a dynamic business which requires constant maintenance and upgrading.
That maintenance has been promised by President Pervez Musharraf.
But nuclear specialist and journalist Shahid ur Rehman believes the president will run into difficulties, the seeds of which were sown many years ago.
"Pakistan's programme was based on smuggled, imported technology," he says. "AQ Khan and his friends went shopping all over the world with the connivance of the Pakistani army.
"By contrast, India's programme was not as sophisticated, but it was indigenous. If there are curbs on India they will not suffer."
Shahid ur Rehman argues that it will be impossible for Pakistan to upgrade its nuclear programme legally.
"If Pakistan needs a nuclear component, they will have to approach the international market. They will not sell it, so Pakistan will have to buy it on the black market."
That means, he argues, that: "Pakistan's nuclear programme is now almost half dead. They won't be able to modernise facilities which are becoming obsolete. It is a de facto roll back."
And that is precisely what President Musharraf has promised to avoid.
"We will continue to develop our capability in line with our deterrent needs. I am the last man who will roll back," General Musharraf promised recently.
Inspections debate
So far, there is no obvious pressure on Pakistan to embark on nuclear reduction or a roll back.
But that could come, if or when new revelations about its proliferation history come to light.
The country could also come under pressure to open its facilities for inspection.
Many Pakistanis regard Dr Khan as a hero
"The outside world would be quite justified in asking the Pakistani government for proper assurances," says AH Nayyar, a physicist and nuclear expert from Qaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad.
"They could demand to inspect the log books of all sensitive organisations in Pakistan to make sure every single kilo of highly enriched uranium is taken account of. That could be very intrusive," he says.
But as long as President Musharraf is in power, that is extremely unlikely.
"No to an internal independent inquiry and no to United Nations inspections teams," he said after AQ Khan's dramatic confession last month.
He might have added 'no' to joining the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has been mooted as a possible consequence of the proliferation scandal.
But it has been ruled out by one government official after another.
Pakistan would have to be legally recognised as a nuclear weapons state first, which is unlikely, and India would have to join the NPT at the same time, which is also unlikely.
Double standards?
NPT touches another nerve. There's a widespread belief in Pakistan that it is being singled out for scrutiny while India's weapons programme is overlooked.
Take the recent hi-tech agreement between India and the United States, on cooperation in nuclear power and space technologies.
Samina Ahmed, from the International Crisis Group, believes it is a green light for proliferation.
Khan's Kahuta plant is Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory
"Transfers of dual-use technology, nuclear technology and space technology is violating a basic principle of the Non Proliferation Treaty," she says.
"It is dangerous and counterproductive.
"Dangerous because with some of the gaps in India's nuclear weapons programme being filled in with American support, that will encourage India to go ahead with its ambitious nuclear programme.
"And counter-productive because it will lead to other states playing catch-up."
While these argument rage, Pakistan is quietly hoping the whole issue will go away.
Or if it does not, that the focus of attention is turned on what President Musharraf says is the real menace - the European companies which he says form the backbone of the nuclear black market.
So far though, there is little sign of that happening.

----------------------------------------------------------------
How to thwart a nuclear black market
BY SALLY ANN BAYNARD
Sally Ann Baynard is a professorial lecturer in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
March 10, 2004
February brought news that we should all pay attention to, especially those of us who live near the two most important nuclear-target cities in America: New York and Washington.
The good news is that Libya spent 20 years and untold millions of dollars trying to develop a nuclear weapons program, but failed. Now Moammar Gadhafi is cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency to dismantle the program and reveal the sources of supply. The bad news is the existence of an international black-market network for supplying parts, machines, technology and even designs for manufacturing nuclear weapons.
Stretching from its roots in the company established by Pakistani nuclear program guru Abdul Qadeer Khan, the covert system has operated through companies from Europe to Malaysia to South Africa, with a hub of operations in Dubai and links to China. Khan has admitted selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea. The network leading from Khan is so extensive an operation for one-stop nuclear shopping that IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei called it an "international Wal-Mart."
What does this mean to us? Are we more safe or less safe than we thought?
With the Cold War over and China's nuclear program decades behind the United States', the most damaging nuclear threat, all-out nuclear war, has become extremely improbable - although we should not forget the thousands of nuclear weapons still sitting atop intercontinental ballistic missiles in Russia and continued ICBM development in China.
The second way that nuclear bombs can threaten us is indirect. A regional rogue state, like North Korea or Iran, might decide to use a nuclear weapon against an enemy in its region, for example Japan or Israel. Or one of the regular confrontations between such regional enemies as India and Pakistan could erupt into a nuclear exchange. The damage would severely affect the global economy and cause incalculable harm to the environment, not to mention the resulting worldwide instability, but its effect on the United States is no greater than on the rest of the world.
The third way we are threatened by nuclear weapons is probably the one that gives most of us the greatest anxiety these days: a nuclear weapon in the hands of an anti-American terrorist group. Is it plausible that such a terrorist group possesses such a weapon? Does the existence of the nuclear black market make this terrifying scenario more likely?
It is unlikely that a group possesses such a weapon now or we probably would already have experienced this nightmare. It is remotely plausible that such a group could obtain one or more nuclear bombs, but the likelihood diminishes daily if the United States and international officials do their jobs right.
So the question is, Are they?
The IAEA seems to be on the ball, but the Bush administration could do much better. The administration and Congress must more aggressively fund and implement the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, a 10-year program that has done much in the areas of the former Soviet Union to guard and destroy nuclear materials, weapons and expertise that might otherwise become available on the black market.
President George W. Bush has said he supports this, but his 2005 budget request includes a cut and the administration has not acted quickly in the past to remove bureaucratic barriers to this critical program.
Similarly, after the revelations in February of Pakistan's nuclear aid to Libya, Iran and North Korea and the links with China, the president proposed new measures to restrict the trade in nuclear material. But Bush's proposals and his overall strategy are, in the words of one arms control expert, "too limited and contradictory to address current and future nuclear weapons dangers adequately."
We are no more at risk than we were before this nuclear black market was exposed, and perhaps less so. We can take comfort in the failure of Libya to achieve its ends after two decades, even with plenty of oil money to spend. A full-fledged nuclear program turns out not to be so easy to set up.
If the IAEA continues its investigative work, if the Bush administration steps up to the plate in funding Nunn-Lugar and other programs to control the spread of nuclear weapons, if the president has the courage to deal seriously with Pakistan over its behavior - if all this happens - then maybe we will be significantly less threatened in the future by nuclear weapons.
Copyright ? 2004, Newsday, Inc.



---------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> CRONYISM WATCH...

AP: Firms Awarded Iraq Pacts Tied to D.C.
Fri Mar 12, 2:55 AM ET
By MATT KELLEY, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON - The former employer of the Pentagon (news - web sites)'s top contracting official in Iraq (news - web sites) shares part of $130 million in reconstruction business awarded this week.
Many of the companies awarded eight management contracts Wednesday have other strong Washington ties: Several are generous Republican donors and another is partly owned by a Democratic California senator's husband.
The Parsons Brinkerhoff construction company was one of two companies picked to share a $43.4 million contract to help manage reconstruction of Iraq's electricity grid. Retired Navy Rear Adm. David Nash, director of the program management office for the Pentagon in Baghdad, is a former president of a Parsons Brinkerhoff subsidiary.
The company also has Republican connections. It gave $90,000 to various Republican Party committees in the past five years, and $8,500 to similar Democratic groups.
"It's hard to find a major company in America anymore that doesn't have political connections," said Danielle Brian, head of the independent watchdog group Project on Government Oversight. "Federal contracting has become political. Just about every company that can compete does have political connections."
Defense Department officials say neither Nash's connections nor politics had anything to do with the contract award, and all eight awards were chosen through open competition. Army Lt. Col. Joe Yoswa, a Pentagon spokesman, said Nash does not have any authority to award contracts. Parsons Brinkerhoff spokesman Bruce Ross declined comment.
The new contracts were awarded Wednesday and Thursday in the shadow of previous controversy over Iraq reconstruction work given to Vice President Dick Cheney (news - web sites)'s former firm, Halliburton Co. Some of that work is under criminal investigation.
Halliburton refunded some money for alleged overcharges, and is running a series of television ads contending the criticism of its work is politically motivated.
The Defense Department announced two new reconstruction contracts worth $1.1 billion Thursday night.
A $500 million contract to design and build electricity facilities went to a partnership of the giant construction companies Fluor Corp. and AMEC. A $600 million contract to build drinking water systems went to a partnership of construction companies Washington Group International and Black & Veatch.
Fluor gave $48,000 to Republican committees in the past five years and $4,500 to Democrats. A Fluor vice president, Kenneth Oscar, joined the company in 2002 after spending 20 years as a contracting official at the Pentagon, the latest as acting Army assistant secretary for procurement.
The Pentagon says it chooses contractors based on which have the best management, are most likely to succeed and offer the best price. But an Army general acknowledged at a House hearing Thursday the military has made mistakes.
"We aren't perfect. It is a war zone, and we are correcting mistakes as we find them," said Gen. Paul Kern, head of the Army Materiel Command.
One such mistake was a $327 million contract to outfit the new Iraqi military. The U.S. Army canceled that contract after two losing bidders complained the decision-making process was confusing and contradictory.
The contract was awarded to Nour USA, whose president is A. Houda Farouki. He is a friend of Ahmed Chalabi, a member of the Iraqi Governing Council who was close to several top Pentagon officials before the U.S. invasion.
Nour and the Pentagon said Farouki's ties to Chalabi had nothing to do with the award. The Army hopes to have a new bidding process for that contract ready within three months, said Maj. Gary Tallman, a spokesman.
Republicans aren't the only ones with ties to Iraq contractors. URS Group Inc., partly owned by Richard C. Blum, the husband of Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California, was part of a two-company team that won $27.7 million in Iraq business Wednesday.
Blum is vice chairman of URS Group, which in partnership with New Jersey's Louis Berger Group will help manage reconstruction of Iraq's transportation, communications, security, education and health infrastructure.
Feinstein spokesman Howard Gantman said Blum's connections had nothing to do with the Iraq contracts. URS Group spokeswoman Judith Lillard did not return a telephone message.
Another contract, worth $28.5 million, went to a partnership of engineering firm CH2M Hill of suburban Denver and California construction firm Parsons Corp., which is not related to Parsons Brinkerhoff.
CH2M Hill gave $69,000 to Republican committees over the past five years and $34,000 to Democratic committees. The head of the company, Ralph R. Peterson gave $6,000 each to Republican and Democratic candidates during that time.
Karen Steeper, a CH2M Hill spokeswoman, said federal rules forbid the consideration of politics in awarding contracts.


--------------------------------------------

>> CANADA...

Meat from Farm May Have Had Human Remains
Thu Mar 11, 8:07 AM ET
By Allan Dowd
VANCOUVER, British Columbia (Reuters) - Pork products processed and distributed from the farm of accused Canadian serial killer Robert Pickton may have contained human remains, police and health officials said on Wednesday.
Pickton raised and slaughtered pigs at the Port Coquitlam farm as a part-time occupation until his arrest at the property in February 2002, and police believe he gave or sold processed meat products to friends and acquaintances.
Pickton, 53, is awaiting trial in the killings of at least 22 of more than 60 missing Vancouver prostitutes who disappeared over the past decade and are feared to have been murdered at the dilapidated farm 20 miles east of Vancouver.
"Given the state of the farm, and what we know about the investigation, we cannot rule out the possibility that cross-contamination may have occurred," B.C. provincial Health Officer Perry Kendall told reporters in Victoria.
"Cross-contamination could mean that human remains did get into or contaminate some of the pork meat," Kendall said.
Officials stressed that the farm's pig slaughtering operation was not officially licensed and he did not sell processed meat to retail outlets.
"There is no evidence we are dealing with anything other than a very specific localized issue, with a specific number of local people," said Cpl. Catherine Galliford of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Kendall said he was not contacted by the police until last month when they asked a "hypothetical question' about the potential health risk. He issued the alert when they later said it probably happened.
Details of evidence from the farm were presented in court last year at Pickton's preliminary hearing, but a court order prohibits reporters who covered the hearing from publishing details of what they heard until it is used in his trial, which will likely not start until next year.
Police defended the timing of their contacting health officials, saying it was needed to protect the investigation, although they also acknowledged more people may have received meat from Pickton than they had originally thought.
"We have carefully considered all the issues," said Vancouver Police Detective Shelia Sullivan.
Pickton is officially charged with 15 murders but prosecutors have said seven more counts are waiting to be filed. Tests have identified the DNA of nine more women, but not yet resulted in charges.
The victims were among more than 60 drug-addicted prostitutes who disappeared from Vancouver's poor Downtown Eastside neighborhood. Families of the missing women expressed horror at the news, with one telling a Vancouver radio station bluntly. "I'm not eating dinner tonight."
Pickton, in custody since his arrest, is the only person charged in the case. He has not entered a plea to the criminal charges but denied wrongdoing in a related civil lawsuit.

Posted by maximpost at 3:35 PM EST
Permalink

>> KOFI BURNS HIMSELF...


Kojo & Kofi
Unbelievable U.N. stories.

By Claudia Rosett

In the growing scandal over the United Nations Oil-for-Food program, which from 1996-2003 supervised relief to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and his staff have excused themselves from any responsibility for the massive corruption involving billions in bribes and kickbacks that went on via more than $100 billion in U.N.-approved contracts for Saddam to sell oil and buy humanitarian supplies. U.N. officials have denied that this tidal wave of graft in any way seeped into their own shop, or that they even had time to notice it was out there. They were too busy making the world a better place.

That's fascinating, not least given the ties of Annan's own son, Kojo Annan, to the Switzerland-based firm, Cotecna, which from 1999 onward worked on contract for the U.N. monitoring the shipments of Oil-for-food supplies into Iraq. These were the same supplies sent in under terms of those tens of billions of dollars worth of U.N.-approved contracts in which the U.N. says it failed to notice Saddam Hussein's widespread arrangements to overpay contractors who then shipped overpriced goods to the impoverished people of Iraq and kicked back part of their profits to Saddam's regime.

Cotecna was hired by the U.N. on December 31, 1998. Shortly afterward, press reports surfaced that Kojo was a partner in a private consulting firm doing work for Cotecna, and that just 13 months previously he had occupied a senior slot on Cotecna's own staff. Asked about this in 1999 by the London Telegraph, a U.N. spokesman, John Mills, replied that the U.N. had not been aware of the connection, and that "The tender by Cotecna was the lowest by a significant margin."

It seems there's a lot the U.N. managed not to be aware of. But the information that Cotecna -- while employing Kofi's son in any capacity -- put in the lowest bid by far for the job of authenticating Saddam's Oil-for-Food imports, is not necessarily reassuring. Cotecna, which got paid roughly $6 million for its services during that first year (the U.N. will not release figures on Cotecna's fees over the following years) was bidding on work that empowered its staff to inspect tens of billions worth of supplies inbound to a regime much interested in smuggling, and evidently accustomed to dealing in bribes and kickbacks as a routine part of business. The issue was never solely whether the monitors were cheap, but whether they were trustworthy.

The whole setup raises disturbing questions. But this is a subject on which neither the U.N. nor Cotecna has been willing to offer illumination. Asked for details, both have stonewalled. The U.N. spokesman Mills, who fielded the question in 1999, is now deceased. A query to the U.N. Oil-for-Food elicits from a spokesman only the information that the five-year-old response by the late Mills "stands, as provided by the U.N." A recent query to Cotecna, asking for at least some detail on ties to Kojo Annan, elicits nothing beyond the reply that: "There is nothing else to add."

It is possible of course, that Kojo Annan had nothing to do with the Iraq program per se, as he told the Telegraph back in 1999: "I would never play any role in anything that involves the United Nations for obvious reasons." Though at the same time, in a comment that suggested at least nodding acquaintance with the Oil-for-Food program, Kojo added: "The decision is made by the contracts committee, not by Kofi Annan."

Then why the reluctance from the U.N., or Cotecna, for that matter, to provide any further details whatsoever? Beyond that, it is disingenuous to suggest Annan had no responsibility for the contracts. Oil-for-Food was run out of the U.N. Secretariat, reporting directly to Annan, who regularly signed off on the six-month phases of the program. Without his approval, the contracts would not have gone forward.

Even if we assume that everyone on the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food staff, as well as Kofi Annan himself, was indeed ignorant of Kojo Annan's involvement with Cotecna, it is hard to buy the argument that Kofi, while signing off regularly on the program's workings, was simply oblivious to the details. Not only was Kofi Annan the boss, but he was directly involved from the beginning. Kofi Annan's official U.N. biography notes that shortly before his promotion to Secretary-General "he led the first United Nations team negotiating with Iraq on the sale of oil to fund purchases of humanitarian aid."

It was Annan, who in October 1997 brought in as Oil-for-Food's executive director Benon Sevan, reporting directly to the Secretary-General, to consolidate Oil-for-Food's operations into the Office of Iraq Program. And it was shortly after Sevan took charge that Oil-for-Food, set up by Kofi Annan's predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, with at least some transparency on individual deals, began treating as confidential such vital information as the names of specific contractors, quantities of goods, and prices paid.

U.N. staff, such as Under-Secretary General Shashi Tharoor in a letter last month to the Wall Street Journal, have argued that the U.N. was not responsible for Saddam's misdeeds, and that U.N. staff were not concerned with such kickback-relevant matters as business terms of Saddam's contracts. The disturbing implication is that the U.N. -- while collecting a commission of more than $1 billion on Saddam's oil sales to cover its own overhead in administering Oil-for-Food -- was indifferent to Saddam's short-changing the Iraqi people, whose relief was supposed to be the entire point of the program.

Beyond that, the U.N., during the final months of Oil-for-Food, gave every indication of knowing just where the problems lay. Last May, shortly after the fall of Saddam's regime, the U.N. Security Council voted to end the Oil-for-Food program and gave the U.N. Secretariat six months to tie-up loose ends before handing over any outstanding import contracts to the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority. With Saddam's regime gone as a contracting party, the U.N. began a frenzied process of "renegotiating" billions in contracts, basically winnowing out the graft component that Oil-for-Food had previously approved.

By the end of this sudden housecleaning, the U.N. had scrapped more than 25 percent of the contracts for which, under Saddam, it had already agreed to release funding from the U.N.-controlled Oil-for-Food bank accounts. Uncharacteristically, the U.N. on its website has posted explanatory notes next to some of the dropped contracts. These do not suggest a U.N. that was living in ignorance of Saddam's 10-percent-overpricing-and-kickback scheme.

For instance, in the U.N.'s own footnotes, there is reference to the welding-machine contractor from Lebanon, "unwilling to accept the 10% deduction"; likewise the Belgian and Jordanian suppliers of medicine, both refusing a "10% reduction." In other cases there is a vaguer note, such as the Russian backhoe supplier, who "refused to accept extra fee deduction." Or the supplier of "fork lift and spares" from Belarus who "stated that the supply of remaining parts cannot be cost effective under the current circumstances." Asked to further explain these notations, an Oil-for-Food spokesman offers no comment except that all available information is already posted on the U.N. website.

Altogether, according to U.N. records, 728 previously approved and funded deals were "removed from the list of amendable contracts," a few because the supplies had already been delivered, but many because the contractors appear to have run for the hills. For instance, there's the Jordanian supplier of school furniture, whose contract was dropped during the U.N.'s post-Saddam frenzy of "prioritization" because the "Company does not exist and the person in charge moved to Egypt." Or the Russian supplier of "vehicle spare parts," who "could not be contacted despite all efforts." Or the Algerian seller of "adult milk" who "has no interest in renegotiation"; the Egyptian seller of "generator" for educational purposes, who "is not enthusiastic about proceeding with the amendment"; the Syrian seller of "laboratory equipment" who is "not possible to contact."

Another 762 contracts set aside indefinitely by the U.N., post-Saddam because of their "questionable utility" were deals for goods that sound handy and humanitarian enough on the generic U.N. face of it. These include medicine from China; sugar and ambulances from Egypt; laboratory materials and medical equipment from France; educational materials from Pakistan; wheat, medical equipment, and ambulances from Russia; and yet more wheat, from Saudi Arabia. One has to wonder if the revised assessment of utility lay in the nature of the goods described, or in the actual terms of the contracts previously blessed by the U.N.

It's commendable that the U.N., facing imminent handover of the program, tried to clean up the remaining contracts. It is plausible, perhaps, that no one at the U.N. knew of the links between Kofi Annan's son, Kojo, and the firm monitoring Iraq's U.N.-approved imports, Cotecna, and that these ties had no bearing on a massively corrupt program. It is possible that only after Saddam fell did anyone among the 1,000 or so U.N. international staff administering Oil-for-Food, or Sevan, or Kofi Annan, notice that they'd been approving Saddam's deals with suppliers that were, in various combinations, paying kickbacks, hard to contact, or even, as in the case of the Jordanian school-furniture contractor, nonexistent.

But what has to be clear by now is that the U.N. itself was either corrupt, or so stunningly incompetent as to require total overhaul. There are by now enough questions, there has been enough secrecy, stonewalling, and rising evidence of graft all around the U.N. program in Iraq, so that it is surely worth an independent investigation into the U.N. itself -- and Annan's role in supervising this program. If Kofi Annan will not exercise his authority to set a truly independent inquiry in motion, it is way past time for the U.S., whose taxpayers supply about a quarter of the U.N. budget, to call the U.N. itself to account for Oil-for-Food -- in dollar terms the biggest relief operation it has ever run, and by many signs, one of the dirtiest.

-- Claudia Rosett is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and an adjunct fellow with the Hudson Institute.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/rosett200403101819.asp

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> WHERE IS CONGRESS WHEN YOU NEED IT?

AFTER THE WAR

The Oil-for-Food Scandal
The program was corrupt. The U.N. owes the Iraqis--and Congress--an explanation.

BY THERESE RAPHAEL
Thursday, March 11, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST

"If there is evidence, we would investigate it very seriously," Kofi Annan insisted last month when presented with allegations that U.N. officials knew about and may have benefited from Saddam Hussein's corruption of the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food Program. Fortunately, Saddam appears to have been a stickler for record-keeping.

A letter has come to The Wall Street Journal supporting allegations that among those favored by Saddam with gifts of oil was Benon Sevan, director of the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food Program. As detailed on this page on Feb. 9, Mr. Sevan's name appears on a list of individuals, companies and organizations that allegedly received oil allocations or vouchers from Saddam that could then be sold via middlemen for a significant markup. The list, compiled in Arabic from documents uncovered in Iraq's oil ministry, included many of Saddam's nearest and dearest from some 50 countries, including the PLO, pro-Saddam British MP George Galloway, and French politician Charles Pasqua. (Messrs. Galloway and Pasqua have denied receiving anything from Saddam.) According to the list, first published by the Iraqi daily Al Mada in January, Mr. Sevan was another beneficiary, via a company in Panama known as Africa Middle East Petroleum, Co. Ltd. (AMEP), about which we have learned quite a bit.

Mr. Sevan, through a U.N. spokesperson, has also denied the allegation. But the letter, which two separate sources familiar with its origins say was recovered from Iraqi Oil Ministry files, raises new questions about Mr. Sevan's relationship with Iraqi authorities.

The letter is dated Aug. 10, 1998, and addressed to Iraq's oil minister. It states: "Mr. Muwafaq Ayoub of the Iraqi mission in New York informed us by telephone that the above-mentioned company has been recommended by his excellency Mr. Sevan, director of the Iraqi program at the U.N., during his recent trip to Baghdad." The matter is then recommended "for your consideration and proportioning" and the letter is signed Saddam Zain Hassan, executive manager of the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), the Iraqi state-owned company responsible for negotiating oil sales with foreign buyers. A handwritten note below the signature confirms the request was granted "by his excellency the Vice President of the Republic [presumably Taha Yassin Ramadan, now in U.S. custody] in a meeting of the Command Council on the morning of Aug. 15, 1998." Scrawled below that to one side is another note stating that 1.8 million barrels were allocated to the company two days later, on Aug. 17.
A second document shown to the Journal is a chart in Arabic with the heading "Quantity of Oil Allocated and Given to Mr. Benon Sevan." The Oil-for-Food program was divided into 13 phases in all, representing roughly six-month periods from December 1996 through June 2003. Under phase four (during which the letter was written), the chart shows 1.8 million barrels as having been allocated to Mr. Sevan and 1,826 million barrels "executed." In some phases the chart indicates that an oil allocation was approved but no contract was executed for some reason, so that the total allocation awarded to Mr. Sevan in phases four through 13 is 14.2 million barrels, of which 7.291 million were actually disbursed, according to the document.

Mr. Sevan could not be reached for comment on the letter, but did issue a denial in response to our Feb. 9 article. "There is absolutely no substance to the allegations . . . that I had received oil or oil monies from the former Iraqi regime," he said through a spokesman. "Those making the allegations should come forward and provide the necessary documentary evidence." The denial notwithstanding, the documents raise enough questions to warrant an investigation by the U.N., as well as by outside investigators, including the U.S. Congress. (A U.N. spokesman said yesterday that Mr. Sevan is on extended vacation until late April, after which he retires at the month's end.)

Africa Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd., which is cited in the letter, is registered in Panama and was also approved by the U.N. to buy Iraqi oil under Oil-for-Food. While Panama registration documents list only Panamanian nominees as directors, the Journal has established that AMEP is owned and managed by Fakhry Abdelnour, a Geneva-based oil trader with superb connections in Egypt. The company was registered in the U.K. in the '80s and dissolved in 1992. Mr. Abdelnour's name does not appear on British registration documents, but his brother's and mother's, Munir Abdelnour and Ehtedal Amin Ghali, do.
In a phone conversation, Munir Abdelnour, leader of the Wafd opposition party in Egypt's parliament and a prominent businessman, said he has nothing to do with the company, despite his name appearing as a director of the now-defunct U.K.-registered company. "Africa Middle East Petroleum is a company owned and managed by my brother. He might have used my name, but I have absolutely no clue."

Fakhry Abelnour (whose wife is Panamanian and related to Panama's president) has close ties to Egypt's oil minister. He comes from a prominent Coptic family that is related to that of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr. Annan's immediate predecessor, and Mr. Sevan's former boss when the latter was U.N. envoy in Afghanistan.

Mr. Abdelnour played a key role in the early '90s in helping South Africa circumvent U.N. sanctions to buy Egyptian crude, through AMEP and a subsidiary, now dissolved, called Interstate Petroleum Company. In 1999, South Africa conducted an investigation into allegations of impropriety surrounding margins paid by South Africa's state-run purchaser, the Strategic Fuel Fund Association (whose job was to find suppliers willing to sell crude oil to South Africa) to Mr. Abdelnour's company for his services in sanctions-busting. The 255-page report submitted to parliament in December 1999 by an independent official appointed to investigate the complaint details Mr. Abdelnour's high-level connections in Egypt and the meetings arranged by him between SFF officials and Egyptian oil ministers and officials from the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), responsible for negotiating sales of Egyptian oil. "Mr Fakhry Abdelnour and his companies' involvement directly or indirectly in the South African oil procurement scenario is a fact that need not be debated. . . . I have already accepted earlier on that AMEP, Interstate and Mr. Abdelnour refer to one and the same person," states the report.

Mr. Abdelnour confirmed he owns the Panama-registered AMEP. "We have been very active in the Middle East for 25 years. We were almost the extended arm of the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation; we were controlling most of the exports in Egypt," he says. He confirmed that AMEP purchased oil from Iraq through Oil-for-Food, beginning around 1998, and said he made semi-annual trips to Baghdad to meet SOMO officials to keep contracts coming. Asked about his relations with Mr. Sevan, he says he met him only once, at an OPEC conference in Vienna, where a relative of Mr. Abdelnour who was also a friend of Mr. Sevan introduced them. They had dinner together at the InterContinental. "It was interesting to know Benon Sevan as he ran the oil-for-food program," says Mr. Abdelnour. But he insists there was no further contact and says he has no idea why a letter showing Mr. Sevan recommended his company to SOMO would be in the files.

Mr. Abdelnour confirms the many reports now in the public domain that SOMO demanded that surcharges on Iraqi oil be paid into Iraqi accounts. "I paid once," he acknowledges. "I was given an account in Jordan and the name of the lady who was in charge of this account." He says the surcharge amounted to 25 cents a barrel. Was it possible that all this happened unbeknownst to the U.N.? "Impossible," he says. "Everybody knew it. The U.N. knew about it. They [SOMO] contacted you over the phone. . . .The call was over a satellite phone, which was tapped, and the head of SOMO talked to me very openly, not through a disguised language."

AMEP still exists on registry documents in Monaco, but Mr. Abdelnour confirmed that the office there on Boulevard Princesse Charlotte closed two years ago. Intriguingly, the same building in Monaco houses another oil company, Toro Energy SAM, whose owner and a key business partner both figure prominently on the Al Mada list: oil industry specialist Cabecadas Rui de Sousa and Frenchman Patrick Maugein. (Mr. Abdelnour says he does not know either man).
Mr. Maugein, a billionaire with close ties to Jacques Chirac, is a longtime associate of the trader and former fugitive Marc Rich, who fled to Europe in 1983 to avoid answering charges of racketeering, illegal trading and dodging a tax-bill of $48 million. (Mr. Rich was pardoned by Bill Clinton in his final hours in the White House). Mr. Maugein was also a close contact of Tariq Aziz, with whom he met regularly. He is the non-executive chairman of Soco International PLC, a publicly listed London-based petroleum exploration/production company, which goes into markets the majors tend to skip--Mongolia, Vietnam, North Korea, Libya and Yemen.

Messrs. Maugein and Rui de Sousa acquired their interest in Soco through an entity called Torobex, whose shares were held by Tobex Holdings Ltd. According to Al Mada, Mr. Maugein allegedly received 25 million barrels of Iraqi crude allocations. Mr. de Sousa is also on the allocation list, down for 11 million barrels.

In a statement provided to the Journal, Mr. Maugein says "there is no truth whatever" to any allegation of impropriety and that his dealings in Iraq "were conducted in a perfectly legal manner and in strict accordance" with U.N. rules. His dealings in Iraq, he suggests, were through his 10% stake in Italiana Energia e Servizi, a Mantua-based oil refinery, which is majority-owned by Mario Contini and purchased crude from Iraq under Oil-for-Food.

On the Al Mada list, Mr. Maugein's name appears next to the name of Dutch-based oil trading company Trafigura (Beheer BV), which has the bulk of its operations in London. In his statement, Mr. Maugein says that "Trafigura's activities in Iraq are completely independent of that of Mr. Maugein and there is no connection at all between Mr. Maugein and the incident in 2001 involving Trafigura." The incident is the Essex oil smuggling scandal, on which the Journal carried an investigative story in May 2002. In a smuggling practice known as top-loading, 1.8 million barrels approved for sale under a U.N. contract was topped off with an additional 272,000 barrels in the summer of 2001, according to the captain of the Essex oil-tanker, who blew the whistle on the smuggling by advising U.S. and U.N. authorities. It was the second time in less than four months that the Essex had been chartered to carry top-loaded crude.

Trafigura purchased the oil from oil equipment supplier Ibex Energy France, which in turn bought it from SOMO in Iraq. Ibex said the scheme had been cooked up by Trafigura; Trafigura claimed Ibex fooled it into believing that it had U.N. permission to purchase all of the oil. A French government investigation into Ibex's involvement in the Essex incident appears to have been dropped in late 2002. Ibex was struck from the U.N.'s list of approved companies to deal in Iraq after the Essex incident and the Security Council's 661 Sanctions Committee, responsible for overseeing oil-for-food, asked eight governments (including the U.S., France, the U.K. and the Netherlands) to investigate, but had not heard back by the time oil-for-food was shut down last November.
Ibex's rise from modest beginnings as a regional company with non-oil commercial dealings to a major petroleum broker is something of a mystery. Its office is at 77 boulevard Champs Elysee in Paris. The building's concierge told us that Ibex and Toro occupy the same penthouse office. A receptionist readily fielded inquiries about both companies, though referred questions on Toro to Mr. de Sousa in Monaco.

"I don't share an office with Ibex. I have nothing to do with them and neither does Mr. Maugein," said Mr. de Sousa in a phone interview. "We know Ibex as we know Shell [Oil]. So they gave you my number. Don't you have the number of the Daily Mail?"

Jos? Antonio Jim?nez, a former friend and business partner who has known Mr. Maugein since 1972, sees it differently. "Ibex is a microscopic company used as a screen by Mr. Maugein. He uses Ibex and Toro Energy as screen companies to manage his oil traffic," says Mr. Jimenez. Mr. Jimenez was a minority partner in Compagnie Francaise Internationale de Distribution, which was controlled by Mr. Maugein, but the two had a falling out in the mid '90s over money. "Maugein specialized in outlaw countries--Libya, Algeria, Iraq--using his political contacts," says Mr. Jimenez. "Chirac used to call Patrick Maugein 'my cousin' and recommended him to Saddam Hussein . . . Maugein used to go every year to Baghdad to see Tariq Aziz, but after a while he would just send his brother Philippe [now a consultant for Trafigura] and de Sousa." Mr. Jimenez believes that Ibex's contracts in Iraq came via Mr. Maugein.

Mr. de Sousa says he and Mr. Maugein know Jean-Paul Cayre, the former Rich trader who is Ibex's managing director, but that they have nothing to do with his business in Iraq or elsewhere. Asked if he has any relationship with AMEP, which once shared a building in Monaco, Mr. de Sousa said "I probably did some business with them buying Egyptian crude at the end of the '80s and early '90s. I don't know [Fakhry Abdelnour], but I talked with him on the phone."

Mr. de Sousa believes the Al Mada list "has something to do with the competition between different groups sharing power in Iraq. People are now adjusting accounts between former people linked to the oil business, people who went there. I went [to Iraq] to discuss potential investments. Who didn't go?" The complaints about Saddam's corruption of Oil-for-Food "is a big hypocrisy," he says. If corruption occurred, "in my opinion it was because whoever was sitting at the U.N. Security Council was not doing their job . . . In my view, the whole thing was accepted, admitted by major countries."

As further details of Oil-for-Food unfold, it becomes clearer than ever that the inspectors employed by the U.N. were, at best, lax in monitoring Saddam's get-rich-quick scheme. This is another area begging for investigation.
Inspections under Oil-for-Food, as former U.N. program-officer Michael Soussan indicated in The Wall Street Journal on Monday, amounted to little more than rubber-stamping whatever contract Saddam's regime initialed. On the export side, top-loading of the Essex and other vessels happened on the watch of inspectors from Dutch-based company Saybolt International BV, though no one has alleged publicly that Saybolt's inspectors knew what was going on. Saybolt's name appears on the Al Mada list too. Saybolt has denied it received anything from Saddam.

The import side too was rife with corruption, including kickbacks demanded by Iraq on imported goods, and shameful lack of quality controls on much of the food and medicine entering Iraq. The job of inspecting those goods fell mostly to a Geneva-based company called Cotecna Inspection, SA. In February 1999, the U.N. terminated a five-year contract with Lloyd's Register, which had set up an innovative system in Jordan for inspecting shipments of goods going into Iraq to ensure against sanctions-busting. The contract was put to tender and Cotecna won with the lowest bid. It has had the contract ever since and it was renewed by the Coalition Provisional Authority in November.

And yet the choice of Cotecna should have raised a few eyebrows. The firm's founder and president is the octogenarian Elie Georges Massey, a Coptic emigr? who transformed his company from salt-extraction in Iran in the early '70s into one of a handful of players in the rough-and-tumble business of pre-shipment inspection (or PSI). PSI work mostly involves winning contracts in the developing world, where customs authorities are too corrupt or inept to be trusted, to monitor the flow of exports and imports.

Cotecna, known in the industry for the Massey family's superb contacts in the countries in which it does business, has won PSI deals in Iran, Nigeria, Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, Peru and other places. One prominent former employee of Cotecna is Kojo Annan, Kofi Annan's son by his first marriage. The young Mr. Annan was employed by Cotecna in the mid-1990s. He reportedly continued a consultancy relationship with Cotecna through his Nigerian-based company.

Philip Henebry, Cotecna's CFO, confirmed that Kojo Annan had been employed there, but would not confirm any dates. Asked how Cotecna was able to underbid competitors on the Iraq contract by as much as half, he replied that "We felt that the margins with competitors were very, very high. Originally the contract was for short periods and we worked on the assumption it would be renewed."

At the time of the U.N. inspection tender, Cotecna's reputation wasn't exactly stellar. Its CEO, Robert Massey, was indicted by a Swiss magistrate in a bribery and money laundering scandal involving Pakistan's former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, that rocked the PSI industry. Also indicted were a former employee of Swiss giant and the global PSI leader, Societ? G?n?rale de Surveillance (SGS)--which at the time owned a majority stake in Cotecna--and a Geneva-based Bhutto lawyer. Cotecna claimed it was a victim of Pakistani politics. SGS, which was suffering its own management and financial troubles, subsequently sold Cotecna back to the Massey family and itself came under new management which diversified the company away from its reliance on PSI contracts. Cotecna, meanwhile, dusted itself off and went on to win a lucrative U.N. deal. According to Yves Genier, a Swiss journalist from the newspaper l'Agefi who has been looking into Cotecna's role here, the prosecutor's case was dropped for lack of compelling public interest.

There is no doubt that the U.N. relief effort in Iraq has been a global scandal. A monstrous dictator was able to turn the Oil-for-Food program into a cash cow for himself and his inner circle, leaving Iraqis further deprived as he bought influence abroad and acquired the arms and munitions that coalition forces discovered when they invaded Iraq last spring.
A U.N. culture of unaccountability is certainly also to blame. And Security Council members share responsibility for lax oversight, no doubt one reason there is so little appetite for an investigation.

But Saddam's ability to reap billions for himself, his cronies and those who proved useful to him abroad depended on individuals who were his counterparties. These deserve a full investigation if the U.N.'s credibility is to be restored and its role in Iraq and elsewhere trusted. Especially now, with the U.N. taking a more active role in Iraq, it's time we knew more about how the oil-for-food scandal was allowed to happen.

Ms. Raphael is editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal Europe.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> "..."

Red-Faced U.N. Finds Black Box of the 1994 Rwandan Air Crash
By WARREN HOGE
UNITED NATIONS, March 11 -- Embarrassed officials disclosed Thursday that the United Nations was unknowingly holding an airplane black box shipped here from Africa after the 1994 crash that killed the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi and set off the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans.
Secretary General Kofi Annan's spokesman, Fred Eckhard, who earlier this week had denied knowledge of the box, said Thursday that a search provoked by journalists' questions had turned it up in a locked file drawer in the office of the United Nations' air safety coordinator, across the street from headquarters.
Mr. Eckhard said diary entries showed that the officials who received the black box a few months after the crash concluded from the recorder's "pristine condition" that it could not have been in the wreck. He said it had never been opened nor had its tape been played.
He said that it was being given to outside experts to determine whether it was the black box from the 1994 wreck and that Mr. Annan had ordered the United Nations inspector general to investigate how it had gone unaccounted for. "The secretary general wants to know exactly what went on 10 years ago that this matter wasn't reported up the chain," Mr. Eckhard said.
Mr. Annan, speaking to reporters after his monthly lunch with Security Council members, said he was "incredulous," and called the situation "a real foul-up, a first-class foul-up."
Thursday's announcement followed a report in Le Monde, a French daily, about an unpublished French investigation that accused the United Nations of withholding the downed aircraft's flight recorder.
Mr. Eckhard acknowledged that he had "ridiculed" the report when first asked about it on Tuesday, but that a subsequent inquiry showed that the black box had been sent to New York three months after the crash, in an official pouch from the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Kigali, the Rwandan capital, by way of Nairobi, Kenya.
The index numbers and details on an accompanying tag had been circulated in aviation circles, but there had been no confirmation of the black box's origins, he said.
The air-safety officials, after concluding that it was not the right black box, apparently decided to store it in a file cabinet but never notified anyone in the secretary general's office, Mr. Eckhard said.
Mr. Annan was head of the United Nations peacekeepers when the massacre occurred. He has often cited the failure to stop the mass killings as one of the lowest points in the history of the international community, and some reports have singled out the United Nations for criticism.
The Rwandan president, Juvenal Habyarimana, and his Burundian counterpart, Cyprien Ntaryamira, both of the dominant Hutu tribe, died on April 6, 1994, when their Falcon 50 aircraft was brought down by two ground-to-air missiles as it approached the airport in Kigali.
Their deaths triggered a 100-day wave of killings in Rwanda of an estimated 800,000 minority Tutsi and moderate Hutu by extremist Hutu.
It has never been certain who shot down the plane, with suspicion alternating between Tutsi rebels and hard-liners in the Habyarimana government worried that Mr. Habyarimana was yielding to international pressure to bring Tutsi into the government.
Le Monde said the French investigation -- carried out by the antiterrorist division of the French judicial police -- concluded that it was Paul Kagame, Rwanda's current president, who ordered the plane shot down. At the time, Mr. Kagame was the leader of a rebel Tutsi movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front.



Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company |

Posted by maximpost at 12:10 AM EST
Permalink
Thursday, 11 March 2004

>> REBUILDING IRAQ?

Iraqi Currency Exchange Comes Up Millions Short
Cashiers Held Responsible for Missing Funds

By Ariana Eunjung Cha and Omar Fekeiki
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, March 11, 2004; Page A16
BAGHDAD -- For the past month, Nadhima Hussein and 12 other women have been locked inside a dark, fly-infested room at a police station here. The Iraqi Finance Ministry says Hussein, a bank manager, owes them millions of dollars to compensate for counterfeit or missing money her branch accepted during the currency exchange that ended in mid-January. She says she did nothing wrong.
The cash swap, designed to erase the image of former president Saddam Hussein from Iraqi bills, was among the most visible projects of the U.S.-led reconstruction, and, on the surface, things appeared to go smoothly. The transport trucks were not hijacked, the banks were not held up. The exchange, which took place between Oct. 15 and Jan. 15, was credited with helping to stabilize the economy.
But a Finance Ministry audit that began a few weeks ago turned up a surprise: The amount of new money given out exceeded the amount of old money taken in by more than $22 million. The ministry has accused bank employees, almost all of whom are female cashiers, of stealing the money for themselves or for organized crime groups. It has sent out notices to hundreds of them, demanding that they repay the money or face imprisonment.
The accused say others had access to the money after it had been counted and that the new government, in a rush to judgment, is acting just like the old government, putting the blame for its own mistakes or corruption on rank-and-file workers. Demonstrations this month have called for the release of the cashiers, who are believed to be the largest group of women to be detained since Hussein was toppled last year.
"They took these women as a sacrifice, so that their colleagues will be frightened to pay the money back and that their problem of the shortage will be solved," said Falih Maktuf, a lawyer who has volunteered to represent the women without pay.
Suspects who maintain their innocence are eligible for release on bail, but few can afford it. Maktuf has asked that the women be released without bail pending trial. They will be tried by a special judge with expertise in economic crimes.
Law is still a fluid concept in the new Iraq. On Monday, the Iraqi Governing Council approved an interim constitution with a bill of rights, but it is a legal framework that does not address the nitty-gritty of crime and punishment. Committees are drafting new foreign exchange laws and guidelines for the role of regulatory bodies. In the meantime, most of the laws in effect during Hussein's rule are still being followed.
The banking scandal is one of several examples of alleged government corruption in postwar Iraq that have hampered reconstruction efforts. The Oil Ministry spent months waiting for spare parts for pumping stations and then discovered forged records showing the equipment had been paid for but never shipped from Amman, Jordan. The Interior Ministry has fired border police who took bribes to let people enter the country from Iran without proper identification. Officials at Iraq's five ports have disciplined workers for stealing from humanitarian aid shipments.
The Governing Council and the U.S.-led occupation authority began a crackdown on corruption a few weeks ago, creating commissions with independent authority to investigate possible crimes in government ministries. A new law governing the operations of the Central Bank authorizes the creation of a financial services tribunal, which will determine the fate of the cashiers.
"In the past, employees did not have any respect for laws. We want to teach people this respect," said Sabah Nouri, head of the Finance Ministry's bank audit committee.
One cashier has confessed to accepting counterfeit old dinars and exchanging them for new ones because she pitied the old man who brought them to the bank. Another said she inserted some white papers in place of old bills and paid herself in new Iraqi dinars. But the rest of the accused say they are innocent and that either someone else tampered with the money, they made an honest mistake in counting it or they unknowingly accepted counterfeit currency.
Their attorneys said the women were arrested because they were easy targets. Samir Adel, the head of the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq, accused the new Iraqi ministries of using "the same old Baathist ways."
"They don't have evidence," he said, "but they imprison people."
Nadhima Hussein was summoned to the Finance Ministry in February for what she was told was urgent business. There, she recalled, a government representative laid out several bricks of forged money and told her they had come from the bank she manages -- a branch of Rafidain Bank in Nasiriyah, about 200 miles south of Baghdad. Hussein, 35, said she was called a thief and told to repay $6.9 million.
"This is fiction," she said she replied. She told them she knew nothing about the fake money and therefore could not return it. A few hours later, she was in jail.
The currency exchange followed months of planning by experts from the U.S. Treasury Department and other foreign government agencies. Occupation officials hoped to get rid of dinars with Hussein's portrait and replace them with bills carrying images from Iraq's history.
They devised an elaborate system for security. They flew the new money in on jumbo jets direct from the printers, paid for four armed escort vehicles for each truck carrying the money, and asked U.S.-led military forces to guard storage facilities.
At each bank, a cashier counted and inspected old money, then dipped it in red ink so it couldn't be used again. With a rubber band, the cashier attached to the brick of money a credit card-sized piece of paper with her name on it. The money was sewn up in a bag and taken to be burned. But between the point where the cashiers signed off on their work and the time the money was destroyed, several other people handled the money, according to a description of the process by occupation officials.
Representatives from the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq, Women's Freedom Organization and other workers' rights groups who have reviewed procedures for the cash exchange also said there were several vulnerable points. Maktuf, the lawyer, said the manager and other bank employees had access to the old cash before it was destroyed. Drivers who took the old cash to warehouses for eventual destruction -- and the Central Bank employees who accompanied each driver -- also could have tampered with the money, he said. Because the ink used to mark the obsolete bills could be washed away with special chemicals, he added, the old bills were not worthless.
But Nouri, of the Finance Ministry, said he believed it was impossible that anyone but the cashiers could have inserted forged bills or taken some of the money.
Iraqi Police Col. Wahda Nasrrat, head of the new economic crimes section, said he expected more arrests but that people other than the cashiers may be involved in the forgeries and stealing. The system that was used to transport the money "is not a good system and can be broken," Nasrrat said.
Nadhima Hussein now shares a large, drafty room with a group of other suspects. They sleep on the concrete floor on piles of blankets and spend their time sharing stories about their families and crying. Among Hussein's roommates is Zainab Jabbar, 35, a cashier at a Rasheed Bank branch near the Shaab Stadium in Baghdad. Jabbar has been asked to pay $40,000. With her salary of about $180 a month, she calculated, it would take her 19 years to repay.

? 2004 The Washington Post Company

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> REBUILDING 2...

Missteps Led to Canceled Iraq Contract
House Panel to Begin Hearings on Procedures; Pentagon Awards 7 New Projects
By Mary Pat Flaherty and Jackie Spinner
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, March 11, 2004; Page A22
Vague contract language, missing paperwork, staff turnover and general instability on the ground led to such flaws in a $327 million contract to outfit the new Iraqi Army that the work had to be canceled and rebid, according to a senior U.S. Army official involved in the contracting.
U.S. contracting officers working for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad were imprecise in describing the work needed when they sought bids and they did not follow their own procedures for ranking offers, the Army official said.
The hostile setting and a Baghdad staff too small to do the job help explain the failures but there is "no excuse for doing this with a contract of this magnitude," said the Army official, who would speak only on background about the problems his office has uncovered.
The cancellation of what had been the largest non-construction contract yet awarded in the Iraqi rebuilding effort comes as the House Government Reform Committee is set to hold hearings today on contract coordination and management in Iraq. Meanwhile, the Defense Department announced yesterday that it had awarded seven contracts to support the Program Management Office in Baghdad, the entity that will oversee the spending of the $18.6 billion in supplemental reconstruction funding that Congress authorized last fall.
Retired Rear Adm. David Nash, who heads the Program Management Office, said the remaining 10 construction contracts will be awarded within the next 30 days, two months late.
"You can do things expeditiously but you still have to do it correctly," said Nash, who is testifying today before the congressional panel. "There's a balance."
The Iraqi Army contract, funded by U.S. tax dollars, was awarded in January to Nour USA Ltd., a Vienna firm. The firm's bid drew immediate formal protests from several losing companies and prompted U.S. Army lawyers and Pentagon-based officials to begin a review that led to the contract's cancellation Friday. The Washington reviewers could not reconcile the facts presented on the final evaluation sheets for bidders with information in the contract files and noticed missing documents, said the contracting officer, who added that he had not seen anything comparable during his 29 years in Army contracting.
Normally, he said, "the paperwork follows a consistent trail" that leads to the overall rating for bidders. "We couldn't track" the factors for the ranking, he said.
CPA officials in Baghdad declined to talk about the contract and referred all questions to the Army. However, Lt. Col. Joseph M. Yoswa, a Defense Department spokesman based in Washington for the CPA, said yesterday, "We have a much better capability of contracting here in Washington. We have the experience here -- not saying that the CPA and civilians and military in Iraq are doing things wrong. But they have a lot of pressure they are dealing with. Contracting is not a simple process, and this is important. We've got civilians on the ground doing work, and we're still in combat conditions. It's not easy."
The language used to describe the required work was so "ambiguous," the Army contracting official said, that it could have been held against the government by losing firms if the contract moved forward. The vague language, he said, may help explain the wide range of bids on the work made by 19 firms, ranging from Nour's $327 million to a high of more than $1 billion.
The contract's cancellation, the Army stressed, "is not a reflection on Nour or its capabilities."
In interviews, Nour USA said it won the contract based on merit and stood by its proposal. The company has drawn attention because its president, A. Huda Farouki, is a financier and friend of Ahmed Chalabi, chairman of the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council. Nour spokesman Robert Hoopes has said there is no business relationship between the two men. A Nour press release said any suggestion that politics played a role in the contract is false.
Ongoing hostilities in Iraq make it hard to be as exacting in contract requests as might normally be expected, said the senior Army official, however "we need to be as informative as we can." The original contract, he said, should have been more precise about equipment needs or the number and range of sites in which the work would be done -- factors that can dramatically influence costs.
The problems were exacerbated by staff turnover. The military contracting officer who had handled the bidding in Baghdad was rotated back to the United States on regular duty a week before the contract was awarded, the Army official said.
A new contract to outfit the Iraqis likely will not be awarded for 60 to 90 days, said Mark J. Lumer, deputy assistant secretary of the Army for Iraqi operations, policy and procurement, who spoke at a Pentagon briefing yesterday. The Army could piggyback on several existing government contracts to buy some supplies more quickly, the Army contracting official said -- using an existing law enforcement contract, for example, to purchase some weapons.
But the rebidding of the main contract will set back the establishment of new Iraqi forces as coalition officials race to hand off sovereignty this summer to the Iraqis.
Army contracting officers in Washington will draft and award the new contract.
Delays in equipping the new Iraqi Army and other Iraqi security forces have frustrated U.S. military commanders in the field, said Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., commander of the 82nd Airborne Division.
In a press briefing yesterday in Baghdad, he said that "if we had the equipment for these brave young men, we would be much farther along." Swannack said he would have drawn on funds available to him as a commander to buy some equipment earlier had he known the extent of the delays.
Rep. Thomas M. Davis III (R-Va.), who called today's House hearing, said of the canceled contract: "They probably don't have as many contracting officers over there as they need." And, he said, "they need to make a decision on what to do next time on this. What did they learn? When you're making decisions in a war zone you always make mistakes."


-----------------------------------------------------

>> REBUILDING 3...

Administration pressed for real estimate of war's cost

By Pauline Jelinek
Associated Press
Pressed to estimate the cost of future operations in Iraq, the Defense Department has repeatedly said it's just too hard to do.
Now the ranks of disbelievers are growing -- in Congress and among private defense analysts. Some say the Bush administration's refusal to estimate costs could erode American support for the Iraq campaign, as well as the credibility of the White House and lawmakers.
"It is crucial that we have every bit of information so we can level with the taxpayer," Democratic Rep. David Obey fumed recently at Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. "We don't have that information now."
"The White House plays hide and seek with the costs of the war," said Sen. Robert Byrd, D-W.Va.
The object of their ire is President Bush's proposed defense spending for the budget year beginning Oct. 1 -- a $402 billion request that didn't include money for the major military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And it's not just Democrats who disagree with the administration's approach.
Republican chairmen of the House and Senate budget committees penciled in tens of billions of dollars for the two military campaigns in spending plans they began pushing through Congress this week.
Asked at a recent congressional hearing why costs for Iraq were not included in the Bush administration's budget, Pentagon comptroller Dov Zakheim replied: "Because we simply cannot predict them."
Yet many contend the administration at least knows that roughly 100,000 soldiers will remain in Iraq for another year, and could have budgeted an estimate or a placeholder request for that.
"We know it will not be free," said Steve Kosiak of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
Private and congressional analysts, in fact, have done a number of studies and projections of possible costs:
* Daniel Goure of the conservative Lexington Institute said he expects troop levels to gradually drop over five years to one-half or one-third the present deployment -- meaning 30,000 to 50,000 Americans troops could remain in Iraq through 2009.
* The Congressional Budget Office a few months ago estimated the cost to occupy Iraq through 2013 at up to $200 billion, depending on troops levels.
* Casualties could rise to at least 1,000, said a recent report by Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a frequent Pentagon adviser. "One thousand or more dead in Iraq is hardly Vietnam," Cordesman said. "But it must be justified and explained, and explained honestly."
The Council on Foreign Relations, citing polls that show American support for the mission slipping, urged leaders of both parties this week to publicly commit to a multibillion dollar program over at least the next several years, outlining "the magnitude of resources that will be necessary, even if they cannot identify all of the specific requirements."
White House budget chief Joshua Bolten acknowledged in a briefing with reporters last month that the military will need money over and above the defense request -- up to $50 billion the administration will seek in a so-called emergency supplemental budget for Iraq and Afghanistan. It used a similar supplemental last fall to ask for $87 billion for Afghanistan and Iraq
But administration officials don't plan to ask for that supplemental, or specify what it might include, until sometime after Jan. 1, 2005 -- about two months after November's presidential election.
Had Bush included it in the budget proposal sent to Congress in February, the government's surging deficit problem would have looked even worse.

-------------------------------------------------------------
>> SYRIA WATCH...

Generals say they need help securing Iraqi borders
By John Diamond
USA Today
U.S. military commanders say they are struggling to secure the borders of Iraq, particularly with Syria in the remote western desert, to prevent Islamic militants from crossing into Iraq to set up operations.
The commander of U.S. forces in western Iraq told Pentagon reporters by video-conference Wednesday that field units are pressing for more men and vehicles to cover huge, sparsely populated regions where small terrorist cells of five to eight people each may be infiltrating on their way to Iraqi cities.
"Our biggest fight is in regards to disallowing terrorist organizations to get established out there in the west," Army Maj. Gen. Charles Swannack Jr. told Pentagon reporters from Baghdad. "You must understand the vastness of the border region out there. It's 850 kilometers (527 miles) of desert with a 10-foot, 12-foot berm marking the border."
The problem is much the same in northern Iraq, along the border with Turkey and Iran, according to Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, who spoke to Pentagon reporters in a teleconference Tuesday. Ham said he and other field commanders have been pressing their superiors to provide additional border police units, better training and more equipment.
Swannack, who said he had to order body armor, radios and vehicles out of his own unit's budget because of bureaucratic delays, said Iraqi forces taking over border control need SUVs to cover the many unofficial crossing points into Iraq from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. These are routes that have been used by smugglers and nomads for 2,000 years.
About 18,000 troops from the Army's 82nd Airborne Division and other Army units under Swannack's command are about to give the Marines responsibility for Al-Anbar province, Iraq's largest, a region that stretches from the edge of Baghdad along the Euphrates River and such hostile cities as Fallujah to the vast western border regions. U.S. intelligence has been watching this area closely, both for terrorists coming in and for Iraqi weapons scientists going out.
"It's a long, porous border," CIA Director George Tenet said in Senate testimony Tuesday. "Syria could do far more than they are today to close off at least major crossing points."
As of last fall, Swannack said, "It was a wide open border," to terrorists, foreign fighters and smugglers. The situation is improving with the establishment of new Iraqi police organizations that are taking up some of the patrol work. But in Swannack's huge area, border police have a few buses and "a couple of small trucks." They still lack the equipment to get to the remote desert crossings.
In Al-Anbar province, Swannack estimated there are between 50 and 80 foreign terrorists operating in eight to 10 cells, mostly in cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi. U.S. forces have been making progress getting tips about the activities and whereabouts of these cells because, Swannack said, "the Iraqis don't want them there."



--------------------------------------------------------
>> DULLES WATCH...

Financial Agencies Criticize U.S. for Detaining Spanish IMF Worker at Dulles
By Mary Beth Sheridan
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, March 11, 2004; Page A12
A Spanish economist working for the International Monetary Fund was handcuffed as he got off a flight at Dulles International Airport last weekend and questioned for three hours, an incident that prompted startled complaints from international financial institutions in Washington.
Alex Segura, 33, who lives in Springfield, said he was detained Saturday by U.S. Homeland Security officials as he returned from a work trip to Senegal. He said the officials questioned him about his travels and passport and searched his luggage before freeing him with no explanation.
A Homeland Security spokeswoman said Segura's name and birth date matched those of a "dangerous individual" listed in federal security databases.
"It was unfortunate. But his name came up as a match when we do our advanced passenger information. Obviously Mr. Segura is not a terrorist," said the spokeswoman, Christiana Halsey, who works for the Customs and Border Protection agency within Homeland Security.
She added that "with the new focus on terrorism . . . these mistakes are going to happen."
Since the incident, e-mails have ricocheted through international financial institutions in Washington, with employees expressing outrage and concern that they, too, could be detained. The agencies employ thousands of people from around the globe, who routinely travel abroad for work.
A spokesman for the IMF, William Murray, said the agency had complained to the U.S. executive director's office at the fund, which represents the U.S. government.
"The management of the IMF is extremely concerned about the development and asked the U.S. executive director's office to raise this with the appropriate authorities," Murray said.
The World Bank also contacted U.S. authorities to see "what can be done to avoid this sort of incident happening in the future," the bank said in a memo to its staff.
Segura said Homeland Security officials boarded his Air France plane shortly after it arrived from Paris and made a beeline for him. He said he showed them his Spanish passport, which carried the G-4 visa given to employees of international organizations, and also handed over his United Nations identification. The officials asked him to leave the plane and promptly handcuffed him, Segura said.
The officers then drove Segura to the main terminal, took off the handcuffs and questioned him. They refused to let him call his wife, who was waiting in the terminal, but eventually sent an officer to contact her, according to Segura and the Customs spokeswoman.
"What's really annoying, when you come to the U.S. . . . you feel like they can do anything to you," Segura said. He added, however, that the officers were polite.
Segura said his previous trip abroad, a visit to Peru in December, occurred without incident.
Halsey, the spokeswoman, said agents have to follow security procedures when they believe a dangerous person is arriving. She said she could not provide details about the person named Segura who was on the government's lookout list.
Segura said he told the U.S. officials that his previous passport had disappeared about five years ago, when he submitted it to the U.S. Embassy in Madrid for a visa. It was not clear whether the person on the lookout list might be using that document.


----------------------------------------------------------

>> PENTAGON WATCH...

Nominee to Head Army Withdraws
Roche's Air Force Leadership Criticized
By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, March 11, 2004; Page A04
The Bush administration dropped efforts yesterday to shift James G. Roche from heading the Air Force to heading the Army, acknowledging that his nomination had become so mired in controversy over a cadet sex scandal and a potential deal with Boeing Co. to lease tanker aircraft that Congress was unlikely to act on the appointment this year.
The admission of defeat highlighted the difficulties confronting the administration in trying to put both controversies behind it. Roche's nomination as Army secretary, presented last spring as a way to bring energetic new leadership to that service, instead drew congressional ire at the Pentagon's inattention, questionable judgments and resistance to demands for internal documents.
Although Roche took forceful action early last year to probe reports of sexual assaults at the Air Force Academy, investigations have continued into assault cases stretching back a decade. Calls in Congress have persisted for some Air Force leaders to be held accountable for past lax enforcement.
In the past week, new reports have emerged of flaws in the handling of sexual assault cases by the Air Force's Pacific command, and the Air Force has launched a service-wide review.
Even more problematic for Roche was the Air Force's plan to lease as many as 100 Boeing 767s as refueling tankers. Roche championed the $21 billion proposal as a novel way of bolstering an aging tanker fleet, but critics attacked it as corporate welfare for Boeing that would needlessly raise taxpayer costs. Investigators also are examining alleged improper contacts between the Air Force and Boeing during negotiations on the deal.
Additionally, the matter has grown into a struggle between Congress and the administration over access to internal documents. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a leading congressional opponent of the plan, put a hold on nominations of civilian Pentagon officials to protest the administration's unwillingness to surrender Roche's e-mails and other material related to the tanker deal. McCain said yesterday that removal of Roche's nomination would have no effect on other appointments being held up.
"I still believe we need these documents, and I will continue to fight for them as long as I can hold the nominations," he said in a phone interview.
In a brief statement released by the Pentagon, Roche said he requested that his nomination be withdrawn. "Given the range of issues before the Senate in a busy legislative year, I accept that my nomination is unlikely to be considered this year," he said, adding that he intends to continue as secretary of the Air Force.
An official close to Roche said that months ago, Roche had given Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld a standing offer to remove his name from consideration. Rumsfeld, the source said, accepted the offer this week.
"At several points in the last few months, Roche went to Rumsfeld and said, 'If you want me to back out, I will,' " the official said. "Rumsfeld was all, 'No, you're the choice. Let's go forward with it.' I think there was just a realization by Rumsfeld at this point in the calendar" that time had run out.
Rumsfeld had asked Roche, a 23-year Navy veteran and former Northrop Grumman Corp. executive, to move to the Army last spring, as part of an attempt to bring in new civilian and military leadership that would modernize and restructure the service.
Rumsfeld had dismissed the previous secretary, Thomas E. White, after months of strained relations. He also had summoned Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker from retirement to take over as Army chief of staff. Schoomaker succeeded Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, who like White had clashed with Rumsfeld over the pace and nature of Army modernization.
But Roche's nomination quickly ran into trouble when a congressional commission probing the academy sex scandal concluded that Air Force leaders had not done enough to prevent sexual assaults or respond to reported cases for much of the past decade.
Roche purged the academy's leadership earlier in the year and issued new policies to fortify the school's ability to monitor and respond to sexual misconduct. Nevertheless, the Senate Armed Services Committee made clear it would not act on his nomination until after an investigation by the Air Force's inspector general.
That investigation, due soon, will comment positively on Roche's actions over the past year, according to the official close to him.
The tanker proposal, meanwhile, remains in limbo pending not only resolution of the documents dispute with Congress but also investigations by the Pentagon's inspector general, federal prosecutors and securities regulators into whether the deal was tainted by unethical conduct.
In November, Boeing fired two senior executives -- its chief financial officer, Michael M. Sears, and Darleen A. Druyun, a former Air Force procurement official. The company accused Sears of beginning employment discussions with Druyun while she was still overseeing Boeing contracts at the Air Force. The company's chief executive, Phil Condit, resigned shortly afterward.
Rumsfeld also ordered a review of the condition of the existing tanker fleet and other options for replacing or refurbishing it.
Les Brownlee, the undersecretary of the Army, has been serving as interim secretary, and a senior defense official said yesterday that Bush would likely move to make Brownlee permanent. Brownlee is a former Senate staff member with deep ties to Congress.
In another personnel matter yesterday, the White House said that Bush had picked the FBI's chief financial officer, Tina W. Jonas, to take over as the Pentagon's chief financial officer, succeeding Dov S. Zakheim, who announced his resignation Tuesday. Before joining the FBI in 2002, Jones was deputy undersecretary of defense for financial management. She also worked for the House Appropriations Committee, the White House Office of Management and Budget, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Staff writers Renae Merle and R. Jeffrey Smith contributed to this report.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

GAO Urges Better Tests of Missile Defense System
By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, March 11, 2004; Page A08
The Pentagon has taken some steps toward more realistic testing of the antimissile system that it plans to deploy this year to protect the United States, but many aspects of the system remain to be tested, according to a congressional report.
The report, prepared by the General Accounting Office, expressed concern about a lack of test data showing whether the system can work using all its final parts instead of prototypes, and whether it can adequately identify warheads in a field of decoys. Also still to be demonstrated, the report said, are such actions as multiple launches of interceptors, nighttime intercepts and operations under adverse weather conditions.
The report, a copy of which was made available to The Washington Post ahead of public release today, focused on assessing the Bush administration's efforts against a list of 50 recommendations issued in the final weeks of the Clinton administration by Philip Coyle, then the Pentagon's chief weapons evaluator. President Bill Clinton decided in August 2000 not to proceed with deployment of the antimissile system pending further development and testing.
President Bush has substantially altered the program, expanding the scope of experimentation and committing the country to deploying a rudimentary national antimissile system by the end of 2004. Even so, most of the recommendations put forward by Coyle "are still relevant," the GAO report said, "because the technical challenges and uncertainty with developing, testing, and fielding effective defensive capabilities . . . remain significant."
"The administration hasn't gone through the technical and testing steps the way they've been advised to do by the Pentagon's own operations and testing people," said Rep. John F. Tierney (D-Mass.), who requested the GAO review. "The report very clearly indicates that there's not been enough progress to give us any sense of security and comfort that this system is at a place where it ought to move forward."
The report said construction of a "test bed" facility in Alaska will help bring more realism and complexity to a testing program whose eight flights have been limited to a single scenario -- a target missile has flown out over the Pacific from California and the interceptor has launched from the Marshall Islands. Greater attention also is being paid to improving the system's ability to distinguish enemy warheads from decoys, the report said.
But the report warned that test plans through 2007 do not include sufficiently challenging targets and decoys. It said the first attempt at launching two interceptors against two targets is not scheduled until 2007. And no plans exist to assess the effects of severe weather on the system's performance or to conduct flight tests "under unrehearsed and unscripted conditions," the report said.
The antimissile system, when activated, will rely on tracking data from an old surveillance radar in Alaska, called Cobra Dane. But the report noted that the radar will not have been tested in its new role and will lack the ability, even with software improvements being completed, to provide more than a rudimentary analysis of incoming missile threats.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> A OF E...
Alarm Raised Over Quality of Uranium Found in Iran
By CRAIG S. SMITH
VIENNA, March 10 -- United Nations nuclear inspectors have found traces of extremely highly enriched uranium in Iran, of a purity reserved for use in a nuclear bomb, European and American diplomats said Wednesday.
Among traces that inspectors detected last year are some refined to 90 percent of the rare 235 isotope, the diplomats said. While the International Atomic Energy Agency has previously reported finding "weapons grade" traces, it has not revealed that some reached such a high degree of enrichment.
The presence of such traces raises the stakes in the international debate over Iran's nuclear program and increases the urgency of determining the uranium's origin. If the enrichment took place in Iran, it means the country is much further along the road to becoming a nuclear weapons power than even the most aggressive intelligence estimates anticipated.
Iran has said that its nuclear program is for purely peaceful purposes, while the United States contends it has secretly tried to produce nuclear weapons. The atomic agency is expected to vote Friday on a resolution criticizing Iran for lack of candor about its nuclear efforts.
Iran has said that all of the highly enriched uranium found on its nuclear facilities was contamination that occurred before imported equipment arrived in the country. Iranian officials said they could not identify the origin of the contamination because the equipment was imported through middlemen in five countries.
I.A.E.A. officials said the contamination may have originated in Pakistan. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist, has admitted secretly supplying uranium enrichment equipment to Iran and other nations. The agency has asked Pakistan for permission to take environmental samples from its enrichment facilities to see if they match the weapons-grade traces in Iran. "Pakistan could let Iran off the I.A.E.A. hook," said a European diplomat here.
American officials argue that traces of such highly enriched uranium, regardless of their origin, are another disturbing clue to what they believe are Iran's hidden ends.
"What it shows is that they have a system that is capable of producing weapons grade uranium," said an American official speaking from Washington. "If it's an assembly that was removed from Pakistan or elsewhere, it's already battle tested," he said.
On Wednesday, Iran's defense minister, Ali Shamkhani, acknowledged for the first time that the Iranian military had produced centrifuges to enrich uranium, the Associated Press reported from Teheran. He said they were manufacturing unsophisticated models for civilian users. The admission came after the I.A.E.A. presented Iran with evidence that some of its nuclear activities were taking place on military bases.
"It's rather strange, don't you think, that the military gets involved in the electric-power generating business?" asked one senior American official. "Or that they forgot to mention this before, when they were `fully disclosing' all details of their program?" American officials are lobbying hard to keep international pressure on Iran.
An I.A.E.A. resolution on Libya, passed by the agency's board of governors on Wednesday, is part of that campaign. The resolution, negotiated by the United States, Britain and Libya in London last week, praises Libya for swiftly dismantling the nuclear weapons program discovered last year. But the resolution's key paragraph calls for the agency to report Libya's past breaches of the Nonproliferation Treaty to the United Nations Security Council.
"The trap is sprung," said a senior American administration official speaking from Washington, saying that the Libyan resolution sets a precedent for future I.A.E.A. resolutions on Iran. "It makes it very hard not to at some point address Iran's breaches by referring them to the Security Council," he said.
The United States has been lobbying since late last year to threaten Iran with Security Council scrutiny if it continued to withhold information on the scope of its nuclear program. Britain, France and Germany have resisted making an explicit threat for fear that it would anger Iran and hinder future cooperation.
Iran warned Wednesday that American-led criticism could "complicate" its relations with the I.A.E.A. "America is taking advantage of any opportunity to put pressure on Iran," Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said in Teheran, the Associated Press reported. "Unfortunately the I.A.E.A. is sometimes influenced in this regard."
Mr. Kharrazi was quoted as saying that Iran would resume enriching uranium for peaceful purposes once its relations with the I.A.E.A. "return to normal."
David E. Sanger contributed reporting from Washington for this article.

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company |
--------------------------------------------------
Iran's muffled coup

By Seth Cropsey

Iran's latest coup d'etat did not use guns, but silence. Faced with rising dissent and the prospect of reformists winning more seats in parliament, the country's hard-line mullahs gagged opponents, shut down public debate, and perhaps most important, silenced national media from reporting the facts. Until that silence is broken, people in Iran and around the world will pay the price.
The coup began with February's elections to the nation's parliament, whose incumbent reformist majority, with President Mohammad Khatami, had challenged the hard-liners' control. But under the pseudo-democratic constitution, only candidates approved by the country's repressive Guardian Council could be on the ballot. In January, the council barred thousands of reformists, including more than 80 incumbent lawmakers. After a three-week sit-in, 125 lawmakers resigned in protest, and reform parties urged people not to participate in the farcical balloting. The unsurprising result put hard-liners in control, despite low voter turnout and many blank ballots.
If more than a quarter of the members of the U.S. Congress staged a three-week sit-in on the floor of the Capitol, and then resigned their seats, you can bet American TV coverage would be 24-7. Not in Iran. As world media reported the deepening crisis, official news sources, including the country's only domestic television sources, stood mute.
Iran's official TV news channel, Voice and Vision, imposed a near-blackout on the MPs' sit-in, and even censored President Khatami's own statements, over protests from his office.
There is, in fact, nothing new about the regime's effort to control information. The Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently restricted the information that reaches the public. There is only one official TV broadcaster, although many Iranians risk owning banned satellite dishes to pick up international TV broadcasts. Newspapers must be licensed by the government, which has shut down scores.
Computer-savvy Iranians have turn to the Internet for news; but Internet service providers need government permission to operate, and there is an extensive official blacklist of banned international news sites. After the February elections, even more Web sites were threatened.
This heavy hand is meant to intimidate and control, but brave journalists continue working. There can be harsh consequences. In a special "Press Court," scores of editors and reporters have been tried and sentenced to jail and even floggings for such crimes as "promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic."
As 2004 began, 10 journalists were known to be imprisoned, including respected investigative journalist Akbar Gandji, and the ailing, 74-year-old, Siamak Pourzand, held in solitary confinement and reportedly tortured.
Today, new trials are scheduled for journalists who tried to report on the election crisis.
The hard-liners also employ the threat of violence: Militia thugs break up public meetings to silence speakers they oppose, from reform candidates to Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi. Journalists have also been targets of extrajudicial killings. The case of Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi, murdered last summer by an Iranian intelligence agent, made international news.
What's lost when people lose free speech and a free press? Plenty. Without credible news sources, Iranians can't get the information they need about economic issues like lagging per capita income and corruption; or education, health, and environmental problems; or the fatal unreadiness to respond to catastrophes like the Bam earthquake.
Nor can Iranians get straight answers about their government's military and foreign policies: the extent of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, Iran's support for terrorism; and the worldwide concern these have engendered. Without information -- without genuine democratic controls -- Iran's secret programs will continue posing a security threat to the U.S. and the Free World.
It is a testament to the Iranian people's love for freedom that, despite the hurdles, they continue to reach for truth, for democracy, for open relations with the world.
In a public-opinion poll sponsored in late 2002 by members of parliament, 75 percent of Iranians supported dialogue with the U.S., and almost half approved of U.S. policy toward their country. The authorities responded by jailing the pollsters.
The Iranian regime's tools of silence speak volumes about the nature of its rule. But Iranians, like captured peoples before them, are trying to search out the information they need.
They deserve our help and are getting it. U.S. broadcasting to Iran includes Radio Farda -- "tomorrow," in Iran's Farsi language -- and, beginning last July, the daily News and Views televised credible news about issues concerning Iranians.
News and Views reaches millions of Farsi-speaking Iranians who aren't fluent in English, and thus can't benefit from global broadcasts like CNN. And, unlike global broadcasts, News and Views focuses on Iran, permitting real depth of coverage. The program is on the air one half-hour daily.
But News and Views could do more; it could cover even more voices and issues, interview more experts on democracy from the U.S. and other free nations, and increase its dialogue with and among the Iranian people.
"Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter," said Thomas Jefferson. He went on to explain why.
If ever people lose their knowledge of and involvement in public affairs, then all the officials of government -- "Congress & Assemblies, judges & governors, shall all become wolves."
Today, the Iranian people try to keep their country from the wolves of injustice, repression and corruption. They will not succeed until all Iranians have access to real news and views.

Seth Cropsey is director of the U.S. Government International Broadcasting Bureau.



----------------------------------------------------------
Iranians to Resume Enriching Uranium
Minister Discloses Military's Atomic Role
By Ali Akbar Dareini
Associated Press
Thursday, March 11, 2004; Page A22
TEHRAN, March 10 -- Iran said Wednesday that it would resume enriching uranium and warned that it might quit cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which it accused of kowtowing to the United States at a crucial meeting in Vienna.
Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani also said the Iranian military had built nuclear centrifuges for civilian use -- the first time the country has acknowledged that its military was involved in its nuclear program.
The head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, warned that Iran risked undermining its efforts to convince the world that its nuclear intentions were peaceful.
"I think suspension is a good confidence-building measure, and Iran needs to do everything possible right now to create the confidence required," ElBaradei said Wednesday in Vienna, where the U.N. nuclear monitor's board of governors was meeting.
The agency's 35-nation board was preparing for a debate Thursday on whether Iran was living up to its pledge of full transparency on its nuclear program.
The United States, which suspects Iran is building a nuclear weapons program, wants a draft resolution on Iran to take a tough line because of evidence that it was developing this program secretly. But the Europeans want to acknowledge that Iran has made substantial steps toward openness.
The draft of the resolution said the agency noted "with the most serious concern" that Iran's declarations "did not amount to the correct, complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear program." But it also praised Iran for signing an agreement that granted a free hand to IAEA inspectors.
Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, Pirouz Hosseini, said Iran was unhappy with the draft and accused the United States of putting pressure on the Europeans.
"We have never been involved in any nuclear weapons program . . . and the Americans don't want to accept the fact," Hosseini said.
In Tehran, the Iranian capital, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi accused the IAEA of failing to reciprocate.
"We take steps and expect the other side to take steps," Kharrazi said. "It can't go one-sided."
Kharrazi warned Britain, France and Germany -- whose foreign ministers visited Tehran last year to discuss the nuclear issue -- that Iran would stop cooperating with them if they failed to resist U.S. pressure at the Vienna meeting.
Kharrazi said Iran had a "legitimate right to enrich uranium" to fuel the nuclear reactor it is building to generate electrical power.
"We suspended uranium enrichment voluntarily and temporarily. Later, when our relations with the IAEA return to normal, we will definitely resume enrichment," said Kharrazi, who accused the IAEA of giving in to U.S. pressure.
"Unfortunately, the agency is sometimes influenced by the United States, while it should maintain its technical and professional identity," Kharrazi said.
The Reuters news agency reported from Vienna:
Libya signed an agreement Wednesday allowing the IAEA to conduct more intrusive inspections of nuclear facilities.
"This is a step by Libya to be clean of all nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction," Maatoug Mohammed Maatoug, the scientific research minister, said after signing the accord with ElBaradei.
ElBaradei said, "Libya's decision could be, and should be, a first step towards an Africa and Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction and at peace."
The protocol allows for IAEA inspectors to obtain short-notice access to any declared or undeclared sites where nuclear material may be present, in order to check for evidence of banned weapons activity.
Earlier in the day, the IAEA's governing board passed a resolution praising Libya for dismantling its nuclear weapons program.
------------------------------------------------
Getting serious about Iran
The Bush administration deserves applause for working tenaciously to focus the international spotlight on the danger posed by Iran's nuclear weapons programs. The compromise reached late Tuesday on a resolution to be considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) included language praising Iran's belated cooperation with investigators while criticizing Tehran's failure to resolve questions about its uranium enrichment programs. The question now is what steps the United States should take to reduce the likelihood of an Iranian nuclear breakout.
One person with some sound ideas for dealing with this danger is Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington. Mr. Sokolski would begin by having the administration request that the IAEA's safeguards division spell out how much time and effort would be required to certify that Iran is out of the bomb-making business. Second, in preparation for the IAEA's next board meeting in June, as well as upcoming G-8 and NATO summits, Washington should lobby its European allies to adopt a host of country-neutral nonproliferation rules that would affect Iran and other aspiring nuclear powers. These rules, to put it mildly, could make life very uncomfortable for such regimes.
The allies should declare that nations cannot free themselves from their obligation to abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by announcing their withdrawal unless the IAEA can clearly find them in full compliance and determines that they have dismantled all undeclared nuclear facilities. In addition, all countries should suspend nuclear cooperation with any nation that the IAEA cannot find to be in full compliance with its safeguards agreement until the agency can establish that that country is completely out of the weapons business. Civilian nuclear exports from NPT member nations that the IAEA can't find in full compliance with the NPT should be considered illegitimate.
Mr. Sokolski would ratchet up the pressure on Iran in myriad other ways. For example, the secretary of state should call for help from France, the EU and Japan to declare that they will delay making investments in Iran's oil industry "until and unless the IAEA finds Iran in full compliance or Iran has dismantled the nuclear facilities and materials it forgot to declare from the IAEA as required by its safeguards agreement with the agency."
Washington should work with its allies to prepare against the contingency of Iran using its nuclear capabilities in the future, either to threaten the Straits of Hormuz (through conventional means, including mining) or to use nuclear mines directly.
As we noted yesterday, the United States does not have the luxury of waiting. Iran has become increasingly defiant in recent weeks, demanding that the IAEA end sanctions. Washington and its allies need to confront the danger before it is too late.

----------------------------------------------
Leaker of nuke secrets curbed

By Abraham Rabinovich
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
JERUSALEM -- Nuclear whistleblower Mordecai Vanunu, who will complete his 18-year prison sentence in April for having revealed some of Israel's nuclear secrets, will be denied a passport in order to prevent him from ever leaving the country, Israel Radio reported yesterday.
The decision was said to have been made at a meeting of senior officials called by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Tuesday night.
Mr. Sharon, however, rejected a request by the head of the Defense Ministry's security department, Yehiel Horev, to keep Vanunu locked up even after completion of his sentence. Mr. Horev asked that Vanunu be placed under administrative detention, which would permit his incarceration indefinitely without trial.
Instead, it was decided to use "certain supervisory means" to keep track of him, according to a statement by the prime minister's office. There have been unconfirmed reports that Vanunu will be kept under semi-house arrest, denied use of telephones and kept under constant guard.
Vanunu, who had worked as a minor technician at the Dimona nuclear plant, left for Australia after his dismissal from the job in 1986 and converted to Christianity. He then flew to London for interviews with the Sunday Times about the nuclear plant, where he had secretly made numerous photographs. The articles and photographs led to estimates that Israel had about 200 nuclear warheads.
The U.S. government does not acknowledge publicly that Israel has a nuclear arsenal. But in his new book, "Rumsfeld's War," Rowan Scarborough, Pentagon correspondent for The Washington Times, reveals a Defense Intelligence Agency report that says Israel has about 82 deployable nuclear bombs and missiles.
A few days before the London Sunday Times story went to press, the Israeli Mossad had a female agent lure Vanunu to Rome where he was kidnapped, sedated and transported to Israel for trial. His confinement was mostly in solitary and the only visitors he has been permitted are first-degree relatives, his lawyer and a clergyman.
Security officials have recently met with Vanunu to sound out his intentions. According to reports in the Israeli media, he refused to answer most of their questions. However, family members have said that he told them he would not leak any more information.
During his interviews with the Sunday Times he had declined to give the names of co-workers, saying he did not want to endanger them and that the information was irrelevant.
A former senior official of the Shin Bet Security Services, Haim Ben-Ami, told Israel Television on Tuesday that Vanunu might be abducted if he left the country and forced to tell all he knew.
Most of Vanunu's family is said to have severed ties with him for having abandoned the Jewish faith. However, two brothers have remained in contact. One of them, Meir, is said to be living in Australia.
Tuesday's meeting on Vanunu, chaired by Mr. Sharon, was attended by senior legal and security officials, as well as a top official of Israel's Atomic Energy Commission.

----------------------------------------------------
>> SO CALLED REVOLUTION WATCH...

From Chavez, Divisive Rhetoric
Embattled Venezuelan's Bluntness Is Fuel for Recall Effort
By Jon Jeter
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, March 11, 2004; Page A23
CARACAS, Venezuela -- When he addresses the nation, President Hugo Chavez sometimes breaks into song. He sermonizes his supporters and taunts his foes. In January he called Condoleezza Rice, the White House national security adviser, "a real illiterate." And last month, he used a profanity to describe President Bush, alleging Bush supported a campaign by Venezuela's political opposition to remove him. Then he issued a challenge.
"We're going to make a bet to see who lasts longer, Mr. George Bush -- you in the White House or Hugo Chavez here in Miraflores," he said, referring to Venezuela's presidential residence. He added that he would make the bet in Venezuelan currency "or in dollars, as you wish."
Chavez's policies, Venezuela's faltering economy and allegations of creeping authoritarianism are ostensibly driving the violent street protests here and the growing efforts to oust the president.
But language also divides this country. Supporters and critics of Chavez have said that the president's salty, earthy and even profane speeches are anything but presidential. While Venezuela's poor, and its black and indigenous minorities, often find Chavez's use of blunt language appealing, wealthy and middle-class Venezuelans find it boorish and embarrassing.
"When Chavez talks, it is like he is one of us," said Pablo Rosales, 53, a black cab driver here. "He is the first president I've seen who talks to the poor and not just the high class. He includes us when he talks."
Said Adriana Ruggiero, 45, a dentist: "He uses such profanity. That is not how a world leader should present himself. He is like a cave man. He makes all Venezuelans look bad."
Class is the principal fault line in Venezuelans' fractured opinion of Chavez. Recent polls indicate that Venezuela's poor, who are nearly 80 percent of the country's 25 million people, are almost evenly split on Chavez. About 41 percent of Venezuelans support Chavez, the vast majority of them poor, said Luis Vicente Leon, executive director of the national polling firm Datanalisis.
But the 59 percent of Venezuelans who disapprove of Chavez include virtually all of the country's most prosperous residents, Leon said.
"There's no doubt that Chavez's strongest support comes from those sectors of Venezuelan society who have typically been the most excluded: blacks, indigenous people and the poor," Leon said.
The son of rural teachers, Chavez has said that he has more support than the polls reflect because researchers avoid the shantytowns and poor neighborhoods where the bulk of his supporters live.
His weekly broadcast program, "Hello President," has a preacher's cadence and is peppered with slang. When the actor Danny Glover visited last month and attended a ceremony to name an elementary school for the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., televised news accounts showed Chavez pointing to his curly hair and broad nose and saying that he, like Glover, was of African heritage.
"He speaks the language of the excluded," said Maximilien Arvelaiz, a Chavez adviser. "He doesn't just speak about the poor. He speaks to the poor."
After returning from a state visit abroad, for example, Chavez has spoken on television using a map and pointer. "He will say this is where I was and it takes X number of hours to travel there by plane from Caracas," Arvelaiz said. "For the rich and the middle class, this is all quite boring because of course they know where Spain is on the map. They think it is stupid. But poor people love this. No one has ever taken the time to explain this to them."
Julio Borges, a spokesman for the campaign to recall Chavez, acknowledges that the president has considerable charisma. But Borges said there had not been any substantial improvements in the lives of the poor since Chavez took office five years ago. Inflation is rising, the economy has lost jobs and crime in urban centers has increased, he said. "He's a demagogue," Borges said.
Elections officials last week validated only 1.8 million of the more than 3 million signatures collected by Borges and other opposition leaders in support of a referendum to recall Chavez. Constitutional provisions require that 2.4 million signatures, representing 20 percent of eligible voters, be validated.
Monitors from the Organization of American States and the Atlanta-based Carter Center said they did not see widespread fraud in the referendum process. But the National Electoral Council ruled that many of the forms were improperly completed and that signatures did not match identification numbers. Chavez said many names were of dead people.
On Wednesday, his opponents condemned the electoral council's action, saying that Chavez's allies on the panel were blocking the referendum with a complex and unfair review process, the Reuters news agency reported. The opponents, a coalition of political parties, labor leaders and civic groups, said their analysis showed that they have enough signatures to force a vote.
-----------------------------------------------------------

>> WHITE HOUSE WATCH

President's Unfunded Mandates Criticized
Group Says States Face Huge Bills
By David S. Broder
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, March 11, 2004; Page A25
It's a familiar complaint from state officials -- the charge that the federal government passes bills that voters love and then passes the buck on paying for them.
The issue, a hardy perennial in the 1990s, came back with a vengeance yesterday as the National Conference of State Legislatures, a bipartisan organization that currently has Republican leadership, assailed the Bush administration and the Republican-controlled Congress for socking the states with at least $29 billion in "unfunded mandates" in the current fiscal year.
President Bush's budget for next year will increase the burden to $34 billion, according to the report made public at a news conference beginning the NCSL's winter leadership meeting in Washington.
Accusing the federal government of "cost-shifting," Utah House Speaker Martin R. Stephens (R), president of the NCSL, said "we have seen an increase" in that practice in recent years "and we're concerned this is going to get worse."
Nine years ago, a concerted campaign by organizations representing state and local governments led to the passage by the first Republican Congress in 30 years of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act -- a measure that ostensibly requires Washington to provide the money needed to carry out the programs it passes. But Stephens and Pennsylvania state Rep. David Steil (R), the head of the NCSL's budgets and revenue committee, said the record in recent years is one of backsliding.
The report fingered two big education programs -- the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act and Bush's landmark No Child Left Behind Act -- as creating a gap of almost $20 billion in state budgets this year.
Another major culprit, the NCSL report said, was the mandate for states to provide prescription drugs for people eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid. It put the shortfall on that program at $6 billion.
The figures are open to dispute. The Congressional Budget Office does not classify either of the big education programs as mandates, because states are not required to participate in them. But Stephens, whose legislature considered not participating in No Child Left Behind, said staying out would have cost Utah $100 million a year it had been receiving to help school low-income children.
"It's kind of a shell game to say states have a right to decide" whether to participate, Stephens said.
NCSL officials said only one piece of legislation -- an immigration bill -- was repealed after Congress determined that it had violated the unfunded-mandates law. On only three other occasions in the past nine years, the report said, has the Congressional Budget Office identified other measures that appeared to violate the statute, and none of the three was altered.
One problem, NCSL officials said, is that the 1995 law does not apply when bills are amended on the floor or changed in a House-Senate conference committee. And it does not apply to appropriations bills, which the report said often fall short of the commitments made in the underlying legislation.
NCSL officials said they hope to highlight the problem by resuming publication of a regular newsletter, the Mandate Monitor, updating the fiscal effects of legislation. They also said they would lobby members of Congress while they are in Washington.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

>> WHITE HOUSE WATCH...2

Behind the gender gap
President Bush makes overtures to women, but is largely solidifying support among men.
By Linda Feldmann | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
WASHINGTON - When President Bush addressed a Cleveland forum on women's entrepreneurship this week, the visuals matched the theme - the president standing with women. But the talk's focus on jobs seemed aimed more at Ohio, a central battleground of the 2004 election and a state struggling with massive job losses, than at the female vote.
In a nation where the "gender gap" has become a permanent feature of electoral politics, Bush is finding it as difficult as most other recent GOP presidents to bring women to his side. So far this year, the Gallup Poll gap between male approval and female approval of Bush is above 7 percent - slightly higher than it was in 2001.
Bush can get away with lower support from women as long as he keeps support from men high. And that is exactly what the president seems to be doing in the early phase of the campaign: solidifying and expanding his support among men (see appearances at NASCAR and the Houston rodeo) and saving the "compassionate conservative" theme of 2000 for later in the campaign.
"Each side's in a fight now to expand their base and mobilize their base," says Democratic pollster Celinda Lake, who notes that that's why Bush adviser Karl Rove is talking less about women and more about getting the 4 1/2 million born-again Christians who didn't vote in 2000 to turn out for Bush this time. "That's why we're saying we can get unmarried women, Hispanics, and African Americans."
To be sure, the Bush campaign isn't ignoring women. First lady Laura Bush has stepped up her political activity in recent months, spearheading efforts on women's health and appearing in Bush campaign ads. The Bush administration has pushed through major reforms in education and healthcare, issues that are especially important to women. But the public prefers the Democrats' positions to the Republicans'.
Still, says independent pollster John Zogby, the gender gap under Bush isn't as big as it has been under previous presidents. "The reason is that there's a marriage gap," he says. "Married women and married men tend to see things much more similarly. They're more conservative; they have more traditional family values."
And that is why there's a move afoot to target unmarried women, a segment of the population with a low rate of participation in politics. In the 2000 election, 68 percent of married women voted, while only 52 percent of unmarried women turned out. And those nonvoters would have, on balance, helped the Democrats.
The organization Women's Voices, Women's Votes, sees across the country a vast untapped population - 22 million single women, 16 million of them unregistered - that it wants to mobilize. The group is planning outreach to these women, through television, mail, Internet, and door-to-door canvassing.
Why are these women not voting? "They don't believe the politicians care about what they have to say," says project co-director Chris Desser, her conclusion drawn from focus groups and surveys. "When we respond with, 'Well, do you know there are 22 million of you?' - their minds are blown."
These single female nonvoters are also diverse - young, old, all races, rich, poor, divorced, never-married, widowed. Thus, they are hard to define, or at least to market to the press with a pithy nickname like NASCAR dads or soccer moms. But they share some traits: As unmarried people, they tend to bear their financial burdens alone - often as the sole caretakers for children, aging parents, or both.
"Healthcare is their No. 1 concern," says Ms. Desser. "Second comes employment - job parity, consistent employment, job security. Third is education. They want to make sure their children get a decent education and a shot at the American dream. They also know how important their own education is to job security and a decent salary."
In interviews on the street, women shared concerns as they look ahead to Nov. 2. Hilda DaSilva, a divorced mother of three from Brazil, fits the profile of the unmarried women that Democrats are keen to attract - though this is the first election she's eligible to vote in, as a newly minted US citizen. "I feel like a lot of people lost their jobs," says Ms. DaSilva, who lives in Somerville, Mass. "Healthcare has gone down so badly. I love this country, I see a better life here.... [But] I don't trust [Bush]."
For Susan, a married woman in her 40s who lives in suburban Boston, the issues are the economy, jobs, and healthcare. But national security factors in as well.
"I voted for Bush, but the whole war in Iraq - at first I thought it was a good thing, and then they never found the weapons of mass destruction," she says. "And the economy has tanked. I think back to his father, and the Democrats were saying, 'Are you better off than you were four years ago?' And I don't feel like I'm better off."
* Sara B. Miller contributed to this report

---------------------------------------------------------------------

>> ASHLAND WATCH...

String of alleged terror cases in Northwest
Muslim fundraising efforts in the region draw federal indictments, and a national guardsman is in prison.
By Brad Knickerbocker | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
ASHLAND, ORE. - To his friends, neighbors, and customers, Pete Seda was known for two things: his professional work as an arborist, especially his efforts to save trees that otherwise would be cut down for development, and his dedication to showing the gentle face of Islam. He was active in interfaith groups, visited grade schools, and paraded his camel on the Fourth of July in this quintessential small town.
Now the man known as Pirouz Sedaghaty when he emigrated from Iran some 30 years ago is suspected of helping a Saudi Arabia-based charity raise and launder thousands of dollars used to fund jihad (holy war).
It's part of a recent confluence of terrorism-related events in the Pacific Northwest:
* The arrest of National Guardsman Ryan Anderson, accused of offering to help Al Qaeda by providing information about US weapons and military tactics.
* The conviction of several of the so-called "Portland Seven," Muslims who tried to get to Afghanistan, where they wanted to help fight Americans.
* The investigation of members of the Muslim community associated with the University of Idaho and Washington State University, where Mr. Anderson had been a student and converted to Islam.
* The sentencing of Earnest James Ujaama, a Seattle man charged with conspiring to aid the Taliban, including plans to set up a remote terrorist training camp in the desert of Oregon.
This region has a significant number of potential terrorist targets, including aircraft carriers and ballistic-missile submarines based in Puget Sound, plus 19 major hydropower dams.
But despite occasional concerns about explosives and weapons slipped across the border from Canada, there's nothing in particular that makes the Northwest interesting to federal officials urgently hunting for terrorists and their supporters. If anything, the most radical antigovernment types here tend to be otherwise engaged: white supremacists opposed to anything having to do with other races or religions, and their politically polar opposites - anarchists concerned with economic globalization and the evils of SUVs.
But federal officials, armed with the controversial USA-Patriot Act and other statutes, have brought the antiterrorism aspects of homeland defense to the region nonetheless. Today, Ryan Anderson - who also uses the name Amir Abdul Rashid - is in a military prison at Fort Lewis in Washington State. He was arrested last month shortly before his Army unit was to leave for Iraq, charged with seeking links to Al Qaeda on the Internet, where he told his contacts, "I share your cause." Those contacts turned out to be FBI and military intelligence agents in an online sting operation. He was quickly arrested.
One thing investigators want to know is if Anderson was recruited and trained while he was a student studying Middle Eastern history at Washington State University in Pullman. Washington State and the University of Idaho are less than 10 miles apart, and they share an active Muslim community of about 200 people.
The investigation of possibly illicit fundraising with connections to terrorism began there in 2002, the year Anderson graduated. There have been several arrests since then, and in January the first of those being investigated was indicted on federal charges of fundraising and recruiting on behalf of Saudi clerics and charities allegedly supporting terrorism.
Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, a doctoral student from Saudi Arabia, is charged with providing $300,000 to Islamic charities to support "murder, maiming, kidnapping and the destruction of property." Mr. Al-Hussayen also is alleged to have connections to a member of the "Portland Seven" as well as to a branch of the Al-Haramain charity in Ashland, Ore., started and run by Mr. Seda.
"The indictment alleges that Al-Hussayen operated more than a dozen websites, including some for the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and two radical Saudi sheikhs," US Attorney General John Ashcroft said last week. "It further alleges that Al-Hussayen knew and intended that his computer services and expertise would be used to recruit and raise funds for violent jihad around the world and that he conspired to conceal the nature of his support for terrorists." Members of the Portland group - who tried but failed to get into Afghanistan through China - reportedly were influenced by a website managed by Al-Hussayen.
In some of these varied cases, those charged appear to have been amateurs.
Many of those donating to charities now considered to have terrorist links thought they were helping fellow Muslims such as Palestinian or Chechnyan refugees. But in the post-9/11 era, that does not lift them above the cloud of suspicion.
"We continue to pursue financiers of terrorist barbarism as aggressively as those that actually perpetrate such horrible crimes," Attorney General Ashcroft has testified before Congress.
Mr. Seda, the Ashland, Ore., arborist, has yet to be charged, although he was placed on an FBI watch list. The IRS alleges that he tried to conceal the transfer of funds, and federal officials recently took computers and video tapes from his home. For the past year, he and his family have been living in the United Arab Emirates. Through his American lawyer he says, "I am certain that once all the facts come out, it will be clear that neither [the charity he represented] nor I have engaged in any criminal activities."
The whole episode has left many here in disbelief, including Rabbi David Zaslow, who told the local newspaper that "Pete is the kind of Muslim we Americans should be standing up applauding."
"The sad irony is that Pete Seda came to the United States as a refugee from Iran in the 1970s and has been promoting peace and understanding of the Islamic faith for many years," says Paul Copeland, co-chair of the local chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and a long-time friend of Seda.

--------------------------------------------------------------------

>>
Bodies intended for science were used in Army land-mine tests
By Cain Burdeau
Associated Press
NEW ORLEANS -- Seven cadavers donated to Tulane University's medical school were sold to the Army and blown up in land mine experiments, officials said Wednesday. Tulane said it has suspended dealings with a national distributor of donated bodies.
Tulane receives up to 150 cadavers a year from donors but needs only between 40 and 45 for classes, said Mary Bitner Anderson, co-director of the Tulane School of Medicine's Willed Body Program.
The university paid National Anatomical Service, a New York-based company that distributes bodies nationwide, less than $1,000 a body to deliver surplus cadavers, thinking they were going to medical schools in need of corpses.
The anatomical services company sold seven cadavers to the Army for between $25,000 and $30,000, said Chuck Dasey, a spokesman for the Army's Medical Research and Materiel Command in Fort Detrick, Md. The bodies were blown up in tests on protective footwear against land mines at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio.
Tulane said it found out about the Army's use of the bodies in January 2003. It suspended its contract with the anatomical services company this month. The company did not immediately return calls for comment.
"There is a legitimate need for medical research and cadavers are one of the models that help medical researchers find out valuable information," Dasey said. "Our position is that it is a regulated process. Obviously it makes some people uncomfortable."
Cadaver remains are routinely cremated, he added.
For years military researchers have bought cadavers to use in research involving explosive devices. In the last five years, that research has been used to help determine safe standoff distances, on how to build the best shelters, and to improve helmets, Dasey said.
Michael Meyer, a philosophy professor at Santa Clara University in California who has written about the ethics of donated bodies, said the military's use is questionable because it knows donors did not expect to end up in land mine tests.
"Imagine if your mother had said all her life that she wanted her body to be used for science, and then her body was used to test land mines. I think that is disturbing, and I think there are some moral problems with deception here," Meyers said.
The market in bodies and body parts is under scrutiny after two men, including the head of the Willed Body Program at the University of California at Los Angeles, were arrested for trafficking in stolen body parts.
-------------------------------------------------------

>> FT ENERGY...

El Paso may face probe over reserves
By Sheila McNulty in Houston and Adrian Michaels in New York
Published: March 11 2004 22:12 | Last Updated: March 11 2004 22:12
US regulators are poised to consider a formal inquiry following El Paso's sharp downward revision of its oil and gas reserves and delayed earnings report.
The company said on Thursday that it had been supplying the Securities and Exchange Commission, the US's chief financial regulator, with details of its 41 per cent reduction in reserves.
"We have been providing information to the SEC all along, upon their request," said Aaron Woods, a spokesman. "If we receive notification from the SEC regarding a formal inquiry, we will make that information public."
The SEC does not comment on individual investigations. However, people close to the discussions said the agency was reviewing the latest moves by El Paso and considering its next steps.
Analysts expect the SEC to step up its review to a formal investigation, as it did with Royal Dutch/Shell, which is under SEC scrutiny for a 20 per cent reduction in its proven reserves. Proven reserves are the amount of oil or gas a company estimates will be recovered by a certain date.
Gordon Howald of Credit Lyonnais Securities said he had been expecting an SEC investigation since El Paso surprised the market with its announcment last month.
The revision has forced El Paso to delay the release of its fourth quarter 2003 earnings, scheduled for Thursday, as well as a 10K filing to the SEC. Analysts said that delay breaches its $3bn bank covenant, although they expected the banks to grant a waiver, which could come at a higher cost to El Paso. The company is in the process of unloading a series of assets to reduce its $24bn in debt.
Analysts say El Paso has long been seen as aggressive with its figures, noting it has sold assets that new owners booked for 25-30 per cent less than what they had been on El Paso's books.
Standard & Poor's has pushed El Paso's credit rating down to B-. "S&P considers it to be a highly speculative rating and one that is very much susceptible to default," said Todd Shipman of S&P.
Below the B- category, companies are seen to have substantial risks associated with them or actually be in default. S&P believes that rating is more likely to go down than up.
-------------------------------------------

Sibneft tycoon seeks to sell 46% stake
By Carola Hoyos and James Politi in New York and Arkady Ostrovsky in Moscow
Published: March 12 2004 0:13 | Last Updated: March 12 2004 0:13
Roman Abramovich, the Russian billionaire and owner of Chelsea football club, is in talks to sell half his 92 per cent stake in Sibneft, the Russian oil company, to a foreign energy group.
Royal Dutch/Shell, the Anglo-Dutch group, ChevronTexaco of the US, and Total of France have had discussions about a possible deal giving them a stake in Sibneft close to 46 per cent, according to oil industry bankers.
Shell is in upheaval after slashing 20 per cent of its oil and gas reserves that had been wrongly listed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Last week, Sir Philip Watts, the company's chairman, and Walter van de Vivjer, its head of exploration and production, were forced out.
Analysts say the possible Sibneft stake sale will be a key test of whether the management reshuffle will handicap Shell in making investment decisions that would be vital to its future growth. Buying Sibneft would help Shell catch up with its peers in Russia - such as BP, its UK rival, which has a joint venture with TNK - and add to its reserves base.
Mr Abramovich is keen to line up a buyer before he completes the unravelling of Sibneft's merger with Yukos, its bigger Russian partner.
However, a firm decision is unlikely to come before that process is complete. Any deal would also require the blessing of Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, who is expected to be re-elected on Sunday for a second term.
Analysts speculate Mr Abramovich does not yet have Mr Putin's blessing to sell a controlling stake.
It is believed that Mr Abramovich started looking for a buyer after a Moscow court ruling paved the way for unwinding the merger with Yukos. He had been trying to offload his Russian assets since last year, at a time of growing pressure on the oligarchs from the Kremlin.
Bankers said ChevronTexaco is particularly keen on acquiring a controlling stake in Sibneft and would probably push for a promise that this would eventually happen.
Total executives have said they would rather move into Russia on a project-by-project basis, but people close to the Paris-based company say they are keeping their options open with Sibneft.

-------------------------------------------
Assets of Yukos Oil's Shareholders Frozen

By Susan B. Glasser
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, March 11, 2004; 1:00 PM
MOSCOW, March 11 -- Swiss authorities have frozen nearly $5 billion in personal bank accounts belonging to imprisoned Russian tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky and other major shareholders in his embattled Yukos oil company, Russian prosecutors announced here Thursday.
In a statement, the prosecutor general's office said the $5 billion was frozen at Russia's request, in accounts of 20 individuals "implicated in the misappropriation of particularly large amounts of state funds." It gave no details about why such a large amount was involved but said prosecutors have asked a court to allow the seizure of the frozen funds.
One of the targeted Yukos shareholders confirmed the frozen bank accounts in an interview but disputed the sum cited by Russian prosecutors. "There's never been $5 billion in these accounts," said Leonid Nevzlin, a close Khodorkovsky associate who fled prosecution here for exile in Israel.
Nevzlin, a billionaire who said his frozen account contained less than $100,000, said the prosecutors appeared to be making an inflated claim in advance of Russian presidential elections Sunday. "They're just excited before the elections, and they're going to be apologizing after the elections," he said.
President Vladimir Putin, the inevitable winner Sunday, has seen his approval ratings climb since his government launched an all-out legal assault on Yukos shareholders last year and arrested Khodorkovsky on fraud and tax evasion charges last October. Prosecutors have publicly accused Khodorkovsky and Yukos of costing the state $1 billion.
Andrea Sadecky, a spokeswoman for the Swiss attorney general, said she could not confirm or deny how much money was frozen. "We cannot speak for investigations by Russia," she said.
The Russian statement, by spokeswoman Natalya Vishnyakova, named only six of the 20 individuals whose bank accounts were blocked, including Khodorkovsky, Nevzlin and two other Yukos shareholders who have also fled to Israel to avoid prosecution. Khodorkovsky is Russia's richest man, with a net worth estimated at $15 billion by Forbes magazine.
Many investors have feared that the legal assault on Yukos could mark the start of a broader attempt to renationalize the oil company that rose, under Khodorkovsky, to become Russia's largest producer. But Vishnyakova denied that, saying the frozen funds were purely "personal cash deposits by private individuals" and not the result of "a review of privatization."
Nevzlin said that his frozen Swiss account at UBS bank had contained a token sum just for the purposes of paying off credit card bills. He said the Russian request to freeze Yukos shareholders' accounts had been made about six months ago, and that there was no way Khodorkovsky or others had kept billions of dollars there. Khodorkovsky's Swiss account, he said, "cannot exceed several million dollars."
Anton Drel, a lawyer for Khodorkovsky, said he was unaware of the Swiss action but also doubted that his client would have had such a sum in his bank account there. "They've never had close to this amount in the past" in Switzerland, Drel said. "Can you imagine them keeping $5 billion in cash?" He said that as far as he knew, Khodorkovsky had closed his personal Swiss bank account last year.
Swiss authorities revealed last week they had searched offices of several companies and seized documents in Switzerland in connection with the Yukos investigation.


---------------------------------------------

Tough targets set for China's state banks
By Mure Dickie in Beijing
Published: March 11 2004 13:43 | Last Updated: March 11 2004 20:41
China's banking regulator has set tough performance targets for two leading state lenders chosen to spearhead financial sector reform by cleaning up their books and selling shares to international investors.
However, Liu Mingkang, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, also highlighted the difficulty of dealing with the bad debt burden weighing down the nation's financial institutions.
"Our fight against non-performing loans will be long and arduous," Mr Liu said. Beijing recently injected $45bn into the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank as part of a reform effort aimed to clear the way for their listings in the next few years in Hong Kong and possibly New York.
Mr Liu said the CBRC had set strict performance targets for the banks, two of China's "big four" lenders, including achieving return on equity of 11 per cent by 2005 and 13 per cent by 2007 and return on assets of close to the "average level of the top 100 banks in the world".
And Mr Liu, a former head of the Bank of China, said efforts this year would concentrate on rooting out those responsible for "policy mistakes that caused losses", underlining Beijing's determination to ensure that senior bank officials focus on financial performance.
The two banks have already made progress in improving their balance sheets, with Bank of China cutting its non-performing loan ratio to under 16 per cent and Construction Bank reducing its NPL ratio to under 12 per cent.
Regulators say the NPL ratio for China's overall banking sector fell by 5.32 percentage points to 17.8 per cent, a dramatic improvement.
However, Mr Liu acknowledged that although the stock of bad loans was reduced, the improvement in the NPL ratio was mainly the result of rapid growth in new loans.
Some economists and officials say enthusiastic lending risks fuelling over-investment in sectors such as automaking and steel, an issue of increasing concern to government planners.
The rapid lending growth also raises the possibility that the new loans will merely add to the NPL burden in the future.
"Of the 5 percentage point fall in the NPL ratio, 4 percentage points were the result of the increase in overall lending," Mr Liu said.
"If banks cannot correctly review, judge, quantify and control the risk involved in expansion of assets, this will be a very dangerous issue," he said.
The success China's banking reform will depend largely on whether managers can adopt more market-oriented lending policies.
Some analysts say change will be difficult as the leading state banks are seen as too big to be allowed to fail, but Mr Liu stressed that Construction Bank and Bank of China should not rely on further injections of public funds.
The banks would be able to raise enough capital by issuing subordinated debts, seeking new investors or selling assets, he said.

-------------------
China vows bank reforms and stable currency
By Richard McGregor in Beijing
Published: March 11 2004 10:09 | Last Updated: March 11 2004 10:09
Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People's Bank of China, said on Thursday that Beijing's efforts to relieve upward pressure on its currency through a series of monetary measures to reduce renminbi demand had begun to take effect.
The central bank head said tighter controls on lending, open market operations to soak up liquidity and allowing Chinese firms to hold greater amounts of foreign currency had helped reduce pressure on the renminbi.
"We have been able to choke the over-supply of the monetary base and the excessive growth of credit," Mr Zhou said.
Mr Zhou, who was speaking at a press conference during the annual meeting of the National People's Congress, warned that there was a "time lag" before the impact of monetary policy could be assessed, which meant that the Bank remained vigilant about the need for further measures.
China has resisted pressure from Washington to begin loosening the longstanding dollar peg for the renimbi, a policy that it believes has been a cornerstone of its economic success in recent years.
Mr Zhou continued to emphasise the benefits of "currency stabilty" on Thursday, saying it was crucial in "promoting economic development."
China's longer-term plan is to allow the renminbi to fluctuate within a wider band than its current Rmb8.3 peg to the dollar but it has given no indication to the timing of such a move.
Some foreign analysts have ambitiously forecast a revaluation as high as 10 to 15 per cent this year, but government officials have suggested that any initial policy change will be slight.
China has witnessed a surge in consumer inflation and wholesale prices recently, mainly caused by rising food and raw materials prices, which may help ease pressure on the currency by reducing the country's export competitiveness. Mr Zhou ruled out an interest rate increase this month to tackle rising prices, as he said inflation was still relatively mild.
"We have yet to adjust the interest rate this month - the reason why is, although there has been some increase of the CPI, the extent of the growth is not large enough for the adjustment," he said.
China last changed deposit and lending rates more than three years ago, in February 2001, reducing the savings rate to 1.98% for single year renminbi deposits and 5.31% for one-year renminbi loans.
---------------------------------------------
China brushes aside Intel's Wapi protest
By Mure Dickie in Beijing
Published: March 11 2004 18:10 | Last Updated: March 11 2004 18:10
The developers of a controversial Chinese standard for wireless data networks on Thursday waved aside a decision by Intel, the world's largest computer chip producer, to shun their technology.
"This could be a critical decision that Intel is making. China is such a strategic market," said an official of the state-backed group promoting China's new standard, known as Wapi. "I think Intel should calm down."
Beijing says Wapi resolves chronic security problems suffered by the popular "Wi-fi" standard for local wireless networks, and has demanded that all manufacturers selling such mobile data products in China adopt the standard by June 1.
However, Intel this week announced it would not support Wapi, saying the standard was backward and poor quality. The move throws into doubt future sales in China of computers that use Intel's wireless-enabled Centrino chips.
"If the Centrino remains what it is today, without any upgrading, it will not comply with the law so it will obviously be banned," the Chinese standards official said. "I don't see any reason why the Chinese government should retreat on this."
The dispute between standards authorities and Intel reflects a gulf in attitudes toward the new standard that may become an increasingly hot issue in trade ties between China and the US. Last week, US officials warned Beijing that Wapi would create a dangerous precedent in using technology as a trade barrier.
US electronics manufacturers fear that Wapi marks an attempt to force them to share their technology with Chinese companies, since Beijing refuses to share encryption methods at the heart of the standard directly with international manufacturers.
They also object to the need to tailor products to the Chinese market, a demand that will raise their costs while handing a competitive advantage to local rivals.
However, Chinese officials and the local companies entrusted with Wapi encryption insist that international wireless equipment manufacturers can easily abide by the new standard by developing simple software or hardware upgrades, and that there is no risk to their intellectual property.
Any halt in Chinese sales of Centrino would also have particular impact for leading local computer manufacturers such as Legend, one of the Chinese companies given access to the Wapi encryption but which uses the Centrino in many of its "Lenovo" brand laptop computers.
Legend on Thursday declined to comment.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

>> SOUTH KOREA WATCH...

S. Korea Parliament Impeaches President
By SANG-HUN CHOE
ASSOCIATED PRESS
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) -
Parliament voted to impeach President Roh Moo-hyun on illegal electioneering and incompetence charges Friday following hours of scuffles and dramatic protests.
Roh's presidential powers will be suspended while the matter is referred to the Constitutional Court for final approval to unseat the leader. The court has 180 days to rule.
The impeachment passed by a vote of 193 to 2.
The voting took place as pro-Roh lawmakers who earlier tried to block the vote were held outside the chamber by National Assembly security officers.
A shoving match was sparked earlier when pro-Roh Uri Party members tried to stop Assembly Speaker Park Kwan-yong from taking the podium, the only place he can call a vote.
Assembly security officers then moved in to begin removing lawmakers trying to block his progress. Park had warned Thursday that he might exercise his right to have security officials clear the lawmakers.


------------------------------------------------------

Fmr. Daewoo Head Kills Himself Following Roh's Comments
119 rescue forces search for the body of Nam Sang-guk, former head of Daewoo Construction. Nam committed suicide Thursday in the southern end of Hannam Bridge, after being investigated by prosecutors for allegedly giving bribes to President Roh Moo-hyun's older brother Geon-pyeong. / Yonhap
Nam Sang-guk, former Daewoo Construction head, committed suicide Thursday by jumping into the Han River. The act was committed at 12:30 p.m. near the southern end of Hannam Bridge, leading to the Olympic Expressway. Nam had recently been undergoing investigations by prosecutorssp and was charged with passing W30 million to Roh's older brother Geon-pyeong, in a request that he be reappointed as the head of Daewoo Construction last September.
President Roh said in a morning press conference at Cheong Wa Dae that Roh's older brother Geon-pyeong had approached the president with a request from Nam that he be re-appointed head of the company, but Roh had ordered Civil Affairs and the personnel office to reject the reappointment of Nam as head of the company, and made sure that Nam was not hired for the job.
Roh added, "I hope that people like the former head of Daewoo Construction, who have attended good schools and have greatly succeeded, will no longer go to small people in the countryside and pass them money for their own interests."
Before committing suicide, Nam called Mr. Shin, Daewoo Construction Judicial Affairs Manager, at 12:09 p.m. On the phone, Nam said, "I will bear everything and go. My car is parked at the southern end of the Han River, so take it later," reports Chae Dong-wook, Director of the Special Investigations 2nd Unit at the Seoul District Public Prosecutors' Office.
Shin repeated the conversation to Nam's lawyer Shin Man-seong, who called the prosecutors' office, and reported the incident to police.
The police found a gray Leganza sedan with the license plate "Seoul 30 Ma 1343," a car owned by Nam's wife, at the southern end of Hannam Bridge at 1:20 p.m. Police also found Nam's cellular phone floating in the water between the 12th and 13th piers, but were unable to find Nam's body. Search operations still continue.
Choi Jong-chang, a witness of the act, said, "I was driving my car around 12:30 p.m. when a person suddenly got out from the car in front of me and went on to the railing. I had a strange feeling and stopped for a moment. When the man jumped down, I immediately called the police."
Nam was a graduate of Seoul National University and Kyunggi High School, and entered Daewoo in 1974. A former engineer of an introvert character who spent much of the next 19 years on construction sites, Nam was promoted to executive director in 1997. As Nam did not appear to conduct public relations activities when his reappointment as head was being decided, Daewoo employees have been showing surprise at recent investigations into Nam's political lobbying activities. Daewoo Construction workers say that they "cannot believe that quiet Nam Sang-guk would give money to Roh Geon-pyeong to ensure his reappointment."
One Daewoo Construction employee who wishes to remain anonymous says that Nam was a person of "great pride and responsibility." Although the employee claims to be unsure of whether Nam, who "attended a good school and greatly succeeded," actually "went to small people in the country to pass them money for his own interests," in the words of President Roh Moo-hyun, the employee says that Nam certainly felt deeply insulted by the president's remarks.
(Youm Kang-su, ksyoum@chosun.com )

Posted by maximpost at 10:19 PM EST
Updated: Thursday, 11 March 2004 10:28 PM EST
Permalink
Wednesday, 10 March 2004

The Mixed Blessing of
Israel's Nuclear Policy
Zeev Maoz
related to Arab decisions to make peace with the Jewish state. Moreover, the policy has had two major adverse side effects, the magnitude of which is only now becoming clear in light of developments in the Middle East in the last decade. First, the policy has been instrumental in fueling a nonconventional arms race in the region. Second, it has had negative implications for Israel?s democracy and political control of national security affairs. Given these Žndings, I argue that Israel should refocus its nuclear policy to explore ways to leverage its nuclear capability to bring about regional agreement on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. This study is organized as follows: First, I review the major arguments suggesting the continued success of Israel?s nuclear policy. I present the evidence on which these arguments are based and show why it is tautological, nonexistent, weak, or only marginally relevant. Second, I examine the policy?s antidemocratic implications. Finally, I derive policy implications for the future of Israeli nuclear deterrence and arms control policy.
Israel?s Nuclear Policy: Arguments, Data, and Problems
Any policy evaluation must begin with a clear conception of the underlying goals of that policy. In light of these goals, it is then possible to assess whether and to what extent the policy has achieved its stated objectives. It is also necessary, however, to consider the policy?s side effects--that is, outcomes other than the policy?s declared aims.1 A key problem in analyzing a state?s strategic decisionmaking involves efforts to determine the impact of a counterfactual policy on a given historical process.2 Despite this difŽculty, once the goals and side effects of a policy are speciŽed, an evaluation becomes more feasible (although a deŽnitive assessment may remain beyond reach). Finally, as with administering medicine to a patient, an assessment of whether the medicine is doing more harm than good is essential.
In evaluating Israel?s nuclear program, it is useful to discuss its political origins. Following the Sinai/Suez War of 1956, the French government agreed
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 45
1. Frans L. Leeuw, "Policy Theories, Knowledge Utilization, and Evaluation," in Ray C. Rist, ed., Policy Evaluation: Linking Theory to Practice (Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 19-37; Lawrence B. Mohr, Impact Analysis for Program Evaluation (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995); and David Nachmias, Public Policy Evaluation: Approaches and Methods (New York: St. Martin?s, 1979).
2. Mohr, Impact Analysis for Program Evaluation, chap. 1. The methodological and theoretical problems connected with the analysis of counterfactuals in international politics are too elaborate to consider here. For more on the issue, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis-Testing in Political Science," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 169-195; and Richard Ned Lebow, "What?s So Different about a Counterfactual?" World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July 2000), pp. 550-573.
to supply Israel with a nuclear reactor and natural uranium. The reactor was built secretly near the city of Dimona in southern Israel. Initial details of its existence were revealed in 1961,when the Israeli government announced that the facility would focus on nonmilitary nuclear research. Meanwhile, Israeli policymakers debated the pros and cons of developing a nuclear weapons program. Heading the pronuclear weapons group were David Ben-Gurion, Israel ?s Žrst prime minister;Moshe Dayan, a former chief of staff and minister of agriculture; and Shimon Peres, director-general of the Israeli defense ministry. Leading opponents included Ministers Yigal Allon and Israel Gallili, as well as key members of the general staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) such as Chief of Staff Zvi Zur and Yitzhak Rabin, head of the operations branch.3 The timing of Israel?s decision to develop nuclear weapons is unclear, but indications suggest that it was in late 1962 or early 1963.4
Israel?s drive for a nuclear weapons capability originated with a doomsday scenario Žrst put forward in the 1950s. The scenario brought together three major Israeli concerns: (1) the prospect of a uniŽed Arab coalition starting an all-out war aimed at the total destruction of the Jewish state; (2) the military advantage in both quantitative terms (e.g., size of armed forces and number of basic weapons systems) and qualitative terms (especially in the realm of weapon systems capability) that such a coalition would enjoy; and (3) the widespread international support (including from the Soviet Union) that this coalition would likely face--compared with the political isolation that Israel could anticipate.5
Yet contrary to the conventional wisdom, which holds that the possession of nuclear weapons cannot be kept secret if they are to be an effective deterrent, Israel?s policymakers decided on a policy of nuclear ambiguity. This policy has
International Security 28:2 46
3. Opponents argued that Israel possessed sufŽcient conventional capability to deter an attack by an Arab coalition or to launch its own attack against such a coalition. See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); and Yair Evron, "Israel and the Atom: The Uses and Misuses of Ambiguity," Orbis, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter 1974), pp. 1326-1343.
4. Detailed accounts of the history of Israel?s nuclear project include Cohen, Israel and the Bomb; Evron, "Israel and the Atom"; Shlomo Aronson with Oded Brosh, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992); Yair Evron, Israel?s Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel?s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991); andWarner D. Farr, "The Third Temple Holy of Holies: Israel?s Nuclear Weapons," Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 2 (Maxwell, Ala.: U.S. Air War College, September 1999), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm.
5. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 11-14; Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, Vol. 3 (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1987), pp. 1550-1553; Avner Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1994), pp. 13-19; and Yigal Allon, A Curtain of Sand (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ha?Kibbutz Ha?Meuchad, 1968), pp. 13-165.
two major components. The Žrst is secrecy: Israel would develop nuclear weapons but refrain from either testing them openly or formally announcing their existence. The second involves signaling: Through a series of leaks and veiled statements, the spread of rumors, and other political actions (e.g., refusal to sign the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT), Israel would bolster its nuclear image--an image comprising indirect evidence of an existing nuclear capability and hints of a deterrence doctrine. In Israel?s case, the doctrine of nuclear ambiguity is embodied in the "Samson option"--namely, the use of nuclear weapons only as weapons of last resort. Adherents of this policy argue that Israeli nuclear ambiguity not only fosters deterrence but also allows the government to minimize the adverse political, military, and diplomatic ramiŽcations of Israel?s regional nuclear monopoly.6 From the beginning, the government has rigidly adhered to a policy of nuclear ambiguity while continuing to oversee the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. According to some sources, by the mid-1990s Israel possessed 100-200 nuclear weapons, including surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles.7
Below I discuss and then evaluate the arguments and evidence that Israeli strategists have marshaled to support the government?s policy of nuclear ambiguity.
the ambiguous performance of israeli nuclear deterrence The majority of Israeli strategists contend that Israel?s nuclear policy has accomplished its principal objective of deterring an all-out Arab attack aimed at the annihilation of the Jewish state.8 Support for this argument rests on the nonoccurrence of such an attack. Since evidence of Israel?s nuclear capability The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 47
6. Israel?s posture of nuclear ambiguity was not borne out of military strategic considerations, but rather out of a need to fend off U.S. pressure to join the NPT and to open nuclear installations to outside inspection. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 142-147, 205-217; and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 59-70.
7. Sources on Israel?s nuclear arsenal include Russian Federation intelligence estimates released on April 19, 1995. See Aluf Ben, "Soviet Intelligence Reveals Israel?s Nuclear Capability," Ha?aretz, April 20, 1995, p. 2; and semiofŽcial estimates by nongovernmental organizations, including Jane?s Intelligence Review, September 1997, and the American Federation of Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/index.html. For data resources on these issues, see http://Žrst.sipri.org/. On nuclear cruise missiles launchable from Israeli submarines, see Nathan Guttman, "Report: Israeli Submarines Possess Nuclear Cruise Missiles," Ha?aretz, June 16, 2002, p. 3.
8. The extent to which nuclear ambiguity was a key to this success is the subject of much debate. For an argument against ambiguity, see Shai Feldman, Israel?s Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). For a pro-ambiguity argument, see Evron, Israel ?s Nuclear Dilemma. See also interviews with Shai Feldman and Shlomo Aronson, in Bob Levin with Milan J. Kubic, "Should Israel Build a Nuclear Bomb?" Newsweek, May 4, 1981, p. 42. Žrst surfaced in the late 1960s, however, there has been no indication of either the political buildup or operational planning for an all-out Arab assault, though there have been at least two instances of Arab states forming ad hoc coalitions to attack Israel: in May-June 1967 and October 1973. In both cases, the Arabs formulated limited operational plans to achieve limited territorial and political objectives.
Over the years, many Israeli decisionmakers have viewed the vehement anti-Israeli--and sometimes anti-Semitic--rhetoric of Arab leaders, journalists, intellectuals, and others as signiŽcant evidence of an overall intent to destroy the Jewish state.9 Before 1967, direct and indirect references to this objective were particularly common. Although still employed by extremist groups, this rhetoric is no longer integral to the political discourse of most Arab regimes, even those still in a declared state of war with Israel.10 Goals such as the reoccupation of the territories captured by Israel in 1967 and the creation of a contiguous Palestinian state have assumed greater importance. Moreover, even after the outbreak of the second intifada (uprising) in September 2000, there has been little evidence that the Arab states--or for that matter most Palestinian leaders--seek to revive the notion of eliminating the state of Israel.11 This evidence seems to support the argument of Israeli strategists that Israel?s nuclear policy has essentially accomplished its principal aim: shifting the strategic objectives of Arab states to re?ect a growing awareness of the futility of trying to destroy Israel. Although a number of other reasons may account for the absence of an all-out Arab attack, perceptual evidence suggests a meaningful change in Arab rhetoric that largely parallels developments in Israel?s nuclear capabilities. By association, Israeli strategists conclude that the
International Security 28:2 48
9. See Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1972).
10. Compare Yehoshafat Harkabi?s discussion of Arab rhetoric in his Arab Attitudes to Israel (originally published in Hebrew in 1968) to his discussion of Arab rhetoric in the post-Six Day War period, in Harkabi, Arab Attitudes and Israel?s Response (New York: Free Press, 1975).
11. In this regard, the most recent and dramatic shift is the Arab League?s resolution of March 28, 2002, to adopt the Saudi initiative. According to this resolution, in return for full Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state, the Arab states would (1) agree to end the Arab-Israeli con?ict, enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all states in the region; and (2) establish normal relations with Israel. See Associated Press report in New York Times, March 29, 2002, p. A14. This initiative was incorporated in President George W. Bush?s "road map" of September 17, 2002. See http://www.mideastweb.org/quartetrm2.htm. The most comprehensive account of Israel?s nuclear image in Arab eyes is Ariel Levite and Emily Landau, Israel?s Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel?s Nuclear Posture (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Pappyrus, Tel Aviv University Press, 1994).
government?s nuclear doctrine has greatly in?uenced the shift toward Arab moderation. A fundamental assumption of the doctrine of deterrence is the presence of a threat to some aspect of a state?s national security. The threat may consist of one or more observable enemies with hostile intent and the capabilities to carry out their objectives. Deterrence rests on the defender?s belief that, in the absence of a credible deterrent threat, the challenger will seek to alter the status quo by force.12 The threat assessment of Ben-Gurion and his associates, for example, was based on four realities: (1) the all-out Arab attempt to unmake the new state of Israel in 1948, followed by numerous inŽltrations into Israel from Egypt and Jordan prior to the 1956 Sinai War; (2) the hostile rhetoric of Arab political elites, which established the intent element in the threat perception; (3) the demographic and territorial asymmetry between Israel and its Arab neighbors that made the threat seem very real; and (4) the simultaneous existence of at least three, and possibly as many as seven, hostile Arab states, illustrating the need to take the capabilities of these states into account when calculating the balance of forces in the region.13
Given these realities, the basic rationale of Ben-Gurion and his colleagues for developing a nuclear insurance policy would appear to have been fundamentally sound. There is one problem, however: Israeli scholars? evaluation of the performance of the doctrine of deterrence has historically assumed that this perception accurately re?ected the objective reality, thus treating it as the factual foundation of their analyses.14 As a result, instead of performing independent strategic analyses grounded in classical principles of threat assessment, these scholars have bought into the rhetoric of Israeli advocates of nuclear deterrence.
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 49
12. Zeev Maoz, Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 66-67.
13. David Ben-Gurion, The Renewed State of Israel, Vol. 1 (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), pp. 518-526; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, Vol. 3, pp. 1359-1363; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 9-14; Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1987), pp. 12-19; Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, pp. 14-21; Evron, Israel?s Nuclear Dilemma, pp. 5-10; Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 22-23; and Shai Feldman, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 95-96.
14. Writings on Israeli conventional deterrence have this same tendency. See, for example, Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry R. Posen, Israel?s Strategic Doctrine (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1981).
Israeli threat perceptions in the 1950s were only partly accurate. For the doomsday scenario to have had a basis in fact, evidence of two related processes was essential: (1) multilateral political cooperation among Arab states, and (2) a sustained Arab military mobilization effort. An examination of inter-Arab politics and of the military policies of key Arab states strongly suggests that neither of these processes was evident in the second half of the 1950s and Žrst half of the 1960s, a critical period in Israeli nuclear decisionmaking. Instead, from 1957 to 1973, inter-Arab relations were characterized primarily by political and military strife.15
Following the 1956 Sinai War, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser adopted a radical pan-Arab policy aimed at creating a uniŽed Arab camp. To some observers, the radical uprising in Iraq and the multiple attempts to overthrow King Hussein in Jordan--not to mention the 1958-61 union between Egypt and Syria--were clear indications that Nasser?s brand of pan-Arabism was gaining widespread support. With the 1962 outbreak of civil war in Yemen, however, Nasser?s allegiance to pan-Arabism was exposed as a sham.16 The Yemeni civil war split the Arab world, with the South Yemenis and Egyptian forces on one side and the North Yemenis and their Saudi ally on the other.17 Later, during the May-June 1967 crisis, Arab unity seemed to reemerge, with Arab states rallying to support Nasser?s campaign against Israel. The evidence suggests, however, that the rhetoric of Arab unity was not matched by a commitment to act. The governments of Syria and Jordan did the minimum to help Egypt during the war.18 Between the 1967 and 1973 wars, Arab states increasingly disagreed over how to deal with Israel. Egypt, for
International Security 28:2 50
15. On inter-Arab politics during this era, see Eli Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995);Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986); Peter Snow, Hussein (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972); and Anthony Nutting, Nasser (London: Constable, 1972), pp. 196-293.
16. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 27-43; and Abraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Con?ict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 41-54.
17. Another episode suggesting the divisive role that the Israeli factor played in inter-Arab politics is the effort to develop a joint Arab policy with respect to the Israeli Kinneret-Negev irrigation project during the January and September 1964 Arab summits. See Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Con?ict, pp. 61-67.
18. For documentation of Syrian inactivity during the 1967 con?ict, see Maoz, Paradoxes of War, pp. 209-212; and Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 137-140. On Jordan, see Ephraim Kam, ed., Hussein Starts a War (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma?arachot, 1974), pp. 25-108.
example, repeatedly indicated interest in reaching a separate deal that would allow it to regain control over the Sinai Peninsula. Syria, meanwhile, led the rejectionist front.19
The human and material effort that Egypt and Syria expended on their military forces during this period was clearly inconsistent with the Israelis? threat perception.20 Around the time the government was deciding to build the Dimona nuclear reactor, the investment in military manpower and hardware by the Arab confrontation states was at best marginal. Egypt, Israel?s primary opponent, was ruled by a military regime that relied on the armed forces for its political survival. In 1957 Egypt had approximately 95,000 soldiers, less than 0.5 percent of its population of about 24 million. Defense spending for that year was $224 million, or about 6 percent of the country?s gross domestic product (GDP).21 Meanwhile, Syria had an armed force of some 60,000 troops and a defense budget of about $39 million (2.8 percent of Syrian GDP). Defense spending Žgures for other Arab states that could have potentially posed an existential threat to Israel were even lower.
Evidence of Arab weakness is also illuminated in the writings of key Arab military and political analysts, as well as in the speeches of Nasser himself.Writing in the Egyptian daily al-Ahram on September 25, 1964, Mohammed Hassanin Heikal (a Nasser conŽdant) stated that for the Egyptian leader, a successful Arab strike against Israel had three preconditions: (1) the concentration of superior Arab military force, (2) Arab unity, and (3) the diplomatic isolation of Israel. Nasser admitted on several occasions during the 1960s, however, that the Žrst condition was far from being fulŽlled, and that a premature provoca- The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 51
19. Yoram Meital, Egypt?s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967-1977 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), pp. 41-76; Seale, Asad, pp. 185-194; and Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Con?ict, pp. 97-132. For a discussion of the extent of disagreement among Arab leaders in the wake of the 1967 war, see AbdelMagid Farid, Nasser: The Final Years (Reading, Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 1994), especially pp. 51-67, 109-122.
20. Sources for these Žgures include the Project on the Quantitative History of the Arab-Israeli Con?ict and the Peace Process, Tel Aviv University, http://spirit.tau.ac.il/poli/faculty/maoz/con?ict/introduct.html; and COW Military Capability Dataset (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Correlates of War Project, 1997), http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. In late 1962, during debate over whether to convert the Dimona reactor into a nuclear weapons facility, the members of the IDF general staff argued that the conventional balance of forces was becoming increasingly important both in a deterrence sense and in terms of its effect on war outcomes. See Evron, Israel?s Nuclear Dilemma, pp. 6-7; and Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 148-151.
21. The government?s efforts to increase Egypt?s military capabilities were a response to the Israeli raid in Gaza on February 28, 1955. The raid convinced Nasser that his army was weak and badly equipped, and could not withstand an Israeli attack. See Mohammed Hassanin Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet In?uence in the Arab World (London: Collins, 1978), p. 58; and Nutting, Nasser, p. 97.
tion of war against Israel would betray the Arab cause.22 It also seemed that individual Arab states were more interested in Žnding ways to catch up with Israel?s growing conventional and nonconventional power than in cooperating with each other. As for the third precondition, Israel was brie?y gripped by a sense of fear and desperation following the Soviet Union?s decision in the fall of 1955 to provide Egypt with top-of-the-line military hardware. At the time, Israel was still subject to a weapons embargo imposed by Britain, France, and the United States in 1950.23 By the summer of 1956, however, and even more so after the October Sinai War, this fear had largely dissipated, as Israel started to receive shipments of French military hardware whose quality and quantity matched or surpassed the weapons systems being supplied to the Egyptians by the Soviets.24
Following Israel?s 1957 withdrawal from the Sinai, Israeli decisionmakers believed that they had secured a Žrm U.S. commitment for direct intervention in the event Egypt should try to blockade the Tiran Strait, Israel?s southern sea route.25 By the time of the construction of the Dimona reactor, Israeli negotiations with the United States on direct and indirect (through Germany) arms transfers were well under way.26 Thus, although one could argue in the mid- 1950s that Israel?s perception of international isolation may have seemed realistic, by the late 1950s this was no longer the case.
In sum, just as Israel?s nuclear project was taking a military turn in the early 1960s, the gravity of the threat it was supposed to address had signiŽcantly receded. Israel?s strategic and international position continued to improve, while the threat of an Arab coalition bent on destroying the Israeli state had become less realistic. Most important, the balance of conventional military forces had started to tilt heavily in Israel?s favor--all of which suggests that, to a large extent, the Israeli nuclear project was not only super?uous but also dangerous in terms of its potentially destabilizing effect on regional politics.
International Security 28:2 52
22. See Ben D. Mor, Decision and Interaction in Crisis (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), pp. 116-119; Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Con?ict, pp. 69-70; Nutting, Nasser, pp. 367-368; and Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet, 1981), pp. 1-17.
23. For Israeli perceptions following the Egyptian-Soviet weapons deal, see Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel?s Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 232-254; and Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York: Schocken, 1967), pp. 4-5.
24. For the balance of forces between Israel and Egypt on the eve of the Sinai War, see Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 212; Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, pp. 183-197, and Maoz, Paradoxes of War, p. 55.
25. Brecher, Decisions in Israel?s Foreign Policy, pp. 378-379.
26. Abraham Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 59-129. Since the beginning of its nuclear project, Israel has faced a number of crises in which it perceived speciŽc Arab military threats to both its conventional and nuclear deterrence postures. According to some sources, Israel has armed its nuclear weapons on three occasions: early June 1967, October 1973, and in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War.27 Below I examine the nature of these military threats and the effectiveness of Israel?s deterrence response. From the Israeli perspective, the May-June 1967 crisis represented a colossal deterrence failure, as Egypt violated all of the casus belli that the Israeli government had articulated following the 1956 Sinai War. Yet a closer examination reveals that Israel?s key political leaders and the Israeli military elite may have had very different perceptions of the Arab threat. Many Israeli politicians considered Egyptian troop movements in the Sinai before the outbreak of hostilities to be a major existential threat.28 On the other hand, most Israeli military commanders viewed them primarily as a challenge to Israeli deterrence.29 In addition, reports of Egyptian Mig-21 jets ?ying over Israel?s Dimona nuclear reactor heightened concern among Israeli politicians that the facility might become a target of attack.30
It seems implausible that Israel?s decision to arm its nuclear weapons during the crisis would not have been accompanied by a--possibly secret--threat to Nasser that an all-out Egyptian attack might provoke nuclear retaliation. Otherwise,
arming the weapons would have been meaningless.31 Assuming that
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 53
27. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 259-276; Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 225-240; Farr, "The Third Temple Holy of Holies"; Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, pp. 139-149; and Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency: Israel and the 1991 Gulf War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (September 1992), p. 307. Eisenberg mentions an Israeli Jericho missile test on the eve of the Gulf War.
28. See Yitzhak Rabin, Personal Service File (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1978), pp. 150-151, 156-159; and Brecher, Decisions in Israel?s Foreign Policy, pp. 331-355.
29. See Rabin, Personal Service File, pp. 157-158; Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), pp. 322-323, 331; Ezer Weizman, Yours Is the Sky, Yours Is the Land (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1975), p. 260; and Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, pp. 115-123.
30. Michael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 230-231. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 266-276, argues that Israeli decisionmakers believed that the potentially negative consequences of revealing Israel?s nuclear capability outweighed any strategic beneŽts. He also states that "by May of 1967, Israel was a nuclear weapon state." Ibid., p. 275. It is unclear what purpose the crash project leading to the assembly of two crude atomic devices could have served other than to provide Israel with a credible deterrence capability at the peak of the crisis.
31. Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 145, alludes to his role during the crisis: "My contribution during that dramatic period was something I still cannot write about openly, for reasons of state security. After Dayan was appointed defense minister, I submitted to him a certain proposal that in my opinion then--and in my opinion today, nearly Israel did indeed communicate its position to Nasser, the threat had failed to accomplish its goal. The Egyptians not only raised the level of rhetoric; they also escalated their violations of the casus belli.
Around May 26-27, 1967, Nasser apparently agreed with the Syrians to launch a limited offensive against Israel, known as Operation Dawn, on May 28.32 There is fairly solid evidence, however, that he had no immediate intention of participating in an all-out attack,33 though not because of Israeli threats. Whether he was caught up in his own rhetoric, as some analysts suggest, or engaged in a calculated game of diplomatic brinkmanship, as others argue, is of marginal importance.34 Nasser?s rhetoric and Egyptian troop movements continued to escalate until Israel seized the initiative by launching a conventional attack; the doctrine of deterrence, it seems, had failed. The 1973 Egyptian-Syrian attack on October 6 caught the Israeli leadership completely by surprise. Following Israel?s abortive counteroffensive along the Suez front two days later, the prospect of an Israeli military defeat became all too real, as Syrian forward units reached the edge of the Golan Heights overlooking northern Israel.35 The situation had become critical,with several Israeli ministers proposing a cease-Žre in place. Israel?s purpose in arming its nuclear warheads on October 9, however, remains unclear. Some accounts suggest that, rather than to deter the Arabs, the goal was to blackmail Washington into launching an airlift to supply Israel with weapons and munitions.36 But, again, International Security 28:2 54
three decades later--would have deterred the Arabs and prevented the war. My proposal . . . was considered--and rejected." It seems that Peres proposed either communicating an explicit nuclear threat to Nasser or conducting a nuclear test. It is conceivable that the Egyptians detected heightened activity at Dimona and that Nasser considered the possibility that Israel did indeed possess a nuclear device.
32. See Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 92-97, 118-121. The operation would have included an aerial attack on the Dimona reactor. Oren argues that last-minute intervention by the Soviet Union resulted in the cancellation of this operation.
33. Muhammad Abd al-Ghani Gamassy, The Ramadan War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamassy of Egypt (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1993), pp. 21-50, offers a penetrating analysis of the political and military confusion in Egypt prior to and during the crisis.
34. For proponents of the Žrst view, see Nutting, Nasser, pp. 395-417; and Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 242-244. For advocates of the second view, see Mor, Decision and Interaction in Crisis; and Ben D. Mor, "Nasser?s Decision Making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A Rational Choice Explanation," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 359-375.
35. Haim Herzog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), p. 122; and Maoz, Paradoxes of War, p. 187.
36. Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 225-239; Avner Cohen, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons of the 1967 and 1973 Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical the arming of Israel?s nuclear warheads would have been meaningless unless this fact was conveyed to Nasser and Syria?s president, HaŽz al-Asad. Even if this information had not been communicated directly, it is likely that Soviet satellites would have picked up some of the details and that ofŽcials in Moscow would have then passed them along to the Iraqis.37
Israel?s arming of its nuclear warheads did not deter the Egyptians from launching a massive armored attack on October 14, aimed at capturing the Mitla and Gidi Passes in the Sinai. Nor did it deter the Syrians from Žring Frog missiles at an Israeli air force base in Ramat David that also hit civilian targets. Nuclear deterrence failed yet again when Israel responded with conventionalforce.38 (Interestingly, the secret nature of the 1967 and 1973 nuclear alerts allowed Israel to back down without signiŽcantly damaging its reputation.) Perhaps the most critical test of Israel?s nuclear deterrence occurred in January 1991. Some months before, on April 2, 1990 (four months before Iraqinvaded Kuwait), President Saddam Hussein made a speech in which he threatened to hit Israel with binary chemical weapons. Despite debate within the Israeli intelligence community regarding the potential scope of the Iraqi threat, it was well known that Iraq possessed missiles capable of hitting Israeli population centers.39
Most observers concur that Iraq?s launching of Scud missiles against Israel during the 1991 Gulf War represents a deterrence failure, at least on the conventional level. On the other hand, many claim that Saddam?s decision not to Žre chemical missiles testiŽes to the spectacular effectiveness of Israeli nuclear deterrence. According to Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli strategy did not prevent the
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 55
Weapons (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 104-124; Avner Cohen, Israel?s Last Taboo (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: ZABAM, forthcoming); and Avner Cohen, "The Last Nuclear Moment," New York Times, October 6, 2003. Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, pp. 139-149, maintains that the Israelis acted out of panic; he also argues that, after the war, Dayan?s critics claimed that he had planned to use nuclear weapons against Damascus if Syrian forces had moved into the Galilee.
37. Cohen, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis under Secrecy."
38. Uri Bar-Joseph, "The Hidden Debate: The Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 1982), p. 216, argues that the arming of Israel?s nuclear warheads may have provoked the Soviets into sending a military supply vessel carrying nuclearwarheads to Port Said on October 25, 1973. Bar-Joseph adds, "If the Soviets did bring these arms in reaction to an Israeli nuclear alert, they disproved the conceptions of Dayan?s pro-nuclear group.This demonstrated that even under the threat of an Israeli `bomb in the basement,? the Arab side could ignore the threat, embark upon a war, and even receive nuclear guarantees from the Soviet Union." Ibid.
39. Moshe Arens, War and Peace in the Middle East (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1995), pp. 146-235.
conventionally armed Scud missile attack, marking the Žrst time since 1948 that Israeli cities had been subject to attack. . . . For Israel this was a failure of deterrence, in a narrow sense, but not one that exacted an intolerable price or endangered national survival." Amatzia Baram?s view re?ects the near consensus among Israeli scholars on the success of Israeli deterrence: "Once the allied air force had attacked Iraq, the latter could not be deterred from launching a conventional attack on Israel. But Saddam stopped short of using nonconventional weapons, and thus, while Israel?s conventional deterrence suffered a certain setback, its nonconventional [i.e., nuclear] deterrence remained intact."40
Given the lack of reliable information about Iraq?s decisionmaking process, assessing the performance of Israeli nuclear deterrence during the Gulf War remains a difŽcult task. There are several reasons, however, to question its supposed success. Between April 2, 1990, and January 17, 1991 (the start of the U.S.-led coalition war against Iraq), virtually every Israeli political and military leader vowed the use of extremely destructive power if Iraq struck at Israel. In most of their statements, the pledge was attached to any kind of attack, not only to a chemical weapons attack.41 As Laura Eisenberg writes: "Top-ranking Israelis repeatedly warned that any Iraqi attack, regardless of scope, would provoke an immediate and devastating response."42
Nevertheless, the Gulf War represents a deterrence failure, at least in the conventional sense, for three reasons. First, despite the explicit and public nature of Israel?s deterrent threats, which may have been accompanied by additional secret threats of massive retaliation, Iraq chose to launch Scud missiles at Israeli military installations and urban centers.43 Second, Iraq?s violation of the status quo was fundamental and persistent. Third, Israel had no effective defense against the Scuds.
Israeli scholars? assessment of the effectiveness of deterrence in the Gulf War may be biased by the relatively minor damage caused by the missiles. At the time, however, nobody knew when or where the next missile would hit, its
International Security 28:2 56
40. Gerald Steinberg, "Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East: Lessons from the 1991 Gulf War," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 57; and Amatzia Baram, "Israeli Deterrence, Iraqi Responses," Orbis, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 399.
41. For examples, see Shai Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence: The Test of the Gulf War," in Joseph Alpher, ed., War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1991), pp. 170-189; and Barak Mendelsohn, "Israeli Deterrence in the Gulf War," M.A. thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1999, especially pp. 120-155.
42. Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," p. 307.
43. Cohen, Israel?s Last Taboo; and Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," p. 307, n. 8. payload, or its destructive potential. Moreover, even though the lack of fatalities may have facilitated Israeli restraint, it does not diminish the deterrence failure. It is difŽcult to believe that the Israeli government would have taken the same course had there been a large number of fatalities, whether from conventional or chemical missiles.
Israeli recognition of the possibility--indeed the likelihood--of a nonconventional attack is one of the best indications of the government?s de factoadmission of the failure of nuclear deterrence during the Gulf War. The supporting evidence is compelling. First, statements by Israeli decisionmakers immediately before the war sought to diminish the signiŽcance of the Iraqi missile threat, including the threat of chemical weapons.44 This may have been a defensive mechanism to justify the possibility of Israeli inaction in the event of such an attack. In reality, it indicates an Israeli belief that nuclear deterrence would fail, despite Israel?s explicit threats of massive retaliation. Second, in anticipation of a gas attack, the government instructed Israelis to move into specially prepared rooms (usually in their houses or apartments) in which the windows and doors had been covered earlier with plastic sheets and taped for minimal outside ventilation. This precaution (in addition to keeping gas masks and atropine injections within reach) remains the most effective passive defense measure that civilians could take against a gas attack. Such action would have been useless against conventional warheads--and indeed could have been dangerous for Israelis who had been told to take cover in these rooms. Thus the call to take protective measures implied only one thing: The government believed that a chemical attack was imminent.45 Third, since the Gulf War the Israeli government has devoted considerable Žnancial, technological, and human resources to the development of a wide array of offensive and defensive measures, including the establishment of the Home Front Command within the IDF; the creation of an aggressive missile defense program, with the Arrow missile as its ?agship project; and the reŽnement of offensive measures, especially in the Israeli air force, to deal with
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 57
44. For example, in a television interview on December 24, 1990, Defense Minister Moshe Arens stated: "We have no way of intercepting incoming missiles, . . . but the physical damage such missiles would cause is limited." Quoted in Ha?aretz, December 25, 1990. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir stated that even if chemical weapons were used against Israel, "this is not an existential threat." Quoted in Ha?aretz, January 10, 1991. Both cited in Mendelsohn, "Israeli Deterrence in the Gulf War," pp. 144-145. 45. For protective measures in the event of a conventional attack or a chemical attack, see, for example, the instructions provided in the IDF Home Front Command?s website at http:// www.idf.il/hebrew/organization/homefront/index1.stm. both short-range and long-range missile threats. In addition, Israel has launched several spy satellites designed to detect nonconventional threats at long range. Combined, these measures re?ect a strategic admission that nuclear deterrence cannot be relied on to guarantee Israel?s security. Some observers might argue that these are the kind of measures that any responsible government must take to protect its citizens against a grave threat, even if the likelihood of a state carrying out such a threat seems very low. Yet similar conditions had existed in the Middle East in the mid-1970s, when Arab countries in possession of SSMs (including Egypt) were still in a state of war with Israel. Earlier, Egypt had used chemical weapons during the Yemeni civil war. Later, in the 1980s, Iraq employed similar weapons against Iran. In the latter con?ict, Iraq also Žred hundreds of conventional missiles at the Iranian capital, Tehran. Thus, even though Arab states had both the capability and the will to use nonconventional weapons and ballistic missiles for some time, only after the Gulf War did Israel begin to invest in an aggressive missile defense program.
There are two common explanations for this shift. The Žrst is that until the Gulf War Israeli intelligence had been unaware of the gravity of the Arab missile threat.46 The second is that Israel?s prevailing assumption was that its nuclear deterrent negated the need for defensive measures against Arab missile and chemical weapons capability. There is no direct evidence to support the latter explanation, although multiple Israeli threats against Iraq from April 1990 to January 1991 may serve as indirect evidence of Israeli decisionmakers? conŽdence in the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.47 In this context, it is useful to consider Israel?s preparations for the 2003 U.S. war against Iraq. In mid-2002, Israeli authorities took steps to increase the
International Security 28:2 58
46. For this argument, see Shlomo Nakdimon, "Black Hole: Israel, the United States, and Iraq, 1981-1991," Tel Aviv, 1996; and Shlomo Nakdimon, "Saddam Is Still Here," Yediot Aharont, January 14, 2001. A number of prominent Israelis, including Moshe Arens, War and Peace in theMiddle East, p. 160, corroborate this argument, although (as noted above) Israeli intelligence did know that Iraq
possessed al-Hussein missiles capable of reaching Israel.
47. Until the Gulf War, Israel confronted strategic challenges such as Arab SSMs or nonconventional weapons primarily with offensive measures (e.g., developing the Jericho missile, producing nuclear weapons, and investing in the Israeli air force). The increasing emphasis on defensive measures and the bolstering of home front infrastructure since the Gulf War suggest a growing belief among some Israelis that deterrence is no longer the iron-clad guarantee against attack that they once thought it was. One of the leading proponents of this shift was Yitzhak Rabin, who drew two principal conclusions from the Gulf War: (1) Israel needed to develop a wide array of defensive and offensive weapons to counter the proliferation of missiles in the region, because deterrence was not enough, and (2) the most effective way to increase Israeli security was to sign peace treaties with as many Arab states as possible. See Ephraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel?s National Security (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 119-122. country?s preparedness for a nonconventional Iraqi attack. Among these were the inoculation of 15,000 emergency personnel against smallpox and a nationwide effort to check, and if necessary replace, the emergency gas kits of the entire Israeli population. At the start of the war in March, Israelis were once again ordered to prepare sealed rooms and get their gas kits ready. The activation of measures based on a worst-case scenario suggests a growing belief among Israeli leaders that a nonconventional weapons attack had become adistinct possibility.
the effect of israeli nuclear policy on the scope of arab attacks Since the start of its nuclear project, Israel has been involved in four wars, two of which Arab states initiated: the 1969-70 War of Attrition and the 1973 war.48 The military scope of both wars was extremely limited,49 as Arab leaders hoped to create conditions that would force the superpowers to pressure Israel into making territorial concessions.50 Even when the Žrst stage of the 1973 war went better than expected, Egypt and Syria did not expand their territorial objectives. Once their early success began to exceed the ambitions of their original strategy, the tide of war shifted in favor of Israel.51
At the height of the May-June 1967 crisis, Egyptian rhetoric threatened the annihilation of the state of Israel.52 Yet on the ground, a number of military and political indicators suggested that Egypt had no intention of attacking Israel,
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 59
48. For similar arguments, see Evron, Israel?s Nuclear Dilemma, pp. 62-75, 202-214.
49. Shlomo Aronson, "The Nuclear Dimension of the Arab-Israeli Con?ict: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, Nos. 1-2 (July 1984), pp. 107-141; and Levite and Landau, Israel?s Nuclear Image, pp. 42-43, as well as references therein.
50. On Nasser?s objectives in the War of Attrition, see Lawrence Whetten, The Canal War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), p. 141; Yaacov Bar-Simantov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 43-71; Dan Schueftan, Attrition: Egypt?s Postwar Political Strategy, 1967-1970 (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma?arachot, 1989), pp. 39-147; Janice Gross Stein, "The View from Cairo," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 38-49; and David A. Korn, Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992). For Egypt?s objectives during the 1973 war, see Gamassy, The Ramadan War; Sa?ad Shazly, The Crossing of the Canal (San Francisco, Calif.: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 172-181; Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 234-237; Raphael Israeli, Man of DeŽance: The Political Biography of Anwar Sadat (London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), p. 29; and Meital, Egypt?s Struggle for Peace,
pp. 111-112.
51. On the relationship between the lack of operational planning for expanding the war and its consequences, see Maoz, Paradoxes of War, pp. 186-190.
52. The combination of Egyptian military escalation and hostile rhetoric threw the Israeli nuclear project into crash mode on the eve of the war. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 259-276, argues that between May 15 and the outbreak of war on June 5, the Israelis built two crude nuclear devices that were ready to launch had Israel determined that the doomsday scenario was about to unfold. let alone engaging in all-out war.53 Moreover, according to several Egyptian sources, Nasser hoped that outside diplomatic intervention could defuse the crisis before it escalated any further.54 Thus Egypt?s defensive deployment of its forces, Nasser?s crisis diplomacy, and in?ammatory rhetoric designed for domestic and inter-Arab consumption would suggest that Israel?s nuclear potential had deterred the Egyptians if not from Žghting, then certainly from a na?ve belief that they could destroy the Israeli state in a war. Indeed proponents of Israel?s nuclear policy blame the failure of Israeli conventional deterrence for the Arab attacks/escalation, while crediting Israeli nuclear deterrence with limiting both. The 1967 case is not relevant here because, at the start of the escalation, the Arabs did not yet suspect Israel of possessing nuclear weapons. Israeli scholars do, however, consider the 1973 war and the 1991 Gulf War as con?icts whose scope was limited due to Israel?s nuclear threat.
Available evidence suggests that two principal factors constrained the scope of the 1973 Egyptian and Syrian attacks: (1) the limited political aims of both countries, and (2) Israel?s conventional military capability. The nuclear factor was not instrumental in restricting the scope of the war, insofar as there is no evidence that it played an explicit role in the decisionmaking processes of either the Egyptian or Syrian leadership.55 From the Egyptian perspective, the crucial date for the 1973war was October 24, 1972,when the Egyptian National Security Council made the key decisions on the military strategy vis-?-vis Israel. At least two Egyptian sources have published verbatim transcripts from this meeting,56 and others have provided details from it.57 In the meeting, Pres-
International Security 28:2 60
53. The IDF knew that the Egyptian army in the Sinai was defensively deployed. At the same time, Israeli generals argued that the longer the government waited to act, the more difŽcult it would be to draw the Egyptian forces out of their trenches. In addition, the continued concentration of Egyptian forces in the Sinai would force Israel to maintain a large-scale mobilization of reserves beyond its economic capacity. See Rabin, Personal Service File, pp. 157-158; Dayan, Story of My Life, p. 331; and Weizman, Yours Is the Sky, Yours Is the Land, pp. 258, 260.
54. Riad, The Struggle for Peace in theMiddle East, pp. 14-23; Gamassy, The Ramadan War, pp. 31-33; Nutting, Nasser, pp. 406-408; and Mor, "Nasser?s Decision Making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis," pp. 359-375.
55. Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, p. 143, notes that the Syrian army stopped short of entering Israel proper in the Žrst days of the war because Asad believed that a limited offensive would minimize (or even neutralize) the risk of Israeli nuclear retaliation. Aronson does not provide sources for this claim, however. For an analysis of Asad?s military calculus, see Seale, Asad, pp. 194-200. This biographical volume, which is based on interviews with the Syrian leader, does not mention the nuclear issue. See also Levite and Landau, Israel?s Nuclear Image, pp. 42-43.
56. This was the so-called Giza meeting. Gamassy, The Ramadan War, pp. 149-152; and Shazly, The Crossing of the Canal, pp. 176-181.
57. Mohammed Hassanin Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Penguin, 1975), pp. 183-184;
Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 234-236; Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking? ident Anwar al-Sadat stated that the principal aim of the war was to break the diplomatic impasse in the Middle East and reignite the peace process. The discussion focused on the operational contours of the war. At no time did Israel?s nuclear capability come up as a factor. On the other hand, the meeting?s participants repeatedly mentioned Israeli conventional capability as a constraint on Egypt?s ability to achieve military success.
The modus operandi of Egypt?s attack plan says more about the principal concerns of Egyptian strategists than does their silence on the nuclear issue. The plan called for two armies to capture and hold on to a limited stretch of land east of the Suez Canal. Surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries stationed along the west bank of the canal would shield the Egyptian troops from the Israeli air force, and Sager missiles would protect them from Israeli armored attacks. Because the Egyptians considered the SAM missile shield essential, the original plan had been to refrain from moving beyond its range. This suggests that what most concerned Egyptian strategists, and what deterred them from launching an all-out attack, was not Israel?s nuclear capability but its conventional air force and armored forces.58
As argued above, most Israeli scholars believe that Iraq refrained from Žring chemical warheads at Israel during the Gulf War for fear of nuclear retaliation. 59 As Baram argues: "If, as pointed out by the Iraqi sources, it is Israel?s nuclear force that has for so long `paralyzed the Arab will [to eliminate Israel],?then there is no reason why, until the Arabs themselves have similar weapons, that it should not continue to paralyze it."60 As noted earlier, the lack of any direct evidence on Baghdad?s decisionmaking process prior to or during the Gulf War allows only cautious remarks on Iraqi behavior. What is known is that (1) Iraq launched forty-four Scud missiles at Israel, some of them targeted at the Dimona nuclear reactor, but none getting close,61 and (2) Iraq refrained
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 61
(London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 122-123; and Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 2001), pp. 121-126.
58. Gamassy, The Ramadan War, pp. 185-202, especially pp. 185-186, 192-193; and Shazly, The Crossing of the Canal. During the Giza meeting, Sadat debated with several military commanders their claim that Egypt even lacked the capability for a limited attack and that it needed more modern weapons from the Soviet Union. Sadat?s decision to dismiss the minister of war, Muhammad Sadeq, re?ects his disagreement with this assessment. See Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, pp. 127-139.
59. Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence"; Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency"; Steinberg, "Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East"; and Baram, "Israeli Deterrence, Iraqi Responses." Perhaps the most ardent support for this notion appears in Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, especially pp. 131-137, 143.
60. Baram, "Israeli Deterrence, Iraqi Response," p. 399 (quotes and brackets in original).
61. Mohammad-Mahmoud Muhamedou, Iraq and the Second Gulf War: State Building and Regime Sefrom launching chemical weapons against either Israel or Saudi Arabia, a coalition ally. The aim of Iraq?s decision to Žre Scud missiles, some argue, was to prompt Israeli retaliation, in the hopes of splitting the U.S.-led coalition.
62 Proponents point to the second fact as evidence of the effectiveness of Israeli nuclear deterrence.
This explanation of Iraqi motives and the effectiveness of Israeli deterrence has two major ?aws. First, Israeli statements in 1990 threatened massive retaliationagainst any kind of attack. The contention that Israeli nuclear threats limited the scope of the Iraqi assault assumes that Israeli decisionmakers made an explicit distinction between a conventional missile attack and a chemical attack. The evidence does not support this assumption. As shown earlier, moststatements suggest that Israel would respond regardless of the nature of the Iraqi attack. This applies to Israel?s secretly communicated threats as well: It is unreasonable to suppose that Israel would have made such a distinction between its public and private statements, because doing so would have given de facto legitimacy to Iraq?s Žring of conventional warheads.63 Second, this explanation incorrectly assumes that Israeli decisionmakers interpreted deterrence success or failure as hinging on the potential lethality of the weapons themselves. This is also unsupported by the evidence. If Israeli fatalities had been signiŽcant, public and political pressure to act would have been enormous. Although Saddam Hussein could not have known just how much damage the missiles would in?ict, by instructing that the Scuds be targeted at Israel?s largest population centers, he was obviously hoping for as many fatalities as possible.
Saddam?s decision not to use chemical weapons against Israel may have another explanation. Following the con?ict, UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors discovered that Iraq?s chemical warheads were quite primitive. In addition, most of the chemical warheads carried sarin nerve gas,64 which is International Security 28:2 62
curity (San Francisco, Calif.: Austin andWinŽeld, 1998), p. 159, claims that Iraq Žred six missiles at the Dimona reactor in retribution for the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor.
62. See Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Con?ict and Its Implications (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 171-172; Bernard Reich, "Israel and the Persian Gulf Crisis," in Ibrahim Ibrahim, ed., The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992), p. 234; Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence," p. 174-176; and Mohamedou, Iraq and the Second GulfWar, p. 159.
63. See sources on Israeli statements in note 41.
64. Arens, War and Peace in the Middle East, p. 160; Baram, "Israeli Deterrence, Iraqi Responses," p. 400; and Steinberg, "Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East," p. 55. For numbers and types of warheads, see UNSCOM, "Comprehensive Review on Iraq," January 25, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm. Annex C of the review acknowlgenerally ineffective against populations equipped with emergency gas kits such as those in the possession of the Israelis. The destructive potential of a missile packed with 500 kilograms of TNT (such as the al-Hussein missile) is far greater than that of a chemical warhead against a protected population. Thus, if the missiles targeted at Israel had carried chemical warheads, the most signiŽcant effect would probably have been psychological, not physical. Because Saddam?s main objective in this regard appears to have been to draw Israel into the con?ict by producing a large number of Israeli fatalities, his greatest chance for success was the use of conventional warheads. To support the argument that Israeli nuclear deterrence was a causal factor in shaping Iraq?s military calculus in the Gulf War, two facts must be determined: (1) that Israel--not the United States--deterred Iraq from using chemical weapons, and (2) that Israel?s nuclear deterrent, and not some other factor, compelled Iraq to rely solely on conventional warheads. No Israeli scholar who argues that Israeli nuclear deterrence was successful provides evidence to support either of these claims. Yet even if nuclear deterrence did prevent Iraq from using chemical (or biological) weapons, there is sufŽcient evidence to cast doubt on both the uniqueness of the source of deterrence (i.e., Israel, not the United States) and the uniqueness of the type of retaliation (i.e., Israel?s nuclear, not conventional, capability).
The key evidence against the uniqueness of the source argument is that Iraq did not use chemical (or biological) weapons during the Gulf War--either against the coalition forces or against other Arab states. Moreover, it refrained from using chemical (or biological) weapons even when coalition ground forces entered Iraq, and when for several days it was unclear whether these forces would stop short of Baghdad.65 Indeed it is more plausible that the U.S. threat of retaliation exerted the greater in?uence over Saddam because, unlike Israel, the United States did not have the same constraints.66
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 63
edges that far less is known about Iraq?s biological weapons capabilities. In addition, the UNSCOM teams were unable to verify most of the Iraqi reports or to develop independent assessments of Iraq?s bioweapons capabilities. The discrepancies between the Iraqi reports and UNSCOM veriŽcation statements are especially signiŽcant in this area. The reports found no evidence, however, that Iraq had conducted Želd tests of its biomissiles.
65. On the course of the Gulf War, see Lawrence L. Friedman and Ephraim Karsh, The Gulf Con?ict: Diplomacy and War in the New World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War (London: HarperCollins, 1992). 66. An important source of confusion is the statement by then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney that Israel would retaliate to a chemical weapons attack with nuclear weapons. Cheney interview with Wolf Blitzer, CNN?s Evans and Novak, January 2, 1991. This also ignores, however, the more obvious threats by the United States that it would retaliate with brute force if Iraq used Second, it is unclear whether a nuclear retaliatory strike would have been Israel ?s only option had Iraq launched chemical (or biological) weapons. In fact, given Israel?s successful air strike on Iraq?s Osirak nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981, the Iraqis were well aware of the broad range of military options available to the Israelis, most of which did not involve nuclear weapons.67 Moreover, in none of the writings on this issue is there evidence to suggest that Israel?s nuclear threat was responsible for Iraq?s decision not to employ chemical weapons. Thus the argument that Israeli nuclear deterrence proved effective in the Gulf War is not only seriously ?awed, but is also based on weak and inconsistent evidence.
a nuclear peace?
The widely held belief among Israeli scholars, journalists, and politicians that Israel?s nuclear policy was instrumental in bringing the Arabs to the negotiating table is based not on citations of actual Arab statements, but on statements attributed to Arab leaders and spokespeople.68 It also appears in arguments that Israel?s nuclear capability decreases the likelihood of the Israeli- Palestinian con?ict ever expanding into a regional con?agration or even seriously threatening the peace between either Israel and Egypt or Israel and Jordan.69
International Security 28:2 64
chemical weapons against anybody, not just Israel. It is more likely that Saddam knew that U.S. stakes in the con?ict would have increased tenfold if he used such weapons.
67. For example, the Begin Doctrine, announced following the 1981 attack, stated, "Under no circumstances would [Israel] allow the enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our nation." Quoted in Feldman, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control in the Middle East, p. 109. Since then, virtually all of Israel?s enemies have developed weapons of mass destruction. Evron, Israel?s Nuclear Dilemma, pp. 211-212, argues that technological and operational problems, rather than Israeli threats of nuclear retaliation, prevented Saddam from using chemical weapons. Khadduri and Ghareeb, in War in the Gulf, p. 171, make a similar case: "The Scud missiles, however, are known for being highly inaccurate and quite an ineffective weapon . . . nor do they contain very powerful warheads; indeed, in one case it was found that an Iraqi warhead was made of cement." Evron suggests that Saddam saw Iraq?s chemical weapons more as a deterrent against threats to his regime.
68. Levite and Landau, Israel?s Nuclear Image, pp. 44-45. This text is the most extensive study of Arab perceptions of Israel?s nuclear policy. The evidence the authors provide for this argument consists of indirect references to the "terrible alternative to peace" and comments by Israeli politicians (Yigael Yadin and Shimon Peres) that Sadat had told them: "Dimona was also a factor in his decision to visit Jerusalem in 1977." Ibid., pp. 66-67. Levite and Landau also seem to accept the notion that Israel?s nuclear image had a signiŽcant effect on the turn toward peace in the Arab world. Ibid., pp. 170-172. See also Levin, "Should Israel Build a Nuclear Bomb?" In a lecture at Tel Aviv University on January 14, 2002, Zeev Schiff, the military analyst at the Israeli daily Ha?aretz, alsosuggested the Arab shift as a possible side effect of Israel?s nuclear policy.
69. Unnamed "experts," for example, are quoted as saying: "Their [Israelis?] renewed regional isolation will strengthen their case, should they want to join the European Union, and they can always keep the Arabs at bay by shaking the nuclear stick and the Masada Complex which the The key event in the Arab-Israeli peace process was Sadat?s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, which led to the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty on March 27, 1979. These momentous events were followed by the signing of the Oslo accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1993 and the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of July 1994. In addition, since the Madrid conference of November 1991, Israel and Syria have continued to engage in direct negotiations. More recent events that mark a dramatic shift in Israeli-Arab relations include Israel?s establishment of diplomatic relations with Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Tunisia, as well as discussions on a framework for multilateral talks on economic issues, the environment, and arms control and regional security. These events also suggest a fundamental change in Arab attitudes toward Israel that is unlikely to reverse itself despite the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian con?ict and fallout from the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq. If, as its adherents suggest, Israel?s nuclear policy was a key factor in producing this shift, then it has had unintended consequences that may have even surpassed the intended objective of deterring an all-out Arab attack.70 A hidden assumption in the argument that Israel?s nuclear policy has helped to bring Arab leaders to the negotiating table is that Arab states had resisted serious negotiations with Israel until its development of a nuclear capability. However, a close review of the public and secret diplomacy over the last halfcentury or so reveals a number of Arab peace initiatives, including the 1949 Husni Za?im peace proposal,71 secret talks between Israel and Syria in the early 1950s,72 and secret negotiations between Moshe Sharett (Israeli foreign minister and prime minister) and President Nasser from 1953 to 1955.73 There are
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 65
Arabs know is a very ominous combination." "Mideast Brinkmanship: The Masada Complex and the Camel That Roared," Deutsche Presse Agentur, October 13, 2000. Also, in discussing the publication of Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, eds., The Middle East Military Balance, 2000-2001 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), Feldman, head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, noted: "Israel?s deterrent power remained robust, serving as a barrier against escalation to a regional war." He also stated that "in addition to its superior conventional weapons, . . . Israel had an edge because of Arab assessments that Israel possesses nuclear weapons." Quoted in "Israel?s Military Might Prevents Intifada Escalating to Regional Con?ict: Study," Agence France-Presse, June 11, 2001.
70. Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in theMiddle East, pp. 160-164, argues that Sadat was not only convinced of the futility of pursuing the destruction of Israel, but was also concerned with the possibly destructive implications of a future war in the Middle East.
71. Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Aryeh Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, 1949-1955 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994); and Maoz, Syria and Israel, pp. 21-26.
72. Maoz, Syria and Israel, pp. 29-37; and Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, pp. 99-161.
73. Gabriel Sheffer, Moshe Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 654-655, 667. Haim Handweker, "Twenty-four Years before Sadat," Ha?aretz, February 1, 2002, reports on top secret documents found in the West German foreign ministry that inmany reasons why none of these peace initiatives advanced very far, not the least of which was their rejection by Israeli decisionmakers.74 In addition, Israeli military operations supported by hard-liners such as Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan proved successful in derailing the diplomatic efforts of moderates such as Sharett.75
Actions such as the Gaza raid of February 28, 1955, the military escalation along the Israeli-Jordanian border in 1955, the 1956 Sinai War, Israel?s 1957-67 periphery policy (which included military and intelligence interventions in the internal affairs of Arab and Muslim states),76 and possible leaks about the development of the Israeli nuclear project posed signiŽcant challenges to Arab-Israeli diplomacy in the late 1950s and Žrst half of the 1960s. These did not, however, preclude a number of secret exchanges between Israeli and Egyptian diplomats, as well as between Israeli ofŽcials and Jordan?s King Hussein.77 Moreover, following the 1967 war, Arab and Israeli diplomats chose to renew their negotiations. In contrast to the prevailing Israeli perception at the time, the Egyptians saw the Khartoum Resolution of September 1967 as a signal to Israel of a possible agreement on the basis of the pre-1967 war boundaries. 78 Other examples of Arab willingness to work toward a peaceful settlement include Nasser?s positive response to the Rogers peace initiative of 1969, the terms of the August 1970 cease-Žre agreement that ended the War of Attrition, and Sadat?s initiative of February 4, 1971, aimed at a limited agreement with Israel.79
International Security 28:2 66
cluded a July 1953 request by Nasser for assistance from German diplomats on mediating between Egypt and Israel.
74. See Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken, p. 68; Maoz, Syria and Israel, pp. 24-26, 29-31; Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, p. 35; and Sheffer, Moshe Sharett, pp. 789-790.
75. Sheffer, Moshe Sharett, pp. 760-761; Benny Morris, Israel?s Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab InŽltrations, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 335; and Zeev Maoz, "Israeli Intervention in Intra-Arab Affairs," in AbrahamBen-Zvi and Aharon Klieman, eds., World Politics: Essays in Honor of David Vital (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 141-143.
76. Maoz, "Israeli Intervention in Intra-Arab Affairs," pp. 142-143.
77. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York:W.W. Norton, 2000), provides an extensive survey of many of these diplomatic exchanges, including the secret diplomacy of the early 1950s. Shlaim discusses an Egyptian initiative by Marshall Amer, the minister of war, to invite Meir Amit, head of the Mossad (Israel?s intelligence agency), to Cairo in 1965. He also discusses meetings between King Hussein and Yaacov Herzog, director-general of the prime minister ?s ofŽce in 1963, and with Golda Meir in 1965. The meetings resulted in several important agreements on intelligence cooperation and water sharing. See ibid., especially pp. 226-228.
78. Meital, Egypt?s Struggle for Peace, pp. 41-46; and Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, p. 57.
79. Meital, Egypt?s Struggle for Peace, pp. 86-97; Riad, The Struggle for Peace in theMiddle East; Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 259-260; and Gad Yaacobi, On the Razor?s Edge (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1990).
A growing amount of documentary and secondary evidence involving numerous secret meetings between King Hussein and various Israeli policymakers, as well as extensive intelligence cooperation on a range of issues, suggest that Israel and Jordan have been in a de facto state of peace since the late 1960s.80 None of this evidence indicates that the nuclear issue was ever a subject of these discussions. Indeed the factors that explain this de facto peace seem unrelated to the nuclear issue, as do those explaining the absence of a peace treaty between the two countries. Rather, most of the factors that contributed to peace between Tel Aviv and Amman involved changes in the two countries? policies toward the West Bank and the Palestinians.81 Overall, the evidence suggests a pattern of Israeli hesitation--and, on occasion, intransigence--that was rooted in mistrust of the opponent as well as in a reluctance to make the necessary territorial concessions.82 In addition, Israeli leaders? self-conŽdence in their ability either to dictate better peace terms or to prosper without peace caused them to consistently assume uncompromising positions.83 Israel?s nuclear policy may have been a factor here, but there is no evidence thus far linking Israeli-Arab diplomacy and Israel?s nuclear policy.
Israel became an undeclared nuclear weapons state in 1967, the same year as another watershed event: Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Six Day War. These territories have provided Israel with a valuable bargaining chip in the land-for-peace formula that continues to be the basis for negotiations.84 The roots of the peace process before and after the 1973 war are found in Israeli policy toward these territories, rather than in the effect of Israel?s nuclear program on the Arab states.
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 67
80. Shlaim, The Iron Wall. On September 20, 1973, Golda Meir met King Hussein who warned her of an impending Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel. The Israelis discounted or ignored this information, viewing it as unreliable. See Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, pp. 243-244.
81. Shlaim, The Iron Wall; Moshe Zak, Hussein Makes Peace: Forty Years and Another Year on the Road to Peace (Hebrew) (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1996); and Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Con?ict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
82. On Israeli attitudes and responses to these initiatives, see Yaacobi, On the Razor?s Edge, pp. 80-
86, 101-143; Mordechai Gazit, The Middle East Peace Process, 1969-73 (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:
Ha?Kibbutz Ha?Meuchad, 1984); and Meron Medzini, The Proud Jewess: Golda Meir and the Vision of Israel (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1991), pp. 397-402. See also the sources in note 81.
83. The key expression to this attitude is re?ected in Dayan?s statement: "We [the Israelis] would rather have Sharm a-Sheikh without peace, than peace without Sharm a-Sheikh." Shlaim, Israel and the Arab World, especially pp. 283-318, provides a penetrating insight into Israel?s policy during this period.
84. The centrality of this agenda is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that all peace negotiations are based on UN resolutions 242 and (after the 1973 war) 338, which adopt the land-for-peace formula. The subscription of all actors in the region to these resolutions suggests that the willingness to make the land-for-peace trade-off helped to create the shift toward peace in the post-1973 era. There is also no explicit admission in any of the Arab documents, memoirs, studies, or media reports on Sadat?s peace initiative or on other states? decisions to enter the peace process that Israel?s nuclear status was a factor. On the other hand, there are clear indications that Israel?s conventional capabilities in?uenced Egyptian and subsequent Syrian decisions to enter into negotiations.
The outcome of the 1973 war created a twofold incentive for peace. First, it enabled the Egyptians to depict the outcome as a major victory, thereby removing the banner of shame from their armed forces. In addition, Sadat could portray Egypt?s military accomplishments as evidence of the destruction of the myth of the Israeli army?s invincibility and the reassertion of Egyptian selfcon Ždence. In effect, these successes allowed Sadat to negotiate from a position of honor.85
Second, and more important, the Egyptians and Syrians realized that despite their militaries? favorable starting positions, the costs of the 1973 war had been substantial. Together, the two countries lost more than 13,000 soldiers, 2,500 tanks, and 500 planes.86 In addition, Israeli forces succeeded in penetrating deep into Egyptian and Syrian territory. Indeed, had it not been for the U.S.-Soviet imposition of a cease-Žre, substantial segments of Egypt?s and Syria?s armed forces would have likely been destroyed. Ultimately, the leaders in Cairo and Damascus reasoned that the chances of recapturing the occupied territories by force were slim. Their only viable option therefore was to regain them through peace. Israel?s nuclear capability was irrelevant to this calculus.87
The 1973 war also forced a fundamental shift among Israelis, as they came to realize the limits of their state?s military power and the costs of continued con?ict. The war also shook their conŽdence. Indeed, if the nuclear option had any impact, it is because it convinced already-skeptical leaders such as Prime
International Security 28:2 68
85. Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 289; Meital, Egypt?s Struggle for Peace, pp. 125-126; Gamassy, The Ramadan War, p. 150; and Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 208-210.
86. Dupuy, Elusive Victory; Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 5-6; and Michael N. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 128-152.
87. Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, pp. 162-163, bases this argument on Egyptian demands that Israel sign the NPT as a condition of a peace settlement. The failure to accomplish the latter objective formed the basis for criticism of Sadat?s initiative. Among the critics were Ismail Fahmy, a prominent Egyptian diplomat, and Gen. Sa?ad Shazly. Ibid., p. 163. The fact remains, however, that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty survived Israeli refusal to join the NPT regime.
Minister Yitzhak Rabin that nuclear deterrence was irrelevant to issues of war and peace. (This is why Rabin sought interim agreements with Egypt.88) In sum, it is more likely that Israeli conventional deterrence--or what some observers have called Israel?s "cumulative deterrence"--was instrumental in changing Arab attitudes toward reaching a peaceful settlement. Contributing, perhaps decisively, to this shift were the following factors: repeated Arab military defeats in major wars; the cumulative impact of human, material, and territorial losses in?icted by these wars and short-of-war confrontations; and the growing image of Israeli resolve and superior conventional capabilities.89 Moreover, the willingness of the Israeli leadership to pay a territorial price for peace, much more so than the Arab willingness to negotiate, may have been a decisive factor in contributing to the 1973 postwar peace process. Israel?s nuclear policy was, at best, marginally relevant in this respect.
Domestic Implications of Israel?s Nuclear Policy
The Israeli security establishment may try to seek comfort in the belief that the doctrine of nuclear ambiguity is secure, having supposedly allowed Israel to develop and maintain its nuclear arsenal while resisting international pressures either to disarm or to allow inspection of its nuclear facilities.90 Israel, however, is not an ambiguous nuclear power, but rather an undeclared nuclear power. Apart from ample evidence based on publicized intelligence estimates, as well as statements by Arab and Western ofŽcials, the Israeli public has been overwhelmingly convinced of this fact. In a 1986 survey, 92 percent of respondents were either certain or "pretty sure" that Israel possessed nuclear weapons.91
Although the Israeli public has generally supported its country?s nuclear posture, this support has eroded over time. In a 1987 poll, 80 percent of respon-
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 69
88. Inbar, Rabin and Israel?s National Security, pp. 119-122.
89. See Doron Almog, "The Israeli Strategy of Deterrence as a Model of Accumulated Deterrence," M.A. thesis, University of Haifa, 1995; and Uri Bar-Joseph, "Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli Strategic Thinking," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring 1998), pp. 145-181.
90. In a television program entitled "A Bomb in the Basement," aired on November 11, 2001, Shimon Peres stated: "Had Israel performed a nuclear test, it would have invited tremendous [international] pressure. You know, there is some pleasure in the [nuclear] ambiguity, just as there is deterrence in the ambiguity. We have chosen ambiguity--deterrence towards the Arabs, and pleasure towards friends."
91. Asher Arian, Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on War and Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 71.
dents backed Israeli nuclear ambiguity, whereas in 2002 only 61 percent did.92 Israeli opinions varied, however, on scenarios that would justify the use of nuclear weapons. For example, in a 1999 survey, 26 percent of respondents opposed the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a chemical or biological attack on Israel; nearly 56 percent rejected the use of nuclear weapons even if Israel were facing a potentially overwhelming conventional military threat; more than 80 percent would not support the use of nuclear weapons if the Golan Heights were taken by force; more than 83 percent would not want Israel to use nuclear weapons "to save many lives"; and 90 percent opposed using nuclear weapons "instead of the regular army."93
These Žgures strongly suggest that most Israelis would justify the use of nuclear weapons only as a last resort. The secrecy surrounding the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, however--especially in light of the deliberate (as well as unintended) leaks regarding Israel?s nuclear capability--suggests a potential disconnect between the public?s perception of the purpose of Israel?s nuclear weapons and their purpose as understood by the Israeli leadership.
This difference in perception raises three questions. First, are the quantity and types of Israel?s nuclear weapons consistent with the public image of them as weapons of last resort, which in turn helps to legitimize the policy of ambiguity? Second, is there effective political control over both the doctrine and development of these weapons? Third, is the Israeli public aware of the potentially destabilizing effects of offensive nuclear weapons, and would they support the development of such weapons?
Some sources indicate that Israel?s nuclear arsenal includes both a signiŽcant overkill capacity as well as tactical nuclear weapons.94 Given that the Israeli
International Security 28:2 70
92. Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security, Memorandum No. 49 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University 1998), p. 31; and Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security, Memorandum No. 61 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2002), p. 34.
93. Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security, Memorandum No. 53 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University 1999). For a distribution of such opinions over the 1986-93 period, see Arian, Security Threatened, pp. 72-73. In the 2002 survey, only 16.75 percent favored nuclear retaliation to a chemical or biological missile attack. Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security, Memorandum No. 61, p. 34.
94. See Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 199-200; and Farr, "The Third Temple?s Holy of Holies." See also the Federation of Atomic Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/index.html; the Monterey Institute of International Studies Report on Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel.htm#2; and the related sources on which these reports rely. On the possible use of tactical weapons on the battleŽeld, see Timothy Garden, Can Deterrence Last? Peace through a Nuclear Strategy (London: Buchan and Enright, 1984), chaps. 8-9. Garden describes Israel?s current posture as "deterrence by denial of victory." public opposes the use of tactical nuclear weapons, how does the government justify their production? What are the doctrinal requirements for which these weapons were produced?
The possibility that Israel possesses a wide range of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons grossly distorts the notion of the "Samson option" that the government has disseminated to the Israeli public. The regime of secrecy surrounding Israel?s nuclear policy makes this distinction possible. Nuclear ambiguity may not only keep the Arabs guessing; it may also foster public support for the policy in the na?ve belief that a logical consistency exists between the deterrent role of these weapons and the quantity and types of weapons produced.
There are two possible explanations for the discrepancy between the professed aims of Israel?s nuclear policy and the quantity and types of weapons systems that Israel has produced. The Žrst explanation is that Israel has shifted from a deterrence-oriented nuclear policy to one that is more offensively oriented, with perhaps even an imperialist strand.95 This explanation adds another rationale to Israel?s policy of nuclear ambiguity: It is presumably designed to mask not only the weapons but also the doctrine of nuclear deployment and use. An examination of Israel?s foreign policy since the 1973 war indicates, however, that this explanation is inconsistent with Israel?s demonstrated willingness--regardless of the party in power--to make territorial concessions on all fronts. Indeed, the tactical nuclear weapons attributed to Israel are not in keeping with the willingness or ability of Israel to hold on to the territories it has occupied in 1967.96
The second explanation asserts that technological considerations and bureaucratic inertia, rather than an overarching strategic logic, have driven Israeli research, development, and production of nuclear weapons. In other words, Israeli scientists set out to develop the most sophisticated weapons systems that their technological capabilities could afford, while the bureaucrats in the defense establishment sought to maximize their budgets. As in other types of
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 71
95. See Levite and Landau, Israel?s Nuclear Image, pp. 24, 52-53, 56; Emily Landau, Egypt and Israel in ACRS: Bilateral Concerns in an Arms Control Process, Memorandum No. 55 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2001), p. 23; and Yair Evron, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (Washington, D.C: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), p. 18.
96. In fact, several scholars as well as left-wing politicians strongly support Israel?s nuclear posture as a means for ensuring the peace once the occupied territories are returned. See Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, pp. 237-243. See also the statement by Shimon Peres in a press conference on July 13, 1998, in which he said that Israel "built a nuclear option not in order to have a Hiroshima but an Oslo." Cited in Michael Barletta and Christina Ellington, Israel?s Nuclear Posture Review, CNS Issue Brief on WMD in the Middle East (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, December 1998), http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israelnc.htm. military-industrial complexes, this coalition exaggerated the threat, "romanticized" the weapons and delivery systems, and used other ploys to create a reality that was inconsistent with or even contradicted the strategic logic of deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons only as a last resort.97 Yet unlike many other military-industrial complexes, the Israeli nuclear community enjoyed almost absolute freedom of operation, for three reasons: (1) the secrecy surrounding the project, (2) the almost nonexistent doctrinal discussion in political and academic forums, and (3) the lack of political control and oversight. Furthermore, some of the politicians responsible for Israel?s nuclear policy were themselves infatuated with the technology. As a result, they may have been tempted by the scientists and weapons developers into supporting efforts to explore the frontiers of weapons development. Others may have had more political motivations.98
The disconnect between the public image of Israel?s nuclear capabilities and the government?s nuclear doctrine requires more elaboration than is possible here. Nevertheless, the public should be aware of the potentially destabilizing implications of Israel?s possession of nuclear weapons other than as weapons of last resort--especially given that Israel?s strategic competitors may already have this knowledge. If Arab leaders believe that Israel possesses tactical nuclear weapons, and if they believe that Israel would use them on the battle Želd, then their incentive to target these weapons at the outset of a confrontation would be very high. The escalatory potential of such weapons runs contrary to the professed aim of deterrence. The Israeli public and their political institutions may nonetheless decide to support the development and possession of tactical nuclear weapons. Such support must be the result of open
International Security 28:2 72
97. Given the secrecy that surrounds this issue, direct evidence on this point is difŽcult to obtain. Indirect evidence, however, is available. See, for example, Munya Mardor?s Rafael (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry Publishing House, 1981). Mardor, a former director-general of the Israeli Weapons Development Authority, lists a large number of "initiatives from below" regarding the development of sophisticated weapons systems. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, especially pp. 223-235, and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 216-218, also mention several bureaucratic struggles and initiatives that suggest that efforts to miniaturize weapons and diversify delivery systems were not necessarily consistent with the logic of deterrence.
98. Rabin, Personal Service File, p. 526, recounts an episode in 1976 when Defense Minister Peres was seeking to increase the defense budget, stating that the IDF could not be held responsible for any consequences resulting from a cut in the budget. In Battling for Peace, p. 149, Peres noted that "every defense minister Žghts for [a] higher budget," and that he did not intend to subvert Rabin?s authority. It is not inconceivable that nuclear weapons production and delivery systems were among the items being debated. Cohen, Israel?s Last Taboo, notes that when Benjamin Netanyahu was prime minister, he too was taken with nuclear weapons-related technology and gave a broad mandate to experts in the nuclear research and development community. discussion, however, not a bureaucratic fait accompli made in secrecy with little or no governmental, parliamentary, or public oversight. Israel?s nuclear policy has never been subject to a comprehensive evaluation. As a result, some of the major implications of this policy, such as its effect on the nonconventional arms race in the Middle East, have been all but ignored.99 Most Israeli studies of nonconventional weapons in the region depict the development and acquisition of such weapons as almost independent of Israel?s other capabilities.Moreover, Israeli strategists often minimize or ignore the impact of Israel?s nuclear capability on Egyptian and Syrian nonconventional weapons development.
Israeli scholars typically interpret the desire of Arab states to acquire weapons of mass destruction as being motivated by considerations other than concern about Israel?s nuclear status.100 One Israeli analyst views Egyptian concerns in this regard as "not entirely born of the direct threat that these presumed weapons pose to Egypt." According to Emily Landau, "Egypt?s quest for a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East may be grounded in its interest in leading the Arab world on the nuclear issue, i.e., using the nuclear issue as a means of consolidating its leadership position in the Arab world. . . . [as well as] Egypt?s interest in the nature of the Middle East once peace agreements have been achieved--in this future Middle East, Israel would most likely be Egypt?s foremost rival for regional power, and Egypt was reluctant to reach this stage with Israel as a nuclear power."101 Other accounts suggest that the ultimate goal of Egypt?s NWFZ proposal is to force Israeli nuclear disarmament, thereby freeing the Egyptians to renew hostilities without fear of nuclear retaliation. These notions are driven by the assumption that Israel?s nuclear policy has been phenomenally successful, and hence any effort to change it would severely threaten the country?s security. In sum, Israel?s policy of ambiguity and the cloud of secrecy surrounding it pre-
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 73
99. In 1998, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai authorized a comprehensive study of Israel?s security doctrine. Public sources suggest that the study?s participants concluded that Israel?s nuclear policy--including the issue of ambiguity--did not require fundamental changes. See Barletta and Ellington, "Israel?s Nuclear Posture Review." The study ended in February 1999, when Mordechai resigned from the defense ministry.
100. See, for example, Feldman, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control in the Middle East; and Danny Shoham, Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Arab Countries and Iran: An Existential Threat to Israel? (Hebrew) (Shaarei Tikva: Ariel Center for Policy Research, 2001). Two exceptions that consider Israeli nuclear weapons as part of the threat perceptions of both Egypt and Syria are Evron, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East; and Evron, Israel?s Nuclear Dilemma.
101. Landau, Egypt and Israel in ACRS, p. 24.
vent any serious discussion of the relationship between the strategic logic of Israel?s nuclear strategy and its actual capabilities.102
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Israel?s nuclear policy is fraught with paradoxes, one of which is particularly noteworthy. From the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, when Israel?s nuclear option was still only an option, there was considerable debate in the Israeli policy and security communities regarding the advisability of developing a nuclear deterrent and its potential implications for the Arab-Israeli con?ict. A number of prominent Israeli strategists--including Yigal Allon, Yitzhak Rabin, and possibly Ariel Sharon--opposed the investment in nuclear weapons on both Žnancial and strategic grounds. This debate occurred when the conventional military balance was only slightly in Israel?s favor. A key argument of the opponents of the nuclear option was that Israel?s conventional capabilities were sufŽcient to deter an Arab attack, and if deterrence failed, to decide the war in Israel?s favor.103 Four decades later, when Israel possesses a signiŽcant conventional edge over any possible Arab coalition--in both quantitative and qualitative terms--there is virtually no debate in Israel concerning the wisdom of maintaining its nuclear capability.104
There is, however, an even more perplexing paradox. One possible reason for the decline in the substantive discussion of Israel?s nuclear policy is that the Israeli policy establishment, the Israeli academic community, and the Israeli public have by and large come to consider Israel?s nuclear policy as an
International Security 28:2 74
102. Other domestic implications of the ambiguity surrounding Israel?s nuclear status involve questions of morality, legality, and the potential effects on the environment and public health. For a provocative and comprehensive discussion of the policy of ambiguity, both in the nuclear realm and in the realm of Israeli chemical and biological weapons programs, see Cohen, Israel?s Last Taboo.
103. For the key arguments in this debate, see Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 148-151; Evron, Israel?s Nuclear Dilemma, pp. 5-7; and Evron, "Israel and the Atom." Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 65, also mentions Levi Eshkol and Pinhas Sapir as opposing the nuclear project on Žnancial grounds.
104. On the military balance, see Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, The Middle East Military Balance, 2000-2001 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001); and Shmuel Gordon, The Military Capability Project, presentation at the annual Herzeliyah conference, "The New Strategic Landscape," December 2, 2002. For the Hebrew PowerPoint presentation, see http://www1.idc.ac.il/ips/content/2002m1Gordonheb_Žles/frame.htm. The only debate in recent years regarding the nuclear issue is if, when, and under what circumstances Israel should abandon its nuclear ambiguity posture. See Barletta and Ellington, "Israel?s Nuclear Posture Review"; and Zeev Schiff, "How Long Can Nuclear Ambiguity Last?" Ha?aretz, August 24, 2000, http://www.fas.org/news/israel/000824- israel.htm. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this paradox. unqualiŽed success.105 Nevertheless, on the eve of the 2003 U.S. attack on Iraq, the Israeli public as well as many in Israel?s security community saw an Iraqi missile strike, perhaps with chemical or biological warheads, as a real possibility. So, nuclear deterrence is believed to be second to none when it comes to security, except when it is put to the test. Then there is general agreement that Israel?s nuclear capability cannot deter a committed adversary.106 Several conclusions ?ow from this analysis. First, the notion that Israel?s nuclear policy has provided an effective deterrent against an all-out attack by an Arab coalition is tenuous. There is no evidence that any of the likely members of such a coalition has expended the human and material resources required for such an attack. This lack of evidence suggests that Ben-Gurion and his followers overplayed the potential threat and that skeptics such as Allon, Gallili, and Rabin were correct in their belief that Israel?s conventional capability was a sufŽcient deterrent.
Second, there is no direct evidence that Israel?s nuclear capability worked to limit Arab operational plans. Nor did the arming of Israeli nuclear weapons have a noticeable effect on Arab actions at times of war. Available evidence suggests, however, that political objectives and Israel?s conventional capability were prime considerations in the Egyptian and Syrian calculations in the 1973 war. It also indicates that technical considerations or U.S. deterrence (or perhaps both) possibly had a more pronounced effect than Israeli threats of nuclear retaliation on the Iraqi decision to refrain from Žring chemical warheads at Israel during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
Third, there is no direct evidence connecting Israel?s nuclear capability to the willingness of the Arab states and the Palestinians to negotiate with Israel. Numerous peace initiatives had their origins in either Syria or Egypt prior to the The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 75
105. Avner Cohen, Israel?s Last Taboo, cites journalist Zeev Schiff as having said: "If I had to choose a single idea that deserves the Israel Prize [a prestigious prize given by the Israeli government to individuals and institutions for their contribution to science, society, and security], I would choose whoever invented the policy of nuclear ambiguity without hesitation." In a survey conducted in the spring of 2002, the Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot asked readers to rank order the Žfty most successful decisions in Israel?s history. The decision to build the Dimona reactor came Žrst with a large margin from the second most successful decision.
106. Iraq did not Žre any missiles at Israel during the 2003 engagement. At the time this article went to press, however, there was no evidence that Iraq possessed long-range missiles capable of hitting Israel. Nor is there evidence that Iraq possessed meaningful stockpiles of chemical and biological warheads for long-rangemissiles. I do not have sufŽcient information to discuss this war in terms of Israeli nuclear policy. Israeli preparations for the war do indicate, however, a lack of conŽdence among the public and the government in the deterrent potential of Israel?s nuclear arsenal.
inception of the nuclear project, during the initial phases of this project, or after the project had reached operational status. The holdout in many of these cases was Israel, not the Arab states. What brought about not only direct negotiations but also a series of agreements was the eventual willingness of Israeli leaders to trade territory for peace, a result due in part to the realization that neither the occupied territories nor Israel?s nuclear weapons bolster security. Fourth, the regime of secrecy surrounding Israel?s "ambiguous" or "undeclared" nuclear status precludes balanced and open debate about this policy. Furthermore, most scholarly work in this area has been uncritical and selfserving, championing the establishment?s view of the decidedly positive balance sheet of this policy and discounting calls for nuclear disarmament. Fifth, this lack of self-examination has prevented open and frank discussion of the logical and operational pitfalls of Israel?s nuclear policy. Even if one supports a nuclear deterrence posture, there are many ways to go about implementing such a policy. It is far from clear whether the contours of Israel?s nuclear policy and its doctrinal and operational components are consistent with the goals of nuclear deterrence.
So what are the policy implications of this analysis? Should Israel renounce nuclear weapons? The answer I suggest is yes, but for a price. In return for greater regional security, Israel must give up its nuclear weapons.107 To explain this thesis, it is useful to consider Israel?s policy vis-?-vis the occupation of Arab territories following the 1967 Six Day War. Since the occupation, many Israelis have developed a cult-like devotion to these territories. Followers adhere to the belief that the territories have signiŽcantly enhanced Israeli security: Not only do they prevent or limit the likelihood of war, but they increase the prospects for a peaceful settlement to the dispute.108 Since the
International Security 28:2 76
107. Only a few members of Israel?s security community have called for reconsideration of Israel?s approach to disarmament. See, for example, Shmuel Gordon, "The Iranian Threat," Yediot Aharonot, May 28, 2002, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-1914319,00.html; Oded Balaban, "A Recipe to Regional Con?agration," Ha?aretz, June 6, 2002, p. 82; and Meir Pa?il, "Israel?s Wars: Toward the 50th Anniversary of the State of Israel," in Sara Aharoni andMeir Aharoni, eds., People and Deeds in Israel (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Miksam, 1998). These voices represent a small minority within Israel?s security community.
108. The Israeli right?s notion of continued occupation of the territories as a foundation for peace is based not on the land-for-peace formula, but on the peace-for-peace formula, wherein Israel agrees not to attack the Arab states or defeat them in war in exchange for peace treaties, diplomatic relations, and open borders. For an example of this vision, see Benjamin Netanyahu, A Durable Peace (New York:Warner Books, 1993), pp. 321-352. See also Shlaim?s discussion of this conception in his historical survey of Israeli policy toward the Arab world, The Iron Wall, especially pp. 447- 457, 564-575.
1973 Yom Kippur War, however, this has not been the prevailing view. A growing conviction has developed among Israelis that the occupation has not contributed to Israel?s security; it has not prevented war; and it has not made war less costly. Indeed Israelis are increasingly concluding that (1) the occupation is decreasing Israel?s security, and (2) it is having a corrupting in?uence on Israeli society and its value system.
As a security asset, the territories are a tradable commodity. Indeed, since the Sadat peace initiative, most Israelis have come to embrace the land-forpeace formula, despite a variety of setbacks--including, most recently, the second intifada, which began in September 2000.109 In the end, trading territories for peace will increase Israel?s security, its international standing, and its wellbeing. Once the link between nuclear capability and security is broken, Israel should be willing to use its nuclear card as leverage to achieve veriŽable conventional and nonconventional arms control and disarmament agreements with its Arab neighbors as well as Iran and states in North Africa. These agreements should be part of a regional security regime that would not only guarantee a weapons of mass destruction-free zone, but would also include a number of institutions and arrangements that would enable the peaceful resolution ofdisputes, ensure transparency, and guarantee the security and territorial integrity of all members. The regime should be comprehensive and involve as manystates as possible.
Paradoxically, just as Israel?s nuclear policy paved the way for a massive arms race in the region, it can be used as the trump card in a regional agreement on arms control and disarmament. If there is a lesson to be learned from the peace process thus far, it is that Israel would be better off to engage in this kind of trade now, rather than being forced into it later, perhaps after these weapons have been used in combat.
The Mixed Blessing of Israel?s Nuclear Policy 77
109. See the Peace Index, Ha?aretz, March 5, 2002, p. B3; Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security, 2001, Memorandum No. 60 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2001), p. 12. In the wake of the most recent wave of terrorist suicide attacks against Israeli citizens, however, many Israelis have begun to seriously question the land-for-peace formula.

Posted by maximpost at 10:05 PM EST
Permalink

China's New Rulers: The Secret Files
Richard B Khoe. SAIS Review. Washington: Summer 2003. Vol. 23, Iss. 2; pg. 239, 5 pgs
Abstract (Article Summary)
Khoe reviews "China's New Rulers: The Secret Files" by Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley.

Full Text (1632 words)
Copyright Johns Hopkins University Press Summer 2003



China's New Rulers: The Secret Files, by Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley. (New York: The New York Review of Books, 2002). 237 pp. $22.

China long has conjured up a sense of mystery and intrigue among Western observers. Just thirty-five years ago during the Cultural Revolution, Western intelligence analysts were starved for knowledge about the insular country and reportedly relied on Hong Kong's market stalls as a vital information source. They eagerly scoured through trash piles to retrieve the newspapers wrapped around vegetables grown nearby in China's Guangdong Province, hoping to find precious bits of information about that country's basic living conditions, government policies, and political leadership. Of course, China has been fundamentally transformed since that time. Communism as an economic system now exists in name only, replaced by a rapidly expanding market-based system. Information about China and its people is now plentiful, perhaps to the extent of analytical paralysis.

One thing that has not changed, however, is the relative lack of information about China's political system and its leaders. At the Sixteenth Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in November 2002, an entire bloc of younger cadres known as the "fourth generation" was elevated to the party's highest leadership positions. At the head of this group is Hu Jintao, who now holds two of the three key leadership positions-President and CCP General Secretary-that constitute supreme power in China. Hu is expected eventually to assume the third main position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission from Jiang Zemin. Remarkably little is known about Hu and his fourth generation peers, such as Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, and Wu Bangguo, who have assumed greater prominence in this era of increased collective leadership. Thus, China's New Rulers: The Secret Files, by Andrew J.. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, is a significant contribution to understanding who these new leaders are and how they think. The book thought-- fully removes the aura of mystery that surrounds the fourth generation, which many observers believe will initiate some degree of political reform over time.

Nathan and Gilley's book is similar, in many respects, to the newspapers found in Hong Kong markets thirty-five years ago. Both fill a need for basic yet critical information, and both give their readers a perspective that is at once voyeuristic and genuine. China's New Rulers draws heavily upon the Chinese-language book Disidai ("The Fourth Generation"), whose author, writing under the pseudonym Zong Hairen, obtained secret documents compiled by the CCP's Organization Department.' These documents are the personnel files used by the CCP itself to evaluate candidates for top party posts and are the product of meticulous research and interviews by party investigators. This is not the first time Nathan has relied on so-called secret files to expose the arcane workings of Chinese politics. He is known most famously for The Tiananmen Papers,2 which documents, through internal party memos and notes, the tragic sequence of events that led to the CCP's decision to use force against its own people in June 1989. Nathan is banned from visiting China to this day, and the government has denied the authenticity of both Disidai and China's New Rulers, albeit with little conviction. Nathan's fellow collaborator is former Far Eastern Economic Review reporter Bruce Gilley, who has authored a wellreceived biography of Jiang Zemin.3

The book's most valuable contribution is its insight into the mysterious Hu-probably the least known of the world's important leaders. Throughout his career, Hu has built an impressive resume that reveals surprisingly little about him. It is tempting, but ultimately imprudent, to infer in Hu personal qualities that could lead to prospective actions (e.g., political reforms) based on the positions he has held. For example, many believe Hu to be sympathetic to the concerns of China's rural population-such as the growing disparity with the rich urban coast-because of his service as party secretary in three of China's most impoverished provinces, including Tibet. According to party files, however, his provincial tenure was not marked with distinction, nor is there evidence of any great concern on his part for rural development. Because Hu headed the school that grooms the CCP's most promising cadres for leadership positions when it taught courses on social democracy, some believe he may favor political reform. However, nothing Hu has actually said verifies these supposed liberal tendencies, and there is no confirmation he had directed or was even authorized to approve the school's curriculum. In fact, there is stronger evidence that Hu's tendencies are more authoritarian. As Tibet's provincial governor in 1989, Hu declared martial law in the face of social unrest, setting an important precedent for the events that unfolded in Beijing just three months later. Notably, Hu was the first provincial leader to congratulate Beijing after the Tiananmen crackdown.

Hu leaves an indelible impression of "ordinariness" that leads the reader to question how he rose to power in the first place. Powerful patrons, good fortune, and, indeed, the non-threatening nature of his ordinariness seem to be the deciding factors. The authors highlight that Hu's friendship with CCP elder Song Ping proved instrumental to his rapid rise, and when Song retired from his post on the powerful Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) in 1992, he lobbied hard for his protege to succeed him. Hu subsequently overtook peers with more substantive records of accomplishment when party elders decided the new PBSC member should be younger than fifty years old at the time of the 1992 Party Congress. (Hu was just three months shy.) As a result, Hu became the youngest PBSC member and was labeled the "core of the fourth generation of leadership." The PBSC slot effectively designated him as Jiang's eventual successor and led to official postings that were second in rank to Jiang, though largely of symbolic power. "What Hu did accomplish during his decade as heir apparent was to retain that status by staying out of the limelight," Nathan and Gilley write. He succeeded mainly by assuring a complex network of party factions that he did not threaten their interests, and, given that a high political position in China frequently leads to personal power and wealth, one cannot overstate the potency of these interests. Thus, Hu has demonstrated skillful political maneuvering, but he has shown little in the way of true leadership or consensus building.

The fourth generation figure that stands in contrast to Hu is Zeng Qinghong, Jiang's protege, who currently ranks fifth in the CCP hierarchy. China's New Rulers shows that unlike Hu, Zeng achieved a considerable amount in the last decade. He helped engineer the fall of three powerful rivals to Jiang, who rewarded him with a place in the CCP's inner circle. As head of the Organization Department, Zeng was responsible for making key personnel decisions and building up a loyal base of support to Jiang and himself, while Hu could only rubber-stamp these decisions. Zeng also played a leading role in crafting the "Three Represents" theory, which codifies the CCP's groundbreaking effort to admit capitalists into the party. Also in contrast to Hu, there is real evidence that Zeng may be a "closet reformer." His files describe him as "an ideological omnivore" who "feeds freely on whatever theory or idea seems to him the most practical way to make China a strong and respected nation." He has told friends he would be willing to reverse the official condemnation of 1989, increase competitive elections, and allow independent parties and media. Ironically, it is these liberal tendencies and his connection to Jiang that now obstruct his political ambitions. Zeng threatens the same vested interests that Hu successfully attracted. He received the largest numbers of "no" votes among current Politburo members and was limited to the fifth-- ranking position in the party despite his stellar record. Nevertheless, Zeng is a politician to watch closely and someone to whom the party may turn for strong and bold leadership.

China's New Rulers is not an impartial "who's who" of Chinese leadership. The authors inject a great deal of useful interpretive analysis with which readers may or may not agree. Also, because the book draws upon documents from the CCP itself, the source files themselves are "tainted." There is much to learn from the party's biases however, as the authors point out: "Most fascinating, the files tell us what the CCP sees when it looks in the mirror." By and large, the reflection is a reassuring one to Western readers. It reveals a party in the hands of younger and technically capable leaders who are well-intentioned and hold forward-looking views. Further, their stated foreign policy goals are rather benign and tend to disavow hegemonic ambitions.

As progressive as some of its stances are, however, the party remains ignorant of its glaring weaknesses. It seems little troubled that the domination of personal interests has potentially planted the seeds of its own undoing in the form of rampant corruption and weak leadership. The party also seems overly confident in its ability to shape people and events at will. Ironically, the explosion of economic dynamism that has strengthened China has inextricably tied the country's fortunes to global forces, for better or worse, and weakened the party's reach. The CCP response to problems within the scope of party control-rampant corruption and the weakness of stateowned industries and financial institutions-has been either feeble or ineffective. Thus, the best intentions of the party may matter little if internal weaknesses reach crisis conditions or are ignited by an external shock.

[Footnote]
Notes

[Footnote]
1 Zong Hairen, Disidai (New York: Mirror Books, 2002).
2 Zhang Liang, Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).
3 Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998).

[Author Affiliation]
Reviewed by Richard B. Khoe, M.I.P.P Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, 2003.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Avalanching" Bin Laden

By Stephen Brown
FrontPageMagazine.com | March 10, 2004

They are smoking the rats out of their holes.

The joint American-Pakistani military offensive, launched recently in the rugged Afghan-Pakistani border region, is making life difficult for Islamist forces. About 2,000 of the 12,000 American troops stationed in Afghanistan are involved in the action, dubbed "Operation Avalanche," to eliminate the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other armed Islamist groups, and to capture their leaders. The American soldiers are positioned on the Afghan side of the border in what is termed a "hammer and anvil" operation: about 70,000 Pakistani troops are acting as the hammer to drive the Islamists across the border into the waiting American anvil.

At one point it was claimed that the allied forces had surrounded Osama bin Laden, however this turned out to be premature. Nevertheless, the military offensive has already achieved some successes. Besides the jihadists forced from their Pakistani refuge back across the Afghan border, the Pakistanis claim to have captured more than 20 foreigners, including nationals from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen. As well, among their number was Khalid al-Zawahiri, son of Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who recently released a taped message that threatened more terrorist strikes against the United States. The Pakistanis have also arrested 15 people for aiding the Taliban.

The first phase of Operation Avalanche is taking place in the tribal areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. Created by the British as a buffer between pre-partition India and Afghanistan, the North-West Frontier Province is made up of seven different tribal areas and contains a population of about six million. The Pakistani government exercises little control in the province where, besides a safe haven, the Islamist groups find support and recruits among the mostly Pashtun population.

And with its long (2,400 kilometers), porous border with Afghanistan, the region has long been a thorn in the side of the American military and the Afghan government, as it was for the Soviets in the 1980s. Taliban and al-Qaeda adherents fled there after the American invasion of Afghanistan more than two years ago, where they continue to stage attacks against allied forces and UN aid workers. One hundred US soldiers alone have died in Afghanistan since the invasion.

Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf is cooperating in the hunt for bin Laden as well as in the battle against the new jihad forming against coalition troops in Afghanistan. Since 9/11, Pakistan has been an important ally of the United States in the War on Terror, having captured more than 550 suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives. Pakistani authorities have also allowed the FBI to set up office in their country where its officials interrogate captured terrorists, listen in on the communications network and conduct other intelligence gathering operations.

After 9/11, Pakistan pretty much had to join the American side in the War on Terror or suffer such consequences as aid reduction, refused loans, and a ban on weapons sales. America granted $395 million in aid to its ally last January, while another $3 billion has been promised to the South Asian country over the next five years. In addition, America will not sanction Pakistan for its role in the recently revealed nuclear proliferation scandal involving that country, receiving instead permission for American troops to operate on Pakistani territory in the spring.

The Pakistani army, often accused of hindering efforts against the Taliban due to Islamist sympathizers in its ranks, appears to be taking Operation Avalanche seriously. It has cut off all access into and out of the region and has ordered the tribes in the affected areas to cooperate or face such punishments as home demolitions. One observer says the tribesmen now cannot even drive around with tinted windows or they face three years in jail, confiscation of their vehicles and a $1,200 fine.

The strategy of the Islamist forces under attack is simply to lie low until the spring when they can launch their own offensive, possibly against Afghan cities. They will also continue their suicide bombing campaign. The Islamists have gained ground in Afghanistan in recent months, especially in the rural, southern Pashtun areas, and are threatening to undo all the gains made since the invasion.

The American-Pakistani offensive was launched at this time due to this worsening security situation in Afghanistan, which has caused a postponement of the Afghan elections, a step regarded as crucial in the rebuilding of the country. The campaign is meant to preempt any Islamist spring attack, as well. Besides, after two years in the country American forces believe they are much better prepared, intelligence- and military-wise, for such a large operation that is expected to last many months with the destruction of the Islamist forces as its ultimate goal. The capture of Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, while a very welcome bonus, are of secondary importance.

Concurrent with military operations, efforts are also being made to split the Islamist resistance by offering certain leaders a roll in the Afghan political process if they cease their attacks. Nevertheless the current offensive, unlike others in the past, still has as its goal the complete destruction of all Islamist forces. This, it is realized, is an important prerequisite for any peaceful political solution in Afghanistan, something which that unfortunate country has long desperately needed.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Brown is a journalist based in Toronto. He has an M.A. in Russian and Eastern European Studies. Email him at alsolzh@hotmail.com.

-----------------------------------------------
Afghanistan: The spring trap is sprung
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - In a clear indication that the spring offensive against suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border will be launched soon, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell is scheduled to arrive in Pakistan on March 17, a visit that comes on the heels of British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw's own journey to Islamabad last week. After Powell's trip, US Chief of Central Command General John Abizaid will also make his way to Pakistan.

These visits are all in preparation for the upcoming "game", one that will have broad consequences for the region. At a time when rebellious feelings are quickly taking root in the Pakistani tribal regions of South and North Waziristan - tribal leaders have unanimously demanded the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the tribal areas - plans for the new operation are nearing their final stages.

An operation outline
The scope of the upcoming operation is far broader in both Afghanistan and Pakistan than it has been in the past, and is likely to be launched in April, according to high-level sources that spoke to Asia Times Online. An important development has already taken place on the Afghan front: access to Tora Bora has been restricted by international and Afghan military forces. While this piece of information made news around the globe, what is little known is that there is a truce between local Afghan military bosses in Jalalabad and local warlords associated with Hezb-i-Islami, the Afghanistan rebel group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that is spearheading the Afghan resistance movement.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the border in Pakistan's Khyber agency and surrounding areas, it is alleged that Osama bin Laden built bunkers and tunnels, echoing the path he took in the Tora Bora mountains, from where he escaped advancing US-led troops in early 2002 after the fall of the Taliban. Sources maintain that if bin Laden is not arrested in Khyber agency, it is unlikely he will be located as it is the only static refuge besides Tora. At the same time, the region is where guerrilla fighters take refuge for longer periods to plan their next guerrilla attack. This information is very much known to US authorities, which is why Khyber agency is one of the next targets for the operation against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

It is also believed that the spring operations will cover not only Afghan and the Pakistani tribal areas, but the city centers of both countries. The high-level sources say that the US is working to paralyze all possible support systems to the Taliban and al-Qaeda from cities in Pakistan.

In the next sweep, the US is expected to play an active role within Pakistan; however, the mission has been kept secret as this is a very sensitive issue in the country. The owners of major Pakistani press organizations have already been warned against coverage of events showing US involvement in Pakistan. And for foreign media correspondents, new proposals are under review to restrict their movements, as well as monitor their writing.

Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf, who faces significant domestic political pressure against US deployments in Pakistan, has repeatedly denied the presence of US troops.

Putting on the pressure
The US has already pressured Pakistan to take all the necessary steps to ensure the spring operation will be a success. In an extraordinary development highlighting the intricacies of the operation, the Corps Commander in Peshawar, Lieutenant-General Ali Jan Orakzai, has retired a month prematurely. Major General Safdar Hussain will take his place. Sources from Peshawar maintain that Orakzai will be installed as governor of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province in compensation for his premature retirement.

Orakzai has been in Washington's bad books since last year, when he visited the US and openly condemned the behavior of US authorities towards Pakistanis. Orakzai was an official guest, but was forced to go through a plethora of screenings and checks at the immigration counter on his arrival. As well as complaining about this particular incident, Orakzai spoke against what he felt was discriminatory behavior against Pakistanis at functions hosted by the Pakistani embassy in the US.

These changes in command come amid word that US authorities have made a special request: in the next phase of operations, all Pashtun officers should be separated from those officers actually involved in the spring offensive, whose names would be vetted by US authorities. (Pashtuns are generally sympathetic to the ethnic Pashtun Taliban.)

Orakzai is a Pashtun. Meanwhile, the new corps commander, Hussain, is from Punjab and enjoys good relations with US authorities. Previously posted in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) , where he coordinated with US forces, Hussain is highly knowledgeable about the north western Pakistani region. Traditionally, the Pakistan army has been dominated by Punjabi and Pashtun officers, but for the past two years Pashtun officers have been greatly cut to size. In recent promotions, 18 brigadiers were elevated to the position of major-general, while only one Pashtun was given the same title.

Elsewhere, a list of Pakistan's most-wanted terrorists has been compiled by a newly formed group called the Special Investigation Cell. This group is headed by a Federal Investigation Agency director from the Pakistani side and by a Central Intelligence Agency official from the US side. As per the list, several top jihadis were recently picked up and interrogated. These events were not reported in the media.

This correspondent spoke with one of the men picked up, who once belonged to the banned Lashkar-i-Taiba and who is now an inactive office bearer. He was previously picked up by ISI and US Federal Bureau of Investigation officials and jointly and separately interrogated by these agencies, which wanted to know the whereabouts of Arab fighters hiding in the port city of Karachi.

The man was given clearance after several days of interrogation, but was picked up again for the same reason, and once again set free after he went through several stages of screenings and investigations. He has been told that since he is on the US's most-wanted list, he will be in contact with these agencies in the future.

Under the new operation, many big names associated with the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Fazalur Rehman) , Jaish-i-Mohammed and the Lashkar-i-Taiba are expected to be interrogated. The names include Maulana Masood Azhar and Abdullah Shah Mazhar, two top-ranking jihadis.

At the same time, all those who previously fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, since released from Afghan jails, will be required to report weekly to their local Afghan police stations and will occasionally be picked up by intelligence agencies for screening. Those Pakistanis released from Afghan jails will not be set free by Pakistani authorities and will be dealt with under a stringent legal clause.

From Kabul to Jalalabad and from Khyber agency to Karachi, an infrastructure is being put in place, all of which is being supervised by US authorities, to make the spring operations a success. The depth of these plans suggests that the battlefields will heat up in the near future, on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. But whether these steps will actually help the US catch Osama remains the million-dollar question.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran demands entry to nuclear club
By Safa Haeri

PARIS - Iran on Sunday surprised the international community, and above all the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by seeking to join the world's atomic club, calling on its members for a prompt entry.

"We want Iran to be recognized as a member of the nuclear club, that means Iran be recognized as a country having the nuclear fuel cycle, and enriching uranium. This is very difficult for the world to accept," Hassan Rohani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS), announced ahead of an important meeting this week of the IAEA. Five countries are officially inside that club - the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France.

The UN agency meets in Vienna to tackle Iran's and Libya's nuclear programs, which have been fed by a global black market linked to the father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan. The governing board will consider two resolutions during the meeting, expected to last until Friday.

The first is Libya's long-secret atomic-weapons program, which Tripoli has agreed to dismantle under the supervision of the IAEA. The second issue is Iran, long accused by Washington, among others, of using its atomic-energy program as a front to build a bomb.

Tehran insists that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful and has called on the IAEA to leave it alone. "The case concerning Iran's peaceful nuclear activities should be completely closed at the IAEA board of governors and removed from its agenda," Rohani said on state television on Sunday.

He added that it was time for the IAEA, which launched an intensive investigation into Iran's nuclear program 13 months ago, to confirm the Islamic Republic's innocence.

The "request" for membership to the atomic club by Rohani, who handles the complicated, complex and controversial issue of Iranian nuclear activities and who conducts the difficult and tortuous talks with the IAEA, means that Iran has the capacity of making nuclear weapons, a potential that most US and European experts and intelligence services put at between three and five years to achieve.

Whatever the reasons that motivated Tehran's move, diplomats and experts say that Rohani's declaration not only will not appease international concerns about Iran's determination to set up a nuclear arsenal, but also convince the United States and the European Union to increase pressures on the Islamic Republic to stop all its atomic projects, or face drastic international sanctions.

In a report to be published at the end of this month, David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a US-based non-profit research organization specializing in nuclear matters, will disclose that Iran has the capacity to produce enough enriched uranium to build some 30 nuclear warheads a year.

In Tehran on Sunday, Rohani told the inaugural session of the Assembly of Experts, a body made up of 82 senior clerics that has the power to elect or dismiss the leader of the regime: "We have two goals ahead of us that we must achieve. One is closing Iran's nuclear dossier with the IAEA and bringing the board of governors to take it out of their agenda, and the other is to have Iran recognized globally as a nuclear country."

As Rohani was briefing the Experts, a hardline newspaper warned the IAEA to be "more realistic in its dealings with Iran or the whole game would be jeopardized", and an unidentified Iranian diplomat in Vienna threatened that Iran would resume uranium enrichment and revise its agreement to cooperate with the international nuclear watchdog if the dispute is not resolved in line with last October's agreement.

The envoy was referring to an accord signed on October 21 in Tehran between Rohani with the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany under which Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and suspend enriching uranium in return for getting access to advanced nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, like the construction of nuclear-powered electrical plants.

"Iran will not wait forever to restore its legitimate national right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities and will not accept that the IAEA continue its double-standard policies toward Iran," the diplomat added, quoted by Mehr, a news agency close to the ruling conservatives.

At the same time, and in an obvious coordinated campaign aimed at intimidating the IAEA's board of governors, Mohsen Rezai, the secretary of the powerful Expediency Council that is chaired by former president Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, said cooperation with the IAEA would become more difficult if the IAEA decided to limit Iran's peaceful and civilian nuclear activities.

Rohani, in his lengthy and detailed report to the Assembly of Experts, explained why he had to bow to the IAEA's demand to sign the Additional Protocol, revealing that in the event that Iran did not obey, "it would face the same fate as Iraq", meaning a possible military invasion of the country authorized by the UN Security Council.

"The pressures applied on Iran were so great that most of the world's leading industrial nations conditioned trading with us to the signing of the protocol, as seen in the Azadegan oilfields that the Japanese refused to develop," the SCNS influential secretary told a bewildered assembly. (See Japan, Iran sign major oil deal, US dismayed , February 20.)

However, Rohani expressed the hope that because of Iran's "clear-cut and full" cooperation with the IAEA, the board would not take the case to the Security Council for economic sanctions. "Even the Americans have indicated that they would not insist on the matter," he added.

Diplomats in Vienna said a draft resolution prepared by the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand does not mention the Security Council and balances criticism of Iran with praise for granting the IAEA access to sites and agreeing to suspend all activities linked to the enrichment of uranium.

The IAEA will also discuss technology and equipment for enriching uranium sold to Iran by Pakistan's Khan. According to a report by Malaysian police based on the apparent confession of a wealthy Sri Lankan who serves as a middleman, Khan sold Iran a number of centrifuges for US$3 million. But Tehran has constantly denied the accusations, saying that it obtained second-hand material on the black market, with no information about its origin.

IAEA inspectors who found traces of aluminum enriched with new equipment known as P-2 say Iran concealed this equipment from them, but the radical daily Keyhan on Sunday accused the agency of "gross lies and total dishonesty", reiterating that Iran had told inspectors about all of its activities and installations.

In a sharp-tongued comment, Hoseyn Shariatmadari, a high-ranking intelligence officer appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as editor, said that although the October 21 agreement with the foreign affairs ministers of Europe's big three was a choice between bad and worse, the IAEA, under pressure from the "US and Zionist circles has gone far beyond honesty in dealing with the Islamic Republic".

Quoting Khamenei as having warned the IAEA and the leading powers "not to try to challenge Islamic Iran's right to possess nuclear technology", Shariatmadari called on the authorities to be ready for "the big showdown" and urged lawmakers elected to the next Iranian parliament not to approve the protocol if the IAEA failed to accommodate Iran.

The additional protocol, which allows IAEA inspectors to carry out "instant" and unrestricted inspections of all Iranian nuclear installations and projects, has not yet been approved by the outgoing Iranian majlis (parliament).

According to Mehr, continuing accusations against Iran, despite its cooperation with IAEA inspectors, has irked the Iranian delegation, which has accused the agency of dealing with Iran in an "illogical manner ... There is nothing permanent. We signed the additional protocol ... and when to resume is in the hands of our system [the ruling Islamic establishment]," Rohani said at the assembly on Sunday, reiterating that Iran's atomic projects, like an electric plant that is under construction at the Persian Gulf port of Booshehr, with assistance from Russia, are for civilian purposes.

But Washington insists that Iran's ruling ayatollahs want to use atomic installations, and Booshehr, for advancing military aims.

The IAEA's latest report on Iran said that agency inspectors had unearthed designs and parts for the advanced P2 uranium enrichment centrifuge, capable of producing bomb-grade uranium at twice the speed of Iran's first generation P1 centrifuges. The agency also uncovered experiments in the creation of plutonium, which can also be used as the explosive in nuclear weapons, and polonium, which can spark a chain reaction in a nuclear weapon.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran threatens to end cooperation with IAEA

TEHRAN: Iran will halt its cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog if European states fail to counter US pressure on the Islamic republic over its atomic programme, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi threatened on Wednesday.

Iran's decision to resume uranium enrichment, a possible material for making nuclear weapons, would not be constructive, Kenneth Brill, US ambassador to the Vienna-based UN nuclear watchdog, said. He was reacting at a press briefing to comments by Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi that Iran intended to end its suspension of uranium enrichment once relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were "normalized".

The Iranian minister also said Iran intended to end its suspension of uranium enrichment -- a key step in producing both nuclear weapons and atomic energy -- once relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were "normalised." "Unfortunately, the agency allows itself to be influenced by the Americans," Kharazi told reporters here after a cabinet meeting. --Agencies



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japan to shift aid focus from China to India
By Purnendra Jain

ADELAIDE - Japan is set to make a historic economic and political policy decision, shifting its foreign aid focus away from China - and to India.

For many years China has been the top recipient of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) that symbolized Japan's economic commitment and political and diplomatic closeness to its powerful Asian neighbor. As recently as 2000, China received some 214 billion yen (US$2 billion) in loans as part of Japan's ODA, while India remained on the periphery of Japan's foreign-aid program; at that time Tokyo had just resumed its yen loans to New Delhi, which had been suspended to demonstrate strong disapproval of India's nuclear tests in 1998.

But this equation is changing fast. If proposed changes in Japan's ODA budget allocations are approved at the political level, China is certain to slip into the No 2 position and India will emerge as the leading recipient of Japan's ODA loans in 2004. China is likely to receive only 100 billion yen in 2004, about 20 billion less than last year - the total loan will be less than half the amount Beijing received in 2000. This is a steep decline. On the other hand, India is certain to receive an amount similar to what it received last year, or even a little more, which will be in excess of 111 billion yen.

An announcement is expected by the end of the month.

Why this shift?
Criticism of Japan's aid policy as being devoid of a philosophy, the misappropriation of aid money in recipient countries, and political scandals within Japan forced policymakers to address these issues through policy change. Moreover, cuts in the ODA budget every year since 2000 - the total budget in fiscal 2002 was $9.1 billion - have also prompted Japan to review its aid policy and set new priorities both in aid-funded projects and country focus. To this end, the government has established several commissions and advisory panels consisting of politicians, officials, business leaders and academics that have proposed numerous recommendations. A better balance between China and India is one of the aims of Japan's new direction in its aid policy.

The shift is no doubt an important milestone in Japan's foreign-aid policy. India was the first recipient of Japan's yen loans when this policy was implemented in 1958. But slowly, India's position declined over the years and countries such as Indonesia and China became the leading recipients of Japan's ODA in Asia. Cold War conditions saw Japan's and India's strategic interests drift apart, and led to a consequent fall-off in economic and diplomatic relations between Tokyo and New Delhi. On the other hand, China continued to rise in prominence in Japan's overall economic, diplomatic and strategic considerations after Beijing and Tokyo signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1978.

With India's recent sustained economic growth, its technical preeminence globally, especially in the information-technology sector, and its diplomatic activism, particularly as a key player in the Group of 20 developing countries, and its push to secure a place as a permanent member of the United National Security Council in recent years, many countries are forced to sit up and take notice of India. Japan is no exception. One way to win back India's heart, hurt deeply in 1998 by Japan's policy response after the nuclear tests, is via its aid policy. Policymakers in Tokyo are convinced it's high time to strengthen diplomatic ties with India.

While China will undoubtedly feel a little disappointed with the continuous decline in Japan's flow of yen loans for infrastructure and other national projects and, more important, because of its status change from No 1 to No 2, Beijing is aware that it commands an overwhelming position in the minds of Tokyo's policymakers. China is a key player in Japan's recent economic recovery, and it is unlikely that Tokyo will intentionally make any policy that would upset the Chinese leadership.

Indeed, Beijing should take this development as a compliment. Japan's aid reductions to China are based on the assessment that China no longer requires Japan's financial assistance as much as it once did. In Japan's analytical framework, China's economy has matured and the country is now able to fund many of its infrastructure projects without support from Japan. Of course, China is not the first country to have seen this transition. There are other cases in Asia, such as South Korea and Singapore, which initially received development aid from Japan but with the growth in their economies they no longer required Japan's aid. Indeed, some of them are now members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and aid donors in their own right.

The ODA priority shift from China to India does not reflect Japan's policy shift in other areas. Japanese investment in China continues to rise and two-way trade is increasing, reaching a level last year never seen before. India still languishes both in trade and investment areas. It will be decades before the level of Japanese investment and trade with India is as high as with China. Indeed it may not reach that level at all.

The subnational factor
It is not just the national government and business leaders who regard China as a key and influential player for many years to come, Japan's subnational governments and local leaders have also realized the importance of China for their industries and future economic well-being.

In recent years, a large number of Japanese prefectural and city governments have opened their offices in Chinese provinces and cities. Their numbers are ever rising and some Japanese local governments are even closing their offices in countries such as Singapore and Thailand and relocating them to Chinese cities and provinces.

More than just in the area of economic linkages, subnational governments of Japan and China are forging strong ties in educational, cultural and scientific fields through sister-city agreements, whose numbers are increasing by the year.

While currently there are some 256 official sister-city agreements between Japanese and Chinese subnational governments, there is only one between India and Japan, formed as far back as in 1965. The first sister-city link between a Japanese and a Chinese subnational government was formed as late as 1973, and that number has now gone above 250. The Council of Local Authorities for International Relations - a national body in charge of promoting international linkages at the grassroots level - has offices in Beijing and Singapore, but none in South Asia. India appears nowhere on its radar screen.

Moreover, there are close to 40 offices of Japan's local governments in different locations in China, seeking business for their local companies, facilitating investment and coordinating cooperative projects. But there are no such activities in India.

The national government's ODA program should not be regarded as the only indicator of government aid and assistance in a bilateral relationship. Japan's subnational governments now offer a range of assistance to their Chinese counterparts, what can be easily regarded as a "local ODA" program. Japan's local governments have knowledge and expertise in areas such as city planning, transportation, the curbing of industrial pollution, environment management, garbage disposal, sewage and water supply, all of which can be highly useful to Chinese localities. Japan's localities are willing to transfer these skills and know-how, and their Chinese counterparts are embracing them. The Indian side neither courts such assistance nor do Japanese local officials have any such proposal for Indian cities.

A strong bilateral relationship in the future will not just be based on how much money a country doles out to another, but long-lasting friendly relations even in times of stresses and strains will be those whose foundations are based on solid ties at the grassroots and popular level. On this measure, China by far leads others in Asia in its relations with Japan.

While India may take some comfort in becoming the No 1 destination of Japanese yen loans, this does not necessarily signal a close and intimate relationship between the two.

But change, even if small and symbolic, does matter in international relations.

Purnendra Jain is a professor in the Center for Asian Studies at Australia's Adelaide University and president of the Japanese Studies Association of Australia.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
`US forcing North Korea to increase nuclear deterrent'

LONDON: North Korea said on Wednesday the US stance in talks on its nuclear programme was forcing it to "further increase its nuclear deterrent force".

The state-run KCNA news agency quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman as dismissing as unfounded statements by US officials that six-way talks in Beijing last month had been a success.

"The recent talks could not yield any results due to the fundamental difference between the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea - North Korea) and the US in their stands," it added.

Washington repeated its demand at the Beijing talks for the "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" of the North's nuclear programme.

The North Korean spokesman called that a "demand that can be forced on criminals only..., embarrassing and disgusting to hear," the news agency said in a report monitored in London.

Instead, the United States "should commit itself to completely drop its hostile policy towards the DPRK in a verifiable and irreversible manner," it added.

The spokesman repeated Pyongyang's denial of US allegations that it is pursuing a uranium enrichment programme to make nuclear weapons.

"The far-fetched US assertion about this programme is intended to attack the DPRK under that pretext just as it did against Iraq," the news agency quoted him as saying.

"The reckless US stance only pushes the DPRK to further increase its nuclear deterrent force."

The impasse in talks "does nothing bad to the DPRK as it will have time to take more necessary steps with increased pace", the spokesman added.

US officials say they believe North Korea already possesses one or two nuclear weapons.

In October the United States said the North had admitted to developing nuclear arms. Pyongyang later ejected UN nuclear inspectors and removed inspectors' seals from a mothballed reactor.

North Korea is viewed by Washington as one of the states at the heart of a network responsible for the spread of nuclear weapons technology. --Reuters
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
KCNA...
Kim Jong Il's Great Personality Praised
Pyongyang, March 10 (KCNA) -- Members of the State Academy Ensemble of the Ministry of Interior of Russia on a performance tour of the DPRK expressed deep impressions of the noble traits of leader Kim Jong Il as a great man who is possessed of distinguished political capacity, extraordinary leadership ability and warm love for the country and the nation. Igor Shustikov, deputy head of the ensemble, after visiting the Revolutionary Museum of the Ministry of Culture, said the literature and art of Korea have reached a high phase under the wise guidance of Kim Jong Il. He is a genius of art who has brought a great turn in the development of Korean literature and art, he added.
Actress Natalia Kurganskaya, who is well known to the Korean people for her successful presentation of the immortal famous song "Dear General, Where Are You", said she liked this song loved by the Korean people and its melody is immensely expressive as befits the most famous song.
She said she was struck with wonders when she learned that it was created by Kim Jong Il. Seeing the audience overwhelmed with deepest longing for him while hearing this song reverberating from the stage, I could keenly feel their boundless trust in their leader.
Anatoli Lazhuk, general director of dance, said there are many famous generals in the world but he had not heard a story that the head of state of a country went out to the front and planted a tree. Kim Jong Il inspected a unit of the Korean People's Army and planted a tree and I can hardly repress admiration at his ardent patriotism, he added.
The world has never seen such a peerless patriot loving the country and the nation as Kim Jong Il does, he said, adding: I was deeply impressed by his great personality.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

EU and NATO at Odds on Peacekeeping Duties
Mar 09, 2004
NATO and EU officials are set to meet on March 10 in Brussels to hash out details surrounding the EU's December takeover of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. NATO has said it will turn over the peacekeeping reins to the EU, but it wants to maintain command and control of ongoing counterterrorism operations. This signals more discord within the European Union -- Italy and the United Kingdom seem to support NATO -- and highlights suspicions about the effectiveness of fledgling EU defense capabilities. The NATO pressure also reveals a lack of confidence and a desire to stunt the EU force's operational development.

Musharraf Cursed if He Does, Ousted if He Doesn't?
Mar 09, 2004
Despite the media hype and fresh military operations on both sides of Pakistan's northwestern border, Osama bin Laden and the top leadership of al Qaeda are nowhere to be found. Certain elements within the Pakistani state and society are known to sympathize with the group, and it is likely that certain rogue elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment are helping al Qaeda members evade capture.

Colombia: Who Isn't Out To Kill Castano?
Mar 10, 2004
Someone is trying to kill Colombian paramilitary chief Carlos Castano -- and U.S. intelligence might unwittingly be involved.
--------------------------------------------------------------

Who "Misled" Whom?

By Steven C. Baker
FrontPageMagazine.com | March 10, 2004

When listening to one of his filibusters, it's hard to tell just what Senator John Kerry really thinks about many things, including Iraq. President Bush recently highlighted the inconsistencies that are inherent in Senator Kerry's legislative record and campaign rhetoric as they relate to Iraq. Summarizing precisely what will become clear to most Americans in November, he said about Senator Kerry that he is "in favor of liberating Iraq, and opposed to it."

The President's retort came after months of relentless assaults from the prospective Democratic presidential nominee. For example, Kerry rarely misses an opportunity to eschew personal responsibility for his October 2002 vote to authorize the use of force in Iraq; a vote that ultimately enabled President Bush to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The liberal Democrat from Massachusetts maintains that he voted in favor of "the process the president promised." According to the Senator, there was a "right way" to hold Saddam Hussein accountable and there was a "wrong way" to do it, and he charges President Bush chose to do it the wrong way.

But anyone with access to the internet can observe that the senator's 2002 vote authorized President Bush "to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to: (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." Contrary to the Kerry's accusations, Public Law 107-243 had nothing to do with a "process" but everything to do with granting the president the authority to execute foreign policy "as he determines."



Furthermore, Secretary of State Colin Powell clarified the Bush Administration's Iraq policy (i.e. "the process" the administration would pursue vis-?-vis the Iraq problem) before the United States Senate during a hearing on September 26, 2002, concerning "U.S. Policy Toward Iraq." In fact, Senator Kerry's exchange with Secretary Powell should dispel the notion that the Senator was "misled" - at any time - by President Bush, or that any so-called promises were broken.



For instance, Secretary Powell informed Senator Kerry: "It's certainly the case that I am making, and the president is making, to our colleagues in the Security Council: Don't go down this road unless you are prepared to take action if there is continued violation of the kind that we have seen in the past with respect to a new resolution." Secretary Powell even went so far as to warn Kerry, "if for one reason or another the United Nations does not wish to take that action... then the president reserves the right to take the action with like-minded nations, just as was done in Kosovo." The Kerry's response: "Fair enough."



Then, in an attempt to assuage the senator's continued concerns regarding the Bush Administration's rationale for seeking a congressional authorization to use force in Iraq, Secretary Powell reiterated that President Bush would use the authority granted to him by Congress "to act as part of a multilateral effort, but also, in the event that the president sees that the UN will not be able to act and decides that it is in our interest to act with like-minded nations. And we believe there would be like-nations at the time..." Kerry's response: "I understand."



Senator Kerry also likes to claim that President Bush "misled" the American people about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Weapons of Mass Destruction. But again, Secretary Powell's testimony on September 26, 2002, reveals the duplicity of this accusation. Secretary Powell told Senator Kerry: "I think the president has made it clear in all his conversations with members of Congress, in his presentations to the American people and his presentation to the United Nations that Iraq has to be disarmed. That is the major problem." The senator's response: "I agree. I agree completely."



Senator Kerry added: "I don't want any misinterpretation about my position. I really want none whatsoever. The issue, to me, is not whether Saddam Hussein should be held accountable. Of course he should. The issue is not whether or not these weapons are a threat. Yes, they are. The issue is: how do we go about this?"



At the time of this debate, Senator Kerry acknowledged that Saddam Hussein's WMDs and were "real" threats in "the capacity of those weapons to slide off to a surrogate terrorist group." Yet he fumed that the authorization to use force in Iraq - in order to protect the American people from these threats - was an "extraordinary broad overreach" in terms of the mandate that it provided the Commander-in-Chief. This is the most significant difference between candidate Kerry and President Bush; a distinction that the President emphasized recently: "It's a choice between an America that leads the world with strength and confidence or an America that is uncertain in the face of danger...Our opponents say they approve of bold action in the world, but only if no other government disagrees." The bottom line is that Kerry is willing to endanger the United States in deference to the "authority" of the United Nations and its preferred statecraft. In contrast, President Bush is determined to do what is necessary to confront America's enemies, with or without the UN's blessing.



In March 2003, President Bush commenced Operation Iraqi Freedom after years of Bill Clinton's feckless diplomacy. When it became clear that the United Nations would not act to enforce its own resolutions, including Resolution 1441, which granted Saddam Hussein "a final opportunity to comply" with his disarmament obligations, the President acted "with like-minded nations." This is exactly what Secretary Powell had forewarned five months earlier. This eventuality should not have surprised Senator Kerry, and if it did, which is the only conclusion he wishes to promote when he says that he was "misled" by the President, then he is not only unfit to be the Commander-in-Chief, but he's unfit to be a senator, as well.

----------------------------------------

Deploying the full arsenal: Fighting hunger with biotechnology
Peter G Lacy. SAIS Review. Washington: Winter 2003. Vol. 23, Iss. 1; pg. 181, 22 pgs
Abstract (Article Summary)
One of the most important issues in the debate over biotechnology today is its potential to combat hunger in the developing world. This question is especially relevant as biotechnology struggles to find acceptance while countries in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world face famine. This paper reviews modern efforts to fight hunger and the projected future of the problem. What does biotechnology have to offer in response to this situation and what are the major obstacles to its deployment? The paper then explores ways to overcome these obstacles, arguing that while traditional efforts should be continued, biotechnology's potential to make a safe, meaningful contribution to fighting hunger is too significant to be overlooked.

Full Text (7450 words)
Copyright Johns Hopkins University Press Winter 2003


[Headnote]
One of the most important issues in the debate over biotechnology today is its potential to combat hunger in the developing world. This question is especially relevant as biotechnology struggles to find acceptance while countries in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world face famine. This paper reviews modern efforts to fight hunger and the projected future of the problem. What does biotechnology have to offer in response to this situation and what are the major obstacles to its deployment? The paper then explores ways to overcome these obstacles, arguing that while traditional efforts should be continued, biotechnology's potential to make a safe, meaningful contribution to fighting hunger is too significant to be overlooked.


Introduction

Among the many hotly contested issues in the debate over biotechnolor today is its potential to combat hun er in the developing world. This question is especially relevant as biotechnology struggles to find acceptance while countries in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world face famine. Proponents of biotechnology argue for the immense possibilities that it offers in the fight to end hunger, while opponents say that hunger can be combated successfully without dependence on what they consider dangerous genetically modified (GM) products. Anti-biotech activists often make the case that the inability to end hunger is due to failure in other areas. In a world awash with agricultural surpluses, they argue, we do not need biotechnology. Instead, we should redouble or refine our efforts to relieve distribution bottlenecks, open markets to exports from less developed countries (LDCs), increase investments in yield-enhancing hybridization techniques, boost foreign assistance budgets and medical aid programs, and focus on other areas where the record of success in combating hunger is characterized by less than satisfactory results or outright failure.

This paper reviews modern efforts to fight hunger and the projected future of the problem. It looks at what biotechnology has to offer and the debate surrounding it, and then explores ways to overcome the obstacles to realizing its potential to help wage a successful war on hunger. While traditional efforts should be continued, biotechnology's potential to make a safe, meaningful contribution to fighting hunger is too significant to be overlooked, and is in fact reason alone to embrace it.

Hunger Today in the Developing World

There are about 840 million undernourished people in the world today, about 30 percent of the world's population. Some 777 million of these people live in the developing world, and of these, 177 million are children under ten years of age.1 Hunger is linked to poverty, and vice versa. Hunger and malnourishment impede productivity, thereby dooming people to poverty. The poor, meanwhile, cannot afford food. Hunger, therefore, often becomes a selfperpetuating cycle.

More than two billion people worldwide suffer from malnutrition,2 meaning they live below the per capita daily caloric intake threshold of 2,350 calories that the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines as necessary for an adequate diet. This manifests itself in many ways. For example, almost two billion people in the developing world suffer from iron deficiency, 140 million people experience iodine deficiency, and 140 million children experience vitamin A deficiency. Today, fiftyfour countries are estimated to fall below the 2,350 average minimum calorie level.3

Hunger and malnutrition are particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa. Three-fifths of Africa is unsuited to sustained yields in grain production and suffers from locust plagues and other scourges that restrain food production.4 Regional food production has dropped 23 percent in the past twenty-five years.- Today, 46.7 percent of the population lives on less than $1 per day, and 194 million people go to bed hungry, including 31 million children under five years of age, one in three of whom suffer from mental retardation, blindness, and other illnesses brought on by malnutrition.6 In 2002, drought, poor governance, and the ravages of HIV/AIDS meant that an estimated 14.4 million people in six southern African countries faced famine.

Hunger and Poverty in the Developing World


A Review of Modern-Day Efforts at Fighting Hunger

Despite the grim numbers, there has been significant success in the post-war era in combating hunger. The percentage of hungry people in the developing world has dropped by about one-half since 1970, from over 30 percent of 3 billion people in 1970 to 16 percent of 4.7 billion today.7 The world's undernourished population has also dropped in absolute terms, from 959 million to 777 million. Major victories have been achieved in China (where the number of hungry people has fallen by 74 million since 1990), Indonesia, Vietnam, Peru, and Nigeria. Across the developing world, the almost 30,000 children who die daily from hunger today is down from the 40,000 in 1985.8

This record of success is due to a variety of efforts carried out on many fronts. The most effective means of reducing hunger rates are general measures such as good governance, avoidance of war and political conflict, strong and stable economies, and social programs that protect the weakest in society. Specific efforts targeted at fighting hunger fall into five basic categories: technological advancements, foreign aid, expanded trade, financial investment, and multilateral cooperation.

Technological advancements

The Worldwatch Institute points out that while the output from fisheries and rangelands has increased five- and three-fold, respectively, since 1950, production in these two food systems has now hit a plateau. Future food growth must therefore come from the third system, croplands. Technological advances raised cropland productivity three-fold in the twentieth century, through irrigation, chemical fertilizers, hybridization, the development of shortstrawed wheat and rice varieties, and, most recently, genetics. The Green Revolution, launched in the 1960s and 1970s, used these techniques to double and triple the yields of rice, wheat, and corn in Asia, saving hundreds of millions of lives. Largely because of these advances, world grain yield per hectare increased from 1.06 tons to 2.73 tons per hectare between 1950 and 1998, and world grain consumption per capita rose from 247 kg to 319 kg over the same period.9 This increased food productivity has greatly contributed to the 50 percent drop in the percentage of undernourished people since 1970, and there is plenty of potential in LDCs for continued growth in yields through technological extension.

Foreign assistance

Overseas development assistance (ODA) was conceived after World War II as a means of helping LDCs to modernize and reduce hunger rates. In the early 1970s, the UN called on all Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to dedicate at least 0.7 percent of their GDP to ODA; very few countries, however, have met that threshold. Total global ODA today stands at about $53 billion, down from $69 billion ten years ago,10 reflecting the global trend in declining aid ratios in the post-Cold War era.ll In particular, the U.S. contribution to total OECD aid fell from 60 percent in the mid-1960s to only 13 percent by the mid-1990s,12 and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) now contribute more resources to aid in aggregate than the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Official aid targeted specifically at expanding LDC agriculture is experiencing an alarming decline. In 2001, USAID's funding for agriculture dropped to 11 percent of total U.S. aid, while agriculture represented only 10 percent of World Bank lending, the lowest level ever.13

After fifty years of experience, many donor countries are unwilling to keep pumping development aid into LDCs because they see no correlation between aid and economic growth, and thus limited impact on reducing hunger. Experts blame the failure of aid on flawed policies and applications in the North and South, including an overemphasis on industrialization at the expense of agriculture-based development, corruption in recipient countries, and the influence of strategic and commercial self-interest on donor country aid allocation. With many LDCs experiencing aid dependency and skyrocketing debt, there is much debate over alternatives to traditional aid methods, such as pursuing growth through partnerships or identifying grassroots development approaches better suited to local needs.

Trade liberalization

In the 1980s, efforts to fight hunger shifted away from government action to a reliance on open markets, with mixed results. A World Bank study found that countries that increased their share of exports and imports to GDP and reduced their tariff levels (e.g., China, Malaysia, Mexico, India, Thailand, Chile, Argentina, and Hungary) saw average economic growth rates increase from 2.9 percent in the 1970s to 5.0 percent in the 1990s.14 Hunger figures in these countries have seen some of the most dramatic declines anywhere. Those countries that decreased their share of trade to GDP and lowered their tariff rates the least (e.g., Burma, Pakistan, Honduras, and most sub-Saharan African countries) saw average economic growth rates drop from 3.3 percent in the 1970s to 1.4 percent in the 1990s. Hunger rates in these countries have remained some of the worst in the world.

However, embracing free trade is a necessary but insufficient element of national development strategies. Free trade is not an "easy" answer to the question of hunger either; its effectiveness depends on the underlying institutional and policy conditions in individual countries. To be successful, countries must support integration into the global economy with good governance measures such as putting the right institutions in place, reducing corruption, and improving infrastructure and public health systems.

Investment

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another major tool to generate economic development and reduce hunger levels in LDCs. Industrialized countries in 2002 invested about $166 billion in LDCs through bonds, loans, and company ownership.ls An Institute for International Economics study of 183 FDI projects carried out in thirty countries since the mid-1980s found the majority (SS to 75 percent) to have a positive impact on host country income levels. The study suggested that most of the negative effects could be addressed through reforming host country policies and laws.16 Coupling these changes with new location incentives, rules of origin, and antidumping regulations in investing countries improves the chances for growth through FDI significantly.17

Microcredit is a particularly important tool in fighting hunger since it targets the rural poor, typically the poorest members of society. The Grameen Bank, which pioneered the concept in Bangladesh in 1976, has disbursed almost $3 billion in loans of less than $150 to individual entrepreneurs in LDCs. A typical borrower might be an impoverished mother who uses the funds to purchase a sewing machine, a cell phone, or even a cow-a small investment that enables her to produce a good or provide a service that meets a need in her community. One benchmark of the Bank's success is its impressive payback rate of over 90 percent. Today, Grameen Bank serves 2.35 million clients throughout Bangladesh, almost all women. The World Bank found that extreme poverty in these Bangladeshi villages where people had access to microcredit fell by 70 percent within five years. As of early 2002, there were about 30 million microcredit borrowers worldwide, 19 million of whom were once among the world's poorest people.18

Since well-structured FDI projects and microcredit can directly boost economic development in LDCs, they are some of the most successful tools for fighting hunger.

Multilateral cooperation

From the World Bank, to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), FAO, World Food Programme, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the world's nations have demonstrated their intent to work together to confront poverty, hunger, and other problems that threaten global peace and stability. Several NGOs aiming to eliminate hunger have also emerged, including Bread for the World, Food First, and the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa. Numerous international conferences, most recently the World Food Summits in 1996 and 2002, have helped bring resources and attention to this continuing problem. All of this cooperation has had an inestimable effect, yet more is clearly required to eliminate hunger.

Future Projections of World Hunger

Hunger continues to be an immense foreign policy challenge, and will likely remain so for many years to come. At the 1996 FAO World Food Summit, 190 nations set a goal of reducing the number of hungry people in the world by half in twenty years. The follow-up Summit in June 2002 reviewed studies showing that the number of undernourished people is falling at an annual rate of about 6 million, well below the 22 million per year average required to meet the FAO's goal.19 In certain countries, the hunger problem will remain especially acute. India will have one-third of the world's undernourished children. Sixteen million African farm workers (i.e., food providers) are expected to die from HIV/AIDS in the next twenty years, and hunger rates in some sub-Saharan African countries are actually expected to rise.20

Projected population growth rates threaten to overwhelm future efforts to feed the world. The FAO expects world population will expand to as many as 10-12 billion by 2050, with the vast majority of the increase occurring in the developing world.21 Because of the expected population boom, the absolute numbers of people going hungry will increase, even though the percentage may continue to decline. Countries facing dramatic population increases include China, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Ethiopia.22 Water scarcity is also emerging as an important constraint. Water tables fell on every continent in the 1990s, with particularly serious declines in North America, North Africa, the Middle East, India, and China.23 Given modern agriculture's heavy reliance on irrigation, water scarcity will be a major obstacle to increasing crop yields.

There is widespread agreement that the world's demand for food will double by 2025. Some observers believe the world's farmers and food industries can, with appropriate changes to policies and resource allocation, meet this increased demand. But with cultivable grain area reaching a plateau, population exploding, and water scarcity constraining production, there is no doubt that feeding the world will be one of the most important challenges governments and policymakers face in the coming decades.

Opponents of biotechnology argue that if foreign aid has failed to end hunger, then ODA budgets must be increased and refocused on grassroots development; if trade liberalization has not solved the problem, then more is required, or it must go hand in hand with better governance; where investment has come up short, then it must be replaced by better-structured investment projects; and if multilateral cooperation has failed, then these efforts must be redoubled. If governments around the world addressed distribution bottlenecks, corruption, bad domestic policies, and internal strife, etc. vigorously and creatively, then hunger would be a thing of the past.

All of this may be true. But can we afford to wait for such ideal results, which have yet to, and may never, be realized? If current methods have failed to feed six billion, we must use all available tools-deploy the full arsenal-if we are somehow to feed almost twice that number. Agricultural biotechnology is one of the most promising new weapons for successfully combating hunger, yet widespread controversy has created major obstacles to its deployment. What is the nature of this controversy and how can the obstacles be overcome?

Biotechnology Products on the Market and in the Pipeline

Modern biotechnology is essentially the introduction into organisms-often across species boundaries-of specific genes with the intention of fostering desirable new traits. It is superior to conventional cross-breeding in that it allows for a quicker, more precise, and more reliable transfer of traits, and draws on a wider variety of genetic material.

Since the introduction of GM crops in the mid-1990s, their share of planted acreage has steadily increased. As of 2001, the total area planted with GM crops was 52.6 million hectares (1.3 percent of total cropland area). More than 99 percent of this planting is in the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, and China, where more than five million farmers now grow GM crops.24 In all, sixteen countries currently grow GM crops and fifty varieties of GM foods are on the market today in the United States and elsewhere. Most traits commercialized so far address herbicide tolerance (77 percent of planted GM crops) and insect and disease resistance (20 percent). These products include herbicide- and insect-resistant cotton (Bt cotton), insect-resistant corn (Bt corn), herbicide-resistant soybeans, and fungal-resistant wheat. GM potatoes, tomatoes, sugar beets, and apples are also being marketed.

The United States is by far the leader in GM production, growing 70 percent of all GM crops. Two-thirds of food products on U.S. shelves contain GM ingredients, and one-third of all corn, three-fourths of all soybeans, and 40 percent of cotton are now GM.25 Herbicide-tolerant crops have reduced the need to plow, thus decreasing soil erosion (and resulting in less carbon dioxide escaping into the air). Pesticide use in the United States has decreased by 46 million pounds since the introduction of insect-resistant GM technology in 1995,26 while corn and cotton yields have increased by 5-10 percent. Because of lower chemical and other input costs, U.S. farmers improved their bottom line by $1.4 billion in 2001 using GM corn, cotton, canola, and soybeans.27

Since today's biotechnology products serve largely to boost production in developed countries, they increase total supplies and lower world market prices. For the moment, therefore, biotechnology is not benefiting income levels or efforts to fight hunger in LDCs. Only once scientists and policymakers adapt biotechnology to enhance local production and target specific needs in LDCs, can it begin to have a real impact on hunger.

Currently available GM products could be leveraged on a case-by-case basis to enhance some crop yields in LDCs. But the coming "second generation" of GM crops and foods is of even greater relevance and may provide significant benefits for poor farmers. "Golden rice"-rice genetically modified to contain high levels of Vitamin A-should be commercialized in Asia by 2006 and is expected to make a significant contribution to fighting Vitamin A deficiency, a major cause of blindness and death. The company that developed golden rice, Syngenta Corp., has offered it royalty-free to the world's poorest farmers. Unfortunately, concerns over biotechnology have led some Asian rice growers to postpone plans to plant golden rice. If fully adopted, golden rice could have a major impact on malnutrition in Asia, as rice is already a staple, and rice dependence is expected to double by 2025.28 Other products five to ten years down the pipeline include crops designed to tolerate cold, drought, and salt, and plants that can flourish in acidic soil.

Some LDCs are experimenting to produce foods that will help target their specific hunger problems. The Philippines is developing GM rice that resists bacterial blithe,29 while India is developing GM groundnuts that survive Indian peanut clump virus, as well as GM pigeon peas, chickpeas, and sorghum.30 China-a country with 33 million acres of saline soil-has experimented with salt-resistant tomatoes, soybeans, and rice.31 Kenya is developing virus- and drought-resistant sweet potatoes, and in South Africa, Bt cotton has already helped poor farmers reap financial gains due to higher yields.12

In the realm of pharmaceutical biotechnology, private sector researchers are developing about 400 plant-based drugs that promise significant benefits for fighting health problems and combating hunger. These include allergy-free soybeans, cancer-fighting tomatoes and tomatoes with vaccines for Hepatitis B and diarrhea, bananas with vaccines against diarrhea and cholera, spinach with rabies vaccine, a corn that treats cystic fibrosis, and potatoes, pearl millet, corn, cassava, and other vegetables with enhanced nutritional value. These products are also expected to become available in five to ten years and, because of their cost benefits as domestically-grown medical alternatives, they could have a significant impact on health care in LDCs.

The Debate over Biotechnology

Despite its demonstrated benefits and immense potential, biotechnology has met strong resistance in many countries and from many quarters. Concerns center around its perceived threats to human health and the environment, the role of the corporations involved in its production, and ethical and moral considerations connected with its creation. Myths and misinformation fuel many of these concerns. The following discussion attempts to respond to these concerns, and assess the origins and ramifications of anti-biotechnology resistance.

Dangers to health

Concerns over the health effects of biotechnology are widespread. One of the most common is that genetic material introduced into new foods could cause unexpected allergic reactions in consumers. Yet, regulatory authorities worldwide pay strict attention to allergenicity when assessing the safety of foods produced using biotechnology. Since GM foods first hit the market in 1996, there have been no known cases of allergy, illness, or death from consuming GM products. In the mid-1990s, regulatory action forestalled the introduction of genes from Brazil nuts into other foodstuffs on the possibility they would cause allergic reactions. In 2000, a number of corn products were pulled from shelves when they were found to contain GM StarLink corn intended only for cattle feed, producing much controversy but no apparent ill effects in terms of human health.33

The fact is that more safety tests have been conducted on GM foods than on any food products in history. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Agriculture have approved every GM food available on the U.S. market today, and a broad, international consensus has emerged on the safety of GM crops for human consumption and the environment. This consensus includes the OECD, World Food Programme, World Health Organization, Third World Academy of Science, American Medical Association, American Dietetic Association, Swiss Association for Research and Nutrition, American Society of Toxicology, six national science academies, and nineteen Nobel Prize-winning scientists.34 At the 2002 World Food Summit, the FAO came out in support of biotechnology products as being as safe for human consumption as their traditional counterparts.31 Even the European Commission recently declared that "the use of more precise technology and greater scrutiny probably make GM foods even safer than conventional plants and foods."36

Nevertheless, since the potential for human health risks exists, continued regulatory scrutiny will be necessary to ensure that only those products suitable for human consumption enter the market.

Environmental damage

Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and other NGOs have warned about the possible emergence of environmentally hazardous "superweeds," new plants that draw unexpectedly on traits introduced through biotechnology. This is essentially a matter of gene flow, a phenomenon common in agricultural production, and one which scientists have experience at containing. Some critics worry about the possible side effects of GM crops on other species, such as the monarch butterfly; however, any negative impact on such species remains, for now, theoretical. What we do know is that examination of environmental impacts is taking place in every country that produces or consumes biotechnology, as well as through several of the international bodies mentioned above, significantly enhancing the risk control process. As with the question of risks to human health, the scrutiny of environmental impacts should, and in all likelihood will, remain intense.

The risks of biotechnology for both human health and the environment are being exaggerated. On the other hand, the proven and potential environmental benefits of biotechnology must be recognized, particularly the reduced reliance on dangerous chemicals that it makes possible. In Australia, for example, the use of Bt cotton has cut the country's pesticide use in half.37 In South America, biotechnology has the potential to help preserve rainforests by increasing yields on existing farmland, lessening the need to clear more land by felling trees.

Corporate control

Monsanto and other leading food science companies led the charge to develop agricultural biotechnology. Both these companies and their critics now recognize the error of introducing biotechnology to the public in ways that benefited corporate bottom lines more than they addressed consumer needs. This did not help the acceptance of a controversial technology. Company requirements that farmers re-purchase new GM seeds yearly, instead of allowing for replanting in the time-honored tradition, have also raised concerns over corporate control, as have plans to insert genes that would prevent such replanting (the so-called "terminator genes"). In addition, some companies are engaging in a mad rush to patent plant gene strains around the world, enraging LDC farmers who developed these strains over generations and who consider them "public goods."

Clearly, corporate behavior has contributed to the resistance these products have encountered, and companies are now trying to repair their image. Syngenta's offer to provide golden rice royalty-free to LDCs is one example, as is Monsanto's decision to make its sequence of the rice genome freely available (LDC research facilities should eventually benefit from this access). Biotechnology's proponents expect the pending "second generation" of GM products, with its potential for more direct benefits to farmers in LDCs and consumers everywhere, to improve the technology's acceptance.

Biotechnology is also seen as a production tool that, because of economies of scale and purchase costs, benefits only corporate and other large-scale producers. However, evidence is beginning to show that it can deliver benefits to smaller farm operations as well. For example, a study on the adoption of Bt cotton in South Africa concluded that "both large-scale and small-scale farmers enjoy financial benefits due to higher yields and despite higher seed CoStS."38

Ethical objections

Some opponents object to biotechnology on moral or ethical grounds, saying that human beings should not interfere with the "natural order" by modifying genes or crossing species boundaries. However, humanity has always made use of science in order to improve living conditions. Traditional plant and animal improvement processes such as cross-breeding and hybridization are obvious examples, and genetic engineering is essentially a refinement of such methods.39

Reflecting these various concerns, resistance to biotechnology is at a high level today, particularly in Europe. Fueled by pressure from the environmental lobby and other NGO sources, as well as genuine consumer preferences for conventional foodstuffs, Europeans have opposed the introduction of GM products into their food system. Although the European Union does not officially ban foods with GM ingredients, a de facto ban on approvals of GM products has existed in the EU since 1998.

There are recent signs, however, of a shift to a more accommodating European position. The European Commission in 2002 cited eighty-one separate studies supporting the view that GM foods on the market are as safe to eat as their traditional counterparts.40 Spain, France, and Portugal are currently growing GM crops, and Spain has reported benefits from Bt corn that include environmental improvements, higher yields, better quality, and increased income.41 In addition, dozens of European companies are developing products like GM beans, grapes, wheat, and bananas-but for now they are intended only for sale in LDCs or the United States, not in Europe.42 Finally, the new European Food Safety Authority is expected to lift the de facto ban in the EU.

Other industrialized countries have been slow to accept biotechnology as well. Switzerland and New Zealand remain biotechfree today, the latter taking a long look before approving any GM products for market entry. This is also the approach in some Asian countries. The resistance of some industrialized countries to biotechnology has even begun to dampen U.S. farmers' enthusiasm for planting GM crops and stifle the development of new products by biotechnology companies.

However, it is EU resistance to biotechnology that is the major obstacle to poor countries' development and use of biotechnology. Africa needs biotechnology more than any other region, yet the EU's position has made some African countries reluctant to take up this technology. Last year, Zambian President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa refused 17,000 tons of U.S. grain intended to forestall the famine facing 2.9 million Zambians out of fear the country would lose its export markets in Europe. Four other African countries facing similar food shortages-Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho-accepted GM corn, but only if the grain was first milled into flour (to prevent it from affecting the region's exports). European resistance could also affect Africa's livestock exports if they become GM-fed.

In some cases, concerns about the risks associated with biotechnology are preventing the establishment of national regulatory regimes that could facilitate the commercial importation or development of biotechnology in LDCs. In others, they are leading to the establishment of regimes that interfere with the technology's development and importation. China, for instance, recently reversed course on biotechnology and imposed restrictions on domestic varieties of GM rice, soybeans, vegetables, and tobacco, while requiring stringent safety tests and labeling for GM imports. Critics consider these constraints protectionist measures designed to shield China's huge domestic farming sector from further pain while it restructures to meet its WTO commitments.43

Pressure from NGOs also contributes to LDC resistance to biotechnology. The environmental lobby has targeted LDCs in a $175 million campaign to convince them to reject biotechnology.44 Greenpeace warned the Philippine government that there would be "millions of dead bodies and disease" if it accepted GM foods.41 The Sierra Club has called for a moratorium on all planting of GM crops,46 while the Earth Liberation Front has caused $40 million of damage to GM farms and laboratories around the world.47 Former Greenpeace co-founder Patrick Moore and others have questioned the honesty of the environmental lobby's arguments on biotechnology, denouncing them as scare tactics designed to raise funds in order to stay solvent.

Finally, some individual anti-GM activists play a prominent role internationally. India's Vandana Shiva opposes all forms of high-tech agriculture, which she says will destroy the land and "traditional farming." The ecologist-activist has opposed golden rice, attempted to block U.S. food donations to Indian cyclone victims that contained GM ingredients, and argued in favor of organic production as the "wave of the future."48 Partly as a result of Shiva's activism, India-a country with significant hunger challenges-has banned the domestic marketing of all GM food crops for supposed human health and rural employment reasons.49

Overcoming Obstacles to the Use of Biotechnology

Enough opposition to biotechnology could stall or defeat breakthroughs in important areas. Opposition could also result in GM products, once developed, going unused, left, as the saying goes, to "wither on the vine." Indeed, many approved GM foods are going unplanted in industrialized countries for fear of attracting NGO-inspired demonstrations or violence. For LDCs, the story is the same. Out of fifty-four African countries, only South Africa and Kenya have plans for developing GM products, and these plans are small scale and limited. The restricted availability and adoption of biotechnology in LDCs is due to several factors, including:

* Fear of lost export sales to Europe and elsewhere

* Intellectual property rights constraints

* Health and environmental concerns

* Inadequate scientific and research capacity in LDCs

* Absence of government regulatory mechanisms to oversee testing and regulation

* A general inability to assess biotechnology's potential and risks

These obstacles must be overcome before LDCs can take full advantage of biotechnology in addressing their nutrition needs. Let us review each in turn.

When coupled with appropriate domestic policies, trade liberalization can be one of the most important engines for growth in LDCs. Two-thirds of the developing world labor force is employed in agriculture. In Africa, rural small-holder farms provide over 80 percent of agricultural exports.50 It follows, therefore, that developing the export potential of LDC agriculture can generate significant growth and combat hunger. However, European export subsidies deny LDC producers their due market share, and EU opposition to GM products creates negative incentives for LDCs to invest in production-enhancing biotechnology and the supporting regulatory mechanisms, with disastrous consequences for economic growth and hunger levels in LDCs.

Many believe that if today's large food surpluses could find their way overseas, we could adequately feed the world. But, while channeling those surpluses to LDCs would feed people today, it would also undercut local agricultural sectors. Such a strategy would, in fact, have a dampening effect on efforts to raise local agricultural production, which is one of the best long-term solutions to hunger. Biotechnology can deliver these much needed production increases, and help people help themselves to break out of the poverty-hunger cycle. Although only four LDCs worldwide currently grow GM products, the initial results for productivity are positive (e.g., South Africa).

One way to resolve the biotechnology standoff is to establish a global system for setting safety standards that rely on scientific evaluation and risk assessment procedures. Such a system could include a labeling regime that facilitates the acceptance of uniform, science-based standards and common regulatory procedures. The ongoing negotiations in the WTO Doha Round are not the appropriate avenue for addressing this issue. Instead, efforts must be made to establish such a global system through alternative fora like the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which sets international food standards and guidelines. In the meantime, the concept of "substantial equivalence," in which GM products are tested to determine whether they are substantially different from their traditional counterparts, is already employed in many countries and can help smooth the way for approval in new countries. Mutual recognition agreements, in which countries agree to recognize each other's approval processes, can also help facilitate trade in GM products today.

Second, the international community needs to develop a shared vision of the role of GM crops that gets beyond current intellectual property rights issues such as the corporate patenting of gene strains. Consideration should be given to creating an international commission, perhaps under UN auspices, that could promote a broad public consultation that balances the corporate need to pursue profits with local needs in the battle against hunger.

As for the risks to human health and the environment, strengthened regulatory scrutiny and transparency will be essential to achieving broader public acceptance of GM products in Europe, LDCs, and elsewhere. A case-by-case assessment of risks will be required, with due attention paid to the effects on human health and the environment in each country concerned. As David Victor and Ford Runge have noted, "A failure in regulating biotechnology anywhere will harm the industry everywhere."51

Although private sector investment in biotechnology rose by $100 billion in the 1990s, greater governmental investment in research will be necessary to disperse the benefits of biotechnology more widely. In particular, increased U.S. government support for foreign agricultural research offers the best potential to raise income and lower hunger levels directly in the developing world. Yet governments in the developing world must invest more as well. In 1995, for every $100 of agricultural GDP, developed countries invested $2.70 in public research and development, while LDCs invested only $0.62.12 Public-private partnerships can help bridge this investment gap. A promising example is the case of South Africa, where the government is cooperating with industry on a $30 million research project to develop drought-resistant crops by 2003.53

LDCs are not currently in a position to invest substantially in the science of biotechnology, nor are they capable of creating the necessary regulatory institutions to govern its adoption and application. They must therefore work with developed countries not only to build their scientific capacity, but also to exchange information that will enhance their ability to construct and enforce regulations and institutions that will facilitate biotechnology's adoption in their own countries.

Last, any assessment of biotechnology's potential and risks in LDCs must take into account the specific and varied needs, conditions, and circumstances of these countries if hunger is to be eliminated there. This means that governments, businesses, and scientists operating in places such as New Delhi, Beijing, Capetown, and Sao Paolo should have a hand in their development. At the very least, it is essential for LDCs to stay abreast of the latest developments in biotechnology in order to make informed decisions.

Biotechnology's Role in Combating Hunger

The need to increase future food production is clear. Over 840 million people go hungry today, and hundreds of millions are expected to go hungry in the decades to come. With cultivable grain area plateauing, feeding tomorrow's global community will require making a choice: either we harvest remaining forests and plant crops on available marginal lands, or we find ways of boosting the yields of existing croplands in both developed and developing countries in ways that circumvent impending water shortages. These demands and constraints highlight biotechnology's potential.

World leaders agree on the production-enhancing benefits of biotechnology. FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf has said that since global food production must increase by 60 percent in coming decades, it makes sense to take advantage of the productivity benefits that biotechnology offers.54 To get around the current stalemate, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Director of UNDP, has called for the development of a "third way," one that involves strengthened measures to address the risks associated with biotechnology, accompanied by a focus on harnessing its potential to tackle the pressing need to improve the productivity of poor farmers.ss

There is no time to waste. Half of the world's poorest people live in uncertain climates, dependent on staple crops such as cassava and sorghum for survival.56 Africa in particular requires advances in food technology-and fast. Most Africans farm small plots of less than four acres, cultivating crops such as corn, sweet potatoes, cassava, and millet. Few have the capital to invest in agricultural improvements, and their harvests are vulnerable to the ravages of plant and animal diseases, pests, soil toxicity, floods, and droughts.57 These are some of the very problems that bio-engineers are tackling in today's laboratories.

However, biotechnology should not be considered a panacea, but rather a complement to traditional agricultural methods. Farmers in Africa and other LDCs could benefit from the application, where feasible, of existing herbicide-tolerant, disease-resistant, and insect-resistant crops (managing pest infestations in poor rural areas for example is a major problem), and particularly the promising new drought-, cold-, and saline-tolerant crops under development (one-fourth of the Earth's landmass is saline soil). From drought-resistant sweet potatoes in Africa to salt-resistant crops in China to golden rice in Indonesia and Bangladesh, biotechnology must be used to target specific problems in specific locations.

Deploying the Full Arsenal

The question of accepting or banning products made using modern biotechnology is an important issue that cuts across social, economic, and political boundaries. The battle lines in the debate are being drawn, and opponents of biotechnology are out in force. Fortunately, GM products have been well received in many countries. Recent polls show that 71 percent of U.S. consumers are willing to embrace products with GM ingredients.51 And a poll of 600 consumers in Thailand, China, and the Philippines suggests that most Asians do not mind buying or eating GM products either.59 The battle for public acceptance must be fought principally in Europe and increasingly in Africa and other developing countries that are concerned about their trade relations.

Developing countries need many things: improvements in infrastructure, credit for small farmers, development that targets women, stable societies and economic policies, anti-corruption policies, medical assistance, technology transfers, and greater and better aid, trade, investment, and cooperation from developed countries. Eradicating hunger will require fighting on all of these fronts simultaneously.

Agricultural biotechnology is an essential tool with immense potential to help developing countries improve crop yields and productivity, safely provide a broader array of more nutritious foods at lower costs, reduce harvest losses, and create higher and more stable rural incomes. And it can do this while also using less land and less water in production, improving pest control methods, reducing dependence on chemical fertilizers, and providing other environmental benefits. With such a powerful array of proven and potential benefits, biotechnology, if deployed, could lead to an agricultural revolution more dramatic than the Green Revolution, and potentially make the difference in waging a successful war on hunger.

[Footnote]
Notes

[Footnote]
1 Bread for the World, Hunger Basics, (11 December 2002).
2 John Mason, "Hunger Reduction Slows to Dismal Level," Financial Times, 16 October 2002.
3 Bread for the World, Hunger Basics.
4 Anthony J. Covington, "What's So Terribly Wrong with GM Food?" Asia Intelligence Wire, 18 September 2002.
5 Bread for the World, Hunger 2001: Foreign Aid to End Hunger (Silver Spring, MD: Bread for the Word Institute, 2002).
6 Sebastian Mallaby, "Phoney Fears Fan Famine in Africa," East African Standard, 16 September 2002.
7 FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 2000 (Rome: FAO, 2000), 306.
8 RESULTS, Global Action, Worksheet, October 2002.
9 Lester R. Brown, "Feeding Nine Billion," in State of the World 1999 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 115-132.

[Footnote]
10 Worldwatch Institute, State of the World: More Connected, Less Stable, Press Release, January 2002, < http://www.worldwatch.org/alerts/0200 10.html> (11 December 2002).
11 Anders Narman, "Reconstructing Development Assistance and Co-operation," in David Simon and Anders Narman, eds., Development as Theory and Practice (Harlow, England: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), 171.
12 Ibid., 159.
13 Bread for the World, Hunger 2002: A Future with Hope (Silver Spring, MD: Bread for the World Institute, 2002), 83.
14 David Dollar, "Globalization, Inequality and Poverty Since 1980," World Bank, September, 2001.
15 Institute of International Finance, as quoted in "A Helping Hand," The Globalist, 27 November 2001.
16 Theodore H. Moran, Foreign Direct Investment and Development: The New Policy Agenda for Developing Countries and Economies in Transition (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998), 24-25.
17 Ibid., 163-168.

[Footnote]
18 RESULTS, "Microcredit," (21 December 2002).
19 Jacques Diouf, Press Release, United Nations FAO, 21 January 1999.
20 Bread for the World, Hunger 2002, 71-91.
21 FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 2000, Rome 2000.
22 The UN expects China's population to grow from 1.3 billion today to 1.6 billion by 2050; India's from 1 billion to 1.6 billion; Pakistan's from 148 million to 357 million; Nigeria's from 122 million to 339 million; and Ethiopia's from 62 million to 213 million. Iran, Indonesia, Sudan, Egypt, and Bangladesh will also likely have trouble feeding their growing populations in coming decades.
23 Brown, 120.
24 Joel I. Cohen and Robert Paarlberg, "Explaining Restricted Approval and Availability of GM Crops in Developing Countries," AgBiotechNet 4 (October 2002).

[Footnote]
25 "Why Africans Are Starving," Wall Street Journal, 17 September 2002.
26 Judy Aita, "Developing Countries Should Adopt Biotech, UN Panelists Urge," U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, 24 September 2002.
27 Rachel Melcer, "Altered Crops Have Farmers Walking a Tightrope of Acceptance," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 25 September 2002.
28 Reuters, "Asian Farmers Seen Sowing `Super Rice' in 2-3 Years," 19 September 2002.

[Footnote]
29 Carmelo Q. Francisco, "Philrice to Commercialize Genetically Modified Rice," Business World, 16 September 2002.
30 "GM Peanut a Field Trial Stage," Hindu Business Line, 14 September 2002.
31 "China Cultivates Salt-Resistant Cloned Tomatoes, Rice, Soya, Poplars," Asia Intelligence Wire, 15 September 2002.
31 Johann Kirsten and Marnus Gouse, "Bt Cotton in South Africa: Adoption and Impact on Farm Incomes Amongst Small- and Large-Scale Farmers," ISB News Report, October 2002.
33 New Scientist, "Much Ado About Nothing," 18 May 2002.
34 Marc Morano, "Green Activist Accused of Promoting Famine Wins Time Magazine Honor," CNSNews.com, 17 September 2002, (12 December 2002).

[Footnote]
31 "Irrational Fears of Frankenfood," Las Vegas Review-journal, 16 September 2002. 36 Francisco, "Philrice to Commercialize Genetically Modified Rice."
37 Denis Dutton, "Fear-Mongering Greens Doom Children to Death," New Zealand Herald, 28 September 2002.
38 Johann Kirsten and Marnus Gouse, "Bt Cotton in South Africa: Adoption and Impact on Farm Incomes Amongst Small- and Large-Scale Farmers."
39 International Policy Council on Agriculture, Food and Trade, Plant Biotechnology and Global Food Production: Trade Implications, Position Paper No. 7 (Washington, DC, October, 1998).
40 James Morris, "Biotech Food Can Save Millions of African Lives," International Herald Tribune, 19 September 2002.
41 "The Farm Level Impact of Using Bt Maize in Spain," Brookes West Consultancy, 27 September 2002 (21 December 2002).
42 Brandon Mitchener, "Politics Hamstring Europe's FDA," Wall Street Journal, 17 September 2002.
43 Joseph Kahn, "The Science and Politics of Super Rice," New York Times, 22 October 2002.

[Footnote]
44 "Why Africans Are Starving," Wall Street Journal. as Murray Lyons, September 19, 2002.
46 Why Africans Are Starving," Wall StreetJournal.
47 Michael Rodemeyer, "Ratcheting Down the Debate Over Biotechnology," Newark Star-Ledger, 24 June 2001.
48 Norman Borlaug estimates that organic production could feed only about 4 billion out of today's 6.1 billion people.
49 Morano, "Green Activist Accused of Promoting Famine Wins Time Magazine Honor."

[Footnote]
50 Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, (12 December 2002).
51 David G. Victor and C. Ford Runge, "Farming the Genetic Frontier," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002).
-12 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, "Making New Technologies Work for Human Development," United Nations Development Programme, 6 September 2002. -13 Ibid.
-14 Jacques Diouf, Press Release, FAO, 21 January 1999.
551 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr,"Making New Technologies Work for Human Development."
56 Ibid.
57 Bread for the World, Hunger 2002, 81.
58 Institute of Food Technologies, "Survey: Consumers Support Food Biotechnology," 30 September 2002.
-19 Jason Leow, "Asians Are Game to Try GM Foods," Straits Times (Singapore), 22 September 2002.

[Author Affiliation]
Peter G. Lacy is the former Executive Director of the International Policy Council on Agriculture, Food, and Trade, a think tank in Washington, DC. Mr. Lacy is currently Director of International Research at Bryant Christie Inc., a consultancy headquartered in Seattle. He is an alumnus of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Posted by maximpost at 9:40 PM EST


BEHIND THE HEADLINES
U.S., Israel find that details
of Gaza withdrawal take time
By Ron Kampeas
WASHINGTON, March 9 (JTA) -- It's become "my-place-or-yours" diplomacy.
A group of three top U.S. Middle East advisers was to return to Israel this week to discuss Israel's plans for withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and possibly parts of the West Bank. A week ago, Israeli advisers were in Washington. Two weeks before that, the Americans were in Jerusalem.
On Thursday, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz was due in Washington, where he was to discuss the withdrawal plan with Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice.
Underlying all the back-and-forth is U.S. frustration with a lack of clear Israeli ideas on how the withdrawal will take shape without Palestinian cooperation.
"We're not even sure if the Israelis are clear about what they want," one American official said ahead of the visit to Israel by Steven Hadley, Bush's deputy national security adviser; Elliott Abrams, his top Middle East adviser; and William Burns, the top State Department envoy to the region.
U.S. Jewish officials say Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's vagueness about his withdrawal proposal is at the heart of the confusion. Giora Eiland, Sharon's national security adviser, is eager to push ahead with a plan, they say, but Sharon is hanging back for now.
Why Sharon is playing his cards so close to his chest is anyone's guess.
"Everyone gives you different information," said Steven Spiegel, a scholar at the Israel Policy Forum, a group that backs U.S. prodding of Middle East parties to get back to the peace table. "A lot of people are scratching their heads."
Representatives of the four bodies behind the "road map" peace plan -- the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russia -- were due to meet in Washington on Wednesday.
Powell has joined his European counterparts in calling on the Israeli and Palestinian prime ministers to meet as soon as possible. He also wants Israel to explain its withdrawal plans.
"There are many other questions that we want to pose to our Israeli colleagues to make sure we have a good understanding of their plans for Gaza, and plans for the West Bank as well," Powell said Tuesday after meeting with Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher.
Powell and Muasher had discussed the Sharon proposal but wanted more details.
"I think that if this is done in the context of the road map, if this is done in coordination with the Palestinians, then this might present an opportunity," Muasher said. "But it is important before we pass final judgment to talk to the Israelis and understand exactly what their intentions are regarding this issue."
When the Americans initially embraced Sharon's proposal for unilateral withdrawal last month, each side suggested it would take no time to get it into shape: a U.S. mission to Israel, an Israeli visit to Washington and then Bush and Sharon would wrap it up at a summit.
However, this week's round is at least the fourth such visit, and the Sharon-Bush summit -- originally set for sometime this week -- has been bumped at least until next month.
Reports in Israeli newspapers quote unnamed Israeli security officials as saying that the Bush administration is behind the delay, worried that a withdrawal could precipitate violence and adversely affect Bush's reelection chances in November.
"They're doing what they can to keep a lid on, maybe because they feel that doing something now is likely to lead to instability," Spiegel said. "If the administration wanted more, they'd be more active, they'd have someone on the scene day after day working with Eiland."
U.S. and Israeli officials insist the November elections have not played a role in delaying the presentation of a plan. U.S. officials have gone out of their way to praise the proposal as one that could entice the Palestinians to crack down on terrorism and rejoin the broader U.S.-led road map.
In the next few weeks, State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said, "What you can expect is continuing engagement by the United States with both parties to really help facilitate progress."
The White House's National Security Council issued a rare on-the-record endorsement of the Sharon proposal.
"The prime minister's ideas are promising and the discussions are very useful to examine the details and many ramifications," NSC spokesman Shawn McCormack told JTA. "The prime minister's proposals have the potential to be historic. We are all working within the framework of the road map and the vision outlined by President Bush."
U.S. officials say details of the pullout have been more daunting than U.S. and Israeli negotiators originally realized. They hearken back to Israel's last unilateral withdrawal, from southern Lebanon in May 2000.
Israel negotiated that move with the United Nations, getting U.N. approval for the exact contours of the withdrawal. Even so, Hezbollah seized on the unresolved status of the Shebaa Farms, a tiny patch of land in the Golan foothills that Israel captured from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War, as a pretext to keep attacking Israel.
The lesson: If a crucial party has absented itself from the table, make sure everything is wrapped up tightly enough that provocateurs can't reignite a conflict.
"They're making sure a lot of details are sorted out so as not to end up with another Shebaa Farms-type of thing," another administration official said. "They're making progress, but a lot more remains to be done."
Another factor might be Israel's failure to anticipate the degree to which the Palestinian Authority lacks control in the Gaza Strip.
Hamas, the Al-Aksa Brigade and other terrorist groups have asserted control in some of the main refugee camps in the center of the strip.
Avi Dichter, head of Israel's Shin Bet security service, was in Washington this week, where he said that a withdrawal now was not likely to end terrorism, according to reports in Israeli newspapers.
Bush administration officials say another factor has been Sharon's attempt to work a tradeoff into any withdrawal: Gaza for parts of the West Bank. Israel wants U.S. recognition of its permanent control over Ma'aleh Adumim, Ariel and the Gush Etzion settlement bloc -- areas the Palestinians effectively ceded in 2000-2001 peace talks.
Sharon might need such a tradeoff to sell the package to hard-liners in his Cabinet -- support he is seeking this week. But he's unlikely to get administration backing for such a trade, the Americans say, because the idea is to get the Palestinians back to the table, not give them an excuse to keep away.
Israel also is seeking Egyptian agreement to secure the Gaza-Egypt border once Israel leaves. The border is a main route for Palestinians to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip.
Nabil Fahmy, Egypt's ambassador to Washington, told JTA that Egypt would withhold a decision until it was certain Israel's actions were designed to lead to the resumption of peace talks.
"We need to understand the details as far of the package and as far as the proposal," he said. "We're not aware of the full details of the position because much of it has not been resolved in Israel itself."
In any case, he said, "It has to be in the context of resolving the conflict on the basis of a two-state solution and ending the occupation."




? JTA. Reproduction of material without written permission is strictly prohibited.

Czech Jewish official brings
Kerry news of his Holocaust dead
By Magnus Bennett
PRAGUE, March 9 (JTA) -- It hasn't been long since Sen. John Kerry learned that he had relatives who were killed in the Holocaust.
Now Kerry, the presumptive Democratic nominee for president, is getting documents about the last days of his paternal grandmother's brother and sister.
During a visit to New York on Sunday, the chairman of Prague's Jewish community, Tomas Jelinek, presented the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research with copies of the original transport lists for Otto and Jenny Loewe -- Kerry's paternal grandmother's brother and sister, who were sent to their deaths on Nazi transports.
Jelinek said he decided to track down the records in Prague after learning about Kerry's Jewish roots from American media reports.
"I presented copies of the records to YIVO as a gift and asked them to pass them on to Sen. Kerry," Jelinek told JTA. "We know how touching this kind of information is for Jewish communities in Europe and thought it would be of interest to Sen. Kerry's family."
The records show that Otto, who was born in Budapest, was transported from Vienna to Terezin transit camp -- Theresienstadt -- in August 1942. He died at Theresienstadt on June 29, 1943.
His sister, Jenny, was transported later from Vienna to Theresienstadt. On Sept. 26, 1942, she was sent from Theresienstadt to the Maly Trostinec concentration camp in Belarus, where she subsequently was killed.
Jelinek presented the records at the launch of an exhibition of the works of the late Czech artist Alfred Kantor, who depicted scenes of everyday Nazi brutality during the Holocaust.
Kantor, who survived Theresienstadt, produced 127 drawings and sketches from memory after the originals had been lost. Kantor emigrated to the United States after the war and died last year in Maine.
Jelinek also was in New York to launch a fund-raising drive for a new $6 million senior home for Holocaust survivors in Prague, called Project Hagibor. The planned 60-bed facility aims to provide round-the-clock care for some of Prague's estimated 1,500 Holocaust survivors.
Former Czech President Vaclav Havel is behind the project.
"In the history of our country, the biggest killing of Czech citizens in one day happened in Auschwitz-Birkenau on March 8, 60 years ago," Havel wrote in a letter of support for the project. "Entire families, including children, were killed. The only thing that made them guilty was being Jewish."
Havel said he is afraid that there remains a lot of indifference in Czech society to the Holocaust.
"I am afraid -- something only a very few people admit -- that our present indifference towards this and other tragedies of the past and present makes us accomplices," he wrote.
"I am very happy that you are meeting today to honor the memory of those who are deceased and at the same time to support a project that should help to lessen the life hardships of those who used to be prisoners in the concentration camps and ghettos, at least in their twilight years," he wrote.




? JTA. Reproduction of material without written permission is strictly prohibited.


PM adviser: no plans for `eastern fence' in West Bank
By Amnon Barzilai, Haaretz Correspondent
Israel does not plan to build a separation fence in the eastern part of the West Bank because of the likely negative political fallout in the international arena, the man who heads the team plotting the route of the fence told Haaretz on Tuesday.
"The State of Israel will not build a separation fence in the eastern part of the West Bank because of the diplomatic damage it is likely to endure as a result," said Colonel (res.) Dan Tirza, who is considered the most senior professional adviser to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on the issue of the fence.
"Legally and publicly, the building of the separation fence in the eastern sector is likely to cause serious damage to the state," he said. "So we shouldn't invest money in it."
Tirza also revealed that there will be a 2.3-kilometer hole in the eastern section of the separation fence being built around Jerusalem. The section where no fence or wall will be built is in the area of the Jerusalem-Ma'aleh Adumim road. It is still not clear what type of obstacle will be placed in the area. The Israel Defense Forces has prepared three alternatives that will soon be presented to Sharon and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, and will then be brought to the government for approval.
The inclination is not to completely seal off Jerusalem so as not to leave Ma'aleh Adumim, which has some 32,000 residents, outside of the separation fence. Tirza said that Kfar Adumim, which is home to 350 families and is east of Ma'aleh Adumim, will not be inside the fence.
Tirza's team, which meets once a week, includes members of the Defense Ministry, the IDF, and representatives of all the relevant planning and legal authorities in the country. The state prosecutor's office has barred the addition of settlers to the committee, despite such requests. Nevertheless, members of the committee, including Tirza, meet with settler representatives to hear their opinions about the route of the fence.
Tirza said his committee has tried to limit the damage wrought by the fence, and that they did not ignore the Green Line. "But one has to remember that the Green Line is not a defensive line," he said. "In places where I can, I move the route of the fence so as not to destroy olive groves and hot houses. Not a single home has been destroyed as a result of the route of the fence. Except for some homes built illegally in the area of Baka al-Garbiyeh."
So far, 26 petitions have been submitted to the High Court of Justice on the issue of the fence. Fifteen were either rejected or a settlement was reached between the sides. Eleven are still being considered by the court. Of these, eight have led to a delay in construction of the fence.
"The reason we haven't lost until now on these petitions is because we tried to take as many considerations into account as possible during the planning phase. We tried to find solutions with the local residents or their lawyers."
Tirza also said a number of Israeli lawyers, who represent Palestinians who own land along the route of the separation fence, are trying to "stir things up" and prevent their clients from reaching understandings or deals with the Israeli government over financial compensation for the seizing of their land.

Posted by maximpost at 12:59 AM EST
Permalink

The Folly of Dialogue Diplomacy
Simplicity, naivety, and deceitful complexity.
By Elio Bonazzi
In every aspect of human life, new ideas, designs, and concepts usually go through three distinct phases. A good dose of naivety characterizes the initial phase of every project, intellectual enterprise, or model; the intrinsic novelty of the subject-matter forces engineers, politicians, and intellectuals to make na?ve assumptions, which are progressively refined and adjusted, and new layers of complexity are added to the model, design, or political doctrine in order to better equip it to deal with complex realities.
Adding complexity, however, is only an intermediate phase. According to Antoine de Saint-Exupery, "Perfection (in design) is achieved not when there is nothing more to add, but rather when there is nothing more to take away."
The best models, designs, and political doctrines are simple. But their simplicity is the fruit of a complex process, which started with naivety, grew through complexity and achieved a level of harmony and integrity possible only after redundancy was eliminated, internal coherence realized, and unnecessary entanglement discarded, all the while striving to capture the true essence of the problem under analysis.
Experience teaches that it is very rarely, if ever, that a successful engineering design, or political or economical doctrine, deviates from common sense, or is counterintuitive. If somebody tried to convince us that in order to achieve an egalitarian society we need to stop taxing the rich and tax more heavily blue-collar workers, we would smell the proverbial rat. A sophism is a plausible but fallacious argument. Unnecessary complexity is deceitful, and often used to muddy the waters and to erect smokescreens that allow unfounded theories to appear logical and coherent.
Which is exactly what certain diplomats and State Department officials are doing when they call for a dialogue with the Iranian mullahs. Their intent is to normalize relations with Tehran in order to seek an understanding -- and possibly a deal -- with the theocratic regime in exchange for the Islamic republic's cessation of its nuclear program.
According to this foreign-policy school of thought, which for lack of a better term we call "realist," the recent outcome of the Iranian national elections, which marked the defeat of the reformists and the triumph of the Islamic hardliners, is good news. The sophists of the State Department would like to convince us that now that the excruciating internal debate between the Leftist mullahs and the conservative establishment is over, the "pragmatic conservatives" are ready to cut a deal with the West over Tehran's WMD programs.
If we leave for a moment the realm of sophisms, and revert to simplicity and common sense, we realize that the analysis of the Iranian situation is straightforward. One doesn't need a Ph.D in political science to realize that the Iranians feel encircled -- American and allied troops are in Afghanistan and in Iraq -- and only the nuclear bomb would make the mullahs feel invincible. We are discovering almost daily that the Iranians are more advanced than originally thought in their nuclear plans. On several occasions, they deceived the European Union and the international nuclear watchdog about their true intentions to buy time and continue pursuing their covert nuclear program.
A common trick is to have one theocrat announce Iran's strict adherence to the nonproliferation protocols; and then, a day later, have a different top cleric state exactly the opposite. This happened, for example, last week: Hassan Rohani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, openly announced that an unspecified number of nuclear installations remain undeclared and that the Iranian authorities don't see the need to disclose all aspects of their nuclear program to the IAEA. But, only a few days earlier, the foreign minister of Germany, France, and Britain signed a last-minute deal in Vienna with Iranian representatives that once again stated Tehran's willingness to comply with the IAEA directives.
Why should we care what happens in Iran? Well, for starters, Iran directly sponsors Hezbollah terrorists in Israel, through Syria. Iranian killers are sent into Iraq to foment anti-American feelings. Iran represents today the single most dangerous threat to world stability. It represents an immediate threat to Israel and to the American troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The natural conclusion is that Iran cannot be "fixed." The only possible way out is a regime change. Anybody claiming that "engagement" with the theocratic fascists in Tehran could produce positive results is following the Yellow Brick Road, and is either a genuine victim of the mullah-orchestrated game of deception, or has ulterior motives.
To justify their willingness to continue a hopeless dialogue with the Islamist leaders in Tehran, foreign-policy realists use convoluted and abstract scenarios, which are inevitably counterintuitive. A typical example is their claim that the outcome of the latest Iranian elections is positive because, now that the "pragmatic conservative clerics" finally got rid of their internal opposition, it clears the way to important diplomatic breakthroughs. It is yet another example of deceitful and unnecessary complexity.
Occam's Razor is a logical principle attributed to the medieval philosopher William of Occam. Scientific knowledge is based on experience and self-evident truths, and on logical propositions resulting from those two sources. Occam stressed the Aristotelian principle that entities must not be multiplied beyond what is necessary. In science, the simplest theory that fits the facts of a problem is the one that should be selected.
The basic facts are that the mullahs are developing the nuclear bomb and nothing will stop them. Hitler should have been stopped in 1936, as soon as he remilitarized the Rhineland in blatant breach of the Versailles treaty. The European nations failed to do so, and the end-result was World War II.
If the West doesn't stop Iran today, the consequences will be dire. The only way to prevent a potentially catastrophic outcome in the Middle East is to provoke regime change in Iran. The good news is that to achieve this goal no direct military intervention is required. No more American troops will have to die in a distant land. And the American taxpayers won't have to bear the costs of another expensive military campaign.
Simply declaring that the only U.S. policy towards Iran is regime change, and enforcing it at every level in the administration, would provoke shock waves in Tehran. A resolute and determined U.S. administration could release part of Iran's frozen assets, seized during the hostage crisis of 1979, and use them to fund the Iranian opposition movement, inside and outside of the country. The Islamic regime has lost popular support, and survives only thanks to a very efficient repressive apparatus, exactly like the Communist regimes in eastern Europe before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Imposing sanctions and isolating the regime would provide the final blow needed to overthrow the mullahs.
The strategy explained above is simple but not na?ve. It follows the principle of Occam's Razor, is internally coherent, and is based on common sense, historical facts, and the will of the people of Iran. If today we miss this historical opportunity to bring peace and long-term stability to the Middle East, we will have to achieve the same goal in a few years, when it will be much more difficult, expensive, and onerous. If we let the sophists of the State Department have their way, the inevitable showdown with the Islamist regime will only be postponed, but not avoided.

-- Elio Bonazzi is an Italian-born political scientist.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/bonazzi200403090852.asp
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. Softens Its Rebuke on Iran Nuclear Issue, Appeasing Allies
By CRAIG S. SMITH
VIENNA, March 9 -- The United States agreed Tuesday to tone down its criticism of Iran in order to win European support for a demand that Tehran divulge more about its nuclear program, according to European diplomats here.
Washington dropped threatening language from a draft resolution being prepared at a meeting of the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, and agreed to insert a paragraph praising Iran's cooperation so far. The board's 10 European members signed off Tuesday on the revised draft, and the United States will present it to remaining board members on Wednesday.
The resolution, which board members are expected to approve later this week, will be the third on Iran issued by the agency since the country was discovered last year to have a far more extensive nuclear program than was previously known. And it will be the second in which the United States has agreed to a weaker rebuke against Iran than it would like because of European fears of alienating the country.
Last November, the United States dropped its demand that an agency resolution threaten Security Council action if Iran again failed to disclose details of its nuclear program, which Tehran insists is for purely peaceful uses.
The resolution instead said that if any further serious failures came to light, the board would "consider all options at its disposal." The United States repeated that language in its initial draft this time but agreed Tuesday to remove the threat in favor of a simple reference to the previous resolutions.
The debate carries unsettling echoes of the controversy that preceded the war with Iraq, when European allies argued to give Iraq more time to prove it had no weapons of mass destruction. In Iran's case, France, Germany and Britain reached an agreement with Iran last year under which Iran would suspend its uranium enrichment program in return for easier access to technology and trade.
The Associated Press reported Tuesday that John R. Bolton, a United States under secretary of state, complained in a letter to the French, German and British governments that their stance was hurting the effort to get Iran to comply with its promises for full nuclear disclosure.
Iran gave the energy agency a detailed account of its nuclear program in October. But the country was later found to possess a more advanced design for uranium enriching centrifuges than it had declared, as well as other undisclosed equipment and plans.
The most pressing question remaining is the origin of traces of highly enriched uranium found on some of the equipment in Iran. Iran told the agency that the traces were on the equipment when it arrived in the country, and that since it had been bought through various middlemen, there was no way to identify its source.
But it is possible that Iran enriched the uranium itself, which would constitute clear evidence of Iran's intent to develop nuclear weapons and represent a major breach of its commitments to the agency.
The draft resolution calls for Mohamed ElBaradei, the director of the energy agency, to report on Iran's progress in May before its next board of governor's meeting in June, deferring the question of how to respond to Iran's omissions in its October declaration until June.



Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> OUR FRIENDS IN ISRAEL GET READY?

Mossad Cuts down Spying Functions
From DEBKA-Net-Weekly 147 Feb. 27
March 8, 2004, 1:03 PM (GMT+02:00)
Here come the A-teams
In the last five months, Israel's central intelligence agency has undergone a metamorphosis in typically deep hush. Once fabled for planting its agents anywhere and everywhere where important military or diplomatic happenings were played out, the Israeli Mossad has retired from the business of espionage and turned itself into a body devoted to special operations.
Many Mossad overseas stations have been shut down or re-staffed according to the new guidelines.
According to DEBKA-Net-Weekly 's exclusive intelligence sources, Mossad aspires to match its past excellence as a gatherer of intelligence by providing equally first-rate operations units, possibly unique in scale, whose broad mission is to secure and protect Israel's vital interests around the world and preserve the Jewish state against existential perils, which are currently defined as Iran's potential nuclear weapons and major al Qaeda terrorism. It is in the process of manufacturing a special operations infrastructure for serving such national security goals at the behest of government policy-makers.
Just as Israel's armed forces crack units are trained for operations behind enemy lines in the immediate region, Mossad's special operations units are to be programmed for operations over the horizon. Its intelligence-gathering resources have been cut down and adjusted to meet the needs of these operations; the remainder transferred to Aman, Military Intelligence.
DEBKA-Net-Weekly 's intelligence experts report that last summer, prime minister Ariel Sharon approved this Mossad reform program submitted by its director, Res. Maj.Gen. Meir Dagan. It went into effect in September 2003.
The Dagan plan is based on six arguments:
1. Israel's special operations units are tailored for action inside Israel and within the limited orbit of the neighboring Arab states.
2. A changed world has confronted Israel with fresh existential threats: Iran's nuclear weapons and fundamentalist Islamic terror spearheaded by al Qaeda, which is actively plotting 9/11 scale and unconventional weapons attacks - nuclear, chemical and biological - on the Jewish state. The traditional special operations units of the armed forces are not equal to these threats; they are not trained to fight them or equipped for long-distance action in remote arenas.
3. Hitherto, Israel lacked a force capable of operating at any point on the globe. But now, should an Al Qaeda team be discovered training in the Ferghana Valley of Central Asia for a dirty bomb attack on Tel Aviv, the Mossad will have an A-team ready and able to wipe out this faraway al Qaeda base. A similar team must be capable of dealing with Iran's secret nuclear weapons facilities and its long-range missile systems.
4. Mossad will retain only one intelligence resource, the ability to reconnoiter the operational targets assigned by the responsible government authority, namely the prime minister. It will be geared purely to such missions.
5. The new mode of operation must necessarily cut Mossad off from its traditional relationships with foreign intelligence bodies as well its domestic ties. This seclusion will enhance its ability to function in total secrecy.
6. The new undercover units will be equipped with the finest secret electronic gear and weapons Israel has developed.
DEBKA-Net-Weekly reports that some of the intelligence experts Sharon consulted before approving the transformation of Mossad were highly critical. They had no argument with the creation of an undercover operational structure for long-distance missions, but held that the loss of an experienced and esteemed resource for gathering political or even industrial intelligence around the world would be seriously detrimental to Israel's international standing.
According to sources familiar with his mind-set, Sharon's overriding motivation in approving the Mossad's overhaul was his acute sense of peril emanating most of all from the nuclear threat. This sense can be summed up in a word: We may find it interesting and even useful to discover who really pulls the wires in some country or other. But what use will this intelligence be if Israel is under nuclear attack?

Posted by maximpost at 12:27 AM EST
Permalink

Newer | Latest | Older