Tehran's Hidden Hand
Iran's mounting threats in Iraq.

By Jonathan Schanzer
The State Department's annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report was issued earlier this month, complete with its usual hit parade of terrorist groups, state sponsors and emerging trends. Predictably, Iran was singled out for the "planning of and support for terrorist acts," as well as assistance to "a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals." The report also fingers Iran for pursuing "a variety of policies in Iraq aimed at securing Tehran's perceived interests there, some of which ran counter to those of the Coalition." A statement castigating Iran for such activities was long overdue. However, Washington must now challenge Iran over this growing list of nefarious activities in Iraq that have been plaguing coalition reconstruction efforts.
Conventional Fighting. Ash-Sharq al-Awsat ran this headline on March 16, 2004: "American and Iranian Forces Exchange Fire on the Border." American officials claimed that one Iranian border guard was killed, and other reports indicated that three Iranians were killed, but Tehran denied that any such incident took place. This was not the first time that open hostilities were reported. Coalition officials indicated in January and February that Abu al-Khasib, the port just below Basra on the Shatt al-Arab, has been the scene of Iranian violence against Iraqis. Iranian Revolutionary Guards have opened fire upon Iraqi water patrols along the estuary separating their two countries. Iranian fighters are also inside Iraq, and they may or may not be sanctioned by Tehran. On February 14, when a number of guerrillas attacked a police station in Fallujah, it was learned that two of the slain guerrillas were Iranian. An insurgency attack the week before, according to U.S. sources, was an attempt to free a number of Iranians who had only recently been arrested in Fallujah.
Hezbollah & IRGC. In February 2004, during a Washington Institute fact-finding mission to Iraq, one Coalition official reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) offices were spotted in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Moreover, officials noted an immense amount of Hezbollah activity in the city of Karbala. Most of the activity was "intimidation and threats of intimidation...Mafia-type stuff." During our delegation's one day in Basra, we spotted a building that openly advertised the offices of Hezbollah. Members of this organization insisted that their Hezbollah was not tied to Tehran, and that the name, which means "Party of God," is a common one. According to one report in the Arabic paper al-Hayat, Iran sent some 90 Hezbollah fighters into Iraq shortly after Saddam's Iraq fell. The group now receives financing, training and weapons from Iran, and has a rapidly growing presence in the Shi'a south. Western intelligence officials also allege that the man who planned the recent suicide attacks in Basra is Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah operative responsible for bombing the U.S. embassy in Beirut in the early 1980s.
Propaganda. Even before the U.S.-led war on Iraq, Iran had begun beaming in Arabic-language television programming in an effort to gain a strategic propaganda foothold in the country -- and it has not stopped. Indeed, American labors to win hearts and minds through the television station, al-Iraqiyya, and Radio Sawa have been steadily undermined by these efforts. In April 2003, an Iranian journalist reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards brought into Iraq radio-transmission equipment, posters, and printed matter for the militia known as the Badr Corps. The Badr Corps is a militia that has not yet challenged the U.S., but it is run by SCIRI (the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq), which is known to have close ties to the Iranian regime.
Ansar al-Islam. Not enough attention has been given to the established ties between Iran and Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish al Qaeda affiliate. Before the war, Iran allowed Ansar al-Islam to operate openly along its borders in the extreme northeast mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, just shy of the Iranian border. Kurdish intelligence, with corroboration from imprisoned Ansar fighters, has established that Iran provided logistical support to the group by allowing the flow of goods and weapons. During periods of conflict with Kurdish militia units, the Peshmerga, Iran further provided a safe haven for these Islamist fighters. One Turkish newspaper also notes that Ansar al-Islam militants actually checked cars going into Iran (rather than coming into their stronghold), indicating close security coordination with the Islamic Republic. When the U.S. struck the Ansar al-Islam enclave in March 2003, Iran permitted many Kurdish fighters to flee across the border. They were later assisted back over the border -- with the help of Iran's Revolutionary Guards -- so that they could fight against American soldiers in the heart of Iraq. Kurdish intelligence has since intercepted between three and ten foreign fighters crossing Iranian border each week.
Moqtada al-Sadr. Iran sent a delegation to Iraq in mid-April to mediate between the rogue cleric and the U.S. administration. However, at the same time, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, an Iranian agent, has been supporting al-Sadr's anti-American efforts. A source from ash-Sharq al-Awsat estimates that Iran may have provided al-Sadr some $80 million in recent months. Further, Sadr's Mahdi army may now be getting training from Hezbollah, according to new intelligence reports. One Iranian source told ash-Sharq al-Awsat that Iran created three training camps along the Iran-Iraq border to train fighters from Sadr's militia.
In sum, Iran may be spending up to $70 million per month in Iraq. This pales in comparison to the billions spent by the U.S. Still, it is enough to undermine U.S. efforts. As such, Washington needs not only to better patrol the Iranian border, but also to confront clandestine Iranian activity within Iraq itself. Failure to do so will only encourage Iran to redouble its efforts to destabilize Iraq.
-- Jonathan Schanzer recently took part in a 12-day fact-finding mission to Iraq, sponsored by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/schanzer200405100900.asp
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London's Jihadists
The U.K. must crack down on resident Islamists.

By Rachel Ehrenfeld
While the world is busy denouncing the United States for the deplorable behavior of a few soldiers, it is oblivious to growing incitement by Islamist clerics against America and the West. Calling for jihad earlier this month in London, Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammad told his disciples: "All Muslims of the West will be obliged to become his sword" in a new battle. At the same time, another Islamist, Imam Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri, is preaching in London that "it's okay to kill [those who] work against Islam, by slitting their throats, or by shooting them."
Such incitement is prohibited by law in the U.K. Under the heading of "Inciting Terrorism Overseas," section 59 1(a), the Terrorism Act of 2000 clearly states that "a person commits an offence if he incites another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the United Kingdom." Needless to say, such an act would also constitute an offense if committed in England. Yet these imams and their ilk are free to call for murder with impunity.
The British allowance of this "free speech" has already resulted in a suicide-bombing attack -- in April 2003 in Tel Aviv -- that cost the lives of three Israelis and wounded more than 50. According to the prosecution attorney at the Old Bailey last week, this attack was planned by Hamas, which recruited British citizens Asif Muhammad Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif, whose family members are on trial in London for failing to inform the U.K. authorities. Considering this, and the fact that British law enforcement is busy exposing terrorist plots and arresting members of al Qaeda and other Islamist cells, while British soldiers are dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.K.'s reluctance to go after advocates of terrorism is puzzling.
This disregard for the law extends to written incitement in the form of magazines and websites, originating from England, calling for jihad. Although Hamas was finally outlawed in the U.K. in September 2003, its publication, Filisteen Almuslima (Muslim Palestine), continued to be published in and distributed from London to the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S. In fact, the cover of that September issue carried the horrifying picture of the bloody casualties from a dissevered bus in Jerusalem, as well as the glorified image of the suicide bomber who murdered 23 innocent civilians, many of them babies, and wounded 136.
Inside, the magazine praises and justifies the terrorist attack against Israelis and glorifies the terrorist, Raid Misk, as a heroic role model for potential suicide bombers against oppressors of Islam everywhere. It quotes the Koranic verse that, according to Hamas, gives Islamic religious justification for suicide bombings: "Among the believers, there are men who have been true to their covenant with Allah: Some of them [have already fulfilled their vows and] found their death [in battle]; and some still wait [their turn]. However, they have not in any way broken [their vows]" (Sura 33, verse 23).
And Filisteen Almuslima is not the only Islamist magazine published in and distributed from England, inciting hate, spreading anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Semitic messages, with pro-jihad, pro-terrorist propaganda and calls for suicide bombings.
Al-Sunnah, another Islamist fundamentalist magazine published in the U.K., called in February 2003 for suicide operations against the United States, saying, "There is no other way for the youth of this nation [Islam] other than suicide operations."
Risalat al-Ikhwan (Message of the Brotherhood) is also a London publication with Muslim subscribers worldwide. This magazine serves as center stage for spreading radical Islamist ideology in the best tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood. This Egyptian terrorist organization was outlawed by Gamal Abd al-Nasser in the 1950s, and despite its influence on Hamas and other internationally outlawed terrorist organizations, it is still out in the open in Western countries.
In October 2003, Risalat al-Ikhwan called for: "Active resistance (muqaawamah) to the occupation and the use of any available means to resist it are a religious Moslem duty, a national duty and a natural right anchored in both international law and the United Nations Charter." More of this can be found on Hamas's website.
Judging by the opposition Prime Minister Blair is facing, it seems that these publications influence, among others, former British diplomats, 50 of whom sent him a letter on April 26, 2004, protesting his support of U.S. Middle East policy, stating: "To describe the resistance [in Iraq] as led by terrorists, fanatics and foreigners is neither convincing nor helpful." These diplomats, in the tradition of Islamist-Arab propaganda, continue to argue, like Lakhdar Brahimi, that Israel is the cause -- that it has for "decades poisoned relations between the West and the Islamic and Arab worlds." It is not surprising, therefore, that the resignation of Liberal Democrat MP Jenny Tonge was not required after she condoned Palestinian suicide bombings, stating in parliament, "I would be a suicide bomber in Israel."
A police source in London, when asked why this incitement is allowed, responded that law-enforcement officials are "unhappy with the situation," but that they are unable to prosecute the instigators because "our hands are tied. It's a political decision." Political leaders ought to heed the warning sirens before the terrorists strike -- as promised.

-- Rachel Ehrenfeld, author of Funding Evil; How Terrorism is Financed -- and How to Stop It, is director of the New York-based American Center for Democracy.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ehrenfeld200405100910.asp


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Study: Many Federal Sites Not Terror Risks

May 10, 1:52 PM (ET)
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN
WASHINGTON (AP) - Federal officials should consider reopening public access to about three dozen Web sites withdrawn from the Internet after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, a government-financed study says, because the sites pose little or no risk to homeland security.
The Rand Corp. said the overwhelming majority of federal Web sites that reveal information about airports, power plants, military bases and other potential terrorist targets need not be censored because similar or better information is easily available elsewhere.
Rand identified four Web pages that might merit the restrictions imposed after the attacks.
"It's a good time to take a closer look at the choices that they made at the time," said John Baker, principal author of the study, which was funded by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the government's intelligence mapping agency.
Advocates of open government said the report shows the Bush administration acted rashly after the suicide attacks when it scrubbed numerous government Web sites.
"It was a gigantic mistake, and I hope the study brings some rationality back to this policy," said Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists' project on government secrecy. "Up to now, decisions have been made on a knee-jerk basis."
Rand's National Defense Research Institute identified 629 Internet-accessible federal databases that contain critical data about specific locations. Co-author Beth Lachman said they "appeared to be the most sensitive sites" among 5,000 federal Web pages the researchers checked.
The study, conducted between mid-2002 and mid-2003, found no federal Web sites that contained target information essential to a terrorist - in other words, information a terrorist would need to launch an attack.
It identified four databases - less than 1 percent of the 629 - where restricting access probably would enhance homeland security. None was available to the general public anymore. Those sites included two devoted to pipelines, one to nuclear reactors and one to dams.
Researchers recommended that officials evaluate 66 databases with some useful information, but they didn't anticipate restrictions would be needed because similar or better data probably could be easily obtained elsewhere.
The remaining 559 databases "are probably not significant for addressing attackers' information needs and do not warrant any type of public restriction," the report said. It said that any information they contain that could be useful to terrorists is easily obtained elsewhere, often by simple, legal observation in an open society.
The Rand researchers found that 30 federal agencies or departments make public, on paper or online, "geospatial information" about critical or symbolic locations and structures. That kind of data can be as simple as a telephone book or as complex as an Internet database that discloses how many people live near each of the nation's power plants or toxic chemical storage sites.
After Sept. 11, federal agencies scrambled to pull such data off the Internet. The Transportation Department removed pipeline maps. The Environmental Protection Agency deleted descriptions of risk management plans for chemicals stored at 15,000 sites. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission took down its Web site, although much of it is now back online.
Using Internet archives that preserve old Web pages or detailed written descriptions, researchers identified 39 federal geospatial databases taken off-line since Sept. 11.
Other than the four databases that posed some risk, "these restrictions need to be more thoroughly assessed," the researchers wrote.
"Under the circumstances, these officials took prudent steps but in a very piecemeal, patchwork way," Baker said.
The study proposed a framework for analyzing and possibly restoring such data to the Internet:
_How useful would it be to an attacker? Far more detailed information is needed to plan an attack than to pick a target, but most federal Web sites are too general to help with more than target selection.
_Is similar or better data readily available elsewhere? If so, "the net security benefits of restricting access ... may be minimal or nonexistent" and could "possibly lead ... to a false sense of security at worst."
_Does the gain in security from restrictions outweigh any harm to those using the data, such as police and fire departments, economic planners or private companies?
For instance, Rand advocated that an Environmental Protection Agency Web site that discloses where toxic chemicals are stored and in what quantity should not be restricted because its value to terrorists is outweighed by its value to communities preparing for emergencies.
Restricting the site would "diminish the public good that comes from providing local communities access to information that can significantly affect the well-being of citizens," the study said.
To demonstrate the futility of removing government data that isn't unique, Rand researchers picked out 300 non-federal Web sites that had similar or better information about critical U.S. targets than federal pages.
For instance, an online scuba magazine contains a divers' description of the ocean depths and currents around an oil-drilling platform off the southern California coast that would be more useful to terrorists than the federal sites that described the platform.

On the Net:
Rand Corp. study: http://www.rand.org/publications
Federation of American Scientists secrecy project: http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction325&projectId5

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CHAIN OF COMMAND
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
How the Department of Defense mishandled the disaster at Abu Ghraib.
Issue of 2004-05-17
Posted 2004-05-09
In his devastating report on conditions at Abu Ghraib prison, in Iraq, Major General Antonio M. Taguba singled out only three military men for praise. One of them, Master-at-Arms William J. Kimbro, a Navy dog handler, should be commended, Taguba wrote, because he "knew his duties and refused to participate in improper interrogations despite significant pressure from the MI"--military intelligence--"personnel at Abu Ghraib." Elsewhere in the report it became clear what Kimbro would not do: American soldiers, Taguba said, used "military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee."
Taguba's report was triggered by a soldier's decision to give Army investigators photographs of the sexual humiliation and abuse of prisoners. These images were first broadcast on "60 Minutes II" on April 28th. Seven enlisted members of the 372nd Military Police Company of the 320th Military Police Battalion, an Army reserve unit, are now facing prosecution, and six officers have been reprimanded. Last week, I was given another set of digital photographs, which had been in the possession of a member of the 320th. According to a time sequence embedded in the digital files, the photographs were taken by two different cameras over a twelve-minute period on the evening of December 12, 2003, two months after the military-police unit was assigned to Abu Ghraib.
An Iraqi prisoner and American military dog handlers. Other photographs show the Iraqi on the ground, bleeding.
One of the new photographs shows a young soldier, wearing a dark jacket over his uniform and smiling into the camera, in the corridor of the jail. In the background are two Army dog handlers, in full camouflage combat gear, restraining two German shepherds. The dogs are barking at a man who is partly obscured from the camera's view by the smiling soldier. Another image shows that the man, an Iraqi prisoner, is naked. His hands are clasped behind his neck and he is leaning against the door to a cell, contorted with terror, as the dogs bark a few feet away. Other photographs show the dogs straining at their leashes and snarling at the prisoner. In another, taken a few minutes later, the Iraqi is lying on the ground, writhing in pain, with a soldier sitting on top of him, knee pressed to his back. Blood is streaming from the inmate's leg. Another photograph is a closeup of the naked prisoner, from his waist to his ankles, lying on the floor. On his right thigh is what appears to be a bite or a deep scratch. There is another, larger wound on his left leg, covered in blood.
There is at least one other report of violence involving American soldiers, an Army dog, and Iraqi citizens, but it was not in Abu Ghraib. Cliff Kindy, a member of the Christian Peacemaker Teams, a church-supported group that has been monitoring the situation in Iraq, told me that last November G.I.s unleashed a military dog on a group of civilians during a sweep in Ramadi, about thirty miles west of Fallujah. At first, Kindy told me, "the soldiers went house to house, and arrested thirty people." (One of them was Saad al-Khashab, an attorney with the Organization for Human Rights in Iraq, who told Kindy about the incident.) While the thirty detainees were being handcuffed and laid on the ground, a firefight broke out nearby; when it ended, the Iraqis were shoved into a house. Khashab told Kindy that the American soldiers then "turned the dog loose inside the house, and several people were bitten." (The Defense Department said that it was unable to comment about the incident before The New Yorker went to press.)
When I asked retired Major General Charles Hines, who was commandant of the Army's military-police school during a twenty-eight-year career in military law enforcement, about these reports, he reacted with dismay. "Turning a dog loose in a room of people? Loosing dogs on prisoners of war? I've never heard of it, and it would never have been tolerated," Hines said. He added that trained police dogs have long been a presence in Army prisons, where they are used for sniffing out narcotics and other contraband among the prisoners, and, occasionally, for riot control. But, he said, "I would never have authorized it for interrogating or coercing prisoners. If I had, I'd have been put in jail or kicked out of the Army."
The International Red Cross and human-rights groups have repeatedly complained during the past year about the American military's treatment of Iraqi prisoners, with little success. In one case, disclosed last month by the Denver Post, three Army soldiers from a military-intelligence battalion were accused of assaulting a female Iraqi inmate at Abu Ghraib. After an administrative review, the three were fined "at least five hundred dollars and demoted in rank," the newspaper said.
Army commanders had a different response when, on January 13th, a military policeman presented Army investigators with a computer disk containing graphic photographs. The images were being swapped from computer to computer throughout the 320th Battalion. The Army's senior commanders immediately understood they had a problem--a looming political and public-relations disaster that would taint America and damage the war effort.
One of the first soldiers to be questioned was Ivan Frederick, the M.P. sergeant who was in charge of a night shift at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, who has been ordered to face a court-martial in Iraq for his role in the abuse, kept a running diary that began with a knock on his door by agents of the Army's Criminal Investigations Division (C.I.D.) at two-thirty in the morning on January 14th. "I was escorted . . . to the front door of our building, out of sight from my room," Frederick wrote, "while . . . two unidentified males stayed in my room. `Are they searching my room?'" He was told yes. Frederick later formally agreed to permit the agents to search for cameras, computers, and storage devices.
On January 16th, three days after the Army received the pictures, Central Command issued a blandly worded, five-sentence press release about an investigation into the mistreatment of prisoners. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said last week that it was then that he learned of the allegations. At some point soon afterward, Rumsfeld informed President Bush. On January 19th, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the officer in charge of American forces in Iraq, ordered a secret investigation into Abu Ghraib. Two weeks later, General Taguba was ordered to conduct his inquiry. He submitted his report on February 26th. By then, according to testimony before the Senate last week by General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, people "inside our building" had discussed the photographs. Myers, by his own account, had still not read the Taguba report or seen the photographs, yet he knew enough about the abuses to persuade "60 Minutes II" to delay its story.
At a Pentagon news conference last week, Rumsfeld and Marine General Peter Pace, the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisted that the investigation into Abu Ghraib had moved routinely through the chain of command. If the Army had been slow, it was because of built-in safeguards. Pace told the journalists, "It's important to know that as investigations are completed they come up the chain of command in a very systematic way. So that the individual who reports in writing [sends it] up to the next level commander. But he or she takes time, a week or two weeks, three weeks, whatever it takes, to read all of the documentation, get legal advice [and] make the decisions that are appropriate at his or her level. . . . That way everyone's rights are protected and we have the opportunity systematically to take a look at the entire process."
In interviews, however, retired and active-duty officers and Pentagon officials said that the system had not worked. Knowledge of the nature of the abuses--and especially the politically toxic photographs--had been severely, and unusually, restricted. "Everybody I've talked to said, `We just didn't know'--not even in the J.C.S.," one well-informed former intelligence official told me, emphasizing that he was referring to senior officials with whom such allegations would normally be shared. "I haven't talked to anybody on the inside who knew--nowhere. It's got them scratching their heads." A senior Pentagon official said that many of the senior generals in the Army were similarly out of the loop on the Abu Ghraib allegations.
Within the Pentagon, there was a spate of fingerpointing last week. One top general complained to a colleague that the commanders in Iraq should have taken C4, a powerful explosive, and blown up Abu Ghraib last spring, with all of its "emotional baggage"--the prison was known for its brutality under Saddam Hussein--instead of turning it into an American facility. "This is beyond the pale in terms of lack of command attention," a retired major general told me, speaking of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. "Where were the flag officers? And I'm not just talking about a one-star," he added, referring to Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, the commander at Abu Ghraib who was relieved of duty. "This was a huge leadership failure."
The Pentagon official told me that many senior generals believe that, along with the civilians in Rumsfeld's office, General Sanchez and General John Abizaid, who is in charge of the Central Command, in Tampa, Florida, had done their best to keep the issue quiet in the first months of the year. The official chain of command flows from General Sanchez, in Iraq, to Abizaid, and on to Rumsfeld and President Bush. "You've got to match action, or nonaction, with interests," the Pentagon official said. "What is the motive for not being forthcoming? They foresaw major diplomatic problems."
Secrecy and wishful thinking, the Pentagon official said, are defining characteristics of Rumsfeld's Pentagon, and shaped its response to the reports from Abu Ghraib. "They always want to delay the release of bad news--in the hope that something good will break," he said. The habit of procrastination in the face of bad news led to disconnects between Rumsfeld and the Army staff officers who were assigned to planning for troop requirements in Iraq. A year ago, the Pentagon official told me, when it became clear that the Army would have to call up more reserve units to deal with the insurgency, "we had call-up orders that languished for thirty or forty days in the office of the Secretary of Defense." Rumsfeld's staff always seemed to be waiting for something to turn up--for the problem to take care of itself, without any additional troops. The official explained, "They were hoping that they wouldn't have to make a decision." The delay meant that soldiers in some units about to be deployed had only a few days to prepare wills and deal with other family and financial issues.
The same deliberate indifference to bad news was evident in the past year, the Pentagon official said, when the Army conducted a series of elaborate war games. Planners would present best-case, moderate-case, and worst-case scenarios, in an effort to assess where the Iraq war was headed and to estimate future troop needs. In every case, the number of troops actually required exceeded the worst-case analysis. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and civilian officials in the Pentagon continued to insist that future planning be based on the most optimistic scenario. "The optimistic estimate was that at this point in time"--mid-2004--"the U.S. Army would need only a handful of combat brigades in Iraq," the Pentagon official said. "There are nearly twenty now, with the international coalition drying up. They were wildly off the mark." The official added, "From the beginning, the Army community was saying that the projections and estimates were unrealistic." Now, he said, "we're struggling to maintain a hundred and thirty-five thousand troops while allowing soldiers enough time back home."
In his news conference last Tuesday, Rumsfeld, when asked whether he thought the photographs and stories from Abu Ghraib were a setback for American policy in Iraq, still seemed to be in denial. "Oh, I'm not one for instant history," he responded. By Friday, however, with some members of Congress and with editorials calling for his resignation, Rumsfeld testified at length before House and Senate committees and apologized for what he said was "fundamentally un-American" wrongdoing at Abu Ghraib. He also warned that more, and even uglier, disclosures were to come. Rumsfeld said that he had not actually looked at any of the Abu Ghraib photographs until some of them appeared in press accounts, and hadn't reviewed the Army's copies until the day before. When he did, they were "hard to believe," he said. "There are other photos that depict . . . acts that can only be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel, and inhuman." Later, he said, "It's going to get still more terrible, I'm afraid." Rumsfeld added, "I failed to recognize how important it was."
NBC News later quoted U.S. military officials as saying that the unreleased photographs showed American soldiers "severely beating an Iraqi prisoner nearly to death, having sex with a female Iraqi prisoner, and `acting inappropriately with a dead body.' The officials said there also was a videotape, apparently shot by U.S. personnel, showing Iraqi guards raping young boys."
No amount of apologetic testimony or political spin last week could mask the fact that, since the attacks of September 11th, President Bush and his top aides have seen themselves as engaged in a war against terrorism in which the old rules did not apply. In the privacy of his office, Rumsfeld chafed over what he saw as the reluctance of senior Pentagon generals and admirals to act aggressively. By mid-2002, he and his senior aides were exchanging secret memorandums on modifying the culture of the military leaders and finding ways to encourage them "to take greater risks." One memo spoke derisively of the generals in the Pentagon, and said, "Our prerequisite of perfection for `actionable intelligence' has paralyzed us. We must accept that we may have to take action before every question can be answered." The Defense Secretary was told that he should "break the `belt-and-suspenders' mindset within today's military . . . we `over-plan' for every contingency. . . . We must be willing to accept the risks." With operations involving the death of foreign enemies, the memo went on, the planning should not be carried out in the Pentagon: "The result will be decision by committee."
The Pentagon's impatience with military protocol extended to questions about the treatment of prisoners caught in the course of its military operations. Soon after 9/11, as the war on terror got under way, Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly made public his disdain for the Geneva conventions. Complaints about America's treatment of prisoners, Rumsfeld said in early 2002, amounted to "isolated pockets of international hyperventilation."
The effort to determine what happened at Abu Ghraib has evolved into a sprawling set of related investigations, some of them hastily put together, including inquiries into twenty-five suspicious deaths. Investigators have become increasingly concerned with the role played not only by military and intelligence officials but also by C.I.A. agents and private-contract employees. In a statement, the C.I.A. acknowledged that its Inspector General had an investigation under way into abuses at Abu Ghraib, which extended to the death of a prisoner. A source familiar with one of the investigations told me that the victim was the man whose photograph, which shows his battered body packed in ice, has circulated around the world. A Justice Department prosecutor has been assigned to the case. The source also told me that an Army intelligence operative and a judge advocate general were seeking, through their lawyers, to negotiate immunity from prosecution in return for testimony.
The relationship between military policing and intelligence forces inside the Army prison system reached a turning point last fall in response to the insurgency against the Coalition Provisional Authority. "This is a fight for intelligence," Brigadier General Martin Dempsey, commander of the 1st Armored Division, told a reporter at a Baghdad press briefing in November. "Do I have enough soldiers? The answer is absolutely yes. The larger issue is, how do I use them and on what basis? And the answer to that is intelligence . . . to try to figure out how to take all this human intelligence as it comes in to us [and] turn it into something that's actionable." The Army prison system would now be asked to play its part.
Two months earlier, Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander of the task force in charge of the prison at Guant?namo, had brought a team of experts to Iraq to review the Army program. His recommendation was radical: that Army prisons be geared, first and foremost, to interrogations and the gathering of information needed for the war effort. "Detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation . . . to provide a safe, secure and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence," Miller wrote. The military police on guard duty at the prisons should make support of military intelligence a priority.
General Sanchez agreed, and on November 19th his headquarters issued an order formally giving the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade tactical control over the prison. General Taguba fearlessly took issue with the Sanchez orders, which, he wrote in his report, "effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agenda assigned to each of these respective specialties."
Taguba also criticized Miller's report, noting that "the intelligence value of detainees held at . . . Guant?namo is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities in Iraq. . . . There are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib. These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaeda." Taguba noted that Miller's recommendations "appear to be in conflict" with other studies and with Army regulations that call for military-police units to have control of the prison system. By placing military-intelligence operatives in control instead, Miller's recommendations and Sanchez's change in policy undoubtedly played a role in the abuses at Abu Ghraib. General Taguba concluded that certain military-intelligence officers and civilian contractors at Abu Ghraib were "either directly or indirectly responsible" for the abuses, and urged that they be subjected to disciplinary action.
In late March, before the Abu Ghraib scandal became publicly known, Geoffrey Miller was transferred from Guant?namo and named head of prison operations in Iraq. "We have changed this--trust us," Miller told reporters in early May. "There were errors made. We have corrected those. We will make sure that they do not happen again."
Military-intelligence personnel assigned to Abu Ghraib repeatedly wore "sterile," or unmarked, uniforms or civilian clothes while on duty. "You couldn't tell them apart," the source familiar with the investigation said. The blurring of identities and organizations meant that it was impossible for the prisoners, or, significantly, the military policemen on duty, to know who was doing what to whom, and who had the authority to give orders. Civilian employees at the prison were not bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but they were bound by civilian law--though it is unclear whether American or Iraqi law would apply.
One of the employees involved in the interrogations at Abu Ghraib, according to the Taguba report, was Steven Stefanowicz, a civilian working for CACI International, a Virginia-based company. Private companies like CACI and Titan Corp. could pay salaries of well over a hundred thousand dollars for the dangerous work in Iraq, far more than the Army pays, and were permitted, as never before in U.S. military history, to handle sensitive jobs. (In a briefing last week, General Miller confirmed that Stefanowicz had been reassigned to administrative duties. A CACI spokeswoman declined to comment on any employee in Iraq, citing safety concerns, but said that the company still had not heard anything directly from the government about Stefanowicz.)
Stefanowicz and his colleagues conducted most, if not all, of their interrogations in the Abu Ghraib facilities known to the soldiers as the Wood Building and the Steel Building. The interrogation centers were rarely visited by the M.P.s, a source familiar with the investigation said. The most important prisoners--the suspected insurgency members deemed to be High Value Detainees--were housed at Camp Cropper, near the Baghdad airport, but the pressure on soldiers to accede to requests from military intelligence was felt throughout the system.
Not everybody went along. A company captain in a military-police unit in Baghdad told me last week that he was approached by a junior intelligence officer who requested that his M.P.s keep a group of detainees awake around the clock until they began talking. "I said, `No, we will not do that,'" the captain said. "The M.I. commander comes to me and says, `What is the problem? We're stressed, and all we are asking you to do is to keep them awake.' I ask, `How? You've received training on that, but my soldiers don't know how to do it. And when you ask an eighteen-year-old kid to keep someone awake, and he doesn't know how to do it, he's going to get creative.'" The M.I. officer took the request to the captain's commander, but, the captain said, "he backed me up.
"It's all about people. The M.P.s at Abu Ghraib were failed by their commanders--both low-ranking and high," the captain said. "The system is broken--no doubt about it. But the Army is made up of people, and we've got to depend on them to do the right thing."
In his report, Taguba strongly suggested that there was a link between the interrogation process in Afghanistan and the abuses at Abu Ghraib. A few months after General Miller's report, Taguba wrote, General Sanchez, apparently troubled by reports of wrongdoing in Army jails in Iraq, asked Army Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general, to carry out a study of military prisons. In the resulting study, which is still classified, Ryder identified a conflict between military policing and military intelligence dating back to the Afghan war. He wrote, "Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews."
One of the most prominent prisoners of the Afghan war was John Walker Lindh, the twenty-one-year-old Californian who was captured in December, 2001. Lindh was accused of training with Al Qaeda terrorists and conspiring to kill Americans. A few days after his arrest, according to a federal-court affidavit filed by his attorney, James Brosnahan, a group of armed American soldiers "blindfolded Mr. Lindh, and took several pictures of Mr. Lindh and themselves with Mr. Lindh. In one, the soldiers scrawled `shithead' across Mr. Lindh's blindfold and posed with him. . . . Another told Mr. Lindh that he was `going to hang' for his actions and that after he was dead, the soldiers would sell the photographs and give the money to a Christian organization." Some of the photographs later made their way to the American media. Lindh was later stripped naked, bound to a stretcher with duct tape, and placed in a windowless shipping container. Once again, the affidavit said, "military personnel photographed Mr. Lindh as he lay on the stretcher." On July 15, 2002, Lindh agreed to plead guilty to carrying a gun while serving in the Taliban and received a twenty-year jail term. During that process, Brosnahan told me, "the Department of Defense insisted that we state that there was `no deliberate' mistreatment of John." His client agreed to do so, but, the attorney noted, "Against that, you have that photograph of a naked John on that stretcher."
The photographing of prisoners, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, seems to have been not random but, rather, part of the dehumanizing interrogation process. The Times published an interview last week with Hayder Sabbar Abd, who claimed, convincingly, to be one of the mistreated Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib photographs. Abd told Ian Fisher, the Times reporter, that his ordeal had been recorded, almost constantly, by cameras, which added to his humiliation. He remembered how the camera flashed repeatedly as soldiers told to him to masturbate and beat him when he refused.
One lingering mystery is how Ryder could have conducted his review last fall, in the midst of the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, without managing to catch it. (Ryder told a Pentagon press briefing last week that his trip to Iraq "was not an inspection or an investigation. . . . It was an assessment.") In his report to Sanchez, Ryder flatly declared that "there were no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices." Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as an agent of the C.I.D., told me that Ryder was in a bureaucratic bind. The Army had revised its command structure last fall, and Ryder, as provost marshal, was now the commanding general of all military-police units as well as of the C.I.D. He was, in essence, being asked to investigate himself. "What Ryder should have done was set up a C.I.D. task force headed by an 0-6"--full colonel--"with fifteen agents, and begin interviewing everybody and taking sworn statements," Rowell said. "He had to answer questions about the prisons in September, when Sanchez asked for an assessment." At the time, Rowell added, the Army prison system was unprepared for the demands the insurgency placed on it. "Ryder was a man in a no-win situation," Rowell said. "As provost marshal, if he'd turned a C.I.D. task force loose, he could be in harm's way--because he's also boss of the military police. He was being eaten alive."
Ryder may have protected himself, but Taguba did not. "He's not regarded as a hero in some circles in the Pentagon," a retired Army major general said of Taguba. "He's the guy who blew the whistle, and the Army will pay the price for his integrity. The leadership does not like to have people make bad news public."

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CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE
by GEORGE PACKER
Will moderate Iraqis embrace democracy--or Islamist radicalism?
Issue of 2004-05-17
Posted 2004-05-10
On the March morning I visited the Baghdad morgue, which is in a decaying neighborhood near the Tigris River, a young forensic-medicine specialist named Dr. Bashir Shaker was on duty. It was the day after Ashura, one of the most important religious holidays on the Shiite calendar, which commemorates the murder of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, and the massacre of his followers at Karbala, in 680 A.D. Thirteen hundred and twenty-four years later, Baghdad was festooned with the symbols of Shiite piety and penitence: the red flags of Hussein's blood, the green flags of Islam, the black flags of grief bearing messages such as "Hussein Taught Us to Become Victims in Order to Gain Victory." For the first time in decades, Iraqi Shiites felt free to observe the day of martyrdom and the forty days of full-throated mourning that follow. The chants, the parades, the beating of chests, and the flaying of backs in ceremonies of atonement also became displays of collective power.
The shrines of Baghdad and Karbala were therefore unusually crowded with black-clad Shiite pilgrims that day--and when suicide bombers in their midst detonated a series of explosions it was the worst civilian massacre since the start of the war. The death toll in the two cities was at least a hundred and eighty, and the Baghdad morgue became a charnel house filled with bodies, heads, limbs, and buckets of flesh. Outside the morgue, a man waited to enter and look for the corpse of an eleven-year-old boy, a neighbor, whose father lay wounded in the hospital. Others were leaving with rags still pressed to their faces, a response to the stench inside. The authorities were rushing to complete the process of identification. There would be no forensic autopsies of the victims, Shaker told me; these followers of Hussein were Shiite martyrs, and Islam forbade the violation of their bodies.
Before the American invasion of Iraq, Dr. Shaker said, only one murder victim arrived at the city morgue each month. This statistic underscores two conditions of Iraqi life under Saddam Hussein: the state had a near-monopoly on killing, and most of the victims of the state disappeared into unmarked mass graves. One unintended effect of Iraq's liberation from Baathist tyranny has been the widespread dispersal of violence. In occupied Iraq, between fifteen and twenty-five murder victims arrive at the Baghdad morgue daily, most of them with gunshot wounds. Shaker estimated that five cases a week involve Baathists executed in reprisal killings; their families typically retrieve the bodies without informing the police. With barely functioning courts, a weak, ill-trained, and often corrupt new police force, a foreign occupier that has failed to provide security, and a pervasive atmosphere of lawlessness, Iraqis don't expect the justice that was denied them during the reign of Saddam Hussein to materialize anytime soon.
The day I visited, Shaker said that he was reviewing "an interesting case," unrelated to the Ashura bombings. The body of a woman, forty-one years old and never married, had recently been discovered with six gunshot wounds in the chest. Shaker's initial examination had found that the woman appeared not to be a virgin, and the number of gunshots suggested that the murder was premeditated. These details cast suspicion on her family: Shaker said that such a crime was called "washing the shame." Honor killing is an old custom in Iraq, he said, though in this case there was a new element: before the war, the family would have burned or drowned the woman to disguise the murder. "Now you can kill and go," Shaker said. "No need to cover the crime." The standard sentence for "washing the shame" is six months.
The woman's case was referred to a committee of five doctors, including Iraq's leading hymen expert. To Shaker's surprise, the committee found that the woman's hymen was extremely thin but intact. Case closed: the family would not be investigated, and, without the means to find other clues, the police would seal the woman's file.
Down the hall from the morgue, which is in a squat, two-story yellow building called the Medico-Legal Institute, is an examination room with a reclining chair and stirrups. This is where virginity exams on living subjects take place--most of them on suspected prostitutes, but also on runaways, kidnapping victims, and girls who have suffered an accident and whose parents, for the sake of marriageability, want a medical certificate establishing their purity.
An entire subspecialty of forensic medicine in Iraq deals with virginity, Shaker said. In any criminal case involving a woman, it's the most important piece of information. "It rules our life," he added. The surprising thing about these details of his profession is their ordinariness. In the West, Iraqis developed a reputation for cosmopolitan modernity that is now decades out of date. In order to win the support of Iraq's clerics, Saddam obliged people to adopt a harsh form of traditional Islam. In private matters of religion, family, and the treatment of women, the vast majority of Iraqis are far more conservative than most outsiders understand.
In March, 2003, a week before the start of the war, a sixteen-year-old girl whom the Baathist police had found wandering disoriented through the streets was brought to the Medico-Legal Institute. Upon examining her, Shaker found that her virginity had been recently and violently taken. The girl, named Raghda, was beautiful, with pale skin and large, dark eyes, and she was so miserable she could hardly speak. Raghda seemed nothing like the teen-age prostitutes Shaker examined, and he gently persuaded her to tell him what had happened.
Raghda had gone to audition as a television announcer at the studio owned by Uday Hussein, Saddam's psychopathic older son. Along with the six other finalists, she was taken to a room where Uday--crippled from a 1996 assassination attempt--was seated in a chair, holding a pistol in his lap. He ordered the girls to undress and walk in a circle around his chair. When one girl begged to be excused, Uday shot her dead. After that, the other girls, including Raghda, did as they were told. In the following days, Uday (who was committing some of his last crimes in power, while an invasion force gathered along Iraq's southern border) raped the girls, then threw them out on the street, drugged, with a wad of cash, which was how Raghda was found by the police. When she told them her story, they gave her a beating and then took her to the Medico-Legal Institute.
"If you want to help me," Raghda told the doctor, "go tell my parents their daughter was found dead."
On March 18th, two days before the war started, Shaker completed Raghda's paperwork. "Notice that there is the appearance of complete hymen rupture from the top to the base," he wrote. "In conclusion, the hymen membrane was ruptured longer than two weeks ago; I cannot say how long. End of report." Raghda was returned to the police; Shaker never learned her fate.
Shaker served in the Iraqi Army and, a decade ago, took part in the occupation of Kuwait. Now he handles Baghdad's nightly traffic of violent death. One Friday brought thirty-two bodies, including two foreign engineers--one German, one Dutch--who had been gunned down by insurgents on a road south of Baghdad, and two Iraqi journalists shot to death by American soldiers as they drove away from a checkpoint. For Shaker, such cases are purely intellectual matters. He told me without emotion that his testimony in trials has sent homosexuals to execution. The effect of this dispassion shows in the cold, handsome gaze of his blue eyes; in his direct, uninflected manner of speaking; and in the way his smile turns almost automatically into a sneer. But he hadn't got over Raghda.
When I met him, Shaker said he was looking for a change in his life: "Any change, better or worse." He had a restless mind and hated boredom, and, since the Americans represented something new, he welcomed spending time with me. I assumed that this forward-thinking man of science--with a flat-top haircut and clean-shaven jaw--wanted a relatively secular, liberal Iraq. I kept waiting for him to catch my eye in the middle of one of his clinical descriptions and shake his head over the backwardness of a society obsessed with virginity and prostitution. It never happened.
Shaker was born in 1968, the year the Baath Party came to power. "For thirty-five years, I feel I was dead," he said. "Only these last weeks I'm beginning to live." The fall of Saddam and the arrival of foreign occupiers--who happened to be the makers of his favorite old movies--had, at last, brought the chance for a new life. Eager to obtain travel documents and venture outside Iraq, he sold his private dermatology practice and a piece of land he'd received as a former soldier. His first foreign trip was to Amman, Jordan, where he had arranged to meet an Iraqi girl who was living in exile in Amsterdam. They married after two days. "Like a movie," he said. His wife is still in Amsterdam, but the plan is for her to move to Baghdad, once the city returns to calm.
Though Shaker was initially grateful to the foreign occupiers, the disorder on Baghdad's streets disillusioned him. The morgue reflected that chaos--it had the improvised, filthy atmosphere of a front-line hospital. There were pools of blood on the floor, and empty stretchers attracted flies. In the hall, bodies lay uncovered on tables: a man with a broad mustache and a slashed throat, found naked under a pile of garbage in a middle-class district; a man with a gunshot wound in his head, his blue eyes open and filmy; the small, blackened corpse of a badly burned woman. Amid the gloomy chill of the refrigerated room, six other naked bodies lay sprawled on the floor, two women and four men. One of the women, believed to be a prostitute, had been shot through the nipple--by a relative, Shaker assumed.
These days, the morgue overflows, but the examination room down the hall is usually empty. Before the war, it was the other way around; Shaker used to perform five or six virginity exams a day. Shaker is a Shiite Muslim, and he was appalled by this inversion of the normal order. In his view, a fragile moral relationship existed between the two sections of the Medico-Legal Institute--as if the social control of virginity offered a defense against the anarchy that led to murder. He noted that in Iran, an Islamist theocracy, prostitutes were publicly whipped. He thought the same practice should be instituted in Iraq--where the sex trade, he claimed, had reached epidemic proportions in the lawlessness of the occupation. "It's strict, it's horrible, but it has good results," he said of Islamic law. "Prostitution now is normal here." He blamed the Americans for the moral laxity in Baghdad, and especially L. Paul Bremer, the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, for threatening, in February, to veto any interim constitution that declared Islam to be the principal basis of federal law. "When they give everybody their rights, it's causing bad things in society--it's corrupting us," Shaker said. "If Islam is the main source of law, none of these things would happen."
The doctor said that he belonged to "the middle level of mind" in Iraqi society, somewhere between the strictly religious masses and the secular ?lite. "There are many Iraqis like me," he said. In Iraq, there is nothing unusual about a doctor who loves Marilyn Monroe and Cary Grant, desires the public whipping of prostitutes, and believes that executed homosexuals got what they deserved. Yet Shaker's mix of traditional and modern views causes him considerable inner conflict. "I hate Iraq," he said. "And I love it." He longs to live abroad, but fears the moral climate outside the country. He is wary of the Western images that appear on his television screen, though he installed a satellite dish on his roof when it was illegal, and dangerous, to own one. He adores his new wife, an independent-minded woman who wears low-cut shirts, but he wants her to start covering her hair and acting like a traditional Muslim woman when she moves to Baghdad. His work fascinates him, but he is concerned that his daily immersion in death will make him less spiritual. "The doctor of forensic medicine deals only with bodies," he said. "So maybe in the end I will become like you--an existentialist."
Dr. Shaker lives with his mother and his brothers and sisters on a tidy side street in Al Thawra, the heavily Shiite slum district in northeastern Baghdad. Last year, the neighborhood was renamed Sadr City, in honor of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a revered Shiite leader known for his subversive sermons against Baathist tyranny; he was assassinated in 1999, almost certainly on Saddam's orders. His son, Moqtada al-Sadr, declared himself his successor. With the overthrow of Saddam, Moqtada began stridently fomenting dissent against the American occupation. Throughout Sadr City, young men in black uniforms guided traffic: these were members of the Mahdi Army, Moqtada's militia.
A round sticker was affixed to the wooden front door of Shaker's house; it bore an image of Ayatollah Sadr, along with a quotation, from one of his sermons, insisting that women be veiled. In the Shakers' living room hung a picture of Imam Hussein crossing a river on horseback by moonlight, like one of the Christian saints. Compact disks containing forty-five sermons by Ayatollah Sadr were stacked inside the family's TV cabinet, alongside a pile of back issues of Al Hawza, the fiercely anti-American newspaper published by Moqtada al-Sadr. Shaker told me that he got his television news from Al Jazeera and Iranian broadcasts--he never watched Iraq's American-run network. His main source of information from the non-Islamic world, I realized, was old Hollywood movies. That wouldn't offer him much help in parsing the truth of a story I noticed in Al Hawza. The newspaper had reprinted photographs of President Bush and President Clinton holding up their index and pinkie fingers; the accompanying article offered the images as evidence of a Zionist-Masonic conspiracy.
Shaker's younger brothers, Ali and Samir, joined us in the living room. Ali was a secondary-school math teacher, Samir an unemployed telecom repairman. Unlike their dirty-blond, fair-skinned older brother, they were dark and bearded--respectful, serious, slightly wary.
"Samir is closer to God than me," Shaker said. "Ali is like me--flexible." Ali and Samir were devoted followers of Moqtada; they shared his hostility toward the occupation. From time to time, someone knocked on the door, and one of the brothers would get up to receive a tray of food or beverages from the hands of an unseen woman.
Ali brought up the Ashura bombings. "Ninety-five per cent of Iraqis knew the main purpose of this was to start a religious war between Shia and Sunnis," he said. He was skeptical of the Americans' assertion that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist with ties to Al Qaeda, was responsible for the attacks. "This Zarqawi--it's only a game that the Americans use," Ali declared. "Before the election of Bush, they'll show Zarqawi on TV. Just like Saddam--they captured him months before they showed him."
The brothers told me a joke about the occupation: An American soldier is about to kill a Shiite, who cries, "Please, no, in the name of Imam Hussein!" The American asks who Imam Hussein was, and then decides to spare the man's life. A few weeks later, this same soldier is sent to Falluja, where he is cornered by a Sunni insurgent. The soldier thinks fast and cries, "Please, no, in the name of Imam Hussein!" The insurgent says, "What? You're an American and a Shiite?," and blows him away.
There was a moment of laughter in the living room.
Ali sat cross-legged on a rug against the wall, and looked directly at me. "Before this war, I was waiting for the Americans to come--and now I feel sort of cheated. All this talk about rebuilding Iraq, and all we see is a couple of light coats of paint. And they say they renovated Iraq."
Samir, the unemployed younger brother, spoke in darker tones, with a faint smile. He had never had any illusions. "No enemy loves his enemy. We know very well that the Americans don't intend us any good."
The Americans had at least got rid of Saddam, I observed. "That's not enough," Ali said. "Now things are worse. We can't go outside at four in the morning, as before."
If within a year there were free elections in Iraq, I asked, would they be satisfied?
"Yes," Samir said.
Ali disagreed. "I don't think the people will be satisfied. So what if we have a President? The mobile phones we have here don't work. Why can't it be like the Gulf countries? Maybe in generations after generations. But we won't be here then. It pisses me off."
Shaker also spoke of the urgent need for improved services. Then he asked to borrow my satellite phone and disappeared up on the roof, to call his new wife in Amsterdam.
One Friday not long after the Ashura bombings, I went with Shaker to hear prayers in Kadhimiya, an old Shiite neighborhood in the northwestern part of Baghdad that is famous for its gold shops. One of the bombs killed nearly sixty people at the local shrine, which holds the remains of two imams who came after the martyred Hussein. Along a broad pedestrian market street that ends in the square in front of the sixteenth-century mosque, cordons of grim-looking young Mahdi Army militiamen, carrying Kalashnikovs, searched the throngs of pilgrims for weapons.
There were no Iraqi policemen or American soldiers on the streets. One Mahdi soldier, who was eighteen years old, said that the Americans had prevented Moqtada's militia from carrying their weapons on Ashura. This was a foolish decision, he said: if the militia had been armed, it would have been able to hold back the surges of worshippers and catch the suicide bombers mingling in the crowd.
While Shaker went into a shop to wash himself before prayers, a local cleric named Sheikh Muhammad Kinani told me that the bombers were Wahhabi members of Al Qaeda, working in concert with an American soldier employed by the John Kerry campaign. "I believe John Kerry is behind this so Bush will lose his Presidency and look bad in front of the world," he said. "But it's the Iraqis who pay for it."
Such rumors proliferate on the streets of Iraq's cities these days. In fact, the traffic in conspiracy theories is so heavy that an American intelligence unit began putting out "The Baghdad Mosquito," a daily compendium of rumors currently in circulation. According to several Shiites I spoke with in Kadhimiya, Wahhabi men all have light-colored beards and are the enemies of true Muslims. A merchant on the pedestrian market street said, "We caught a Wahhabi from Ramadi an hour ago." The captive, he said, was wearing a short dishdasha, in the Wahhabi style; although his feet were dirty, his body was suspiciously clean. A search of the Wahhabi man turned up blank paper and a map. Local people took him to the police station, where he would be tortured until he confessed.
Prayers began beneath a hot noon sun. The shrine itself, with its splendid golden domes and minarets, was closed because of bomb damage. Men filled the square; holding black signs and pictures of Shiite martyrs, and shaking their fists, they chanted, "Pray to Muhammad and the followers of Muhammad and hurry the damning of our enemies. Give victory to Moqtada! We follow Moq-ta-da!" Shaker knelt in the front row and prayed. He seemed alone in the crowd, the only worshipper who wasn't chanting.
One of Moqtada's aides, Hazem al-Araji, delivered the sermon. He is a thirty-five-year-old sayyid with a salt-and-pepper beard who spent two years in exile in Vancouver before the war. Later, in a conversation at his office, he proved to be a smooth, smiling politician who Googles himself several times a day to keep up with his press, and who made a theocratic Islamic state sound not very different from a parliamentary democracy. But, in front of the crowd of worshippers outside the shrine, Araji let loose an incendiary and conspiracy-laced analysis of the violence in Iraq. The attacks came from four sources, he declared, none of them Iraqi or Muslim: it was the Jews, the Americans, the British, and the Wahhabi. The Jews--who had been warned to stay away from the World Trade Center on September 11th, so that not one Jew died--"want Iraqis to die." America, the devil, allows the violence in order to have an excuse to continue occupying Iraq. The British, America's partners, are more directly responsible, since they invented Wahhabism and, therefore, Al Qaeda, which have "nothing to do with Islam."
Shaker knelt, slump-shouldered, and gazed down at his clasped hands, muttering prayers. He looked puzzled, as if he were trying to figure something out. I wondered if the cleric's ranting embarrassed him.
"If you read the modern books of history," Araji proclaimed, "you know that Wahhabism started in 1870 by the good graces of the British government in order to go against Islam, to make Islam look bad, to make Muslims fight each other. Those who know--good. Those who don't--know now."
Araji was referring to "Confessions of a British Spy," an apocryphal memoir attributed to a British colonial officer of the early eighteenth century named Hempher. (Araji was off by a hundred and fifty years.) Going undercover, Hempher befriends a gullible, hotheaded Iraqi in Basra named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and tempts him into founding a heretical sect of Islam that will bring disrepute to other Muslims and turn them against one another: "We, the English people, have to make mischief and arouse schism in all our colonies in order that we may live in welfare and luxury." Hempher cannot conceal his admiration for the spiritual grandeur of Islam, which more than once nearly causes him to abandon his mission. "Confessions of a British Spy" reads like an Anglophobic variation on "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion"; it is probably the labor of a Sunni Muslim author whose intent is to present Muslims as both too holy and too weak to organize anything as destructive as Wahhabism (or, Araji's listeners could deduce, to pull off a crime as appalling as the Ashura bombings, which took place two centuries after Wahhabis, on the same holiday, sacked the Shiite shrine at Karbala, slaughtering two thousand citizens). With its subtext of powerlessness, the "memoir" is ultimately a confession of Muslim humiliation--a text that was bound to find an audience in occupied Iraq, where the name Hempher has begun to circulate among militant Shiites.
"America, England, Israel, do whatever you have to do, build more missiles, more explosives, more terrorism all over the world," Araji said. "But it's not going to stop us."
The crowd chanted, "Yes, yes to Islam!"
"Just a speech," Shaker scoffed as we drove out of Kadhimiya. "If I knew this man is going to deliver the Friday prayers, I would not go." He would have preferred to hear Moqtada himself. If Moqtada had come, he said, there would have been less talk and more action.
It is one measure of America's inability to achieve its goals in Iraq that a man of "the middle level of mind" like Bashir Shaker--who had everything to gain from the overthrow of Saddam and the opportunities it opened up--feels himself pulled toward a harsher brand of Islam in reaction to the pervasive insecurity of the occupation. Many flaws of the occupation have by now been exhaustively documented: the lack of significant international support at the outset; the catastrophic looting that followed the fall of Baghdad; the commitment of a grossly insufficient number of American troops to provide security, rebuild infrastructure, and fight a widening insurgency; the decisions to abolish the Iraqi Army and purge higher-level Baathists from government jobs, which turned several hundred thousand mostly Sunni Arabs, who might have become partners, into jobless, well-armed, and well-funded potential enemies; the slipshod planning in Washington and political mistakes in Baghdad that have forced the occupation authority to toss out one road map for Iraq's future after another.
Yet perhaps the greatest mistake made by the architects of the war was to assume that their vision of a liberal state would be eagerly embraced by an ethnically divided, overwhelmingly Islamic country with a long history of dictatorship. The Coalition Provisional Authority managed the occupation as if benevolent American intentions guaranteed success. Giving Iraqis a chance to experience and participate in democracy became less important than achieving a desired outcome. As a result, Paul Bremer and his colleagues failed to anticipate the level of resistance that would emanate from Iraq's various factions--in particular, the Shia.
The C.P.A. has been consistently slow to respond to the simmering frustrations of ordinary Iraqis. Since conditions in Iraq were already unravelling when Bremer arrived, last May, his primary focus has been on establishing his authority. "One thing that the C.P.A. couldn't make a mistake about was showing that it was in control," Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the British envoy to Iraq, told me at the end of March, just before returning to London. "This place has to be controlled, and I think this is an area where Bremer has got it exactly right, has shown that he's boss. The Iraqis wanted a boss." But, Greenstock admitted, "we could have been more consultative."
Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, who served as a C.P.A. adviser on democracy, put it more bluntly: "There has always been a tension in our occupation between control and legitimacy. And the more we've sought control, the less legitimacy we've had. I think we have erred in general, from the start, much too heavily in the direction of control at the expense of legitimacy, and that has come back to haunt us."
This is a dilemma that Bremer has never been able to resolve. In January and February, he oversaw the drafting of an interim Iraqi constitution by the Governing Council, the Iraqi body appointed by the Coalition. If Bremer had encouraged widespread public discussion of the emerging document's main points, in order to make educated participants of Iraqis, he would have risked seeing the inevitable controversies fought out in the streets. Instead, the interim constitution was written under tremendous time pressure, in small, secretive committee meetings during all-night negotiating sessions inside the Green Zone, the impenetrable fortified area in the center of Baghdad. The signing ceremony, on March 5th, was elaborately planned for the cameras: twenty-five pens were laid out on a table, one for each council member, and a chamber ensemble provided music. At the last minute, however, five Shiite members who had agreed to sign the document ruined Bremer's script by failing to show up.
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most respected Shiite cleric, had belatedly expressed his opposition to Article 61c of the interim constitution. The article, which soon became notorious, essentially gave Iraq's minority Kurds and Sunnis veto power over any element of the permanent constitution. For the Kurds, who were long oppressed by Iraq's central government, Article 61c was a guarantee of minority rights in a federal republic. In January, Bremer had sent a young and inexperienced team of advisers to negotiate with the senior Kurdish leaders, who refused to back off heavy demands. Even after Bremer personally intervened, the Kurds got almost everything they wanted, including an autonomous region in the north. To the Shiite religious leadership, which apparently learned of the article's language only at the last hour, the same Article 61c appeared to stand in the way of majority rule.
On March 8th, after three days of persuasion, the five Shiite holdouts on the council signed the document. The interim constitution is a real achievement--the only one the Governing Council can claim. It represents political compromise and a broad consensus about individual rights. During the final day and night of negotiations, Bremer yielded control--a rare moment for an official who has been described as a micromanager--and for eight hours became a silent observer, allowing the Iraqis to work out the unavoidable conflicts between majority rule and minority rights. But, because the C.P.A. and the council had failed to build any support for the interim constitution outside the Green Zone, its unveiling inspired street demonstrations, mass confusion over its contents, and a sharp increase in tension between the Shia and the Kurds. At a meeting of the district council in Baghdad's Karrada neighborhood, I listened to Governing Council representatives patiently explaining the interim constitution to a roomful of increasingly agitated citizens who, confronted with a fait accompli, accused the council of dismembering the country.
Even as it became clear that the key article risked undermining the entire document's legitimacy in the eyes of Iraq's majority, Bremer refused to consider any changes. An official involved in the process said that Bremer wanted the interim constitution to be sold to the Iraqi public in a one-way conversation: "He has a tremendous investment in this as one of his prized accomplishments."
Other than the June 30th deadline for the transfer of sovereignty, the interim constitution is just about all that remains of the November 15th agreement between the C.P.A. and the Governing Council--the agreement that outlined Iraq's political future, replacing Bremer's original plan. Throughout the year of its existence, the C.P.A. has seen its blueprints overrun by events beyond the Green Zone that were to some degree predictable--and were caused partly by its own deep isolation.
One crucial example has been the fate of Moqtada al-Sadr. Last summer, Hume Horan, the C.P.A.'s senior liaison to the Shia religious community, spoke with me about the dilemma posed by Moqtada. On the day after the fall of Baghdad, an American-backed liberal cleric, Abdel Majid al-Khoei, was killed by a mob of Moqtada's followers outside the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf. (Eyewitnesses have said that Moqtada himself refused to save his rival when Khoei was dragged bleeding to his door.) The murder was a power grab by Iraq's most radical Shiite faction. Later, Al Hawza, Moqtada's newspaper, published a blacklist with the names of Iraqi "collaborators," at least one of whom was subsequently killed. As a result, Horan told me, Moqtada's paper could be shut down and he could be arrested. Then again, putting Moqtada in jail might make him a martyr and, therefore, more dangerous.
During our conversation, Horan sounded as if he were inclined to let the establishment Shiite clerics of Najaf deal with the demagogic young upstart who had planted himself in their midst. "His father would be so distressed if he'd seen his son," Horan said of Moqtada. "Here's this unchurched son of one of the great churchmen, who fills the role without any of the qualifications. What is he lashing out at? Is it his own sense of inadequacy that is being projected?"
Last August, an Iraqi judge issued a warrant charging Moqtada with having ordered the killing of Khoei, but the C.P.A. kept the warrant a secret while it deliberated. One Coalition official said that the C.P.A. prepared to seize Moqtada on two occasions. "The word was `Lock your doors, bring everybody in. We're going to snatch Moqtada,'" he said. Both operations were abruptly called off. "The decisions had to have occurred somewhere up the Defense Department chain," the official said. (A C.P.A. spokesman said that its plans to capture Moqtada were not that definitive.)
During this same period, the C.P.A. found itself in a series of protracted battles with Ayatollah Sistani, the Shiite leader. The first was over Bremer's decision to have the permanent constitution written by unelected Iraqis. That plan was finally scrapped, in favor of the November 15th agreement, which put the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty ahead of elections and a constitution. Then another dispute arose: Sistani objected to the C.P.A.'s proposal to hold regional caucuses for the selection of Iraq's interim government. Months went by before Bremer, having steadily misjudged Sistani's power, threw out the plan.
While the C.P.A. and Sistani took each other's measure in private, there was no political progress in Iraq. The local and provincial councils set up by the C.P.A.--which should have been seedbeds of Iraq's future leadership, offering the best hope for the emergence of moderate indigenous alternatives to the sectarian parties, with their armed militias and foreign backers--never received the means to exercise real power and show their constituents concrete results. For months, members went unpaid; I was told that a draft of the government order delineating the councils' powers was prepared in October--but it wasn't issued until April 6th. The councils' reconstruction efforts were constantly hindered by bureaucratic clots that kept money from flowing to local military commanders and civil authorities.
The absence of healthier politics created a dangerous vacuum, which was filled by the most extreme tendencies in Iraq: the Sunni resistance, made up of Baathist, Islamist, and nationalist elements; and the Shiite street politics of Moqtada al-Sadr. Sistani and Moqtada are natural foes, for personal and ideological reasons, and Sistani, because of his immensely greater religious authority, commands a much larger following among Iraqi Shiites. But after Sistani declared his opposition to the interim constitution the balance of power shifted. "As long as the Coalition had Sistani's tacit support, it didn't need to worry too much about Moqtada al-Sadr," Amatzia Baram, an Iraq scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace, in Washington, told me. "But when Sistani announced his objection to the interim constitution the Coalition lost him." Article 61c placed Sistani, who was born in Iran, in a terrible position: he couldn't seem to be selling out Arab interests to the Kurds, nor could he afford to give Shiite radicals the chance to accuse him of selling out Islam. "That was a watershed moment," Baram said. "Because, from now on, every crazy Shiite could claim that he was fighting the Americans in Sistani's name. The moment radicals could present themselves as fighting for Sistani's causes, that united the Shia community against the Americans and the Governing Council. They were using Sistani's slogans against Sistani. Sistani became marginalized in his own name."
Moqtada's amplified significance was lost on Coalition officials. In late March, I asked Greenstock about the size of his following. "Tiny--and with no political impact," he said. "Go around Sadr City again now and you will find fewer Moqtada al-Sadr followers than you would have done five months ago." He added, "We thought he had an opportunity to bubble up and grow--he hasn't done it. Partly because he knows that if he moves anywhere he'll be picked up."
A week later, on March 28th, Bremer ordered the closing of Al Hawza; within days, American soldiers had arrested an aide to Moqtada. Urged on by Moqtada's vitriolic speeches, the Mahdi Army responded with demonstrations that quickly escalated into armed confrontations with Coalition troops in Baghdad and a number of southern cities, several of which fell under the militia's control. The uprising seriously damaged the C.P.A.'s authority and undermined the occupation's legitimacy in the eyes of many Shiites who otherwise have no love for the erratic Moqtada and his violent followers. In early May, after a month of fighting, the Americans acted to end the uprising, confronting the Mahdi Army in Najaf and Karbala.
The timing of the C.P.A.'s move against Al Hawza was baffling, coming in the middle of the mourning period that follows Ashura. A senior official in Washington suggested to me that the Administration had been caught off guard: "Was there a series of decisions that seemed idiotic to those of us back here? Yes. Is one of them that, during a major Muslim holiday, Moqtada al-Sadr is suddenly a persona non grata? Yes." Worse, the C.P.A. seemed not to have prepared for the reaction from Moqtada's militia, betraying a serious miscalculation of the young cleric's strength. The Mahdi Army had been acquiring money and guns since last summer, and continued to intimidate townspeople in Najaf and elsewhere; at one point in January, militiamen occupied the shrine of Imam Ali.
Amatzia Baram faulted Bremer for the clumsy manner of the March crackdown on Moqtada, but not for the effort itself. As with so many other C.P.A. decisions, he said, "You're damned if you do and damned if you don't. That's the main problem in Iraq these days."
Moqtada's newfound power was in part a result of the failed communications effort by the C.P.A. Its Iraqi Media Network has been ineptly run, featuring vapid programming and Coalition-friendly news briefs. The Pentagon, which is in charge of the occupation of Iraq, kept tight control over the flow of news for domestic political reasons. It was a self-defeating effort, however: American propaganda was no match for Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya--and Moqtada's newspaper.
The C.P.A., having sacrificed legitimacy for control, has ended up with neither. A former Coalition official traced the failures in Baghdad directly back to Washington, and he identified the central irony of the occupation: "A lot of this is the unwillingness of the Bush Administration to rock the boat before the election. And it's laughable that it's pursued this policy. Because of the failure to confront Moqtada, because of the failure to disarm the militias, because of the lack of troops on the ground, Bush may well lose the election."
In March, during the standoff over the interim constitution, I went to see Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurd on the Governing Council. A small man with a large nose and an unblinking stare, Othman was for many years the personal doctor of Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish peshmerga guerrillas who fought the Iraqi central government. Before the American invasion, Othman was living in London, and, like most Kurdish politicians, he shares the Americans' vision of a relatively secular and liberal Iraq. But, much to the annoyance of the C.P.A., he has proved to be the Governing Council's in-house critic. When most of its other members were jockeying to perpetuate their positions beyond the June 30th transfer of sovereignty, Othman was calling flatly for the council to be dissolved, saying that it hadn't worked. He placed the blame for the debacle over Article 61c squarely on Bremer--who, Othman claimed, had coddled the council's Shiite bloc early on, encouraging its members to become intransigent. "It's a humiliation to him," he told me, with faint satisfaction. "He gave them that leverage, coming and going, and it was very bad."
I asked Othman if the occupation was a failure. "It's not a success, either security-wise or media-wise or economic-wise," he said. "But I can't say it's a failure." He believed that most Iraqis still hoped for a decent life and a better society. In fact, Othman declared, going further than most observers would, "if things are set right, I think liberalism and secularism have the majority in this country always. But are the people now free to express their points of view? They are not. Because the country now is ruled by militias, mullahs, and warlords. The simple citizen is not allowed to have his own rights, to say freely what he wants." In one way, he added, the Americans were like Saddam: "They are not caring much for a simple Iraqi citizen. They care for a chief of a tribe here, a mullah there, a religious man here, a militiaman here, head of a party there."
As the June 30th deadline approaches, with no Iraqi interim government in sight, the United States has turned reluctantly to the United Nations. Until recently, Washington consistently prevented the U.N. from establishing any real authority in Iraq (the words "United Nations" appear nowhere in the November 15th agreement). But the Administration now finds that the C.P.A. and the Governing Council have so little legitimacy in the eyes of most Iraqis--including Ayatollah Sistani--that the transfer of sovereignty can't occur without outside help. Enter Lakhdar Brahimi, the U.N.'s envoy to Iraq, and an Algerian diplomat who was Secretary-General Kofi Annan's representative in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. In April, Brahimi and his team travelled to Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra to meet with groups of Iraqis and begin preparations for an interim government. The senior Administration official told me, "Brahimi has identified--unlike the ivory-tower C.P.A.--a lot of passionate, talented Iraqis who want the same things we want: freedom, democracy, liberty."
Fairly quickly, Brahimi concluded that the Governing Council should not be part of the new Iraqi government. "The Governing Council in its current constitution doesn't have the confidence of most Iraqis," his spokesman, Ahmed Fawzi, told me. At the end of April, Brahimi briefed the U.N. Security Council, in New York; he called for a caretaker government of technocrats, whose main purpose will be to prepare the country for elections by January, 2005. "We are reaching out to the professional associations, the trade unions, the universities, and asking them to give us the best of their crop," Fawzi said. "The best five lawyers, the best five doctors, the best five accountants, the best five engineers, to form a short list acceptable to all for a short-term interim government." A Prime Minister and a cabinet will be chosen by Brahimi, Bremer, and the Governing Council by the end of May. It seems inevitable that some of Iraq's leading politicians, including members of the Governing Council, will end up with positions in the interim government, though this will surely be the subject of intense negotiations between rival factions. Brahimi, who oversaw Afghanistan's loya jirga, imagines Iraqis from all sectors of society gathering in a national conference soon after June 30th to choose an advisory body, or rump parliament. The conference could be the first chance for ordinary Iraqis to feel that they have a stake in the country's political future.
It's not clear that a U.S. Administration with a history of pronounced hostility to the U.N. will relinquish real authority in Iraq to it, even now. The senior official said, "There are people in this Administration who have led me to believe that the U.N. is a greater clear and present danger to the United States than any foreign enemy, including Osama bin Laden." Robert Blackwill, a director at the National Security Council, will be Washington's point man in the process; according to the senior official, Blackwill will keep the pressure on Bremer to accept Brahimi's recommendations. Will the U.N., for its part, having been so badly undermined by the Administration on Iraq, return in force now, when things are going so poorly? "Kofi's going to have a really hard time looking at this and saying, `Do I want a piece of this?'" the senior official said.
Annan and Brahimi, perhaps sensing that the U.N. is being set up to take the fall for what is bound to be an unstable, tumultuous period before elections, have tried to lower expectations about the organization's role in Iraq. Brahimi cannot answer some of the most important questions about the transition--such as how extensive Iraqi sovereignty will be, and what the relationship will be between the interim government and the U.S. military. Ahmed Fawzi expressed the hope that a sovereign Iraqi government will take the steam out of the insurgency. In the meantime, another U.N. official told me, the security situation in Iraq is so perilous that "it's going to be very difficult for any full-scale engagement of the U.N. in Iraq for the next couple of months." He added, "We're expected to take the lead--and we're not the lead. We're helping to do what we can. But the political reality is that the Americans are the biggest player in Iraq, and they're going to be before and after June 30th."
The only good reason left for the invasion of Iraq, and for an ongoing war involving a hundred and thirty-five thousand American troops, is the creation of a decent Iraqi government. The National Democratic Institute is an organization funded largely by the U.S. government and affiliated with the Democratic Party; it operates with relative independence, under the direction of the National Endowment for Democracy. The institute's purpose is to find what Mahmoud Othman called "the simple citizens" in a place like Iraq, and help them to participate in democratic political life. This tends to be obscure, poorly funded work--but the Bush Administration wants to pour half a billion dollars into Iraq for "democracy-building" programs before the transfer of sovereignty and national elections. The effort is floundering, however, because the escalation of violence has made it hard to spend the money.
Early one morning in mid-March, I drove to Hilla, which is ninety minutes south of Baghdad, with a group of Iraqis and Americans working for N.D.I. We travelled in non-armored vehicles, without guards. In the back seat of one of the sedans, wearing a navy-blue suit, a salmon-colored tie, and glasses, was David Dettman, a pale, chain-smoking political consultant from Ohio. For many years, Dettman, who is thirty-three and has the nervous, self-deprecating sense of humor of a Jack Lemmon character, worked successfully as a campaign consultant in Washington. Then he ran for the Ohio state legislature as a Democrat, got creamed, and had an epiphany. "What got me charged up is that I really believed in the process," he told me. He decided to leave his job, and he became one of N.D.I.'s democratization missionaries, posted in Ukraine. To the dismay of his wife, his mother, and his boss, Dettman had come to Iraq for two weeks to train groups of aspiring political-party activists in Baghdad, Tikrit, and Hilla.
The workshop in Hilla took place in the city's former secret-police headquarters, which has become a human-rights center. Forty Iraqis--including a political-science professor and an unemployed sports instructor--had travelled at some risk to attend the class. They listened intently and took careful notes as Dettman stood before a flip chart and presented a ten-step program on message development and voter contact. Mayasa al-Naimy, an Iraqi staff member of N.D.I., gamely translated the exotic campaign terminology: "earned media," "communications strategy," "wedge and base issues." (Dettman had told me earlier, "Politics is the art of getting people to vote for you. It's applicable all over the world. If it wasn't, I wouldn't have a job.")
After two hours of discussion, an Iraqi raised his hand. "This shows me we're making a transition from dictatorship to democracy," he said. "That makes me feel good. But this is the question: Will the American Administration leave it to us? Or just throw someone on us? Will all these efforts be lost?"
Outside, in the distance, there was an explosion--mortar fire--and then a second, closer one, which was followed by gunfire. Dettman glanced out the window and grinned with alarm.
"Does that answer your question?" someone asked.
"I'm not the government," Dettman said. "I'm N.D.I. We have to eat lunch. Can we talk about this later?"
After lunch, Dettman returned to the question. "My opinion is if America invaded Iraq for nothing other than to have a friendly dictator, then all of the American and Iraqi lives that were lost will have been wasted," he said. "I supported the invasion because I'm in the democratization business. I don't know anything about W.M.D.--I don't know if anyone was telling the truth or not--but I do know the Iraqi people deserve freedom. I can't say the Americans won't do anything wrong, because they already have done many things wrong in this occupation. And I'm sorry. But there's a reason N.D.I. is here now, and there's a reason we didn't bring a tank. We're the least armed Americans in Hilla. We're here trusting your hospitality. Because democracy is good and right." He went on, "If this traumatic war was fought for anything other than that, I'm gonna be mad. Here's the problem: I can't do much. I'm just the arrogant American in a suit standing up in front of you. I haven't suffered as much as you have. Only you can build democracy here. But if I just thought America was going to steal the freedom we fought for I would have stayed home with my wife and had a lovely time."
"Aren't you having a lovely time here?" someone asked.
"I am having a lovely time. But I miss my wife."
It was a heartfelt speech, and it was received with scattered applause. Then a man sitting near me muttered to himself, "A British guy named Hempher laid plans decades ago for Presidents to take turns ruling Iraq."
The people in the room belonged to Shaker's "middle level of mind." They were neither mullahs nor militiamen, and some of the parties they belonged to counted no more than several hundred members. One of the participants was Jawdet al-Obeidi, a former Army officer from Hilla. He fled Iraq after taking part in the Shiite uprising in 1991, and ended up in Portland, Oregon. He started a small limousine company there, and last year he sold it and returned to Iraq, as a member of a militia aligned with the U.S. invasion force. Since then, Obeidi has poured a hundred and fifty thousand dollars of his savings into building a coalition of almost two hundred small political parties that can challenge the larger parties in parliamentary elections. (Already, there are some three hundred political parties in Iraq.) The coalition's platform combines a moderate Muslim agenda with Iraqi nationalism and a respect for individual rights--a deliberately mild mixture that seems designed to have broad support. Obeidi, a balding, middle-aged man with a salesman's cheerfulness, has received death threats, and his brother-in-law survived three bullets in the head.
Also at the meeting was a married couple from Mahawil, a village of dirt roads and salt marshes near Hilla: Emad Dawood, who worked in a shop selling construction materials, and his wife, Saad, who had received a business degree in Baghdad but was unable to find work, and was now raising their three children. She was one of only three women at the meeting; like the others, she wore a hijab.
Her husband explained to me, "We go everywhere together."
"Any educated couple would do this," Saad said.
"Of course, we have religion, and we go by the rules," Emad added. "The Islamic religion doesn't say women can't mix with other men, but everything has to do with limits."
Saad pointed out that Islam doesn't deny women the right to participate in politics: "They should have a role in everything."
In Hilla, the repression of the 1991 Shiite uprising was particularly brutal, and, last year, mass graves containing thousands of victims were uncovered on the periphery of the town. Saad and Emad had each lost a brother, and many friends. The couple had only the vaguest notion of what was in Iraq's new interim constitution, but they knew very well what it was like to live under Saddam. "It's like a hammer on your head every day," Emad said, "and then they take it away."
The Dawoods had once seen the Americans as heroic liberators, but the feeling was short-lived. According to Emad, as the occupation ground on, with constant power outages and rampant crime, ordinary unhappiness was turning into a kind of insanity. "Things are just getting worse here," Saad added. "Of course, if there was democracy things would change."
"But democracy needs a long period of time, because we've been living so long under Saddam," Emad said.
"Most people do not get the idea of democracy," Saad said. "Ask anybody about democracy, and you'd find most people would say, `What am I going to do with democracy? Give me security first.'"
Emad told me, "I know a guy who shot two bullets at random. He said, `Isn't this freedom?'"
As for Dettman's presentation, it clearly meant something to this couple that Americans had come to meet with them in Hilla. Dettman had given them a lot of helpful information, they felt. Their only complaint was that there was no exam at the end, to test how much they'd learned about democracy.
The failures of the occupation and the violence of the insurgency have stranded moderate Iraqis like those who attended the meeting in Hilla. Lakhdar Brahimi wants to bring such Iraqis onto the national political stage, but, considering the disproportionate power of groups represented on the Governing Council and backed by foreign states, the chances for success are poor. Marina Ottaway, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me that, after the fall of dictatorships, "you always have a lot of political parties forming, and they never get anywhere." N.D.I., she concluded, is "bravely doing something that is completely futile."
Of course, electoral success isn't the only measure of what organizations like N.D.I. are trying to do. In Hilla, it felt like an achievement simply to hold a discussion, amid gunfire, about democracy, in which there was a genuine give-and-take between Iraqis and foreigners. The fact that Hempher, the supposed British spy blamed for so much trouble in the Muslim world, was invoked at the Hilla workshop was a less hopeful sign. The Americans' mistakes in Iraq have been only part of the story of disappointment. Many Iraqis--damaged beyond imagining by the cruelty of Saddam's rule, and afflicted with outsized expectations and suspicions of America--have fallen back on aspects of their culture and faith that offer a blind resistance to the new world that has been thrown open before them. In the past year, Iraq has undergone not just a war but a revolution. It's no wonder that Iraqis have responded not only with hope but with confusion, rage, and despair; the wonder is that Americans expected anything else.
We left Hilla just before dark, and set out for Baghdad. An hour later, on a nearby road, three people--an American woman working with Iraqi women's groups, a C.P.A. press officer, and their Iraqi translator--were ambushed and shot to death by men wearing Iraqi police uniforms. It was the start of a wave of attacks on foreign civilians and the Iraqis who worked with them. The violence had still not subsided by early May, and most of the non-governmental groups and contractors working for democracy in Iraq had evacuated their foreign employees. Les Campbell, the Middle East director of N.D.I., recently told me that the organization's foreign staff was in Amman, Jordan, waiting for the violence to diminish before returning to Baghdad, where the Iraqi staff continues to work. Meanwhile, Campbell is talking with private security firms, and looking for the right armored car.
He has not lost his optimism altogether. "Even with all the problems in Iraq, there is already far more civil-society space and party organizing than in any other Arab country," he said. He described how N.D.I.'s Iraqi staff members, such as Mayasa al-Naimy, have begun to blossom intellectually. "Even in the midst of the killings, which are terrible, and even though the planning and administration continue to be a joke, something interesting is going on here," Campbell said. "It makes me sort of sick to think it might not work."
Three days after the trip to Hilla, I paid another visit to Dr. Shaker at his house in Sadr City. His brother Samir had just come back from a demonstration against the interim constitution, led by one of Moqtada al-Sadr's top aides, in Firdus Square, the same spot where Saddam's statue was pulled down a year ago. "The Kurds have more rights than the others," Samir said. "They can veto anything we decide, but we don't have the right to veto."
Ali had watched a Shiite politician on television who said that Arabs could refuse the Kurds' demands for federalism. "We don't know anything about the constitution," Ali said. "It was written, handed over to the Governing Council to sign, and then shown to the people, who never saw it before."
As for Shaker, the controversy filled him with foreboding. He doubted that Iraq would remain intact. The Shia, the Kurds, and the Sunnis had agendas that could never be reconciled. "The story will be like Lebanon," Shaker told me. "A civil war."
Arab against Kurd? "A strong possibility." Shiite against Sunni? "It's a possibility," he said. "The constitution will be the starting point, and then the event will be gradually increased." I asked if he envisioned rival armies fighting each other. "That is how I imagine it," he said. But, the likeliest scenario of all, he added, was a civil war among his own people, the Shia.
It was my last visit to the house. Afterward, neighbors belonging to Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army warned Shaker against having any more American visitors.
It was a few weeks later, on March 28th, that Moqtada's uprising began, and Sadr City exploded in days and nights of firefights between militiamen and American soldiers. I spoke with the doctor by phone. He had spent days trapped at home, unable to go to the morgue, while the uprising continued. Twelve of his friends in the neighborhood had died in crossfire. His brothers, Ali and Samir, wanted to join the Mahdi Army and fight the Americans, but he had stopped them. The scale of the violence shocked him, but not its outbreak, which he had seen coming. The bravery of the young militiamen, standing up to tanks with small arms, impressed him, and though he deplored their tactics, he sympathized with their goal--"real Islamic democracy."
Shaker said, "My idea of the situation now: the Americans are at the high level and Moqtada is down at the bottom, and they can't understand each other. They should be in the middle." He added, "The Americans have to use the political way. Bremer must be more diplomatic, more flexible. He needs to go through the middle level of mind--as I told you. He must speak to people like me."

FURIOUS BUSH DEMANDS TO SEE ALL PRISONER ABUSE PHOTOS, VIDEOS
**Exclusive**
A furious President Bush has demanded to see all photos and videos showing abuse of Iraq detainees, a senior White House source said late Sunday.
"The president was blindsided by the first TV images, he will not be blindsided again," the source, who demanded anonymity, explained to the DRUDGE REPORT.
The president has instructed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to present him with him all known images that could further deepen the crises.
Monday editions of the NEW YORKER feature photos of a dog attacking a naked Iraqi detainee at Abu Ghraib prison.
President Bush was aware of the photo, the top source claims.
The White House is preparing for more fallout, and leaks from lawmakers.
The Pentagon is considering the possibility of showing the unseen material to members of Congress.
"It's clear the moment the evidence is sent to the Congress, we will see a new feeding frenzy in the media."

Filed By Matt Drudge
Reports are moved when circumstances warrant
http://www.drudgereport.com for updates
(c)DRUDGE REPORT 2004
Not for reproduction without permission of the author
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Officials Grapple With How and When to Release Images
By THOM SHANKER

WASHINGTON, May 9 -- The Defense Department is planning to provide Congress with many more pictures of the abusive treatment of Iraqi detainees, but has not decided whether to release them to the public, Congressional leaders and Pentagon officials said Sunday.
In the end, President Bush is likely to make the determination on making the images public, aides said.
Inside the White House, several of Mr. Bush's aides have argued that he has little choice but to make them public. Sooner or later, they say, the images will leak out, prolonging the pain, fueling Iraqi and Arab suspicions of a Pentagon-orchestrated cover-up, and giving new life to calls for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's removal.
Many in the Pentagon, though, are resisting. Pentagon officials warned that a public release could jeopardize its criminal inquiry. They theorized that defense lawyers could cite a governmental release in motions to dismiss charges, arguing that their clients could not get a fair hearing. So far, seven soldiers are facing charges related to abuse of Iraqi detainees.
In meetings this weekend, officials who took part said, some senior military officials argued that releasing the pictures would only further inflame Iraqis, fuel the insurgency and make it nearly impossible to gain help from Arab allies. Moreover, the officials expressed fear in those meetings that any captured American soldiers would be placed at greater risk.
That argument broke out in public on Sunday when the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John W. Warner, Republican of Virginia, seemed to back keeping the images from public view, describing them as "of a classified nature" on the NBC News program "Meet the Press." He was immediately challenged by a fellow Republican, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, who shot back: "If there's a videotape out there, for God's sake let's talk about it, because men and women's lives are at stake, given how we handle this. So I want to get it all out on the table."
The Pentagon's chief spokesman, Larry Di Rita, confirmed that the Defense Department had been in discussions with Congress to find a way for members to view the photographs and videos. "We're looking for a mechanism to do that," Mr. Di Rita said.
One complication, he said, is that the Pentagon is not certain it has obtained all photographic and video material gathered as evidence in the case from military investigators in Iraq.
While pressure grew to push the images out for public review, the Pentagon was aware that such a decision could taint the criminal investigation.
On one hand, Mr. Di Rita said, is "an understandable desire for people to see and get a better sense of the range of activities that may be depicted in the photos." On the other, he noted, "is everybody's desire and obligation to be careful about not prejudicing an administrative review and criminal proceeding."
In an interview later Sunday, Mr. Graham, a colonel in the Air Force Reserve with 20 years' experience in the area of military justice, said: "We actually have an opportunity to prove to those who may still be open-minded that there is a difference between us and the Saddam Hussein regime. I really do believe that a lot of people are sort of checking under the hood of democracy to see if they want to be part of it."
He said the material was almost certain to become public eventually and that a "drip, drip" of damaging photos would only add to what he described as a public relations disaster. He said there might be a way to release the material and protect the investigation, but "at the end of the day there is a larger issue and this is of the credibility of the United States."
During back-to-back hearings on Friday on detainee abuse convened by the House and Senate, members from both parties warned that American troops in Iraq were less secure, and the United States was less secure, because the depraved acts of detainee abuse have so ignited world anger. Some members of Congress have called on Mr. Rumsfeld to resign.
Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, agreed that the public should view the images.
"It's best that this be seen for what it is," Senator Levin said. "Judgments then can be made by people. Any effort to hide this kind of material is just not going to work. We have an open society. We are proving it, I believe, by proceeding to investigate the way we are."
Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, who also serves on the Armed Services Committee, warned that scandals grow until information is released.
"Look, one thing I know about scandals: They go on and on and on until the American people feel they have a full and complete picture of what happened," Senator McCain said on "Fox News Sunday."
"And to hold back these pictures, or to hold back the videos and only show them to members of Congress or something like that, first, is foolish, because they'll leak out, but second of all, it is sending the wrong signal," he added.
But Senator McCain indicated that focusing on the images missed larger, more important questions, including whether the military police unit at Abu Ghraib, a notorious prison during the Hussein era, was acting on the specific orders of military intelligence to soften up detainees in advance of interrogation.
Senator Levin also warned that the degrading treatment of detainees might be "much more systemic than just a few guards abusing prisoners," and that it might have been part of a wider effort "to extract information from these prisoners."
"And this was part of a new intelligence policy which goes right on up to the Pentagon and perhaps even beyond," Senator Levin said.
He said that "some of the environment here was actually set at the White House when they said it was a bunch of legalisms to discuss whether or not the Geneva Conventions would apply to prisoners directly or whether they would be treated consistent with the Geneva Conventions or in the same way but not precisely."
This policy, Senator Levin said, was "splitting legal hairs about the application of Geneva Conventions, and it seems to me that sent exactly the wrong message to the intelligence people and to the guards themselves."

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company |

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CACI Defends Screening of Interrogators
By Ellen McCarthy
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A19


CACI International Inc. said yesterday that its interrogators were carefully screened and worked under the supervision of the U.S. military in Iraqi detention centers.
The Arlington government contractor, whose employee Steven Stefanowicz is implicated in an Army report on prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, said in a statement released yesterday that it reviewed 1,600 applications for interrogator positions and sent less than 3 percent on to the military for final approval.
The company also said all of its interrogators had secret clearances that required background investigations and the workers were briefed on military rules of engagement.The statement did not define the rules.
The military dictated "how CACI must operate in Iraq and included the required qualifications for interrogators and other allied specialties. The company has followed these instructions," the statement said.
Stefanowicz is cited in the report as one of four men who were either "directly or indirectly responsible" for the abuses at the prison near Baghdad.
The company has hired a law firm to conduct its own investigation of the allegations. It reiterated yesterday that none of its employees have been formally charged with wrongdoing and that the company was cooperating with the military's investigation of the abuses.
CACI's statement also supported Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's testimony before Congress last week that civilian contractors are "responsible to military intelligence who hire them, and have the responsibility for supervising them."
The firm again said it would take "appropriate action" against any employee found to have acted illegally. It also said its employees continue to perform a number of duties in Iraq, including interrogation services.
In an interview last night, CACI chief executive J.P. London said the company's contract with the military defined the terms of its service, including length of engagement and pricing. "It's pretty straight forward," he said. "We will provide services to the U.S. military. We don't provide supervisory services over anybody else. That's very clear."
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Analysts Say Iraqi Agencies Unlikely to Follow U.S. Rules

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A20
With less than two months before the Coalition Provisional Authority is to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi government, CPA administrator L. Paul Bremer III has been establishing rules for key agencies in the fields of intelligence, defense and the law that analysts say may not survive long because they reflect American rather than Middle Eastern values.
The new Iraqi intelligence service, which the CPA has created to replace Saddam Hussein's Mukhabarat, will not collect intelligence that helps or harms any "legal" political party or Iraqi government official, under an order Bremer signed April 1. Nor will the agency carry out covert activities against "any Iraqi citizen or group based on race, religion, sect, gender, language, origin or tribal affiliation," the order said.
In some cases, Bremer's orders go beyond U.S. government practices. For example, after the U.S.-led coalition transfers limited sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government June 30, officers in the new Iraqi armed forces will have to wait 18 months after resigning or retiring before they are permitted to hold any political office, under Bremer's order establishing the new Ministry of Defense.
"There is no chance at all that a follow-on government [in Baghdad] will observe these orders," said Patrick Lang, a retired colonel and former head of the Middle East division of the Defense Intelligence Agency. "They need to walk away from us."
"No one has any illusion that it all is going to last," said Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a specialist in the Middle East. He said Iraqis will reshape all the orders and ideas that Bremer's group is promulgating, no matter what is put down on paper.
"It makes perfect sense as attempts to lead into the future," Cordesman said, "but Americans need to understand we are just creating a climate for Iraqis . . . and it will be modified by them."
Lang agreed with Cordesman that the Iraqis will "adapt their government to their own traditions and culture."
"We can write all those things into law and it won't do any good," Lang said. "Saddam had a constitution with some of those same words, but none of it worked because they ignored it. That's their culture."
A poll of Iraqis taken in February found that only 42 percent of those surveyed understood that a transitional constitution had been approved, and that only half of that number understood that a constitution is "a nation's fundamental law," according to a recent Defense Department report.
Some of Bremer's orders are designed to keep military and intelligence officers out of the Iraqi political system to avoid having a new dictator emerge, as Hussein did 35 years ago. According to a Baghdad newspaper report, the newly named defense minister, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, and the director of the intelligence service, Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed Shehwani, have already moved into political activities, working behind the scenes to reach an understanding with Moqtada Sadr, the Shiite cleric leading an anti-coalition insurgency.
Juan Cole, a University of Michigan professor who specializes in Middle Eastern affairs, noted earlier this week that Allawi "clearly wants to build a future political career by bringing order to the country."
The Mukhabarat was a sort of hybrid of the FBI and CIA, and regularly surveilled, arrested, imprisoned, tortured and even killed both citizens and foreigners.
The new Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) "shall have no power to arrest or detain persons" under its charter, which supplemented Bremer's order. Instead, it will provide intelligence "to Iraqi law enforcement authorities not precluded by other law."
Under Bremer's order, the INIS will be headed by a director general named by the future prime minister and confirmed by the body vested with national legislative authority. The director general will serve for five years and "ensure that no information is obtained by the INIS except so far as necessary for the proper discharge of its responsibilities."
In conducting searches or wiretaps, INIS employees will "minimize the unintentional acquisition, retention and dissemination of information about citizens of Iraq that is not of value in its work on national security," its charter says. Warrants from a judge will be obtained in advance and will be operable for only 90 days, after which a renewal will be required.
Bremer's order setting up the new defense ministry includes a set of "principles" to be followed in its operation, including one that calls for the ministry to "play its full part in reinforcing national unity" and not be "used to foster or institutionalize disunity."
Another principle is that the armed forces act to gain the confidence of the Iraqi people by "acting in the country's interest" and "abiding by laws and telling the truth."
The new defense minister "shall exercise administrative control" over the Iraqi armed forces, but operational control will remain with the "command of coalition forces," under another order Bremer signed March 21.
Another order Bremer recently signed in effect gave legal protection, after the transfer of sovereignty, to U.S. and other coalition military forces. It said the Central Criminal Court authorities "shall not compel" foreign military forces to appear if they are in Iraq "in support of operations sanctioned by a U.N. Security Council resolution."
Normally such protection is included in a status-of-forces agreement signed between governments.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company



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Iraq Oil Exports Cut by Pipeline Sabotage

BAGHDAD (Reuters) - A sabotage attack against a southern pipeline has reduced Iraq (news - web sites)'s oil exports sharply, the South Oil Company President said on Monday.
"The situation is not good," Jabar al-Leaby told Reuters, but declined to say how much oil was still being exported.
Leaby said the attack affected flows to the Basra terminal, the export point for most of Iraq's 1.8 million barrels per day of overseas sales -- and the country's only means of earning foreign currency.
The attack came around two weeks after Western forces occupying southern Iraq foiled suicide boat attacks on oil tankers at the Basra terminal.
Violence has intensified in southern Iraq in recent weeks after occupying forces cracked down on followers of Shi'ite leader Moqtada al-Sadr.
(Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Baghdad newsroom)




SUDAN
Algerian bullets
Late last month, an Ilyushin-76 aircraft with clear Algerian air force markings unloaded ten tonnes of ammunition at Ab?ch? airport, 170 kilometres from Chad's border with Sudan, say Western diplomatic sources. Did President Idriss D?by swap Algerian Islamists for support for his fellow Zaghawa fighting Sudan's Islamist regime?


ZIMBABWE
Disappearing food
The government may turn away food aid as part of its ruthless election strategy
An internal United Nations' memorandum describes Zimbabwe's latest crop projections as 'complete nonsense' and 'quite impossible.' That's no surprise. Fanciful agricultural forecasts are common in Agriculture Minister Joseph Made's department but these particular projections are critical. The forecasts were used to justify the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front government's decision to turn down food aid this year. At a meeting on 30 March, a Ministry official claimed that the harvest would be 1.7 million tonnes, an impossibly big figure.
The following day, Minister of Labour Paul Mangwana met UN officials and diplomats, reiterated the figures and emphasised that the government had asked the UN to keep food aid out of the humanitarian assistance appeal. Yet the current debate within ZANU-PF shows that there are still practical constraints. Periodic fuel shortages and scarcity of spare parts limit the government's ability to move the food quickly to wherever it can win most votes. So a ruthless campaign to benefit from shutting out foreign food aid could still work against the ruling party. Politicians will lose votes if the gamble goes wrong; hungry Zimbabweans may lose their lives.


KENYA
Kibaki's crowded diary
The President has to take some tough decisions to rescue the coalition government
The next six months will be critical for President Mwai Kibaki and for the future of his National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government. After almost 18 months of power, NARC's standing with Kenyans has plummeted as partisan squabbling has overshadowed the government's efforts at economic revival and the promised creation of 500,000 jobs a year (AC Vol 45 No 4). After reopening parliament last month, Kibaki has attempted to assert the authority of the presidency. He has brokered a truce between rival wings of the ruling coalition, but the deal-making has just bought time before difficult decisions are made in the coming months. The key issues are: 1)constitutional reform; 2)political party reorganisation; 3)cabinet reshuffle; 4)the anti-corruption campaign; 5)civil service retrenchment; 6)drawing down IMF and World Bank credits; and 7)tackling security
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Rumsfeld Should Stay
By WILLIAM SAFIRE

WASHINGTON -- Donald Rumsfeld has been designated by Democratic politicians as the scapegoat for the scandal at Abu Ghraib prison. But any resignation would only whet their appetite to cut and run. The highly effective defense secretary owes it to the nation's war on terror to soldier on.
Because today's column will generate apoplectic e-mail, a word about contrarian opinion: Shortly after 9/11, with the nation gripped by fear and fury, the Bush White House issued a sweeping and popular order to crack down on suspected terrorists. The liberal establishment largely fell cravenly mute. A few lonely civil libertarians spoke out. When I used the word "dictatorial," conservatives, both neo- and paleo-, derided my condemnation as "hysterical."
One Bush cabinet member paid attention. Rumsfeld appointed a bipartisan panel of attorneys to re-examine that draconian edict. As a result, basic protections for the accused Qaeda combatants were included in the proposed military tribunals.
Perhaps because of those protections, the tribunals never got off the ground. (The Supreme Court will soon, I hope, provide similar legal rights to suspected terrorists who are U.S. citizens.) But in the panic of the winter of 2001, Rumsfeld was one of the few in power concerned about prisoners' rights. Some now demanding his scalp then supported the repressive Patriot Act.
In last week's apology before the Senate, Rumsfeld assumed ultimate responsibility, as J.F.K. did after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Pentagon chief failed to foresee and warn the president of the danger lurking in the Army's public announcement in January of its criminal investigation into prisoner abuse. He failed to put the nation's reputation ahead of the regulation prohibiting "command influence" in criminal investigations, which protects the accused in courts-martial.
The secretary testified that he was, incredibly, the last to see the humiliating photos that turned a damning army critique by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba into a media firestorm. Why nobody searched out and showed him those incendiary pictures immediately reveals sheer stupidity on the part of the command structure and his Pentagon staff.
But then Senator Mark Dayton of Minnesota rudely badgered the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Richard Myers, repeatedly hurling the word "suppression" at him. General Myers had been trying to save the lives of troops by persuading CBS to delay its broadcast of pictures that would inflame resistance. Rumsfeld quieted the sound-bite-hungry politician by reminding him that requests to delay life-threatening reports were part of long military-media tradition.
This was scandal with no cover-up; the wheels of investigation and prosecution were grinding, with public exposure certain. Second only to the failure to prevent torture was the Pentagon's failure to be first to break the bad news: the Taguba report should have been released at a Rumsfeld press conference months ago.
Now every suspect ever held in any U.S. facility will claim to have been tortured and demand recompense. Videos real and fake will stream across the world's screens, and propagandists abroad will join defeatists here in calling American prisons a "gulag," gleefully equating Bush not just with Saddam but with Stalin.
Torture is both unlawful and morally abhorrent. But what about gathering intelligence from suspected or proven terrorists by codified, regulated, manipulative interrogation? Information thus acquired can save thousands of lives. Will we now allow the pendulum to swing back to "name, rank, serial number," as if suspected terrorists planning the bombing of civilians were uniformed prisoners of war obeying the rules of war?
The United States shows the world its values by investigating and prosecuting wrongdoers high and low. It is not in our political value system to scapegoat a good man for the depraved acts of others. Nor does it make strategic sense to remove a war leader in the vain hope of appeasing critics of the war.
This secretary of defense, who has the strong support of the president, is both effective and symbolic. If he were to quit under political fire, pressure would mount for America to quit under insurgent fire. Hang in there, Rummy! You have a duty to serve in our "long, hard slog."
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company

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Analysis: Withdrawal on the cards?

By Paul Reynolds
BBC News Online world affairs correspondent

Events in Iraq have been spinning out of control - and out of control of the spinners - so fast on so many fronts that the W word - withdrawal - is now being mentioned.
Charles Heyman, senior defence analyst for Jane's Consultancy Group, wrote in the London Times on Monday:
"It begins to look as though there is going to be a rather messy political solution to the whole affair, possibly brokered by the United Nations.
"Expect to see an agreement where both sides can claim some sort of a victory, followed by a rather hasty withdrawal of coalition troops at some stage in the next six months."
It is certainly true that on three fronts the coalition is not doing too well:
On the military, the insurgency has clearly spread from the few "former regime elements" and "foreign fighters" whom coalition spokesmen regularly blame.
Will the interim government be able to command the loyalty of Iraqis to a sufficient degree to bring the insurgency under control?
And the ability of the coalition to impose its own solutions has slipped away.
The bizarre situation in Falluja is a prime example of this.
The sight of former Republican Guard General Jasim Saleh appearing on the scene in his chauffeur-driven Mercedes and his old uniform to negotiate a security role for himself could hardly have contradicted the coalition's original aim of driving out the fighters from Falluja more vividly.
And what has happened to Moqtada Sadr, the fiery young Muslim leader, who, we were told, was going to be brought to justice on a murder charge? Not much, it seems.
The propaganda war could not have gone worse with the publication of the photos of prisoner abuse.
Whatever the origin of some of these photos, the damage has been done on the street.
The pictures highlight the problem that the coalition, having failed to make the case for going to war over the elusive weapons issue, is now failing to make its second case - the moral argument that it can bring the rule of law to a land without law.
The third problem is political.
There is now only May and June to go before the handover of "sovereignty" to an interim government.
Yet this government will have no power. It will be able to make no new laws or change any law previously decreed by the Coalition Provisional Authority.
It will also have very limited powers over the occupation troops, to be renamed the multi-national force.
So will it be able to command the loyalty of Iraqis to a sufficient degree to bring the insurgency under control?
Tug of war
Against the gloomy predictions, one has to say that the will of the soon-to-be-appointed Iraqi Interim Government and that of the United States and the UK to see this through should not be underestimated.
And there is always a risk that the herd instinct of journalists and commentators often predicts one thing while events produce another.
Christopher Hitchens, the gadfly journalist who has been one of the war's great supporters, writes acerbically of his fellow hacks in Slate magazine:
"It's now fairly obvious that those who cover Iraq have placed their bets on a fiasco or 'quagmire'."
He is still hoping for an eventual settlement in Iraq, which might go democracy's way:
"There are vast numbers of Iraqis - as we know from the leaflets distributed in Najaf, and the blogs from Baghdad, and from the hundreds of thousands who are exercising their right of return to the country - who do not wish to live under the rule of demented mullahs. The pulse and heart rate of the society have barely had a chance to register."
The problem is that a year after the invasion, there are still no plans for an election before the end of this year and therefore the "chance to register" for all those moderates is still not available.
The whole idea was based on the belief that, as in Germany and Japan after the war, resistance would collapse and that the task of building institutions could therefore be given time.
It is instructive, for example, that even at this stage in Iraq, the drawing up of voting lists is only just being examined.
Time, as it turned out, has not been on the coalition's side and the race between chaos and stability is still on.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3681289.stm
Published: 2004/05/03 19:15:23 GMT
? BBC MMIV


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Daniel Pearl 'refused to be sedated before his throat was cut'
By Massoud Ansari in Karachi
(Filed: 09/05/2004)


Horrifying new details of how Daniel Pearl, the murdered Wall Street Journal reporter, met his death have emerged from the interrogation of new suspects by Pakistani police.
Pearl, who was kidnapped in Karachi in January 2002, knew for several hours that he was about to be killed, but resisted repeated attempts to sedate him, police now believe.
He was fully aware of what was happening when the Arab extremists who took control during his final days cut his throat, according to information gleaned from Pakistani militants now in police custody.
Shocking video film of Pearl's murder, seen around the world via the internet, was in fact a partial reconstruction of what had happened a few moments earlier, officers have been told.
The camera operator made a mistake and missed the moment of his death, which his murderers then re-enacted, before decapitating the reporter.
The revelations have fuelled anger among police investigators that at least a dozen leading suspects in the kidnap and murder of the 38-year-old journalist have been arrested, but have not been charged or tried in connection with his death.
Some have been accused of unrelated - and mostly lesser - offences. The three most recently captured suspects have not yet been charged, and their arrests have never been officially announced.
The only cases brought so far in connection with Pearl's death have been those against Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the British-born al-Qaeda terrorist, who was convicted of kidnap and conspiracy to murder the American journalist, and three others who played relatively minor roles in the kidnapping.
All were given life sentences for conspiracy to kidnap, but are now appealing against their convictions in the country's high court. Pakistani authorities are said to be reluctant to put the new suspects on trial lest their evidence helps the first four win their appeals.
A legal official said: "No matter what Sheikh is guilty of, if the police were forced to change their account of what happened because of newfound evidence, he might be given the benefit of the doubt on everything else, and be set free immediately."
Omar Sheikh, the mastermind of the kidnapping, set the trap which lured Pearl to his captors. He put the reporter in touch with a man who, he pretended, would introduce him to an extremist Muslim leader whom Pearl wished to interview.
Contrary to evidence given during Omar Sheikh's trial, police now believe he may not have been present when Pearl met Sajid Jabbar, the go-between, at a Karachi restaurant. It was after the meeting that Pearl disappeared.
Investigators say that senior officials in the Sindh police - the force responsible for Karachi - are "petrified" that if militants arrested in the past year were tried for their part in Pearl's murder, their earlier case against Omar Sheikh might unravel in the courts.
One official close to the investigation said: "Even if these men have admitted their roles in the kidnapping and killing of Daniel Pearl, we simply cannot charge them because of its impact on that earlier case."
Police have pieced together new details of how Pearl was held in captivity for two weeks, and eventually killed, from those involved - including two who witnessed his final hours.
Many of the details were unknown even to Mariane Pearl, the reporter's widow, who wrote a moving memoir about his death, A Mighty Heart.
They now believe that Pearl was not forcibly abducted from the restaurant, but at first went willingly with Sajid in his car, while four other militants followed. He was driven to the house on the outskirts of Karachi where he was to be held and killed.
There, four others who would guard Pearl dragged him inside at gun-point, tying his hands and blindfolding him. "Even at this point, Pearl didn't realise that he was already in trouble, and kept asking why they were behaving like this," one of those in custody told police.
He was held for two weeks before he was killed but made at least one escape attempt - according to the arrested men, just three days before he was murdered.
"He tried to scale the wall but couldn't do it because both his hands were tied," one told police. His captors said that Pearl had difficulty sleeping.
They brought him English-language newspapers and magazines to help him pass the time and let him exercise inside the room.
His efforts to converse with his captors were limited since they could speak only broken English. However, one said: "He made clear that he was a Jew and his wife a Buddhist. He used to imitate the way she prayed, and sing hymns and songs whenever he thought about her."
Eventually, Saud Memon, who is believed to be al-Qaeda's chief financier in Pakistan and owned the house where Pearl was held, contacted a group of Arab extremists who took over custody and decided he would be killed.
Armed with a video camera, three Arabs arrived, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, third-in-command of al-Qaeda - since handed over to the Americans.
For the first time, police have now identified the others as Abdul Rahman and Nasrullah - both Kuwaiti nationals fluent in Arabic, Balochi and Persian. Authorities are still searching for them.
On the day Pearl died, two of his Pakistani guards were present: Ali Khan, arrested just two weeks ago, and Fazal Karim, an employee of Saud Memon. One recently told interrogators how the Arabs tried to sedate Pearl, first by injection, then by doctoring his tea.
"I think he understood that he was going to be killed and refused to accept tea or to gulp pills. He even did not allow himself to be injected."
Before he was murdered, they forced him to relate his Jewish background and express sympathy with detainees in Guantanamo Bay before putting the knife to his throat once - and then again, a second time, owing to the faulty camera.
One of those present told police: "When they were slaughtering him in front of me I thought it was a bad dream. I had seen the cutting of a goat or chicken many times, but had never seen a human being slaughtered in front me."
Karim is among those who have been arrested and jailed for other crimes: narcotics smuggling, in his case. Investigators fear that Khan will also escape prosecution for his part in Pearl's capture and death.
Five others who took part in Pearl's capture or guarded him are behind bars for their part in unrelated sectarian killings, and Pakistani authorities have no plans to press charges related to Pearl. Authorities have yet to reveal publicly that they are holding three of the suspects: Khan, Naeem Bokhari and Faisal Bhatti.
Last night members of Pearl's family said they wanted all those involved in the journalist's death brought to book, and urged Pakistani authorities to hasten the hearing of Omar Sheikh's appeal.
In a statement to The Sunday Telegraph, Mariane Pearl and her parents-in-law, Ruth and Judea Pearl, said: "We are eager to see justice served and the truth come out. We are especially waiting to see a just conclusion of Omar Saeed Sheikh's conviction and the apprehension of all those involved."
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Chavez foils 'assassination plot'
By James Menendez
BBC correspondent in Caracas
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez says his forces have captured a group of about 50 Colombian paramilitaries who were plotting to kill or overthrow him.
According to Mr Chavez, the men had been trained by Venezuela's political opposition.
Opposition leaders say the claim is a crude attempt to discredit them.
The controversy comes at a time of rising political tension in Venezuela, with the opposition hoping to unseat Mr Chavez in a referendum.
In a few weeks' time President Chavez will find out whether his opponents have gathered enough support to hold the referendum against him and possibly force him from office.
Dawn raid
The government says 56 Colombians were arrested in a dawn raid at a farm on the outskirts of the capital, Caracas.
State television has been showing pictures of armed police guarding groups of young men dressed in green camouflage.
It has also shown what appears to be a camp complete with sleeping quarters and cooking facilities.
Security officials say the men were using the camp to plan an attack on a military installation in Caracas.
They say the farm belongs to a Cuban exile with close links to Venezuela's opposition.
According to President Chavez, the discovery is clear evidence that his opponents are trying to assassinate him.
That claim brought a swift denial from opposition leaders who dismiss the raid as a publicity stunt designed to justify a security clampdown.
In Colombia the leader of the main paramilitary group has also denied any involvement.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3699245.stm
Published: 2004/05/09 22:11:14 GMT
? BBC MMIV
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Top Korean soldier held for fraud
The military authorities in South Korea have arrested their top officer on the Korea-US Combined Forces Command on charges of embezzling army funds.
Shin Il-soon, a 57-year-old four-star general, was detained at a military jail after three days of interrogation by investigators.
Gen Shin denies the charges, saying the money missing was used for official parties and other army-related events.
He is the first serving general of his rank to be arrested for corruption.
He is second-in-command on the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to US Gen Leon LaPorte, who also commands the US military in South Korea and the UN Command overseeing the Korean War armistice.
The CFC is charged with defending South Korea against foreign attack and has nearly 700,000 Korean soldiers and 37,000 US troops at its disposal, facing North Korea's million-strong forces.
An unnamed officer at the South Korean defence ministry told Reuters news agency that Gen Shin was facing embezzlement charges "but no bribery charges".
The agency's sources added that the charges date back to 2000 when the general commanded South Korea's Third Army.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3697585.stm
Published: 2004/05/09 05:23:52 GMT
? BBC MMIV
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Medicine against the odds in N Korea
By Sarah Buckley
BBC News Online
Aid workers who visited victims of last week's explosion in North Korea have spoken of doctors dealing with horrific injuries in very basic conditions.
But this is not surprising in a country with limited medical supplies; where doctors have been known to take the skin off their own legs to help burns patients.
Gerald Bourke and Richard Ragan of the World Food Programme said the People's Provincial Hospital in Sinuiju, near the Chinese border, was fairly clean and spacious but that equipment was scarce.
They said that of the 40 or 50 critically injured patients they saw, only two of them were on intravenous drips.
"We saw no modern equipment, nothing that could be plugged in," said Mr Bourke, the WFP's representative in Beijing, told BBC News Online.
"A lot of the patients had been stitched up, but the thread... was more like twine, it was very thick," he said.
"It shows these guys were probably operating in a hurry trying to stabilise people," said Mr Ragan, WFP country director of North Korea.
The victims were suffering from facial and eye injuries, internal injuries and broken or severed limbs.
Many had lost the sight in one eye, sometimes both; one woman had had both feet blown off.
"The faces of the kids were a mix of being burned and lacerated and several of the children had had the skin ripped off of them," Mr Ragan said.
He said the doctor in charge of the hospital, who was assisted by about 10-15 staff, was "very calm", given he was responsible for 360 emergency cases.
The doctor "said only 15 patients had died, and this was two days after the blast. So one could argue that they're pretty skilled physicians but are working with very limited supplies and equipment", Mr Ragan said.
Both Mr Bourke and Mr Ragan said that what struck them most was the "eerie silence" in the hospital.
There's an absence of almost everything except beds and doctors and patients and desire
Stephen Linton, EugeneBell Foundation
"A couple of the children were whimpering and moaning but most of them were lying stock still in their beds," said Mr Bourke.
The relatives of the injured children were also quiet, Mr Ragan said. He described the parents of one eight- or nine-year-old boy who were having to hold their son down to stop him having spasms.
"You could clearly see the father didn't know where to turn", he said.
The rudimentary conditions the WFP officials witnessed are typical of many North Korean general hospitals, according to Stephen Linton, founder of the EugeneBell Foundation, a US NGO that provides the country with medical supplies and treatment facilities.
"The medical people are very dedicated, but the problem is modern medicine is predicated on a river of supplies and equipment, and that river has dried to a trickle in North Korea.
"There's an absence of almost everything except beds and doctors and patients and desire," he said.
He said some doctors were forced to grow cotton to make bandages, or to whittle their own splints; virtually every hospital grew its own herbal medicines; and surgeons often took their tools home to sharpen them.
"Most doctors have lots of scars on their legs because they give grafts from their own skin", he said.
Mr Linton said the medical training programmes were of a similar length to those in Europe and every province has a medical school.
"Doctors are recommended to prioritise herbal medicine before the harder to obtain Western medicine," he said.
"They're very creative and hard working but everything that most people take for advantage is lacking," he said.
He said the conditions in the buildings were also very basic.
"They're not even often well-lit... some of them aren't heated.
"Patients wear their parkas in bed in the winter."
As a result, a lot of people received out-patient care because they could eat better and keep warmer at home.
"I don't know if medicine would be so popular in the West if (doctors) had to operate under the conditions in North Korea," he said.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3669141.stm
Published: 2004/04/29 10:54:44 GMT
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What if...? Kim's close call
Last week's devastating train blast in North Korea has refocused attention on the murky question of leader Kim Jong-il's successor.
Mr Kim is believed to have passed through the station in Ryongchon, which was devastated in the explosion, just hours before the incident.
If he had been seriously injured or killed, diplomats and analysts are not sure who would have taken his place as North Korea's "Dear Leader".
It is likely that in the first instance, the nominal head of state - Kim Yong-nam, the president of the Supreme People's Assembly - would have assumed power.
Kim Jong-il was travelling back from China with a sizeable entourage, including the chief of general staff of the army, Kim Yong-chun and Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju, according to state media. But the reports did not mention Kim Yong-nam.
KIM'S FAMILY
Kim has several children
His eldest son disgraced himself in Japan
Therefore, power may pass to a younger boy, Kim Jong-chul
Even if Kim Yong-nam had initially taken the reins, it is far from clear what would have happened next. The relationship between the military, party and Kim Jong-il's family is difficult to fathom.
There has only been one change of leadership in North Korea so far - from Kim Il-sung to his son Kim Jong-il - and that was put in motion several years before the elder Kim's death.
Kim Jong-il is himself believed to be grooming one of his sons as successor, but the candidates may be considered too young to assume power any time soon.
A recent BBC News Online investigation into the country's "first family" found that many analysts believed a serious contender was Kim Jong-chul, Kim Jong-il's oldest son by the woman thought to be his favourite consort.
But Kim Jong-chul, who works in the Party propaganda department - the same job that Kim Jong-il did when he was being groomed for succession by his father - is only in his early 20s.
A factor which may further complicate the succession question is the reported illness of Kim Jong-chul's mother, Ko Young-hee.
A former dancer in the state dance troupe, Ms Ko is currently reported to be receiving treatment in a Paris hospital, according to the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3658729.stm
Published: 2004/04/26 09:27:11 GMT
? BBC MMIV
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>> AHEM 1

U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposal Project Languishing


By Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A17
With much fanfare, the world's two nuclear superpowers announced in 1998 that they would destroy 68 tons of plutonium stripped from bombs and warheads. The cost, counted in billions, would be borne largely by the United States and European governments intent on removing dangerous fissile material from circulation.
Six years later, the project sits stalled. The plutonium remains intact, and no construction has begun on either of the planned processing factories. In frustration, some U.S. analysts and politicians are doubting the Bush administration's commitment.
This has happened because the United States and Russia have been unable to agree on who would pay if an accident -- or sabotage -- occurred in Russia. The Bush administration wants Russia to take full responsibility, and the Russians are balking.
The stalemate comes when the fear of nuclear terrorism is growing and President Bush is pledging aggressive action. Nuclear specialists and some members of Congress say the case highlights a failure by the White House to back up its nonproliferation ambitions with action.
"How a little issue of indemnification can hold this up is beyond me," Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.) told top Energy Department officials at a recent hearing. "This is a way to get rid of a huge chunk of nuclear-grade plutonium."
The project was blocked by "trivial negotiating issues," Domenici said. He added that he told the White House "that maybe they ought to put some bigger people in the position of negotiating." Plutonium is not easily obtained, but Russia is considered to be the site of the largest and most vulnerable stockpiles.
"It's a very messy, messy situation," said Kenneth Luongo, executive director of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. The project, he said, has been "in the works for a decade, and we haven't moved beyond the talking phase."
Agreements to build parallel plants in Siberia and South Carolina expired last year. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said in March that the administration hoped to resolve the issue by this spring and asserted that it "is being worked at high levels."
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld are among those who have raised the issue with their Russian counterparts. Despite intensive discussions within the administration in recent weeks, a White House official conceded that the issue is "one of those things that have been on the one-yard line a long time." Abraham reported in his annual budget request that construction was officially 10 months behind schedule but should begin by May 2005 if an agreement can be reached. He said money will be needed to start building the plants that convert plutonium into mixed oxide fuel for nuclear reactors.
"We are confident that we can work it out. We are not that far apart, believe it or not," said Paul M. Longsworth, deputy Energy Department administrator, who acknowledged that the positions remain "pretty firm right now."
"Plutonium disposition is a 20-year program that is going to eliminate enough plutonium to make far more than 10,000 nuclear weapons," Longsworth said. "You've got to start it right."
On Feb. 11, in a speech intended to amplify his record on nonproliferation and inspire other countries to do more, the president declared that governments around the world "must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical and biological and radiological materials."
A particular worry is that terrorist organizations or rogue states will buy or steal a nuclear weapon or the fissile material that powers an atomic blast. Many scientists and public policy experts believe that an organized group or government that acquires fissile material would have little trouble assembling a crude weapon.
To build an atomic bomb from 50-year-old technology would require about 13 pounds of plutonium, said Thomas Cochran, director of nuclear projects at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Libya, which recently abandoned its fledgling secret nuclear program, acquired a bomb design of that vintage from the illicit supply network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
U.S. government facilities are also vulnerable, the General Accounting Office said in a report released late last month. The Energy Department's responses to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were "not sufficient" to ensure that all of its sites are prepared "to defend themselves against the higher terrorist threat present in a post-Sept. 11 . . . world," the GAO said.
In Russia, basic security improvements have not been made at dozens of military installations where more than 60 percent of the country's plutonium and weapons-grade uranium is kept, the GAO warned last year.
GAO auditors blamed Russia for failing to allow U.S. officials to visit key sites but also said Congress and the Bush administration exacerbated the delays by denying critical funds or refusing to grant contract waivers. When the report came out, the United States had spent $6 billion since 1992 to help Russia destroy or safeguard nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
"The big problem is there's a leadership gap. These are not big obstacles. They can be handled by leaders who are determined and can be focused," said former U.S. senator Sam Nunn, who with Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) backed the vast counterproliferation program that bears their names.
The project to destroy 68 tons of plutonium -- half in Russia and half in the United States -- was designed as part of the cooperative project to reduce the risk of fissile material falling into the wrong hands. Announced during the Clinton administration, the program was formally launched during a presidential summit in Moscow in 1998.
Domenici, who helped direct $200 million to the project in its first year, attended the summit as President Bill Clinton's guest. He has been among the sharpest critics of the Bush administration's inability to keep the program on track.
The sticking point is the issue of liability for potentially catastrophic problems. In threat-reduction agreements signed in the mid-1990s, Russia agreed to take responsibility in return for help from foreign governments in disarming former Soviet nuclear weapons and improving security.
"If something blew, Russia would pay. No ifs, ands or buts," said Leonard S. Spector, director of the Washington office for the Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center for Nonproliferation Studies. But on the plutonium program and a project known as the Nuclear Cities Initiative, the Russians insisted that if U.S. contractors were to blame, they or the federal government should be liable for damages and possible prosecution.
Sabotage is a particular worry, the Russians told U.S. negotiators, who have been led by Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton.
"They kept saying, 'Hey, you can hire Chechen rebels under contract and they could blow up our facilities, and we would be powerless to prosecute,' " said an administration official closely involved in the issues, speaking on the condition of anonymity. "We said that's ridiculous. We don't hire people who will conduct sabotage."
The Bush administration is adamant that U.S. companies and officials are engaged in a goodwill effort and should not be held liable for unintended problems. The liability negotiations commanded attention at the 2002 summit of the world's most industrialized countries, which pledged $20 billion for 10 years of nonproliferation programs in Russia.
There is a disagreement within the administration, where sources said the Defense and State departments have demanded the more stringent liability provision, while the Energy Department believed that a somewhat less rigorous formula was sufficient.
"What you would have thought was an incidental legal issue looms so large," said Spector, who suggested sharing the burden, a structure established in the civilian nuclear power sector. "Everybody is frustrated that an additional hurdle is being presented that has to be overcome."
As the negotiations continue, the potential dangers remain, critics believe.
"The implications are that you're going to have 68 additional tons of weapons-grade plutonium lying around the United States and Russia," said Luongo, the nuclear security specialist. "And Russia, in particular, is where security is not up to global standards."

? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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>> AHEM 2...

Conservatives Restive About Bush Policies
Fresh Initiatives Sought On Iraq, Domestic Issues

By Dana Milbank and Jonathan Weisman
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A01
After three years of sweeping actions in both foreign and domestic affairs, the Bush administration is facing complaints from the conservative intelligentsia that it has lost its ability to produce fresh policies.
The centerpiece of President Bush's foreign policy -- the effort to transform Iraq into a peaceful democracy -- has been undermined by a deadly insurrection and broadcast photos of brutality by U.S. prison guards. On the domestic side, conservatives and former administration officials say the White House policy apparatus is moribund, with policies driven by political expediency or ideological pressure rather than by facts and expertise.
Conservatives have become unusually restive. Last Tuesday, columnist George F. Will sharply criticized the administration's Iraq policy, writing: "This administration cannot be trusted to govern if it cannot be counted on to think and, having thought, to have second thoughts." Two days earlier, Robert Kagan, a neoconservative supporter of the Iraq war, wrote: "All but the most blindly devoted Bush supporters can see that Bush administration officials have no clue about what to do in Iraq tomorrow, much less a month from now."
The complaints about Bush's Iraq policy are relatively new, but they are in some ways similar to long-standing criticism about Bush's domestic policies. In a book released earlier this year, former Bush Treasury secretary Paul H. O'Neill described Bush as "a blind man in a room full of deaf people" and said policymakers put politics before sound policy judgments.
Echoing a criticism leveled by former Bush aide John J. DiIulio Jr., who famously described "Mayberry Machiavellis" running the White House, O'Neill said "the biggest difference" between his time in government in the 1970s and in the Bush administration "is that our group was mostly about evidence and analysis, and Karl [Rove], Dick [Cheney], [Bush communications strategist] Karen [Hughes] and the gang seemed to be mostly about politics."
Michael Franc, vice president of the Heritage Foundation, said the criticism by O'Neill, Will and Kagan has a common thread: a concern that the administration is "using an old playbook" and not coming up with bold enough ideas, whether the subject is entitlement reform or pacifying Iraq. Conservative intellectuals "are saying, 'Don't do things half way,' " he said.
"It's the exhaustion of power," said a veteran of conservative think tanks who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Ideology has confronted reality, and ideology has bent. On the domestic side, it has bent in terms of the expansion of the government embodied in the Medicare prescription-drug law. On the foreign policy side, it has bent because of what has transpired in the last few weeks in Fallujah."
A Bush spokesman quarreled with that notion, saying there has been no let-up in Bush's policymaking. "We are marching ahead," said the spokesman, Trent Duffy, pointing to Bush's plans for community-college-based job training, space exploration and modernizing health records. "He's continuing to push the policies that have made the country better and stronger."
Part of the current perception of policy fatigue in the White House is a reflection of the political calendar: With a presidential election approaching, there is little possibility that the closely split Congress will enact serious legislation this year regardless of what the White House proposes. "It's a combination of how very challenging it is to move anything in the Senate these days, and it is an election year," said one former Bush aide, who like some of the conservatives interviewed for this article declined to be identified to avoid offending the White House.
But conservative policy experts and a number of former Bush administration officials say there are more systemic reasons for the policy sclerosis. For three years, the president pushed policies conceived during his 2000 campaign for the White House, but with most of those ideas either enacted or stalled, policymaking has run out of steam, they said.
Bush has also discouraged the sort of free-wheeling policy debates that characterized previous administrations, and he relies on a top-down management style that has little use for "wonks" in the federal bureaucracy. At the same time, many of the top domestic policy experts in the Bush White House have moved on to other jobs; in many cases they have been replaced by subordinates with much less experience in governing.
Bruce Bartlett, a conservative economist with the National Center for Policy Analysis, said policy ideas typically bubble up from experts deep inside federal agencies, who put together working groups, draft white papers, sell their wares in the marketplace of ideas and hope White House officials act on their suggestions. In this case, ideas are hatched in the White House, for political or ideological reasons, then are thrust on the bureaucracy, "not for analysis, but for sale," Bartlett said.
The result is a White House that has become unimaginative with domestic policy and, in foreign policy, has struggled to develop new policies to adapt to changing circumstances in Iraq, according to several conservatives.
"In Iraq, you don't see the thinking, 'Things have not happened as we had planned. What do we do now?' " said David Boaz, executive vice president of the libertarian Cato Institute, who last week organized a Cato forum entitled "The Triumph of the Hacks?"
Richard W. Rahn, a prominent Republican economist, excoriated the administration's telecommunications, antitrust and international economic policies in a Washington Times column April 30 along similar lines. "From the beginning of the Bush administration, sympathetic, experienced economists have warned its officials about the need to avoid some obvious mistakes," he wrote. "Unfortunately, these warnings have gone unheeded."
In an interview, Rahn said he has grown concerned over what he sees as "a lack of vision and policy consistency" in the Bush administration. "I mean, we knew where [President Ronald] Reagan was heading; at times there were deviations from the path, but we knew what it was all about," he said. In contrast, he said, now "there doesn't seem to be a clear policy vision."
Some attribute the policy lethargy to personnel changes, particularly on the domestic side. For example, three veterans of previous White Houses with lengthy experience in Washington have left their policymaking roles; their successors, though capable, have significantly less policymaking experience.
Joshua B. Bolten, the deputy chief of staff for policy, has been replaced by Harriet Miers, a Texas lawyer and former chairman of the Texas Lottery Commission. Jay Lefkowitz, director of the Domestic Policy Council, has been replaced by Kristen Silverberg, who was a young aide to Bolten. And Lawrence B. Lindsey was replaced as top economic adviser by investment banker Stephen Friedman.
Likewise, John Bridgeland, a former director of the Domestic Policy Council, was replaced as director of Bush's USA Freedom Corps initiative by Desiree Sayle, the former director of correspondence in the White House. And public-policy professor DiIulio was replaced as chief of Bush's "faith-based" initiative by Jim Towey, who had ties to the president's brother, Florida Gov. Jeb Bush. Leading experts in welfare and health policy have left the White House and been replaced by less experienced hands.
"It would be fair to say the policy shop is less policy-oriented in its apparatus and more administratively managed," said a Republican with close ties to the White House.
In interviews, former officials of the current and three previous administrations described Bush's domestic policy team as unusually green -- particularly compared with Bush's top political adviser, Karl Rove. At the Cato forum last week, former Bush speechwriter David Frum said Rove is "the top hack and the top wonk" in the White House.
"I don't think he should be the most important wonk in the White House," said Bruce Reed, former domestic policy chief to Bill Clinton and author of an article about how policy "wonks" had been bested by political "hacks" in the current White House. "Every White House takes on the enthusiasms and the interests of the president, and most of the time this president seems to take more joy in the politics than in the policy."
Defenders of the Bush policymaking apparatus agree that the volume of policymaking has diminished significantly from 2001 and 2002, when the White House was fighting for passage of policies developed during the presidential campaign, such as tax cuts and education accountability. But they say the cause is outside the administration.
Frum said much of the policy energy has been channeled into fighting terrorism at home and abroad because of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. "On the most critical issue of our time, they have been bold, creative, and in some cases, they have shocked the intelligentsia with their assertiveness," he said.
Whatever the cause, conservatives say the remedy to policy malaise won't come until the election. Conservative strategist Jeffrey Bell said the big items on the policy agenda -- such as an overhaul of Social Security -- are necessarily on hold as Bush fights for reelection. "He's having to defend the forward motion he's already had," Bell said. "Reagan in '84 was the same way. People who thought Reagan's creative period was going to end after '83 were wrong. I think Bush will be the same way."
? 2004 The Washington Post Company

U.N. BIDS TO SILENCE OIL-$$ WHISTLEBLOWER

By NILES LATHEM


May 7, 2004 -- WASHINGTON - The United Nations has sent a stern letter to an important witness in the Iraq oil-for-food investigation, demanding that he not cooperate with congressional probes of the scandal, The Post has learned.
The letter - in the name of oil-for-food program chief Benon Sevan - was sent to a U.N. consultant after it was learned he had been talking to congressional investigators about allegations of wholesale corruption, officials said last night.
"This particular individual is someone we have been in contact with for more than a month," said an investigator. "This letter has chilled his willingness to cooperate with the congressional investigation. This individual also appears to be genuinely frightened by the implications inherent in the letter."
Congressional officials would not identify the consultant because he is a potential whistleblower.
The U.N. letter, obtained by The Post, reminded the consultant that under his contract with the oil-for-food program, he "may not communicate at any time to any other person, government or authority external to the United Nations any information known to them by reason of their association with the United Nations, which has not been made public."
"In view of the contractual provisions referred to above and the fact that these matters relate to internal U.N. procedures for administering the Programme, we would ask that you consult with the U.N. before releasing any documentation or information," the letter said.
It is the third letter to surface this week from Sevan's office to companies that did business with the oil-for-food program that invoked confidentiality agreements and demanded that they not release documents to outside investigators.
U.N. spokesmen have said this week that the letters are following standard legal procedure and that U.N. lawyers want all documents to be collected by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who was appointed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to head an investigation into the scandal. But the letters have ignited a firestorm.
"These confidentiality agreements are fueling a perception on the Hill that the U.N. is deliberately seeking to thwart a congressional inquiry into these allegations," said one congressional investigator.
Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), whose subcommittee is one of three congressional committees investigating the scandal, noted this week that his panel recently heard sworn testimony that Sevan accepted sweetheart oil deals from Saddam Hussein's government.
"It would be a big mistake, I think, for him to suggest that people not cooperate in this investigation. It would further imply that he is totally mixed up in this," Shays said.
The United Nations has said Sevan, who is on vacation pending retirement, was not the author of the letters. They were drawn up by U.N. lawyers and sent out on his stationery.

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Iraqi probed in rigging of cell-phone pacts


By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES


An international financier with ties to Saddam Hussein's regime and the United Nations' oil-for-food program helped Middle Eastern and European cell-phone companies edge out American firms for lucrative Iraqi contracts, The Washington Times has learned.
Nadhmi Auchi, an Iraq-born British national who was involved in international arms trading, is being investigated for purportedly rigging bids with the Iraqi Communications Ministry and the Coalition Provisional Authority, which resulted in contracts being awarded to three companies tied to Europe, according to defense officials familiar with an internal investigation.


All the companies have links to Auchi, who was convicted in France last year for taking illegal payments. The contacts could be worth some $500 million annually in future cell-phone service in Iraq, said officials who discussed details ofthe investigation on the condition of anonymity.
"The winners of the Iraqi cellular tender were Saddam's most senior financiers, their Egyptian, Kuwaiti and Iraqi supporters, the bank BNP Paribas, European cellular corporations, particularly Alcatel and the European GMS technology it depends on, and Chinese telecom interests, such as Huawei, which had been active in breaking the Iraqi embargo," said a defense official.
"The losers were American bidders," the official said.
American firms that lost out in the contracting included a consortium of companies such as Qualcomm, which developed a more advanced cell-phone technology known as CDMA, and Lucent Technologies.
Auchi was convicted by a French court in November for his involvement in an illegal payment scheme involving the state-owned oil company Elf-Aquitaine. He received a 15-month suspended prison sentence and a $2.4 million fine.
He also has been linked by U.S. investigators to the United Nations' oil-for-food program, now under investigation by the world body and the U.S. Congress for skimming oil revenue meant to buy humanitarian goods in Iraq.
Auchi, 66, is viewed by U.S. officials as a key figure in the emerging scandal because of his close relationship with officials of the Saddam regime, and because most of the $65 billion involved in the eight-year program was deposited in the Paris bank BNP Paribas. Until 2001, Auchi was a major shareholder in the bank, and investigators believe as much as $10 billion from the program was stolen by Saddam and his associates.
A former Ba'ath Party member, Auchi is believed to have a net worth of about $3 billion.
David Corker, a London lawyer who represented Auchi in the French case, referred calls to Auchi's office. Auchi could not be reached at the headquarters of his company, General Mediterranean Holdings, in Luxembourg.
Officials said Auchi's attorneys in the past have dismissed corruption accusations against him as rumors, at least before the conviction in France.
Auchi also has claimed that the killing of his brother by agents of Saddam's government shows that he is not sympathetic to the ousted dictator.
According to the defense official, "significant and credible evidence" reveals "a conspiracy was organized by Auchi to offer bribes to 'fix' the awarding of cellular-licensing contracts covering three geographic areas of Iraq."
The contracts were won by Asia Cell Telecommunications Co. Ltd., Orascom Telecom Iraq Corp. and Atheer Telecom Iraq.
Officials believe that the contracts-award process was arranged so that companies linked financially to Auchi won the bids and that the common European cell-phone standard, known as GSM, would be the only standard used under the contracts.
As a result, Auchi succeeded in taking over the entire postwar cellular-phone system in Iraq by using contacts and front companies to design the architecture for the phone network in three sectors in Iraq, and to make sure that he owned or controlled the components.
Several American, British and Iraqi nationals are under investigation in addition to Auchi for the reputed cell-phone bid rigging, U.S. officials said.
Two American officials working within the Iraqi Communications Ministry resigned last month and accused a Pentagon official of improperly influencing another contracting process in Iraq. The matter involving all three officials is under investigation by the Pentagon's inspector general.
"The implications of [Auchi] having fixed the tender for the entire Iraqi cellular-telephone system go beyond mere corruption and technological empire building," the defense official said. "It put in control of Iraqi telecommunications a man with an anti-American, anticoalition mind-set and a history of illegal international arms traffic. That control could allow him to compromise the entire Iraqi telecommunications system and undermine the Iraqi security system on an ongoing basis."
One problem for investigators is the June 30 deadline for turning over sovereignty of Iraq to a new government in Baghdad. After July 1, it will be very difficult to figure out how the licensing process for telecommunications contracts was carried out.
The investigation by the Pentagon's Directorate of International Armament and Technology Trade, a special unit set up to track arms and technology transfers, is under way on the telecommunications-contracting improprieties.
According to officials familiar with the investigation, Auchi used "influence peddling and access to the Iraqi regime in conjunction with his European, North African and Middle Eastern financial and business empire to build a worldwide network."
Auchi has large cell-phone business interests in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Jordan in addition to the concessions in Iraq. He is also seeking to set up cell-phone networks in Iran.
Officials also believe Auchi was involved in illegal activities related to Iraqi intelligence officers under Saddam.
The information obtained by the officials shows that Auchi bribed foreign governments and individuals in the months leading up to the Iraq war to oppose the U.S.-led effort to oust Saddam.

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Democracy Now
From the May 17, 2004 issue: The Bush administration seems not to recognize how widespread, and how bipartisan, is the view that Iraq is already lost or on the verge of being lost.
by Robert Kagan and William Kristol
05/17/2004, Volume 009, Issue 34


WE DO NOT KNOW how close the American effort in Iraq may be to irrecoverable failure. We are inclined to believe, however, that the current Washington wisdom--that the United States has already failed and there is nothing to do now but find a not-too-damaging way to extricate ourselves--is far too pessimistic, a panicked reaction to the difficulties in Falluja and with Moktada al-Sadr, as well as to the disaster of Abu Ghraib. We are also appalled at the cavalier and irresponsible way people on both left and right now suggest we should pull out and simply let Iraq go to hell. We wonder how those who, rightly, complain about the American mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners, can blithely consign the entire Iraqi population to the likely prospect of a horrific civil war and the brutal dictatorship that would follow. Spare us that kind of "humanitarianism."
Thank goodness the president says he remains committed to victory. Thank goodness there are stalwarts like Senators Joe Biden, Joe Lieberman, and Evan Bayh in the Democratic party who are fighting against that party's growing clamor for withdrawal. But loss of confidence that the war is winnable goes well beyond left-wing Democrats and isolationist Republicans. The Bush administration seems not to recognize how widespread, and how bipartisan, is the view that Iraq is already lost or on the verge of being lost. The administration therefore may not appreciate how close the whole nation is to tipping decisively against the war. In a sense, it doesn't matter whether this popular and elite perception of the situation in Iraq is too simplistic and too pessimistic. The perception, if it lingers, may destroy support for the war before events on the ground have a chance to prove it wrong.
So Iraq could be lost if the Bush administration holds to the view that it can press ahead with its political and military strategy without any dramatic change of course, without taking bold and visible action to reverse the current downward trajectory. The existing Bush administration plan in Iraq is to wait for U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to name an interim Iraqi caretaker government by the end of May that will take power on July 1, and prepare for elections in January 2005. This plan might have been adequate a couple of months ago. But it is inadequate to meet the new challenge.
Among the biggest mistakes made by the Bush administration over the past year has been the failure to move Iraq more rapidly toward elections. It's true that many, inside and outside the administration, have long been clamoring to hand over more responsibility to Iraqis, responsibility above all for doing more of the fighting and dying. But the one thing even many of these friends of Iraq have been unwilling to hand over to Iraqis is the right to choose their own government. This is a mistake.
We do not believe in the present circumstances that the current administration plan moves quickly enough toward providing Iraqis real sovereignty. It is not real sovereignty when a U.N. official tells Iraqis who their next prime minister will be. We strongly doubt that the announcement of a new interim government--three to four weeks from now, to take office almost two months from now--will have sufficient impact on Iraqi public opinion to overcome the images of American soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners. Nor do we believe the present course will give the American people and their representatives sufficient reason to hope that a corner may be turned in the near future. The coming weeks are critical.
We don't claim to have a silver bullet. But we believe one answer to the current crisis would be to move up elections by several months, perhaps to September. The administration could announce very soon that nationwide Iraqi elections will be held on September 30. Brahimi could go ahead and announce his caretaker government, but it would be clear to all that the new government's primary purpose was to preside over the transition to elected government--first by preparing for the elections, with the help of the United States and the international community.
Accelerating the elections would have several virtues: First, it would change the subject. Instead of focusing on their anger at Americans, Iraqis would be compelled to begin focusing on the coming elections, where each and every Iraqi adult will have a chance to participate in shaping the future. Second, with elections coming quickly, those who continued to commit violence in Iraq would be understood to be attacking not only the United States, but also the elections process, and therefore democracy. The insurgents would be antidemocratic rather than anti-American. Sunnis could be told that if they want more power, they should begin organizing for the vote. Those Sunnis who committed violence would be harming the Sunni population's chances of fair representation, since violence that disrupts the voting could lead to nullification of the vote in the affected areas. The impending elections would encourage the majority of peaceful Sunnis and Shia to take sides against the guerrillas who seek power through force of arms instead of through the ballot.
Third, with elections pending, American military actions could be seen not just as an effort to suppress rebellious Iraqi movements but as a vital support for the elections process, and for democracy. Americans would be fighting to give Iraqis a chance to vote, soon. Fourth, and not least important, the holding of elections in Iraq within a few months might give Americans here at home greater confidence that things can be turned around in Iraq. Does it make that much difference whether elections are held in January 2005 or September 2004? In normal times, perhaps not. But these are not normal times. In terms of perception and psychology, both in Iraq and in the United States, we believe moving the elections to September can make a very big difference. As for those who rightly point out that the schedule we suggest would make for a hasty and imperfect election process and that much could go wrong, we agree. But even flawed elections in Iraq would contribute to a sense of political progress--of movement toward legitimate self-government--that would give us a chance of improving the situation.
In addition to setting a new date for elections, the administration would have to do a couple of other things. It would have to increase, substantially, the number of troops in Iraq in order to create a more secure environment for elections. Rep. John Murtha has been attacked by Republicans for insisting that we are unlikely to succeed in Iraq without a big increase in the number of troops. These attacks on Murtha are stupid, because he is absolutely right. The Pentagon continues to fiddle while Iraq burns. Everyone in Iraq with whom we talk bemoans the shortage of troops and equipment. It is now impossible to travel safely throughout most of Iraq. This is terrible news, and would be even if we weren't preparing for an election. But if elections are announced, the Pentagon could be forced to overcome its arrogant stubbornness and beef up the force.
Finally, the administration should use the new date for elections as an opportunity to make one more run at Europe and the international community for support. It could challenge the French and Germans to send troops to Iraq not to aid our occupation but to support elections. And aside from troops, Europeans could provide vital money and technical assistance to the elections process, which must be managed with care. We believe it would be hard for Europeans to say no when asked to support a more rapid electoral process in Iraq. The Bush administration, therefore, might be able to demonstrate to the American people that it was acting with greater success to bring the international community in to help. That too would help reverse the gloom and doom here at home.
As we say, this proposal is not a cure-all. It carries its own risks as well as benefits. If someone has a better idea, we're happy to hear it. But if the administration does not take dramatic action now, it may be unable to avoid failure.

--Robert Kagan and William Kristol




? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
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These Hollywood special effects may cost the world $15 trillion
By Bjorn Lomborg
(Filed: 09/05/2004)


In the final minutes of the Hollywood doomsday spectacular The Day After Tomorrow, which opens in Britain at the end of the month, the US president makes a ludicrously over-the-top State of the Nation speech. It is a great deal less realistic than the performance by the undoubted star of this $125 million blockbuster of a film: a 100 ft high tidal wave that engulfs New York.
Indeed, the film loses any credibility long before that. This is not because of any one of the far-fetched incidents that occur in the course of its 125 minutes. It isn't the flash freezing of a presidential motorcade, or even the escape of man-eating wolves from New York Zoo. No, this extremely enjoyable film has been let down by the simple fact that it has got its science all wrong. None of it could happen.
The story goes like this. As a consequence of global warming, the polar caps melt, sending vast quantities of fresh water into the world's salty oceans. The torrent stops the Gulf Stream, a major current in the North Atlantic, precipitating a global storm that instantly creates a new Ice Age. This is an excuse for breathtaking special effects: Manhattan is buried in 30-storey snowdrifts, Los Angeles is hit by 250 mph tornadoes, and a fearless paleoclimatologist, played by Denis Quaid, straps on his snow shoes to trek from Washington, DC to New York to rescue his son.
The bad guy is the vice president, who bears a striking resemblance to the real one. This Dick Cheney doppelganger arrogantly dismisses the Kyoto Protocol - it is too expensive - and rejects concern about climate change as fearmongering. The scriptwriters save him from death only to subject him to a mea culpa public address at the movie's climax, saying roughly, "We thought that we could affect the Earth's delicate systems without suffering the consequences. We were wrong. I was wrong." This State of the Nation address is broadcast live on the Weather Channel.
If The Day After Tomorrow had no claims to be anything more than another cheesy Hollywood movie with some fabulous special effects, we could happily turn a blind eye to its bogus science and concentrate on the sight of the Statue of Liberty up to her armpits in the water. But the film claims to be offering something more than this.
"There's more truth than hype," the film-makers promise in their publicity. The German director, Roland Emmerich, claims he tried to present us with a valuable fund of scientific information. The film's website provides links to news stories published in February about "a secret report prepared by the Pentagon" which warned that climate change would "lead to global catastrophe costing millions of lives". What this publicity does not reveal is that the Pentagon report was merely a hypothetical worst-case scenario - and one that has already been thoroughly debunked. In fact, the respected magazine Science has reviewed this Pentagon report and the alleged scientific support for The Day After Tomorrow and concludes that "it is highly unlikely that global warming will lead to a widespread collapse" of the Gulf Stream, and "it is safe to say that global warming will not lead to the onset of a new Ice Age".
In Nature, another highly-respected scientific journal, a researcher finds that halting the Gulf Stream would be impossible, arguing that "the only way to produce an ocean circulation without the Gulf Stream would be to turn off the wind system or stop the Earth's rotation, or both."
Now, although it is not going to kill us the day after tomorrow, global warming certainly is a reality. It is caused at least partly by mankind's use of fossil fuels. The effects will be predominantly adverse - although high-latitude nations might prosper in a warmer world, tropical countries will have to deal with more heat-days, altered precipitation and higher sea-levels. So what is wrong with using a piece of popular entertainment to campaign for action to save people from that? As the Nasa research oceanographer William Patzert says: "The science is bad, but perhaps it's an opportunity to crank up the dialogue on our role in climate change."
The problem is that if we overestimate the risk that climate change poses, then we will pay less attention to the other challenges that face us. That appears to be exactly the aim of the movie's creators. Emmerich believes that global warming is "the only problem big enough to force all the countries of the world to stop fighting and work together to save the planet"; he says that his great dream is that "this film will force politicians to act".
If politicians were to see The Day After Tomorrow and act on its agenda, what would happen? Implementing the Kyoto agreement on climate change would cost at least $150 billion each year, yet would do no more than postpone global warming for six years by 2100. That is to say, it would cause temperatures to increase slightly more slowly - the temperature we would have reached in 2100 without Kyoto, we would now reach in 2106. Those families in Bangladesh who will get flooded will have an extra six years to move. Even if the film's creators are right - and the scientists are wrong - and the Gulf Stream current does collapse within a decade, then Kyoto would have made no difference.
There is another reason why it is wrong - I would even say amoral - to overplay the case for combatting climate change. We cannot do everything. Our resources are limited, and our attention is quickly diverted from one fashionable cause to another. We must ask ourselves if spending $150 billion every year for the rest of the century to postpone warming for six years is really the best use of that money.
For the cost of implementing Kyoto in just one year, we could permanently provide clean drinking water and sanitation to everyone on the planet. Of course it is unlikely that Emmerich will cast Brad Pitt as a sewage engineer in Kenya for his next glamorous movie. Nor are there many good plotlines to be made from tales of a government which invests in malarial vaccines, or of a global conference called to remove trade barriers. But these are real options that policy-makers face every time they spend a dollar with the intention of easing human suffering.
The world needs a rational basis for making such priorities. That is the aim of a new project, Copenhagen Consensus, which will bring together nine economists - including four Nobel Prize winners - to prioritise solutions to 10 great challenges facing humanity. They will look at problems ranging from financial instability to communicable diseases, examining several different solutions to each challenge. The experts will produce a ranked list - at the top will be the solution that will achieve the most for humanity.
In an ideal world, we would be able to achieve everything - we should halt global warming and eradicate corruption, end malnutrition and win the war against communicable diseases. Because we cannot do everything, we need sound reasoning and high quality information to defeat the hysteria of Hollywood. I believe there is more hope in truth than in hype.


Bjorn Lomborg is the director of Copenhagen Consensus and Denmark's Environmental Assessment Institute. He is the author of The Skeptical Environmentalist
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Gas Cartel Gouging the Golden State
Roger Hedgecock, KOGO-AM 600, San Diego
www.RogerHedgecock.com

Gas prices are too high! These prices are caused by a near-monopoly ownership of the whole industry in California. From the oil well to the refinery to your local gas station, five oil companies control 90 percent of California's gas supply. And surprise, surprise! In 2003 gas prices were up 35 percent, and those five oil companies' profits went up 926 percent.
I'm all for profits, but profits like these tell me this monopoly feels no competitive pressure. In a real capitalistic economy, competition between companies produces better-quality products at lower prices. A monopoly produces obscene profits by conspiring to produce a scarce product at a higher and higher price.
The state has antitrust laws designed to give the attorney general the tools to fight this kind of monopoly. Where is our California Attorney General Bill Lockyer? He says he's studying the problem.
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Hillary's Hidden History of Persecuting the Press
Posted May 7, 2004

Though Hillary Clinton may be a media darling now, as a popular New York senator and author of a best-selling tome about her White House years, a new book by Richard Poe claims that, as first lady, she ran a secret police force that went after journalists who dug too deeply into Clinton scandals.
The New York Times best-selling author reveals in Hillary's Secret War: The Clinton Conspiracy to Muzzle Internet Journalists how reporters who the first lady considered a threat were harshly dealt with in myriad ways, including being the subjects of wiretaps, being blacklisted and being framed for crimes.

For more on this story, see the interview ...


Hillary's Secret War

By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | May 7, 2004
Frontpage Interview's guest today is Richard Poe, a New York Times bestselling author and cyberjournalist. Formerly the editor of Frontpagemag.com, he is the author of the new book Hillary's Secret War: The Clinton Conspiracy to Muzzle Internet Journalists. Visit his blog at RichardPoe.com.
Frontpage Magazine: Mr. Poe, welcome to Frontpage Interview. It is a pleasure to have you with us.
Poe: Thank you.
FP: So let's discuss your new book. First things first though: Hillary is out of the White House. Why should we even care about her anymore?
Poe: Well, as we all know, Hillary means to regain the White House, at any cost. I believe she will make her play this year, in 2004. John Kerry is imploding as we speak. He is unelectable. Kerry has too much baggage, too many skeletons in his closet.
Democrat strategists are already quietly discussing a "Torricelli option" - to pull Kerry from the race, just as they pulled Robert Torricelli from the New Jersey Senate race in 2002, replacing him at the last minute with Frank Lautenberg.
If the Democrats "pull a Torricelli" at their National Convention in July - that is, if they force Kerry to withdraw - Hillary will be the obvious frontrunner. I think there's a strong chance that, when Election Day rolls around, President Bush will face Hillary, not Kerry.
FP: Hillary's Secret War tells us that Hillary personally led a secret police force from her office in the White House. Tell us about your proof and evidence.
Poe: The operations of Hillary's secret police have been copiously documented, to the point where the topic can hardly be called controversial any longer.
During the Clinton years, journalists who probed too deeply into Clinton scandals ran terrible risks. Journalists were beaten, wiretapped, framed on criminal charges, fired and blacklisted. They experienced burglaries, IRS audits, smear campaigns and White-House-orchestrated lawsuits.
Some may have paid the ultimate price. In February, 1998, just as the Clinton impeachment was gathering steam, Sandy Hume, the 28-year-old son of Fox News anchorman Brit Hume, suddenly turned up dead of a gunshot to the head. He was covering the U.S. Congress for the magazine The Hill, and was known for his excellent sources among Republican insiders. Sandy Hume supposedly committed suicide, but friends and associates have questioned the official story.
Some of the White House "secret police" were private detectives, such as Terry Lenzner, Jack Palladino and Anthony Pellicano. Others were Clinton loyalists embedded in federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, the CIA, the IRS, the NTSB and so on. Many of these people are still in place, and still doing the Clintons' dirty work. I call them the Shadow Team.
FP: How does Hillary fit into all this?
Poe: Hillary is the muscle end of the Clinton mafia. It was she who organized and led the Shadow Team. Her role as White House enforcer was first revealed by the late Barbara Olson.
Mrs. Olson was a former federal prosecutor who served from 1995 to 1996 as Chief Investigative Counsel for the Clinger Committee - Rep. William F. Clinger Jr.'s House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, which probed the Filegate and Travelgate affairs. The evidence Mrs. Olson uncovered convinced her that Hillary Clinton had, among other things, conspired to use the Federal Bureau of Investigation unlawfully to intimidate, punish, harass, frame and otherwise harm innocent people who stood in her way.
In her 1999 book Hell to Pay, Mrs. Olson wrote, "Hillary is not merely an aider and abettor to this secret police operation. She has been its prime instigator and organizer. ... In one White House scandal after another, all roads led to Hillary. To investigate White House improprieties and scandals, the evidence necessarily led to her hidden hands guiding the Clinton operation."
FP: This is actually quite incredible. How did Hillary get away with all of this? Surely Ken Starr would have jumped on any excuse to indict Hillary, no?
Poe: Well, as I explain in my book, there are two Ken Starrs. There's the imaginary Ken Starr conjured up by Big Media - a ruthless, rightwing religious zealot, bent on toppling the Clintons. Then there's the real Ken Starr - a timid bureaucrat, afraid of his own shadow, who shrank from investigating any of the truly serious Clinton scandals. On the contrary, Starr actively helped to suppress and whitewash evidence of Clinton wrongdoing.
Take the Vincent Foster case. In September 1994, Starr appointed Miquel Rodriguez to lead the grand jury investigation into Foster's death. Rodriguez resigned in protest less than four months later, charging that the investigation was rigged. Rodriguez accused Starr's people of pressuring him to announce that Foster committed suicide, despite evidence to the contrary.
After resigning, Rodriguez tried to go public. But Big Media shut him out. According to WorldNetDaily, Rodriguez claims that he told his story to reporters from Time, Newsweek, ABC's Nightline, the Boston Globe, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and the New York Times. Rodriguez says that he spent six hours with a reporter from the New York Times. In every case, his story was spiked by higher-ups. No one reported it.
Clinton defenders often argue that five different investigations ruled Foster's death a suicide. But Rodriguez retorts, "In fact, all of the investigations were done by the same people, the FBI." Rodriguez says that FBI agents threatened his "physical well-being," if he did not shut up about the Foster case. Today, Rodriguez serves as an assistant U.S. Attorney in Sacramento.
FP: Why would Ken Starr cover for the Clintons?
It has been alleged that the Clintons had some sort of hold over Starr - that, in fact, Starr was "fixed," either by threats, blackmail or perhaps mutual self-interest.
According to White House whistleblower Nolanda Hill, Starr's team was thoroughly infiltrated by Clinton loyalists. Even Starr's FBI investigators reported secretly to Janet Reno. This gave the Clintons enormous leverage to guide and manipulate the investigation their way.
Moreover, Starr had a conflict of interest. In his private legal practice, he represented a subsidiary of CITIC, a company owned by the People's Liberation Army of China, and led by arms dealer Wang Jun, a Chinese military intelligence operative and a key player in the Chinagate scandal. The mere fact that Starr was on Wang Jun's payroll should have disqualified him from serving as Independent Counsel. But, for some reason, Starr did not recuse himself.
FP: You also accuse Hillary's secret police of blackmailing witnesses, journalists, Senators, Congressmen - even federal investigators and House impeachment managers. Can you prove these charges?
Poe: Well, in many cases, these threats were made quite openly. For example, on February 8, 1998, with pressure mounting to impeach Bill Clinton, George Stephanopoulos appeared on ABC's This Week with Sam Donaldson and Cokie Roberts. Stephanopoulos had resigned as White House communications chief in 1996 and become an ABC news analyst. But he was still carrying the Clintons' water, as his next words made clear.
Stephanopoulos announced that the Clinton White House was planning what he called an "Ellen Rometsch" strategy. He explained that Rometsch was an East German spy who had managed to become John F. Kennedy's lover. According to Stephanopoulos, the Kennedy White House threatened to open up the FBI files and divulge embarrassing or incriminating information on anyone who attempted to blow the whistle on JFK's affair with Rometsch. If pressed to the wall, the Clinton White House would do likewise, said Stephanopoulos.
Sam Donaldson asked, "Are you suggesting for a moment that what they're beginning to say is that if you investigate this too much, we'll put all your dirty linen right on the table? Every member of the Senate? Every member of the press corps?" To which Stephanopoulos replied, "Absolutely. The president said he would never resign, and I think some around him are willing to take everyone down with him."
This was a clear threat, delivered openly, on national television. Through Stephanopoulos, the Clintons were warning Congress and the media to back off. The threat worked. David P. Schippers, who was Chief Investigative Counsel for the Clinton impeachment, reveals in his book Sell-Out that Republican leaders, from the get-go, had no intention of holding a proper impeachment trial or of convicting Bill Clinton. It was all a charade.
FP: What is the New Underground?
Poe: The New Underground is the name I have given to the network of dissident journalists who began speaking out against Clinton corruption during the 1990s, through New Media outlets such as talk radio, cable TV and the Internet.
FP: How did Hillary persecute the New Underground?
Poe: In July 1995, Hillary's Shadow Team produced a secret report which identified the Internet as a special danger to the Clintons' power. The report proved prophetic when journalists such as Matt Drudge, Christopher Ruddy, Joseph Farah and, of course, David Horowitz, began using the Internet to publish stories that Big Media would never touch.
In February 1998, Hillary announced that the Internet needed an "editing or gatekeeping function." By the time she spoke those words, Hillary was already hard at work putting her gatekeeping machinery into place.
Her most damaging attacks against the Internet came disguised as private lawsuits, brought by third parties. For instance, Hillary operative Sid Blumenthal sued Matt Drudge for $30 million in 1997, charging defamation. The lawsuit was clearly orchestrated by the White House. David Horowitz came to Drudge's rescue, providing him with free legal representation, and got slapped with an IRS audit for his troubles. The case dragged on for years, but, soon after the Clintons left office, Blumenthal dropped his suit.
In September 1998, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times sued Jim Robinson's FreeRepublic.com for copyright violation. Like most message board operators, Robinson allowed users to post full-length newspaper articles on his discussion forum. However, unlike other message board operators, Robinson one day found himself deluged by cease-and-desist orders from Times Mirror, Dow Jones, Reuters and other leading news organizations. According to the Washington Weekly, the attack on FreeRepublic was coordinated by Debevoise & Plimpton - a law firm used by the Clintons and the Democratic National Committee.
FP: Have you experienced any persecution or harassment personally? Any threats or warnings? Do you have concerns for your and your family's safety?
Poe: Well, I doubt that I'm important enough to merit Hillary's personal attention. The Shadow Team has bigger fish to fry. For instance, I imagine they've got their hands pretty full, right now, trying to frame Rush Limbaugh on drug charges.
That said, I did have a devil of a time getting Hillary's Secret War published. Random House originally signed the book. After I turned in the manuscript, they refused to publish it. Things looked bad for awhile. Then Joseph Farah and WND Books came riding to the rescue, God bless them, and agreed to publish Hillary's Secret War.
FP: Tell us about Hillary's secret conspiracy report.
Poe: Its official title was The Communication Stream of Conspiracy Commerce. Hillary's Shadow Team produced this report in July 1995, in an attempt to squelch further discussion of the Vincent Foster case. Hillary's operatives quietly circulated the report to Clinton-friendly journalists, in order to give them ammunition for debunking and discrediting any journalist who dared to continue probing the Foster cover-up.
The report accused Pittsburgh newspaper mogul Richard Mellon Scaife of fabricating rumors about Foster's death and paying rightwing journalists to spread them. Significantly, the report featured a special section identifying the Internet as the most dangerous weapon in Scaife's arsenal, enabling him and his vast rightwing conspiracy to disseminate - and I quote - "an extraordinary amount of unregulated data and information..."
FP: We all know that Matt Drudge broke the Monica Lewinsky story. What other big stories did the New Underground break?
Poe: Virtually every Clinton scandal of any note was either broken on the Internet, or kept alive on the Internet long after Big Media had suppressed it. The list is endless: there's the Clintons' involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal; the Vincent Foster cover-up; the suspicious death of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown; the Clintons' ties to drug lords and global crime syndicates; the TWA 800 coverup; the Oklahoma City bombing coverup; Chinagate; Russiagate; the Clinton body count. You name it.
FP: You claim that the New Underground helped turn the tide for George W. Bush during the 2000 election. Please explain.
Poe: During the election crisis, FreeRepublic mobilized activists who took the fight to the streets. They created the now-famous "Sore Loserman" emblem brandished by protesters across America. When Jesse Jackson came to Florida to incite racial unrest, the Freepers shouted him down at a major rally and sent him packing. Freepers also joined the protest outside the Stephen Clarke government building in Miami, which helped stop the all-Democrat Miami-Dade canvassing board from carrying out an illegal, selective vote count behind closed doors.
Meanwhile, J.J. Johnson's SierraTimes.com acted as a central command post for Operation Truckstop 2000 - a nationwide, general trucking strike that would have gone into effect had Gore succeeded in stealing the election.
The real tie-breaker, however, was an exclusive series of stories published on Joseph Farah's WorldNetDaily, exposing Gore's ties to the criminal rackets of the "Hillbilly Mafia." Local observers say that story, which got wide play in Tennessee media, cost Gore his home state, with its crucial eleven electoral votes. Had Gore won Tennessee, he never would have needed those disputed votes in Florida.
FP: In your epilogue, you recount an interesting experience you had on the day of the 9-11 attack. Tell us about that.
Poe: I was then editor of David Horowitz's FrontPageMagazine.com -- as you are now. On the day of the attack, my wife Marie got a call from our friend Ann Coulter. She was stranded in a bar in Queens, and her cell phone was dying. Manhattan was locked down. The bridges were closed and Ann couldn't get home. So we got in the car and picked her up.
Ann had a column due that night, so we set her up in our library with her laptop. We were all there together when we got the news of Barbara Olson's death. Tragically, Mrs. Olson had gone down with American Airlines Flight 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon.
Barbara Olson was a personal friend of Ann's. The loss hit her very hard. That night, Ann sat in my library, with F-16 jet fighters screaming overhead every few minutes, and wrote her eulogy to her lost friend. It concluded with what would soon become Ann's most famous and controversial one-liner: "We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity."
FP: You compare the New Underground to the pamphleteers of the American Revolution. Do you believe we are headed for revolution?
Poe: God forbid. Revolutions usually end in dictatorship, no matter which side wins. Still, if the enemies of our Republic pick a fight - and I'm talking here about our internal foes - I don't believe that Americans are in any mood these days to back down from it.
FP: Mr. Poe, we are out of time. Thank you for joining us and everyone here at Frontpagemag.com would like to congratulate you on accomplishing this vital piece of work on the Clintons. We hope to see you again soon.
Poe: Thank you Jamie.
*
I welcome all of our readers to get in touch with me if they have a good idea/contact for a guest for Frontpage Interview. Email me at jglazov@rogers.com.
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Israel and the Ghost of Gonen

By P. David Hornik
FrontPageMagazine.com | May 7, 2004

In the days leading up to Likud voters' crushing defeat of Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan, an Oslo golden oldie reappeared in the Israeli media. Ex-Member of Knesset and cabinet minister Gonen Segev was arrested and remanded on charges of trying to smuggle 25,000 Ecstasy pills into Israel from the Netherlands. It seemed like a fortuitous reminder that so long as Israel is in the grip of the Oslo mentality, the Spirit of Gonen lives on.
Seemingly, the Likud anti-disengagement vote was a stellar example of democracy in action. A month ago Prime Minister Sharon, accused of negating his electoral platform and betraying his constituents from his own party, announced to those constituents that they'd have a chance to decide if his plan would go any further.
But now that they've said no, Sharon is already saying he's going to find a way to get around it. Gonen must be smiling in his jail cell.
Gonen Segev emblazoned his name forever in the annals of infamy back at the time of the Knesset's vote on the Oslo II agreement in October 1995. He was elected to the Knesset in 1992 on the ticket of the Tsomet Party--a hawkish party to the right of Likud that became thoroughly anti-Oslo as the "process" emerged. But Gonen and his sidekick Alex Goldfarb bolted Tsomet, joined Labor, and cast the two votes that enabled Oslo II to squeak past by a margin of 61-59. For the citizens' votes that they'd bargained away, Segev and Goldfarb were each rewarded, it was commonly understood, with a cabinet post and a new car by the Rabin-Peres Labor Party.
In other words, except for that glitch of corruption the Oslo II agreement would have been rejected by the elected representatives of the Israeli people (especially the Jewish representatives, among whom the anti-agreement margin was wide even after Segev and Goldfarb's treachery). But, rather than refusing to make further concessions to the genocidal Palestinian Authority or for that matter dismantling it, the "process" moved on, taking its toll of blood whose latest addition was a mother and four daughters murdered pointblank in their car by two "militants" in Gaza.
Sharon's plan for unilateral retreat from Gaza and northern Samaria (and, clearly, additional parts of Judea and Samaria further down the road) has a seductive appeal to many Israelis and friends of Israel, since Sharon speaks in terms of "strengthening" our position and being able to "fight terror more effectively." Yet Palestinian Media Watch reports that the Palestinian media unanimously views the plan as a victory for the Palestinians and a precedent for destroying Israel entirely. Let me put it this way: if you lived in New York City and anti-American terrorists were operating in Westchester County, would you want the U.S. army to be operating there too, or would you want it to be pulled out? Well, the Sharon Plan states: "upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of Gaza Strip territory which have been evacuated"--meaning the entire Strip except for a tiny "corridor" along the Gaza-Sinai border. Even there, the plan only promises that Israel will "initially" deploy forces.
It was because they recognized the Sharon plan as a further continuation of the Oslo giveaways, whose result has been to surround Israel with terror enclaves and turn it into a slaughterhouse, that an overwhelming majority of Likud members voted against it. Yet Sharon, in the true Oslo spirit, is now saying he'll go ahead with the plan anyway.
Israel is admired as an innovative country, but not all its innovations are something to be proud of. The idea here is: "O.K., you guys can vote on this. If the vote goes in my favor, it counts; if it goes against me, it doesn't count."
In seeking to get around a Likud vote that was supposed to be binding, Sharon is behaving about as honorably as Gonen Segev.
Unlike Gonen, Sharon's motives may not be--if one may put it so--pure corruption. True, some claim his disengagement plan is an attempt to escape his legal difficulties by currying favor with Israel's left-wing media and judicial establishments. Others claim that, with his roots in the Labor movement, he's showing his own true left-wing colors. Or, some say that like Likud prime ministers before him, Sharon now wants to prove his "peace" credentials while ignoring all the evidence that caving in to terror brings on further catastrophes.
But Sharon's determination to scotch the Likud verdict smacks of the Oslo paradigm of running roughshod over Israeli democracy. From Yitzhak Rabin's betrayal of his 1992 campaign promises not to negotiate with the PLO to the crooked Oslo-II vote to the use of Clinton-donated American spin doctors in Ehud Barak's election campaign to Sharon's current maneuvers, Oslo has always been a totalitarian impulse that sacrifices honor and morality to goals that turn out to be disastrous. Maybe that's why Gonen Segev came back to haunt us.

P. David Hornik is a freelance writer and translator living in Jerusalem whose work has appeared in many Israeli, Jewish, and political publications.


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Dissension Grows In Senior Ranks On War Strategy
U.S. May Be Winning Battles in Iraq But Losing the War, Some Officers Say

By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, May 9, 2004; Page A01


Deep divisions are emerging at the top of the U.S. military over the course of the occupation of Iraq, with some senior officers beginning to say that the United States faces the prospect of casualties for years without achieving its goal of establishing a free and democratic Iraq.
Their major worry is that the United States is prevailing militarily but failing to win the support of the Iraqi people. That view is far from universal, but it is spreading and being voiced publicly for the first time.
Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, who spent much of the year in western Iraq, said he believes that at the tactical level at which fighting occurs, the U.S. military is still winning. But when asked whether he believes the United States is losing, he said, "I think strategically, we are."
Army Col. Paul Hughes, who last year was the first director of strategic planning for the U.S. occupation authority in Baghdad, said he agrees with that view and noted that a pattern of winning battles while losing a war characterized the U.S. failure in Vietnam. "Unless we ensure that we have coherency in our policy, we will lose strategically," he said in an interview Friday.
"I lost my brother in Vietnam," added Hughes, a veteran Army strategist who is involved in formulating Iraq policy. "I promised myself, when I came on active duty, that I would do everything in my power to prevent that [sort of strategic loss] from happening again. Here I am, 30 years later, thinking we will win every fight and lose the war, because we don't understand the war we're in."
The emergence of sharp differences over U.S. strategy has set off a debate, a year after the United States ostensibly won a war in Iraq, about how to preserve that victory. The core question is how to end a festering insurrection that has stymied some reconstruction efforts, made many Iraqis feel less safe and created uncertainty about who actually will run the country after the scheduled turnover of sovereignty June 30.
Inside and outside the armed forces, experts generally argue that the U.S. military should remain there but should change its approach. Some argue for more troops, others for less, but they generally agree on revising the stated U.S. goals to make them less ambitious. They are worried by evidence that the United States is losing ground with the Iraqi public.
Some officers say the place to begin restructuring U.S. policy is by ousting Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, whom they see as responsible for a series of strategic and tactical blunders over the past year. Several of those interviewed said a profound anger is building within the Army at Rumsfeld and those around him.
A senior general at the Pentagon said he believes the United States is already on the road to defeat. "It is doubtful we can go on much longer like this," he said. "The American people may not stand for it -- and they should not."
Asked who was to blame, this general pointed directly at Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz. "I do not believe we had a clearly defined war strategy, end state and exit strategy before we commenced our invasion," he said. "Had someone like Colin Powell been the chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], he would not have agreed to send troops without a clear exit strategy. The current OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] refused to listen or adhere to military advice."
Like several other officers interviewed for this report, this general spoke only on the condition that his name not be used. One reason for this is that some of these officers deal frequently with the senior Pentagon civilian officials they are criticizing, and some remain dependent on top officials to approve their current efforts and future promotions. Also, some say they believe that Rumsfeld and other top civilians punish public dissent. Senior officers frequently cite what they believe was the vindictive treatment of then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki after he said early in 2003 that the administration was underestimating the number of U.S. troops that would be required to occupy postwar Iraq.
Wolfowitz, the Pentagon's No. 2 official, said he does not think the United States is losing in Iraq, and said no senior officer has expressed that thought to him, either. "I am sure that there are some out there" who think that, he said in an interview yesterday afternoon.
"There's no question that we're facing some difficulties," Wolfowitz said. "I don't mean to sound Pollyannaish -- we all know that we're facing a tough problem." But, he said, "I think the course we've set is the right one, which is moving as rapidly as possible to Iraqi self-government and Iraqi self-defense."
Wolfowitz, who is widely seen as the intellectual architect of the Bush administration's desire to create a free and democratic Iraq that will begin the transformation of the politics of the Middle East, also strongly rejected the idea of scaling back on that aim. "The goal has never been to win the Olympic high jump in democracy," he said. Moving toward democratization in Iraq will take time, he said. Yet, he continued, "I don't think the answer is to find some old Republican Guard generals and have them impose yet another dictatorship in an Arab country."
The top U.S. commander in the war also said he strongly disagrees with the view that the United States is heading toward defeat in Iraq. "We are not losing, militarily," Army Gen. John Abizaid said in an interview Friday. He said that the U.S. military is winning tactically. But he stopped short of being as positive about the overall trend. Rather, he said, "strategically, I think there are opportunities."
The prisoner abuse scandal and the continuing car bombings and U.S. casualties "create the image of a military that's not being effective in the counterinsurgency," he said. But in reality, "the truth of the matter is . . . there are some good signals out there."
Abizaid cited the resumption of economic reconstruction and the political progress made with Sunni Muslims in resolving the standoff around Fallujah, and increasing cooperation from Shiite Muslims in isolating radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr. "I'm looking at the situation, and I told the secretary of defense the other day I feel pretty comfortable with where we are," he said.
Even so, he said, "There's liable to be a lot of fighting in May and June," as the June 30 date for turning over sovereignty to an Iraqi government approaches.
Commanders on the ground in Iraq seconded that cautiously optimistic view.
"I am sure that the view from Washington is much worse than it appears on the ground here in Baqubah," said Army Col. Dana J.H. Pittard, commander of a 1st Infantry Division brigade based in that city about 40 miles north of Baghdad. "I do not think that we are losing, but we will lose if we are not careful." He said he is especially worried about maintaining political and economic progress in the provinces after the turnover of power.
Army Lt. Col. John Kem, a battalion commander in Baghdad, said that the events of the past two months -- first the eruption of a Shiite insurgency, followed by the detainee abuse scandal -- "certainly made things harder," but he said he doubted they would have much effect on the long-term future of Iraq.
But some say that behind those official positions lies deep concern.
One Pentagon consultant said that officials with whom he works on Iraq policy continue to put on a happy face publicly, but privately are grim about the situation in Baghdad. When it comes to discussions of the administration's Iraq policy, he said, "It's 'Dead Man Walking.' "
The worried generals and colonels are simply beginning to say what experts outside the military have been saying for weeks.
In mid-April, even before the prison detainee scandal, Peter Galbraith, a former U.S. ambassador to Croatia, wrote in the New York Review of Books that "patience with foreign occupation is running out, and violent opposition is spreading. Civil war and the breakup of Iraq are more likely outcomes than a successful transition to a pluralistic Western-style democracy." The New York Review of Books is not widely read in the U.S. military, but the article, titled "How to Get Out of Iraq," was carried online and began circulating among some military intellectuals.
Likewise, Rep. John P. Murtha (Pa.), a former Marine who is one of most hawkish Democrats in Congress, said last week: "We cannot prevail in this war as it is going today," and said that the Bush administration should either boost its troop numbers or withdraw.
Larry Diamond, who until recently was a senior political adviser of the U.S. occupation authority in Iraq, argued that the United States is not losing the war but is in danger of doing so. "I think that we have fallen into a period of real political difficulty where we are no longer clearly winning the peace, and where the prospect of a successful transition to democracy is in doubt.
"Basically, it's up in the air now," Diamond continued. "That's what is at stake. . . . We can't keep making tactical and strategic mistakes."
He and others are recommending a series of related revisions to the U.S. approach.
Like many in the Special Forces, defense consultant Michael Vickers advocates radically trimming the U.S. presence in Iraq, making it much more like the one in Afghanistan, where there are 20,000 troops and almost none in the capital, Kabul. The U.S. military has a small presence in the daily life of Afghans. Basically, it ignores them and focuses its attention on fighting pockets of Taliban and al Qaeda holdouts. Nor has it tried to disarm the militias that control much of the country.
In addition to trimming the U.S. troop presence, a young Army general said, the United States also should curtail its ambitions in Iraq. "That strategic objective, of a free, democratic, de-Baathified Iraq, is grandiose and unattainable," he said. "It's just a matter of time before we revise downward . . . and abandon these ridiculous objectives."
Instead, he predicted that if the Bush administration wins reelection, it simply will settle for a stable Iraq, probably run by former Iraqi generals. This is more or less, he said, what the Marines Corps did in Fallujah -- which he described as a glimpse of future U.S. policy.
Wolfowitz sharply rejected that conclusion about Fallujah. "Let's be clear, Fallujah has always been an outlier since the liberation of Baghdad," he said in the interview. "It's where the trouble began. . . . It really isn't a model for anything for the rest of the country."
But a senior military intelligence officer experienced in Middle Eastern affairs said he thinks the administration needs to rethink its approach to Iraq and to the region. "The idea that Iraq can be miraculously and quickly turned into a shining example of democracy that will 'transform' the Middle East requires way too much fairy dust and cultural arrogance to believe," he said.
Finally, some are calling for the United States to stop fighting separatist trends among Iraq's three major groups, the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds, and instead embrace them. "The best hope for holding Iraq together -- and thereby avoiding civil war -- is to let each of its major constituent communities have, to the extent possible, the system each wants," Galbraith wrote last month.
Even if adjustments in troop presence and goals help the United States prevail, it will not happen soon, several of those interviewed said. The United States is likely to be fighting in Iraq for at least another five years, said an Army officer who served there. "We'll be taking casualties," he warned, during that entire time.
A long-term problem for any administration is that it may be difficult for the American public to tell whether the United States is winning or losing, and the prospect of continued casualties may prompt some to ask of how long the public will tolerate the fighting.
"Iraq might have been worth doing at some price," Vickers said. "But it isn't worth doing at any price. And the price has gone very high."
The other key factor in the war is Iraqi public opinion. A recent USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll found that a majority of Iraqis want the United States to leave immediately. "In Iraq, we are rapidly losing the support of the middle, which will enable the insurgency to persist practically indefinitely until our national resolve is worn down," the senior U.S. military intelligence officer said.
Tolerance of the situation in Iraq also appears to be declining within the U.S. military. Especially among career Army officers, an extraordinary anger is building at Rumsfeld and his top advisers.
"Like a lot of senior Army guys, I'm quite angry" with Rumsfeld and the rest of the Bush administration, the young general said. He listed two reasons. "One is, I think they are going to break the Army." But what really incites him, he said, is, "I don't think they care."
Jeff Smith, a former general counsel of the CIA who has close ties to many senior officers, said, "Some of my friends in the military are exceedingly angry." In the Army, he said, "It's pretty bitter."
Retired Army Col. Robert Killebrew, a frequent Pentagon consultant, said, "The people in the military are mad as hell." He said the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, should be fired. A spokesman for Myers declined to comment.
A Special Forces officer aimed higher, saying that "Rumsfeld needs to go, as does Wolfowitz."
Asked about such antagonism, Wolfowitz said, "I wish they'd have the -- whatever it takes -- to come tell me to my face."
He said that by contrast, he had been "struck at how many fairly senior officers have come to me" to tell him that he and Rumsfeld have made the right decisions concerning the Army.



? 2004 The Washington Post Company




>> BEYOND CVID...

US mantra: N Korea nukes must go, but how?
By Ralph A Cossa

(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)

With a six-party working-group meeting about to take place in Beijing, in which North Korea has agreed to participate, Washington has said that its position toward the Hermit Kingdom remains unchanged: it seeks the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs, or CVID for short. Yet, despite its repeated devotion to the acronym, Washington has not been entirely specific as to what CVID means, or to what it fully entails.
True, North Korea has agreed to participate in a six-party working-group meeting on May 12 to help lay the groundwork for the third session of the more senior-level six-party talks (among North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States), which are anticipated before the end of June. However, in regard to CVID, assistant secretary of state James Kelly, who heads the US delegation at the plenary sessions, recently told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "that acronym (CVID) and the important goal it represents [have] been accepted by all but the North Koreans."
While it is also true that all parties (including North Korea) profess to seek a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula, and the others (less North Korea) at least pay lip serve to the CVID objective, it is not clear that all agree on the definition of its components.
Dissecting CVID
Washington has made it clear that "complete" means the dismantlement of both plutonium and uranium enrichment-based programs. But, despite the highly publicized confession by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, that he had sold uranium-enrichment equipment to North Korea, Pyongyang continues to deny having a uranium-based weapons program, and several other members of the six-party process seem openly skeptical of Washington's accusations (or more willing to disregard the evidence, even if it might be true). Thus, it would appear that North Korea's (also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK's) acknowledgment of a uranium-enrichment program - and a willingness by the others to press Pyongyang on this point - must be the first order of business at the working-group meeting, if there is to be any hope for future progress.
"Verifiable" means just that. It has long been acknowledged that devising a verification regime intrusive enough to satisfy hardline skeptics will be no mean feat. This is why the "Libyan model" is potentially so important. As Kelly told Congress, "the DPRK needs to make a strategic choice for transformed relations with the United States and the world - as other countries have done, including quite recently - to abandon all of its nuclear programs." In case the reference was too subtle, Kelly later noted that he "discussed Libya's example with our North Korean counterparts, and we hope they understand its significance". In truth, verification can only work if the North cooperates in turning in its hidden hardware - not to mentioned reprocessed plutonium. Taking an Iraqi-style "catch me if you can" approach seems unworkable.
The definition of "irreversible" remains subject to the most interpretation. At a minimum, it would seem to require an end to all DPRK nuclear programs, including energy-associated efforts (both production and reprocessing), to guard against future backsliding. Pyongyang has, at times, intimated that its "peaceful nuclear energy program" might also be put on the bargaining table - if the price is right. Washington has argued that there is no "peaceful" program and has made no secret of its desire to avoid an Agreed Framework II. The first Agreed Framework was decided in 1994, when both the US and North Korea reaffirmed the importance of achieving peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, however, no serious movement came from the safeguards outlined in the framework, and much of it was later postponed. Thus, the US and the DPRK have decided to take the "freeze" approach for the resolution of the nuclear issue or a revival of any light water reactor (LWR) programs, although the US has yet to formally demand an end to all nuclear energy-related programs.
Washington sees "dismantlement" as an action, not as a future promise. Previously, it had dismissed North Korean "freeze" proposals, saying it would not reward North Korea for merely honoring past (broken) promises. However, a breakthrough now seems possible in this area, depending on how Pyongyang defines its current "reward for freeze" proposal. While US incentives will only come after dismantlement begins - which is itself a step beyond the [President George W] Bush administration's "no rewards until dismantlement is complete" approach - Washington has indicated that it would not object to a South Korean plan to offer energy assistance to North Korea in return for a "complete and verifiable" freeze, as long as the freeze were identified as "a first step toward dismantlement".
For any freeze proposal to work, however, it must encompass all of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs, both plutonium and uranium-based. It must also be accompanied by a return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and monitoring devices to North Korea, removed in 2002. Therefore, success at the May 12 working-level talks, like success at the more senior-level six-party talks that will hopefully follow before the end of June, continues to rest on North Korea becoming more forthcoming on the full extent of its nuclear programs, and for China, South Korea and others to insist that any freeze be "complete and verifiable" before significant new rewards are provided to Pyongyang.

Ralph A Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [pacforum@hawaii.rr.com], a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute, which made this article available.

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Iran, North Korea and proliferation
By Ritt Goldstein

Part 1: US neo-cons and war
Part 2: Preemption and an arms race with itself

In early February, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted that he was instrumental in the sale of nuclear weapons technology to Iran and Libya. America's top arms control official, John Bolton, outlined that the Pakistani network sold "technology for enriching uranium as well as warhead designs to Iran, North Korea and Libya", according to the San Francisco Chronicle. And concerns exist that the warhead blueprints may have gone considerably further.
Notably, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports that Pakistani nuclear weapons cooperation with North Korea "accelerated in the 1990s". But in an amazing example of Bush administration spin, Bolton described the February revelations of the Pakistani operation as "a great intelligence success", arguing that the incident represented "an enormous victory", the Chronicle reported. And while the Bush administration has accepted Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf's assertions that Khan acted independently, a Washington coverup is widely understood.
US security and defense expert John Pike of Global Security observed for Asia Times Online: "Pakistan has been an extremely good partner to the US in the war on terrorism, because the US, to include the president of the US, has been prepared to lie publicly about their nuclear proliferation activities ... it was an established government [of Pakistan] policy."
A CRS report from March 11 notes that one account of events "states generals Musharraf, [Jehangir] Karamat and [Abdul ] Waheed knew of aid to North Korea when they were chiefs of the army staff". And two former Pakistani prime ministers' political parties have expressed concerns that Khan - who was immediately granted a pardon on his "confession" - is merely a handy scapegoat.
The CRS notes that Pakistan and North Korea have had a long cooperation on missile technology. CRS also questions whether a 1996 Pakistani foreign-currency crisis led the government to swap nuclear weapons technology, doing so in lieu of missile payments then allegedly due to Pyongyang. Moreover, while North Korea has never tested a nuclear device, the CRS cites "some reports" that in 1998 Pakistan tested a plutonium bomb for them.
Pike also spoke to this issue, noting that the detonation in question took place far from the site of Pakistan's first nuclear test, and that "sniffer planes" detected plutonium traces - the material North Korean weapons are said to use - and not the uranium with which Pakistani weapons are built. But cutting to what many perceive as the heart of such nuclear efforts, Pike noted: "Historically, states which have felt existential threats, states which feel they have a well-founded fear of regime change, have wanted to get the bomb." And the reasons for this are widely acknowledged.
US nuclear weapons and policy expert Joseph Cirincione, director for non-proliferation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Asia Times Online: "Nuclear weapons are the only weapons in the world that could deter the US." Highlighting the validity of Cirincione's assertion, nuclear hawk C Paul Robinson, director of the US nuclear weapons complex of Sandia National Laboratories, told the National Journal: "Some people draw the lesson that the United States can be deterred by nuclear weapons, but not by chemical or biological ones. I can't argue with that conclusion."
In the same August 2003 National Journal interview, Robinson also said: "I disagree with people who infer that the NPT [nuclear non-proliferation treaty] is a real arms control treaty. It's not." By contrast, numerous US figures, including former president Jimmy Carter, are on record as both strongly endorsing the NPT and expressing strong concern regarding its future.
Between the US's "pressures" on one hand, and its treaty abrogation and avoidance on the other, administration critics believe the international structures which have limited nuclear proliferation are effectively being pulled apart.
In a now established pattern highlighting the Bush administration's commitment to its treaty obligations, it appears to have rescinded the NPT's so-called "negative assurance" to non-nuclear states, a guarantee that they would never face nuclear attack as long as they continued to renounce nuclear weaponry. And with Washington's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) initiating the pursuit of new nuclear weapons, the US has clearly violated article six of the accord - its treaty obligation to continually move towards nuclear disarmament.
As early as 2001, the Observer from Britain christened international acts in this genre as "Big dog diplomacy". But the "big dog" has even been chewing up things at home.
Notably, in a reflection of the reasons underpinning the dangerously destabilizing erosion of US international credibility, the administration appears to have both substantively misled Congress and violated domestic legislation, with a recent CRS update even citing it for this.
But prior to the CRS findings, a sharply critical January letter to the agency responsible for nuclear weapons research and production - the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) - by the chairman and ranking member of the House of Representatives sub-committee overseeing their efforts - the sub-committee on energy and water development - charged that a drive to "charge forward with unrestricted efforts on advanced nuclear weapons concepts" is ongoing, despite Congressional limitations.
The NNSA's "bunker-busting" mini-nuke project, "RNEP", then spawned subsequent and very considerable CRS attention, with a April 9 CRS update highlighting quite wide Congressional concerns. "For many members [of Congress], the five-year cost of RNEP as presented in the FY2005 budget document came as a surprise not only in the amount, but also in what appeared to be an intent contrary to legislation," the CRS wrote. Demonstrating the Congress' level of reservation, in addition to House members, both Republican and Democratic senators' concerns were quoted by CRS.
In addressing his reservations with energy secretary Spencer Abraham, CRS quoted Senator Ted Kennedy as charging: "... you're rushing ahead with the nuclear weapons, including mini-nukes and the nuclear bunker busters. I'll give you a chance to be able to explain how this program [RNEP], which was $45 million two years ago is now up to almost $.5 billion." Other legislators voiced equally strong reservations, particularly regarding the manner in which the administration has pursued the nuclear "flexibility" advocated by the NPR.
As the BBC reported in August 2003, bunker-busting bombs "would fit well with President George W Bush's preference for a preemptive strike capability". But the price of such programs includes considerably more than dollars.
Numerous international security experts have warned of the potential for a new and global nuclear arms race. The Carnegie Endowment's Cirincione warned that if "the most powerful military nation in the world says it needs nuclear weapons for its national security, why don't other countries". He warned that not only America's "enemies", but its friends would be prompted to enter the nuclear race.
Emphasizing such concerns, Brazil recently made international headlines for refusing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors access to a new facility for uranium enrichment. Notably, during his successful campaign for office, Brazil's widely respected and much acclaimed president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, pointedly noted: "If someone asks me to disarm and keep a slingshot while he comes at me with a cannon, what good does that do?" And while Brazil is not currently suspected of having a weapons program, the implications of the Bush administration's nuclear posture appear profound.
As regards Russia, executive director Daryl Kimball of the Washington-based Arms Control Association told Asia Times Online that "the US-Russian arms reduction process has, for all intents and purposes, halted". And a recent article in Izvestia quoted the deputy chief of the Russian general staff, Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky, as warning: "We will be compelled to modify the development of our own strategic nuclear forces depending on Washington's plans."
Cirincione saw the administration's plans in terms of expanding militarism, saying: "They place their faith in maximizing US military strength, not in establishing international law or international norms", noting this was despite US interests lying in the firm establishment of both. Spain's new premier, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, had previously emphasized the same point, saying: "Terrorism is combated by the state of law ... That's what I think Europe and the international community have to debate." But some experts believe another kind of debate may be on the administration's agenda.
On April 6, the Wall Street Journal editorialized: "If warnings to Tehran from Washington don't impress them, perhaps some cruise missiles aimed at the Busheir nuclear site will." Concerns that Iran may have acquired the plans for a nuclear device appear to provide the true rationale behind such headlines, particularly as Iran is building a large uranium enrichment plant before it has reactors which could utilize that plant's nuclear fuel.
IAEA inspectors are reported to have questioned this sequence. And speculation exists that a US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear-related targets is possible in an effort to delay Iran's potential acquisition of sufficient fissile material for a weapon's construction. But Global Security's Pike noted that the difficulty in striking the most significant extent of any clandestine program would make such an effort ill advised. And the substantive political implications also argue against such a precipitous move; yet, some analysts have expressed concern.
Though a number of observers believe Iran may well be in the process of going nuclear, the majority believe any Iranian weapon would be for defensive purposes. "Clearly Iran's motivation is not to obliterate Israel, but to limit the ability of the US, or any foreign power, from coercing them," nuclear expert Christopher Paine of the Natural Resources Defense Council told Asia Times Online. But even defensive weapons could have implications.
Saudi Arabia is said to have helped fund Pakistan's nuclear program through discounts on its oil shipments. And according to Pike, "probably every even-numbered Pakistani bomb has a little sticker on it saying 'property of Saudi Arabia'," with the less than jocular implication being that should Iran go nuclear, the Saudis would do so simultaneously, long-standing differences between the two states spawning the move. Pike pointedly mentioned that Egypt would then want to join "the club", and a deadly regional nuclear arms race would be on. Pike noted that a similar situation exists in Asia, with North Korean weapons providing the seeds for an equally disturbing scenario there.
While it is widely acknowledged that US "pressures" have precipitated the current global volatility, many observers look to the November US elections, hoping for American "regime change" as the best avenue for renewed world stability.

Ritt Goldstein is an American investigative political journalist based in Stockholm. His work has appeared in broadsheets such as Australia's Sydney Morning Herald, Spain's El Mundo and Denmark's Politiken, as well as with the Inter Press Service (IPS), a global news agency.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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South Korea and Japan Reaching Out to North Korea

By Anthony Faiola
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, May 9, 2004; Page A25


SEOUL -- Top U.S. allies in Asia are opening new lines of communication with North Korea, seeking direct dialogue on a host of sensitive issues such as nuclear proliferation, even as the Bush administration continues to reject broad engagement.
The South Korean and Japanese governments reacted with new urgency, analysts said, after U.S. intelligence indicated that North Korea had built up an arsenal of at least eight nuclear devices over the past 20 months.
Two rounds of disarmament talks in Beijing involving high-level delegations from the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea have failed to produce results. With North Korea and the United States at loggerheads, the negotiations have devolved into mid-level working group talks set to begin Wednesday, leaving few observers optimistic of a quick breakthrough.
As a result, South Korea and Japan -- which lie within easy range of North Korean missiles -- are engaging North Korea independently. President Bush, in contrast, has branded North Korea a member of the "axis of evil," rejecting bilateral talks with the government of Kim Jong Il.
South Korea, whose policy of rapprochement has brought unprecedented contacts with the North since the late 1990s, is pushing for more and better dialogue. Officials in Seoul, frustrated with the deadlocked multilateral talks, are convinced the North Koreans need to "be drawn out into trusting us," one official in Seoul said. During the last round of six-nation talks in Beijing, South Korean officials proposed to their North Korean counterparts that they open bilateral channels of communication on the nuclear issue.
"The biggest point with the North Koreans now, whether in dealing with the nuclear or other issues, is establishing trust," said a South Korean official familiar with the talks. "If they don't trust us or the United States, they will be less willing to reach an agreement. That is where dialogue comes in. We need to establish trust through more communication, not less."
In Washington, a Bush administration official said both South Korea and Japan had their own reasons for dealing directly with North Korea. "I think we're not too far out of line here," he said, noting there would be "tremendous opportunities" for direct meetings between U.S. and North Korean officials at the working-group talks. "I think there is enough opportunity for dialogue. We don't think that has been a major obstacle to moving on."
Improved North-South communications can already be seen in photos of South Korea's unification minister, Jeong Se Hyun, shaking hands with his counterparts in Pyongyang this week. The South Korean decision to dispatch a cabinet-level delegation for four days of talks on security issues -- the second such meeting this year -- resulted in a key breakthrough. North Korea's typically surly military agreed to hold a rare meeting between top generals from North and South on defense issues, perhaps this month.
Japan last week dispatched a high-level team to Beijing to meet with North Korean officials. Although the nuclear issue was reportedly raised, the meeting focused on Japan's demands for the return of family members of Japanese citizens abducted by the North Koreans and held in spy training camps during the 1970s and 1980s. Two years ago, North Korea allowed five Japanese citizens to return home and admitted they had been abducted, but it kept eight close family members -- including children -- in North Korea.
Japan and North Korea have been at bitter odds over their return, but Japanese officials described the North Koreans as showing a new willingness to cooperate during this week's talks. One Japanese official who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the negotiations said Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi "is prepared to do whatever it takes" to secure the return of the family members.
That includes, the official said, the possibility of jump-starting now-frozen talks to normalize relations with North Korea. Koizumi is reportedly prepared to fly to Pyongyang to receive the detainees if the North Koreans give them up -- an event that would mark Koizumi's first official visit there since his historic summit with Kim in September 2002.
The overtures by South Korea and Japan underscore the divergent opinions held by the three allies on how to handle North Korea.
South Korea, in particular, has called on the U.S. government to show "more flexibility" to resolve the nuclear crisis. The Bush administration has insisted on a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. But U.S. officials have been "vague," according to one South Korean government source familiar with the talks, on the eventual rewards the North can expect if it complies.
North Korea has a plutonium reactor and appears to have recently reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea told U.S. diplomats two years ago that it had a uranium enrichment program but has since denied the program's existence.
Analysts see Japanese and South Korean engagement of the North in two possible lights. On the one hand, the increased dialogue may turn into a useful, if indirect, channel for U.S. officials to hash out thorny issues and could help pave the way for a disarmament agreement.
But analysts warn there is also a risk that North Korea may succeed in what many see as its primary strategic goal: to drive a wedge between the United States and its key Asian allies.
The Japanese, for instance, share the Bush administration's hard line on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. But analysts say a decision by North Korea to return the relatives of the kidnapped Japanese citizens could be calculated to soften Tokyo's resolve.
It could also be pragmatic. The Japanese government is likely to be called upon to offer massive economic aid to North Korea if it dismantled its nuclear programs. But the Japanese have said they would not offer any aid until North Korea resolved the issue of the family members.
The United States, Japan and South Korea are allies "in the same bed but with different dreams," said Hideshi Takesada, professor at Tokyo's National Institute for Defense Studies. "Japan and the U.S. are united, but there is a gap between those two countries and South Korea," he said. "North Korea has already succeeded in drawing South Korea to the North's side. . . . Now it's trying aggressively to hammer a wedge between Bush and Koizumi."
Staff writer Glenn Kessler in Washington and special correspondent Sachiko Sakamaki in Tokyo contributed to this report.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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China Warns Hong Kong Legislators to Halt Debate on Elections

By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, May 9, 2004; Page A15

BEIJING, May 8 -- China warned Saturday that pro-democracy lawmakers in Hong Kong are violating the law by proposing legislative resolutions criticizing the government's refusal to allow the territory to choose its leaders in direct elections.
The warning, from the government's liaison office in Hong Kong, marked the first time Beijing has sought to limit discussion in Hong Kong's Legislative Council since the former British colony reverted to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Attributed to an unnamed senior official, the statement was the latest step in a government campaign seeking to end debate on its April 26 decision to bar direct elections for Hong Kong's chief executive in 2007 and the full legislature in 2008.
"The official says any move by Legislative Councilors in Hong Kong to advance motions to voice 'discontent' or 'condemn' the April 26 decision by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress over Hong Kong's constitutional development is against the law as well as the constitution," the statement said. "He says the moves do not accord with the Legislative Council's constitutional status as a local legislature and go beyond the limit of its duty and authority."
The statement, issued late Friday night in Hong Kong and relayed Saturday by the official New China News Agency, came in response to attempts by members of the Legislative Council to pass a resolution condemning the Beijing government and another expressing regret at its decision not to allow expanded voting.
Both motions have been blocked by the Legislative Council president, Rita Fan, on grounds they violate the Basic Law, negotiated between China and departing British officials, which outlines the "one country, two systems" arrangement for Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong.
Yeung Sum, chairman of the Democracy Party, told Hong Kong reporters that Fan's rulings in support of Beijing's views amount to restrictions on freedom of speech in the Legislative Council.
The first motion was introduced a week ago by Martin Lee, a leading pro-democracy legislator. It called on the Legislative Council to "strongly condemn" the April 26 decision by Beijing.
After Lee's motion was blocked, another pro-democracy legislator, Albert Ho, introduced a motion accusing Beijing of violating the Basic Law by infringing on the one-country, two systems arrangement that was supposed to guarantee Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy. In addition, it expressed "regret and discontent" at the April 26 decision.
With their motions stymied, pro-democracy activists had called a meeting for Monday to decide the next step in the confrontation. Legislators said they could introduce a third, softer resolution in hopes it would be allowed to come to a vote. If Fan remained firm, they could take the rulings to court seeking to have them overturned.
But Beijing's tough statement appeared designed as a warning that the debate had gone on long enough. The pro-democracy lawmakers are not entitled to voice any criticism of central government decisions through legislative resolutions, the Chinese government said, adding that the April 26 decision was "an important legal document" that "cannot be questioned or challenged."
Audrey Eu, one of 24 elected members in the 60-seat legislature, suggested Beijing's warning, if heeded, would rob the body of its oversight function. "The move implies that Legislative Councilors cannot speak freely, and how could you expect us to speak for the people, to monitor the government?" she said.
"It is not in the interest of Hong Kong's society," said Edward Chan, chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association.
Chinese authorities and their followers in Hong Kong have suggested repeatedly that the debate over political reform in Hong Kong should wane now that Beijing has spoken. Premier Wen Jiabao said during a recent visit to Europe that the April 26 decision did not rule out direct elections forever, only for now. But the message in Hong Kong has been that it is time to move on.
Chinese officials and like-minded Hong Kong officials have put forward two reasons for delaying the expansion of Hong Kong's voting rights. First, they suggest that moving swiftly toward full democracy could destabilize the territory and endanger its economic well-being. Second, they say that those who push for full democratic rights are not patriotic Chinese citizens but are following a U.S. or British agenda.

Special correspondent K.C. Ng in Hong Kong contributed to this report.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company


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Pakistan's Uneasy Role in Terror War
Conciliatory Approach to Tribal and Foreign Fighters Leaves U.S. Officials Frustrated

By Pamela Constable
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, May 8, 2004; Page A08


ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, May 7 -- It was a cinematic moment, heavy with symbolism. In the courtyard of a village Islamic school, uniformed army officers greeted tribal fighters wearing enormous turbans and bandoliers. Rusty rifles and swords were ceremonially presented, and the former adversaries embraced.
But the April 24 meeting, which formally ended a bloody month-long conflict between Pakistani troops and Islamic militants in the tribal region bordering Afghanistan, also signaled a setback for Pakistan's campaign to clear al Qaeda and Taliban operatives out of its border areas. And it underscored persistent contradictions between Pakistani and U.S. priorities despite the two governments' alliance against terrorism.
More than 21/2 years after the United States launched military operations in Afghanistan, U.S. officials continue to describe the threat from revived Taliban and al Qaeda forces there as an urgent and overriding concern. There are constant reports of armed attacks on military or civilian targets in several Afghan provinces along the Pakistani border, and extremist groups have vowed to intensify assaults before the Afghan national elections, which are scheduled for September.
While U.S. and Afghan forces pursue their quarry on the Afghan side of the border, they rely on Pakistan to take on guerrillas who have found refuge on the other side. From Washington's perspective, Pakistan's aborted military mission in the tribal area of South Waziristan was a job half done.
A series of raids in March ended with more than 120 people dead but did not result in the capture or killing of any senior Taliban or al Qaeda figure believed to be sheltered in the rugged, semi-autonomous region. Instead, the mission ended in a settlement that offered amnesty to foreign and tribal fighters who had fiercely resisted the raids, including one local leader who this week pledged loyalty to the Taliban and an anti-Western holy war.
On Monday, the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno, called on Pakistan to renew its military operations in the defiant tribal regions. Criticizing Pakistan's conciliatory approach, he said that "there are foreign fighters in those tribal areas who will have to be killed or captured."
The U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, has made similar critical remarks, expressing disappointment and impatience with Pakistan's performance. So far, U.S. officials noted, not a single foreign fighter has come forward to register under Pakistan's amnesty, though officials have twice extended the deadline for them to surrender or face military action. Last week, the cutoff date was extended to May 8.
Pakistani authorities have bristled at the American criticism, saying they remain determined to uproot Islamic terrorism but must balance the concerns of their allies with the need to respect public opinion and keep the peace at home.
"We are committed to the war on terror and we will pursue it to the end," said a senior government official. "We have a well-thought-out operational and political strategy. We need American support, but we are also sensitive to public opinion, and we do not want to add fuel to the extremists.
"It's a tricky situation, and we must be nimble," he added. "If we don't take care of our domestic constituents, we cannot deliver to the Americans either."
Pakistan is an impoverished Muslim country of 150 million people, rife with religious passions and bristling with weapons. Many Pakistanis are obsessed with national sovereignty and suspicious of Western motives; some adhere to radical interpretations of Islam and oppose efforts to modernize society. Tribesmen are especially protective of their autonomy and traditional way of life.
The agreement that was sealed at the April meeting in South Waziristan may have rewarded a group the government had vowed to punish for harboring foreign terrorists, but analysts say it also averted a wider clash with restive tribesmen, a potential split in the army and a backlash by the country's militant Islamic movement.
"The compromise was an acknowledgment of brutal reality," said Rifaat Hussain, an expert on Pakistani defense issues. "The government wanted to win international credibility, but it could not go too far without risking domestic opposition and possibly provoking a local war. The overriding goal became not to open another front and antagonize the tribal areas -- even at the price of international criticism."
A similar balancing act has blunted many of the initiatives promoted by Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, since he seized power in October 1999. He frequently has been forced to scale back or even abandon ambitious reform efforts, backed by Western governments, after encountering strong resistance from political, religious or economic groups at home.
But the dilemma has been sharpest when it comes to the war on terrorism, to which Musharraf has repeatedly committed his government since the Bush administration first demanded his support after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Musharraf's decision to back the U.S.-led effort abruptly put the Pakistani government, which supported not only the Taliban but also a handful of Muslim guerrilla groups fighting Indian forces in Kashmir, at odds with many powerful segments of society.
This week, for example, while U.S. officials were expressing concern that Pakistan had backed off in the border region, the Pakistani parliament erupted in indignation at the news that a handful of U.S. troops had briefly strayed across the poorly marked border from southeastern Afghanistan.
"There is not a single Pakistani who accepts the intrusion of a single foreign soldier on Pakistani soil," said Aitzaz Ahsan, a lawyer and legislator of the opposition Pakistan People's Party in parliament. He said the government must balance the need to combat terrorism with respect for due process, national sovereignty and domestic traditions, including the laws that limit state intervention in the tribal areas.
"We cannot countenance that foreign elements take refuge in Pakistan to destabilize Afghanistan or any other country, but we also cannot countenance a paramilitary operation that ignores the political system and brutalizes the human rights of Pakistani citizens," Ahsan said. "No one wants foreign elements in Pakistan, but this problem cannot be left to the military alone."
Pakistan's religious parties, whose influence has grown dramatically in recent years and who now wield significant power in several provinces and the national legislature, have been far harsher, repeatedly branding Musharraf as a Western lackey.
Under the April 24 agreement, five tribal guerrilla leaders received full amnesties in return for agreeing to lay down their weapons. Foreign guerrillas were allowed to remain in the tribal areas as long as they agreed to live peacefully and register with the government.
This week Naik Mohammed, 28, one of the tribal leaders, received local journalists in his village. He denied harboring any fighters from other countries, but he described himself as an Islamic holy warrior and said he had fought alongside the Taliban in the past.
Within Pakistan, reaction to the agreement has been mixed. Numerous critics said that while it temporarily pacified the tribal region, it also may have emboldened such troublemakers as Mohammed and set back efforts to reform the governance of tribal areas, which have traditionally been havens for crime, smuggling, violence and primitive forms of justice.
Some, however, saw the agreement as something more portentous: a tactical retreat from an anti-terrorist policy that government critics say could lead to further military intervention in Pakistani politics.
"The Americans are using Pakistan, and what their officials in Kabul are asking of us is the road to suicide," said Sen. Khursheed Ahmad, an Islamic scholar and member of the country's largest Islamic party. "We do not condone terrorism, but the Americans are trying to persuade us to kill our own people. If the war on terror leads the army to carve out an institutional role in politics, it will be bad for Pakistan and bad for America too."



? 2004 The Washington Post Company



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The Best of Bad Choices


Given the Iraq War's mounting costs and impossible goals, America should transfer sovereignty and come home.


By Christopher Layne

The administration's Iraq policy is in shambles. Iraq has become a geopolitical humpty-dumpty that America cannot put back together, and the time has come for the United States to withdraw.
We now face a full-blown uprising against the occupation of Iraq. Events plainly belie the administration's spin that order will soon be restored and that the revolt is just the work of a few Iraqi extremists and a handful of terrorists from other Middle Eastern states. Even top officials in the British government--America's most loyal ally--understand that the administration's take on Iraq is divorced from reality. As British Foreign Minister Jack Straw said, "The lid on the pressure cooker has come off. There is no doubt that the current situation is very serious and it is the most serious we have faced. It plainly is the fact today that there are larger numbers of people, and they are people on the ground, Iraqis, not foreign fighters, who are engaged in this insurgency." Americans should not allow the administration's "perception management" campaign--a fancy bureaucratic term for lying--to pull the wool over their eyes.
From a policy standpoint, an even greater concern is that the administration believes its own disinformation about events in Iraq. But there are three disturbing facts about the insurrection that cannot be swept under the rug. First, what began as a small-scale insurgency mounted by Sunni "dead-enders" and "former regime elements" now has morphed into a broad-based popular rebellion joined by large numbers of Shi'ites. The Shi'ite revolt is especially troubling because--to the extent that the Bush II administration had any strategy at all for administering postwar Iraq--it was based on the assumption that the United States could co-opt the Shi'ites and gain their support for Washington's plans to create a "democratic" Iraq. Second, Iraq's Sunnis and Shi'ites --heretofore deeply antagonistic to each other--now are finding common ground in resisting the occupation. Here U.S. policy seems to be having a bitterly ironic and quite unintended consequence. Previously, Iraq, which Britain artificially cobbled together from the Ottoman Empire's wreckage, lacked a sense of national identity. Now, however, resentment of the American occupation is creating an Iraqi nationalism shared by Sunnis and Shi'ites. Third, outrage at America's heavy-handed use of military power to suppress the uprising has alienated the very Iraqis Washington has counted upon to form the core of a new government to which "sovereignty" can be transferred. Although they were handpicked by U.S. officials, leading members of the Iraqi Governing Council now are condemning American policy and distancing themselves from Washington.
Where does U.S. policy go from here? There are three options: internationalizing the occupation, increasing U.S. troop strength and cracking down hard on the insurgency, or withdrawal.
Internationalizing the occupation by bringing in the UN and/or NATO is a non-starter--pure political grandstanding. First, Iraq now is so dangerous and chaotic it is doubtful that the UN wants to step in and take responsibility for trying to fix things. Second, for the same reasons, other nations are not going to rush in and send troops to restore order in Iraq. Indeed, it now is apparent that others are concluding that their best option is staying out--or, if they already have troops there, getting out--of Iraq. Third, although some individual NATO members have token contingents in Iraq, the alliance has its hands full in Afghanistan (and the Europeans are stretched to the breaking point by their non-NATO Balkan and West African peacekeeping commitments). NATO just doesn't have more troops that it can send to help the U.S. in Iraq.
There is another reason internationalization cannot be a real option as long as the Bush II administration remains in office. Even if the UN agreed to step in, it would do so only if Washington agreed to give the international community real decision-making authority in Iraq. The Bush administration will not do this because giving up control over Iraq would be tantamount to abandoning the very goals for which it went to war in the first place: using Iraq as a platform for establishing American military dominance in the Persian Gulf; transforming Iraq into a dependable, oil-supplying client state; and using Iraq as the launching pad for the proposed "democratic transformation" of the entire Middle East.
Increasing American troop levels and suppressing the insurgency is not a viable option, either. Although the U.S. has enough firepower to dampen down the insurrection--at least for a while--this would be a self-defeating policy because there no longer is a military solution in Iraq. There is a good reason --to quote the title of Andrew Mack's important article that appeared some years ago in the journal World Politics--big states lose small wars.
Insurgencies start small but gain widespread political support by driving a wedge between the civilian population and the occupation forces. Here, insurgents count on the occupation forces to be their unwitting accomplices. When the occupying forces resort to violent and coercive measures, they lose politically by alienating the population. As events in Fallujah and elsewhere demonstrate, such tactics fan widespread popular anger and resentment. Regardless of what happens in Iraq in the next several weeks, a watershed has been reached. Iraq's population is seething and hostile, and if the United States stays on in Iraq, henceforth it will face broad-based political, and armed, resistance to the occupation. In that setting, the U.S. will confront the asymmetry in motivation that causes big states to lose small wars; the Iraqis are fighting for their country, but the United States is fighting for goals that are ephemeral.
Contrary to what Mr. Bush has said, the growing numbers of Iraqis supporting the insurgency do not "hate freedom." It is just that they define "freedom" as freedom from American rule. Now, in this regard, the administration hopes it can placate Iraqi nationalism by handing over "sovereignty" on June 30. But Iraqis are not fooled by this, and Americans shouldn't be either. As things now stand, Iraq will be sovereign in name only because the U.S. will still be wielding military, economic, and political control in Baghdad.
The administration has dug a hole in Iraq. It is time to stopping digging deeper. The war was a tragic, avoidable mistake, and those who opposed it have been vindicated. The administration should be held accountable, both for leading the nation in war under false pretenses and for its willful failure to think through the consequences of going to war with Iraq. As James Fallows recently pointed out in the Atlantic, the administration was warned about many things. It was warned by the then-Army Chief of Staff that stabilizing postwar Iraq would require the long-term commitment of several hundred thousand U.S. troops. It was warned by the Army War College that if American forces remained in postwar Iraq for any length of time, they would soon cease to be viewed as liberators and be seen instead as a hostile occupation army. And it was warned that Iraq was a singularly poor candidate for a "democracy transplant" because it lacked the essential prerequisites for a successful democratic transition. (And if by some chance the U.S. did transplant democracy to Iraq, we would rue the day. A democratic Iraq would be virulently anti-American and anti-Israeli.) The administration turned a deaf ear to these warnings because it considered them to be "antiwar"--that is, undermining its already decided-upon policy of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. And, of course, the administration was correct: these warnings did cut the legs from underneath its case for going to war because they demonstrated that the administration's policy would lead the U.S. into an Iraqi quagmire.
Of course, it can be said that all this is true but is just water under the bridge: we are in Iraq now, and it is "defeatist" to suggest that the United States "cut and run." There are arguments that can be marshaled to support continuing American involvement, but they are not very convincing. And if they are accepted, it will mean that the U.S. has to stay in Iraq for a long, long time no matter what the cost in lives and treasure--and even though there is scant prospect of ultimate success.
First, some will claim that if the U.S. withdraws Iraq will fall into chaos. Of course, the U.S. has been in Iraq for a year and that country is in chaos. Second, it might be claimed that if America withdraws Iraq will become a terrorist haven. But the truth is that the longer the United States stays in Iraq, the more that country will become a magnet for Islamic fighters who want to take us on. Staying the course will not make things better, because America's bloody suppression of the current uprising not only is alienating many Iraqis who were--up to now--acquiescing in the occupation (however reluctantly) but also is stirring up anti-Americanism and creating more terrorism throughout the Middle East. Third, it is said that if America fails to prevail in Iraq, our enemies--not just in the Middle East, but worldwide--will doubt U.S. resolve and will be tempted to challenge the United States in future crises. Well, the same arguments were made against withdrawing from Vietnam. But the United States withdrew from Vietnam, and it survived to triumph in the Cold War: the dominoes did not topple, America's world position did not crumble, and neither its allies nor its adversaries questioned Washington's determination to defend vital U.S. interests.
There is a more heart-wrenching argument against U.S. withdrawal: how can we justify the loss of American lives to the parents of those military personnel who have been killed in Iraq? The real question, however, is how many more parents do we wish to send into mourning. The argument about sunk costs--whether in lives, in wounded (some 3,000 U.S. troops have been wounded in Iraq, many grievously), or dollars (some $121 billion in 2003 and another estimated $50-75 billion this year)--can always be invoked to stick with a failed policy. But staying the course--continuing to pay these costs in pursuit of policy objectives that cannot be attained--is not the answer. Instead of compounding our losses in Iraq, we should be cutting them.
The United States has no good options in Iraq but the least bad is this: Washington should transfer real sovereignty to the Iraqis on June 30. It should tell the Iraqis to work out their own political future among themselves and turn over full responsibility for Iraq's external and internal security to the new regime in Baghdad. Simultaneously, the United States also should suspend all offensive military operations in Iraq, pull its forces back to defensive enclaves well away from Iraq's cities, and commence a withdrawal of American forces from Iraq that will be completed on December 31 (or on January 20, 2005).
There is no point in being Pollyannaish. In the long run, the U.S. will be better off leaving Iraq. In the short-term, however, there will be consequences--not all of which are foreseeable--if the U.S. withdraws. But that misses the point. Sooner or later the U.S. is going to end up leaving Iraq without having attained its goals. Washington's real choice is akin to that posed in an old oil-filter commercial that used to run on television: America can pay now, or it can pay later when the costs will be even higher.
Some 45 years ago, France found itself involved in a conflict very much like that in which the U.S. is involved in Iraq. Algeria was a bitter, bloody, and interminable struggle. The French could not prevail but were unwilling to bow to reality. Charles de Gaulle--a statesman of great vision and courage--cut the Gordian knot and extricated France from the unwinnable war in Algeria. Although painful, it was the right decision. George W. Bush is no de Gaulle. He is incapable either of admitting that his administration blundered into Iraq or of cutting America's losses and disengaging. Whether any other political leader in the U.S. is capable of stepping up to the plate and demonstrating de Gaulle-like wisdom--which might require admitting to having made a misjudgment in initially backing the decision to go to war--remains to be seen. But plainly, the time has come for a statesman to step forward and ask the American people the question that must be asked: if the United States remains in Iraq, how do we tell the U.S. troops there that one of them will be the last one to die for a mistake?
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Christopher Layne, a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and a Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, writes frequently about American and international politics.


May 10, 2004 issue
Copyright ? 2004 The American Conservative

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Iraq through a rear-view mirror


By Paul Greenberg


Slowly, painfully slowly, after a long and increasingly bloody year, a hard truth dawns on American policymakers:
A New and Democratic Iraq cannot be created simply by repeating that phrase. There can be no new Iraq unless it is rooted in the old, or it will be swept away by the first wind out of the desert.

To quote some wisdom out of the East: Where there is no vision, the people perish. Democracy may be a grand vision, but where there is no appreciation of the realities, it is vision that perishes. And nowhere can visions be more dangerous and deluding than in the desert, where wishes may create cruel mirages. Especially to foreign eyes.
Looking at Iraq a year after the formal war ended while the informal, decisive one continues, there is no listing all the multiple mistakes made there, but some stand out like a mountain range, casting long shadows:
* It becomes clearer as the Rumsfeldian mirages are dispelled that the old Iraqi army should not have been disbanded but reformed under rehabilitatable leaders.
By dissolving the Iraqi army, the occupying authorities in one brilliant stroke assured high unemployment, created a critical mass of injured pride and deep resentment in the Iraqi population, and loosed bands of well-armed freebooters to roam the country -- much like the German Freikorps that bedeviled the Weimar Republic after the collapse of the Kaiser's Empire at the end of the First World War in 1918.
* Order should have been more strictly imposed -- instead of violence being tolerated in the name of freedom. Our own Gen. John Shinfeki had warned it might take some 200,000 American troops to occupy Iraq. At the time he may have seemed alarmist to the civilians running the Pentagon like any other high-tech, low-manpower, outsourcing corporation; now he seems prophetic.
* Established religious leaders should have been given greater sway, imported secular ones held in check. Democracy should have been given room to develop in accordance with the culture, not pitted against its Islamic basis.
Next to these massive misjudgments, American successes may not be the stuff of headlines, but they are just as real and impressive -- from a remarkably successful three-week military campaign a year ago to the peace and progress that generally reigns in Kurdish territory. Freedom of the press, individual rights, the liberation of Iraqi women ... all are signal contributions to this new-old Iraq.
But it is the mistakes that stand out in hindsight (they always do) and are brought home with every casualty report. Yet in hindsight it also becomes clearer the greatest mistake of all would have been to allow Saddam Hussein to stay in power, and to think/hope we could somehow contain his mad plans without a showdown at some point. The sooner it came, the better for America and the world.
The various weapons programs David Kay found in Iraq after the formal war there had been concluded, even if they had not yet produced weapons, needed to be stopped while they were still programs, not assembly lines. As George W. Bush observed soon after September 11, time was not on our side.
As for John Kerry, he has not yet made the mother of all mistakes; he still gives at least lip service to staying the course in Iraq, though it is clear he also hopes to appeal to the isolationist impulse at the core of the American psyche.
The senator who would be president has his own litany of empty phrases that on examination will not stand up any better than the superficial talk of a New and Democratic Iraq: He speaks loosely of recruiting NATO to supplant American forces, by which he means France and Germany -- the same powers that frustrated any real attempt to confront Saddam Hussein in the first place.
Mr. Kerry speaks just as loosely about relying on the United Nations, the same outfit that originated the oil-for-palaces program that enriched not just Saddam Hussein but the U.N. itself -- and maybe some high-ranking U.N. officials personally. (The investigation is only starting, and may still get sidetracked.)
Both NATO and the U.N. may provide useful diplomatic cover, but, please, let us not replace old delusions with new ones. Peace and freedom depend, as they have for the better part of a century now, on the power and perseverance of America, and the steadfastness of American public opinion. Make no mistake: If our national unity goes, so will American security. Among all the new lessons to be learned, an old one needs to be kept in mind: Divided we fall.

Paul Greenberg is a nationally syndicated columnist.

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Soldier: Role was to 'make it hell' for prisoners
Reservist tells of orders from intelligence officers

An undated family handout photo obtained by the Washington Post shows Army Specialist Sabrina D. Harman with a young Iraqi boy in Al Hillah., Iraq. Harman is among those charged with abuse of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison.
By Jackie Spinner
Updated: 11:45 p.m. ET May 07, 2004There were no rules, by her account, and there was little training. But the mission was clear. Spec. Sabrina D. Harman, a military police officer who has been charged with abusing detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, said she was assigned to break down prisoners for interrogation.
"They would bring in one to several prisoners at a time already hooded and cuffed," Harman said by e-mail this week from Baghdad. "The job of the MP was to keep them awake, make it hell so they would talk."
Harman, one of seven military police reservists charged in the abuse of detainees at the prison, is the second of those soldiers to speak publicly about her time at Abu Ghraib, and her comments echo findings of the Army's investigation into prisoner abuse there. That probe documented the maltreatment of detainees and found the prison was chaotically run, that there were no apparent rules governing interrogations and that Harman's military police unit was ill trained for the job it was asked to perform.

* Special reports: Military

Harman, a 26-year-old Army reservist from Alexandria, said members of her military police unit took direction from Army military intelligence officers, from CIA operatives and from civilian contractors who conducted interrogations. She did not discuss abusive treatment of prisoners or clarify who specifically ordered such treatment, and she referred questions about the charges against her to her attorney, who declined to comment.
Her face is now famous as belonging to one of two soldiers posing in the widely published photograph of naked Iraqi detainees stacked in a pyramid. The picture is one of several that have inflamed the Arab world and brought condemnation from President Bush and other U.S. political and military leaders.
Harman is accused by the Army of taking photographs of that pyramid and photographing and videotaping detainees who were ordered to strip and masturbate in front of other prisoners and soldiers, according to a charge sheet obtained by The Washington Post. She is also charged with photographing a corpse and then posing for a picture with it; with striking several prisoners by jumping on them as they lay in a pile; with writing "rapeist" on a prisoner's leg; and with attaching wires to a prisoner's hands while he stood on a box with his head covered. She told him he would be electrocuted if he fell off the box, the documents said.


The New Yorker via AP
Harman is among the soldiers who posed with Iraqi detainees. She is accused by the Army of videotaping prisoners who were ordered to strip.
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Private employees as interrogators
In her e-mails, Harman said detainees would be handed over to her military police unit by Army intelligence officers, by CIA operatives or by the contractors. The Army probe into Abu Ghraib said the U.S. government used employees of private companies as interrogators and interpreters along with intelligence officers. Two of the civilian contractors are under investigation in connection with the abuses.
Prisoners were stripped, searched and then "made to stand or kneel for hours," Harman said. Sometimes they were forced to stand on boxes or hold boxes or to exercise to tire them out, she said.
"The person who brought them in would set the standards on whether or not to 'be nice,' " she said. "If the prisoner was cooperating, then the prisoner was able to keep his jumpsuit, mattress, and was allowed cigarettes on request or even hot food. But if the prisoner didn't give what they wanted, it was all taken away until [military intelligence] decided. Sleep, food, clothes, mattresses, cigarettes were all privileges and were granted with information received."
She said the prison had no standard operating procedures and on Tier 1A, where suspected insurgents were held, Army and other intelligence officers "made the rules as they went."
Harman joined the Army as a reservist in 2001, after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. She was assigned to the 372nd, based in Cresaptown, Md. The company was called up for duty in February of last year and deployed to Fort Lee, Va., for three months before heading to Iraq.
Harman, an assistant manager at a Papa John's Pizza in Fairfax County before being sent to Iraq, said the company received additional training at Fort Lee, but it was for "combat support, not I/R," the military term for internment and resettlement. She said she was never schooled in the Geneva Conventions' rules on prisoner treatment.
"The Geneva Convention was never posted, and none of us remember taking a class to review it," Harman said. "The first time reading it was two months after being charged. I read the entire thing highlighting everything the prison is in violation of. There's a lot."
'They're passing the buck'
In the Army report on conditions at the prison, Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba said that "soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater and throughout their mission."
The Army has launched several investigations into the abuse and has notified seven officers and sergeants that they will receive letters of reprimand or admonishment that could end their careers.
Harman is charged with conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty and maltreatment, making a false statement, and assault. She faces an Article 32 hearing tentatively set in June, the military equivalent of a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is enough evidence to convene a court-martial.
In his investigation, Taguba used a portion of Harman's sworn statement to conclude that prisoners had been abused. Harman "stated . . . regarding the incident where a detainee was placed on box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, 'that her job was to keep detainees awake.' "
The other soldiers charged with abuse are Staff Sgt. Ivan L. Frederick II, Sgt. Javal S. Davis, Cpl. Charles A. Graner Jr., Spec. Jeremy C. Sivits, Spec. Megan M. Ambuhl and Pfc. Lynndie R. England. England was charged yesterday.
Harman's mother, Robin Harman, said her daughter would never hurt anyone.
"She has this . . . attitude that she is going to save the world," said Robin Harman, who lives in Northern Virginia. "She got over there and got an eye-opener. You don't put unqualified kids in that situation."
Yesterday, as Robin Harman watched Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld testify, she called her daughter a "scapegoat." "They're passing the buck, putting it all on the little kids," she said. "That's what makes me so mad."
Harman took many photographs while in Iraq, her family said.
Evidence of improper conditions
Among hundreds of digital pictures passed around her MP unit -- and obtained by The Post -- is one taken before the soldiers got to Abu Ghraib in October. In it, Harman is smiling, crouching slightly, a thumb up, and leaning toward a blackened, decaying corpse with long fingers and a gaping mouth.
The photo was taken at a makeshift combat morgue in Al Hillah, her family said, citing letters that Harman sent with the picture.
Sabrina Harman grew up around photographs of dead people, her family explained. Her father was a homicide detective, and her mother was a forensics buff. Robin Harman said her husband often brought home crime-scene photographs for the family to "profile."
"She has been looking at autopsies and crime-scene pictures since she was a kid," her mother said. "At 7 or 8, she could spot things I'd miss."
Shortly after Harman got to Abu Ghraib in October, her mother said, she began to take and collect pictures as evidence of the improper conditions.
Robin Harman said when her daughter told her what she was doing, she ordered her to stop. "We got into an argument about it at 4 a.m.," Robin Harman said. "Sabrina said she had to prove this. I told her to bring the pictures home, hide them and stay out of it."
Sabrina Harman brought the photographs home to Virginia in mid-November during a two-week leave. An Army investigator showed up on Jan. 16 and took a CD of photos and Harman's laptop computer, her roommate said.
In February, the Army moved Harman to Camp Victory, a base of trailers and tents near Baghdad's airport. Her weapon was confiscated, but she is not in confinement. She spends her days sweeping streets and planting flowers, her family said.
Robin Harman said her daughter had dreamed of following her father into a career as a homicide detective. Now she does not want to have anything to do with law enforcement, Robin Harman said.
"She just moved out two years ago," Robin Harman said. "She has no clue what people are really like. She thinks everyone is good."

? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Little Red Corvette
Do the pictures of John Kerry in his Lycra cycling suit make you wonder if he's running for the right reasons?
by Hugh Hewitt
05/06/2004 12:00:00 AM
WHEN JOHN KERRY took a spill from his bike this past weekend, it triggered thoughts of Jimmy Carter's collapse in a road race, Gerald Ford's much-mocked stumbles, and of Kerry's own misadventures on the ski slopes earlier this year. But it wasn't until the pictures of Kerry on his bike appeared that the real damage was done. The electric-lemon Lycra look probably won't play well outside the metrosexual caucus, and it can't be particularly inspiring to the troops living in holes outside of Falluja. Presidents can golf, and they can run, but they can't get dandied up and dart around on bikes in tights and fluorescent helmets.
Kerry's obsessive, if ill-fated, displays of physical activity also raise issues other than decorum. I've seen this sort of behavior before in men of a certain age, usually from their early 50s to their early 60s. And then the thought stuck: Are John Kerry's presidential ambitions and the shape and images of his campaign more about a mid-life crisis writ very large than any underlying set of ideas?
First, note that there aren't a lot of ideas over at Kerry Central, other than the U.N. blathering which, in the aftermath of oil-for-food-for-cash-for-Kofi's-friends, doesn't even persuade United Nations employees anymore. And Kerry's paper thin record of Senate accomplishments over two decades doesn't provide us with a reason for his running either.
So who's to say that it all isn't just an effort to head-off old age via the biggest sideshow of them all.
There are warning signs of mid-life crisis. At least a couple of these--excessive time spent on personal appearance and the constant reminiscing about one's youth--seem spot-on in the context of Kerry. And the big gun experts on male mid-life melt-down, such as Jim Conway, author of Men in Midlife Crisis, warn that some candidates for mid-life crisis "seem to have a lot of power, leadership, and ability, yet many of them express great insecurity, and feeling worthless." Kerry may be hiding a lot of angst behind his fa?ade of lift-tickets and SUVs and his Shrumian rhetoric.
Presidents Bush, Clinton, and Carter arrived in the White House before the age when the mid-life demons descend, and President Reagan and candidate Dole had passed the age of such smash-ups.
But Kerry's definitely in the danger zone. Maybe those Lycra shorts are just a cry for help. Maybe he needs help. Maybe what the Kerry campaign really needs is a red corvette.
Hugh Hewitt is the host of The Hugh Hewitt Show, a nationally syndicated radio talkshow, and a contributing writer to The Daily Standard. His new book, In, But Not Of, has just been published by Thomas Nelson.
? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
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HOW TO END-RUN KOFI'S COVERUP


May 6, 2004 -- U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan talks grandly of "transparency" in the so-called probe of the world body's festering Oil-for- Food scandal - but don't believe a word of it.
For he seems to be running a coverup.
Benon Savan - the former Oil-for-Food boss, whose name appears on a list of foreigners bribed by Saddam Hussein's regime and who has been on a mysterious "vacation" pending retirement since the scandal broke - has ordered the program's contractors not to cooperate with requests for information.
Even if officials proceeding in Savan's name are merely foot-dragging, a stonewall is a stonewall.
Specifically, two letters signed "for Benon V. Savan" have come to light, each ordering a company with material knowledge of the scandal not to share any details with investigators.
One of those companies, the Swiss firm Cotecna, had employed Annan's son Kojo on its payroll as a "consultant" when the Oil-for-Food rip-offs began.
And Kofi Annan's official spokesmen admit that the secretary-general has personally approved blocking the sharing of relevant Oil-for-Food details with investigators. Perhaps an unfettered probe would get a little too close to home?
Meanwhile, the U.N. Secretariat - which administered the Oil-for-Food program - refused to provide a number of audits to Congress.
Still awaiting his own copies of these (and other) critical documents is former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, hired by Annan to conduct a separate, parallel investigation of the scandal.
Good luck to Volcker, too - for it has become crystal clear that Annan & Co. have every intention of fighting every honest effort to shed sunlight on the scandal.
The latest line from Turtle Bay is that the Oil-for-Food mess isn't really a scandal at all, just an anti-U.N. plot inspired by "right-wingers" - or, alternatively, by former Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi.
Those are shameful lies.
In fact, the Iraqi Governing Council has been probing the mess since January, when the Baghdad newspaper Al-Mada published its now-famous list of the 270 officials from 44 countries who were bribed with oil vouchers by Saddam (see above: Benon Savan).
Indeed, reports of massive corruption in the $46 billion program began years before the liberation of Iraq opened government records to inspection.
And only last weekend Jalal Talabani, a Kurdish leader on the Governing Council, announced that the body has obtained larger and more comprehensive lists of individuals, companies and governments that received suspicious payments from U.N.-supervised oil sales.
This hasn't stopped ardent advocates of a U.N.-administered Iraq from trying to wish the scandal away. The New York Times, for example, has consistently editorialized for a U.N. takeover - and simply refused to cover the Oil-for-Food scandal for weeks after it first broke.
No talk of right-wing plots can alter the plain truth:

* That much of the food, hospital supplies and other humanitarian goods that were supposed to be bought with Oil-for-Food funds never were, because contractors overcharged the program and kicked back a percentage of the proceeds to Iraqi officials.

* That fully half of the 13 percent of Oil-for-Food revenues that were supposed to go to the Kurds living in the northern No-Fly Zone - some $4.4 billion - is still unaccounted for. The money seems to have been hijacked by Saddam's officials while U.N. "watchmen" turned a blind eye.

* That the Oil-for-Food office never transferred its database to the Coalition Provisional Authority - despite Benon Savan's assurances to the Security Council that it had done so.

* That many Oil-for-Food contractors turned out to be false fronts or non-existent when the CPA tried to contact them.

* That Oil-for-Food funds meant for a full range of humanitarian projects were instead diverted to pay for luxury cars and the construction of an Olympic Stadium for Saddam's son Uday - a project that Kofi Annan personally approved.

* That the United Nations can't begin to explain how all of this happened, or how its oversight system failed.

Assuming, of course, that the United Nations ever intended for the oversight system to work in the first place.
One way or another, it's time to find out.
Happily, the much-maligned (by Democrats) Patriot Act contains the tools needed to pry open some of Turtle Bay's box of dirty secrets.
Here's how it could work:
It's beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein paid money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.
And there is evidence that Saddam had financial and other ties to al Qaeda terrorists. For example, two firms doing business with Saddam via Oil-for-Food are reportedly linked to a financier associated with Osama bin Laden.
Since Oil-for-Food was Saddam's chief source of cash, it's safe to assume that the money he lavished on terrorists came from program kickbacks processed along with other Oil-for-Food revenues by BNP Paribas - a powerful French commercial bank chartered to do business in New York state.
Now, Kofi Annan may manage to keep U.N. information away from investigators - but you can be sure that BNP Paribas kept a full set of discoverable books.
And the Patriot Act grants Treasury Secretary John Snow substantial power to investigate U.S.-chartered banks suspected of having been involved - knowingly or otherwise - in terrorist activity.
Paribas may not have consciously bankrolled Osama.
But Snow nonetheless can subpoena its records to find out how much of Saddam's ill-gotten cash passed through the bank - and where it went.
And he has the power to look at all of the bank's Oil-for-Food dealings since the passage of the Patriot Act.
That's precisely what he needs to do.
And to hell with Kofi Annan's stonewall.

Warnings go unheeded over North Korea threat
Michael R. Gordon International Herald Tribune
Thursday, May 06, 2004
Dispatches
WASHINGTON Imagine a former official who toiled behind the scenes on the most sensitive national security issues leaving the Bush Administration in frustration and now charging that White House policies have left the United States exposed to a dangerous and growing threat.
I am not referring to Richard Clarke, the former National Security Council aide whose criticism of the Bush Administration's counterterrorism policies rocked Washington, but to Charles Pritchard, a retired U.S. Army colonel and the former point man on North Korea for the U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell.
Jack Pritchard, as he is known around Washington, is not a celebrity. He does not have a best-selling book. He makes more appearances at research institutes than at talk shows. But for months he has warned that the White House lacks an effective strategy to dissuade North Korea from building up its nuclear arms.
With the United States understandably occupied with the escalating violence in Iraq, the issue of North Korea has not attracted the attention it deserves. But North Korea's nuclear arsenal, which was once thought to number one or two weapons, appears to be growing substantially on President George W. Bush's watch.
The Bush Administration insists that the best way to put pressure on North Korea is through six-party talks, which also include China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. There can be unofficial side conversations between American and North Korean officials, but the United States will not be blackmailed into making concessions, administration officials say.
But Pritchard's basic critique is that the administration has neither offered much of a carrot nor wielded a stick. Wary of offering inducements to a totalitarian regime, the Bush Administration has not engaged the North Koreans in the sort of direct negotiations that might lead to a diplomatic breakthrough, he argues.
But fearful of sparking another crisis at a time when American forces are tied down in Iraq, the Bush administration has not put the North Koreans on notice that further nuclear developments will trigger economic sanctions or perhaps even military action.
"This administration has adamantly refused to deal directly with North Korea, and they are not going to make any progress until that happens," Pritchard said in an interview. "And there have been no red lines. We have never said 'if you do this here are the consequences.' Now they may have developed as many as six nuclear weapons to add to the two that they confirmed that they have."
Pritchard's path from policy insider to outside critic is an unusual odyssey. A son of an army officer, Pritchard joined the army after college. He served as a foreign area officer in Japan, an expert on the politics and military trends of the region, and later became the army attach? at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.
After President Bill Clinton was elected, Pritchard was assigned the Japan and Korea portfolio on the National Security Council, a responsibility he retained after he retired from the military. He was one of the officials who went to Powell's home to brief him on North Korea issues soon after Bush was elected president. After Powell became secretary of state, Pritchard, a political independent, went to the State Department as a special envoy for talks with North Korea.
But the Bush Administration was divided about how to deal with Pyongyang. While Powell wanted to engage Pyongyang hard-liners at the White House, the Defense Department cast North Korea as an untrustworthy regime that would implode over time. The North Koreans, for their part, set back chances for progress when it was discovered that they had begun a clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons from highly enriched uranium using technology imported from Pakistan, a development that violated their international commitments.
After three-party talks involving the United States, North Korea and China were arranged last year, Pritchard was expected to be the envoy. But senior State Department officials persuaded Powell that he would be unacceptable to the White House because of his past work for the Clinton Administration, Pritchard says. Pritchard figured he was an envoy without a role and submitted his resignation on April 18, 2003. Powell asked him to stay on and keep working on North Korea. So he kept his decision to resign confidential and waited to see what would happen.
What happened convinced him that the administration's policy was unlikely to succeed. As James Kelly, the State Department's top official on Asia, prepared for the three-party talks, Pritchard said he had drafted negotiating instructions that would allow Kelly to engage in "pull-aside," or informal discussions, with the North Koreans. The proposal for pull-aside discussions, he says, were cast aside after Kelly convened an interdepartmental meeting and hard-liners from Vice President Dick Cheney's staff and the Defense Department objected.
Pritchard was later asked to help organize the current six-party talks. Those negotiations do allow for informal side conversations between American and North Korean officials, but they stop short of the fuller dialogue Prichard believes is necessary to produce an agreement rolling back North Korea's nuclear program. Pritchard left the government in August.
Estimating North Korea's nuclear potential is an inexact science. But some experts say Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal is expanding and could grow by as many as six weapons if it produces plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods it has kept in a cooling pod. A parallel program to produce bomb grade uranium would allow Pyongyang to expand its arsenal even more in several years time.
"Jack was here for a couple of years," Powell told The Washington Times in April. "He was an expert in these matters, and he thought we ought to be moving in another direction. And I said, 'No, the president wants us to do it this way.' And he left, and now he's writing long, tortured articles about how we are doing it wrong." Pritchard says he loyally defended the administration's line while in government but now has an obligation to call it as he sees it.
The United States has two big security problems on its hands: a violent insurgency in Iraq and a simmering dispute with a nuclear North Korea that does not always make the headlines and which is full of complexities. North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the best way to contain or end them deserves fuller debate during this election year, and Pritchard's critique is a good place to start.
Gordon can be reached at pagetwo@iht.com.
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com
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>> PROGRESS NOTES...


Philippines uncovers al-Qaeda linked operation
By Roel Landingin in Manila
Published: May 6 2004 11:27 | Last Updated: May 6 2004 11:27
Philippine defence and police officials said Thursday they had uncovered a new Jemaah Islamiah (JI) logistics cell in the country and arrested a suspected member who might have helped transfer funds from the al-Qaeda and JI terror networks.
Eduardo Ermita, the defence secretary, said in a press briefing that the authorities had begun proceedings to freeze several bank accounts holding a total of $25,000 of funds transferred from suspected JI leader Riduan Islamudin, also known as Hambali, currently under US custody.
It was the first time that Philippine security officials had been able to establish a detailed money trail from international terror suspects to their local partners, he said.
Philippine security officials are on heightened alert amid reports that the JI and local terror groups are planning to sabotage the May 10 presidential election.
Last month, six suspected Muslim militants said to be plotting major bomb attacks on shopping malls and western embassies in Manila were arrested.
The authorities also arrested 46-year old Jordan Mamso Addullah based on leads provided by US officials who interrogated Mr Islamudin, said Hermogenes Ebdane Jr., the Philippine police chief.
He added that according to US intelligence, the $25,000 was transferred in July 2003 and was delivered to JI members by an unknown courier flying in from Kuala Lumpur.
The authorities believe that upon receiving the money, Mr Addullah changed it into local currency and sent half of it to an Indonesian JI cell leader called "Zulkipli". "Zulkipli" was then supposed to have deposited some of it in a bank and gave the rest to a JI bomber known only as "Marwan". Mr Ebdane said the remainder might have been used to finance a safe-house for the JI cell, Mr Addulah's money trading business and the dowry for Zulkipli's fiancee.
Apart from money laundering, Mr Addullah is also facing charges for possible involvement in at least three bombing incidents in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, where most of the country's Muslim minority live.

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>> EXIT STRATEGY?

http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700102004

NGO Says Trafficking Of Women Rampant In Kosovo
6 May 2004 -- Amnesty International says that trafficking of women and girls for sexual purposes in Kosovo comprises a disgraceful human rights abuse.
The London-based human rights organization said that the international community itself bears complicity for growth of a sex industry based on the abuse of trafficked women in Kosovo.
Amnesty cited reports that the number of establishments in Kosovo where trafficked women and girls may be exploited has increased from 18 in 1999 to more than 200 in 2003. The report said that clients include international police and troops.
It said the women come from Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine, and Kosovo itself. The report said that the women are sold into slavery.
(dpa)
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>> IF ONLY WATCH...

Iranian Hard-Liners OK Anti-Torture Law
5 May 2004 -- Iranian state television reports that a bill to ban torture in Iran has become law after its approval by the hard-line Guardians Council.
Iran's reformist-dominated parliament approved the bill yesterday.
State television said the bill was then approved by the 12-man Guardians Council, which has vetoed dozens of pro-reform bills.
Guardians Council spokesman Ebrahim Azizi was quoted as saying on state television that the council scrutinized the bill for its compliance with Islamic law and the Iranian Constitution and did not find it contradictory.
Parliament passed the anti-torture bill after the head of the hard-line judiciary, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi-Shahroudi, last week issued an order to police and security officials, calling for an end to torture.
Iran's constitution outlaws the use of torture, but human rights groups claim the Islamic Republic's security forces routinely use it to extract confessions.
(Reuters)
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Head Of Kyrgyz Anticorruption Department Killed
6 May 2004 -- Interior Ministry spokesman Joldoshbek Buzurmankulov told a press conference today in Bishkek that Chynybek Aliev, chief of the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry's anticorruption department, was shot dead as he was driving his car last night.
Buzurmankulov blamed "criminals" for the murder and said the killing was related to Aliev's work.
Aliev was reportedly hit by 17 bullets fired from an automatic weapon.
Buzurmankulov said Aliev was investigating contract killings and appeared to have become a victim of the crime he was fighting.
(ITAR- TASS)
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Fears that oil price is fuelling inflation
By our International Staff
Published: May 6 2004 19:51 | Last Updated: May 6 2004 19:51
Central bankers around the world raised concerns about the inflationary impact of higher oil prices on Thursday as crude rose to nearly $40 a barrel in New York - its highest level since October 1990.
Oil prices have risen by 22 per cent this year. Traders fear tight supplies will be even further stretched by rising tension and attacks in the Middle East.
World equity markets retreated in response to inflation fears and the prospect of rising interest rates. The Dow Jones Industrial Average had fallen by just over 1 per cent at mid-session on Thursday.
In the UK the Bank of England pointed to the need to keep inflation under control as a reason for raising its main interest rate by a quarter-point to 4.25 per cent on Thursday. In a statement explaining its decision the Bank's monetary policy committee cited sharply rising commodity prices.
Although the European Central Bank kept rates on hold at 2 per cent, Jean-Claude Trichet, its president, adopted a more hawkish tone towards price rises. He warned that increases in oil prices might pose "an upside risk to price stability" and that Eurozone inflation could rise above 2 per cent over the next few months.
Last week Alan Greenspan, chairman of the US Federal Reserve, warned that the "dramatic" rise of oil and gas futures was "an economic event that can significantly affect the long-term path of the US economy".
Earlier this week Mr Greenspan signalled that US interest rates would be raised soon, prompting speculative investors to start to reduce their risks. As a result, emerging market bond prices on Thursday suffered their worst one-day losses in nearly two years.
JP Morgan's EMBI+ emerging debt index was down 2.2 per cent as European markets closed, the biggest one-day decline since July 2002. John Bates, analyst at West LB, said: "There was an irrational stampede to get out - there were only sellers in the market."
Tony Blair, Britain's prime minister, said he had spoken to oil-producing countries about the impact of higher oil prices.
Mr Trichet also repeated his recent call for oil-producing countries to exercise "responsibility" on the price of oil. "It is is a matter of importance," he stressed.
However, an Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries official said there was nothing the oil cartel could do to reduce the soaring crude price.
Hossein Kazempour Ardebili, Iran's representative on Opec's board of governors, told Dow Jones newswires that security fears in the Middle East and the tight US petrol market had created a $6 a barrel premium in the oil price.
Opec, which accounts for about one-third of global oil output, quashed market rumours of an emergency meeting when an official said there were no plans for a meeting before the next scheduled gathering in Beirut on June 3.
Oil prices have risen about 5 per cent since Saudi militants attacked western expatriates at a petrochemical plant at the weekend.
Reporting by Tony Major in Helsinki, Ed Crooks, Kevin Morrison and P?ivi Munter in London


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Greenspan issues warning on deficits
AP ~~article_owner~~
Thursday, May 06, 2004
WASHINGTON America's soaring federal budget deficits represent a major obstacle to the country's long-term economic stability, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan warned on Thursday.
Greenspan told a banking conference that the federal budget deficit was a bigger worry to him than America's soaring trade deficit or the high level of household debt because those two problems can be corrected by market forces.
``Our fiscal prospects are, in my judgment, a significant obstacle to long-term stability because the budget deficit is not readily subject to correction by market forces that stabilize other imbalances,'' he said in remarks to a banking conference.
Greenspan noted that the federal deficit, estimated to climb above $500 billion this year, will amount to 4.25 percent of the total economy after being in surplus just a few years ago.
He said one of the biggest concerns was that the deficits now were occurring right before the first wave of baby boomers will begin retiring.
``We have legislated commitments to our senior citizens that, given the inevitable retirement of our huge baby-boom generation, will create significant fiscal challenges in the years ahead,'' Greenspan said in his remarks, which were delivered by satellite to the conference in Chicago.
Greenspan cautioned that the country should not be lulled into a false sense of security about the federal deficit just because at the moment interest rates on long-term Treasury securities remain at low levels.
He said that the dollar's foreign exchange value has remained close to the average level of the past two decades in spite of soaring trade deficits and there have been no major economic disruptions triggered by record high household debt.
``Has something fundamental happened to the U.S. economy and, by extension, U.S. banking, that enables us to disregard all the time-tested criteria of imbalance and economic danger?'' Greenspan asked.
Answering his own question, the Fed chairman said, ``Regrettably, the answer is no. The free lunch has still to be invented.''
Greenspan said he believed market forces would provide the impetus to move the trade deficit and high household debt to more sustainable levels.
But he said his concern was that there were no market forces that would push the country to deal with the federal budget deficit.
Greenspan did not offer a solution to the budget deficit in his speech Thursday although in the past he has called on Congress to move quickly to address the looming funding difficulties in Social Security by trimming the benefits of future retirees.
Two proposals he has suggested include raising the retirement age for receiving full Social Security benefits and reducing annual cost of living adjustments that Social Security recipients receive.
Federal Reserve policy-makers met on Tuesday and left a key interest rate at a 46-year low but signaled that they planned to start raising rates at a moderate pace in coming months. Greenspan did not address interest rates in his prepared remarks.
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com

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EU/China: Leaders Reaffirm Blossoming 'Strategic Partnership'
By Ahto Lobjakas
Brussels, 6 May 2004 (RFE/RL) -- European Commission President Romano Prodi today hailed the current rapprochement between the European Union and China as a "permanent" strategic link.
Prodi spoke in Brussels after a long meeting this morning with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.
"I congratulated the People's Republic of China on the strategic choice that it has made to build a partnership with Europe to promote our shared aims for peace and prosperity," Prodi said.
Prodi praised China's involvement in the Galileo global-navigation system and its support to the EU's efforts to set up the world's first nuclear-fusion facility.
Prodi said the EU would strive to step up political, economic, cultural, and social contacts with China, predicting also that the trade relationship between the two sides would grow to eclipse all other global trade links.
The EU is currently running a 55 billion euro ($66.9 billion) annual trade deficit with China, but officials in Brussels say they will not resort to appeals to the World Trade Organization to consider sanctions.
Both Prodi and Wen refrained from references today to partnerships with other countries, such as the United States or Russia.
Prodi stressed the EU's commitment to the "one China" policy ruling out formal ties with Taiwan.China failed today to elicit a promise from the EU to drop its weapons embargo imposed in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators in 1989.
"On this specific case, me and my colleagues listened carefully to the Chinese request that the European Union lift our embargo on arms sales to China, and I explained that the issue is currently under discussion between member states," Prodi said.
While France, Belgium and Germany back the move, Britain resists -- partly in response to U.S. pleas to keep the embargo in place -- while others remain concerned about the human rights situation.
China has argued it wants the embargo lifted for predominantly symbolic reasons, describing it as obsolete. It is assumed that lifting the ban would not dramatically boost EU arms sales to China, as a bloc-wide code of conduct would still prevent most exports.
"We have also expressed our hope at these talks to President Romano Prodi and the European Commission that the Chinese government hopes the European Union will lift the arms embargo against China and will recognize China as a full market economy," Wen said. "President Romano Prodi and the European Commission both expressed their positive stance, which we appreciate."
However, China made headway on its other major goal -- that of being recognized as a market economy by the EU. Prodi said today the EU is prepared to offer China provisional recognition by the end of June -- although such a move would not have a binding impact on an eventual final decision.
Prime Minister Wen today sought to separate both the arms embargo and market economy status from considerations such as human rights.
"In resolving those two issues, from the very beginning we have not been in favor of the view that those two issues should be linked with human rights or other political issues," Wen said.
Wen said China appreciates the long-standing human rights discussion it has conducted with the EU for years. He pointed to China's recent ratification of a UN covenant on economic, cultural, and social rights. He said the adoption of a similar convention on civil and political rights is "in preparation."
Prodi today said he believes a gradual, step-by-step approach to political reform is the best way to success.
He also stressed the EU's commitment to the so-called "one China" policy ruling out formal ties with Taiwan. China has made clear that compliance with the policy is a crucial precondition for closer links.
Both sides today also discussed the effects of the recent EU enlargement. Prodi said he was certain EU investment in China would not fall. Wen, for his part, said the size of the Chinese market and its labor force were "irreplaceable."
Wen also said China would not "unpeg" its national currency from the U.S. dollar before a "proper macroeconomic situation" has been achieved and a "prudent" banking system is in place in China. The United States, among others, has argued the peg gives China an unfair trading advantage by keeping its currency artificially cheap.
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China's Wen Seeks Slowdown, Opposes `Sudden Braking' (Update4)
May 6 (Bloomberg) -- Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said he is taking ``forceful'' steps to slow growth and inflation without triggering a slump in the world's seventh-largest economy.
China needs to ``reduce the speed, but not a sudden braking'' in an economy that grew 9.1 percent in 2003, the fastest pace in seven years, Wen told a business forum during a visit to the European Commission in Brussels. China is studying the switch to a ``market-oriented'' foreign-exchange mechanism that won't come before an overhaul of the bank system, he said.
The Chinese government is seeking to cool growth after investment in roads, factories and other fixed assets jumped 43 percent in the first quarter. The boom has led to shortages of oil, coal and power and driven up prices of raw materials.
China may overtake Italy this year to become the world's sixth-biggest economy, according to International Monetary Fund figures. The government is targeting growth of 7 percent this year, compared with the European Commission's forecast for expansion of 1.7 percent in the 12-nation euro economy.
Hong Kong stocks rose today, lifting an index of mainland shares to a two-week high, after the South China Morning Post reported similar comments from Wen yesterday. CNOOC Ltd. and PetroChina Co. advanced as the Hang Seng Index gained 59.85, or 0.5 percent, to 12,010.31 at the 4 p.m. close in Hong Kong.
`More Comfortable'
``People are a bit more comfortable'' with the outlook for the Chinese economy after Wen's comments, said Alex Wong at Rexcapital Asset Management Ltd. His Rexcapital Asian Pacific Fund rose 88 percent in the year through March 31, according to Bloomberg data, compared with a 65 percent advance by Morgan Stanley Capital International's Asia-Pacific Index.
China is calling on banks to curb lending for makers of cars, cement and steel to lessen the economy's momentum, while giving preferential treatment for energy and transport projects to cope with surging demand.
The credit restrictions and the government's halting of a $1.3 billion steel mill project have stirred expectations that the central bank will raise interest rates for the first time in nine years.
Calming Economy
Investment in fixed assets and real estate has led to ``excessively high growth in the M2 money supply and credit,'' Wen said. He promised ``firm, resolute and forceful'' steps to bring growth down to a more sustainable pace.
The Chinese leader said his administration will ``improve'' its handling of the yuan's exchange rate, which has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1994. The euro's 16 percent rise against the dollar since the end of 2002 has widened the European Union's trade deficit with China.
EU imports from China rose 16 percent to 94.9 billion euros ($115 billion) in 2003, while exports to the Asian nation climbed 17 percent to 39.9 billion euros, according to EU statistics. As a result, China's trade surplus with the EU widened to 54.9 billion euros from 47.6 billion euros.
``Our trade with China is growing fast -- and there is no denying that there is a certain imbalance,'' commission President Romano Prodi told the business meeting in Brussels. ``This is not yet a major issue in Europe.''
Wen said he is ``anxious'' to loosen China's currency peg to the dollar. The country needs ``Number one, a proper macroeconomic situation, and number two, a prudent banking system'' before that can happen, he said. ``We are now taking measures to create those two situations.''
Exchange Rates
Prodi said that Chinese leaders promised that ``they will not use the rate of exchange as an instrument of trade.''
China's economy expanded at a faster-than-expected 9.7 percent in the first quarter, barely slowing from a 9.9 percent pace in the previous three months.
Wen said he wanted the EU to grant China the status of full- market economy ``at an early date.'' The commission, the 25- nation EU's executive branch, said in a statement it would reach a ``preliminary assessment'' of this by the end of June.
A full-market economy status would mean that the commission, also the EU's trade authority, would use price and cost data provided by Chinese companies rather than third-country information when investigating unfair-trade complaints by EU industry, said commission spokeswoman Arancha Gonzalez. EU punitive tariffs resulting from such inquiries affect about 0.4 percent of China's exports to the EU, she said.
Arms Embargo
Wen also asked the EU to lift the arms embargo it imposed on China after the 1989 killings of pro-democracy protestors in Tiananmen Square. Prodi said he ``listened carefully'' to the request, on which national governments in the EU will decide. France is leading a European campaign to lift the embargo -- a move that would need the backing of all EU member nations.
During Wen's visit, China and the EU signed declaration on cooperation over the planned European Galileo satellite- navigation system, in which the Chinese government has already agreed to invest about 200 million euros.
The two sides also signed a customs accord to boost trade and an agreement for talks on competition issues including antitrust law and merger control. In addition, they agreed to hold talks aimed at addressing EU concerns about a possible rise in Chinese textile exports after the elimination next year of World Trade Organization quotas.
To contact the reporter on this story:
Jonathan Stearns in the Brussels bureau jstearns2@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editor of this story:
Catherine Hickley at chickley@bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: May 6, 2004 10:16 EDT

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Slowly but steadily, India will overtake China
Jonathan Power IHT
Thursday, May 06, 2004
An economy awakes
LONDON India is now in the middle of what many Chinese would give their right arm for - a general election. Yet China is the power that gets all the attention.
When President Richard Nixon first went to China it was widely assumed that he was ignoring India and courting China because China had nuclear weapons and could help balance the Soviet Union. But since 1998 India has possessed nuclear weapons and can balance China.
While Washington is slowly waking up to the fact that the tortoise soon might overtake the hare, the investors and the press continue in their old ways. Last year the inflow of foreign capital into China was two and a half times that into India. The press barely covers the Indian election while every day there is a story out of Beijing.
This skewed appreciation has been going on since the time of Mao. China basked in accolades in the 1960s and 70s, while India was mocked for its "Hindu growth rate." China's people were fed, housed, clean and tidy, while India's were ragged, hungry and sinking into a trough of despondency - "a wounded civilization," in the words of the novelist V.S. Naipaul.
With the 1981 famine we could see, to use George Watson's phrase, that "the intellectuals were duped." China had to beg around the world for grain while India had managed to survive the savage drought of 1979 without having to import a sack.
Now with Mao long dead and the capitalist reforms of Deng Xiaoping well into their stride, the story is being repeated but in a more complex way. To many, China's economic progress has been nothing less than spectacular. But inflationary pressures, bad bank loans, a rapidly increasing maldistribution of income and crime all threaten its economic stability.
India, meanwhile, has been gradually but with increasing speed loosening up its old Fabian socialist system. After a major economic crisis in 1991, Finance Minister Manmohan Singh introduced major promarket reforms and fiscal expansion and India's economy has never looked back.
India's annual growth has been averaging 5 percent - and is now 8 percent, thanks to a good monsoon. Singh, who has become Sonia Gandhi's principal economic adviser, believes that with more reforms than the present government has so far countenanced, an average annual growth rate of 6.5 percent is sustainable - which is what he privately thinks China's overhyped growth rate actually is.
India is better placed than China for future growth. Its capital markets operate with greater efficiency. They are also much more transparent. Companies can raise the money they need. India's legal system, while too slow, is much more advanced and is able to settle sophisticated and complex cases. Its banking system has relatively few nonperforming assets.
India's democracy and news media are alive and vital, which provides a safety valve for the incoherent changes that modern economic growth brings. India has religious riots, secessionist movements, urban squalor and bitter rural poverty. But the voters know they can throw the rascals out, and regularly do.
Moreover, the massive flows of foreign investment into China are a two-edged sword. It has become a substitute for domestic entrepreneurship. Few of the Chinese goods we buy are in fact made by indigenous companies. And the few that exist are besieged by regulatory constraints and find it hard to raise domestic capital. China's state-owned enterprises remain massive but bloated and possess a frightening number of nonperforming loans from China's vulnerable banking system.
India, by contrast, has created world-class companies that can compete with the best in the West, often on the cutting edge of software, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.
India's trump cards are its use of English, its emphasis on mathematics in its schools and the talents of its diaspora. For decades China has benefited from the wealth and the investment potential of its diaspora and the economic energy of Hong Kong and Taiwan. After years of ignoring its ?migr?s, India is now welcoming them back - and they have much more "intellectual capital" to offer than China's, much of it coming from Silicon Valley, where the Indian contribution has shone.
Watch the tortoise continue its course as the hare starts to lose its breath.
Jonathan Power is a commentator on foreign affairs.
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com

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New head named for British spy agency
AP ~~article_owner~~
Thursday, May 06, 2004
LONDON The primary author of a disputed British intelligence dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction will be the next head of the MI6 spy agency, Prime Minister Tony Blair's office said Thursday.
Blair's opponents said John Scarlett's promotion to head the foreign intelligence agency was tainted by politics, but Blair said he was recommended by an independent panel and chosen on merit.
``He's someone who is a fine public servant ... and I think it's very unfortunate if (the appointment) becomes a matter of political comment in any way,'' Blair said at a news conference with visiting Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski.
Scarlett, chairman of the government's Joint Intelligence Committee, was a key figure in the judicial inquiry into the death of weapons scientist David Kelly.
Scarlett testified that he, and not Blair's aides, had the final say on the disputed September 2002 dossier on Iraqi weapons.
The dossier said Iraq had an active program of making and deploying chemical and biological weapons, and had sought to buy uranium in Africa for a nuclear weapons program. Coalition forces in Iraq have found no evidence to back those claims.
That contention was the basis of the government's claim that the document was a summary of hard intelligence, not the work of political operatives.
Kelly killed himself after he was publicly identified as the source of a British Broadcasting Corp. story quoting him anonymously as saying officials exaggerated evidence about Iraq's alleged arsenal to justify war.
Scarlett's testimony matched that of Blair and his aides, who denied pressuring the intelligence committee to strengthen the dossier's claims. Lord Hutton, the judge in the highly charged case, ruled that the BBC was wrong to report that officials knowingly manipulated evidence.
``In view of the evidence at the Hutton inquiry, this appointment can only be described as highly controversial,'' said Menzies Campbell, foreign affairs spokesman for the opposition Liberal Democrat party.
Michael Ancram, foreign affairs spokesman for the Conservative Party, called the appointment ``inappropriate,'' saying Scarlett should not have been promoted while an inquiry into the quality of prewar intelligence on Iraqi weapons was still under way.
``In today's world Britain's Secret Intelligence Service is central to our national security,'' Ancram said. ``And it is essential the whole country has the fullest confidence in it.''
Scarlett graduated from Oxford University in 1970 and worked at MI6 until leaving for the Joint Intelligence Committee post in 2001. He speaks Russian and has served in Paris, Moscow and Nairobi, Kenya.
His testimony at the Hutton inquiry made him the first head of that committee to become widely known to the public.
Scarlett, 55, succeeds Sir Richard Dearlove, 60, who is leaving MI6 to become master of Pembroke College at Cambridge University.
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said he made the appointment on the recommendation of a selection panel chaired by Blair's security and intelligence co-ordinator, Sir David Omand.
``The Secret Intelligence Service is in the front line of our defense against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other threats,'' Straw said. ``John Scarlett has the operational background, personal qualities and wide experience to be a worthy successor to Richard Dearlove.''
Blair's office said Scarlett would follow MI6 practice in the future by not giving interviews, making public appearances or providing on-the-record comments.
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com
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New UK spy chief had key WMD dossier role
By Mark Huband, Security correspondent
Published: May 6 2004 12:48 | Last Updated: May 6 2004 20:34
The new chief of Britain's foreign intelligence service will be the man who played a key role in the writing of the controversial dossier used by the government to justify its decision to invade Iraq.
John Scarlett, who was head of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) that produced the Iraq dossier, will take over as head of the Secret Intelligence Service, better known as MI6, when Sir Richard Dearlove retires in August.
Mr Scarlett, who served as an MI6 intelligence officer in Nairobi, Paris and Moscow before becoming JIC chairman in 2001, is seen by some government officials as tainted by the close ties he established with the office of Tony Blair, prime minister, in the run-up to the Iraq war.
He appeared last year at the inquiry by Lord Hutton into the suicide of the government scientist David Kelly, whose information was used in a BBC report that cast doubt on claims about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes.
During the inquiry, Mr Scarlett said he "owned" the government dossier on Iraq's WMD, and it had not been manipulated by Downing Street officials. However, his defence of the dossier left him open to the accusation that he had allowed secret intelligence to be politicised.
Lord Hutton's report exonerated Mr Scarlett. But the subsequent failure to find WMD in Iraq has discredited the US and UK intelligence services, and is likely to raise questions about Mr Scarlett's stature.
Although government mandarins, intelligence officers and diplomats rarely speak for long about Mr Scarlett before the word "integrity" slips into the conversation, the problem for him will be whether his integrity can be distinguished from that of the "JIC process" of assessing intelligence.
His qualities are those of a discreet and successful spy who lists history, medieval churches and his family as his personal interests.
A fluent Russian speaker, he was recruited to MI6 in 1971 after gaining a first class degree in history at Oxford.


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Japan's tough sell: public trust in social security
James Brooke NYT
Thursday, May 06, 2004
TOKYO With almost 40 percent of young workers skipping out on their social security payments, Japan started an advertising campaign featuring a popular actress, who sternly lectured subway riders: "So you don't mind crying in the future? Pay now. Or later, you don't get paid."
Then, enterprising reporters discovered that the 20-something actress, a self-employed worker, had neglected to pay into the national pension system for years.
But with legislation in Parliament seeking to increase pension contributions gradually by 35 percent, other enterprising reporters have uncovered that seven ministers, a third of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's cabinet, have also neglected to pay into the National Pension Plan.
With the ministers of economy, of finance and of trade and industry on the list, the opposition thought it finally had an issue to take to voters in elections this summer. Then, through more enterprising reporting, it was discovered that Naoto Kan, leader of the opposition, had neglected to pay into the plan for 10 months in 1996, when, as health minister, he was in charge of the national pension system.
"This pathetic political theater leaves us more dumbfounded than angry," an editorial in The Asahi Shimbun stated.
The Japan Times printed a cartoon showing a dozen bureaucrats cavorting on a double-decker wooden festival float, marked "Public Pension System." As the four porters, labeled "Public," staggered bug-eyed under this enormous weight, the bureaucrats did a fan dance, singing a jolly chorus: "Trust us, trust us."
But, according to a poll conducted in March by the Mainichi newspaper, 81 percent of Japanese respondents in their 20s said they "don't trust" the national pension system. For people in their 30s, the figure was 74 percent. For all adults, the "don't trust" group was 60 percent.
"Those ministers not paying their premiums certainly exacerbated the already skeptical public view of the system," Shingo Hirata, a 21-year-old economics student said here on Wednesday. "The existing system is not sustainable, and drastic change is needed."
Yusuke Tomofuji, a classmate, agreed, saying: "Honestly, I cannot trust the current pension system. I am sure that system will soon go bankrupt."
The lack of trust derives from the widespread understanding that Japan's work force is already shrinking.
Japan now has one of the world's lowest birth rates. On Tuesday, the government's statistics bureau announced that the number of children aged 15 or under had fallen by 200,000 over the last year, to 13.9 percent of the population, the lowest level on record. By contrast, the comparable American figure is 21 percent.
In 1950, when the national pension system started to take shape, 35 percent of Japan's population was 15 years or younger, and 4.9 percent of Japanese were 65 or older. Since 1970, the number of workers supporting a pensioner has dropped from 8.5 to about 3.5.
If trends hold up, the elderly population will match the working population in 2044, according to Tadashi Nakamae, president of Nakamae International Economic Research. Birthrates could stay low for years to come.
As of 2000, 54 percent of Japanese women in their late 20s were single, more than double the 1980 level of 24 percent. The comparable rate in the United States today is about 31 percent. In contrast to the United States, Japan has few births outside of marriage; at last count, 99 percent of Japanese babies were born in wedlock.
Without future workers in the pipeline, many young workers view the mandatory pension system as a one-way intergenerational asset transfer.
Where will the money come from, they ask, to pay for their own retirements 40 years down the road? The Nikkei newspaper calculates a roughly $4 trillion gap between the government's future pension obligations and its future contributions. With politicians determined to maintain a level of government spending not related to tax receipts, Japan is already the most indebted of the major industrialized nations.
Taking one step, the Parliament is to approve in coming days the plan to raise premium payments gradually by about one-third and to cut pension benefits by 15 percent. Officials are also studying ways to simplify the system's complicated rules, a trap that apparently caught many of the ministers.
To keep the program solvent through 2012, "they are 85 percent there," Robert Feldman, chief economist for Morgan Stanley Japan, said. To keep Japan's pension system solvent and its living standards high, he said, the nation needs more immigration, more free market economic policies and an annual rate of capital investment of 4.3 percent a year.
The New York Times
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com

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Libya
Time to make human rights a reality




"You are the only people who have come to really listen to my story. I am not a political person. I just wanted to live a normal life with my family," Ahmad 'Abd al-Salam al-'Alam al-Sharif, a fisherman and football supporter, accused of being a political opponent in the so-called "Ahli Benghazi" Football Club case, told an Amnesty International delegate. He is currently serving life imprisonment, along with two others, after a death sentence against the three men was commuted (for case details, see section below, entitled the application of the death penalty).

Introduction
This report is published after a four-member Amnesty International delegation visited the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for two weeks in February 2004, following a 15-year absence from the country. During the visit, Amnesty International delegates had an unprecedented opportunity to meet political prisoners and were also able to hold meetings with the Libyan authorities, including with Colonel Mu'ammar al-Gaddafi, Leader of the Revolution.

Amnesty International has welcomed positive steps taken by the Libyan authorities in recent years, including the long overdue decisions in 2001 and 2002 to release hundreds of political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience detained since 1973. It is also pleased about the opportunities it had to discuss human rights matters during the visit of February 2004, and welcomes the assurances it received from the Libyan authorities at all levels that they would seriously consider its recommendations. However, as outlined in this report, Amnesty International continues to have grave concerns about the human rights situation in Libya.

The report is based on a comprehensive memorandum focused on civil and political rights that Amnesty International submitted to the Libyan authorities at the beginning of the visit of February 2004. It also reflects the views of the Libyan authorities and other findings during that visit. Since the visit, Amnesty International has urged the Libyan authorities to respond fully to its concerns outlined in the memorandum.

At the time of this report going to print, Amnesty International learnt of a speech given by Colonel al-Gaddafi to the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies and to other high-ranking members of the judiciary on 18 April 2004. In this speech, Colonel al-Gaddafi called for a number of legal and institutional reforms, and responded to a number of issues raised by Amnesty International and dealt with in this report. Specifically, Colonel al-Gaddafi urged the abolition of the People's Court, a special court known to try political cases, and the transfer of its jurisdiction to ordinary criminal courts. He called for a more stringent application of Libyan law, and for reducing the scope of the death penalty to the most serious crimes. Colonel al-Gaddafi also said that the authorities have no right to prevent lawyers and families visiting prisoners, and affirmed the right of families to know what happened to their relatives during incidents in Abu Salim Prison in 1996 during which large numbers of prisoners were reportedly killed. He also praised Amnesty International and other human rights groups for condemning the use of torture by governments and called on all countries to ratify international treaties that ban torture. Following Colonel al-Gaddafi's speech, the Libyan authorities indicated that they were reviewing legislation relating to the formation of associations, among other reforms.

Amnesty International welcomes Colonel al-Gaddafi's intervention addressing the organization's concerns in several areas. It hopes that it will give impetus to a comprehensive program of reform that will address fully the concerns outlined in this report.

Chapter 1 of the report gives background to the human rights situation in Libya. Chapter 2 focuses on current human rights violations faced by real or suspected political opponents, migrants, possible asylum-seekers and others. It identifies laws which severely restrict the right to freedom of expression and association; outlines a pattern of incommunicado detention by security forces, often accompanied by torture, and of unfair trials before special courts, in particular the People's Court, often leading to long-term prison sentences and the death penalty; and illustrates how, despite having set abolition of the death penalty as a goal for Libyan society, capital punishment remains prescribed, and continues to be carried out for a large number of offences including the peaceful exercise of political activities. A new rhetoric inspired by the "war on terror" has been used in recent years to justify the repetition of old practices at the expense of human rights.

In this context, Amnesty International was pleased to learn that the Libyan authorities are revising Libya's Penal Code, with a view to adopting a new code in June 2004. However, the new legal text, if adopted in the form existing in February 2004, will not redress the concerns outlined above. In particular, it still violates the rights to freedom of expression and association, and includes an extensive range of offences punishable by death.

Chapter 3 of the report examines past policies and events constituting grave human rights violations which continue to cast a shadow on Libya's human rights record, involving hundreds of victims and affecting the everyday lives of their families. It includes the policy of "physical liquidation" of political opponents of the 1980s; numerous deaths in custody without adequate explanation; the "disappearance" of political prisoners, especially since 1996; and the "disappearance" of Libyan nationals abroad and foreign nationals visiting Libya. Hundreds of families still do not know whether their relatives are alive or dead, or how they died. Many are too scared to ask about their relatives for fear of retaliation.

Chapter 4 of the report includes Amnesty International's specific recommendations to the Libyan authorities. These recommendations are aimed at ensuring that Libya complies fully, in law and in practice, with its obligations under international human rights law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture).

Amnesty International calls on the Libyan authorities to undertake without delay institutional reforms and other measures necessary to address the grave human rights concerns outlined in this report. There is an urgent need for the truth to emerge in respect of many events of the last three decades. Those responsible for violations must be held to account and the victims must receive full reparations. Libyan nationals in the country must feel confident that they can engage in human rights work without fear of reprisals.

Without prompt and concrete initiatives in this direction, human rights violations in Libya are likely to continue with their toll of human suffering. It is time to turn promises into action, and make human rights a reality.


1. Background

On 1 September 1969, following a military coup overthrowing the monarchy, Colonel al-Gaddafi came to power with a small group of army officers. The country was ruled by a Revolutionary Command Council with Colonel al-Gaddafi at its head. The following years were marked by the one-party system of the Arab Socialist Union, created in 1971. In 1972, Law 71 was adopted, which prohibited the formation of political parties(1).

In 1973 Colonel al-Gaddafi announced a "popular revolution", paving the way for a political system, known as "direct democracy", which continues to operate until today. In 1976 the Arab Socialist Union was abolished and replaced by the General People's Congress, the country's highest decision-making authority, which holds its ordinary sessions annually in Sirte. This gradually evolved towards the establishment in 1977 of the Jamahiriya system, a "state of the masses", whereby all citizens over the age of 18 are meant to contribute directly to decision-making processes in the country through their participation at a local level in Basic People's Congresses. Their decisions are eventually channelled through to the General People's Congress which makes decisions at a national level. Decisions are then implemented by General People's Committees, equivalent to Ministries.

In this system, Colonel al-Gaddafi, officially referred to as the "Leader of the Revolution", is not considered a head of state in the conventional sense but rather as an influential advisor to the people. Parallel to the Basic People's Congresses lie the Revolutionary Committees, whose function it is to mobilize the people to support the ideas and policies of Colonel al-Gaddafi. This system operates in a context in which the formation of political parties continues to be prohibited.

The 1970s and early 1980s were years marked by a policy of repression of those who expressed dissent at the policies of the Libyan authorities. Student demonstrations were violently put down and political opponents were arrested and imprisoned or "disappeared". In 1980 the Libyan authorities introduced a policy of extrajudicial executions of political opponents, termed "stray dogs". The policy, known as "physical liquidation", seemed to have been endorsed at the highest levels. The Revolutionary Committees were empowered to implement this policy both at home and abroad.

At the international level, relations between Libya and several European countries and the USA deteriorated during the mid-1980s. During a demonstration in 1984 in London organized by members of the Libyan opposition, British woman police officer, Yvonne Fletcher, was shot, apparently from the offices of the Libyan People's Bureau. In 1986 three people were killed and some 250 wounded in the bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin. The USA held Libya responsible, and launched bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi, hitting Colonel al-Gaddafi's residence among other places. Some 40 people died as a result.

In 1988 there was a period which appeared to herald important human rights reforms. The authorities released hundreds of political prisoners in a wide-ranging amnesty. During an extraordinary session of the General People's Congress convened that year, the Great Green Charter of Human Rights of the Jamahiriyan Era was adopted. This document restricted the scope of applicability of the death penalty, setting its abolition as an aim; outlawed degrading punishment and ill-treatment of prisoners; and proclaimed the right to a fair trial. Amnesty International was invited to visit the country, where the organization held talks with officials; met several political prisoners; gathered data on human rights developments; and attended a special session of the General People's Congress, held in June. Colonel al-Gaddafi, who had called on the General People's Congress to abolish the death penalty, intervened to seek the commutation of all death sentences in response to a request by Amnesty International. Following an undertaking in 1988, Libya became a state party to the first Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)(2) and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture) in 1989.

After this brief period of positive developments in 1988, the human rights record in Libya deteriorated and the country was closed to international scrutiny, including to the independent human rights experts of the UN and international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International(3). The subsequent years were characterized by widespread human rights violations, including mass arbitrary arrest and detention, "disappearances", torture and the death penalty(4). Repression further escalated in the mid-1990s at a time of clashes between the authorities and armed political groups. Repeated requests by Amnesty International, over a number of years, to visit Libya in order to attend hearings of trials, particularly those heard before the People's Court, were met without response from the authorities. Amnesty International's only access to the country since its visit in 1988 took place in April 2001, when two delegates attended the 29th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in Tripoli. Inside the country, independent human rights organizations were not able to emerge and a climate of fear prevailed, preventing victims of human rights violations or their relatives from communicating with the outside world.

This was accompanied by an era of isolation from the international community following the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988, in which 270 people were killed, and of UTA flight 772 over Niger in 1989, which resulted in the deaths of 170 people. In January 1992 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 748 which imposed an air and arms embargo on Libya. This was lifted in September 2003(5) following a period of suspension initiated in 1999 after the authorities handed over for trial two Libyan nationals suspected of carrying out the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie. This trial resulted in the conviction of 'Abd al-Basit al-Megrahi in January 2001 to life imprisonment; his co-defendant al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah was acquitted. This sentence was confirmed on appeal in March 2002. In 2003 the Libyan authorities accepted "responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials"(6) for the attacks on the Pan Am and UTA flights and reached agreement over compensation to the families of victims of the bombing. Negotiations regarding compensation for victims of the La Belle nightclub bombing were underway at the time of writing.

On 19 December 2003 Libya announced the dismantling of its programs of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, negotiations with the USA and the European Union rapidly intensified with a view to a full normalization of relations between the parties.

1.1 Human rights developments in recent years

In recent years the Libyan authorities have taken limited steps to address the human rights situation in their country, including the waves of releases of political prisoners beginning in 2001 and other initiatives illustrated below. In 2001 nearly 300 prisoners, among them political prisoners, were released. They included Libya's longest-serving political prisoner, Ahmad Zubayr Ahmad al-Sanussi, who had been accused of involvement in an attempted coup d'?tat in 1970 and who spent 31 years in prison, many of those in solitary confinement. In 2002 over 60 prisoners were released, including prisoners of conscience Muhammad 'Ali al-Akrami, al-'Ajili Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Azhari, Muhammad 'Ali al-Qajiji, Salih 'Omar al-Qasbi and Muhammad al-Sadiq al-Tarhuni. They had been imprisoned for almost three decades, following their arrest in 1973 for their peaceful involvement with the prohibited Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, Islamic Liberation Party.

To Amnesty International's knowledge, however, legal proceedings leading to reparation have not been initiated for any former prisoners with a view to compensating them for the abuses they have suffered. In many cases, they are unable to continue to live as they had prior to their imprisonment. For example, their former employers refuse to receive them back at work, a practice which has reportedly been most severe and widespread in the field of education. While some professors and lecturers were able to resume their jobs as academics after their release, others were reportedly told that, given their political background and imprisonment, they would not be allowed to return to their posts. Moreover, such restrictive practices take place in a context in which the authorities have failed to take responsibility for these past abuses, which include prolonged arbitrary detention and torture or ill-treatment.

In 2003 the Libyan authorities apparently lifted travel restrictions which had been imposed on thousands of Libyan nationals, who were forbidden from leaving the country. Since then, many have had their passports restored to them. The Libyan authorities have also embarked upon a policy of actively encouraging Libyan nationals residing abroad to return to Libya with guarantees that they will not face persecution after return. However, in at least one case known to the organization, a Libyan national returned to Libya in May 2002, after assurances from Libyan officials abroad that he would return safely, only to be arrested at the airport. When Amnesty International delegates met Mustapha Muhammad Krer in February 2004, he had still not been charged or tried. He told them: "I returned to Libya because I believed that it was changing for the better. I came here to see my family and because I love my country."(7)

While it continues to be virtually impossible for independent human rights organizations to develop in Libya, there has been limited progress with regard to allowing work on human rights violations in the country. Since its establishment in December 1998, the Human Rights Society of the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, presided over by Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, one of Colonel al-Gaddafi's sons, has become increasingly active in the field of human rights. Since 2003 this organization has made strong calls for long-term human rights violations, including deaths in custody, to be addressed. It has also launched a campaign against torture in Libya and in the Middle East, researched scores of allegations of torture within Libya and in several cases pursued the matter with the authorities; and conducted visits to places of detention, making recommendations to improve their conditions(8).

Libya has also played an important role in regional and international bodies relating to human rights. In 2003 Libya was elected as Chair of the 59th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, during which the Bureau of the Commission introduced a number of measures to strengthen the functioning of its mechanisms. However, Libya did not use its term as Chair of the Commission to take concrete steps to demonstrate its commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights; for example, by extending a standing invitation to the independent human rights experts of the UN to visit the country. In February 2004 Libya ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.

Libya has a good record of ratification of international human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention against Torture. However, Libya has failed to act on the majority of the recommendations made by UN treaty bodies, which monitor the implementation by states of these treaties. In addition, Libya has not yet become a state party to important human rights instruments, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.

1.2 An Amnesty International visit to Libya after a 15-year absence

Amnesty International was granted access to Libya in February 2004, the first visit of its kind since 1988(9). The organization had been requesting authorization to conduct research into its human rights concerns in the country for many years and finally received a positive response from the Libyan authorities in early February 2004. A two-week visit by Amnesty International delegates to Tripoli, Benghazi, Sirte and Bani Walid culminated in a meeting with Colonel al-Gaddafi on 29 February. Amnesty International delegates also held talks with Muhammad al-Misrati, then Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security(10), on several occasions, and with 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation. They also met Karima al-Madani at the Secretariat for Women's Affairs of the General People's Congress.

Upon their arrival, Amnesty International presented a detailed memorandum to the Libyan authorities, focusing on the need for legal reform and the ongoing gap between law and practice, with particular regard to arrest, detention and trial procedures. Issues and individual cases raised in this document provided a basis for discussion in lengthy meetings with the Libyan authorities. At all levels, Libyan officials showed a willingness to discuss issues of concern to the organization.

In their discussions with Amnesty International delegates, the Libyan authorities repeatedly promised to look seriously into the organization's concerns and recommendations. Colonel al-Gaddafi personally expressed his interest in and appreciation for Amnesty International's work. However, no concrete commitments were made with a view to beginning to resolve these issues.

Delegates held detailed discussions on a range of legal issues with 'Umar 'Ali Shalbak, the then Public Prosecutor, and other prosecutors, as well as with other members of the judiciary, in particular Supreme Court judges. At the time of writing, a draft Penal Code was under examination by a committee of legal experts assembled by the then Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security. In February 2004 the then Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, Muhammad al-Misrati, provided Amnesty International with a copy of the draft Penal Code for analysis and told Amnesty International delegates that the draft was scheduled to be discussed before the General People's Congress in June 2004 with a view to its adoption.

Delegates also met private lawyers and lawyers from the Popular Lawyers' Office(11), linked to the People's Court, an exceptional court known to try political cases, among other offences. They held meetings with the Director of the Prison Administration, Major Belqassem al-Gargum, and several prison directors, including Milad Daman, the Director of Abu Salim Prison, known for holding political prisoners. In addition, the visit provided an invaluable opportunity to meet representatives of charitable associations and those working in the field of human rights within the country.

Amnesty International was granted unprecedented access to prisoners of conscience and political prisoners, with whom delegates were able to conduct lengthy individual interviews and collect detailed testimonies. However, without explanation, some of those prisoners whom the organization had asked to see were not made available for interview. In most cases, delegates were able to interview prisoners at their place of detention. However, in several cases, prisoners were brought to the Public Relations Department of the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security. While some of those interviewed were able to speak with relative freedom, others clearly feared to do so.

There was limited opportunity to meet people outside prisons, either former victims of human rights violations or their relatives. Many of them were reluctant to relay their experiences, indicating a climate of fear which still prevails and in which full expression of human rights concerns is far from being a reality. Amnesty International sought and obtained assurances from the Libyan authorities that none of the people met during the visit would face reprisals.

Delegates also attended a hearing before the Benghazi Criminal Court in the trial relating to 426 children infected with the HIV virus while in the care of al-Fateh Children's Hospital in Benghazi. Delegates met the defendants and their lawyers as well as families and children of the Association for Child Victims of AIDS in Benghazi and their lawyers. They told Amnesty International that this had been their first opportunity to have their story heard by the outside world. In addition, they interviewed officers currently being tried on charges of torture in relation to the same case.

Following their visit, Amnesty International published preliminary findings in a press release(12), and called on the authorities to take prompt action to demonstrate their commitment to human rights reform. Amnesty International delegates also invited the authorities to provide the organization with a response in writing to the concerns, issues and questions raised in the memorandum. At the time of writing, Amnesty International had not received a written response to the memorandum. Neither had the authorities undertaken any concrete measures to begin to implement the organization's recommendations. This report is based largely on the memorandum and the findings of the February 2004 visit.


2. Continued human rights violations in law and practice

"It is normal in Libya to hear that your dad has died [in prison] because we have all seen it happen to a neighbour or a friend. It is only since I left Libya that I realize how bad the situation is."
These were the words said to Amnesty International by the son of a political prisoner living abroad, after he and his family, residing in Libya, were informed, years after the arrest, that his father had died in custody.

This section focuses on the need for changes in law, policy and practice in order to end the criminalization of activities merely amounting to the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and association. Unless reformed, the legal system, including a draft Penal Code currently under review, is bound to perpetuate arbitrary political imprisonment and a climate of fear among Libyan nationals.

In addition to the extensive provision of the death penalty within Libyan legislation, a variety of other punishments provided by law are also a matter of great concern. They include forms of "collective punishment", including house demolition, as well as corporal punishment, including flogging and cross-amputation (amputation of the right hand and the left foot).
2.1 Criminalization of rights to freedom of expression and association

In recent years, the Libyan authorities have used the international context and the language of the "war on terror" to further justify the continuation of a repressive policy at home which severely curtails the right of Libyan citizens to freedom of expression and association. The "counter-terrorism" argument is clearly used as a new justification for an old practice, enshrined in Libyan law, of repression of all political dissent.

Legislation prohibits the formation of associations or political parties outside the existing political system. Critics of the current system, who wish to voice their political dissent through peaceful means outside the official structures, are heavily sanctioned and even face the death penalty. They are forced to operate in secret. Movements such as al-Jama'a al-Islamiya al-Libiya, the Libyan Islamic Group, also known as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brothers, meet clandestinely in small groups, often in private houses. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood have told Amnesty International that these discussions include a variety of issues, such as reform of the system or the provision of informal support for families of political prisoners. Legislation further restricts freedom of association, making it almost impossible for independent human rights associations to emerge. Despite the risks, some Libyans, including lawyers, are calling for legal obstacles to be lifted to enable them to form independent human rights organizations.

If such activities are discovered by the security forces, those involved or suspected to be involved, are at risk of arrest, prolonged incommunicado detention often coupled with torture, followed by unfair trials and possibly the death penalty.

The "anti-terrorism" argument

In his annual address to the nation on 31 August 2002, Colonel al-Gaddafi reportedly argued that, following the 2002 releases of prisoners, those who remain in Libyan prisons, with the exception of those sentenced for "ordinary crimes", have links to al-Qa'ida or the Taleban and as such the Libyan authorities would, "...treat the heretics just like America is treating [the al-Qa'ida or Taleban detainees]... America said, these people do not have the right to defend themselves, it will neither provide them with lawyers nor respect their human rights".

At the end of December 2003, in an address to civil servants of the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, Colonel al-Gaddafi reportedly reiterated that Libya had no prisoners of conscience and that current prisoners were of two kinds only: either "ordinary criminals" or "heretics" (zanadiq). This position was again reiterated by the Libyan authorities in their discussions with Amnesty International in February 2004.

In recent years, the Libyan authorities have stated their commitment to fighting acts of "terrorism" and to cooperating with other states and inter-governmental organizations in this respect(13). While Amnesty International recognizes the duty of governments to protect their citizens from acts of violence and to bring to justice those responsible, Amnesty International has stressed worldwide(14) that all means taken in this respect, including investigations and trials, must always be in full compliance with international human rights standards(15).

In its second report to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Libyan authorities announced that "[a] new draft Penal Code is being prepared and will include crimes qualified as terrorist acts"(16). Based on an analysis of this draft Penal Code, Amnesty International is concerned that the definition of "terrorism", according to Article 260 of the draft, may be abused in order to punish people for non-violent acts, including those related to freedom of expression and human rights work(17). The broad definition provided could be subject to wide interpretation and abuse.

Several provisions contained in Article 260 do elaborate on violent acts or the threat of such acts which, according to the text, constitute "terrorist" activity. However, in several others, terms such as "terrorism" and "terrorist acts" are used without being further defined. For example, provision 4 relates to "setting up an association or gang or society or organization which uses terrorism in achieving or implementing its aims or membership to it...". Provision 5 criminalizes "approaching or communicating with an association or society or organization or group or gang, whose headquarters are abroad, or anyone working for their interests with a view to undertaking terrorist act/s in the country or against its interests, even if abroad". Amnesty International urges the Libyan authorities to ensure that all provisions relating to "terrorism" are well defined and exclude any form of peaceful exercise of rights protected under international law, such as the rights to freedom of expression and association.

Prisoners of conscience

Despite the authorities' categorical denial of the existence of prisoners of conscience, the organization is aware of scores of individuals whom it considers to qualify as such(18). They include professionals and students, who were arrested in and after June 1998 on suspicion of supporting or sympathizing with the banned Libyan Islamic Group(19) - also known as the Muslim Brothers - which is not known to have used or advocated violence.

On 16 February 2002 Salem Abu Hanak and Abdullah Ahmed 'Izzedin were sentenced to death before a People's Court in Tripoli following a grossly unfair trial(20) of 152 people on charges relating to affiliation to the Libyan Islamic Group. Salem Abu Hanak, born in 1957 and father of five, was the head of the Chemistry Department at the Faculty of Science at the University of Qar Younes in Benghazi. He was arrested on 5 June 1998. Abdullah Ahmed 'Izzedin, born in 1950 and father of four, was working as a lecturer at the Nuclear Engineering Faculty of al-Fateh University in Tripoli when he was arrested on 7 June 1998. Seventy-three of the defendants received sentences of life imprisonment, and 11 others received 10 years' imprisonment. A further 66 were reportedly acquitted.

The appeal trial before the People's Court of Appeal has been repeatedly adjourned, with hearings taking place approximately every three months and reportedly lasting just a few minutes. At the time of writing, the next hearing was reportedly scheduled to take place on 25 November 2004, when a verdict was expected.

In all meetings with the Libyan authorities in February 2004, Amnesty International delegates raised the question of freedom of expression and association. Colonel al-Gaddafi described the activities of the Muslim Brothers in the case above as being "terrorist work", "aiming at creating an Islamic state in Libya". He argued that "they tried to impose their opinions on others" and that they "confessed to using violence".

Other officials, including the Secretaries of the General People's Committees for Justice and Public Security and for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, tended not to differentiate between acts by individuals in a given case and a political grouping as a whole, nor between various political groupings. All those who carry out political activities, peaceful or otherwise, outside the official political structure were deemed by the authorities to be "heretics".

The Director of Abu Salim Prison, Milad Daman, said that those prisoners whom Amnesty International had requested to see were "terrorist" cases, including several prisoners sentenced in the Muslim Brothers case. He said that the Muslim Brothers had given birth to other Islamist groups, such as al-Salafia al-Jihadia, the Militant Traditionalist, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. All these groups, according to the Director, agree on the use of violence as a means to achieve their aim of assuming power in Libya. He argued that some prisoners had spent time in Afghanistan and trained with al-Qa'ida and therefore were a danger not only to Libya but also to other countries. Speaking with particular reference to his prison, he reaffirmed Colonel al-Gaddafi's point that there were no political prisoners; rather, all those imprisoned were people who had used violence.

However, in the case of the Muslim Brothers, the men were not charged with any violent acts. This was confirmed to Amnesty International in February 2004 following interviews with several lawyers defending the accused, appointed by the state Popular Lawyers' Office, and with several of the defendants themselves. The men faced charges under Law 71 of 1972 banning political parties(21) solely for the peaceful expression of their ideas and for meeting to discuss those ideas with others in secret. Abdullah Ahmed 'Izzedin told Amnesty International, "I am not against the regime, nor do I have any political aims. I just wanted to work towards reforming society and to making it a better place".

The Muslim Brothers are just one example of cases of prisoners of conscience and possible prisoners of conscience currently held in Libyan prisons. Others include members of the Harakat al-Tajammu' al-Islami, the Islamic Alliance Movement, who were arrested in the summer of 1998, at the same time as the arrests of the Muslim Brothers.

One of those imprisoned was Ramadan Mas'ud Shaglouf, a father of two who worked as a chemical engineer for an oil company in Benghazi. He was arrested on 27 September 1998 by several armed men in civilian clothes who announced that they were officers of the Internal Security Agency.
After being detained by the Internal Security Agency for a month, the interrogation began. Ramadan Mas'ud Shaglouf told Amnesty International that he was occasionally beaten and threatened with further beatings if he did not "confess" to accusations of membership of the Islamic Alliance Movement. At the end of a month of interrogation, he said he was coerced into signing papers which he was not able to read.

Ramadan Mas'ud Shaglouf's trial before a People's Court finally began on 8 October 2002, more than four years after his arrest. On 26 January 2003 he was sentenced to life imprisonment under Law 71 of 1972 banning political parties. Several others tried in the same case were sentenced to between 10 years' and life imprisonment.
Legal provisions

"All Libyans over the age of 18 can participate in the Basic People's Congresses and express their opinion freely. If others agree with them, their idea would be taken up, otherwise it would not. We are not like other countries in which there is one ruling party which may choose to imprison others from other parties. It is not possible to have a prisoner of conscience in this set-up," Colonel al-Gaddafi to Amnesty International in February 2004.

Libyan law provides certain guarantees to the rights to freedom of expression and association. According to Article 6 of the Great Green Charter of Human Rights of the Jamahiriyan Era, adopted in June 1988, "the members of the Jamahiriyan society are free to form associations, trade unions and leagues in order to defend their professional interest". However, these rights are strictly qualified. For example, Article 8 of Law 20 on the Promotion of Freedom, adopted in 1991, states that "Every citizen has the right to express his opinions and ideas and to publicise them at people's congresses and through jamahiri media. The citizen shall not be questioned in relation to the exercise of this right unless he uses it to undermine the authority of the people or for personal ends".

Within this system, all adults are allowed to express opinions and views in the Basic People's Congresses and in the local media, which provide the only vehicles for sanctioned debate. However, the system operates in a context in which the formation of political parties is prohibited and in which the media is fully controlled by the state(22). Further, vaguely-worded restrictions - such as those contained in Article 8 of the Law on the Promotion of Freedom - are placed on the expression of opinions even within the official forums, leaving even those who challenge the system from within at risk of punishment. In at least one case known to Amnesty International, a Libyan citizen was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in 2002 for the peaceful expression of his views in a Basic People's Congress.

On 19 October 2002 Fathi al-Jahmi, a civil engineer born in 1941 and married with seven children, attended a session of the Basic People's Congress in al-Manshia, Bin Ashour, a suburb of Tripoli. At the Congress, he reportedly stated that reform within Libya would never take place in the absence of a constitution, pluralism and democracy. He reportedly went on to ask how issues within the country could genuinely be addressed while Libya is "ruled by criminals", naming one particular example. It appears that he was known for his outspoken views prior to this incident.
Apparently as a result of this statement, he was arrested by members of the Internal Security Agency while at the Basic People's Congress and detained for several months. According to Fathi al-Jahmi, he was tried twice under the same charges by the People's Court in two different districts within Tripoli. He reportedly received two separate sentences, one of five years' imprisonment and the other, suspended, of eight months' imprisonment. On 10 March 2004 his case was heard before the People's Court of Appeal and he received a suspended sentence of one year's imprisonment. He was finally released on 12 March 2004(23).
After his release, Fathi al-Jahmi gave several media interviews, including to the US-based Arabic channel al-Hurrah and to the Dubai-based Arabic channel al-'Arabiya, in which he continued to call for reform within Libya. Apparently as a result, basic services, such as his telephone line, were reportedly suspended. On around 26 March 2004, he was reportedly beaten outside his house. Subsequently, relatives, friends and other interested parties appear to have lost contact with Fathi al-Jahmi, his wife, Fawzia, and eldest son, Muhammad. At the time of writing, family members had received no official confirmation as to their whereabouts.

The following laws, which severely restrict the rights to freedom of expression and association, have been used to repress those suspected of being opposed to or critical of the current political system.

- Law 71 of 1972 bans any form of group activity based on a political ideology opposed to the principles of al-Fateh Revolution of 1 September 1969. Article 3 of Law 71 provides for the death penalty for forming, joining or supporting groups prohibited by law.
- Article 206 of the Penal Code (Law 48 of 1956) provides for the death penalty for those who call "for the establishment of any grouping, organization or association proscribed by law", and even for those who belong to or support such an organization.
- Article 208, which bans forming or joining an international association, states that "The punishment is imprisonment for whoever sets up, establishes, organizes or directs international non-political organizations, associations or bodies, or a branch thereof, without government authorization, or where such authorization is based on false or insufficient information."
- Article 178 prescribes life imprisonment for the dissemination of information considered to "tarnish [the country's] reputation or undermine confidence in it abroad."
- Article 207 states that "The punishment is execution for whoever spreads within the country, by whatever means, theories or principles aiming to change the basic principles of the Constitution or the fundamental structures of the social system or to overthrow the state's political, social or economic structures or destroy any of the fundamental structures of the social system using violence, terrorism or any other unlawful means."

Amnesty International had hoped that the draft Penal Code, announced by the Libyan authorities in 2003, would provide for an improvement in the legislation. The aims set out in the draft include "limiting capital punishment to serious criminals who cannot be rehabilitated...". However, it goes on to define "serious criminals" as including those who have committed crimes against the integrity and security of society and dealing with foreign countries to harm the state. This phrasing, alongside vague terms - such as "spreading rumours", "insult", "harms the reputation of the country" or "incitement" - could lead to the imposition of the death penalty for peaceful political opponents and government critics. Even those who merely participate in conferences or publish their writings peacefully expressing their views could be at risk of imprisonment.

The draft Penal Code contains specific provisions providing harsh punishments, including capital punishment, for undertaking peaceful social or political activities:

- Article 152 imposes imprisonment on any Libyan national, who while abroad publishes news or rumours constituting lies or exaggeration or creates disturbances about the internal situation in Libya in a way that harms its reputation or shakes the confidence in it or carries out an activity that in any way harms the interests of the country.
- Article 164 imposes imprisonment on anyone who seeks to undermine the reputation of the goals of the Revolution or defames its Leader, as well as anyone who insults public authorities or the Libyan people.
- Article 167 imposes imprisonment on anyone who spreads rumours against the governing system or who demonstrates in protest against the governing system. Terms used in this section of the law include "spreading rumours" and "insult".
- Article 173 imposes the death penalty on anyone who calls for the establishment of any association or party which is against the Revolution in purpose and means, or which aims to harm its public authorities, or anyone who establishes, joins, administers or funds such an association or party.
- Article 174 imposes imprisonment of no less than 10 years on anyone who promotes in the country, in any way, principles or theories that aim at changing the governing system.
- Article 175 imposes imprisonment on anyone (except for the husband, children or grandchildren) with knowledge of the crimes in Articles 173-174.
- Article 176 imposes imprisonment on anyone who establishes, organizes, or administers an international organization in Libya, without permission from the relevant authorities or with permission based on falsified information. It also imposes imprisonment on any Libyan national resident in Libya who joins or participates in any way, without prior permission, in any such organization.

For many years, Amnesty International has urged the Libyan authorities to comply with their obligation to ensure consistency between Libyan legislation and international human rights law. This includes the ICCPR, Article 19 of which states that, "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice"(24).

Furthermore, Article 6(2) of the ICCPR states that "in countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes". This provision has been interpreted by several resolutions of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the latest of which is resolution 2003/67, which requires ensuring that the notion of "most serious crimes does not go beyond intentional crimes with lethal or extremely grave consequences and that the death penalty is not imposed for non-violent acts such as ...non-violent religious practice and expression of conscience".

The UN Human Rights Committee - the body of experts which monitors states parties' implementation of the ICCPR - expressed, in its Concluding Observations on Libya's periodic report on 6 November 1998, "its deep concern about the numerous restrictions, in law and in practice, on the right to freedom of expression, and in particular on the right to express opposition to or criticism of the Government, of the established political, social and economic system and of the cultural values prevailing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya."(25) The Committee urged the Libyan authorities "to undertake a truly critical analysis" of restrictions to articles guaranteeing the rights to freedom of expression and association within the ICCPR(26). The Libyan authorities have failed to implement those recommendations.
Obstacles to human rights work

Numerous charitable associations operate within Libya and Amnesty International met several of them(27) during its February 2004 visit, both on an individual level and at a broader meeting. Despite the existence of these charitable associations, human rights organizations or individuals wishing to carry out human rights work continue to be prevented from operating, with the exception of the Human Rights Society of the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations. The Human Rights Society, headed by Giuma Atiga, a lawyer and former political prisoner, has become a strong voice for human rights protection and promotion in the country. However, others wishing to carry out human rights work are forced to operate abroad.

During its visit to Libya in February 2004, Amnesty International learnt of the eagerness of a number of Libyan nationals to undertake human rights work in their country. Lawyers of the Tripoli Bar Association, who had recently established a Freedoms Committee, highlighted the legal and other constraints still faced by those seeking to operate in this field. One lawyer recounted his first short-lived attempt to create a 250-member human rights committee in 1977. In 1988 lawyers made a second attempt to establish an independent human rights body but this was soon co-opted by the authorities. In 1998 lawyers tried to form a human rights committee within the Bar Association. On this occasion, after issuing a report on the human rights situation in Libya, their activities were frozen. Recently, approximately 40 lawyers of the Tripoli Bar Association launched a Freedom's Committee. Among them, some expressed their interest in establishing an association independent from the Bar Association.

The fear of those wanting to work in this field is well-founded when faced with severely restrictive legislation. As mentioned above, Article 206 of the Penal Code imposes the death penalty on those who call for "the establishment of any grouping, organization or association proscribed by law", as well as for those who belong to or support such an organization. This provision has been maintained in Articles 141 and 145 of the new draft Penal Code, which imposes the death penalty on "any person who communicates with a foreign country or works in its service for the purpose of enabling it to attack Libya" or "who transfers news to [the enemy] or leads him or incites others to join the enemy". Furthermore, many Libyans, residing inside and outside the country, continue to be reluctant even to report human rights violations for fear of retaliation against themselves or their relatives.

This was a matter of concern for the UN Committee against Torture, the body of experts which monitors states parties' implementation of the Convention against Torture. It concluded that "the wording of article 206 of the Penal Code could be an obstacle to the creation of independent human rights non-governmental organizations"(28). International standards, such as the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders), adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1998, also grants the right to work on human rights issues both individually or in association with others(29).

2.2 Arbitrary arrest and detention

In recent years, the authorities have routinely violated international standards as well as the existing legal safeguards in Libyan law regarding arrest, detention and trial(30). These violations have disrupted the lives of hundreds of real and suspected political opponents as well as those of migrants and possible asylum-seekers. Amnesty International has documented numerous cases which illustrate such violations, including detention after expiry of sentence; arbitrary detention of Libyans returning from abroad; and prolonged incommunicado detention, where detainees are at risk of torture and ill-treatment.

Unlawful detention

Detention after expiry of sentence
The practice of unlawful detention after completion of sentence seems to be widespread and in some cases can have serious, even fatal, consequences, due to poor prison conditions or inadequate care for prisoners.

In February 2004, Amnesty International delegates met seven Eritrean nationals (Masfin Aman Adem, Mesghna Seium Tedla, Abiel Tekle Haile, Rezene Issak Yohanns, Zekerias Michael Belay, Yonas Neghasy Brhane and Michael Yemane Tekle) who had reportedly deserted the Eritrean army at different times during 2002 and fled from Eritrea to Sudan and then to Libya. They were arrested on 11 August 2002 as they attempted to cross the Mediterranean, heading for Italy where they planned to seek asylum. They were subsequently convicted of illegal entry but not released after the expiry of their three-month sentences on 19 November 2002. After being granted refugee status in March 2004, the UN High Commission for Refugees called on the Libyan authorities to release the seven men. At the time of writing, they remained in detention.

For some 18 months of arbitrary detention, the seven men lived in fear of being deported to Eritrea, where they would be at risk of serious human rights violations. They have been moved to several different prisons. In two separate instances, the men described being beaten with sticks; the first time prior to being transported in a lorry into which they were crammed with scores of others. The second time occurred while being transferred from Ghiryan Prison to three other prisons. Michael Yemane Tekle said that he was particularly badly injured on the second occasion and lost consciousness after being hit over the head with a truncheon. During a separate incident, Rezene Issak Yohanns was allegedly beaten by a guard with a wire while in Jdeida Prison in January 2004. The men told Amnesty International: "we just want to get out of detention. We have seen here in prison what we never saw in our country."

Another Eritrean national, Binyam Abraha, who was in his early 30s and married with one daughter, died in custody on the night of 16-17 September 2003. He was detained in Ghiryan Prison with the seven Eritreans mentioned above. He had reportedly been detained in Libya since early 2002 on alcohol-related charges, for which he had been sentenced to three months' imprisonment. He apparently contracted tuberculosis as a result of poor prison conditions and was allegedly denied access to medical care despite requesting it repeatedly. Just before his death, Masfin Aman Adem and the other Eritrean detainees asked again for Binyam Abraha to be sent to hospital for treatment. Instead he was apparently held in solitary confinement in a dirty room between 5 and 16 September 2003, when he died.

Arbitrary detention of Libyans returning from abroad
The Libyans authorities have publicly announced that they encourage Libyans in exile to return to the country(31), and that they would be able to resume a normal life upon return. Al-Sadeq Krimah, deputy head of the International Relations and Cooperation Department (also known as the External Security Agency, an intelligence apparatus), told Amnesty International in February 2004 that the External Security Agency had facilitated, in cooperation with the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, the return of Libyan nationals from countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. Al-Sadeq Krimah assured delegates that scores of Libyan nationals had returned to Libya in recent years without being arrested or detained after their return.

Amnesty International delegates interviewed some of the returnees. They stated that they were usually not detained upon arrival, but were summoned for questioning by the External Security Agency. Although they have to some extent succeeded in resuming a normal life, they faced financial difficulties and continued to be under close surveillance, usually by officers of the Internal Security Agency. One of them said to Amnesty International that he had shaved his beard for fear of being arrested as part of the policy against those the authorities describe as "heretics".

Amnesty International is concerned by the fate of others who have returned to Libya and have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. It is particularly disturbing to note that some Libyan nationals were arbitrarily detained upon arrival despite assurances they had received that they would be safe and able to resume a normal life.

On 2 May 2002 Mustapha Muhammad Krer, a Libyan national with Canadian citizenship, travelled to Libya after an absence of some 15 years. He was arrested on arrival and has been detained ever since. He initially travelled to Malta, where he was reportedly assured by members of the Libyan security forces and officials from the Libyan People's Bureau (the Libyan Embassy) in Malta that he would not be arrested on his return. Both his ticket and travel documentation were apparently provided by the Libyan People's Bureau in Malta.
On arrival at Tripoli airport, he was reportedly detained for questioning, initially in the airport and later by members of the Internal Security Agency. He has been held in 'Ayn Zara Prison for most of his detention. He first saw a lawyer on 15 March 2004, nearly two years after his arrest, when he appeared for the first time before the People's Court. He is charged alongside scores of others in connection with his alleged affiliation to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group(32). He denies the accusations against him.

Mustapha Muhammad Krer had left Libya in 1989 after apparently being sought by the Libyan authorities and following the arrest of his brother, al-Mukhtar Muhammad Krer. He reportedly chose to return to Libya after his family was informed by the Libyan authorities in mid-April 2002 of the death in custody of al-Mukhtar Muhammad Krer.
At least three Libyan nationals were arrested and arbitrarily detained upon arrival after being returned from Sudan to Libya at the end of 2002. 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Rahman, Muhammad 'Abd al-Hamid Rashid al-Jazawi and Isma'il 'Umar Jibril al-Lawati were arrested and detained in September 2002 in Sudan and fined for illegal residency there. They were then ordered to leave the country. When Amnesty International delegates met the three men in Abu Salim Prison in February 2004, they reported that Sudanese officials had promised them a safe return to Libya after they had apparently received guarantees from the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations and the Libyan People's Bureau in Khartoum. On 17 October 2002 the three men and their families were sent to Libya. Upon arrival in Tripoli, they were immediately separated from their families, blindfolded, handcuffed and reportedly held by officers of the External Security Agency (33).
After a period of detention with the External Security Agency, the men were held by the Internal Security Agency before being transferred to prison. In the first quarter of 2003, they were presented before the Popular Prosecution Office for the first time. Since then, the three men have been brought before the People's Court in separate cases linked to their alleged political activities.

According to one of the three men, Isma'il 'Umar Jibril al-Lawati, he faces trial along with more than 50 others, from many different backgrounds. They are charged with remaining outside Libya without authorization and fighting against a friendly country. He told Amnesty International that since his arrest, he had been denied the right to any contact with his family. Muhammad 'Abd al-Hamid Rashid al-Jazawi reported that he was being tried alongside scores of others(34). He said that he had never met his court-appointed lawyer. 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Rahman said that he was also being tried in connection with his alleged affiliation to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. He commented that he was not aware that he was being represented by a lawyer in court. A verdict was reportedly scheduled for late April 2004.

Amnesty International has also documented cases of Libyan nationals who were forcibly returned to Libya and whose fate has remained unknown for several years.

On 13 February 2000 a group of eight Libyans was forcibly returned from Jordan to Libya. They were arrested in Jordan at the end of December 1999 or beginning of 2000 on suspicion of being sympathizers with Islamist groups. There were reports that three of the eight Libyans were shot after their return to Libya. The allegations reported in the media(35) did not include details of the incident or provide the names of the victims. Amnesty International issued urgent appeals in March 2000(36) but received no response from the authorities. During their visit to Libya in February 2004, al-Sadeq Krimah, deputy head of the External Security Agency, assured the delegates that none of the Libyans returned in this case had been killed.

Amnesty International delegates also met 'Adel Salem Kamuka, one of the eight Libyans returned. He too said that, to his knowledge, there were no killings after their return. However, four years after the events, the authorities continue to fail to disclose information on the fate of the seven others returned in February 2000.
After his return on 13 February 2000, 'Adel Salem Kamuka told Amnesty International that he was blindfolded, handcuffed and taken for questioning at the headquarters of the External Security Agency in Tajoura, a suburb of Tripoli. According to his testimony, he was held in solitary confinement and handcuffed at night for 10 days. While being interrogated he was threatened with the use of an electric baton. At the beginning of March 2000, he was transferred to a wing of 'Ayn Zara Prison believed to be under the supervision of the Internal Security Agency, where his interrogation continued. There he witnessed that those who did not cooperate were beaten or otherwise ill-treated.
'Adel Salem Kamuka said that on 14 July 2000 he was brought before the People's Prosecutor, who interrogated him while he was blindfolded. He explained that he had left the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group but was nevertheless charged with membership of the group under Law 71 of 1972. He was then transferred to Abu Salim Prison. At the beginning of 2003, he was brought to trial before the People's Court with some 170 others(37). Apparently, some of the defendants tried in this case were arrested as far back as 1992 while others were arrested in the mid and late 1990s. The verdict is expected to be pronounced in late April 2004.
Widespread practice of prolonged incommunicado detention
At the heart of a series of violations lies the widespread practice of prolonged incommunicado detention. For periods of weeks or months, and in some cases even years, detainees in Libya have been held without any contact with the outside world, including their families or legal counsel. In the majority of cases known to Amnesty International, detainees are held by the Internal Security Agency. During this initial period of detention, their families usually do not know where they are being held. It is during this period that they are at greatest risk of torture or ill-treatment.

The practice of prolonged incommunicado detention breaches Libyan law. Under domestic law, detainees can be held immediately after arrest for up to 48 hours at a police station. They must then be brought before a prosecutor, who can hold them for six days under investigation. Following that, detainees must be brought before a judicial authority at regular intervals of 30 days in order to renew their detention order(38). In practice, however, Amnesty International has documented numerous cases where detainees are held for lengthy periods of time without access to the outside world.

The main agency said to be responsible for the practice of prolonged incommunicado detention and of torture or ill-treatment is the Internal Security Agency. Since March 2004, the Internal Security Agency has fallen under the jurisdiction of the General People's Committee for Public Security, after the abolition of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security. The Internal Security Agency appears to have its own places of detention. During their visit to Libya in February 2004, Amnesty International delegates repeatedly requested a meeting with the Head of the Internal Security Agency but this did not take place.

Ahmed 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi was arrested on 14 June 1997 at his house in the early hours by officers of the Internal Security Agency. He told Amnesty International that he was taken for interrogation with his head covered and his hands cuffed. He also said that he was threatened into signing a document without reading it.

He was then held apparently without charge or trial in various prisons, including al-Hawari Prison near Benghazi, 'Ayn Zara Prison in Tripoli, and later back and forth between 'Ayn Zara and Abu Salim prisons. On 18 October 2001, more than four years after the arrest, his father was allowed to visit him in 'Ayn Zara Prison for the first time. On two occasions, in March and October 2002, he and his family were informed that he would be released, but when the family came to the prison to greet him, they discovered that he had not been released.
According to Ahmed 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi's testimony, it was only on 3 April 2003, nearly six years after his arrest, that he was brought before the Popular Prosecution Office, without the presence of a lawyer. He found out that the date of arrest in the court file had been falsified and the signature was not his. He was accused of supporting a prohibited organization.
On 21 October 2003 Ahmed 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi was sentenced to life imprisonment by the People's Court(39). According to his testimony, the only evidence brought against him was a confession extracted under torture from another accused in the case, who later retracted his confession. He said that on 18 February 2004 the appeal trial before the People's Court of Appeal opened in a courtroom set up in the buildings of the Police Academy in Tripoli. The hearing reportedly took place without the presence of Ahmed 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi or his lawyer. The next hearing is apparently scheduled for 12 May 2004.

Amnesty International delegates repeatedly raised the urgent need to put an end to the practice of incommunicado detention in meetings with Libyan officials, including Colonel al-Gaddafi, during their visit in February 2004. In its Concluding Observations on Libya's periodic report, the UN Committee against Torture expressed concern that, "Prolonged incommunicado detention, in spite of the legal provisions regulating it, still seems to create conditions that may lead to violation of the Convention(40)".
2.3 Torture

According to the Libyan Penal Code, torture is considered a crime. Article 435 stipulates that "Any public official who orders the torture of the accused or tortures them himself is punished by a prison term of three to 10 years". This is confirmed in Article 341 of the draft Penal Code, which stipulates a maximum prison sentence of 10 years for those who order or carry out torture. Article 337 of the draft Penal Code imposes imprisonment on "any public official who uses violence against any person while on duty in a way that is degrading and causes physical pain".

However, Libyan legislation does not define the crime of torture. Amnesty International calls on the Libyan authorities to make explicit that torture is absolutely prohibited under all circumstances, including when committed by public officials off duty, and that it is "punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature"(41).

Amnesty International also calls on the Libyan authorities to ensure that Libyan law fully reflects the definition of torture included in Article 1 of the Convention against Torture, to which Libya is a state party: "For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."

Use of torture to extract confessions

From the testimonies collected by Amnesty International, it appears that if a detainee "confesses" quickly, they are usually subjected to light beatings or other forms of ill-treatment. However, if a detainee refuses to "confess", torture is used in order to extract a "confession". The most frequently reported techniques are beatings with electric cables, beatings on the soles of the feet (falaqa), the use of electric shocks and being suspended from a height by the arms.

The Muslim Brothers' case
A total of 152 professionals and students were arrested in and after June 1998, on suspicion of supporting or sympathizing with the Muslim Brothers. After their arrests, the detainees were held incommunicado and their whereabouts remained unknown for more than two years. It was only at a hearing before the People's Court in Tripoli in April 2001 that the families were for the first time allowed a brief contact with the detainees, and that the men were given legal representation, mostly by popular lawyers appointed by the court.

During this period of incommunicado detention, some of the defendants alleged that they were tortured, including being beaten on the soles of the feet (falaqa), after their arrest by members of the Internal Security Agency. Defendants were also reportedly forced to sign confessions.
One of the defendants, Salem Abu Hanak, who was later sentenced to death in February 2002, told Amnesty International delegates that he was arrested on 5 June 1998 from his home in the early hours and taken to the headquarters of the Revolutionary Committees at al-Birka in Benghazi. That day he was questioned about his connection with the Muslim Brotherhood.
According to his testimony, during the questioning, electric shocks were applied to his arms and he was beaten with electric cables on his feet in order to make him confess. Later that day, his wife was brought to him and he was threatened that she would be raped. He said: "once I saw my wife and realized what they might do to her, I said that I would tell them anything they wanted to know". Once he had agreed to confess, the torture stopped.
According to a lawyer from the Popular Lawyer's Office, who was representing some of the accused in this case, at least some of the accused were referred for medical examinations in order to verify whether they had been tortured. She argued that those acquitted and subsequently released in this case were those whose torture had been confirmed. The referral of the men for medical examinations was not corroborated by any of the accused whom Amnesty International delegates interviewed during their 2004 visit. It remains the case that according to Amnesty International's information, none of the suspected perpetrators of torture or ill-treatment have been brought to justice.

Foreign nationals in the so-called HIV trial
In a separate case, over five years after their arrest in January 1999, six Bulgarian health professionals (Kristiana Malinova Valcheva, Nasya Stojcheva Nenova, Valentina Manolova Siropulo, Valya Georgieva Chervenyashka, Snezhanka Ivanova Dimitrova and Zdravko Marinov Georgiev) and one Palestinian doctor (Ashraf Ahmad Jum'a) are still on trial, alongside nine Libyan doctors. The foreign defendants are accused of deliberately infecting 426 children with the HIV virus(42), while working in al-Fateh Children's Hospital in Benghazi. At the time of writing, a verdict was scheduled to be handed down on 6 May 2004.

While Amnesty International recognizes the pressing need to bring to justice anyone responsible for the tragic consequences for these children and their families, it is imperative that the rights of the accused are respected at all stages, from the moment of their arrest. It is only by means of a fair trial that follows due legal process that the truth will emerge about how these children became infected with the HIV virus and those responsible be held fully to account.

After their arrest, the seven foreign nationals were held for more than a year with only intermittent access to the outside world, namely to their relatives and lawyers and, in the case of the Bulgarian nationals, to representatives from their embassy. For the first nine months, representatives from the Bulgarian Embassy in Tripoli met the defendants three times before meetings with the Embassy became more regular from June 2000. They met defendants on 25 February 1999, 29 April 1999 and 30 October 1999. Not all of the defendants were present at the first two meetings. For example, Nasya Stojcheva Nenova and Valya Georgieva Chervenyashka were not brought to the meeting on 25 February 1999, apparently because they exhibited scars of torture which they had undergone.
The seven foreign nationals were first brought before the Popular Prosecution Office on 16 May 1999, approximately four months after their arrest. They were subsequently taken to the Popular Prosecution Office every 30 to 45 days in order to have their detention order renewed. The first time they were granted access to a lawyer was in February 2000, after their trial had opened before the People's Court.
The very limited access to the outside world, in the form of the representatives of the Bulgarian Embassy for the Bulgarian nationals and of the Popular Prosecution Office for all the foreign defendants, did not safeguard the defendants against torture or ill-treatment. When the defendants were granted limited access to the outside world, they explained that they were too frightened to report their allegations of torture. The Bulgarian defendants told Amnesty International delegates that those torturing them instructed them not to mention their treatment to their diplomatic representatives. At the level of the prosecution, defendants said that they were taken to the Popular Prosecutor by some of those who had carried out the torture and were threatened with further torture if they did not "confess" in front of him. In the case of Ashraf Ahmed Jum'a, he was reportedly beaten on one occasion in the Popular Prosecution Office.
The foreign defendants told Amnesty International that they had been tortured in order to extract confessions, which they later retracted on the basis that they had been forcibly coerced. Methods of torture they reported included: extensive use of electric shocks; being suspended from a height by the arms; blindfolding and threats with being attacked by barking dogs; and beatings, including falaqa (beatings on the soles of the feet) and with electric cables. They said that they were tortured for approximately two months; sometimes on a daily basis. After that, the torture ceased to be used on them routinely. When Ashraf Ahmed Jum'a's parents saw him for the first time on 30 November 1999, 10 months after his arrest, they described their reaction to Amnesty International: "We did not recognize our son because he looked so terrible. We stood there for 10 minutes just holding each other and crying."
All the foreign defendants deny the accusations against them. Valentina Manolova Siropulo told Amnesty International: "I was denying the accusations against me [even after the torture had started] until they began with the electric shocks. I began to "confess" in order to stop them using electric shocks. They would raise or lower the voltage according to what I said."
Their trial began before the People's Court. However, in February 2002 their case was transferred to the Criminal Prosecution Service, which forms part of the ordinary criminal justice system. In May 2002 the foreign nationals raised allegations of torture before the prosecutor. On the basis of these allegations, the prosecutor referred the defendants for a medical examination. In June 2002 a Libyan doctor, appointed by the prosecutor, examined the defendants and, in all cases except for Zdravko Marinov Georgiev, found traces on their bodies which he argued resulted from "physical coercion" or "beatings" or both. This evidence was subsequently refuted in court by another Libyan doctor, called to give expert opinion, who argued that it would have been impossible to identify traces of torture after so much time had passed but did not examine the defendants himself.
On the basis of these allegations, eight members of the security forces and two others (a doctor and a translator) in their employ were charged in connection with the torture. They face trial alongside the foreign and Libyan health professionals before the same criminal court in Benghazi. Some of the officers alleged that they themselves had been tortured in order to confess that they inflicted torture on the defendants in the trial. At least one of them confessed to having tortured some of the defendants and named several of the others as having tortured them too. Another officer reportedly denied torturing them himself but said that he had witnessed others torturing them. During the February 2004 visit, Amnesty International delegates interviewed two of the police officers accused of having inflicted torture, who denied the allegations against them.
A context of impunity

In all cases known to Amnesty International, except for the so-called HIV trial, no investigations are known to have been carried out and suspected perpetrators have not been brought to justice in connection with alleged human rights violations, including torture or ill-treatment.

In addition to prohibiting torture and ill-treatment under any circumstances, Libya's obligations under the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture include taking "effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture" (Article 2(1) of the Convention against Torture); investigating thoroughly and impartially all complaints of torture or ill-treatment (Article 12 of the Convention against Torture; Article 2 of the ICCPR); prosecuting suspected perpetrators in accordance with international standards for fair trial and punishing those found guilty (Article 4(2) of the Convention against Torture); and compensating victims of torture or ill-treatment (Article 14 of the Convention against Torture).

Amnesty International calls on Libya to also take preventive measures. In this context, it urges Libya to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (the Protocol), which allows independent international experts to conduct regular visits to places of detention within states parties, to assess the conditions of detention and the treatment of those detained and to make recommendations for improvements. The Protocol also requires states parties to set up national mechanisms to conduct visits to places of detention and to cooperate with the international experts. The Protocol received overwhelming support at the UN General Assembly when it was adopted in December 2002, but Libya abstained in the vote.

Amnesty International recalls that the UN Committee against Torture recommended on 11 May 1999 that 'the law and the practices of [Libya] be brought in line with article 3 of the Convention' (43). The Committee against Torture further recommended that Libya 'should send a clear message to all its law-enforcement personnel that torture is not permitted under any circumstances. In addition, those who committed the offence of torture should be subjected to a prompt and impartial investigation and rigorously prosecuted in accordance with the law' (44).


Corporal punishment

Corporal punishments provided by law remain in force. Amnesty International has received information that corporal punishments, including the amputation of the right hand and the left foot, have been carried out in recent years.

According to Libyan media reports(45), four men convicted of robbery under Law 13 of 1425(46) (Case 10/2002) had their right hand and left leg amputated on 3 July 2002, after the punishment was endorsed by the Supreme Court. Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharif, Sayyid Muhammad Ahmad, Dahmu Muhammad Abu Bakr al-Sharif and Barkah Sidi Jira Barkah had been accused by the Public Prosecution of seizing by force some vehicles, telecommunications sets, food supplies and a quantity of fuel belonging to a Chinese company for oil exploration. The amputation was carried out after the Supreme Court had ruled on 25 June 2002 that the sentences were endorsed.

A number of laws passed since the 1970s have introduced corporal punishment for various crimes. They include Law 70 of 1973 which provides flogging as a punishment for those convicted of the crime of zina - adultery or fornication -(Articles 3 and 4); Law 52 of 1974 on had al-qadhaf - defamation - which also provides for flogging (see Article 4). Law 13 of 1425 on theft and haraba - highway robbery or rebellion - states that the accused convicted of theft is to be punished by having his right hand amputated (Article 2); for the crime of haraba, the death penalty is prescribed if there has been a killing, or cross amputation (right hand and left foot) (Article 5).

Amnesty International is further concerned that corporal punishments are provided in several articles of the draft Penal Code, which is currently being discussed.
- Article 317 imposes the punishment of 100 lashes on anyone convicted of adultery. In the case of incestuous adultery, the punishment is increased to life imprisonment and flogging.
- Article 318, relating to the crime of rape, states that the punishment is increased to execution by stoning in the case of incestuous rape.
- Article 345 imposes 80 lashes on anyone who falsely accuses another in any way of adultery.
- Article 350 imposes the punishment of amputation of the right hand for theft.
- Article 352 imposes the death penalty for armed robbery that results in death (regardless of whether or not theft occurred), and amputation of the right hand and left foot if the robbery resulted in theft but no death.

Amnesty International unconditionally opposes the judicial punishments of flogging and amputation, which inflict pain and suffering amounting to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment(47). As a state party to the Convention against Torture, Libya is obliged not to impose any such punishments. In its Concluding Observations in 1999, the Committee against Torture stated that corporal punishment "should be abolished by law" (48).

2.4 Special courts and the independence of the judiciary


The People's Court

The principle of the independence of the judiciary is enshrined in the 1991 Law on the Promotion of Freedom, which states that "Judges are independent in their decisions and there is no authority above them [in their decision making] apart from the law" (Article 31). According to Article 5 of Law 5 of 1988 establishing the People's Court, "Members of the People's Court are independent and shall only be subject in their judgements to the law and their conscience".

However, Amnesty International is concerned that the People's Court continues to operate and that the legal proceedings before it fail to comply with minimum standards for fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 14 of the ICCPR. Many lawyers in Libya have already been refusing to practise before the People's Court in protest at the lack of adequate procedural guarantees for a fair trial. In February 2004 Amnesty International delegates were informed that the People's Court system was under review before the Basic People's Congresses and that there were recommendations for it to be abolished. 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, told Amnesty International that he personally agreed that the People's Court should be abolished. Moreover, while Colonel al-Gaddafi told Amnesty International that he thought the People's Court was a good idea in theory, he acknowledged that in reality it may not be. He expressed his willingness to review the system based on Amnesty International's analysis. Amnesty International supports calls within the country advocating the abolition of the People's Court.
In Libya, several judicial systems operate side by side. One is the ordinary criminal system, containing a prosecution service headed by the Public Prosecutor and criminal courts of first instance and appeal, presided over by a Supreme Court. Another relates to the People's Court(49). The current system of the People's Court, which has been in operation since the promulgation of Law 5 of 1988, contains its own prosecution service, the Popular Prosecution Office, in addition to courts of first instance and appeal. Within this second system, the Popular Prosecution Office has extensive powers, operating as both an examining magistrate and a prosecutor, as well as having the prerogatives of an arraignment chamber(50).

For over 15 years, the Libyan authorities have defended the system of the People's Court. In May 1988 the Libyan authorities wrote to Amnesty International, arguing that the People's Court was primarily established to promote human rights and enhance freedom. They also stated that the People's Court specializes in criminal offences, which include political and economic offences; complaints by citizens against the state, such as grievances relating to property confiscation and calls for compensation; and appeals against decisions taken by the Basic People's Congresses. In 1988 a new law was passed, redefining the role of the People's Court(51).

More recently, in a statement(52) commenting on Amnesty International Report 2002, the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security reiterated that the People's Court is an "independent body" which "maintains all legal safeguards with regard to levels of litigation and the rights of the defence"(53). In February 2004 Muhammad al-Misrati, then Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, argued that the People's Court is a specialized and not an exceptional court as it primarily examines cases of "terrorism", torture, human rights and administrative corruption. He further argued that it is designed to expedite justice because its procedures do not suffer from the same prolonged delays that plague ordinary courts.

In February 2004, senior members of the judiciary briefed Amnesty International delegates on the composition and workings of the People's Court. According to them, the People's Court is primarily composed of legally-trained judges, although the statute does not specify that as a condition. They explained further that the court focuses on administrative and civil offences as well as criminal and political cases. It is bound by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which also applies in ordinary courts. They added that it provides for the right of defence, has a three-judge chamber at first instance and a five-judge chamber at appeal. Members of the judiciary also argued that the existence of exceptional courts should not deprive ordinary courts from their jurisdiction over the same range of offences.

A special court trying political cases
Amnesty International has brought to the attention of the Libyan authorities the cases of scores of people brought before this court for their real or alleged political activities, particularly under Law 71 of 1972 prohibiting party activities. Amnesty International has documented numerous cases in which the People's Court has handed down harsh sentences, including the death penalty and life imprisonment, primarily on the basis of confessions allegedly extracted under torture. In other cases, confessions of co-defendants that are neither corroborated by independent evidence nor by the admittance of the defendant in question have been used to secure a guilty verdict. The example of Ahmed 'Ali Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi (page 30) is a case in point.

The cases brought before the People's Court have confirmed its role as a special court trying political cases. The UN Human Rights Committee has clarified that while the ICCPR does not prohibit trials of civilians in special courts, "the trying of civilians by such courts should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in Article 14 [of the ICCPR]"(54). Article 5 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary guarantees the right "to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to ordinary courts or judicial tribunals."

Amnesty International believes that there is no justification for maintaining the special People's Court system, which has operated as an instrument of political repression. It should be abolished and its jurisdiction transferred to the ordinary judicial system.
Violations of the rights of the accused
In trials before the People's Court documented by Amnesty International, international standards for fair trial, such as Article 14 of the ICCPR, are flagrantly violated. The rights of the accused are routinely violated, even in instances where these rights are guaranteed in Libyan law. These include the rights of detainees to access to the outside world, the right to appoint a lawyer of their own choosing, the right to trial within a reasonable time, the right to a public hearing, the right to be tried without undue delay and the right to a full review before a higher tribunal.

Amnesty International is further concerned by the role of the Popular Prosecution Office and the role of the People's Court in overseeing its actions. Pre-trial procedures, including detention, are overseen by the Popular Prosecution Office, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Public Prosecutor and do not appear to fall under any judicial supervision. In the cases documented by Amnesty International, the People's Court has not questioned the lawfulness of incommunicado detention. To Amnesty International's knowledge, the court has neither ordered investigations into allegations of torture nor questioned the lawfulness of a confession said to have been extracted under torture. Inadequate legal representation has made it almost impossible for defendants to challenge the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention or to seek remedies for procedural irregularities.

Amnesty International is concerned that, with the exception of death penalty cases, appeals procedures fall entirely within the People's Court system and outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Law 7 of 1426 amending Law 5 of 1988 restricted the right to appeal (Article 16). Prior to this amendment, defendants had the right to two stages of review, one before a People's Court of Appeal and a second before the Supreme Court. Currently, only death penalty cases are subject to a further stage of review before the Supreme Court. Such a measure sustains the status of the People's Court as a special court with its own prosecution and appellate services. In addition, it lacks accountability to a higher judicial authority at all stages from arrest, interrogation and pre-trial detention, which may last for several years, to the verdict.


Violations of the right to trial without undue delay

One of the fundamental standards for a fair trial is the right to be tried without undue delay. The UN Human Rights Committee, commenting on Article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR, which guarantees everyone the right to be tried without undue delay, stated that: "This guarantee relates not only to the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time by which it should end and judgement be rendered; all stages must take place "without undue delay". To make this right effective, a procedure must be available in order to ensure that the trial will proceed 'without undue delay', both in first instance and on appeal." (55)

In February 2004 Muhammad al-Misrati, then Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, told Amnesty International that due to a backlog of cases more than 50 per cent of the prisoners in Libya are pre-trial detainees. The practice of prolonged pre-trial detention appears to be particularly widespread in political cases. There has been a long pattern in Libya of detaining political prisoners, in some cases for several years, without bringing them before a court of law. Until recently, political detainees were often held for many years without charge or trial.

The following cases illustrate the fate of detainees who have been denied the right to a trial without undue delay.

Detained for almost seven years without being presented before a judicial authority
Sudanese-born Jalal al-Din 'Uthman Bashir, born in 1969, was studying economics at Qar Younes University in Benghazi when he was summoned by the Internal Security Agency in connection with violent clashes in 1995 between armed Islamist groups and the authorities. He was arrested on 25 September 1995 and held initially by the Internal Security Agency. He told Amnesty International delegates that he was beaten, subjected to electric shocks, and had freezing water poured on him, and was then forced to sit in front of the air conditioning in order to force him to "confess". He said that, as a result of the torture, he was transferred to hospital on 7 October 1995 where he stayed for nearly three weeks.

Jalal al-Din 'Uthman Bashir further explained that he was brought before a prosecutor for the first time in August 2002 and that his trial before the People's Court began in mid-January 2003. He was sentenced on 13 October 2003 to life imprisonment in connection with his alleged support of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. He denies any connection with the accusations against him.

Detained more than four years without access to the judiciary
Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb, a 39-year-old school inspector from Benghazi, was arrested in the early hours of 14 July 1998 when armed officers of the Internal Security Agency stormed his house without a warrant. He told Amnesty International that he was blindfolded, handcuffed and put in a car and taken to an unknown location pending investigation. He said that, during the investigation which lasted approximately 10 days, he was accused of belonging to the Islamic Alliance Movement and forced to divulge the names of people allegedly connected to this group. Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb claimed that there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations made by the security forces and told Amnesty International delegates in February 2004: "I personally don't know the Islamic Alliance Movement".
After periods of detention in al-Hawari, al-'Uruba and 'Ayn Zara prisons, he was transferred on 5 December 1998 to Abu Salim Prison. For approximately two years his family did not know where he was. His mother, brother and sister visited him for the first time on 26 January 2002 after hearing only via 'unofficial' channels where he was held.
For more than four years, Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb reportedly had no access to the judiciary, and was not even able to have legal counsel. He said that he was finally brought in mid-August 2002 before the Popular Prosecution Office where he discovered that dates in the file had been falsified: the file indicated that the arrest and investigation took place in 2002 instead of 1998. When he protested, the Popular Prosecutor reportedly replied that he should not worry. Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb said that, "unfortunately, in Libya, people are not used to fair legal proceedings as there is no culture of the law nor of freedom".
According to Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb, his trial began before the People's Court in the Police Academy in Tripoli in October 2002(56). His family were reportedly not allowed in the courtroom and he was defended by a court-appointed lawyer. On 16 January 2003, in a hearing reportedly held in camera, he was sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of belonging to a prohibited organization under Law 71 of 1972. In the same case, others received sentences of between 10 years' and life imprisonment. Following the first instance verdict, he lodged an appeal, which had not started by February 2004.

In recent years, in addition to the waves of releases of long-term political prisoners, the Libyan authorities have increasingly begun to put detainees on trial. The recent trials of alleged members of the Muslim Brothers, of the Islamic Alliance Movement, of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and others arrested years ago have been a welcome, though overdue, development. However, there have been further delays in the appeals process.

In the case of the 152 alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood arrested in 1998, hearings in the appeal trial have been repeatedly adjourned following the first instance verdict in February 2002. After the appeal trial began before the People's Court in the summer of 2002, hearings have taken place approximately every three months, and in many instances were reportedly adjourned without any discussion of the substance of the case.
Violations of the right to a lawyer of one's own choosing

While the right to have a lawyer is guaranteed by Libyan law(57), detainees are not advised of their right to legal representation during the period of interrogation. This was confirmed to Amnesty International delegates during a meeting with the then Public Prosecutor in February 2004, who clearly stated that the presence of a lawyer during the period of investigation was not prevented but that he did not see this as fundamentally important.

In many cases heard before the People's Court, defendants have not been allowed to choose their own lawyer. According to Article 13(58) of Law 5 of 1988 establishing the People's Court, the Popular Lawyers' Office is the institution which provides legal services for those standing trial before the People's Court. Neither this article nor others within Law 5 of 1988 explicitly give defendants the right to choose their own lawyer outside the Popular Lawyers' Office.

One lawyer described to Amnesty International delegates the way in which he was prevented from defending his client before the People's Court in Tripoli. At the end of 2000, following racist attacks against sub-Saharan Africans in Libya, a number of Libyans and sub-Saharan Africans were tried in connection with the events. This lawyer was appointed to defend a young Libyan accused of attacking a group of sub-Saharan Africans. When the lawyer went to the Popular Prosecution Office to look at the case file, he was refused access to the file and later prevented from entering the courtroom.

Once in court the accused is automatically appointed a lawyer, even if he declines the offer. Lawyers are usually appointed during the first hearing of the trial. The court appoints lawyers from the state Popular Lawyers' Office which, as explained to Amnesty International by the Director of its Tripoli Branch and his staff of lawyers, provides legal aid to those in financial need. While Amnesty International welcomes the opportunity offered to defendants in financial need to use court-appointed lawyers before the People's Court, there are many instances where court-appointed lawyers are imposed on defendants seeking to use lawyers of their own choice.

Several of the lawyers whom Amnesty International delegates met in February 2004 explained that in the vast majority of cases there is no time given to adequately review the case since they only receive the case file in the first trial session. With regard to cases featuring large numbers of defendants, it is not uncommon for the accused not to know who his or her lawyer is, particularly since each lawyer often represents dozens of clients. All of the individuals interviewed by Amnesty International said that their court-appointed Popular Lawyers had never met or questioned them about the charges brought against them. In short, there is usually very little contact, if any, between the lawyer and his or her client.

As a result of the shortcomings of trials before the People's Court, defendants often have little faith in a fair outcome of their trial. As Ramadan Mas'ud Shaglouf(59), sentenced by the People's Court to life imprisonment in January 2003 in connection with his peaceful activities relating to the Islamic Alliance Movement, told Amnesty International: "There is no point in having a private lawyer [of my own choosing]. It is just a waste of money because the verdict is already decided in advance"(60).


2.5 Application of the death penalty


No concrete steps toward the proclaimed objective of abolition

The abolition of the death penalty has been for the past 15 years a proclaimed objective of Libya. Article 8 of the Great Green Charter of Human Rights of the Jamahiriyan Era states that "the goal of the Jamahiriyan society is to abolish capital punishment". In February 2004 Colonel al-Gaddafi confirmed to Amnesty International his continued opposition to the death penalty. He said that he had called for its abolition since first asking the General People's Congress to do so in 1988, but Libya's decision-making bodies did not heed his appeals. 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, also stated to Amnesty International his personal opposition to the death penalty.

Amnesty International regrets that since 1988, no concrete steps seem to have been taken towards the abolition of the death penalty. The organization remains extremely concerned that capital punishment continues to be prescribed for a large number of offences, including for activities which merely amount to the peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and association, and that death sentences continue to be handed down and implemented. The authorities have clearly failed to reduce the scope of the death penalty to the "most serious crimes". Amnesty International is further concerned that the draft Penal Code contains 26 articles prescribing the death penalty. It maintains the death penalty for activities merely amounting to freedom of expression and association(61) and for a wide range of crimes, including hudud (62) crimes which are all punishable by death, among other punishments.

Amnesty International also regrets that Libya did not support the resolution on "The question of the death penalty" at the 59th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2003, which called for the abolition of capital punishment and a moratorium on executions. On the contrary, Libya not only voted against the resolution but also supported the statement of dissociation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, read out by Saudi Arabia, outlining the reasons for opposition to the resolution.

Executions continue to be carried out

Libyan law provides certain safeguards for the application of the death penalty. All death sentences, including those imposed by the People's Court, have to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, which can overturn the ruling in favour of the accused. When a death sentence is confirmed by the Supreme Court, it cannot be implemented without the consent of the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies(63). However, death sentences have been pronounced after proceedings which violated international standards for fair trial, particularly in cases before the People's Court.

Amnesty International has received information that several prisoners under sentence of death had their sentence commuted. However, prisoners met by Amnesty International testified about the trauma of being brought to the scene of execution and being informed at the last minute that the execution would not be carried out.

During their February 2004 visit, Amnesty International delegates met Libyan nationals Ahmed Muhammad Kheir Farag al-Zalawi, 'Abdel Salam 'Abdel Salam Jum'a al-Gamaty and Ahmed 'Abdel Salam al-'Alem al-Sherif. In a ruling issued on 30 October 2001(64), the Supreme Court in Tripoli confirmed death sentences against the three men(65). Following their arrest in 2000 along with several others, they were accused of having used the Ahli Benghazi Football Club as a cover to form a clandestine and illegal group based on political ideas opposing the principles of the al-Fateh Revolution(66). The men told Amnesty International that they had been tortured in order to make them "confess".


On 10 February 2002 they were brought to a place for execution in the Jdeida Prison. They told Amnesty International delegates that they were blindfolded, attached to crosses and held there for over one hour waiting for their execution by

firing squad to take place. Eventually, instruction was given not to carry out the execution. The prisoners understood that their death sentences had been commuted but had no further information regarding the exact procedure or when this happened. Ahmed Muhammad Kheir Farag al-Zalawi, 'Abdel Salam 'Abdel Salam Jum'a al-Gamaty and Ahmed 'Abdel Salam al-'Alem al-Sherif continued to serve a prison sentence in al-Kuweifiya prison in Benghazi.

In another case, a Nigerian national, Nathaniel Notibo, and three Ghanaian nationals, were convicted of murder on 21 January 2003 and sentenced to death. Their sentences were reportedly commuted, just days after their execution was due to have been implemented.

In line with the worldwide trend towards the abolition of the death penalty, it is imperative that Libya does not delay further in taking concrete measures to realize its long-standing aim to abolish the death penalty. The UN Commission on Human Rights calls on all states that still maintain the death penalty "to establish a moratorium on executions, with a view to completely abolishing the death penalty"(67). Amnesty International delegates called on Colonel al-Gaddafi in February 2004 to consider calling for a moratorium on death sentences, and he replied that it was a good idea. However, no calls for a moratorium seem to have been made during the latest session of the General People's Congress, convened in March 2004, or since.

In the meantime, Amnesty International continues to receive unconfirmed reports that executions of people sentenced to death continue to be carried out. In the memorandum addressed to the authorities in February 2004, Amnesty International asked for detailed information on the number of death sentences passed and executions carried out in recent years, but received no response.
2.6 Collective punishment

International and regional human rights treaties, by which Libya is bound, stipulate that punishment for an offence may be imposed only on the offender and that the imposition of collective punishment is prohibited. However, Amnesty International is concerned that forms of "collective punishment" are sanctioned and continue to take place in Libya.

Provisions for collective punishment fall under what is known as the "Charter of Honour", a notion inspired by tribal customary law and institutionalized by the political system. Its application appears to fall outside the ordinary judicial system. UN treaty bodies have expressed deep concern regarding this law. In 1998 the UN Human Rights Committee expressed "deep concern that the law enacted in 1997 known as the 'Charter of Honour', which authorizes collective punishment for those found guilty of collective crimes (including 'obstructing the people's authority..., damaging public and private institutions'), violates several articles of the Covenant, including articles 7, 9 and 16"(68). In 2003 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child stated that "the Collective Punishment Law, which may affect children, violates fundamental human rights principles"(69).

The transformation of a local tradition into a repressive political tool

Many Libyan tribes have, over decades, developed a "Charter of Honour", an unwritten customary law which regulates the behaviour of members of the tribe in many spheres of life, including at times of marriage and funerals, and is seen to act as a form of protection to the tribe as a whole.

In March 1997, during its annual session, the General People's Congress passed a resolution, also known as a "Charter of Honour", which was subsequently accompanied by Resolution 8 of 1428 relating to its application. These texts, while not as extensive as the tribal charters, do include provisions for what are termed "crimes", which are defined in very broad terms. Those deemed criminals are "[t]hose who carry out or encourage or give shelter to or defend any individual or group phenomenon or activity or behaviour, which can be described as treachery or heresy or corruption in any form...".

This "Charter of Honour" establishes the notion of collective responsibility for the actions of others at three main levels: the family; society; and at an official level. Further, the text of the Charter allows for the application of collective punishment to all members of a given group, whether small or large, believed to be linked to the "crime". As punishment, the Charter prescribes in broad terms deprivation of public services and publicly-funded projects. It appears that this can mean being deprived of the right to participate in the Basic People's Congress and of the right to benefit from public services, such as electricity, water and telephone, as well as access to food supplies, social benefits or basic administrative services.

During a visit on 26 February 2004 by Amnesty International delegates to the small town of Bani Walid, south of Tripoli, a local clan leader and local officials described the operation of a system, parallel to the official judicial system, in which clan leaders decide the innocence or guilt of an accused and allocate punishment for those found guilty of crimes such as murder and theft, as well as for "moral crimes", namely committing treacherous acts against the state or society. Therefore, those accused can face two punishments, one from the authorities, if legal proceedings are instigated, and another from the tribe.

The local clan leader went on to define "treacherous acts" as criticism of the state or society outside of the Basic People's Congresses and appropriate tribal channels. In his opinion, any criticism expressed outside the official structures necessarily implies personal ambitions to acquire political power. The crime of treachery is considered the most serious crime, resulting not only in the punishment of the individual who is alleged to have committed the act but also of his family. He told Amnesty International delegates that in such cases the appropriate punishment would be the expulsion of the immediate family from the area and removal of all traces of them, namely the demolition of their home.

While in Bani Walid, Amnesty International delegates met "offenders" and their relatives, who had been subjected to forms of collective punishment. Amnesty International was told that on 15 October 2002 six houses belonging to members of the al-Jadik clan were demolished in Bani Walid. Since 1993 members of the al-Jadik clan have reportedly been intermittently subjected to varying forms of punishment, including temporary suspension of basic services such as telephone and electricity, temporary eviction from their homes, not receiving a salary for prolonged periods, not being allowed to study or to work and being asked to leave the area.

Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik was reportedly among dozens of people, including army officers, who were arrested and held in prolonged incommunicado detention in unknown locations in connection with an attempted military coup, which took place in the city of Misrata in October 1993. Amnesty International met residents of Bani Walid who understood that they were being punished for Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik's alleged actions and his being cast as a "traitor". In late 1999 Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik's house was apparently demolished(70).
These measures can also be accompanied by others which fall within the official state structure, including the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention of family members of "traitors". In this case, Sawf al-Jadik, brother of Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik, was reportedly detained for almost five years without charge or trial between 16 August 1995 and 13 July 2000. He believes that this was also connected to the alleged activities of his brother.
On 10 September 2002 'Abd al-Wahab Sawf al-Jadik and Hussein Sawf al-Jadik, nephews of Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik, were arrested at a petrol station in Bani Walid. While detained, they were allegedly beaten with thick cables and beaten on the soles of the feet (falaqa). They were apparently given a blank piece of paper and asked to write their "confessions", which they reportedly related to the case of their uncle, Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik. 'Abd al-Wahab Sawf al-Jadik was released on 13 September 2002 but Hussein Sawf al-Jadik was apparently found hanging in the toilet in their cell. No investigation into the causes of his death is known to have been carried out and no death certificate has been provided to the family.
Amnesty International raised its concern about the treatment of members of the al-Jadik clan with the then Public Prosecutor, 'Umar 'Ali Shalbak, who said that he was not aware of the case but agreed to look into the matter and to open an investigation if he deemed that a crime may have taken place. At the time of writing, no such investigation is known to have been opened.

"If you try to affect our traditions and our customary law, you will cause many deaths amongst our people, you should realize that." These were the words said to the Amnesty International delegates in Bani Walid by the local clan leader, as he explained the house demolition of another former resident, Abdullah Muhammad Mas'ud Zubeida(71). While Amnesty International takes no position on tribal systems per se, it calls on the Libyan authorities to ensure that "Charters of Honour" are not used as a pretext to violate basic human rights.

3. The legacy of human rights violations

The legacy of human rights violations committed in the past continues to cast a long shadow on Libya's human rights record. They have taken place in a context of near-total lack of accountability over decades, which has perpetuated the suffering of victims and their relatives and continues to do so. The toll of this impunity has been the repetition of human rights violations and an undermining of the rule of law.

The Libyan authorities have not begun to address the gross human rights violations, to which hundreds of Libyan nationals have fallen victim in the past. These have included long-standing cases of political imprisonment and "disappearance". In addition, dozens of Libyan dissidents inside and outside the country have been killed over the past decades in circumstances suggesting that they were extrajudicially executed by members of the security forces or by agents working on behalf of the Libyan authorities(72). This formed part of a deliberate policy, known as "physical liquidation", used against political opponents, which appears to have been endorsed at the highest levels, including by Colonel al-Gaddafi himself.

Impunity denies truth and justice and undermines confidence in the justice system. Lasting human rights protection will not be achieved without proper investigations leading to fair trials in which perpetrators of human rights violations are brought to justice. By such measures, the authorities would send a clear message that human rights violations will not be tolerated and that those who commit such crimes will be held accountable before a court of law. Victims have the right to see justice done, to have the truth about what happened to them acknowledged and to receive compensation and other forms of reparations.


3.1 Deaths in custody


Inadequate information to families about the death of detained relatives

Around the time of the releases of political prisoners in 2001 and 2002, the authorities started to inform the families of other detainees that their relatives had died in custody. Initially, the authorities apparently posted lists of those who died on the walls of the prisons, including Abu Salim Prison in Tripoli. Soon afterwards, in what seems to have been the application of a new policy, officers of local branches of the Internal Security Agency either visited the families individually or summoned them to their office.

It appears that the families were usually informed orally of the death in custody of their relatives and that, at least initially, death certificates were not issued. When the families inquired about the date of the death, they reportedly either received no response or were told that the detainee had died some years earlier. Usually, no information was disclosed regarding the circumstances or cause of death. In at least three cases known to Amnesty International, when a death certificate was subsequently issued to the family it apparently stated simply that the prisoner had died of natural causes, without further explanation or any evidence. In all cases reported to Amnesty International, the authorities have refused to return the detainee's body to the family. The failure of the authorities to systematically deliver death certificates, to disclose fully the details of how the detainees died and to return their bodies has forced families to mourn the deceased without having formal evidence of the death or the circumstances surrounding it.


In May 2002 two such families were informed of the death of their relatives:
Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani, born in 1970 in al-Bayda; and Mustapha 'Ali al-Jihani, born in 1933 in Benghazi.
On 25 May 2002 members of the Internal Security Agency came to the house of Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani to inform his family that he had died in prison. When his brothers inquired about the cause of the death and asked for the body, they reportedly received no answer. Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani was arrested on 28 July 1995, along with one of his brothers, Faraj Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani, by several armed men dressed in civilian clothes, whose faces were covered with scarves. They were taken to a detention centre of the Internal Security Agency in al-Bayda. His brother was released three days later. Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani was transferred with eight others to an unknown location. After his transfer, there was no news about him whatsoever until the authorities informed the family nearly seven years later that he had died in custody. A death certificate was subsequently delivered to the family, which apparently stated that Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani died in Tripoli Hospital in 2001 without specifying the cause of death.
Mustapha 'Ali al-Jihani, a father of seven, was taken from his house on 19 June 1995 by members of the Internal Security Agency. When his family inquired about him at the office of the Internal Security Agency, they were informed that he had been transferred to Tripoli approximately seven days after his arrest. They heard that he was detained in Abu Salim Prison but received no official confirmation regarding his whereabouts. Despite all their efforts, Mustapha 'Ali al-Jihani's family had no contact with him from the time of his arrest and on 9 May 2002 officers of the Internal Security Agency informed the family that he had died. When they asked for the body and for a death certificate, officers of the Internal Security Agency reportedly refused, saying simply that Mustapha 'Ali al-Jihani had been ill and had died several years before. The Internal Security Agency gave the family permission to hold the mourning. A death certificate was subsequently delivered to the family.
Amnesty International does not have a comprehensive list of detainees who have died in custody and whose families have been informed of their deaths. In February 2004 the Geneva-based organization, Human Rights Solidarity, issued a list of 96 such prisoners. The majority were prisoners who had been arrested in mass arrests in 1989 and 1995. It is believed that some prisoners may have died as a result of diseases, such as epidemics of tuberculosis. Poor prison conditions, which were at their worst in the mid-1990s, may have contributed to these deaths. However, it is also feared that scores of others may have died in suspicious circumstances.
1996 events in Abu Salim Prison

It has been widely alleged that prisoners were killed in large numbers in June 1996 in Abu Salim Prison, located in a compound of the Military Police in the area of Abu Salim, a suburb of Tripoli. One of the reasons fuelling these allegations is that some families of prisoners who had received news from, or had been allowed visits to, their relatives up to 1996 were barred from visiting them and received no information at all since June 1996.

In February 2004, Colonel al-Gaddafi spoke to Amnesty International delegates about the events in Abu Salim Prison in 1996. This was the first time that the organization had heard official recognition that any such events took place. Colonel al-Gaddafi described the events as a tragedy. He said that one of the prison guards was handing out food to prisoners in their cells. When the guard reached the first cell, the prisoners attacked and killed him and stole his keys. Using his keys, they then opened all the other cells in the same block and the prisoners began to attack the guards, taking their weapons and killing some of them. Police from outside the prison intervened and there was an exchange of fire resulting in casualties, including deaths, on both sides. Those who were still alive were placed back in their cells. Colonel al-Gaddafi went on to say that a number of prisoners also managed to escape during these events and some even reached Afghanistan.

Another version heard by Amnesty International and based on the testimony of former prisoners is that, at the end of June 1996, a riot took place in Abu Salim Prison, apparently sparked off by appalling prison conditions. At least one guard was allegedly taken hostage by several prisoners who managed to steal his keys. The prisoners opened a number of cells but failed to escape from the prison as they were not able to open one of the gates. Security forces reportedly intervened at this stage, threatening to kill whoever attempted to approach the gate.

Shortly afterwards, a senior security official reportedly came to the prison and urged the prisoners to return to their cells. According to this version of events, as there was no sign of order being restored, the same senior official began to negotiate with a group of four prisoners. Their demands apparently included that the scores of prisoners in bad health be hospitalized; that adequate health care be provided to all prisoners; that they be allowed visits by their families; and that prisoners be given the right to a fair trial. Prisoners allegedly received guarantees that the first demand would be met. The negotiation continued until late in the night, after which prisoners returned to their cells.

Several prisoners have reported having heard shootings which lasted some two hours the following morning. At the time, they did not know what was happening but later heard from others that scores of prisoners had been killed. Estimated figures of the numbers of those killed range from tens to hundreds.

Immediately after the events of June 1996, Amnesty International wrote to Colonel al-Gaddafi urging that a prompt, thorough and impartial investigation be set up to establish the circumstances in which the prisoners were killed, and that the findings of the investigation and the names of those killed be made public(73). Since then, Amnesty International has repeatedly called for such an investigation but these calls have yielded no results. 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, told Amnesty International that he would provide the organization with information regarding these events but to date none had been received beyond what Colonel al-Gaddafi told Amnesty International's delegates.

Amid a general climate of fear in Libya to speak about human rights violations, the events of 1996 in Abu Salim Prison are of particular sensitivity. Many of those who had the courage to talk about the issue with Amnesty International delegates in February 2004 did so with great anxiety.

Abu Salim Prison's unique status was confirmed to Amnesty International by several Libyan officials in February 2004. 'Umar 'Ali Shalbak, the then Public Prosecutor, explained that Abu Salim Prison was supervised by the Internal Security Agency and did not fall under his jurisdiction. Major Belqassem al-Gargum, Director of the Prison Adminstration, also explained that it does not fall under his jurisdiction.

Urgent need for investigations into all deaths in custody

As Colonel al-Gaddafi told Amnesty International delegates in February 2004, "families have a right to know". In order for the truth to emerge, there is a pressing need for thorough, independent and impartial investigations to be carried out into all deaths in custody which occurred in the past, including those which took place at the time of the 1996 events in Abu Salim Prison.

Article 48 of Law 47 of 1975 on prisons requires that families be informed immediately when the life of relatives in prison is in danger in order that they can visit them. In cases of the death of a prisoner, the family must be informed and the body returned to them on request. The failure of the authorities to investigate all cases of death in custody is also a clear breach of their obligations under international human rights standards.

Amnesty International's calls for investigations into deaths in custody have recently been echoed within Libya. For example, the Human Rights Society of the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations called for investigations into cases of several prisoners who had died in custody in unclear circumstances(74). In recent years, several Libyan human rights organizations operating outside the country - including Human Rights Solidarity, the Libyan League for Human Rights and Libya Watch for Human Rights(75) - have made similar calls.

In a statement reported by the daily Arabic newspaper al-Hayat on 5 September 2003, the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security acknowledged "the death of some detainees in police stations" as "limited and known cases which are investigated by the public prosecution". However, it appears that the statement does not refer to the cases of people who died in prison and which have remained uninvestigated.

The Special Rapporteur on Torture raised seven cases of deaths in custody in Libya in a letter dated 3 September 1998, which remains without response. The cases raised by the Special Rapporteur on Torture include that of Muhammad al-Furtiya, who was aged in his early seventies, and who died at the end of 1994 or early 1995 in Abu Salim Prison. He was said to have been suffering from high blood pressure and diabetes and had reportedly not been receiving adequate medical care in the prison. He had been held without charge or trial since 1989(76).


3.2 Political prisoners who have "disappeared" in custody

According to Amnesty International's information, the fate of dozens of political prisoners, some imprisoned since the 1980s, remains unknown. They have effectively "disappeared". Human Rights Solidarity has published a list of 258 names of prisoners whose relatives have had no contact with them since their detention. In some cases, prisoners have been detained apparently without charge or trial for more than a decade. In other cases, even people who were acquitted by the court are believed to still be detained although their families have had no news for years.

Since his arrest in 1989, there has been no news of Belqassem al-Furtiya, an electrical engineer born in 1965 in Misrata. He was allegedly part of an unauthorized group calling peacefully for reform in society. In 1989, his family house was surrounded by members of the Internal Security Agency and Belqassem al-Furtiya, his father Muhammad and his brother Ismail were arrested. For the first few days, they were detained together in the office of the Internal Security Agency in Misrata. Shortly afterwards, Muhammad and Ismail were transferred to Tripoli and lost contact with Belqassem. Muhammad al-Furtiya died in Abu Salim Prison in 1994(77). Ismail al-Furtiya was released in 1995 without having been charged or tried.

There has been no news of Belqassem al-Furtiya since his arrest in 1989 despite repeated attempts by his family to approach the authorities or to get information from released prisoners. Like many other mothers in her situation, Belqassem al-Furtiya's mother, aged in her sixties, who already lost her husband in prison, lives with the daily reality of not knowing whether she will ever see her son again or whether she should mourn for him.

Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi, an engineer, born on 30 June 1955 in Benghazi, was taken for questioning on 18 April 1986. He remained held under investigation until July 1986. He returned home briefly before being arrested again on 26 July 1986.
He was reportedly accused of sabotage and membership of an illegal political organization, but was acquitted by a criminal court in 1987 due to a lack of evidence against him. However, he remained in detention. On 17 March 1990 Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi's family received a summons for him from the Popular Prosecution Office to appear before a criminal court in Tripoli. The court was apparently surprised to learn that Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi had not been released following his acquittal several years earlier.
Between 1981 and 1985, he had lived and studied in the United Kingdom (UK). During his time abroad, he became politically active in the opposition and organized many peaceful demonstrations in the UK, including a demonstration before the Libyan People's Bureau in London in 1984, during which British police officer, Yvonne Fletcher, was shot dead.
In April 1988 Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi's family was allowed to visit him in Abu Salim Prison where he was then detained. In June 1988 Amnesty International delegates visiting Libya were also able to visit him. Visits by the family then continued, with some interruptions, until June 1996. On 10 June 1996 his wife visited Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi for the last time.
Information from former prisoners indicates that he was last seen in Abu Salim Prison in June 1996. Other information has filtered out suggesting that until some three years ago, he was still alive. However, requests for information by his family to the authorities have gone unanswered. When he was arrested, his wife was pregnant. His now 17-year-old son, his elderly mother and the rest of the family have had no news about his fate and whereabouts for nearly eight years.
In February 2002 six men, including Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi(78), were reportedly sentenced to life imprisonment. Apparently, only two of the accused were present in the court room; they were Yousef Lahaywal and Najm al-Din al-Naquzi, who both later benefited from the wave of releases of political prisoners in September 2002.
During the February 2004 visit by Amnesty International, the Director of Abu Salim Prison, Milad Daman, told delegates that Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi was "alive and well" and being held in Benghazi. Requests by delegates to visit him there were not granted.

3.3 Developments in other "disappearances"

"If we had detained them, we would have the courage to say that we had done it", 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation told Amnesty International in February 2004 with reference to Libyan nationals who had "disappeared" abroad. He continued, "Why not investigate? We must reach the truth. Those who participated in these 'disappearances' are criminals".

Over the years, Amnesty International has worked to seek the truth in the cases of "disappearances" within and outside of Libya(79). With regard to all the people named below, families and other concerned parties have also sought clarification from the authorities about their fate and whereabouts but have received no concrete information. They continue to try to obtain answers from the authorities on whether their relatives are held in secret detention, have died in custody or were killed. However, no thorough, independent and impartial investigations by the Libyan authorities are known to have taken place into any of these "disappearances" and nor have those responsible been held to account.

Mansur al-Kikhiya, a human rights activist and the Secretary General of the National Libyan Alliance, an opposition group based abroad, "disappeared" in Cairo, Egypt in 1993. He had worked in the Libyan government for a number of years and resigned from office in 1980 in protest at the execution of political opponents by the Libyan authorities that year. Before his "disappearance", Mansur al-Kikhiya was attending the general conference of the Arab Organization for Human Rights in Cairo and was last seen on the evening of 10 December 1993 at the al-Safir Hotel.

Baha al-Kikhiya, Mansur al-Kikhiya's wife, told Amnesty International: "As a woman and as a mother, I have had to live with the suffering of not knowing where my husband is and whether he is still alive. My children and I just want to know the truth, whatever that may be".

In 2002 the Libyan authorities wrote to Amnesty International, stating that they had "conducted a series of investigations to determine [Mansur al-Kikhiya's] whereabouts" but that "[his] disappearance remains a mystery". The letter further proffered the theory that he may have been "forcibly abducted as part of a settlement of conflicts among competing groups or as part of tactics orchestrated by foreign intelligence services"(80). However, in February 2004, 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, was not able to offer any details about investigations into this "disappearance".

Jaballah Hamed Matar and 'Ezzat Youssef al-Maqrif, two prominent members of the Libyan opposition group, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), "disappeared" in Cairo in March 1990. Their whereabouts since that time have remained unknown, although unconfirmed reports have suggested that they were both handed over to the Libyan authorities.

Amnesty International has received information that at least until 1995 Jaballah Hamed Matar was detained in Libya. In 1995 he was reportedly seen by another prisoner in Abu Salim Prison in Tripoli. Amnesty International also received an audio taped message, said to be recorded in the early 1990s, in which Jaballah Matar confirmed that he was being held in a Libyan prison.
In 2001 Jaballah Hamed Matar's name reportedly appeared on an indictment of several people accused of belonging to a secret and prohibited organization and smuggling explosives from abroad (Case 2001/1). During the trial, the defence reportedly asked for Jaballah Hamed Matar to be brought to court, but this request yielded no result. In the verdict, pronounced by the Permanent Military Court on 5 February 2002, Mahmud Hamed Matar, a brother of Jaballah Hamed Matar, was sentenced to life imprisonment. At the time of writing, Mahmud Hamed Matar was said to be held in Abu Salim Prison. Amnesty International requested to meet him in February 2004 but he was not made available for interview.

Imam Musa al-Sadr, a prominent Iranian-born Shi'a cleric of Lebanese nationality, "disappeared", along with two others, Sheikh Muhammad Ya'qub and 'Abbas Badr al-Din, during a visit to Libya in 1978. In 2002 the Libyan authorities wrote to Amnesty International, saying that there was evidence showing that Imam Musa al-Sadr "departed Libya to travel to a European country" and expressing readiness "to cooperate in finding the truth about his disappearance"(81). The case of Imam Musa al-Sadr was also mentioned by Colonel al-Gaddafi in his annual address to the nation on 1 September 2002. According to media reports, Colonel al-Gaddafi said Imam Musa al-Sadr had "'disappeared' in Libya" and that it was imperative that a solution be found to clarify his fate.

Amnesty International suggested in February 2004 that the Libyan authorities consider forming joint investigation commissions with the countries where these people allegedly "disappeared" or to which they were nationals. Such commissions, which should be chaired by independent and impartial experts, would ensure that all the available information is shared and that further investigative steps are taken to clarify the fate of those individuals.

Amnesty International recalls that "disappearances" are a continuing crime. In other words, the violation continues as long as the fate and whereabouts of the victims have not been established. The UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1992, states in Article 17, "Acts constituting enforced disappearances shall be considered a continuing offence as long as the perpetrators continue to conceal the fate and the whereabouts of persons who have disappeared and these facts remain unclarified".(82)
4. Conclusion and recommendations

The human rights situation in Libya remains a matter of grave concern to Amnesty International. Laws, institutions and practices violating human rights continue to operate and the truth about past events remains undisclosed. Perpetrators enjoy impunity and victims suffer, often in silence. With few but important exceptions, Libyans remain afraid to engage in human rights activities in the country.

Despite positive developments in recent years and expressions of readiness to engage seriously with the human rights situation in Libya, the Libyan authorities have yet to undertake structural reforms and take other measures to redress violations. In this context, the legal system continues to produce new generations of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners likely to spend decades behind bars. Making sure that there is full accountability for the perpetrators and justice for the victims is also necessary to prevent the repetition of the human rights violations witnessed over the last three decades.

Amnesty International recommends that the Libyan authorities take, as a matter of urgency, the following steps:

Ensuring the rights to freedom of expression and association

? Release all prisoners of conscience immediately and unconditionally;
? Repeal all laws, including Law 71 of 1972 and relevant articles of the Penal Code, which criminalize activities which merely amount to the peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and association;
? Ensure that the draft Penal Code, currently under review, is amended to ensure that the provisions relating to the rights to freedom of expression and association conform with Libya's obligations under the ICCPR; and
? Ensure that, in law and in practice, "collective punishment" is prohibited, and never imposed to punish families of opponents or suspected opponents to the political system, or for any other reason.


Protecting human rights activism
? Ensure that all Libyan citizens can engage freely in human rights work, including by forming independent human rights associations, without legal or practical obstructions;
? Allow Libyan nationals to freely communicate on human rights matters both in the country and outside it without fear of reprisal; and
? Fully implement the provisions of the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders).

Ending the practice of incommunicado detention

? Ensure that all detainees are brought before an independent judicial authority without delay to review the lawfulness and necessity of their detention;
? Give prompt and regular access to relatives, lawyers and doctors of the detainees' own choosing; and
? Send a clear message to the security forces, especially the Internal Security Agency, that incommunicado detention will not be tolerated and abuses will be punished.

Ending torture

? Amend the Penal Code to include a detailed definition of the crime of torture that fully reflects the definition of the Convention against Torture. All forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment should be prohibited;
? Ensure that all allegations of torture and ill-treatment are promptly, thoroughly, independently and impartially investigated and that the full findings of such investigations are made public;
? Ensure that confessions or other evidence obtained under torture are not admissible in a court of law;
? Ensure that all those responsible for torture and other human rights violations are brought to justice, as stipulated by Article 435 of the Libyan Penal Code;
? Stop implementing corporal punishments, including the amputation of a hand and foot as well as flogging;
? Repeal all provisions prescribing corporal punishment, including those contained in Law 70 of 1973, Law 52 of 1974 and Law 13 of 1425;
? Review the draft Penal Code, which is currently being discussed, to ensure that all forms of corporal punishment are abolished; and
? Ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.


Guaranteeing the right to a fair trial
? Ensure that all detainees have access to legal counsel of their choice, and that court-appointed lawyers are not imposed on detainees who have the financial means and desire to hire a private lawyer;
? Ensure that both private lawyers and court-appointed lawyers are free from improper interference in the exercise of their professional duties, including by having sufficient access to their clients in order to prepare their defence;
? Ensure that members of the judiciary are free from external intervention or influence, not only in law but also in practice;
? Abolish the People's Court and related institutions, including the Popular Prosecution Office, and transfer all pending cases to the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal court system; and
? Review all cases of prisoners who were tried by the People's Court. They should be retried before ordinary courts, in full compliance with international standards for fair trial, if they are not to be released.


Taking steps toward the abolition of the death penalty
? Announce a moratorium on executions, in line with the call by the UN Commission on Human Rights to all states that still maintain the death penalty "to establish a moratorium on executions, with a view to completely abolishing the death penalty";
? Review all Libyan laws and the draft Penal Code to ensure that the death penalty is restricted to the "most serious crimes", as required by the ICCPR, with a view to its early abolition; and
? Ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.


Ensuring truth, accountability and reparations for human rights violations
? Carry out thorough, independent and impartial investigations into all cases of extrajudicial executions, including those resulting from the policy of "physical liquidation";
? Ensure that the families of all those who died in custody over the years receive detailed information regarding the circumstances of the deaths of their relatives;
? Ensure that a thorough, independent and impartial investigation into the killings in Abu Salim Prison in June 1996 is carried out, that the findings are made public and that the families are informed of the fate of their relatives involved in those events;
? Transfer jurisdiction of Abu Salim Prison to the ordinary prison system;
? Fully clarify the fate of all other prisoners still unaccounted for;
? Make immediately public the information available regarding all those who "disappeared" inside or outside Libya, including the Libyan nationals abducted in Cairo in 1990 and 1993, and hold independent, impartial and thorough investigations into these cases;
? Consider establishing joint mechanisms of inquiry with states relevant to these cases, in order to facilitate the establishment of the truth about what happened to those who "disappeared";
? Ensure that no arbitrary measures are imposed on former prisoners after their release;
? Ensure that all those responsible for human rights violations are held to account, including through prosecutions where crimes were committed, regardless of the rank or status of the perpetrators; and
? Establish an independent and impartial body to ensure that all those who have been victims of human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detention or imprisonment after unfair trials receive full reparations, including rehabilitation and compensation.

Ratifying human rights treaties and cooperating with UN mechanisms

? Ratify further international human rights treaties, including the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
? Extend a standing invitation to all the UN Commission on Human Rights' special procedures and implement their recommendations;
? Submit periodic reports to the UN treaty monitoring bodies on time and in accordance with reporting guidelines; and
? Implement the recommendations of the treaty monitoring bodies following consideration of periodic reports and communications, in particular those made by the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee.


********


(1) After the independence of Libya in 1951, political parties were banned in 1952 under the monarchy of King Idris al-Sanusi.


(2) Libya became a State Party to the ICCPR in 1976.


(3) The first visit of this kind took place in October 2003 when the UK-based International Centre for Prison Studies conducted a visit focusing on prison conditions.


(4) For further details, see: Libya: Amnesty International's Concerns in the Light of Recent Legal Reforms (AI Index: MDE 19/02/91); and Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97).


(5) UN Security Council Resolution 1506


(6) ibid


(7) For full details of the case, see section below, entitled Unlawful detention


(8) More details of their activities can be found at http://www.gaddaficharity.org


(9) The delegation was composed of Claudio Cordone, Senior Director, International Law and Organizations; Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program; and Sara Hamood and J?r?me Bellion-Jourdan, experts on Libya in the Middle East and North Africa Program. During the 1990s, despite the lack of access to the country, Amnesty International issued several reports and made specific recommendations to the Libyan authorities. Among them: Libya: Amnesty International's prisoner concerns in the light of recent legal reforms (AI Index: MDE 19/02/91, June 1991); and Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: 19/08/97, June 1997).


(10) After a government reshuffle, reported on 6 March 2004, the post of Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, previously held by Muhammad al-Misrati, was replaced by the creation of two new posts, one in charge of Justice, held by 'Ali 'Umar Abu Bakr, and one in charge of Public Security, held by Nasser al-Mabruk. Muhammad al-Misrati was appointed Public Prosecutor, replacing 'Umar 'Ali Shalbak.


(11) The Popular Lawyers' Office is comprised of state-appointed lawyers who provide legal aid services. They are linked to the system of the People's Court. For further details, see section below, entitled Special courts and the independence of the judiciary.


(12) Libya: Towards ensuring human rights protection - Initial findings of Amnesty International visit (AI Index: MDE 19/005/2004, March 2004)


(13) Reports of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the UN Counter-Terrorism: S/2001/1323, 31 December 2001 and S/2002/1021, 13 September 2002


(14) For example, see: USA: The threat of a bad example - Undermining international standards as "war on terror" detentions continue (AI Index: AMR 51/114/2003, August 2003); and The backlash: human rights at risk throughout the world (AI Index: ACT 30/027/2001, October 2001).


(15) This includes ensuring respect for fundamental rights, such as the requirement that detainees be brought before a judicial authority without delay, as stipulated by Article 9(4) of the ICCPR and by Principle 11(1) of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Body of Principles). People deprived of their liberty also have the right of prompt access to and assistance of a lawyer; the right to be informed immediately upon arrest of the reasons for their arrest and promptly informed of any charges brought against them; and the right to a fair trial. These rights are also contained in the ICCPR and the Body of Principles.


(16) Report of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the UN Counter-Terrorism, S/2002/1021, 13 September 2002.


(17) Amnesty International has also raised concerns relating to the definition of terrorism in the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, which Libya has ratified. For a detailed analysis of the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, see: Amnesty International. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism: A serious threat to human rights (AI Index: IOR 51/001/2002, January 2002).


(18) Amnesty International calls for the immediate and unconditional release of prisoners of conscience - those detained for their political, religious or other conscientiously-held beliefs or because of their ethnic origin, sex, colour, language, national or social origin, economic status, birth or other status - who have not used or advocated violence. The organization calls for political prisoners, who are accused or having used or advocated violence, to be tried for recognisably criminal offences in accordance with international standards for fair trial and without recourse to the death penalty, or be released.


(19) Al-Jama'a al-Islamiya al-Libiya, the Libyan Islamic Group, should not be confused with al-Jama'a al-Islamiya al-Libiya al-Muqatila, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. According to Amnesty International's information, the Libyan Islamic Group does not use or advocate the use of violence.


(20) Case 254/2000


(21) For details, see section below, entitled Legal provisions


(22) However, satellite television is widely viewed by Libyans and access to the Internet is available.


(23) Despite repeated requests by the Amnesty International delegation visiting Libya in February 2004 to meet Fathi al-Jahmi, he was not made available. He was reportedly transferred from Abu Salim Prison to 'Ayn Zara Prison, located in the outskirts of Tripoli, during the visit.


(24) Article 19(2). Article 19(3) recalls that this article carries special duties and responsibilities, rendering it subject to certain restrictions, namely "(a) ...respect of the rights or reputation of others; (b) ... protection of national security or of public order...or of public health."


(25) Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. CCPR/C/79Add.101, Para.15


(26) In its Concluding observations on the Republic of Korea's Second Periodic Report (1 November 1999, CCPR/C/79/Add.114, para. 9), the UN Human Rights Committee stated that "[t]he Covenant does not permit restrictions on the expression of ideas, merely because they coincide with those held by an enemy entity or may be considered to create sympathy for that entity."


(27) These included the Libyan Red Crescent Society; Hana Philanthropic Association for Orphans; Watismo Charity Society; and the Islamic Call Association, among others.


(28) Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 11/05/99, para.184


(29) Article 6 of the Declaration notably states:


"Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others: [...]


(b) As provided for in human rights and other applicable international instruments, freely to publish, impart or disseminate to others views, information and knowledge on all human rights and fundamental freedoms;


(c) To study, discuss, form and hold opinions on the observance, both in law and in practice, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and, through these and other appropriate means, to draw public attention to those matters."


(30) Safeguards within the Criminal Procedure Code include: the necessity to produce an arrest warrant (Article 30); limiting the period of detention (Articles 26, 115, 122, 123, 124 and 175); the right of detainees to challenge the legality of the detention (Article 33); the right to be informed of the charges brought against them (Article 105); the right to legal counsel (Article 106); and prompt access to a judicial authority (Article 112). In addition, Article 53 of Law 47 of 1975 on prisons provides the right to lawyers to visit their clients in custody.


(31) See, for example, the statement issued on 10 August 2003 by the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security.


(32) Case 120/98


(33) In February 2004, the deputy head of the External Security Agency assured Amnesty International delegates that this agency did not hold people and ran no place of detention.


(34) Case 120/98


(35) The news was reported in al-Jazeera TV, Agence France Press and the British Broadcasting Corporation.


(36) Forcible return/fear of torture or ill-treatment of seven Libyans deported from Jordan (AI Index: MDE 19/01/00, EXTRA 21/00, 7 March 2000)


(37) Case 120/98


(38) In 2003 the Criminal Procedure Code was amended by Law 3 of 1371 reducing the maximum number of days a person can be detained before they must appear before a prosecutor from 45 to 30.


(39) Case 104/2003


(40) Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 11/05/99, para.182


(41) Article 4(2) of the Convention against Torture


(42) Prosecutors originally gave the number of infected children as 393, but at a trial session in September 2003, they increased the number to 426.


(43) Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 11 May 1999, para.11


(44) Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 11 May 1999, para.13


(45) Libya: Limbs of four people amputated, BBC (Text of report by Libyan radio), 4 July 2002.


(46) In Libya, three different calendars are used: the Gregorian calendar; the Hijra calendar; and another beginning in the year of the death of the Prophet Muhammad.


(47) In 2003 the UN Special Rapporteur on torture argued that he cannot accept the notion that the administration of such punishments as stoning to death, flogging or amputation - acts which would be unquestionably unlawful in, say, the context of custodial interrogation - can be deemed lawful simply because the punishment has been authorized in a procedurally legitimate manner. See Appendix 15, Corporal punishment: Observations of the Special Rapporteur on torture in combating torture - a manual for action (AI Index: ACT 40/001/2003, June 2003).


(48) Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 11/05/99.


A/54/44, para.189.


(49) In February 2004, Amnesty International also raised the issue of other special courts with the Libyan authorities, namely the Permanent Revolutionary Court and the Military Court. However, Amnesty International did not obtain detailed information about their functioning.


(50) Article 19 of Law 5 of 1988.


(51) Law 5 of 1988 establishing the People's Court


(52) Sent to Amnesty International on 29 October 2002


(53) During their February 2004 visit, Amnesty International delegates repeatedly requested a meeting with the President of the People's Court, who presides over the whole system, including the Popular Prosecution, but were not granted such a meeting. In addition, delegates requested numerous court documents from the People's Court but these were not made available.


(54) General Comment 13 of the Human Rights Committee: Equality before the courts and the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law (Article 14), 13 April 1984.


(55) ibid


(56) Case 333/2002


(57) Article 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code.


(58) As amended in 1427. It appears that in the original law of 1988 defendants enjoyed higher levels of guarantees of the right to legal counsel: Article 13 stated that the court would only appoint a lawyer from the Popular Lawyers' Office if the accused had not already chosen someone for his defence.


(59) For case details, see section entitled Prisoners of conscience


(60) Prisoners sentenced by the People's Court also reportedly suffer from different treatment, such as not being eligible for release on grounds of good behaviour after having completed three-quarters of their sentence; not being allowed to work while in prison; and not being allowed extended family visits.


(61) For further details, see section above, entitled Criminalization of rights to freedom of expression and association


(62) Specific penalties sanctioned by shari'a, Islamic law.


(63) Article 131 of Law 51 of 1976 on the organization of the judiciary, amended by Law 10 of 1425


(64) Case 48/1551


(65) Case 353/2000


(66) After these events took place, an article was added to the Penal Code by Law 15 of 2002 providing for punishment including the death penalty for taking part in riots or demonstrations during or after a sporting event (Article 198 bis of the Penal Code).


(67) UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/67 adopted on 24 April 2003


(68) Concluding observation of the Human Rights Committee: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, CCPR/C/79/Add.101, 6 November 1998, para.12


(69) Concluding observation of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, CRC/C/15/Add.209, 4 July 2003, para.45(c)


(70) Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik appeared, with three others, on Libyan television in early March 1994. While being interrogated at length on camera, they confessed to being American "spies" and to having been recruited as US intelligence agents by members of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. It was alleged they had been tortured into making these confessions. Charges against them included spying, treason, "instigation of violence, use of armed forces channels to achieve political and social goals" and "cooperation with the enemy to harm the interests of the country", all of which are punishable by death.


They were tried by a lower military court in 1995, which reportedly handed down sentences of up to life imprisonment on at least 12 people. However, the Libyan authorities were said to have ordered a retrial on the grounds that the initial sentences were too lenient. The men were retried by a military court at the end of December 1995 and 12 were sentenced to death.


On 2 January 1997 Libyan television stated that eight men - six senior army officers and two civilians - were executed after the Supreme Military Court upheld their death sentences. The court sentenced at least five men to prison terms and acquitted at least five others. The six army officers executed included Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik. (For further details, please refer to: Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation [AI Index: MDE 19/08/97]) Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik's family was reportedly not directly informed of his execution.


(71) In its report, entitled Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97, June 1997), Amnesty International raised the case of 'Abdallah Muhammad Mas'ud Zubeida, an alleged member of the banned Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, the Islamic Liberation Party, who "disappeared" after his reported arrest in 1982.


(72) While not detailed in this report, such cases have been previously raised by Amnesty International. For further information, see Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97, June 1997).


(73) Libya: Political prisoners in Abu Salim Prison, Tripoli - Fear for safety / Deliberate killings / Medical neglect (Urgent Action 188/96, AI Index: MDE 19/05/96, July 1996).


(74) For details, see their five-page report, entitled Report on Human Rights in Libya (17/07/2003)


(75) For further details, see their websites: http://www.lhrs.ch and http://www.libya-watch.org. The Libyan League for Human Rights does not have a website but can be contacted at allibyah@yahoo.com


(76) See Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97, June 1997)


(77) For details, see section above, entitled Urgent need for investigations into all deaths in custody


(78) The five others were: Mustapha Bin Daga, 'Ali al-Zirqani and 'Ali Kanunu, who had been released in 1988; and Yousef Lahawyal and Najm al-Din al-Naquzi.


(79) For examples, see Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97) and Libya: Time to break the 10-year silence on Mansour al-Kikhiya (AI Index MDE 19/021/2003, December 2003).


(80) Response of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the 2002 Annual Report of Amnesty International - December 2002


(81) Response of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the 2002 Annual Report of Amnesty International - December 2002


(82) The continuing nature of "disappearances" is also explicitly mentioned in the draft International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance, Article 5 of which states:

"This offence is continuous and permanent as long as the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared person have not been determined with certainty."


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> DIRT BAG? WHERE?


Arafat Fortifies Compound Fearing Attack
By MOHAMMED DARAGHMEH
Associated Press Writer
RAMALLAH, West Bank (AP) -- Fearing Israel will seize him, Yasser Arafat fortified his West Bank headquarters with hundreds of concrete-filled barrels and wrecked cars Thursday, saying he's determined to go down fighting.
Israel, which has repeatedly threatened the Palestinian leader, said it has no immediate plan to go after Arafat. One senior Israeli official said Arafat and his aides are being "hysterical" - although Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned only last month he is no longer bound by a promise to the United States not to harm Arafat.
Palestinian officials said the obstacles in the courtyard are meant to slow tanks and prevent helicopters from landing nearby, but he acknowledged that heaps of scrap metal would not hold back the Middle East's mightiest army for long.
Israel has confined the 74-year-old Arafat to his Ramallah offices for more than two years. In September, Israel's Cabinet decided Arafat should be "removed" and has repeatedly threatened him since then, but never taken any action.
Arafat's aides would not say what spooked the Palestinian leader.
However, he has become increasingly jittery since Israel assassinated Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin in March. Yassin had widely been considered immune, with Palestinians assuming Israel would be held back by concern about a bloody backlash. After Israel killed Yassin - and Hamas failed to carry out a major revenge attack - Arafat increasingly feared he might be next, his aides said.
Israeli jeeps drive close to Arafat's compound from time to time, and sometimes park outside for hours. Recent visitors to Arafat's compound said he asked them on arrival whether they had seen Israeli jeeps in the vicinity. "They usually come after midnight. Today, they came early," Arafat was quoted as saying.
Arafat said he wouldn't go down without a fight. "I am going to enter this battle with my gun by my side," a visitor quoted Arafat as saying Wednesday over a supper of salads and cooked vegetables. "I will resist until I become a martyr."
Israel has contingency plans for seizing and expelling Arafat, and troops have practiced taking over his compound. However, it is believed Israel would not act without provocation, such as a major attack by Palestinian militants.
Sharon adviser Raanan Gissin said there is no immediate plan to raid Arafat's compound. "We are not going to carry out any operation, but they are hysterical," Gissin said of Arafat and his aides.
Sharon said last month he is no longer bound by a promise to President Bush not to harm Arafat. Although the United States rebuked Sharon for the comments, the veiled threat raised speculation that Israel might target Arafat, whom it accuses of backing Palestinian militants.
Earlier this week, Israeli troops briefly surrounded Arafat's compound during an overnight raid. The army said Arafat was not the target, but Palestinian officials said the veteran leader fears for his life.
"We have a real concern that they (Israeli troops) may come here," said Palestinian Cabinet minister Saeb Erekat.
On Thursday, cement mixers filled hundreds of blue barrels with concrete, and they were then scattered across the main courtyard outside Arafat's compound. Bulldozers also spread dozens of wrecked cars - remnants of previous Israeli raids - across the courtyard.
Security officials said they also set up a new system to alert Arafat's guards if Israelis approach the compound, but gave no details.
Addressing a rally in the Gaza Strip by phone Thursday, Arafat said the Palestinians are ready to meet their obligations under the U.S.-backed "road map" peace plan and hope to resume negotiations with Israel. However, the plan has been stuck since its launch last year, and neither side has kept its promises.
The Palestinians are to dismantle violent groups, and Israel is to freeze settlement construction and remove West Bank outposts. Instead, Israel's Housing Ministry has funneled nearly $6.5 million to outposts and illegal construction in the past three years, a government watchdog reported Wednesday.
Sharon has been weighing his options since his Likud Party on Sunday overwhelmingly rejected his proposal to pull out of the Gaza Strip and four West Bank settlements. Sharon had said the plan would boost Israel's security in the absence of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

When Islam Breaks Down
Theodore Dalrymple



My first contact with Islam was in Afghanistan. I had been through Iran overland to get there, but it was in the days of the Shah's White Revolution, which had given rights to women and had secularized society (with the aid of a little detention, without trial, and torture). In my naive, historicist way, I assumed that secularization was an irreversible process, like the breaking of eggs: that once people had seen the glory of life without compulsory obeisance to the men of God, they would never turn back to them as the sole guides to their lives and politics.

Afghanistan was different, quite clearly a pre-modern society. The vast, barren landscapes in the crystalline air were impossibly romantic, and the people (that is to say the men, for women were not much in evidence) had a wild dignity and nobility. Their mien was aristocratic. Even their hospitality was fierce. They carried more weapons in daily life than the average British commando in wartime. You knew that they would defend you to the death, if necessary--or cut your throat like a chicken's, if necessary. Honor among them was all.

On the whole I was favorably impressed. I thought that they were freer than we. I thought nothing of such matters as the clash of civilizations, and experienced no desire, and felt no duty, to redeem them from their way of life in the name of any of my own civilization's ideals. Impressed by the aesthetics of Afghanistan and unaware of any fundamental opposition or tension between the modern and the pre-modern, I saw no reason why the West and Afghanistan should not rub along pretty well together, each in its own little world, provided only that each respected the other.

I was with a group of students, and our appearance in the middle of a country then seldom visited was almost a national event. At any rate, we put on extracts of Romeo and Juliet in the desert, in which I had a small part, and the crown prince of Afghanistan (then still a kingdom) attended. He arrived in Afghanistan's one modern appurtenance: a silver convertible Mercedes sports car--I was much impressed by that. Little did I think then that lines from the play--those of Juliet's plea to her mother to abrogate an unwanted marriage to Paris, arranged and forced on her by her father, Capulet--would so uncannily capture the predicament of some of my Muslim patients in Britain more than a third of a century after my visit to Afghanistan, and four centuries after they were written:

Is there no pity sitting in the clouds
That sees into the bottom of my grief?
O sweet my mother, cast me not away!
Delay this marriage for a month, a week,
Or if you do not, make the bridal bed
In that dim monument where Tybalt lies.
How often have I been consulted by young Muslim women patients, driven to despair by enforced marriages to close relatives (usually first cousins) back "home" in India and Pakistan, who have made such an unavailing appeal to their mothers, followed by an attempt at suicide!

Capulet's attitude to his refractory daughter is precisely that of my Muslim patients' fathers:

Look to't, think on't, I do not use to jest.
Thursday is near, lay hand on heart, advise:
And you be mine, I'll give you to my friend;
And you be not, hang, beg, starve, die in the streets,
For by my soul, I'll ne'er acknowledge thee,
Nor what is mine shall ever do thee good.
In fact the situation of Muslim girls in my city is even worse than Juliet's. Every Muslim girl in my city has heard of the killing of such as she back in Pakistan, on refusal to marry her first cousin, betrothed to her by her father, all unknown to her, in the earliest years of her childhood. The girl is killed because she has impugned family honor by breaking her father's word, and any halfhearted official inquiry into the death by the Pakistani authorities is easily and cheaply bought off. And even if she is not killed, she is expelled from the household--O sweet my mother, cast me not away!--and regarded by her "community" as virtually a prostitute, fair game for any man who wants her.

This pattern of betrothal causes suffering as intense as any I know of. It has terrible consequences. One father prevented his daughter, highly intelligent and ambitious to be a journalist, from attending school, precisely to ensure her lack of Westernization and economic independence. He then took her, aged 16, to Pakistan for the traditional forced marriage (silence, or a lack of open objection, amounts to consent in these circumstances, according to Islamic law) to a first cousin whom she disliked from the first and who forced his attentions on her. Granted a visa to come to Britain, as if the marriage were a bona fide one--the British authorities having turned a cowardly blind eye to the real nature of such marriages in order to avoid the charge of racial discrimination--he was violent toward her.

She had two children in quick succession, both of whom were so severely handicapped that they would be bedridden for the rest of their short lives and would require nursing 24 hours a day. (For fear of giving offense, the press almost never alludes to the extremely high rate of genetic illnesses among the offspring of consanguineous marriages.) Her husband, deciding that the blame for the illnesses was entirely hers, and not wishing to devote himself to looking after such useless creatures, left her, divorcing her after Islamic custom. Her family ostracized her, having concluded that a woman whose husband had left her must have been to blame and was the next thing to a whore. She threw herself off a cliff, but was saved by a ledge.

I've heard a hundred variations of her emblematic story. Here, for once, are instances of unadulterated female victimhood, yet the silence of the feminists is deafening. Where two pieties--feminism and multiculturalism--come into conflict, the only way of preserving both is an indecent silence.

Certainly such experiences have moderated the historicism I took to Afghanistan--the naive belief that monotheistic religions have but a single, "natural," path of evolution, which they all eventually follow. By the time Christianity was Islam's present age, I might once have thought, it had still undergone no Reformation, the absence of which is sometimes offered as an explanation for Islam's intolerance and rigidity. Give it time, I would have said, and it will evolve, as Christianity has, to a private confession that acknowledges the legal supremacy of the secular state--at which point Islam will become one creed among many.

That Shakespeare's words express the despair that oppressed Muslim girls feel in a British city in the twenty-first century with much greater force, short of poisoning themselves, than that with which they can themselves express it, that Shakespeare evokes so vividly their fathers' sentiments as well (though condemning rather than endorsing them), suggests--does it not?--that such oppressive treatment of women is not historically unique to Islam, and that it is a stage that Muslims will leave behind. Islam will even outgrow its religious intolerance, as Christian Europe did so long ago, after centuries in which the Thirty Years' War, for example, resulted in the death of a third of Germany's population, or when Philip II of Spain averred, "I would rather sacrifice the lives of a hundred thousand people than cease my persecution of heretics."

My historicist optimism has waned. After all, I soon enough learned that the Shah's revolution from above was reversible--at least in the short term, that is to say the term in which we all live, and certainly long enough to ruin the only lives that contemporary Iranians have. Moreover, even if there were no relevant differences between Christianity and Islam as doctrines and civilizations in their ability to accommodate modernity, a vital difference in the historical situations of the two religions also tempers my historicist optimism. Devout Muslims can see (as Luther, Calvin, and others could not) the long-term consequences of the Reformation and its consequent secularism: a marginalization of the Word of God, except as an increasingly distant cultural echo--as the "melancholy, long, withdrawing roar" of the once full "Sea of faith," in Matthew Arnold's precisely diagnostic words.

And there is enough truth in the devout Muslim's criticism of the less attractive aspects of Western secular culture to lend plausibility to his call for a return to purity as the answer to the Muslim world's woes. He sees in the West's freedom nothing but promiscuity and license, which is certainly there; but he does not see in freedom, especially freedom of inquiry, a spiritual virtue as well as an ultimate source of strength. This narrow, beleaguered consciousness no doubt accounts for the strand of reactionary revolt in contemporary Islam. The devout Muslim fears, and not without good reason, that to give an inch is sooner or later to concede the whole territory.

This fear must be all the more acute among the large and growing Muslim population in cities like mine. Except for a small, highly educated middle class, who live de facto as if Islam were a private religious confession like any other in the West, the Muslims congregate in neighborhoods that they have made their own, where the life of the Punjab continues amid the architecture of the Industrial Revolution. The halal butcher's corner shop rubs shoulders with the terra-cotta municipal library, built by the Victorian city fathers to improve the cultural level of a largely vanished industrial working class.

The Muslim immigrants to these areas were not seeking a new way of life when they arrived; they expected to continue their old lives, but more prosperously. They neither anticipated, nor wanted, the inevitable cultural tensions of translocation, and they certainly never suspected that in the long run they could not maintain their culture and their religion intact. The older generation is only now realizing that even outward conformity to traditional codes of dress and behavior by the young is no longer a guarantee of inner acceptance (a perception that makes their vigilantism all the more pronounced and desperate). Recently I stood at the taxi stand outside my hospital, beside two young women in full black costume, with only a slit for the eyes. One said to the other, "Give us a light for a fag, love; I'm gasping." Release the social pressure on the girls, and they would abandon their costume in an instant.

Anyone who lives in a city like mine and interests himself in the fate of the world cannot help wondering whether, deeper than this immediate cultural desperation, there is anything intrinsic to Islam--beyond the devout Muslim's instinctive understanding that secularization, once it starts, is like an unstoppable chain reaction--that renders it unable to adapt itself comfortably to the modern world. Is there an essential element that condemns the Dar al-Islam to permanent backwardness with regard to the Dar al-Harb, a backwardness that is felt as a deep humiliation, and is exemplified, though not proved, by the fact that the whole of the Arab world, minus its oil, matters less to the rest of the world economically than the Nokia telephone company of Finland?

I think the answer is yes, and that the problem begins with Islam's failure to make a distinction between church and state. Unlike Christianity, which had to spend its first centuries developing institutions clandestinely and so from the outset clearly had to separate church from state, Islam was from its inception both church and state, one and indivisible, with no possible distinction between temporal and religious authority. Muhammad's power was seamlessly spiritual and secular (although the latter grew ultimately out of the former), and he bequeathed this model to his followers. Since he was, by Islamic definition, the last prophet of God upon earth, his was a political model whose perfection could not be challenged or questioned without the total abandonment of the pretensions of the entire religion.

But his model left Islam with two intractable problems. One was political. Muhammad unfortunately bequeathed no institutional arrangements by which his successors in the role of omnicompetent ruler could be chosen (and, of course, a schism occurred immediately after the Prophet's death, with some--today's Sunnites--following his father-in-law, and some--today's Shi'ites--his son-in-law). Compounding this difficulty, the legitimacy of temporal power could always be challenged by those who, citing Muhammad's spiritual role, claimed greater religious purity or authority; the fanatic in Islam is always at a moral advantage vis-?-vis the moderate. Moreover, Islam--in which the mosque is a meetinghouse, not an institutional church--has no established, anointed ecclesiastical hierarchy to decide such claims authoritatively. With political power constantly liable to challenge from the pious, or the allegedly pious, tyranny becomes the only guarantor of stability, and assassination the only means of reform. Hence the Saudi time bomb: sooner or later, religious revolt will depose a dynasty founded upon its supposed piety but long since corrupted by the ways of the world.

The second problem is intellectual. In the West, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, acting upon the space that had always existed, at least potentially, in Christianity between church and state, liberated individual men to think for themselves, and thus set in motion an unprecedented and still unstoppable material advancement. Islam, with no separate, secular sphere where inquiry could flourish free from the claims of religion, if only for technical purposes, was hopelessly left behind: as, several centuries later, it still is.

The indivisibility of any aspect of life from any other in Islam is a source of strength, but also of fragility and weakness, for individuals as well as for polities. Where all conduct, all custom, has a religious sanction and justification, any change is a threat to the whole system of belief. Certainty that their way of life is the right one thus coexists with fear that the whole edifice--intellectual and political--will come tumbling down if it is tampered with in any way. Intransigence is a defense against doubt and makes living on terms of true equality with others who do not share the creed impossible.

Not coincidentally, the punishment for apostasy in Islam is death: apostates are regarded as far worse than infidels, and punished far more rigorously. In every Islamic society, and indeed among Britain's Muslim immigrants, there are people who take this idea quite literally, as their rage against Salman Rushdie testified.

The Islamic doctrine of apostasy is hardly favorable to free inquiry or frank discussion, to say the least, and surely it explains why no Muslim, or former Muslim, in an Islamic society would dare to suggest that the Qu'ran was not divinely dictated through the mouth of the Prophet but rather was a compilation of a charismatic man's words made many years after his death, and incorporating, with no very great originality, Judaic, Christian, and Zoroastrian elements. In my experience, devout Muslims expect and demand a freedom to criticize, often with perspicacity, the doctrines and customs of others, while demanding an exaggerated degree of respect and freedom from criticism for their own doctrines and customs. I recall, for example, staying with a Pakistani Muslim in East Africa, a very decent and devout man, who nevertheless spent several evenings with me deriding the absurdities of Christianity: the paradoxes of the Trinity, the impossibility of Resurrection, and so forth. Though no Christian myself, had I replied in kind, alluding to the pagan absurdities of the pilgrimage to Mecca, or to the gross, ignorant, and primitive superstitions of the Prophet with regard to jinn, I doubt that our friendship would have lasted long.

The unassailable status of the Qu'ran in Islamic education, thought, and society is ultimately Islam's greatest disadvantage in the modern world. Such unassailability does not debar a society from great artistic achievement or charms of its own: great and marvelous civilizations have flourished without the slightest intellectual freedom. I myself prefer a souk to a supermarket any day, as a more human, if less economically efficient, institution. But until Muslims (or former Muslims, as they would then be) are free in their own countries to denounce the Qu'ran as an inferior hodgepodge of contradictory injunctions, without intellectual unity (whether it is so or not)--until they are free to say with Carlyle that the Qu'ran is "a wearisome confused jumble" with "endless iterations, longwindedness, entanglement"--until they are free to remake and modernize the Qu'ran by creative interpretation, they will have to reconcile themselves to being, if not helots, at least in the rearguard of humanity, as far as power and technical advance are concerned.

A piece of pulp fiction by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, first published in 1898, when followers of the charismatic fundamentalist leader Muhammad al-Mahdi tried to establish a theocracy in Sudan by revolting against Anglo-Egyptian control, makes precisely this point and captures the contradiction at the heart of contemporary Islam. Called The Tragedy of the Korosko, the book is the story of a small tourist party to Upper Egypt, who are kidnapped and held to ransom by some Mahdists, and then rescued by the Egyptian Camel Corps. (I hesitate, as a Francophile, to point out to American readers that there is a French character in the book, who, until he is himself captured by the Mahdists, believes that they are but a figment of the British imagination, to give perfidious Albion a pretext to interfere in Sudanese affairs.) A mullah among the Mahdists who capture the tourists attempts to convert the Europeans and Americans to Islam, deriding as unimportant and insignificant their technically superior civilization: " `As to the [scientific] learning of which you speak . . . ' said the Moolah . . . `I have myself studied at the University of Al Azhar at Cairo, and I know that to which you allude. But the learning of the faithful is not as the learning of the unbeliever, and it is not fitting that we pry too deeply into the ways of Allah. Some stars have tails . . . and some have not; but what does it profit us to know which are which? For God made them all, and they are very safe in His hands. Therefore . . . be not puffed up by the foolish learning of the West, and understand that there is only one wisdom, which consists in following the will of Allah as His chosen prophet has laid it down for us in this book.' "

This is by no means a despicable argument. One of the reasons that we can appreciate the art and literature of the past, and sometimes of the very distant past, is that the fundamental conditions of human existence remain the same, however much we advance in the technical sense: I have myself argued in these pages that human self-understanding, except in purely technical matters, reached its apogee with Shakespeare. In a sense, the mullah is right.

But if we made a fetish of Shakespeare (much richer and more profound than the Qu'ran, in my view), if we made him the sole object of our study and the sole guide of our lives, we would soon enough fall into backwardness and stagnation. And the problem is that so many Muslims want both stagnation and power: they want a return to the perfection of the seventh century and to dominate the twenty-first, as they believe is the birthright of their doctrine, the last testament of God to man. If they were content to exist in a seventh-century backwater, secure in a quietist philosophy, there would be no problem for them or us; their problem, and ours, is that they want the power that free inquiry confers, without either the free inquiry or the philosophy and institutions that guarantee that free inquiry. They are faced with a dilemma: either they abandon their cherished religion, or they remain forever in the rear of human technical advance. Neither alternative is very appealing; and the tension between their desire for power and success in the modern world on the one hand, and their desire not to abandon their religion on the other, is resolvable for some only by exploding themselves as bombs.

People grow angry when faced with an intractable dilemma; they lash out. Whenever I have described in print the cruelties my young Muslim patients endure, I receive angry replies: I am either denounced outright as a liar, or the writer acknowledges that such cruelties take place but are attributable to a local culture, in this case Punjabi, not to Islam, and that I am ignorant not to know it.

But Punjabi Sikhs also arrange marriages: they do not, however, force consanguineous marriages of the kind that take place from Madras to Morocco. Moreover--and not, I believe, coincidentally--Sikh immigrants from the Punjab, of no higher original social status than their Muslim confr?res from the same provinces, integrate far better into the local society once they have immigrated. Precisely because their religion is a more modest one, with fewer universalist pretensions, they find the duality of their new identity more easily navigable. On the 50th anniversary of Queen Elizabeth's reign, for example, the Sikh temples were festooned with perfectly genuine protestations of congratulations and loyalty. No such protestations on the part of Muslims would be thinkable.

But the anger of Muslims, their demand that their sensibilities should be accorded a more than normal respect, is a sign not of the strength but of the weakness--or rather, the brittleness--of Islam in the modern world, the desperation its adherents feel that it could so easily fall to pieces. The control that Islam has over its populations in an era of globalization reminds me of the hold that the Ceausescus appeared to have over the Rumanians: an absolute hold, until Ceausescu appeared one day on the balcony and was jeered by the crowd that had lost its fear. The game was over, as far as Ceausescu was concerned, even if there had been no preexisting conspiracy to oust him.

One sign of the increasing weakness of Islam's hold over its nominal adherents in Britain--of which militancy is itself but another sign--is the throng of young Muslim men in prison. They will soon overtake the young men of Jamaican origin in their numbers and in the extent of their criminality. By contrast, young Sikhs and Hindus are almost completely absent from prison, so racism is not the explanation for such Muslim overrepresentation.

Confounding expectations, these prisoners display no interest in Islam whatsoever; they are entirely secularized. True, they still adhere to Muslim marriage customs, but only for the obvious personal advantage of having a domestic slave at home. Many of them also dot the city with their concubines--sluttish white working-class girls or exploitable young Muslims who have fled forced marriages and do not know that their young men are married. This is not religion, but having one's cake and eating it.

The young Muslim men in prison do not pray; they do not demand halal meat. They do not read the Qu'ran. They do not ask to see the visiting imam. They wear no visible signs of piety: their main badge of allegiance is a gold front tooth, which proclaims them members of the city's criminal subculture--a badge (of honor, they think) that they share with young Jamaicans, though their relations with the Jamaicans are otherwise fraught with hostility. The young Muslim men want wives at home to cook and clean for them, concubines elsewhere, and drugs and rock `n' roll. As for Muslim proselytism in the prison--and Muslim literature has been insinuated into nooks and crannies there far more thoroughly than any Christian literature--it is directed mainly at the Jamaican prisoners. It answers their need for an excuse to go straight, while not at the same time surrendering to the morality of a society they believe has wronged them deeply. Indeed, conversion to Islam is their revenge upon that society, for they sense that their newfound religion is fundamentally opposed to it. By conversion, therefore, they kill two birds with one stone.

But Islam has no improving or inhibiting effect upon the behavior of my city's young Muslim men, who, in astonishing numbers, have taken to heroin, a habit almost unknown among their Sikh and Hindu contemporaries. The young Muslims not only take heroin but deal in it, and have adopted all the criminality attendant on the trade.

What I think these young Muslim prisoners demonstrate is that the rigidity of the traditional code by which their parents live, with its universalist pretensions and emphasis on outward conformity to them, is all or nothing; when it dissolves, it dissolves completely and leaves nothing in its place. The young Muslims then have little defense against the egotistical licentiousness they see about them and that they all too understandably take to be the summum bonum of Western life.

Observing this, of course, there are among Muslim youth a tiny minority who reject this absorption into the white lumpenproletariat and turn militant or fundamentalist. It is their perhaps natural, or at least understandable, reaction to the failure of our society, kowtowing to absurd and dishonest multiculturalist pieties, to induct them into the best of Western culture: into that spirit of free inquiry and personal freedom that has so transformed the life chances of every person in the world, whether he knows it or not.

Islam in the modern world is weak and brittle, not strong: that accounts for its so frequent shrillness. The Shah will, sooner or later, triumph over the Ayatollah in Iran, because human nature decrees it, though meanwhile millions of lives will have been ruined and impoverished. The Iranian refugees who have flooded into the West are fleeing Islam, not seeking to extend its dominion, as I know from speaking to many in my city. To be sure, fundamentalist Islam will be very dangerous for some time to come, and all of us, after all, live only in the short term; but ultimately the fate of the Church of England awaits it. Its melancholy, withdrawing roar may well (unlike that of the Church of England) be not just long but bloody, but withdraw it will. The fanatics and the bombers do not represent a resurgence of unreformed, fundamentalist Islam, but its death rattle.


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The Fruits of Appeasement
Victor Davis Hanson



Imagine a different November 4, 1979, in Teheran. Shortly after Iranian terrorists storm the American embassy and take some 90 American hostages, President Jimmy Carter announces that Islamic fundamentalism is not a legitimate response to the excess of the Shah but a new and dangerous fascism that threatens all that liberal society holds dear. And then he issues an ultimatum to Teheran's leaders: Release the captives or face a devastating military response.

When that demand is not met, instead of freezing Iran's assets, stopping the importation of its oil, or seeking support at the UN, Carter orders an immediate blockade of the country, followed by promises to bomb, first, all of its major military assets, and then its main government buildings and residences of its ruling mullocracy. The Ayatollah Khomeini may well have called his bluff; we may well have tragically lost the hostages (151 fewer American lives than the Iranian-backed Hezbollah would take four years later in a single day in Lebanon). And there may well have been the sort of chaos in Teheran that we now witness in Baghdad. But we would have seen it all in 1979--and not in 2001, after almost a quarter-century of continuous Middle East terrorism, culminating in the mass murder of 3,000 Americans and the leveling of the World Trade Center.

The twentieth century should have taught the citizens of liberal democracies the catastrophic consequences of placating tyrants. British and French restraint over the occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, the absorption of the Czech Sudetenland, and the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia did not win gratitude but rather Hitler's contempt for their weakness. Fifty million dead, the Holocaust, and the near destruction of European civilization were the wages of "appeasement"--a term that early-1930s liberals proudly embraced as far more enlightened than the old idea of "deterrence" and "military readiness."

So too did Western excuses for the Russians' violation of guarantees of free elections in postwar Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia only embolden the Soviet Union. What eventually contained Stalinism was the Truman Doctrine, NATO, and nuclear deterrence--not the United Nations--and what destroyed its legacy was Ronald Reagan's assertiveness, not Jimmy Carter's accommodation or Richard Nixon's d?tente.

As long ago as the fourth century b.c., Demosthenes warned how complacency and self-delusion among an affluent and free Athenian people allowed a Macedonian thug like Philip II to end some four centuries of Greek liberty--and in a mere 20 years of creeping aggrandizement down the Greek peninsula. Thereafter, these historical lessons should have been clear to citizens of any liberal society: we must neither presume that comfort and security are our birthrights and are guaranteed without constant sacrifice and vigilance, nor expect that peoples outside the purview of bourgeois liberalism share our commitment to reason, tolerance, and enlightened self-interest.

Most important, military deterrence and the willingness to use force against evil in its infancy usually end up, in the terrible arithmetic of war, saving more lives than they cost. All this can be a hard lesson to relearn each generation, especially now that we contend with the sirens of the mall, Oprah, and latte. Our affluence and leisure are as antithetical to the use of force as rural life and relative poverty once were catalysts for muscular action. The age-old lure of appeasement--perhaps they will cease with this latest concession, perhaps we provoked our enemies, perhaps demonstrations of our future good intentions will win their approval--was never more evident than in the recent Spanish elections, when an affluent European electorate, reeling from the horrific terrorist attack of 3/11, swept from power the pro-U.S. center-right government on the grounds that the mass murders were more the fault of the United States for dragging Spain into the effort to remove fascists and implant democracy in Iraq than of the primordial al-Qaidist culprits, who long ago promised the Western and Christian Iberians ruin for the Crusades and the Reconquista.

What went wrong with the West--and with the United States in particular--when not just the classical but especially the recent antecedents to September 11, from the Iranian hostage-taking to the attack on the USS Cole, were so clear? Though Americans in an election year, legitimately concerned about our war dead, may now be divided over the Iraqi occupation, polls nevertheless show a surprising consensus that the many precursors to the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings were acts of war, not police matters. Roll the tape backward from the USS Cole in 2000, through the bombing of the Khobar Towers and the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the destruction of the American embassy and annex in Beirut in 1983, the mass murder of 241 U.S. Marine peacekeepers asleep in their Lebanese barracks that same year, and assorted kidnappings and gruesome murders of American citizens and diplomats (including TWA Flight 800, Pan Am 103, William R. Higgins, Leon Klinghoffer, Robert Dean Stethem, and CIA operative William Francis Buckley), until we arrive at the Iranian hostage-taking of November 1979: that debacle is where we first saw the strange brew of Islamic fascism, autocracy, and Middle East state terrorism--and failed to grasp its menace, condemn it, and go to war against it.

That lapse, worth meditating upon in this 25th anniversary year of Khomeinism, then set the precedent that such aggression against the United States was better adjudicated as a matter of law than settled by war. Criminals were to be understood, not punished; and we, not our enemies, were at fault for our past behavior. Whether Carter's impotence sprang from his deep-seated moral distrust of using American power unilaterally or from real remorse over past American actions in the cold war or even from his innate pessimism about the military capability of the United States mattered little to the hostage takers in Teheran, who for some 444 days humiliated the United States through a variety of public demands for changes in U.S. foreign policy, the return of the exiled Shah, and reparations.

But if we know how we failed to respond in the last three decades, do we yet grasp why we were so afraid to act decisively at these earlier junctures, which might have stopped the chain of events that would lead to the al-Qaida terrorist acts of September 11? Our failure was never due to a lack of the necessary wealth or military resources, but rather to a deeply ingrained assumption that we should not retaliate--a hesitancy al-Qaida perceives and plays upon.

Along that sad succession of provocations, we can look back and see particularly critical turning points that reflected this now-institutionalized state policy of worrying more about what the enemy was going to do to us than we to him, to paraphrase Grant's dictum: not hammering back after the murder of the marines in Lebanon for fear of ending up like the Israelis in a Lebanese quagmire; not going to Baghdad in 1991 because of paranoia that the "coalition" would collapse and we would polarize the Arabs; pulling abruptly out of Somalia once pictures of American bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu were broadcast around the world; or turning down offers in 1995 from Sudan to place Usama bin Ladin into our custody, for fear that U.S. diplomats or citizens might be murdered abroad.

Throughout this tragic quarter-century of appeasement, our response usually consisted of a stern lecture by a Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, or Bill Clinton about "never giving in to terrorist blackmail" and "not negotiating with terrorists." Even Ronald Reagan's saber-rattling "You can run but not hide" did not preclude trading arms to the Iranian terrorists or abruptly abandoning Lebanon after the horrific Hezbollah attack.

Sometimes a half-baked failed rescue mission, or a battleship salvo, cruise missile, or air strike followed--but always accompanied by a weeklong debate by conservatives over "exit strategies" and "mission creep," while liberals fretted about "consultations with our allies and the United Nations." And remember: these pathetic military responses were the hawkish actions that earned us the resignation of a furious Cyrus Vance, the abrogation of overflight rights by concerned "allies" such as France, and a national debate about what we did to cause such animosity in the first place.

Our enemies and Middle Eastern "friends" alike sneered at our self-flagellation. In 1991, at great risk, the United States freed Kuwait from Iraq and ended its status as the 19th satrapy of Saddam Hussein--only to watch the restored kingdom ethnically cleanse over a third of a million Palestinians. But after the murder of 3,000 Americans in 2001, Kuwaitis, in a February 2002 Gallup poll (and while they lobbied OPEC to reduce output and jack up prices), revealed an overwhelming distaste for Americans--indeed the highest levels of anti-Americanism in the Arab world. And these ethnic cleansers of Palestinians cited America's purportedly unfair treatment of the Palestinians (recipients of accumulated billions in American aid) as a prime cause of their dislike of us.

In the face of such visceral anti-Americanism, the problem may not be real differences over the West Bank, much less that "we are not getting the message out"; rather, in the decade since 1991 the Middle East saw us as a great power that neither could nor would use its strength to advance its ideas--that lacked even the intellectual confidence to argue for our civilization before the likes of a tenth-century monarchy. The autocratic Arab world neither respects nor fears a democratic United States, because it rightly senses that we often talk in principled terms but rarely are willing to invest the time, blood, and treasure to match such rhetoric with concrete action. That's why it is crucial for us to stay in Iraq to finish the reconstruction and cement the achievement of our three-week victory over Saddam.

It is easy to cite post-Vietnam guilt and shame as the likely culprit for our paralysis. After all, Jimmy Carter came in when memories of capsizing boat people and of American helicopters lifting swarms of panicked diplomats off the roof of the Saigon embassy were fresh. In 1980, he exited in greater shame: his effusive protestations that Soviet communism wasn't something to fear all that much won him the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, while his heralded "human rights" campaign was answered by the Ortegas in Nicaragua and the creation of a murderous theocracy in Iran. Yet perhaps President Carter was not taking the American people anywhere they didn't want to go. After over a decade of prior social unrest and national humiliation in Vietnam, many Americans believed that the United States either could not or should not do much about things beyond its shores.

As time wore on and the nightmare of Vietnam began to fade, fear of the Soviet Union kept us from crushing the terrorists who killed our diplomats and blew up our citizens. These were no idle fears, given the Russians' record of butchering 30 million of their own, stationing 300 divisions on Europe's borders, and pointing 7,000 nukes at the United States. And fear of their malevolence made eminent sense in the volatile Middle East, where the Russians made direct threats to the Israelis in both the 1967 and 1973 wars, when the Syrian, Egyptian, and Iraqi militaries--trained, supplied, and advised by Russians--were on the verge of annihilation. Russian support for Nasser's Pan-Arabism and for Baathism in Iraq and Syria rightly worried cold warriors, who sensed that the Soviets had their geopolitical eyes on Middle East oil and a stranglehold over Persian Gulf commerce.

Indeed, these twin pillars of the old American Middle East policy--worry over oil and fear of communists--reigned for nearly half a century, between 1945 and 1991. Such realism, however understandable, was counterproductive in the long run, since our tacit support for odious anti-communist governments in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and North Africa did not address the failure of such autocracies to provide prosperity and hope for exploding populations of increasingly poor and angry citizens. We kept Russians out of the oil fields and ensured safe exports of petroleum to Europe, Japan, and the United States--but at what proved to be the steep price of allowing awful regimes to deflect popular discontent against us.

Nor was realpolitik always effective. Such illegitimate Arab regimes as the Saudi royal family initiated several oil embargoes, after all. And meanwhile, such a policy did not deter the Soviets from busily selling high-tech weaponry to Libya, Syria, and Iraq, while the KGB helped to train and fund almost every Arab terrorist group. And indeed, immediately after the 1991 Iraqi takeover of Kuwait, U.S. intelligence officers discovered that Soviet-trained Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas, and Abu Ibrahim had flocked to Baghdad on the invitation of the Baathist Saddam Hussein: though the Soviet Union did not interrupt Western petroleum commerce, its well-supplied surrogates did their fair share of murdering.

Neither thirst for petroleum nor fear of communists, then, adequately explains our inaction for most of the tumultuous late 1980s and 1990s, when groups like Hezbollah and al-Qaida came on to the world scene. Gorbachev's tottering empire had little inclination to object too strenuously when the United States hit Libya in 1986, recall, and thanks to the growing diversity and fungibility of the global oil supply, we haven't had a full-fledged Arab embargo since 1979.

Instead, the primary cause for our surprising indifference to the events leading up to September 11 lies within ourselves. Westerners always have had a propensity for complacency because of our wealth and freedom; and Americans in particular have enjoyed a comfortable isolation in being separated from the rest of the world by two oceans. Yet during the last four presidential administrations, laxity about danger on the horizon seems to have become more ingrained than in the days when a more robust United States sought to thwart communist intrusion into Arabia, Asia, and Africa.

Americans never viewed terrorist outlaw states with the suspicion they once had toward Soviet communism; they put little pressure on their leaders to crack down on Middle Eastern autocracy and theocracy as a threat to security. At first this indifference was understandable, given the stealthy nature of our enemies and the post-cold war relief that, having toppled the Soviet Union and freed millions in Eastern Europe, we might be at the end of history. Even the bloodcurdling anti-American shouts from the Beirut street did not seem as scary as a procession of intercontinental missiles and tanks on an average May Day parade in Moscow.

Hezbollah, al-Qaida, and the PLO were more like fleas on a sleeping dog: bothersome rather than lethal; to be flicked away occasionally rather than systematically eradicated. Few paid attention to Usama bin Ladin's infamous February 1998 fatwa: "The rule to kill Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is a sacred duty for any Muslim." Those who noticed thought it just impotent craziness, akin to Sartre's fatuous quip during the Vietnam War that he wished for a nuclear strike against the United States to end its imperial aspirations. No one thought that a raving maniac in an Afghan cave could kill more Americans in a single day than the planes of the Japanese imperial fleet off Pearl Harbor.

But still, how did things as odious to liberal sensibilities as Pan-Arabism, Islamic fundamentalism, and Middle Eastern dictatorship--which squashed dissent, mocked religious tolerance, and treated women as chattel--become reinvented into "alternate discourses" deserving a sympathetic pass from the righteous anger of the United States when Americans were murdered overseas? Was it that spokesmen for terrorist regimes mimicked the American Left--in everything from dress, vocabulary, and appearances on the lecture circuit--and so packaged their extremism in a manner palatable to Americans? Why, after all, were Americans patient with remonstrations from University of Virginia alumna Hanan Ashrawi, rather than asking precisely how such a wealthy Christian PLO apparatchik really felt about the Palestinian Authority's endemic corruption, the spendthrift Parisian Mrs. Arafat, the terrorists around Arafat himself, the spate of "honor killings" of women in the West Bank, the censorship of the Palestinian press, suicide murdering by Arafat affiliates, and the lynching of suspects by Palestinian police?

Rather than springing from realpolitik, sloth, or fear of oil cutoffs, much of our appeasement of Middle Eastern terrorists derived from a new sort of anti-Americanism that thrived in the growing therapeutic society of the 1980s and 1990s. Though the abrupt collapse of communism was a dilemma for the Left, it opened as many doors as it shut. To be sure, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, few Marxists could argue for a state-controlled economy or mouth the old romance about a workers' paradise--not with scenes of East German families crammed into smoking clunkers lumbering over potholed roads, like American pioneers of old on their way west. But if the creed of the socialist republics was impossible to take seriously in either economic or political terms, such a collapse of doctrinaire statism did not discredit the gospel of forced egalitarianism and resentment against prosperous capitalists. Far from it.

If Marx receded from economics departments, his spirit reemerged among our intelligentsia in the novel guises of post-structuralism, new historicism, multiculturalism, and all the other dogmas whose fundamental tenet was that white male capitalists had systematically oppressed women, minorities, and Third World people in countless insidious ways. The font of that collective oppression, both at home and abroad, was the rich, corporate, Republican, and white United States.

The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced these newer post-colonial and liberation fields of study by immunizing their promulgators from charges of fellow-traveling or being dupes of Russian expansionism. Communism's demise likewise freed these trendy ideologies from having to offer some wooden, unworkable Marxist alternative to the West; thus they could happily remain entirely critical, sarcastic, and cynical without any obligation to suggest something better, as witness the nihilist signs at recent protest marches proclaiming: "I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas."

From writers like Arundhati Roy and Michel Foucault (who anointed Khomeini "a kind of mystic saint" who would usher in a new "political spirituality" that would "transfigure" the world) and from old standbys like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre ("to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time"), there filtered down a vague notion that the United States and the West in general were responsible for Third World misery in ways that transcended the dull old class struggle. Endemic racism and the legacy of colonialism, the oppressive multinational corporation and the humiliation and erosion of indigenous culture brought on by globalization and a smug, self-important cultural condescension--all this and more explained poverty and despair, whether in Damascus, Teheran, or Beirut.

There was victim status for everybody, from gender, race, and class at home to colonialism, imperialism, and hegemony abroad. Anyone could play in these "area studies" that cobbled together the barrio, the West Bank, and the "freedom fighter" into some sloppy global union of the oppressed--a far hipper enterprise than rehashing Das Kapital or listening to a six-hour harangue from Fidel.

Of course, pampered Western intellectuals since Diderot have always dreamed up a "noble savage," who lived in harmony with nature precisely because of his distance from the corruption of Western civilization. But now this fuzzy romanticism had an updated, political edge: the bearded killer and wild-eyed savage were not merely better than we because they lived apart in a pre-modern landscape. No: they had a right to strike back and kill modernizing Westerners who had intruded into and disrupted their better world--whether Jews on Temple Mount, women in Westernized dress in Teheran, Christian missionaries in Kabul, capitalist profiteers in Islamabad, whiskey-drinking oilmen in Riyadh, or miniskirted tourists in Cairo.

An Ayatollah Khomeini who turned back the clock on female emancipation in Iran, who murdered non-Muslims, and who refashioned Iranian state policy to hunt down, torture, and kill liberals nevertheless seemed to liberal Western eyes as preferable to the Shah--a Western-supported anti-communist, after all, who was engaged in the messy, often corrupt task of bringing Iran from the tenth to the twentieth century, down the arduous, dangerous path that, as in Taiwan or South Korea, might eventually lead to a consensual, capitalist society like our own.

Yet in the new world of utopian multiculturalism and knee-jerk anti-Americanism, in which a Noam Chomsky could proclaim Khomeini's gulag to be "independent nationalism," reasoned argument was futile. Indeed, how could critical debate arise for those "committed to social change," when no universal standards were to be applied to those outside the West? Thanks to the doctrine of cultural relativism, "oppressed" peoples either could not be judged by our biased and "constructed" values ("false universals," in Edward Said's infamous term) or were seen as more pristine than ourselves, uncorrupted by the evils of Western capitalism.

Who were we to gainsay Khomeini's butchery and oppression? We had no way of understanding the nuances of his new liberationist and "nationalist" Islam. Now back in the hands of indigenous peoples, Iran might offer the world an alternate path, a different "discourse" about how to organize a society that emphasized native values (of some sort) over mere profit.

So at precisely the time of these increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, the silly gospel of multiculturalism insisted that Westerners have neither earned the right to censure others, nor do they possess the intellectual tools to make judgments about the relative value of different cultures. And if the initial wave of multiculturalist relativism among the elites--coupled with the age-old romantic forbearance for Third World roguery--explained tolerance for early unpunished attacks on Americans, its spread to our popular culture only encouraged more.

This nonjudgmentalism--essentially a form of nihilism--deemed everything from Sudanese female circumcision to honor killings on the West Bank merely "different" rather than odious. Anyone who has taught freshmen at a state university can sense the fuzzy thinking of our undergraduates: most come to us prepped in high schools not to make "value judgments" about "other" peoples who are often "victims" of American "oppression." Thus, before female-hating psychopath Mohamed Atta piloted a jet into the World Trade Center, neither Western intellectuals nor their students would have taken him to task for what he said or condemned him as hypocritical for his parasitical existence on Western society. Instead, without logic but with plenty of romance, they would more likely have excused him as a victim of globalization or of the biases of American foreign policy. They would have deconstructed Atta's promotion of anti-Semitic, misogynist, Western-hating thought, as well as his conspiracies with Third World criminals, as anything but a danger and a pathology to be remedied by deportation or incarceration.

It was not for nothing that on November 17, 1979--less than two weeks after the militants stormed the American embassy in Teheran--the Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the release of 13 female and black hostages, singling them out as part of the brotherhood of those oppressed by the United States and cloaking his ongoing slaughter of Iranian opponents and attacks on United States sovereignty in a self-righteous anti-Americanism. Twenty-five years later, during the anti-war protests of last spring, a group called "Act Now to Stop War and End Racism" sang the same foolish chorus in its call for demonstrations: "Members of the Muslim Community, Antiwar Activists, Latin-American Solidarity Groups and People From All Over the United States Unite to Say: `We Are All Palestinians!' "

The new cult of romantic victimhood became gospel in most Middle East departments in American universities. Except for the courageous Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, and Fouad Ajami, few scholars offered any analysis that might confirm more astute Americans in their vague sense that in the Middle East, political autocracy, statism, tribalism, anti-intellectualism, and gender apartheid accounted for poverty and failure. And if few wished to take on Islamofascism in the 1990s--indeed, Steven Emerson's chilling 1994 documentary Jihad in America set off a storm of protest from U.S. Muslim-rights groups and prompted death threats to the producer--almost no one but Samuel Huntington dared even to broach the taboo subject that there might be elements within doctrinaire Islam itself that could easily lead to intolerance and violence and were therefore at the root of any "clash of civilizations."

Instead, most experts explained why violent fanatics might have some half-legitimate grievance behind their deadly harvest each year of a few Americans in the wrong place at the wrong time. These experts cautioned that, instead of bombing and shooting killers abroad who otherwise would eventually reach us at home, Americans should take care not to disturb Iranian terrorists during Ramadan--rather than to remember that Muslims attacked Israel precisely during that holy period. Instead of condemning Wahhabis for the fascists that they were, we were instead apprised that such holy men of the desert and tent provided a rapidly changing and often Western-corrupted Saudi Arabia with a vital tether to the stability of its romantic nomadic past. Rather than recognizing that Yasser Arafat's Tunisia-based Fatah organization was a crime syndicate, expert opinion persuaded us to empower it as an indigenous liberation movement on the West Bank--only to destroy nearly two decades' worth of steady Palestinian economic improvement.

Neither oil-concerned Republicans nor multicultural Democrats were ready to expose the corrupt American relationship with Saudi Arabia. No country is more culpable than that kingdom in funding extremist madrassas and subsidizing terror, or more antithetical to liberal American values from free speech to religious tolerance. But Saudi propagandists learned from the Palestinians the value of constructing their own victimhood as a long-oppressed colonial people. Call a Saudi fundamentalist mullah a fascist, and you can be sure you'll be tarred as an Islamophobe.

Even when Middle Easterners regularly blew us up, the Clinton administration, unwilling to challenge the new myth of Muslim victimhood, transformed Middle Eastern terrorists bent on destroying America into wayward individual criminals who did not spring from a pathological culture. Thus, Clinton treated the first World Trade Center bombing as only a criminal justice matter--which of course allowed the United States to avoid confronting the issue and taking on the messy and increasingly unpopular business the Bush administration has been engaged in since September 11. Clinton dispatched FBI agents, not soldiers, to Yemen and Saudi Arabia after the attacks on the USS Cole and the Khobar Towers. Yasser Arafat, responsible in the 1970s for the murder of a U.S. diplomat in the Sudan, turned out to be the most frequent foreign visitor to the Clinton Oval Office.

If the Clintonian brand of appeasement reflected both a deep-seated tolerance for Middle Eastern extremism and a reluctance to wake comfortable Americans up to the danger of a looming war, he was not the only one naive about the threat of Islamic fascism. Especially culpable was the Democratic Party at large, whose post-Vietnam foreign policy could not sanction the use of American armed force to protect national interests but only to accomplish purely humanitarian ends as in the interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia.

Indeed, the recent Democratic primaries reveal just how far this disturbing trend has evolved: the foreign-policy positions of John Kerry and Howard Dean on Iraq and the Middle East were far closer to those of extremists like Al Sharpton and Dennis Kucinich than to current American policy under George W. Bush. Indeed, buffoons or conspiracy theorists like Noam Chomsky, Michael Moore, and Al Franken often turned up on the same stage as would-be presidents. When Moore, while endorsing Wesley Clark, called an American president at a time of war a "deserter," when the mendacious Sharpton lectured his smiling fellow candidates on the Bush administration's "lies" about Iraq, and when Al Gore labeled the president's action in Iraq a "betrayal" of America, the surrender of the mainstream Democrats to the sirens of extremism was complete. Again, past decorum and moderation go out the window when the pretext is saving indigenous peoples from American oppression.

The consensus for appeasement that led to September 11, albeit suppressed for nearly two years by outrage over the murder of 3,000, has reemerged in criticism over the ongoing reconstruction of Iraq and George Bush's prosecution of the War on Terror.

The tired voices that predicted a litany of horrors in October 2001--the impassable peaks of Afghanistan, millions of refugees, endemic starvation, revolution in the Arab street, and violations of Ramadan--now complain, incorrectly, that 150,000 looted art treasures were the cost of guarding the Iraqi oil ministry, that Halliburton pipelines and refineries were the sole reason to remove Saddam Hussein, and that Christian fundamentalists and fifth-columnist neoconservatives have fomented a senseless revenge plot against Muslims and Arabs. Whether they complained before March 2003 that America faced death and ruin against Saddam's Republican Guard, or two months later that in bullying fashion we had walked over a suddenly impotent enemy, or three months later still that, through incompetence, we were taking casualties and failing to get the power back on, leftist critics' only constant was their predictable dislike of America.

Military historians might argue that, given the enormity of our task in Iraq--liberating 26 million from a tyrant and implanting democracy in the region--the tragic loss of more than 500 Americans in a year's war and peace was a remarkable sign of our care and expertise in minimizing deaths. Diplomats might argue that our past efforts at humanitarian reconstruction, with some idealistic commitment to consensual government, have a far better track record in Germany, Japan, Korea, Panama, and Serbia than our strategy of exiting Germany after World War I, of leaving Iraq to Saddam after 1991, of abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban once the Russians were stopped, of skipping out from Haiti or of fleeing Somalia. Realist students of arms control might argue that the recent confessions of Pakistan's nuclear roguery, the surrender of the Libyan arsenal, and the invitation of the UN inspectors into Iran were the dividends of resolute American action in Iraq. Colonel Khadafy surely came clean not because of Jimmy Carter's peace missions, UN resolutions, or EU diplomats.

But don't expect any sober discussion of these contentions from the Left. Their gloom and doom about Iraq arises precisely from the anti-Americanism and romanticization of the Third World that once led to our appeasement and now seeks its return. When John Kerry talks of mysterious prominent Europeans he has met (but whose names he will not divulge) who, he says, pray for his election in hopes of ending George Bush's Iraqi nightmare, perhaps he has in mind people like the Chamberlainesque European Commission president Romano Prodi, who said in the wake of the recent mass murder in Spain: "Clearly, the conflict with the terrorists is not resolved with force alone." Perhaps he has in mind, also, the Spanish electorate, which believes it can find security from al-Qaida terrorism by refuting all its past support for America's role in the Middle East. But of course if the terrorists understand that, in lieu of resolve, they will find such appeasement a mere 48 hours after a terrorist attack, then all previously resolute Western democracies--Italy, Poland, Britain, and the United States--should expect the terrorists to murder their citizens on the election eve in hopes of achieving just such a Spanish-style capitulation.

In contrast, George W. Bush, impervious to such self-deception, has, in a mere two and a half years, reversed the perilous course of a quarter-century. Since September 11, he has removed the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, begun to challenge the Middle East through support for consensual government, isolated Yasser Arafat, pressured the Europeans on everything from anti-Semitism to their largesse to Hamas, removed American troops from Saudi Arabia, shut down fascistic Islamic "charities," scattered al-Qaida, turned Pakistan from a de facto foe to a scrutinized neutral, rounded up terrorists in the United States, pressured Libya, Iran, and Pakistan to come clean on clandestine nuclear cheating, so far avoided another September 11--and promises that he is not nearly done yet. If the Spanish example presages further terrorist attacks on European democracies at election time, at least Mr. Bush has made it clear that America--alone if need be--will neither appease nor ignore such killers but in fact finish the terrible war that they started.

As Jimmy Carter also proved in November 1979, one man really can make a difference.

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WASHINGTON

>> FRUM NODS...
http://www.nationalreview.com/frum/frum-diary.asp

MAY. 5, 2004: STATE DEPARTMENT LOGIC

Let's see if I have this straight: Ahmed Chalabi has been condemned as an Iranian agent and is therefore to be shunned by all agencies of the US government. But Iran itself is to be courted by the United States, and its terrorism and nuclear development is to be ignored. Sound logical to you?
Yesterday, we read in Newsweek and Salon a government-sourced full-blast attack on Chalabi's connections with the Iranians. But ask yourself this: When was the last time you saw government sources revealing anything untoward about the Iranians themselves?
You may remember that the International Atomic Energy Commission caught the Iranians in a series of lies about their nuclear program last spring and summer. The Iranians themselves finallyy admitted that they had deceived the world for 18 years. It was no longer seriously possible to doubt that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons - or that it had already acquired much of the capability to build them.
In the first shock after the discovery, many expressed fear that the Bush administration would be tempted to act unilaterally to shut down the Iranian nuclear program. Britain, France, and Germany pressed the United States to work through the International Atomic Energy Commission instead - and the US agreed. In November 2003, the IAEA condemned Iran's past violations of IAEA rules and voted a new set of inspection procedures. The IAEA threatened that if Iran continued to violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the case would be referred to the Security Council - which could (theoretically) vote for harsh sanctions against Iran, including (again theoretically) military action.
On Nov. 26, 2003, Colin Powell said that he was "very happy" with the IAEA's actions.
But of course, Iran has paid scant attention to the IAEA. The Iranian nuclear program races ahead. And the IAEA has done nothing. No UN referral; no sanctions.
And those intrepid foes of Iranian imperialism at the State Department? What have they done? In March 2004, Colin Powell agreed with the European allies to drop US demands for Security Council action against Iran. US policy is now one of "engagement" with Iran - even as Iran hosts al Qaeda on its territory and supports terrorism inside Iraq.
US inaction has allowed Iran to assert itself as a contender for paramountcy inside Iraq. The US has accepted Europe's "do-nothing" policy on Iranian nukes. No wonder Ahmed Chalabi joined that phone call to Teheran. Maybe he thought he was doing what America wanted. Unfortunately for him, he misread the policy. America's clients in Iraq are not allowed to truckle to the tyrannical mullahs of Teheran. Only Americans themselves may do that.

08:03 AM


MAY. 4, 2004: THE CHALABI SMEAR

Really, if the CIA and State Department fought this country's enemies with even one-half the ferocity with which they have waged war on Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress, the United States would be a vastly safer place. Yesterday, the agencies launched their latest offensive against this leader they so detest: They leaked Mark Hosenball of Newsweek a story claiming that Chalabi has betrayed US interests to the Iranians.
"U.S. intelligence agencies have recently raised concerns that Chalabi has become too close to Iran's theocratic rulers. NEWSWEEK has learned that top Bush administration officials have been briefed on intelligence indicating that Chalabi and some of his top aides have supplied Iran with `sensitive' information on the American occupation in Iraq. U.S. officials say that electronic intercepts of discussions between Iranian leaders indicate that Chalabi and his entourage told Iranian contacts about American political plans in Iraq. There are also indications that Chalabi has provided details of U.S. security operations. According to one U.S. government source, some of the information Chalabi turned over to Iran could `get people killed.' (A Chalabi aide calls the allegations `absolutely false.')"
You have to give credit where credit is due: This is an audacious accusation. Audacious because it demands that the State Department's and CIA's cheering sections in the media perform a cult-like reversal of belief in everything they were saying about Iraq, Iran, and Chalabi himself up until now.
But those of us with memories that extend back beyond the past 24 hours will have some questions for Newsweek and its sources:

ITEM: Up until now we were supposed to believe that the INC produced no useful intelligence - that it dealt only in fantasies and lies. Now suddenly the INC is accused of being in possession of accurate and valuable sensitive information. How did Chalabi go from know-nothing to valuable intelligence asset overnight?

ITEM: A government source says that the security information Chalabi may or may not have provided could "get people killed." Get them killed by whom? Up until now, the CIA and State Department have resolutely refused to acknowledge that Iran might be supporting the insurgency in Iraq. Now they are willing to admit reality - but only in order to use it against what they perceive as the real threat: Chalabi.

ITEM: Chalabi has been caught talking on the phone to the Iranians. But wait - hasn't the State Department been arguing for months that the US should talk to the Iranians about Iraq? In testimony to Congress in October 2003, State number 2 Richard Armitage explicitly disavowed regime change in Iran and called for discussions with Iran on "appropriate" issues. In January 2004, Secretary of State Powell openly called for "dialogue" - and the Bush administration offered to send Elizabeth Dole and a member of the president's own family to deliver earthquake aid to Iran. (The British sent Prince Charles.) Since then, the hinting and suggesting have grown ever more explicit. What, pray, is the difference between the policy Chalabi is pursuing and that which his State Department critics want the US to pursue?

ITEM: Chalabi is now accused of playing a "double game" in Iraqi politics, an offense for which he must forfeit all rights to a role in Iraq's future. This "no double game" rule is a new and impressive standard for judging our allies in the Arab Middle East. Question: Will that same standard apply to those former Republican Guard generals whom the State Department is now so assiduously promoting? Will it apply to the former Baathists that Lakhdar Brahimi wishes to include in the provisional Iraqi government? Will it apply to Lakhdar Brahimi himself? Will it apply to the Saudi royal family? Will it apply to the Iranians? Or is it only Ahmed Chalabi who must swear undeviating loyalty to the US policy-of-the-day in Iraq?

ITEM: Salon magazine last night published a lengthy attack on Chalabi by John Dizard. In it, former Chalabi business partner Marc Zell calls Chalabi a "treacherous, spineless turncoat," for failing to deliver on Chalabi's alleged promises to open Iraq to trade with Israel. I don't know that these promises were ever made - and if made, I wonder whether Chalabi ever suggested that they would rank first on a new Iraqi government's list of priorities. But never mind that: Chalabi has not exercised executive power in Iraq for even a single day. How exactly was it ever possible that he would carry out any promise about anything to anyone?

Ahmed Chalabi no doubt has many faults. I have never been easy in my mind about the collapse of the bank he ran in Jordan back in 1989. (Although the charges that Chalabi himself stole money from the bank are not very convincing either.) But I do know this: Chalabi is one of the very few genuine liberal democrats to be found at the head of any substantial political organization anywhere in the Arab world. He is not consumed by paranoid fantasies, he understands and admires the American system, and he is willing to work with the United States if the United States will work with him. He risked his life through the 1990s to topple Saddam Hussein, which is more than can be said about any of State's or CIA's preferred candidates for power in Iraq. Compared to anybody other possible leader of Iraq - compared to just about every other political leader in the Arab world - the imperfect Ahmed Chalabi is nonetheless a James bleeping Madison.

And maybe that's exactly why he is so very unpopular with so many of the local thugs and tyrants who unfortunately command the attention of America's spies and diplomats.




10:21 AM


------------------------------------------------------------------------
IRAQ


Shiite leaders want Sadr out of Najaf

Shiite leaders gather in Baghdad to make demands of the firebrand cleric and his militia.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0505/dailyUpdate.html
by Matthew Clark | csmonitor.com
Shiite leaders have had enough of Moqtada al-Sadr's hijacking of Najaf. More than one hundred prominent Iraqi Shiites agreed Tuesday in Baghdad that the fiery anti-coalition cleric must remove his militia from the holy shrines in the cities of Najaf and Kufa, reports The Los Angeles Times.
"It was the clearest such statement by a group of powerful Shiite Muslims and could open the way for a resolution of the standoff in Najaf, where US troops have surrounded the city in an effort to pressure Sadr to disband his Mahdi militia, which has set up illegal checkpoints, taken over police stations and seized civil authority."
Sadr must also relinquish control to the police and defense corps and cease stockpiling weapons in the cities, according to the report.
Joad Al Malki, a member of the political bureau of the Shiite Dawa Party reportedly told the Times that "five representatives traveled to Najaf [Wednesday]" to inform Sadr of the decision.
Sadr has been holed up in Najaf for several weeks, after the US-led coalition issued a warrant for his arrest in connection to a murder of a rival cleric last spring. But, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) waited until early last month to make that move after Sadr's militia began a violent revolt because the CPA had closed Sadr's anti-coalition al-Hawza newspaper.
The New York Times reports that the Shiite leaders also called for "a rapid return to the American-led negotiations on Iraq's political future," which have been stalled by violence throughout central Iraq and in the Sunni triangle city of Fallujah. The leaders also warned US troops again not to go after Sadr in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.
The Times reports that the leaders "effectively did what the Americans have urged them to do since Mr. Sadr ... began his attacks in April: they tied Iraq's future, and that of Shiites in particular, to a renunciation of violence and a return to negotiations."
The Washington Post reports that a 21-member committee of Shiite tribal, religious, and political leaders "hopes to broker a deal" for Sadr to leave Najaf. Members of this committee said "any arrangement would likely require US officials to cancel the arrest warrant against Sadr and allow him to be taken into protective custody by a group of respected Shiite clerics in Najaf or to leave the country," according to the Post.
Meanwhile, Knight Ridder Newspapers reports that a group of young men in Najaf has gathered nightly since mid-April to attack members of Sadr's Mahdi army and force them out of the city. "If we capture them and they swear on the holy Koran they will leave Najaf and never come back, we let them go," a 20-year-old furniture maker named Haider told Knight Ridder. "If they resist, they are killed."
So as to prevent a larger conflict, "the grand ayatollahs who guide the Shiites are withholding support from Haidar and his band of vigilantes," says Knight Ridder. Many Shiites in Najaf say only a small number of Iraqi Shiites supports Sadr, according to the news service.
The Associated Press reports that the month-long standoff between Sadr's militia and coalition troops has cost the holy city of Najaf around $1 billion, according to Faisal Mathbob, deputy head of Najaf's Chamber of Commerce. AP also explains why the loss is particularly tough for the city.
It's a major blow to a city that was in the midst of a revival with the fall of Saddam Hussein, who had restricted the freedom of Shiite worship for decades. Pilgrims from Iran and other countries had again flooded in to visit a colorful shrine to Shiite Islam's most revered saint, bringing money and prosperity back to Najaf. ...
Up to 35,000 pilgrims from Iran alone visited Najaf each day. Now, only a few are seen.... With no agriculture or industry to speak of, Najaf depends on the visitors to fill hotels, restaurants, and shops. The crowds are large enough to sustain more than a 1,000 hotels and private guest houses in Najaf.
According to AP, some residents blame Sadr's militia for bringing the conflict with the coalition troops that has kept the pilgrims away from Najaf.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED NATIONS


'We Have Other Priorities'
Why won't the U.N. answer questions about its Iraq scandal?

BY CLAUDIA ROSETT
Wednesday, May 5, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

The harder the United Nations tries to keep a lid on Oil for Food, the more the scandal keeps boiling over. This past Sunday Secretary-General Kofi Annan appeared on "Meet the Press," rejecting as "outrageous" allegations that this graft-ridden U.N. relief program for Iraq had helped prop up Saddam Hussein's regime, and denying that the U.N. has made any attempt at a coverup. Asked by host Tim Russert why only a portion of the documentation requested of the U.N. by the U.S. General Accounting Office had been turned over, Mr. Annan protested: "We are open. We are transparent."

That sounded lame enough, coming just after Mr. Russert on national TV had flourished in front of Mr. Annan a letter sent by Mr. Annan's own Secretariat on April 14, advising one of the pivotal Oil for Food contractors, Saybolt International--which oversaw Saddam's oil exports--to keep quiet.

Now investigators for the House International Relations Committee have dug up a second hush letter, this one dated April 2, sent by the U.N. to yet another crucial Oil for Food contractor: Cotecna Inspections. This is the company that for the last five years of the seven-year program held the U.N. contract for the sensitive job of authenticating all goods being shipped into Iraq under Oil for Food--and was recommended last October by Oil for Food's executive director, Benon Sevan, for the work it is still doing in Iraq for the Coalition Provisional Authority. (Cotecna is also the company that for the better part of three years before winning its slot in the Oil for Food program, in December, 1998, employed Mr. Annan's son, Kojo Annan, first on staff and then as a consultant, a potential conflict of interest that the U.N. did not declare.)

Both letters, to Saybolt and Cotecna, are signed on behalf of Mr. Sevan, each by a different member of Mr. Annan's staff. Mr. Sevan was on vacation, pending retirement, when they were drawn up. The letter to Cotecna was a pointed reminder of terms of the U.N. contracts with Cotecna, detailing that all documentation connected with Oil for Food "shall be the property of the United Nations, shall be treated as confidential and shall be delivered only to the United Nations authorized officials on completion of work under this contract."
In the letter to Saybolt, dated 12 days later, the message had become tougher and yet more detailed, telling the company that any requests for information not already public should be relayed to the U.N., including "the reason why it is being sought." The letter to Saybolt also made specific mention that if U.N. internal audit reports are asked for, "we would not agree to their release." These would be the same internal audits that the U.N. Secretariat--which administered the Oil for Food program--did not share with the Security Council and has refused to provide to Congress.

In other words, in the interval between March 19, when Mr. Annan finally conceded in the face of overwhelming evidence that the program might after all need investigating by independent experts, and April 21, when former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker was appointed to head to the investigation, Mr. Annan's office explicitly reminded these two crucial contractors, which worked for the Secretariat's Oil for Food program checking the imports and exports involved in more than $100 billion worth of Saddam's oil sales and relief imports, to keep quiet.

Mr. Annan's reaction when confronted with the Saybolt letter was to explain that "we are protecting all the material for the investigation that's been handed over to the Volcker group," as well as to say he himself had no knowledge of the letter: "This is news to me." Mr. Annan's office has since defended such letter-writing on grounds that "this is standard procedure" and "an institutional response." According to Mr. Annan's spokesman, Fred Eckhard, "To protect our name and our documentation, we put in every contract with a supplier that documentation relating to UN business can only be released to the United Nations, unless otherwise authorized."

It's that phrase, "unless otherwise authorized," that needs attention. The U.N. has the authority to open the books if its officials so choose; the main question is whether the boss wants to. A senior congressional staffer notes that "with the stroke of a pen, the U.N. can clear the companies from all confidentiality."

Instead, after years of insisting on the confidentiality of vital details of Saddam's deals, on grounds such as the argument that disclosure would offend the "sensitivities" of some member states, the U.N. last month came up with a new reason. Secrecy must be maintained, or so says the U.N. letter to Saybolt, "so as to avoid impeding the Secretary-General's independent inquiry and to accord due regard to the Organization's privileges and immunities."

It's high time for Congress, which appropriates 22% of the U.N.'s core budget, to ponder precisely why these U.N. privileges and immunities should be allowed to outweigh the rights of both U.S. taxpayers and Congress to know what it was within Oil for Food that some of the participants were so sensitive about.

There's also the question of why Mr. Annan's Secretariat itself is so sensitive. Take, for example, those April letters to Saybolt and Cotecna, signed on behalf of Benon Sevan. On Monday, when only the Saybolt letter had come to light, I phoned Maurice Critchley, the U.N. official who had signed that letter on behalf of Mr. Sevan. He told me that Mr. Sevan had no hand in it: "The letter was not done on any request or instruction on his part." So who, then, initiated Mr. Critchley's signing of the letter over Mr. Sevan's name?
Mr. Critchley declined to answer, and instead directed me to Mr. Annan's office--to which I sent three questions pertaining to the Saybolt letter. The answer was an e-mail from Mr. Annan's spokesman, Fred Eckhard, which began with the accusation that "you twist the facts." Mr. Eckhard went on to say, "Frankly, we have other priorities. I will answer one of your questions, the first one." This was a question about who, precisely, at the U.N., had authorized the signing of the Saybolt letter over Mr. Sevan's name. To this, Mr. Eckhard gave the answer quoted above, that it was "an institutional response."

The second question, which Mr. Eckhard did not answer, was whether the U.N. had sent similar letters to other contractors, "For example, has the Secretariat sent a similar letter to Cotecna?" The answer to that is now clear, with the Cotecna letter cited above surfacing via the House International Relations Committee the next day.

The third question was, who is the individual on the U.N. staff now fielding Oil for Food matters and authorized to give definitive answers? That one Mr. Eckhard also did not answer, but Mr. Critchley did: "The Secretary-General."

Ms. Rosett is a fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Hudson Institute. Her column appears here and in The Wall Street Journal Europe on alternate Wednesdays.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNfit for Iraq
The United Nations can't escape the Oil-for-Food scandal.

By John O'Sullivan

Not for the first time, the shrewdest analyst of international affairs turns out to be the great comic novelist, P. G. Wodehouse, writing on this occasion about the United Nations. The plot may be bleaker than that of a "Jeeves and Bertie Wooster" novel, but the banana-peel factor is about the same.
Consider: In recent weeks the pressure has been inexorably building in favor of a much stronger and more "central" role for the U.N. in Iraq. The partisans of "multilateralism" in the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, France, Germany, the Democratic party, and the New York Times editorial page had all been arguing that the U.S. would inevitably fail in Iraq without the "legitimacy" bestowed by U.N. involvement. Nor would an Iraqi government handpicked by the U.S. have any better hopes of success. Only one handpicked by the U.N. -- and by its representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Algerian foreign minister -- would enjoy the respect of Iraqis and of the world.
The Bush administration, buffeted by its setbacks in Iraq and apparently hoping that U.N. support would encourage nations like France and Germany to commit troops, capitulated to this pressure. The U.N. was invited in, and Brahimi began calling the shots. He warned strongly against sending the U.S. Marines into Fallujah. (They were withdrawn to the sidelines.) And he let it be known that the new government would be very different from the governing council that the U.S. had recruited -- and that had taken great political risks for the past year to restore some sort of decent Iraqi rule after fifty years of savage oppression.
At no point, however, was it suggested that the U.N. would provide either troops or money to restore public services and order in the country. The division of labor was clear: The U.N. would provide "legitimacy," and the U.S. would provide everything else. In return they would share political power between themselves -- and with whatever Iraqi government emerged from Brahimi's conversations.
Nice work if you can get it. In the words of the Immortal Wodehouse, however, "Meanwhile, unnoticed in the background, fate was quietly slipping lead into the boxing glove." (I quote from memory, but that is the gist of it.)
For several years, rumors had been circulating that the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food program in Iraq -- ballyhooed as the largest aid program in the world -- was seriously mired in corruption. Reuters news agency, watchdog groups such as the Coalition for International Justice, and the Wall Street Journal had all drawn attention to the increasingly blatant corruption of the program involving (according to the CIJ) not merely "informal on-the-sly deals," but even "formal government-to-government arrangements." But the reaction of the U.N. to these charges had been to deny any wrongdoing, to claim that Oil-for-Food was the most audited U.N. program ever, and to tighten the secrecy surrounding it. And largely because of the U.N.'s saintly reputation, the world moved on to other things.
But the fall of Saddam meant that Iraqi records were suddenly open to inspection. Officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority were asked to investigate any irregularities. Hence, two weeks ago, the dam burst -- and revelations of extraordinary corruption poured forth at exactly the moment when the U.N. was poised to take control of Iraq.
The Claudia Rosett, whose reporting (including in NRO) has done much to bring the scandal to light, gives the clearest and most comprehensive account of its spreading tentacles in the current issue of Commentary magazine. To summarize it briefly here, however, a program that was meant to underpin sanctions against Saddam Hussein's Iraq by moderating its effects on innocent Iraqis with humanitarian aid became a joint venture by Saddam, senior U.N. officials, and public figures in Security Council member states such as France and Russia to divert many billions in oil revenues into their various pockets; to bribe governments, companies, and individuals in Saddam's behalf; to establish a network of corrupt cronies beholden to Saddam around the world; to build up Saddam's machinery of war and oppression in Iraq; and to do little or nothing for the ordinary Iraqis who were the poster children for the entire enterprise.
The Iraqi newspaper Al-Mada, whose investigative reporting has also driven the revelations, found a list in the Iraqi oil ministry of 270 people in 50 countries who allegedly received oil "vouchers" worth millions from Saddam Hussein -- including the former French interior minister, the present Indonesian president, a number of Russian oil companies, the Russian state, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the family name, Sevan, of the U.N. director in charge of the Oil-for-Food program. In all likelihood, Oil-for-Food is the biggest financial and political scandal in world history -- nothing less.
U.N. officials at a very high level were apparently complicit in this vast fraud. Among them was Benon Sevan, the program's director and a long-time U.N. official, reported directly responsible to the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. U.N. officials -- whose approval was required for certain expenditures -- okayed such purchases as Mercedes Benz touring sedans and the rebuilding of Saddam's Interior Ministry.
Some will -- and should -- go to prison. Kofi Annan should at least resign since he presided, knowingly or not, over this vast robbery. Needless to say, the entire scandal casts a dark backward light on the U.N.'s convolutions in the run-up to the Iraq invasion -- France, Russia, the U.N. bureaucracy, and the "peace movement" all had an undeclared interest in the survival of their co-conspirator, Saddam Hussein, at the very moment when they were seeking in the Security Council to save him from the consequences of his defiance of U.N. resolutions.
We should not be altogether surprised at the corruption revealed here. Multi-national organizations like the U.N. and the European Union are regularly plagued by financial scandals because they bring together three incentives for dishonesty: large sums of money sloshing around, the absence of the financial accountability built into the political arrangements of established nation-states, and a belief in their own sanctity and importance that enables them to overlook any sins they may commit. Similar scandals, admittedly on a smaller scale, flourish in almost all places where the U.N. rules. Maybe some attention will now be paid to them.
What is more worrying is what the Oil-for-Food scandal tells us about the political attitudes of both the U.N. bureaucracy and the political elites of the European continent. None of them was seriously hostile to Saddam Hussein or his brutal kleptocratic state -- they struck attitudes in public that their private actions belied. None of them was even slightly concerned about the Iraqi people, despite their crocodile tears about the impact of sanctions -- they colluded in denying promised humanitarian aid to those in need. None of them wanted to see U.N. resolutions enforced despite their sanctimonious rhetoric about the U.N. being the fount of legitimacy. All of them were mainly concerned with obstructing the Anglo-Americans in their campaign to enforce those resolutions and oust Saddam.
Now that these facts are known, the power of the U.N. to bestow legitimacy anywhere, let alone in an Iraq that is the main victim of the Oil-for-Food scandal, has evaporated into thin air. It has precious little legitimacy to bestow on itself.
If the Bush administration, because it is hoping to hand the problem of Iraq over to someone else, now grants real power to the U.N. there, it will be a betrayal of the Iraqis it intervened to liberate. And the American people -- to borrow another insight from Wodehouse -- if not actually disgruntled, will be very far from being gruntled.

-- John O'Sullivan is editor-in-chief of The National Interest. This piece first appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times and is reprinted with permission. O'Sullivan can be reached through Benador Associates
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PAKISTAN

Pakistan authorities uncover hijack plot
ISLAMABAD (AP) -- Pakistani authorities have uncovered a plot by a small terror cell to hijack a plane en route to the United Arab Emirates and possibly blow it up, the prime minister said Wednesday.
Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali told The Associated Press in an interview that authorities believe there was a group of about four to six people who wanted to hijack a plane. Intelligence indicated they wanted to blow it up, he said.
Jamali had no details on how close the plotters came to carrying out the attack.
Details of the plot came a day after Pakistan said it was beefing up security at 35 airports nationwide. Airports remained open and flights were not disrupted, although security was raised to its highest level, Jamali said.
"Naturally when one gets some hint about (a plot) or one gets a feeler or is informed directly or indirectly, I think this high alert is a must," he said.
The United Arab Emirates is the main financial hub of the Arab world. Dubai also is a regional transit hub and a destination for several flights most days from the Pakistani cities of Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore.
Pakistan International Airlines, Emirates airlines and Gulf Air all fly to the Emirates from Pakistan.
In March, the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi and the consulate in Dubai briefly shut their doors after receiving a "specific threat," though there was no indication it was connected to the recent Pakistani alert.
The United States has had friendly relations with the UAE since 1971, and the UAE military has provided humanitarian assistance in Iraq.
Jamali did not say whether the plot involved Pakistanis or foreign terrorists.
"Hijackers have no nationality," he said.
Interior Ministry spokesman Abdul Rauf Chaudhry told AP that a Pakistani intelligence agency had issued the warning, but no arrests had been made. He also would not reveal whether the plotters were believed to be linked to al-Qaeda.

Pakistan has been beset by a string of terror attacks since President Gen. Pervez Musharraf threw his support behind the U.S. war on terror following the Sept. 11 attacks.

Musharraf survived two suicide attacks in December that he blamed on al-Qaeda. Dozens of people have been killed in attacks on foreigners and minority Christians.

A bus bombing killed three Chinese engineers working on a major port project in the remote southwest Monday.

In March, a bomb was found and defused outside the U.S. Consulate in Karachi.


Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

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PAKISTAN
The Politics Of A Retreat
The military regime is currently caught in the dilemma of protecting the surviving remnants of its own creation, the Taliban, and the need to project the image of a responsible state internationally.

KANCHAN LAKSHMAN

Ever since President Musharraf announced a turn-around on his country's support to the Taliban and Al Qaeda on September 19, 2001, Pakistan has been treading a thin line between placating the domestic Islamist extremist constituency and maintaining the alliance with the United States. Since the volte face, Pakistan has arrested more than 500 Al Qaeda/Taliban operatives, handing a majority of them over to US custody. Last week, however, saw the military regime adopt a strategy of amnesty, not an uncommon approach across many theatres of anti-state violence in South Asia.

Five tribesmen accused of sheltering Al Qaeda terrorists surrendered to the Pakistan army at a Jirga (tribal council) on April 24, 2004. The five men, led by Nek Mohammed, from the Zalikhel tribe turned themselves in before the Jirga and reportedly pledged loyalty to Pakistan in return for clemency. "We give amnesty to these people in return for their pledge of brotherhood and loyalty," said Peshawar Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain after the wanted men joined him in the ceremony that occurred at a Madrassa at Shakai, South Waziristan, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region.

The military regime has reportedly agreed to halt its operations against Nek Mohammed's tribal combatants, set free most of the 163 suspected Al Qaeda supporters who were captured during the March 2004 operations, and provide a grant of Rupees 90.1 million for development in Waziristan. In return, Nek Mohammed and his clique promised to refrain from attacks on Pakistani forces and the U.S. troops in adjacent Afghanistan. Among others, the unwritten agreement also specifies that: local tribesmen will not provide protection to 'foreign terrorists' (Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks among others) in the FATA; the tribesmen will surrender their heavy arms to local authorities; tribesmen are to ensure registration of all foreigners who would then be given amnesty and residence by the state.

As a result, the tribal combatants, designated as 'most wanted' only a month ago, were seen embracing the military regime's representatives after a deal reportedly brokered by leaders of the Islamist grouping, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). Startled by the bonhomie expressed at the surrender ceremony, a Western diplomat in Islamabad said, "How can you go and fight these people last month and embrace them this month?"

The 30-something Nek Mohammed, who was a 'commander' at the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule, and his tribal combatants had, in March, led a fierce resistance to an army-led offensive on their hideouts in the remote South Waziristan area, where senior Al Qaeda leaders are thought to have taken refuge. At least 145 people, including 46 troops, were killed during these operations. Some Western diplomats have claimed that Nek not only harboured, but also supplied arms and men to Central Asian Al Qaeda-linked terrorists for cross-border attacks on aid workers, troops and government targets in Afghanistan over the past 12 to 18 months. "He is, indirectly or directly, responsible for the deaths of up to 400 people in Afghanistan," an unnamed Western diplomat based in Pakistan told AFP.

Since the March operations, the state had been threatening military action against the tribal fighters and had also postponed deadlines for threatened military action on two occasions. That Nek Mohammed, reportedly a popular figure in South Waziristan, was a crucial actor is evident from the fact that a wide spectrum of powers within the Pakistani state was involved in the negotiations.


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SYRIA


A cold Ba'ath
By Guy Maayan
"The Face of Syria: Society, Government and State" by Eyal Zisser. The Red Line Series, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 346 pages, NIS 88.
It will soon be four years since Bashar Assad became president of Syria. In the Israeli media, Assad is often depicted as an obsessive Web surfer and Sony Playstation buff, clumsy and uncharismatic. Israelis like to compare him with his late father, commenting on the son's inferior skills and claiming that he is held captive by the old guard of the Ba'ath Party leadership. Many commentators believe that Syria's military forces and oppressive security mechanisms are all that keeps the Assad dynasty and the Alawi regime in power, allowing an ethnic group that accounts for only 13 percent of the population to remain in control of the country.
Viewing the Syrian leader and his enforcement mechanisms, however oppressive they might be, as the totality of Syria's being is problematic. At best, this is a fraction of the bigger picture - and not necessarily the most important fraction. It is often showcased to further a political agenda, whether of right-wingers opposed to a political settlement with Syria, or left-wingers entranced by Assad's aggressive rule. Anyone expecting these kinds of claims from Eyal Zisser will soon discover him to be a serious scientist who shies away from cliches. His previous book, "Syria under Assad: At a Crossroads," concluded five years ago with some unanswered questions about the internal mechanisms that have granted legitimacy to the current regime. The new work sets out to examine these questions.
Israeli academics wishing to write about Syria should know they are facing an uphill battle. First, they will encounter objective problems, such as the physical inaccessibility of our northern neighbor and a dismal lack of archival sources. A second, equally oppressive obstacle - for better or worse - is the giant shadow cast by Patrick Seale, a British journalist who had close ties with the late Hafez Assad. Seale's writing on Syria is based on sources that Israeli scholars will never get to see, even if they are someday permitted to eat hummus on the banks of Abana and Pharpar.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Israeli author approaching this daunting task will have to deal with symbols and images that have inscribed Syria in the Israeli consciousness as the most extremist, uncompromising and belligerent country in today's Middle East, a country that will stop at nothing to get what it wants. The Syrian tank serving as a monument at Kibbutz Deganya; the story of Israeli POW Uri Ilan, who committed suicide in a Syrian jail; the case of Israeli spy Eli Cohen, who was caught by the Syrians and hanged; and the struggle for control of water sources - all these were fixed by the agents of our national memory as the image of Syria long before the battle of Tel Elfahar, the 1973 war and the emergence of Hezbollah. Some will even say that the subject is impossible to tackle. Zisser, however, rises to the challenge.
"The Face of Syria" is a rare (for Israel) retrospective account of an Arab country's society and government. Zisser's discussion focuses on internal processes and leaves as background Syria's foreign relations, and especially its charged relationship with Israel. In choosing this strategy, he is trying to shake off the provincialism of the "old" Israeli scholarship, which held that the Arab world's internal processes needed to be seen through the lens of the Israeli-Arab conflict.
The result is compelling, if, sadly, less than perfect. Zisser is among those who rightly refuse to see the modern Middle East as created solely by European imperialism. He points to certain primal elements embedded in the Syrian identity, primarily the sense of belonging to the region between the Euphrates River and the Mediterranean. This sense of regional kinship, though it does not fully reflect the country's actual territory, has been an important facet of Syrian nationalism since the days of the French Mandate. Hafez Assad, for his own reasons, cautiously promoted this unique identity as part of the pan-Arabic identity to which both the Ba'ath Party and he personally were committed.
A slow machine
Francis Bacon once compared the state to a huge machine that moves slowly, and this definition is largely true of Syria in recent decades. Clearly, the country's greatest achievement has been a static stabilization based on a delicate balance of its various social forces, like the balance that was maintained (or, more accurately, was supposed to be maintained) by the regimes preceding the Ba'ath's 1963 rise to power. Zisser shows how the Syrian territorial state managed to win legitimacy even before Assad senior became president, despite the country's religious and ethnic complexity. He also follows its slow construction of a political center.
Zisser points to the process by which ethnic and religious minorities came increasingly to identify with the Syrian state, to join the republic's various frameworks of action, and in a sense to blur their own ethnic identity. The primary victims of this process were the urban Sunni Muslims, who lost their hold on the government in the 1960s. Still, representatives of this group - which accounts for some 60 percent of the population - continue to hold key government positions. Examples include Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Foreign Minister Farouk Shara and Defense Minister Mustafa Talas, all of whom have many proteges within the bloated Syrian administration.
The strengthening of the political center in Damascus brought prosperity to the city's inhabitants, the majority of whom are also Sunni. They were grateful to Hafez Assad and did not take part in the Islamic revolt (1976-82), which occurred mostly in the north of the country. Zisser, however, is careful not to idealize Syria's inter-ethnic relations, stressing the extreme delicacy of the socio-political balance. Last March's riots show that the internal tensions are still there, even if they have been temporarily kicked to the sidelines of Bashar Assad's playing field.
It seems to me that recent developments could also be placed in a different, more comparative perspective. Paradoxically, the revolutionary Ba'ath regime is gradually adopting the conservative Ottoman model, in which the central government serves as arbitrator between sub-forces within a clear framework of status quo. In Syria this framework is rigid, as are the means used to protect it. Frequently, the central government responds to offenses against the status quo by harshly suppressing those who challenge it.
Syria's transformation into a distinct status-quo state has greatly decreased internal pressures. This change created - though with much difficulty - a consensus around the ruling oligarchy (the so-called "jama'a") and allowed for the smooth transition of power from Hafez Assad to his son.
Ba'ath pragmatism
As Zisser says, Syria is far from being a democracy, nor is it close to developing Western institutions of government, and it needs to be viewed as inseparable from the development of other Arab regimes. However, the Syrian status quo would best be examined vis-a-vis the revival of Ottoman order in the region, and especially in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean. Another factor that must be taken into account is the central role played by oligarchic structures, based in part on family or ethnic affiliation, in economics and politics. In some of the empire's regions, which became republics or democracies (Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Greece, Israel, and Egypt as well to some degree), the process has also been characterized by the rise of family dynasties of political leaders and by the proliferation of patron-client systems, familiar to us from the internal workings of our own political parties.
Zisser's descriptions are diligent and meticulous. His chapter on the relationship between the state and the army is the best part of the book. It was actually Assad senior - the former head of the air force, who used the army to seize the presidency - who understood that he had to minimize the army's political involvement in order to keep his country stable. Zisser shows how, in the first decades of Syria's independence, the army began to play a key role in politics, due to the weakness of the political center; he also traces the military's gradual dismissal and return to the barracks as part of the creation of the status quo.
Nevertheless, the author is sometimes tempted to repeat his own previously published claims; this is especially evident in the chapter on relations between state and religion. Yet he makes some fascinating comments about the pragmatism of the Ba'ath regime, which, despite its commitment to secularism, conducts a dialogue with the country's Islamic elements. Moreover, following the brutal 1982 massacre in the city of Hamat (and in many ways as a result of it), there has been a shift in the government's attitude toward Islamic groups. Here, too, we see a return to a pre-Ba'ath pattern: the Islamic groups, for their part, accept the existence of the regime as a fait accompli, while the government acts to strengthen its own Muslim image.
It is unfortunate that two major topics - economy and culture - are not subjected in the book to a thorough analysis, despite their importance to the development of the new Syria. The country's economy is mentioned offhandedly, and its literary, philosophical and artistic activity are not included in the "face of Syria." One also cannot shake the impression that the book was written from a local-historicist perspective, lacking exhaustive comparison to other countries in the region or to parallel global developments.
The book also suffers from a large number of editorial and factual errors, as well as spelling mistakes. The separatist regime was not in power from 1958 to 1961 (page 39); these, of course, were the days of the union with Egypt. You need not be a Francophile to realize that the Syrian flag, and not the French one, is "comprised of two red and black stripes on a white background, with two green stars in between" (page 109). There are many of these embarrassing errors, indicating some sloppiness in the editing stage.
Yet the book's great virtue lies in the fine links it establishes between long-term historical processes and present-day developments in Syria. The book serves as a platform for the extensive knowledge Zisser has accumulated through his study of Syria and in the now-extinct journal Middle East Contemporary Survey. In this context, there is symbolic value to the editorial error that caused the book's back-cover blurb also to appear on page 346. One of the most aggravating features of university libraries is that frequently used books are often re-bound in thick, opaque cardboard, making it impossible to read their back covers. The editor's error will spare book lovers this annoyance, as "The Face of Syria" is sure to command a place on library shelves for many years to come.

Guy Maayan is scientific editor of the Hebrew translation of "What Went Wrong" by Bernard Lewis, forthcoming from Dvir Publishing House.


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ISRAEL

State Comptroller's report finds Housing Ministry sent $6.5 million for illegal West Bank construction

By Ziv Maor and Gideon Alon
The Housing and Construction Ministry has funneled nearly $6.5 million to illegal settlement construction in the West Bank in the past three years, more than half of it to outposts Israel pledged to remove, according to the annual State Comptroller's Report, released yesterday.
State Comptroller Eliezer Goldberg wrote in the second part of his annual report that the Housing Ministry has funneled money to settlement construction that had not received cabinet or Defense Ministry approval - as required by law - and in cases where land ownership was still under dispute. Of the $6.5 million given to illegal West Bank construction, about $4 million went to the outposts, the report said.
The money was sent even as a branch of the Israel Defense Forces was "investing resources to track down and demolish illegal construction" in settlements and outposts, Goldberg wrote.
From January 2000 to June 2003, the Rural Building Administration's Jerusalem district office approved 77 contracts for construction projects in 33 West Bank areas, 18 of them unauthorized outposts, the report said. The administration is considered an arm of the Housing Ministry that enables it to carry out irregular activities, particularly in the territories.
The contracts were for housing units, security paths, approach roads, open public spaces, electricity hook-ups, water supplies and public buildings.
The comptroller hints that there was no due diligence and transparency in the geographical distribution of the ministry's budgets. From the budget it is not clear what monies were sent to the territories.
Minister Effi Eitam said he has decided, in the wake of the report, to set up a system of inspection over the transfer of the budgets. Ministry officials said the report deals with activities between January 2000 and June 2003, and that there had been four ministers during this period.
Eitam said he was determined to ensure the budgets were appropriated according to law, "so no damage would be caused to the settlement enterprise."
Attorney General Menachem Mazuz ordered a freeze last month on government funding for settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza after reviewing Goldberg's initial findings. Mazuz lifted the freeze after approving a monitoring system to prevent funding of illegal projects, the Justice Ministry said yesterday.
Yariv Oppenheimer of Peace Now welcomed the comptroller's report. "This confirms everything we've been saying for eight years," he said. "We are going to request a police inquiry, and we are filing an immediate police complaint against the housing minister."
Numerous reactions came from Knesset members as well. Labor MK Eitan Cabel called on the prime minister to fire Eitam, saying he was behaving as though the ministry was his personal estate. Eti Livni (Shinui) asked Mazuz to examine the possibility of opening an investigation into the way the ministry distributed public funds.
Meretz MK Haim Oron said the report showed clearly that there was a separate entity alongside Israel - the Yesha state that has no laws and no regulations. He said the government was implicated in the illegal activities of the settlers.
Labor MK Ophir Pines-Paz asked that Eitam be dismissed and the ministry be run instead by an appointed committee. Ilan Leibowitz (Shinui) said that the secret that had been known for years was now officially revealed by the state comptroller - squandering of millions in public funds on the settlements, without any supervision or planning.

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State drops charge that probe into PM was hindered by leak
By Zvi Harel
The state has decided to slightly amend the indictment against suspended prosecutor Liora Glatt-Berkowitz, it was revealed yesterday. Glatt-Berkowitz is on trial for giving details to Haaretz correspondent Baruch Kra about the investigation into Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in the case of money loaned to the Sharon family by British/South African businessman Cyril Kern.
The state has decided to withdraw its allegations that the prosecutor's leak had disrupted the investigation against Sharon in the Kern affair. This is, however, merely a cosmetic change as it does not affect the charges in the indictment.
The Tel Aviv Magistrate's Court yesterday rejected a request by Glatt-Berkowitz to reveal who the source was who told investigators that she had spoken to a journalist about the case.
On December 25, 2003, Public Security Minister Tzachi Hanegbi issued a gag order on releasing any details concerning the source, known as "Eagle."
In the request to the court, Glatt-Berkowitz's lawyers argued that "Eagle" is actually a journalist who revealed their client's name to police and Shin Bet security services investigators for money.
The attorneys claimed that there was a "give and take" relationship between this source and the investigating body, which is an intolerable situation. The request argued that Glatt-Berkowitz only handed over the information to Kra, without getting anything in return.
The court has not yet reached a decision on Glatt-Berkowitz's demand to call former attorney general Elyakim Rubinstein and State Prosecutor Edna Arbel as witnesses in order to prove she has been discriminated against, compared with other public servants accused of leaking information.
The prosecution has charged her on two counts: revealing information she received in her professional capacity; and fraud and breach of trust.
Her lawyers contend that Glatt-Berkowitz has been discriminated against because the article under which she is being tried has never before been enforced. They say this trial is being held because of ulterior motives, adding this is the only case of its kind since the establishment of the state.
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Arik beat Sharon

By Israel Harel

"All the options are open; it is not too late" goes the popular song that Army Radio dedicated to boost Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's morale, and in effect also its own. "Our mood will improve tomorrow," continues the song. From the broadcasts of this station and others, it was clear that the broadcasters and commentators were mourning the defeat no less than Sharon and Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The failure of the man to whose cause the media had enlisted, and particularly the electronic media, was also their failure, and the media are not willing to come to terms with this. Onward, they are now urging Sharon - ordering him is more like it - go back to the uprooting and thumb your nose at the referendum.
That was one of the hidden, though resolute, messages voiced by the media after the defeat: Please, Sharon, deliver the goods for which we made a type of plea bargain with you, in order to realize the ambition on which we have focused all our energies: the withdrawal and the uprooting of settlements. We built your image as a courageous statesman, the only one who can break the vicious cycle. Now you must fulfill your part of the bargain, and we don't care how.
Even though he is already suffering blows from those demanding the payment of the debt, Sharon is incapable - despite the fact that he and those hitting him continue to pretend that "only Arik can" - of uprooting the Likud from its main ideological positions. Were it not for those basic positions, the settlers, even if they were to triple and quadruple their efforts to convince Likud members, would not have been able to sway them and defeat the leader of their party. The landslide proved that Sharon, despite the many years he has spent in the company of his party faithful and the settlers, remains a foreign element, both mentally and ideologically, among those two groups. This is also evident in his sharp veering to the left.
If he could understand the code that enables them, and particularly the settlers, to overcome the terrible events they are going through, such as the murder on Sunday of Tali Hatuel and her daughters, and to cleave with even greater strength to their life's work, their homes and their faith, it is reasonable to assume that he would not have concocted the uprooting plan.
The conciliation gestures of Uzi Landau and Effie Eitam, who now prefer a lame duck to a succession battle, are deceptive: Sharon's fate as the leader of the national camp was sealed - the Likud members simply ratified it, and by an overwhelming majority - the moment that "Arik" the uninhibited adventurer overtook "Sharon" the seasoned politician, and ran to announce to Yoel Marcus of Haaretz that he was about to uproot settlements in the Gaza Strip.
From meetings between visitors from Yesha (the Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria and Gaza) and Likud members (the homes of some 50 percent of the party's members were visited), it became clear - and was proven by the results - that most of them consider ideology more important than solidarity with their leader. More than a few of them also feel that he transgressed, both ideologically and personally.
It also turned out that the heavy barrage by the media to convince Likud members in favor of disengagement only strengthened, rather than weakened, their ideological positions against it. Just as some 4,000 mortar shells and dozens of Qassam rockets have only strengthened us, said one resident of Gush Katif, so too has the media assistance to Sharon.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that another media dictate also had an effect: If Likud members do not approve the disengagement plan, stated the ultimatum, "we will not forget and will not forgive." Even the threats that the American guarantees would be cancelled, that the stock exchange would tumble and that the terror would escalate did their jobs against Sharon.
The opponents of the uprooting had another secret weapon: Olmert, Omri Sharon and their ilk. In Ashdod, for example, the settlers were told not to waste their breath because, "this is Omri's territory." The result - some 60 percent voted against the uprooting. A. from Holon told her visitors that Sharon and Olmert, who went to the elections with a platform promising that the Likud would prevent the uprooting of settlements, were now implementing the platform of former Labor party leader Amram Mitzna. It was Sharon and Olmert, and not the settlers, who had instigated a hostile takeover of the Likud, A. asserted.
According to the referendum it is A., and not those who are licking Sharon's boots, who represents the firm faithful core, whose members are never floating voters, of the Likud. It is thanks to that core that Sharon's new commitments to go ahead with his plan are empty promises.

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Sharon's challenge



In the wake of the overwhelming rejection of his Gaza-West Bank disengagement proposal by Likud voters, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is not giving up. The Israeli leader vows to forge ahead with a modified version of his plan to unilaterally withdraw from some of the settlements he had proposed to leave in the referendum. As Mr. Sharon moves forward with this politically courageous step, he will deserve and most likely receive the strong support of President Bush. The two leaders are likely to discuss the matter when Mr. Sharon travels to Washington several weeks from now.
We remain convinced that the strategic rationale behind Mr. Sharon's approach is sound. There are just 7,300 Israeli settlers living in Gaza today, where they are surrounded by more than 1.3 million hostile Palestinians. There is no realistic chance that Israeli settlements will be able to remain in Gaza if Israelis and Palestinians reach a peace agreement. The resources that Israel spends to protect the outlying Gaza and West Bank settlements Mr. Sharon has proposed to evacuate could be better spent on winning the war against the terrorist organizations operating out of Gaza and the West Bank.

As he prepares to meet with Mr. Bush, the Israeli leader faces a difficult challenge: crafting a new disengagement plan in which Israel withdraws from a smaller number of settlements (thus mollifying some on his right) without alienating Washington by limiting the scope of an Israeli pullback. When Mr. Sharon visited Mr. Bush at the White House last month, he won U.S. support for his positions that Israel would be able to retain some West Bank settlements in a peace agreement and that the Palestinians would not be granted the "right of return" to Israel. Mr. Sharon counts his excellent relationship with Mr. Bush among his foremost achievements as prime minister. He does not want to run the risk of jeopardizing it by holding on to settlements that serve no vital security purpose.
An unnamed State Department official quoted yesterday by The Washington Post complained that the United States would "get hammered" following the referendum defeat and would have to show that "we weren't played by Sharon." But Secretary of State Colin Powell later praised Mr. Sharon, noting that his push for the settlement pullout was unprecedented for an Israeli prime minister.
The prime minister is actually in a stronger political position than imagined vis-a-vis his critics among the settlers. For one thing, public opinion polls suggest that close to two-thirds of the Israeli electorate as a whole favor his disengagement plan. But even among Likud voters, Mr. Sharon retains a surprising degree of support. In the referendum proposal defeated Sunday, some 59,000 Likud Party members voted against Mr. Sharon. But, by way of comparison, 1 million Israelis voted for Likud in the last election. According to a poll published yesterday in the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot, 55 percent of Likud voters -- roughly 550,000 people -- favor the prime minister's disengagement plan.
In short, Mr. Sharon's disengagement concept remains very much alive. Mr. Bush should continue to support the Israeli leader as he attempts to win a popular mandate for his forthcoming plan at home.


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Mergers & Acquisitions
Hezbollah tries to fill Hamas's power vacuum.

By Aaron Mannes
Israel's elimination of the Hamas leadership -- most recently Sheikh Yassin and Rantissi, but also several mid-level leaders -- has created a power vacuum in Hamas, allowing Hezbollah, and its sponsors Syria and Iran, to move in. With the removal of Saddam, Syria and Iran are making a play to become the dominant powers in the region. To do so they need to do two things: kick the U.S. out of Iraq, and neutralize the region's strongest military power: Israel. Hamas has key assets to contribute to this Syrian-Iranian gambit.
Hamas's utility against Israel is apparent. With its network of schools and hospitals and its history of successful terror attacks, Hamas has street credibility not just among the Palestinians, but also throughout the Middle East. For the last several years Hamas has been split between the leadership in Gaza and the leadership in Damascus. The Damascus leadership, which disburses Iranian money within the organization, has grown closer to its patrons. The Gaza leadership hates Israel just as much, but tries to preserve its independence. As the effective Gaza leaders are eliminated the Damascus leadership has a free hand to run Hamas in accord with Iranian-Syrian goals.
Hezbollah has been providing technical and financial support to the Palestinian factions, and building its own network in the West Bank, Gaza, and among the Israeli Arabs since the late 1990s. According to the Israeli daily Maariv, with Arafat sidelined and his organization in disarray, most of the funding for the Arafat-affiliated al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades comes from Hezbollah. The minor Palestinian factions are already tied into the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad receives all of its funding from Iran. The secular "fronts" are based in Damascus and rely on Syrian support. By pulling Hamas into the fold, Hezbollah becomes the real power behind Palestinian violence.
With Hezbollah pulling the strings, Israel will face a coordinated campaign along three fronts. In addition to terror attacks, the Katyusha rockets threatening Israel's north could be augmented by artillery and rocket attacks from Gaza and the West Bank capable of reaching Israel's population centers and commercial airspace -- effectively encircling Israel.
Hamas's assets will also be useful to Hezbollah and its patrons in Iraq, where they seek to undermine the American endeavor and create a weak Iraq dependent on Iran. Hamas has already opened offices in southern Iraq to foment anti-American activities. Gaza and the West Bank could be fertile recruiting grounds for jihadists wishing to fight the United States in Iraq.
Hamas has links to radical Sunni groups throughout the Middle East and could build relations between them and Shiite Hezbollah. Jordan -- a key U.S. ally bordering Israel, the West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia -- could be target number one. With a majority Palestinian population, Jordan is particularly vulnerable to Palestinian unrest, and Hamas has close ties to Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood and particularly the Islamic Action Front. Indeed, Jordan recently thwarted a massive terror attack. But another incident, in Kosovo -- where a Jordanian policeman serving with the U.N. contingent shot and killed two U.S. policemen -- is a warning that, even within the security forces that prop up Jordan's monarchy, there is unhappiness with the regime's pro-Western tilt. If Jordan fell into the Syrian-Iranian camp it would become a base for attacks on Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
Finally, Hamas could augment Hezbollah's already formidable ability to launch terror attacks around the world. Hezbollah has already unleashed terror on Europe, the Middle East, and even Latin America -- and attempted to do so in Asia. Hamas has an international fundraising network (particularly in the United States, where Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzuk lived for nearly 20 years) that can also be used to provide logistical support for terrorist operations and recruitment. The April 30, 2003, attack on a Tel-Aviv bar by two British citizens of Pakistani descent who were recruited into Hamas is a harbinger of this possibility. In another ominous sign, in November 2003, Israel arrested a Canadian citizen of Palestinian birth for training and plotting terror attacks in North America. This ability to recruit Westerners is an important asset in conducting international terror, which Hezbollah and its sponsors have already used effectively around the world.
Hamas personnel, resources, and "brand name" fit neatly into the regional and global plans of Hezbollah and its sponsors. To head off this threat, the U.S. should not merely support Israeli action against Hamas. The U.S. should be actively coordinating with Israel to neutralize and destroy Hamas, particularly by pressuring sponsors Iran and Syria. In the Middle East one often hears the old saying: "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." Surely, then, the enemy of my friend is my enemy. And Hamas's enmity is not reserved for Israel alone.

-- Aaron Mannes is the author of TerrorBlog. This piece is adapted from his article in the April 2004 edition of the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/mannes200405050929.asp


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US BUSINESS & ECONOMY

CVS chairman: Legalize prescription drug imports
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Breaking with others in his industry, the chief executive of CVS/pharmacy called Wednesday for temporarily legalizing imports of prescription drugs.
"While many in our industry believe that importation is a fundamentally flawed concept and oppose it without exception, I have come to a slightly different view," Thomas Ryan, CVS chairman and chief executive officer, said in prepared testimony for a government task force on drug importation.
Ryan is the first executive of a large drug store chain to support importing drugs from countries where prices are controlled by governments so that people can fill prescriptions more cheaply than they can at U.S. pharmacies. Ryan said such a move would be a recognition of reality.
"Millions of Americans already have opted to import drugs because they can't afford not to. We owe it to them to face this issue head on and not look the other way," Ryan said.
The government panel is considering whether and how drugs could be safely imported from Canada and elsewhere.
The Bush administration and Republican leaders in Congress, as well as the pharmaceutical industry, have opposed legalizing drug imports, citing safety concerns.
Ryan said, however, that he believed importing prescription drugs can be done safely by using established distributors of pharmaceuticals in this country. He suggested a two-year trial run while the government seeks a long-term solution to soaring U.S. drug prices.
Three governors also called on the federal government to put in place in quickly a means of safely allowing importation.
Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson, whose agency has led the opposition to imported drugs, on Tuesday became the first senior Bush administration official to say that legalizing drug imports appears inevitable.
Thompson said imports would save consumers money and that he would urge President Bush not to stand in the way of legislation in Congress to make them legal.


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Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
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Tied & Tested
China and the U.S. are linked . . . a good thing.

By Larry Kudlow
Columnist Tom Friedman of the New York Times wrote that "When Chinese authorities told banks last week to cut back their wild lending, commodity prices and stock markets tumbled all over the world." The always clever Friedman then conjured up a prayer that concluded, "May China's leaders live to 120, and may they enjoy 9 percent GDP growth every year of their lives. Thank you, Father. Amen."
While it's good to see Friedman appealing to a higher power, his prayer has already been answered over the past ten years. Since China's 1994 currency stabilization reform, which firmly linked the yuan to the dollar, real economic growth in the country has averaged 8.9 percent per year -- with no recessions. Call this the post-Tiananmen Square modern era of Chinese growth.
Most important to the continuing health of China's rapidly emerging economy have been pro-growth measures to reduce tariffs, market-liberalization steps to reform and modernize the Chinese economy, agriculture reforms going back to the late 1970s, and, in particular, the currency reform to stabilize the yuan -- which has been crucial to attracting deep-pocketed international investors. These measures set the stage for the decade-long durable economic boom which shows absolutely no signs of stalling.
China has become one of the world's primary growth engines. Almost single-handedly China has pulled Japan into an export-led recovery, ending a fifteen-year Japanese downturn. In fact, China has anchored an economic revival throughout the Asian-Pacific rim. Its huge industrial demand has contributed mightily to a revival of the U.S. commodity and manufacturing sectors and has had a boom-triggering impact on world shipping.
In short, the global economy needs China.
In recent weeks China has taken a few modest steps to slow its allegedly overheated economy. It raised bank-reserve requirements, clamped down on cement, steel, and aluminum projects to curb excess development, and implemented some land-use rules to slow industrial growth.
Amidst the current growth wave, government-reported Chinese inflation has picked up. In mid-2002 China was deflating at a 1.3 percent pace, but recent consumer-price-index readings have hovered around 3 percent. The corporate-goods index, a proxy for wholesale prices, was deflating at a 4 percent clip in 2002. Now it's rising at a 6? percent rate.
Look familiar?
In effect, China's price trends mirror and magnify U.S. price trends. This is because the yuan is tied to the dollar. So it is really the U.S. Federal Reserve calling the tune for Chinese money.
As the Fed reflated its way out of deflation in recent years by lowering interest rates and expanding the money supply, China's economy benefited enormously (as did emerging country economies worldwide). And as China's economy is not nearly as diverse, flexible, or developed as America's, price swings up and down tend to be more exaggerated than those in the U.S.
Still, there is no inflation crisis occurring in either country.
The Greenspan Fed undoubtedly overshot liquidity additions to the U.S. economy in fighting deflation in 2000-02. Some of this spilled over to China. Yet while core inflation (excluding food and energy) is creeping up in the U.S., it is only 1.4 percent over the past twelve months -- nothing to panic over. Still, it is noteworthy that the overall Consumer Price Index did rise 5.1 percent annually in this year's first quarter.
Here are some other telling parallels: As U.S. Treasury bond rates have increased recently from 3.6 percent to 4.5 percent, China's government bond yield has turned up from 4 to 5 percent. In recent weeks the U.S. dollar has reversed a two-year decline and appreciated by roughly 6.5 percent. This means the dollar-linked Chinese yuan has also appreciated in lockstep with the greenback.
Currency appreciation amounts to a de facto tightening of monetary policy in both countries. As currency values rise, increased consumer and business purchasing power will slow price increases. In response to this restraint, U.S. dollar-denominated commodity prices -- such as gold, copper, steel scrap, and wheat -- have corrected sharply lower with stock markets also losing some of their steam of late. But these are overreactions to a very mild dose of monetary restraint in both China and the U.S.
Today's Federal Open Market Committee meeting will lay the rhetorical groundwork for an overdue increase in the federal funds policy rate. Most market mavens expect a rate hike in June or August. Really, the central bank should act today. Global stock, bond, currency, and commodity markets have already built in about a 75-basis-point Fed move. Why wait? The sooner the Fed acts, the less action it will have to take later on.
That said, Federal Reserve policy will remain relatively accommodative for quite some time. The boom in the U.S. and China will not end. Instead, with a bit of stimulus removal -- actually nothing more than a lightening up on the monetary accelerator -- rising inflation expectations can be stopped dead in their tracks. This would prolong bull-market prosperity cycles in both countries. Once again, Mr. Tom Friedman's prayer would be answered.

-- Larry Kudlow, NRO's Economics Editor, is CEO of Kudlow & Co. and host with Jim Cramer of CNBC's Kudlow & Cramer.
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RUSSIA


US and Russia nukes: still on cold war, hair-trigger alert
A Clinton-era plan to enhance US-Russia early warnings systems languishes under bureaucracy.
By Scott Peterson | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
MOSCOW - It promised to be a quiet evening at the Soviet nuclear early warning center when Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov settled into the commander's seat on Sept. 26, 1983.
But within minutes, Colonel Petrov was locked in perhaps the most dangerous drama of the cold war. An alarm sounded, warning screens blinked. A computer map on the wall showed the hostile launch of a US nuclear warhead.
"Every second counted.... My legs were unsteady, my hands were trembling, my cozy armchair became a hot frying pan," says the former officer. It only got worse. Within five minutes the computer registered five more launches; the alarm flashed: "Missile Attack."
The decision that Petrov made in those pressure-cooked minutes - that the computer was in error, and the elaborate early warning system that he helped build was wrong - may have prevented a nuclear holocaust.
Twenty years later, there is growing concern that a similar nuclear miscue could happen again. The lone superpower and its former rival still aim thousands of missiles on hair-trigger alert at each other's major cities. As the US rushes to deploy a missile shield this summer designed to intercept North Korean warheads, Clinton-era plans that would improve both US and deteriorating Russian detection systems are stalled.
At presidential summits in both 1998 and 2000, the US and Russia announced plans for a joint, real-time warning system in Moscow. The blueprint, drawing on American's sophisticated satellite network and Russia's wide radar net, promised to keep better tabs on the superpower arsenals as well as on terrorist threats.
"I wish I could say there is no chance of it [today]," Petrov says, in a matchbox kitchen with a yellowing star chart. "But when we deal with space - when we [play] God - who knows what will be the next surprise?"
Dreams of joint efforts ground to a halt long ago. Meanwhile, neglect has left Russia's system in disrepair.
"The fact is, the Russians are flying blind," says Jon Wolfsthal, a nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. "There are huge portions of their periphery that are unmonitored because their satellites are down, and they've lost a number of [Soviet-era] radar sites."
The result is a growing concern about false readings that could show a hostile nuclear launch, and provoke real retaliation. Such fears have been augmented by a string of Russian military accidents, from failed test missile launches to a sunken nuclear submarine.
After a secret year-long investigation into the 1983 incident, Petrov says the false readings that shocked him and his team were attributed to a rare but predictable reflection off the earth. The system was fooled again in 1995, when Russians briefly thought that a scientific launch from Norway was a nuclear-tipped US missile heading their way. President Boris Yeltsin reportedly brought out the launch suitcase called the "nuclear football" - perhaps the closest it's ever come to being used in Soviet or Russian history - before coming to believe there was no need to respond.
"There are examples of weather satellite launches, the full moon rising, flocks of geese - all these horror stories in history," says Mr. Wolfsthal. Part of the solution was meant to be a joint warning center built in Moscow. It was to have been completed years ago.
When President Bill Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin first announced plans to build the center in 1998, it was heralded as a breakthrough in preventing a "false warning" leading to accidental war. When Russia's new President Vladimir Putin signed the deal in 2000 with Mr. Clinton, the White House touted it as a "milestone in ensuring strategic stability."
Expert advice backed up that view, with compelling findings in the mid-1990s that combining the US and Russian systems would significantly boost results.
"We went through a whole simulation of different missiles fired by different countries from the Mideast to Europe at different targets at different trajectories," says Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information in Washington who oversaw the detailed research with Russian scientists.
"We looked at detections of the US system operating alone, and the Russian one alone, and found the combined performance would be 20 to 70 percent better," says Mr. Blair, a former Minuteman launch officer and early proponent of the joint warning center.
With seven Russian radars stretched from the Baltics to Azerbaijan - which can pick-up Middle East launches - and the US satellites, "you just have a lot more assets focusing on the threat," adds Blair. "We could work together and have a much better ability to detect third country attacks."
US and Russian leaders had another reason to be optimistic. Russian missile officers used a US command center in Colorado Springs, Colo., for months at the end of 1999, to familiarize themselves with the US early-warning system - and to be on hand during the Millenium New Year - to ensure direct contact with Moscow in case any Y2K computer "bug" affected the Russian system.
"It was incredibly useful, and built a lot of trust between ... early-warning groups on both sides," says Carnegie's Wolfsthal. "But in the end, they went away, and we're left without real-time sharing."
The joint project, first envisioned for completion in mid-2001, has foundered on everyday issues of what Russian taxes should be paid for imported US equipment, and legal concerns about liability.
"It's a lack of political will on both sides," says Vladimir Dvorkin, a former major general in Russia's nuclear forces, and a top strategist until 2001. Russia's early warning is "less trustworthy" than the American one, he says, though its readings "will never serve as the only guide [to launch]."
Even more important, General Dvorkin says, is "joint analysis of threats coming from unstable regions with authoritarian regimes."
The mundane points stalling the project are surprising security experts. "If you're a lawyer at the State Department, [liability and taxes] may be very important issues," says Wolfsthal. "But if you are concerned about the geostrategic survival of the human species, they are minuscule in their relevance."
Experts on both sides are planning to issue a wake-up call, however. A group has planned to begin a year-long modeling exercise that will examine the risks of inaction, and the need for the joint center.
"We want to show what can happen without this center," says Pavel Zolotarev, a former Strategic Forces major general. "If such a center were already open here, these threats would probably not lead to dangerous situations. We'll get these results in a year, but who knows when we will be able to convince the leadership?"
Over the past decade, the US has spent roughly $7 billion funding nuclear-threat-reduction programs to control "loose nukes" and to secure weapons-grade nuclear material and scientific expertise that might be easy targets for terrorists. The $1 billion total spent per year on all threat reduction amounts to less than one-third of one percent of US defense spending.
Taking the thousands of warheads off hair-trigger alert, experts say, would also help lower risks. Experts estimate that there is a world total of 30,000 assembled nuclear weapons and enough bomb-grade material to create nearly a quarter million more.
Some Russian experts argue that, since they have no intention of ever "launching on warning," Moscow is deliberately letting its early-warning system deteriorate.
"Certainly if you look at what they do to maintain their satellite constellation, it's pathetic," says Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard's Belfer Center. There is virtually no coverage of areas where US submarines could launch missiles - long considered the first phase of any attack on Soviet forces.
"I can't imagine a Russian president awakened in the middle of the night with a blip on the radar screen, saying 'Yes, I'm going to launch the missiles on that basis,' knowing what he has to know about the state of their early-warning system," says Mr. Bunn.
* Second in an occasional series on US-Russian strategic issues. "Old weapons, new terror worries," ran April 15, 2004.
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>> TROUBLE WITH ISLAM 1

France tries to soften local style of Islam

Officials there have deported two allegedly radical clerics, leading a Europe-wide crackdown.
By Peter Ford | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
PARIS - As European governments crack down on radical imams as part of their battle against Islamic terrorism, they have laid bare a central problem for millions of their Muslim citizens: a lack of homegrown religious leaders to guide their integration into Western societies.
Overwhelmingly foreign, and sometimes speaking only Arabic, Europe's imams often have little understanding of their host countries, and their teachings run counter to modern European values and gender roles, say Muslim leaders and government officials. But there seems little chance of any change soon, they add.
"There is an abyss between the imams' vision of the world and that of young Muslims born here," says Dounia Bouzar, a member of the French Council for the Muslim Religion, a body established last year to lead the Muslim community.
France has taken the lead in a Europe-wide crackdown on radical clerics. French officials have deported two allegedly fundamentalist imams in recent weeks, and are threatening to expel three more. Italy expelled a Senegalese imam last November, and the British government is seeking to deport the Egyptian born radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri, accusing him of supporting al Qaeda.
"Under the cover of religion, individuals present on our soil have been using extremist language and issuing calls for violence," French Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin said Saturday. "These favor the installation of terrorist movements. It is necessary therefore to oppose this together and by all available means."
Since the Madrid bombing in March, European authorities are paying new attention to the possibility that fundamentalist preachers are sheltering and supporting jihadist bombers.
French authorities announced with great fanfare two weeks ago that they were deporting Abdelkader Bouziane, an Algerian imam, after he defended wife-beating and stoning adulterous women in a magazine interview. They expelled him before he had a chance to appeal the ruling, which a court later overturned.
Officials told reporters that Mr. Bouziane had ties to terrorist groups, and that the police were keeping a close eye on about 30 mosques whose preachers were suspected of fundamentalist leanings.
The hasty expulsion drew criticism. "You cannot fight an antidemocratic movement by using its own methods," complained opposition Socialist Party spokesman Malik Boutih on French radio Tuesday.
Some Muslim leaders fear the government has made political use of the affair. "They are dramatizing it so as to show that all imams are foreign," complains Lhaj Thami Breze, president of the influential Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF). "They are preparing the ground to set up a government institute to train imams, and we are against such government interference."
Ninety percent from abroad
An estimated 90 percent of imams in France are indeed foreign citizens, mostly from North Africa. Some "have not evolved in French society," says Mr. Breze, whose group is considered close to the Muslim Brotherhood. "Some adapt fast, but lots do not."
Dalil Boubaker, the head of Paris's Grand Mosque, is harsher. "There are 1,500 places of Islamic worship in France," he says. "Five hundred of them have proper imams. The other thousand are clowns."
Who chooses the imams?
While the Algerian government (which funds the Grand Mosque) sends 80 imams to France, and the Moroccan government sends dozens more, most prayer leaders are chosen by local groups that run their own mosques, often in the run-down, big-city suburbs where most of France's five million Muslims live.
Very few of them are paid for their services. Most live on welfare, supplemented by donations from the faithful.
The imams of the 250 mosques affiliated with the UOIF must meet certain criteria, says Breze.
"Our preachers must speak French,they must have been here for many years if they are not French citizens, and their sermons must strengthen social peace," he insists. "We don't want imams who rouse their congregations against their country or a government."
Authorizing imams
Breze would like to see the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM) - set up last year at the urging of the government to provide the authorities with a representative Islamic body they could deal with - set similar conditions in drawing up a list of approved imams.
Dr. Boubaker, head of the CFCM, proposed such a scheme in a meeting Monday with Prime Minister Jean Pierre Raffarin. "We must distinguish between real imams and subversives who call themselves imams," he says. "Imams in France should absolutely stop talking politics."
The CFCM, riven by internal divisions between different branches of Islam, would probably not able to draw up a credible list of "authorized" imams, however, and some members doubt it should try. "It might look like police-style management," worries Ms. Bouzar. "A lot of Muslims already think the government is trying to control them through the council, and this could revive the anxieties."
Some Muslim leaders look to the training of French-born young men as imams as the solution, hoping that they would be more moderate and nonpolitical, and better attuned to the realities of life in a secular Western nation.
The UOIF runs a small college in the French countryside that turns out about 10 new imams a year, but officials acknowledge that this is nowhere near enough to meet the demand. The problem is not only to find enough young Frenchmen attracted by the life of an imam; equally difficult is the question of financing a training institute.
In Muslim countries, governments generally subsidize such institutions. In secular France, with its strict separation of church and state, such an idea is anathema. "This is precisely the CFCM's mission and task. The ball is in their court," says Interior Ministry spokeswoman Veronique Guillermo. "The French state will have nothing to do with how a religion organizes itself."
But the Muslim community in France does not have the resources to fund four-year imam training courses, Muslim leaders say, and they are reluctant to turn to traditional donors, such as wealthy patrons in Gulf countries, for fear of the influence that would give them.
"The question of money is key," says Bouzar. "But the whole imam situation is a reflection of the state of relations between French society and Islam. Islam used to be seen as a foreigner's religion. Today we have a generation which wants to be Muslim and French. Before we can decide what we want from our imams we have to reflect on what it means to be a Muslim in a secular society, and we have a long way to go in that reflection."

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>> TROUBLE WITH ISLAM 2
Outside Encouragement
Sharia rules Nigeria -- with the help of foreign Islamists.

By Paul Marshall

It is a pretty good rule of thumb that where you find Muslim extremism, Islamist terrorism, and women being sentenced to death by stoning, there you will find Saudi funds and Saudi-trained personnel. One exception to this rule has been Nigeria, but now evidence of Wahabbi mischief is surfacing there as well.
Since the governor of Zamfara State, Alhaji Ahmed Sani, introduced a draconian version of sharia in 1999, 11 of Nigeria's 36 states have followed suit. Five women have been sentenced to death by stoning for adultery, though no punishment has yet been carried out. Thieves have had their hands amputated by court order. One man had his eye removed after accidentally blinding a friend (he could have escaped this by paying 60 camels, but the injured party wasn't interested in the camels).
Under these sharia dictates, women are harshly subjugated. In northern Nigeria, they have been forbidden to rent houses and barred from riding motorbikes or traveling in the same vehicles as men. Taxi drivers have been caned for carrying female passengers. Zamfara requires all high-school girls to wear a hijab and bars them from wearing skirts and other "Western" forms of dress. State officials have advocated public flogging of those violating an "Islamic" dress code. Prostitution charges have been leveled at women merely for the crime of being unmarried after the age of 13. Judges in Bauchi State have told women to get married immediately or be sent to prison. One judge ordered four of them to pick out husbands from among the men in the court. Women are at a particular disadvantage in these criminal prosecutions since their testimony usually counts for only half that of a man.
Non-Muslims, usually Christians, have become second-class citizens. Their taxes pay for Islamic preachers, while hundreds of churches have been closed by government order. Last week, Sani announced that all "unauthorized" places of worship in Zamfara State would be demolished. Those who exercise their right under the Nigerian constitution to change their religion from Islam are threatened with death, a punishment for apostasy under sharia law. The Catholic and Anglican churches have had to set up protected centers for converts.
This spread of radical Islam has also led to riots, mob attacks, and vigilantes, producing the largest death toll in Nigeria since the civil war over Biafra in the 1960s. Over 10,000 people have died in the last four years in sharia-related violence -- perhaps over 1,000 in the central states this year alone.
Recent months have seen the emergence of more organized militias. In early January, in Yobe State, there was an uprising by a group calling itself the "Taliban," led by a "Mullah Omar," and demanding an Islamic state. It took several hundred troops two weeks to put it down.
Foreign groups have been aiding the institutionalization of Islamic law. Saudi, Sudanese, Syrian, and Palestinian representatives appeared with Governor Sani in the days before he announced his plans for sharia. The Jigawa State government has sent Islamic judges for training in Malaysia and Sudan. The government of Katsina State has sent a delegation to Sudan to study its laws. Other states have been offered assistance from some these same countries as well as from Iran and Libya.
In January, the Saudi religious and cultural attach? in Nigeria, Sheik Abdul-Aziz, said that his government had been monitoring the implementation of sharia in Nigeria and noted the results "with delight."
There is also evidence of infiltration by foreign Islamic radicals. According to some reports, extremists from neighboring Chad were involved in the July 2001 violence in Bauchi State. In November 2001, Nigerian police arrested six Pakistani preachers, accusing them of inciting religious violence in Ogun state. The police have announced that scores of Pakistanis have been arrested in different parts of the country for allegedly fomenting religious trouble since 9/11. Church spokesmen in Plateau State said last month that local Muslim extremists have brought in thousands of mercenaries from Niger and Chad to invade Christian towns and villages.
However, despite repeated rumors, there has until this year been little evidence of organized foreign support for violence and domestic terrorism. Now such evidence is appearing. On February 3, the Nigerian government announced that an unnamed Iranian diplomat was arrested on January 23 in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, after he was found taking photographs of Churches, a presidential villa, the defense headquarters, and the Israeli, British, and American embassies.
The usually reliable news service Compass Direct reports that one of January's "Taliban" raiders, Muslim cleric Alhaji Sharu, confessed to police that he was a middleman between Nigerian extremists and the Al-Muntada Al-Islami Trust, a Saudi funded "charity" headquartered in Britain. Sharu said that the Trust's money had been used to propagate a Wahabist version of Islam in Nigeria and fund religious violence.
Subsequent investigation by Nigeria's police led to "the discovery of financial transactions running into millions of dollars" between Sharu and the Trust's local head, a Sudanese businessman named Muhiddeen Abdullahi. Authorities arrested Abdullahi on February 20, accusing him and the Trust of financing attacks on Christians, including the January Taliban uprising.
When authorities released Abdullahi 10 days after his arrest, more than 5,000 Qadiriyya Sufi Muslims, the largest tradition within Nigerian Islam, mounted a protest march. Chanting "Allahu Akbar" ("God is Great"), demanded that Wahabbis be banned from the country. Their spokesman, Abduljabbar Nasiru Kabara, told journalists, "As a matter of urgency, the state government should close the office of Al-Muntada Al-Islami because of its activities which have resulted in religious unrest in Nigeria."
If Nigeria's moderate Muslims can call for the rejection of Saudi interference, there is nothing stopping the Nigerian government from doing the same, and little stopping the U.S. government from encouraging it to do so.

-- Paul Marshall is senior fellow at Freedom House's Center for Religious Freedom. He is author of Islam at the Crossroads and God and the Constitution: Christianity and American Politics.

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IRAQ 2...

Loose Canons
Unacceptable and Un-American
By Jed Babbin
Published 5/5/2004 12:07:25 AM
That's what Big Dog called the abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad and, as usual, he was dead right. Unfortunately, those words seem to describe more than the outrageous and illegal actions of a few soldiers and civilians there. There is a sense of disarray about Iraq this week, and those who want us to fail there are doing everything they can to magnify it. The Marines had the city of Falluja cordoned off for almost a month, and -- having paid for the real estate with blood -- they were ordered to pull back. We had one former Saddamite general put in charge of a small new Iraqi force going into the city to restore order and drive out the insurgents. But after a couple of days it was clear that this general -- Jasim Muhammed Saleh - was performing up to the standards of Hans Blix.
Saleh was chosen on the recommendation of some members of the Iraqi Governing Council. But we later discovered a small problem. Gen. Saleh had a role in crushing the Shia revolt America invited and then abandoned in 1991. Somehow, Gen. Saleh -- garbed in his old uniform and surrounded by red-bereted cohorts -- wasn't able to locate any of the foreign insurgents and dead-ender Baathists who have made Falluja a battleground that has claimed too many American lives. Exit Saleh, stage left.
Now we have another former Saddam general, Muhammed Latif, who is at the head of the 900-man Iraqi "force" in Falluja. The IGC and Ambassador Bremer have apparently done a better job of vetting this guy. Gen. Latif -- who spent seven years in jail for resisting Saddam's orders -- seems a slightly better bet than Saleh. But only slightly, because it's not clear that he can command any loyalty from the few troops at his disposal, or cooperation from the locals.
WE'RE FACED WITH one of the central dilemmas of this war: How do you instill a sense of freedom and democracy among a population that is -- at least partly -- tolerant of, if not sympathetic to, barbarians who murdered and mutilated four Americans who fell into their hands? As one Defense Department source told me, we have a 21st century military trying to restore order among a 12th century population without turning everything into a smoking pile of rubble. Every instinct tells me that we should have ordered all the women, children, and elderly out of Falluja quickly then systematically destroyed the pockets of insurgents that our scout-sniper teams were locating. A 500-pound precision-guided bomb does the job in a manner that won't need to be repeated, at least in regard to those within a half a block. We were doing that when a halt was imposed. Now we have chosen to test this "Iraqification" option. By doing so, we are pretending that we have obtained the results we should have in the past year, and haven't.
The Iraqis are unready. Thirteen months after the fall of Saddam's regime -- hell, six months after his capture -- Iraq is not ready for a new government, and a new government is not ready for Iraq. There's plenty of blame to go around, but that's for another day. (Or not. One wise man told me soon after L. Paul Bremer was appointed proconsul over Iraq: "If you want anything to be accomplished, never hire someone whose first name is 'ambassador.'") The issue now is how to push Iraq along. Face facts: June 30 will be a symbolic turnover, not a substantive one. American troops will be there for many years to come. Paul Bremer will leave on June 30, and John Negroponte - until recently, our ambassador to Kofi and the Kupcakes -- will take over in what may seem a lesser role. But he has his work cut out for him, as do the soldiers who will remain.
This Churchillian situation (Sir Winston once said that you can always count on Americans to do the right thing, but only after they try everything else) can't be fixed quickly. As we are discovering, you can't make up for lost time when you're nation-building. Lost time is just lost. The President tried to make up for it by making his most puzzling pronouncement to date: that the U.N.'s representative -- the anti-American Algerian, Lakhdar Brahimi -- will choose the new Iraqi government. Those of you who know what the acronym FUBAR stands for can derive my prediction for the U.N.'s success. We will waste another year at this, and then realize that we don't need more ambassadors and diplomats.
WE -- AND THAT MEANS Uncle Sam, and our real allies -- need to establish several things before Iraq can be stable enough to govern itself. First, it needs security. Which means we need to protect it from external threats coming from Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, and get the Iraqis to the point where they are capable of dealing with the internal mess themselves. Second, it needs a functioning legislature and courts, which means it needs something like the Afghan "loya jirgha," an assembly of local leaders who choose the new government and can pass laws and establish courts. ASAP. Third, it needs to provide evidence of the functioning government including the security, but also services, schools, and hospitals. The $18 billion in construction money should be spent now to employ restive Iraqis and help get their economy going. That is more than enough for our new representative to Iraq, John Negroponte, to deal with after June 30. The prisoner abuse matter makes everything worse. It has energized every opponent we have and makes our continued presence in Iraq more difficult, though not less essential.
One general has been suspended, six soldiers are facing courts-martial, and a number of others, including a military intelligence colonel, will probably be prosecuted. The military justice system is, in truth, better than its civilian counterpart. There are at least six investigations ongoing, and there will be trials. They can't happen fast enough, be public enough, or impose sentences severe enough. Those few -- those miserable few -- have dishonored the service of tens of thousands of devoted, brave soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines and made their jobs even more dangerous. Think of the next American soldier captured by the insurgents. His -- or her -- fate will be horrible, and the insurgents will say it is payback for what happened at Abu Ghraib.
The Blixiecrats in Congress and our pals in the Arab press are in full cry. Teddy and Carl Levin are harrumphing because they weren't told about the investigation before it was leaked to the press. They are trying to make things worse by saying that the problem is much more widespread than any facts indicate. But the seriousness of these incidents is not to be underestimated. At this writing, there are new allegations that at least two prisoners were murdered, and there may also have been abuses in Afghan jails.
The military justice system is cranking along, and it will meet out justice to the perps. Those not under military jurisdiction will have to face Iraqi justice. At least three civilians are implicated, and one of them may have participated in one of the murders. They should be held in Iraqi jails, and tried in Iraqi or Afghani courts. Until then, they should remain in the Abu Ghraib jail or the Afghan equivalent. As prisoners, not as jailers. They are certain to be treated better than were the prisoners they are accused of abusing.
[Nota Bene: On Tuesday, the junior senator from Massachusetts was said, by his Vietnam-era Navy boss, to have been a "loose cannon" while in the war zone. Said junior senator is in no way connected to this column, the proper spelling of its banner, or its author. Except as to be hoisted on its petard.]


TAS Contributing Editor Jed Babbin is the author of the forthcoming book, Inside the Asylum: How the U.N. and Old Europe are Worse than You Think.

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L'?ditorial du Monde
Torture en Irak
LE MONDE | 03.05.04 | 12h49
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Le Monde ?DITORIAL
LES ACCUSATIONS de torture contre des prisonniers irakiens ne pouvaient tomber plus mal pour la coalition am?ricano-britannique, ? l'issue du mois le plus sanglant du conflit depuis la fin - officielle - de la guerre. Les t?moignages et les photographies d'actes brutaux et d?gradants commis par des militaires am?ricains sur des d?tenus ont fait le tour du monde, et leur impact dans la rue arabe ne saurait ?tre minimis?. M?me si un doute subsiste sur l'authenticit? des clich?s impliquant des Britanniques.
Il ne s'agit pas de jeter la pierre ? la seule coalition. Les opposants irakiens ne sont pas en reste avec leurs attentats aveugles. Et la torture est, h?las, un sous-produit condamnable mais habituel des situations de conflit et de r?pression. Aucun pays n'en a ?t? exempt, la France incluse, pour ceux qui n'ont pas oubli? les heures noires de la guerre d'Alg?rie.
Il n'en demeure pas moins que ces actes inadmissibles ont eu lieu dans le cadre d'une exacerbation des relations entre Am?ricains et Irakiens depuis la "lib?ration" de leur pays. Et qu'ils s'inscrivent en faux contre cette id?e de l'administration Bush qu'elle n'a pas ? ?tre li?e par des conventions internationales encombrantes.
Depuis son arriv?e en Irak, l'arm?e am?ricaine a eu la main lourde et a, pour le moins, manqu? de doigt? dans sa guerre psychologique. En m?me temps, le Pentagone avait gravement sous-estim? les effectifs n?cessaires pour y ramener la paix. Il n'en reste pas moins que m?me une r?action rapide de Washington ? l'encontre des coupables risque d'?tre insuffisante, tant l'hostilit? des Irakiens, chiites comme sunnites, est g?n?rale.
Au moins aussi grave est la d?gradation du prestige du pr?sident George W. Bush, que cette affaire implique : une administration de donneurs de le?ons se retrouve prise ? son propre pi?ge. Et, comme le remarque le Washington Post, "les politiciens et les chefs militaires am?ricains doivent en tirer une le?on importante et implacable : les r?gles de droit comptent, m?me quand il s'agit des pires ennemis de l'Am?rique".
Comment, par exemple, justifier que l'interrogatoire de prisonniers, de guerre ou autres, puisse ?tre "sous-trait?" ? des "consultants" civils, mercenaires recrut?s aupr?s d'officines sp?cialis?es ? Il est crucial, pour l'image comme pour l'efficacit? de la coalition, qu'elle respecte les conventions de Gen?ve. Sur le terrain comme dans cette zone de non-droit qu'est la base de Guantanamo.
Il n'est pas certain que cela suffise ? redresser la situation sur le terrain. Il y va, malgr? tout, de l'honneur des Etats-Unis, ancien leader du "monde libre" et unique superpuissance, de faire en sorte que les coupables soient ch?ti?s, que ces atrocit?s ne se reproduisent plus et que le droit de la guerre pr?vale.
Sinon, comment convaincre Irakiens et musulmans - si cela est encore possible - de la bonne foi de Washington ? Et comment persuader d'autres pays - europ?ens en particulier - de participer sous commandement am?ricain au processus de paix en Irak ?

* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 04.05.04
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A Bagdad, d'autres t?moignages ?voquent des tortures "bien pires"
LE MONDE | 03.05.04 | 13h21 * MIS A JOUR LE 03.05.04 | 15h58
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Bagdad de notre envoy?e sp?ciale
C'est presque avec soulagement que beaucoup de Bagdadis ont accueilli la publication des photos de prisonniers tortur?s dans la prison d'Abou Ghraib. "Tous les Irakiens le savaient, maintenant, l'Occident sera oblig? de le savoir aussi", dit Omar, un ancien militaire sunnite de la capitale. Durant deux jours, les t?l?visions satellitaires arabes, Al-Jazira en t?te, - les plus regard?es en Irak - ont ouvert par ces images leurs bulletins d'information, largement consacr?s aux r?actions officielles qu'elles ont provoqu?es.
Al-Jazira n'a pas manqu? de montrer celle d'un des membres du Conseil int?rimaire de gouvernement (CIG, install? par les Am?ricains), celle du chef kurde Talabani. Apr?s avoir d?nonc?, un peu formellement, ces "actes indignes", il a pr?cis? que "pour les Irakiens, qui ont connu bien pire sous Saddam -Hussein-, cela n'est pas tr?s important". Chacun, en Irak, en est bien conscient, mais cette phrase prononc?e ? l'?cran - qui plus est, avec le sourire - a provoqu? un grave malaise pour les uns, la fureur pour des autres, partisans de la "r?sistance" en Irak.
L'?pisode a mis ? nu le dangereux foss? qui s'est ?largi, depuis "l'insurrection d'avril" des sunnites arabes et des partisans chiites de Moqtada Sadr, entre ces derniers et les Kurdes, seul grand groupe rest? en bloc alli? des Am?ricains en Irak.
TORTURE SYST?MATIQUE
Certains commentaires rapport?s de la rue ? Bagdad sont d?sabus?s : "Quoi attendre d'autres des Am?ricains ?" "C'est ?a leur civilisation !" Les "?lites" plus ou moins pro-am?ricaines expliquent, elles, que si les r?actions en Irak ne sont pas plus violentes, "c'est parce que tout le monde sait aussi que les m?dias arabes, et Al-Jazira en particulier, se sont bien gard?s de d?noncer, en leur temps, les tortures autrement plus terribles pratiqu?es dans les prisons de Saddam", comme le dit un professeur d'Universit? chiite. Autre type de r?action, celui de sunnites de la province d'Al-Anbar, surtout, qui s'indignent du fait que la d?nonciation de ces s?vices pratiqu?s dans la vaste prison d'Abou Ghraib masque des tortures "bien pires" pratiqu?es dans les nombreux centres de tri et d'interrogatoires pr?liminaires.
De nombreux t?moignages concordent, depuis au moins sept mois, pour dire que les d?tenus sont syst?matiquement maltrait?s, frapp?s ou tortur?s, r?ellement ou par simulacre, dans ces centres o? ils sont gard?s de deux ? dix jours avant d'?tre dirig?s sur Abou Ghraib ou d'autres prisons.
"Le pire, c'est ? Baghdadi", un centre de d?tention situ? entre Ramadi et Hit, plus ? l'ouest, entend-on souvent. "Beaucoup y sont morts et des corps tortur?s ont ?t? rendus aux familles, ou jet?s sur les routes", assure ainsi un membre du Parti islamique - sunnite "mod?r?" - de Fallouja. Il se souvient du nom d'un seul Irakien ainsi martyris? - Nafe'Khalaf Ghadban -, mais chacun autour de lui opine ? ses dires.
Cheikh Jalal, 60 ans, une des autorit?s religieuses les plus respect?es de Fallouja, a ?t? rel?ch? jeudi 28 avril - dans le cadre des accords pass?s avec ses insurg?s - de la prison d'Abou Ghraib, o? il fut d?tenu sept mois. Ce "soufi", qui pr?che aussi fermement la l?gitimit? de la r?sistance que la n?cessit? du pardon, dit que lui n'a jamais ?t? frapp?, contrairement ? son jeune fils : "On lui a cass? des chaises sur le dos, il a ?t? rel?ch? au bout de dix jours, mais il souffre encore de ces coups."
Il dit aussi que beaucoup de ses compagnons de d?tention ont ?t? "brutalement frapp?s, humili?s, ramen?s nus des interrogatoires" ? leur tente de d?tention, o? ils avaient "tout le temps faim et soif, alors que les d?tenus criminels mangeaient comme dans un palais". Interrog? pour savoir s'il "est vrai que les Am?ricains arrachent les ongles ?", il r?pond qu'il ne le pense pas - "c'est sous Saddam qu'ils faisaient ?a". Il n'a pas vu lui-m?me les femmes "que les Am?ricains arr?tent quand ils ne trouvent pas leurs maris". Mais il est s?r qu'il s'en trouve, ? Abou Ghreib, "dans les pires cellules, souterraines et sans lumi?re".
Sophie Shihab

* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 04.05.04

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Interrogators pressured to make inmates talk

By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES


Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller arrived in Baghdad in September with one urgent mission: Improve the intelligence gathered from Iraqi detainees in 16 Army-run prisons, including Saddam Hussein's favorite, Abu Ghraib.
Saddam was still on the run, and commanders desperately needed information on him and on a growing insurgency that was killing American troops daily. The recommendation was to "Gitmo-ize" interrogations, or bring them more in line with practices at the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Gen. Miller, who ran the Guantanamo Bay compound for al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, advocated centralizing military intelligence interrogations at Abu Ghraib. Cellblocks 1A and 1B, which served as the prison's maximum-security wing, became home to a relatively modest number of insurgents thought to hold a wealth of facts on the enemy.
"He wanted all the interrogation teams in one location," said Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, an Army reserve military police officer (MP) who served as warden for all 16 prisons as commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade. "They were putting a lot of pressure on the interrogation teams to get more information.
"The problem was he had 800 MPs to guard 600 prisoners [in Guantanamo]. We had 130 MPs for about 8,000 detainees," Gen. Karpinski told The Washington Times yesterday.
Gen. Miller now runs the Army's Iraq prison system.
What followed in those two cell blocks was three months of abusing prisoners by MP guards and interrogation teams.
Whether the abuse produced the coveted intelligence information is not clear. But publicized graphic photographs of Iraqis forced to form naked pyramids or simulate sex acts has enraged the Arab world and President Bush and have sparked at least six formal investigations.
Army officials say at this point, the abuse seems to have been limited to those two cellblocks that held captured Iraqi insurgents and to incidents at another camp.
Six MPs face criminal charges. Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, who heads Combined Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) in Baghdad and is up for a fourth star, has reprimanded six officers at the prison and admonished a seventh.
Gen. Karpinski thinks the scandal is rooted in the pressure that Gen. Sanchez's command exerted on the interrogation teams after he accepted Gen. Miller's recommendation.
"The combat divisions were being more vigorous going out on raids," she said. "They wanted to get actionable intelligence."
To Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, who completed an investigative report in March, the scandal can be traced, in part, to training and resources.
"I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for a mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib prison complex," he said in a secret report obtained yesterday by The Washington Times. "I also find ... that the 800th MP Brigade as a whole was understrength for the mission for which it was tasked."
Gen. Karpinski said she would have stopped the abuse had she known about it. For what the Army considers command failures, she has received a written admonishment. She said she remains in command of the 800th MP Brigade, which demobilized as scheduled with members returning to their hometowns.
"She has not been suspended, reprimanded or relieved of her command," said Neal A. Puckett, her civilian attorney and a former Marine Corps judge advocate.
The one-star general ran a two-tiered prisoner system. The Army housed criminals and some insurgents in 15 detention centers around the California-size country. Gen. Karpinski said the system holds few, if any, classic prisoners of war -- that is, Iraqi soldiers captured during the war to topple Saddam. Virtually all of those individuals have been released.
The system also does not house the infamous 55-member "deck of cards" -- the most senior Ba'athists, including Saddam. The coalition detains those prisoners in undisclosed lockups.
Abu Ghraib became the hub for what are called "security detainees" -- those involved in attacking coalition forces. The 7,000 to 8,000 population is a mix of Ba'ath Party loyalists, former intelligence security officers and criminals who joined an anticoalition cell.
Some are accused of killing American troops.
Of that population, those thought to hold special information on Saddam loyalists and their whereabouts were moved to cellblocks 1A and 1B.
"They wanted to separate the wheat from the chaff," said Gen. Karpinski, who saw CJTF-7 switch control of Abu Ghraib on Nov. 19 from her MPs to a military intelligence commander.
CJTF-7's push for "actionable intelligence" meant units such as the 4th Infantry Division in Tikrit and the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad were pushing their mobile-intelligence units to vacuum up more Iraqis and bring them to Abu Ghraib. From October to December, the time span when the abuse occurred, the two cellbocks held nearly 200 prisoners.
Interrogations occurred each day. Detainees were questioned by three-member interrogation teams made up of an Army 205th Military Intelligence Brigade officer, a civilian linguist on contract and another agency representative normally from either the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency or the Army criminal investigative command.
The interrogators have been given some leeway to pressure prisoners, such as depriving them of sleep and light.
But the abuse depicted in the photos violates Army regulations, the rules of engagement for Iraq and the Geneva Conventions.
In general, the conventions state that prisoners of war must be treated humanely and not subjected to torture or scientific experiments. They cannot be threatened if they do not talk and cannot be put on public display.
Gen. Karpinski said the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) frequently visited Abu Ghraib, including the high-value men in cellblocks 1A and 1B. She said she was aware of only one complaint: a Red Cross team found an Iraqi naked in an isolation cell. He told them that he had refused to talk and that the staff made him wear women's underwear.
Gen. Karpinski said when the complaint was reported to a senior Army military intelligence commander, he commented, "We have to stop allowing them to order from the Victoria's Secret catalog."
Amanda Williamson, the ICRC spokeswoman in Washington, said the group visits Abu Ghraib every five or six weeks.
Mrs. Williamson said it is ICRC policy not to comment on its observations to the press.
She also said, "There are apparently a number of different categories of people detained in Iraq. Some are POWs, and there are some detained in other categories. Nonetheless, the Geneva Conventions clearly prohibit mistreatment."
Army investigators now have scores of investigations under way. Gen. Taguba's report highlights a pattern of abuse and some shocking statements from Army noncommissioned officers, according to a copy of the report obtained by The Times.
*"[Spc.] Sabrina D. Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in her sworn statement regarding the incident where a detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, that her job was to keep detainees awake."
*Another MP, Sgt. Javal Davis, said military intelligence officers told him, "Loosen this guy up for us. Make sure he has a bad night. Make sure he gets the treatment." After some detainees began talking, an officer told him, "Good job. They're breaking down real fast. They answered every question."
*"The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib demonstrated questionable work ethics and loyalties and are a potentially dangerous contingent within the [prison]. These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they have facilitated the escape of a least one detainee."

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SPIEGEL ONLINE - 05. Mai 2004, 15:59
URL: http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/0,1518,298455,00.html
Zimbardo zu Misshandlungen

"Krieg verwandelt Menschen in brutale Folterer"
Von Christian St?cker
F?r den renommierten US-Psychologen Philip Zimbardo sind die Misshandlungen irakischer Gefangener durch amerikanische Soldaten kein Zufall. Die Situation im Irak bringe die Soldaten regelrecht dazu, Gr?ueltaten zu ver?ben. Verantwortlich daf?r sei die US-Regierung.
AP / The New Yorker
Misshandelte Gefangene: "Fass des Krieges mit Essig gef?llt"
"Wir d?rfen den Politikern und dem Pentagon nicht erlauben, die Ernsthaftigkeit der Vorf?lle mit der ?blichen, auf Pers?nlichkeitsstrukturen abzielenden Analyse beiseite zu schieben", schreibt Philip Zimbardo in einem Brief an die Mitglieder der "Society of Personality and Social Psychology". Die Erkl?rung, es gebe ein paar faule ?pfel in einem ansonsten guten Fass, sei nicht akzeptabel, hei?t es in dem Schreiben, das SPIEGEL ONLINE vorliegt.
George Bush habe gesagt, die Ereignisse sollten kein schlechtes Licht auf das an sich gute amerikanische Volk oder das Milit?r werfen. "Falsch", so Zimbardo, "die situationsbezogene Analyse sagt uns, dass das Fass des Krieges mit Essig gef?llt ist, der gute Gurken in saure Gurken verwandelt, und das immer tun wird. Er verwandelt die Mehrzahl guter Menschen, M?nner wie Frauen, in ?belt?ter."
Wesentliche Faktoren dabei seien Anonymit?t und Verlust der Individualit?t, Entmenschlichung, Geheimhaltung, Diffusion von Verantwortung, soziale Vorbilder, starke Machtgef?lle, Frustration, Rachegef?hle, Autorit?tsh?rigkeit und mangelnde ?berwachung, die ein Gef?hl des "laissez-faire" erzeuge.
Stanford University
Psychologie-Papst Zimbardo: "Soldaten in brutale Qu?ler verwandelt"
Philip Zimbardo ist nicht irgendwer. Der Sozialpsychologe war Pr?sident der m?chtigen American Psychological Association (APA), seine Publikationen, unter anderem ?ber Machtmissbrauch und Unterdr?ckung, geh?ren weltweit zum Pflichtstoff, sein Einf?hrungsbuch f?r Psychologiestudenten ist auch an deutschen Universit?ten Standardlekt?re.
Zimbardos Analyse der Misshandlungen im Bagdader Gef?ngnis basiert auf seinen eigenen Forschungen. In seinem "Stanford Prison Experiment" erfuhr der Forscher 1971 am eigenen Leib, was eine Situation, in der Macht und Unterwerfung willk?rlich verteilt werden, mit ganz normalen Menschen anstellen kann. In der Studie waren 24 Freiwillige entweder zu Gef?ngnisw?rtern oder zu Gefangenen erkl?rt worden. Die Gefangenen wurden von Anfang an gedem?tigt, mussten Krankenhausnachthemden und Ketten an den F??en tragen, wurden nur noch mit Nummern statt mit ihren Namen angesprochen.
Stanford-Gef?ngnis-Experiment: Das B?se im Menschen geweckt
Da es f?r die W?rter keine expliziten Regeln gab, entwickelten sie verschiedene Unterdr?ckungsmethoden, mit denen die Gefangenen gef?gig gemacht wurden. So wurden zur Bestrafung Liegest?tzen angeordnet, den Eingesperrten wurden Decken und Matratzen weggenommen, es gab eine lichtlose Einzelhaft-Zelle.
Im Laufe des Experiments wurden die Unterdr?ckungsma?nahmen immer extremer: Als sich die W?rter nachts unbeobachtet f?hlten, zwangen sie die Gefangenen sogar, sich auszuziehen und miteinander sexuelle Akte zu simulieren - so wie die US-Soldaten im Irak. Das Experiment, das eigentlich zwei Wochen dauern sollte, wurde schlie?lich nach sechs Tagen abgebrochen, weil die Situation vollst?ndig au?er Kontrolle geraten war. Das "Stanford Prison Experiment" bildete vor einigen Jahren auch die Grundlage f?r den deutschen Kinoerfolg "Das Experiment" mit Moritz Bleibtreu.
Zimbardo hat Mechanismen von Unterdr?ckung und Folter auch an anderen Orten untersucht, etwa bei den Todesschwadronen der brasilianischen Milit?rjunta. Aus den Ergebnissen schlie?t er, dass Personen, die in derartige Situationen gebracht werden, mehr oder minder zwangsl?ufig agressiv-unterdr?ckerische Verhaltensweisen entwickeln - auch wenn sie an und f?r sich keine grausamen oder b?sartigen Menschen sind.
"Die allgegenw?rtige Ursache ist das ?bel des Krieges", schreibt der Psychologe, "die vorgeschobene Geschichte von der 'Nationalen Sicherheit' und den ?bertriebenen ?ngsten vor dem Terrorismus, die durch zehn 'glaubw?rdige' Terrorwarnungen erzeugt worden sind. Sie verwandeln unsere Nation in eine Kultur der Opfer und unsere Soldaten in brutale Qu?ler anderer Menschen."
Zimbardo ist ?berzeugt, dass die Wunschvorstellung, die USA k?nnten den Irak demokratisieren, eine reine Utopie ist. "Das wird nicht passieren. Dieser aggressive, ?berfl?ssige Krieg ist die H?lle auf Erden, er wird langandauernde Konsequenzen in der Heimat und im Ausland haben."

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? SPIEGEL ONLINE 2004
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>> AHEM...

SPIEGEL ONLINE - 05. Mai 2004, 12:49
URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,298425,00.html
Geheimdienste

Saddams mobile Dattellabors

Von Sebastian Knauer

Bei der Suche nach Massenvernichtungswaffen haben die US-Ermittler eine weitere Fehleinsch?tzung abgegeben. SPIEGEL ONLINE liegen die Original-Unterlagen der tats?chlich aufgefundenen mobilen Chemielabors aus Deutschland vor. Allerdings waren sie ungeeignet f?r die Herstellung von biologischen und chemischen Waffen.
AFP
US-Au?enminister Powell vor dem Uno-Sicherheitsrat (Februar 2003): "Beweis f?r die Aufr?stung mit C-Waffen"
Ende April vergangenen Jahres entdeckten US-Milit?rs im Irak einen betagten, sandfarbenen Lastwagen auf dem ein "mobiles chemisches Labor" montiert ist. Auf der Webseite der CIA wurde in einem Bericht vom Mai vergangenen Jahres das dreiachsige Fahrzeug und seine Einbauten mit Bildmaterial dokumentiert. Zu erkennen sind ein handels?blicher K?hlschrank, eine kastenf?rmige Laborzentrifuge sowie eine Abzugshaube.
SPIEGEL ONLINE liegen die Original-Konstruktionspl?ne der Laborwagen vor. Nach dem begleitenden Text und CIA-Einsch?tzung handele es sich um ein chemisches Labor, dass m?glicherweise andere "mobile Produktionsanlagen f?r Biowaffen" im Irak "unterst?tzen" solle.
Konstruktionsplan des mobilen Labors
?hnliche mobile Produktionsanlagen f?r Kampfstoffe waren von US-Au?enminister Colin Powell vor dem Weltsicherheitsrat als Beweis f?r die B- und C-Waffenaufr?stung des Irak pr?sentiert worden. Die Informationen dazu hatte zuvor eine Quelle des deutschen Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND) namens "Curveball" (benannt nach dem Trickwurf im Baseball) geliefert.
BND h?lt an den Informationen fest
AP/ US Army
Mobiles Labor im Irak (Archiv): Keine Beweise f?r die Produktion von B- und C-Waffen
W?hrend Powell inzwischen von den angeblichen Biowaffenlabors auf gro?en Sechsachsern abr?ckte, glauben die BND-Experten weiterhin keinem Schwindler aufgesessen zu sein. "Wir halten die Angaben weiterhin f?r glaubhaft", sagt eine BND-Sprecherin. Der Informant ist Chemiker und lebe derzeit in Deutschland. Trotz intensiver Suche durch US-Milit?rs und Uno-Waffenkontrolleure sind die so genannten rollenden Biowaffenfabriken jedoch im Nachkriegs-Irak nirgendwo gefunden worden.
Aufgetaucht sind dagegen die Uralt-Lastwagen "made in Germany". Insgesamt acht Magirus-Deutz-Lastwagen, ausger?stet mit Chemielabors durch die Kaufbeurer Fahrzeugfirma Rhein Bayern, waren in den achtziger Jahren mit offizieller Genehmigung der Bundesregierung via Bremerhaven in den Irak exportiert worden.
REUTERS
Powell-Beweis: Das angeblich rollende Chemielabor
Der damalige Rhein-Bayern-Chef Anton Eyerele, 81, sp?ter wegen des Versto?es gegen das Kriegswaffen Kontrollgesetz zu einer hohen Haftstrafe verurteilt, hatte stets beteuert, dass es sich bei den Lieferungen in den Irak um "zivile Laborwagen" handele. Nach den Giftgasangriffen von Saddam Husseins Truppen auf die kurdische Zivilbev?lkerung 1988 hatte die G?ttinger Gesellschaft f?r bedrohte V?lker Recherchen zu den Mobillabors durchgef?hrt ?ber die damals der "Stern" unter dem Titel "Ich mache nur meine Gesch?fte" berichtete.
Die Ausr?stung dieser Spezialwagen f?r Wasser-, Boden- oder Nahrungsmittelproben kam von der Firma "Karl Kolb GmbH & Co KG Scientific Technical Supplies", die weltweit auch Universit?ten und Industrieunternehmen mit Laborausr?stungen beliefert.
"Simple Standardlabors f?r Agrochemie"
In den irakischen Labors fehlte nach den Konstruktionszeichnungen jedoch selbst ein handels?blicher Gas-Chromatograf, mit dem biologische oder chemische Kampfstoffe untersucht werden k?nnten. "Das waren simple Standardlabors f?r die Agrochemie", sagt heute ein Kolb-Manager gegen?ber SPIEGEL ONLINE. Die Ger?tschaften w?ren beispielsweise gut geeignet gewesen, um auch Untersuchungen in Dattelplantagen durchzuf?hren.
Beim Bundesnachrichtendienst wird die Verwirrung um die "mobilen Labors", die m?glicherweise den Informanten zu seinen farbenfrohen Erz?hlungen anregten, k?hl kommentiert: "Das sind verschiedene Baustellen."

? SPIEGEL ONLINE 2004
Alle Rechte vorbehalten
Vervielf?ltigung nur mit Genehmigung der SPIEGELnet GmbH
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>> MEETING? WHAT MEETING?

Experts See U.S. Policy on Iraq in Crisis
http://www.npr.org/rundowns/segment.php?wfId=1869887
?
from Morning Edition, Tuesday , May 04, 2004
Rising U.S. casualties, confusion about U.S. efforts to end violence in places such as Fallujah, and allegations of Iraqi prisoner abuse have many questioning the viability of U.S. policy on Iraq. Many blame the lack of a clear chain of command for the chaos. Some analysts say U.S. goals for Iraq are no longer attainable. Hear NPR's Mike Shuster.


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Senior fighters escape Fallujah


By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES


U.S. military commanders think senior foreign fighters in Fallujah have escaped during the Marines's monthlong siege that has produced an inconsistent allied war policy.
Meanwhile, in southern Iraq, the U.S.-led coalition continues to come under deadly attacks from black-clad militiamen loyal to radical cleric Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr.

Despite vowing to "capture or kill" the renegade sheik, the United States has refrained from using force against him or to launch an all-out assault on his Mahdi's Army. The United States fears such an attack would inflame the passions of Shi'ites in battles that also are likely to result in the deaths of civilians.
A military source said if international terrorist Abu Musaab Zarqawi was ever in Fallujah, as was suspected, he was able to escape. The source said although the Marines blocked roads leading out of the town of 300,000 residents, the cordoning was not "airtight." He said the assessment that senior fighters have left Fallujah is based on intelligence reports.
"The problem is they don't know where they have gone," the source said.
The assessment comes as the United States is sending conflicting signals about how it plans to quell the violence in Fallujah, a troublesome hot spot ever since the coalition ousted Saddam Hussein 13 months ago.
The mixed message has allowed insurgents to claim victory and has forced commanders to deny they are pulling out of the frontier town.
The confusion comes at a particularly bad time. The Bush administration is trying to contain damage from the release of photos of American service members abusing Iraqi prisoners images that reinforce the militant Arab view that the occupation force oppresses Muslims.
U.S. commanders have estimated that there are about 2,000 hard-core insurgents in Fallujah, including several hundred foreign fighters. A Pentagon official says there are probably "several thousand" foreign fighters in Iraq, many of whom entered through Syria's long desert border.
The U.S. mission around Fallujah has been marked by inconsistencies since early April, when the ambush and mutilation of four American contractors there spurred the Marines to begin an offensive to clear the town of militants.
"They are testing the water in every possible alternative to resolve this without further loss of American blood and treasure," said retired Army Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis. "The Marine commanders are faced with a Hobson's choice, and they are desperately trying to find an alternative to continued sieges, bombardment and patrols that are being shot up."
The Marines had launched a full-bore operation to kill or capture the insurgents, only to see political pressure from the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council force Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the top commander in Iraq, to stop the mission.
What followed was a tenuous cease-fire, during which the Marines attacked insurgents who came into the open or attempted to position themselves for attacks. It was during this stage that the military thinks some senior foreign fighters escaped.
The Sunni tribal chiefs, the council and Marine commanders then worked out a deal under which a new Iraqi brigade would be established to police Fallujah's mean streets. As the new brigade entered the southern sector, the Marines vacated, stirring a series of press reports that the Marines were withdrawing. Some Iraqis celebrated the "defeat."
The perception prompted Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to issue a heated denial.
"First of all, let's make sure we understand the Marines have not pulled back," Gen. Myers said Sunday on ABC's "This Week." "They have not pulled back at all. Now, what we are trying to do is what we are trying to do throughout Iraq, is get Iraqis to help deal with this issue."
There also was confusion about who would run the new brigade. A former Iraqi Republican Guard general, Jassim Mohammed Saleh, arrived on the scene last week. Some military officials privately said Mr. Saleh would take command. But on Sunday, after the U.S. military command had investigated his background, a new name emerged: Maj. Gen. Mohammed Latif.
"There's another general we're looking at," Gen. Myers said. "My guess is it will not be General Saleh. He will not be their leader. It's not a reversal. As I say, the reporting on this has been very, very bad and way ahead of the pack."
The Associated Press reported from Fallujah that Gen. Latif had been imprisoned under Saddam's rule.
"He is very well thought of, very well-respected by the Iraqi general officers," said Lt. Gen. James Conway, the top Marine in Iraq. "You can just see the body language between them."
The AP said reports surfaced that Mr. Saleh was involved in crushing a Kurdish uprising after the 1991 Persian Gulf war.
In Najaf, south of Baghdad, Sheik al-Sadr's militia fired about 20 mortar rounds at a U.S. base. The Americans responded, destroying a building that was the source of the fire and killing about 20 Iraqis.
On Saturday, Sheik al-Sadr's army attacked a convoy, killing two American soldiers.

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. . . U.N. fantasy


By Bruce Fein


As was said of Napoleon's assassination of the Duc d'Enghein, President George W. Bush's inanely conducted effort to summon a secular democratic Iraq into being is worse than a crime, it is a blunder.
His latest follies unwittingly aid the enemy. The president should publicly confess his monumental miscalculations over post-Saddam Iraq, arrange for an orderly withdrawal of America's military presence, and accept the inescapable Iraqi convulsions that will follow as less horrific than would be additional aimless American casualties. As the Vietnam war taught, victory is hopeless without a discernable and plausible North Star to inform military operations.

President Bush signaled weakness to the enemy by yielding appointment authority for an interim Iraqi government on June 30 to United Nations special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. Ahmed Chalabi, who had been the marquee choice of the Defense Department to extract an Iraqi democracy from Saddam's dictatorship, disappeared from the power grid faster than the Cheshire cat. Mr. Bush had earlier sneered at the United Nations for its irrelevancy and effeteness. The U.N. had opposed Operation Enduring Freedom, and had endlessly indulged Saddam's repeated violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions. The president's turn to an impotent and derided United Nations at the eleventh hour as violence and American deaths escalate in Iraq carries all the earmarks of desperation.
Mr. Brahimi's selection also strengthens the enemy's recruitment claim that President Bush's Iraqi democracy banner is counterfeit. The special envoy no more represents the people of Iraq than a name plucked from the New York City telephone directory. His legitimacy is universally disputed. Muhammed Bahr Uloum, a prominent Shi'ite member of the Iraqi Governing Council, has rejected Mr. Brahimi's intercession, and warned Iraqis would fight against any new government picked by the United Nations. As reported in The Washington Post, Mr. Uloum amplified: "We are not under age in need of a guardian. Iraqis are not a herd of 27 million people to be directed by Brahimi and the coalition. Iraqis will take to the streets if Brahimi insists on his view." Would Americans feel or react differently if Mr. Brahimi appointed the next president of the United States?
The special envoy's plan for naming a new government is no more legitimate than his nondemocratic selection, which provides additional fuel to the enemy. Mr. Brahimi will unilaterally appoint 25 Cabinet officers, the prime minister, a ceremonial president, and two vice presidents. His appointees will be technocrats. They will neither command popular followings nor hold political ambitions for future electoral office, an aspiration which might rivet them to popular sentiments. In other words, Mr. Brahimi's plan perversely aims to ensure the new government will not represent the Iraqi people. It will be even less democratic than President Bush's 25-member Iraqi Governing Council. And as the IGC has aroused popular ridicule, Mr. Brahimi's technocrat appointees will likewise be scorned by the Iraqi people.
President Bush's crippling limits on the sovereignty of the new appointed government makes the entire impending exercise an insulting hoax. It will be disabled from either enacting new laws, or repealing decrees issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority, or controlling military operations of the United States. Indeed, its sole purpose is to baby-sit Iraq for six or seven months.
During that period, President Bush hopes an electoral code will be promulgated; political campaigns will be conducted; peaceful, free and fair elections will be held for the first time in 4,000 years, and, the Iraqi people will accept the results as legitimate. The number of people in Iraq who believe that blather can be counted on one hand with fingers left over.
The enemy has been further fortified by the commander in chief's wretched military decisions in the past weeks. Victory in Iraq requires the killing, wounding and capturing of enemy combatants period, with no commas, semi-colons or question marks. To negotiate war tactics with the enemy demoralizes troops and endows enemy leaders with popular glory and fame.
Yet President Bush permitted the enemy to negotiate a cease-fire in Fallujah to avoid casualties, tacitly conceding the United States can be forced by threats of violence into fighting by Queensbury rules. The commander in chief also replaced Marines at the front lines with Iraqi forces with dubious resolve and loyalty. The enemy, Fallujah's civilians and the U.S.-sponsored Iraqi soldiers alike, predictably celebrated their tactical defeat of America and invited imitation throughout Iraq.
In Najaf, a second edition of Fallujah is unfolding. President Bush has permitted enemy cleric Sheik Moqtada al-Sadr to negotiate a standoff with his illegal Mahdi Army. The cleric champions violence against United States troops, and has been charged with murder of a fellow religious figure. According to the newly meek commander in chief, Najaf and Sheik al-Sadr must be treated gently because widespread violence has been threatened. President Bush's meekness has transformed terrorist Sheik al-Sadr from a marginal figure to a lion.
Finally, President Bush relaxed the bar to appointing former Ba'athists and leaders of Saddam's military coincident with the alarming climb in United States casualties and spread of violence. Thus, Maj. Gen. Jassim Mohammed Saleh, who served in Saddam's notorious Republican Guard, has been provisionally appointed to lead the Iraqi forces in Fallujah.
The timing of the president's relaxation reinforces the appearance of American despair and fading resolution. The enemy has been emboldened, and a wavering civilian population lost to extremists.

Bruce Fein is a constitutional lawyer and international consultant with Bruce Fein & Associates and the Lichfield Group.


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Looking for the exit


By Arnaud de Borchgrave


If it wasn't a quagmire, it was certainly quagmiry. And the first prominent retired general to break ranks with President Bush's Iraq war policy was a Republican who once headed the National Security Agency and also served as a deputy national security adviser. Gen. William E. Odom, a fluent Russian speaker who teaches at Georgetown and Yale universities, told the Wall Street Journal's John Harwood staying the course in Iraq is untenable.
It was hard to disagree with Gen. Odom's description of Mr. Bush's vision of reordering the Middle East by building a democracy in Iraq as a pipedream. His prescription: Remove U.S. forces "from that shattered country as rapidly as possible."

Gen. Odom says bluntly, "we have failed," and "the issue is how high a price we're going to pay -- less by getting out sooner, or more by getting out later."
At best, Iraq will emerge from the current geopolitical earthquake as "a highly illiberal democracy, inspired by Islamic culture, extremely hostile to the West and probably quite willing to fund terrorist organizations," Gen. Odom explained. If that wasn't enough to erode support for the war, he added, "The ability of Islamist militants to use Iraq as a beachhead for attacks against American interests elsewhere may increase."
Gen. Odom, heads of the pro-Republican Hudson Institute, also calls the sum achievement of U.S. occupation of Iraq "the radicalization of Saudi Arabia and probably Egypt, too. And the longer we stay in Iraq, the more isolated America will become."
The retired four-star's proposed solution is for the U.N. and the European allies to take charge of political and security arrangements. This formal request from the U.S., says Gen. Odom, should be accompanied by a unilateral declaration that U.S. forces are leaving even if no one else agrees to come in.
The Journal's John Hardwood in his Capital Journal column asks which sounds more credible -- Gen. Odom's gloomy forecast or Mr. Bush's prediction of success? He does say which way he leans. But a company-size bevy of retired U.S. generals and admirals were in constant touch this week with a volunteer drafter putting the final touches to a "tough condemnation" of Bush administration Middle Eastern policy.
The Council of Foreign Relations organized a conference call-in for its members with Gen. Odom. A score of former U.S. ambassadors who had served in the Middle East were also discussing how to join their voices to Britain's 52 former ambassadors, high commissioners and governors who wrote to Tony Blair to accuse him of scuttling peace efforts between Israel and Palestinians. The British diplomats also took Mr. Blair to task for policies "doomed to failure" in Iraq.
One British co-signer was Paul Bergne, who until recently was the prime minister's personal envoy to Afghanistan.
It was the first time in living memory so many former envoys to the Middle East had acted as a group to denounce the government's foreign policy. They said they spoke for many serving diplomats, as well.
The retired U.S. ambassadors were as one in warning President Bush that discarding the Middle East road map to peace and substituting a plan that leaves Palestinians no hope for a viable state is tantamount to declaring war on moderation -- and jeopardizing U.S. interests all over the region.
Total alignment with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's anti-Palestinian strategy has turned even moderate Muslims against the United States. Egypt's President Mubarak said hatred of the U.S. had never reached such depths.
When Mr. Bush suddenly dropped longstanding U.S. opposition to Jewish settlements on the West Bank, rooted as they were in U.N. resolutions, Israeli settlers could not believe their luck. Mr. Sharon conceded Gaza, where 7,500 Jewish settlers had no future among 1.3 million Palestinians, but in return obtained U.S. blessings for permanent Israeli habitation in large swaths of what was to be a Palestinian state. Even illegal hilltop settlements concluded they were now safe from removal and immediately began erecting permanent structures to replace mobile homes. Israel spends $600 million a year on settlements. And Sharon's Likud stalwarts hung tough on Gaza, voting, in a non-binding resolution, to keep 7,500 Jews in 26 settlements living among 1.3 million Palestinians.
No sooner had the White House's red light flashed green than the once surreptitious, crawling annexation of the West Bank resumed in the open. Jewish West Bank settlers were jubilant while Palestinians were adrift in the Slough of Despond.
With the Right of Return for Palestinians also off the table, and no viable state of their own on the West Bank, extremist organizations will have no problem recruiting more jihadis (holy warriors) and merging terrorist operations with the underground resistance in Iraq.
Arab opinion has been inflamed to the point where Palestine and Iraq are now two fronts in the war against what Charles de Gaulle used to call "the Anglo-Saxons." Osama bin Laden is probably thinking he's some kind of strategic genius.
In Iraq, quite apart from Fallujah and Najaf, the U.S. occupation, according to the latest Gallup polls, has turned most of the population against America. In Baghdad, only 13 percent now believe the invasion and regime change it accomplished were morally justifiable. Only one-third of Iraqis believe the occupation is doing more good than harm and a majority favor an immediate U.S. troop withdrawal while conceding this could put them in greater danger. Gen. Odom presumably has his finger on the same pulse.

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.



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U.N. BIGS 'SEAL' THE OIL DEALS
By NILES LATHEM

BENON SEVAN - "UN SWELL" PICTURE...
http://www.nypost.com/news/worldnews/23691.htm
Letter warned contractors.


May 4, 2004 -- WASHINGTON - The United Nations yesterday threw up a stone wall in the oil-for-food scandal, insisting that contracts between the world body and private companies should not be turned over to investigators.
In a defiant move that has infuriated probers, Secretary-General Kofi Annan threw his support behind a letter from former oil-for-food head Benon Sevan to officials of a Dutch company that inspected Iraqi oil shipments. The letter directed the company not to hand over documents to congressional committees and other "governmental authorities."
Sevan's shocking April 14 letter sternly reminded the company, Saybolt International, that details of its contract with the United Nations are confidential "and we would not agree to their release."
The letter was especially eye-opening because it came from Sevan, who is under investigation for accepting sweetheart oil contracts from Saddam Hussein and who supposedly was on vacation, pending retirement, when it was written.
Annan appeared taken by surprise when he was confronted with the letter on NBC's "Meet the Press" Sunday and said he did not see why Sevan "was involved in sending a message like this."
But yesterday, Stephane Dujarric, spokesman for Annan, told The Post that the letter was written by another official on Sevan's stationery and that the official was following advice of U.N. lawyers.
"The letter follows standard U.N. legal procedure," which mandates that companies cannot give documents about contracts with the United Nations to outside governmental agencies without the approval of the United Nations, Dujarric added.
The Annan spokesman said other companies participating in the $100 billion humanitarian-aid program received similar letters and that all documents will be reviewed by former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker, who is investigating charges of corruption within the program.
"This is disturbing," said a congressional investigator.
"U.N. officials are talking about transparency in this investigation and yet they appear to be thwarting efforts to get the relevant documents. What does that say?" the investigator added.
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WHAT TO DO IN IRAQ?:
W'S CARELESS TALK ...


May 4, 2004 -- OH? Who?
Appearing Friday in the Rose Garden with Canada's prime minister, President Bush was answering a reporter's question about Canada's role in Iraq when suddenly he swerved into this extraneous thought:
"There's a lot of people in the world who don't believe that people whose skin color may not be the same as ours can be free and self-govern. I reject that. I reject that strongly. I believe that people who practice the Muslim faith can self-govern. I believe that people whose skins aren't necessarily - are a different color than white can self-govern."
What does such careless talk say about the mind of this administration? Note that the clearly implied antecedent of the pronoun "ours" is "Americans." So the president seemed to be saying that white is, and brown is not, the color of Americans' skin. He doesn't mean that. But that is the sort of swamp one wanders into when trying to deflect doubts about policy by caricaturing and discrediting the doubters.
Scott McClellan, the president's press secretary, later said the president only meant that "there are some in the world that think that some people . . . can't live in freedom." The president meant that "some Middle Eastern countries - that the people in those Middle Eastern countries cannot be free."
Perhaps that, which is problematic enough, is what the president meant. But what he suggested was: Some persons - perhaps many persons; no names being named, the smear remained tantalizingly vague - doubt his nation-building project because they are racists.
That is one way to respond to questions about the wisdom of thinking America can transform the entire Middle East by constructing a liberal democracy in Iraq. But if any Americans want to be governed by politicians who short-circuit complex discussions by recklessly imputing racism to those who differ with them, such Americans do not usually turn to the Republican choice in our two-party system.
This administration cannot be trusted to govern if it cannot be counted on to think and, having thought, to have second thoughts. Thinking is not the reiteration of bromides about how "all people yearn to live in freedom" (McClellan). And about how it is "cultural condescension" to doubt that some cultures have the requisite aptitudes for democracy (Bush). And about how it is a "myth" that "our attachment to freedom is a product of our culture" because "ours are not Western values; they are the universal values of the human spirit." (Tony Blair)
Speaking of culture, as neoconservative nation-builders would be well-advised to avoid doing, Pat Moynihan said: "The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself." Here we reach the real issue about Iraq, as distinct from unpleasant musings about who believes what about skin color.
The issue is the second half of Moynihan's formulation - our ability to wield political power to produce the requisite cultural change in a place like Iraq. Time was, this question would have separated conservatives from liberals. Nowadays it separates conservatives from neoconservatives.
Condoleezza Rice, a political scientist, believes there is scholarly evidence that democratic institutions do not merely spring from a hospitable culture, they can also help create such a culture. She is correct; they can. They did so in the young American republic. But it would be reassuring to see more evidence that the administration is being empirical, believing that this can happen in some places, as opposed to ideological, believing that it must happen everywhere it is tried.
Being steadfast in defense of carefully considered convictions is a virtue. Being blankly incapable of distinguishing cherished hopes from disappointing facts, or of reassessing comforting doctrines in face of contrary evidence, is a crippling political vice.
In "On Liberty" (1859), John Stuart Mill said "it is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say" that the doctrine of limited, democratic government "is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties." One hundred forty-five years later it obviously is necessary to say that. People who think Mill was mistaken, or that it is a mistake to doubt Iraqi faculties today, should say why.
Ron Chernow's magnificent new biography of Alexander Hamilton begins with these of his subject's words: "I have thought it my duty to exhibit things as they are, not as they ought to be." That is the core of conservatism.
Traditional conservatism. Nothing "neo" about it. This administration needs a dose of conservatism without the prefix.
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WHAT TO DO IN IRAQ?:
... AND THE REAL ROAD AHEAD

By AMIR TAHERI


May 4, 2004 -- WHAT to do about Iraq? I was bombarded with this question during a recent visit to the United States.
The question is based on two assumptions. First, that Iraq is about to plunge into one of the nightmare scenarios discussed by self-styled experts on TV. Second, that there is some kind of magic wand that one could wave to transform Iraq into a paradise of freedom and prosperity.
Both assumptions are false.
The nightmares are often peddled by those who had opposed the liberation because they didn't wish to see a U.S.-led coalition bring down a Third World dictator. The doomsayers' initial prediction was that, deprived of its oppressor, Iraq would plunge into civil war. That has not happened, so they now warn of chaos, and predict a nationwide insurrection against the Coalition.
But is Iraq really plunging into chaos? Anyone in contact with Iraqi realities would know that the answer is: No.
Yes, a variety of terrorist, insurgent and ordinary criminals are active in the country. Parts of Baghdad remain unsafe. Some roads, especially in the desert area bordering Jordan and Syria, are prone to attacks by bandits. And, as in many other parts of the world where criminal gangs operate, there is also some hostage-taking. But most of Iraq's 18,000 villages and 200-plus towns and cities remain as safe, if not safer, than those in some other Arab countries.
The Coalition faces a problem in Fallujah. But Fallujah accounts for no more than 4 percent of Iraq's Sunni Arab community. Other major Sunni cities - Mosul, Ramadi, even Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's hometown - remain calm.
Fallujah has become a problem for specific reasons. It is at the heart of a region that has been the center of Sunni military elites since the creation of Iraq in 1921. It is also the capital of several Sunni Arab tribes with branches in other nations, including Syria and Jordan. And Saddam invested heavily there, especially by building housing for army, police and secret service personnel working in Baghdad. Ba'athist military and their families account for some 30 percent of the city's population. It is the Iraqi city that most resents Saddam's fall and the end of its privileges.
Yet even in Fallujah there is no evidence that a majority of the people regret liberation or want Saddam back. There are perhaps 2,000 insurgents, including dozens of non-Iraqi fighters, in the city. The fact that more than half of the city's inhabitants have left their homes shows that, though they may wish the occupation to end, they don't wish to side with the insurgents.
Those who claim that Iraq is in chaos also point to Najaf, where Muqtada al-Sadr, a 30-year-old Shiite cleric, is hiding in a number of holy shrines and mosques along with his so-called Army of the Mahdi. But talk to anyone in Najaf and you'll soon know that the overwhelming majority of the city's population wants Sadr to get the hell out. (After more than two weeks of contacts with Iraqi Shiite leaders and opinion-makers at various levels, this writer has not found anyone who supports Sadr and his shenanigans.)
Sadr is abusing the old Shiite practice of "bast," which consists of taking sanctuary in a holy shrine. But Najaf is a city of 500,000 people, while Sadr's followers number 3,000 at most.
And Sadr's quarrel with the Coalition is personal rather than principled. He resents not being given a share in the Governing Council, and is unhappy that he and 18 close associates are wanted for murder. His strategy is a typical desperado's: He hopes to force the Coalition out of Iraq, provoke chaos and, if not secure a chunk of power for himself, avoid prosecution for murder.
The Coalition would do well not to force its way into either Fallujah or Najaf. In each, it faces a group of armed men holding larger civilian populations hostage. In Fallujah, the insurgent Ba'athists are using Saddam's typical tactic of using human shields. In Najaf, Sadr and his gang use the Shiite shrines for the same purpose.
There is no nationwide insurrection in Iraq. Nor is Iraq suffering from a general breakdown in law and order. To be sure, it is no bed of roses. But the violence and insecurity are within the remit of normal in a post-liberation situation, and remain manageable.
As things stand, the Coalition does not need more troops. In fact, it should speed up withdrawals from the dozen or so cities and towns where its troops are deployed for policing, a task for which they are neither trained nor equipped. Disbanding the Iraqi army and national police was a major mistake. But that is spilt milk. What's now needed is a fast-track program to train and deploy more units of the new army and police.
What of the pundits' second assumption - that some magic wand could turn that country into an Arab Switzerland overnight? There is, of course, no such magic wand. And Iraq, while capable of moving towards pluralism, will need years to develop a stable democratic system.
When President Bush announced the start of the war to liberate Iraq, he promised to stay the course until the Iraqi people built a new democratic system. Implicit in that offer was that the Iraqis should play their part in what is by far the greatest challenge they have faced since their state was created eight decades ago.
The people of Iraq have kept their end of the bargain. They did not fight on Saddam's side, allowing the Coalition to achieve victory with remarkable ease. Since then, they've continued to do what is required of them - not only by isolating insurgents and terrorists, but also by beginning to rebuild their shattered country. As a string of recent polls, complemented by personal and anecdotal information, indicates, the overwhelming majority are still prepared to work with the Coalition to achieve their dream of a new political system based on human rights and pluralism.
The real question is: Will the Coalition keep its end of the bargain? Or will U.S. and British leaders, for reasons of domestic politics, lose their nerve, throw Iraq to the United Nations or some other ineffectual custodian and sacrifice the strategic goal of a democratic Middle East to tactical electoral considerations?
What to do in Iraq? The answer is simple: Don't lose your nerve!
Yes, Iraq can become another Vietnam - not because of anything that's happening there, but because America and its allies, for reasons of domestic politics, might panic and transform victory into defeat.

E-mail: amirtaheri@benadorassociates.com
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Saudi Arabia says attackers were family
May 5, 2004

Jeddah: Saudi Arabia said yesterday that four men who killed an Australian and four other Westerners in a suspected al-Qaeda attack on a Saudi energy site were two brothers and their uncles.
One reportedly had links to a Saudi dissident group in London.
Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz has said he believes Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda was behind Saturday's attack in the oil and petrochemical town of Yanbu.
There has been no claim of responsibility for the shootings, which killed 57-year-old Australian Anthony Mason, two Americans and two Britons.
The gunmen dragged the corpse of one American through the streets of the Red Sea town before being shot dead by police.
Two Saudi security personnel were also killed.
Violence in the Middle East and concerns over potential disruptions to petroleum supplies have helped push oil prices to their highest levels for 13 years.
US light crude rose more than 80 cents a barrel on Monday after the killings at Yanbu, which heightened fears that militants might target oil infrastructure in the world's top crude exporter.
The interior ministry named the attackers as brothers Sami and Samir al-Ansari and their uncles Ayman and Mustafa, all Saudis.
It identified Mustafa as a suspected militant wanted by Saudi authorities who had entered the country illegally after working with well-known Saudi dissident figures abroad.
"He last left the country in 1994 to join Saad al-Fagih and Mohamed al-Mas'ari to work with them in their suspicious committee," it said. "He recently entered the country illegally, crossing the borders in order to carry out vile plans."
Fagih and Mas'ari, two British-based Saudi opposition figures promoting democratic reform in the conservative kingdom, set up the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in 1993.
"This is a desperate and hopeless attempt by the Saudi government to find some link (between us and terrorists), after trying many times and failing," Fagih told Reuters by telephone.
"The Saudi government has to decide if it is accusing us, Israel or al-Qaeda, and then those accusations can be taken seriously," he said in reference to initial comments by Crown Prince Abdullah blaming "Zionist hands" for the attack.
He said someone called Mustafa al-Ansari had frequented the CDLR in 1996, but he did not know if that man was the attacker.
On Monday, the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia praised the kingdom's crackdown on al-Qaeda militants but re-issued a warning to the 35,000 Americans in the Gulf state to leave.
"They are making great progress. That is shown in the way they are working through the most wanted (militant) list," James Oberwetter said. "However, there is a still long way to go."
Fifty people were killed in the Saudi capital Riyadh last year in a string of suicide bombings blamed on al-Qaeda. Security forces have killed or arrested eight on a list of 26 top militants since December.
Swiss-based company ABB Lummus, targeted in Saturday's attack, said it was evacuating all 90 foreign staff from Yanbu and a project it was carrying out for a Saudi petrochemical firm would be delayed.

Reuters
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E-Notes
Saddam Circus Is Coming to Town: the Strange Story of Jacques Verges
by Michael Radu

April 14, 2004

Michael Radu, Ph.D., is co-chairman of FPRI's Center on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Homeland Security. This essay is adapted from a version that originally appeared on frontpagemagazine.com.

French celebrity lawyer Jacques Verges has announced that "at the request of the family" he has agreed to serve as defense counsel for Saddam Hussein at his upcoming trial for genocide and similar charges. The trial, which is to begin sometime this year, has been greatly anticipated ever since Saddam was captured in December, and now Verges' involvement ensures that it has all the potential of becoming an international ideological and political three-ring circus. Issues such as officials' personal responsibility for their government's acts, genocide, terrorism, and the right to a fair trial will all come under scrutiny, as seen from Verges' trademark Stalinist "anti-imperialism" viewpoint.

For those who believe that communism, and even more so Stalinism, are long dead, Verges is a living fossil, his ideology a Jurassic Park of twentieth-century criminal thought. Verges' life (see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Verges) is as fascinating in its contradictions as it is revealing of a trend in the European-- especially French-- intellectual environment, whereby "justice" becomes a matter of ideology, fashion, and politics rather than of morality and law. It is only in such an environment that a lawyer who lost most of his cases (before France abolished capital punishment in 1981, Verges was nicknamed "Monsieur guillotine," given the fate of many of his clients) became famous. His books, such as On Judicial Strategy (1981), The Beauty of Crime (1988), I Defend Barbie (1988) and I Have More Memories than If I Were One Thousand Years Old (1999), have been published by the most prestigious editors, and he has been taken seriously in his relentless assaults against the co
ncepts of law, justice, and Western democracy.

Jacques Verges and his twin brother, Paul, were born in 1925 in Thailand, where their father, Raymond, was serving as a French diplomat. Raymond was a native of the French island department of La Reunion in the Indian Ocean, whose inhabitants are mostly of mixed race (Asian, European, African); Jacques' mother was Vietnamese. Based on his lineage, Jacques has perennially claimed to be a victim of racism, notwithstanding that the careers of his father and brother contradict that claim. In 1937, Raymond Verges founded the Reunion Communist Party (PCR), the local branch of the metropolitan organization. Paul, jailed as a young man for the murder of one of his father's political opponents, became a deputy and, in 1996, senator in the French parliament, to which he was reelected in 2001. He remains president of the Regional Council of Reunion and head of the PCR, the island's second largest party.

Jacques himself joined the Communist Party as a teenager, supported Charles de Gaulle during World War II (but only once Stalin had entered the war), and afterwards studied law at the Sorbonne. By 1949 he was president of the AEC (Association of Colonial Students), a communist front. There he met a fellow colonial student from then French Indochina, Saloth Sar, who became a friend for life. Saloth Sar went on to become better known as Pol Pot. Verges' connection with the Khmer Rouge continued: his disappearance from the public eye between 1970 and 1978 has been attributed by some to his joining the Khmer Rouge, and in February 2004 Verges offered to defend Pol Pot's associate and Sorbonne classmate Khieu Samphan in his upcoming trial for genocide before a UN-aided tribunal in Cambodia.

Between 1950 and 1954 Verges was in Prague, then the center of Soviet global propaganda and ideological training, as leader of one of Moscow's youth front organizations. During that period he had the privilege of meeting Joseph Stalin himself.

Upon return to France, radicalized by the Algerian war, Verges left the Communist Party and began his road to fame as a defense lawyer for Algerian terrorists. The most famous of those, and the case that won him plaudits from cultural icons of the Left such as Jean-Paul Sartre, was that of Djamila Bouhired, implicated in an Algiers cafe bombing that resulted in numerous fatalities. Ms. Bouhired was sentenced to death, but the combination of a leftist media campaign and a weak socialist government led to her release. She subsequently married Verges.

At a time when France was at war, Verges openly supported and defended terrorists and their French accomplices-- that is, traitors. He was jailed for this for two months in 1960 and temporarily disbarred.

Verges effortlessly shifted his loyalty from to Stalin to political evil in general-- he once admitted a "passionate interest in evil." Commingled in his brilliant mind were the worst of Nazism, Stalinist communism and, lately, Muslim totalitarianism. One of his French critics theorizes that his mixed-race background led to an extreme need for recognition, megalomania, and personal adventure, so that "behind an image of international lawyer of the first rank is hidden a mercenary of law" (Bernard Violet, Le Parisien, Mar. 27, 2004).

That, and an obsessive hatred for Israel, best explain his personal and professional associations and his choice of clients. The latter have included Nazi criminal Klaus Barbie, who was sentenced to life in prison in 1987; Marxist turned Islamist terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez a.k.a. Carlos the Jackal, who was sentenced to life in prison in 1994; Algerian terrorists linked to petty thief and Islamist terrorist Khaled Kelkal, who was killed by the police in 1995; former Marxist philosopher (and another convert to Islam) Roger Garaudy, who was convicted of Holocaust denial and fined in 1996; Slobodan Milosevic, in 2002; and now, logically enough, Saddam.

What do these clients have in common, both among themselves and with their lawyer? The same characteristics as former Nazi and now Islamist sympathizer Francois Genoud, another Verges associate. As owner of the Arab Commercial Bank in Switzerland, Genoud was the apparent financier of the Barbie case, as well as some of Genoud's Palestinian terrorism cases. These men are the ideologues and defenders, practitioners, or would-be practitioners of mass murder or genocide. Their ideology is totalitarian at its core, thus explaining the effortless movement from Marxism or Nazism to Islamism or support for it. They also share a common trait of twentieth-century European totalitarianists and present- day Islamists: hatred of Jews and Israel.

It is this background that gives away Verges' likely tactics at Saddam's trial and explain his taking up the case. This is no humanitarian response to a desperate "family request"-- indeed, Verges had volunteered to represent Saddam within days of Saddam's capture. The celebrated lawyer is on a lifelong campaign against Western values and freedoms, and the fate of his clients is not a major concern to him. They are merely cannon-fodder for him to use toward his greater goal.

As a defender of Palestinian terrorist hijackers of El Al planes in 1969, Verges claimed that the terrorists' acts were political, not criminal, and the fault of Israeli aggression. Representing Milosevic, Verges claimed that the International Court trying the Serb leader was inherently illegitimate and biased because it received outside donations from individuals such as George Soros (whom he called "not exactly a Mother Theresa") and nations such as the United States and Saudi Arabia. He threatened to call for testimony from Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder, and Jacques Chirac, "because in Dayton they recognized Mr. Milosevic as a respectable and valid interlocutor." Expect the same in a Baghdad court--after all, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld did talk to Saddam in the 1980s, and the West helped him against Iran at the time.

Verges' personal and views of the justice system in general and of morality are similarly peculiar. Thus, in The Beauty of Crime he writes: "The judges are like chefs-- they do not like to be observed when they cook," and "The world of justice is a closed, cruel world. . . . Its doors are quilted to stifle the cries, its cathedral windows to block the view" "between the dogs [prosecution] and the wolf [defendants] I'll always be on the side of the wolf-- especially when it is wounded." More relevant, and revealing, accusations in the name of society are uses of the banality of the time, while the defense must escape "the trapped terrain of consensus" to set itself "beyond good and evil, to give crime a new sense and the criminal a face. What sets them apart is the beauty." (See Denis Touret, "Un mercenaire du droit, Me Verges defend Saddam Hussein," March 2004).

In Legal Apartheid, Verges writes that the old notions of honor demonstrated at Thermopylae, Waterloo, and Stalingrad, were ended with Hitler, whose adversaries could only be subhuman. Referring to Kosovo, he says that NATO follows on Hitler's steps in its contempt, charged with fear and hatred, for those [i.e. Milosevic's Serbs] who would contest its hegemony. More radical still, for Verges "racism is simply replaced by the ideology of human rights in the exclusive version of Gens. Powell and Clark, butchers of the peoples of Vietnam, Iraq, and Serbia. . . . 'Human rights' is the pretext for the murder of civilians in the Balkans, the starving of Iraqi children, and poppy cultivation in Afghanistan." (Touret, "Un Mercenaire du droit")

In many ways Verges has been a path breaker for radical lawyers everywhere. His approach to the defense of terrorists has been followed by lawyers in the United States and Germany, especially. He blurred the lines between defense, representation, and ideological comradeship with the accused, and sought to transform legal cases against individuals into global tribunals against "the system"--to put the court, the judges, and democracy on the stand. He has already made clear that he will try to bring world leaders to testify in Baghdad and found enablers in the media speculating that such tactics "could be a huge embarrassment for the United States, France, and other countries." ("World leaders should take stand in Saddam trial: lawyer," AFP, Dec. 20, 2003)

That would, of course, depend on the Iraqi judges and the rules to be decided in Baghdad. If Western human rights groups and defense lawyers succeed in making the Saddam trial an international affair, they will offer Verges another platform for his anti-Western psychopathic obsessions and Saddam the opportunity for revenge against Washington and London and, perhaps, a chance to save his skin. If, however, common sense and morality set the rules, Verges will not only lose the case--that is to be expected-- but, given his age, also lose his last chance to promote the counter-values of totalitarianism of which he is the premier living representative.

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Radical Islam in the Maghreb

by Carlos Echeverr?a Jes?s
Carlos Echeverr?a Jes?s is professor of International Relations at Open University in Madrid, professor on Mediterranean security at the Escuela Superior de las Fuerzas Armada, lecturer at the NATO Defence College in Rome on North Africa and Mediterranean issues, and an analyst on Islamist terrorism at the Centre for Analysis and Prospective of the Guardia Civil in Madrid.

The Maghreb (from the Arabic word for "West") region is made up fives states:
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Their main common characteristics are the Arabic language, Islam, and historical ties with the Arab world, subsaharan Africa, and Mediterranean Europe. They are also all members of the Arab League and of the Islamic Conference Organization (OIC). Radical Islam and terrorism have spread throughout the region and acquired a high level of militancy. All the states suffer from potential or real Islamist opposition. Radical Islamists believe that the Maghrebi regimes, which have traditionally collaborated with the Christians and the Jews, must be subverted. They gained strength from the bitterness engendered by the 1991 Gulf War; the Bosnian, Chechen, and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts beginning later in the decade; and, more recently, the U.S.-led coalition's defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.
Algeria's experience after it permitted multiparty elections in 1989, which brought Islamists into power, caused fear in other Maghreb countries and in the West that their democratization could lead to similar takeovers or internal strife. Since 1989, more than 120,000 civilians, military and police personnel, and radical Islamists have been killed in Algeria. Though the circumstances of the Algerian crisis have been uniquely Algerian, the problem is not. Radical Islam in the Maghreb has long been a problem in the region. While no government in North Africa is likely to be overthrown by radical Islamists in the coming years, all will have to deal with the challenges to their rule from moderate Islamist political components and, in a number of countries, also from Islamist terrorists. The region not only faces direct terrorist threats, but also poses a problem to the rest of the world, due to Al Qaeda and the other transnational terrorism groups who have origins there. Secret
ary of State Colin Powell's November 2003 visit to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia reflects the importance of the region to the United States. In the 1990s, moderate Islamists in Algeria and Morocco, the two countries that initially tolerated the movement, focused on penetrating the civil society and occupying the maximum ground in social sectors. They now publish newspapers and have a significant presence in Moroccan universities. In Algeria, natural disasters such as the 2001 floods in Algiers' Bab-el-Oued borough and the 2003 earthquake in the great Algiers region, together with widespread unemployment or
ECHEVERR?A
| Orbis 2
underemployment produced by economic restructuring, have been exploited by both the legal and illegal Islamist groups to gain support. But unlike the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, the Islamist groups in Algeria and Morocco have not yet been able to use their presence and activism in trade associations to gain control of those groups.
Algeria
The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major feature of Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of President Houari Boumedi?ne, the Republic's first president, in December 1978.1 Boumedi?ne had adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language. French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique alg?rien (MIA), founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations. Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt in October 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in that revolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. In 1989 it legalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over the next two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of the country, targeting symbols of Western "corruption" such as satellite TV dishes that brought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn't wear the hiyab (the Islam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first round of the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of an impending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoral process
in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that had begun in 1991 with the FIS's rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, the growing presence of Algerian "Afghans"--Algerian volunteer fighters returning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan--and the November 1991 massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria and Tunisia.2
Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army-AIS (the FIS's armed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen, soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreign and Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners were found in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors, intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamists vowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000 foreigners left in November 1993. As writer Tahar Djaout, assassinated some years
1 Hugh Roberts, "Radical Islamism and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: The Embattled
Arians of Algiers" Third World Quarterly, April 1988, p. 556.
2 Mohamed Issami, Le FIS et le terrorisme. Au coeur de l'enfer Algiers, Le Matin ?ditions, 2001, pp.
255-73.
3 Lara Marlowe, "Algeria: Macabre Arithmetic," Time, Dec. 13, 1993.
Maghreb
3
later by the GIA, put it, "two visions of society separated by ten centuries" were at war. The GIA, which released its first communiqu? in late 1993, believes that the best government is a universal caliphate based on the model of the four Rashidin, successors of the Prophet.
The government's main priorities in these years were combating terrorism and cleansing the mosques so that it could become the sole purveyor of the Islamic religion. In 1995, its sustained pressure on the terrorist groups' supply lines made it increasingly difficult for them to procure weaponry. At the time, the army was launching major offensives aimed at confining the terrorist groups and generally putting them on the defensive. The movement's operations seemed to indicate that it was gaining organizational efficiency, and its terrorist attacks in France in 1995 suggested it was seeking public-relations successes to compensate for defeats within Algeria and to increase its credibility with outside supporters. Rivalries within the movement increased that year, with the AIS and GIA fragmented by the army's pressures and internal strife. In January 1996 the GIA, which wanted to oust the government militarily, declared war on the AIS, which did not rule out finding a political
solution to the crisis.
In 1996, there were 14 armed Islamist groups acting in Algeria, six of whom enjoyed some kind of organized support in Europe. Each group had its own arms depots and militants, and all of them were trying to "inherit" the European support networks. The AIS, led by the Emir Madani Merzag, a veteran of Qaddafi's Islamic Legion, enjoyed the support of clandestine networks in France. The GIA, led then by the new emir Antar Zouabri, comprised 600-650 armed men and enjoyed thesupport of intellectuals and religious leaders such as Abu Qutada and Abu Hamza in Northern Europe, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. Completing the picture of Algerian radical Islam are marginal groups such as the GIA led by Emir Kada Benchiha, composed of Algerian Afghans and Bosnians, and the GIA led by Emir Mohamed Mossab, both of which rejected Zouabri's leadership. (The Mossab GIA's Italian support network, the Djamel Lounici's group, was dismantled by Italian police early in 1996.).
Between 1995 and 1999 the Algerian government applied an antiterrorist strategy based on three pillars: a military offensive by the army, security forces, and the intelligence services; a political offensive; and a more subtle propaganda war. Military Offensive. Military and civilian assets working together proved highly efficient in arming village guards and other paramilitary units for self defense. Over the course of 1995 the authorities distributed weapons among villagers in the countryside, and in small towns the people were guarded against Islamist activists by self-defense groups who called themselves Patriots (which were legalized in January 1997). By the beginning of 1996 the army had significantly increased the percentage of territory it controlled and turned the tide against the rebels. The AIS and GIA came to depend less on classic guerrilla warfare and more on a strategy of destabilization, including using explosives for bomb attacks on crowded markets. Booby-tr
apped cars, assassinations, and roadblocks were proof that the terrorists could no longer launch major military attacks. They were taking the battle away
ECHEVERR?A
| Orbis 4
from the mountains and plains and into the cities and the desert areas of southern Algeria, where the country's vital hydrocarbon wealth is located. The extension of violence to the south, following a GIA threat to oil workers when the government signed contracts with foreign oil companies BP, Total, Repsol, and Arco, was a significant new security development. In February 1996, the international Arabic-language press published the GIA's threat to kill any employees of Algerian companies such as Sonatrach and Naftal or any of their foreign partners who did not abandon their work immediately, as well as army reservists who left their home areas. In September 1996, GIA's Emir Zouabri pronounced a death sentence on anyone who participated in the privatization of state enterprises or worked in the hydrocarbons sector, on the grounds that the revenue from foreign oil companies was bolstering the regime. The increase in civilian casualties entailed by the new terrorist strategy fu
eled divisions within the ranks of the Islamist movement that helped the army negotiate a cease-fire with the AIS.
Political Offensive. After President Liamine Zeroual, the former Defense Minister who had been appointed president by the High Council of State in 1994, decided to hold elections in November 1995, the Algerian establishment agreed to a clear division of labor. While the president's main task was to campaign for the elections, the army and security services would intensify their operations to ensure maximum security for them. Moderate Islamist candidates steered a careful path between their Islamist identity and respect for the constitution and electoral laws, which forbid parties based on religion and the use of mosques for political activities. Zeroual won the election, in which 75 percent of the Algerian electorate reportedly participated, with a comfortable majority of 61 percent, and even the FIS accepted the results. A clemency law was passed that allowed members of armed groups to give themselves up to the security forces.
Given the election results, Washington concluded that Algeria's regime had won the war against Islamists, a conclusion that belied the Clinton administration's earlier prediction that the Algerian regime would be toppled by a bloody insurrection. The visit of high-level U.S. officials to Algiers in the first quarter of 1996 signaled new U.S. cooperation. In December 1996, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service detained Anwar Haddam, head of the banned FISparliamentary mission abroad, in Washington pending deportation hearings.4 Counterterrorism. Meanwhile, on the border with Niger, which was thought to be a potential source of weapons for the terrorist groups, the government arranged for the Agadez and Tahoua areas to be policed by joint patrols made up of the Army, the Gendarmerie, the Tassara vigilante committees, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the North, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust. Other former rebel organ
izations were invited to join the patrols, which seemed likely to help restore authority over the northern regions.
4 Haddam was freed in 2000 and remains in the United States; he faces a death sentence in
Algeria.
Maghreb
5 The Algerian-Malian border has also been important in counterterrorism strategies. In the mid-1990s Algeria played an important role as mediator in Bamako's struggle with Twareg and Arab rebels in the north of the country. But the situation remained tense and unstable in the west, around the Moroccan border, where disparate armed groups appeared to be coordinating their activities and seemingly finding routes to safe haven in Morocco. Political Institutions. In 1997 the government completed forming all the various elected institutions required under its new constitution. In a November 1996 referendum considered to be the cornerstone of true democracy in Algeria, Algerians had voted to amend the constitution to concentrate power in the presidency and to prevent political parties from exploiting religion. In June 1997 Algerians went to the polls for the first parliamentary elections in six years and elected the first multi-party government. In municipal and provincial polls
held in October 1997, the National Democratic Union, a government-sponsored party, won over half of the vote; the former ruling party, the National Liberation Front-FLN, came in second, with one-fifth of the vote. The elections were the final part of an institutional process aimed at increasing the regime's legitimacy and consolidating its powers. It provided roles for moderate Islamist parties, including leadership of several ministries. As an additional concession, it reenacted the law generalizing the use of the Arabic language, which had been frozen in 1996. The law called for completing the process of generalizing the use of Arabic by July 1998. The election campaigns provoked an increase in both GIA massacres of civilians and in disputes among the former FIS's leadership. The side led by Rabah K?bir and the exiled leadership favored making the FIS respectable and seeking its legalization. In parallel, the AIS negotiated a cease-fire that opened the door to its reinserti
on in the political arena. The cease-fire was implemented after Abdelaziz Bouteflika became president in 1999. Meanwhile, brutal GIA attacks on vulnerable settlements alienated its potential supporters and led to the formation in 1998 of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which owed its existence directly to Osama bin Laden. Led by Hassan Hattab, the GSPC is active in the forests and mountains of Kabylia, which provide a refuge for terrorist cells despite the profusion of self-defense groups there. The group specializes in attacks against the armed forces and security services. In 2003, it was involved in the kidnapping of 32 Western tourists in the south of Algeria.
Propaganda War. In February 1996, the Interior Ministry issued a strongly worded warning to the Algerian press not to publish reports of security-related matters deriving from non-official sources. A few days later, the Ministry revived at the offices of Algeria's newspapers the censorship committees first established in 1994. The government also took control of the flow of security-related information to the Arabic media abroad. But it faced an additional problem: out of the 10,000 mosques in the country, 2,600 were not under the control of an employee of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was trying to find practical means of clarifying the role of imams and provincial religious affairs directors in teaching Islam. In
January 1997, Minister of Religious Affairs Ahmed Merani pointed out that his
ECHEVERR?A
| Orbis 6
Ministry was doing its best to protect mosques from corruption and keep them solely places of worship, not venues for politicking. Radical Islamist attacks against popular Islam also remained a threat. An October 1996 attack on a Tijania Sufi mosque at Kardan underlined the growing dichotomy between the radical Islamists' quest for extreme Islamic orthodoxy and more traditional, local forms of belief and worship.
When he was elected president in 1999 (in an uncontested election), President Bouteflika inherited a flagging peace process. He paid special attention not only to the fight against terrorism but also to national reconciliation, through the Civilian Concord Law that had been approved by referendum. In 2000, more than 6,000 members of the AIS and other groups returned to their homes, the president asserts. In February 2000, at Marrakesh, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen announced that Washington planned to expand and enhance its contacts with Algeria. Washington has supported normalization of Algeria's relations, including Algeria's adherence to NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and enhanced U.S.-Algerian cooperation on security and defense matters, which began even before the 9/11 attacks.5
Libya
During the 1990s, Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi staged a fierce campaign against radical Islamists in Libya, especially the armed groups in the eastern part of the country, which has witnessed clashes between these groups and government security forces. In June 1996 eight Libyan policemen were killed in an attack carried out by Islamists in Darnah, in the east. In 1996-97 Libya negotiated with several Gulf capitals and Sudan for extradition of Libyan Islamists trained in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.6 Some 70 out of 300 Arab veterans of that war residing in Sudan were Libyans, and Tripoli believed that there was a connection between these Libyan "Afghans" and the Sudanese government. At the same time, Qaddafi continued to support some radical Islamist groups abroad through Dawaa al-Islamiya, which was an active Libyan instrument for external propaganda. The regime has curtailed this practice with the normalization of its international relations in recent
years, and in 1994 Qaddafi promised President Zeroual to cease providing support for Algerian Islamists. This pledge came after Libya had been accused of helping those groups cross into Algeria through the Libyan desert after receiving training in camps in Sudan. In September 1995 Egypt claimed to have evidence of the existence in neighboring Sudan of twenty camps for training terrorists to operate in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, and Libya. The next year, Algerian Islamists claimed that hundreds of FIS activists who had taken refuge in Libya had disappeared in mysterious circumstances after Algiers and Tripoli signed a security cooperation agreement. In 1998, there were reports of armed confrontations between Islamists and security forces in Benghazi, in the core of eastern Libya, and the Libyan
5 "Boutef Rides his Luck" Africa Confidential, Feb. 18, 2000.
6 Ray Takeyh, "Qadhafi and the Challenge of Militant Islam," Washington Quarterly, Summer 1998.
Maghreb
7
government released through Interpol the first international alert against Osama bin Laden. Since 9/11, Libya has played an active role in the international war on terror, through its full participation at the Ministerial Conference of Interior Ministers of the Western Mediterranean, as an observer in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's Barcelona Process, at the UN, and in bilateral cooperation with former enemies such as the UK and the United States. After the U.S.-led war on Iraq, it also agreed to dismantle its WMD.
Morocco
In the early 1990s, its European proponents claimed that the Kingdom of Morocco was on a new liberal path, politically and economically, that deserved Europe's support to stem the tide of radical Islam in the Maghreb. Rabat often pointed to the danger of Islamism in Algeria or Egypt as a way of demonstrating the advantages of its own regime. King Hassan's decision to send 1,200 troops to join the forces of the anti-Saddam coalition on the Saudi-Kuwait border in the 1991 Gulf War, even if they were not be used for the liberation of Kuwait, was less than popular and sent a frisson of resentment around the country.7
Morocco's Islamists are barred from setting up parties, denied legal status as associations, and kept under a close watch. But they have been allowed to gather, arrange social events, publish newspapers, and preach a stricter adherence to Islamic values. None of the groups advocates violence, but certain violent factions do exist in Morocco, as was evident in 1994, when a cell of the Moroccan Combatant Islamic Movement (MIC) assassinated two Spanish tourists at the Atlas Asni Hotel in Marrakesh. Morocco accused the Algerian Secret Service of being behind the attack and imposed a visa requirement for Algerians wishing to enter the country, leading the Algeria to close the border. In fact, the radical Islamist groups had been operating in Morocco since the early '90s, led by Moroccan "Afghans" who led attacks such as those against a McDonald's in Casablanca and the Soci?t? Marocaine de D?pot Bank in Oudja in 1993 and against the Makro department store in Casablanca in 1994. Af
ter their arrest in France, in 1997 a Paris court sentenced members of the MIC network involved in the Atlas Asni Hotel attack.Moroccan police arrested a group of arms smugglers made up of 12 Moroccan members of the Jamaat al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) and five Algerian GIA members in 1995, seizing a number of Kalashnikovs and pistols, homemade explosives, radio transmitter-receivers, and night-vision equipment. Two months later Morocco sentenced eight people for smuggling weapons to Algerian armed groups.
Clashes broke out in Casablanca in January 1997 between security forces and hundreds of students, most of whom were Islamists who had been attending the trial of three of their comrades. Several people were injured. The Islamists had imposed strikes and sit-ins, much as the General Union of Moroccan Students had done in the 1960s, and stirred up tension on the campuses. They continue to engage in grassroots activism in trade unions, especially the Democratic Confederation of
7 Jonathan Farley, "The Maghreb's Islamic Challenge" World Today, Aug.-Sept. 1991, pp. 149-50.
ECHEVERR?A
| Orbis 8
Labour. For the time being, they have not created a specific Islamist trade union, as the FIS did with its Workers Islamic Trade Union. However, they are attaining positions in several professional sections of existing trade unions and have demonstrated their intention to foment strikes and obstruct any agreements' being reached between the unions and the government.
At the end of the 1990s, the social and political conditions in Morocco were favorable for radical Islam. These conditions included a concentration of wealth, corruption at various levels of the administration, and high unemployment (especially among those of age 15-25). The political class in Morocco and in Europe feared that demanding social justice and freer political expression would produce popular explosions in the absence of King Hassan's agile exercise of power. However, since Hassan II's death in August 1999, his son, Mohammed VI, has embarked on a careful process of transition and modernization. Moderate Islamists are becoming relevant in politics through the Hizb al-Adala wal-Tanmiyya (Justice and Development Party-PJD), and radical Islamists are also getting some protagonism.
The PJD has been effective in its frontal opposition against the steps taken in 1999 by socialist then-prime minister Abderrahmane Yussufi to reform the Mudawwana, the code of personal status. In March 2000 it staged a "One Million March" in Casablanca to protest the reforms. Legislative and local elections held in 2002 and 2003 evidence the wide support they enjoy. By March 2002, Lib?ration warned of the presence of "fundamentalist gangs organized as private militia groups spreading a reign of terror among the suburbs." In Fez, terrorists had set up roadblocks to identify drivers and hunt down alcohol users, something that carries an ugly ring of events in Algeria in the 1990s.
Along with the rise of political Islam came a new terror threat. Since 9/11, the international activities of Islamist terrorism and the presence of Moroccans in its midst--17 Moroccans are imprisoned in Guantanamo--has been an issue of growing concern to the security forces, the intelligence service, and the armed forces.
A combined operation led by the head of the internal information service, Gen. Amidou Laanigri, thwarted May 2002 attacks against Western warships in the Straits of Gibraltar. These would-be attacks demonstrated the presence of an increasingly globalized Islamist terrorist network extending throughout North Africa and Europe. The 17 Moroccans held in Guantanamo Bay provided the information that permitted the arrest of three Saudis apparently acting as liaisons for Al Qaeda and four Moroccan accomplices. They had apparently received instructions on carrying out terrorist attacks in Morocco from Mullah Bilal, who was responsible for Al Qaeda operations in North Africa and the Middle East. They appeared in court in Casablanca in June 2002, and it seemed clear that since the start of 2001 the suspects had been recruiting prospective terrorists from the Moroccan wing of the Islamic Combatant Group-GIC, which has links to the Algerian GSPC. Fear of infiltration by Islamist extremi
sm within the state's own ranks is another danger. In January 2003, the Royal Gendarmerie arrested an army sergeant, Yusef Amani, who had stolen Kalashnikov rifles from the Guercif barracks,intending to provide them to an Islamist cell in Meknes.
Maghreb
9
All these trends were dramatically confirmed by the May 2003 synchronized suicide attacks in Casablanca, which left 45 dead and dozens wounded. Since then, hundreds of militants in the Salafiya Djihadia Moroccan network and alleged Al Qaeda members have reportedly been arrested. For the time being, Morocco has approved rigid counterterrorism legislation and reinforced its links with international partners such as France, Spain, and the United States to combat the globalized radical Islamist terrorism threat. In this context, the king, who has this prerogative as the supreme religious authority in the country, instructed the parliament in December 2003 to pass a new personal code modernizing the Mudawwana.
Tunisia
Since November 1987, when he took over from former Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba, President Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali has fought against radical Islamists in the Republic and tried to undercut the Islamist Harkat Nahida party's support by creating jobs and development. During the 1990s, the regime appropriated the slogans of Islamists and made itself the champion of youth, providing job opportunities for the poor and unemployed. President Ben Ali has developed a system of social assistance for disadvantaged communities through a solidarity fund run by the presidency, a program that has won UN support as a model for other countries and regions.
But since becoming the first Mediterranean country to sign an EU Association Agreement in 1995 toward establishing a free-trade zone with the EU by 2010, Tunisia is in a delicate transition period. Liberalization of the economy and privatization have brought tensions. The number of new job seekers will rise over the next few years, and unemployment levels are already reaching about 15 percent. With a small domestic market (the total population is about 10 million), Tunisia has to compete for foreign direct investment with countries of the Mediterranean as well as Eastern Europe and Asia.
The government's fears of radical Islam and its obsession with security threaten to further undermine its political position.8 Islamism in Tunisia has traditionally been a reaction to the secularization programs of presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali and to President Ben Ali's growing personality cult, but it has also been activated from abroad. In the 1989 general elections, the last attended by the Islamists, even the government's unpublished polls showed Harkat Nahida candidates polling over 50 percent in some constituencies. The next year Islamists applied formally, as Ennahda (Renaissance), for registration as a political party, which was refused on the grounds that it was a religious organization, not a political party. Shortly thereafter Ennahda was implicated in bombing a building in Tunis belonging to the government party. One hundred leading members of the party were detained and its newspaper banned.9
8 Nicolas Demezieres, "La Tunisie, ou le triumphe du `tout-s?curitaire'," Relations Internationales et
Strat?giques, Winter 1994, pp. 128-30.
9 Farley, "The Maghreb's Islamic Challenge," p. 151.
ECHEVERR?A
| Orbis 10
The terrorism threat from neighboring Algeria has aroused concern in Tunisia since the early 1990s, especially after an attack in Guemmar, on the Algerian border, in November 1991 and the appearance of clear signs of links between Algerian terrorist groups and Tunisian Islamists. In summer 1992 a large trial in Tunis confirmed the extent of Islamism in the armed forces and the real threat of coup d'?tat: 50 of 171 Ennahda members, and many of its so-called Commandos of Sacrifice, came from the military/security apparatus.10 A major diplomatic incident between Tunisia and the UK was provoked in 1993 when Ennahda's leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, who had been sentenced to death in absentia for alleged involvement in terrorism in Tunis, was granted asylum by the British Home Office. The affair illustrates the differences in perception between the Maghreb countries and the Western countries on questions of political rights, as Algerian and Tunisian officials were prompt to point out
in September 2001.
The veteran Foreign Affairs minister, Habib Ben Yahia, initiated discussion of terrorism in the Arab League in 1993, and Tunis has been in regular consultation with allies such as Algeria, Egypt, and Tunis, exchanging information and coordinating activities, for a decade. More recently, Tunisia's economic growth, improved education and living standards for the rising middle class, and coercive security measures against real and suspected terrorists have kept Islamist politics quiescent. To Tunis, Algeria's problems only showed the folly of allowing elections that include Islamists. Many Tunisians are reluctant to support a cause that seems to threaten economic growth. Ennahda has been silenced at home and the activities of its exiled leader curtailed.11 The involvement of Tunisian terrorists in Al Qaeda's assassination of Commandant Ahmed Shah Massoud in Tajikistan on September 9, 2001, and, above all, the April 2002 suicide car bombing in Djerba's La Ghriba Synagogue, which
left 19 dead and dozens wounded, only intensified Tunis' counterterrorism efforts.12
Mauritania
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania's recognition of the State of Israel in 1995, its perpetual ethnic problems, its weakness, and its chronic security deficit have led to an upsurge of radical Islamist activism over the past decade. In 1995, Mauritanian authorities launched the first massive police operation against radical Islamist networks, and the next year they began a major crackdown on arms smuggling into Algeria, focusing on the triangle of arid territory defined by it, Western Sahara, and Mali.13 More than 40 suspects were arrested in connection with
10 In this trial of 279 Islamists, 265 were found guilty of offenses against the state and 46 received
life sentences.
11 Maha Azzam, "Recent Developments Among Islamist Groups" in Volker Perthes, ed., Political
Islam and Civil Society in Northern Africa. Four Approaches, Ebenhausen/Isartal, Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, May 1998, p. 19.
12 ?lise Colette, "Comment Massoud a ?t? pi?g?," Jeune Afrique/l'Intelligent, Feb. 11-
17, 2002.
13 The need to bring this area under control is evidenced by the build-up in 2003 of a
Maghreb
11
contraband arms formerly belonging to the Azawad's Malian Touareg rebels, one among many rebel movements that are the real actors in the volatile Sahelian region. While Mauritania undoubtedly had its own reasons for cracking down on illicit arms dealings, Algiers presumably encouraged these moves. Algiers' influence is strong in Nouakchott. Also, the Algerian oil industry, which controls 55 percent of production and distribution of oil-based products in Mauritania, was reportedly considering the possibility of prospecting for oil and gas along the Mauritanian coast, a region that is becoming of more and more interest after exploration there by Australian and British oil companies in 2003. In summer 2003, a coup attempt against President Ould Taya highlighted the need for the West to support this country, which, because of its location in the extremely sensitive region connecting the Maghreb with subsaharan Africa, must not become a failed state.

The West and the Maghreb: Lessons Learned
Fear that the FIS triumph in Algeria could lead to Islamist takeovers throughout North Africa left most Western governments secretly siding, although weakly, with the Algerian government in the early 1990s. The Europeans additionally feared that turmoil in the Maghreb might mean waves of immigrants and/or refugees to Europe. At the same time, the Islamists' free-market economic programs, promoting an "Islamic" economy in which the state would disengage from most economic activities, made it seem that removing the economic, social, and political causes for these movements was the best option.14 The Maghreb states had in fact all been vulnerable to the advance of radical Islam since the end of the 1980s, as impoverished masses sought refuge in Islam during the turbulent process of modernization and globalization.
The most important security concern for the Maghreb in the mid-1990s was that Europe might play the role of home base for the Islamists, as was true for some European countries. At that time, European governments were reluctant to speak of an "Islamist International," but it was clear to a number of North African governments that radical Islam had external sources--arms trade and funding through Europe, connected with smuggling and drugs. It was also clear that Islamist terrorism had begun to affect European interests, with acts including the assassination of Europeans in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia; the hijacking of the Air France Airbus in Algiers in December 1994 and of two Air Algeria aircrafts over Spain in 1994; the series of bombings in France in 1995-96; and arms trafficking in Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain.
Western governments, mainly in Europe, finally asked whether the political agendas of radical Islamists in the Maghreb were strictly focused on confrontation with their own governments or if elements of a substantial transnational agenda against the West could be identified. The Maghreb regimes hoped their European facility in the southern Algerian city of Tammanrasset for the U.S. National Security Agency.
14 Pedro Moya, "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism and the Future of Democracy in North
Africa," Interim Report of the Subcommittee on the Mediterranean Basin International Secretariat of the North
Atlantic Assembly, Nov. 1994.
ECHEVERR?A
| Orbis 12
counterparts would begin to crack down on the GIA and other groups in the terrorists' support networks, but it took years for their hopes to be fulfilled. Finally in 1995 a number of European nations began to reinforce bilateral and multilateral links with North Africa.
In Algeria, the government's counter-insurrectionist strategy, begun in 1992, eventually reduced the number of active radical Islamists. Both Algeria and Morocco have explored how to coopt Islamist opposition forces within the system, as with the Society for Peace Movement (formerly Hamas) and Islah (formerly Ennahda) in Algeria and the PJD in Morocco, isolating only the violent factions. At the same time, for the radical Islamists, the West--even if it is seen as apathetic to the suffering of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Afghanistan, or Iraq--is an attractive refuge. The Islamist networks have exploited disputes between European and Maghreb states, such as that between Paris and Algiers after the interruption of elections in 1992, and among the European states themselves, such as the one between the northern and southern European countries on the nature of these networks in Europe. The reluctance of a number of Western countries to do their part in combating terror
ism in the Maghreb only strengthened the Islamists. The Europeans' belief that conflicts in the Maghreb did not significantly affect their national interests, along with the fact that the greater impact of this terrorism was on France, the former colonial power and the European country with the largest Maghrebi population, increased other Western countries' reticence to coordinate their counterterrorism efforts. That Rashid Ghannouchi found asylum in the UK, Anwar Haddam in the United States, and Rabah K?bir in Germany, all engaging in activism until the authorities finally decided to control their activities, was only the visible part of the iceberg. Radical Islamists from the Maghreb enjoyed Western liberties during the 1990s on European, American, and also Canadian soil, attaining the rights of "political activists" while actually feeding clandestine terror networks.
Fortunately, increased government networking began in the Mediterranean as globalization called for coordinated approaches to transnational issues. The Algerian government finally started to benefit from overt or covert European initiatives to dismantle the Islamists' European networks and to cut supplies and money. Members of Djamal Lounici's terrorist group were arrested in summer 1995 in Italy and tried there in April 1997. Lounici had been sentenced to death in Algiers in a separate trial for his involvement in the attack at Houari Boumedi?ne International Airport in 1992. In December 1996, Italy and Morocco signed an additional protocol to their 1987 Cooperation Agreement concerning terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking. Maghreb states and the West must continue to work together on terrorism, which is increasingly involving citizens from both areas, some holding dual nationalities.15
At the level of inter-Arab relations, Tunisia's and Egypt's counterterrorism efforts at the Arab League and the OIC have had more rhetorical than operational results. In December 1993, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia claimed that Sudan was
15 Fran?ois Soudan, "Maghreb-?tats-Unis: L'ami alg?rien," Jeune Afrique/l'Intelligent, Jan. 5-11,
2003, p. 39.
Maghreb
13
home to the Islamist International, as reflected in the meeting of Hassan el Turabi's Arab and Islamic Popular Congress in Khartoum and another, larger conference in 1995. Washington accused members of the Sudanese Delegation to the UN of being involved in the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. The firm U.S. policy towards the Sudanese regime in 1995-96 was instrumental in stopping this Sudanese support to radical Islamist groups in the Maghreb. Algerian terrorist groups found their main sources of weapons supply in the Maghreb and other African countries (Morocco, Libya, Chad, or Mali) in the mid-nineties. They benefited from the lack of either border control or cooperation among states in the region. The improvement of Algerian-Libyan and Algerian-Malian cooperation made it possible to crack down on these sources of weapons. Since 9/11, the Arab Maghreb Union, which held its first meeting since 1994 in January 2002, has been working to develop common criteria
for joint analysis of terrorism. For the time being, the increasingly motivated radical Islamist groups in the Maghreb and abroad are proving that they can function with minimal resources. Despite the shutdown of funding sources, weapons and explosives remain easy to obtain. The most important lesson learned by the Maghreb and the West is that radical Islamist terrorism must no longer be able to benefit from the lack of a common international consensus on what constitutes terrorism and the absence of coordinated counterterrorism initiatives.

North Korea to Deploy Intermediate-Range Missiles, Chosun Says


May 4 (Bloomberg) -- North Korea plans to deploy a new model of intermediate-range ballistic missiles earlier than the U.S. and South Korea had expected, the Chosun Ilbo newspaper said, citing an unidentified South Korean government official.
North Korea is building two underground missile bases, one in the country's center and the other in the northeast, the paper said. The bases are as much as 80 percent complete and U.S. satellites detected about 10 new missiles and mobile launch pads at the bases between last year and early this year, it said.
The new missiles can fly as far as 4,000 kilometers (2,500 miles), reaching the Okinawa islands, Guam and areas near Hawaii, the paper said. Of the North's previously deployed missiles, the longest-range was 1,300 kilometers, covering most of Japan, it said. The new missiles are smaller because they're more technologically advanced, it said.
Western intelligence agency haven't determined whether North Korea has developed the technology for attaching nuclear warheads on missiles, according to South Korean and U.S. media reports. North Korea, the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan and Russia are scheduled to hold lower-level talks this month on ending North Korea's nuclear weapons development program.

(Chosun Ilbo 5-4, p.1)



To contact the reporter on this story:
Meeyoung Song in Seoul at msong2@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor of this story:
Peter Langan at plangan@bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: May 4, 2004 01:27 EDT
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Once Again, North Korea to Make U.S. Terrorism List
WASHINTON, D.C. -- The U.S. will announce its annual report on global terrorism at 10 a.m. Thursday (local time), in which it plans to designate six nations -- including North Korea -- as nations that support terrorism.
A high-ranking U.S. State Department official said Tuesday that while North Korea will be named to the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting states for the 17th year straight, this year's report would specifically mention the kidnapping of Japanese citizens for the first time. The report will include Kim Jong-il's acknowledgement -- made during a February 2002 summit meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro -- that kidnappings of Japanese citizens were carried out by "special bodies." Accordingly, it has become more difficult for North Korea to escape the yoke of being classified a terrorist state.

14 North Korean defectors, five U.S. lawmakers, and about 200 figures from the religious and human rights group, attend the "North Korea Freedom Day" event on Wednesday and pray for the victims of the Ryongchon train explosion./AFP


The U.S. will designate Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria and North Korea as states that support terrorism.

Meanwhile, in speeches given at a "North Korea Freedom Day" rally in front of the U.S. Capitol on Wednesday, five U.S. congressmen called for improvements in North Korea's human rights situation and regime change in the North.

Sen. Sam Brownback, the Republican who heads the East Asia Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that North Koreans have suffered enough under the North Korean dictatorship. "North Korea's oppression must end now," he said. Brownback discussed the Rwanda genocide of 10 years ago and the Holocaust of World War II, and said strong measures, like the quick passing of the "North Korea Freedom Act" currently in both houses of the U.S. Congress, were necessary.

Republican Rep. Edward Royce said, "To ignore North Korea's human rights situation is to distort the challenge facing the Korean Peninsula... The entire world must understand the essence of the North Korean regime and confront it, and more than anything else, it must get its message across to the North in a sincere voice."

Republican Rep. Trent Franks, too, said, "The rally must serve as a jump off point for improving human rights in North Korea," and called for the activation of NGO activity. Republican Rep. James Leach, chairman of the House Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, presided over a hearing on North Korea after the rally and demanded that attention be pain to the 200,000 people being held in North Korean political prisons, human rights abuses and the hardships suffered by defectors and refugees in China.

(Joo Yong-joong, midway@chosun.com )

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>> PHOTOS
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200404/200404270021.html

Ryongchon Survivors Face Wretched Conditions



Injured victim children of the April 2 train explosion lay on hospital beds at the People's hospital in Sinuiju, North Korea , Sunday.

DANDONG, China -- Six days following the powerful train explosion that ripped apart the North Korean town of Ryongchon, vivid evidence of the wretched conditions faced by locals is pouring into the Chinese border town of Dandong.
In particular, distressing news is pilling up from Chinese who have been to the disaster site to look in on ethnic-Chinese relatives who reside there.

One source in Dandong described the situation as "on the brink of death." The critically wounded are dying off as time passes, but because of poor medical facilities, it's common for people to just look on helplessly, he said.

In particular, he said that cries ring out from children who can no longer bear the pain in their bodies broken by debris and fragments from the explosion, but neither their parents nor medical personnel can give them pain killers.

He said, "I went to one Chinese medicine practitioner's, and there were several wounded being treated there. The skin on most of the patients' faces was almost peeled off, and in particular, children were crying with their eyes bandaged."

Young boys injured from the train explosion in Ryongchon Station lie in a hospital in Sinuiju, North Korea on Sunday. Many children's faces were severely burned from the accident.

Everything within a 500-meter radius of the explosion has been turned almost completely to ruin, another source said, but systematic reconstruction efforts were not taking place.

With about half the city of Ryongchon destroyed, thousands have been left homeless, and most of them -- with the exception of those who have found shelter with nearby relatives -- have been reduced to camping outdoors. In particular, when the weather turned cold Monday, blankets that appear to have been provided by the outside as emergency assistance gave the homeless much strength, said the source, but the number given fell way short of the number needed.

Locals are becoming increasingly panicked as time goes on, because not only was the accident a large-scale disaster, but the North Korean authorities have not been carrying out proper rescue operations.
Firstly, locals in Ryongchon are brushing aside the death toll resulting from the calamity claimed by the North Korean authorities -- 160 -- claiming the total is a "laughable number." One source said, "There's still talk going around Ryongchon that the total dead will surpass 2,000... You can't believe everything the locals there say, but the scale of the losses is likely to exceed greatly that which has been officially announced."

Moreover, perhaps because the survivors are so pessimistic about their own situation, but it's said that resentment against North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, who passed through the area on the day of the accident, is on the rise. Because of this, talk is spreading among locals that, "some force tried to assassinate Kim, but killed only innocent residence."

Talk is also going round that security personnel got wind of an assassination plot and had Kim's train route hastily changed; his train was originally scheduled to pass through Ryongchon, but some are saying his train passed through nearby Baekhwa Station instead.

An ethnic Chinese living in North Korea who divulged information about the Ryongchon area said, "It's known that Kim stopped for about an hour at Sinuiju Station and consulted with North Korean officials in his train... If one takes this into consideration, it's possible that his travel times were changed from those that were originally known."

About the cause of the accident, too, evidence to the contrary of official announcements is being raised. Another source in Dandong said, "Locals say this accident was caused by a dynamite explosion."

One South Korean businessman who works in Dandong said, "The various rumors that are running wild are evidence of the panicked public sentiment in the area affected by the disaster... The North Korean authorities must quickly accept relief aid from the international community and cope with public sentiment in the area."

(englishnews@chosun.com )
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Who let the dogs out?

So now you know. Thanks to prime-time television, you, the American people, understand that war is horrible. The mystery is why you didn't know before, why you are outraged now. Perhaps the answer is, if it's not on TV, it's not happening. So, credit to CBS's 60 Minutes II for finally showing part of the truth - that Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison have been undergoing the horrors of war at American hands. No credit to the US media for pulling the wool over your eyes about this war for so long. No credit to you for being appalled now - you should have known that this is what happens in any war, no matter whose side God is on.
Don't you remember the stark images in Life magazine of US soldiers torturing suspected communists during the Vietnam War? Have you forgotten about the My Lai massacre? Did you think the Disasters of War, as depicted by Spanish artist Francisco de Goya in 1810-11 (click here ) were things that only other countries perpetrated, in other times?

Did you think American wars are more civilized, more humane? Well, of course you did. Your president and your media, after the nonsense about weapons of mass destruction had been swept under the carpet, sold you this war as ridding the world of the brutal, bloodthirsty tyrant Saddam Hussein; as bringing the forces of humanity, civilization and enlightenment to a people living in darkness. And you believed that war could achieve this. Now, shocked, you are seeing images that show that the brutal, bloodthirsty tyrant's boot fits some American feet as well. Sorry, but war is dehumanizing.

Your president thunders that prisoner abuse "is not the American way". Maybe he really thinks so - he never saw service in Vietnam, or any other war, after all. Maybe his advisers just didn't tell him what really goes on in war. But to all but the simple-minded and the rose-bespectacled, this is not only the American way of war, it is the way of all sides in all wars.
The US media tell us this morning: "General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told US news channels that those responsible [for the horrors of Abu Ghraib prison] would be brought to justice and that the 'chain of command' would be investigated, as well as the six junior soldiers who face court-martial proceedings." Splendid. There is no doubt, however, that the "chain of command" investigation will not go all the way to the end of the chain. Underlings will take the fall in the US leaders' efforts to show that apart from a few misguided individuals, American soldiers are enlightened and humane killing, raping and torturing machines. An oxymoron? You bet. But you don't win wars by being gentle.
The underlings who will be punished are soldiers who were dragged along by the dogs of war. If you are shocked and appalled by what they did, it is those who let the dogs out who should be investigated. They have only one question to answer, and it is not "Did you order the maltreatment of Iraqi prisoners?" The question is, "Is this a just, necessary war?" If it is a just war, you may swallow your horror, because this is how wars are waged.
Sometimes war is unavoidable. Just don't be naive about it. Sorry to say, the grim reality is a whole lot worse than what you have recently seen on the "stupid box".
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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The dehumanizing nature of occupation
By Ehsan Ahrari

If the United States invaded Iraq to liberate its people from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, recent reports of "systematic" inhumane treatment of Iraqi prisoners only underscore that the very nature of occupation of one country by another is such that it invariably leads to acts that dehumanize the occupied people in the name of security. The outcome: intense and incessant hostility, resentment, and anger of the occupied toward the occupiers.

New Yorker reporter Seymour Hersh has written a gruesome account of gross and systematic abuse of Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Gharib prison. The ultimate irony is that, during the rule of Saddam, Abu Gharib became a symbol of brutality. Once it could not find weapons of mass destruction to justify its invasion of Iraq, the administration of US President George W Bush claimed that the liberation of Iraqis from the most inhumane rule of a dictator was a good enough reason for taking military action against that country. Now reports of the US military's abuse of Iraqi prisoners in that notorious prison threaten to deprive the United States of even that wobbly claim.

The seeds of prisoner abuse were sown in the very act of invasion and occupation of a country, especially when it was done without the moral authority of the international community. By going into Iraq without the sanction of the United Nations - the sole symbol of international legitimacy - the occupation forces became the target of Iraqi anger, particularly by not only remaining there indefinitely, but also by promising to transform Iraq into the image of their own society. Any expectation of overwhelming cooperation from the Iraqi populace was unrealistic. The manifestation of Iraqi anger through acts of resistance and insurgency was bound to create an equally brutal response from the occupying forces.

No occupying force can effectively respond to acts of insurgency, subversion and resistance without good intelligence. Therein lies the rub. Can the Anglo-American forces get credible information regarding potential hostile acts - known in the jargon of intelligence as "actionable intelligence" - without the use of force, including psychological means of torture and acts of humiliation regarded highly offensive in the Arab and Islamic culture? The answer, at least in the case of Abu Gharib prison, is that someone at the top made the decision to use whatever means desirable to get credible and actionable intelligence, or to look away and play innocent. Now the focus of inquiry ought to be whether such a decision, indeed, was made at the top. If so, how far up the chain of command does the notion of culpability go?

Bush has appropriately and promptly expressed his feeling of disgust at the reports of abuse. However, General Richard Meyer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was quick to go on the defensive during an interview conducted on Fox Television Network on Sunday. He said: "There is no evidence of systematic abuse" in the US detention operations in the region. However, his claim was in direct contradiction with the one reported in Hersh's essay. Major-General Antonio M Taguba's report, which he wrote for the Pentagon, but was not meant for public release, cites numerous instances of "sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses" at Abu Gharib. The Taguba report notes: "Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broomstick; and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee."

The issue of culpability may be best pursued by closely examining the rationale - such as it was - for any abuse or dehumanizing treatment of Iraqi prisoners. At least for now, there are reasons to believe that the perpetrators of such acts were not merely some young soldiers from rural West Virginia or Oregon, acting on their own and without proper guidance, training, or supervision. Hersh reports: "In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the military-intelligence teams, which included CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] officers and linguists and interrogation specialists from private defense contractors, were the dominant force inside Abu Gharib. In a letter written in January, he said: 'I questioned some of the things that I saw ... such things as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell - and the answer I got was, "This is how military intelligence [MI] wants it done" ... MI has also instructed us to place a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.' The military-intelligence officers have 'encouraged and told us, great job, they were now getting positive results and information,' Frederick wrote. The CIA has been present when the military working dogs were used to intimidate prisoners at MI's request. At one point, Frederick told his family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Jerry Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th MP Battalion, and asked about the mistreatment of prisoners. His reply was. 'Don't worry about it.'"

If the preceding information is correct, then these events may not be swept under the rug merely by taking disciplinary action against a few soldiers, junior officers and one flag officer, Brigadier-General Janis Karpinski, who was in charge of military prisons in Iraq. One has to go to the top - all the way to Lieutenant-General Ricardo Sanchez, senior commander of US forces in Iraq. After all, he was the one who initially ordered Major-General Donald Ryder, provost marshal of the US Army, to review the Iraqi prison system. The Ryder report concluded that the "situation had not yet reached a crisis point". Why did General Sanchez decide against a further probe when he knew how damaging such incidents could be for the overall US prestige in the world?

We know now that the conclusion of the Ryder report was rejected by General Taguba when he stated in his report: "Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during [Ryder's] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation. In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment." He went on to add, according to Hersh: "Contrary to the findings of M G Ryder's report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade, were directed to change facility procedures to 'set the conditions' for MI interrogations." Army intelligence officers, CIA agents and private contractors "actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses".

The Arab world has been saturated with the reports and pictures of the dehumanization of Iraqi prisoners. Admittedly, there is no comparison between the brutality of the Saddam regime and the reports of abuse of prisoners in occupied Iraq. However, as one dispatch in the latest issue of Newsweek aptly notes: "No one would liken US abuses to Saddam's techniques, which included the most sadistic forms of torture and murder. But then, being more humane than Saddam isn't much to brag about."

Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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Editor-in-chief of U.S.-funded Iraqi newspaper quits, complaining of American control
By Lee Keath, Associated Press, 5/3/2004 14:47
BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) The head of a U.S.-funded Iraqi newspaper quit and said Monday he was taking almost his entire staff with him because of American interference in the publication.
On a front-page editorial of the Al-Sabah newspaper, editor-in-chief Ismail Zayer said he and his staff were ''celebrating the end of a nightmare we have suffered from for months ... We want independence. They (the Americans) refuse.''
Al-Sabah was set up by U.S. officials with funding from the Pentagon soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein last year. Since its first issue in July, many Iraqis have considered it the mouthpiece of the U.S.-led coalition, along with the U.S.-funded television station Al-Iraqiya.
Zayer said almost the entire staff left the paper along with him and that they were launching a new paper called Al-Sabah Al-Jedid (''The New Morning''), which would begin publishing Tuesday.
Zayer had sought to break Al-Sabah away from the Iraqi Media Network, which groups the paper, Al-Iraqiya and a number of radio station and is run by Harris Inc., a Florida-based communications company that won a $96 million Pentagon contract in January to develop the media.
''We informed (Zayer) that the paper would remain part of the IMN,'' said Tom Hausman of Harris' corporate communications. ''He made the decision to resign.''
Hausman said Al-Sabah would continue publishing on Tuesday with a new staff.
''We had a project to create a free media in Iraq,'' Zayer said of the founding of Al-Sabah. ''They are trying to control us. We are being suffocated.''

Zayer accused Harris of interfering in the paper's workings, including trying to stop some of its advertising and speaking to reporters about articles.
Among the ads that he said Harris tried to prevent was advertisement from a new political organization called ''the Iraqi Republican Group.'' The ad ran in Monday's issue the last put together by Zayer's staff.
The ad complained of the ''griefs of occupation'' and called on Iraqi elite to rally ''to preserve our nation from destruction.''
Zayer said he was told by Harris that the ad was ''too political.''
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Buyer's Remorse
Dems start to worry that Kerry can't win.

Monday, May 3, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

It's six months until the election, and Democrats are already having buyer's remorse. The Bush campaign "is kicking Kerry's ass every damn day," one prominent Democratic operative told the Washington Post last week. "Kerry hasn't owned one day in the news yet. Not one day!"
Some liberals are so frantic that they want to pull the plug. Village Voice columnist James Ridgeway says prominent Democrats should "sit down with the rich and arrogant presumptive nominee and try to persuade him to take a hike" and withdraw. Call that the Torricelli option, after the former New Jersey senator who was muscled out of the race by party elders.
That's not going to happen. First, John Forbes Kerry has wanted to be president ever since he hung around the Kennedy family compound as a teenager. He's not going to let any of the same pooh-bahs who only last December wrote him off as a primary contender drive him from the race now. Second, Mr. Kerry's convention delegates are loyal to him and not easily transferable. There was similar grumbling about dumping Bill Clinton in the summer of 1992 when he was running third in polls behind both George Bush and Ross Perot. Nothing came of it.
But that doesn't mean that the worries about John Kerry's electability are going away. Time magazine columnist Joe Klein says Mr. Kerry is "engulfed by the sort of people Howard Dean railed against: timid congressional Democratic staff members and some of the old Clinton crowd. . . . Kerry's may be the most sclerotic presidential campaign since Bob Dole's." Ouch.
Complaints about Mr. Kerry extend beyond his staff. John Weaver, who was strategist for John McCain's 2000 presidential campaign before he became a Democrat, calls Mr. Kerry's TV skills "abysmal. . . . I don't know if it's a stream of consciousness or stream of unconsciousness." MSNBC's Chris Matthews, who has lavished airtime on Mr. Kerry, is nonetheless frustrated with his elliptical speech patterns. "There's no such thing as a trick question with Kerry, because he won't answer it," he sighs. "We'll be having conversations afterward, and it's hard to get to him even then."
The few times that Mr. Kerry decides to abandon his nuanced reserve and programmed responses he can become argumentative and hectoring. ABC's Charlie Gibson asked him last Monday on "Good Morning America" to reconcile his inconsistent stories about whether he had flung his medals or merely his combat ribbons over the White House fence during a 1971 antiwar protest . After Mr. Gibson pointed out that he had covered the demonstration and had personally seen Mr. Kerry throwing medals away, the candidate replied: "Charlie, Charlie, you're wrong! That is not what happened. I threw my ribbons across. And all you have to do is go back and find the file footage." He then lapsed into incoherence.
Vaughn Ververs, the editor of the political newsletter Hotline, says Mr. Kerry's weak performances have led to "a good deal of hand-wringing among Democrats over the perception that one of Kerry's biggest strengths--his military service--seems to have become a liability."
One reason is that he began his presidential race talking far too much about Vietnam. My colleague James Taranto points out that in a December 2002 interview with NBC's Tim Russert, Mr. Kerry managed to work Vietnam into an answer about the death penalty. Robert Sam Anson, a Kerry friend who first met him during that same antiwar protest at which Mr. Kerry burst onto the national scene in 1971, concludes that Mr. Kerry is suffering from a desire to "explain away, deny, revise, trim or flat-out lie about all past events, beliefs and statements that got you the Democratic nomination in the first place. It happened to another friend of mine in 1972. His name was George McGovern. . . . See what happens when you ignore what Mother said about fibbing? No one's saying that Mr. Kerry's cooked. But McGovern parallels give him a toasted look he didn't get skiing in Sun Valley."
Liberals know they are stuck with Mr. Kerry, but that's not preventing them from worrying about his tendency to appear to take both sides of an issue. The irony is that Mr. Kerry has wanted the White House so badly, and for so long, that he has become almost a caricature of an opportunistic, programmed candidate. The resulting image turns off many voters who sense that not much is motivating him beyond blind ambition. For example, many voters may not feel comfortable with Mr. Bush's religious impulses and motivations, but they highlight the image he conveys of a sincere, committed leader.
It is traditional for party activists to grumble about their prospective nominee between the time he wraps up the primaries and when he is actually nominated. But the doubts about Mr. Kerry go beyond campaign kvetching. At times, they seem to verge on quiet panic.
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CACI Wants to Review Report on Alleged Abuse


By Ellen McCarthy
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, May 4, 2004; Page A18


CACI International Inc. said yesterday that an outside law firm will conduct its investigation of its employees' conduct in Iraq and review its operations around the world.
The Arlington defense contractor's chairman, meanwhile, complained that the government hasn't allowed the company to see an internal Army report that, according to portions made available to The Washington Post, says two CACI employees, along with two military intelligence officials, were "either directly or indirectly responsible" for abuses of prisoners allegedly committed by soldiers at Abu Ghraib detention facility outside Baghdad.
Details of the report were published previously in the New Yorker, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times.
"There are things flying around . . . and I'm sitting here having not seen anything from the government," J.P. "Jack" London, the company's chairman and chief executive, said yesterday. The government, he said, has not told the company its employees are accused of wrongdoing. The company has confirmed some employees were interviewed by the Army.
CACI said yesterday it has never employed one of the two men named in the report, but it declined to say which one.
Six soldiers have been charged with physical and sexual abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Seven others will be reprimanded, Army officials announced yesterday.
Pictures of the alleged mistreatment, aired on television and printed in newspapers around the world, have shocked people and inflamed Arab countries.
The law firm hired by CACI, which it declined to identify, "has competence with these types of matters," London said. "Frankly, we want to make sure that there isn't something going on that we were not aware of. We don't have any intent to support illegal behavior by our employees, if there is any."
CACI provides services such as engineering and integrating computer systems for government clients, including the Department of Defense, where it gets the bulk of its revenue.
Lawyers for some of the soldiers charged with abuse said CACI employees acted as interrogators at the prison. The company has declined to say how many people it has in Iraq or to describe their work, but it has posted ads seeking interrogators, intelligence analysts and counterintelligence agents on several Internet job boards.
"This particular type of work is something we've been performing for several years, this intelligence-gathering," London said. Asked how the company trains employees to conduct interrogations, London said CACI recruits "people who have these competencies and have demonstrated those capabilities." Many of them, he said, have previous military experience.
Military use of private contractors has escalated rapidly in the past 15 years, said Deborah Avant, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University who has studied the practice. Private companies have traditionally been hired to provide services such as food preparation and logistical support but more recently have been used for more demanding jobs such as providing security for U.S. officials.
Until now, though, Avant said, she was not "aware of a situation where the U.S. military has outsourced interrogation."
Employees of San Diego-based Titan Corp., which employed translators at Abu Ghraib, are also involved in the investigation, U.S. investigators have said. According to the New Yorker, the Army report quotes a Titan employee who witnessed the abuse.
A company spokesman, Wil Williams, said he did not know whether Titan was involved in the investigation. "I know of no allegations against Titan or any of its employees," he said.

Staff writers Sewell Chan in Baghdad and Renae Merle in Washington contributed to this report.



? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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CBS Delayed Abuse Report At the Request Of Gen. Myers
Associated Press
Tuesday, May 4, 2004; Page A18


NEW YORK, May 3 -- CBS News delayed for two weeks airing a report about U.S. soldiers' alleged abuse of Iraqi prisoners, following a personal request from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Gen. Richard B. Myers called CBS anchor Dan Rather eight days before the report was to air, asking for extra time, said Jeff Fager, executive producer of "60 Minutes II."
Myers cited the safety of Americans held hostage and tension surrounding the Iraqi city of Fallujah, Fager said, adding that he held off as long as he believed possible given it was a competitive story.
With the New Yorker magazine preparing to run a detailed report on the alleged abuses, CBS broadcast its report last Wednesday, including images taken last year allegedly showing Iraqis stripped naked, hooded and being tormented by U.S. captors at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.
Fager said he felt "terrible" being asked to delay the broadcast.
"News is a delicate thing," he said. "It's hard to just make those kinds of decisions. It's not natural for us; the natural thing is to put it on the air. But the circumstances were quite unusual, and I think you have to consider that."
Rather revealed the two-week delay in a postscript to viewers at the end of Wednesday's broadcast.
Fager said he believed the story was better because of the delay; CBS was able to interview Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt about the alleged incidents because the network waited.
Myers, speaking on ABC's "This Week" on Sunday, confirmed that he asked CBS for the delay. "You can't keep this out of the news, clearly," he said. "But I thought it would be particularly inflammatory at the time."



? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Intelligence Reform Will Not Be Quick
Many Groups to Weigh In on Changes

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, May 4, 2004; Page A23

The White House, Congress and two independent commissions are discussing wholesale reform of the nation's intelligence community in the wake of its failures to detect the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and accurately describe Iraq's weapons programs, mistakes that were highlighted in recent public hearings.
But despite warnings from some members of the national commission investigating the terrorist attacks that they will soon recommend intelligence reform, many government officials say it will be at least a year until any substantive change is realized.
None of the panels has completed its work, and any recommendations for substantial change will be politically controversial, particularly if they involve control of the Pentagon's intelligence programs, which account for the vast majority of U.S. intelligence spending. The large number of agencies and congressional committees with vested interests in the current intelligence structure guarantees that change will be difficult, as past commissions recommending reforms can attest.
Thomas H. Kean, chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which last month released a critique of intelligence failures before the attacks, describes reform of the intelligence community as a major focus of the panel's report to be delivered July 26. "It could possibly be our most important recommendation," Kean said recently, "but I don't think any of us can honestly say what that recommendation will be yet."
The Senate and House intelligence panels also will be making their own recommendations over the next few months based on separate inquiries into the failure of prewar estimates of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
U.S. Appeals Court Senior Judge Laurence H. Silberman, co-chairman of President Bush's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, said recently that his newly formed group has just begun its inquiry into the Iraq failure and some intelligence successes, such as Libya. There, U.S. and British knowledge of Moammar Gaddafi's programs forced the Libyan leader to cooperate in destroying his weapons and stockpiles. Silberman's panel reports next March.
"We want to hear from all our commissions," said Sean McCormack, spokesman for the president's National Security Council, "but we are not ruling out any idea that could immediately provide protection to the American people."
Even CIA Director George J. Tenet has said there could be other ways for the intelligence community to be organized, but veterans of previous attempts at reform are urging caution. They are particularly concerned about one proposal that appears to be gaining popularity: creating a new director of national intelligence separate from the CIA and other intelligence agencies, but with overall budgetary and operational authority over the entire intelligence apparatus.
Tenet is the director of central intelligence (DCI) as well as CIA director. In the DCI role, he has only secondary control over the budgets of Pentagon-based agencies that receive nearly 90 percent of the intelligence community's roughly $40 billion annual budget. His relationship with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld determines how much influence he has over the use of the Pentagon's intelligence assets.
Proponents of a single director of central intelligence believe putting one official in charge of all intelligence agencies, including the Defense Department's, would make the collection and dissemination of information more efficient.
Kean said his commission is looking at the idea, but neither he nor other members of the panel have reached any conclusions. A similar idea, proposed more than a year ago by retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), has recently received attention inside the administration and on Capitol Hill.
Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.), ranking minority member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and other committee Democrats have proposed establishing a national director of intelligence (NDI) who would have overall operational and budgetary control over Defense Department intelligence agencies, which would remain in the Pentagon. The new NDI would have the same relationship with the CIA, without the direct administrative responsibilities.
Harman said recently she is pushing for action before November and has made a presentation to members of Kean's commission. "The DCI concept should have changed when the Cold War ended," Harman said. "Lacking budgetary authority, the DCI ends up being an advocate rather than a disinterested broker."
Most reformers forget how complicated it can be to change the intelligence community, said L. Britt Snider, who for 25 years has worked on intelligence issues in senior posts on Capitol Hill, at the Defense Department and at the CIA. The intelligence system is woven through numerous agencies, and officials report to at least 12 congressional committees, each with entrenched interests in the current structure.
"This is the first time a president has indicated a possible interest," Snider said. Reform "has not had that in the past, and nothing will happen without the president aboard and taking an interest."
But he warned that "the interests of the Defense Department have to be understood." The Pentagon handles more than 90 percent of the money spent on intelligence because protection of troops is the primary concern in the allocation of funds. In the past, Snider said, legislators, particularly on the House and Senate Armed Services committees, "were afraid of making changes that could harm military forces in deployed situations." Devoting more intelligence resources to terrorism, he added, could reduce intelligence gathering on other threats.
Former senator Warren Rudman (R-N.H.), who participated in several past reform attempts and served for many years as chairman of the PFIAB, said some quick efforts at reform have left the intelligence community "worse than we were in the first place." He said he was concerned about "creating massive new structures for politically expedient reasons."
Tenet has argued against a national director of intelligence, saying initially that the creation of that post would add another layer to the bureaucracy. "Rather than focus on a zero-sum game of authorities, the focus should be on ensuring that the DCI and the secretary of defense work together on investments tied to mission," he told Kean's panel.
He believes the "way into the future" is a system under which the intelligence community functions through new combined entities. In one recent example, intelligence officials from the Pentagon, FBI and other agencies were brought to work at the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center. "That's the way we are moving," he said.
Tenet feels strongly about rebuilding human intelligence capabilities and the need to be able to carry out covert operations against terrorists. But he said he believes the president's chief intelligence officer must be directly involved in the CIA's covert activities, each of which must be approved by the president. As CIA director and, earlier, as the top staff member of the Senate intelligence committee, Tenet has seen firsthand the political fallout from the failure of such activities.
"If you separate the DCI from troops, from [agency] operators and analysts, I have a concern about his or her effectiveness, his or her connection," he said.



? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Turkey Charges 9 In Plot to Bomb NATO Summit
Associated Press
Tuesday, May 4, 2004; Page A21


ANKARA, Turkey, May 3 -- A Turkish court on Monday charged nine suspects in an alleged plot to set off a bomb at a NATO summit in Istanbul next month that President Bush is scheduled to attend.
Authorities in the northwestern province of Bursa on Thursday detained 16 alleged members of Ansar al-Islam, a Turkish group allegedly linked to al Qaeda, Gov. Oguz Kagan Koksal said. The suspects also planned to attack a synagogue in Bursa and rob a bank, Koksal said.
A Turkish court that deals with terrorism cases charged nine of the detainees with "membership in an illegal organization." They also could face other charges.
Prosecutors questioned and released the other seven suspects, as well as nine others who were questioned in Istanbul, officials said.
The leader of Ansar al-Islam, identified as Alpaslan Toprak, was among those detained, Koksal said. Police also seized equipment to make remote-controlled bombs, guns, books on bomb-making, forged identity documents and CDs that served as training manuals, he said.
The crackdown on the group comes amid heightened security before the June 28-29 meeting of NATO leaders in Istanbul. In November, more than 60 people were killed in the bombings of two synagogues, a London-based bank and the British Consulate in Istanbul that authorities blamed on suspected members of an al Qaeda cell in Turkey. Officials have charged 69 suspects in those attacks.
An Islamic group based in northern Iraq that also calls itself Ansar al-Islam and is believed to be linked to al Qaeda, asserted responsibility for suicide bombings on Feb. 1 against the offices of two Kurdish political parties in northern Iraq that killed more than 100 people. A police official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the Turkish and Iraqi groups shared "the same ideology and tactics." The Turkish group has grown in size since the U.S.-led war in Iraq, the official said.



? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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U.N. Warns of Delay in Iraqi Election
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, May 4, 2004; Page A19


UNITED NATIONS, May 3 -- National elections in Iraq scheduled for January could be postponed unless security there improves, the top election official for the United Nations said Monday.
"If the security situation does not improve, one of the things that is clear is that the U.N. won't participate in Mickey Mouse elections," Carina Perelli, the director of the U.N.'s electoral assistance division, told reporters in New York. "Elections under the gun," she said, do not go "hand in hand."
Perelli said that despite the ongoing violence in Iraq, technical preparations for elections are advancing faster than expected. The United Nations will establish an independent electoral commission by the end of the month after negotiating a new electoral law ahead of schedule. "Security aside, right now we are better than on track," she said.
Perelli, a Uruguayan election specialist who recently concluded a three-week visit to Iraq, said the United Nations will soon return to Iraq to work out a series of unresolved issues, including whether Iraq will be governed by a presidential or parliamentary political system.
The United Nations is trying to create a new electoral system from scratch in Iraq, a country that has little experience with democracy. In February, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said that he could help organize elections in Iraq by the end of the year if Iraqis reached agreement on a new electoral law by May. That would provide U.N. and Iraqi officials with a minimum of eight months to prepare for elections.
As a first step, the United Nations has invited individuals from across Iraq's political, religious and tribal spectrums to vie for a few positions on the electoral commission. U.N.-appointed officials will narrow the field of candidates to 20 individuals and select an executive director general of elections and seven-member board of commissioners from the group. The United Nations will also appoint an international election commissioner to advise Iraq's electoral commissioners.
Perelli said that aspirants can obtain entry forms at any of 13 regional coalition sites throughout the country until May 15. She said that although coalition sites in five of Iraq's 18 governates were too dangerous to distribute the forms, contenders could get copies of the form on the Internet or travel to another site to obtain one.
U.S. occupation authorities have appropriated as much as $260 million to finance the elections, Perelli said. But she said the cost could rise if Iraqis living outside the country are allowed to vote.
In an effort to ensure their competence and independence, candidates for the electoral posts will be questioned by a panel of three international election specialists and required to sign a paper renouncing participation in politics as long as they serve on the commission. They will have to accept a "curtailment of the exercise of their civil and political rights," she said. They will be the "enforcers of the legitimacy of the process," she added.
Perelli said the United Nations would try to avoid selecting commissioners based on their political, tribal or religious affiliation. That is a major departure from the U.S.-led occupation authorities, who apportioned political seats on the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council on the basis of affiliation.
The process has done little to strengthen the standing of politicians and political parties, which are viewed favorably by only 3 percent of the Iraqi population, according to a local poll cited by Perelli. "The anti-political party feelings of the population is extremely high," she said.
The decision has fueled anxiety by Iraq's factions that they may be left out if they do not aggressively promote their own causes. "There is a concern right now in terms of the different groups feeling that it is now or never" or they could be left out of Iraq's political future, she said.



? 2004 The Washington Post Company

CACI to Open Probe Of Workers in Iraq
Army Officials Interviewed Employees
By Renae Merle and Ellen McCarthy
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, May 3, 2004; Page A16
Defense contractor CACI International Inc. said yesterday it launched an independent investigation of its employees in connection with allegations that Iraqi detainees were abused by U.S. soldiers at an Army-run prison in Iraq.
Six Army soldiers have been charged with the physical and sexual abuse of 20 prisoners at the Abu Ghraib facility, which is about 20 miles west of Baghdad, and others remain under investigation. Employees for Arlington-based CACI were serving as interrogators at the facility, according to an attorney for one of the soldiers facing criminal charges.
Two CACI employees were named in an unreleased internal Army report about abuses at Abu Ghraib, according to a New Yorker article published last week on the magazine's Web site. The report alleges that one employee allowed or ordered untrained military police to set conditions for interrogations that amounted to abuse, and recommends he be fired, according to the New Yorker account. It recommends that the other be disciplined.
CACI acknowledged that its employees had been interviewed by Army officials as part of the investigation, but said in an e-mailed statement that it has "received no indication from the Army that any CACI employee was involved in any alleged improper conduct with Iraqi prisoners."
"CACI has initiated an independent investigation of the actions of Company employees in connection with this matter," the statement said. It was unclear who was conducting the investigation. Company spokeswoman Jody Brown and the company's chief executive and chairman, Jack London, did not return calls yesterday for comment.
"We are appalled by the reported actions of a few," the company statement said. "The Company does not condone or tolerate illegal behavior on the part of its employees when conducting CACI business in any circumstance at any time."
CACI, which gets about 64 percent of its revenue from the Pentagon, has declined to disclose how many employees are working in Iraq or Afghanistan.
According to several Internet job sites, CACI has been recruiting interrogators, senior counterintelligence agents and intelligence analysts for work in Iraq for more than a year, requiring some to have active and current top-secret security clearances. An ad posted on Yahoo's HotJobs Web site in February, under the headline "Exciting intelligence opportunities in Iraq!," sought to recruit interrogators with two or more years "conducting tactical and strategic interrogations." Another posting on IntelligenceCareers.com lists opening for senior counterintelligence agent with 10 years experience and intelligence analysts with a minimum of three years' experience.
The increasingly prominent and important roles played by civilian contractors in Iraq have stirred criticism from some industry analysts, who said private contractors cannot be held to the same standards as soldiers. The Pentagon's oversight of private contractors around the world is "inconsistent and sometimes incomplete," according to a 2003 General Accounting Office report.
"The use of private contractors in Iraq is becoming an increasingly volatile political issue," the International Peace Operations Association, a Virginia-based nonprofit group representing private military service companies. "This incident could adversely impact an industry that has been instrumental in supporting stability and reconstruction efforts not just in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti and all over the world."
There are 15,000 to 20,000 civilian military contractors in Iraq working at jobs once reserved for soldiers, said Peter Singer, a fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry." The duties have veered from the mundane, such as delivering mail and serving food, to critical activities that include conducting interrogations and coordinating logistics, Singer said. "We have truly pushed the boundaries to this," he said.
Staff writer Sewell Chan contributed to this report from Baghdad.

? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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U.S. Official: Abuse Allegations Are 'a Big Deal'
Charges Involving Army-Run Prison in Iraq Seen as Setback for Military; Britain Launches Inquiry

By Sewell Chan
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, May 3, 2004; Page A16
BAGHDAD, May 2 -- The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged Sunday that allegations that Iraqi prisoners were abused at a detention facility run by the Army have set back efforts to cultivate a positive image for the U.S. military in the region.
"Where a handful of people can sully the reputation of hundreds of thousands of people that are over there trying to give a better life to 50 million people, it's a big deal, because we take this very seriously," Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers said on CBS's "Face the Nation," referring to both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Myers added: "There are a lot of Iraqis that have daily contact with our forces, and they get to know the character and the compassion of our forces. And so they probably understand this is an aberration. Not that it won't be used against the United States of America. It certainly will."
Last week, CBS broadcast images showing Iraqis stripped naked, hooded and being otherwise tormented, allegedly by their U.S. captors.
The British military has also begun an investigation into abuses, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said Sunday, after the Daily Mirror newspaper published photographs Saturday that purportedly showed British troops kicking, stomping and urinating on a hooded Iraqi detainee in the southern city of Basra.
"These allegations are being taken extremely seriously," Straw said, according to the Reuters news service. "The allegations are terrible."
Human rights advocates criticized the alleged abuses by U.S. soldiers at the prison in Abu Ghraib, a western suburb of the capital.
"We had heard reports about torture, but we didn't know that it rose to this level of brutality," said Salim Mandelawi, a lawyer who directs the Human Rights Organization in Iraq, founded in 1960. "These are inhuman actions that are taken only to humiliate people."
An analyst said fallout from the reports of abuse allegations could be devastating for U.S. policy in Iraq.
"The public relations damage is profound and permanent," said Juan Cole, a professor of modern Middle Eastern history at the University of Michigan. "The release of these pictures may be the point at which the United States lost Iraq."
Three separate investigations have been launched since the abuses were uncovered in January. Criminal charges have been filed against six soldiers and could be filed against four others. Administrative penalties have been recommended against seven officers.
The Army Reserve commander who oversaw all 16 Army-run detention facilities in Iraq said that military intelligence operatives exerted the most influence on the daily life of the prisoners in Cellblock 1A, the area of the prison where the prisoners allegedly were mistreated.
"The MPs were responsible for the detention operation," Brig. Gen. Janis L. Karpinski said in a telephone interview Saturday. "They got them their meals, they got them showers, medical attention if they needed it. But the people that were in those cells, their every conduct was scheduled and negotiated by the MI people."
Karpinski said she did not learn about the allegations until she received an e-mail from Army criminal investigators on Jan. 19. "It is not excusable," she said. "It is not acceptable."
As commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Karpinski oversaw 3,400 soldiers, including the six soldiers charged. The six were part of a military police company based in Cumberland, Md.
An attorney for one of the accused soldiers said Sunday that he had requested a Court of Inquiry, which would precede a court-martial.
Gary R. Myers, who represents Staff Sgt. Ivan L. "Chip" Frederick II, said the inquiry should be "a broad-based fact-finding mission."
"It is the best truth-finding vehicle available in a hydra-headed circumstance such as this," the attorney said. If the military "is serious about getting the truth, this is the way to do it," he said. "A court-martial is limited by rules of evidence, and is not nearly so expansive as a Court of Inquiry."
Gen. Myers, on CBS, said the military is taking a close look at interrogation procedures inside Abu Ghraib. "We want intelligence information, but we have to stay inside international norms and international law," he said.
U.S. officials have confirmed that two contractors with employees at Abu Ghraib are subjects of the investigation.
One is CACI International Inc., an Arlington-based security firm, which supplied interrogators to assist military intelligence officers. "We are on the record of supporting the investigation," said L. Kenneth Johnson, CACI's president of U.S. operations. "None of our employees have been implicated in any wrongdoing, to the best of our knowledge."
The second company is Titan Corp., based in San Diego, which employed translators at Abu Ghraib. A company spokesman, Wil Williams, declined to answer questions about the company's work at the facility.
Staff writers Christian Davenport, Scott Higham, Ellen McCarthy and Renae Merle in Washington contributed to this report.



? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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'Sexual torture' sparks inquiry call
May 3, 2004 - 12:22PM
Images of abuse
The US-led coalition faced mounting pressure today to allow an independent inquiry into allegations of widespread prisoner abuse in Iraq as 11 more US troops and three Iraqis died in fresh fighting.
Meanwhile United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said a UN-sanctioned multinational force will help maintain security in Iraq after the US military hands limited sovereignty back to the country on June 30.
London's Sunday Telegraph said up to 4,000 British troops are to be sent to take control of the Shi'ite holy city of Najaf, currently under siege by US forces, in the largest expansion of British forces in Iraq over the past year.
Eleven US soldiers were killed in combat in less than 24 hours, military sources said.
Two died in an ambush in the southern city of Amara, two in Baghdad, one in an attack on a base near the northern city of Kirkuk, and six when another base was mortared west of Baghdad.
Three Iraqis were killed and eight wounded in clashes between Shi'ite militiamen and British troops in Amara, a hospital source said.
More than 750 US troops have died since the United States and its allies invaded Iraq in March last year, according to a tally based on Pentagon figures. More than 10,000 Iraqis are also estimated to have been killed.
But it was the graphic pictures of the abuse of prisoners by troops in the US and British media that continued to shock the world and undermine coalition claims that it was "winning the hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people.
The images depicted prisoners of US forces, some naked, in humiliating, sexually suggestive poses, with military personnel pointing and laughing at them.
British tabloid the Daily Mirror followed up with photographs of British troops apparently abusing an Iraqi prisoner.
The British press exploded at the Mirror's photos, and though the BBC said their authenticity had been questioned, the daily's editor Piers Morgan stood by the story and hinted at more revelations.
Six US military police, including Reserve Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, in charge of US-run prisons in Iraq, were charged in March with offences relating to the abuse of up to 20 prisoners.
A senior military spokesman said US probes were leading to "other areas" outside the limited scope of prisoner interrogation procedures.
Karpinski told the New York Times she was "disposable" and hinted she was being made a scapegoat to protect the army military intelligence unit that controlled the abused prisoners.
Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Richard Myers said the "handful" of US soldiers accused will be prosecuted, insisting that such misdeeds are "not systematic".
One soldier has been referred to court-martial, a second soldier's case is pending and "several are still under investigation," Myers said on US television.
Myers said he would be surprised if military intelligence was responsible for the soldiers' actions.
The former chief of the US group of experts which failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, David Kay, said the photographs had lent weight to calls for coalition troops to withdraw.
Amnesty International said its "extensive research in Iraq suggests that this is not an isolated incident".
"There must be a fully independent, impartial and public investigation into all allegations of torture. Nothing less will suffice," the human rights group said.
Sunni Muslim leaders in Iraq have said the abuse constituted "war crimes" while Arab League Secretary General Amr Mussa has expressed "shock and disgust" at the "shameful images".
Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair vowed to crack down on those responsible, while UN special envoy to Iraq Lakhdar Brahimi called it "very worrisome".
Meanwhile representatives of Iran-based Grand Ayatollah Kazem Hossein Haeri are helping mediate to end a standoff between radical Shi'ite Muslim cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and US forces besieging him in Najaf, the ayatollah's office said.
Sadr is wanted over the murder of a rival cleric last year and US forces have vowed to "kill or capture" him and dismantle his Mehdi Army militia, which is several thousand strong.
On the other main front troubling US-led forces, the Sunni bastion of Fallujah west of Baghdad, insurgents were celebrating what they claimed as a great victory over the besieging US marines.
Iraqi forces under the command of a former officer from ousted dictator Saddam Hussein's army began replacing US troops around the city on Saturday under a plan to end a bloody two-week standoff and avoid an all-out US attack.
Annan told a US television programme, "The (UN Security) Council will probably authorise a multinational force to remain in Iraq to help create a secure environment."
"I think it will be part of the new resolution that the Council will be discussing and approving that will cover the period after the 30th of June," Annan said.
"Obviously the new government would also be consulted, but there will be a resolution authorising a multinational force and encouraging governments to come together in a genuine international effort to help stabilise Iraq," Annan said.
"Quite frankly, it's in everybody's interest that we do whatever we can to stabilise Iraq."
But Americans celebrated the news that US civilian contractor Thomas Hamill managed to escape his kidnappers in Iraq, though officials continue to be concerned about the fate of other US captives who remain unaccounted for.
Hamill, a truck driver supplying US forces, was captured April 9 after his convoy came under attack.
A videotape sent out by his captors showed them threatening to murder him within 12 hours if US troops did not end their siege of Fallujah, and nothing more had been heard of him until today.
AFP
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An empire in moral crisis
By Margo Kingston
May 2, 2004

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Email to a friend Printer format A version of this piece was first published in the Sun Herald today. See Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker for TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB, a detailed report into systematic US torture at Saddam's former prison. Yesterday was the first anniversary of Bush's "Mission accomplished" decree. On Friday, American time, he defended his statement with these words: "A year ago I did give the speech from the carrier saying we had achieved an important objective, accomplished a mission, which was the removal of Saddam Hussein. As a result, there are no longer torture chambers or mass graves or rape rooms in Iraq." He lied. The US defence force has confirmed that Bush was kept informed of the investigation into the American torture chambers in Iraq - completed in February. Webdiary's April statistics are at the end of this entry. For an update on the torture scandal, see Is US withdrawal the least worst option?

Yep, time to get out of Iraq

by Margo Kingston

G'day. Time magazine this week interviewed Jumpei Yasuda, one of the Japanese hostages set free by Iraqi kidnappers:
"The man who pointed his gun at me told me he was walking on the sidewalk and was arrested by the G.I.s when he wouldn't answer their questions. He said he was imprisoned for almost a month and regularly beaten up. One day, he said, he was taken to a private room and sexually assaulted. He asked me what I would have done if I were him, and I had no answer."
I didn't believe the man's story. Now I do. I've also reversed my opposition to Mark Latham's promise to bring our soldiers home by Christmas. The photos released by Sixty Minutes in the US changed my mind (also see thememoryhole and albasrah). The photos record tableaus in a US prison in Iraq. In one, a man cloaked in black, his face covered, stands on small box, electric wires attached to his fingers, toes and genitals, after being told that if he falls off he will be electrocuted. In another, several naked men, garbage bags over their heads, are arranged in a human pyramid. One American soldier stands behind them, arms folded, smiling to camera. A female soldier squats behind them, also smiling.
The photos are deeply disturbing, not just for their sadism, but because they are precisely posed. They are `artistic', not torture in action, but torture frozen to capture the moment for the camera. Trophy pics. As Juan Cole wrote:
"There was also apparently coerced male on male sexual activity. The genteel mainstream news reports of this scandal (which have given it less attention than it deserves or than it will get in the Arab press) have not commented on the explicitly sexual message sent by the abusers, which is that Iraq is f**ked."
The decadent American empire now sees itself as the star of its own movie. Remember when it rushed a few troops into Baghdad to show it could win quickly, meaning no one was there to stop the inevitable looting and anarchy when Saddam's regime collapsed? Remember when George Bush dressed up as a soldier to pronounce "mission accomplished" in May last year? Every non-American is a stage prop for the greater glory of America.
We're told that those directly involved in recreating the Caligula movie in Baghdad will be court martialled. Yet if you read the very few stories on the matter in the US media, it's clear that the smiling faces are scapegoats for a US defence force which has lost its way. There was no training for the soldiers on holding prisoners. They were not even given the Geneva conventions on the treatment of prisoners, and were told to get on with it when they queried prisoner abuse. The US even outsourced interrogation to private contractors!
When I wrote about my change of heart on Latham, a couple of readers accused me of being silly. "Surely you must have considered the possibility that, if psychopaths constitute between 1 and 5% of the male population worldwide, then there must logically be a similar percentage of psychopaths in the volunteer US military," wrote Mike Lyvers.
Matthew Cleary: "That you now think the troops should leave is akin to thinking jails should be abolished because there are instances of prisoner abuse by guards."
But the photos are the defining visualisation of what's been becoming clear since Saddam's statue fell last year. The Americans were unprepared for the task of securing the peace, with defence chiefs failing even to train soldiers on the cultural norms of the Iraqis so they would not needlessly humiliate or insult them. Even worse, the ugly side of being American, the side incapable of empathy with any other culture, let alone respect for it, has eaten alive any chance of nurturing democracy in Iraq.
Recently, a British officer said the US troops saw the Iraqis as "untermenschen", a term Hitler used to describe Jews, gypsies and other "racially inferior" groups:
"My view and the view of the British chain of command is that the Americans' use of violence is not proportionate and is over-responsive to the threat they are facing. They view (the Iraqi people) as untermenschen. They are not concerned about the Iraqi loss of life in the way the British are. Their attitude towards the Iraqis is tragic, it's awful."
As one of three nations which invaded Iraq, Australia is responsible for what is happening there. What those pictures show is that it is not possible to "do the job" any more. The war is lost. They longer we stay, the worse it will get, for the world and for the long-suffering Iraqis.
As for the importance of the US alliance, the United States under its present government is a force for evil and perpetual war. Until America elects a leader and an administration which brings out the good side of America and listens to solid, thoughtful advice, we are endangering our security by supporting it.
All the reasons they told us to go to war have fallen apart except the one about giving the Iraqi people freedom and dignity. Now that one is in ruins. What is the job we must do, Mr Howard?
Bring our soldiers home. The longer we stay, the more complicit we are in the war crimes of an empire in moral crisis.

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Is US withdrawal the least worst option?
By Margo Kingston
May 3, 2004

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Email to a friend Printer format A year after Bush declared `Mission accomplished' in Iraq, a few mainstream American military and foreign policy voices are urging the US to admit defeat and withdraw.

These opinions were aired before the images of torture which end any chance that the Iraqi people will believe that America is a benign force for freedom and democracy in their nation.

Since the publication of those images on Thursday night the shocks keep coming. So tonight, updates on the tragedy of Iraq and your thoughts on what went wrong and what to do next.

The truth about American torture

* Seymour Hersh obtained the military report into America's torture chambers in Iraq: TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB: American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?

* Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, in charge of Iraqi prisons at the time, says the block concerned was off limits to her and under the complete control of US intelligence - Rough Justice in Iraq:

Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski is angry. She says she warned her superiors from the first about the ill-treatment of Iraqi prisoners... The trouble was, Karpinski says, she didn't have enough troops or resources to do the job right, and the men at the top ignored her complaints. "They just wanted it to go away," she told NEWSWEEK last week... "There's no excuse for what these people did," says Karpinski. "They're just bad people. But the guys involved in this were new to Abu Ghurayb. It got way out of hand.

Karpinski says the abuse took place in Abu Ghurayb's Block 1A, which had been taken over and turned into a windowless prison-within-a-prison by military-intelligence officers. They called the shots there, not the usual military-police guards. "So far I haven't heard of any investigation of the military-intelligence people," she says.

* The American military denied problems in the prison for months, dead batting complaints from the British human rights envoy and Amnesty International. Hersh reports:

As the international furor grew, senior military officers, and President Bush, insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military as a whole. Taguba's report, however, amounts to an unsparing study of collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels. The picture he draws of Abu Ghraib is one in which Army regulations and the Geneva conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day management of the prisoners was abdicated to Army military-intelligence units and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.

* An American veteran comments in Abu Ghraib as My Lai?

* The Americans have outsourced interrogation to private contractors (see Hersh), thus ending the last remaining core function of the State: Privatization of warfare. And now we're losing our SAS soldiers to the private army in Iraq: Army exodus: SAS troops quit. Webdiarist Donald Brook commented:

It's good to see the war being privatised, with soldiers leaving the SAS and going entrepreneurial. One had thought that the blight of socialism, under which armed conflict has been seen by old Lefties like Howard et al as essentially a public enterprise, would never be cured.

* The American media hardly run the story for days, although the Hersh scoop seems to have forced them to do so. See Iraq Torture Images Vie with Photos of U.S. War Dead:

This shows U.S. newspaper editors understand what kind of war coverage interests American readers, according to David D. Perlmutter, a historian of war and media at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. "The torture pictures are absolutely irrelevant," Perlmutter said in a telephone interview. "Americans care about American soldiers, and only journalistic and political and academic elites fret about pictures of collateral damage ...

As US blogger Kevin Drum said:

Remember this the next time someone wonders aloud why Arabs all hate us so "irrationally." We play down incidents like this as "aberrations," merely a few soldiers out of thousands, and run the story on page 27. They see it splashed across the front page and think of it as yet another case of American hypocrisy. It's going to be awfully hard now to convince them they're wrong.

***

Voices for withdrawal

* Former General Sees 'Staying the Course' In Iraq as Untenable:

It is delusional, asserts the Army veteran, college professor and longtime Washington hand, to believe that "staying the course" can achieve President Bush's goal of reordering the Middle East by building a friendly democracy in Iraq. For the sake of American security and economic power alike, he argues, the U.S. should remove its forces from that shattered country as rapidly as possible.

"We have failed," Mr. Odom declares bluntly. "The issue is how high a price we're going to pay. ... Less, by getting out sooner, or more, by getting out later?" His is not the voice of an isolationist, or a peacenik, or Republican-hater. He is talking from the conservative Hudson Institute, where he was hired years ago by Mitch Daniels, later Mr. Bush's budget director. His office displays photos of Ronald Reagan, under whom Mr. Odom directed the National Security Agency, and Jimmy Carter, on whose National Security Council staff he served.

* Conservative' foreign policy expert Christopher Layne of the Cato Institute (one of the very few right wing think tanks which opposed the war) wrote The Best of Bad Choices in `The American Conservative':

The United States has no good options in Iraq but the least bad is this: Washington should transfer real sovereignty to the Iraqis on June 30. It should tell the Iraqis to work out their own political future among themselves and turn over full responsibility for Iraq's external and internal security to the new regime in Baghdad. Simultaneously, the United States also should suspend all offensive military operations in Iraq, pull its forces back to defensive enclaves well away from Iraq's cities, and commence a withdrawal of American forces from Iraq that will be completed on December 31 (or on January 20, 2005).

There is no point in being Pollyannaish. In the long run, the U.S. will be better off leaving Iraq. In the short-term, however, there will be consequences -- not all of which are foreseeable -- if the U.S. withdraws. But that misses the point. Sooner or later the U.S. is going to end up leaving Iraq without having attained its goals. Washington's real choice is akin to that posed in an old oil-filter commercial that used to run on television: America can pay now, or it can pay later when the costs will be even higher.

* Paul Krugman in In Front of Your Nose:

Even among harsh critics of the administration's Iraq policy, the usual view is that we have to finish the job. You've heard the arguments: We broke it; we bought it. We can't cut and run. We have to stay the course. I understand the appeal of those arguments. But I'm worried about the arithmetic.

... I don't have a plan for Iraq. I strongly suspect, however, that all the plans you hear now are irrelevant. If America's leaders hadn't made so many bad decisions, they might have had a chance to shape Iraq to their liking. But that window closed many months ago.

* United Press International analyst Arnaud de Borchgrave wrote in Looking for the exit:

Total alignment on Prime Minister Sharon's anti-Palestinian strategy has turned even moderate Muslims against the United States. Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak said hatred of the United States had never reached such depths.

When Mr. Bush suddenly dropped longstanding U.S. opposition to Jewish settlements on the West Bank, rooted as they were in U.N. resolutions, Israeli settlers could not believe their luck. Sharon conceded Gaza, where 7,500 Jewish settlers had no future among 1.3 million Palestinians, but in return obtained U.S. blessings for permanent Israeli habitation in large swaths of what was to be a Palestinian state. Even illegal hilltop settlements concluded they were now safe from removal and immediately began erecting permanent structures to replace mobile homes...

No sooner had the White House's red light flashed green than the once surreptitious, crawling annexation of the West Bank resumed in the open. Jewish West Bank settlers were jubilant, while Palestinians were adrift in the Slough of Despond. With the Right of Return for Palestinians also off the table, and no viable state of their own on the West Bank, extremist organizations will have no problem recruiting more jihadis (holy warriors) and merging terrorist operations with the underground resistance in Iraq, Arab opinion has been inflamed to the point where Palestine and Iraq are now two fronts in the war against what Charles de Gaulle used to call "the Anglo-Saxons."

Osama bin Laden is probably thinking he's some kind of strategic genius.

After the torture photos scandal, he wrote Tutwiler's mission impossible:

The shameful pictures of U.S. soldiers humiliating naked Iraqi prisoners were the final straw for Margaret D. Tutwiler. Moved out of her post as Ambassador to Morocco last December to become Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs, Ms. Tutwiler was instructed to spruce up the Bush administration's image in the Arab world in particular and the Muslim world in general.

It took her only four months to conclude this was mission impossible. She was the third "image" czarina to come a cropper in three years. Competing against the Qatar-based al-Jazeera and Dubai-based al-Arabyia and their coverage of the occupation of Iraq gave Ms. Tutwiler about the same chance of success as going over Niagara Falls in a barrel.

* For a detailed account of the end of the neo-con power in Washington, see Jim Lobe's US on the brink:

One year after President George W Bush declared the end of major combat in Iraq, the United States appears to be teetering on the brink of strategic defeat in its Mesopotamian adventure.

Even as Bush on Friday reiterated his ambition to bring "freedom and democracy" to Iraq and the Middle East, a series of recent policy reversals - capped by Friday's announcement that a former Ba'athist general will take charge of an all-Iraqi security force in Fallujah - suggests that an increasingly desperate Washington will settle for far less.

* The father of thus Senate and a consistent opponent of the war, Senator Robert Byrd made a speech called Mission Not Accomplished in Iraq to mark the first anniversary of Bush's boast:

Since that time, Iraq has become a veritable shooting gallery. This April has been the bloodiest month of the entire war, with more than 120 Americans killed. Young lives cut short in a pointless conflict and all the President can say is that it "has been a tough couple of weeks". A tough couple of weeks, indeed.

Plans have obviously gone tragically awry. But the President has, so far, only managed to mutter that we must "stay the course". But what course is there to keep when our ship of state is being tossed like a dinghy in a storm of Middle East politics? If the course is to end in the liberation of Iraq and bring a definitive end to the war against Saddam Hussein, one must conclude, mission not accomplished, Mr. President.

The White House argues time and again that Iraq is the "central front" on the war on terrorism. But instead of keeping murderous al Qaeda terrorists on the run, the invasion of Iraq has stoked the fires of terrorism against the United States and our allies. Najaf is smoldering. Fallujah is burning. And there is no exit is in sight. What has been accomplished, Mr. President? (For Byrd's pre-war speeches against the war, see A lonely voice in a US Senate silent on war and Today, I Weep for my Country...)

***

Allen Jay

This piece by Alex Cockburn, Watching Niagara: Stupid Leaders, Useless Spies, Angry World, summarises the situation perfectly and applies equally to Howard's Australia.

My only comment on evaluating intelligence and being able to sort the wheat from the chaff is that it requires an unbiased and open mind. When you have either a political or ideological bias there is a great temptation to ignore contrary facts and information as a matter of deliberate policy or because you subconsciously give them little credence.

That seems to be the deep corruption and failing within Australian, British and particularly US intelligence.

***

Alistair Bain in Perth

I am amazed at all these protestations of outrage at the abuse of Iraqi prisoners. We knew from interview snippets revealed during the invasion that elements of the American and British forces had little respect for the Iraqis. The abuse of prisoners is hardly surprising.

You claim not to have believed the released Japanese captive when he recounted his captor's claims of mistreatment by the Americans - until you saw the photographs. Hmmm. We believe what we want to, don't we? We invaded Iraq because we wanted to believe Mr Saddam had WMD. We didn't want to believe that Iraq's "liberators" could be brutal and inhumane.

The pictures - of which others, less "presentable", exist - are reminiscent of the rape of Nanking, where Japanese soldiers had happy snaps taken while they abused Chinese women.

However, I acknowledge your moral courage in openly stating your changed position. What amazes me is how quickly former supporters of the invasion are changing their minds or carefully qualifying their support. Why do they think so many people raised objections to the invasion in the first place? With what REAL evidence did they offer their support?

I sympathise with Mark Latham's pull-out call. However, part of me still believes that since Australia has allowed itself to become part of the Iraqi mire we have a moral responsibility to stay and help clean up the mess. Let's hope we can find ways of doing so which truly make amends for the unspeakable horror we have helped create.

***

Russell Dovey in Canberra

Recent images of American and British soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners are more than disturbing; they are damning to a cultural tradition that upholds itself as the way of freedom, peace, and civilisation. The West is shamed by these photos, as it is by every act of barbarity that its soldiers commit in foreign wars.

Those in the US and British military who were responsible for these crimes, those who gave the orders, and those who did nothing even though they knew these crimes were being committed, should be arrested and tried in a court of law. It is the third group that I fear will get away with their crime, because the very nature of these acts means that many will have heard what was going on, making it hard to separate criminal negligence from disbelief.get away with their crime, because the very nature of these acts means that many will have heard what was going on, making it hard to separate criminal negligence from disbelief.

It is disturbing to remember that before the war, the US refused to join many other countries around the world, including Australia, in signing and ratifying the treaty for the International Criminal Court. The ICC handles war criminals who have not been adequately tried in their own countries.

It is possible that the Bush administration knew this sort of thing was likely to happen, and therefore ensured it could control the investigation. So why didn't they make sure that soldiers knew the basic idea behind the Geneva Convention and respected a prisoner's human rights? Why did it not respond to allegations that many of its soldiers regard Iraqis as subhuman?

However, Margo, the solution you propose in An empire in moral crisis may be worse than the problem. If the US and Britain withdrew all their forces from Iraq, then there would be no more tortures, beatings or Falluja-style massacres committed by American or British soldiers upon Iraqis.

Unfortunately, the American and British forces are not the only self-righteous, militaristic cowboys in Iraq, just the most numerous and well-armed. There are dozens, if not hundreds of militia groups of various sizes in Iraq, each one with a different view on how the country should be run. The weapons available to these groups range from the ubiquitous Kalashnikov rifle to rocket-propelled grenades capable of ripping apart a car.

An optimist might think that once the American and British forces leave, these militias would have no-one to fight anymore. They would go home and keep their rifles buried in the back yard, wrapped in oiled cloth, in case they were needed again.

No doubt, this is exactly what many of them would do. Quite a few more would simply protect their own neighbourhood, as they have ever since the fall of Saddam's regime in the absence of any effective policing by the CPA.

Unfortunately, many of these groups were not formed in reaction to the Western occupation, or to protect their own neighbourhoods. Some are the personal armies of aspiring warlords, out to conquer as much territory as they can and hold it by force.

Other groups are motivated by religious beliefs, and intend to enforce their own rules and systems of worship wherever they can. Finally, there are terrorist groups under the banner of Al-Qaeda, using Iraq as a stage to hurt the US in their propaganda war, caring nothing for the people they kill or maim in the process.

Iraq's borders are being enforced by the American and British military. Effectively, Iraq now exists as a nation because of the occupation. If we withdraw, then the borders are just lines on a map. While regional militias would fiercely defend their territories from Turkish, Iranian or Syrian attack, they would be hard-pressed to mount the fully co-coordinated defence required to prevail against the well-equipped armies of Turkey and Iran.

At best, if American and British forces withdrew entirely, Iraq would become a fragile coalition of diverse militias, many of whom have long histories of violence with many of the others. In another part of the world, they might even maintain stability, and be left alone to find their own way to govern themselves.

However, the land of Iraq has been blessed, or cursed, with a staggeringly large amount of oil. Especially in a time when we are constantly being told that the oil will start to run out in 30 years, it is hard for any country to resist this lure. Oil is valuable both for its financial and its geopolitical value, even if a country is already the richest, most powerful nation on earth with its own oil reserves.

If the USA is unable to go without Iraq's oil, Iraq's neighbours would be even more unable to resist the opportunity to grab what they can now in order to protect themselves from economic chaos in 30 years, and Iran would especially see it as a chance to gain more control over the US economy.

So the Iraqi people, far from having a chance to determine their own future, would be invaded and plunged into anarchy. Civilian deaths in the widespread fighting could be in the tens of thousands, and hundreds of thousands would probably die from lack of basic infrastructure, combined with an inability to deliver food aid. The flood of refugees into surrounding countries would cause even more hardship and famine.

Therefore, even though the occupation of Iraq is wrong and must end, to simply wash our hands of the mess would be worse for Iraq's people and for global stability. I don't mean that the PM is right about "getting the job done", because he wouldn't know what the real job was if it hit him in the face.

This petty, selfish national interest that the PM seems to believe in is not what the Australian people believe in. We are not a selfish, petty little people, ready to sell another country down the river to enrich our American big brother. Our fearless leader has done a great job of convincing the world that we are, but we know better.

***

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Former General Sees
'Staying the Course'
In Iraq as Untenable
April 28, 2004; Page A4
The time to worry is when Washington politicians on all sides agree. So when John Kerry echoes President Bush in arguing that the United States "can't cut and run" from Iraq, maybe it's time to listen to someone who says we must.
Maybe it's time, in other words, to listen to retired Gen. William E. Odom. It is delusional, asserts the Army veteran, college professor and longtime Washington hand, to believe that "staying the course" can achieve President Bush's goal of reordering the Middle East by building a friendly democracy in Iraq. For the sake of American security and economic power alike, he argues, the U.S. should remove its forces from that shattered country as rapidly as possible.
"We have failed," Mr. Odom declares bluntly. "The issue is how high a price we're going to pay. ... Less, by getting out sooner, or more, by getting out later?"
His is not the voice of an isolationist, or a peacenik, or Republican-hater. He is talking from the conservative Hudson Institute, where he was hired years ago by Mitch Daniels, later Mr. Bush's budget director. His office displays photos of Ronald Reagan, under whom Mr. Odom directed the National Security Agency, and Jimmy Carter, on whose National Security Council staff he served.
Rather, his unsettling view reflects a broader reassessment of America's predicament as Iraq looks ever-uglier. It can be seen as well in U.S. Administrator L. Paul Bremer's tacit admission of error in disbanding the Iraqi Army and Mr. Bush's new reliance on United Nations help.
Mr. Odom opposed the Iraq war before it happened. An expert in comparative politics who teaches at Georgetown and Yale, he warned that there was no reason to expect that Iraq could soon develop the ingredients for constitutional democracy: individual rights, property rights and a tax-collection system supporting a government to enforce them. The violence of recent months, he concludes, has exposed Mr. Bush's vision of doing so as a dream.
Following the planned June 30 handover of nominal sovereignty, Iraqis may go to the polls and vote. But the result, Mr. Odom explains, will resemble theocracy more than liberal democracy. As televised images of Iraqis cheering attacks on U.S. troops suggest, it's not likely to be anything Americans would consider worth the war's cost in blood and treasure.
"Anybody that's pro-American cannot gain legitimacy," he says. "It will be a highly illiberal democracy, inspired by Islamic culture, extremely hostile to the West and probably quite willing ... to fund terrorist organizations." The ability of Islamic militants to use Iraq as a beachhead for attacks elsewhere may increase.
But can't U.S. troops there tamp down such hostile activity? Well, yes, he says -- at a cost of rising hostility to the U.S. throughout the region.
"It probably will radicalize Saudi Arabia, [and] it could easily radicalize Egypt," Mr. Odom says. Violence yesterday between security forces and terrorists in Syria hinted at what may come, heightening dangers for Israel and the U.S. Iran might agree not to stir trouble among fellow Shiites who are 60% of Iraq's population -- provided the U.S. eases its hostile stance toward Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
Yet the stakes, in Mr. Odom's view, are much bigger. The longer U.S. troops hang tough, he reasons, the more isolated America will become. That in turn will place increasing strain on international economic and security institutions that have undergirded the emergence of "America's Inadvertent Empire," as Mr. Odom's latest book calls it. "I don't know that the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, [or] NATO can survive this," he says.
His proposed solution sounds initially like Mr. Kerry's: a call for the U.N. and European allies to take charge of political and security arrangements. What's different -- even Bushlike -- is that Gen. Odom would accompany that request with a unilateral declaration that U.S. forces would leave even if no one else agrees to come in.
Such a move, he concludes, might even provoke an unexpected result a year after Mr. Bush brushed off opposition from France, Germany and many others to oust Saddam Hussein. "The Europeans might get scared [of chaos] and go in," Mr. Odom says. "There'd probably be a big effort to try to rescue" Mr. Bush. But U.S. troops would be gone within six months in any event.
It is a jarring prescription. But ask yourself, as bullets fly in Najaf and Fallujah, which sounds more credible: Mr. Odom's gloomy forecast, or Mr. Bush's prediction of success?
Write to John Harwood at john.harwood@wsj.com