Report: Syrians, 'equipment' were in N. Korea train blast

Special to World Tribune.com
EAST-ASIA-INTEL.COM
Sunday, May 16, 2004
Syrian technicians accompanying unknown equipment were killed in the train explosion in North Korea on April 22, according to a report in a Japanese newspaper.
A military specialist on Korean affairs revealed that the Syrian technicians were killed in the explosion in Ryongchon in the northwestern part of the country, according to the Sankei Shimbun. The specialist said the Syrians were accompanying "large equipment" and that the damage from the explosion was greatest in the portion of the train they occupied.
The source said North Korean military personnel with protective suits responded to the scene soon after the explosion and removed material only from the Syrians' section of the train.
The technicians were from the Syrian technical research center called Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche Scientific (CERS). Although CERS was established to promote science and technology development, it has been viewed as a major player in Syria's weapons of mass destruction development program
The source said it was not known whether the cargo was the source of the explosion or whether it had exploded following a separate explosion on another section of the train.
As many as 10 Syrians and accompanying North Koreans were killed, according to the report. The bodies of the Syrians were taken home on May 1 by a Syrian aircraft, which had come to Pyongyang to deliver aid supplies.
The Syrians and North Koreans who transported the victimrs were also reportedly wearing protective suits similar to those worn by the North Korean military figures who arrived on the scene immediately after the accident, the source said.
The United States and other countries have expressed concern that Syrian and North Korea are developoing Scud-D missiles, as well as chemical and biological weapons.
Concerning the cause of the explosion incident, the DPRK has explained that a train carrying fertilizer containing ammonium nitrate and a railroad tank carrying petroleum were being shunted, and, in the process, came into contact with electrical wires, due to carelessness.

Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.


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Public portraits of Kim's current wife signals rise of her son, Kim Jong-Chol

Kim Jong-Il's current wife, Ko Yong-Hi. Weekly Post
Portraits of Kim Jong-Il's current wife, Ko Yong-Hi, have been displayed recently at N. Korean military units and are seen as evidence of a new personality cult, a Japanese daily reported. The move is seen as preparation for one of her two sons as Kim's successor. An intelligence official said the report seems valid, adding that the North has already launched a campaign to idolize Ko as "Beloved Mother."

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EU will ignore U.S. sanctions
on Syria
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Sunday, May 16, 2004
LONDON - The European Union has decided to ignore U.S. sanctions on Syria.
EU officials said the Bush administration's decision to impose economic sanctions on Damascus would not affect plans by Brussels to increase trade with Syria. They said the EU planned to maintain a high-level dialogue with the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad to facilitate the signing of a trade agreement.
On Sunday, European Commission Vice President Loyola de Palacio was scheduled to arrive in Damascus to meet Assad and other Syrian leaders.
Officials said the discussions would focus on the role of Syria in a regional energy network. Syria exports natural gas and has proposed serving as a way-station for the transfer of Egyptian gas to Europe.
Spain, which invited Assad to Madrid in early June, has criticized the U.S. sanctions on Syria. Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos said Europe and Spain must cooperate in supporting Syria as a Euro-Mediterranean partner.
"Sanctions don't ensure the appropriate climate for a constructive understanding, but they increase factors of tension in the region." Moratinos said. "They have to develop and defend the fruitful relations with Syria."
Britain was the only EU member to support the U.S. decision to impose sanctions on Damascus. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said his government shares U.S. concerns over Syria's weapons of mass destruction programs and its harboring of groups deemed terrorists.
"We have concerns also about WMD, terrorism, human rights and cooperation over Iraq," Dean MacLaughlin, a spokesman for Blair, said. "We expect Syria to take these concerns seriously. In particular, we expect Syria to take a constructive approach to the situation in Iraq and work with us to restore stability and aid Iraq's reconstruction."
But the British goverment ruled out imposing similar sanctions on Damascus. London has sent a series of military delegations to discuss cooperation with Syria, but does not export lethal weapons to Damascus.
"We have similar objectives and concerns to the U.S., but we pursue those through a policy of critical and constructive engagement which allows us to encourage and support reform while talking frankly and robustly about issues of concern," MacLaughlin said. "Sanctions are a matter for the EU as a whole, not individual countries."
Political sources said senior figures in Blair's Labor Party have urged the prime minister to disassociate from Washington's policies in the Middle East. They said a key area where Britain should not follow the United States regards sanctions against Syria.

Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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Strategists call for Israeli strikes against expanding WMD threat



SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Friday, May 14, 2004
TEL AVIV - Leading strategists in Israel have proposed preemptive strikes against the expanding threat posed by weapons of mass destruction arsenals in the Middle East.
A report, entitled "Israel's Strategic Future," called such strikes an option in preventing the formation of a WMD coalition. The report said the Jewish state has been threatened by a biological or nuclear first-strike that seeks to exploit Israel's small space and high population density.
"To meet its ultimate deterrence objectives - that is, to deter the most overwhelmingly destructive enemy first-strikes - Israel must seek and achieve a visible second-strike capability to target approximately 15 enemy cities," the report, presented to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, said.
The report marked the last phase of Project Daniel, sponsored by the Ariel Center for Strategic Studies, part of the College of Judea and Samaria. The contributors to the report included [Res.] Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael, the former director of research and development at Israel's military and Defense Ministry, Middle East Newsline reported.
The report also urged the Israeli military to reduce the priority assigned to conventional warfare without impairing its superiority over any enemy coalition. The report said Israeli strategy must be revised to address the expanding threats from what it termed terrorism and long-range WMD attacks.
One option, the report said, would be to target an enemy WMD regime.
"The tools for preemptive operations would be novel, diverse and purposeful; for example, long-range aircraft with appropriate support for derived missions; long-range high-level intervention ground forces; long-endurance intelligence-collection systems; long-endurance unmanned air-strike platforms," the report said.
"Ranges would be to cities in Libya and Iran, and recognizable nuclear bomb yields would be at a level sufficient to fully compromise the aggressor's viability as a functioning state. All enemy targets should be selected with the view that their destruction would promptly force the enemy to cease all nuclear/biological/chemical exchanges with Israel."
The report called on Israel to operate a multi-layered ballistic missile defense system as well as establish a second-strike capability. Such a missile defense should include a Boost Phase Intercept capability as well as enhanced real-time intelligence acquisition, interpretation and transmission.
The report said that despite the prospect of a WMD attack, the principal existential threat to Israel was a conventional war mounted by a coalition of Arab states along with Iran. But such a war, the report said, could be facilitated by the development of WMD and result in nonconventional weapons strikes against the Jewish state.
"Irrespective of its policy on nuclear ambiguity vs. disclosure, Israel will not be able to endure unless it continues to maintain a credible, secure and decisive nuclear deterrent alongside a multi-layered anti-missile defense," the report said.
The report said advanced weaponry would enable Israel to reduce its defense expenditure while enhancing effectiveness and lethality in conventional warfare. The report cited the need for increased weapons range, precision, warhead efficiency; electronic warfare, reduced infrared and radio frequency signatures.
The report also stressed the need for real time tactical and strategic intelligence within a command, control, communications, computer and intelligence [C4I] system. The technologies cited to combat strategic threats included ballistic missile defense, early-warning satellites, combat unmanned air vehicles and deep-strike forces.
"There is no operational need for low-yield nuclear weapons geared for actual battlefield use," the report said. "There is no point in spreading - and raising costs - Israel's effort on low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons given the multifaceted asymmetry between Israel and its adversaries."
Israel must also maintain its policy of refusing to acknowledge nuclear capability, the report said. The report said such a policy should be revised in the future if an enemy state turns nuclear.
The report asserted that the development of an Arab and Iranian nuclear weapons program required 20 years while that of a long-range missile would need 12 years. But once development is completed, the report said, the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles would entail a short process. Any country could build an arsenal of 100 atomic bombs within four years of the assembly of its first nuclear weapon.
"Israel will have to maximize its long-range, accurate, real-time strategic intelligence," the report said. "Israel will have to maximize the credibility of its second-strike capability. Israel will have to develop, test, manufacture and deploy a BPI [Boost Phase Intercept] capability to match the operational requirements dictated by enemy ballistic missile capacities -- performance and numbers."
The report also called on Israel to deploy recoverable and non-recoverable stealth UAVs to suppress enemy air defenses, electronic warfare, intelligence-gathering and strikes. The military was also urged to develop a second-strike land or sea nuclear capability.
To finance such an effort, Israel must cooperate with the United States, make better use of U.S. military aid and eliminate obstacles to U.S.-Israel defense trade. One option was for Israel to consider revising its defense strategy to account for an expanded U.S. military presence in the Middle East.
The report urged Israel to seek U.S. cooperation for a joint BPI project, something the Defense Department has refused. Another option was for the United States to "participate technologically and financially in Israel's multi-layered missile defense efforts as fully as possible."
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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Another Israeli APC destroyed in Gaza


Special to World Tribune.com
MIDDLE EAST NEWSLINE
Thursday, May 13, 2004
GAZA CITY - Palestinian insurgents destroyed another Israeli armored personnel carrier in the Gaza Strip.
It was the second time in as many days that insurgents destroyed an Israeli APC in the Gaza Strip. The APC was carrying a a ton of explosives that blew up and killed all five crew members in the combat vehicle along the Egyptian border with the Gaza Strip.
"An armored personnel carrier, responsible for the detonation of the tunnels, was struck and subsequently exploded while preparing to detonate a tunnel," an Israeli military statement said. "The explosion was apparently a result of an RPG fired at the force."
The blast on Wednesday evening tore apart the U.S.-origin M113 APC and pieces of the vehicle as well as parts of the bodies of soldiers flew into the adjacent Palestinian refugee camp of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombing.
"We don't really know what happened yesterday," Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya'alon told a news conference outside Rafah on Thursday. "This is being investigated."
The destruction of the two Israeli APCs has sparked what military sources termed an intensified effort to locate and eliminate Palestinian insurgency strongholds in the Gaza Strip. The sources said the military plans a series of combined armored, infantry and air operations in the Gaza Strip over the next few days. They said the navy would also participate in the missions.
"We have to think of the following day," Lt. Col. Ofer Winter, commander of the Givati infantry brigade's reconnaissance unit, said. "After three or four hours of sleep, the soldiers are preparing for the next operation."
The APC destroyed on Wednesday was part of a convoy on patrol along the Egyptian-Gaza Strip border to detect tunnels full of explosives that connect Rafah to neighboring Egypt and meant to destroy Israeli armored vehicles.
The lead vehicle in convoy, an armored D-9 bulldozer, was disabled by a mine and two soldiers were injured.
When the APC moved to help, it was struck by what appeared to be a rocket-propelled grenade that blew up the explosives inside the vehicle. The explosion took place along an eight-kilometer 20-meter wide border route called "Philalelphi." Military sources said this area was the most violent in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
"We conducted hundreds of such operations in the past and there were no casualties," Winter said. "But we always knew that this could happen."
Israeli troops and combat vehicles came under fire by Palestinian insurgents as they searched for the bodies of the Israeli casualties.
Ya'alon said that in the fighting Israeli troops killed nine Palestinians, seven of them in an AH-64A Apache helicopter missile strike. He said Egyptian authorities allowed Israeli military representatives to search for the Israeli bodies on the Egyptian side of the border.
So far, Israel's military detected and destroyed at least 11 tunnels in 2004. Military sources said Southern Command had increased patrols along the Egyptian border in wake of intelligence that Palestinian insurgents were trying to smuggle Soviet-origin Katyusha rockets into the Gaza Strip.
On Tuesday, an M113 APC was destroyed by a mine detonated by Palestinian insurgents in Gaza City. Six Israeli soldiers were killed and Palestinian insurgents made off with the parts of the bodies of the Israelis as well as subsystems of the M113.
On late Wednesday, Jihad returned the body parts in a deal arranged by Egypt. At the same time, Israeli troops and combat vehicles left the Zeitoun neighborhood of Gaza City, the target of an earlier Israeli attack on Palestinian weapons laboratories.
Israeli military sources said the success of Palestinian attacks on Israeli APCs reflect training and explosives relayed by Hizbullah. They said Hamas and Jihad insurgents have been trained in the production of mines, rockets and other weapons.
Palestinian sources said 24 Palestinians have been killed in fighting with Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip since Tuesday, at least 10 of them in Rafah on Thursday. Overnight Thursday, Hamas gunners fired a Kassam-class short-range missile toward a community in Israel. An Israeli woman was injured.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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US Pushes World Court Immunity Amid Iraq Scandal


By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Bush administration is pursuing its campaign to protect Americans from International Criminal Court jurisdiction even as it deals with the Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal that may involve some of the very war crimes the court was created to handle.
So far 89 countries have signed agreements with Washington promising that Americans accused of grave international offenses, including soldiers charged with war crimes, will be returned to U.S. jurisdiction so their cases can be decided by fellow Americans rather than international jurists.
Other states may soon be added, officials said this week.
"It's never been our argument that Americans are angels," one senior U.S. official told Reuters.
"Our argument has been if Americans commit war crimes or human rights violations, we will handle them. And we will," he added.
The permanent court was established in 2002 after ad hoc institutions dealt with war crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
But President Bush opposed it and insisted on so-called Article 98 agreements under which countries guaranteed not to surrender Americans to ICC prosecution.
With military and civilians on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in 100 countries, Washington must preserve its independence to defend its national interests worldwide, U.S. officials said.
This position is coming under new scrutiny following publication of photographs showing U.S. army soldiers abusing and humiliating Iraqis at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad.
The photos have fueled international outrage and severely damaged U.S. credibility. U.S. officials promise the guilty will be punished but rights experts worry prosecutions will focus on lower-ranking soldiers, not their superiors.
WAR CRIMES PROSECUTION
"The political reality is that its going to be harder now to persuade democratically elected leaders to immunize the U.S. military from war crimes prosecution," said Tom Malinowski, Washington advocacy director for Human Rights Watch.
While some states may be more reluctant to sign the bilateral immunity agreements, it is unclear they can avoid it, said Anthony Dworkin, London-based editor of the Crimes of War Project Web site .
U.S. law prohibits military aid to countries that do not sign immunity accords and Washington has used this lever to exert "enormous pressure" on countries to sign, he said.
Some legal experts disagree with the use of Article 98 agreements and question government insistence that U.S. military interrogation rules in Iraq and elsewhere comply with the Geneva Convention.
Washington "is reluctant to test its interpretation" before international jurists, Dworkin said.
"All of us are appalled by those prisoner abuse photos and we need to address them," a U.S. official said.
"But the idea that the ICC would come in and judge whether we did enough ... that's where the politicization comes and where those who might have opposed the Iraq war in the first place could use that as an opportunity to whack us," he said.
Another official said: "You can't get out of these things by having somebody go to trial in international court. The only way to repair our authority and reputation is to show that we find the behavior abhorrent and are going to punish it."
Europe has resisted U.S. pressure and countries with major concentrations of U.S. forces, like Germany, Japan and South Korea, have not signed immunity pacts with the United States.
Copyright ? Reuters 2004. All rights reserved.

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No military draft in post-Saddam Iraq

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Friday, May 14, 2004
BAGHDAD - Iraq's interim government has agreed that the nation's new military will be based on voluntary service.
Iraqi officials said the Interim Governing Council has determined that Iraq will not renew the draft employed by the former regime of Saddam Hussein. They said the military will be based on an all-volunteer force similar to the United States and European Union countries.
In Amman, Jordan continued to train Iraqi police and security forces. On Thursday, a class of 500 police officers completed training and underwent graduation in Amman, Middle East Newsline reported.
Iraq has been training to complete the first phase of its new army, composed of 27 battalions. This calls for three light infantry divisions in a 40,000-member army.
Officials said Iraq could decide on a second stage of development that would expand the army to 60,000. Baghdad also plans to restore the nation's navy and air force.
"Iraq is passing through a very difficult security phase and all efforts should be focused on putting an end to the state of chaos by building effective security forces capable of restoring stability in the country," Iraqi police chief Maj. Gen. Taleb Abbas said.
So far, Jordan has trained and graduated 1,900 Iraqi police officers at Amman's police academy. Jordan agreed to train 32,000 Iraqi policemen by the end of 2005.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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WRITTEN ON WATER

No Way to Run a War
The Democrats are guilty of ideological confusion and the Republicans of disdain for reflection.

BY MARK HELPRIN
Monday, May 17, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

Though America has condemned the cruelties of Abu Ghraib, they remain nonetheless a symbol of the inescapable fact that the war has been run incompetently, with an apparently deliberate contempt for history, strategy, and thought, and with too little regard for the American soldier, whose mounting casualties seem to have no effect on the boastfulness of the civilian leadership.
Before the war's inception, and even after September 11, the Bush administration, having promised to correct its predecessor's depredations of the military, failed to do so. The president failed to go to Congress on September 12 to ask for a declaration of war, failed to ask Congress when he did go before it for the tools with which to fight, and has failed consistently to ask the American people for sacrifice. And yet their sons, mainly, are sacrificed in Iraq day by day.
When soldiers are killed because they do not have equipment (in the words of a returning officer, "not enough vehicles, not enough munitions, not enough medical supplies, not enough water"), when reservists are retained for years, and rotations canceled, it is the consequence of a fiscal policy that seems more attuned to the electoral landscape of 2004 than to the national security of the United States. Were the U.S. to devote the same percentage of its GNP to defense as it did during the peacetime years of the last half-century, and the military budget return to this unremarkable level, we would be spending (apart from the purely operational costs of the war) almost twice what we are spending now.
The year-and-a-half delay between action in Afghanistan and Iraq mobilized the Arabs and the international left, weakened the connection with September 11, and prompted allies who would have been with us to fall away. The delay was especially unconscionable because it was due not merely to normal difficulties but to the aforementioned military insufficiencies and to indecision masquerading as circumspection. Once the Army and Marines were rolling, their supply lines were left deliberately unprotected, and are vulnerable to this day. Why? Why do the generals, in patently identifiable top-down-speak, repeatedly state that they need nothing more than the small number of troops (for occupying such a large country) that they are assigned? Why do they and the administration steadfastly hold this line even as one event cascading into another should make them recoil in piggy-eyed wonder at the lameness of their policy?
From the beginning, the scale of the war was based on the fundamental strategic misconception that the primary objective was Iraq rather than the imagination of the Arab World, which, if sufficiently stunned, would tip itself back into the heretofore easily induced fatalism that makes it hesitate to war against the West. After the true shock and awe of a campaign of massive surplus, as in the Gulf War, no regime would have risked its survival by failing to go after the terrorists within its purview. But a campaign of bare sufficiency, that had trouble punching through even ragtag irregulars, taught the Arabs that we could be effectively opposed.
Mistakenly focused on physical control of Iraq, we could not see that, were we to give it up, the resultant anarchy might find a quicker resolution than the indefinite prolonged agony through which our continuing presence has nursed it. Seeking motivation after the fact, we decided to make Iraq a Western-style democracy, and when that began to run off the rails, to make Iraq the mere model for a Middle East filled with Western-style democracies. Of course, instead of a model to inspire them (of which they have many, such as Switzerland), what the Arabs need is first the desire, and then a means to overcome the police states that oppress them, neither of which a reconfigured Iraq, were it possible, would supply. Japan and Germany are often cited in defense of this overreach, but rather than freeze our armies in place and set them to policing and civil affairs as we fought through the Second World War, we waited until we had won.
Having decided to remake a country of 26 million divided into warring subcultures with a shared affection for martyrdom and unchanging traditions, the administration thought it could do so with 100,000 troops. Israel, which nearly surrounds the West Bank, speaks its language and has 37 years of experience in occupation, keeps approximately (by my reckoning) one soldier on duty for every 40 inhabitants and 1/13th square mile, and the unfortunate results are well known. In Iraq we keep one soldier per 240 inhabitants and 1.7 square miles. To put this in yet clearer perspective, it is the same number of uniformed police officers per inhabitant of the City of New York. But the police in New York are not at the end of a 9,000-mile supply chain (they live off the land at Dunkin' Donuts), they do not have to protect their redoubts, travel in convoys, maintain a hospital system, run a civil service, reform a government, build schools, supply electricity, etc. And, most importantly, they do not have to battle an angry population that speaks an alien language, lives in an immense territory, and is armed with automatic weapons, explosives, suicide bombers, and rocket-propelled grenades. Imagine if they did, and you have Iraq. Imagine if then the mayor said, "We don't need anything further, it's just a question of perseverance: Bring it on," and you have the Bush continuum.
Leaving out entirely our gratuitously self-inflicted inability to deal with major contingencies in Asia, this has been the briefest summary of mismanagement, a full exposition of which could fill a thick and very unpleasant book. But to these failings the left offers no better alternative, for if the right has failed in execution, the left's failure, in conception, is deeper.
John Kerry may say one thing and another, but no matter how the topgallants break in the Democratic Party, its ideological keel is a leaden and unthinking pacifism, a pretentious and illogical deference to all things European, and the unhinged belief that America by its very nature transforms every aspect of its self-defense into an aggression that justifies the offense against which it is defending itself. After the enemy has attacked our shipping, embassies, aviation, capital, government and largest city, and after he has slit the throats of defenseless stewardesses, and crushed and immolated three thousand unwary men, women, and children, those who wonder what we did wrong are not likely to offer a spirited defense.
Their allergy to military expenditure assures that, unlike Republicans, who provided just enough to accomplish an arrogant plan if nothing went wrong, they would not provide enough to accomplish a humble plan if everything went right. They say that war is not the answer, and, meaning it, profess their faith in special operations. But are we to credit their supposed indignation that in the early Bush presidency there was a shortage of covert insertions into sovereign states, a dearth of assassinations, the absence of close cooperation with the intelligence services of dictatorships, and insufficient funding for black operations? Or to take seriously the crackpot supposition that this was a war for oil, the price of which, since the war, has gone up? And why then did we not invade Venezuela? It's closer, and the food is better.
With nothing to offer but contradictions and paralysis, they and their presidential aspirant have staked their policy on a mystical and irrational prejudice against unilateralism. This is a new thing under the visiting moon, an absurdity propounded by the very same people who often urge the U.S. to unilateral action when it refrains, for example, from interventions in Africa to fight genocide or AIDS. In what way is America, moving in concert with Britain and Spain to invade Iraq, more unilateral or less multilateral than France moving in concert with Germany and Belgium to oppose it? And does a wrong act cease to be wrong if others join in, or a right cease to be right if others do not?
Just as many Republicans detest the idea of international governance but glow at the prospect of empire, many Democrats are reliably anti-imperialist yet dewy-eyed about world government. Thus, Sen. Kerry's only non-secret policy for the war is a bunch of mumblings about the U.N. and our "allies," presumably the ones who are not with us at the moment in Iraq. It is they and the U.N. who in the fairy dust of multilateralism will solve this most difficult problem. But in fact they neither can nor will do any such thing. Either Sen. Kerry knows that his strategy is just a cover for simple, complete, and ignominious withdrawal, or he does not know, which is worse.
Though the parties have been incompetent, nothing but politics keeps them from correcting their deficiencies, and at a point like this, even if professional politicians are incapable of knowing it, explicit and decisive correction would be the best politics. The situation need not remain intractable if once again respect is accorded to certain fundamentals.
The military must be reconstituted so that it has a surplus of power without having to choose between transformation and tradition, quality and numbers, heavy and light: All are necessary. This is expensive, and would require more plain speaking and less condescending manipulation from those who govern, but would allow for the quick and overwhelming application of force, unambiguous staying power, coverage of multiple contingencies, and, most importantly, deterrence. It is always better to deter an enemy than, by showing weakness, to encourage him to take the field.
In addition to more aggressive unconventional, police, and paramilitary operations against the fragmented terrorist legion, we must strengthen civil defense. Although striking a thousand targets is easier than defending ten million, it isn't possible to control every laboratory and closet in the world. If the social cost and hundreds of billions of dollars annually necessary for a probabilistically effective defense against weapons of mass destruction appear a great burden, they pale before an unrestrained epidemic or a nuclear detonation in a major city.
In the Middle East, our original purpose, since perverted by carelessness of estimation, was self-defense. To return to it would take advantage of the facts that the countries in the area do not have to be democracies before we require of them that they refrain from attacking us; that a regime with a firm hold upon a nation has much at stake and can be coerced to eradicate the terrorist apparatus within its frontiers; and that the ideal instrument for this is a remounted and properly supported U.S. military, released from nation building and counterinsurgency, its ability to make war, when called upon, nonpareil.
The Kurds and Shia of Iraq could within days assert control in their areas. We already have ceded part of Sunni Iraq: What remains is to pick a strongman, see him along, arrange a federation, hope for the best, remount the army, and retire, with or without Saudi permission, to the Saudi bases roughly equidistant to Damascus, Baghdad, and Riyadh. There, protected by the desert, with modern infrastructure, and our backs to the sea, which is our metier, we would command the center of gravity of the Middle East, and with the ability to strike hard, fast and at will, could enforce responsible behavior upon regimes that have been the citadel of our enemies.
In a war that has steadily grown beyond expectations, America has been poorly served by those who govern it. The Democrats are guilty of seemingly innate ideological confusion about self-defense, the Republicans of willful disdain for reflection, and, both, of lack of imagination, probity, and preparation--and, perhaps above all, of subjecting the most serious business in the life of a nation to coarse partisanship. Having come up short, both parties are sorely in need of a severe reprimand and direct order from the American people to correct their failings and get on with the common defense.
Mr. Helprin is a novelist, a contributing editor of The Wall Street Journal and a senior fellow at the Claremont Institute.

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U.S. stymies interrogators: Direct questions, isolation only options

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, May 17, 2004
The U.S. military has restricted techniques for eliciting information from detainees in Iraq.
Officials said Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, has restricted options for use in interrogations at the Abu Gharib facility north of Baghdad. They said the new policy - ordered on May 13 amid the U.S. Army's investigation of interrogations at Abu Gharib - banned the use of techniques meant to pressure detainees to provide information to military intelligence.
One banned technique was the practice of forcing detainees into physically stressful positions. Until Sanchez's decision, such a technique required approval from the commanding general.
[On Monday, a car bomb exploded near U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad and killed Iraqi Governing Council head Abdul Zahraa Othman, Middle East Newsline reported.
Earlier, the Shi'ite Mahdi Army, employing grenade and mortar fire, drove an Italian military force from a base in the southern city of Nasseriya.]
"What is said is simply we will not even entertain a request, so don't even send it up for a review," a senior U.S. Central Command official said.
Officials said the only option left to interrogators after Sanchez's review was the isolation of the detainee for up to 30 days. They said this technique also required approval from the commanding general.
The Sanchez review came after a decision in October 2003 to ease restrictions imposed on U.S. military interrogators. Officials said the October policy provided greater options for interrogators - after approval from commanders - to force detainees to sit, kneel or stand in abnormal positions.
U.S. officials said the military has developed an interrogation plan that included the acquisition of background information on Iraqi prisoners for use in questioning. In addition, the military drafted a series of approaches meant to respond to the level of cooperation exhibited by the detainee. In all, the army manual lists 53 techniques for interrogation.
Military intelligence officials, providing the first open details in a Defense Department briefing on May 14, described the process undergone by a detainee after his capture and imprisonment in Abu Gharib, where thousands of Iraqis were being held. They said the detainee would be screened by military intelligence in cooperation with military police.
Military intelligence and military police then would examine the detainee and determine whether he should undergo interrogation. Officials said such a decision would depend on the tactical information required by commanders. They said the priority of commanders has focused on information that could protect U.S. troops and civilians.
The officials said the first task of the interrogator was to gather information on the detainee and draft what they termed an analyst support package and an interrogation plan. The plan included the type of information sought from the detainee as well as the approach to take with him.
In most cases, officials said, interrogators have taken the direct approach and merely ask questions. They said this approach elicited information in 95 percent of cases.
"Or if you're not talking or we think you're deceptive, we might think you might be a different person and say, 'Now I'm not sure," a Central Command official said. "'You're - aren't you so and so?' One of those approaches would be laid down."
The Central Command official said interrogators would require permission for any technique not on what he termed an approved list. One such technique that has required approval, he said, was forcing the detainee to stand for a period of time. In some cases, such requests would be relayed to the judge advocate general to determine whether such a technique was not banned by the Geneva Conventions.
The Bush administration has been besieged by U.S. media reports that Pentagon officials approved a special classified interrogation unit in Iraq to obtain information from Iraqi or foreign insurgents. One of the reports asserted that senior Pentagon officials authorized the use of harsh interrogation techniques against a Syrian national believed to have been sent to bolster the Sunni insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
"It is our position, and has been from the very beginning, that we don't address these things because the one time you don't say something, that's the one time you're essentially confirming it," Pentagon spokesman Lawrence DiRita said.
But officials acknowledged that interrogations have been hampered by a block in the flow of information from battlefield units to Abu Gharib. They said this has prevented combat units from obtaining important information from detainees that could help operations.
The official said interrogations at Abu Gharib have yielded important information that later helped capture key Iraqi officials, including deposed President Saddam Hussein. Other information obtained through interrogation included the routes of Al Qaida-inspired foreign volunteers who arrived to fight the U.S. military in Iraq as well as the location and network of improvised explosive devices.
"We have gotten some great information on additional terrorist threats in Iraq, on radical Sunni Islamists working with former regime elements and how that working relationship takes place," an official said. "And we've also gotten some key information on terrorists. I'm going to put it as tactical: their techniques, tactics and procedures; their command and control structure; and how that's coming together there in Iraq. We've also gotten some great information on key personalities."


Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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Lawyer enforces rules for prisoner treatment
By Katarina Kratovac
Associated Press
FALLUJAH, Iraq -- A U.S. military lawyer assembled the guards at the jail on the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment's desert base to convey the latest orders: it is no longer permissible to hood Iraqi detainees. Blindfolds will suffice.
The practice was banned by the U.S. command after the scandal erupted over treatment of inmates at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. With the international outcry over the abuse captured in photographs shown worldwide, the Marines are being extra careful to go by the book in their handling of suspects.
"Sandbagging is now prohibited," said Capt. Jamie McCall, referring to the practice of putting bags over the heads of Iraqi suspects rounded up in raids or captured in combat.
A graduate of the University of Pittsburgh law school, McCall, 29, is a member of the Judge Advocate General's Corps.
The battalion sees him as their in-house lawyer, and commander Lt. Col. Brennan Byrne calls McCall his "legal beagle."
"I am here to answer their questions about all legal issues," said McCall, from Wilmington, Del.
These days, McCall is busier than ever.
The scandal over the Army's treatment of inmates at Abu Ghraib prison -- less than an hour's drive from this battalion's base -- shocked many Marines who take pride in their elite training and credo.
"Those people who did this will absolutely face some stiff penalties," Byrne said.
The first defendant goes on trial Wednesday in Baghdad.
However, the Marine record in Iraq is not spotless. Two Marines at Camp Pendleton, Calif., face courts-martial on charges including assault and dereliction of duty in the death of an Iraqi prisoner in their custody last year in the southern city of Nasiriyah.
Before getting to Abu Ghraib, McCall said, each Iraqi detainee passes two levels of screening -- at the detention center with the unit that captured him, then, if initial questioning determines his detention should continue, at a division-level detention.
Only after division screening shows "compelling evidence" that prisoners should be held are they taken to a third-level prison such as Abu Ghraib, where a magistrate court sits and decides the fate of each prisoner, McCall said.
Photographing any prisoner -- many troops have personal digital cameras in Iraq -- goes against rules of conduct and is strictly banned, McCall says.
Before deployment, Marines were "schooled up on the rules of engagement, law of war, what does and does not constitute hostile intent," McCall said. "And above all, the Geneva Conventions."
Once in Iraq, "we all carry a rules of engagement card" -- a yellow card with lists of these definitions, McCall said.
When officially speaking of the enemy, the Marines go by the book, using tongue twisting acronyms like FRE for Former Regime Elements, NCF for Non-Compliance Forces, ACF or Anti-Coalition Forces, and lately, AIF for Anti-Iraqi Forces.
But in April, during the urban warfare with insurgents in Fallujah, a Sunni stronghold some 35 miles west of Baghdad, the enemy became simply the "bad guys."
During Fallujah battles, Marines blamed the insurgents for "abusing law of war."
"It was unbelievable," McCall said. "They transported weapons in ambulances marked with the Red Crescent, stored up arms in mosques and hospitals, fired at us from mosques and shrines."
Still, Fallujah insurgents were considered "illegal combatants" and as such had to display a "hostile intent," not simply brandish a firearm, before they could become a target of the Marines.
Rules of engagement differ elsewhere.
In the southern city of Najaf, where U.S. troops battle a renegade Shiite cleric's militia, the al-Mahdi Army in its uniform black dress and headscarves, the group is perceived as a "hostile force."
"All I have to do is see a guy in that uniform, he does not even have to see me, he does not have to have a weapon in his hand, he goes down," Byrne said.

Copyright 2003 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

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Sex Abuse Is Poor Interrogation Tool, Israelis Say

By Dan Williams
JERUSALEM (Reuters) - Sexual humiliation of the kind practiced by U.S. military police at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq does little to help interrogators gain useful information from prisoners, Israeli counter-terrorism experts said Monday.
Israel, perhaps unique in having public debate and legal guidelines on the use of physical coercion against suspects, does not use Abu Ghraib-type methods despite its close ties with the United States on security matters, they said.
"Under questioning, a terrorist should be made to yield. Sexual abuse goes too far by breaking him, so it's not an option," Ami Ayalon, former chief of Israel's Shin Bet domestic security service, told Reuters.
"A broken man will say anything. That information is worthless."
The United States is reeling from revelations that low-level personnel at Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad piled naked Iraqi detainees on top of one another and photographed them simulating sex acts.
New Yorker magazine said the abuses were ordered by U.S. military intelligence as part of the effort to gather information on Iraqi insurgents through interrogation. The Pentagon denied this, calling the scandal an isolated incident.
For many in Israel, the case recalled charges by a Lebanese guerrilla leader, Mustafa Dirani, that he was sodomized by an Israeli interrogator while in captivity in the mid-1990s.
Ayalon said the Dirani case was exceptional as he had been held by Israeli military intelligence, whose top-secret foreign missions secure it virtual freedom from judicial scrutiny, while the Shin Bet works in Israel and the Palestinian territories under strict Supreme Court guidelines.
"MODERATE PHYSICAL PRESSURE"
Under court restrictions, the Shin Bet can use "moderate physical pressure," including sensory deprivation and shaking short of causing permanent damage, on so-called "ticking bombs" -- suspects it believes know about imminent attacks.
"The Shin Bet has professionalism and oversight, so everyone keeps to these methods. They are effective enough," Ayalon said, adding that interrogators undergo almost three years of Arabic and psychology training before confronting their first suspect.
According to New Yorker correspondent Seymour Hersh, some of Abu Ghraib's abused inmates may have been photographed in the hope they could later be blackmailed into becoming U.S. informants. Israel depends on a vast network of collaborators in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to help its hunt for Palestinian militants waging a 3 1/2-year-old revolt with suicide bombings.
Palestinian advocates say collaborators are recruited on the offer of pay or after Israeli authorities withhold favors such as travel permits, an account confirmed by Shin Bet sources.
But sexual blackmail is almost unheard of.
"An informant risks being caught and killed by his countrymen, so he will only be effective if he works of his own free will, feeling it is worth his while," said Menachem Landau, a retired Shin Bet supervisor of Palestinian collaborators. "Someone acting out of fear will be unreliable and could even end up attacking his handler to clear his name."

Copyright ? Reuters 2004. All rights reserved.

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Donald Rumsfeld personnellement mis en cause dans le scandale des tortures en Irak
LEMONDE.FR | 16.05.04 | 08h56 * MIS A JOUR LE 16.05.04 | 22h02
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Le secr?taire ? la d?fense am?ricain a lui-m?me approuv? un projet destin? ? autoriser l'usage de m?thodes d'interrogatoire non conventionnelles pour obtenir des renseignements au sujet de l'insurrection irakienne, croit savoir le "New Yorker". Ces m?thodes, d'abord utilis?es en Afghanistan aupr?s de membres d'Al-Qaida, puis ? Guantanamo, sont ? l'origine du scandale des tortures inflig?es aux d?tenus irakiens de la prison d'Abou Ghraib, explique l'hebdomadaire sur son site internet.
Donald Rumsfeld est ? nouveau dans la tourmente. Selon un article du New Yorker ? para?tre lundi 17 mai et d?j? accessible sur le site internet de l'hebdomadaire, les tortures inflig?es dans la prison d'Abou Ghraib par des militaires am?ricains ? des d?tenus irakiens ont r?sult? d'une d?cision approuv?e secr?tement en 2003 par le secr?taire ? la d?fense.
L'auteur de cet article, Seymour Hersh, qui, avec la cha?ne CBS, avait r?v?l? le scandale d'Abou Ghraib, ?crit que les "racines" de cette affaire "ne reposent pas sur les penchants criminels de quelques r?servistes, mais sur une d?cision approuv?e l'an dernier" par M. Rumsfeld.
Cette d?cision visait ? "?tendre les limites d'un programme hautement secret, destin? ? l'origine ? la chasse d'Al-Qaida, aux interrogatoires de prisonniers en Irak", poursuit Seymour Hersh dans les colonnes de l'hebdomadaire new-yorkais, citant des officiers du renseignement actifs ou ? la retraite.
Ces officiers ont confi? au journaliste que ce programme "encourageait la coercition physique et les humiliations sexuelles de prisonniers irakiens, dans une tentative d'obtenir plus d'informations sur l'insurrection grandissante en Irak".
"FAITES-EN CE QUE VOUS VOULEZ"
Selon l'auteur de l'article, le projet, class? secret, autorisait ? tuer, ? capturer ou ? interroger les personnalit?s dites de valeur dans le cadre de la "lutte antiterroriste". Largement utilis?es en Afghanistan, ces pratiques ont ?t? appliqu?es en Irak avec davantage de mod?ration et uniquement - dans un premier temps - dans la traque de Saddam Hussein et la recherche des armements non conventionnels.
A mesure que l'insurrection gagnait en intensit? et que les pertes am?ricaines s'accumulaient, Donald Rumsfeld et Stephen Cambone ont d?cid? de les ?tendre aux interrogatoires pratiqu?s dans la prison d'Abou Ghraib, affirme le New Yorker. Le projet aurait ?t? approuv? et mis en oeuvre l'?t? dernier ? la suite des attentats qui ont vis? en ao?t le si?ge des Nations unies ? Bagdad et l'ambassade de Jordanie.
"Attrapez ceux qu'il faut et faites-en ce que vous voulez", constituait l'ordre de mission des militaires charg?s des interrogatoires, toujours selon les sources cit?es par l'hebdomadaire.
Cette d?cision aurait ?t? ?labor?e par Stephen Cambone, sous-secr?taire ? la d?fense pour le renseignement, puis approuv?e par Donald Rumsfeld et par le chef d'Etat-major interarm?es, Richard Myers. "La solution ent?rin?e par Rumsfeld et appliqu?e par Stephen Cambone ?tait d'?tre plus dur avec les Irakiens qui se trouvaient dans le syst?me carc?ral et qui ?taient soup?onn?s de prendre part ? l'insurrection", ?crit Seymour Hersh.
"GUANTANAMO?SER" LE SYST?ME DES PRISONS EN IRAK
Il cite ?galement le g?n?ral Geoffrey Miller, commandant du centre de d?tention et d'interrogation de la base navale am?ricaine de Guantanamo, ? Cuba, qui s'est rendu ? Bagdad en ao?t. L'officier, selon le New Yorker, aurait recommand? de "guantanamo?ser" le syst?me des prisons en Irak.
Mais, poursuit l'hebdomaire, Donald Rumsfeld et Stephen Cambone "ont ?t? plus loin" en autorisant des m?thodes "non conventionnelles" ? Abou Ghraib, notamment par le recours ? des humiliations sexuelles sur les hommes, pour leur soutirer des renseignements qui faisaient d?faut aux Etats-Unis pour r?primer l'insurrection.
La CIA, qui avait approuv? l'usage de techniques "sp?cifiques" pour les interrogatoires de dirigeants d'Al-Qaida apr?s les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, s'est oppos?e ? leur application en Irak a et ? refus? d'y coop?rer, selon le New Yorker.
Apr?s l'ouverture d'une enqu?te militaire sur Abou Ghraib en janvier dernier, il a ?t? d?cid? de pr?senter une version officielle des faits ne faisant pas mention du programme secret, selon le New Yorker, seulement de "gamins devenus incontr?lables", en l'occurrence les sept militaires actuellement inculp?s.
Une porte parole du Pentagone, Laurence Di Rita, a qualifi? samedi l'article de "saugrenu, avec un air de conspiration et rempli d'erreurs et de conjectures anonymes". "Aucun responsable du d?partement de la d?fense n'a approuv? quelque programme que ce soit con?u pour r?sulter en de tels abus comme ceux vus sur les photos et videos r?centes", a-t-elle affirm? dans un communiqu?.

Avec AFP et Reuters


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Les s?vices perp?tr?s ? Guantanamo auraient ?t? film?s

Les s?vices perp?tr?s contre les prisonniers du centre de d?tention am?ricain de Guantanamo ? Cuba ont fait l'objet d'enregistrements vid?o, selon un ancien d?tenu britannique, cit? dimanche 16 mai par l'hebdomadaire dominical The Observer. Tarek Dergoul, 26 ans, un des six Britanniques lib?r?s de Guantanamo en mars dernier, s'exprimant pour la premi?re fois sur la mani?re dont il avait ?t? trait? pendant sa d?tention, a affirm? avoir ?t? victimes de s?vices, qui ont tous ?t? film?s. "Il y avait toujours un type derri?re filmant ce qui se passait", a-t-il d?clar?, selon l'Observer. L'ex-prisonnier britannique a affirm? avoir subi des humiliations et des passages ? tabac, racontant notamment un ?pisode o? il ?tait confront? ? cinq militaires am?ricains. "Ils m'ont projet? du gaz au poivre ? la face et j'ai commenc? ? vomir, a-t-il affirm?. Puis ils m'ont attaqu? et clou? au sol, me mettant les doigts dans les yeux, me poussant la t?te dans les toilettes et tirant la chasse." "Ils m'ont ensuite ligot? comme un animal, se sont mis ? genou sur moi, me donnant des coups de pied et des coups de poing. En fin de compte ils m'ont sorti encha?n? de la cellule pour me conduire dans la zone de r?cr?ation o? ils m'ont ras? la barbe, les cheveux et les sourcils", a-t-il encore racont?. Le porte-parole du centre de d?tention de Guantanamo, le lieutenant-colonel Leon Sumpter, a indiqu? ? l'Observer que les enregistrements vid?o ?taient faits afin de pouvoir ensuite ?tre supervis?s par des officiers sup?rieurs. Tous les enregistrements sont conserv?s dans les archives de la base, a-t-il pr?cis?, selon le journal. Le r?cit de Tarek Dergoul a imm?diatement relanc? les appels au gouvernement britannique de faire pression sur les Etats-Unis pour obtenir la publication des enregistrements. "Le gouvernement doit demander que ces vid?os soient livr?es et la v?rit? sur ces all?gations tr?s s?rieuses ?tablie une fois pour toutes", a d?clar? le porte-parole pour les affaires ?trang?res du parti lib?ral-d?mocrate, Menzies Campbell. Deux autres d?tenus britanniques lib?r?s ont ?crit au pr?sident am?ricain, George W. Bush, pour lui exposer les abus et mauvais traitements inflig?s, selon eux, pendant les interrogatoires. - (AFP.)

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Cotes de confiance en baisse sensible pour George W. Bush et Tony Blair

La politique men?e par George W. Bush ne satisfait plus que 42 % des Am?ricains, score le plus bas jamais enregistr? depuis son arriv?e ? la Maison Blanche, r?v?le un sondage publi? samedi 15 mai par le magazine Newsweek. En plein scandale des tortures inflig?es aux d?tenus irakiens de la prison d'Abou Ghraib, 57 % des personnes interrog?es d?sapprouvent en outre sa gestion du dossier irakien.
Au Royaume-Uni, les sp?culations au sujet de l'avenir politique de Tony Blair risquent de prendre un nouveau tour apr?s la publication dimanche d'un sondage selon lequel 46 % des Britanniques jugent que le chef du gouvernement devrait d?missionner avant les prochaines ?ch?ances ?lectorales. L'?tude d'opinion, r?alis?e par l'institut Yougov pour le compte du Sunday Times, ajoute que 22 % des personnes interrog?es souhaitent son d?part apr?s ces ?lections, qui devraient avoir lieu dans un an, alors que 20 % souhaitent son maintien au 10, Downing Street. Qui plus est, 61 % des Britanniques disent ne plus faire confiance au premier ministre, alors que 36% expriment un avis contraire. Malmen? jusque dans ses propres rangs depuis le d?but de la guerre en Irak, Tony Blair a qualifi? vendredi de "futilit?s" les sp?culations au sujet de son avenir ? la t?te du gouvernement. - (Reuters.)
Acheter les droits de reproduction

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SPIEGEL TV EXKLUSIV

Iraker in US-Haft zu Tode gefoltert

Nach dem Schock ?ber die Misshandlungsbilder kommt aus dem Irak ein neuer schlimmer Verdacht gegen die US-Truppen. SPIEGEL TV liegen schriftliche und m?ndliche Belege vor, wonach ein 47-j?hriger Iraker in amerikanischer Haft zu Tode gefoltert wurde. Die Amerikaner sollen versucht haben, den Fall zu vertuschen.
ANZEIGE
SPIEGEL TV
Jaleels Leiche: Deutliche Spuren von Gewalteinwirkung
Berlin - F?r die amerikanischen Truppen war der Fall des Irakers Asad Abdul Kareem Abdul Jaleel reine Routine. Nachdem der 47-j?hrige Familienvater am 9. Januar 2004 in der amerikanischen Milit?rbasis Al Asad westlich des Ortes Khan Al Baghdadi gestorben war, f?llte ein US-Mediziner einen Totenschein aus. Offenbar ohne detaillierte Untersuchungen und laut Dokument auch ohne Obduktion diagnostizierte der Pathologe Luis A. Santiago, dass der Mann im Schlaf gestorben ("died in sleep") sei. Samt dem Totenschein ?bergaben die US-Truppen die Leiche kurz darauf dem Internationalen Roten Kreuz.
Zuvor hatten amerikanische Truppen den angesehenen Stammes-?ltesten auf offener Stra?e festgenommen und zur amerikanischen Milit?rbasis Al Asad westlich des Ortes Khan Al Baghdadi gebracht. Angeblich bestand der Verdacht, der Festgenommene geh?re dem irakischen Widerstand an. In dem Gef?ngnis innerhalb der Basis sollen die Soldaten Asad Abdul Kareem Abdul Jaleel massiv unter Druck gesetzt haben. Ein Mitgefangener beschrieb gegen?ber SPIEGEL TV detailliert, wie der 47-J?hrige f?nf Tage lang auf sadistischste Weise gefoltert wurde. Von den Misshandlungen h?tten US-Soldaten auch Fotos gemacht, so der Zeuge.
Am 9. Januar dieses Jahres starb Asad Abdul Kareem Abdul Jaleel in der US-Haft. An der Version eines nat?rlichen Todes jedoch gibt es erhebliche Zweifel. Ein irakischer Gerichtsmediziner, der den Leichnam des Mannes von den US-Streitkr?ften ?bernahm, best?tigte gegen?ber SPIEGEL TV in Bagdad eindeutig Folterspuren am K?rper des Verstorbenen diagnostiziert zu haben. Bilder des Toten belegen zudem, dass der Mann entgegen den US-Angaben sehr wohl obduziert wurde. Die Narben auf dem Oberk?rper deuten daraufhin, dass dies westliche ?rzte durchgef?hrt haben.
Tiefdunkle Bluterg?sse am ganzen K?rper
SPIEGEL TV
Familienvater Asad Abdul Kareem Abdul Jaleel mit seinen Angeh?rigen: An bestialischer Folter gestorben?
Die Bilder der Leiche lassen auch den Laien deutliche Gewalteinwirkung leicht erkennen: An beiden K?rperseiten sind gro?fl?chige, dunkle Bluterg?sse zu sehen, die von Schl?gen stammen k?nnten. An den Handgelenken und an den Unterschenkeln sieht man ebenfalls Bluterg?sse, die vermutlich auf tagelange Fesselungen zur?ckgehen. Auf dem R?cken zeugen Wunden von Schl?gen oder anderen Arten von Gewalteinwirkungen. Auch andere Schnittwunden im Brustbereich deuten auf Verletzungen hin, die kaum "nat?rlich" zu nennen sind.

Stellen sich die Verdachtsmomente gegen die US-Truppen als wahr heraus, bek?me der Folter-Skandal um US-Soldaten eine dramatische Wendung. Geht es bisher um gewaltsame Misshandlungen von Gefangenen und erniedrigende Verh?rmethoden, m?sste pl?tzlich wegen unterlassener Hilfeleistung, Totschlags oder gar Mord ermittelt werden. Auf die beteiligten Soldaten und deren Vorgesetzte k?men harte Strafen zu und die US-Armee im Irak w?re noch mehr Hass und Rachgel?sten als bisher schon ausgesetzt. Zwar gibt es schon jetzt mehrere Ermittlungsverfahren wegen ungekl?rter Todesf?lle im Irak und auch in Afghanistan - doch die US-Armee beharrt darauf, dass in keinem der Verfahren die Schuld von Soldaten habe nachgewiesen werden k?nnen.

Den SPIEGEL TV-Recherchen zufolge ist der Fall des Familienvaters Jaleel im besetzten Irak keine Seltenheit. Angestellte des Gerichtsmedizinischen Instituts in Bagdad best?tigten, dass sich unter den Toten, die das Internationale Rote Kreuz im Auftrag der Amerikaner an sie ?bergebe, immer wieder auch Folteropfer befinden w?rden. Allerdings sei es den irakischen Gerichtsmedizinern untersagt, eigene Untersuchungen anzustellen, sobald ein amerikanischer Totenschein vorliege - auch, wenn die Angaben ?ber die Todesursache offensichtlich falsch seien.

US-Armee schweigt

Allein in Bagdad, so Mitarbeiter des Instituts, w?rden w?chentlich etwa f?nf Leichen mit Totenscheinen der US-Streitkr?fte eingeliefert. G?ngige Praxis der Amerikaner sei, dass beispielsweise Leichen aus dem Gef?ngnis Abu Ghureib als Opfer von Granatenangriffen auf das Straflager deklariert w?rden. So sei dies allein in der vergangenen Woche bei 26 Leichen von H?ftlingen geschehen, obgleich nur ein Teil dieser Leichen die f?r Granatenangriffe typischen Verletzungen aufgewiesen habe, so die Mitarbeiter.

Im Fall des 47-j?hrigen Asad Abdul Kareem Abdul Jaleel scheint es mittlerweile auch eine interne Ermittlung der US-Truppen zu geben. Zeugen berichteten, dass sie von US-Soldaten zu den Vorg?ngen in der amerikanischen Milit?rbasis Al Asad befragt worden sein. Seit mehreren Tagen versuchte SPIEGEL TV zudem, eine Stellungnahme von den zust?ndigen Stellen der Armee in Bagdad zu bekommen. Bisher allerdings blieben sowohl m?ndliche als auch schriftliche Anfragen unbeantwortet.

SPIEGEL TV zeigt den Bericht am Sonntag, 16. Mai, um 22.55 Uhr auf RTL
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TSCHETSCHENIEN
Putins zwielichtiger Kraftmeier
Von Alexander Schwabe
Nach dem Bombenattentat auf Pr?sident Achmed Kadyrow kursieren in der russischen Teilrepublik Tschetschenien wilde Ger?chte ?ber die Auftraggeber. Die Macht im zerst?rten Land liegt nun bei Ramsan, dem Sohn des Ermordeten. Der passionierte Boxer unterh?lt eigene Todesschwadronen und gilt als Folterknecht von Putins Gnaden.
ANZEIGE
REUTERS
Unpassender Auftritt: Ramsan Kadyrow und der russische Pr?sident Putin (r.)
Der Auftritt im Kreml passte gar nicht zur gewohnten Erscheinung von Ramsan Kadyrow, 27. Wenige Stunden nach der Ermordung seines Vaters Achmed, 52, des Pr?sidenten Tschetscheniens, trat er vergangenen Sonntag an der Seite des russischen Pr?sidenten Wladimir Putin im Kreml vor die Kameras - statt im Anzug, oder wie sonst oft in Uniform, zeigte er sich in einem blauen Sportdress.
Ramsan Kadyrow, von Putin zum stellvertretenden Regierungschef ernannt, ist der neue starke Mann in Tschetschenien - auch wenn Sergej Abramow bald nach der Bluttat zum ?bergangspr?sidenten bestellt wurde.
Wie einst Saddam Husseins Sohn Kussei die Elitetruppen der Republikanischen Garden befehligte, so steht auch Ramsan einer mehrere Tausend Mann starken Eliteeinheit vor. Wie f?r die Republikanischen Garden, so ist der Begriff Sicherheitstruppe auch f?r Ramsans Soldaten eine Besch?nigung. Die dem Rebellenf?hrer und fr?heren tschetschenischen Pr?sidenten Aslan Maschadow nahe stehende Exilzeitung "Chechen Times" schreibt, die Kommandos seien zu R?uberbanden verkommen, sie raubten, entf?hrten und mordeten - m?glicherweise unter direkter Beteiligung ihres obersten Befehlshabers.
AFP
Sicherheitschef Ramsan Kadyrow: Parallelen zu Kussei Hussein
Anfang des Jahres berichtete die britische Zeitung "Guardian" von einem 27-j?hrigen Tankstellengehilfen, der von Ramsan pers?nlich misshandelt worden sein soll. Nachdem sie ihn drei Tage lang im Keller eines Hauses in der Ortschaft Hosi Yurt verpr?gelt hatten, sei der Sicherheitschef pers?nlich in die Zelle getreten, in der drei weitere M?nner festgehalten wurden. "Wei?t du wer ich bin?", habe Ramsan gefragt.
Boxer und Folterer
Der Befragte, der Ramsan aus dem Fernsehen kannte, bejahte. Daraufhin habe ihm der Pr?sidentensohn, der sich auch als Boxer versucht, auf den Kopf geschlagen und ihm in den Unterleib getreten. "Sie schlugen mich und brachen mir die Nase", sagte das Opfer weiter. Er sei schlie?lich frei gekommen, weil seine Familie der Polizei drei AK-47-Gewehre als L?segeld ?berbracht habe.
AP
Dynamo-Stadion Grosny: Explosion am "Tag des Sieges"
Hosi Yurt ist ein Ort des Schreckens. "Ich hatte schlimme Dinge ?ber den Ort geh?rt", sagte der Tankstellengehilfe gegen?ber dem "Guardian". Kadyrows Sicherheitsdienst verh?rt dort unliebsame Tschetschenen auf Verbindungen zu antirussischen Rebellen. Oder man h?lt sie schlicht fest, um von Angeh?rigen L?segeld zu erpressen.
Die Methoden sind skrupellos: "Ich habe von Leuten geh?rt, die dort 40 Tage lang mit Metallstangen geschlagen wurden", sagt der Tankwart, "sie zerschmettern einem auch die Enden der Finger". Regierungssprecher Abdulbek Vakheyev sagte dazu lediglich, Ramsan habe noch nie an Folterungen teilgenommen. Der Gefolterte dagegen sagt: "Wenn ich die M?glichkeit h?tte, w?rde ich Ramsan eigenh?ndig t?ten."
AP
Achmed Kadyrow stirbt durch eine Landmine
Die Schl?gertrupps Ramsan Kadyrows, gef?rchtet als "Kadyrowzis", haben die Arbeit ?bernommen, die fr?her der russische Inlandsgeheimdienst FSB erledigte. "Bisher gab es marodierende russische Einheiten, die in H?user eindrangen, raubten, vergewaltigten und mordeten, jetzt verlaufen die S?uberungen wie in der Stalinzeit: gezielt und heimlich", sagt Ekkehard Maass von der deutsch-kaukasischen Gesellschaft in Berlin.
Komplott- und Rachetheorien
F?nf Tage nach dem blutigen Anschlag im Dynamo-Stadion in Grosny ist noch immer unklar, wer hinter der Ermordung des Pr?sidenten steckt. Die Ermittler kommen nicht weiter. Niemand hat sich bisher zu dem Anschlag bekannt.
AFP
Kadyrow-Beisetzung in dessen Heimatort Zentoroj
Nach Angaben des stellvertretenden Innenministers Kadayew hatte der russische Geheimdienst FSB die Trib?ne zwei Mal ?berpr?ft, so dass die Mine kurz vor Beginn der Gedenkfeier anl?sslich des 59. Jahrestags des Sieges ?ber Hitler eingeschmuggelt worden sein muss. In tschetschenischen Zeitungen kursiert die Verschw?rungstheorie, ein Komplott zwischen Ramsan und Putin habe Kadyrow und sechs weitere Menschen das Leben gekostet.
Laut "Chechen Times" ist der Statthalter Moskaus zu selbstherrlich geworden, habe seine Begehrlichkeiten zu sehr auf die ?leink?nfte der Republik gerichtet und ?ber Geb?hr nach Unabh?ngigkeit gestrebt. Allein Ramsan soll gewusst haben, wo der Vater im Dynamo-Stadion von Grosny genau Platz nehmen w?rde. Die t?dliche Explosion wurde von einer kleinen Landmine ausgel?st, die direkt unter dem Sitz des Pr?sidenten angebracht worden war.
Nach Ansicht Ahmed Sakajews, Maschadows Vertreter in Europa, steckt Sulim Jamadaew, ein enger Freund Ramsans, hinter dem Anschlag. In angetrunkenem Zustand hatte er sich vor wenigen Tagen mit Ramsan gestritten. Es kam zu Sch?ssen, Jamadaew verletzte den Freund am Bein. Aus Freunden seien Feinde geworden. Behandelt wurde Ramsan in einem Moskauer Krankenhaus - weshalb er bereits wenige Stunden nach dem Attentat an der Seite Putins im Kreml auftreten konnte.
AP
Tschetschenien: Trauer und Verzweiflung
Aus Furcht vor Rache habe Jamadaew - in Zusammenarbeit mit dem milit?rischen Geheimdienst GRU den Kopf des Kadyrow-Clans get?tet.
Nach Einsch?tzung der russischen Regierung haben tschetschenische Rebellen den t?dlichen Anschlag vom vergangenen Sonntag ver?bt. Bereits vor zwei Jahren waren am "Tag des Sieges" 43 Menschen bei einem Bombenanschlag in Kaspiisk im benachbarten Dagestan gestorben. Sergej Fridinski, stellvertretender Generalstaatsanwalt in Moskau, vermutet den oder die T?ter von Grosny unter fr?heren Widerstandsk?mpfern, die Ramsan Kadyrow in seine ber?chtigte Sicherheitstruppe aufgenommen hatte.
Putins Tschetschenien-Strategie
DPA
Grosny: Russische Soldaten patrouillieren durch die tschetschenische Hauptstadt
Trotz Ramsans miserabler Reputation setzt Russlands Pr?sident Putin weiter auf die Kadyrow-Schiene. Seine Strategie: Der schmutzige Job, den tschetschenischen Widerstand zu brechen, sollen nun Kadyrows Truppen ?bernehmen. Das Kalk?l: Die russische Bev?lkerung toleriert den von ihm begonnenen zweiten Tschetschenienkrieg eher, wenn Tschetschenen von Tschetschenen get?tet werden, anstatt von russischen Soldaten - das Prinzip "Teile und Herrsche" gilt auch in Grosny.
Um die Kontinuit?t seiner Politik zu unterstreichen, entschloss sich Putin diese Woche gar, ?berraschend nach Grosny zu reisen. Als er in einem Hubschrauber ?ber dem Alltag der tschetschenischen Bev?lkerung stand, zeigte er sich erschrocken, wie sehr das Land durch den Krieg ruiniert worden ist. "Es sieht schrecklich aus", sagte Putin und versprach die tschetschenische Polizei um 1125 Mann zu verst?rken und Wirtschaftsexperten f?r den Wiederaufbau in die Region zu entsenden.
DPA
Folgen des Krieges: Ruinen in Grosny
Ob sich Putins Strategie auszahlt, scheint fraglich. Seit Ramsan Sicherheitschef in Tschetschenien ist, verging kein Jahr, in dem es nicht zu einem Mordanschlag auf den verhassten Kadyrow-Sohn kam. Dabei wurde er wiederholt verletzt. Auf einer von Rebellen betriebenen Website hei?t es, man m?sse nicht Nostradamus sein, um das Schicksal Ramsans vorauszusehen. Sollte er am Wahltag im September noch leben, sei das ein gro?er Erfolg f?r Moskau. "Es gibt einfach zu viele Menschen in Tschetschenien, die bereit sind, zu sterben, um ihn los zu werden", hei?t es weiter. Die Reaktion Ramsans ist nicht weniger brachial. In einem Interview mit der vom fr?heren Kreml-Berater Gleb Pawlowski gegr?ndeten russischen Internetzeitung "strana.ru" sagte er: "Ich werde diese Banditen und Terroristen zerquetschen."
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Malaysian Officials Deny Claims of Abuse
By JASBANT SINGH Associated Press Writer
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (AP) - Government ministers on Monday denied claims by suspected Islamic extremists that they were routinely abused by Malaysian police interrogators.
Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar said comparisons of the treatment of Malaysian detainees to the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. troops at Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison would be "very naughty."
Noh Omar, deputy security minister, said he met with detainees a few weeks ago and that no prisoner claimed being abused.
The charges of abuse were made by detainees in a human rights document obtained last week by The Associated Press that provides the most detailed accounts of alleged abuses since Malaysia began rounding up suspected terrorists nearly three years ago.
The government is holding about 100 people at a prison camp under security laws that allow indefinite detention without trial. About 70 of those are alleged Islamic militants, many of them suspected members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a group linked to al-Qaida and blamed for attacks that have killed hundreds of people in Southeast Asia.
Security officials previously said interrogations of the suspects gained information about plots to bomb U.S. and other Western interests in neighboring Singapore and about Malaysia's role as a meeting point for senior al-Qaida operatives involved in the Sept. 11 attacks.
Thirty-one of the detainees signed a complaint that was lodged with the government's Human Rights Commission. They listed 57 types of abuse they claimed to have been subjected to.
Noh disputed the accounts. He said that during a visit to the prison camp April 29, he spoke to every inmate and heard no complaints.
"None of them alleged to me that they were mistreated," Noh told reporters. "They only said they have repented and they want to be released soon to reunited with their families."
He said he would meet with international human rights activists if they wish. The New York-based Human Rights Watch is planning to issue a report on the treatment of Malaysian detainees Wednesday.
"I think these accusations are just to smear our country's name," Noh said. "They want to portray our situation like Iraq. Just because we have a camp where we hold detainees without trial, they think our methods are the same as U.S. methods."
The allegations were compiled by independent local activists from inmate complaints and handed to the Human Rights Commission in January. The panel said it did not investigate and passed the document to police officials, who have repeatedly denied condoning mistreatment of prisoners.
Unlike the scandal involving abuses at U.S. detention camps in Iraq, there is no independent corroboration, such as photographs or testimony from non-detainee witnesses.
The complaints range from verbal attacks and denial of religious freedoms to long periods of solitary confinement and physical abuse and humiliation.
Detainees charged they were routinely slapped, kicked and spat on during interrogations. One said his beard was set afire. Some said they were forced to perform demeaning tasks such as massaging interrogators' feet.
Lim Kit Siang, leader of the opposition in Parliament, said Monday that the government should conduct a thorough investigation.
"The Malaysian government has rightfully taken a stand condemning the abuse, torture and humiliation of Iraqis," Lim said. "We should also make sure that there is no such mistreatment of our own prisoners in Malaysia."

2004-05-17 15:57:28 GMT


Copyright 2004
The Associated Press All Rights Reserved

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When the Bank of China Wakes

By Desmond Lachman Published 05/14/2004

TCS
Judging by recent global market jitters, Napoleon might very well have been referring to the Bank of China and the global economy when he uttered his famous warning some two hundred years ago that "when China woke the world would shudder." However, it is unlikely that even Napoleon would have anticipated the complexity of the choices now facing China's policymakers as they try to engineer a soft landing for their economy. Nor would he likely have foreseen how vital a Chinese soft landing would be for the continued health of the global economy.
The importance of China to the global economy derives not so much from the size of its economy but from the fact that China has continued to grow at a remarkable 9 percent annual rate at a time that the rest of the world half-slumbered. As a result, while China accounts for only 4 percent of world GDP, it has accounted for as much as 15 percent of the world's GDP growth and almost 20 percent of the growth in world exports and imports.
These figures understate the importance of China's role as the locomotive for its neighbors, including Australia and Japan, which have become increasingly dependent on the 40 percent growth rate in Chinese imports. They also understate the importance of China as the dynamo for the boom in international commodity prices, including aluminum, copper, petroleum, and soybeans, which have helped keep Latin America's economies afloat.
No less impressive is the importance that China is assuming in the international capital markets as its external sector has strengthened and as foreign capital has flooded into China. By April 2004, China's holdings of US Treasury bonds approached US$400 billion, while it now accounts for almost 12 percent of each new auction of US Treasury paper. Were China to withdraw from the US Treasury market for any reason, ripples would be felt globally as US interest rates would be forced sharply higher.
The immediate risk that China now poses to the global economy is that it simply cannot continue growing at its recent torrid pace without stoking domestic inflation. In particular, it is difficult to see how China might sustain the 19 percent rate of industrial output growth or the 43 percent rate of overall investment growth that it registered in the first quarter of 2004. Inflation at the consumer level is already ticking up to 5 percent, while the growth in China's monetary and credit aggregates is now exceeding 20 percent.
Recent pronouncements by Chinese policymakers clearly suggest that they have become increasingly concerned about the risk of an overheated economy. However, they recognize that they are not equipped with the normal monetary policy instruments that would increase the prospects of a soft-landing for the economy. Indeed, the Bank of China recognizes that there are clear limits to the use of interest rates to cool the economy in the context of a currency that remains pegged to the US dollar.
Any attempt by the Bank of China to raise interest rates in such a context would tend to be neutralized by further encouraging the large inflow of "hot money" from abroad. And the Bank of China is not willing to contemplate a large revaluation or the floating of the currency that would restore potency to interest rate policy for fear of losing China's present international competitive advantage. Chinese policymakers view the maintenance of an undervalued currency as vital to generate the much-needed urban employment that might solve their chronic problem of rural unemployment.
Instead, in their effort to slow the economy, the Chinese authorities are being forced to regress to the blunt instrument of administrative credit and investment controls, whereby the government dictates to the banks to whom and how much they might lend. Apart from representing a retreat from the move to a more market oriented economy, such administrative controls constitute a hit-and-miss way of slowing the economy and heighten the probability that China has a hard landing.
For China's sake one can only hope that the Chinese policymakers follow through on their pronouncements to cool China's economy soon before the imbalances in that economy get worse. From a global perspective, one can only pray that they are blessed with good luck in applying the crude tools at their disposal to reign in an overheated Chinese economy without precipitating a hard landing that would be so damaging to the world economy.
Desmond Lachman is a frequent contributor. He recently wrote for TCS about it being Time for a New Broom at the IMF.
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Time for a New Broom at the IMF

By Desmond Lachman Published 03/25/2004

TCS
Horst Koehler's hasty departure as the IMF's Managing Director has already started the horse-trading amongst the European nations to whom tradition has assigned the task of nominating a successor. It would be the greatest of pities if in that horse-trading the Europeans lost sight of the fact that perhaps never before has the IMF been in need of more basic reform. For the IMF now has practically nothing to say about the key global exchange rate issues of the day. Moreover, in recent years, the IMF's bread and butter business of lending to crisis-stricken countries has run amok.
Set up in the shadow of the Great Depression by the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, the IMF's basic mission was supposed to have been that of "promoting exchange rate stability, maintaining orderly exchange rate arrangements, and avoiding competitive exchange depreciations." In particular, the IMF was to have been the bulwark against a repetition of the destructive competitive depreciations of the 1930s that were thought to have been a major factor in the length of the Great Depression.
Yet today, the IMF offers little leadership in addressing the burning currency issues of the day that have eerily come to resemble those of the 1930s. What, if anything, has the IMF been saying about the fact that the three major global economies -- Europe, Japan, and the United States -- simultaneously want weaker currencies? Does the IMF even raise an eyebrow when Japan engages in massive purchases of US dollars, to the tune of US$100 billion in the first two months of 2004, with the explicit objective of weakening the yen? Or could the IMF be more conspicuously silent about the fact that a host of Asian countries, led by China and India, maintain currencies that are grossly undervalued by any reasonable measure?
One would hope that in their deliberations, the European nations seek a new IMF chief, who might provide the intellectual leadership so sorely needed to deal with today's difficult global exchange rate issues. For only then can one expect the IMF to get back into the game of promoting orderly exchange rates, so necessary for enhancing global prosperity.
The Europeans also might wish to nominate a new IMF chief who would restore order to the chaos in IMF lending to "emerging market" countries. Since the 1995 Mexican peso crisis, the IMF has abandoned the normal limits that used to apply to the amount of money it would lend to a country in distress. Instead, it has lent tens of billions of dollars to countries on the grounds that "exceptional circumstances" prevail. The net result of this approach has been huge bailouts that provide incentives for investors and governments alike to behave in an irresponsible fashion, since they assume that they will be saved from the consequences of their mistakes by the IMF's largesse. It has also eliminated any semblance of transparency in the IMF's lending operations and it has undermined the IMF's balance sheet. This latter point is epitomized by the fact that Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey now account for three quarters of the IMF's outstanding loan portfolio.
The fact that the IMF is now forced to lend Argentina very sizeable amounts of money in order to ensure that Argentina does not default on its past IMF loans should raise basic questions about the wisdom of the IMF's current lending policy. In particular, it should raise the question as to whether the IMF should not revert to its pre-1995 type of access limit policy, whereby there were strict ceilings upon the amount that the IMF could lend to any individual country. Such a change in policy would effectively restrict the IMF to its original role of a catalytic lender for the emerging markets.
Given the IMF's highly hierarchical structure and the very long tenure of its Managing Director's appointment, it is not often that one has the opportunity to change the IMF's basic direction. In today's increasingly complicated financial market world, it would be a crying shame if Europe's leaders did not grasp this opportunity to effect real change at the IMF.

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2nd ID elements to move from Korea to Iraq

By Matthew Cox
Times staff writer

With no other fresh combat forces available, the Army is planning on pulling soldiers from 2nd Infantry Division out of Korea and sending them to Iraq.
One of the 2nd ID's two maneuver brigades is slated to deploy to Iraq as part of a larger force to replace the 20,000 soldiers the Pentagon recently extended to deal with increasing violence there, said a Pentagon planner, who requested that his name not be used.
It would be the first time in more than 50 years that U.S. military used the 2nd Infantry's two brigades for a mission other than the defense of South Korea.
Pentagon officials maintain that the movement of one brigade will have little impact on South Korea's ability to defend itself from attack from North Korean forces.
"The South Korean army is a capable force, unlike it was in the 1950s," said the Pentagon planner.
The 2nd ID is part of a force of about 37,000 troops that the U.S. maintains in South Korea. The South Korean Army has about 560,000 soldiers, compared to North Korea's force of 1 million soldiers.
U.S. carrier battle groups in the region and three Marine Expeditionary Force units stationed at Okinawa could help in the event of an attack, the planner said.
While no date has been set yet, the brigade from the 2nd ID would likely deploy about the end of June when the 1st Armored Division 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment are slated to pull out, he said. Those units were scheduled to redeploy in April, but were ordered to stay in Iraq up to 90 additional days because of escalating violence..
Joining the 2nd ID force for the year-long tour would be elements of the 10th Mountain and two companies from the 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which serve as opposing force soldiers at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La., the planner said.

The Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Scandal:
It Shows Why the Court Must Decide In Favor of Judicial Review in the Guantanamo Cases
By EDWARD LAZARUS
elazarus@findlaw.com
----
Thursday, May. 13, 2004

As is evident from the frantic positioning of Republican and Democratic politicians, the scandal arising from the abuse of Iraqi prisoners is likely to have far-reaching political consequences. Less obvious, but no less important for the long-term, are the legal consequences that may well flow from the military's unconscionable treatment of those it has taken into custody.
Right now, the Supreme Court has before it the cases involving the Al Qaeda suspects detained at the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba -- as well as the two American citizens, Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, being held on U.S. soil. These cases raise a historic question: Can the Executive Branch unilaterally designate these detainees as "enemy combatants"; hold them indefinitely without charging them with any crime; fail to treat them as prisoners of war; and refuse them access to counsel - all without the possibility of review by the judiciary?
After the Iraqi prisoner abuse revelations, the prospect of this kind of unreviewable detention is all the more frightening. Even with military court-martial a possibility, the Iraq abuses occurred. Without any court watching, what will happen in U.S. prisons, run by our country in our name?
What limits will be placed on what can be done? The answer may well be: Only the ones upon which our courts, interpreting our Constitution insist. And the courts can only insist, if they have jurisdiction to inquire.
Defenders of the Administration claim that the prison abuse scandal should have no effect on the legal issues before the Court. But this is just so much nonsense. It is like asking the Brown v. Board of Education Court to ignore the effect of segregated schools.
Making Already High Stakes Even Higher: The Guantanamo Cases
As I noted in a prior column, when the Supreme Court first decided to review the detention of the Guantanamo prisoners, it has always been clear that the stakes in these cases were monumental.
The Bush Administration has taken the position that the Executive may incarcerate anyone, even citizens, for an indefinite time, without meaningful judicial review -- so long as the Executive, in its discretion, designates those persons "enemy combatants." That position is an unprecedented claim of Executive power -- and one that strikes at the heart of the Constitution's system of checks and balances.
Going back to before the Magna Carta, such detentions have posed the risk of both mistaken imprisonment, and the mistreatment of prisoners. Protecting against such evils is the very purpose of the ancient writ of habeas corpus by which a prisoner may challenge the legality of his or her detention.
For that reason, I described the Guantanamo cases in my previous column as the kind that define as the soul of a nation and its institutions.
In light of the torture of Iraqi prisoners, it is now even more important that the Supreme Court definitively reject the Administration's claim of unbridled power. After all, the Administration's position always boiled down to the idea that the Executive could be "trusted" to handle the detainees fairly and appropriately.
That notion lies in tatters now -- rebutted by pictures so awful, we find them difficult to bear, and feel a national shame at the acts to which they testify. If the Court accepts the Administration's "just trust us" argument even after all the grisly instances of Executive Branch misconduct that have recently emerged, then it will be guilty of a moral as well as legal abdication of catastrophic magnitude.
Oral Argument In Padilla: A Lie About Torture Undermines A Bid For Trust
At oral argument in Padilla v. United States, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recognized the centrality of the risk of prisoner mistreatment to the issues raised in the case. She saw that absent a judicial check on the power of the Executive to detain prisoners, and sequester their cases from judicial scrutiny, abuses could occur.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, some regimes (though not ones the United States seeks to emulate) use torture to obtain intelligence information. "Suppose," she asked Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement, who was arguing the Administration's position before the Court. "the Executive says 'mild torture, we think, will help get this information?'"
Clement did not hesitate in his answer: "Well, our executive doesn't, and I think the fact that executive discretion in a war situation can be abused is not a good and sufficient reason for judicial micromanagement in overseeing that authority. You have to recognize that in situations where there is a war, where the government is on a war footing, that you have to trust the executive." (Emphases added).
It turns out, of course, that the Executive cannot even be trusted to give a truthful answer to the Supreme Court. In fact, our executive does use torture -- though Clement surely didn't know it. (No lawyer in the Solicitor General's office - whose main job it is to represent the federal government before the Supreme Court - would risk his or her credibility with the Justices by responding to a question with a knowing falsehood.)
At the time Clement answer, his client -- the Department of Defense -- had known about the torture of Iraqi prisoners for months. Nevertheless, DOD let its lawyer argue before the Court while he was blind to a fact of obvious relevance -- and to therefore unknowingly lie to the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.
This lie to the nation's highest tribunal, too, ought to be laid at Secretary Rumsfeld's door by those who call for his resignation.
Why the Court Cannot Trust the Executive Branch to, In Effect, Review Itself
But mightn't the Iraqi prisoner abuse be an aberration? Can't we generally trust the Executive Branch? The answer is: Absolutely not. Not only actual evidence, but structural analysis, testifies to the fact that without judicial review, abuses will inevitably occur, be covered up, and remain unremedied.
The "Executive Branch" is a label for an enormous web of bureaucracies, all ultimately responsible to the President. Naturally, the actions of the Executive Branch, both good and bad, inevitably reflect the limitations and weaknesses inherent in any far-flung human enterprise.
Such human institutions respond to pressure. And pressure creates both errors and sins.
The War on Terror exerts enormous pressure on the Executive Branch. Its invocation has sent the U.S. military to distant lands to fight an ill-defined foe, amid a civilian population whose language and culture most soldiers do not comprehend.
Under the circumstances, it should come as no surprise that the military detains lots of Afghanis and Iraqis who pose no legitimate threat to the United States. (Indeed, Red Cross estimates suggests that the overwhelming majority of Iraqi prisoners were imprisoned by mistake.)
Nor should it come as a surprise that, in order to obtain vital intelligence from detainees, the military and other law enforcement have crossed the line of lawful interrogation. It should even be no surprise that, while detaining a large number of ethnically distinct and often uncooperative prisoners, some considerable number of individuals have exhibited the unfortunate human tendency towards cruelty and even sadism.
Bureaucracies, however, are not inclined to admit mistakes or problems, and especially not ones that are highly embarrassing. Bureaucracies cover up, sweep under the rug, ignore, or bury.
This natural tendency, moreover, is dramatically enhanced when partisan politics are added to the mix. No President in the midst of a bitter re-election campaign (or at any time, for that matter) wants to admit problems within the agencies under his purview -- nor, typically, do any of his underlings. Note that Richard Clarke, who has stepped down, feels he can apologize for mistakes and omissions that led to 9/11; but those still in office plainly feel they cannot.
Everything we know about the conduct of the War on Terror confirms this view of the Executive. No one within the Executive wanted to own up to the glaring weaknesses in our pre-9/11 intelligence gathering. No one within the Executive wanted to own up to having detained many, many innocent civilians -- in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and even in the United States, through the sweeping detention of noncitizens after 9/11. (As Anita Ramasastry has described, this detention has now been well-documented, and admitted at least by the Office of the Inspector General.)
No one wanted to own up to prisoner abuse - and now, in a classic act of self-preservation, this abuse is attributed to just a few "bad apples."
Why the Iraqi Prisoner Abuses Are Directly Relevant to the Cases Before the Court
So what does this have to do with Padilla, Hamdi, and the Guantanamo detainees? Everything.
The framers of our Constitution understood the risk of abuse of power within every branch of government, and the inability of each branch to police those potential abuses itself. That is why they created the scheme of checks and balances. And that is why they created an independent federal judiciary (life-tenured, with a fixed salary) that could not be swayed, or tempted away from enforcing Constitutional rights when the other branches infringed them.
There are no principle more fundamental to our Constitution -- or more responsible for separating our own Constitution from those of many other countries around the world that have proven to be glorious but worthless declarations of rights -- than these: An independent judiciary with the power of judicial review. A system that prevents abuse of power by dividing it.
If the Supreme Court exempts the Administration from the essential structure of the Constitution -- in the face of gruesome evidence from Iraqi prisons vindicating that very structure -- then more will have been lost in Iraq than even the terrible price of our people's blood. We will have lost ourselves.


Edward Lazarus, a FindLaw columnist, writes about, practices, and teaches law in Los Angeles. A former federal prosecutor, he is the author of two books - most recently, Closed Chambers: The Rise, Fall, and Future of the Modern Supreme Court.

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Bush Signs Order Giving State Lead Role in Iraq


By Sue Pleming and Caren Bohan
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The State Department will take over the lead role for most U.S. operations in Iraq from the Pentagon after the transfer of sovereignty on June 30, according to an order signed by President Bush this week.
The executive order, called a national security presidential directive, was signed by the president on Tuesday but has not yet been released publicly, government sources who have seen the document said on Thursday.
Officials said the order seemed to put to rest a power struggle between the State Department and the Pentagon over who should lead U.S. government operations in Iraq after June 30 when the Coalition Provisional Authority ceases to exist and limited powers are given to the Iraqis.
The order said when the CPA's role ended, the United States would be represented in Iraq by a chief of mission under the guidance of the State Department who would be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all U.S. government employees, policies and activities in the country.
The Senate on May 6 confirmed John Negroponte as U.S. ambassador to Baghdad and he will be the administration's top official in Iraq, replacing Paul Bremer, who will step down June 30 as head of the provisional authority.
However, the order specified that State Department control did not cover employees under military command or those seconded to an international organization.
The document gave continued authority to U.S. Central Command for military actions but said Secretary of State Colin Powell would be responsible for the supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq.
The U.S. military would also coordinate efforts for equipping Iraqi security forces and at the appropriate time, the secretaries of State and Defense would jointly decide when military functions should be transferred to the appropriate security organizations.
The State Department, whose lawyers are currently examining the document, and the White House declined comment on the executive order.
VICTORY FOR STATE
The order is seen as a victory for the State Department, which has been trying to play a more dominant role in Iraq and to place more emphasis on nation-building.
Moreover, the prison abuse scandal in which U.S. soldiers are seen in photographs humiliating and abusing Iraqi prisoners has damaged the military's credibility.
Diplomats also hope that by leaning more on the State Department, allies who opposed the U.S. occupation will be more enthusiastic about joining the effort to rebuild the shattered country.
Iraqi contracts paid for by U.S. tax dollars, which are currently controlled by the CPA's Program Management Office, will be under a temporary organization established by the defense department, according to the order.
This new office, to be called the Project and Contracting Office, would include such tasks as engineering, auditing and other contracting activities, said one source.
A U.S. official said allowing the military to set up the contracting office was not controversial and had been done in a manner that State itself had suggested because the Pentagon had more procurement experience.
Last month, the U.S. government handed out just over $5 billion worth of heavy construction contracts for Iraq and billions more are expected to be advertised in the coming months, to be paid for out of the $18.4 billion appropriated by Congress for rebuilding Iraq.

Copyright ? Reuters 2004. All rights reserved.
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The "Taguba Report" On Treatment
Of Abu Ghraib Prisoners In Iraq



ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION
OF THE
800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE


SECRET / NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION1







--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Related Links
Uniform Code of Military Justice


Military Lawyers


Military Law Resources




TABLE OF CONTENTS


References ..................................................................... 3

Background ................................................................... 6

(Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation
and Detention Operations In Iraq
MG Miller's Assessment).............................................. 8

IO Comments on MG Miller's Assessment ................... 8

Report on Detention and Corrections In Iraq
(MG Ryder's Report) .................................................... 9

IO Comments on MG Ryder's Report ......................... 12

Preliminary Investigative Actions ................................ 12

Findings and Recommendations

Part One (Detainee Abuse)........................................... 15

Findings ..................................................................15

Recommendations .................................................. 20

Part Two (Escapes and Accountability) ....................... 22

Findings ................................................................. 22

Recommendations .................................................. 31

Part Three (Command Climate, Etc.)............................ 34

Findings ................................................................. 36

Recommendations .................................................. 44

Other Findings/Observations ........................................ 49

Conclusion .................................................................... 50

Annexes ........................................................................ 51


References


1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949

2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949


3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949

4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1967

5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1951

6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949

7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949

8. DOD Directive 5100.69, "DOD Program for Prisoners of War and other Detainees," 27 December 1972/p>

9. DOD Directive 5100.77 "DOD Law of War Program," 10 July 1979/p>

10. STANAG No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June 1994/p>

11. STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 6), 6 December 1994/p>

12. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997

13. AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996

14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993

15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992

15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992

16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, 12 February 1998

17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September 1993

18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30 September 1993

19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988

20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security, 31 September 2000

21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, 5 September 2003

22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993

23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, 11 May 1988

24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002

25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000

26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June 2002

27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996

28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002

29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998

30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29 October 1999

31. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001

32. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001

33. FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March 2002

34. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000

35. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 5 May 1994

36. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992

37. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 1985

38. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001

39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May 1984

40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001

41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003

42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Battalion (IR)

43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Guard Company

44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Escort Guard Company

45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier's Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill Level 1, 6 August 2002

46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March 1999

47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003

48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Levels 2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, 30 September 2003

49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September 2003

50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq, (MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6 November 2003

51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 & 3.C.8.A.1, Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF), 19 November 2003

52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence- Led Detention Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August 2003

53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement, 26 December 2003

54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter- Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003

55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting Operations, 13 December 2003

56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial, 2002 Edition

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

BACKGROUND

1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US Central Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in the grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of detention and internment operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003 to present. LTG Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes from confinement facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry to make findings and recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 2)

2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that the investigation should inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 3)

3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support, CFLCC, to conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was directed to conduct an informal investigation under AR 15- 6 into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:


(U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF));
(U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;
(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;
(U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate. (ANNEX 4)

4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request to investigate the 800th MP Brigade followed the initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at the time this investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition Confinement Facilities in Iraq over the past several months. These include Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities. In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)

5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to the actual appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to be my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted the Provost Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts in the areas of detention and internment operations. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)

6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ, CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. MG Miller's team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention operations. MG Miller's team used JTF-GTMO procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)

7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in- depth analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal, medical, and automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had previously requested a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make specific recommendations concerning detention and corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG Ryder personally led this assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)

ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND
DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT)

1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller's team was on the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees in Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive Summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary also stated that detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller's Team recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that "sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees." Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller's team stated that the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also stated "it is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees." (ANNEX 20)

3. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also concluded that Joint Strategic Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment. The Miller Team also stated that establishment of the Theater Joint Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized, and focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)

4. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also observed that the application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a legal review and recommendations on internee interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge Advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)

IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT

1. (S/NF) MG Miller's team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its observations and recommendations. There is a strong argument that the intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller's team that the "guard force" be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that military police "do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions." The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 20)

REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
IN IRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)

1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a comprehensive review of the entire detainee and corrections system in Iraq and provided recommendations addressing each of the following areas as requested by the Commander CJTF-7:
(U) Detainee and corrections system management

(U) Detainee management, including detainee
movement, segregation, and accountability

(U) Means of command and control of the detention
and corrections system

(U) Integration of military detention and
corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-
run corrections system

(U) Detainee medical care and health management

(U) Detention facilities that meet required
health, hygiene, and sanitation standards

(U) Court integration and docket management for
criminal detainees

(U) Detainee legal processing

(U) Detainee databases and records, including
integration with law enforcement and court databases (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG Ryder's team are beyond the scope of this investigation. However, several important findings are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is added in certain areas):

(U) Detainee Management (including movement,
segregation, and accountability)
(U) There is a wide variance in standards and
approaches at the various detention facilities.
Several Division/Brigade collection points and US
monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently
detailed use of force and other standing operating
procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility,
improper restraint techniques, detainee management,
etc.) Though, there were no military police units
purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. (ANNEX 19)

(U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi
facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi
crimes) are detained with security internees (generally
Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same
facilities, though segregated in different
cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)

(U) The management of multiple disparate groups of
detained people in a single location by members of the
same unit invites confusion about handling, processing,
and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer
of information between different categories of
detainees. (ANNEX 19)

(U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific
training during their mobilization period. Corrections
training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R)
Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one
currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the
other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting
JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention
acility operations, to include two days of unarmed
self-defense, training in interpersonal communication
skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer
safety. (ANNEX 19)

B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and
Corrections System

1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task
organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of
both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to
force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two
Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion
and the 324th MP Battalion. In December 2003, the
400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and
redeployed in January 2004. The 724th MP Battalion
redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is
scheduled to redeploy in March and April 2004. They
are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 530th
MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The units that
remain are generally understrength, as Reserve
Component units do not have an individual personnel
replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the
departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24
months of Federal active duty in a five-year period.
(ANNEX 19)

2. (U) The 800th MP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC
asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All
detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO;
Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a
separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges
adapting its task organizational structure, training,
and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct
standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait).
Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee
population ratio and facility layout templates are
predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW
population, and not criminals or high-risk security
internees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the
full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the
denial of these protections is due to specifically
articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to
preclude the direction of insurgency operations).
(ANNEXES ( 19) and 24)

5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees, FM
3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement
Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations,
require military police to provide an area for
intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities.
Military Police, though adept at passive collection of
intelligence within a facility, do not participate in
Military Intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby
military police actively set favorable conditions for
subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run
counter to the smooth operation of a detention
facility, attempting to maintain its population in a
compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has
not been directed to change its facility procedures to
set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor
participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23))

6. MG Ryder's Report also made the following, inter
alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations regarding
the command and control of detainees:



(U) Align the release process for security
internees with DoD Policy. The process of
screening security internees should include
intelligence findings, interrogation results, and
current threat assessment.

(U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that
will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast
Compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi
run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish
procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers
securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the
guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.

(U) Consolidate all Security Internee
Operations, except the MEK security mission, under
a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for
OIF 2.

(U) Insist that all units identified to rotate
into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to
conduct internment and confinement operations in
support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)

IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER'S REPORT

1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder's Team was to observe
detention and prison operations, identify potential
systemic and human rights issues, and provide near-term,
mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve CJTF-7
operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from
US military control/oversight to the Coalition
Provisional Authority and eventually to the Iraqi
Government. The Findings and Recommendations of MG
Ryder's Team are thorough and precise and should be
implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that
surfaced during MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very
same issues that are the subject of this investigation.
In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees
occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.
As will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions
of this report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG
Ryder's Team in one critical aspect, that being its
conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked
to change its facility procedures to set the conditions
for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th MP Brigade
and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for
detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious
from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects
and witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder's conclusion regarding
the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at
passive collection of intelligence within a facility,
should not participate in Military Intelligence
supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military
Police should not be involved with setting "favorable
conditions" for subsequent interviews. These actions, as
will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run
counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.
(ANNEX 19)

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS

1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder's Report and MG
Miller's Report, my investigation team immediately began
an in-depth review of all available documents regarding
the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail the
voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee
abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed
approximately fifty witness statements from military
police and military intelligence personnel, potential
suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and
videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention
facility personnel, which are now in the custody and
control of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command and
the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos are
not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies
of the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and
assorted internal investigations and disciplinary actions
involving that command for the past several months. (All
ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)

2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers
from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the
services of two individuals who are experts in military
police detention practices and training. These were LTC
Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion,
United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth,
and SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US
Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also
requested and received the services of Col (Dr) Henry
Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned to
assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)

3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's Reports,
the team reviewed numerous reference materials including
the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-
Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on Riot and
Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205th MI
Brigade's Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE),
facility staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR
15-6 investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs)
on detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters
from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES (5-20), 37, 93, and 94)

4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a
one-day inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and
the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex in order to become
familiar with those facilities. We also met with COL
Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation
Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP
Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade,
and COL Ed Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7
February 2004, the team visited the Camp Bucca Detention
Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and
operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February
2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive
training sessions on approved detention practices. We
continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID
investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in
Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the
applicable reference materials within each team member's
area of expertise, and practiced investigative
techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to
finalize appropriate witness lists, review existing
witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect
potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to
arrange witness attendance, force protection measures,
and general logistics for the team's move to Baghdad on 8
February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and (25)

5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority
on 1 February 2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the
upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP Brigade Command,
I directed that several critical witnesses who were
preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My
team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted
a series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX
30). We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February
2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of
witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February we
returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of
witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28
February we collected documents, compiled references, did
follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis
of the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our
investigation. On 29 February we finalized our executive
summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted
the AR 15-6 written report with findings and
recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark
Johnson, for a legal sufficiency review. The out-brief
to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on
3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


(PART ONE)

(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).

1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained professional agents have done a superb job of investigating several complex and extremely disturbing incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison. They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police personnel on numerous occasions from October to December 2003. Several potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions regarding their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in this abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)

2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all of these statements and documentary evidence, we also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade working at the prison. We did not believe it was necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID, and I have adopted those statements for the purposes of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26), 34), 35), and 45-91)

REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF) provides security of both criminal and security detainees at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, facilitates the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the force protection/quality of life of Soldiers assigned in order to ensure the success of ongoing operations to secure a free Iraq. (Annex 31)

2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November 2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003 until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI Brigade and the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (Annex 31)

3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the 800th MP Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th MP Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was suspended from his duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the Company Commander of the 372nd MP Company, which was in charge of guarding detainees at FOB Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company were located within the confines of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)

4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L. Karpinski was the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade. (Annex 45)

5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force (372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos are available from the Criminal Investigative Command and the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)

6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the following acts:

(S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees;
jumping on their naked feet;

(S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and
female detainees;

(S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various
sexually explicit positions for photographing;

(S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and
keeping them naked for several days at a time;

(S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's
underwear;

(S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate
themselves while being photographed and videotaped;

(S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and
then jumping on them;

(S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box,
with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his
sfingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;

(S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a
detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old
fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;

(S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked
detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a
picture;

(S) A male MP guard having sex with a female
detainee;

(S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles)
to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least
one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;

(S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.
(ANNEXES 26 and 26)
7. (U) These findings are amply supported by written confessions provided by several of the suspects, written statements provided by detainees, and witness statements. In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):

(U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

(U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

(U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

(U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

(U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp.,
Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect

(U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company

(U) SGT Neil A. Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical
Battalion

(U) SGT Samuel Jefferson Provance, 302nd MI
Battalion

(U) Torin S. Nelson, Contractor, Titan Corp.,
Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade

(U) CPL Matthew Scott Bolanger, 372nd MP
Company

(U) SPC Mathew C. Wisdom, 372nd MP Company

(U) SSG Reuben R. Layton, Medic, 109th Medical
Detachment

(U) SPC John V. Polak, 229th MP Company
8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses (ANNEX 26):

(U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the
phosphoric liquid on detainees;

(U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;

(U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;

(U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a
chair;

(U) Threatening male detainees with rape;

(U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the
wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed
against the wall in his cell;

(U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and
perhaps a broom stick.

h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and
intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one
instance actually biting a detainee.
9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided by the following detainees, which under the circumstances I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:

(U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365

(U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee # 13077

(U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446

(U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108

(U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307

(U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542

(U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422

(U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425

(U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529

(U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787

(U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427

(U) Ameen Sa'eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362

(U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470
(ANNEX 26)
10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder's Report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to "set the conditions" for MI interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP personnel actually participated in those MI interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).

11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees and by the following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25, and 26):

(U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in
her sworn statement regarding the incident where a
detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his
fingers, toes, and penis, "that her job was to keep
detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to CPL
Grainer. She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk.
It is Grainer and Frederick's job to do things for MI
and OGA to get these people to talk."


(U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in
his sworn statement as follows: "I witnessed prisoners
in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made to do various
things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A we
were told that they had different rules and different
SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP
for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier in
charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the
Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but
nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic)."
When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than
the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: "The rest of
the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military
Intelligence (MI) holds." When asked why he did not
inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis
stated: " Because I assumed that if they were doing
things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines,
someone would have said something. Also the wing
belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of
the abuse." SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI
insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When
asked what MI said he stated: "Loosen this guy up for
us." Make sure he has a bad night." "Make sure he gets
the treatment." He claimed these comments were made to
CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis
stated that (sic): "the MI staffs to my understanding
have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has
been handling the MI holds. Example being statements
like, "Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They
answer every question. They're giving out good
information, Finally, and Keep up the good work . Stuff
like that."


(U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked
if he were present when any detainees were abused. He
stated: "I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take
away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." He could
not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but
commented that, "if they wanted me to do that they
needed to give me paperwork." He was later informed
that "we could not do anything to embarrass the
prisoners."


(U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract
translator was questioned about several detainees
accused of rape. He observed (sic): "They (detainees)
were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were
there that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT
Granier and SGT Frederick ordered the guys while
questioning them to admit what they did. They made them
do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach, jump
up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet,
called them all kinds of names such as "gays" do they
like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed their
hands together and their legs with shackles and started
to stack them on top of each other by insuring that the
bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt."


(U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical
Battalion, a medic testified that: "Cell 1A was used to
house high priority detainees and cell 1B was used to
house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During
my tour at the prison I observed that when the male
detainees were first brought to the facility, some of
them were made to wear female underwear, which I think
was to somehow break them down."
12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the
372nd MP Company had received no training in
detention/internee operations. I also find that very
little instruction or training was provided to MP
personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that
few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever
made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24, 33, and multiple witness statements)

13. (U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership
not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their
tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee
abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003.
Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th
MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military
Police Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a
number of detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca.
An extensive CID investigation determined that four
soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and
beaten these detainees following a transport mission from
Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)

14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred
against these Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation
conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general court
martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski
supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no
evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th
MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions
regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure
that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any
evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the
Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took
any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly
trained regarding detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and 62)

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated
multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of
subject matter experts in internment/resettlement
operations, international and operational law,
information technology, facility management,
interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques,
chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices
as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to
oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects
of detainee and confinement operations.


2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence
personnel involved in any aspect of detainee operations
or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate
units, be immediately provided with training by an
international/operational law attorney on the specific
provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10,
specifically the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other
Detainees, and AR 190-8.

3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for
overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater
of Operations. I also recommend that the Provost Marshal
General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject
matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7
in coordinating detainee operations.

4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation
facility commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War and notice of protections be made available in
both English and the detainees' language and be
prominently displayed in all detention facilities.
Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should
be given the full opportunity to read the Convention.


5. (U) That each detention facility commander and
interrogation facility commander publish a complete and
comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)
regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel
be required to read the SOPs and sign a document
indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.


6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG
Ryder's Assessment Report, and my findings and
recommendations in this investigation, all units in the
Iraq Theater of Operations conducting
internment/confinement/detainment operations in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to
include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.


7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for
detainee operations in the Iraq Joint Operations Area
(JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by
COMCJTF-7).

8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be
conducted to determine the extent of culpability of
Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th MI
Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
(JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).


9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee
operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate,
with specialized training and knowledge of international
and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of
detainee operations.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(PART TWO)

(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and
accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically
allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib
Prison:

REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,
I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide
Internment and Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)


2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex
during the time period covered in this investigation.
(ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)

3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB)
Operations at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on
26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)

4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD
Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)

5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK
holding facility until TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)

6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care,
and well being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person,
Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi
criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)

7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)

8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge,
implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory,
doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP
Brigade and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness
statements in ANNEXES 45-91). 9. (U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after
in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to
detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to
encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP
Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)

10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had
a "Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP" and a "Training
Outline" for transferring and releasing detainees, which
appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)

11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being
documented in the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS)
and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) as required by
regulation at all detention facilities. However, it is
underutilized and often does not give a "real time" accurate
picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating.
(ANNEX 56)

12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of
detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP
Battalion used a self-created "change sheet" to document the
transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For
proper accountability, it is imperative that these change
sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated
within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process
would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-
time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial
Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee
manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound,
and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP
Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David
DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the lack
of manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner. (ANNEXES 39 and 98)

13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee accountability at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of their operational journals revealed that these accounts were often not done or not documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the accounting process triggered any immediate corrective action by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX 44)

14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the 320th MP Battalion conducted physical counts of their detainees. Each compound within a given encampment did their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and counted them as they passed to the other end of the compound. (ANNEX 98)

15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100% ISN band checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this check only 2 times per week. Due to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these checks were regularly inaccurate. (Annexes 22and 98)

16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted non-doctrinal terms such as "band checks," "roll-ups," and "call-ups," which contributed to the lapses in accountability and confusion at the soldier level. (ANNEXES 63, 88, and 98)

17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There was no indication that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of command. (ANNEX 37)

18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and standing TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did exist were not trained on, and were never distributed to the lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the unit TOC, rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites. (ANNEXES 44, 67, 71, and 85)

19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks and balances to ensure compliance. (ANNEXES 76 and 82)

20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to develop the accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade's subordinate units. Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made up as the operations developed with reliance on, and guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian corrections experience. (ANNEX 21)

21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)

22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade's AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more unreported cases of escape that were probably "written off" as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported knowing about at least two additional escapes (one from a work detail and one from a window) from Abu Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade, stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities, which does not match the number derived from the investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)

23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities are significantly over their intended maximum capacity while the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses at the various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)

24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should not be in custody takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention facilities. There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a criminal detainee can be released after it has been determined that the detainee has no intelligence value, and that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in this second category. Lastly, detainees accused of committing "Crimes Against the Coalition," who are held throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR, can be released upon a determination that they are of no intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category of detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the "Detainee Release Authority" for detainees being held for committing crimes against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this category of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total detainee population, and is the fastest growing category. However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely denied the board's recommendations to release detainees in this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski, the extremely slow and ineffective release process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)

25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being conducted after an escape or other serious incident. No lessons learned seem to have been disseminated to subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and none were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)

26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that the majority of her orders directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations contained within their own investigations been analyzed and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)

27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the detention facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to be improved to illuminate dark areas that have routinely become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)

28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are posted in English or in the language of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in the 800th MP Brigade's AOR, even after several investigations had annotated the lack of this critical requirement. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate questionable work ethics and loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous contingent within the Hard-Site. These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak's Statement)

30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI, etc.), third country nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be properly supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised free access in the detainee area. Having civilians in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to the difficulties in the accountability process and with detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement (DROE) and the general principles of the Geneva Convention were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal observations, support his contention. I find that SGM Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee operations; however, they have been unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this training. (ANNEXES 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training Records)

33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees "ghost detainees." On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of "ghost detainees" (6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law. (ANNEX 53)

34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have been documented and reported to this Investigation Team. Although there is no data from other missions of similar size and duration to compare the number of escapes with, the most significant factors derived from these reports are twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical data needed to evaluate the details of each incident. Second, each investigation seems to have pointed to the same types of deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done to correct the problems and to implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG Karpinski, nor was there any command emphasis to ensure these deficiencies were corrected:

(U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6 Investigation covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant (320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or additional information was provided as requested by this investigation team. (ANNEX 7)

(U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at Camp Cropper. (115th MP Battalion) Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5 detainees were wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications, no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate and outdated. (ANNEX 5)

(U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and shooting of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified detainee from Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly made their escape in the nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2) concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling under the wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One detainee was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP Battalion search team recaptured detainee # 8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a Soldier during the recapture process. Contributing factors were overcrowding, poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal detainees at that location. It is of particular note that the command was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the upcoming escape attempt and started doing amplified announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The investigation pointed out that rules and guidelines were not posted in the camps in the detainees' native languages. (ANNEX 6)

(U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968 and the shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400 hours from the Camp Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the detainee allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while the tower guard was turned in the other direction. This detainee was subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees rioted and pelted three interior MP guards with rocks. One guard was injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters injuring 7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)

(U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and # 10739 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th MP Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal prisoners escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of the Hard-Site. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 11)

(U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1330 from Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a detainee escaped from the North end of the compound and was discovered missing during distribution of the noon meal, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)

(U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, # 151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners escaped from the North end of the compound, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 13)

(U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees # 150216, #150894, #153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399, #20257, #150348, #152616, #116146, and #152156 at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest of their living conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of non-lethal force was ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed "Golden Spike," the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly force was authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount conducted prior to shift, no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted after incidents, ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding, uniforms not standardized, and poor communication between the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)

(U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in his cell and around 1830 an extraction team shot him with less than lethal and lethal rounds in the process of recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that one of the detainees in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a pistol and a couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working in the encampment. Immediately upon receipt of this information, an ad-hoc extraction team consisting of MP and MI personnel conducted what they called a routine cell search, which resulted in the shooting of an MP and the detainee. Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate SOPs, the Detention ROE in place at the time was ineffective due to the numerous levels of authorization needed for use of lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between the MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)

(U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd- dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 14)

(U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots to disperse the crowd, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 15)

(U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30- 40 detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1642 in Compound 3 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd- dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 16)

(U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of detainee from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly assaulted an MP at 1459 inside the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that three detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the use of a non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 17)

(U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp Bucca (310th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between the hours of 0445 and 0640 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) and CPT Holsombeck (724th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainee escaped through an undetected weakness in the wire. Contributing factors were inexperienced guards, lapses in accountability, complacency, lack of leadership presence, poor visibility, and lack of clear and concise communication between the guards and the leadership. (ANNEX 9)

(U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and #109950 as well as the escape and recapture of 5 unknown detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility (310th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped around 0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6 Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC Camp Arifjan Detachment) concluded that three of the detainees escaped through the front holding cell during conditions of limited visibility due to fog. One of the detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and returned to his holding compound. That same night, 4 detainees exited through the wire on the South side of the camp and were seen and apprehended by the QRF. Contributing factors were the lack of a coordinated effort for emplacement of MPs during implementation of the fog plan, overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)

(U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and missing Iraqi guard from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape by signing him out on a work detail and disappearing with him. At the time of the second SIR, neither missing person had been located. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 99)

(U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236, 116272, and 151933 from Camp Bucca (310th MP Battalion). Several Detainees allegedly escaped between the hours of 0440 and 0700 during a period of intense fog. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainees crawled under a fence when visibility was only 10- 15 meters due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of proper accountability reporting, inadequate number of guards, commencement of detainee feeding during low visibility operations, and poorly rested MPs. (ANNEX 18)
36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation determined that there was virtually a complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of the detention facilities. Moreover, despite the fact that there were numerous reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq (in excess of 35), AR 15-6 Investigations following these escapes were simply forgotten or ignored by the Brigade Commander with no dissemination to other facilities. After-Action Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all, remained at individual facilities and were not shared among other commanders or soldiers throughout the Brigade. The Command never issued standard TTPs for handling escape incidents. (ANNEXES 5-10, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:

(U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed
and referenced series of recommendations for improving the
detainee accountability practices throughout the OIF area of
operations.

(U) Accountability practices throughout any particular
detention facility must be standardized and in accordance
with applicable regulations and international law.

(U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be
expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real
time updating when detainees are moved and or transferred
from one location to another.

(U) "Change sheets," or their doctrinal equivalent must
be immediately processed and updated into the system to
ensure accurate accountability. The detainee roll call or
ISN counts must match the manifest provided to the compound
guards to ensure proper accountability of detainees.

(U) Develop, staff, and implement comprehensive and
detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons learned from this
investigation as well as any previous findings,
recommendations, and reports.

(U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and
understood at the lowest level.

(U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must be held in separate
facilities from any other category of detainee.

(U) All of the compounds should be wired into the
master manifest whereby MP Soldiers can account for their
detainees in real time and without waiting for their change
sheets to be processed. This would also have the change
sheet serve as a way to check up on the accuracy of the
manifest as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS
system can be utilized for this function.

(U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and disturbances
within the detainment facilities must be immediately
reported through both the operational and administrative
Chain of Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The
SIRs must then be tracked and followed by daily SITREPs
until the situation is resolved.

(U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation
Rules of Engagement (IROE), and the principles of the Geneva
Conventions need to be briefed at every shift change and
guard mount.

(U) AARs must be conducted after serious incidents at
any given facility. The observations and corrective actions
that develop from the AARs must be analyzed by the
respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a plan
of action, shared with the other facilities, and implemented
as a matter of policy.

(U) There must be significant structural improvements
at each of the detention facilities. The needed changes
include significant enhancement of perimeter lighting,
additional chain link fencing, staking down of all
concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion of Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) .

(U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules must
be prominently displayed in English and the language of the
detainees at each compound and encampment at every detention
facility IAW AR 190-8.

(U) Further restrict US civilians and other
contractors' access throughout the facility. Contractors
and civilians must be in an authorized and easily
identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from
the masses of detainees in civilian clothes.

(U) Facilities must have a stop movement/transfer
period of at least 1 hour prior to every 100% detainee roll
call and ISN counts to ensure accurate accountability.

(U) The method for doing head counts of detainees
within a given compound must be standardized.

(U) Those military units conducting I/R operations must
know of, train on, and constantly reference the applicable
Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies. The references
provided in this report cover nearly every deficiency I have
enumerated. Although they do not, and cannot, make up for
leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use
them to maintain standardized operating procedures and
efficient accountability practices.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART THREE)

(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate:

Pursuant to Part Three of the Investigation, select members of the Investigation team (Primarily COL La Fate and I) personally interviewed the following witnesses:


(U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

(U) COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade

(U) COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA
Ministry of Justice (Interviewed by COL Richard Gordon,
CFLCC SJA)

(U) LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer,
800th MP Brigade

(U) LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade

(U) LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI
Battalion (Tactical Exploitation)

(U) LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion

(U) LTC Vincent Montera, Commander, 310th MP Battalion

(U) LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI
Brigade

(U) LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander, 724th MP Battalion
and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade

(U) LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion

(U) MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade

(U) MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP
Brigade

(U) MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade

(U) MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

(U) MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion

(U) MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade

(U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

(U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

(U) CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP
Battalion

(U) CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion

(U) CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade

(U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

(U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

(U) CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company

(U) CPT Michael Anthony Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander,
310th MP Company

(U) CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade

(U) 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP
Company

(U) 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-camp to Brigade Commander,
800th MP Brigade

(U) 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP
Battalion

(U) 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP
Company

(U) CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade

(U) CSM Joseph P. Arrington, Command Sergeant Major,
320th MP Battalion

(U) SGM Pascual Cartagena, Acting Command Sergeant
Major, 800th MP Brigade

(U) CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major,
310th MP Battalion

(U) 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP
Company

(U) SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
Battalion

(U) MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP
Company

(U) MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th
MP Battalion

(U) SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP
Company

(U) SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company

(U) SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

(U) SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company

(U) SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler, 42nd MP
Detachment, 16th MP Brigade

(U) SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler, 523rd MP
Detachment, 937th Engineer Group

(U) MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler, NAS Signal
and Canine Unit

(U) Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian Contract
Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade

(U) Mr. John Israel, US civilian Contract Interpreter,
Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade
(ANNEXES 45 and (91)
REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the
800th MP Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG
Karpinski has remained in command since that date. The
800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in
the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion,
320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP
Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and
744th MP Battalion.
(ANNEXES 41 and 45)

2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the
800th MP Brigade believed they would be allowed to go
home when all the detainees were released from the Camp
Bucca Theater Internment Facility following the cessation
of major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At one point,
approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp
Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening
process, several thousand detainees were released. Many
in the command believed they would go home when the
detainees were released. In late May-early June 2003 the
800th MP Brigade was given a new mission to manage the
Iraqi penal system and several detention centers. This
new mission meant Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS
when anticipated. Morale suffered, and over the next few
months there did not appear to have been any attempt by
the Command to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45 and 96)

3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of
numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP
Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills,
particularly regarding internment/resettlement
operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the
command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted
to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc
training by individuals with civilian corrections
experience. (Multiple Witness Statements and the
Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)


4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately
trained for a mission that included operating a prison or
penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. As the
Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the
800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific
training during their mobilization period. MP units did
not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization
and during the post mobilization training, and thus could
not train for specific missions. The training that was
accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and
implemented at the company level with little or no
direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade
levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law
enforcement training. However, I found no evidence that
the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever
requested specific corrections training from the
Commandant of the Military Police School, the US Army
Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost
Marshal General of the Army, or the US Army Disciplinary
Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76)

5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian
internee detention mission, Brigade personnel relied
heavily on individuals within the Brigade who had
civilian corrections experience, including many who
worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their
civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had
no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-
19.40. It does not appear that a Mission Essential Task
List (METL) based on in-theater missions was ever
developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout
the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)

6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder's Team, that the 800th
MP Brigade as a whole, was understrength for the mission
for which it was tasked. Army Doctrine dictates that an
I/R Brigade can be organized with between 7 and 21
battalions, and that the average battalion size element
should be able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at
a time. This investigation indicates that BG Karpinski
and her staff did a poor job allocating resources
throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally
housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was
operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD
Facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also
run by an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)

7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual
replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses.
Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from
personnel shortages through release from active duty
(REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization.
In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of
life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was
extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or
MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks,
random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to
Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison
complex was also severely overcrowded and the Brigade
lacked adequate resources and personnel to resolve
serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past
associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the
Brigade, it appears that friendship often took precedence
over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships.
(ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team)

8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and
lack of effective communication between the Commander,
205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP
Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the
FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility
between commands, little coordination at the command
level, and no integration of the two functions.
Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with
little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)

9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was
exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108
issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment
of 205th MI Brigade Commander's Responsibilities for the
Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:


3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR "SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION."

Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made
all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander,
205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer,
rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units
conducting detainee operations at that facility. This
is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions
and agendas assigned to each of these respective
specialties. (ANNEX 31)

10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces
(UNAAF), 10 July 2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as
the detailed direction and control of movements or
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to
accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)



"TACON is the command authority over assigned or
attached forces or commands or military capability made
available for tasking that is limited to the detailed
direction and control of movements or maneuvers within
the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned
missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may
be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any
echelon at or below the level of combatant commander."




11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this
investigation, I find that there was little, if any,
recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade
or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence
if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the
Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the
Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON
relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness
statements and personal interviews that the 320th MP
Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued to function as
if they were responsible for the security, health and
welfare, and overall security of detainees within Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas
clearly behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that
the Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an
extremely ineffective commander and leader. Numerous
witnesses confirm that the Battalion S-3, MAJ David W.
DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day
basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P)
Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two
weeks, apparently to give him some relief from the
pressure he was experiencing as the 320th Battalion
Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately
followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the
CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October
2003. BG Karpinski placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of
the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP
Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC
Chew was also in command of the 115th MP Battalion
assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no
orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum
from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command
of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this
removal and search for a replacement was communicated to
the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to
Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily removing
one commander and replacing him with another serving
Battalion Commander without an order and without
notifying superior or subordinate commands is without
precedent in my military career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was
also reprimanded for lapses in accountability that
resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP Battalion was
stigmatized as a unit due to previous detainee abuse
which occurred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater
Internment Facility (TIF), while under the command of LTC
(P) Phillabaum. Despite his proven deficiencies as both
a commander and leader, BG Karpinski allowed LTC (P)
Phillabaum to remain in command of her most troubled
battalion guarding, by far, the largest number of
detainees in the 800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum
was suspended from his duties by LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7
Commander on 17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)

14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted
a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over
four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation
Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during
much of her testimony. What I found particularly
disturbing in her testimony was her complete
unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of
the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused
or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her
command to both establish and enforce basic standards and
principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the Personal Observations of the Interview Team)

15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from
the Civil Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance
from either BG John Kern or COL Tim Regan. She blames
much of the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib (BCCF) on
MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given the
MPs "ideas" that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she
blamed the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider,
the Company Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant,
MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in
Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan
because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib.
(ANNEX 45)

16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that
the criminal abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
might have been caused by the ultimate disposition of the
detainee abuse cases that originally occurred at Camp
Bucca in May 2003. She stated that "about the same time
those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central,
the decisions were made to give the guilty people at
Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the
soldiers, the worst that's gonna happen is, you're gonna
go home." I think it important to point out that almost
every witness testified that the serious criminal abuse
of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred in late
October and early November 2003. The photographs and
statements clearly support that the abuses occurred
during this time period. The Bucca cases were set for
trial in January 2004 and were not finally disposed of
until 29 December 2003. There is entirely no evidence
that the decision of numerous MP personnel to
intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Ghrabid (BCCF) was
influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca cases.
(ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)

17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade
S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially
dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complaints,
these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental
effect on the Brigade Staff's effectiveness and morale.
Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James
O'Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to
accept responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary
Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the
Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities,
take overt corrective action when needed, and supervise
their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)


18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff inefficiencies, I find that the 800th MP Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier and Army standards. I specifically found these examples of unenforced standards:

There was no clear uniform standard for any MP
Soldiers assigned detention duties. Despite the
fact that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers and
officers were detainees, MP personnel were allowed
to wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours
while carrying weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on
their helmets and soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have
been reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during
this period. Those disciplined include; (ANNEXES
43 and 102)

(U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP
Brigade
Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander,
CJTF-7, on 17 January 2004.

(U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
10 November 2003, for lack of leadership and for failing to
take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade
Commander; filed locally
Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
17 January 2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction
of duty

(U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP Battalion
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
20 August 2003, for failure to properly train his Soldiers.
(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

(U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a
violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field
Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he
personally observed; returned to soldier unfiled.

GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security
measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally.

(U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th MP Brigade
GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming
alcohol with an NCO; filed locally.

(U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP Company
Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in
that he was alleged to have taken nude pictures of his
female Soldiers without their knowledge; Trial date to be
announced.

(U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP Company
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers
(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

(U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major,
800th MP Brigade
GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski,
Commander 800th MP Brigade, for fraternization and
dereliction of duty for fraternizing with junior enlisted
soldiers within his unit; GOMOR officially filed and he was
removed from the CSM list.

(U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major,
400th MP Battalion
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers
(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally

(U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant,
770th MP Company
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers
(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

(U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP Brigade,

GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming
alcohol; filed locally.

(U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,

Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from
BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for failing to
adhere to the guidance/directives given to him by BG
Karpinski; filed locally.
d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not
enforced. LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., Commander of
the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical
Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy
was enforced by COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and
that BG Karpinski approached COL Pappas to reverse
the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as
previously existed. (ANNEX 53)


19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP
Brigade and the 320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq
had very little contact during their tour of duty with
either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG Karpinski
claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular
visits to the various detention facilities where her
Soldiers were stationed. However, the detailed calendar
provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support
her contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that
they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum.
(Multiple Witness Statements)

20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such
as the difference in culture, the Soldiers' quality of
life, the real presence of mortal danger over an extended
time period, and the failure of commanders to recognize
these pressures contributed to the perversive atmosphere
that existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility and
throughout the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).


21. As I have documented in other parts of this
investigation, I find that there was no clear emphasis by
BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th MP Brigade Staff,
Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to standard in
detainee operations and proficiency or that serious
accountability lapses that occurred over a significant
period of time, particularly at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were
corrected. AR 15-6 Investigations regarding detainee
escapes were not acted upon, followed up with corrective
action, or disseminated to subordinate commanders or
Soldiers. Brigade and unit SOPs for dealing with
detainees if they existed at all, were not read or
understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult mission
of detainee operations. Following the abuse of several
detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003, I could find no
evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective
training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers
throughout Iraq clearly understood the requirements of
the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of
detainees. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team )


22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished
in writing by LTG Sanchez regarding the serious
deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez found that the
performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met the
standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that
incidents in the preceding six months had occurred that
reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and
leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez also cited
the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the
most recent example of a poor leadership climate that
"permeates the Brigade." I totally concur with LTG
Sanchez' opinion regarding the performance of BG
Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and the
Personal Observations of the Investigating Officer)


RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP
Brigade be Relieved from Command and given a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have
been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:


Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level
detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs
for dealing with detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers
had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs.

Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP
Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the protections
afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation
Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate
commands.

Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG
McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary
authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer
misconduct.

Failing to take appropriate action regarding the
ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry
Phillabaum.

Failing to take appropriate action regarding the
ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff
including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.

Failing to properly ensure the results and
recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation
reports on escapes and shootings (over a period of several
months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by,
subordinate commanders.

Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards
throughout her command.

Failing to establish a Brigade METL.

Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned
tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade.

Failing to ensure that numerous and reported
accountability lapses at detention facisslities throughout
Iraq were corrected.
2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI
Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US
Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which
have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:


Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in and followed the IROE.

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew, understood, and followed the protections
afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.


Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
3.(U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and be removed from the
Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the following acts which
have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:

Failing to properly ensure the results,
recommendations, and AARs from numerous reports on escapes
and shootings over a period of several months were properly
disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.

Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations
from various 15-6 Investigations as specifically directed by
BG Karpinski.

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
Operations.

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew and understood the protections afforded to
detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.

Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.

Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and
to task organize to accomplish his mission.
4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to
205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be relieved from duty
and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for
the following acts which have been previously referred to in
the aforementioned findings:


Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating
Team, including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
control were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
control knew, understood, and followed the protections
afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct
authority working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from his position as the Battalion
S-3 and be given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:


Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC,
on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to
report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a
subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned
Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was returned to
Soldier and not filed.

Failing to take corrective action and implement
recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even after
receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP
Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective
security measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.

Failing to take appropriate action and report an
incident of detainee abuse, whereby he personally witnessed
a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of a truck.

6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from Command and be given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts
which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:


Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew and understood the protections afforded to
detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.

Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
Operations.

7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader
and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand
for the following acts which have been previously
referred to in the aforementioned findings:


Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew and understood the protections afforded to
detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.

Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
Operations.


8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from his duties and given a
General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following
acts which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:

Making a material misrepresentation to the
Investigation Team stating that he had "never" been
admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski, when in fact he
had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG
Karpinski to "stay out of the towers" at the holding
facility.

Making a material misrepresentation to the
Investigation Team stating that he had attended every shift
change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP Battalion, and
that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper
treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements
contradict this assertion.

Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP
Battalion knew and understood the protections afforded to
detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.

Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.

Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of
the 372nd MP Company and given a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have
been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company
knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War.

Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.

Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant,
372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a
General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive
action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the
following acts which have been previously referred to in
the aforementioned findings:


Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War.

Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.

Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct
control, abused detainees by stomping on their bare hands
and feet in his presence.

11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian
Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,
be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his
employment file, termination of employment, and
generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security
clearance for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:



Made a false statement to the investigation team
regarding the locations of his interrogations, the
activities during his interrogations, and his knowledge of
abuses.

Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in
interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by
"setting conditions" which were neither authorized and in
accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly
knew his instructions equated to physical abuse.

12. (U) That Mr. John Israel, Contract US Civilian
Interpreter, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,
be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his
employment file and have his security clearance reviewed
by competent authority for the following acts or concerns
which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:


Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in
violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several witness
statements.

Did not have a security clearance.

13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information
to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army
Intelligence Activities, be conducted to determine the
extent of culpability of MI personnel, assigned to the
205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC
Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John
Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for
the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend
immediate disciplinary action as described in the
preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a
Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of
their culpability. (ANNEX 36)


OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS


1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this investigation, I
acquired the assistance of Col (Dr.) Henry Nelson, a USAF
Psychiatrist, to analyze the investigation materials from
a psychological perspective. He determined that there
was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the
detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select
soldiers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There
was a complex interplay of many psychological factors and
command insufficiencies. A more detailed analysis is
contained in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.

2. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted
a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over
four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation
Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during
much of her testimony. What I found particularly
disturbing in her testimony was her complete
unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of
the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused
or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her
command to both establish and enforce basic standards and
principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)

3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many individual Soldiers and some subordinate units under the 800th MP Brigade that overcame significant obstacles, persevered in extremely poor conditions, and upheld the Army Values. We discovered numerous examples of Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of leadership and accomplishing their assigned tasks.

(U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis
McGlone, efficiently operated the HVD Detention
Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission
requirements with little to no guidance from the
800th MP Brigade. The unit was disciplined,
proficient, and appeared to understand their basic
tasks.

(U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC
Stephen J. Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK
Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers
were proficient in their individual tasks and
adapted well to this highly unique and non-doctrinal
operation.

(U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing
perimeter security and force protection at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded
standards be enforced and worked endlessly to
improve discipline throughout the FOB.

4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we observed
and believe should be favorably noted include:



(U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro,
US Navy Dog Handler, knew his duties and refused to
participate in improper interrogations despite
significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu
Ghraib.

(U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company
discovered evidence of abuse and turned it over to
military law enforcement.

(U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took
immediate action and stopped an abuse, then reported
the incident to the chain of command.

CONCLUSION

1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious
acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu
Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key
senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th
MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations,
policies, and command directives in preventing detainee
abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the
period August 2003 to February 2004.


2. (U) Approval and implementation of the recommendations
of this AR 15-6 Investigation and those highlighted in
previous assessments are essential to establish the
conditions with the resources and personnel required to
prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse.


Annexes

1. Psychological Assessment
2 Request for investigation from CJTF-7 to CENTCOM
3 Directive to CFLCC from CENTCOM directing investigation
4 Appointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG Taguba
5 15-6 Investigation 9 June 2003
6. 15-6 Investigation 12 June 2003
7. 15-6 Investigation 13 June 2003
8. 15-6 Investigation 24 November 2003
9. 15-6 Investigation 7 January 2004
10. 15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004
11. SIR 5 November 2003
12. SIR 7 November 2003
13. SIR 8 November 2003
14. SIR 13 December 2003
15. SIR 13 December 2003
16. SIR 13 December 2003
17. SIR 17 December 2003
18. Commander's Inquiry 26 January 2004
19 MG Ryder's Report, 6 November 2003
20 MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003
21 AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997
22 22. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001
23 23. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992
24 24. Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949
25 25. CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January 2004
26 26. CID Interviews, 10-25 January 2004
27. 800th MP Brigade Roster, 29 January 2004
28. 205th MI Brigade's IROE, Undated
29. TOA Order (800th MP Brigade) and letter holding witnesses
30. Investigation Team's witness list
31 FRAGO #1108
32 Letters suspending several key leaders in the 800th MP Brigade and Rating Chain with suspensions annotated
33. FM 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
34 CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8 June 2003
35 Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 26 August 2003
36. AR 381-10, 1 July 1984
37 37. Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion
38. 310th MP Battalion's Inprocessing SOP
39. 320th MP Battalion's "Change Sheet"
40. Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center's (JIDC) Slides, Undated
41. Order of Battle Slides, 12 January 2004
42. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Actions Armed Forces, 10 July 2001
43. General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand
44. 800th MP Battalion's TACSOP
45 BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
46 COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice
48. LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade
49. LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade
50. LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical exploitation)
51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion
52. LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion
53. LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade
54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade
55. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion
56. MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade
57. MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade
58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade
59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
60. MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion
61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade
62. CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
63. CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion
65. CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion
66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade
67. LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
68. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company
69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company
70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade
71. 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company
72. 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP Brigade
73. 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion
74. 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company
75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade
76. CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP Battalion
77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade
78. CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP Battalion
79. 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company
80. SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion
81. MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company
82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion
83. SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company
84. SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company
85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company
86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company
87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler
88. SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler
89. MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler
90. Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade
91 Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade
92. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
93 CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated
94 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003
95 95. 800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders
96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004
97 530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February 2004
98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of Military Justice, CFLCC, 9 March 2004
99. SIR 14 January 2004
100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004
101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP Battalion
102. Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG Karpinski, 17 January 2004
103. Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP Battalion
104. 205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 December 2003
105. SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company
106. 1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP Company




--------------------------------------------------

Footnote 1 Although the Taguba Report is marked Secret / No Foreign Dissemination, it has been widely distributed, and made available to the public worldwide since at least the week of May 2, 2004.

Imminent death of Saudi Defense minister bad news for Al Qaida


Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz - a chief competitor for the Saudi crown - is succumbing to terminal illness. Last week, there was what a senior Saudi source termed a "death watch" at the defense minister's bedside. If this is correct, then it is good news for Saudi crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz, Sultan's half-brother.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Northeast Asia Report:
Jiang Zemin strengthens power base at Central Military Commission

China Gives Prison Term To Dissident Based in U.S.
Five-Year Sentence Comes Despite American Urgings
By Philip P. Pan
Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, May 14, 2004; Page A12
HONG KONG, May 13 -- China sentenced a prominent dissident and longtime U.S. resident to five years in prison on Thursday despite repeated appeals for his release by Congress, the Bush administration and human rights groups.
Yang Jianli, 40, who runs a foundation in Boston that advocates democratic reform in China, received the sentence immediately after being convicted by a Beijing court of spying for Taiwan and entering China on a false passport, the official New China News Agency reported.
Yang denied the charges during a closed-door trial in August. He was detained in 2002 when he returned to China after more than a decade in exile in the United States.
Yang's case has generated strong support in the United States, where he earned doctorates in political economy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and in math at the University of California at Berkeley. Yang is a permanent resident of the United States, and his wife and two young children are citizens.
Senior Bush administration officials have pressed for Yang's release in meetings with Chinese leaders, and both the House and the Senate unanimously passed resolutions urging China to free him. Last month, on the second anniversary of Yang's detention,67 members of Congress signed a letter to President Hu Jintao calling his treatment "extraordinarily inhumane."
"I'm saddened beyond words," said his wife, Christina Fu, by telephone from Boston. "Although I realize that things could be worse, five years is still very heavy on our family and our children and also for his parents."
Jared Genser, a family attorney, said he hoped the Chinese government would react to international pressure by deporting Yang, as it has other prisoners. He urged the State Department to file a strong protest in Beijing and asked members of Congress to contact the Chinese ambassador in Washington. "These next couple of days are critical," Genser said.
Yang fled to the United States after taking part in the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and was exiled. But in April 2002, he used a friend's passport to return to China and observe large-scale labor protests in the northeastern part of the country.
Police arrested him and charged him with entering China illegally, a crime that carries a maximum one-year prison term. Prosecutors later accused him of spying for Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims is part of China.
Yang is the latest in a series of Chinese living overseas who have been arrested upon returning to the mainland and then convicted of spying for Taiwan with little or no evidence presented in public. His attorneys said China violated its own laws by holding him without trial for 14 months and waiting more than nine months after the trial to issue a verdict.
When Yang protested his detention last month by refusing orders to fold his blanket, wear a uniform or answer when addressed by his prisoner number, he was placed in solitary confinement with his wrists handcuffed behind his back until they bled, Genser said.
A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Liu Jianchao, defended the government's handling of the case, saying Yang was allowed to present a full defense in court. "The Chinese judicial departments have been trying this case and made a sentence in accordance with the law," Liu said.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Stealing Defeat from the Jaws of Victory in Iraq
May 13, 2004 | |
President Bush's political opponents are trying to make electoral hay over the Abu Ghraib prison nightmare. That's predictable. But it's unfortunate, too, as the political broadsides tend to obscure the fact that -- after a couple of tough weeks -- things are going well militarily and politically in Iraq.
Worse, sowing politically motivated seeds of doubt about our wartime leaders discourages our troops and encourages the enemy -- which has once again revealed its true face in the ghastly execution of Nicholas Berg. If we're not careful here on the home front, we'll steal defeat in Iraq right from the jaws of victory -- just as in Vietnam, where the war was lost not militarily, but politically, here at home.
Time for a little stock-taking. First, let's look at the Abu Ghraib scandal.
The abusive acts of a few Americans at the prison are inexcusable and downright un-American. These acts do not reflect the values of the U.S. military or the American people.
The Pentagon erred in not "breaking" the story of these horrors first, leaving that task to network TV. A cardinal rule of crisis management is to get good news out fast, but bad news out faster. Always come clean as soon as possible -- especially with the Congress.
The incidents should be fully investigated, and those responsible duly punished. The investigations must be transparent, broad and thorough, examining those in charge who were aware of and sanctioned the abuse, as well as those in the chain of command who should have known about these activities.
Ultimate responsibility for the performance of the Department of Defense lies with Secretary Rumsfeld. But he wasn't party to the activities of a few bad seeds in Iraq. Absent revelations of a cover-up, Rumsfeld should stay in place and soldier on. (Allegations of CIA officer involvement in the abuses at Abu Ghraib mean Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet has some questions to answer.)
The prison should be razed. It is a symbol of the darkest side of man's soul. (Saddam Hussein's regime tortured and executed tens of thousands there.) Move the detainees; tear down the walls, and let the Iraqi people move on.
On the battlefield, meanwhile, the situation has improved. The military's patient strategy of dealing with Fallujah, Najaf, Karbala and rebel Shi'a cleric Moqtada al Sadr has paid off to date.
We're fighting the insurgency on our terms. We've brought Iraqi soldiers into the fight with the Fallujah Brigade and gathered allies among 100 or so senior Shi'a clerics who publicly oppose Sadr's radical policies and use of mosques as military bases. These are all very positive developments.
Meanwhile, the U.S. military continues to soften up the enemy with raids by ground troops and precision strikes, to gather intelligence from agents, satellites and drones, and to prepare the battlefield, should an all-out urban assault become necessary.
By avoiding bloody, house-to-house fighting in places like Fallujah and Najaf, we have saved the lives of both innocent civilians and American soldiers.
To win politically and militarily, the insurgents need to fight. Inactivity is their enemy. By not going whole-hog into the cities to fight them, Coalition soldiers have left the insurgents no option but to abandon their defensive positions to engage us.
And every time the enemy comes out to do battle, they lose -- badly. Scores of insurgents, terrorists and foreign fighters have been killed in suicidal raids on American forces over the past few weeks. Patience is a virtue in life and sometimes in war.
On the political front, the United Nations is fully engaged in setting up the transitional government that will hold power until a full government can be chosen in national elections early next year. Soon, there will be an Iraqi face on a new Iraqi government, and Iraq will be a step closer to full sovereignty.
Despite the lingering strife borne of Fallujah, Najaf and Abu Ghraib, the situation in Iraq is overwhelmingly positive -- and improving. With the exception of a few hotspots, the California-sized country is pacified and moving in the right direction.
Clearly, though, our job there isn't done. Until it is, America's elected officials and other second-guessers might consider spending more time and effort pondering how to win the war and less time and rhetoric trying to turn national setbacks to political advantage.
Peter Brookes is a senior fellow for national security affairs at The Heritage Foundation (heritage.org), a Washington-based public policy research institute.
Distributed nationally on the Knight-Ridder Tribune wire


? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
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Prisoner abuse and the rot of American culture
May 11, 2004 | |

Every decent person I know has reacted in horror to the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners in Al Ghraib prison near Baghdad. When the lewd photos emerged of American soldiers forcing prisoners to engage in sexual acts, and leading them around on leashes with hoods over their heads, and threatening them with electrocution, people were speechless and horrified.
We should be enraged and demand that those involved be severely punished. We must also remember that the vast majority of our brave soldiers are decent human beings who have been willing to sacrifice their very lives to secure freedom for others.
But should we be shocked that some Americans are capable of such barbaric behavior as depicted in the infamous photos?
Consider:
Pornography is the No. 1 Internet industry - No. 1. There are well over 300,000 Internet porn sites.
American consumers spent an estimated $220 million at such fee-based "adult" sites in 2001, according to Jupiter Media Metrix, a New York Internet research firm. That was up from $148 million in 1999. Jupiter is projecting $320 million by 2005.
A comprehensive 2-year study by Alexa Research, a leading Web intelligence and traffic-measurement service, has revealed "sex" was the most popular term for which people searched. According to their online searching habits, people want "sex" more than they want "games," "music," "travel," "jokes," "cars," "jobs," "weather" and "health" combined.
A nationwide survey of 1,031 adults conducted by Zogby International and Focus on the Family on March 8-10, 2000, found that "20 percent of respondents - which extrapolates to 40 million adults - admitted visiting a sexually-oriented website. According to the Nielsen Net ratings, 17.5 million surfers visited porn sites from their homes in January of 2000 - a 40 percent increase compared with September of 1999."
Pornography websites earned $1.5 billion in 1999 and more than $2 billion in 2000.
According to a 2001 report by the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Public Education, "by the time adolescents graduate from high school, they will have spent 15,000 hours watching television, compared with 12,000 hours spent in the classroom ... American media are thought to be the most sexually suggestive in the Western hemisphere. The average American adolescent will view nearly 14,000 sexual references per year, yet only 165 of these references deal with birth-control, self-control, abstinence or the risk of pregnancy or STDs."
The 2001 pediatric report also said that "56 percent of all programs on American television were found to contain sexual content. The so-called "family hour" of prime-time television (8:00 to 9:00 p.m.) contains on average more than eight sexual incidents, which is more than 4 times what it contained in 1976. Nearly one third of family-hour shows contain sexual references ..."
And that's just the tip of the iceberg.
The military experts are right when they say we need to discuss how we administer prisons, how we handle foreign detainees and how complaints travel up and down the chain of command. The average soldier receives three hours of training a year on the Geneva Conventions regarding the proper treatment of prisoners of war. Is it possible to deprogram and reprogram soldiers - who come from a culture living the above statistics - in three hours a year?
A recent poll says Americans aren't even overly ashamed of what has gone on. Why? "People out in the hinterlands can keep the perspective of the big picture," the pollster told U.S. News magazine. Oh yeah? What is the big picture? That "everyone does it"? That this was mistreatment, not torture? That these were mere "fraternity pranks"? That the Iraqis are doing far worse to each other and to our soldiers?
Forget defending it. It's indefensible. Since the photos were seen 'round the world, very few folks 'round the world now view America as the country that liberated the Iraqis from Saddam, that rebuilt roads, schools and power stations. They see America as the country that engaged in the exact reprehensible behavior we said we were going to Iraq to stop.
But, with the non-judgmental, sex-crazed, anything-goes culture that we have become at home, it seems that America has set herself up for international humiliation. Our country permits Hollywood to put almost anything in a movie and still call it PG-13. We permit television and computers to bring all manner of filth into our homes. We permit school children to be taught that homosexuality is an acceptable lifestyle. We allow Christianity and the teaching of Judeo-Christian values to be scrubbed from the public square. We allow our children be taught how to use condoms in school, rather than why to avoid sex. We let these things happen. They don't happen on their own.
While hearings take place to examine the horrific behavior that took place in a military prison overseas, it's time to take a cold, hard look at the degradation in our own country - and in our own homes. If there are problems in your home, contact the National Coalition for the Protection of Children and Families, or Focus on the Family, or Web Wise Kids for help.
Rebecca Hagelin is a vice president of the Heritage Foundation, a research and educational think-tank whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values and a strong national defense. She is also the former vice president of communications for WorldNetDaily and her 60-second radio commentaries can be heard on the Salem Communications Network.
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
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>> MILITARY POSTS

New tankers not needed, report says
By Matthew Daly
Associated Press
There is no compelling reason for the Air Force to immediately acquire 100 air refueling tankers from The Boeing Co., a new Defense Department report concludes in another blow to the controversial deal.
The report by the Defense Science Board says that, contrary to Air Force claims, corrosion of the aging tanker fleet is "manageable" and several options exist to refurbish the fleet.
If officials are willing to tolerate increased maintenance costs, "you can defer major near-term ... investments" to replace the tanker fleet, the report said.
"There is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a replacement program prior to the completion of" a lengthy analysis of alternatives and other studies, the report said.
The report has not been released, but members of Congress were briefed on it late Wednesday.
It follows a report released last month by the Pentagon's inspector general, who concluded the Pentagon should not move forward on the $23.5 billion plan until significant changes are made.
In a highly critical report, Inspector General Joseph Schmitz said procedural and financial problems with the deal could cause the government to spend as much as $4.5 billion more than necessary.
Once the changes are made, however, there is no compelling reason not to complete the deal, Schmitz said.
A Pentagon official, who asked not to be identified, said the Defense Science Board "has offered the department several very good suggestions" that will be considered as officials make a final decision on the tanker deal.
Boeing spokesman Doug Kennett said the company had not seen the actual report, but stood ready to assist the Air Force.
"We believe that the 767 is clearly the best solution to the nation's aerial tanker needs," he said.
A watchdog group said the report was the latest evidence that the Air Force should not go through with the tanker deal, in which the Air Force would lease 20 modified Boeing 767 jets for use as refueling tankers and purchase another 80 planes.
The planes would be made at Boeing's Everett, Wash., plant and modified for military use in Wichita, Kan.
"The Defense Science Board report is further confirmation that there is no need to proceed with the purchase or lease of the current boondoggle until a robust analysis of all options for tanker replacement is completed," said Keith Ashdown, vice president of Taxpayers for Common Sense, a Washington-based advocacy group.
The report confirms that the Air Force and Boeing are "crying wolf over the corrosion problems in the fleet to create an emergency that never existed," Ashdown said. "The current tanker fleet is old, but efforts to combat corrosion are working and can be managed in a fiscally responsible manner."
Copyright 2003 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
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Study recommends cutting submarine fleet
By Lolita C. Baldor
Associated Press
The Navy Wednesday said reports that a study is recommending the submarine fleet be cut by a third are very preliminary, and no decisions have been made.
But members of Congress are already vowing to fight any efforts to trim the fleet, and a Connecticut senator Wednesday filed his official objection to the plan with the Navy's operations' chief.
Navy Lt. Amy Gilliland said there are several ongoing studies by the Defense Department and the Navy to assess the fleet strength and determine the Navy's current and future needs. But none are completed, she said.
"The Navy continually assesses force structure to ensure we are tailored to best meet joint mission requirements for both today and in the future," Gilliland said.
A published report Wednesday confirmed testimony earlier this year that a Navy study would propose slashing the submarine fleet from about 55 vessels to 37 by retiring older submarines and ordering fewer of the new Virginia class models.
"I am at a loss to understand how the Defense Department could reach such startling conclusions, as the United States only grows more dependent on these stealthy platforms in the conduct of intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and attack missions," said Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, D-Conn., in a letter to Adm. Vernon E. Clark, chief of naval operations.
The new submarines are being built by Electric Boat in Connecticut and Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia. EB employs about 1,100 people in Groton, Conn., and Rhode Island.
Ronald O'Rourke, defense specialist for the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, testified about the report in March in front of the House Armed Services Committee. He said there are concerns that the study, done by a Navy programming and budgeting office, would stall plans to build two submarines a year, which is supposed to begin in 2009.
O'Rourke said Wednesday that he believes the report is finished and it determined that fewer submarines were needed if the vessels were used only for war fighting, while surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance duties were shifted to satellites, unmanned aircraft and other vehicles.
Lawmakers, however, said decisions should be made based on the Navy's needs, not on budget constraints.
"The stealth and range of submarines makes them one of the most critical weapons of the U.S. Armed Forces in their fight against terrorism," said Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I. "It would be a foolish and shortsighted to use a reduction in submarines as a means of cutting costs."
And Rep. Rob Simmons, R-Conn., said Congress "will not stand idly by while unnamed bean-counters in the Pentagon propose cost-saving measures."
The House defense panel was expected to vote late Wednesday on the military authorization bill for 2005, and there was no indication submarine orders or funds would be cut at all.
And Dodd noted in his letter that the Navy report would contradict a 1999 study by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that concluded the Navy needed 68 attack submarines by 2015, and 76 by 2025 to respond to emerging threats throughout the world.
A larger Defense Department study on undersea warfare is ongoing and expected to be complete next year.
The Navy in January signed a five-year, $8.4 billion contract with EB and Newport News for five Virginia class nuclear submarines, cementing a congressional plan to provide a more stable, cost-effective shipbuilding program.
Some of the work will be done in Quonset Point, R.I. Lawmakers and company officials said the long-term commitment will achieve significant cost savings, and could lead to contracts for two ships a year later this decade.
Copyright 2003 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed

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SICK ROMPS AT PORNY PRISON
By BRIDGET HARRISON
LEASH OF HER WORRIES:
http://www.nypost.com/news/worldnews/20902.htm
"Leash GI" Lynndie England had video sex with Spc. Charles Graner.
Washington Post
May 14, 2004 -- Iraq's feared Abu Ghraib jail was one big sex romp - sometimes by candlelight with an audience watching, U.S. troops said yesterday.
Sex and alcohol were commonplace, and soldiers frequently set up candlelit rooms for voyeuristic sex shows, said a soldier who served at the notorious prison.
"There were lots of affairs. There was all kinds of adultery and alcoholism and all kinds of crap going on," said Dave Bischel, a National Guardsman with the 870th Military Police unit, who returned home from Abu Ghraib last month.
"There was a bed found in one of the abandoned buildings. There was a mattress on the ground. They had chairs all circled around it and candles all over the place," said Bischel, adding the chairs were "obviously for an audience."
The soldier said the X-rated liaisons at the prison were made easier by its maze-like layout and that other troops frequently turned a blind eye to what their pals were up to.
"One of the female soldiers supposedly had sex in a gang bang," said Terry Stowe, an MP from California. "From time to time, things like this would happen."
News of the shocking sexcapades in the controversial lockup come as a friend of disgraced reservist Lynndie England lashed out in her defense yesterday, saying tapes of her having sex in the prison were personal to her and the boyfriend with whom she is "in love."
Congress members, who viewed shocking new pictures of abuse in the Iraqi jail, said England appeared in a sicko video having sex in front of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and that she was snapped in graphic sex acts with other U.S. soldiers.
But one family friend insisted the racy reservist had sex only with her boyfriend, Spc. Charles Graner - one of six others from the 372nd Military Police Company facing charges for the abuse - and that the pair are "madly in love."
He said the X-rated tapes had been taken from their foot lockers.
"We are all amazed by this. She only had sex with him," said Kenny Flanagan, who has known England since childhood.
The pregnant England, who is now stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C., met Graner, 35, a divorced father of two, shortly before the pair's Maryland-based unit was posted to Iraq.
Graner is charged with overseeing numerous abuses of Iraqi prisoners, and appears in several photos with the young private, leering at humiliated Iraqi captives.
Another soldier involved in the scandal, Spc. Jeremy Sivits, told Army investigators Graner would mock the detainees and brutalize them, The Los Angeles Times reported last night.
In one incident, he allegedly punched a detainee so hard, he knocked him unconscious. "His eyes were closed and he was not moving," Sivits was quoted as saying. Afterward, Graner shook his fist and said, "Damn, that hurt," the report says.
Sivits, who the paper said is expected to plead guilty at a court-martial proceeding next week, also disputed England's claims that she was ordered to pose for the snapshots that shocked the world.
One picture showed her holding a naked Iraqi man on a dog leash, and in others, she is shown making thumbs-up signs in front of a pyramid of naked Iraqi men and pointing at the genitals of a naked prisoner.
Sivits said England was "laughing at the different stuff that they were having the detainees do."
He also shot down her claim that the soldiers were ordered to abuse the prisoners, and said Graner warned him not to tell higher-ups about how they were being treated.
"Our command would have slammed us," Sivits said.
New photos and videos revealed by the Pentagon to lawmakers in a private viewing Wednesday showed attack dogs snarling at cowing prisoners, Iraqi women forced to expose their breasts, and naked prisoners forced to have sex with each other, the lawmakers revealed.

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Halabi released from pre-trial confinement
Associated Press
TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. -- An airman accused of spying while he worked at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba was ordered released from military jail pending his court-martial.
The judge, Air Force Col. Barbara Brand, said Wednesday that Senior Airman Ahmad Al Halabi was not a flight risk and that "lesser forms of restraint are available." His civilian lawyer, Donald G. Rehkopf, said he most likely will be restricted to Travis Air Force Base until his court-martial begins there.
"It feels great," Al Halabi said as he left the hearing. His military lawyer, Maj. James Key, said Al Halabi would go back to his job as a supply clerk "unless his commander comes up with some bizarre plan."
Al Halabi, 25, had been locked up since he was arrested in July, shortly before he was to leave for Syria, where he planned to marry his girlfriend. He faces 17 criminal counts including espionage, lying and misconduct.
The Syrian-born U.S. citizen is accused of attempting to deliver more than 180 e-mail messages to Syria from detainees at Guantanamo Bay, where the U.S. government is holding suspected terrorists. Al Halabi also is charged with mishandling classified material and repeatedly lying to Air Force investigators.
If convicted of spying, the most serious of the charges, Al Halabi could be sentenced to life in prison. He has not yet entered a plea.
Rehkopf asked Brand on Wednesday to dismiss all charges, alleging that prosecutors mishandled evidence and witnesses lied. Brand is set to rule on that motion and others at a June 15 hearing where a start date for opening statements will also be decided.
Rehkopf said Air Force investigators in September mishandled a box of evidence by not wearing gloves and by drinking beer while examining the contents.
He said they realized their mistake and "the evidence was replaced and the box reopened and photos were taken as if it was being opened for the first time."
The alleged incident was witnessed and reported by Staff Sgt. Suzan Sultan, an Arabic translator working for the prosecution, Rehkopf said.
Sultan also testified during Al Halabi's Article 32 hearing, which is similar to a civilian grand jury, about the meaning of a word contained in a letter from the Syrian Embassy to Al Halabi.
She said she initially thought the letter said Al Halabi planned to visit Qatar as well as Syria, but later realized the Arabic word for that Persian Gulf country also means "homeland." When she told Capt. Dennis Kaw, an assistant prosecutor, of the mistake in her translation, he told her not to change her testimony, she testified.
Lt. Col. Brian Wheeler, the Air Force's lead prosecutor, said none of the alleged incidents amounts to obstruction of justice.
In March the judge denied a defense request to dismiss the charges against Al Halabi based on his lawyers' lack of access to evidence against him.
Copyright 2003 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
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SPIEGEL ONLINE - 14. Mai 2004, 9:47
URL: http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/erde/0,1518,299722,00.html
Geografie-Posse
Asiatischer Kartenkrieg erreicht Deutschland
Von Alexander Neubacher
Zwischen S?dkorea und Japan schwelt ein bizarrer Namensstreit: Darf das "Japanische Meer" auch "Ostmeer" hei?en? So weit, so nebens?chlich - w?re da nicht die Gefahr, dass jetzt auch Deutschland in den Streit verwickelt wird. Ein D?sseldorfer Verlag hat es gewagt, eine Karte mit beiden Namen zu drucken.
kartenwelten.de
Karte vom D?sseldorfer Verlag: Corpus delicti
Das raue Gew?sser liegt zwischen Russland, Korea und Japan, erstreckt sich ?ber eine Fl?che von knapp einer Million Quadratkilometern und ist bei seinen Anrainern nicht nur wegen der Fischgr?nde ein steter Quell des Streits. Japanische und s?dkoreanische Piraten liefern sich hier einen Wettlauf um die besten Prisen. Russen nutzten die See, um radioaktiven Fl?ssigm?ll zu verklappen. Den Nordkoreanern dient das Meer als Testgebiet f?r Nuklearsprengk?pfe. Selbst um die Felsen, die hier und da aus den von Taifunen aufgepeitschten Wogen ragen, wird erbittert gerungen.
Anfang des Jahres provozierte die s?dkoreanische Post einen diplomatischen Eklat, als sie die von koreanischen M?wen okkupierte, politisch aber von Japan beanspruchte Insel Tokdo mit einer Sonderbriefmarke w?rdigte. Jetzt droht auch die Bundesrepublik in den s?dostasiatischen Nachbarschaftsstreit hineingezogen zu werden: Japanische Spitzendiplomaten werfen einem deutschen Unternehmen einen politischen Fauxpas vor, der die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen schwerwiegend belaste. Man schade, erregt sich Japans Generalkonsul Takahiro Shinyo, "den Interessen unserer Regierung".
Einigung nicht in Sicht
Es geht um die Frage, wie das von Japan, Russland und Korea umschlossene Gew?sser eigentlich hei?t. "Nihon-kai", sagen die Japaner, "Japanisches Meer", und verweisen auf entsprechende Eintr?ge in jahrhundertealten Seekarten. "Tonghae", "Ostmeer", sagen hingegen die Koreaner, und k?nnen ihrerseits Belege anf?hren, dass das Meer seit ?ber "zwei Millennien" (Koreas Ex-Botschaftsrat Lee Hyeon-Pyo) - zumindest aus ihrer Sicht - im Osten liegt und deshalb auch so bezeichnet werden m?sse. Eine Einigung im bizarren Namensstreit ist nicht in Sicht.
AP
S?dkoreanischer Fu?ballfan: Nationale Aufwallung um den Namen eines Meeres
Die vor zwei Jahren von Bundesinnenminister Otto Schily in Berlin einberufene "Uno-Weltkonferenz zur Standardisierung von geografischen Namen" (UNCSGN) endete ergebnislos. Doch nun, so f?rchten Japans Diplomaten, werden ausgerechnet in Deutschland Fakten geschaffen. Auf der weltgr??ten Druckfachmesse "Drupa" in D?sseldorf wollte der Druckmaschinenfabrikant MAN Roland an diesem Freitag eine Weltkarte des Spezialverlags Kober-K?mmerly+Frey pr?sentieren. Und in der unteren rechten Ecke der Karte, Ma?stab 1 zu 25 Millionen, hat Japans Botschaft zu ihrem Entsetzen drei kleine W?rter ersp?ht: "Ostmeer/Japanisches Meer".
Japan f?hrt schweres Gesch?tz auf
Mit allen Mitteln versucht Japan nun, die Publikation der derart beschrifteten Landkarte zu verhindern. Bei Verlagschef Tim Kober ging ein Brief der Botschaft ein. "Mit Nachdruck" wende man sich gegen den Versuch, einen "allgemein eingeb?rgerten geografischen Namen ohne berechtigten Grund" zu ?ndern. Offenbar sei der Verlag der Propaganda S?dkoreas auf den Leim gegangen, das, so die Japaner, "einseitig fordert, eine bisher international nicht anerkannte Bezeichnung, die nicht auf historischen Tatsachen beruht, ?ber die Verwendung im eigenen Land hinaus als internationalen Standard zu verwenden".
Japans Generalkonsul Shinyo verlangt deshalb von Kober und zugleich von der Messeleitung und vom D?sseldorfer Oberb?rgermeister, die Publikation der Weltkarte "sofort einzustellen und sie nicht weiter auf der Messe zu verteilen". Es sei "?u?erst bedauerlich", dass die Druckmesse "zu einem politischen Akt missbraucht" werde.
Der Verlagschef indes ist sich keiner Schuld bewusst. Monatelange Recherchen h?tten zweifelsfrei ergeben, dass die Bezeichnungen "Ostmeer" und "Japanisches Meer" gleichberechtigt seien. So stehe es in der Encyclopaedia Britannica, in der "Financial Times" und in Ver?ffentlichungen des US-Verlagsgiganten RandMcNally. Die "New York Times" benutzt inzwischen beide Namen, wenn das Kriegsschiff "Kitty Hawk" von seinem japanischen Heimathafen aus in See sticht.
Anw?lte sollen notfalls Feierstunde st?ren
Auch von der f?r Fragen der maritimen Weltordnung zust?ndigen Internationalen Hydrografischen Organisation (IHO) bekommt Kober R?ckendeckung. Deren Standardwerk "Grenzen der Ozeane und Meere" f?hrte bislang nur das "Japanische Meer" auf - eine Folge einer Konferenz Ende der zwanziger Jahre, an der das jahrelang von den Japanern besetzte Korea nicht teilnehmen durfte. Inzwischen jedoch will die IHO auch die koreanische Position ber?cksichtigen.
Wie der Streit um die Weltkarte aus D?sseldorf ausgeht, ist ungewiss. Die f?r diesen Freitag geplante Pr?sentation hat die Messe vorsichtshalber abgesagt. Japans Botschaft hatte angedroht, die Feierstunde mit Hilfe seiner Rechtsanw?lte zu st?ren. Koreas Botschaftsrat Kotae Kim wiederum besteht nun erst recht darauf, dass die Karte gedruckt wird. Die Erstausgabe, so hat sich der offenbar streitlustige Diplomat vorgenommen, will er dann sogar mit seinem Autogramm verzieren.

? SPIEGEL ONLINE 2004
Alle Rechte vorbehalten
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Bankrupt China Becomes Economic Threat
Posted May 12, 2004
By Christopher Whalen

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao promised "resolute" measures to rein in excessive economic growth.

Financial and political analysts have been predicting the demise of China's economic miracle for months now, but the latest policy shift by the Federal Reserve toward a more restrictive interest-rate posture has caused the alarm bells to ring from Hong Kong to Wall Street. The rebound of the dollar that began in February has taken the pressure off other central banks, particularly the Bank of Japan, to sop up the fiat greenbacks printed by the Fed, thus placing added upward pressure on U.S. interest rates. By no accident, April was the worst month for emerging market debt in years.
More expensive dollar credit means the end of speculative booms in markets such as China, whose economy has grown to account for 10 percent of global trade. Wen Jiabao, China's prime minister, promised "resolute" measures to rein in excessive economic growth, while assuring investors that Beijing would seek to orchestrate a "soft landing," the Financial Times reports. Like Alan Greenspan at the Fed, China's communist bureaucrats have used excessive credit and investment to boost short-term economic activity, but at a dire cost in terms of future inflation. Indeed, there is great debate whether China's economy is growing or is just pumped up with cheap dollars - money proffered by the latest generation of credulous gringos.
Many Bush administration officials remind Insight that China is a corrupt, chaotic country where the central government has only a tenuous grip on events, especially in the interior of the country. Local Communist Party officials loot private companies and banks with impunity, leaving all investors - foreign and domestic - at terrible risk. Foreign banks and investors, meanwhile, are providing a critical source of foreign exchange to bolster China's authoritarian rulers, who use fantastic claims of economic performance to entice new financial and direct investment from abroad.
This reporter always keeps in mind a comment of liberal economist Lester Thurow to an investment conference in Hong Kong a few years back when the MIT sage observed that China's economic statistics were so remarkable as to be unbelievable. Few of the investment-banking types in the audience appreciated the full import of Thurow's remarks, but the bottom line is that economic data from China is even less reliable than the politically biased economic and labor statistics that emanate from Washington.
For example, China's National Bureau of Statistics reports annualized growth of 9.7 percent for the first quarter of 2004, a problem the Bush administration wishes it had. China claims to have expanded its economy at a brisk pace; 9.1 percent growth for all of 2003 and a 9.7 percent annualized growth rate for first quarter of 2004. The good news is that these numbers may indeed reflect the increase in economic activity caused by foreign dollar inflows, but the bad news is that these levels cannot be maintained, experts tell Insight.
China's statistics agency reports that investment in fixed assets in the first quarter ran 43 percent ahead of the previous year's levels. "The scale of investment in fixed assets is too large and growth is too fast," a National Bureau of Statistics spokesman told Pacific News Service. Officially, consumer prices rose 2.8 percent in the quarter, but observers in Hong Kong tell Insight that the actual rate of inflation in the major Chinese cities is running at 20 to 30 percent above annual rates. Indeed, even the International Monetary Fund said last week that China's economy is "overheating."
"By definition, a shock is something that catches us by surprise," wrote Walter Molano of BCP Securities in a missive to his clients, mostly investors who follow his research on Latin American economies. "We expect a shock from Asia, but we do not know how, when and why."
Molano warns that the Chinese economy is badly overheated and that the rise in the inflation rate well into double digits is creating factors that will decelerate the pace of Chinese economic growth. Nevertheless, he argues, "the rampant corruption and the weakness in the banking sector suggest that the controlled adjustment could manifest itself into a hard landing." Such a scenario, Molano writes, "would ricochet immediately into Latin America."
A drop in the much noted Chinese demand for commodity products, he continues, "would coincide with a large increase in production" to accommodate the market's expectations that China's voracious appetite for everything from U.S. grain to steel is insatiable. "The result would be downward gap in commodity prices, thus affecting the balance of payments for most of the region. Unfortunately, this could coincide with a rise in U.S. interest rates, creating a more worrisome situation for Latin America."
The torrid growth rates observed in China during the last several years have been a bonanza for investors and exporters, but the prospect of a sudden drop in China's demand for everything foreign implies that the Chinese central bank may need to allow the country's currency to fall. The restrictive measures put in place so far by China's authoritarian government have not yet reduced the economic surge, but there are indications that the vast speculative boom in China is nearing an end.
In Hong Kong, the South China Morning Post reports that prices for just about every local asset class began heading south simultaneously. Commodities, currencies, H shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and even every equity bear's safe haven - gold - are tumbling, while the U.S. dollar has experienced a sudden rejuvenation. Meanwhile, there is growing evidence that the economic constraints felt by millions of Chinese, which caused the central government to embrace a "great leap forward" via hyper economic expansion in the first place, are causing social instability, the dark menace that has followed China's history.
Keith Bradsher of the New York Times describes how a flotilla of Chinese warships sailed slowly down the length of Victoria Harbor in early May "in a rare show of force that comes as democracy advocates here say they face growing intimidation by Beijing." He continues: "Two guided-missile destroyers, four guided-missile frigates and two submarines displayed China's military strength for the first time since the territory was handed over by Britain in 1997. It marked a distinct change of tactics by Beijing. The Chinese military has been a nearly invisible presence here for the last seven years. Soldiers are required to wear civilian clothing when they leave their bases, and the main base is tucked away on an island at the harbor's western end. But today, residents here watched as a submarine sailed past the downtown Bank of China tower, designed by I.M. Pei. Sailors in dress whites lined the sides of the destroyers and frigates, and some gave friendly waves to workers on a passing tugboat."
If astute financial observers are correct and China's economy experiences another sudden "adjustment," particularly via a currency devaluation, the political ramifications may be even more important than the financial fallout. While China has hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign reserves, the imbalances in its economy, surging imports and losses hidden within corrupt banks and state-owned companies could easily wipe out these assets several times over. But then again, it is impossible to say for sure whether the financial statements of China's central bank are any more truthful than the other statistics produced by the nation's communist government.
So far, the Bush administration has been too distracted by the Iraq mess to notice that the world's largest nation is on a collision course with the wall of financial reality. The White House refused, for example, to confront China over its manipulation of its currency (thus fueling the present boom) and suppression of worker's wages (thus artificially suppressing visible inflation), in essence encouraging Beijing's self-destructive economic course. While the Bush administration likes to kid itself into thinking that China can be coaxed into embracing market norms via a policy of "engagement with leverage," say savvy China watchers, if recent history is any guide China's financial implosion is likely to confirm the market's worst fears.

Christopher Whalen is a contributing writer for Insight magazine.


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>> REWORK 1

Senator airs GOP war discomfort
May 13, 2004
BY ROBERT NOVAK SUN-TIMES COLUMNIST
Sen. Pat Roberts of Kansas is an old-fashioned conservative and a loyal Republican who happens to be the current chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. That's why his Landon Lecture last week at his alma mater, Kansas State University, is a remarkable document. While benefitting from the most highly classified information, he is expressing the concerns of ordinary conservatives and Republicans.
The lecture paid sincere tribute to George W. Bush for the ''courage to act'' after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and in this election year Roberts is not sniping at the Republican president. Nevertheless, the former Marine officer from Dodge City, Kan., is blunt in addressing two overriding problems in the war on terror: lack of accountability in the intelligence community and a messianic desire to recast the world in the American image.
These are precisely the concerns I have heard all over the country from people who call themselves Republicans and are distraught about the U.S. adventure in Iraq. They ask questions. Who is responsible for the false forecast of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that was the immediate cause for war? Are we really intent on planting democracy throughout the Arab world? These skeptics are not about to vote for John Kerry for president, but they are very unhappy.
Roberts, unlike the previous Republican Intelligence chairman (Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama), is not calling for CIA Director George Tenet's dismissal. But he showed in his Kansas State lecture he is concerned about the lack of accountability on two major counts:
''Almost three years after 9/11, no one in the intelligence community has been disciplined, let alone fired. Almost two years since the publication of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that declared Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and was reconstituting his nuclear program, no one has been disciplined or fired.''
While not mentioning Tenet by name, Roberts nailed the CIA director with this telling comment: ''Rarely is any intelligence case a 'slam dunk.''' In Bob Woodward's new book Plan of Attack, Tenet is quoted declaring weapons evidence in Iraq to be a ''slam dunk.'' These are not complaints of a backbencher, but the considered statements of a committee chairman whose long committee inquiry is due for completion this week.
Roberts' broader criticism goes beyond intelligence failure to the U.S. mission of planting the seeds of democracy on Arab soil. ''In fighting the global war against terrorism,'' he said, ''we need to restrain what are growing U.S. messianic instincts -- a sort of global social engineering where the United States feels it is both entitled and obligated to promote democracy -- by force, if necessary.'' While stressing U.S. willingness ''to use force unilaterally if necessary,'' he called it ''time for some hard-headed assessment of American interests.''
Roberts has the sense of history that the Bush policymakers seem to lack. Dating back to his days as a Marine officer, he has studied the misadventures of Winston Churchill and Lawrence of Arabia in dealing with the same people who are proving so troublesome for the Americans more than 80 years later.
As a loyal Republican and strong Bush supporter, Roberts is torn. His president is under incessant assault from Democrats, and for this reason, Roberts comes to Bush's defense. In his Landon Lecture, he suggested ''we may transform the world for the better'' in fighting the war against terrorism.
But Bush can be faulted for lack of interest in accountability and for succumbing to messianic pretensions of spreading democracy, even though Roberts does not single out the president. The questions remain whether any official ever will pay for the intelligence failures and whether the difficulty of nation-building is a lesson learned.
Roberts is not alone among Republicans. The GOP's top two members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- Richard Lugar of Indiana and Chuck Hagel of Nebraska -- have their own misgivings. These Midwestern Republicans know their constituents are concerned about Iraq and what comes next. But how does George W. Bush adjust to these realities while fighting a shooting war and campaigning for re-election?


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>> REWORK 2

Bush Team to Rework Iraq Funding After Senate Balks
Thu May 13, 4:11 PM ET Add Politics to My Yahoo!
By Vicki Allen
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Bush administration officials said they would rework a plan for a $25 billion reserve fund for Iraq (news - web sites) operations after Republican and Democratic senators on Thursday deplored it as an effort to get "a blank check" without congressional oversight.
In a frequently testy Senate Armed Services hearing, even reliable Republican allies balked at the White House's unusual proposal to let it allocate the money to help finance Iraq and Afghanistan (news - web sites) operations for coming months without the approval of Congress.
"Our forefathers would have scorned such arrogance as has been demonstrated by this request," said Sen. Robert Byrd, a West Virginia Democrat. "I'm going to support this $25 billion but we're going to put limitations on it."
Pressed by lawmakers, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and White House deputy budget director Joel Kaplan agreed to try to rework the plan to give Congress more oversight.
Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain criticized the administration's handling of Iraq, citing "mistakes that have been made which have led us to a situation which I think is very grave," and said Congress must increase its oversight.
Democratic presidential hopeful John Kerry (news - web sites), a Massachusetts senator, said in a statement he would back the additional money despite voting against a previous supplemental bill for Iraq. "The situation in Iraq has deteriorated far beyond what the administration anticipated. The money is urgently needed," he said."
The White House late on Wednesday sent Congress its formal request for the $25 billion fund it says it needs until Congress acts on a larger supplemental bill next year.
BIGGER BILL EXPECTED
Wolfowitz said that bill "will certainly be much larger than $25 billion," which would push the cost next year well above the $50 billion the White House originally projected.
Under the White House plan, the reserve funds could be shifted among accounts without congressional approval, which lawmakers said would give the Pentagon (news - web sites) full control over the money, cutting Congress out of its constitutional role of overseeing expenditures.
The Senate will debate the issue next week when it takes up a $422 billion bill for defense programs.
Congress has so far sent the White House about $160 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan.
Until last week when it suddenly asked for the $25 billion, the administration had insisted it would not seek more money for Iraq until next year, which would have put off debate on the issue until after the Nov. 2 presidential election.
Pressed by the military, which was running short of money with the heightened Iraq conflict, the White House sought the fund as a bridge until it gets a bigger bill next year.
With the Pentagon putting the monthly cost of Iraq and Afghanistan operations at nearly $5 billion, Democrats questioned why the Pentagon did not simply ask for a full supplemental spending bill instead of the reserve fund.
"There is no reason not to be direct on this issue and to acknowledge what the costs are of this war," said Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee's top Democrat. "This is the very definition of a blank check."
Wolfowitz said the fund was needed to help the Pentagon manage its accounts until Congress acted on the larger bill next year. "You can do the arithmetic, Senator, we're not hiding the ball on what we're spending now."


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>> REWORK 3

Trade Sanctions Pile Up While Congress Fiddles
May 10, 2004 | |

If private companies worked the way Congress does, we'd probably never be able to compete in the global marketplace. Efficiency, productivity, responsiveness to changing conditions -- all seem lacking under the Capitol Dome.
Consider how long it's taking lawmakers to fix a costly problem with our tax laws.
Several years ago, the World Trade Organization ruled that certain tax breaks given by the federal government for export subsidiaries of American companies (know as "Foreign Sales Corporations," or FSCs) were illegal. That decision gave European nations the power to impose tariffs against many popular American exports, including paper, cotton and a variety of agricultural products.
Congress tried to fix the problem by passing the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act (ETI). The EU sued again -- and won another victory at the WTO.
More than four years later, nothing has changed. The federal government is still giving "illegal" tax breaks to American companies. So on March 1, the European Union began imposing tariffs of 5 percent on our exports. It plans to increase them by one percentage point per month up to 17 percent. The WTO has authorized sanctions that could increase the cost of American exports by up to $4 billion a year, creating a tremendous competitive disadvantage for U.S. producers.
Now, we can argue about whether the WTO should impose sanctions. It's running a big risk, since sanctions might trigger a trade war between Europe and the United States. After all, we need more free trade, not less. If sanctions put that at risk, everybody gets hurt.
Still, the United States voluntarily agreed to join the WTO, and to abide by its rulings. We should live up to our commitment, and as an added bonus, improve our domestic tax system at the same time.
Lawmakers should act immediately to repeal the FSC and ETI. They should then help American businesses by trimming corporate income tax rates. Doing so would lower tax rates and reduce the double taxation of capital income. It also would make our companies more competitive at home and abroad.
The U.S. has the world's second-highest corporate tax rate -- higher than the rates in socialist welfare states like France and Sweden. Lowering the rate is always a good idea; lowering it to settle a complaint by the EU would be even better. After all, the EU seems to be attempting to use the World Trade Organization against us, but if we lower corporate tax rates in response, we'll actually end up stronger and generate more jobs.
Unfortunately, many politicians are using this issue as an excuse to push for more special-interest tax breaks. A Senate bill, for instance, replaces the special tax break for export-oriented income with a special tax break for certain manufacturers.
Amazingly, some lawmakers want to make the bill worse. Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, for example, has succeeded in tacking on a measure that would block the Bush administration's recent effort to ease government-imposed overtime regulations.
In the business world, this amendment process would be like a company insisting that if you want to buy a DVD, you must also buy some other unpopular titles that company sells, whether you liked them or not. That company wouldn't sell many discs or would quickly go out of business. In the nation's capital, this process simply rolls on, day after day.
The answer seems pretty simple. Just as companies allow you to buy only the DVDs you want, lawmakers should bring the tax reform measure up, without all the unrelated amendments, and vote on it. And the Senate tried that with what's known as a cloture vote, on March 24.
Unfortunately, parliamentary rules allowed a minority to block the will of the majority. It takes 60 votes to bring a bill to the floor, and "only" 51 senators supported the motion to invoke cloture. This is the same process, by the way, that's kept so many well-qualified judges who enjoy majority support in the Senate from being confirmed.
So far, the Senate has managed to whittle down the number of amendments from about 150 to about 80. That's still far too many. Until the world's self-proclaimed "greatest deliberative body" can agree to get rid of dozens more amendments, the bill will remain in limbo.
Sadly, in Washington, this is just business as usual. The lawmakers fiddle while sanctions pile up. And we'll all end up paying higher prices for goods and services while U.S. firms lose markets because of increased tariffs on our exports. There ought to be a law against such shenanigans. Unfortunately, we already know it would never pass.

Ed Feulner is the president of The Heritage Foundation (heritage.org), a Washington-based public policy research institute.

? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.




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The War that Dare Not Speak Its Name
The battle is against militant Islam, not "Terror"

By Andrew C. McCarthy

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following is adapted from a speech given last month at the annual conference of the University of Virginia School of Medicine's Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG). The theme of this year's CIAG conference was "Countering Suicide Terrorism: Risks, Responsibilities and Realities."
At any gathering of analysts, academics, and law-enforcement officers who specialize in counter-terrorism, it certainly is appropriate that we should focus on risks, responsibilities, and realities. My question, though, is whether we have the order backwards. Our most urgent imperative today is the need to confront reality. Only by doing that can we get a true understanding of the risks we face and our responsibilities in dealing with them.
What reality am I talking about?
Well, we are now well into the third year of what is called the "War on Terror." That is the language we all use, and it is ubiquitous. The tabloids and the more prestigious journals of news and opinion fill their pages with it. The 24-hour cable television stations are not content merely to repeat "War on Terror" as if it were a mantra; they actually use it as a floating logo in their dizzying set designs.
Most significant of all, the "War on Terror" is our government's top rhetorical catch-phrase. It is the way we define for the American people and the world -- especially the Islamic world -- what we are doing, and what we are about. It is the way we explain the nature of the menace that we are striving to defeat.
But is it accurate? Does it make sense? More importantly, does it serve our purposes? Does it make victory more identifiable, and hence more attainable? I humbly suggest that it fails on all these scores. This, furthermore, is no mere matter of rhetoric or semantics. It is all about substance, and it goes to the very core of our struggle.
Terrorism is not an enemy. It is a method. It is the most sinister, brutal, inhumane method of our age. But it is nonetheless just that: a method. You cannot, and you do not, make war on a method. War is made on an identified -- and identifiable -- enemy.
In the here and now, that enemy is militant Islam -- a very particular practice and interpretation of a very particular set of religious, political and social principles.
Now that is a very disturbing, very discomfiting thing to say in 21st-century America. It is very judgmental. It sounds very insensitive. It is the very definition of politically incorrect. Saying it aloud will not get you invited to chat with Oprah. But it is a fact. And it is important both to say it and to understand it.
We have a rich and worthy tradition of religious tolerance in America. Indeed, in many ways our reverence for religious practice and tolerance is why there is an America. America was a deeply religious place long before it was ever a constitutional democracy. That tradition of tolerance causes us, admirably, to bend over backwards before we pass judgment on the religious beliefs and religious practices of others. It is an enormous part of what makes America great.
It led our government, within hours of the 9/11 attacks, to announce to the world that Islam was not and is not our enemy. Repeatedly, the president himself has said it: "The 19 suicide terrorists hijacked a great religion." The message from all our top officials has been abundantly clear: "That's that; Islam off the table; no need to go deeper."
But we have the ostrich routine way too far. A commitment in favor of toleration is not the same as a commitment against examination. We have been so paralyzed by the fear of being portrayed as an enemy of Islam -- as an enemy of a creed practiced by perhaps a billion people worldwide -- that we've lost our voice on a very salient question: What will be the Islam of the 21st century? Will it be the Islam of the militants, or the Islam of the moderates? That's the reality we need to grapple with.
Let's make no mistake about this: We have a crucial national-security interest in the outcome of that struggle. We need the moderates to win. And here, when I speak of moderates, I am not talking about those who merely pay lip service to moderation. I am not talking about those who take advantage of America's benign traditions and our reluctance to examine the religious practices of others. I am not talking about those who use that blind eye we turn as an opportunity to be apologists, enablers, and supporters of terrorists.
I am talking about authentic moderates: millions of Muslims who want an enlightened, tolerant, and engaged Islam for today's world. Those people need our help in the worst way. They are losing the battles for their communities. The militants may not be a majority, but they are a vocal, aggressive minority -- and they are not nearly as much of a small fringe as we'd like to believe.
As an assistant U.S. attorney, time and time again I heard it over the last decade, from ordinary Muslims we reached out to for help -- people we wanted to hire as Arabic translators, or who were potential witnesses, or who were simply in a position to provide helpful information. People who were as far from being terrorists as you could possibly be. "I'd like to help the government," they would say, "but I can't." And it was not so much about their safety -- although there was, no doubt, some of that going on. It was about ostracism.
Repeatedly they'd tell us that the militant factions dominated their communities. These elements were usually not the most numerous, but they were the most vocal, the best networked, the best funded, and the most intimidating. Consequently, people whose patriotic instinct was to be helpful could not overcome the fear that they and their families could be blackballed if it became known that they had helped the United States prosecute Muslim terrorists. The militants had the kind of suasion that could turn whole communities into captive audiences.
This is no small matter. Events of the last decade, throughout the world, are a powerful lesson that the more insular and dominated communities become, the more they are likely to breed the attitudes and pathologies that lead to terrorist plots and suicide bombings. It's true that suicide bombers seem to defy precise psychological profiling; they come from diverse economic and educational backgrounds -- the only common thread seems to be devotion to militant Islam. But while we have not had success predicting who is likely to become a suicide bomber, it is far easier to get a read on where suicide bombers and other terrorists will come from. They come from communities where the militants dominate and those who don't accept their beliefs are cowed into submission.
SAVING OURSELVES, SAVING ISLAM
That militant Islam is our enemy is a fact. That it is the object of our war is a fact. That we need to empower real moderates is a fact. And we need to talk about these facts.
We are not helping the authentic moderates if we avoid having the conversation that so needs to be had if the militants hiding in the weeds we've created are going to be exposed and marginalized. If we fail to be critical, if we fail to provoke that discussion, it will continue to be militants who hold positions of influence and who control indoctrination in communities, madrassas, prisons, and other settings where the young, the vulnerable, and the alienated are searching for direction.
For ourselves too, and for the success of our struggle, we need to be clear that the enemy here is militant Islam. If we are to appreciate the risks to our way of life, and our responsibilities in dealing with them, we need to understand that we are fighting a religious, political and social belief system -- not a method of attack, but a comprehensive ideology that calls for a comprehensive response.
In the 1990s, our response, far from being comprehensive, was one-dimensional. We used the criminal justice system. As an individual, I am very proud to have been associated with the good work done in that effort. Yet, if we are going to be honest with ourselves -- if we are truly going to confront reality -- as a nation, we'd have to call it largely a failure.
We have learned over the years that the militant population is large -- maybe tens of thousands, maybe more. Certainly enough to staff an extensive international network and field numerous cells and small battalions that, in the aggregate, form a challenging military force. Nevertheless, in about a half dozen major prosecutions between 1993 and 2001, we managed to neutralize less than three-dozen terrorists -- the 1993 World Trade Center bombers; those who plotted an even more ghastly "Day of Terror" that would have destroyed several New York City landmarks; the Manila Air conspirators who tried to blow U.S. airliners out of the sky over the Pacific; those who succeeded in obliterating our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; and the would-be bombers of Los Angeles International Airport who were thwarted just before the Millennium celebration.
In these cases, we saw the criminal-justice response at its most aggressive, operating at a very high rate of success. Every single defendant who was charged and tried was convicted. As a practical matter, however, even with that rate of efficiency, we were able to neutralize only a tiny portion of the terrorist population.
Now, however, combining law enforcement with the more muscular use of military force -- the way we have fought the battle since September 11 -- we are far more effective. Terrorists are being rolled up in much greater numbers. They are being captured and killed. Instead of dozens being neutralized, the numbers are now in the hundreds and thousands.
But I respectfully suggest that this is still not enough, because it doesn't necessarily mean we are winning.
WAR OF IDEAS
When I was a prosecutor in the 1980s, it was the "War on Drugs" that was all the rage. We would do mega-cases, make mega-arrests, and seize mega-loads of cocaine and heroin. It made for terrific headlines. It looked great on television. But we weren't winning. Neighborhoods were still rife with narcotics traffickers and all their attendant depravity. And there was the tell-tale sign: The price of drugs kept going down instead of up. We said we were at war, but with all we were doing we were still failing to choke off the supply chain.
Now I see another version of the same syndrome, and if we don't talk about Islam we will remain blind to it -- to our great detriment. To understand why, all we need to do is think for a moment about the cradle-to-grave philosophy of Hamas. Yes, what blares on the news are suicide bombings that slaughter scores of innocents. But look underneath them, at what Hamas is doing day-to-day. They don't just run paramilitary training for adult jihadists. They start from the moment of birth. From infancy, hatred is taught to children. They learn to hate before they ever have a clue about what all the hatred is over. At home, in mosques, in madrassas, in summer camps -- dressed in battle fatigues and hoods, and armed with mock weapons -- it is fed to them.
And Hamas is not nearly alone. A funding spigot has been wide open for years. We are better about trying to shut it down than we used to be, but we're not even close to efficient yet. And even if we were to shut it down tomorrow, there are hundreds of millions -- maybe more -- already in the pipeline. Dollars that are contributed and controlled by the worst Wahhabist and Salafist elements. Those dollars are funding hatred. Hatred and the demonization of human beings simply because of who they are.
Some suggest that our situation might benefit from making accommodations -- policy concessions that might mollify the militants and miraculously change their attitude toward us. But let's think about a five-year-old Muslim boy who has already gotten a sizable dose of the venom that is found in the madrassas and the Arabic media.
I can assure you that that five-year-old kid does not hate American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. He does not hate the intractable nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. What he hates is Jews. What he hates is Americans. It is in the water he drinks and the air he breathes. Sure, as he grows, he'll eventually be taught to hate American foreign policy and what he'll forever be told is the "Israeli occupation." But those abstractions are not the source of the child's hatred, and changing them won't make the hatred go away -- the hatred that fuels the killing.
When I say I worry that we could lose this struggle against militant Islam that we keep calling the "War on Terror," it is that fuel and that hatred I am talking about. We have the world's most powerful, competent military -- it can capture and kill large numbers of terrorists. With the help of our law-enforcement and intelligence agencies -- especially cutting off funding and cracking down on other kinds of material support -- our unified government can make a sizable dent in the problem. It can give us periods like the last two years when there have been no successful attacks on our homeland -- although it is hard to take too much comfort in that once you look at Bali, or Casablanca, or Istanbul, or Baghdad, or Madrid.
Yes, we can have temporary, uneasy respites from the struggle. We cannot win, however, until we can honestly say we are turning the tide of the numbers. The madrassas are like conveyor belts. If they are churning out more militants in waiting than we are capturing, killing, prosecuting, or otherwise neutralizing, then we are losing this war.
It's not enough to deplete the militants' assets. We need to defeat their ideas, and that means marginalizing their leaders. That means talking about how Islam assimilates to American ideals and traditions. It means making people take clear positions: making them stand up and be counted -- and be accountable -- not letting them hide under murky labels like "moderate".
As far as recognizing what we're really up against here, the terrorism prosecutions of the 1990s were a powerful eye-opener. We saw up close who the enemy was and why it was so crucial to be clear about it. Those cases are generally thought to have begun with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing -- a horror that oddly seems mild compared to the carnage we've witnessed in over a decade since. Yet, while that attack -- the militants' declaration of war -- began the string of terrorism cases, it was not really the start of the story.
That actually began years earlier. The men who carried out the World Trade Center bombing spent years training for it, mostly in rural outposts remote from Manhattan -- like Calverton, Long Island, western Pennsylvania, and northern Connecticut. There, they drilled in shooting, hand-to-hand combat, and improvised explosive devices. From about 1988 on, they were operating here, and saw themselves as a committed jihad army in the making.
They were fully convinced that their religion compelled them to brutality. And unlike us, they had no queasiness: They were absolutely clear about who their enemy was. They did not talk in jingos about the "War on Freedom," or the "War on Liberty." They talked about the War on America, the War on Israel, and the War on West. They were plainspoken about whom they sought to defeat and why.
Their leader was a blind Egyptian cleric named Omar Abdel Rahman, the emir of an international terrorist organization called the "Islamic Group." This was a precursor of al Qaeda, responsible for the infamous 1981murder of Anwar Sadat for the great crime of making peace with Israel. Abdel Rahman continues to this day to have a profound influence on Osama bin Laden; his sons have been linked to al Qaeda, and one of bin Laden's demands continues to be that America free the "Blind Sheikh," who is now serving a life sentence.
Abdel Rahman laid out the principles of his terror group -- including its American division -- with alarming clarity: Authority to rule did not come from the people who are governed; it came only from Allah -- a God who, in Abdel Rahman's depiction, was not a God of mercy and forgiveness, but a God of wrath and vengeance, and a God single-mindedly consumed with the events of this world. For the Blind Sheikh and his cohorts, there would be no toleration for other religions or other views. There was militant Islam, and there was everybody else.
All the world was divided into two spheres -- and it is very interesting how those spheres were referred to: the first was Dar al Islam, or the domain of the Muslims; the second was Dar al Harb. You might assume that Dar al Harb would be the domain of the non-Muslims. It is not. It is instead the domain of war. The militants perceive themselves as in a constant state of war with those who do not accept their worldview.
Sometimes that war is hot and active. Sometimes it is in recess while the militants take what they can get in negotiations and catch their breath for the next rounds of violence. But don't be fooled: the war never ends -- unless and until all the world accepts their construction of Islam.
As Abdel Rahman taught his adherents -- and as the bin Ladens, the Zawahiris, and the Zarqawis echo today -- the manner of prosecuting the never-ending war is jihad. This word is often translated as holy war; it more closely means struggle.
We hear a lot today from the mainstream media about jihad. Usually, it's a happy-face jihad, congenially rendered as "the internal struggle to become a better person," or "the struggle of communities to drive out drug peddlers," or "the struggle against disease, poverty and ignorance." In many ways, these reflect admirable efforts to reconstruct a very troubling concept, with an eye toward an Islam that blends into the modern world.
But let's be clear: these are reconstructions. Jihad, in its seventh-century origins, is a forcible, military concept. I realize politesse frowns on saying such things out loud, but one of the main reasons it is so difficult to discredit the militants -- to say convincingly that they have hijacked a peaceable religion -- is this: when they talk about this central tenet, jihad, as a duty to take up arms, they have history and tradition on their side. As Abdel-Rahman, the influential scholar with a doctorate from the famed al-Azhar University in Egypt, instructed his followers: "There is no such thing as commerce, industry, and science in jihad.... If Allah says: 'Do jihad,' it means jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the grenades, and with the missile. This is jihad. Jihad against God's enemies for God's cause and his word."
So rich is the military pedigree of this term, jihad, that many of the apologists concede it but try a different tack to explain it away: "Sure, jihad means using force," they say, "but only in defense -- only when Muslims are under attack." Of course, who is to say what is defensive? Who is to say when Muslims are under attack? For the militants, Islam is under attack whenever anyone has the temerity to say: "Islam -- especially their brand of Islam -- is not for me." For the militants who will be satisfied with nothing less than the destruction of Israel, Islam is under attack simply because Israelis are living and breathing and going about their lives.
Simply stated, for Abdel Rahman, bin Laden, and those who follow them, jihad means killing the enemies of the militants -- which is pretty much anyone who is not a militant. When your forces are outnumbered, and your resources are scarce, it means practicing terrorism.
Abdel Rahman was brazen about it. As he said many times:
Why do we fear the word terrorist? If the terrorist is the person who defends his right, so we are terrorists. And if the terrorist is the one who struggles for the sake of God, then we are terrorists. We have been ordered to terrorism because we must prepare what power we can to terrorize the enemy of God. The Quran says the word "to strike terror." Therefore, we don't fear to be called terrorists. They may say, "He is a terrorist. He uses violence. He uses force." Let them say that. We are ordered to prepare whatever we can of power to terrorize the enemies of Islam.
It is frightening. But, as this makes clear, it is not simply the militants' method that we are at war with. We are at war with their ideology. Militant Islam has universalist designs. That sounds crazy to us -- we're from a diverse, tolerant, live-and-let-live culture. It's hard for us to wrap our brains around a hegemonic worldview in the 21st Century. But if we are going to appreciate the risk -- the threat -- we face, the reality is: it matters much less what we think about the militants than what they think about themselves.
The militants see terrorism as a perfectly acceptable way to go about achieving their aims. When they succeed in destroying great, towering symbols of economic and military might; when with a few cheap bombs detonated on trains they can change the course of a national election; it reinforces their convictions that their designs are neither grandiose nor unattainable. It tells them that their method of choice works, no matter what we may think of it.
Making our task even more difficult is the structure of Islam. As Bernard Lewis and other notable scholars have observed, there are no synods, and there is no rigorous hierarchy. There is no central power structure to say with authority that this or that practice is heresy. There is no pope available to say, "Sheik Omar, blowing up civilians is out of bounds. It is condemned."
So how does the conduct become condemned? How do we turn the tide? Naturally, only Muslims themselves can cure Islam. Only they can ultimately chart their course; only they can clarify and reform where reform is so badly needed.
There is much, however, that we can do to help. It starts with ending the free ride for the apologists and enablers of terrorists. We need to be more precise in our language. We are not at war with terror. We are at war with militant Islam. Militant Islam is our enemy. It seeks to destroy us; we cannot co-exist with it. We need to defeat it utterly.
We seek to embrace moderate Muslims; to promote them, and to help them win the struggle for what kind of religious, cultural and social force Islam will be in the modern world. "Moderate," however, cannot just be a fudge. It needs to be a real concept with a defined meaning.
What should that meaning be? Who are we trying to weed out? Well, last year, the distinguished Middle East scholar Daniel Pipes proposed a few questions -- a litmus test of sorts. Useful questions, he said, might include: Do you condone or condemn those who give up their lives to kill enemy civilians? Will you condemn the likes of al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah by name as terrorist groups? Is jihad, meaning a form of warfare, acceptable in today's world? Do you accept the validity of other religions? Should non-Muslims enjoy completely equal civil rights with Muslims? Do you accept the legitimacy of scholarly inquiry into the origins of Islam? Who was responsible for the 9/11 attacks? Do you accept that institutions that fund terrorism should be shut down?
To be sure, we should have no illusions about all this. We are never going to win every heart and mind. Asking these questions and questions like them, though, would provoke a very necessary conversation. It could begin to reveal who are the real moderates, and who are the pretenders. It could begin to identify who are the friends of enlightenment and tolerance, and who are the allies of brutality and inhumanity. It could begin the long road toward empowering our friends and marginalizing our enemies. Finally, it could make the War on Militant Islam a war we can win -- for ourselves and for the millions of Muslims who need our help.

-- Andrew C. McCarthy, a former chief assistant U.S. attorney who led the 1995 terrorism prosecution against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others, is an NRO contributor.

http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy200405130837.asp
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Kingdom Comes to North America
Top Saudi cleric to visit Canada.
By Steven Stalinsky
Sheikh Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sudayyis, the Saudi government appointed imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, will give a series of lectures in Canada next week and attend the Islamic Society of North America conference in Toronto. Al-Sudayyis's position is one of the most prestigious in Sunni Islam. Thus, his sermons hold significant weight throughout the Islamic world.
The themes of his sermons are characterized by confrontation toward non-Muslims. Al-Sudayyis calls Jews "scum of the earth" and "monkeys and pigs" who should be "annihilated." Other enemies of Islam, he says, are "worshippers of the cross" and "idol-worshipping Hindus" who should be fought. Al-Sudayyis has been consistent in calling for jihad in Kashmir and Chechnya, for Jerusalem to be liberated, and for the "occupiers in Iraq" to also be fought. He often claims that Islam is superior to Western culture.
At the Grand Mosque in Mecca on February 1, 2004, Sheikh Al-Sudayyis called on Muslims everywhere to unite to defeat the world's occupiers and oppressors. "History has never known a cause in which our religious principles, historical rights, and past glories are so clearly challenged.... The conflict between us and the Jews is one of creed, identity, and existence." He told those listening to "read history," in order "to know that yesterday's Jews were bad predecessors and today's Jews are worse successors. They are killers of prophets and the scum of the earth. Allah hurled his curses and indignation on them and made them monkeys and pigs and worshippers of tyrants. These are the Jews, a continuous lineage of meanness, cunning, obstinacy, tyranny, evil, and corruption...."
Al-Sudayyis elaborated on the conflict between Muslims and Jews:
O Muslims, the Islamic nation today is at the peak of conflict with the enemies of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, with the grandsons of Bani-Quraydah, Al-Nadhir, and Qaynuqa [Jewish tribes in the early days of Islam]. May Allah's curses follow them until the Day of Judgment.
The nation must know that these are people with a disgraceful history and.... They want to establish the Greater Israel with Jerusalem as its capital. They also aspire to demolish the Al-Aqsa Mosque and build their alleged temple in its place. They want to liquidate the State of Islam and the Koran, and build the State of the Torah and Talmud on its debris. They will get what they deserve from Allah.... Our Al-Aqsa is crying out saying all mosques have been liberated, while I -- a great holy mosque -- am still being desecrated. Is the aspiration of over 1 billion Muslims to preserve their holy places [to be] considered savagery and terrorism? What a great lie, O Allah, O steadfast brothers in struggler and steadfast Palestine, the land of honor, loftiness, sacrifice, jihad, and bravery. The captivity of our Al-Aqsa in the hands of the tyrants makes us sleepless. May Allah please us with its liberation. Victory is coming soon, Allah willing.
....Here are the flags of victory looming on the horizon. We can smell it. It is crowned by a brave jihad, an intifada, which is still the winning card and the lit candle in the hands of the devout sons of this nation.... O nation of jihad and sacrifice, it is the duty of Muslims to support their brothers in creed in Palestine and elsewhere and to back them with material and moral support. Jihad with money sometimes supersedes jihad with soul, as mentioned in many Koranic verses and the prophet's traditions.
In a sermon on April 23, 2004, regarding Iraq, Al-Sudayyis stated that "our Muslim brothers in the Iraq of history and civilization are facing another bloody chapter, particularly in the brave, steadfast city of Al-Fallujah." He called on Muslims everywhere to unite "to defeat all their occupiers and oppressors" for the destruction of the enemies of Islam, to support "our mujahedeen brothers in Palestine," and to disperse "the unjust Zionists."
Discussing plots by enemies of Islam, who he identifies as Hindus, Jews, and Christians, Al-Sudayyis delivered a sermon on May 31, 2002, which stated:
Those whom Allah cursed, got angry with, and turned into monkeys and pigs, the tyrant worshippers among the Jewish aggressors and criminal Zionists. Their course is supported by the advocates of usury and worshippers of the Cross, as well as by those who are infatuated with them and influenced by their rotten ideas and poisonous culture among the advocates of secularism and Westernization.... The enemies of Muslims among the atheists insist on their arrogance and aggression against our people and our holy places in Chechnya? The idol-worshipping Hindus indulge in their open hatred against our brothers and holy places...in Muslim Kashmir, threatening an imminent danger and a fierce war in the whole Indian sub-continent?... O Allah, support our brother Mujahedeen for your sake and the oppressed everywhere. O Allah, support them in Palestine, Kashmir, and Chechnya. O Allah, we ask you to support our Palestinian brothers in Palestine against the aggressor Jews and usurper Zionists. O Allah, the Jews have oppressed, terrorized, and indulged in tyranny and corruption. O Allah, deal with them for they are within your power.
According to Sheikh Al-Sudayyis, Islam is superior to Western culture. He told worshipers in Mecca in February 2002: "The most noble civilization ever known to mankind is our Islamic civilization. Today, Western civilization is nothing more than the product of its encounter with our Islamic civilization in Andalusia [medieval Spain]. The reason for [Western civilization's] bankruptcy is its reliance on the materialistic approach, and its detachment from religion and values. [This approach] has been one reason for the misery of the human race, for the proliferation of suicide, mental problems...and for moral perversion.... Only one nation is capable of resuscitating global civilization, and that is the nation [of Islam].... While the false cultures sink in the swamp of materialism and suffer moral crises...our Islamic nation is the one worthy of grasping the reins of leadership and riding on the back of the horse of pioneering and world sovereignty."
"Read history," Al-Sudayyis stated in another sermon in May 2002, "and you will understand that the Jews of yesterday are the evil fathers of the Jews of today, who are evil offspring, infidels, distorters of [others'] words, calf-worshippers, prophet-murderers, prophecy-deniers ... the scum of the human race 'whom Allah cursed and turned into apes and pigs....' These are the Jews, an ongoing continuum of deceit, obstinacy, licentiousness, evil, and corruption...."
The concluding supplications of Al-Sudayyis sermons are often filled with statements concerning current affairs. He consistently calls for "Muslims to humiliate the infidels (non-Muslims)," as well as for their destruction. For example, on November 1, 2002, he stated "O Allah, support our mujahedeen bothers in Palestine, Kashmir, and Chechnya and destroy the aggressor Jews and the tyrannical Zionists, for they are within your power." In a June 21, 2002, sermon, Al-Sudayyis gives supplication: "O Allah, support them in Palestine, Kashmir, and Chechnya. O Allah, deal with the Jews and Zionists for they are within Your power. O Allah, scatter their assemblies, make them a lesson for others, and let them and their property be a booty for Muslims."
In another sermon in May 2003, Sheikh Al-Sudayyis condemned what he termed the "serpents" to "spit their venom" by harming the Islamic religion, ridiculing the pious, and blaming the school curricula and religious and welfare institutions. Al-Sudayyis stated: "O Lord, support our brother mujahedeen for your sake everywhere. O Lord, support them in Palestine. O Lord, deal with the aggressor Jews and sinful Zionists. O Lord, deal with them for they are within Your power. O Lord, deal with the enemies of religion and show us the miracles of Your power on them." Also, on July 11, 2003, he stated: "O Allah, support our mujahedeen brothers everywhere. O Allah, help them score victory over the unjust Jews and aggressive Zionists in Palestine. O Allah, destroy the Jews and their supporters. O Allah, destroy them, for they are within your power. O Allah, disperse them and make them prey for Muslims."
According to statements beginning in June 2003 made by Washington D.C. Saudi-embassy spokesman Adel Al-Jubeir, "Hundreds of imams [in Saudi Arabia] who violated prohibitions against preaching intolerance have been removed from their positions and more than 1,000 have been suspended and referred to educational programs." Clearly, this is not the case with Saudi Arabia's leading imam, Sheikh Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sudayyis, who continues to preach incitement from the most holy site in all of Islam.

-- Steven Stalinsky is executive director of the Middle East Media Research Institute.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/stalinsky200405130846.asp
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Zarqawi called 'field commander' of most Islamic terrorists in Iraq
Special to World Tribune.com
GEOSTRATEGY-DIRECT.COM
Thursday, May 13, 2004
Abu Musad al Zarqawi, the Al Qaida-affiliated terrorist who U.S. intelligence says conducted the videotaped beheading of American civilian Nick Berg on May 11, also claimed responsibility for a terrorist bombing in Baghdad last week. The attack on a coalition forces headquarters was the work of the Tawhid and Jihad Group, a group that is part of the Zarqawi network, officials said.
A poster distributed by the U.S. Army shows different images of Abu Musad al Zarqawi, a Jordanian national. AFP/US ARMY-HO
Zarqawi remains the most dangerous terrorist in Iraq despite a major covert operation to find and kill or capture him and his group.
A communiqu? posted on a Jihadist web site a day after the bombing stated that a terrorist it identified as Abu Mutab, a Saudi national, "departed in a car loaded with 600 kilograms of TNT for the main headquarters of the occupying forces and their apostate quislings, known as the Republican Palace."
The notice stated that the bombing was "a successful operation, in which the brother was granted the chance to harvest many of the infidels and the apostates."
Zarqawi is also linked to the Islamist terror organization Ansar al Islam, which has stepped up operations in post-war Iraq. Many of the group's members had fled to neighboring Iran and are returning to fight the coalition forces.
Kurdish officials in northern Iraq have stated that Zarqawi was recently in the northern part of the country and had a role in plotting the assassination of Barham Salih, a local governing official.
An Ansar terrorist was caught before the attack could be carried out and the man had stated that he had met Zarqawi in the border town of Halabja. Zarqawi is viewed as the field commander of most of the Islamist terrorists in Iraq.

Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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Diplomat's E-Mails Show Berg in Custody
Yahoo!
By JASON STRAZIUSO, Associated Press Writer
WEST CHESTER, Pa. - Family members provided e-mails Thursday that say Nicholas Berg was held by the U.S. military before he was kidnapped and beheaded, but the government contends the messages were based on erroneous information.
Berg's family has called on the U.S. government to tell all it knows about its contacts with the 26-year-old businessman in the weeks before his body was found last weekend in Baghdad and a gruesome video that showed his beheading was posted on the Internet.
To back its claims that Berg was in U.S. custody, the family on Thursday gave The Associated Press copies of e-mails from Beth A. Payne, the U.S. consular officer in Iraq (news - web sites).
"I have confirmed that your son, Nick, is being detained by the U.S. military in Mosul. He is safe. He was picked up approximately one week ago. We will try to obtain additional information regarding his detention and a contact person you can communicate with directly," Payne wrote to Berg's father, Michael, on April 1.
Payne repeated that Berg was "being detained by the U.S. military" in an e-mail the same day to Berg's mother, Suzanne. The next day, Payne wrote that she was still trying to find a local contact for the family, but added that "given the security situation in Iraq it is not easy."
U.S. officials say Berg was detained by Iraqi police March 24 and was never in the custody of American forces. Berg is believed to have been kidnapped days after Iraqi police or coalition forces released him April 6.
The government says the e-mail from Payne was false. State Department spokeswoman Kelly Shannon said Payne's information came from the Coalition Provisional Authority. The authority did not tell Payne until April 7 that Berg had been held by Iraqi police and not the U.S. military, she said.
"As Mr. Berg had been released, the consular officer did not convey this information to the family because he was released, thankfully," Shannon said. "And we thought he was on his way."
Berg's brother called on the government to come clean about its contacts with the slain American before he died. The family has blamed the government for keeping him in custody for too long while anti-American violence escalated in Iraq.
"They're trying to deflect attention to a couple weeks down the road when no one's paying attention," David Berg said. "I think President Bush (news - web sites) needs to be a man about this and tell the truth. I think most, if not all, Americans can figure out who's telling the truth and who's lying."
Meanwhile, the family said Berg had been questioned by the FBI (news - web sites) more than a year ago about a contact he had with a terrorism suspect in 1999, while he was a student at the University of Oklahoma in Norman.
A senior law enforcement official who spoke on condition of anonymity said the terror suspect appears to have been acquainted with Zacarias Moussaoui, an al-Qaida adherent now in federal custody and awaiting trial on conspiracy charges stemming from the Sept. 11 attacks.
The official said an e-mail address traced to Berg had been used by the unidentified individual with purported terror connections, but a 2002 investigation showed Berg had never met the individual and had not given the e-mail address to that person.
Michael Berg told reporters Thursday that his son was cleared of any wrongdoing. He said Nicholas Berg met the suspect while riding the bus to classes, and had allowed the suspect to use his computer.
A private memorial for Berg was scheduled for Friday at a West Chester synagogue. Family members declined to discuss burial arrangements.
The Bergs said they want to know if the government had received an offer to trade Iraqi prisoners for Nicholas Berg. On the videotape of his death, Berg's killers made a reference to a trade offer, but U.S. officials have said they knew of no such offer.
Michael Berg said he wanted to hear President Bush address the issue.
"I would like to ask him if it is true that al-Qaida offered to trade my son's life for the life of another person," Michael Berg said. "And if that is true, well, I need that information. ... and I think the people of the United States of America need to know what the fate of their sons and daughters might be in the hands of the Bush administration."
Associated Press writers Curt Anderson and Lara Jakes Jordan in Washington contributed to this report.
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U.S. contractors say they served as interrogators when asked
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Thursday, May 13, 2004
U.S. security contractors said their primary role was translation, not the interrogation of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Gharib prison north of Baghdad.
But U.S. officials said that under the terms of the Defense Department contract, private security personnel could be asked to serve as interrogators in case of a shortage of U.S. military personnel.
The contractors denied involvement n the abuse of Iraqi prisoners. At least two U.S. contractors were hired to provide services at Abu Gharib.
The two contractors were identified as CACI International and Titan Corp. Both companies said they provided Arabic interpreters to translate for military intelligence during interrogations, Middle East Newsline reported.
"The company's contract is for linguists, not interrogators," Titan said in a statement. "For security and safety reasons, we do not discuss individual assignments, military operations or duty locations."
But Pentagon officials said security contractors agreed to also serve as interrogators at Abu Gharib and other detention centers in Iraq. The officials said interrogations conducted by the private security personnel were under U.S. Army supervision.
"In the theatre we have employed civilian contract interrogators and linguists," Acting Army Secretary Les Brownlee told the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 6. "The Central Command has done this. And these people have no supervisory capabilities at all. They work under the supervision of officers in charge or non-commissioned officers in charge of whatever team or unit they are on."
Lt. Gen. Lance Smith, deputy chief of U.S. Central Command, said security contractors at Abu Gharib provided a range of services for intelligence officers. Smith said contractors were expected to provide both translation and interrogation services depending on needs of military intelligence.
"In this particular case, there is a tiger team that interrogates and goes through that process," Smith said. "One is an interpreter normally. One is an analyst. And one is an interrogator. And where we have a shortage in the military of interrogators and translators we go to contractors to do that."
Neither CACI nor Titan explained the assertion by the Pentagon officials regarding the use of security contractors in the interrogation of Irarqi prisoners. But the companies said they have ordered their personnel stationed at Abu Gharib to cooperate in the army investigation. So far, neither company reported that its employees had been charged with the abuse of prisoners at the detention facility.
"There is an ongoing investigation underway in which our people have cooperated in the interview process," CACI president Jack London said. "CACI will continue to cooperate with all U.S. government investigations when requested and is now conducting its own analysis and investigation of events."


Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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>> THE STATES...


States Burning Up Litigation Funds
Posted May 14, 2004
By John Pike
Critics are furious that antismoking funds are being used by states such as North Carolina to purchase tobacco-company stocks.
The cost of the 1998 billion-dollar tobacco-settlement agreement has been put at approximately $246 billion for the first 25 years, or an average of $10 billion annually. To get to this windfall a number of states went so far as to change their laws of civil procedure to tap into the wealth of a politically incorrect group: the U.S. tobacco manufacturers, a worldwide, economy-building industry that goes back to the English colonies of North America and the Native Americans before that.
What the manifoldly mendacious states attorneys general (AGs) did in the 1990s was announce that, for the good of the people, they were suing the cigarette manufacturers to recover Medicaid expenses to pay for smoking-related illnesses and fund smoking-cessation programs. Within five years most of the money the states were receiving from the tobacco settlement was defraying their general budget costs that had nothing to do with tobacco. The plaintiffs' lawyers who cooked up the deal, meanwhile, had received their billions from the settlement.
Former Massachusetts attorney general Scott Harshbarger made antitobacco efforts a prominent theme of his administration, and he was the fifth AG to file suit against the tobacco companies. The main reason Harshbarger gave for the lawsuit was to fund smoking-cessation programs. But although Massachusetts soon received $689 million from the manufacturers (excluding the tax on packs), it virtually shut down its celebrated tobacco-control program, say antismoking activists, cutting the funding. According to the Boston Herald, it was funded at $48 million at its height, an amount that quickly fell to $5.7 million, with the program exhausting its annual stipends. Massachusetts now uses less than 1 percent of its tobacco money for tobacco-prevention programs. Much of the tobacco-settlement money in the Bay State is paying for budget expenses unrelated to tobacco.
Other venues that misused the funds include Los Angeles, where, according to the American Medical Association, former mayor Richard Riordan planned to use $100 million in tobacco-settlement funds to deal with lawsuits involving police corruption. In one year the tobacco state of Virginia spent about $15.5 million of these funds to cover its budget deficit. By 2001 just six states, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, were spending enough money on antitobacco programs to be effective, despite the fact that many of the states received hundreds of millions of dollars from the settlement for that purpose.
In 1997 former surgeon general C. Everett Koop commented for CNN on the tobacco companies and the master settlement, declaring: "It's a big concern for all those of us who worked three decades with the tobacco industry and find you can't trust them. I am sure they will take every effort they can to find loopholes." But as it developed, the states were even more untrustworthy than the demonized tobacco companies.
The government already was taking plenty from the tobacco companies to care for the casualties of tobacco use. In 1999, Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor said that a study by Harvard Law School professor Kip Viscusi "proved that cigarette-tax collections more than offset the cost to government for treating tobacco-related illnesses." He explained that "The main objective of the tobacco lawsuits was to raise revenue. Using lawsuits to raise revenue is far easier than raising taxes the old-fashioned way. This method bypasses the need for representatives of the voters to approve the tax. It shifts the awesome powers of the legislative bodies - commercial regulation, taxation, appropriation and the power to change law - to the judicial branch of government."
Although Alabama was not actively involved in the tobacco-settlement agreement, the manufacturers funded a trust to compensate adversely affected venues that grow tobacco, which include that state, North Carolina, Virginia and others.
As a result, some states have gone so far as to take money from the tobacco settlement - funds that are supposed to fight tobacco use and addiction - and put it toward growing tobacco or into the tobacco companies themselves. According to one published report, the tobacco state of North Carolina spent almost three-quarters of its settlement money on tobacco marketing and production, although some was used to help farmers adjust to growing other crops. One tobacco farmer received $25,000 to help pay for curing bins he installed in 2001. The state used $43 million on items such as constructing a tobacco auction house and $15,000 for a video of the history of the crop. Critics consider it likely that much of the rest of the $4.6 billion North Carolina was expected to receive within 25 years also would help the blindsided tobacco interests, in direct opposition to the declared purposes of the suit.
And according to a March 2002 study by the Washington-based Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), tobacco-settlement money even has been used by states to purchase tobacco stocks. "Texas, Connecticut, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah and West Virginia are among the states which invested a portion of their tobacco-settlement proceeds in tobacco companies. Much of these state investments ended up in index funds, tracking indexes like the S&P 500, which have tobacco-company representation. For each dollar invested in such funds, usually only about a penny goes into tobacco stocks. But given the huge size of the settlement pool, it still adds up to tens of millions of dollars flowing back into the tobacco industry."
Doug Cogan of the IRRC estimates that by late 2001 about $11 million had been invested in tobacco securities by Texas, and Utah soon had almost $600,000 in Philip Morris Companies Inc., Loews Corp. and UST Inc. "Of the 33 states investing tobacco-settlement proceeds, at least 16 have no restrictions on investing in tobacco companies," the report states.
And remember this was done by means designed to circumvent long-established law. According to Robert A. Levy of Washington's libertarian Cato Institute, Florida, Maryland and Vermont specifically changed their laws to allow for a successful lawsuit against the tobacco manufacturers. The rest of the states asked the judges to ignore common law and pretend the law had indeed been changed. The trick was that higher courts never had to rule on the constitutionality of what amounted to passage of both bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, illegal under the Constitution, because the whole agreement was settled out of court.
"During the past 40 years," Levy states in a 1997 study, "not a single smoker received a single dollar of damages from tobacco companies as juries repeatedly concluded that smokers are responsible for their own behavior and their own losses." Yet under the new laws, "If a smoker happens to be a Medicaid recipient, individual responsibility is out the window," he notes. "The same tobacco company selling the same person the same product that results in the same injury is, magically, liable, not to the smoker but to the state. By legislative fiat, liability hinges on a smoker's Medicaid status, a fortuity totally unrelated to any misdeeds of the industry."
What this means is that, for example, if a person injures himself skiing, the ski manufacturer would not be liable for his medical expenses. But under the changed laws, if the skier was on Medicaid and everything else stayed the same, the manufacturer then would be liable for his medical expenses.
"And it gets worse," Levy's study points out. "The state is not even required to show that a particular party was harmed by his use of tobacco. Instead, causation may be proven by statistics alone (later ruled unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court). The act originally provided that Florida was not required to identify the individual recipients of Medicaid payments; instead, the state could seek recovery for all recipients, anonymously, as a group. One would think that the industry could at least investigate whether patients suffering from 'smoking-related illnesses' ever smoked. Wrong. Incredibly, the industry will be allowed to depose only 25 of 400,000 claimants. These lawsuits retroactively eradicate settled doctrine and deny due process to an industry singled out for its deep pockets and public image, not its legal culpability."
So according to Florida law while it was suing the manufacturers, the man who broke his leg and sues the ski manufacturers, for example, does not have to prove he ever skied at all or show what type of ski he used.
Ordinarily, a link has to be established between a manufacturer's conduct and the injured person's health problems. This settlement resulted in the states receiving damages for some Medicaid recipients when their injuries were caused by other means. And remember this, critics note, if the government can circumvent the Constitution to do this to Big Tobacco, it can do the same to anyone it decides to demonize. And it can get worse, much worse.
So why did the tobacco companies agree to an unconstitutional and expensive settlement? Levy has an answer for that too. "Not even the tobacco companies are big losers," he states. "Even though the four companies have to raise their prices to fund the settlement, they are guaranteed a virtual monopoly. Any new or existing tobacco companies not party to the settlement would have to put up damages for 25 years to guard against the possibility they might be later sued by the states. In effect, a highly competitive industry has been transformed into a cartel. So now we have these barriers to entry, a blatant violation of the antitrust laws."

Something for everyone, you see.

John Pike is a contributing writer for Insight magazine.
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>> ALBANY WATCH...

THEY'RE THE SAME OLD LUSTY LEGISLATORS I KNEW AND DIDN'T LOVE
By ANDREA PEYSER
http://www.nypost.com/commentary/20759.htm
May 13, 2004 -- TAKE it from a survivor of Albany's intern program.
It brings some warped comfort in these uncertain days to know that a few services provided by your taxpayer-paid servants in the state Capitol haven't changed a bit in 20 years.
As sure as you can count on higher taxes and the open bar, you know that your elected officials are hard at work each legislative season, plying eager, young interns with booze and promises.
But I exaggerate.
One important thing has indeed changed in the two decades since I was among the ranks of cuties who tapped eagerly aboard high heels and hair gel up to the New York state capital, pursuing brilliant careers among the most fertile minds tax money could buy - only to discover it wasn't just legislators' heads that were stocked with fertilizer.
Today, after endless scandals involving interns bearing big hair and knee pads, guys who indulge in illicit romps with college-age underlings have - finally - gotten their acts together.
Now, instead of scarfing up hotties at Albany's intern-stocked bars, legislators have staffers to do their recruiting. Who says your tax dollars can't produce streamlined services?
Things were not so organized, back in the day when "out of town or under five minutes" was the only rule for adultery.
It was at a lobbyist's cocktail party that I - broke and anorexic, though not by choice - was offered a job writing newsletters by a homely legislator amused by my singular ability to pack away the chilled shrimp. Little got written, though, as the guy spent most of the day whining to me about his wife. Finally, he made a pass, right in your state capital. I nearly decapitated the runt. Next day, I was fired.
It never even occurred to me to complain.
Years later, an intern nearly toppled a presidency. And nothing has changed.
We don't know what happened behind a locked hotel-room door between Adam Clayton Powell IV and a liquored-up college girl who accuses him of rape.
"But how can people be so stupid, putting himself in that position?" my old SUNY Albany professor Alan Chartock said.
Shelly Silver, you've got a problem. It's called Legislative Democrats, and they're running wild.

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Unipolar Versus Unilateral

By John Van Oudenaren
John Van Oudenaren is chief of the European Division at the Library of Congress and adjunct professor, BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University. He writes here in a personal capacity. This article is the second part of a two-part analysis of multilateralism in transatlantic relations based on a presentation at Princeton University in October 2002. The first part appeared as "What Is `Multilateral'?" Policy Review 117 (February-March 2003).

(Go to Print Friendly Version)

ong before their bitter falling out over the war in Iraq, the United States and France were at odds over unilateralism. In a November 1999 speech in Paris, French President Jacques Chirac fired one of the first salvos in this conflict. He condemned the U.S. Senate's decision not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, setting forth a vision of a multipolar world the chief organizing principle of which was the containment of American power. For Chirac and other French officials, American unilateralism was a product of the post-Cold War imbalance of power and the emergence of the United States as the world's lone "hyperpower." Multilateralism was to be both the ultimate objective of a French-led effort to restore a balance and the means by which to achieve it.

Policymakers and academics on both sides of the Atlantic have since debated whether a more multipolar world is feasible or desirable. The debate has done little, however, to establish consensus on what both sides have taken to calling "effective multilateralism." Government ministers speak in garbled terms of the need to build a "multipolar and partnership-oriented world order" and to "strengthen all multipolar structures," using the terms multipolar and multilateral almost interchangeably -- and without defining either one. In effect, the debate over unipolarity has been marked by the same rhetorical excess and lack of intellectual rigor that characterize the broader discussion of multilateralism.

Three particular problems stand out in this debate. The first is conceptual and concerns the absence of any logically necessary or historically demonstrable association between unipolarity and unilateralism or between multipolarity and multilateralism. The second relates to the internal American debate and the absence of a dominant "unipolar unilateralist" outlook on the part of those making U.S. foreign policy. The third concerns the course of post-Cold War diplomacy and the difficulty of reconciling the actual record of events since the fall of communism with the thesis that a shift in the balance of power led to increased unilateralism on the part of the United States.



Conceptual confusion

o identify unipolarity with unilateralism and multipolarity with multilateralism is to confuse categories and levels of analysis. Polarity is a system-level concept that relates to the distribution of power, real or perceived, in the international system. Unilateralism and multilateralism are choices about policies that states adopt within a given international system. In principle, there is no reason why the leading power in a unipolar order cannot pursue a multilateralist foreign policy or, conversely, why the great powers in a multipolar system necessarily must be multilateralists.

If anything, history shows that the strongest powers often are the most multilaterally inclined. International relations theorists have been fascinated by the concept of hegemonic stability in which it is the strongest power that underpins the multilateral system in a way that serves both its own interests and provides order as an international public good. Nineteenth-century Britain and late-twentieth-century America were classic hegemons in this regard. Conversely, the persistent unilateralism of French policy for much of the post-1945 period -- the franc devaluations of 1957 and 1958, the refusal to sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the European Community "empty chair" crisis of 1965, the withdrawal from the integrated nato command in 1966, the refusal to participate in the us-uk-ussr Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1969, and the decision not to join the International Energy Agency at the time of the 1973 oil crisis -- can only be explained in terms of France's relative weakness and the determination of Paris to preserve its freedom of action by keeping a certain distance from the postwar multilateral order.

Moreover, to identify multipolarity with multilateralism and unipolarity with unilateralism is to overlook the complexity of the U.S. foreign policy debate, reducing it to a one-dimensional conflict between unilateralists and multilateralists. If polarity and multi-/unilateralism are different analytic categories, then foreign policy visions should be analyzed with reference to both these categories: in regard to differing perceptions of the distribution of power in the international system, on one hand, and different preferences for unilateral or multilateral approaches to policy, on the other.

Table 1 attempts a rough classification of a number of participants in the U.S. policy debate and how they view the relationship between power and policy.

TABLE 1
Polarity and Foreign Policy: U.S. Views
Preferred Policy Perception of the International System
Unipolar Multipolar

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Unilateral Kagan
Krauthammer Buchanan
Mearsheimer
Rabkin

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Multilateral Nye
Ikenberry Lind
Kupchan
Calleo



Charles Krauthammer and Robert Kagan are what might be called unipolar unilateralists. They see the distribution of power in the international system as essentially unipolar. They also embrace unilateral policies as the means by which the United States must protect its interests and act for the greater good of humanity. Krauthammer identified the "unipolar moment" in his seminal article of 1990 and later came to see unipolarity as an enduring feature of the international order. He rejects the multilateral "straitjacket" that in his view threatened to neutralize American power during the Clinton administration and has commended the Bush administration for "adopting policies that recognized the new unipolarity and the unilateralism necessary to maintain it."1

Kagan also sees the United States as possessing unique strengths that make the world unipolar and that account for what he sees as an increasing U.S. tilt toward unilateralism. He argues that the strong are always attracted to unilateral options while the weak seek refuge in multilateral diplomacy -- and that the defining characteristic of the current international order is European weakness. Moreover, he sees little chance that Europe, having let its military capabilities atrophy in the post-Hobbesian paradise that it has built behind U.S. protection, will develop the capabilities needed to function as a credible pole in a multipolar world.

In acute form, unipolar unilateralism informs the much talked-about imperial strain in U.S. thinking about foreign policy -- what one analyst has called "global social engineering" to rid the world of dictators and to promote the spread, by force if necessary, of democracy and free markets.

John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye are similar to Krauthammer and Kagan in that they perceive the international system as essentially unipolar.2 However, they differ over the effect of unilateral policies, which in their view undermine rather than underpin American interests. Ikenberry focuses on the way in which dominant powers -- England after 1815, the Western powers in 1919, and the United States after 1945 -- built institutions that constrained their own power but that also reduced the incentives and opportunities for potential rivals to challenge their dominant positions. Ikenberry essentially updates hegemonic stability theory to post-Cold War conditions, arguing that through restraint and the judicious use of international institutions, the United States can perpetuate its special status in the international system, forestalling the formation of hostile coalitions or the rise of a new hegemon.

Nye acknowledges some elements of multipolarity in the international system -- he argues that international relations has become a three-level game involving military, economic, and so-called soft power, with the United States enjoying unipolar dominance only on the first level -- but he is concerned that a shift to across-the-board multipolarity would be destabilizing. American foreign policy, according to Nye, can and should work to preserve U.S. military dominance through the judicious use of soft power. Like Ikenberry, Nye believes that the dominant power has the option, if it is smart, of shaping the international order in ways that can forestall the rise of competing powers in the system.

Traditional realists such as John Mearsheimer reject both the neoconservative and liberal views of the unipolar world order.3 They argue that the international system is inherently multipolar. Any unipolar imbalance can only be momentary, as competing power centers inevitably rise and seek to counterbalance the dominant power. But Mearsheimer also argues that U.S. policy must be unilateralist for the simple reason that all great powers pursue essentially unilateralist policies. As a realist, he regards international norms and institutions largely as window dressing, the importance of which has been vastly overstated by liberal institutionalists. Under no circumstances can the promotion by the dominant power of such norms and institutions -- no matter how imaginative or judicious -- persuade rulers in Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi, or Paris to abandon their efforts to counterbalance.

Patrick Buchanan (drawing upon the work of Christopher Layne and other realists) and Jeremy Rabkin are also multipolar unilateralists, albeit for different reasons.4 Like Mearsheimer, they are not dismissive of the power of other countries and blocs. Buchanan not only expects but positively embraces multipolarity: Only a truly multipolar world will eliminate the geopolitical vacuums that drew twentieth-century America into extensive involvement in the affairs of Europe and Asia, with (in his view) harmful effects on the U.S. constitutional order. At the same time, however, Buchanan affirms that U.S. policy must remain true to its nineteenth-century unilateralist roots, precisely to avoid the international entanglements (and resulting domestic spillovers) that multilateralism requires.

Rabkin also sees strong elements of multipolarity -- or at least bipolarity -- in the international system, with the European Union as the chief rival to the United States. Focusing on economics and law rather than military power, he sees Brussels and the United States engaged in a struggle over global governance, with the eu very much threatening to gain the upper hand. Rabkin takes a very negative view of the eu's self-proclaimed status as the champion of a new system of global governance, which he sees as a threat to democratic legitimacy, economic efficiency, and American sovereignty. Resistance to the European governance agenda -- which from the European perspective comes across as U.S. unilateralism -- is the only sensible American response. Rabkin thus differs strongly from Kagan, who does not see a serious bid for power in European multilateralism but merely the tactics of the weak.

Those who see the world as multipolar and embrace genuinely multilateral policies include Michael Lind, who has called for an effort to revive a concert of the great powers, as well as David Calleo and Charles Kupchan, both of whom also embrace a form of multipolar multilateralism, albeit one that is highly Eurocentric.5 Lind argues that the United States should concentrate on working with the other major powers in the United Nations Security Council and the g8, an approach that in his view will spare the United States the need to choose between a reflexive multilateralism that subordinates U.S. interests to the rule of small and weak countries and an arrogant unilateralism that places Washington at odds with the rest of the world. Calleo and Kupchan see the eu as evolving into a great-power counterpart to the United States, one that is neither weak nor necessarily a threat to U.S. interests. Calleo sees a stronger eu as the natural partner of a chastened and more modest United States in building "a cooperative multilateral system, based on rules with an effective balance of power to sustain those rules," while Kupchan heralds the "return of a world of multiple power centers" in which Europe is America's only near-term major competitor.

Each of these streams of foreign policy thinking has its strengths and insights, but each also has problems and contradictions. Collectively, they point toward the dilemmas that the United States has faced as it has tried to chart a post-Cold War foreign policy. The unipolar unilateralists are generally not given to self-doubt, but even they display a certain unease at policies that so obviously irritate so many people around the world. Krauthammer has called for what he admits would be an oxymoronic "humble unilateralism." Kagan, even as he insists that the Europeans are too weak to constrain the United States, counsels that Washington should show more generosity of spirit by playing along with multilateralism when the costs of doing so are low.

Ikenberry argues that multilateralism can dissuade would-be rivals from mounting challenges to No. 1 but fails to explain how the self-restraint of the leading power can prevent the ambitious number twos and threes -- particularly those that see themselves in ascendance -- from turning multilateral institutions against the leading power to challenge its hegemony (in the way, for example, that imperial Germany exploited free trade to undercut British preeminence). As a former policymaker, Nye is sensitive to the need for the United States to act unilaterally to protect its interests when inertia or opposition elsewhere in the world precludes multilateral action or when multilateral initiatives do not meet certain tests for U.S. involvement. But he does not explain how a general preference for multilateralism will prevent what Washington might regard as exceptional acts of unilateralism from accumulating into the unilateralist-rogue-state image that the United States has earned in recent years.

The cautions of the realists -- the multipolar unilateralists -- about overextension and excessive engagement are well taken. As policy guidance, however, they have their limitations. While it may be useful for policymakers to remind themselves that in the long run all empires fall and all power is counterbalanced, even the most realpolitik-oriented administration cannot avoid making decisions on a daily basis about the many agreements and institutional arrangements in which the United States is enmeshed.

As regards the multipolar multilateralists, their readiness to think about a world of multiple power centers acting according to some agreed definition of multilateralism is to be welcomed, given the eventual likely emergence of India and China as great powers, Russia's path toward recovery, and Europe's continued drive for a greater role in world affairs. But they confront the same structural dilemmas that arise for Ikenberry and Nye: How can the leading power be sure that cooperation within a concert will not be exploited by potential rivals to establish a new hegemony? Or, conversely, what guarantees do the rising powers have that the erstwhile hegemon will not use the concert to lock them into positions of permanent inferiority? Absent a solution to these dilemmas, it is difficult to see how what Kupchan calls the "devolution" of responsibility from the United States to Europe (or any other power center) can become the chief guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy.



Diplomacy after the Cold War

he link between American unilateralism and the emergence of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War distorts the actual record of international relations in this period. Future historians are unlikely to have much patience with the simplistic view that the United States suddenly took a unilateralist turn in 1991 -- or even in 2001 -- as a consequence of its newfound relative strength. The first Bush and Clinton administrations teemed with multilateral activism -- in economics, arms control, nonproliferation, and selected world-order issues. The descent into what the rest of the world came to see as unilateralism, which began during Clinton's second term and accelerated dramatically after George W. Bush's inauguration, was a much more complex process involving both the rejection of a particular brand of American multilateralism and the rise of competing multilateral initiatives.

As any hegemonic stability theorist would have predicted, the United States entered the post-Cold War era in a decidedly multilateralist frame of mind. The first President Bush declared the establishment of a "new world order," led the U.N.-mandated coalition that expelled Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, completed the Uruguay Round negotiations that established the World Trade Organization, completed the start treaty with the collapsing Soviet regime, and launched the negotiations that led to the treaty banning chemical weapons and the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Clinton administration continued in much the same vein. It secured the ratification of the Uruguay Round agreements, took the lead in negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, backed the establishment of and provided much of the funding for the International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia, and, after some initial hesitation, began a campaign to enlarge and reform nato.

As the hegemonic stability theorists also would have predicted, the Bush i and early Clinton policies reflected a tendency to enlist multilateralism in the service of unipolarity. Whether or not they were consciously framed as such, many of these U.S. initiatives had a certain one-sided character that, while they were difficult to oppose outright, made other powers distinctly nervous. The European Union, for example, was initially skeptical of the U.S. push for a mandatory dispute resolution mechanism in the wto, which meant the end of the standard eu practice of using the consensus rule to block any finding that Brussels had violated international trade law. France and Britain were hardly enthusiastic about the criminal trials for the former Yugoslavia, which smacked of American Wilsonianism at its worst and potentially touched upon the pro-Serb leanings in both countries. France and China could not accept a comprehensive test ban treaty until they had completed a final round of tests, while India was incensed by the Clinton administration's early proposals for a ctbt that would have allowed some low-level testing by the nuclear powers in a way that sanctioned and perpetuated the existing inequality between nuclear haves and have-nots. European governments were also quite wary of Clinton's push to enlarge and reform nato, which they saw as an attempt to reinforce U.S. influence on the continent and to upstage the eu, whose widening and deepening they saw as the main act in Europe's post-Cold War transformation.

Not surprisingly, beginning gradually in the early 1990s and gathering strength during Clinton's second term, an increasing number of international actors began to resist American hegemonic multilateralism, less by outright rejection of U.S. initiatives than by assertive counteractions, the eventual effect of which was to deprive Washington of the multilateralist high ground and place it on the unilateralist defensive.

The United States won quick victories over the eu in the wto on beef hormones and bananas, areas in which the eu had long defied international rules. But this encouraged an enraged European Commission to begin scouring the U.S. trade, tax, and antitrust code in search of non-wto-compliant provisions and to file a flurry of lawsuits that Brussels knew it could win. Today, transatlantic trade relations are very much shaped by the unpredicted (but in retrospect entirely predictable) way in which the eu learned to counterpunch against U.S. legal activism in the wto, as Congress struggles to amend tax and antitrust laws that may have little real effect on trade but that from a strictly legal point of view are not wto-compliant.

In the arms control sphere, the non-nuclear powers came to accept the idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty but demanded a steep price in return: The United States and the other nuclear powers had to accept the "true zero yield." President Clinton ultimately made this concession, winning international support for the agreement but doing so in a way that ultimately doomed the treaty in the Senate. As in the case of the wto, the story of the ctbt is one of effective and in some ways unexpected counterpunching by other countries against a multilateral initiative by the United States that other powers saw as one-sided. In the end, Washington was left with an agreement that banned all U.S. testing and was enormously difficult to verify, but that did little to arrest the nuclear ambitions of Pakistan and India -- not to mention Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.

A key moment in the shift from the "assertive multilateralism" of the early Clinton administration to a new defensiveness about unilateralism was the Ottawa process that led to the signing of the December 1997 treaty banning land mines. This process was driven by a coalition of ngos and "like-minded" states that turned aside the U.S. request for a partial and temporary exception for the Korean Peninsula. Having lost the initiative on this issue, the United States was faced with a simple choice: to accept an immediate and total ban, codified in a treaty that allowed for no exceptions or reservations, or not to sign the treaty and risk being tagged with the unilateralist label.

In the negotiations to establish the International Criminal Court (icc), concluded in Rome some six months later, countries that had never shown much interest in a permanent court became active in the effort to establish such a body, largely in pursuit of unrelated agendas, including undermining the power of the U.N. Security Council. They were joined by a coalition of like-minded countries and ngos that, as with land mines, were determined to push through a treaty that did not reserve a special role for the U.N. Security Council and that at least implicitly was directed at constraining U.S. power. Once again, Washington was forced either to accept an agreement that it feared could be used against it or to reject the treaty and endure the unilateralist opprobrium that doing so would bring.

With regard to global warming, the United States had always been somewhat on the defensive, but the first Bush administration was able to sign the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, with its purely voluntary commitments to stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions. By the mid-1990s, key European countries and the environmental ngos were demanding that Washington accept the mandatory cuts ultimately imposed by Kyoto and that the U.S. economy experience real pain as it turned away from its energy-wasting ways, which many European ministers saw as much in moral as environmental terms. By the Hague conference of 2000, environmental multilateralism had been turned against the United States by an assertive coalition of weaker powers that, at a minimum, did not want to see Washington come off with any special treatment and that, more ambitiously, hoped to take some of the gloss off the much-heralded U.S. economic boom by highlighting what they saw as its dark environmental underside.

The most triumphalist phase of U.S. policy in the 1990s thus rather awkwardly coincided with the strengthening of external and especially European determination to use multilateral agreements to check U.S. power. In the end, the second Clinton administration was caught between recalcitrant partners who, notwithstanding the administration's essentially Eurocentric and multilateralist instincts, were unwilling to cut it much slack on key world-order issues and U.S. domestic forces (chiefly though by no means exclusively in the Republican-controlled Senate) who had never signed onto the new world order and perhaps were not surprised to see multilateralism turned against U.S. interests in so many areas.

These developments set the stage for the intensified transatlantic clashes over unipolarity and unilateralism that followed the inauguration of the second President Bush. To some extent, the much-decried unilateralism of the new administration was a matter of style, as Washington explicitly and in some cases harshly walked away from arrangements that the Clinton administration had never really embraced but could not bring itself to repudiate. Clinton signed Kyoto but took no steps to ratify or implement it; Bush declared the treaty dead. Clinton voted against the icc agreement, signed it at the last possible moment for procedural reasons, but recommended that the Senate not ratify; Bush went out of his way to "unsign" the agreement. With regard to the use of force, the new administration clearly was more inclined to act without U.N. or European sanction -- hence, the eventual conflict with France and Germany over Iraq. But even this was more a matter of degree than an absolute change, and in any case it was difficult to separate from the extraordinary security challenges that would have confronted any U.S. administration after September 11.



Where to go from here

he evidence does not support the view that American unilateralism is the result of a unipolar imbalance of power and that a return to multipolarity is a necessary or sufficient condition for creating a stronger multilateral order.

Viewed in the light of a vast international relations literature, this argument does not explain why the United States was the consummate multilateralist at the height of its power in the 1940s but then turned unilateralist after the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union more than restored its earlier dominance. Conversely, it does not explain how France, once a weak and prickly unilateralist, suddenly became the world's most fervent multilateralist when confronted 50 years later with the emergence of the new American "hyperpower."

Similarly, the argument does not fit the facts as they relate to post-Cold War diplomacy. The history of this period is yet to be written, but even a cursory review of the wrangling over global warming, the icc, the use of force, and other issues suggests that the usual generalizations about the relationship between polarity and the choice of unilateral or multilateral policies are at best partially correct. Multilateralism is not a politically neutral instrument that, as the hegemonic stability theorists imply, can be used by a right-minded dominant power to cement its advantages. Nor is it, as the unipolar unilateralists argue, a tool of the weak that the leading power can safely ignore. Rather, multilateralism is itself up for grabs in the international system, with both the leading and aspirant powers seeking to define it and use it in ways that serve their interests.

Finally, the argument that unipolarity is the cause of unilateralism vastly simplifies the intellectual debate in the United States and ignores the different strands of thinking that have gone into shaping post-Cold War policy. As has been seen, some influential Americans see unipolarity as an argument for rather than against robust multilateralism. Others doubt the reality, at least for long, of a truly unipolar order but divide sharply on whether this means that the United States should follow unilateral or multilateral policies to advance its interests in what they see as a multipolar world.

Since January 2001, the tendency in Europe has been to see U.S. policy as driven by the unipolar unilateralism associated with prominent neoconservative thinkers. But even under the Bush administration, U.S. policy has reflected a blend of intellectual currents as policymakers have sought to adjust to particular situations and come to grips with American power and its limitations. Clearly, a readiness to act unilaterally and to do so on the basis of an awareness of power is a factor, albeit one that tends to be exaggerated in Europe. But there is also a certain unipolar multilateralist momentum behind the foreign policy of this as of any administration as the sheer weight of the United States shapes multilateral forums and international norms in ways that reflect and help to perpetuate U.S. power, precisely in the way that the hegemonic stability theorists would predict. Perhaps most interestingly, there are adumbrations of a multipolar multilateralism in U.S. policy -- an acceptance of the emergence of new power centers and a willingness to work with these powers cooperatively in international forums. This tendency can be seen, for example, in the recognition of China, India, and Russia as potential great powers in the 2002 National Security Strategy and more recently in Secretary of State Powell's focus on "embracing major powers."6 It is a stance that has historic roots in the Republican Party -- in the Eisenhower administration, for example -- and arguably was reflected in candidate Bush's call for a "humble" foreign policy.

Multilateralism in the service of multipolarity is precisely the high diplomatic ground that the eu has staked out for itself as it goes around the world forming "strategic partnerships" with key countries said to share its commitment to global governance and stronger multilateral institutions in a multipolar world. It remains to be seen, however, whether such a world will emerge and, if so, what it would look like; whether multipolarity in fact would strengthen multilateralism rather than lead to an intensified economic and political rivalry of all against all; and, not least, whether Europe would have more influence and security in such a world.

Many in Europe seem to assume that because the United States is the chief protagonist of the unipolar world, any attenuation of unipolarity will redound to Europe's benefit. This view seems to be based on the assumption that such a world will be exactly like the one that exists at present, except that Europe will have vastly more power relative to the United States. In reality, Europe could emerge as one of the weaker "poles" in such a system, the Austria-Hungary of a new globalized balance of power, its privileged ties with the United States weakened but without the endogenous sources of power -- economic and demographic dynamism, favorable geography, and effective centralized leadership -- that are likely to be needed to exercise real power in the rough and tumble of a true multipolar order.

Alternatively, diffusion of power to Asian giants such as China and India along with a partial revival of Russian power outside Europe's sphere of control could lay the basis for a new transatlantic solidarity as both sides accentuate commonalities of interest, values, and history in a more diverse world. Europe would continue to build its own identity and pursue its interests, but becoming a "counterweight" to the United States would not be the driving rationale behind eu or member-state foreign policies. Both sides would concentrate on finding ways to use multilateralism to solve global and regional problems without artificially seeking to employ it either to consolidate or to reverse power relationships that in the long run will be determined by the internal cohesion and dynamism of each side. Such an outcome is arguably in the interests of both parties in that it neither permanently condemns Europe to a second-tier status in a way that many European elites find difficult to stomach nor exposes the United States to the constant harassment of a Europe seeking to consolidate its unity and enhance its international status by playing the "unilateralism" card.

This outcome can be realized, however, only if both sides of the Atlantic are careful not to make policy on the basis of erroneous assumptions about unipolarity, unilateralism, and the relationship between them.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes

1 Charles Krauthammer, "The Bush Doctrine: ABM, Kyoto, and the New American Unilateralism," Weekly Standard (June 4, 2001); and "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," National Interest (Winter 2002-2003). Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review 113 (June-July 2002); and Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Knopf, 2003).

2 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton University Press, 2001). Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (Oxford University Press, 2002).

3 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton, 2001).

4 Patrick J. Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming America's Destiny (Regnery, 1999). Jeremy Rabkin, Why Sovereignty Matters (AEI Press, 1998); Euro-Globalism? (Centre for the New Europe, 1999); and "Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?" Chicago Journal of International Law (Fall 2000).

5 Michael Lind, "Toward a Global Society of States," Wilson Quarterly (August 2002). David P. Calleo, Rethinking Europe's Future (Princeton University Press, 2001). Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century (Knopf, 2002).

6 Colin Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships," Foreign Affairs (January-February 2004).



Feedback? Email polrev@hoover.stanford.edu.

>>

Laying the Groundwork for Universal Health Care Coverage
by Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D.
Testimony


March 10, 2003 | |



Testimony given March 10, 2003 before the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate.

My name is Stuart Butler. I am Vice President of Domestic and Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I

express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage

Foundation.

Mr. Chairman, any observer of the American health care system is immediately struck by two of its central features.
Gaps and unevenness in coverage. Despite the huge expenditures devoted to the system, there are enormous gaps in the degree

in to which it covers Americans and there are wide difference in the level and type of benefits available to people of

similar circumstances.
Millions of Americans lack any insurance protection at all, and many of these are middle class. Many poor and non-working

Americans are eligible for a wide range of benefits, while others struggle to keep their families just out of poverty yet

lack any insurance. A worker may have coverage one week, arranged by his employer, yet lose it the following week because he

switched jobs to a firm without coverage. Similarly, workers who are perhaps forced in to early retirement by economic

conditions, or their health, are not eligible for Medicare or any other program and can find themselves suddenly in dire

straits for lack of affordable coverage.
The level of benefits available also can widely differ. An elderly person who happens to qualify for veteran's benefits can

obtain general support for their outpatient pharmaceutical needs. Yet an otherwise identical retiree in Medicare has no such

coverage.
So our "system" is a system in name only. It is really a patchwork of public and private programs with widely differing

eligibility criteria. And many people end up falling between the eligibility requirements of the programs and many others

have benefits only loosely connected to their needs.
Multiple systems of health care. The second distinctive feature of the American system is that different parts of it are run

on totally different principles of design and economics. The Veterans Administration health system, for example, has

similarities to single payer systems in other countries, in that the VA maintains its own hospitals, pays its own staff, and

decides centrally on the distribution of medical resources. Meanwhile another government program, Medicare, runs on other

principles, with private providers reimbursed by government for the services they render to eligible beneficiaries. In

Medicare, the primary package of benefits is decided in detail by Congress. Moreover, Medicare is actually two separate

programs. The hospital insurance system functions as a traditional mandatory social insurance program. The other part of

Medicare, principally covering physician costs, is a voluntary system with a subsidy for government-sponsored insurance.
Yet another government program, The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), covers over nine million federal

employees, their families and federal retirees, and operates on yet another approach. The FEHBP provides a direct subsidy

which is used by eligible families to reduce the premium cost of the private plan of their choice, providing that plan meets

basic requirements laid down by the government. The benefits in FEHBP plans vary significantly. Congress sets down only a

very basic set of benefit classifications, and the actual content of each plan is determined by consumer demand in the

competitive market place.
In parallel to these widely differing government-sponsored programs is the extensive private insurance system that covers

most working age Americans. The primary component of this system is insurance sponsored by employers to cover their employees

and families. The families obtaining health coverage in this manner enjoy an often very large tax benefit since the value of

the employer sponsored component of there compensation is free of all taxes. Other individuals obtain private insurance by

purchasing it directly from insurance companies, often because their employers do not provide such coverage. While some tax

benefits are available for this form of purchased insurance the criteria for tax relief are so restricted that many in this

market have no tax subsidy at all.
Our experience with this fragmented patchwork of programs should lead us to draw some important lessons as we ponder ways to

achieve universal coverage in America. Among these lessons:

Lesson 1: The employment-based system, while successful for certain families, has severe weaknesses as the basis for

universal coverage

The employer-sponsored system is often pointed to as a success story, despite the current concerns about escalating costs. In

the case of coverage offered through larger firms, employment-based coverage does have advantages. For instance:
Pooling.A company with a large workforce obviously also has a large pool for insurance purposes. A large number of

individuals can be grouped together and insured as a group for a standard premium, despite possibly wide variations in

medical risks among employees. Large companies also have the economies of scale and the sophistication to provide insurance

at a low administrative cost per employee.

Advantages for bargaining and administration.Larger companies also can bargain very effectively with insurers and providers,

and so are able to deliver cost-effective coverage that is often tailored specifically for their work force.

Choice.Because of the size of their insurance pool and their sophistication, large companies can arrange a choice of health

plans, making it more likely that workers will be reasonably satisfied with their coverage.
Employment-based insurance is very convenient. When an employer provides coverage, it is normally very easy for an employee

to take part in the plan. Premiums are paid directly by the employer, and the worker does not have to apply for a tax

exclusion; the W-2 form, indicating the worker's income for tax purposes, simply makes no mention of the value of the

employer's contribution to his health insurance. Moreover, if the worker has to pay something toward the cost of his plan,

this is usually done in the form of a convenient payroll deduction during each pay period.


Problems for Small Firms Sponsoring Health Insurance
While these advantages of employer-sponsored coverage certainly apply to workers in many firms, they are less likely to apply

to certain specific categories of workers, especially those employed in small firms.[1] Among the reasons for this:
Small firms by definition are small insurance pools. A retail store with a handful of employees is a dismal pool for

insurance purposes. Hiring a new employee with a disability, for example, can mean a huge change in insurance costs for the

employer. States and the federal government recognize this and are exploring various ways to group small firms together to

form larger insurance pools. But the need for these efforts only underscores the fact that the place of employment is not a

particularly good basis for the pooling of these insurance risks for employees of small firms.
Small firms face relatively high administrative costs, and many small-business owners do not wish to organize insurance.

Because they lack the economies of scale and the management resources of larger firms, small businesses tend to face high

costs when administering plans. According to data collected by the Congressional Budget Office, overhead costs for providing

insurance can be over 30 percent of premium costs for firms with fewer than 10 employees, compared with about 12 percent for

firms with more than 500 employees.[2] Moreover, many small-business owners have little desire to engage in the demanding

task of trying to organize health insurance that meets the often-varied needs of their employees.
Small firms can rarely offer a choice of plans. If a small employer provides coverage, it tends to be a single "one-size-

fits-all" plan. Small companies rarely offer a choice of plans. While 81 percent of workers with insurance in firms of 5,000

or more employees had a choice of at least three plans in 2000, only 2 percent of covered workers in companies with fewer

than 25 employees had a similar choice of at least three plans. Meanwhile, 95 percent of covered workers in the smaller

companies had only one plan available to them.[3]
These obstacles to employment-based coverage in the small-business sector help to explain the high level of uninsurance among

families with workers in that sector. According to a recent survey by the Kaiser Foundation, 74 percent of the uninsured are

in families with at least one full-time worker, and while 99 percent of large firms offer insurance, only 55 of firms with

fewer than 10 employees do so. Among low-wage workers (defined as those who earned less than $7 an hour in 1996), 45 percent

are not even offered insurance.[4]

Lesson 2: The primary method for subsidizing insurance for working families is inequitable, inefficient and fundamentally

flawed.

Today we subsidize for insurance very efficiently. In fact, the current form of subsidy encourages an inefficient overuse of

medical care by most non-poor Americans while providing little or no help to the lower-paid uninsured, and it actually

exacerbates the problem of uninsurance for many Americans. This happens because by far the largest subsidy for insurance for

working Americans is the tax exclusion for employer-sponsored insurance. The exclusion means that the portion of a worker's

compensation devoted to employer-paid health insurance is not subject to federal or state income taxes, or payroll taxes. In

aggregate this subsidy dwarfs even the value of the mortgage interest deduction. John Sheils and Paul Hogan valued the

subsidy in 1998 at over $111 billion at the federal level and nearly another $14 billion in exemptions from state taxes.[5]

In contrast to a subsidy aimed at those who need help the most, a tax exclusion provides most help to upper-income workers (

who are in the highest tax bracket) with the most generous coverage. Sheils and Hogan have estimated the average annual

federal tax benefits in 1998 as ranging from $2, 357 for families with incomes of $100,00.
But the exclusion is highly inequitable. Sheils and Hogan estimated the average annual tax benefit at just $71 for families

with incomes of less than $15,000. Thus the exclusion provides little help to lower-paid workers, who often face hardship in

paying for family coverage or out-of-pocket costs, and it is not available to workers lacking an employer-sponsored plan. It

is hard to imagine a less efficient system of subsidies for helping people to obtain coverage.



Lesson 3: The Medicare program does not represent a sound structure for universal coverage.


The trust fund woes of the Medicare program indicate the financing dangers of a social insurance approach to health care.

Similar to the experience of maturing social insurance programs around the world, Medicare is plagued with huge unfunded

liabilities as political pressure for ever-larger defined benefits today mean ever-larger obligations on future generations.

The 2002 report of the Medicare trustees provided a dire picture of the program's finances, with expenditures rapidly

outstripping dedicated revenues in future decades.[6]
But the structural problems of Medicare are not confined to its financing. When Medicare was created in 1965, its benefit

package was based on the prevailing Blue Cross/ Blue Shield package for working Americans in large firms. As such, it was

seen as state-of-the-art coverage. Since that time, however, the benefits for Medicare recipients gradually slipped further

behind the benefits routinely available to working Americans. For example, Medicare provides no outpatient prescription drug

benefit. It would be virtually unthinkable for a large corporation today to offer its workers a plan without at least some

coverage for outpatient pharmaceuticals, or, for that matter, protection against catastrophic medical costs.
The main reason that Medicare's benefits package is out of date--despite the general awareness that it needs to be updated--is

that all major benefit changes require an act of Congress. Consequently, discussions about changing benefits (especially

about introducing new benefits by reducing coverage for less important ones) are necessarily entangled in the political

process. Providers included in the package fight diligently--and usually effectively--to block serious attempts to scale back

outdated coverage for their specialties. Meanwhile, talk of upgrading the Medicare benefits package unleashes an intense

lobbying battle among other specialties that seek to be included in the Medicare benefits package. Invariably, the result

depends as much (if not more) on shrewd lobbying than on good medical practice. The understandable reluctance of most

lawmakers to subject themselves to this pressure further slows the process of modernizing benefits.
Formula Payments. Medicare today uses complex formulas to determine its payments to managed care plans serving beneficiaries

and payments to physicians and hospitals under the traditional fee-for-service program. Through legislation and regulation,

the government tries to create a payment schedule that will work in all parts of the country and that takes into account

local conditions. But as is typical of attempts by government to set payments by formula, these schedules rarely match the

actual market, which constantly changes. As a result, policymakers and health care providers grumble constantly that the

formulas systematically and wastefully overpay some plans and underpay others, and that many payments to physicians and

hospital are far out of line with the cost and difficulty of providing specific services.
Bureaucratic Decisionmaking. Just as arcane and problematic the complex administrative process used by the Centers for

Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to modify benefits, to determine whether certain medical treatments or procedures are to

be covered under Medicare, and to define under what conditions or circumstances servicesare to be delivered and paid for.

This byzantine process is marked by intense pleading by medical specialty societies, and a degree of congressional

micromanagement that makes efficient management of the program impossible.[7]
Moving Towards Universal Coverage
If we are to construct a health care system in this country that focuses resources efficiently to help those who need

assistance to obtain health coverage, we need to take the following important steps:
Agree on a health care social contract between society and individuals that is explicit and fair.
Today there is a legal and moral obligation on society to provide some level of health care to those who become ill. Under

federal law almost all hospitals must provide immediate health services to individuals entering the emergency room. In

addition, physicians and hospitals routinely provide services to individuals unable to pay for these. A recent study by Jack

Hadley and John Holahan estimates that as much as $38 billion is spent each year in public and private resources on health

care services for the uninsured.[8]
This implicit "social contract" is both inefficient and unfair. It is inefficient because the method of providing services

often means they are delivered in the most expensive setting. And because the services are not part of a comprehensive plan

they are inefficient from a medical point of view. The contract is unfair because it discourages many families with the means

to obtain adequate coverage from doing so.
The current social contract should be replaced with a more rational one. In a civilized and rich country like the United

States, it is reasonable for society to accept an obligation to ensure that all residents have affordable access to at least

basic health care - much as we accept the same obligation to assure a reasonable level of housing, education and nutrition.
But as part of that contract, it is also reasonable to expect residents of the society who can do so to contribute an

appropriate amount to their own health care. This translates into a requirement on individuals to enroll themselves and their

dependents in at least a basic health plan - one that at the minimum should protect the rest of society from large and

unexpected medical costs incurred by the family. And as any social contract, there would also be an obligation on society. To

the extent that the family cannot reasonably afford reasonable basic coverage, the rest of society, via government, should

take responsibility for financing that minimum coverage.
The obligations on individuals does not have to be a "hard" mandate, in the sense that failure to obtain coverage would be

illegal. It could be a "soft" mandate, meaning that failure to obtain coverage could result in the loss of tax benefits and

other government entitlements. In addition, if federal tax benefits or other assistance accompanied the requirement, states

and localities could receive the value of the assistance forgone by the person failing to obtain coverage, in order to

compensate providers who deliver services to the uninsured family.
Provide support to people to obtain health care based on their need, not where they happen to work, or their eligibility for

welfare, or their military record, or their age. Enable individuals and families to use this support to enroll in a seamless

system of coverage according to their choice.
The central public policy objective of a health care system is to use public funds in an efficient and economical way to

enable every household to obtain at least an acceptable level of health care services and protection from large financial

burdens associated with ill health. Whether a US resident is able to count on that commitment should not depend on their

current circumstances. Moreover, resources should be used as efficiently as possible to provide help those who need it most

to obtain coverage. That requires us to overhaul current subsidy methods to target funds more efficiently and to achieve

horizontal equity between similar people.
An important step towards that would be to overhaul the tax treatment of health care, gradually ending the regressive tax

exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance and replacing it with a more progressive subsidy. That is the logic behind

the various refundable tax credit proposals in numerous proposals for addressing uninsurance. These proposals would increase

the subsidy to lower-income households relative to upper-income households.
The same rationale lies behind various approaches designed to alter the Medicare program to target a higher proportion of

benefits on lower-income seniors, in contrast with the traditional social insurance vision of equal benefits regardless of

income. And while there is fairly universal support for a residual safety net public program for indigent or dysfunctional

households, replacing part of the Medicaid program with a refundable tax credit or voucher-like assistance is in line with

the same goal.
It is also important to de-link financial support from household work status. In other words assistance for health care

coverage should not be based on employment or retirement status, and it should be available for the cost of coverage from any

reasonable source. Thus an unemployed person and his or her family should have the same degree of assistance as an employed

household of similar income with employer-sponsored coverage. A worker with employer-sponsored coverage should get the same

tax break or direct subsidy for coverage as a similar worker whose firm does not provide insurance. A 60 year-old early

retiree should be able to count on the same help as a similar person who is still in the workforce.
The value of the assistance should also not differ according on the source of coverage. Thus a household should receive the

same subsidy value were it to obtain coverage through an employment based insurance plan or by buying into a public program.

On the other side of the same coin, an individual or household should be able to continue the same form of coverage

throughout their life if they wish. Thus a worker with a private insurance plan should be able to continue that coverage into

retirement, receiving "Medicare" benefits in the form of assistance towards the cost of continued insurance coverage.
Make it possible for the place of work be the location through which most families can get coverage, without employers

necessarily being the sponsor of coverage.
Most people in America pay their taxes through a place of work. This is a very convenient system under which employers

withhold income and Social Security taxes and send the money to the government. In addition, employees typically adjust their

withholdings to take advantage of any tax breaks for which they may be eligible (for example, the mortgage interest

deduction). This means that employers actually operate the basic income tax system; but they do not in any sense design the

tax code for their employees or "sponsor" the tax system. They could more appropriately be considered a clearinghouse for tax

payments.
The place of employment is likewise particularly convenient and efficient for handling health insurance enrolment and

payments. Workers with employer-sponsored health insurance benefits typically sign up for the firm's plan when they take a

job and arrange for a payroll deduction to cover premium costs for them or their family. With individual tax credits or other

forms of subsidy discussed above, employers could carry out the critical clearinghouse role for plan choices, tax

adjustments, and premium payments. Such employers would not required to organize or sponsor a plan for their employees to

obtain tax relief or other subsidies for the cost of coverage.
In other words, smaller employers could handle the mechanical aspects of arranging for payroll deductions and premium

payments (similar to their role in the tax collection system) without having to sponsor a plan. Thus, the employer could play

a very important role in facilitating coverage without having to organize coverage. In this way the place of employment could

be the "point of service" for selection and payment decisions, and for the receipt of subsidies, without the employee being

restricted to coverage decisions made by the employer.
Using automatic enrollment to boost coverage. Whether or not they sponsored insurance, employers could be encouraged to

institute an automatic enrollment and payment system to make health insurance premium payments and to obtain health-related

subsidies. This means that employees would automatically be enrolled in a health plan unless they explicitly declined to do

so, perhaps by signing a document indicating that they understood the possible consequences of not enrolling in a plan.

Alternatively, a state could establish a default bare-bones health plan in conjunction with a private insurer, to which

anyone not otherwise choosing a plan would be assigned.
Evidence from pension plans indicates that an automatic enrollment system for health insurance could have dramatic effects on

sign-up rates.[9] This payment system is also very similar to the way in which the FEHBP enables a federal worker who may

work in a small workplace, such as the local office of a Member of Congress, to choose from possibly dozens of plans.

4. Use "creative federalism" to discover the best arrangements for organizing health coverage.
Any approach designed to secure universal coverage, and perhaps especially one which seeks to encourage greater equity and

freedom of choice in coverage, has to confront the challenge of organizing the system of coverage. There is no consensus on

which structures are best to deliver health care. Some argue for government-sponsored plans. Others for individual insurance.

Others still argue for various group arrangements. In addition, allowing people to make choices in health care, even within

government-sponsored programs, raises such issues as risk selection. Moreover, views differ on how to achieve the right

combination of subsidy and insurance regulation to secure affordable and efficient coverage for people of differing health

status.
Perhaps the fastest way to discover the best methods of organizing health coverage under a universal system would be to

institute a modified form of the idea of "creative federalism." Under this approach, federal-state covenants would be

instituted to test comprehensive and internally consistent strategies at the state level designed to move towards universal

coverage. Congress would provide federal funds to assist states to experiment with a chosen strategy for arranging health

insurance and services. In contrast to a simple system of block grants, these federal-state covenants would operate within

policy constraints designed to achieve national goals for achieving universal coverage.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM), one of the national academies, recently proposed a limited version of this strategy designed

to stimulate and test creative methods of expanding coverage for the uninsured.[10] The IOM proposed that the federal

government create a number of statewide 10-year demonstrations based on combinations of proposals, including federal and

state tax credits, as well as Medicaid and SCHIP expansions partly financed by the federal government.
Congress should consider the IOM recommendations. But it could also pursue a more comprehensive strategy to trigger state

experimentation. Under such a more comprehensive "creative federalism" approach the federal government would do four things:


1) Congress would establish goals for universal coverage. The goals could include a certain percentage reduction in

uninsurance rates in each state over a period, and steps towards ending multiple programs and eligibility criteria. Congress

would also establish boundaries in policies that could be adopted in reaching the goals (e.g. that no person could face

unreasonable coverage costs as a result of their medical condition)
2) Congress would enact a number of changes to provide an "a la carte menu" of federal policy options that would be

available to states to help achieve the goals. These options might include making a version of the FEHBP available within the

state, allowing some Medicaid/SCHIP money to be used in creative ways, removing regulatory/tax obstacles to churches, unions,

and other organizations providing health insurance plans, and the creation of association plans and other innovative health

organizations that would then be available to states.
3) Congress would provide an amount of funding. This would be fortwo purposes. Part of the money would help states fund

certain approaches. The other part would "reward" states according to how successful they were in meeting the goals.
4) The federal government would enter into agreements, or covenants, with states to achieve the goals. States would

propose some combination of modifications of their current programs, initiatives with their federal allocation, and a

selection from the federal menu. The states could also negotiate regulatory waivers to the extent allowed by law. The federal

agreement would have to agree to the covenant before it could proceed and evaluation procedures would have to be included.

The goal of universal coverage is likely to remain elusive under our current health care system. Today we provide help to

people to afford coverage in such an inefficient and inequitable way that it is impossible to help all those who need it to

afford coverage. In addition, we have a patchwork of programs and subsidy systems with a multitude of complex eligibility

requirements that guarantees people will fall through the cracks. Reaching the goal of universal coverage will be difficult.

But it will be much easier if we rationalize subsidies for health coverage, enable people to pick the form of coverage that

is best for them, and encourage state-federal experiments to explore innovative ways of organizing health care coverage.
---------------------
The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization operating under Section 501(C)(3). It is

privately supported, and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other

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The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2002, it had more than 200,000

individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2002 contributions came from the

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available from The Heritage Foundation upon request.
Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views

expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1]For a summary of the pros and cons of employer-sponsored coverage, see Uwe E. Reinhardt, "Employer-Based Insurance: A

Balance Sheet," Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 124-132.
[2]Congressional Budget Office, The Tax Treatment of Employment-Based Health Insurance, 1994, p. 8.
[3]Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits, 2000 (Menlo Park, Cal.:

Kaiser Family Foundation, 2000), p. 57.
[4]Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Uninsured in America: Key Facts (Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family

Foundation, 2000).
[5] John Sheils and Paul Hogan, "Cost Of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits In 1998," Health Affairs, vol. 18, no. 2, March-April

1999, pp. 176-181.
[6] The 2002 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Insurance

Trust Funds (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2002), p.10.
[7] For a recent review of management problems arising from congressional micromanagement, see Sheila Burke et. al.,

Improving Medicare's Governance and Management, (Washington, DC.: National Academy of Social Insurance, 2002), pp. 39-42.
[8]Jack Hadley and John Holahan, "How Much Medical Care Do The Uninsured Use, And Who Pays For It?" Health Affairs web

exclusive, February 12, 2003, available at: http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Hadley_Web_Excl_021203.htm
[9]A recent study found that automatic enrollment for 401(k) plans boosted participation rates from 37 percent to 86 percent

for such voluntary pensions, with even sharper increases for young and lower-paid employees. See Brigitte Madrian and Dennis

Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, National Bureau of Economic Research

Working Paper No. 7682, May 2000, p. 51.
[10]Janet M. Corrigan, Ann Greiner, Shari M. Erickson, Editors, Fostering Rapid Advances in Health Care: Learning from System

Demonstrations (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, 2002).



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
How the President's Health Care Plan Would Expand Insurance Coverage to the Uninsured
by Nina Owcharenko and Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D.
Backgrounder #1636
March 11, 2003 | |

Millions of Americans are without health insurance. As a result, these individuals and their families too often find that

their access to vital health care services is compromised while American taxpayers bear the burden of paying the costs.

President George W. Bush has proposed a number of positive policy initiatives that can reverse this situation and make health

care coverage more affordable for millions of individuals and families.
A Diverse and Dynamic Uninsured Population
According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 41.2 million Americans did not have health insurance coverage in 2001.1 Roughly

half of the members of this diverse population are uninsured for a period of six months or less, and about 40 percent are

uninsured for a period of 18 months or more.2
The overwhelming majority of the uninsured are young, between the ages of 18 and 34; over 80 percent are part of a working

family.3 They tend to be employed in small businesses and are concentrated in wholesale and retail trade industries as well

as in agricultural, forestry, fishing, mining, and construction.4 They are disproportionately minorities, largely Hispanic.5

While a substantial majority of these Americans are low-income working people, the fastest growing portion is comprised of

middle-income to upper-middle-income families.6
Although the majority of Americans have health care coverage through their place of work, lower-income working Americans are

less likely to have employer-sponsored coverage.7 Yet Americans get unlimited tax relief for the purchase of health insurance

if--and only if--coverage is provided through their employer. In 2000, the tax subsidy linked to employer-sponsored coverage

was estimated to be $126 billion.8
Lower-income working Americans who do not or cannot get health insurance at their place of work have few choices; they can

either purchase non-group coverage outside of the place of work (and do so with after-tax dollars) or go without coverage

altogether. Health care economists concluded long ago that this health care tax policy is inequitable and inefficient, and

that it distorts the insurance markets and contributes significantly to the number of the uninsured in the United States.9
Policymakers should also consider the "cost" of the uninsured to the public--including the costs of government payments and

programs and other public spending for health care. In a recent research paper, Urban Institute analysts Jack Hadley and John

Holohan estimate that, in 2001 dollars, the public paid $35 billion in uncompensated care and that $30.6 billion of this

payment was in the form of government spending.10 As Hadley and Holohan explain:
We...estimated that governments finance most of the uncompensated care received by the uninsured, spending about $30.6

billion on payments and programs largely justified to serve the uninsured and covering possibly as much as 80-85 percent of

the uncompensated care costs through a maze of grants, direct provision programs, tax appropriations, and Medicare and

Medicaid payment additions. Most of this money comes from the federal government, primarily through Medicare and Medicaid,

followed by state/local tax appropriations for hospitals, Medicaid DSH and UPL payments, and VA's direct care programs.11
Replacing this inefficient and messy system with direct assistance to the uninsured would be both simpler and more cost-

effective.

The President's Plan to Expand Coverage and Choice
President Bush is proposing changes to address the needs of America's uninsured by fixing the inequities of the current

system and mainstreaming uninsured individuals and families into the private insurance market. While liberal policymakers

would like to enroll the uninsured in public programs such as Medicaid (which are, even now, overwhelmed and underperforming

), available survey research shows that Americans prefer to have private health coverage rather than government-run public

programs.12 To achieve this objective, the Bush Administration would create a new system of tax credits for health care

coverage that targets low-income individuals and families who do not have employer-provided coverage.
In addition, President Bush has put forward a series of policy changes aimed at improving existing health care accounts.

These policy recommendations would enable individuals and families to control decisions regarding their own health care and

decide for themselves how best to spend their health care dollars.
The President's proposals to expand coverage and return personal choice and control to individuals and families include the

resubmission of a system of tax credits, targeting individuals and families who do not get health insurance through the

workplace; allowing the carryover of existing flexible spending arrangements (FSAs) to enable individuals and families to

build up savings for health care expenses; and the elimination of statutory restrictions on medical savings accounts (MSAs).

Health Care Tax Credits
The President is resubmitting an $89 billion health care tax credit proposal to assist millions of Americans who are without

health insurance provided through the workplace. The health care tax credit would provide a subsidy of up to 90 percent of

the cost of a health insurance premium, up to a dollar amount of $1,000 per person and $3,000 per family. Families with an

adjusted gross income of $25,000 or lower would be eligible for the maximum credit of $3,000. For families with incomes above

$25,000, the size of the credit would vary with income and would be phased out at income levels of $30,000 for an individual

with no dependents and $60,000 for families with children.13
In its structure, the proposed Bush tax credit would be refundable, meaning that low-income individuals and families who owe

minimal or no taxes would still receive a direct subsidy for the purchase of health insurance. It would also be "

advanceable," meaning that individuals or families would get the assistance at the time premium payment is due and not have

to wait until the end of the year for reimbursement.
The Bush tax credit proposal outlines a new role for the states, both in building an infrastructure that incorporates choice

and competition and in providing additional subsidies for low-income Americans. Under the terms of the original Bush tax

credit proposal outlined last year, a person could purchase individual health insurance with the tax credit; under the terms

of the revised version, in addition to options in the non-group market, a person could purchase health insurance through

private-sector purchasing pools, state-sponsored insurance-purchasing pools, and state high-risk pools.14 These state

purchasing arrangements are similar to those extended to states under the Trade Adjustment and Assistance (TAA) Act.15
At the discretion of state authorities, after December 31, 2004, individuals and families who would not otherwise be eligible

for public assistance could receive a federal tax credit to buy into certain state-sponsored purchasing groups where private

insurance is offered or to buy into state government employee health-purchasing groups.16 Moreover, states could supplement

the federal tax credits used for group purchasing of private health plans with additional state contributions. Under the

terms of the Bush proposal, states could make an additional contribution of up to $2,000 per adult for those with incomes at

133 percent of the poverty level; this contribution would be phased down to $500 per adult for those with incomes that are

200 percent of the poverty level.17

Health Care Accounts
Beyond the tax credit proposals, the Bush Administration has unveiled a broad range of policy improvements to make health

care coverage more affordable by giving individuals greater control of their health care spending. In 2002, the U.S.

Department of the Treasury issued a ruling to clarify the status of health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs). Through these

arrangements, employers could offer employees a health plan in combination with a tax-free spending account for health care

expenses, allowing any unspent funds to be carried over from year to year, tax-free.18
Beyond this administrative change in the system, the Bush Administration is also proposing statutory changes that would

expand and improve Archer MSAs and FSAs.19 Changes in Archer MSAs are particularly significant, given that nearly 73 percent

of MSA enrollees were previously uninsured.20

Flexible Spending Arrangements
Under current law, employees can participate in employer-based flexible spending arrangements, through which employees can

set aside a portion of their salaries in a special, pre-tax account to use for anticipated qualified health care expenses. If

employees do not use the funds they have set aside in their FSA by the end of the year, however, they lose them. They may not

carry over any unused funds to the following year. Under the Bush proposal, employees could carry forward up to $500 of

unused funds in their FSAs tax-free every year for medical expenses.

Medical Savings Accounts
Today, some Americans are permitted to open medical savings accounts from which individuals and families can pay for their

medical expenses. These accounts are tax-free and can be rolled over from year to year. Under current law, no more than 750,

000 individuals can have a medical savings account, and the MSA demonstration is scheduled to end after December 31, 2003.21

These stipulations are both a profound restriction on the health insurance market and a legal impediment designed to

discourage the growth of such plans.
In addition to these restrictions, there are a number of statutory and regulatory restrictions that determine how such

accounts may be used. For example, under current law, an MSA must be coupled with a high-deductible health plan. The law

specifically defines a high-deductible plan as one that has "deductible(s) in the range of $1,700 to $2,500 in the case of

individual coverage, and $3,350 to $5,050 in other coverage arrangements, with out-of-pocket limits set at $3,350 for

individual coverage and $6,150 in "all other cases."22
The Bush proposal would eliminate the artificial participation cap on MSAs and make the demonstration permanent. These

changes would remove market disincentives and allow supply to meet market demand. The Bush proposal would open up the MSA

option to any individual who wanted one (with the exception of those who would otherwise be eligible for a refundable tax

credit) and change the definition of a "high-deductible" plan to any plan with an annual deductible as low as $1,000 for an

individual and $2,000 for family or other coverage, with an additional provision to encourage preventive medical services. In

addition, it would allow both employers and employees to contribute to the account and would permit contributions up to 100

percent of the annual deductible.23
Making the President's Proposals Better
The problems of the uninsured reflect a broader problem of the health care system--the current federal and state tax

treatment of health insurance. The current system undermines the portability of insurance, inhibits personal ownership and

control of health plans, prohibits genuine consumer choice, and obstructs the functions of the market. Heritage Foundation

health policy analysts have long championed a comprehensive and universal reform of America's health care system and have

recommended replacing the existing federal and state tax structure for health insurance with a national system of tax

credits.24
Short of such a comprehensive reform, President Bush's health care policy agenda is laudably ambitious. It would make health

care coverage more affordable and would help millions of Americans secure health insurance coverage. The President's policy

would ensure the expansion and availability of private health insurance coverage for individuals and families.
Congress should work with the Bush Administration to make further improvements in health care policy. Specifically, Congress

should:
Permit states to determine the level of tax credit supplement and allow employers to contribute. As described above, the Bush

proposal allows states to supplement the federal tax credit. However, there are limits regarding the amount that states may

contribute and whom they may assist. States should have the flexibility to leverage all available resources to enhance the

federal tax credit as they see fit for their residents. Furthermore, for employees who are not receiving employer-sponsored

coverage, regulatory policy should be amended to permit employers to make a contribution on behalf of their employees.
Provide a partial tax credit for employer-sponsored health insurance. While a number of uninsured workers do not have access

to employer-sponsored coverage, there are those who simply decline employer coverage due to cost.25 Furthermore, those

insured low-income families who make a financial commitment to get insurance through their employer would not be eligible for

assistance. Therefore, to promote equity, certain income-eligible individuals should be able to receive a partial tax credit

that can be applied to an employer-sponsored policy. Such a policy could also encourage some small businesses to offer

coverage. According to a recent survey, "75 percent of uninsured small employers said that they would consider offering a

health plan if the government provided tax credits to workers to help them pay for coverage."26 Senator James Jeffords (I-VT)

incorporated such an approach in legislation introduced in the 107th Congress.27
Expand the FSA carryover to include all unused funds. There should be no limit to the carryover amount of unused FSA funds.

Monies contributed to an FSA are set aside from the employee's earned wages. It is the employee's money; therefore, any

unspent dollars in the account should be carried over year to year. Instead of simply anticipating planned annual medical

expenses, workers would also be able to save for future, unexpected, or uncovered services.
Establish individual ownership of HRAs. Currently, employers control health reimbursement arrangements, including the

accounts. While employees are able to carry over unspent funds from the account year to year, when an employee leaves his or

her job, the employer controls the account funds. Some employers have decided to allow their employees access to any

remaining funds in the accounts after they leave. However, if an employer chooses not to do so, there is little incentive for

an employee not to "spend down" the funds in the account before separating from the company. A better solution would be to

give employees control and ownership of these accounts so that, upon their departure, they would be able to maintain the HRA

policy on their own and continue to have full access to the account.
Expand the use of re-employment accounts for health care-related expenditures. President Bush has proposed establishing re-

employment accounts for certain unemployed workers. These accounts would be worth up to $3,000 and could be used to purchase

training and supportive services.28 Since most workers lose their health insurance when they lose their jobs, unemployed

workers should also be allowed to use the funds in these re-employment accounts to assist with health care-related costs,

including premium payments on a health insurance policy, during their period of unemployment.
CONCLUSION
The President has laid out an ambitious health care policy agenda that includes substantial revisions in the federal tax code

and the federal tax treatment of health insurance. These tax changes would broaden access to private health insurance

coverage, establish equity in the treatment of health insurance, and improve the overall function of the private health

insurance market by incorporating consumer choice and market competition.
The President's proposals establish a high bar for success. With the help and support of Congress, the bar can be reached--

and, in some cases, raised even higher.

Nina Owcharenko is Health Care Policy Analyst in, and Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., is Director of, the Center for Health Policy

Studies at The Heritage Foundation.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Health Insurance Coverage: 2001," September 2002, p. 1. Cited

hereafter as "Health Insurance Coverage: 2001."
2. "A Revolving Door: How Individuals Move in and out of Health Insurance Coverage," University of Michigan, Economic

Research Initiative on the Uninsured, ERIU Research Highlight No. 1, October 2002, p. 1.
3. Paul Frostin, "Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2002 Census

Population Survey," Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No. 252, December 2002, pp. 20, 11.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. "Health Insurance Coverage: 2001," p. 2.
6. BlueCross BlueShield Association, "The Uninsured in America," February 2003, p. 7.
7. Frostin, "Sources of Health Insurance," p. 16.
8. White House, Council of Economic Advisers, "Health Care Tax Credits," February 14, 2002, p. 4.
9. For an overview of the relationship between federal tax policy and insurance coverage, see Grace-Marie Arnett, ed.,

Empowering Health Care Consumers Through Tax Reform (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
10. See Jack Hadley and John Holohan, "How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who Pays for It?" Health Affairs,

February 12, 2003, at http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Hadley_Web_ Excl_021203.htm.
11. Ibid.
12. Jennifer Edwards et al., "The Erosion of Employer-Based Health Coverage and the Threat to Workers' Health Care," The

Commonwealth Fund, Issue Brief, August 2002, p. 7.
13. U.S. Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue Proposals,

February 2003, pp. 45-47. Cited hereafter as General Explanations.
14. Ibid., p. 47.
15. See Nina Owcharenko and Edmund Haislmaier, "State Opportunities to Provide Affordable Health Coverage Under the Trade

Law," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1626, February 25, 2003. Public Law 107-210, H.R. 3009, included provisions to

provide both workers who lost their jobs in part because of expanded international trade and certain other individuals a

refundable, advanceable health care tax credit worth 65 percent of the premium to assist them in securing health care

coverage. These tax credits could be used only for a select group of coverage options, which included state-sponsored

purchasing pools.
16. General Explanations, p. 47.
17. Ibid. Under the Bush proposal, persons with incomes in excess of 200 percent of the poverty level would not be eligible

for additional state subsidies or refundable tax credits.
18. Press release, "Treasury and IRS Guidance on Health Reimbursement," U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 26, 2002, at

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3204.htm.
19. White House, "The President's Proposals for Health Security in the World's Best Health Care System," at http://www.

whitehouse.gov/infocus/medicare/health-care/health-accts.html.
20. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Bulletin, October 7, 2002, p. 685, at http

://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-40.pdf.
21. General Explanations, p. 54.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 55. Under the Bush proposal, preventive health care services would get an additional incentive: "Such plans

would be...permitted to provide, without counting against the deductible, up to $100 of coverage for allowable preventive

services per covered individual each year."
24. See Stuart M. Butler, "Reforming the Tax Treatment of Health Care to Achieve Universal Coverage," in Jack A. Meyer and

Elliott K. Wicks, eds., Covering America: Real Remedies for the Uninsured (Washington: Economic and Social Research

Institute, 2001), pp. 21-42, at http://www.esresearch.org/RWJ11PDF/butler.pdf; see also Stuart M. Butler and Edmund F.

Haislmaier, A National Health Care System for America (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1989).
25. Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, "Employer Health Benefits 2002 Annual Survey,"

September 2002, p. 48.
26. BlueCross BlueShield Association, "The Uninsured in America," p. 11, referring to the 2002 Small Employer Health Benefit

Survey conducted by the BlueCross BlueShield Association, the Consumer Education Council, and the Employee Benefit Research

Institute.
27. For further detail, see S. 590, the Relief, Equity, Access, and Coverage for Health (REACH) Act, at www.thomas.loc.
28. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, p. 199.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
New Data on Health Insurance, the Working Poor, and the Benefits of Health Care Tax Changes
by Derek Hunter
WebMemo #492

April 28, 2004 | printer-friendly format |

Health care tax credits can make health insurance coverage affordable for millions of working Americans.
In 2002, 43.6 million Americans went without health insurance at some point.[1] Most were uninsured for a short period: 44.1

percent for less than four months and an additional 19.9 percent for between five and 8 months.[2] The shortness of the

coverage gap can be explained by any number of reasons, including the time spent between jobs after having lost work and the

probationary period, after which coverage begins, when switching jobs. However, that still leaves a significant number of

Americans without health insurance for long periods of time.
Policymakers have been struggling for years to find ways to help those without insurance obtain coverage. President George W.

Bush has proposed a tax credit, based on income, of up to $1,000 for an individual and $3,000 for a family. There has been

some criticism that this amount would be too little to help low-income individuals and families purchase coverage, but new

data from eHealthinsurance.com show the cost of individual plans to be well within reach of those numbers.
Congress and the Administration should aggressively promote health care tax credits, and thus help millions of Americans who

do not, or cannot, get health insurance through their places of work.
Current Tax Policy
There is currently a tax advantage for the purchase of health insurance for those who get that insurance through their

employer, but this favorable tax treatment is not available for people who purchase health insurance on their own in the

individual market. Workers with employer-provided coverage have their contribution toward their premiums taken out of their

compensation pre-tax and, therefore, are not taxed on that income; those in the individual market do not have that option. In

2004 there will be an estimated $188.5 billion tax break for individuals and families with employer-provided health

insurance, with 26.7 percent of that tax benefit going to families with incomes of $100,000 or more--roughly 14 percent of the

population.[3] Families with lower incomes see less of a benefit. (See Chart 1)
While the average family receives a tax break for health benefits of $1,482, lower-income families--those with incomes of less

than $30,000--get a break of only $725, with that amount being less the lower their income is.
Favorable tax treatment for health insurance should not be based on whether one has access to employment-based health

insurance. Congress can end this inequitable policy. A tax credit would be the most efficient and effective way to accomplish

this goal, and Congress could target the credits to individuals and families with the greatest needs including those who work

in small businesses. With a change in congressional policy, health insurance in the individual market would be within reach

for millions of uninsured citizens.
Premium Costs in the Individual Market
In the April 2004 study by eHealthinsurance.com, researchers analyzed the more than 62,000 plans the company sold to

individuals and families in 42 states and the District of Columbia since August 2003. What they found was that the average

annual premium for an individual was $1,812, or about $151 per month.[4]
Annual premiums varied widely by state, from a high of $4,044 in New Jersey to a low of $1,188 in Iowa and Wyoming, and the

average age of the consumer was 33 (See Table 1).[5]
The study also found the average cost of a family plan (average of 2.9 family members) to be $288 per month, or $3,456 per

year.[6]
Type of Coverage Purchased
Individual Plans
Seventy-five percent of individuals and 79 percent of families purchased Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) plans, while

14 percent of individuals and 9 percent of families purchased Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans.[7]
Of the plans purchased, "94% of policies purchased by individuals and 89% of policies purchased by families can be considered

'comprehensive' in coverage, where comprehensiveness is defined to include: Inpatient, Outpatient, Lab and Test benefits. 76%

of these plans also include Prescription Drug benefits."[8]
Deductibles
Ehealthinsurance.com reports that the vast majority of the plans purchased through its service had deductibles of $1,500 or

less. For individuals, 71.2 percent of plans purchased had deductibles of $1,500 or less, while that number was 60.8 percent

for families.[9]
Co-Payments
Fully three-quarters (75 percent) of purchasers bought plans with co-payments of $20 or less.[10] For individuals the number

was 74.9 percent, and for families it was 75.5 percent.[11]
Preliminary Data on Health Savings Accounts
Health Savings Accounts (HSA) were signed into law on December 8, 2003, as part of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and

became available for purchase on January 1, 2004. Ehealthinsurance.com has offered HSAs since that date and has released

preliminary data on who has bought them and how much they cost. The information, while from only a two and a half month

period, is very promising.
Given the option of an HSA, individuals and families of all sizes have chosen to enroll in them. Of the enrollees, 38 percent

were individuals, 16 percent were individuals and their spouses, and 4 percent were individuals with one child.[12] Families

of varying size make up the remaining 42 percent.[13]
The ages of those choosing to enroll in HSA-eligible plans ran the spectrum, with the largest group being 40 to 49 years old

(32.89 percent).[14] In fact, 55.7 percent of enrollees were over the age of 40.[15] Enrollees between the ages of 30 to 39

comprised another 30.26 percent of those choosing an HSA.[16]
The cost of HSA-eligible plans varies, but the majority of enrollees (52.83 percent) pay between $51 and $100 a month.[17]

Another 23.14 percent of enrollees pay between $101 and $200 per month, 5.65 percent pay between $201 and $300, and 17.67

percent pay $50 or less per month.[18]
Once enrollees meet their deductibles, 54 percent will have to pay 20 percent coinsurance for office visits, surgery,

hospitalization, Ob/Gyn, and X-Ray/lab tests, but 44 percent have chosen plans that require no coinsurance.[19]
While this data is very preliminary, it is promising. The option of an HSA is one that appeals, as the preliminary data show,

to a wide range of individuals and families. In the future, HSAs should continue to offer an affordable option for the

uninsured.
Conclusion
Tax benefits have long favored those who get health insurance through their employers. The policies and premiums of the

individual health insurance market are often dismissed as out of reach for millions of those who are uninsured. Based on the

data, however, this is not necessarily the case.
Comprehensive and affordable plans are available in the individual market. These health plans would be more prevalent and

more effective with tax credits that are refundable and advanceable for low-income individuals, who often work in small

businesses.
Congress can help millions of working Americans through a vital change in health care tax policy. The Bush Administration has

proposed a solid first step with a tax credit. Through refundable, advanceable tax credits, not only would more Americans be

able to afford health insurance, but the playing field would be closer to level between those with employer-provided coverage

and those who find themselves in the individual market. Thus, such a policy would be far more equitable than the existing

policy, which favors higher-income individuals with employment-based coverage in large companies.

Derek Hunter is Research Assistant in the Center for Health Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1]Robert J. Mills and Shailesh Bhandari, "Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2002," U.S. Census Bureau,

September 2003.
[2]Ibid.
[3]John Sheils and Randall Haught, "The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004," Health Affairs-Web Exclusive, February

25, 2004.
[4]"The Cost and Benefits of Individual Health Insurance Plans," eHealthinsurance.com, updated April 15, 2004.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Ibid.
[7]"The Cost and Benefits of Individual & Family Health Insurance Plans."
[8]Ibid.
[9]Ibid.
[10]"The Cost and Benefits of Individual & Family Health Insurance Plans."
[11]Ibid.
[12] "Health Savings Accounts Fact Sheet," eHealthinsurance.com, April 21, 2004.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Ibid.
[15]Ibid.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Ibid.
[18]Ibid.
[19]Ibid.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
Covering the Uninsured: How States Can Expand and Improve Health Coverage
by Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., and Nina Owcharenko
Backgrounder #1637


March 14, 2003 | |



Innovative governors and legislators in every state of the Union can take specific steps to increase health insurance

coverage and improve the range of choice and quality of that coverage for individuals and families.
State officials' range of action is constrained severely by federal law because America's health insurance markets are

shaped--and distorted--by the federal tax treatment of health insurance. But while state officials obviously cannot change

the federal tax code, they can still take major steps to create more expansive and efficient consumer-based health insurance

markets.

WORKING WITH WASHINGTON
State officials can work directly with the Bush Administration and Congress to increase access to health care coverage for

millions of Americans, including those who have difficulty obtaining coverage because they cannot get it at their places of

work, are low-income working people, or have lost their health coverage with their employment. Moreover, states can do it

right by creating new structural arrangements that would give millions of Americans more choice and control over their health

care decisions.

Specifically, the states can:

Cooperate with the Bush Administration in expanding private health insurance coverage and improving public programs. This

means making changes in state law and regulation to accommodate proposed federal changes in the tax treatment of health

insurance and medical care. These include new health care tax credits, tax-free rollover of funds in existing flexible

spending accounts, and the expansion of tax-free medical savings accounts.
State officials can also take advantage of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) waivers, particularly the new

Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) demonstration waivers.1 These federal waivers encourage state

officials to develop innovative coverage options using existing federal funds and incorporating private coverage options.

Seven states have already sought and obtained expedited waiver authority from HHS. The Administration is proposing to build

on this model by giving states even greater flexibility in improving the function of their Medicaid and State Children's

Health Insurance (SCHIP) programs.2

Create a state-based information system of health plans available in the state. Individuals and families who do not get

health insurance at the place of work or do not have Internet access to health plans often do not know how or where to secure

affordable coverage. State officials should break the "awareness barrier" and make that information, including consumer

information on quality care, available in an easy and accessible way through agencies that routinely contact working

families, such as the motor vehicle administration, the revenue department, or even local hospitals.
Allow displaced workers who are eligible for new federal assistance for health coverage to enroll in private plans offered to

state employees. Under the Trade Adjustment Reform Act of 2002, an estimated 260,000 American workers displaced by

international trade can now qualify for a 65 percent federal tax credit for the purchase of health insurance. While such

displaced workers are found in all states, they are particularly numerous in Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,

Texas, and Washington. State officials can make available a variety of congressionally authorized options for these workers,

but they could secure quick coverage for these workers by allowing them to enroll in the private health plans routinely

offered to state government employees.
Allow state and municipal employees to use the new health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs) to secure the doctors and medical

services of their choice. In 2002, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a major tax policy ruling allowing employers to

deposit funds in tax-free health care accounts for employees and roll over the unused funds year after year in these

accounts. Combining a wellness program with this new account, the Louisiana State University Healthcare Network (LSUHN), for

example, experienced a 9.6 percent increase in physician office visits and a 28 percent decrease in total health costs.3

Under the Treasury Department's ruling, employers can also make the accumulated funds in these accounts available to

employees when they retire to help them offset retirement health care expenses. State officials can now make the HRA option

available to their employees, just as it is available to federal employees and their families.
Create preventive care accounts for Medicaid beneficiaries. While Medicaid, the huge federal-state program for the poor and

indigent, is in desperate need of reform, state officials should seek waivers to improve the program for the 44 million

people enrolled in it. To improve access to physicians, states could establish state-based cash accounts for Medicaid

recipients with a PIN number and debit card. Payments for routine medical and preventive care services such as doctors'

visits and checkups could be paid directly out of the preventive care account. Not only would doctors get quick, hassle-free

reimbursement for their services, but Medicaid beneficiaries could avoid emergency rooms and roll over the unused funds in

the Medicaid account each year. When Medicaid beneficiaries leave welfare or get a job in the private sector, the unused

funds in their account could be transferred to pay for private insurance or put into a medical savings account. Using a

federal waiver, Florida officials have already created a consumer-driven option for disabled Medicaid beneficiaries.4
Make health care coverage more affordable for individuals and families through state regulatory reforms. Benefits are

mandated nationwide. A 1999 study of state-mandated benefits, conducted by the Health Insurance Association of America, found

that as many as one out of four Americans who are uninsured lack coverage because of the costs of state-mandated benefits.5

State officials should review the continuing and accumulating costs of state-mandated benefits and health insurance

regulations, and scale back or repeal those that exceed their regulatory benefits.
Enact serious medical malpractice reform. In several states, including Texas, Pennsylvania, and Nevada, soaring medical

malpractice costs have made the practice of medicine increasingly difficult for doctors and other medical professionals.

Beyond encouraging doctors to practice roughly $50 billion worth of defensive medicine annually to avoid litigation,6 flawed

medical malpractice laws are also causing doctors to leave their states or even quit medicine altogether. This is creating

serious access problems for patients in several states. At the very least, state officials should give malpractice relief to

all doctors who treat Medicaid patients or dispense charity care to the poor.
Create a statewide voluntary purchasing cooperative. Unlike other forms of insurance, health insurance is routinely insulated

from consumer choice. According to Alain Enthoven, a professor at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, 77

percent of all employees with employer-based coverage do not have a choice of health insurance carrier.7 State officials can

reverse these dynamics by creating a structure that gives individuals and families easy access to health plans and allows

private health plans to compete directly with each other for consumers' dollars. This is, in effect, what the federal

government does today for federal employees and their families in the popular and successful Federal Employees Health

Benefits Program (FEHBP). The components would include a state "clearinghouse" for comparative information, the enforcement

of minimum benefit requirements and consumer protection rules, a service center for enrollment and the collection of

premiums, a reinsurance pool for companies to cope with adverse selection, and a system of premium subsidies or state-based

tax credits for insurance coverage. The best way to establish an infrastructure for consumer choice and competition would be

to fold state employee health plans into the new system.
Study the cost of the uninsured and create a system of state-based tax credits or premium subsidies for private health

insurance. Faced with tight budgets, many state officials are understandably reluctant to create a new system of health care

tax credits or premium subsidies for low-income persons to purchase private health plans. But the cost of expanding coverage

must be balanced against the cost of not expanding coverage. According to Jack Hadley and John Holohan of the Urban

Institute, a prominent Washington public policy institution, Americans today pay $34.5 billion, mostly through government

spending, in uncompensated care costs on behalf of the uninsured.8 State officials should emulate the Texas Comptroller's

Office and undertake a similar analysis of the total cost of the uninsured to state taxpayers. The Texas Comptroller

estimated that in 2002, Texans paid roughly $1,000 for each uninsured Texan, or the same amount that President Bush has

proposed for his $89 billion program of health care tax credits for eligible uninsured adults.9
THE NEXT STEPS: CREATIVE FEDERALISM
Policy analysts at the Institute of Medicine, reflecting a growing consensus among health policy analysts, have suggested

that the states, in cooperation with the federal government, undertake innovative demonstrations to find out what works best

in expanding coverage for the uninsured.10 As one example of "creative federalism," Congress could specify a "menu" of

changes available for federal funding, including various consumer choice alternatives, a set of "performance goals" for the

states to meet as a condition for federal funding, and a bonus program to reward states that meet the agreed-upon goals of

expanding patient choice, insurance coverage, quality improvements, and patient satisfaction.11
In the 1990s, innovative state welfare initiatives helped to drive the overhaul of national policy to fix the crumbling

welfare system. Governors and other state officials can pattern their health care reform efforts after the success in welfare

reform. To assist states, Congress has already created a new source of federal funding to create pooling arrangements to

cover the uninsured under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002.

HOW STATES CAN EXPAND HEALTH CARE COVERAGE, IMPROVE QUALITY, AND CONTROL COSTS
Securing health insurance coverage for millions of Americans is both a federal and a state problem. State officials should

engage in a continuing dialogue with officials at HHS and take advantage of new opportunities to expand choice, control cost,

and reduce the number of the uninsured.
To advance this agenda, state officials can take a variety of steps:

STEP 1: Cooperate with the President in reducing the number of uninsured.
Over the past two years, the Bush Administration has outlined an ambitious and fairly comprehensive health care reform

agenda.12 It includes an $89 billion program of refundable tax credits for the uninsured, an annual rollover of up to $500 of

unused funds in employer-based flexible spending accounts (FSAs), and a lifting of existing statutory restrictions on medical

savings accounts (MSAs).13
In concert with congressional action on these items, or even in anticipation of such changes, state officials could start

changing state law and regulations to accommodate these federal initiatives in order to facilitate increases in patient

choice, control, and coverage. For example, the Bush tax credits would be available not only for private health insurance on

the individual market, but also for individuals and families who purchased health plans through "private purchasing groups,

state-sponsored insurance purchasing pools and state high risk pools."14
After December 31, 2004, under the Bush proposal, the states could permit eligible individuals and families to buy into state

employee purchasing groups using the new federal health care tax credits.15 Moreover, states could supplement federal health

care tax credits for individuals and families with incomes at or below 200 percent of poverty with additional state

contributions ranging from $500 to $2,000 per adult, depending on their income levels.16 State officials should start

planning for such changes.

STEP 2: Take a statewide inventory of private plans and design a consumer-friendly information clearinghouse for individuals

and businesses on available health plans.
Most Americans easily access the health insurance system through the place of work; but for those who do not get health

insurance through their places of work, the task of securing affordable coverage can be formidable. The 41.2 million

uninsured Americans are a dynamic population, uninsured largely because of a change in employment. According to a special

report on the uninsured produced by researchers at the University of Michigan, "Half of the uninsured go without coverage for

six months or less, while more than 40 percent are uninsured for at least 18 months."17
While expanding Internet access has helped make better information available to consumers, states could do more to make that

information more readily available for those without Internet access or those who just do not know where to secure health

care coverage. According to a 1999 study by the California Health Care Foundation, 53 percent of the "non-poor" uninsured

said that they would be more likely to buy insurance coverage once they knew the true cost of available plans.18
Breaking down barriers to awareness becomes increasingly important if Congress or the state legislatures start providing

individual tax relief or creating a system of premium supports for individuals and families to purchase health insurance. If

Congress or state legislators enact a health care tax credit, the mere existence of that assistance is of little help if the

persons who would benefit most from it are unaware of the health plans available to them. State officials could establish

information centers or clearinghouses for individuals and families seeking health insurance and make comparative information

available at state offices, including the revenue department and the motor vehicle administration.
There is precedent for the provision of consumer information in a consumer-driven health care system at the federal level.

The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the personnel offices of all federal agencies provide comparative plan

information for federal employees and retirees enrolled in the consumer-driven FEHBP. These enrollees can choose from many

private health plans and receive useful comparative information on the available health plans, including premium costs, co-

payments, the levels of benefits, and solid comparative information on health plan performance.

STEP 3: Make sure that health plans available to the uninsured are affordable.
A key advantage of group health insurance is that group coverage makes premiums affordable, but individual health care

policies can also be affordable for millions of Americans without coverage. A national on-line source of health insurance

policies, eHealthInsurance.com, has reported that the average premium for an individual policy purchased through their

Internet service was less than $1,500, with a typical deductible of $500 or less.19
Studies conducted by the National Health Underwriters and the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) report similar

findings. HIAA, for example, found that of its members who sell individual policies, the average premium was $2,070 for

single coverage and $4,000 for family coverage.20
Policy costs vary from state to state, reflecting differing economic conditions, demographics, and patterns of medical

practice. However, health plan costs also reflect the cost of state rules and regulations governing individual policies.
For example, states impose benefit mandates on individuals and families that purchase health insurance, regardless of whether

they want or need such benefits. In a recent analysis of the factors driving health care costs, PricewaterhouseCoopers

estimated that, nationwide, government mandates and regulations contributed 15 percent of the total increase in health care

premiums for 2001-2002.21 In 2001, Maryland led the nation with 54 such mandated benefits, including legislative requirements

to cover politically favored medical specialties, treatments, and procedures.
For various political reasons, state officials might hesitate to reduce or eliminate all such benefit mandates, but they

could at least reduce or eliminate such mandates for those who are uninsured or have endured a spell of uninsurance for a

specified period of time. Such a policy could make health plans more affordable for those young families who desperately need

coverage.22 A young family with two children needs a health plan that gives them access to physicians and hospitalization

services; they should not be forced to buy a health plan that incorporates dozens of benefits they do not want or need, some

of which--like alcohol and substance abuse treatments or coverage for in vitro fertilization--are very expensive.
Mandated benefits are often popular with provider groups and medical specialty societies, which battle ferociously to make

sure that state legislators include their treatments or procedures in all state-regulated health plans. Research shows that

health mandates increase health costs, pricing many individuals and families out of the private market. According to a 1999

HIAA study, as many as one in four of the uninsured are without coverage because of state health benefit mandates.23
Some states have begun to change their benefit mandate policies. North Carolina, for example, has imposed a moratorium on any

new benefit mandates.24 Hawaii, Texas, Louisiana, and Vermont require a cost assessment before imposing new benefit mandates

.25 Some states have considered "mandate-lite" plans, and others are taking similar steps.26
State officials should also order an independent econometric review of state health insurance regulations, including a cost-

benefit assessment and an assessment of their impact on the affordability and accessibility of private health plans. This

type of analysis should be performed by a top-ranked, private econometrics firm, not by a state agency or any other political

institution that has a vested interest in maintaining the regulatory status quo.
In many states, the health insurance market is heavily regulated, and this raises the cost of insurance and prices many

lower- and middle-income families out of coverage. In a state-by-state price comparison of insurance policies, analysts for

eHealthInsurance.com found significant price differences between states that have differing levels of insurance regulation.

Two of the most significant insurance rules include community rating, in which all enrollees pay the same premium regardless

of risk or health status, and guaranteed issue, in which insurers are required to offer policies to all, regardless of risk

or health status. For example, in Texas, a state with no community rating or guaranteed issue, the average single monthly

premium was $181, while in New York, a state with both community rating and guaranteed issue, the average monthly premium was

nearly $300.27
State legislators may strongly believe that there are very good policy reasons to impose such rules as community rating and

guaranteed issue of insurance; but there are trade-offs, and these trade-offs should be made visible. State officials should

realize that while community rating and guaranteed issue are often enacted to assure increased access of individuals and

families to health insurance, they often accomplish exactly the opposite result.

STEP 4: Conduct a study of the true cost of the uninsured and use that study to justify state credits or premium subsidies

for the uninsured.
As noted, a recent analysis by Urban Institute scholars indicates that Americans pay an estimated $34.5 billion in

uncompensated care for the uninsured.28 State officials should likewise get a clear idea of what they are already paying for

the uninsured.
The Texas Comptroller's Office, for example, found in a major study that the total cost of health care spending in 1998 for

uninsured Texans was $4.7 billion, including the costs to local governments, doctors, hospitals, and state agencies. In

effect, Texas citizens paid about $1,000 for health care for each uninsured Texan.29
State officials can use this kind of analysis if they wish to expand coverage further and piggyback on any federal health

care tax credits or premium subsidies. Additional state assistance, especially targeted at low-income or harder-to-insure

individuals and families, would bring the cost of coverage within closer reach of these low-income working families. As

noted, the Bush Administration encourages such assistance. State officials should follow through, especially if they believe

that the President's proposed federal health care tax credit would not be generous enough for certain populations.
Moreover, for the unemployed, state-based assistance could be administered quickly and easily through state unemployment

compensation offices. A person who is eligible for unemployment compensation could automatically be eligible for the credit

or the subsidy and for private health insurance. This process of "one-stop shopping" for displaced workers and their families

could be done with both a federal and a state credit or premium subsidy approach.

STEP 5: Secure HHS waivers to use existing federal funds to expand private health care coverage.
Officials at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services have created the Health Insurance Flexibility and

Accountability demonstration initiative, along with an expedited approval process, "to encourage new comprehensive state

approaches that will increase the number of individuals with health insurance coverage within current-level Medicaid and

SCHIP [State Children's Health Insurance Program] resources."30
HHS officials emphasize the value of "approaches that maximize private health insurance coverage options" and target

populations below 200 percent of the federal poverty level.31 Nationally, a substantial majority of uninsured Americans are

below 200 percent of the poverty line. State officials can take advantage of this new demonstration authority and use it to

secure innovative private-sector coverage options for low-income, uninsured populations.
Under HIFA, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson has approved several waivers. New Mexico and Oregon, for example, take advantage of

Medicaid and SCHIP funds and combine them with private-sector health plans to expand coverage to the uninsured. In New

Mexico, state officials can use unexpended SCHIP funds to subsidize private health insurance for 40,000 low-income residents.

Under the New Mexico waiver, employers can also contribute to private health plans. With a combination of government

subsidies from existing government programs and employer contributions, HHS estimates that these low-income employees will be

paying about $25 to $35 per month in insurance premiums.32
Based on its waiver, Oregon officials will expand the state's premium support program, the Family Health Insurance Assistance

Program, to cover as many as 25,000 beneficiaries. Under the Oregon waiver, Oregon residents earning up to 185 percent of the

federal poverty level would be eligible to receive "for the first time" federal premium assistance for employer-sponsored

coverage or individual health insurance.33
Finally, the President's budget proposal would provide states with increased flexibility under Medicaid and SCHIP. Under this

proposal, states would be able to implement program changes and improvements without having to go through the waiver process

.34

STEP 6: Improve care for Medicaid enrollees by creating a Medicaid preventive care account.
The best Medicaid policy gets low-income persons and their families out of the traditional Medicaid program and mainstreams

them into the private health insurance market.35 Meanwhile, states can adopt initiatives that give Medicaid patients more

control over their health care spending and decisions while ensuring that they get the care they need when they need it.
State Medicaid programs often have a rich benefits package. While Medicaid coverage looks good on paper, however, the program

has a well-deserved reputation for perverse economic incentives, disruptions in the continuity of care, and poor-quality

care. If Medicaid beneficiaries experience a change in income or assets, their eligibility will change, regardless of health

status, possibly resulting in a loss of coverage. As a Baltimore Sun report on the plight of Medicaid patients in Maryland

summarizes the problem, "They are poor, but not poor enough. They have medical bills that are high, but often not high

enough. They are insured some months, but uninsured others."36 Getting clarity with respect to Medicaid eligibility can be a

problem for doctors, patients, and state officials.
Faced with exploding Medicaid spending, states are cutting back on benefits, thereby causing a further deterioration in the

quality of care.37 As a recent Kaiser Commission survey of Medicaid directors shows, states are planning cost-cutting

measures such as limiting access to prescription drugs and reducing or freezing payments to doctors, hospitals, and other

medical professionals.38
Most doctors treat Medicaid patients, but they also find that Medicaid reimbursement levels are too low and loathe wrestling

with Medicaid paperwork and regulations. In 2001, roughly 20 percent of physicians were not accepting new Medicaid patients,

and the overall proportion of physicians serving Medicaid patients declined slightly.39 The danger, of course, is that

Medicaid patients will start to experience difficulty in getting access to doctors and, like the uninsured, will end up

either in hospital emergency rooms for routine medical services or, worse, being treated for deteriorating medical conditions

that could and should have been treated more effectively if treated much earlier in a doctor's office.
A partial solution to this problem would be to create a Medicaid preventive care account for each Medicaid recipient with a

specified amount accessed using a PIN number and a debit card. Payments for routine medical services--doctors' visits,

regular checkups, and preventive care--could be paid directly out of the Medicaid account. For Medicaid enrollees, states

could roll the unused funds over each year in an interest-bearing account. When enrollees leave welfare or get a job in the

private sector, the unused funds could be used to pay for private health insurance or transferred into a medical savings

account or health reimbursement account.
The creation of such a Medicaid account is thus compatible with welfare reform, helping low-income persons make the

transition not only into productive jobs, but also into the private insurance market. Such an account would combine the best

features of the private-sector-style health reimbursement arrangement with the public-sector-style administration of the food

stamp program.
HHS has already established a precedent for this approach with its "Independence Plus" initiative. This initiative both

improves the existing "cash and counseling" program and provides states with an expedited process to offer families with

disabled individuals the opportunity to have greater control of "the design and delivery of their own health care services."

40 State officials should examine the success of such programs in New Jersey, Arkansas, and Florida, where Medicaid

recipients decide how best to spend their allocated health care dollars instead of having government officials decide for

them.

STEP 7: Establish a statewide voluntary purchasing cooperative for the uninsured.41
To give residents more coverage options, states should consider designing voluntary purchasing cooperatives that would

function much like the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, which covers Members of Congress, federal workers and

retirees, and their families--roughly 9 million Americans.42 Nationally, hundreds of private health plans compete directly

for consumers' dollars. Unlike other government health care programs, the FEHBP functions with comparatively little

bureaucracy and regulation. It also enjoys a solid historical record of cost control, competitive benefits, programmatic

stability, and a high degree of patient satisfaction.43
Because of its historical record of solid performance, the FEHBP is a leading model for Medicare and health care reform.44 In

2001, the Maine legislature voted overwhelmingly, on a bipartisan basis, to create a voluntary purchasing pool called "an

insurance exchange," and Maine officials are in the first stages of implementing it.45 This policy initiative has precedents

in other states.46
To give individuals and families greater access to affordable coverage, a voluntary purchasing cooperative could incorporate

several features:
The state employees' health benefit program. All uninsured employees in the state could have access to existing health plans

in the state employees' system, which is usually a system of multiple health plans, plus any additional health plans that

meet basic benefit and fiscal solvency requirements.47 These plans, as well as the plans that serve state employees, could be

made available to every uninsured person in the state.
Initially, it might be prudent to separate the state employee pool from the private, non-state-employee pool and allow the

competing private plans to risk and rate these populations separately. Since most of the uninsured are young and healthy, it

is likely that state employee organizations will soon realize that the combination of the pools would directly benefit state

employees with lower premiums. In the meantime, it would be politically attractive for the governor and the state legislators

to open up their own health insurance system to the states' uninsured citizens.
Automatic sign-up for uninsured workers at their place of employment. More than four out of five uninsured workers are in

full-time working families. Lynn Etheredge, a prominent health care policy analyst at George Washington University, argues

vigorously that the most efficient way to target workers is therefore through their place of work.48 While employers would

not pay for health insurance, there is no reason why they could not serve as the place for employees and their families to

sign up for available health plans. Of course, employers could also contribute, if they wished, to their employees' premium

and reap the same tax breaks as corporate employers do in the conventional payment of health insurance premiums.
Automatic payroll deduction for premium collection at the place of work. Employers are legally required to use the payroll

deduction system for Social Security, Medicare, federal income tax, state taxes, and unemployment compensation. While

employers do not sponsor the tax code, they do enforce it. With a state voluntary purchasing cooperative, employers could

deduct the premium, over and above any tax credit assistance or state assistance (through SCHIP or Medicaid waivers) that

would be available, and send it to the plan of the employee's choice. National Federation of Independent Business surveys

show strong interest on the part of small employers in helping to administer a system of individual tax relief for insurance

for their employees.49
In order to stimulate maximum take-up, Etheredge and others have suggested that policymakers create a system of automatic

enrollment for employees, with the proviso that they can refuse in writing both the available health insurance and any state

tax relief or premium assistance.50 An employee's rejection of health insurance coverage and any refusal to accept help to

pay for health insurance would require the employee to make a conscious trade-off, making the direct costs transparent to the

employee and the employee's family.
A light regulatory regime. A system based on the principles of consumer choice and market competition cannot work without a

system of light and intelligent regulation. This means that the state agency administering such a system should act as a

referee--and not play favorites--in the competition among different types of health plans: traditional indemnity insurance,

managed care, preferred provider plans, high deductible plans, health reimbursement accounts, and medical savings accounts.

An efficient market requires free entry and exit of suppliers and the freedom of consumers to make the decisions in

accordance with their personal wants and needs.
A statewide reinsurance pool to cope with adverse selection. In the adoption of a voluntary choice cooperative for the

uninsured, or any similar consumer choice system that allows individuals and families to pick the kinds of plans and benefits

they want, state policymakers should establish a mechanism to cope with risk segmentation or adverse selection--a process

whereby higher-risk or higher-cost individuals congregate in one or more plans, contributing to spiraling costs and

encouraging younger, healthier, and lower-income enrollees to leave the higher-cost plan(s) or drop out of health care

coverage altogether.
There are many ways to cope with the possible issues of adverse selection. One might be for state officials to charter a

nonprofit, self-governing corporation that would be administered and financed by the health insurers themselves and that

would create a pool to finance high-cost individuals without disrupting the individual's continuity in coverage. In creating

such a system, state officials could require that all plans selling state-regulated health insurance, including plans writing

policies for state employees or Medicaid, participate and contribute to the pool. While every health plan that ceded a risk

to the pool would pay a premium to the pool for each risk ceded, there would be no taxpayer subsidies to the pool.
Such a mechanism could protect both carriers and enrollees from the effects of adverse selection. Plans would be encouraged

to cover the broadest possible pool of individuals and families and also would be able to recover a portion of the costs

incurred as a result of the enrollment of high-risk individuals.

STEP 8: Enact meaningful medical malpractice reform legislation.
The Bush Administration has put the medical malpractice problem front and center in the national policy agenda. This alone is

sparking a major debate. But the medical malpractice issue is essentially a matter of state tort law.
There is a medical malpractice crisis in several states. Median jury awards have increased dramatically. Malpractice premiums

are soaring, "defensive" medical procedures are common, and patient access to care is being compromised.
State legislators can take remedial action. While a sound malpractice reform measure would provide for unlimited economic

damages, state legislators can reduce the growing pressures on physicians through several amendments to state tort law. Such

changes could include an up-front disclosure of attorneys' fees; limiting non-economic damages (such as pain and suffering)

to $250,000; limiting punitive damages to $250,000 or twice the amount of economic damages (such as medical expenses or the

cost of domestic services); and limiting attorneys' fees to ensure that a maximum amount of recovery for damages would go to

patients. Moreover, if state legislators are unable to secure comprehensive medical malpractice reform, at the very least

they could provide legal relief for doctors who accept Medicaid patients and give doctors immunity from malpractice suits

when they provide charity care to the poor.
Several states have made significant progress in reforming medical malpractice laws: Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine,

Michigan, and Utah. A sound model for medical malpractice reform would be the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975,

enacted by the California legislature.

STEP 9: Take advantage of the new federal health care tax credits to cover workers displaced by international trade.
In the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002, Congress enacted a provision to give a 65 percent health care tax

credit to the roughly 260,000 workers nationwide who have lost employment and their health care coverage in part because of

expanded international trade.51 The purpose of this first-of-its-kind health care tax credit is to help these workers secure

health care coverage.
While the legislation contains artificial and complicated restrictions on personal choice, it does offer states broad

authority to determine new purchasing options available to these workers.52 Indeed, state officials can build such an

infrastructure with a view to facilitating the coverage of other classes of uninsured Americans, particularly if Congress

enacts significant health care tax credit legislation. As noted, the trade legislation also provides states with additional

federal assistance to help them administer newly created purchasing options.

STEP 10: Take advantage of the new health reimbursement arrangements for state and municipal employees.
In June 2002, the U.S. Department of the Treasury ruled that America's employers could set aside funds for their employees

under a new health reimbursement arrangement (HRA), a special tax-free account for the payment of health bills. Employers

could roll over unused funds in the employee's account from year to year and allow employees to use accumulated funds for

their health care needs in retirement.
For 2003, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal agency that runs the FEHBP, allowed the American Postal

Workers Union (APWU) health plan to offer an HRA to federal employees and retirees. Under the APWU plan, federal employees

can get an up-front credit of $1,000 per person or $2,000 per family in their account to pay for traditional medical expenses

as well as dental, vision, and other expenses that may not be covered by insurance. The funds are available before enrollees

pay deductibles, or out-of-pocket costs, and traditional insurance covers their health costs.53
State officials may also consider employing the new health accounts as a means of promoting innovative employee wellness

programs. For example, the LSU Health Care Network, which covers Louisiana State University health care employees, has

recently initiated such a plan, and its preventive care program ranges from routine checkups and tests to prostate exams,

mammograms, and children's vaccinations. As noted, the initial comparative data showed an increase in physician visits but an

overall reduction in costs.54 State officials should allow state employee to choose similar arrangements. Likewise, municipal

employees should also be able to take advantage of the new HRAs.

STEP 11: Engage faith-based organizations in preventive care and wellness programs.
State and local officials manage or oversee public health clinics and health centers. These organizations help low-income and

uninsured families secure health care services.55
An enormous resource exists among faith-based and religious organizations. These organizations can play a vigorous role in

promoting and sponsoring wellness and preventive care programs. State officials should make every effort to tap the power of

faith-based and religious organizations in their health care outreach into various communities, particularly inner-city and

ethnic communities.56 They should also find ways of integrating these faith-based wellness initiatives into their public

assistance programs.
Where conventional government efforts may not inspire trust or confidence, religious and faith-based organizations can often

succeed. That success could result in many more poor Americans getting the checkups and routine preventive care they need.
CONCLUSION
Innovative and imaginative governors and state legislators can make significant headway in reducing the number of America's

uninsured, improving access to quality health care, and expanding choice and competition in the state health insurance

markets.
They can achieve this by taking several key steps, including:
Cooperating with the President and the Administration in expanding health coverage,
Promoting solid information on available health plan options,
Reducing barriers to coverage by reviewing the costs of mandates and eliminating excessive regulation,
Accepting new HHS flexibility to expand private insurance coverage for individuals and families,
Taking an inventory of the costs of the uninsured in their states and offsetting those costs with state health care tax

credits or premium subsidies,
Creating preventive care accounts for Medicaid beneficiaries,
Cooperating with the Administration in securing coverage for displaced workers under the Trade Adjustment Reform Act of 2002,
Enacting serious medical malpractice reform, and
Engaging faith-based and religious organizations in public health efforts to secure preventive care services among poor and

low-income people.
The problems of the uninsured are problems for both federal and state officials. While the central weakness of the health

insurance market is the inefficient, inequitable, and restrictive federal tax treatment of health insurance, state officials

can nonetheless take direct action without waiting for Congress to enact major changes in the federal tax code.
States can work energetically with the Administration and also implement innovative solutions on their own. Millions of

Americans desperately need that federal-state cooperation.

Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., is Director of, and Nina Owcharenko is Health Care Policy Analyst in, the Center for Health Policy

Studies at The Heritage Foundation.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. For a description of the range of possibilities under the new HIFA waivers, see Nina Owcharenko, "How States Can Expand

Private Coverage with HIFA Waivers," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 846, December 16, 2002.
2. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, pp. 125-127. Cited

hereafter as Budget for Fiscal Year 2004.
3. Letter to Robert E. Moffit from Gerald Chandler, Chairman, Proweh Health Systems, Inc., December 18, 2002. Proweh Health

Systems compiled comparative data on utilization and costs for the first six months of 2002 and 2001.
4. For a description of the Florida consumer-directed Medicaid option, see James Frogue, "The Future of Medicaid: Consumer

Directed Care," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1618, January 10, 2003.
6. Robert L. Pollock, "Americans Need a Market for Medical Progress," The Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2003.
7. Alain C. Enthoven, "Where Are Health Care's Hondas?" The Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2002. As Enthoven points out,

employers often give employees a choice of "a plan," an HMO or a PPO, but the different plans are offered by the same carrier

and have the same doctors. Thus, there is no real free-market competition among delivery systems under current arrangements.
8. Jack Hadley and John Holohan, "How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who Pays for It?" Health Affairs, Web

Exclusive, February 12, 2003, p. 3, at www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Hadley_Web_Excl_021203.htm.
9. U.S. Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue Proposals, February

2003, pp. 45-48. Cited hereafter as General Explanations.
10. See Janet M. Corrigan, Ann Greiner, and Shari M. Erickson, eds., Fostering Rapid Advances in Health Care: Learning from

System Demonstrations (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, 2002).
11. For this "Creative Federalism" approach to health coverage and experimentation, the authors are indebted to Stuart M.

Butler, Vice President for Domestic and Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
12. For an excellent overview of the direction of the Bush Administration's health care policy, see the Hon. Mark McClellan,

M.D., "The Health Care Crisis: The President's Plan for High Quality, Affordable Care," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 768,

April 17, 2002.
13. General Explanations, pp. 45-55.
14. Ibid., p. 47.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. "A Revolving Door: How Individuals Move In and Out of Health Insurance Coverage," University of Michigan, Economic

Research Initiative on the Uninsured, University of Michigan, ERIU Research Highlight No. 1, October 2002, p. 1.
18. Cited by Vip Patel, "Raising Awareness of Consumers' Options in the Individual Insurance Market," Health Affairs, Web

Exclusive, October 23, 2002, p. 2, at www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Patel_Perspective_Web_Excl_102302.htm.
19. Cited in Mark McClellan and Katherine Becker, "Reducing Uninsurance Through the Non-Group Market: Health Insurance

Credits and Purchasing Groups," Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, October 23, 2002, p. 2, at www.healthaffairs.org/

webExclusives/McClellan_Perspective_
Web_Excl_102302.htm.
20. Health Insurance Association of America, "Individual Health Insurance: Access and Affordability," HIAA Brief Analysis,

October 2002, p. 1.
21. PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Factors Fueling Rising Health Care Costs, report prepared for the American Association of

Health Plans, April 2002, p. 3.
22. See, in this connection, Robert E. Moffit, "Maryland Health Care Mandate Policy," testimony before the House Economic

Affairs Committee, Maryland General Assembly, March 7, 2002, at www.heritage.org/library/keyissues/healthcare/.
23. Jensen and Morrisey, "Mandated Benefit Laws and Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance."
24. Paul Guppy, "How Mandates Increase Costs and Reduce Access to Health Care Coverage," Washington Policy Center, Policy

Brief, June 2002, at www.wips.org/HealthCare/PBGuppyHealthCareMandates.html.
25. Ibid.
26. Cheryl Jackson, "States Look at Costs of Insurance Mandates," American Medical Association, AMNews, November 11, 2002, at

www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_02/bisc1111.htm; "Major 2001 State Health Care Laws," BlueCross BlueShield Association,

BlueCross BlueShield Health Issues, at bcbshealthissues.com/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=20063.
27. Fact sheet, "The Cost and Benefit of Individual Health Insurance Plans," eHealthInsurance.com, September 30, 2002, p. 3,

at www.ehealthinsurance.com/ehealthinsurance/expertcenter/ExpertCenter.html.
28. Hadley and Holahan, "How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who Pays for It?"
29. See Texas Comptroller's Office, Texas Estimated Health Care Spending on The Uninsured, at www.window.state.tx.us/

uninsure/.
30. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability Demonstration Initiative,"

at www.cms.hhs.gov/hifa/default.asp.
31. Ibid.
32. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, "Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) Initiative Fact

Sheet: New Mexico," at www.cms.gov/hifa/nmfs.pdf.
33. Press release, "Oregon Receives Okay to Expand Oregon Health Plan at No Additional Cost to State," State of Oregon,

October 15, 2002, at www.governor.state.or.us/governor/press/p021015a.htm.
34. Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, pp. 125-127.
35. For an excellent discussion of broader Medicaid reform, see Michael T. Bond, John C. Goodman, Ronald Lindsey, and Richard

Teske, "Reforming Medicaid", National Center for Policy Analysis and Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions, NCPA

Policy Report No. 257, February 2003, at www.ncpa.org/pub/st/st257; see also Richard Teske, "Abolishing the Medicaid Ghetto:

Putting Patients First," American Legislative Exchange Council, The State Factor, April 2002.
36. See M. William Salganik, "Medicaid Revolving Door Frustrates Many in Maryland," The Baltimore Sun, September 1, 2002.
37. For a brief description of Medicaid spending pressures in the states, see "Medicaid Is Fastest Growing Item in State

Budgets," National Center for Policy Analysis Daily Policy Digest, January 14, 2002, at www.ncpa.org/iss/hea/2002/pd011402b.

html; see also Robert Pear and Robin Toner, "Grim Choices Face States in Making Cuts in Medicaid," The New York Times,

January 14, 2002.
38. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, "State Budgets Under Stress: How Are States Planning to Reduce the

Growth in Medicaid Costs?" July 30, 2002, at www.kff.org/content/2002/20020730/statbudupdate73002.pdf. For an excellent

overview of how state officials are restricting Medicaid prescription drugs, see Linda Gorman, "Treatment Denied: State

Formularies and Cost Controls Restrict Access to Prescription Drugs", Washington Policy Center, Policy Brief, February 2003,

at www.washingtonpolicy.org/HealthCare/PBGormanTreatmentDenied.html.
39. Peter J. Cunningham, "Mounting Pressures: Physicians Serving Medicaid Patients and the Uninsured, 1997-2001," Center for

Studying Health System Change, Tracking Report No. 6, December 2002, at www.hschange.com?CONTENT/505/?topic+topic01.
40. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, "Why Has CMS Developed the Independence Plus Programs?" Independence Plus:

Frequently Asked Questions, at cms.hhs.gov/independenceplus/.
41. The authors are indebted to Daniel S. Johnson, M.D., The Heritage Foundation's Visiting Fellow in Health Policy and

former President of the American Medical Association, for this concept of a state-based voluntary choice cooperative.
42. For a discussion of the FEHBP as a model for a purchasing cooperative for the uninsured, see Stan Dorn and Jack Meyer, "

Nine Billion Dollars a Year to Cover the Uninsured: Possible Common Ground for Significant Incremental Progress," Economic

and Social Research Institute, Current Policy Series No. 4, October 2002, pp. 5-10.
43. See Robert E. Moffit, "Promoting Choice and Controlling Cost: What Congress Can Learn--Again--From Its Own Health

Insurance Program," Heritage Foundation Web Memo No. 146, September 20, 2002, at www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm146.

cfm.
44. In 1999, the majority of the members of the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare, chaired by Senator

John Breaux (D-LA) and Representative Bill Thomas (R-CA), proposed to reform Medicare along the lines of the FEHBP. During

the 2000 presidential primary season, Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) proposed a reform of the Medicaid program along the lines

of the FEHBP.
45. Maine Consumer Choice Health Plan, Chapter 708, 120th Maine Legislature, 2nd Sess., at janus.state.me.us/legis/ros/lom
/LOM120th/6Pub701-713/Pub701-713-07.htm.
46. The Democratic leadership in the Maryland legislature also considered such a dramatic approach in 1992, when the

Honorable Casper Taylor, Chairman of the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee and later Speaker of the Maryland House,

unveiled a comprehensive and innovative reform of the Maryland health care system, based on a state-wide system of health

care tax credits and consumer choice and competition. For a description of the original Taylor bill, see Robert E. Moffit, "

Why the Maryland Consumer Choice Health Plan Could Be a Model for Health Care Reform," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.

902, June 17, 1992.
47. The addition of state employees to a new purchasing cooperative would help make the pool more attractive to carriers and

more effective as a vehicle for consumer choice and competition. According to Elliot Wicks, senior fellow at the Washington-

based Economic and Social Research Institute, a key lesson from the experience of purchasing cooperatives is the need to

achieve "critical mass." See Elliot K. Wicks, "Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives," Commonwealth Fund Issue Brief,

November 2002, p. 5.
48. Lynn Etheredge, "How to Administer Health Insurance Tax Credits for Working Families," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder

No. 1516, January 31, 2002.
49. See Robert E. Moffit, "Why Adopting the Common Ground Health Care Proposal Would Be a Costly Mistake," Heritage

Foundation Backgrounder No. 1445, June 1, 2001.
50. Etheredge, "How to Administer Health Insurance Tax Credits for Working Families."
51. See Public Law 107-210 at thomas.loc.gov.
52. For a discussion of state options, see Nina Owcharenko and Edmund Haislmaier, "State Opportunities to Provide Affordable

Health Coverage Under the Trade Law," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1626, February 27, 2003.
53. "Anatomy of a Premium Increase," remarks by the Hon. Kay Coles James, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management,

before the American Association of Health Plans National Policy Forum, February 25, 2003, pp. 29-31. Under the APWU plan,

once the funds in the account are exhausted, there is a $600 deductible for individual coverage and a $1,200 deductible for

family coverage before traditional insurance covers costs. Under the terms of the APWU plan, enrollees can roll over up to $

500 per year in their accounts, up to a maximum of $4,000. According to Director James, the initial data indicate that the

average age of the enrollee taking advantage of the new plan is 49.
54. Letter to Robert E. Moffit from Gerald Chandler, December 18, 2002.
55. According to HHS, 12 million Americans are served by the existing network of health centers at over 3,500 locally managed

sites across the nation. See Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 2004 Budget Proposal for the

Department of Health and Human Services, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/hhs.html.
56. On developments in the District of Columbia, for example, see Steven Gray, "In Northeast, Moved by a Fitness Revelation,"

The Washington Post, July 9, 2002, p. F1; see also Barbara Martinez, "How a City Aims to Give Minorities Better Health Care,"

The Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2002, p. 1.

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On the Art of Cinema
by Kim Jong-Il, Kim Jong Il
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0898756138/qid=1081762109/sr=8-2/ref=pd_ka_2/103-0799466-2183848?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

Another U.N. Scandal
At Turtle Bay, North Korean dissidents find only indifference.
BY CLAUDIA ROSETT
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
UNITED NATIONS--The U.N. Secretariat has been pouring noticeable energy lately into expressions of outrage over allegations that there was something rotten with its Oil-for-Food relief program in Iraq. In politics that is no doubt to be expected; it is probably too much to wish that the U.N. would simply seize the opportunity of this multibillion-dollar scandal to shed its entrenched habits of privilege and secrecy, and restructure itself as the model of decency it was meant to be. But amid the current fracas over Oil-for-Food, there are other points to be made, and one of them has to do with a very small demonstration held in front of the U.N. late last month.
The demonstration had nothing to do with Iraq or Oil-for-Food. It involved some three dozen protesters who were asking the U.N. to honor its commitment to help refugees from North Korea. They held posters showing photos of starving children in North Korea, and pictures of tyrant Kim Jong Il alongside slogans such as, "Stop subsidizing this regime." One man wore a sandwich board with big lettering that said: "China! Comply With the U.N. Resolution for North Korean Refugees"--a demand that Bejing honor its obligations as a signatory to the U.N.'s Convention on Refugees, instead of sending asylum-seekers back to what can often be hideous punishment or death in North Korea.
They were protesting the most horrific surviving totalitarian regime on the planet. They were making entirely reasonable demands. They knew what they were talking about. Among their number were several defectors from North Korea, who had come to New York after testifying before Congress about horrible abuses of human rights in North Korea, alleging biological and chemical weapons experiments on prisoners in the slave-labor camps of Kim's regime. One of these defectors, Dong Chul Choi, who escaped along with his mother in the mid-1990s and has since become one of an incredibly small handful to receive asylum in the U.S., was wielding a megaphone, calling in both English and Korean a few words that deserve to echo around the world: "Free North Korea."
There were perhaps half a dozen spectators. Apart from that, what registered in the surroundings on that lovely spring day was complete indifference. Tulips bloomed in a nearby flower bed. Traffic went by on First Avenue. Across the street, the long row of flags fluttered in front of the U.N. From within the landmark headquarters, as far as I could see, no one emerged to take a look.
One might argue, of course, that the U.N. office of the High Commissioner for Refugees is not in New York, but in Geneva, so that's where folks worried about refugee rights should go. One might also argue that the U.N., as currently configured, places the highest premium on deference to sovereign states, regardless of what abominations a prevailing regime might commit within its own borders--so Kim's regime must have its seat within the fancy building, while those who would like to end his regime must wait on the sidewalk outside. One might further add that a much larger group of demonstrators for freedom for North Koreans, and rights for North Korean refugees, had already had their say in Washington, at a series of events organized by activist Suzanne Scholte's Defense Forum Foundation, in which the testimony to Congress served as the centerpiece.
And the politics are, of course, complex. China, a veto-wielding member of the Security Council, and a member of the governing body of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, opposes any move to help the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have risked their lives to flee North Korea. As one humanitarian aid worker, Tim Peters, testified to Congress last month, "China continues to flout international law and world opinion by continuing to imprison the selfless and sacrificial souls who reach out with a helping hand to the vulnerable North Koreans who wander, vulnerable, in China." Mr. Peters went on to list five of these private aid workers now in Chinese prisons.
The points have been duly made. The procedures relating to such matters as North Korean refugee rights may not have been complied with, but they have at least been noted on paper. The U.N. can point to the resolution in which its own Human Rights Commission in Geneva actually worked around to condemning Pyongyang, for the second year running (after a decade in which state-inflicted famine in North Korea has killed an estimated two million or so). Surely such measures are enough? Why should anyone at the U.N.'s New York offices bother about this small group of demonstrators, however enormous their concerns? They have no official voice, no serious lobbying presence, nothing in fact that seems to carry true weight within the mighty debates of the U.N.
And maybe that's where the Oil-for-Food scandal comes into it. In watching the strenuous efforts at the U.N. to protect above all the U.N.'s own reputation; in seeing the circling of wagons, and appearances on television; in observing the efforts to ensure that none of the contractors involved in the Oil-for-Food saga speak a word out of school or spill a secret that might endanger the U.N.'s reputation--I have to wish that anything close to this kind of energy were going into support for that small band of protesters with their huge message: "Free North Korea."
The litmus test of the U.N.'s worth and integrity should not be how well it manages to protect its own image, regardless of the deeds within, or how well it navigates the nuances of the ruthless and repressive politics still practiced by dozens of its 191 member states. Kofi Annan was at pains in his recent "Meet the Press" interview to stress that he sees the U.N. as a "unique organization," one "that can bring the whole world together." To bring the whole world together, given how the world really works, requires in too many cases the sacrifice of precisely the integrity, freedom and decency that the U.N. was meant to serve.
In dealing with the current Oil-for-Food scandal, the best defense for the U.N., and particularly for Mr. Annan's Secretariat, would be to stop circling the wagons and fretting about image, and instead to seize the opportunity to reform its cloistered ways, and get with the program of a democratizing world--with all the transparency and accountability and genuine respect for the principles of liberty that this entails. The U.N. was put there to listen to people like those demonstrators who last month stood unheeded on the sidewalk, not to broadcast to the world a long series of messages about its own precious image and importance.

Ms. Rosett is a fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Hudson Institute. Her column appears here and in The Wall Street Journal Europe on alternate Wednesdays.

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Kofi's Coverup
Another U.N. letter saying shut up, or else.

Tuesday, May 11, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
So now there's a third "hush" letter from the United Nations demanding that an Oil for Food Program contractor cease cooperation with Congressional investigators. Dated April 27, the note--like earlier ones to inspection companies Saybolt and Cotecna--is signed by another U.N. official "for Benon V. Sevan," the outgoing Iraq Program chief. In this case the recipient was an individual consultant whose name was blacked out by our Capitol Hill source.
The letter informs the consultant of a contract clause stating: "contractors may not communicate at any time to any other person, Government or authority external to the United Nations any information known to them by reason of their association with the United Nations which has not been made public, except in the course of their duties or by authorization of the Secretary-General or his designate."
The purpose of the first of these letters to surface, U.N. spokesman Fred Eckhard argued last week, was to facilitate evidence gathering by the U.N.-backed inquiry headed by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. This excuse didn't make a whole lot of sense. It's not as if the Oil for Food-related documents in question could be shared with either Congress or Mr. Volcker but not both. But this latest hush letter adds a new wrinkle, stating twice that the U.N. demands control of "documentation or information" (emphasis added). Translation: Shut up or we'll sue.
We have every confidence Mr. Volcker will lead a thorough investigation, but the public should not be asked to take it on faith that he will be given access to all information and rely on his interpretation alone. As the above-quoted contract makes clear, the Secretary-General has the authority to waive all these confidentiality agreements. The fact that Kofi Annan has chosen instead to pursue a campaign of legal intimidation is a pretty good indication that he intends as much of a whitewash as he can get away with.
All this lends urgency to new accountability legislation that has been introduced in the Senate by John Ensign (R., Nevada) and Lindsey Graham (R., South Carolina), and in the House by Jeff Flake (R., Arizona). Modeled on language that passed Congress during a 1990s battle over U.N. reform, the law would have the United States withhold a modest percentage of its U.N. dues unless the President certifies that the U.N. is cooperating with Oil for Food investigations in the U.S. and other member states.
Speaking of the President, the White House's silence on this issue is becoming more notable by the day. We understand the Administration is trying to enlist the U.N.'s help in Iraq, but that's not a good reason to try to squelch the bad news until later like it did with its cost estimates for the Medicare drug bill. In particular, we hope it's not at White House request that Iraq czar L. Paul Bremer has been threatening to defund the Iraqi Governing Council's investigation of Oil for Food.

If abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers demands an accounting, so too does the world-wide conspiracy of bribery that helped prop up Saddam Hussein's torture-based regime. Now's hardly the time for the White House to be seen demanding anything less than full openness and accountability in any area of its Iraq policy.



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Out of Manila's Control
The Philippines terrorist problem.
By Brett M. Decker
MANILA -- For the past two months leading up to yesterday's national elections in the Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has led an all-out effort to try to sign a peace agreement with the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Although the Bush administration has provided Manila with more than $400 million in U.S. aid to combat local terrorist groups, the al Qaeda-linked MILF continues to operate in the Philippines without government interference. Arroyo successfully lobbied to keep the MILF off the State Department's terrorist-watch list, and thus off military-targeting maps. Bargaining with this group is doomed to fail, as it has in the past.
A telling hold-up to a peace accord is the MILF's refusal to disarm its armies -- which have been estimated as high as 45,000 strong by the U.S. -- and close down its paramilitary facilities, which number at least 40 on the island of Mindanao alone. Most of these camps are the product of the last time Manila tried to cut a peace deal by offering development funds to the MILF. In the early 1990s, aid was given directly to Muslim leaders for public works and infrastructure, which they instead used to construct training grounds, including Camp Abubakar, a 10,000-hectare compound run largely by Arabs that has trained 2,000 terrorists, many of them foreigners. Abubakar's course of study includes lessons in assault weapons, stealth operations, hand-to-hand combat, and bomb-making.
There is no reasonable justification for the Arroyo administration's efforts to negotiate a peace settlement with an enemy that does not desire peace. Most Muslims in the southern Philippines do not want to be part of the larger secular nation. A large majority of his people want an independent Muslim nation based on sharia, according to Congressman Hussin Amin, a former separatist leader who represents the Abu Sayyaf's home of Sulu island.
The MILF effectively runs its own state within the Philippine republic already. Across Mindanao and on some of the smaller islands in the Sulu archipelago, radical Islamists control the roads, rule the people through their own Islamic-based law and maintain their own armies, police, tax structure, and governing councils. The schools, which are separate from the national public-education system, teach Arabic and radical Wahhabi tenets of Islam.
Funded by Saudi and other Middle Eastern charities and drug proceeds from the northwest of the island, this nation within a nation provides a sanctuary for terrorists from all over the world. Even if the MILF leadership signs a peace deal later in the year, a splinter group is guaranteed to form to keep up the fight. The MILF itself split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1982 because the latter recognized the Philippine constitution and the secular government in Manila.
In an interview, Philippine National Security Advisor Norberto Gonzales told me that he had a "credible" intelligence report that Osama bin Laden was hiding in the Philippines. Other intelligence sources discount this, but the mere fact that the Philippine intelligence community considers it is a possibility reveals how little control the local authorities have over large parts of the country. Daily firefights make the southern islands a constant battle zone, and last week President Arroyo cancelled all of her campaign stops in the south because it was too dangerous. This is hardly a stable position from which to negotiate.
The Bush administration has been criticized for being too unilateralist. That is not a problem in Southeast Asia, where cooperation among American officials and local allies has brought impressive results, such as thwarting an attempt to blow up the U.S. embassy in Singapore and the capture in Thailand of Hambali, Osama bin Laden's operations chief. There are major problems in the Philippines, however, including multiple jailbreaks by al Qaeda, a reticence to act on U.S. intelligence, and arms sales to terrorists by military officials. Now Manila is hanging fire when it should be firing at will.
If the vote count confirms that Arroyo was elected to another term on Monday, the United States should pressure her to end negotiations with Philippine groups that harbor and train international terrorists.

-- Brett M. Decker, a Phillips Foundation fellow, is writing a book on al Qaeda in Southeast Asia.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/decker200405110859.asp

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Winning in Iraq
The public puts Abu Ghraib in perspective.
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
When all else fails, look to the good sense of the American people. Even amid a 24/7 news frenzy fed by dreams of Donald Rumsfeld's resignation, the U.S. public isn't even close to buying. In almost inverse proportion to the bizarre perceptions of political reality that obsess those inside the Beltway, recent polls show a 2-to-1 majority of Americans rejecting any move to oust the Secretary of Defense.
To put it another way, even amid one of the worst weeks the Bush Administration has endured in Iraq, the American people have digested the disgusting photographs from Abu Ghraib and put them in proper perspective. They understand that what's really at stake at this moment--underscored by yesterday's news of the beheading of an American civilian captured in Iraq--is the far larger question of American purpose. We read the overwhelming support for Mr. Rumsfeld as evidence that the public wants America not merely to stay in Iraq but to win.
We'll get back to winning in a moment. Most of the Rumsfeld survey results have been relegated to the back pages or their cable equivalent, so it's worth taking a fuller look at what they reveal. According to a Washington Post/ABC News poll, seven in 10 Americans agree the prison abuse story is "a big deal." No attempt at denial here. But by the same number, 69%, they don't want to see Mr. Rumsfeld go (20% desired resignation). A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll yields almost the exact same percentages.
If similar findings released by the National Annenberg Elections Survey are any clue, moreover, this support for a Rumsfeld Defense Department cuts across huge swaths of the American landscape. In this survey, 66% of respondents come down for keeping Rummy on. More telling still, when broken down into subgroups--Republicans, Democrats, African-Americans, Latinos, men, women--not a single category reported a majority favoring Mr. Rumsfeld's ouster. Even among those who describe themselves as "liberals," only a third want him given the boot.
We relay these results not so much to defend Mr. Rumsfeld, who is quite able on that score, but to add what has sorely been missing from the media bonfire the past week: perspective. Yes, Abu Ghraib is abhorrent, but as yesterday's hearing on Major-General Antonio Taguba's report made clear, this does not represent the behavior of most, or even many, U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
The war's domestic opponents are too obviously eager to expand the misdeeds of a few into a general repudiation of the war and all involved in it. For example, we are now reading that Geneva Convention status should be accorded to illegal combatants such as those at Guantanamo. We suspect the U.S. public understands that terrorists such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who wear no uniforms so as to more easily murder innocent civilians, do not deserve the same status accorded legitimate prisoners of war.
We went into Baghdad promising to liberate Iraqis from Saddam Hussein, to ensure that the country would no longer be a safe haven for those who mean America harm, and to hand power over to a free Iraqi people. Right now that is what is being put to the test. The terrorists' bet is that we don't have the stomach to fight a nasty, guerrilla war designed to transform last year's resounding military victory into a humiliating strategic defeat.
As Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong put it eloquently in his speech last week to the Council on Foreign Relations, "The key issue is no longer WMD or even the role of the U.N. The central issue is America's credibility and will to prevail." This was much the same point, made more brutally, by the tape put up on an al Qaeda-linked Web site yesterday showing the beheading of Nick Berg, an American from Philadelphia recently captured in Iraq.
In the face of these challenges and atrocities, Americans don't want to hear about "staying the course." They want to hear our commander-in-chief tell us how we are going to win. Primarily this means making good on our promise to go ahead with the June 30 handover of power to Iraqis and hold elections as soon as possible.
If Iraqis are to have a fighting chance of success, we need in the meantime to ensure that they are not menaced by those seeking to turn Fallujah into a Baathist protectorate or stir up a Shiite rebellion in the South. The news now coming out of Najaf--that our forces seem finally to be taking care of Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia--gives modest reason for hope.
If we end up losing in Iraq it won't be because the American people were too soft or unwilling to stick with the President and his team when the going got tough. The public understands something the pundit and political classes have mostly forgotten: We're still in a war. Our enemies understand that too. And we trust that even the most political part of the White House understands that the bigger challenge it faces is not who wins in November but who wins in Iraq.
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Abu Ghraib & Enemy Combatants
An opportunity to draw good out of evil.
By Andrew C. McCarthy
I was in Israel when the initial storm rained down over the appalling treatment of Iraqi war prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. As shameful as any proud American must feel at the arrant inhumanity and sinister glee the images exude, it was worse to experience the shock while in a foreign country -- especially one warmly disposed toward the U.S. To be caught in the searching eyes of one's friends and struggle for the words to explain that which one cannot himself understand is a tall order.
There are worthy arguments in mitigation. The measure of us as a people lies not only in the unspeakable that was done in our name, but in how it came to light (by the conscience and courage of a member of our armed forces), the promptness of aggressive investigation, the transparency with which we open our faults to the world, and the decisive way the guilty are ultimately rooted out and punished. Yet, while the determination to exact justice for Ghraib in a forceful, public way is all well and good, our concerns are broader than that. Another part of our measure lies in how well we come to terms with that, and what we do to address it.
THE ENEMY & THE AMERICAN WAY
The problem of captured enemy combatants in this new kind of war is immensely serious. Indeed, the whole crossroad of terrorism and law enforcement is complex. For those of us who contend that the criminal-justice system is a poor fit for terrorists, it has never been so thoughtless a matter as "lock them up and throw the key away." It is imperative that we defeat enemies who mean us existential harm; we cannot simply manage militant Islam as if it were a mere nuisance. But even as our cause is just so must our manner of execution be legitimate. The sanctity and dignity of human life is a bedrock premise of civilized society, expressed at the Founding in the Declaration of Independence itself -- as an unalienable right the preservation of which is the very purpose of forming governments. That even captured terrorists and enemies are treated with humanity and due process is no idle concern. It is an obligation. It is an instantiation of what distinguishes us from what we are fighting.
It is worth rehearsing why we are holding enemy combatants in the first place. The argument that terrorists and other opposing militias must be fought as a military enemies rather than criminal elements proceeds on three levels, the first two being straightforward and closely related. First, empirically, the justice system simply does not work. As a practical matter, it is incapable on its own of neutralizing more than a tiny fraction of the hordes that oppose us -- and that at prohibitive expense. Second, a military enemy is emboldened and becomes more brazen over time if it is not met with overwhelming responsive force and convinced that devastation will surely be the price of further attacks. By themselves, judicial proceedings that target a relative handful of committed (and some suicidal) jihadists do not dissuade them; they have the opposite effect.
The third point is most often missed, though equally compelling. The reluctance to treat terrorists as criminals, far from being caused by disdain for the rigorous demands of criminal justice, is instead a reflection of abiding reverence for our system's majesty. I have had the privilege of working with many dedicated prosecutors, agents, judges, and defense lawyers who see it as both a point of honor and an epigrammatic truism that our society best displays its enlightenment by affording even to those who would destroy it all the luminous protections of our Constitution. I was once one of them. Nonetheless, if we are to be honest with ourselves, it is a dangerous delusion.
Islamic militants are significantly different both in make-up and goals from run-of-the-mill citizens and immigrants accused of crimes. They are not in it for the money; they desire neither to beat nor cheat the system, but rather to subvert and overthrow it; and they are not about getting an edge in the here and now -- their aspirations, however grandiose they may seem to us, are universalist and eternal, such that their pursuit is, for the terrorist, more vital than living to see them attained. They are a formidable foe -- that should be plain enough by now. If the way of life we revere is to be preserved, they have to be completely defeated, just like the Nazis, the Communists, and all tyrannically inclined, would-be hegemons. In sum then, the national-security imperatives that they present are simply absent from the overwhelming run of criminal cases.
As a result, while we don't like to admit this, when we bring them into our criminal-justice system, we have to cut corners -- and hope that no one, least of all ourselves, will discern that with the corners we are cutting important principles. Innocence is not so readily presumed when juries -- often having been screened for their attitudes about the death penalty -- see intense courtroom security around palpably incarcerated defendants. The legally required showing of cause for a search warrant is apt to be loosely construed when agents, prosecutors, and judges know denial of the warrant may mean a massive bombing plot is allowed to proceed. Key government intelligence that is relevant and potentially helpful to the defense -- the kind of probative information that would be disclosed in a heartbeat in a normal criminal case -- may be redacted, diluted, or outright denied to a terrorist's counsel, for to disseminate it, especially in wartime, is to educate the enemy at the cost of civilian and military lives.
Since we obdurately declare we are according alleged terrorists the same quality of justice that we would give to the alleged tax cheat, we necessarily cannot carry all of this off without ratcheting down justice for the tax cheat -- and everyone else accused of crime. Civilian justice is a contained, zero-sum arrangement. Principles and precedents we create in terrorism cases generally get applied across the board. This, ineluctably, effects a diminution in the rights and remedies of the vast majority of defendants -- for the most part, American citizens who in our system are liberally afforded those benefits precisely because we presume them innocent. It sounds nice to say we treat terrorists just like we treat everyone else, but if we really are doing that, everyone else is being treated worse, and that is not the system we aspire to.
Worse still, this state of affairs incongruously redounds to the benefit of the terrorist. Initially, this is because his central aim is to undermine our system, so in a very concrete way he succeeds whenever justice is diminished. Later, as government countermeasures come to appear more oppressive, it is because civil society comes increasingly to blame the government rather than the terrorists. In fact, the terrorists -- the lightening rod for all of this -- often come perversely to be portrayed, and to some extent perceived, as symbols of embattled libertarian principles, the very ones it is their utopian mission to eradicate. The malignant campaign against the Patriot Act is an example of this dynamic.
A SILVER LINING
For me, the best escape from this downward spiral is forthrightly to concede that the existing civilian judicial system generally does not work for terrorists. By stretching precariously to assimilate them while accommodating national security, the system succeeds only in warping itself. Does that mean indefinite detentions and military tribunals, all at the say-so of executive-branch decision makers forever insulated from judicial review? Well, if the only choice is between that and compromising the judicial system to wage Pyrrhic battles that help the enemy defeat us, that is no choice at all -- we must proceed with the detentions and tribunals, withstanding the heat from the pie-in-the-sky libertarians.
But is that our only choice? I don't think it is, and that is the silver lining potentially to be drawn from the dark cloud of Ghraib.
As we now know, the military's reaction to this shameful episode has been swift and determined. Upon being alerted, the chain of command instantly and intensively began investigations. Those responsible, who have blighted our reputation and grievously endangered every American captured in combat, will obviously be severely punished. The cataclysm here, of course, is the media's decision to release the photographs. This has given the scandal outsized dimension and allowed a small cabal of sadists to sully the entirety of our armed forces and the whole of our nation. The media can say all they want that the people have a right to know. The people, however, have known about the abuse allegations for weeks, and it has never been true that the right to know means the right to see every gruesome detail. Indeed, in a criminal trial, in the so-called "search for the truth," shocking evidence is routinely withheld from juries, not because it is irrelevant but because of its powerful tendency to prejudice reasoned, dispassionate fact-finding -- to feed the very type of hysteria that now abounds.
All that, though, is academic. The images are out and we must move forward. Moreover, the world in which we must go forward is not limited to Iraq. We have for many months been holding captured unlawful combatant terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, as well as three other such combatants (including two American citizens) in United States military brigs.
As counsel for some of the combatants argued late last month in the Supreme Court, when the executive branch asserts that it should be permitted to detain indefinitely without judicial review, it is essentially saying, "Trust us." Trust us that we have captured the right people, that we are treating them humanely, and that we don't intend to keep them in limbo for a second longer than is necessary to elicit intelligence and prevent them from rejoining the battle against our troops. No, it's not fair that the barbarity of a few should be of such profound consequence, but anyone who thinks that "trust us" carries the same assurances today as it did two weeks ago is hallucinating.
Ghraib, however, is also an opportunity. It is a chance for the executive branch and Congress to craft some reasonable, well-deliberated safeguards that publicly reaffirm our national commitment to due process of law without materially harming our security or imperiling our armed forces -- and to do so before a far worse solution may be imposed by the courts, which institutionally are not well equipped for the task. And by "due process," I refer not to airy longings for cosmic justice but the strict sense of the term: the process that is due -- in this case, to hostile combatants who, for the most part, are foreigners (and thus not endowed with Bill of Rights protections) and terrorists (and thus "unlawful combatants" not entitled to the full protections of the Geneva Conventions). This is a project that would require dedicated and comprehensive thought, but a few ideas come ready to hand.
CUSTOMIZED COURT
For example, the libertarian opposition homes in principally on the current lack of judicial review of detentions. Like most contentions that are long on lofty rhetoric but short on clear-eyed analysis, this argument misses at least two critical points, both relating to death -- which, one might have thought, would by definition be anathema to the libertarians.
First, as long as we are in active hostilities, searching judicial proceedings to probe the detentions would not only interrupt interrogations to gather new intelligence but also inform the enemy of our current state of information; further, they would discourage our allies from sharing strategic and tactical intelligence with us for fear that it might be revealed in court. All of these factors would inevitably cause combat casualties to American and allied forces that would not otherwise have happened. Second, our forces are frequently in a position where the options on the battlefield include killing and capturing. The prospect of adversarial judicial proceedings would incentivize our forces to choose killing over the merciful alternative of capture-and-detention, necessarily resulting in more widespread loss of life than would otherwise have happened.
These potential harms, however, do not have to mean there is no place for judicial review. I believe we should create a special national-security court -- much like the court established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that now hears government applications for national-security wiretaps and searches. This court, which like the FISA court would be drawn from the talented national pool of experienced federal judges, would develop an expertise in issues peculiar to this realm: classified information, the Geneva Conventions, the laws and customs of war, etc., and would have jurisdiction over matters related to the detentions and any resulting trials of alleged unlawful combatants.
The Justice Department could similarly form a specialized unit (much like the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section and the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review, which already exist) to be the liaison with the Defense Department as well as the government's representative before the national-security court. That unit could then report to the Court the fact that an alleged unlawful combatant had been captured and was being detained, and certify both that hostilities were ongoing and that it was in the national-security interest of the United States that the combatant be held. For the first three years, that certification would be unreviewable. As we have seen from the Guantanamo experience, this would be enough time for many of these cases simply to go away -- the military has already released and repatriated scores of combatants.
After that point, the court could require the government to make a more informative representation, under seal, of the basis for continuing to hold a particular combatant. Such a proffer, which could be ex parte to the extent necessary to protect classified information, would include a certification that hostilities were still ongoing and a rational basis for concluding both that the prisoner was an enemy combatant and that it remained in the national interest to detain him. After three years, this should not be difficult to do -- the military will have done an initial screening at the time of capture (as it does now in any event), it would have had months to interrogate, and it would have developed a rationale for holding this prisoner while it was otherwise winnowing down the number of detainees.
The detainee might have access to counsel at this point and an option (but not a requirement) to present, by affidavit, any competing claim that he was not an unlawful combatant. This could serve as a basis for the court, if appropriate, to ask the government to provide additional, responsive information. As long as hostilities continued in the pertinent theater of combat, however, the court would be required to accept the government's representation. That representation, though, would be a matter of record and thus preserved for important future purposes, such as: the combatant's defense, judicial monitoring as the case proceeds, and congressional oversight of the executive branch's exercise of this detention power. The government, moreover, would be required to notify the court as soon as hostilities had ended in a particular combat theater, and could be made to report back to the court every six months if hostilities were still underway and it was still in the national interest to hold the detainee. Once hostilities were over in the pertinent theater, the government could then be compelled in the national-security court either to prove, at an adversarial proceeding, that continued detention was warranted or to file charges against the detainee.
A NEW JUDICIAL PARADIGM
This, among other things, would serve to blunt the resonant criticism that detainees could be held forever because the "War on Terror" may last, as Justice O'Connor surmised, for as much as 25 or 50 years. While that may be true of the "War on Terror," it is obviously not true of its component parts, such as the war against the Taliban. Combat in Afghanistan is still ongoing, but it is plainly winding down and with it the necessity to hold captured Taliban combatants. This, undoubtedly, is why the Defense Department has already released so many Guantanamo detainees. The proceedings described above would provide an oversight role for the independent judiciary without interfering in the conduct of the war; set a reasonable hurdle for the government to surmount if it is deemed necessary to hold combatants after hostilities have ended in the theater where they were captured (for example, by showing that there is a basis to believe a captured Taliban combatant is a member of al Qaeda and likely to join the continuing battle in another theater if freed); and prescribe a finite end-point at which it would be time to charge or release.
Thought must also be given to what trials of alleged combatants before the national-security court should look like. I would anticipate that they would more resemble military tribunals than civilian trials, but they would be neither -- they would part of the new paradigm. First, they would not be a unilateral executive-branch production; they would be held before an Article III court, albeit a specialized one. This would not only ensure development of the needed judicial expertise but would result in the government having to adapt to but a single body of jurisprudence rather than varying constructions by hundreds of federal judges all over America. It would also foster the salutary effects of legitimately disconnecting unlawful combatants from the justice system that applies to ordinary Americans accused of crimes.
Governing law for such a court would no doubt spur much debate, seeking to strike a due-process standard that balances national-security imperatives against what is essential to ensure the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. In my conception, the defendants would be detained until trials and any appeals (to a special national-security appellate court and, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court) were concluded. There would be non-jury trials before a national-security judge (or, in capital cases, perhaps a panel of three or five judges). Proceedings would be presumptively public but could be closed when necessary to avoid disclosure of sensitive information. The statute of limitations for terrorist crimes would be eliminated (as it is for murder in many jurisdictions) so that trials could be delayed as necessary to avoid holding them during combat in the pertinent theater.
Indictments would be drawn far more narrowly than they typically are in civilian courts -- for the more broadly charges are pled, the more due process implicates discovery. The biggest dilemma civilian trials have posed in the national-security context is the intelligence trove our generous discovery rules provide for the edification of terrorist organizations. A major reason for having a special court would be to plug that hole.
Along those lines, I would also tighten the government's so-called Brady obligation (i.e., its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence) to something far closer to Brady's original purpose than the elastic concept it has become in modern practice. Brady, as first promulgated, was a due-process rule that required the government to reveal to the defense any material evidence in its possession that actually demonstrated the defendant was not guilty. In the ensuing decades, the doctrine has been enlarged to embrace much that is neither exculpatory, admissible, nor particularly germane but that might be thought helpful to the defense presentation. That may be a healthy development in the civilian system, in which we willfully prefer the guilty to go free than a single innocent to be wrongfully convicted. It has no place in matters of national security. Thus, I would require the government, in cases before the national-security court, to disclose only (a) the evidence it intends to introduce at trial to prove the charges, and (b) any material, admissible evidence in its possession that actually indicates the defendant is not guilty of the charges.
Many other critical matters would have to be discussed. Most defendants, for example, would not be entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, and I would not afford it to them to the same degree it protects those to whom it rightfully applies. It is an ingrained principle of civilized societies that persons should not be compelled to be witnesses against themselves, and I would thus not require accused terrorists to testify. It is, however, a fairly recent jurisprudential development that silence can neither be commented on by the prosecution nor considered by the court. In national-security cases, I would personally prefer to see less evolved self-incrimination principles, while admitting that there is a vibrant counterargument to be made on this point.
Similarly, while I would place the burden of proof on the government, I do not believe we owe unlawful combatants (many of whom we could, after all, have killed on the battlefield) a presumption of innocence rebutted only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The government should be required to prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, the standard by which our system has long been satisfied to settle civil disputes even when billions of dollars are at stake. Finally, sentencing rules, including capital procedures, would have to be addressed. I would permit the death penalty only if the government convinced a super-majority of the court -- all members if we were to use three-judge panels, and at least four if five-judge panels were the rule.
Clearly, there is room for spirited disagreement on all of this, but it surely is a debate worth having. Nothing can cure the horror of sensational depictions of abuse, but if the legacy of Ghraib is that the United States manifestly reaffirms its commitments to human dignity and thoughtful due process, our current shame will have been well worth enduring.

-- Andrew C. McCarthy, a former chief assistant U.S. attorney who led the 1995 terrorism prosecution against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others, is an NRO contributor.



http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy200405110832.asp
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Free the Iraqi Press!
From the May 17, 2004 issue: The last thing they need in Baghdad is another statist medium.
by Stephen Schwartz
05/17/2004, Volume 009, Issue 34
AS IF THE COALITION in Iraq didn't have enough problems, on May 3 most of the staff of al-Sabah (Morning), the daily newspaper published with support from the Coalition Provisional Authority, walked out. Ismael Zayer, the paper's editor in chief, announced that a new, independent daily would be established, to be called al-Sabah al-Jedid (New Morning). Zayer moved his newsroom to a private house.
The story of al-Sabah, which claimed the largest daily circulation of any newspaper in Iraq, dramatizes numerous questions about how the Coalition can help construct a modern, stable, prosperous, and democratic country on the ruins of the Saddam dictatorship. These include: Can Iraqis be trusted to build new institutions? How responsible will Iraqis be in handling media? How much do foreigners need to control? Or can foreign officials simply act as mentors and advisers? Even after the scheduled "Iraqification" on June 30, such questions will remain.
Iraq now has between 100 and 200 newspapers and newsmagazines, depending on who counts. Iraqi media are often dismissed as low in quality; those who want to judge for themselves can read English-language summaries of front-page newspaper stories published daily by the Iraqi Press Monitor, at iwpr.net/index.pl?iraq_ipm_index.html. Al-Sabah itself has a website with an English page at alsabaah.com. There is also a considerable number of independent English-language websites and blogs coming out of Iraq.
Al-Sabah was created in May 2003, after the liberation of Iraq, with help from the Mare Foundation, a Netherlands NGO with a history of supporting Iraqi journalists in exile (marefoundation.org). Zayer himself had worked in Europe as a journalist for years. Early on, al-Sabah became one of three media outlets maintained by the CPA under the umbrella of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), the other two being a television channel, al-Iraqiyah, and a radio network.
The IMN has inherited the staff and facilities of the Ministry of Information of the former Saddam regime. This is not necessarily a bad thing when it comes to personnel. Under many dictators, media and other professionals have had to accept submission, against their will and conscience, in order to survive. Many of these people can be trusted to work as responsible journalists under free conditions. More problematic is the legacy of bureaucratic government control over the media sector.
Al-Sabah and the TV and radio components of the Iraqi Media Network have been administered since mid-January 2004 by the U.S.-based Harris Corporation, a producer of communications equipment. When the contract to run the IMN was put up for bid in the United States, however, it specified that the daily newspaper would be independent within a year, operating free of American subsidy, and on course to be privatized.
Al-Sabah's editor and staff welcomed this. They did not want the paper to remain dependent on American financial aid or to be seen forever as the voice of the Coalition.
In March, a rival newspaper, the daily al-Mutamar (The Congress), published by the Iraqi National Congress and considered the mouthpiece for Ahmad Chalabi, criticized al- Sabah. Al-Mutamar charged that Iraqi government ministries unfairly subsidized al-Sabah by giving it exclusive contracts for government advertising. Yet however its competitors viewed it, al-Sabah was clearly the dominant paper, printing between 40,000 and 75,000 copies per day and claiming millions of hits on its website. Al-Sabah got a new printing press early this year, and was preparing to launch itself into the world of free media. Zayer and his staff were confident of their ability to publish on their own, gaining revenue from advertisers.
Then came bad news. On March 20, the Coalition issued Decree Number 66, signed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, turning the Iraqi Media Network into the Iraqi Public Service Broadcaster, a government media enterprise equivalent to the British Broadcasting Corporation. Zayer and the al-Sabah staff professed shock that, under the decree, their newspaper would become a state-owned newspaper, with no prospect of the promised privatization.
Around the same time, the upheaval in Falluja and the confrontations between the Coalition and rebels elsewhere in Iraq were making their work--given their reputation as Coalition apologists--especially dangerous. Three al-Sabah workers were killed, five bombings were attempted and prevented at the al-Sabah building in the Baghdad district of al-Qahera, and Zayer himself was the target of two murder plots, according to the Washington Post. Even printers and drivers working for the paper were threatened.
Before announcing their attempt at independence, al-Sabah had published a detailed critique of the media laws set to be imposed in Iraq. Coalition Decree Number 65, also issued March 20, for example, had established an Iraqi Communications and Media Commission. This body would regulate all "telecommunications and telecommunications-related information services," including print media, broadcasting, coverage of elections, mobile telephone services, Internet providers, and Internet caf?s. The commission, which would issue licenses for all such enterprises, was to be supported by an array of chairmanships, boards, and panels.
In an editorial, al-Sabah described the commission as "bigger and more powerful than Iraq's former Ministry of Information--a state within the state." The newspaper continued, "This Commission will be lawmaker, prosecutor, and judge, technical engineer and moral guardian of the interests of, for example, children (against too much violence on television) and consumers (against fraudulent advertising)....[I]n order to be prosecutor and judge, this Commission will need considerable staff to monitor television and radio programs and read the newspapers and weeklies."
With so many print organs already in existence, al-Sabah's editorialists were justified in asking how the commission would find time to keep track of the press. Al-Sabah blamed this unwieldy plan on Simon Haselock, the British official named media commissioner by the Coalition in August 2003. The decree making al-Sabah part of the Iraqi Public Service Broadcaster also comprised the creation of another whole set of governorships, boards, committees, and related bodies.
In all this, three things should be obvious. The first is that imposing a massive bureaucratic apparatus on top of Iraqi media is a disincentive to independent reporting, entrepreneurial investment, and other essentials for media success in the free market.
The second is that these offices, boards, and other bodies will instantly become centers of political patronage and corruption, regardless of safeguards written into their constitutional documents.
The third and overarching fact is that this is no way to cure the Iraqis, or any other Arab society, of the statist legacy of the Baathist dictatorship.
After Ismael Zayer and his staff walked out of the al-Sabah offices, the Washington Post quoted the man left behind to run the paper for the Coalition--Maher Faisal, a veteran of al-Jumhuriya (The Republic), one of Saddam's newspapers--as saying, "These exiles have nothing to teach Iraqis. We can work without them." The message was: Iraqis who learned how media operate in free societies should not try to import their knowledge into the new Iraq.
This gets it precisely backwards. In their editorial criticizing the establishment of the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission, the al-Sabah journalists candidly admitted that "in Iraq irresponsible journalism is the norm, not the exception." But the solution to low journalistic standards in the new Iraq is straightforward:
* Iraq needs a free press, in the spirit of the First Amendment.
* Alleged abuses of press freedom should be addressed under a strong libel law along American lines when these abuses involve persons, and by enforcement of public order when it can be shown that media are inciting violence. Incitement to violence is not protected speech in the United States, and should not be in Iraq.
* Newspapers, radio stations, television channels, movie companies, Internet providers, Internet caf?s, cell-phone operators, and all other forms of communications enterprise should be encouraged to succeed or fail according to the markets they serve. No subsidies should be required in a country that, almost immediately after its liberation, generated countless new media organs. Iraqis have the resources and the will to create flourishing media.
* The licensing of radio and TV frequencies should be a neutral function administered by a small commission with a minimal staff, with no oversight over content. Broadcast content, like print news, can be regulated through libel law and enforcement of public order. Regarding children's exposure to violence through television, parents can be trusted to make choices.
* Foreign media experts should mentor, advise, and teach. They should not administer media, or write laws governing them, or issue licenses for media employees or investors.
* Iraqi journalists, like free journalists everywhere, should be encouraged to engage in a vigorous discussion among themselves and with the public of what responsible journalism is in a self-governing society. Adherence to high standards should remain a matter of personal and professional commitment, not submission to regulators or the police.
It is often said that the Coalition in Iraq needs a voice of its own. That is true: It should express its views at frequent press conferences open to all reporters. A vigorous, free press is the best possible place to begin the real democratization of Iraq.
Stephen Schwartz, a frequent contributor, consulted for a losing bidder on the Iraqi Media Network contract.

? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.

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Prison Mutiny
What the torturers of Abu Ghraib have wrought.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Tuesday, May 4, 2004, at 9:01 AM PT
The images from Abu Ghraib prison do not test one's convictions about the wrongness of torture. They test one's opinions about the wrongness of capital punishment. Just consider for a moment what this bunch of giggling sadists has done, with its happy snaps and recreational cruelties:
It has defiled one of the memorials of regime change. I was a visitor to Abu Ghraib last summer, and the stench of misery and evil was still palpable in those pits and cellars. It is as if British or American soldiers had not only executed German prisoners of war, but had force-marched them to Dachau in order to commit the atrocity.
It has been like a shot in the back to the many soldiers (active front-line duty, not safe-job prison guards) who were willing to take casualties rather than inflict them and who fought selectively and carefully. What are the chances of the next such soldier who is captured by some gang of Saddamists or Wahabbists or Khomeinists?
It seems, at least on its face, to have profaned the idea of women in the military. One does not have to concede anything to Islamist sexism in order to know what the impact of obscene female torturers will have in the wider society.
This is only the rehearsal for one's revulsion. One of two things must necessarily be true. Either these goons were acting on someone's authority, in which case there is a layer of mid- to high-level people who think that they are not bound by the laws and codes and standing orders. Or they were acting on their own authority, in which case they are the equivalent of mutineers, deserters, or traitors in the field. This is why one asks wistfully if there is no provision in the procedures of military justice for them to be taken out and shot.
Probably everyone has wondered what they might do--or might allow to be done--in the case of the "ticking bomb" and the stubborn terrorist detainee. At least when I saw the movie, Sean Connery in The Untouchables got a rousing cheer when he shot a corpse in the head, in the thick of combat, to convince a mobster that he was deadly serious. But no such excuse will conceivably do in this case. Junk videos made by mediocre pick-nose pornographers are evidence of a complete indifference to intelligence. Who is going to dare claim that a car bomb outside a school was thwarted by such tactics? One has to remember the crucial objection to torture in the first place. Moral considerations apply, as they must. But the vice of the torturer is that he or she produces confessions by definition. And soon, the whole business of confession has become polluted with falsity and madness. Even the medieval church was smart enough to work this out and to drop the practice.
Another objection is that the torturers very swiftly become a law unto themselves, a ghoulish class with a private system. It takes no time at all for them to spread their poison and to implicate others in what they have done, if only by coverup. And the next thing you know is that torture victims have to be secretly murdered so that the news doesn't leak. One might also mention that what has been done is not forgiven, or forgotten, for generations.
If anyone wanted to argue that torture is a matter of routine in many of the countries whose official media now express such shock, they would have to argue by way of double standards. This case would collapse at once and of its own weight if the standard was to become a single one, or if one torturer became an excuse for another. This point doesn't completely apply to the media themselves, who have yet to show the video execution of an Italian civilian kidnapped by Iraqi jihadists, or indeed many other lurid atrocities. But there's no hypocrisy in holding self-proclaimed liberators to a higher standard.
There it is in black and white in Bob Woodward's book, and we can be pretty sure that it's accurate, because we know that Colin Powell likes to talk to the composer of the first draft of blah. The secretary of state is quoted as saying that he often thinks our biggest problem in Iraq is Ahmad Chalabi. Just take a moment to roll that thought around your own cranium. Iraq ... mass murder, looted economy, mass trauma, incipient warlordism, devastated ecology, foreign infiltrators, crazed mullahs ... .you become a bit spoiled for choice when you select a main problem here. Picking Chalabi is presumably easier than picking a fight with Rumsfeld or Wolfowitz or even Bush.
It's a change, though, from the authorized smear and jeer of last year, which was that Chalabi was an American puppet. Since then he has called for an earlier transfer of sovereignty, earlier elections, and a sterner line on de-Baathification than the patrons of Abu Ghraib would like. He's said and done some other things that I'm not so sure about, and I don't know what happened in the Jordanian banking system many decades ago (and neither, dear reader, do you). But he's not a puppet, and anyone who thinks he is the problem is probably readying some puppets of his own whom you don't want to think about. Here one might also mention George Tenet's CIA, which doesn't have many recent successes to its credit, either in defending the homeland or in guessing right about enemies overseas, but which seems to have agents to spare to defame the Iraqi National Congress. Unpunished enemies, protected torturers, and punished friends ... not a great week for the good old cause of regime change.


Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair. His book Blood, Class and Empire has just been republished in paperback.

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The Right's Abu Ghraib Denial
Is the liberal outrage really worse than the torture?
By Timothy Noah
Posted Tuesday, May 11, 2004, at 3:52 PM PT
The rapidly emerging conservative line on Abu Ghraib is that Congress and the news media are exploiting the story in order to discredit the Bush administration. "Clearly, the images are serving the political agenda of many newspapers," sniffed Col Allen, editor-in-chief of the New York Post, to the New York Times. Until this past Saturday Abu Ghraib was kept off Page One of the Rupert Murdoch-owned Post, proving that the Post's loyalty to right-wing politics is greater than its not-inconsiderable loyalty to Fleet Street-style tabloid journalism. Murdoch publications have downplayed Abu Ghraib even more than the rest of the conservative press. The Weekly Standard's Web site had nothing to say until yesterday, and the Times piece quotes Fox News executive producer Bill Shine saying he's "dialing back" on use of the photographs.
But other conservative commentators, while less skittish about discussing Abu Ghraib, have adopted more or less the same argument. Torture is bad; liberal outrage against torture is worse. "Like reporters at a free buffet," intoned the Wall Street Journal editorial board on May 6, "Members of Congress are swarming to the TV cameras to declare their outrage and demand someone's head, usually Donald Rumsfeld's." Shame on Congress for wanting to hold the defense secretary responsible for losing control of the troops he sent to Baghdad! It's an "ersatz scandal," Midge Decter, author of a hagiographic Rumsfeld biography, pronounced in the May 7 Los Angeles Times. In an editorial headlined "A Few Bad Men," the Weekly Standard, which turned against Rumsfeld months ago for messing up its pretty war, has now come to his defense. The idea that anyone in addition to the prison guards currently facing court martial should bear any responsibility for the mayhem at Abu Ghraib is, the Weekly Standard says, a con perpetrated by defense lawyers.
The prison guards were badly trained, we hear; they thought they were doing what the interrogators/contractors/CIA wanted them to do; they were cogs in a corrupt military machine. We might say something like that if we were being paid to defend these lowlifes. And, yes, there do seem to have been lamentable weaknesses in training and command. But "sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light" is evidence of a lack of humanity, not a lack of training. And consider this lovely detail: The Washington Post reports that there is "a new batch of photographs similar to those broadcast a week ago [which include] pictures showing crude simulations of sex among soldiers." Did the CIA encourage them to do that, too?
No, but the utter chaos that apparently prevailed at Abu Ghraib might have something to do with a lack of oversight. The military moved quickly to investigate after Gen. Taguba filed his report, but better still would have been sufficient supervision to prevent the abuses from becoming widespread in the first place. A May 9 story by Scott Higham, Josh White, and Christian Davenport in the Washington Post makes clear that one of the reasons the guards were out of control at Abu Ghraib was that there weren't enough of them:
At Abu Ghraib, the guard-to-prisoner ratio was about one to 15, with one battalion guarding 7,000. Army doctrine calls for one battalion per 4,000 enemy soldiers. In civilian prisons, one guard per three inmates is considered ideal.
Why weren't there enough guards? Why aren't there enough American soldiers performing any other vital tasks in Iraq? Because Rumsfeld wouldn't spare them. Until last week, the Weekly Standard was justifiably exercised about this. Here are Robert Kagan and William Kristol in the April 26 issue:
The shortage of troops in Iraq is the product of a string of bad calculations and a hefty dose of wishful thinking. Above all, it is the product of Rumsfeld's fixation on high-tech military "transformation," his hostility to manpower-intensive nation-building in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, and his refusal to increase the overall size of the military in the first place. ... The question is whether Rumsfeld and his generals have learned from past mistakes. Or rather, perhaps, the question is whether George W. Bush has learned from Rumsfeld's past mistakes. ... If his current secretary of defense cannot make the adjustments that are necessary, the president should find one who will.
If this dump-Rummy analysis was correct on April 26, why isn't it now? Because Abu Ghraib has made it more scathing than Kagan and Kristol ever intended.
In the May 7 National Review Online, Kate O'Beirne was so offended by congressional outrage over Abu Ghraib that she abandoned rational thought altogether. Shame on "the Republican leadership in the House, who never got around to condemning the savage videotaped execution of Daniel Pearl," O'Beirne inveighed. Instead, they passed by "overwhelming approval ... a redundant resolution condemning 'the abuse of persons in U.S. custody.' " To state the obvious: Congress did not have oversight authority over the terrorists who killed Pearl. Congress does, however, have oversight authority over the Baghdad occupation. It is therefore morally and diplomatically necessary for Congress to condemn the humiliation and torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Chatterbox, who sat beside Pearl for a few years in the Wall Street Journal's Washington bureau, can assure you that Pearl would have been outraged to see his name invoked to silence protest against American war crimes. What decent person wouldn't?
Not even President Bush can escape conservative criticism for apologizing (albeit belatedly and clumsily) for the Abu Ghraib horrors and for urging the Iraqi people not to conclude that Americans are barbarians. How paternalistic, complains Jonathan V. Last today on the Weekly Standard's Web site. When Iraqis slaughtered military contractors in Falluja and desecrated their corpses, did Americans conclude that Iraqis were "savages or evildoers"? Um, yes. To be more precise, Americans concluded that Iraqis (Sunnis, anyway) were consumed by a dangerous and unceasing hatred toward Americans. But Last argues, absurdly, that the massacre was merely "[t]he product of a few deranged, dangerous men." If that's true, what was the military battle for Falluja all about? And why did we lose it?
Conservative Abu Ghraib denial reached its crudest expression today, at a Senate hearing, when Sen. James Inhofe, R., Okla., pronounced, "I'm probably not the only one up at this table that is more outraged by the outrage than we are by the treatment. ... I am also outraged that we have so many humanitarian do-gooders right now crawling all over these prisons looking for human rights violations, while our troops, our heroes are fighting and dying."
Deny though it may, the right can't avoid forever any engagement with the ugly things that happened at Abu Ghraib. It will have to grapple with what the prison guards did and what made them do it. But all is not lost. Conservatives have forgotten the most important rule from the neoconservative playbook. When all else fails, blame the 1960s. The sexual abuse, the exhibitionism in photographing it, and the general breakdown of moral authority, are all legacies of ... what, Class? The moral relativism and flight from responsibility that gained legitimacy when liberals surrendered to the radicals in the 1960s. (Or, if you're David Frum: the 1970s.) It's a cheap and shameless argument, but when did that ever stop the culture warriors? Hell, two years ago the Wall Street Journal blamed Enron on the 1960s. The Abu Ghraib argument is actually slightly less ridiculous than that one. Yet searching the Factiva news database for "Abu Ghraib and 1960s and liberalism," Chatterbox comes up empty. This is usually Decter's area of expertise, but obviously her allegiance to Rumsfeld has put any condemnation of Abu Ghraib out of bounds, no matter what the argument. Where have you gone, William J. "Death of Outrage" Bennett? Our nation turns its lonely eyes to you.
Timothy Noah writes "Chatterbox" for Slate.
E-mail Timothy Noah at chatterbox@slate.com.

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ECONOMIC SCENE
How Much Does Information Technology Matter?
By HAL R. VARIAN
IN May 2003, The Harvard Business Review published an article by a former editor, Nicholas G. Carr, titled "IT Doesn't Matter."
The reaction from industry chief executives was immediate. "Hogwash!" said Steven A. Ballmer of Microsoft. "Dead wrong," said Carleton S. Fiorina of Hewlett-Packard. Craig R. Barrett of Intel responded forcefully, "IT matters a whole lot."
Now, a year later, Mr. Carr has replied to his critics with a new book, "Does IT Matter?" (Harvard Business School Press).
It's a good book. Mr. Carr lays out the simple truths of the economics of information technology in a lucid way, with cogent examples and clear analysis.
His basic point is straightforward. At one time, information technology was so expensive and so difficult to manage that companies could make large amounts of money simply by being able to make systems work. (Think I.B.M.)
Companies that lacked the skills to manage information technology effectively suffered compared with competitors that had mastered those skills. But over the years, as information technology has become cheaper and more manageable, this source of competitive advantage has been reduced and perhaps eliminated. Hiring knowledgeable employees is much easier than it used to be, and the tools to manage this technology are far more powerful than they were a few short years ago. Nowadays anybody can set up a Web server, or an accounting system, or an inventory management system.
The ability to manage technology effectively is no longer the barrier to entry it once was. Hence, it no longer serves as a source of competitive advantage.
So it is with every new technology. When electric motors became small enough to drive individual machine tools, it became possible to set up assembly lines and greatly improve productivity.
Henry Ford and his colleagues created the assembly line and other techniques of mass production in the formative days of the automobile industry and enjoyed a significant advantage over their competitors for nearly 20 years.
But by the end of the 1920's, all automobiles were made using the techniques Ford pioneered, and his competitive advantage disappeared. The playing field tipped toward General Motors, which had developed more flexible procedures that allowed it to offer frequent updates in model styles. Knowing how to run an assembly line no longer conferred a competitive advantage, because everyone knew how to do it.
According to Mr. Carr, knowing how to use information technology is like knowing how to run an assembly line. It is a utility now, like telephone service or electricity.
Asking whether information technology matters is like asking whether electricity matters. In one sense it certainly does - without electricity, commerce would grind to a halt. But skill in the management of electricity isn't particularly useful to most companies, since electricity is now so cheap and so commonplace that it can't really be a source of competitive advantage to anyone.
Profit comes from scarcity. Companies that can provide products or services that others can't provide can charge premium prices. As more and more companies are able to supply something, competition works its magic and forces prices down.
"Complexity management" can still serve as a barrier to entry in some industries. Making integrated circuits is fiendishly complex, and Mr. Barrett of Intel is certainly right when he says information technology is critical in his industry.
But as he would readily agree, it is not the whole story. A potential competitor could go out and buy the same technology that Intel uses and still fail miserably in trying to compete with it.
Even Intel doesn't know quite why some chip manufacturing processes work better than others. In the late 1990's it instituted a program called "Copy EXACTLY!," which required that new plants use equipment and procedures replicated from existing plants, right down to the color of paint on the wall.
When a technology is so complex that the only way to make things work is to copy what you already have in place, you have a competitive advantage. After all, only the incumbents have something to copy, which makes it difficult for new companies to enter the industry.
But most businesses aren't as complex as chip manufacturing. If someone makes money selling fruit-flavored iced tea, you can be sure that other competitors will soon spring up. And if one of them gains some temporary competitive advantage by building an inventory management system, the others will soon follow.
So Mr. Carr's main thesis is right. It is not information technology itself that matters, but how you use it.
But even though it is true that when information technology is turned into a commodity it no longer serves as a source of unique competitive advantage, we still face a critical question: Are we now at that point?
Standardization and commoditization of a technology don't always mean that innovation stops. Once products become commodities, they can serve as components for further innovation.
In the 19th century, American manufacturers created standardized designs for wheels, gears, pulleys, shafts and screws. As such standardized parts became widely available and could be purchased "off the shelf," there was an outpouring of invention.
Sewing machines made clothing manufacture cheaper. Farm equipment made planting and harvesting cheaper. The locomotive made transportation cheaper. By the end of the century, the groundwork had been laid for the automobile and the next wave of innovation involving power tools and mass production.
In the 19th century the real innovations came after the basic building blocks were commoditized.
Perhaps information technology is like those standardized parts. Desktop PC's, Web servers, databases and scripting languages have become components in larger, more complex systems. As these components have become more standardized, the opportunities to create innovations have multiplied.
Do such innovations offer "sustainable competitive advantage"? Maybe, maybe not. Truly sustainable competitive advantage is a high hurdle. Doing something better and cheaper than the competition is always valuable, even if the competitive advantage is only temporary.
In my view, companies cannot afford to ignore information technology, or relegate it to the back burner. Commoditizing it does not necessarily mean innovation slows. If anything, it could accelerate as more and more innovators experiment and tinker with those cheap, ubiquitous information technology commodities.
Hal R. Varian is a professor of business, economics and information management at the University of California, Berkeley.
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
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Price Check
More inflation may be coming -- if only the Fed could see it.
By Larry Kudlow
A surprising new economic report suggests that the U.S. manufacturing sector is operating at or near full capacity. This raises threatening red flags about Federal Reserve interest-rate policy and higher future inflation.
According to Economy.com, the Institute for Supply Managers' biannual outlook shows manufacturing capacity utilization at 85.6 percent. This is way above the Fed's current estimate of 74.6 percent and could be a strong signal that more inflation is coming. (Economist Bruce Bartlett deserves thanks for alerting the profession to this report.)
Economy.com believes the difference between these numbers may lie in the fact that the Fed does not remove "dead" capacity nearly as quickly as the real-world ISM poll. "Capacity presumably `died' at a faster pace during the deep investment recession of the past few years," stated the economics website.
This helps explain the moonshot reading of 88 percent on the ISM price index for April. Near bottleneck factory conditions combined with globally driven oversized order books is a sure formula for big price hikes. The last time the ISM price index was this high was back in November 1979 -- the dark old days of stagflation.
For April, 77 percent of supply executives reported paying higher prices, while only 1 percent said prices were lower. (Twenty-two percent said prices were unchanged.) Across-the-board price hikes were reported on furniture, energy, wood, transportation, textiles, metals, chemicals, apparel, and many other items.
The year-to-date producer price index, which tracks the prices of wholesale business goods, is 5.1 percent at an annual rate, or 2.1 percent on a core basis (excluding food and energy). If the ISM capacity numbers are right and the Fed is wrong, then the PPI is going to accelerate markedly over the remainder of the year as industrial demands outstrip production capacity.
There is no automatic pass-through from the producer price index to the consumer price index, which is where inflation meets Main Street. However, through March, the CPI has also increased at a 5.1 percent annual rate, with a core reading of 2.9 percent. Many economists have held that the Fed will act much more aggressively if core inflation readings exceed 2 percent. Well, we may already be there.
The stock market, of course, is smarter than the Fed and all the rest of us put together. The recent big sell-offs may be discounting a tougher-than-expected 2004 (in terms of inflation and interest rates).
Ultimately, all these price movements are driven by excess liquidity supplied by the central bank in relation to the availability of goods in the economy. Inflation is always a monetary problem. Push in too much money to chase too few goods, and prices everywhere start rising.
Inflation-sensitive market-price signals have been warning of excess liquidity for at least a year. Gold and commodity prices have recently nosedived in market trading, but that's after a huge run-up in the prior 18 months. Meanwhile, sinking bond prices and rising yields, along with a steeply upward-sloping Treasury yield curve (an unusually wide gap between bond rates and the overnight rate on the fed funds policy target), continue to signal excess money and future inflation.
Taken together, too much liquidity in the economy, tighter capacity use in manufacturing, an energy-price spike, and unbelievably strong raw-material demands from China have set the stage for an inflation comeback.
Offsetting these inflationary factors, lower tax rates, record productivity, and more-rapid economic growth are now working to create a greater-than-usual supply of new goods and services. This positive supply shock, driven in particular by tax cuts, will absorb some of the excess money in circulation. That's why the mere expectation of Fed rate hikes and money-withdrawing actions has led to a recent drop in gold and commodity prices. This may suggest that the inflationary potential in the economy is more muted than price pessimists believe.
Nonetheless, Greenspan & Co. have incorrectly focused on lagging indicators of inflation, an approach that seems to have put them behind the curve for maintaining domestic price stability. The Fed's much-ballyhooed "output gap" difference between actual and potential gross domestic product, along with unit labor costs and mismeasured capacity use, are backward-looking and non-monetary signs of inflation.
Many supply-siders instead advocate a price-rule approach: the use of forward-looking market prices rather than backward-looking government data to track early warning inflation signs. For this reason, price-rulers have correctly warned of the monetary-based inflation threat. Today they have every reason to be concerned that the Fed has waited too long to rein in unusually easy money.
Ever try to drive a car through the rearview mirror? It's a dangerous stunt. Aiming forward through the windshield is the much safer bet. Hopefully the Fed will learn this before they drive economic recovery off the road.

-- Larry Kudlow, NRO's Economics Editor, is CEO of Kudlow & Co. and host with Jim Cramer of CNBC's Kudlow & Cramer.

http://www.nationalreview.com/kudlow/kudlow200405111038.asp

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The Neoconomists
The Bush administration's other revolutionaries.
By Daniel Altman
Posted Monday, May 10, 2004, at 11:17 AM PT
While neoconservatives in the Bush administration remake American foreign policy, another cadre of ideologues--call them the neoconomists--is busy attempting to transform American society.
The revolution in economic policy is not being televised. There was no big speech by President Bush to mark its birth, no "Axis of Evil" catchphrase designed to capture headlines. Yet it is every bit as dramatic and risky a change.
The neoconomists have one goal: to increase the rate at which the economy grows by changing how the nation uses its resources. It is a worthy goal, too. Following such as path could lead to a period of untold prosperity, with living standards rising faster than ever before. Or it might not. But even if the plan works, it might just lead to the collapse of the capitalist system.
The nation's current economic policy came to Washington in care of R. Glenn Hubbard and Lawrence B. Lindsey, who spent roughly the first two years of the Bush administration as the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and chairman of the National Economic Council, respectively.
For years, both men had been ardent supporters of the notion that income from savings and wealth was taxed too much. In 1990, Lindsey wrote that "with only a very modest loss of tax revenue, the tax system can be reformed to substantially encourage the savings we need to sustain our investment in a more productive economy." A decade later, Hubbard and a co-author wrote that savings and wealth had "long and widely been acknowledged as especially impaired by taxation."
Hubbard and Lindsey saw cutting taxes on savings and wealth as a recipe for faster growth. Their plans were consistent with supply-side economics, which had dominated Republican policy for decades, since they targeted the economy's long-run potential to grow rather than short-run fine-tuning of demand. But the focus on savings was a departure from earlier conservative doctrine.
During the Reagan administration, most talk about tax cuts centered on removing disincentives to work. In the years that followed, though, academic economists began to favor a new set of theoretical models where the savings rate took a more prominent role as a determinant of economic growth. In addition, the models suggested that the pace of technological change depended on changes in the size of the capital stock, which can only grow if investors save more. The neoconomists didn't invent these models--that was the job of theorists whose work sometimes looked more like physics than economics--but they quickly grasped the implications for policy. They used the models to postulate the following chain reaction:

1. Government cuts tax rates on savings and wealth.
2. Saving by households--bank accounts, stocks, bonds, etc.--increases.
3. More money becomes available to American businesses, since they're the ones offering the bank accounts, stocks, bonds, etc.
4. Businesses spend more on machinery, software, and other capital, as well as on research and development.
5. The nation's output of goods and services grows, and technological innovation accelerates.
6. Incomes and living standards rise more quickly for several years and perhaps forever.

With George W. Bush's cooperation, the first steps have already been taken. So far, the president has signed bills eliminating the estate tax, lowering the tax rates on dividends and capital gains, and helping companies to reduce the tax they pay on their profits. In addition, by cutting rates for "ordinary" income, the Bush administration has lowered taxes on interest payments, rental income and income from mutual funds, and pensions and retirement accounts. (Though slated to be temporary, the Bush administration is campaigning to make its tax breaks permanent.) All of these changes make it relatively more attractive to accumulate wealth than to spend money.
In addition, the White House is pushing for an initiative that would almost single-handedly accomplish Hubbard and Lindsey's goal: a huge expansion of tax-free savings accounts. And the growth of these tax-free savings accounts would dovetail well with the White House's plan for reforming Social Security, which calls for the creation of another type of tax-free investment account for every working American.
Hubbard and Lindsey's agenda is long-term, but it has already incurred some substantial costs. In the short term, their focus on savings has offered relatively little stimulus to the economy. Had the White House directed more incentives toward spending, the lag between recession and recovery might have been shorter.
In the long term, the cost of the Bush administration's policy has been forgone opportunities. The combination of the weak economy and the White House's decadelong schedule of tax cuts has left future administrations with little room to maneuver. Forecasts for budget balances from 2002 to 2011 have dropped from $5.6 trillion in surpluses to $2.9 trillion in deficits in the past three years. In the coming years, the federal government will have little money to invest in economic growth directly, by spending money on education, worker training, or basic research, which generate reliably high returns to society in the long run.
This latter cost is particularly germane, since there is no assurance that the positive chain-reaction the neoconomists envision will actually occur. Hubbard and Lindsey's strategy has never been tried in a large, wealthy economy. One flaw in the theory is that American savings do not always stay in America for use by American companies. In the past two decades, the share of savings sent abroad appears to have risen from about 10 percent to at least 40 percent. And when the Treasury borrows to make up for large deficits, more American savings will end up in the hands of government and less in investments by businesses.
The speedy growth of the economy in the last three quarters--averaging more than 5 percent at an annual rate--could signal impressive things to come. And the experience of the Clinton administration proved that even the biggest deficits can disappear given a broad enough expansion in the economy. But even if the Bush administration succeeds, its policies could create two problems that could undo all their positive effects: rising inequality and a drastic change in incentives.
Wealthier people derive more of their income from returns on saving--both in dollar terms and as a proportion of income--than poor people do. When taxes on the return from savings suddenly disappear, the wealthy benefit the most. It may be that people who depend on their jobs for income will benefit, too, in the long run, thanks to an expanding economy and rising wages. But for several years, in all likelihood, the income gap will continue to widen.
That income gap poses some real dangers to the economy and even to the earnings of the wealthy. With rising inequality, it's harder for poor people to obtain economic opportunities, because chances to get education and training, or to bring ideas to market, depend on money as well as talent, and because the number of these opportunities is limited.
The Bush administration has done little to alleviate either of these conditions. So, when income gaps widen, more of the potential of poor people--even the smartest and most innovative poor people--will inevitably be wasted. The wealthier people who own America's companies won't have as skilled a workforce, or as fast a flow of new ideas, as they might have had otherwise.
Perhaps more important, abolishing taxes on saving would give people every incentive to receive all their income from financial assets rather than wages and salaries. For some, spending all day adjusting one's portfolio might make more sense than taking a job. Even people who work will seek ways to avoid taxes, for example by being paid solely in stock options or high-interest bonds.
Of course, those people would probably be chief executives and other financial sophisticates, rather than home health workers, call-center operators, and short-order cooks. Eventually, the new incentives could lead to a whole new way of classifying people: working and upper-class would be replaced by taxpayer and free-rider. Titans of industry, heirs and heiresses, and wizards of Wall Street wouldn't pay for national defense, cancer research, or President Bush's trip to Mars. All those costs would be borne by America's breadwinners.
It sounds like a recipe for the kind of social unrest that can make an economy stagger, stagnate, or worse. A political backlash would seem almost inevitable. And something worse--like a riotous manifestation of anticapitalist sentiment--would become a real possibility for the first time in decades. And that's what could happen if the theory works.


Daniel Altman is the author of Neoconomy, which will be published this summer. He previously wrote economics columns for the Economist and the New York Times.

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Brazil to Expel NYT Reporter After Drink Story
Tue May 11, 2004 08:56 PM ET
By Claudia Pires
BRASILIA, Brazil (Reuters) - Brazil said on Tuesday it would expel a New York Times correspondent who wrote that President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was drinking too much.
Lula, a former union leader, said journalist Larry Rohter deserved to lose his visa after writing that Lula's drinking had raised "national concern" it was affecting his ability to rule.
"It's not for a president to respond to such a piece of stupidity. Certainly its author, who doesn't know me and who I don't know, must be more worried ... than I am. It doesn't deserve a response, it deserves action," Lula told reporters in Brasilia.
Brazil's justice ministry said it would cancel Rohter's visa in light of the article that was "lightweight, lying and offensive to the honor of the president."
The presidential palace has denied the president has a drinking problem and is considering legal action against The New York Times .
Officials for The New York Times were not immediately available for comment.
The nation's political opposition has joined the center-left government in condemning the article published on Sunday.
Lula is known to enjoy a drink or two socially and Brazilians generally do not look down on drinking.
In a letter published in The New York Times on Tuesday, Brazil's ambassador to Washington, Roberto Abdenur, said he had read the story with "perplexity and indignation."
"Mr. da Silva's personal prestige, coming as it does from a developing country, generates all kinds of reaction, some directed toward dimming the glitter of his leadership," the letter said. "It is surprising and regrettable that The Times should have given credit to such an offensive and totally unfounded story."
The story quoted a politician who was Lula's presidential running mate in 1998, but who has since distanced himself from the ruling Workers' Party.
In an online survey on the Web site of daily Folha de S. Paulo, 54 percent said the article was "disrespectful."
But 36 percent of the 7,185 people who responded to the survey agreed the article was "correct, as ultimately this is about a newspaper with international credibility." (Additional reporting by Axel Bugge)



Brasil
Ter?a, 11 de maio de 2004, 20h21 Atualizada ?s 21h12
Governo cancela visto de rep?rter do "NY Times"
O Minist?rio da Justi?a cancelou o visto tempor?rio do jornalista americano William Larry Rohter Junior, correspondente no Brasil do jornal norte-americano New York Times. Rother escreveu uma mat?ria sobre suposto envolvimento do presidente Luiz In?cio Lula da Silva com bebidas alco?licas. Com a decis?o do governo, ap?s receber a comunica??o oficial do cancelamento do visto o jornalista ter? oito dias para deixar o pa?s.

May 11, 2004
Brazil's President
To the Editor:
I read with perplexity and indignation your May 9 news article about the president of Brazil. Given the headline, "Brazilian Leader's Tippling Becomes National Concern," one would expect any serious journalist to indicate reliable local sources or solid local media coverage in support of such an assertion, certainly not what the reporter himself expressly refers to as "speculation," "innuendo" and "stories."
How can a long article be written to try to depict as real a fact that the journalist suggests may not actually exist?
President Luiz In?cio Lula da Silva is a respected leader and statesman in Brazil and all over the world. Only last month, Time magazine included him among the 100 most influential people on earth. This was done as a recognition of his role as the developing world's new spokesman, one who seeks a fairer world order through reforms, economic austerity and social justice.
Mr. da Silva's personal prestige, coming as it does from a developing country, generates all kinds of reaction, some directed toward dimming the glitter of his leadership. It is surprising and regrettable that The Times should have given credit to such an offensive and totally unfounded story.
ROBERTO ABDENUR
Ambassador of Brazil
Washington, May 10, 2004


May 11, 2004
Brazil President Denies Drinking Problem
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 8:19 a.m. ET
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil (AP) -- The office of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva angrily denied a published report that he has a drinking problem, calling it ``calumny and defamation.''
``It's infamy,'' Vice President Jose Alencar added Monday. ``President Lula is a good man. All of us Brazilians have to be indignant.''
Silva, Brazil's first working-class president, has never hidden his affection for alcohol, appearing on occasion with a glass of beer or whiskey. He has never been known to be drunken in public, however.
The nature of his drinking, a subject of speculation among local journalists, attracted particular attention after The New York Times published an article Sunday under the headline ``Brazilian Leader's Tippling Becomes National Concern.''
``We do not consider this article to be valid journalism,'' presidential spokeswoman Marcia Ornelas said. ``It is a piece of calumny and defamation and shows a prejudice against the president.''
She said the president's office was considering legal action.
Silva's chief of communications, Andre Singer, said late Sunday that Brazil asked its U.S. ambassador to express the nation's indignation to The New York Times over the ``gratuitous insults aimed'' at Silva, whose social habits are ``moderate.''
A spokeswoman for the Times, Catherine Mathis, said Monday by telephone that the newspaper stood by its story.
One source for the article was Leonel Brizola, a former Rio de Janeiro governor who was Silva's vice-presidential running mate in 1998. He said the president drank heavily during that unsuccessful campaign and still does.
Since that race, however, Brizola has not hidden his dislike for Silva, and even opposition politicians rallied to the president's defense.
``Some of (Silva's) remarks, especially the ones he improvises, are inadequate, but it would be imprudent to say that was the effect of his drinking,'' said Rep. Jose Carlos Aleluia, who leads the opposition in the lower house.
A former lathe operator with a fifth-grade education, Silva has been given more latitude by most voters in Brazil, a country where two-thirds of the people describe themselves as working class.
That tolerance extends to Silva's sometimes mangled use of the Portuguese language as well as his behavior.
A recent column by Diogo Mainardi in the respected weekly Veja called on Silva to stop drinking to set an example, but it did not accuse him of drinking to excess.
``Lula's drinking is not a national concern,'' said Alberto Dines, editor of the media-watching Web site and TV show Observatorio da Imprensa. ``Most people don't even think about it. There's a group of journalists in Brasilia who joke about it, and that's about it.''



Copyright 2004 The Associated Press
---------------------------------------------

May 9, 2004
Brazilian Leader's Tippling Becomes National Concern
By LARRY ROHTER

BRAS?LIA - Luiz In?cio Lula da Silva has never hidden his fondness for a glass of beer, a shot of whiskey or, even better, a slug of cacha?a, Brazil's potent sugar-cane liquor. But some of his countrymen have begun wondering if their president's predilection for strong drink is affecting his performance in office.
In recent months, Mr. da Silva's left-leaning government has been assailed by one crisis after another, ranging from a corruption scandal to the failure of crucial social programs. The president has often stayed out of the public eye and left his advisers to do most of the heavy lifting. That has spurred speculation that his apparent disengagement and passivity may somehow be related to his appetite for alcohol. His supporters, however, deny reports of heavy drinking.
Though political leaders and journalists are increasingly talking among themselves about Mr. da Silva's consumption of liquor, few are willing to express their misgivings in public or on the record. One exception is Leonel Brizola, the leader of the leftist Democratic Labor Party, who was Mr. da Silva's running mate in the 1998 election but now worries that the president is "destroying the neurons in his brain."
"When I was Lula's vice-presidential candidate, he drank a lot," Mr. Brizola, now a critic of the government, said in a recent speech. "I alerted him that distilled beverages are dangerous. But he didn't listen to me, and according to what is said, continues to drink."
During an interview in Rio de Janeiro in mid-April, Mr. Brizola elaborated on the concerns he expressed to Mr. da Silva and which he said went unheeded. "I told him 'Lula, I'm your friend and comrade, and you've got to get hold of this thing and control it,' " he recalled.
" 'No, there's no danger, I've got it under control,' " Mr. Brizola, imitating the president's gruff, raspy voice, remembers Mr. da Silva replying then. "He resisted, and he's resistant," Mr. Brizola continued. "But he had that problem. If I drank like him, I'd be fried."
Spokesmen for Mr. da Silva declined to discuss the president's drinking habits on the record, saying they would not dignify baseless charges with a formal reply. In a brief e-mail message responding to a request for comment, they dismissed speculation that he drank to excess as "a mixture of prejudice, misinformation and bad faith."
Mr. da Silva, a 58-year-old former lathe operator, has shown himself to be a man of strong appetites and impulses, which contributes to his popular appeal. With a mixture of sympathy and amusement, Brazilians have watched his efforts to try not to smoke in public, his flirtations at public events with attractive actresses and his continuing battle to avoid the fatty foods that made his weight balloon shortly after he took office in January 2003.
Aside from Mr. Brizola, political leaders and the news media alike seem to prefer to deal in innuendo, but do so with relish. Whenever possible, the Brazilian press publishes photos of the president bleary-eyed or ruddy-faced, and constantly makes references both to weekend barbecues at the presidential residence at which the liquor flows freely and to state events at which Mr. da Silva never seems to be without a drink in his hand.
"I've got a piece of advice for Lula," the gadfly columnist Diogo Mainardi wrote in late March in Veja, the country's leading newsmagazine, reeling off a list of articles containing such references. "Stop drinking in public," he counseled, adding that the president has become "the biggest advertising spokesman for the spirits industry" with his very conspicuous consumption of alcohol.
A week later, the same magazine printed a letter from a reader worrying about "Lula's alcoholism" and its effect on the president's ability to govern. Though some Web sites have been complaining for months about "our alcoholic president," it was the first time the mainstream national press had referred to Mr. da Silva in that manner.
Historically, Brazilians have reason to be concerned at any sign of heavy drinking by their presidents. J?nio Quadros, elected in 1960, was a notorious tippler who once boasted, "I drink because it's liquid"; his unexpected resignation, after less than a year in office during what was reported to be a marathon binge, initiated a period of political instability that led to a coup in 1964 and 20 years of a harsh military dictatorship.
Whether or not Mr. da Silva really has a drinking problem, the issue has seeped into the public consciousness and become the subject of gibes. When the government spent $56 million early this year to buy a new presidential plane, for instance, the columnist Claudio Humberto, a sort of Matt Drudge of Brazilian politics, sponsored a contest to give a tongue-in-cheek name to the aircraft.
One winning entry, recalling that the United States president's plane is called Air Force One, suggested that Mr. da Silva's jet should be designated "Pirassununga 51," which is the name of the most popular brand of cacha?a. Another suggestion was "Powered by Alcohol," a pun referring to a government plan to encourage cars to use ethanol as fuel.
Speculation about the president's drinking habits has been fed by various gaffes and faux pas that he has made in public. As a candidate, he once offended residents of a city regarded as a haven for gays by calling it "a factory that manufactures queers," and as president, his slips in public have continued and become part of Brazilian political folklore.
At a ceremony here in February to announce a large new investment, for example, Mr. da Silva twice referred to the president of General Motors, Richard Wagoner, as the president of Mercedes-Benz. In October, on a day honoring the nation's elderly, Mr. da Silva told them, "when you retire, don't stay at home bothering your family, find something to do."
Abroad, Mr. da Silva has also stumbled or spoken ill-advisedly. On a visit to the Middle East last year, he imitated an Arab accent in speaking Portuguese, mispronunciations and all; and in Windhoek, Namibia, he said the city seemed to be so clean that it "hardly seems like Africa."
Mr. da Silva's staff and supporters respond that such slips are only occasional, are to be expected from a man who likes to speak off the cuff and have nothing to do with his consumption of alcohol, which they describe as moderate in any case. As they see it, he is being held to a different and unfair standard than that of his predecessors because he is Brazil's first working-class president and received only a sixth-grade education.
"Anyone who has been at a formal or informal reception in Bras?lia has witnessed presidents sipping a shot of whiskey," the columnist Ali Kamel wrote in the Rio de Janeiro daily O Globo recently. "But you'll have read nothing in that respect about other presidents, just about Lula. That smacks of prejudice."
Mr. da Silva was born into a poor family in one of the country's poorest states and spent years leading labor unions, a famously hard-drinking environment. Brazilian press accounts have repeatedly described the president's father, Aristides, whom he barely knew and who died in 1978, as an alcoholic who abused his children.
Stories about drinking episodes involving Mr. da Silva are legion. After one night on the town when he was a member of Congress during the late 1980's, Mr. da Silva got off the elevator at the wrong floor of the building where he lived at the time and tried to batter down the door of an apartment he mistakenly thought was his own, according to politicians and journalists here, including some who are former residents of the building.
"Under Lula, the capirinha has become the national drink by presidential decree," the daily F?lha de S?o Paulo said last month in an article about Mr. da Silva's association with alcohol and referring to a cocktail made with sugar-cane liquor.



Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company |

Venezuela Soldiers Raid U.S. Embassy Warehouse, Detain More Suspects in Alleged Paramilitary Plot
By Christopher Toothaker Associated Press Writer
Published: May 10, 2004
CARACAS, Venezuela (AP) - Venezuelan authorities raided a U.S. Embassy warehouse Monday and made more arrests, a day after President Hugo Chavez charged there was a plot to oust him.
Venezuela soldiers on Sunday arrested 53 Colombian right-wing paramilitary fighters in a raid on a farm outside Caracas, and another 24 recruits were caught after fleeing into the countryside, Chavez said.
Soldiers and federal agents searched another farm around the same area Monday, including a warehouse rented by the U.S. Embassy, said Leopoldo Sarria, a lawyer for the family who owns the farm.
The agents had orders to seize weapons and military uniforms but found nothing after a five-hour search, Sarria said.
U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Victoria Alvarado said the embassy used the warehouse to store furniture and denied any U.S. involvement in efforts to oust Chavez.
In Washington, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher rejected comments made by Chavez on Sunday suggesting the United States was behind the alleged conspiracy.
"Those kinds of charges are baseless and irresponsible, and we categorically reject these kinds of outrageous statements and accusations," Boucher said.
Chavez has frequently claimed that Venezuela's opposition, including a number of military officers have conspired to overthrow his government, with Washington's backing.
Opposition leaders said the raids were a government-hatched scheme meant to divert attention from their presidential recall effort now entering a decisive phase.

AP-ES-05-10-04 2250EDT

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Palestinian Authority Decides to Hold Municipal Elections

By Mohammed Daraghmeh Associated Press Writer
Published: May 10, 2004

RAMALLAH, West Bank (AP) - The Palestinian Authority decided Monday to hold its first local elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, bowing to pressure to end chaos and corruption plaguing many Palestinian towns.
The increasing anarchy persuaded a reluctant Yasser Arafat to allow the vote, the first electoral test of his government in eight years, officials said, despite fears that his opponents, particularly the violent Islamic Hamas, could gain ground.
Early Tuesday, Israeli forces entered Gaza City and exchanged fire with Palestinian gunmen, an operation the Israelis said was aimed at the "terrorist infrastructure" in the city.
An Israeli helicopter fired a missile at a group of men, killing one and wounding nine, three of them seriously witnesses and doctors said. In earlier exchanges of fire, one Palestinian gunman was killed and nine people were wounded, at least four of them armed, they said.
The clash occurred in the Zeitoun neighborhood, across from the isolated Jewish settlement of Netzarim. Zeitoun is known as a stronghold of Islamic militant groups. The Israeli military said only that an operation was in progress, aimed at the "terrorist infrastructure" in Gaza City.
The Palestinian elections are to be held in stages in coming months, with the first to take place in the West Bank town of Jericho by late August.
The Cabinet said an Israeli troop withdrawal from Palestinian population centers is not a prerequisite for the local vote, removing an obstacle that has thwarted elections before.
However, Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia reiterated Monday that legislative and presidential elections could take place only after Israeli troops leave. He said a June deadline set by his government is unrealistic.
Qureia said he would instead ask the Quartet of Mideast mediators - the United States, Russia, the United Nations and the European Union - to propose a date, apparently to prod Israel to withdraw its troops and remove roadblocks. He said he would raise the idea in a meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in Berlin next week.
Elections are needed to counter Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's claim he does not have a Palestinian negotiating partner, Qureia said.
"We cannot set a date because of the occupation," Qureia said after Monday's Cabinet meeting. "We will call on the Quartet to suggest or propose a new date so we can put an end to (people saying) there ... is no partner" for peace.
Sharon has been pushing for a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and four West Bank settlements, charging that he does not have a Palestinian partner, because the Palestinian Authority is not cracking down on violent groups responsible for deadly attacks against Israelis.
Sharon's plan, which was rejected by his Likud Party, irked Palestinians, who fear Israel is trying to impose a border and grab large chunks of the West Bank.
The Palestinians held their only general elections in 1996 as part of an interim peace deal with Israel. Arafat was overwhelmingly elected Palestinian Authority president, while his Fatah movement won a majority in the 88-member parliament.
Elections in 2001 were postponed after the outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian violence.
It is assumed Arafat would be re-elected, despite widespread dissatisfaction with his handling of the conflict with Israel, the collapse of the Palestinian economy and rampant official corruption and mismanagement.
Israeli and U.S. efforts to sideline Arafat have only contributed to his continued appeal. Many Palestinians also consider him a unifying force and fear his ouster could unleash bloody factional fighting.
Israeli officials said they didn't expect local elections to contribute to Palestinian reforms as long as Arafat controls the government. Israel accuses Arafat of corruption and involvement in violence.
Municipal elections were last held in the West Bank in 1976, under Israeli military rule, and there hasn't been a local vote in Gaza in more than four decades.
Since the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, mayors have been appointed, usually Fatah stalwarts loyal to Arafat.
Minister Qadoura Fares said the Cabinet agreed to local elections after many municipal officials threatened to resign amid increasing chaos.
Hamas leaders could not immediately be reached for comment. However, the group has said it is willing to take part in municipal voting and is even considering competing in a general election, at least in Gaza, if Israel withdraws.
In other developments Monday:
- Israeli troops demolished 13 Palestinian houses along a Gaza road, a day after Palestinian gunmen ambushed Jewish settlers there during an outdoor memorial service for an Israeli family killed at the spot last week. The demolitions left about 75 Palestinians homeless. The army said the gunmen had used the structures as cover during the shooting attack.
- Palestinian vandals with axes and shovels desecrated 32 graves in a Commonwealth military cemetery in Gaza City. Photographs of U.S. and British soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners were stuck to some of the tombstones. About 3,000 Commonwealth soldiers from 17 countries are buried in the plot.
- The anti-settlement group Peace Now said Israel is building up West Bank settlements and unauthorized outposts in defiance of a U.S.-backed peace plan. Sixty houses have been built in the outposts, along with 1,800 housing starts in veteran settlements last year, Peace Now said.
- An Israeli soldier charged with manslaughter in the shooting death of a pro-Palestinian British activist went on trial at an army base in southern Israel. The unidentified soldier is accused of shooting Tom Hurndall in the head during an army operation in Gaza last year. Witnesses said Hurndall, 22, was helping Palestinian children avoid Israeli tanks.

AP-ES-05-10-04 2223EDT


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Un passage recouvert ? l'encre noire dans un document r?cemment diffus? par la Maison Blanche a ?t? reconstitu?. La m?thode pourrait ?tre appliqu?e ? bon nombre d'archives d?classifi?es.
Il "s'ennuyait" devant la t?l?vision, le week-end de P?ques, "lorsque le m?mo de la CIA ? George Bush a ?t? diffus?", se souvient David Naccache, sp?cialiste du chiffrement des donn?es de la soci?t? fran?aise Gemplus. "J'ai aussit?t t?l?phon? ? Claire Whelan, une ?tudiante de la Dublin City University, dont je dirige la th?se, pour lui proposer de s'attaquer aux passages caviard?s", raconte-t-il. Mission accomplie, ou presque.

Le "m?mo" en question, adress? le 6 ao?t 2001 par la CIA au pr?sident Bush et intitul? "Ben Laden d?termin? ? frapper aux USA", venait d'?tre d?classifi? par la Maison Blanche. Celle-ci voulait prouver que la pr?cision des avertissements des services de renseignement n'?tait pas suffisante pour permettre au pr?sident d'emp?cher les attaques du 11 Septembre. Mais cinq passages pr?cisant les sources des renseignements collect?s avaient ?t? recouverts d'encre noire.

Pour le cryptologue David Naccache, ces fragments illisibles ?taient autant de chiffons rouges. Le r?sultat de ses efforts - "conduits ? titre priv?", pr?cise-t-il, soucieux de ne pas impliquer son employeur dans son initiative - a ?t? pr?sent? mardi 4 mai lors de la conf?rence Eurocrypt 2004 qui a r?uni jusqu'au 6 mai ? Interlaken, en Suisse, le gratin de la cryptographie mondiale. "La d?monstration ?tait fort impressionnante", juge Jean-Jacques Quisquater (universit? de Louvain-la-Neuve), sp?cialiste du domaine, qui salue cette entreprise de "reverse engineering de document censur?".

David Naccache et son ?l?ve ont en effet r?ussi ? d?couvrir l'un des mots censur?s. Le terme "Egyptian" leur semble le seul possible. Ils veulent peaufiner leur m?thode avant de rendre leur verdict sur un passage plus long, afin de ne pas la discr?diter. Et ils ont carr?ment jet? l'?ponge pour un mot totalement isol?, faute d'indices suffisants.

La technologie employ?e n'a, ? premi?re vue, rien de r?volutionnaire. Les deux chercheurs ont d'abord "redress?" le texte, d?form? lors de sa num?risation - l'inclinaison n'?tait que de 0,52?. Ils ont ensuite utilis? un logiciel de reconnaissance de caract?res pour d?terminer la police du texte qui fixe le nombre de signes par unit? de longueur. Le simple recours ? un dictionnaire d'anglais permet alors d'?tablir une liste de mots possibles. "1 530 correspondaient", indique David Naccache.

Mais l'article "an" pr?c?dant le mot myst?re impliquait que celui-ci commen?ait n?cessairement par une voyelle, ce qui a permis de ramener la liste ? 346 mots. En fran?ais, un indice fourni par des articles comme "un" ou "une" aurait, de la m?me fa?on, permis de resserrer les recherches. La s?lection a aussi ?t? facilit?e par le fait que la police de caract?re, l'Arial, est "proportionnelle", c'est-?-dire que la "chasse" des lettres varie. L'espace occup? par un i diff?re de celui pris par un w, ce qui peut donner des indices suppl?mentaires, par rapport aux polices dites "monospace", comme le Courrier, souvent utilis?, o? toutes les lettres se valent.

"Parmi les mots "survivants", cinq ou six pouvaient faire sens, mais seul Egyptian correspondait au contexte", indique le cryptologue. Cette derni?re ?tape rel?ve plus de l'intelligence humaine que de la g?om?trie du texte. Pour choisir parmi Ukrainian, univited, unofficial, incursive, Egyptian, indebted et Ugandan, les deux chercheurs se sont appuy?s sur leur bon sens, l'Ouganda et l'Ukraine semblant trop ?loign?s du th??tre des op?rations pour ?tre retenus, par exemple.

Sans doute l'analyse du "m?mo" de la CIA ne d?voile-t-elle qu'un "secret de polichinelle", reconna?t David Naccache. Mais la m?thode syst?matise les recherches. Dans un autre "m?mo", elle a r?v?l? que des h?licopt?res civils militaris?s par les Irakiens avaient ?t? achet?s ? la Cor?e du Sud. Et rien ne s'oppose ? l'application automatis?e de cette technique ? l'ensemble des documents d?classifi?s, dans lesquels elle pourrait mettre au jour "des mots isol?s, voire des groupes de deux ou trois mots". Avis aux censeurs...

Herv? Morin

* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 08.05.04
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IRANIENNES, VIES PRIV?ES (1)
Les mari?s de T?h?ran
LE MONDE | 10.05.04 | 14h08
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De la drague au divorce, en passant par le mariage : pour les Iraniennes, vingt-cinq ans apr?s la r?volution islamique, la vie en couple est toujours un parcours sem? d'emb?ches
C'?tait le d?but de la nuit. On ?tait entre filles, c'est-?-dire en libert?. Pas de voiles sur les t?tes, dans la partie r?serv?e au personnel soignant f?minin de cet h?pital d'un quartier tr?s populaire du sud-ouest de T?h?ran. Celles qui ?taient de garde passaient de la cuisine commune ? leur petite chambre, s'asseyant autour d'un th? en attendant les urgences. Comme cette gyn?cologue de 34 ans qu'on appellera Ferouzeh, le faux nom qu'elle s'est choisi pour rester tranquille. Cette nuit-l?, donc, Ferouzeh bavardait dans sa chambre avec une amie. Soudain, on l'appelle aux urgences.

En vitesse, elle met sa blouse blanche et un voile noir sur les cheveux, descend les marches, rejoint les salles de consultation. La cohue. Il y a du bruit, du d?sordre, des va-et-vient. Une femme et sa s?ur attendent l? avec une fillette de 2 ans. "Elle est tomb?e d'une chaise, il faut v?rifier", dit la m?re dans une grande confusion.

Ferouzeh a bien compris ce qu'il fallait v?rifier. Ce ne sont pas d'?ventuels os cass?s qui pr?occupent la m?re. La seule chose dont il importe de s'assurer qu'elle est intacte, c'est l'hymen. Des familles traditionalistes ? celles de la bourgeoisie ?duqu?e, un tabou traverse les si?cles en Iran, solide vestige archa?que, ant?-islamique, d'une soci?t? pourtant en pleine ?bullition : la virginit?.

La petite fille est d?shabill?e sous la lampe. Les t?tes se penchent sur son cas, l'air soucieux. Elle ne comprend pas, hurle. Deux ans ! Est-elle vraiment "tomb?e d'une chaise" ? Ferouzeh fronce les sourcils, redoute le pire, examine l'enfant. Avant le verdict, la seconde de silence dure une ?ternit?. La gyn?cologue secoue la t?te : "Non, ?a va."La m?re rhabille la petite. Elle ne demandera pas si elle s'est fait mal, si des m?dicaments s'imposent. L'inqui?tude, la seule qui compte, est ?cart?e.

Quand Ferouzeh exer?ait dans un cabinet, les filles affluaient pour demander des certificats de virginit? avant le mariage. La plupart, assure-t-elle, n'?taient pas vierges. Leurs m?res entendaient la sentence. Pleurs, cris, insultes. Certaines la suppliaient pour obtenir un faux certificat, qu'elle donnait parfois. D'autres partaient se faire op?rer pour reconstituer l'hymen. Clandestinement, en payant le prix. Et ? leurs risques et p?rils.

Ferouzeh la gyn?cologue a une amie, Anahita. Elles ont pass? leur scolarit? ensemble dans une ?cole du centre de T?h?ran. Ce centre-ville g?ant, ?tal? sans queue ni t?te, o? les classes sociales se m?langent. Ferouzeh vient d'un milieu populaire, traditionnel : m?re au foyer, p?re fonctionnaire. Anahita, elle, est issue d'une famille d'artistes, gens de th??tre au temps du chah. Toutes deux ont connu ? 10 ans la r?volution (qui, en 1979, mit fin au r?gime du chah pour instaurer la R?publique islamique) ; puis, pendant huit ans, la guerre Iran-Irak, les bombardements, la fermeture de l'?cole, les p?res et les fr?res qui ne revenaient pas, la peur.

Chacune a fait son chemin. Ferouzeh a ?tudi? la m?decine. Elle raconte l'universit?, la surveillance permanente des brigades des m?urs : "Si on te voyait donner une lettre ? un homme, tu ?tais exclue ou oblig?e de te marier." Anahita, elle, trop avide de libert?, s'est exil?e plusieurs ann?es en Europe. Avant de revenir, pour essayer encore une fois de vivre chez elle, en Iran, dans cette soci?t? qu'elle ne supporte pas, qui ne supporte pas la libert? des femmes.

Les deux copines se sont perdues de vue. Elles se retrouvent cette nuit-l? dans la petite chambre de l'h?pital. Et se racontent l'essentiel, c'est-?-dire leur mariage. Un passage oblig? dans ce pays de 65 millions d'habitants. Le concubinage ?tant hors la loi et les femmes seules mal vues, tous les couples se marient : c'est l'une des pesanteurs de cette soci?t? pourtant au seuil de la modernit?, o? l'archa?sme et la tradition r?sistent encore aux dynamismes qui la secouent. Les deux tiers de la population ont moins de 30 ans, plus de 60 % des ?tudiants sont des femmes, la source principale du revenu d'un quart des familles provient du travail des femmes, 88 % d'entre elles utilisent des contraceptifs, le taux de f?condit? avoisine les moyennes europ?ennes...

Tous les couples passent donc par ce goulot d'?tranglement : le mariage, n?ud crucial de la soci?t? iranienne, avec ses rites en plusieurs ?tapes - drague, tabou de la virginit?, cours d'?ducation sexuelle obligatoires, contrat de mariage, mariage... jusqu'au tribunal des affaires familiales, o? se r?glent les divorces. Car ici, o? l'on se marie d'abord pour ?tre en r?gle, environ 5 unions sur 10 s'ach?vent par un divorce.

Anahita et Ferouzeh, ainsi, se sont mari?es. Ferouzeh a attendu d'avoir 33 ans. Jusque-l?, pr?cise-t-elle en pouffant timidement, elle est rest?e vierge. "J'avais tr?s peur de ne plus l'?tre. Je savais o? ?a pouvait mener..." Elle ajoute, avec un naturel d?sarmant : "C'est tr?s dur de trouver un homme qui accepte une fille non vierge. Alors, puisque la virginit? est importante pour le mari, c'est important aussi pour moi." Comme beaucoup d'Iraniennes, Ferouzeh a rencontr? son futur mari dans un taxi collectif. La loi interdisant de "fr?quenter" librement avant le mariage, "c'est difficile de conna?tre un homme, note-t-elle. Tu ne vois que la surface. La plupart du temps, ils mentent... le temps de te convaincre".

Pour les jeunes Iraniens, sept ans de pouvoir des r?formateurs avaient vaguement d?tendu l'atmosph?re. Le nouveau Parlement conservateur (?lu le 20 f?vrier et le 7 mai) n'est pas l? pour arranger les choses. Mais, quel que soit le pouvoir en place, dans ce pays, on drague comme on peut.

On s'?change des num?ros de t?l?phone en se croisant dans les parcs ou les grands magasins. Des rues du nord de T?h?ran sont connues pour les rencontres en auto : voitures de filles, voitures de gar?ons, chass?-crois? de regards, et plus si affinit?s. Les plus modernes organisent des soir?es priv?es tr?s "occidentales".

Le mari choisi, Ferouzeh et Anahita sont pass?es, comme tout le monde, par le cours d'?ducation sexuelle obligatoire, dit "d'?quilibre familial".

Nous y voil? justement, ? ce cours. Le rendez-vous a lieu dans une clinique du centre de la capitale. Il y a l? une centaine de couples de tous ?ges. Des tr?s jeunes et des tr?s vieux. Des femmes en tchador, d'autres en habits plus modernes, le voile gliss? vers l'arri?re pour laisser les cheveux d?couverts. Chacun s'observe. Apr?s la prise de sang r?glementaire, c'est l'heure de la classe.

Les futurs ?poux s'asseyent c?te ? c?te. Au mur sont ?pingl?s diff?rentes plaquettes de pilules, un pr?servatif et des dessins de st?rilets. "Au nom d'Allah..." : de sa petite voix aigu?, une dame en blouse blanche et pantalon, voile noir sur la t?te, commence le cours. L'objectif est de recommander les contraceptifs, "comme ils font en Europe et en Am?rique".

Le raisonnement est simple : "Nous sommes en R?publique islamique d'Iran, et l'avortement est interdit. (...) Au d?but du mariage, ? cause de l'excitation, c'est difficile de se contr?ler, et 50 % des femmes tombent enceintes..."

Quelques couples pouffent bruyamment. Ceux d'allure plus occidentalis?e. Les autres ne voient pas ce qu'il y a de dr?le et restent concentr?s sans rien dire. Au bout d'une heure, les hommes sont invit?s ? quitter la salle. Les filles restent : certaines choses ne seront confi?es qu'? elles. La petite voix aigu? donne des d?tails pratiques d'une crudit? inou?e. Et termine par ce conseil : "Les hommes ne montrent pas leur vrai visage. La plupart d'entre vous divorceront dans un an, apr?s les avoir connus. Alors contr?lez-vous, attendez au moins un an avant de tomber enceintes !"

Ferouzeh et Anahita, les deux copines, ne manquent pas de se questionner ensuite sur cette tradition ancestrale, ce moment crucial de la vie iranienne : le montant de la mehreeye, sorte de dot ? l'envers fix?e par le couple au moment du mariage et que le mari doit ? sa femme en cas de divorce. Ferouzeh-la-traditionnelle y voit "une mesure visant ? prot?ger mat?riellement la femme". "C'est une mani?re insultante d'acheter la virginit?", r?torque Anihata-la-moderne.

"Qu'as-tu eu, toi, comme mehreeye ?, lui demande Anihata, l?g?rement ironique.

- Cinq pi?ces d'or -environ 400 euros-. Et toi ?

- Moi ? Un grattoir de guitare.

- ? ? ?"

Cette demande insolite, Anahita la formule maintenant devant le mollah charg? du contrat de mariage. La sc?ne a lieu dans le bureau de ce dernier, sous les portraits de l'ayatollah Khomeiny et du guide actuel du pays, Ali Khamenei. Anahita et Dariush, son fianc?, demandent que figurent dans leur contrat toutes les "options" laissant ? l'?pouse le droit de se d?placer, de travailler, d'avoir un compte en banque, de quitter l'Iran, de divorcer sans l'autorisation du mari... Le religieux tente de les en dissuader :

"Le droit de divorcer appartient ? l'homme !

- Je peux obtenir l'autorisation ?crite de mon mari, insiste Anahita.

- Une autorisation n'est pas un droit. Le tribunal ne la reconna?t pas.

- Alors ? quoi bon ce contrat de mariage ?

La r?union se passe tr?s mal. La demande fantoche de mehreeye n'arrange rien. "La mehreeye doit ?tre un don concret, explique le mollah. Vous pouvez ?ventuellement demander un coran, pas les nuages dans le ciel ni un grattoir de guitare." "Mon mari adore les grattoirs, dit Anihata. C'est un vrai sacrifice de sa part, une preuve d'amour." Ils partent sans conclure de contrat.

La jeune femme sort en larmes du bureau. Dariush est boulevers?. "J'ai honte d'?tre un homme dans ce pays." Des amis leur indiquent des "mollahs plus progressistes, plus compr?hensifs, qui encouragent ? signer les fameuses "options"". Ils iront. "De toute fa?on, on est forc?s de se marier. On te demande tes papiers. Il y a toujours des gens pour te d?noncer."

Pour les couples, c'est ici, bien souvent, que l'histoire se termine : au tribunal des affaires familiales, un b?timent ? colonnades situ? dans l'extr?me-sud de T?h?ran, l? o? se r?glent les divorces. Dans les couloirs, des hommes et des femmes attendent leur tour. On ouvre une porte : nous voil? dans le bureau d'un juge, visiblement en plein drame. Une femme et ses deux filles en tchador noir sanglotent ostensiblement, supplient le magistrat, montrent du doigt l'homme qui se tient ? leurs c?t?s.

"Il a une liaison, il ne paie rien pour nous et il refuse de divorcer !

- Elles mentent !,r?torque le mari en les mena?ant de l'index. J'aurai ma revanche !"

En tenue d?contract?e, sans cravate, le juge tapote son dossier, fixe la date de la prochaine audience. Dans le bureau voisin, un autre mari, piteux, se voit somm? de payer la mehreeye. L?-dessus, la justice ne transige pas : l'homme doit assumer ce devoir-l?. Sinon, c'est la prison. Le tribunal peut m?me se montrer sans piti? pour ceux qui sont jug?s en infraction. Alors les femmes l'emportent... mais dans le cadre d'une loi ?crite sur mesure pour les hommes.

Cette loi stipule en effet qu'un homme peut divorcer sans raisons. L'?pouse, elle, doit avancer des "motifs" contre son mari : usage de drogue, adult?re, impuissance, st?rilit?, mauvais comportement (violence, d?faut de paiement). Tout le probl?me est de prouver ces fautes."Ce syst?me juridique archa?que ne correspond plus ? la soci?t? iranienne", estime une avocate.

Les juges, ? de tr?s rares et r?centes exceptions pr?s, sont tous des hommes. Celui-ci est un mollah, habill? en robe blanche et turban blanc. On lui demande : pourquoi, selon le Coran et la Constitution iranienne, seule la femme doit-elle donner des "motifs" en cas de divorce ? Quelle question saugrenue ! "L'homme est responsable de la famille. C'est lui le patron. C'est douloureux pour lui de divorcer. En plus, il doit payer la merheeye. S'il divorce, c'est donc qu'il a de bonnes raisons, le tribunal n'a pas ? les demander." Logique.

Voici Mania. Pour obtenir le divorce, elle a renonc? ? tous ses droits : la garde de son fils, la mehreeye, la pension, ses meubles, tout. "Quand tu es divorc?e, dit-elle, c'est une ?preuve de chaque jour. Les gens te regardent comme une prostitu?e. Tous les commer?ants veulent coucher avec toi, puisque tu n'es plus vierge. Les hommes rechignent ? t'?pouser. Les appartements ? louer ne le sont plus pour toi. On t'accepte dans les quartiers plus ?duqu?s, plus riches, mais alors un seul salaire ne suffit pas pour le loyer." Le r?ve de Mania, c'est de se remarier. Pour redevenir une Iranienne normale.

Marion Van Renterghem L'art des limites

* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 11.05.04
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Un Sud-Africain, un N?o-Z?landais et un Irakien tu?s dans une attaque ? Kirkouk

AP | 10.05.04 | 12:13


BAGDAD (AP) -- Des hommes arm?s ont ouvert le feu sur un v?hicule ? Kirkouk, la ville p?troli?re du nord de l'Irak, tuant un Sud-Africain, un N?o-Z?landais et leur chauffeur irakien, a annonc? un responsable de la s?curit? irakienne.
Le Sud-Africain et le chauffeur irakien sont morts sur le coup tandis que le N?o-Z?landais est d?c?d? des suites de ses blessures.
Les deux ressortissants ?trangers travaillaient sur un projet de construction dans la ville.
Selon le g?n?ral Anouar Mohammed Amin, chef des forces de s?curit? pour Kirkouk, les deux ressortissants ?trangers se dirigeaient vers le centre-ville quand leur voiture a ?t? attaqu?e.
L'arm?e am?ricaine a d?clar? n'avoir aucune information sur cet incident. AP
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Guantanamo: Dominique Perben doit rencontrer son homologue am?ricain

AP | 10.05.04 | 16:27


PARIS (AP) -- En d?placement ? Washington dans le cadre d'une rencontre de G8, le ministre de la Justice, Dominique Perben, doit rencontrer lundi son homologue am?ricain John Ashcroft, pour ?voquer notamment le sort des sept Fran?ais d?tenus sur la base am?ricaine de Guantanamo ? Cuba.
Le 29 avril dernier, le secr?taire d'Etat am?ricain Colin Powell avait laiss? entendre que des Fran?ais d?tenus ? Guantanamo seraient bient?t lib?r?s. ?Je pr?vois du nouveau pour les d?tenus fran?ais dans un avenir proche?, avait-il d?clar?.
Plus de 600 hommes, arr?t?s apr?s le 11 septembre 2001, notamment en Afghanistan et au Pakistan, sont d?tenus sur cette base am?ricaine ? Cuba, soup?onn?s de relations avec des organisations terroristes. Les Etats-Unis, qui les qualifie de ?combattants ?trangers?, ont toujours exclu de leur accorder le statut de prisonnier de guerre, les privant notamment de tout contact avec un avocat.
La France r?clame depuis longtemps l'extradition des sept ressortissants fran?ais, dont plusieurs sont recherch?s dans des dossiers terroristes instruits ? Paris.
La justice fran?aise s'int?resse notamment ? Mourad Benchellali et Nizar Sassi, dans le cadre de l'enqu?te dite des ?fili?res tch?tch?nes?. Le nom de Brahim Yadel est apparu dans le dossier des campeurs de la for?t de Fontainebleau, entra?nements organis?s par des groupuscules islamistes, pr?lude ? leur d?part pour les camps d'entra?nement en Afghanistan et Tch?tch?nie.
Deux autres d?tenus de Guantanamo, Ridouane Khalid et Khaled ben Mustafa, sont impliqu?s dans des dossiers qui ont d?j? ?t? jug?s en France. AP

The Two World Orders
by Jed Rubenfeld

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What's the source of America's growing unilateralism? The easy answer is self-interest: We act unilaterally to the extent that we see unilateralism as serving our interests. But the answer prompts a more searching question: Why do so many Americans view unilateralism this way, given the hostility it provokes, the costs it imposes, and the considerable risks it entails? Americans sometimes seem unilateralist almost by instinct, as if it were a matter of principle. Might it be?
It will not do to trace contemporary U.S. unilateralism to the 18th-century doctrine of isolationism, for unilateralism is a very different phenomenon. An isolationist country withdraws from the world, even when others call on it to become involved; a unilateralist country feels free to project itself--its power, its economy, its culture--throughout the world, even when others call on it to stop. Although there may still be a thread of isolationism in the United States today, unilateralism, the far more dominant trend, cannot usefully be derived from it.

The search for an explanation should begin instead at the end of World War II. In 1945, when victory was at hand and his own death only days away, Franklin Roosevelt wrote that the world's task was to ensure "the end of the beginning of wars." So Roosevelt called for a new system of international law and multilateral governance that would be designed to stop future wars before they began. Hence, the irony of America's current position: More than any other country, the United States is responsible for the creation of the international law system it now resists.

The decisive period to understand, then, runs roughly from the end of the war to the present, years that witnessed the birth of a new international legal order, if not, as widely reported, the death of the Westphalian nation-state. America's leadership in the new internationalism was, at the beginning, so strong that one might be tempted to see today's U.S. unilateralism as a stunning about-face, an aberration even, which may yet subside before too much damage is done. But the hope that the United States will rediscover the multilateralism it once championed assumes that America and Europe were engaged in a common internationalist project after World War II. Was that in fact the case?

It's undoubtedly true that, after the war, Americans followed the path Roosevelt had charted and led Europe and the world toward an unprecedented internationalism. We were the driving force behind the United Nations, the primary drafters of the initial international human-rights conventions, the champions of developing an enforceable system of international law. Indeed, America pressed on Europe the very idea of European union (with France the primary locus of resistance). At the same time, America promoted a new constitutionalism throughout Europe and the world, a constitutionalism in which fundamental rights, as well as protections for minorities, were laid down as part of the world's basic law, beyond the reach of ordinary political processes.

How then did the United States move from its postwar position of leadership in the new international order to its present position of outlier?

The Cold War played an essential role in the change, fracturing the new international order before it had taken root. At the same time, the Cold War also had the effect of keeping the Atlantic alliance intact for many decades by suppressing divisions that would show themselves in full force only after 1989. When, in the 1990s, the United States emerged as the last superpower standing, it became much easier for the forces of European union to move ahead and for the buried divisions between America and its European allies to be made apparent. The most fundamental of those divisions had been the most invisible: From the start, the postwar boom in international and constitutional law had had different meanings in America and Europe--because the war itself meant different things in America and Europe.

At the risk of overgeneralization, we might say that for Europeans (that is, for those Europeans not joined to the Axis cause), World War II, in which almost 60 million people perished, exemplified the horrors of nationalism. Specifically and significantly, it exemplified the horrors of popular nationalism. Nazism and fascism were manifestations, however perverse, of popular sovereignty. Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini rose to power initially through elections and democratic processes. Both claimed to speak for the people, not only before they assumed dictatorial powers but afterward, too, and both were broadly popular, as were their nationalism, militarism, repression, and, in Hitler's case, genocidal objectives. From the postwar European point of view, the Allies' victory was a victory against nationalism, against popular sovereignty, against demo?cratic excess.

The American experience of victory could not have differed more starkly. For Americans, winning the war was a victory for nationalism--that is to say, for our nation and our kind of nationalism. It was a victory for popular sovereignty (our popular sovereignty) and, most fundamentally, a victory for democracy (our democracy). Yes, the war held a lesson for Americans about the dangers of democracy, but the lesson was that the nations of continental Europe had proven themselves incapable of handling democracy when left to their own devices. If Europe was to develop democratically, it would need American tutelage. If Europe was to overcome its nationalist pathologies, it might have to become a United States of Europe. Certain European countries might even need to have democratic institutions imposed upon them, although it would be best if they adopted those institutions themselves, or at least persuaded themselves that they had done so.

These contrasting lessons shaped the divergent European and American experiences of the postwar boom in international political institutions and international law. For Europeans, the fundamental point of international law was to address the catastrophic problem of nationalism--to check national sovereignty, emphatically including national popular sovereignty. This remains the dominant European view today. The United Nations, the emerging European Union, and international law in general are expressly understood in Europe as constraints on nationalism and national sovereignty, the perils of which were made plain by the war. They are also understood, although more covertly, as restraints on democracy, at least in the sense that they place increasing power in the hands of international actors (bureaucrats, technocrats, diplomats, and judges) at a considerable remove from popular politics and popular will.

In America, the postwar internationalism had a very different meaning. Here, the point of international law could not ultimately be antidemocratic or antinationalist because the Allies' victory had been a victory for democracy (American democracy) and for the nation (the American nation). America in the postwar period could not embrace an antinationalist, antidemocratic international order as Europe did. It needed a counterstory to tell itself about its role in promoting the new international order.

The counterstory was as follows: When founding the United Nations, writing the first conventions on international rights, creating constitutions for Germany and Japan, and promoting a United States of Europe, Americans were bestowing the gifts of American liberty, prosperity, and law, particularly American constitutional law, on the rest of the world. The "new" international human rights were to be nothing other than the fundamental guarantees made famous by the U.S. Constitution. Wasn't America light-years ahead of continental Europe in the ways of democracy? International law would be, basically, American law made applicable to other nations, and the business of the new internationalism would be to transmit American principles to the rest of the world. So of course America could be the most enthusiastic supporter of the new international order. Why would it not support the project of making the world more American?

In the American imagination, then, the internationalism and multilateralism we promoted were for the rest of the world, not for us. What Europe would recognize as international law was law we already had. The notion that U.S. practices--such as capital punishment--held constitutional by our courts under our Bill of Rights might be said to violate international law was, from this point of view, not a conceptual possibility. Our willingness to promote and sign on to international law would be second to none--except when it came to any conventions that might require a change in U.S. domestic law or policy. The principal organs of U.S. foreign policy, including the State Department and, famously, the Senate, emphatically resisted the idea that international law could be a means of changing internal U.S. law. In the 1950s, the United States refused to join any of the major human-rights and antigenocide conventions. The rest of the world might need an American-modeled constitution, but we already had one.

In part, this exceptionalist attitude reflected American triumphalism in the wake of the war; in part, it expressed American know-nothing parochialism; and, in part, it placated southern fears that U.S. participation in international rights agreements could loosen the chokehold in which American blacks were held. But it reflected something more fundamental as well: a conception of constitutional democracy that had been reaffirmed by the war. It was impossible for Americans to see the new international constitutionalism as Europeans saw it--a constraint on democratic nationalism--for that would have contradicted America's basic understanding of constitutional democracy.

It's essential here to distinguish between two conceptions of constitutionalism. The first views the fundamental tenets of constitutional law as expressing universal, liberal, Enlightenment principles, whose authority is superior to that of all national politics, including national democratic politics. This universal authority, residing in a normative domain above politics and nation-states, is what allows constitutional law, interpreted by unelected judges, to countermand all governmental actions, including laws enacted by democratically elected legislators. From this perspective, it's reasonable for international organizations and courts to frame constitutions, establish international human-rights laws, interpret these constitutions and laws, and, in general, create a system of international law to govern nation-states. I call this view "international constitutionalism."


Let me make the abstract picture more concrete. The Council of Europe--the first postwar organization of European states, and the progenitor of today's European Union--has a quasi-judicial branch, called the Commission on Democracy through Law (also called the Venice Commission), on which I have served for several years as the U.S. representative or observer. One of my first duties was to sit on a committee charged with drafting a constitution for Kosovo. The committee consisted of distinguished jurists and constitutionalists from all over Europe. We met in Paris and Venice, and the proceedings were professional and expert in every respect. But though the committee had visited Kosovo for three days, it had no Kosovar members. Uncertain as to whether their absence was deliberate, I made inquiries among the committee members. It was indeed intentional. The framing of a constitution was a delicate business, I was told, and to have involved Kosovars in the process would have impeded the committee's work and mired it in political infighting.

Might it therefore be desirable, I asked, to draft an explicitly transitional document, on the model of the interim South African constitution, one that created institutions through which local drafting and ratification of a permanent charter could later take place? No, was the committee's answer. We were drafting a constitution, and constitutions are not meant to be transitional documents.

The committee's attitude perfectly exemplified international constitutionalism, which is the dominant constitutional worldview in Europe. From this viewpoint, it's not particularly important for a constitution to be the product of a national participatory political process. What matters is that the constitution recognize human rights, protect minorities, establish the rule of law, and set up stable, democratic political institutions, preferably of a parliamentary variety, in which the chief executive is not directly elected by the people. National ratification of a new constitution might be instrumentally valuable, but having a committee of expert foreign jurists draw up a constitution would be perfectly satisfactory in principle. Having that constitution imposed on the society by an occupying power would be awkward, but so long as the occupying power was recognized as valid under international law, and so long as the constitution took, imposing it by force would be entirely acceptable.

The alternative to international constitutionalism is American, or democratic, national constitutionalism. It holds that a nation's constitution ought to be made through that nation's democratic process, because the business of the constitution is to express the polity's most basic legal and political commitments. These commitments will include fundamental rights that majorities are not free to violate, but the countermajoritarian rights are not therefore counterdemocratic. Rather, they are democratic because they represent the nation's self-given law, enacted through a democratic constitutional politics. Over time, from this perspective, constitutional law is supposed to evolve and grow in a fashion that continues to express national interpretations and reinterpretations of the polity's fundamental commitments.

In American constitutionalism, the work of democratically drafting and ratifying a constitution is only the beginning. Just as important, if not more so, is the question of who interprets the constitution. In the American view, constitutional law must somehow remain the nation's self-given law, even as it is reworked through judicial interpretation and reinterpretation, and this requires interpretation by national courts. By contrast, in international constitutionalism, interpretation by a body of international jurists is, in principle, not only satisfactory but superior to local interpretation, which invariably involves constitutional law in partisan and ideological political disputes.

The overtly political nature of American constitutional law stuns Europeans; indeed it's one of the features of the American system at the root of the differences between American and European constitutionalism. Claims about "American realism" are often exaggerated, but there is undoubtedly in the United States a greater understanding than in Europe that all law, including judge-made law (i.e., judicial decisions), and even judge-made constitutional law, is a political product. From an American point of view, if the law is to be democratic, the law and the courts that interpret it must retain strong connections to the nation's democratic political system. By contrast, the processes through which EU law has emerged so far betray a disconnection with, and even a disrespect for, democratic processes that would be unacceptable as a basis for constitutional transformation in the United States.

Americans at bottom do not believe in the claims made for a nonpolitical, neutral constitutional law. They know that judges' values inevitably inform constitutional law. Europeans tend to have a different understanding. To be sure, there was for a long time, and perhaps still is, a European tradition of distrust of judges, especially constitutional judges, shared by left-wing and right-wing European political thinkers. Yet this skepticism about "government by judici?ary" coexisted with a belief in the possibility of an expert, neutral bureaucratic rationality and a dogmatic, apolitical legal reason. The result was a deeply ambiguous attitude toward judicial review and constitutional law. Before World War II, Europe had some constitutional courts, but these courts had almost no power to strike down laws on the ground that individuals' rights had been violated.

Postwar European constitutionalism has shed this equivocation. European constitutionalism today invests courts with full jurisdiction over individual rights, without fully acknowledging that judicial decisions about the meaning of constitutional rights are fundamentally political in character. On the contrary, what makes the new European constitutionalism cohere, and gives European constitutional courts their claim to legitimacy, is the ideology of universal or "international" human rights, which owe their existence to no particular nation's constitution, or which, if they derive from a national constitution, possess nonetheless a kind of supranational character, rendering them peculiarly fit for interpretation by international juridical experts. In America, by contrast, it would be nothing short of scandalous to suggest that U.S. constitutional questions had to be decided by an international tribunal claiming supremacy over our legal system.

From the American perspective, national constitutional courts are an essential feature of constitutional law, and it's critical that constitutional interpretation remain interwoven with the nation's processes of democratic self-governance. This is done in various ways: through a politically charged judicial nomination mechanism; through judges' membership in the national polity and the nation's particular political and legal culture; through the always-open possibility of amendment; and, perhaps most important but least understood, through periodic but decisive contests between the judicial and political branches. (The most famous 20th-century example was the confrontation between Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court of the 1930s, which repeatedly struck down New Deal legislation--a battle Roosevelt won only after pro?posing to appoint six additional justices to the court.) These clashes are too often portrayed as moments of institutional peril to be avoided at all costs. In reality, they play a crucial role in maintaining the judiciary's connections to a nation's long-term democratic development. The ideal is not to make constitutional courts responsive to popular will at any given moment, but to make sure that constitutional law remains answerable to the nation's project of political self-determination over time.

To summarize: International constitutionalism contemplates a constitutional order embodying universal principles that derive their authority from sources outside national democratic processes and that constrain national self-government. American or democratic national constitutionalism, by contrast, regards constitutional law as the embodiment of a particular nation's democratically self-given legal and political commitments. At any particular moment, these commitments operate as checks and constraints on national democratic will. But constitutional law is emphatically not antidemocratic. Rather, it aims at democracy over time. Hence, it requires that a nation's constitutional law be made and interpreted by that nation's citizens, legislators, and judges.

Let me give three illustrations--in turn, historical, theoretical, and practical--that make plain the contrast between American and European conceptions of constitutionalism. In 1789, the popular assembly of France promulgated the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The document spoke in the language of universal rights. The rights of man were at issue, not merely the rights of Frenchmen. That same year, the U.S. Congress promulgated the Bill of Rights, which, far from proclaiming universal law, originally applied only to the federal government and not to the state governments. Thus, the First Amend?ment forbade national religious establishments but not religious establishments in the states. The U.S. Constitution did not speak in the language of universal rights. It spoke in the language of popular sovereignty: "We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish. . . ." American constitutional law was understood from the outset to be part of the project of popular self-government, as op?posed to an external force checking that project. The Amer?ican language of constitutional rights, properly understood, does not claim the authority of universal law. It claims, rather, the authority of democracy.

A second illustration of the contrast between the two types of constitutionalism makes the point at the level of theory. Contemporary American constitutional theorists are unendingly concerned with the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty: Because constitutional law allows unelected judges to override the outcomes of the majoritarian democratic process, it's potentially in conflict with democracy. Europeans constitutionalists used to share this obsession, but since 1945, and particularly with the recent explosion of "international human-rights" law, the countermajoritarian difficulty rarely figures in European thinking any more. The reason is that Europeans have embraced international constitutionalism, according to which the whole point of constitutional law is to check democracy. For Americans, constitutional law cannot merely check democracy. It must answer to democracy--have its source and basis in a democratic constitutional politics and always, somehow, be part of politics, even though it can invalidate the outcomes of the democratic process at any given moment.

The third contrast is more practical. It involves the question of whether there must be one order of human rights applicable to all nations. In the European view, human rights transcend national politics and ought, at least ideally, to be uniform throughout the world. For example, European nations--or at least European governments--now see capital punishment as a human-rights violation. Accordingly, European diplomats and politicians not only excoriate the United States for allowing the death penalty but even call for our expulsion from international organizations such as the Council of Europe. The American view holds that democratic nations can sometimes differ on matters of fundamental rights. For example, freedom of speech is stronger in America than in many other nations; an individual has the constitutional right in the United States to make statements in favor of Nazism that might land the person in jail in Germany. Yet the United States does not demand that Germany change its law on this point or risk expulsion from international organizations. Again, in America today, it's a bedrock principle of constitutional freedom that there be no established church at any level of government. But the American position does not require every nation with an established church--such as England or Italy--to disestablish.

For Europeans, a great marker of successful constitutional development is international consensus and uniformity. They point to such consensus as if agreement through?out the "international community" were itself a source of legal validation and authority. The more consensus there is on a constitutional principle throughout the international community, the greater the strength of that principle. Americans do not share this view. We've learned to see our own constitutional judgments as worth defending even during periods when most of the nations of Europe scorned or violated them. For Americans, a democratic nation's constitutional law is supposed to reflect that nation's fundamental legal and political commitments. Consensus in the "international community" is not the compelling source of legal or constitutional authority that it's made out to be in the European perspective.

Whether out of hubris or principle, or both, the United States has not understood its support for international law and institutions to imply a surrender of its own commitment to self-government. As the international system became more powerful, and international law diverged from U.S. law, the United States inevitably began to show unilateralist tendencies--not simply out of self-interest but because the United States is committed to democratic self-government. The continental European democracies, with their monarchical histories, their lingering aristocratic cultures, and their tendency to favor centralized, bureaucratic governance, have always been considerably less democratic than the American democracy. It's not surprising, then, that in forging the European Union they should be so tolerant of what Europeans casually refer to as the Union's "democratic deficit."


Three specific developments over the past decade helped press the United States toward unilateralism: the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo; a growing skepticism about international law, including the concern that international law might be used as a vehicle for anti-Americanism; and the events of September 11, 2001. Each merits additional consideration.

For many in the United States, the Kosovo intervention stands today as a unilateralist precedent. Because the UN Security Council never approved the use of force in Kosovo, international lawyers regarded the U.S.-led bombing as plainly illegal. But this asserted illegality has not caused Amer?icans to regret the intervention. On the contrary, it has reinforced the view that events in the former Yugoslavia represented an appalling failure on the part of the international law system, the United Nations, and, in particular, the nations of Eur?ope. From the American perspective, if the UN-centered international law system could not bring itself to authorize the use of force in Kosovo, then that system was incapable of discharging the responsibility that is an essential corollary of authority.

The United States had no compelling territorial, imperial, or economic interests in Kosovo. The intervention sought rather, at least in the American account, to prevent manifest, grotesque, genocidal crimes. And if the United Nations did not respond to the most blatant, wanton, and massive of human rights violations in Kosovo, how could it be trusted to respond to less demonstrable but perhaps more dangerous threats elsewhere?

Kosovo is a doubly significant precedent because it illustrates how Americans do not quite recognize the UN Charter as law. American society is notorious for turning political questions into legal ones. Yet Americans, including American lawyers, were and are largely uninterested in the Kosovo bombing's asserted illegality under the UN Charter. The same broad indifference would emerge again when internationalists claimed that the war in Iraq was illegal.

To be sure, some American international-law specialists are interested in these issues, but they are often perceived by the rest of the U.S. legal world to be speaking a foreign language, or not so much a language as a kind of gibberish lacking the basic grammar--the grammar of enforceability--that alone gives legal language a claim to meaning. Kosovo symbolizes not merely an exceptional, exigent circumstance in which the United States was justified in going outside the UN framework, but rather an entire attitude about that framework, according to which the UN system, while pretending to be a legal system, isn't really a legal system. And what, in this view, is the United Nations really about? The several possible answers to the question are not attractive: hot air, a corrupt bureaucracy, an institution that acts as if it embodied world democracy when in reality its delegates represent illegitimate and oppressive autocracies, an invidious wonderland where Libya can be elected president of a human-rights commission.

A second spur to U.S. unilateralism has been a growing skepticism about the agenda the "international legal community" has been pursuing. The skepticism is partly due to the proliferation of human rights conventions that are systematically violated by many of the states subscribing to them. A good example is the convention banning discrimination against women, which the United States has been almost alone in refusing to ratify. But what is one to make of the fact that the signatory nations include Saudi Arabia and other states not exactly famous for respecting women's equality?

A deeper reason for the skepticism lies in the indications that international law may be used as a vehicle for anti-American resentments. A case in point is the position taken by the "international community" with respect to the continuing use of capital punishment in some American jurisdictions. Most Americans, whatever their view of capital punishment, can respect the moral arguments that condemn the death penalty. But what many Americans have trouble respecting or understanding is the concerted effort to condemn the United States as a human-rights violator because of the death penalty and to expel the United States from international organizations on that ground. When the international community throws down the gauntlet over the death penalty in America while merely clearing its throat about the slaughter in Yugoslavia, Americans can hardly be blamed if they see a sign that an anti-American agenda can be expected to find expression in international law.

This is not a purely speculative concern. Given that the U.S.-led military interventions in Kosovo and Iraq were probably in violation of international law, might U.S. officers therefore be liable to criminal prosecution in international courts? No, say the international lawyers. Americans need not fear criminal repercussions because international law "clearly" distinguishes between jus ad bellum, the law that determines whether the use of military force is legal, and jus in bello, the law that determines whether particular acts undertaken during armed hostilities are criminal. But academic certainty about the "clear" meaning of law has never been a reliable predictor of how the law will actually be interpreted by courts. How can Americans be certain that the international law system will not embrace the perfectly reasonable logic under which an unlawful bombing becomes a criminal act, especially when Americans have acted unilaterally? This possibility may help explain U.S. resistance to the International Criminal Court.

The events of September 11, 2001, had obvious implications for U.S. unilateralism. There was a critical period in the weeks following the massacre when a renewed U.S. multilateralism in the prosecution of the war against terrorism seemed a distinct possibility. Americans were stunned by the prevalence and intensity of anti-American sentiments expressed all over the world. Even Europeans who condemned the attacks frequently suggested, implicitly and explicitly, that the United States had it coming, that the motives behind the attack were understandable, and that the massacre, though reprehensible, might have a salutary effect on U.S. policy. A period of soul-searching followed in the United States. It lasted maybe a month and ended with a characteristically American reaction: to hell with them.

So began the rhetoric that continues to escalate today. The White House took increasingly belligerent positions, which elicited new denunciations of our bullying, and the denunciations spurred Americans to feel more and more that they would have to fight this world war on their own. The fighting in Afghanistan hardened that resolve. For whatever reason, the European nations, with the exception of Great Britain, contributed almost nothing to the war, and instead issued repeated warnings that the war might be illegal, that the bombings could be considered war crimes if too many civilians died, and that the fight, in any case, would be unwinnable once the opposition took to the mountains. Did we win? That remains to be seen. But the American experience of the Afghan campaign was of an overwhelming, unexpectedly swift victory--achieved essentially without the help of the international community. And this made possible the war in Iraq.

Because of that war, U.S. unilateralism is now identified in many people's minds with U.S. military aggression and the occupation of Iraq. I am not arguing here either for or against the Iraq War; the case for U.S. unilateralism does not turn on the justifiability of that war. The fundamental question is this: Which of two visions of world order will the United States use its vast power to advance? Since World War II, much of "old" Europe has been pursuing an antinational, antidemocratic world constitutionalism that, for all its idealism and achievements, is irreconcilable with America's commitment to democratic self-government.

There is, among international lawyers, a hazy notion that the emergence of the international community in the world of law and politics is itself a democratic development. The unfortunate reality, however, is that international law is a threat to democracy and to the hopes of democratic politics all over the world. For some, that may be a reason to support internationalism; for others, a reason to oppose it. Either way, the fundamental conflicts between democracy and international law must be recognized.

The United Nations and the other institutions of international law take world government as their ideal. In theory, there's no necessary conflict between democracy and the ideal of a world government. A world government could be perfectly democratic--if there were world democracy. But at present, there is no world democracy, and, as a consequence, international governance organizations are, at present, necessarily and irremediably antidemocratic.

The antidemocratic qualities of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international governance organizations--their centralization, their opacity, their remoteness from popular or representative politics, their elitism, their unaccountability--are well known. Internationalists counter this criticism by pointing to the growing influence of "nongovernmental organizations" (NGOs) in international law circles, as if these equally unaccountable, self-appointed, unrepresentative organizations somehow spoke for world public opinion. But the fundamentally antidemocratic nature of international governance is not merely a small hole that NGOs might plug. World government in the absence of world democracy is necessarily technocratic, bureaucratic, diplomatic--everything but democratic.

Nor are international organizations undemocratic only in themselves; they undermine the hopes and vitality of democratic politics elsewhere. The point is familiar to every nation in Latin America that has seen its internal policies dictated by IMF or World Bank directives. To an increasing extent, democratic politics throughout the developing world is being displaced by a relentless demand for competitiveness and growth, which are authoritatively interpreted by international organs to require the implementation of designated social, political, and economic policies (so far, these have had rather mixed success in delivering competitiveness and growth, though they have contributed to several national catastrophes, as in Argentina).

The irony is that the United States remains the world's greatest champion of internationalism in economic affairs. Weaker countries correctly perceive U.S.-led marketization programs as deeply undercutting their own ability to decide for themselves what their social and economic policies should be. To be sure, the United States does not exactly force economic policy on other countries. Ruling elites agree to the emasculation of their countries' politics in order to get their hands on the money. But the result is the same: Democracy is hollowed out.

So all the talk of U.S. unilateralism needs an important qualification. The United States plays utterly contradictory roles on the international stage: It champions multilateralism on the economic front, because worldwide free trade and marketization are perceived to serve U.S. interests, and resists it elsewhere. But if a commitment to democracy is what underlies America's growing unilateralism today on matters of war, criminal law, human rights, and the environment, that commitment is violated wherever U.S.-led international economic organizations cripple the possibilities of democracy under the guise of free-trade principles and loan conditionality.

The American and French revolutions tied democracy to the ideal of a self-determining nation. (If the European Union should successfully forge itself into a democratic mega-nation, it would be another example of this linkage, not a counterexample.) Two hundred years later, there remains no realistic prospect of world democracy, and if there were such a prospect, the United States would resist it, because world decision making would very likely be unfriendly to America. But though the United States would be no friend of world democracy, it ought to be a friend to a world of democracies, of self-governing nation-states, each a democracy in its own politics. For now, the hopes of democratic politics are tied to the fortunes of the nation-state.

Europeans tend to neglect or minimize the damage that universal constitutionalism does to the prospects for variation, experimentation, and radical change opened up by national democracy. So long as democracy is allied with national self-government rather than with world governance, it remains an experimental ideal, dedicated to the possibility of variation, perhaps radical variation, among peoples with different values and different objectives. Democratic national constitutionalism may be parochial within a given nation, but it's cosmopolitan across nations. Democratic peoples are permitted, even expected, to take different paths. They're permitted, even expected, to go to hell in their own way.

That is what the ideology of international human rights and of a global market will not allow. Both press for uniformity among nations on some of the most basic questions of politics. Both, therefore, stand against democracy.

The response from the Right will be that a market economy is a precondition of a flourishing democracy, so international free trade and lending institutions cannot be called antidemocratic. Rejecting the Right's claim to the transcendental democratic necessity of the IMF or the World Trade Organization, the Left will reply that the existence of a capitalist economy and the particular form it should take are matters for independent nations to decide for themselves. But the Left, for its part, will insist that international human rights, the abolition of the death penalty, and environmental protections are necessary preconditions of democracy. To which the Right will reply that these are matters for independent nations to decide for themselves.

Claims that any particular multilateral order, whether humanitarian or economic, is a necessary condition of democracy should be received with extreme skepticism. We all tend to sympathize with such claims when they're made in behalf of policies we support, but to see through the same claims when they're in behalf of policies we oppose. To be sure, in some cases of national crisis and political breakdown, international governance has brought about stability and democratization. And for the many nations incapable at present of sustaining a flourishing democratic politics, international law offers the hope of economic and political reforms these nations cannot achieve on their own. But every time a functioning, self-determining nation surrenders itself to the tender mercies of international economic or political regimes, it pays a price. The idea that men and women can be their own governors is sacrificed, and democracy suffers a loss.

The justification of unilateralism outlined here is not intended to condone American disdain for the views of other nations. On the contrary, America should always show a decent respect for the opinions of the rest of mankind, and America would be a far safer, healthier place if it could win back some of the support and affection it has lost. Unilateralism does not set its teeth against international cooperation or coalition building. What sets its teeth on edge is the shift that occurs when such cooperation takes the form of binding agreements administered, interpreted, and enforced by multilateral bodies--the shift, in other words, from international cooperation to international law. America's commitment to democratic self-government gives the United States good reason to be skeptical about--indeed, to resist--international legal regimes structured, as they now are, around antinationalist and antidemocratic principles.


The unilateralism I am defending is not a license for aggressive U.S. militarism. It is commanded by the aspirations of democracy and would violate its own essential principles if it were to become an engine of empire. But the great and unsettling fact of 21st-century global governance is that America is doomed to become something like a world policeman. With the development of small, uncontainable nuclear technologies, and with the inability of the United Nations to do the job, the United States will be in the business of using force abroad against real or feared criminal activity to a far greater extent than ever before.

This new American role will be deeply dangerous, to other nations and to our own, not least because American presidents may be tempted to use the role of world's law enforcer as a justification for a new American militarism that has the United States constantly waging or preparing for war. If the United States is going to act unilaterally abroad, it's imperative that in our domestic politics we retain mechanisms for combating presidential overreaching.

Since September 11, 2001, the White House has flirted with a dangerous double unilateralism, joining the president's willingness to act without international consent abroad to an effort to bypass Congress and the judiciary at home. In December 2001, without congressional approval, the president announced the withdrawal of the United States from an important missile treaty with Russia. In early 2002, the White House began claiming a presidential power to deem any individual, including an American citizen arrested on American soil, an "enemy combatant" and on that basis to imprison him indefinitely, with no judicial review. Later that year, the president came close to asserting a power to make war on Iraq without express congressional authorization.

This double unilateralism, which leaves presidential power altogether unchecked, is a great danger. If we are to be unilateralists abroad, we have a special responsibility--to ourselves and to the world--to maintain and reinvigorate the vital checks and balances of American constitutionalism at home.



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Jed Rubenfeld is the Robert R. Slaughter Professor of Law at Yale University and author of Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (2001).


Reprinted from Autumn 2003 Wilson Quarterly
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Does the United States need international law? At times in recent years, it has acted as if it does not. Yet international law provides the foundation not only for momentous undertakings, such as the efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to protect the ozone layer, but also for more routine endeavors, such as defining the boundaries of territorial seas and guaranteeing the right of diplomats to move freely. The United States needs international law acutely now because it offers a way to preserve our power and pursue our most important interests while reassuring our friends and allies that they have no reason to fear us or to form alliances as a counterweight to our overwhelming might. And we will need the law more than ever in the future, to regulate the behavior not only of states but of the individuals within them.

International law is not some kind of abstract end in itself. It's a complex of treaties and customary practices that govern, for example, the use of force, the protection of human rights, global public health, and the regulation of the oceans, space, and all other global commons. Each of its specialized regimes is based in the consent of states to a specific set of rules that allow them to reap gains from cooperation and thereby serve their collective interests. Overall, the rule of law in the global arena serves America's interests and reflects its most fundamental values. But in many specific areas, existing rules are too weak, too old, or too limited to address current threats and challenges. The United States must recommit itself to pursuing its interests in concert with other nations, according to principles of action that have been agreed upon and that are backed by legal obligation, political will, and economic and military power. At the same time, it has every right to insist that other nations recognize the extent to which many rules must be revised, updated, and even replaced.

International law provides the indispensable framework for the conduct of stable and orderly international relations. It does not descend from on high. Rather, it's created by states to serve their collective interests. Consider, for instance, the concept of sovereignty itself, which is routinely described as the cornerstone of the international legal system. Sovereignty is not some mysterious essence of statehood. It is a deliberate construct, invented and perpetuated by states seeking to reduce war and violence in a particular set of historical circumstances.

The founding myth of modern international law is that the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648, gave birth to the system of states and the concept of inviolable state sovereignty. The Thirty Years' War was the last of the great religious wars in Europe, which were fought not really between states as such but between Catholics and Protestants. As religious minorities in one territory appealed to the coreligionist monarch of another, the Continent burned for three decades, and its people bled in a series of battles among the Holy Roman Empire, France, Sweden, Denmark, Bohemia, and a host of smaller principalities. The Treaty of Westphalia restored the principle of cuius regio eius religio--that is, the prince of a particular region determines the religion of his people. In today's language, this means that one sovereign state cannot intervene in the internal affairs of another.

But in reality, it took centuries for the modern state system to develop, and absolute sovereignty has never existed in practice, as many states on the receiving end of great-power interventions would attest. The architects of the Treaty of Westphalia glimpsed a vision of a world of discrete states armored against one another by the possession of "sovereignty"--a doctrine of legal right against military meddling.

It's important to realize that the right of sovereignty did not mean the prohibition of war. States were still free to go to war, as a matter of international law, until the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 formally outlawed war (to evidently little effect). Sovereignty was the foundation on which modern states were built, but as they matured, their attacks on one another rapidly became the principal threat to international peace and security. After the conflagrations of World War I and World War II, it was evident that if interstate war continued unchecked, states--and their peoples--might not survive into the 21st century. Hence, the innovation of the United Nations Charter: Article 2(4) required all states to refrain from "the use of force in their international relations against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." The right of sovereignty no longer included the right to make war.

Further, given the apparent link between Adolf Hitler's horrific depredations against the German people and his aggression toward other states, the right of sovereignty became increasingly encumbered with conditions on a sovereign state's treatment of its own people. Thus was born the international human rights movement, which today has turned traditional conceptions of sovereignty almost inside out. A distinguished commission appointed by the Canadian government at the suggestion of the UN secretary general released a report at the end of 2001 that defined a state's membership in the United Nations as including a responsibility to protect the lives and basic liberties of its people--and noting that if a member state failed in that responsibility, the international community had a right to intervene.

Why such a shift? Because the decade after the Cold War, much like the decades before the Treaty of Westphalia, revealed a seething mass of ugly conflicts within states. The dividing lines in those conflicts were drawn by ethnicity as much as religion, and the divisions were almost always fueled by opportunistic leaders of one faction or another. But unlike in the 16th and 17th centuries, the danger as the 20th century drew to a close was not so much from one sovereign's meddling in the affairs of another as in the failure of regional and international institutions to intervene early enough to prevent the conflicts from boiling into violence--producing streams of refugees and heartbreaking pictures broadcast into living rooms around the world.

The story of sovereignty, even highly simplified, illustrates a basic point about international law. It is an instrumental rather than an essential body of rules, instrumental to achieving the goals of peace, order, justice, human dignity, prosperity, and harmony between human beings and nature--in short, those ends that reflect the changing hopes and aspirations of humankind. It is a highly imperfect instrument, as indeed is domestic law. Because international law regulates a society of states with no central authority, it lacks even the hint of coercion that's implicit in every encounter with a domestic police officer. It can be enforced by the military might of one or more nations, but that sort of enforcement is the exception rather than the rule.

Yet for all its imperfections, international law survives because it is the only alternative for nations seeking to regularize their relations with one another and bind together credibly enough to achieve common gains. Inter?national law allows diplomats to escape parking tickets in New York City because without diplomatic immunity embassies would close. It allows a nation to set aside 12 miles of territorial waters for the use of its own fishing boats rather than just three or five or seven. And it allowed the first President Bush to assemble a UN coalition against Iraq quickly and easily in 1991 because Iraq had so flagrantly violated the UN Charter by invading Kuwait.

In the 1980s, political scientists such as Robert Keohane, Steve Krasner, and John Ruggie demonstrated more precisely what international lawyers had long believed: "Regimes," meaning everything from treaties to organizations to customary practices, allow nations to overcome a dilemma. The best solution to a problem can be achieved only through cooperation, but any individual state risks a "sucker's payoff" if it acts cooperatively and other states do not. Rules and settled practices overcome this dilemma by making it easier for states to negotiate credible commitments, to gather and share information, and to monitor one another and develop reputations for good or bad behavior.

America's Founding Fathers knew that the United States needed international law as a shield to protect a new and weak nation. They went to great pains to declare their new democracy a law-abiding member of the society of nations. The Declaration of Independence set forth the legal case for revolution out of "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." The Constitution enshrined treaties as "the supreme law of the land," alongside the Constitution itself and federal law. The first Congress made it possible for aliens to sue in U.S. federal courts "for a tort only, in violation of the law of nations." The statute was originally intended to assure foreign citizens and their governments that they would find sure redress in U.S. courts for violations of the laws governing relations among countries, such as diplomatic immunity. Today, it allows foreign victims of grave human-rights violations to sue their torturers if they find them on U.S. soil.

Just over a century after its founding, the United States was an emerging power with a new prominence in world affairs. Yet its commitment to international law remained firm--much more so, in fact, than we generally recognize today. Though most accounts of the crucial period after World War I are dominated by the struggle between President Woodrow Wilson and the American isolationists who opposed his vision of world order, an important group of Republicans championed a view of international relations that rested on a commitment to
international law more zealous than Wilson's. The leader of
this group was Elihu Root (1845-1937), the most distinguished lawyer-statesman of his day, who served as secretary of war under William McKinley, secretary of state under Theo?dore Roosevelt, and as a U.S. senator from New York. As Jonathan Zasloff recalls in New York Uni?ver?sity Law Review (April 2003), more than a decade before Wilson championed his great cause, Root was developing and implementing a distinctive vision of world order based solely on law. Using the kind of rhetoric that would later be associated with Wilson, Root scornfully declared that diplomacy in the past had "consisted chiefly of bargaining and largely cheating in the bargain." But unlike Wilson, who would propose a new international system based on the global spread of democracy and the political and military power of the League of Nations, Root argued for a system based strictly on law.

During the debate over the League, Root, though retired from the Senate, was the principal architect of Republican strategy. Leading Republican senators embraced U.S. engagement with the world, but only on the basis of law, not of binding military and political obligations. They supported legal institutions such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (established in The Hague in 1899) and the new Permanent Court of International Justice (created by the League of Nations in 1921). But they rejected the collective security guarantee that lay at the core of the League Covenant. They would vote for the Covenant only with reservations attached. Root himself denounced the Covenant for abandoning "all effort to promote or maintain anything like a system of international law, or a system of arbitration, or of judicial settlement, through which a nation can assert its legal rights in lieu of war." Wilson, however, would accept no compromise, and the Covenant was defeated.

Root worked hard throughout his life to put his vision into effect (in 1912 he won the Nobel Peace Prize, in part for negotiating treaties of arbitration be?tween the United States and more than 40 other nations). But the Japanese invasion of Man?churia in 1931 and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 made the shortcomings of both isolationism and pure legalism evident. In 1945, Repub?licans and Democrats finally came together in strong support of a new international legal order in the United Nations, but one that melded law and power. The UN Charter was written, as Time put it, "for a world of power, tempered by a little reason." The provisions giving the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France, and the United States permanent seats on the Security Council, along with veto power over Council actions, were recognition that a law-based order has to accommodate the realities of great-power politics.

The interesting question is why the United States, the overwhelmingly dominant power at the end of World War II, would choose to embed itself in a web of international institutions--not just the United Nations but the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In After Victory (2000), political scientist John Ikenberry argues compellingly that the United States pursued an institutional strategy as a way of entrenching a set of international rules favorable to its geopolitical and economic interests. Along the way, however, it was repeatedly compelled to accept real restraints on American power in order to assure weaker states in its orbit that it would neither abandon nor dominate them. For instance, U.S. officials had a sophisticated strategy for rebuilding Western Europe and integrating West Germany into a Western European order but sought to keep America aloof from the process. The Europeans, Ikenberry writes, "insisted that the binding together of Europe was only acceptable if the United States itself made binding commitments to them." The power of the United States to build a political order thus required the nation's willingness and ability to tie itself to a legal order.

Since the end of the Cold War, as Americans seem never to tire of repeating, America's power relative to that of other nations has only increased. But instead of hastening to reassure weaker nations by demonstrating our willingness to accept rules that further the common good, the United States is coupling its explicit drive for primacy with an equally explicit disdain for a whole range of treaties. Consider the current U.S. opposition to virtually all arms-control treaties--land mines, small arms, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty--and to efforts to strengthen existing treaties on biological and chemical warfare. The result? Nations around the world are arming themselves, if not directly against us, then at least, as in the case of the European Union, to ensure that they have an independent military capability.

The 1945 strategy was the right one, and it is now more essential than ever. We have an opportunity to lead through law, not against it, and to build a vastly strengthened international legal order that will protect and promote our interests. If we are willing to accept even minimal restraints, we can rally the rest of the world to adopt and enforce rules that will be effective in fighting scourges from terrorism to AIDS. The Bush administration, or rather some of its leading members, have constructed and promoted a simplistic dichotomy: international law versus national sovereignty. The ridiculousness of that position is evident the minute one turns to the international economic arena, where the World Trade Organization has the power to impose enormous constraints on U.S. sovereignty. A panel of three independent trade experts, for example, can rule on the legality or illegality of a federal statute under international trade law, and then enforce its judgment by authorizing trade sanctions against the United States by all WTO members. No human rights or arms control treaty has teeth nearly as sharp. Yet the Bush administration strongly supports an expansion of the WTO regime. Why? Because the free-trade system ensured by the WTO yields benefits that greatly outweigh the costs of constraints on American freedom of action.

That is the right kind of calculus to make, rather than resorting to knee-jerk appeals to national sovereignty and fearmongering about world government. And by that sort of calculus, at a time when the United States is frightening and angering the rest of the world, the benefits--to ourselves and to other nations--of demonstrating once again that we are a superpower committed, at home and abroad, to the rule of law far outweigh the costs of self-imposed multilateralism.

International law today is undergoing profound changes that will make it far more effective than it has been in the past. By definition, international law is a body of rules that regulates relations among states, not individuals. Yet over the course of the 21st century, it will increasingly confer rights and responsibilities directly on individuals. The most obvious example of this shift can be seen in the explosive growth of international criminal law. Through new institutions such as the International Criminal Court, created in 2003 and based in The Hague, the international community is now holding individual leaders directly accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Most important, under a provision that was insisted on by the United States, all nations that are party to the treaty have committed themselves to domestic prosecutions of potential defendants before the court. Only if the states prove unable or unwilling to undertake these prosecutions will the court have jurisdiction. Under this arrangement, for example, Chile would have had primary responsibility to prosecute former dictator Augusto Pinochet as soon as he was out of office. If the Chilean prosecutors and courts had failed to act, he would have been remitted to The Hague. (Instead, Pinochet was arrested in Britain in 1998, under a warrant issued in Spain, and after being returned to Chile was ultimately spared prosecution because of ill health.) The political effect of this provision is a much-needed strengthening of those forces in every country that seek to bring to justice perpetrators of such crimes within their countries.

But criminal law is only one field of change. A similarly radical departure from the traditional model of state-to-state relations is reflected in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement. Under its terms, individual investors can sue NAFTA member states directly for failing to live up to their treaty obligations. In one celebrated case, a Canadian funeral home conglomerate is suing the United States for $725 million over a series of Mississippi state court decisions that it claims deliberately and unfairly forced it into bankruptcy; the decisions allegedly violated NAFTA guarantees that Canadian and Mexican inves?tors will be granted equal treatment with domestic U.S. corporations. The WTO grows out of a more traditional form of law in which only states can bring suit against one another, but even in the WTO, evidence of the new trend can be seen in the knots of lawyers who congregate outside WTO hearing rooms to represent the interests of individual corporations directly affected by the rulings of the organization's dispute resolution panels. And now nongovernmental organizations such as Environmental Defense and Human Rights Watch are fighting for the right to submit briefs directly in cases that raise important environmental or human-rights issues.

As they come increasingly to apply directly to individuals, future international legal regimes will have more teeth than ever before--through links to domestic courts and by building up a direct constituency of important voters in important countries. The United States has long complained about the weaknesses of international treaty regimes, worrying that they bind states with strong domestic traditions of the rule of law but allow rampant cheating by states that lack such traditions or are without systems of domestic governance that check the power of leaders disinclined to follow the rules. Now is the moment to begin putting these international regimes on a new foundation, allowing them to penetrate the shell of state sovereignty in ways that will make the regimes much more enforceable.

If the United States participates in the formation of these new regimes and the reformation of the old, in areas that include foreign investment, anticorruption measures, environmental protection, and international labor rights, it can help shape a new generation of international legal rules that advance the interests of all law-abiding nations. If it does not participate, U.S. citizens will be directly affected by international rules that ignore U.S. interests. To take only one example, suppose the EU participated with other nations in drafting an international environmental treaty that imposed sanctions on corporations that didn't follow certain pollution regulations. The United States could stay out of the treaty, but any American corporation seeking to do business in the EU would be affected.

The United States needs international law, but not just any international law. We need a system of laws tailored to meet today's problems. The Bush administration is right to point out that the rules developed in 1945 to govern the use of force don't fit the security threats the world faces in 2003. But those aren't the only rules in need of revision. Well before September 11, politicians and public figures were calling for major changes in the rules governing the global economy (remember the cries for a "new global financial architecture"?), a redefinition of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and major UN reform, including expansion of the Security Council's membership. All those appeals proceeded from the premise that the rules and institutions created to address the economic, political, and security problems present after World War II were inadequate, and sometimes counterproductive, in the face of a new generation of threats to world order--to name but a few, AIDS and other new contagions, global warming, failed states, regional economic crises, sovereign bankruptcies, and the rise of global criminal networks trafficking in arms, money, women, workers, and drugs.

The mismatch between old rules and new threats is even more evident today. Two years after September 11, and one year after President Bush called on the Security Council to prove its strength and relevance in world affairs by enforcing a decade of resolutions against Saddam Hussein, the UN General Assembly convened this fall in a world that had changed radically yet again. Now both the United States and the UN are targets in a country and a region that seem to be spinning out of control. It's time to end the finger-pointing and get serious about generating new rules and updating old ones. Institutions, too, must be reinvigorated and reinvented. The UN Trusteeship Council, for example, could be used to spearhead the civilian rebuilding of countries devastated by war, disease, debt, and the despair of seemingly endless poverty.

The world needs international law. The United States needs the world. The dream of a just world under law may be no more than a dream. But the United States has never been stronger than when it has led the world in trying to make the dream a reality.



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Anne-Marie Slaughter is dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and president of the American Society of International Law. She was formerly J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative Law at Harvard Law School.


Reprinted from Autumn 2003 Wilson Quarterly
This article may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from the author. For further reprint information, please contact Permissions, The Wilson Quarterly, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.
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Sometimes a Great Notion
by Michael J. Glennon

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Leading Through Law by Anne-Marie Slaughter

Two Cheers for International Law by Oona A. Hathaway


Skepticism about international law abounds these days. A commentator in a national newsmagazine probably spoke for many when he wrote that international law is to law as professional wrestling is to wrestling: No one over the age of nine mistakes it for the real thing. International law has long had its critics, but in recent years they have seemed more numerous and included not only laypersons but specialists and diplomats. Meanwhile, its supporters express growing concern about its lack of clout. French president Jacques Chirac, for example, fears that the "law of the jungle" now prevails, and United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan has warned that we are "living through a crisis of the international system." In an extraordinary news conference on July 30, 2003, Annan wondered aloud "whether the institutions and methods we are accustomed to are really adequate to deal with all the stresses of the last couple of years." "What are the rules?" he asked.

Can it be that, 355 years after the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War and established the principle of the sovereign equality of nations, the "rules" of the international system are still in doubt? In fact, most of the rules are not in doubt, and for the most part the international legal system functions effectively, regulating air travel, telecommunications, and the like. The problem, rather, is that the two categories of rules that are in doubt--rules about rules, and rules regarding security--are vitally important.

Rules about rules--so-called metarules--are foundational and shape the content of every legal system. They specify what qualifies as a "rule"--how the rules that govern day-to-day conduct are made and unmade. The rest of a legal system depends for its vitality and coherence on the strength of its metarules, and three particular metarules of international law provide especially weak support. These rules relate to the issues of consent, obligation, and causation.

First, consent. It's commonly said that the international legal system is voluntarist, that is, that its rules are based on the consent of individual states. A state is not bound by any rule it does not accept. Thus, the system is grounded, ultimately, on self-restraint. Unless a state voluntarily restrains itself by consenting to be bound by a rule, it remains free to act in violation of the rule. This arrangement contrasts with the operation of domestic legal systems, which are based not on consent but on coercion. One can hardly decide that one will no longer be bound by the rule prohibiting bank robbery. A domestic legal system is voluntarist only in the sense that one can always leave it and relocate to a state with more congenial laws. In the international system, there's no overarching authority. All states have an equal right to accept or reject rules. It's sometimes claimed that this right of rejection exists only when a rule is first proposed, while it is in an inchoate state. But the whole logic of voluntarism undercuts this contention, for the notion of a consent-based system is meaningless if consent cannot be withdrawn in the same way it's given. States have not consented to the elimination of their consent.

But a system grounded on self-restraint creates serious problems--to the point of raising doubts as to whether it can accurately be described as "law." A leading international jurist, Judge Hersch Lauterpacht of the International Court of Justice, addressed the question in a narrower context in a 1957 case involving the validity of a state's acceptance of a treaty subject to an unusual reservation. The reservation in question would have rendered the treaty applicable only when the reserving state desired it to be applicable. In Judge Lauter?pacht's words, it would have left to the reserving state "the right to determine the extent and the very existence of its obligation," with the result that the state would have "undertaken an obligation to the extent to which it, and it alone, consider[ed] that it had done so." And this would have meant, the judge concluded, that the reserving state had "undertaken no obligation," for an "instrument in which a party is entitled to determine the existence of its obligation is not a valid and enforceable legal instrument." The treaty as modified would have lacked an "essential condition of validity of a legal instrument."


Judge Lauterpacht would no doubt be surprised to find that his logic in this one case could be extended to apply to the entire international legal system. But because the system is consent based, every state maintains the right to determine "the very existence of its obligation." The judge's reasoning suggests, therefore, that all international legal "obligations" undertaken by states are illusory because an "essential condition" of law is missing. Absent genuine obligation rather than mere self-restraint, it's hard to make the case that international law is really law.

U.S. domestic law rejects the notion that self-restraints are binding law. In constitutional law, a branch of the federal government cannot impose binding obligations on itself. For example, an executive order issued by President Gerald Ford, and still in effect, prohibits officials of the executive branch from engaging in assassination. Yet despite that executive order, President Bill Clinton ordered the assassination of Osama bin Laden. Though the earlier order had never been repealed, the later order simply superseded it. Self-restraints are not binding law.

This suggests a second systemic weakness of international law, deriving from the notion of obligation. The "glue that holds the system together," it's often said, is the rule that a state is bound to carry out treaties to which it is a party. But where does this rule to comply with treaties come from? In a consent-based system, from the states themselves. There's no alternative. So states can reject this rule just as they can reject any other rule. Yet if states can turn their backs on the rule that requires compliance with all rules, where does that leave the system?

Again, to respond that states may not withdraw their consent from the rule requiring compliance with treaties would be to reject the voluntarist foundation on which the whole system is based and to necessitate some alternative, transcendent source of obligation--"some brooding omnipresence in the sky," in the disparaging words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Such an obligation would be moral, not legal, and its source would be unclear. Whether there exists a moral obligation to obey laws of human making is an important question--can a city council, for example, create a moral obligation to cross streets only in crosswalks?--but the question is moral, not legal.

The issue of obligation suggests a third systemic weakness, relating to causation. Inter?national law scholars have long been concerned about distinguishing what states do as a matter of legal obligation from what states do for other reasons--motivated, for example, by considerations of comity, courtesy, or simple self-interest. In assessing whether a given practice constitutes a norm of customary international law, therefore, international law has insisted upon some evidence that states have followed the practice in question because they have believed such conduct to be legally required. Traditional analysis, in other words, requires both a consistent state practice and a belief on the part of the state that the practice is obligatory as a matter of law. The belief must cause the conduct.

But the difficulty here is obvious. States, like individuals, seldom if ever act from a single intent. Conduct almost always flows from a tangled web of motives. Some international lawyers resolve this problem by assuming that if a rule exists and conduct consistent with the rule also exists, the rule must be the cause of the conduct. But such an inference is manifestly unjustified. If a city council adopted an ordinance requiring residents to brush their teeth daily, would it be accurate to ascribe the practice of daily toothbrushing to the new requirement imposed by law? In fact, it's often impossible to separate self-interested behavior from behavior caused by legal requirements.

The International Court of Justice took a new crack at this conundrum in Nicaragua v. U.S.A (1986). The case arose after the United States mined Nicaragua's harbors and otherwise provided support to the
so-called contras, who were attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. In the course of rejecting arguments that the conduct of the United States was lawful, the court considered the status of the underlying rule. "If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule," the court said, "but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule." Unfortunately, the court's new approach is circular and self-referential. Some?times a breaching state may indeed agree with a rule that it violates. But again, there may be many reasons why a state appeals to "exceptions or justifications" contained within the rule other than an intent to confirm the rule. For example, the state may wholly object to a rule but appeal to an exception merely to avoid retribution. The assumption that the state's intent is necessarily to "confirm" the rule is arbitrary. If the state has engaged in a prima facie violation of a rule, it's more sensible to conclude that the state disagrees with the rule, not that it wants the rule strengthened.

These conceptual problems arise primarily in connection with customary international law, but they can also infect the application of treaty rules, for obligations imposed by treaties and customary international law often overlap. Consider once again the practice of assassination, which is commonly said to violate not only customary international law but also Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibiting any use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state. States rarely engage in assassination, but what's the proper inference to draw from their behavior? That assassination is legally prohibited? It's possible that states forgo assassination for reasons related entirely to self-interest: Many may believe that the risks of retaliatory assassination are too great. The source of the rule may be treaty or custom, then, but it's impossible to know whether the behavior in question represents compliance or coincidental conformance with the rule.

So is everything up for grabs in the international legal world? Hardly. As Columbia University law professor Louis Henkin has famously observed, "It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time." My point is simply that the international legal order is far more fragile than most domestic legal regimes because it rests on a foundation of problematic metarules. Most of the time, the system works well enough because most states derive greater benefit from honoring day-to-day rules than from breaching them. Issues concerning the metarules do not arise, and international life proceeds. States that deviate from expected patterns of practice face reprisals. Sometimes, the consequences of divergence take the form of immediate diplomatic, economic, or military sanctions, and sometimes they're reputational, with penalties long-term and indirect. Either way, violators suffer costs, even though those costs are imposed horizontally, at the hands of other actors within the system, rather than vertically, at the hands of some supranational authority.

Whether this is law, meaning a proper legal system, is, in many ways, beside the point. The real question is whether it works--whether the international legal system fulfills the functions that it's intended to serve. And here the record is decidedly mixed. Some rules work much better than others. As Georgetown University professor Anthony Arend has pointed out, legal rules have a stronger impact on state behavior in areas of "low politics" that "do not strike at the core security concerns of states"--international trade, communication, and transit--than they do in the realm of "high politics," where issues do touch on states' core security concerns. On issues of high politics, consensus is much harder to obtain, and legal regulation is correspondingly more difficult. Accordingly, states are more apt to rely on themselves than on international institutions, for often their very survival is at stake. The determinants of state behavior in the realm of high politics tend to be the cultural, historical, and power-related factors that affect states' calculations of their nerve-center security interests. In this realm, international rules are epiphenomenal, more effect than cause. So while it's important to know that most states observe most rules most of the time, it's equally important to realize that when some states violate some rules some of the time, those states are likely to be among the most powerful states, the rules are likely to be extraordinarily significant rules, and violations are likely to be highly visible and historically significant. Hence, the recent burst of skepticism about international law.

By their very effectiveness, the enormous body of international legal rules governing the quotidian dealings of states and nonstate actors--rules affecting such matters as finance and trade--have spun an increasingly tight web of interdependence and made globalization possible. But the fact that planes land, packages are delivered, and phone calls go through does not mean that the international legal order is operating as it should. The risks flowing from the failure of security rules are not lessened because many less important rules work. Though rules governing the use of force constitute only a small part of the international regulatory scheme, their dramatic collapse has overshadowed international law's many small successes--and understandably so, for the stakes could hardly be greater. Until international law does a better job of tackling the large issues, doubts about it will persist.



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Michael J. Glennon, a professor of international law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a former Wilson Center fellow, is the author of Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after Kosovo (2001).


Reprinted from Autumn 2003 Wilson Quarterly
This article may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from the author. For further reprint information, please contact Permissions, The Wilson Quarterly, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.
Phone:202/691-4200
E-mail:wq@wwic.si.edu
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Two Cheers for International Law
by Oona A. Hathaway

Related Articles
Green Fatigue by Stacy D. VanDeveer

The Two World Orders by Jed Rubenfeld

Leading Through Law by Anne-Marie Slaughter

Sometimes a Great Notion by Michael J. Glennon


In March of this year, as U.S. tanks began to roll toward Baghdad, international lawyers in the United States and abroad decried the action as a violation of the United Nations Charter. The invasion, some worried, would strip away the last pretense that international law could constrain state action. Today, as we face an increasingly conflict-ridden post-September 11 world, questions linger about the place of international law in maintaining international order. When states so openly flout it, is international law worth having?

Even before the invasion of Iraq, events had given pause to all but the staunchest defenders of international law. Near the end of the Clinton administration, for example, Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, bluntly declared before the UN Security Council that if the United Nations were to seek to impose its power and authority over nation states, it would "meet stiff resistance from the American people." The administration of George W. Bush, which came to power almost exactly one year later, immediately made clear that it shared Helms's disdain for international law. Within his first six months in office, President Bush withdrew from the Kyoto global climate accord, threatened to abrogate unilaterally the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and revoked the signature of the United States on the treaty creating the International Criminal Court.

But not all the blame for today's state of crisis in international law can be laid in Bush's lap. The issue of the role of international law in regulating international relations has bedeviled the world community for decades. After World War II, even as the world pressed ahead with the UN and other new international institutions, widespread dismay over the failure of earlier institutions to prevent the collapse of order prompted a wave of attacks on the Wilsonian ideal of an international system founded on global legal order. As long as there was no sovereign power to manage enforcement, critics argued, international law was meaningless. To regard it as anything else was not just unrealistic but dangerous.

And yet, these deep-seated doubts have done nothing to stem the growth of such laws. More than 50,000 international treaties are in force today, covering nearly every aspect of international relations and nearly every facet of state authority. The treaties range from ambitious multiparty agreements to narrow bilateral pacts. This great edifice is now under siege, yet those who built it have done little to explain or defend it to the public at large. Their inaction has allowed those who are skeptical of international law (and tend to know little about it) to fill the vacuum in the public debate. Little surprise, then, that the Bush administration has faced only a whimper of challenge to its policy of malign neglect.

The failure to mount a persuasive defense of international law has its roots in the universities, where so many of the ideas that inform public debate are incubated. With a few notable exceptions, legal scholars have remained largely above the fray. Instead of addressing critics, they have focused most of their attention on interpreting and creating international legal rules--and simply assumed that states will observe the rules. At the same time, an intellectual chasm has opened between students of law and students of politics: Legal scholars, for the most part, have ignored many questions about the role of political power, while political scientists, who think of power first and foremost, have tended to ignore international law. That division has prevented the emergence of a fuller view of the role of international law in the world.

But the chasm is closing. A new vein of scholarship, which takes international law seriously while examining it critically, confirms neither the greatest hopes of international law's advocates nor the greatest fears of its opponents. Consider a controversial study in the Journal of Public Economics (Feb. 1997) by James Murdoch and Todd Sandler. It suggests that the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone-Layer, often hailed as one of the most successful international agreements of modern times, had virtually no independent impact on countries' use of ozone-depleting gases. The authors argue that the treaty merely codified an existing trend of voluntary cutbacks in emissions. But a more recent study by Beth Simmons in the American Political Science Review (Dec. 2000) indicates that rules in the International Monetary Fund's Articles of Agreement governing the financial policies of national governments have indeed been effective in influencing behavior. It's not just IMF pressure that does the job, Simmons found, but the desire of individual countries to establish their credibility in world markets.

My own recent research on human rights treaties suggests that they have effects fairly different from what either friends or foes of international law would expect. Countries that sign and ratify human rights treaties turn out to have better human rights practices than those that fail to ratify. Yet the difference is not very large. And some of the countries that have joined human rights treaties have worse human rights practices than those that have not joined. For example, the countries that have ratified the 1987 Convention against Torture have torture practices that are, on average, nearly impossible to distinguish from those of countries that haven't ratified the convention. Among the ratifiers are states--including Algeria, China, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey--whose horrific abuses of their own citizens have been documented by the U.S. government and human rights organizations. Even more striking, states that have ratified regional conventions prohibiting torture, such as the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, have worse practices on average than those that have not.

The facts may be bad news for those who see human rights treaties as an instant elixir, but they also confound the predictions of critics, who see the treaties as mere window-dressing. States do not agree only to treaties that require them to do what they're already doing, as critics contend. They actually join treaties that commit them to do something more.

My research also indicates that human rights treaties do not always have the effect their proponents intend. For example, while states with better practices are, on the whole, more likely to join human rights treaties than those with worse practices, only the most democratic states appear to improve their practices after ratifying human rights treaties. Signing a treaty is no guarantee that a country will make improvements. Egypt, Cameroon, and Mexico were among the earliest to ratify the Convention against Torture, yet they continued to have some of the worst torture practices well into the 1990s. Among states with otherwise similar economic and political characteristics, some that ratify human rights accords actually indulge in worse practices than those that don't ratify them. And some of the most brutal episodes of mass killing since World War II--the massacres in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Yugo?slavia--occurred in countries that had ratified the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Understanding how international law works in the real world requires a reorientation of our thinking. The critics are undoubtedly right about at least one thing: International law is nothing like domestic law. Unlike effective domestic law, it lacks a sovereign with the power to enforce it. The closest thing to an international sovereign is the UN, and it has virtually none of the powers necessary for effective governance, most notably the power of enforcement (for which it must depend on member states). Fur?ther, international law is largely voluntary; states are, for the most part, not bound by it unless they accede to it. If the same were true in domestic law, we all could decide for ourselves whether the nation's criminal laws applied to us. Needless to say, the laws would work much less well if that were so.

Whether states will actually abide by international legal commitments once they are made is, of course, another issue altogether. Law that is not enforced will not be obeyed. That seems obvious. But a closer look suggests that the assertion is questionable. If enforcement were the only reason people followed the law, the world would be a much messier place. I refrain from taking property that does not belong to me not solely because I fear punishment by the state. I abide by the law for a complex mix of reasons, including--besides fear of enforcement by the state--my moral beliefs, internalization of the legal rule, fear of retribution by the wronged party, and concern for my reputation if others learn of my wrongdoing. Even if I know there's no chance the state will punish me, there are many reasons why I'm likely to abide by the law.

Countries, too, observe the law for multiple reasons, and fear of enforcement is unquestionably among the more important of them; international legal rules that incorporate penalties for violations are more likely to be followed. But states, like individuals, observe rules for many other reasons as well. Because central enforcement of international agreements is rare, parties to international legal agreements often enforce the agreements themselves. Indeed, many trade and arms control agreements are effectively enforced by the threat of tit-for-tat retaliation. States may also face internal political or legal pressure to adhere to international law. Especially in democratic nations, people outside government can use litigation, media exposure, and political challenges to compel governments to abide by their legal commitments. Such pressure is a key reason why states abide by their commitments under human rights treaties.

Concern for reputation is an additional powerful motivation for states to keep their international legal commitments. If violations are likely to be discovered (as is often true, for example, with violations of international trade laws), states will be disposed to follow international rules in order to foster a good impression among other members of the international community. By making themselves look good, they may hope to attract more foreign investment, aid donations, international trade, and other tangible benefits. They may also accept limits on their own actions to obtain similar limits on the actions of others. Thus, they may limit the tariffs they charge on imports, for example, to obtain a reciprocal easing of access to the markets of other states. But when violations of international commitments are difficult to detect--such as occurs with the dumping of toxic waste, excessive air pollution, or police abuse of suspects--violations are likely to be more common. And last but not least, let's not forget that government leaders may even be led, on occasion, by their own moral judgment to abide by international legal rules.

International law, in other words, is neither as weak as its detractors suggest nor as strong as its advocates claim. The events of the past year have made it painfully evident that international law is not the panacea some might hope it to be. Yet it remains a powerful tool for creating international order in a world that desperately needs it. The challenge now is to move beyond bitter and unproductive all-or-nothing debates over the effectiveness of international law and find ways of harnessing its real but limited power to change the world for the better.



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Oona A. Hathaway is an associate professor of law at Yale Law School. She is writing a book on the sources and effects of international law, and is co-authoring a volume with Harold Hongju Koh on the foundations of international law and politics.


Reprinted from Autumn 2003 Wilson Quarterly
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Tehran's Hidden Hand
Iran's mounting threats in Iraq.

By Jonathan Schanzer
The State Department's annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report was issued earlier this month, complete with its usual hit parade of terrorist groups, state sponsors and emerging trends. Predictably, Iran was singled out for the "planning of and support for terrorist acts," as well as assistance to "a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals." The report also fingers Iran for pursuing "a variety of policies in Iraq aimed at securing Tehran's perceived interests there, some of which ran counter to those of the Coalition." A statement castigating Iran for such activities was long overdue. However, Washington must now challenge Iran over this growing list of nefarious activities in Iraq that have been plaguing coalition reconstruction efforts.
Conventional Fighting. Ash-Sharq al-Awsat ran this headline on March 16, 2004: "American and Iranian Forces Exchange Fire on the Border." American officials claimed that one Iranian border guard was killed, and other reports indicated that three Iranians were killed, but Tehran denied that any such incident took place. This was not the first time that open hostilities were reported. Coalition officials indicated in January and February that Abu al-Khasib, the port just below Basra on the Shatt al-Arab, has been the scene of Iranian violence against Iraqis. Iranian Revolutionary Guards have opened fire upon Iraqi water patrols along the estuary separating their two countries. Iranian fighters are also inside Iraq, and they may or may not be sanctioned by Tehran. On February 14, when a number of guerrillas attacked a police station in Fallujah, it was learned that two of the slain guerrillas were Iranian. An insurgency attack the week before, according to U.S. sources, was an attempt to free a number of Iranians who had only recently been arrested in Fallujah.
Hezbollah & IRGC. In February 2004, during a Washington Institute fact-finding mission to Iraq, one Coalition official reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) offices were spotted in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Moreover, officials noted an immense amount of Hezbollah activity in the city of Karbala. Most of the activity was "intimidation and threats of intimidation...Mafia-type stuff." During our delegation's one day in Basra, we spotted a building that openly advertised the offices of Hezbollah. Members of this organization insisted that their Hezbollah was not tied to Tehran, and that the name, which means "Party of God," is a common one. According to one report in the Arabic paper al-Hayat, Iran sent some 90 Hezbollah fighters into Iraq shortly after Saddam's Iraq fell. The group now receives financing, training and weapons from Iran, and has a rapidly growing presence in the Shi'a south. Western intelligence officials also allege that the man who planned the recent suicide attacks in Basra is Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah operative responsible for bombing the U.S. embassy in Beirut in the early 1980s.
Propaganda. Even before the U.S.-led war on Iraq, Iran had begun beaming in Arabic-language television programming in an effort to gain a strategic propaganda foothold in the country -- and it has not stopped. Indeed, American labors to win hearts and minds through the television station, al-Iraqiyya, and Radio Sawa have been steadily undermined by these efforts. In April 2003, an Iranian journalist reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards brought into Iraq radio-transmission equipment, posters, and printed matter for the militia known as the Badr Corps. The Badr Corps is a militia that has not yet challenged the U.S., but it is run by SCIRI (the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq), which is known to have close ties to the Iranian regime.
Ansar al-Islam. Not enough attention has been given to the established ties between Iran and Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish al Qaeda affiliate. Before the war, Iran allowed Ansar al-Islam to operate openly along its borders in the extreme northeast mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, just shy of the Iranian border. Kurdish intelligence, with corroboration from imprisoned Ansar fighters, has established that Iran provided logistical support to the group by allowing the flow of goods and weapons. During periods of conflict with Kurdish militia units, the Peshmerga, Iran further provided a safe haven for these Islamist fighters. One Turkish newspaper also notes that Ansar al-Islam militants actually checked cars going into Iran (rather than coming into their stronghold), indicating close security coordination with the Islamic Republic. When the U.S. struck the Ansar al-Islam enclave in March 2003, Iran permitted many Kurdish fighters to flee across the border. They were later assisted back over the border -- with the help of Iran's Revolutionary Guards -- so that they could fight against American soldiers in the heart of Iraq. Kurdish intelligence has since intercepted between three and ten foreign fighters crossing Iranian border each week.
Moqtada al-Sadr. Iran sent a delegation to Iraq in mid-April to mediate between the rogue cleric and the U.S. administration. However, at the same time, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, an Iranian agent, has been supporting al-Sadr's anti-American efforts. A source from ash-Sharq al-Awsat estimates that Iran may have provided al-Sadr some $80 million in recent months. Further, Sadr's Mahdi army may now be getting training from Hezbollah, according to new intelligence reports. One Iranian source told ash-Sharq al-Awsat that Iran created three training camps along the Iran-Iraq border to train fighters from Sadr's militia.
In sum, Iran may be spending up to $70 million per month in Iraq. This pales in comparison to the billions spent by the U.S. Still, it is enough to undermine U.S. efforts. As such, Washington needs not only to better patrol the Iranian border, but also to confront clandestine Iranian activity within Iraq itself. Failure to do so will only encourage Iran to redouble its efforts to destabilize Iraq.
-- Jonathan Schanzer recently took part in a 12-day fact-finding mission to Iraq, sponsored by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/schanzer200405100900.asp
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London's Jihadists
The U.K. must crack down on resident Islamists.

By Rachel Ehrenfeld
While the world is busy denouncing the United States for the deplorable behavior of a few soldiers, it is oblivious to growing incitement by Islamist clerics against America and the West. Calling for jihad earlier this month in London, Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammad told his disciples: "All Muslims of the West will be obliged to become his sword" in a new battle. At the same time, another Islamist, Imam Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri, is preaching in London that "it's okay to kill [those who] work against Islam, by slitting their throats, or by shooting them."
Such incitement is prohibited by law in the U.K. Under the heading of "Inciting Terrorism Overseas," section 59 1(a), the Terrorism Act of 2000 clearly states that "a person commits an offence if he incites another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the United Kingdom." Needless to say, such an act would also constitute an offense if committed in England. Yet these imams and their ilk are free to call for murder with impunity.
The British allowance of this "free speech" has already resulted in a suicide-bombing attack -- in April 2003 in Tel Aviv -- that cost the lives of three Israelis and wounded more than 50. According to the prosecution attorney at the Old Bailey last week, this attack was planned by Hamas, which recruited British citizens Asif Muhammad Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif, whose family members are on trial in London for failing to inform the U.K. authorities. Considering this, and the fact that British law enforcement is busy exposing terrorist plots and arresting members of al Qaeda and other Islamist cells, while British soldiers are dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.K.'s reluctance to go after advocates of terrorism is puzzling.
This disregard for the law extends to written incitement in the form of magazines and websites, originating from England, calling for jihad. Although Hamas was finally outlawed in the U.K. in September 2003, its publication, Filisteen Almuslima (Muslim Palestine), continued to be published in and distributed from London to the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S. In fact, the cover of that September issue carried the horrifying picture of the bloody casualties from a dissevered bus in Jerusalem, as well as the glorified image of the suicide bomber who murdered 23 innocent civilians, many of them babies, and wounded 136.
Inside, the magazine praises and justifies the terrorist attack against Israelis and glorifies the terrorist, Raid Misk, as a heroic role model for potential suicide bombers against oppressors of Islam everywhere. It quotes the Koranic verse that, according to Hamas, gives Islamic religious justification for suicide bombings: "Among the believers, there are men who have been true to their covenant with Allah: Some of them [have already fulfilled their vows and] found their death [in battle]; and some still wait [their turn]. However, they have not in any way broken [their vows]" (Sura 33, verse 23).
And Filisteen Almuslima is not the only Islamist magazine published in and distributed from England, inciting hate, spreading anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Semitic messages, with pro-jihad, pro-terrorist propaganda and calls for suicide bombings.
Al-Sunnah, another Islamist fundamentalist magazine published in the U.K., called in February 2003 for suicide operations against the United States, saying, "There is no other way for the youth of this nation [Islam] other than suicide operations."
Risalat al-Ikhwan (Message of the Brotherhood) is also a London publication with Muslim subscribers worldwide. This magazine serves as center stage for spreading radical Islamist ideology in the best tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood. This Egyptian terrorist organization was outlawed by Gamal Abd al-Nasser in the 1950s, and despite its influence on Hamas and other internationally outlawed terrorist organizations, it is still out in the open in Western countries.
In October 2003, Risalat al-Ikhwan called for: "Active resistance (muqaawamah) to the occupation and the use of any available means to resist it are a religious Moslem duty, a national duty and a natural right anchored in both international law and the United Nations Charter." More of this can be found on Hamas's website.
Judging by the opposition Prime Minister Blair is facing, it seems that these publications influence, among others, former British diplomats, 50 of whom sent him a letter on April 26, 2004, protesting his support of U.S. Middle East policy, stating: "To describe the resistance [in Iraq] as led by terrorists, fanatics and foreigners is neither convincing nor helpful." These diplomats, in the tradition of Islamist-Arab propaganda, continue to argue, like Lakhdar Brahimi, that Israel is the cause -- that it has for "decades poisoned relations between the West and the Islamic and Arab worlds." It is not surprising, therefore, that the resignation of Liberal Democrat MP Jenny Tonge was not required after she condoned Palestinian suicide bombings, stating in parliament, "I would be a suicide bomber in Israel."
A police source in London, when asked why this incitement is allowed, responded that law-enforcement officials are "unhappy with the situation," but that they are unable to prosecute the instigators because "our hands are tied. It's a political decision." Political leaders ought to heed the warning sirens before the terrorists strike -- as promised.

-- Rachel Ehrenfeld, author of Funding Evil; How Terrorism is Financed -- and How to Stop It, is director of the New York-based American Center for Democracy.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ehrenfeld200405100910.asp


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Study: Many Federal Sites Not Terror Risks

May 10, 1:52 PM (ET)
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN
WASHINGTON (AP) - Federal officials should consider reopening public access to about three dozen Web sites withdrawn from the Internet after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, a government-financed study says, because the sites pose little or no risk to homeland security.
The Rand Corp. said the overwhelming majority of federal Web sites that reveal information about airports, power plants, military bases and other potential terrorist targets need not be censored because similar or better information is easily available elsewhere.
Rand identified four Web pages that might merit the restrictions imposed after the attacks.
"It's a good time to take a closer look at the choices that they made at the time," said John Baker, principal author of the study, which was funded by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the government's intelligence mapping agency.
Advocates of open government said the report shows the Bush administration acted rashly after the suicide attacks when it scrubbed numerous government Web sites.
"It was a gigantic mistake, and I hope the study brings some rationality back to this policy," said Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists' project on government secrecy. "Up to now, decisions have been made on a knee-jerk basis."
Rand's National Defense Research Institute identified 629 Internet-accessible federal databases that contain critical data about specific locations. Co-author Beth Lachman said they "appeared to be the most sensitive sites" among 5,000 federal Web pages the researchers checked.
The study, conducted between mid-2002 and mid-2003, found no federal Web sites that contained target information essential to a terrorist - in other words, information a terrorist would need to launch an attack.
It identified four databases - less than 1 percent of the 629 - where restricting access probably would enhance homeland security. None was available to the general public anymore. Those sites included two devoted to pipelines, one to nuclear reactors and one to dams.
Researchers recommended that officials evaluate 66 databases with some useful information, but they didn't anticipate restrictions would be needed because similar or better data probably could be easily obtained elsewhere.
The remaining 559 databases "are probably not significant for addressing attackers' information needs and do not warrant any type of public restriction," the report said. It said that any information they contain that could be useful to terrorists is easily obtained elsewhere, often by simple, legal observation in an open society.
The Rand researchers found that 30 federal agencies or departments make public, on paper or online, "geospatial information" about critical or symbolic locations and structures. That kind of data can be as simple as a telephone book or as complex as an Internet database that discloses how many people live near each of the nation's power plants or toxic chemical storage sites.
After Sept. 11, federal agencies scrambled to pull such data off the Internet. The Transportation Department removed pipeline maps. The Environmental Protection Agency deleted descriptions of risk management plans for chemicals stored at 15,000 sites. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission took down its Web site, although much of it is now back online.
Using Internet archives that preserve old Web pages or detailed written descriptions, researchers identified 39 federal geospatial databases taken off-line since Sept. 11.
Other than the four databases that posed some risk, "these restrictions need to be more thoroughly assessed," the researchers wrote.
"Under the circumstances, these officials took prudent steps but in a very piecemeal, patchwork way," Baker said.
The study proposed a framework for analyzing and possibly restoring such data to the Internet:
_How useful would it be to an attacker? Far more detailed information is needed to plan an attack than to pick a target, but most federal Web sites are too general to help with more than target selection.
_Is similar or better data readily available elsewhere? If so, "the net security benefits of restricting access ... may be minimal or nonexistent" and could "possibly lead ... to a false sense of security at worst."
_Does the gain in security from restrictions outweigh any harm to those using the data, such as police and fire departments, economic planners or private companies?
For instance, Rand advocated that an Environmental Protection Agency Web site that discloses where toxic chemicals are stored and in what quantity should not be restricted because its value to terrorists is outweighed by its value to communities preparing for emergencies.
Restricting the site would "diminish the public good that comes from providing local communities access to information that can significantly affect the well-being of citizens," the study said.
To demonstrate the futility of removing government data that isn't unique, Rand researchers picked out 300 non-federal Web sites that had similar or better information about critical U.S. targets than federal pages.
For instance, an online scuba magazine contains a divers' description of the ocean depths and currents around an oil-drilling platform off the southern California coast that would be more useful to terrorists than the federal sites that described the platform.

On the Net:
Rand Corp. study: http://www.rand.org/publications
Federation of American Scientists secrecy project: http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction325&projectId5

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CHAIN OF COMMAND
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
How the Department of Defense mishandled the disaster at Abu Ghraib.
Issue of 2004-05-17
Posted 2004-05-09
In his devastating report on conditions at Abu Ghraib prison, in Iraq, Major General Antonio M. Taguba singled out only three military men for praise. One of them, Master-at-Arms William J. Kimbro, a Navy dog handler, should be commended, Taguba wrote, because he "knew his duties and refused to participate in improper interrogations despite significant pressure from the MI"--military intelligence--"personnel at Abu Ghraib." Elsewhere in the report it became clear what Kimbro would not do: American soldiers, Taguba said, used "military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee."
Taguba's report was triggered by a soldier's decision to give Army investigators photographs of the sexual humiliation and abuse of prisoners. These images were first broadcast on "60 Minutes II" on April 28th. Seven enlisted members of the 372nd Military Police Company of the 320th Military Police Battalion, an Army reserve unit, are now facing prosecution, and six officers have been reprimanded. Last week, I was given another set of digital photographs, which had been in the possession of a member of the 320th. According to a time sequence embedded in the digital files, the photographs were taken by two different cameras over a twelve-minute period on the evening of December 12, 2003, two months after the military-police unit was assigned to Abu Ghraib.
An Iraqi prisoner and American military dog handlers. Other photographs show the Iraqi on the ground, bleeding.
One of the new photographs shows a young soldier, wearing a dark jacket over his uniform and smiling into the camera, in the corridor of the jail. In the background are two Army dog handlers, in full camouflage combat gear, restraining two German shepherds. The dogs are barking at a man who is partly obscured from the camera's view by the smiling soldier. Another image shows that the man, an Iraqi prisoner, is naked. His hands are clasped behind his neck and he is leaning against the door to a cell, contorted with terror, as the dogs bark a few feet away. Other photographs show the dogs straining at their leashes and snarling at the prisoner. In another, taken a few minutes later, the Iraqi is lying on the ground, writhing in pain, with a soldier sitting on top of him, knee pressed to his back. Blood is streaming from the inmate's leg. Another photograph is a closeup of the naked prisoner, from his waist to his ankles, lying on the floor. On his right thigh is what appears to be a bite or a deep scratch. There is another, larger wound on his left leg, covered in blood.
There is at least one other report of violence involving American soldiers, an Army dog, and Iraqi citizens, but it was not in Abu Ghraib. Cliff Kindy, a member of the Christian Peacemaker Teams, a church-supported group that has been monitoring the situation in Iraq, told me that last November G.I.s unleashed a military dog on a group of civilians during a sweep in Ramadi, about thirty miles west of Fallujah. At first, Kindy told me, "the soldiers went house to house, and arrested thirty people." (One of them was Saad al-Khashab, an attorney with the Organization for Human Rights in Iraq, who told Kindy about the incident.) While the thirty detainees were being handcuffed and laid on the ground, a firefight broke out nearby; when it ended, the Iraqis were shoved into a house. Khashab told Kindy that the American soldiers then "turned the dog loose inside the house, and several people were bitten." (The Defense Department said that it was unable to comment about the incident before The New Yorker went to press.)
When I asked retired Major General Charles Hines, who was commandant of the Army's military-police school during a twenty-eight-year career in military law enforcement, about these reports, he reacted with dismay. "Turning a dog loose in a room of people? Loosing dogs on prisoners of war? I've never heard of it, and it would never have been tolerated," Hines said. He added that trained police dogs have long been a presence in Army prisons, where they are used for sniffing out narcotics and other contraband among the prisoners, and, occasionally, for riot control. But, he said, "I would never have authorized it for interrogating or coercing prisoners. If I had, I'd have been put in jail or kicked out of the Army."
The International Red Cross and human-rights groups have repeatedly complained during the past year about the American military's treatment of Iraqi prisoners, with little success. In one case, disclosed last month by the Denver Post, three Army soldiers from a military-intelligence battalion were accused of assaulting a female Iraqi inmate at Abu Ghraib. After an administrative review, the three were fined "at least five hundred dollars and demoted in rank," the newspaper said.
Army commanders had a different response when, on January 13th, a military policeman presented Army investigators with a computer disk containing graphic photographs. The images were being swapped from computer to computer throughout the 320th Battalion. The Army's senior commanders immediately understood they had a problem--a looming political and public-relations disaster that would taint America and damage the war effort.
One of the first soldiers to be questioned was Ivan Frederick, the M.P. sergeant who was in charge of a night shift at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, who has been ordered to face a court-martial in Iraq for his role in the abuse, kept a running diary that began with a knock on his door by agents of the Army's Criminal Investigations Division (C.I.D.) at two-thirty in the morning on January 14th. "I was escorted . . . to the front door of our building, out of sight from my room," Frederick wrote, "while . . . two unidentified males stayed in my room. `Are they searching my room?'" He was told yes. Frederick later formally agreed to permit the agents to search for cameras, computers, and storage devices.
On January 16th, three days after the Army received the pictures, Central Command issued a blandly worded, five-sentence press release about an investigation into the mistreatment of prisoners. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said last week that it was then that he learned of the allegations. At some point soon afterward, Rumsfeld informed President Bush. On January 19th, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the officer in charge of American forces in Iraq, ordered a secret investigation into Abu Ghraib. Two weeks later, General Taguba was ordered to conduct his inquiry. He submitted his report on February 26th. By then, according to testimony before the Senate last week by General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, people "inside our building" had discussed the photographs. Myers, by his own account, had still not read the Taguba report or seen the photographs, yet he knew enough about the abuses to persuade "60 Minutes II" to delay its story.
At a Pentagon news conference last week, Rumsfeld and Marine General Peter Pace, the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisted that the investigation into Abu Ghraib had moved routinely through the chain of command. If the Army had been slow, it was because of built-in safeguards. Pace told the journalists, "It's important to know that as investigations are completed they come up the chain of command in a very systematic way. So that the individual who reports in writing [sends it] up to the next level commander. But he or she takes time, a week or two weeks, three weeks, whatever it takes, to read all of the documentation, get legal advice [and] make the decisions that are appropriate at his or her level. . . . That way everyone's rights are protected and we have the opportunity systematically to take a look at the entire process."
In interviews, however, retired and active-duty officers and Pentagon officials said that the system had not worked. Knowledge of the nature of the abuses--and especially the politically toxic photographs--had been severely, and unusually, restricted. "Everybody I've talked to said, `We just didn't know'--not even in the J.C.S.," one well-informed former intelligence official told me, emphasizing that he was referring to senior officials with whom such allegations would normally be shared. "I haven't talked to anybody on the inside who knew--nowhere. It's got them scratching their heads." A senior Pentagon official said that many of the senior generals in the Army were similarly out of the loop on the Abu Ghraib allegations.
Within the Pentagon, there was a spate of fingerpointing last week. One top general complained to a colleague that the commanders in Iraq should have taken C4, a powerful explosive, and blown up Abu Ghraib last spring, with all of its "emotional baggage"--the prison was known for its brutality under Saddam Hussein--instead of turning it into an American facility. "This is beyond the pale in terms of lack of command attention," a retired major general told me, speaking of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. "Where were the flag officers? And I'm not just talking about a one-star," he added, referring to Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, the commander at Abu Ghraib who was relieved of duty. "This was a huge leadership failure."
The Pentagon official told me that many senior generals believe that, along with the civilians in Rumsfeld's office, General Sanchez and General John Abizaid, who is in charge of the Central Command, in Tampa, Florida, had done their best to keep the issue quiet in the first months of the year. The official chain of command flows from General Sanchez, in Iraq, to Abizaid, and on to Rumsfeld and President Bush. "You've got to match action, or nonaction, with interests," the Pentagon official said. "What is the motive for not being forthcoming? They foresaw major diplomatic problems."
Secrecy and wishful thinking, the Pentagon official said, are defining characteristics of Rumsfeld's Pentagon, and shaped its response to the reports from Abu Ghraib. "They always want to delay the release of bad news--in the hope that something good will break," he said. The habit of procrastination in the face of bad news led to disconnects between Rumsfeld and the Army staff officers who were assigned to planning for troop requirements in Iraq. A year ago, the Pentagon official told me, when it became clear that the Army would have to call up more reserve units to deal with the insurgency, "we had call-up orders that languished for thirty or forty days in the office of the Secretary of Defense." Rumsfeld's staff always seemed to be waiting for something to turn up--for the problem to take care of itself, without any additional troops. The official explained, "They were hoping that they wouldn't have to make a decision." The delay meant that soldiers in some units about to be deployed had only a few days to prepare wills and deal with other family and financial issues.
The same deliberate indifference to bad news was evident in the past year, the Pentagon official said, when the Army conducted a series of elaborate war games. Planners would present best-case, moderate-case, and worst-case scenarios, in an effort to assess where the Iraq war was headed and to estimate future troop needs. In every case, the number of troops actually required exceeded the worst-case analysis. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and civilian officials in the Pentagon continued to insist that future planning be based on the most optimistic scenario. "The optimistic estimate was that at this point in time"--mid-2004--"the U.S. Army would need only a handful of combat brigades in Iraq," the Pentagon official said. "There are nearly twenty now, with the international coalition drying up. They were wildly off the mark." The official added, "From the beginning, the Army community was saying that the projections and estimates were unrealistic." Now, he said, "we're struggling to maintain a hundred and thirty-five thousand troops while allowing soldiers enough time back home."
In his news conference last Tuesday, Rumsfeld, when asked whether he thought the photographs and stories from Abu Ghraib were a setback for American policy in Iraq, still seemed to be in denial. "Oh, I'm not one for instant history," he responded. By Friday, however, with some members of Congress and with editorials calling for his resignation, Rumsfeld testified at length before House and Senate committees and apologized for what he said was "fundamentally un-American" wrongdoing at Abu Ghraib. He also warned that more, and even uglier, disclosures were to come. Rumsfeld said that he had not actually looked at any of the Abu Ghraib photographs until some of them appeared in press accounts, and hadn't reviewed the Army's copies until the day before. When he did, they were "hard to believe," he said. "There are other photos that depict . . . acts that can only be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel, and inhuman." Later, he said, "It's going to get still more terrible, I'm afraid." Rumsfeld added, "I failed to recognize how important it was."
NBC News later quoted U.S. military officials as saying that the unreleased photographs showed American soldiers "severely beating an Iraqi prisoner nearly to death, having sex with a female Iraqi prisoner, and `acting inappropriately with a dead body.' The officials said there also was a videotape, apparently shot by U.S. personnel, showing Iraqi guards raping young boys."
No amount of apologetic testimony or political spin last week could mask the fact that, since the attacks of September 11th, President Bush and his top aides have seen themselves as engaged in a war against terrorism in which the old rules did not apply. In the privacy of his office, Rumsfeld chafed over what he saw as the reluctance of senior Pentagon generals and admirals to act aggressively. By mid-2002, he and his senior aides were exchanging secret memorandums on modifying the culture of the military leaders and finding ways to encourage them "to take greater risks." One memo spoke derisively of the generals in the Pentagon, and said, "Our prerequisite of perfection for `actionable intelligence' has paralyzed us. We must accept that we may have to take action before every question can be answered." The Defense Secretary was told that he should "break the `belt-and-suspenders' mindset within today's military . . . we `over-plan' for every contingency. . . . We must be willing to accept the risks." With operations involving the death of foreign enemies, the memo went on, the planning should not be carried out in the Pentagon: "The result will be decision by committee."
The Pentagon's impatience with military protocol extended to questions about the treatment of prisoners caught in the course of its military operations. Soon after 9/11, as the war on terror got under way, Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly made public his disdain for the Geneva conventions. Complaints about America's treatment of prisoners, Rumsfeld said in early 2002, amounted to "isolated pockets of international hyperventilation."
The effort to determine what happened at Abu Ghraib has evolved into a sprawling set of related investigations, some of them hastily put together, including inquiries into twenty-five suspicious deaths. Investigators have become increasingly concerned with the role played not only by military and intelligence officials but also by C.I.A. agents and private-contract employees. In a statement, the C.I.A. acknowledged that its Inspector General had an investigation under way into abuses at Abu Ghraib, which extended to the death of a prisoner. A source familiar with one of the investigations told me that the victim was the man whose photograph, which shows his battered body packed in ice, has circulated around the world. A Justice Department prosecutor has been assigned to the case. The source also told me that an Army intelligence operative and a judge advocate general were seeking, through their lawyers, to negotiate immunity from prosecution in return for testimony.
The relationship between military policing and intelligence forces inside the Army prison system reached a turning point last fall in response to the insurgency against the Coalition Provisional Authority. "This is a fight for intelligence," Brigadier General Martin Dempsey, commander of the 1st Armored Division, told a reporter at a Baghdad press briefing in November. "Do I have enough soldiers? The answer is absolutely yes. The larger issue is, how do I use them and on what basis? And the answer to that is intelligence . . . to try to figure out how to take all this human intelligence as it comes in to us [and] turn it into something that's actionable." The Army prison system would now be asked to play its part.
Two months earlier, Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander of the task force in charge of the prison at Guant?namo, had brought a team of experts to Iraq to review the Army program. His recommendation was radical: that Army prisons be geared, first and foremost, to interrogations and the gathering of information needed for the war effort. "Detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation . . . to provide a safe, secure and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence," Miller wrote. The military police on guard duty at the prisons should make support of military intelligence a priority.
General Sanchez agreed, and on November 19th his headquarters issued an order formally giving the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade tactical control over the prison. General Taguba fearlessly took issue with the Sanchez orders, which, he wrote in his report, "effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agenda assigned to each of these respective specialties."
Taguba also criticized Miller's report, noting that "the intelligence value of detainees held at . . . Guant?namo is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities in Iraq. . . . There are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib. These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaeda." Taguba noted that Miller's recommendations "appear to be in conflict" with other studies and with Army regulations that call for military-police units to have control of the prison system. By placing military-intelligence operatives in control instead, Miller's recommendations and Sanchez's change in policy undoubtedly played a role in the abuses at Abu Ghraib. General Taguba concluded that certain military-intelligence officers and civilian contractors at Abu Ghraib were "either directly or indirectly responsible" for the abuses, and urged that they be subjected to disciplinary action.
In late March, before the Abu Ghraib scandal became publicly known, Geoffrey Miller was transferred from Guant?namo and named head of prison operations in Iraq. "We have changed this--trust us," Miller told reporters in early May. "There were errors made. We have corrected those. We will make sure that they do not happen again."
Military-intelligence personnel assigned to Abu Ghraib repeatedly wore "sterile," or unmarked, uniforms or civilian clothes while on duty. "You couldn't tell them apart," the source familiar with the investigation said. The blurring of identities and organizations meant that it was impossible for the prisoners, or, significantly, the military policemen on duty, to know who was doing what to whom, and who had the authority to give orders. Civilian employees at the prison were not bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but they were bound by civilian law--though it is unclear whether American or Iraqi law would apply.
One of the employees involved in the interrogations at Abu Ghraib, according to the Taguba report, was Steven Stefanowicz, a civilian working for CACI International, a Virginia-based company. Private companies like CACI and Titan Corp. could pay salaries of well over a hundred thousand dollars for the dangerous work in Iraq, far more than the Army pays, and were permitted, as never before in U.S. military history, to handle sensitive jobs. (In a briefing last week, General Miller confirmed that Stefanowicz had been reassigned to administrative duties. A CACI spokeswoman declined to comment on any employee in Iraq, citing safety concerns, but said that the company still had not heard anything directly from the government about Stefanowicz.)
Stefanowicz and his colleagues conducted most, if not all, of their interrogations in the Abu Ghraib facilities known to the soldiers as the Wood Building and the Steel Building. The interrogation centers were rarely visited by the M.P.s, a source familiar with the investigation said. The most important prisoners--the suspected insurgency members deemed to be High Value Detainees--were housed at Camp Cropper, near the Baghdad airport, but the pressure on soldiers to accede to requests from military intelligence was felt throughout the system.
Not everybody went along. A company captain in a military-police unit in Baghdad told me last week that he was approached by a junior intelligence officer who requested that his M.P.s keep a group of detainees awake around the clock until they began talking. "I said, `No, we will not do that,'" the captain said. "The M.I. commander comes to me and says, `What is the problem? We're stressed, and all we are asking you to do is to keep them awake.' I ask, `How? You've received training on that, but my soldiers don't know how to do it. And when you ask an eighteen-year-old kid to keep someone awake, and he doesn't know how to do it, he's going to get creative.'" The M.I. officer took the request to the captain's commander, but, the captain said, "he backed me up.
"It's all about people. The M.P.s at Abu Ghraib were failed by their commanders--both low-ranking and high," the captain said. "The system is broken--no doubt about it. But the Army is made up of people, and we've got to depend on them to do the right thing."
In his report, Taguba strongly suggested that there was a link between the interrogation process in Afghanistan and the abuses at Abu Ghraib. A few months after General Miller's report, Taguba wrote, General Sanchez, apparently troubled by reports of wrongdoing in Army jails in Iraq, asked Army Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general, to carry out a study of military prisons. In the resulting study, which is still classified, Ryder identified a conflict between military policing and military intelligence dating back to the Afghan war. He wrote, "Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews."
One of the most prominent prisoners of the Afghan war was John Walker Lindh, the twenty-one-year-old Californian who was captured in December, 2001. Lindh was accused of training with Al Qaeda terrorists and conspiring to kill Americans. A few days after his arrest, according to a federal-court affidavit filed by his attorney, James Brosnahan, a group of armed American soldiers "blindfolded Mr. Lindh, and took several pictures of Mr. Lindh and themselves with Mr. Lindh. In one, the soldiers scrawled `shithead' across Mr. Lindh's blindfold and posed with him. . . . Another told Mr. Lindh that he was `going to hang' for his actions and that after he was dead, the soldiers would sell the photographs and give the money to a Christian organization." Some of the photographs later made their way to the American media. Lindh was later stripped naked, bound to a stretcher with duct tape, and placed in a windowless shipping container. Once again, the affidavit said, "military personnel photographed Mr. Lindh as he lay on the stretcher." On July 15, 2002, Lindh agreed to plead guilty to carrying a gun while serving in the Taliban and received a twenty-year jail term. During that process, Brosnahan told me, "the Department of Defense insisted that we state that there was `no deliberate' mistreatment of John." His client agreed to do so, but, the attorney noted, "Against that, you have that photograph of a naked John on that stretcher."
The photographing of prisoners, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, seems to have been not random but, rather, part of the dehumanizing interrogation process. The Times published an interview last week with Hayder Sabbar Abd, who claimed, convincingly, to be one of the mistreated Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib photographs. Abd told Ian Fisher, the Times reporter, that his ordeal had been recorded, almost constantly, by cameras, which added to his humiliation. He remembered how the camera flashed repeatedly as soldiers told to him to masturbate and beat him when he refused.
One lingering mystery is how Ryder could have conducted his review last fall, in the midst of the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, without managing to catch it. (Ryder told a Pentagon press briefing last week that his trip to Iraq "was not an inspection or an investigation. . . . It was an assessment.") In his report to Sanchez, Ryder flatly declared that "there were no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices." Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as an agent of the C.I.D., told me that Ryder was in a bureaucratic bind. The Army had revised its command structure last fall, and Ryder, as provost marshal, was now the commanding general of all military-police units as well as of the C.I.D. He was, in essence, being asked to investigate himself. "What Ryder should have done was set up a C.I.D. task force headed by an 0-6"--full colonel--"with fifteen agents, and begin interviewing everybody and taking sworn statements," Rowell said. "He had to answer questions about the prisons in September, when Sanchez asked for an assessment." At the time, Rowell added, the Army prison system was unprepared for the demands the insurgency placed on it. "Ryder was a man in a no-win situation," Rowell said. "As provost marshal, if he'd turned a C.I.D. task force loose, he could be in harm's way--because he's also boss of the military police. He was being eaten alive."
Ryder may have protected himself, but Taguba did not. "He's not regarded as a hero in some circles in the Pentagon," a retired Army major general said of Taguba. "He's the guy who blew the whistle, and the Army will pay the price for his integrity. The leadership does not like to have people make bad news public."

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CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE
by GEORGE PACKER
Will moderate Iraqis embrace democracy--or Islamist radicalism?
Issue of 2004-05-17
Posted 2004-05-10
On the March morning I visited the Baghdad morgue, which is in a decaying neighborhood near the Tigris River, a young forensic-medicine specialist named Dr. Bashir Shaker was on duty. It was the day after Ashura, one of the most important religious holidays on the Shiite calendar, which commemorates the murder of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, and the massacre of his followers at Karbala, in 680 A.D. Thirteen hundred and twenty-four years later, Baghdad was festooned with the symbols of Shiite piety and penitence: the red flags of Hussein's blood, the green flags of Islam, the black flags of grief bearing messages such as "Hussein Taught Us to Become Victims in Order to Gain Victory." For the first time in decades, Iraqi Shiites felt free to observe the day of martyrdom and the forty days of full-throated mourning that follow. The chants, the parades, the beating of chests, and the flaying of backs in ceremonies of atonement also became displays of collective power.
The shrines of Baghdad and Karbala were therefore unusually crowded with black-clad Shiite pilgrims that day--and when suicide bombers in their midst detonated a series of explosions it was the worst civilian massacre since the start of the war. The death toll in the two cities was at least a hundred and eighty, and the Baghdad morgue became a charnel house filled with bodies, heads, limbs, and buckets of flesh. Outside the morgue, a man waited to enter and look for the corpse of an eleven-year-old boy, a neighbor, whose father lay wounded in the hospital. Others were leaving with rags still pressed to their faces, a response to the stench inside. The authorities were rushing to complete the process of identification. There would be no forensic autopsies of the victims, Shaker told me; these followers of Hussein were Shiite martyrs, and Islam forbade the violation of their bodies.
Before the American invasion of Iraq, Dr. Shaker said, only one murder victim arrived at the city morgue each month. This statistic underscores two conditions of Iraqi life under Saddam Hussein: the state had a near-monopoly on killing, and most of the victims of the state disappeared into unmarked mass graves. One unintended effect of Iraq's liberation from Baathist tyranny has been the widespread dispersal of violence. In occupied Iraq, between fifteen and twenty-five murder victims arrive at the Baghdad morgue daily, most of them with gunshot wounds. Shaker estimated that five cases a week involve Baathists executed in reprisal killings; their families typically retrieve the bodies without informing the police. With barely functioning courts, a weak, ill-trained, and often corrupt new police force, a foreign occupier that has failed to provide security, and a pervasive atmosphere of lawlessness, Iraqis don't expect the justice that was denied them during the reign of Saddam Hussein to materialize anytime soon.
The day I visited, Shaker said that he was reviewing "an interesting case," unrelated to the Ashura bombings. The body of a woman, forty-one years old and never married, had recently been discovered with six gunshot wounds in the chest. Shaker's initial examination had found that the woman appeared not to be a virgin, and the number of gunshots suggested that the murder was premeditated. These details cast suspicion on her family: Shaker said that such a crime was called "washing the shame." Honor killing is an old custom in Iraq, he said, though in this case there was a new element: before the war, the family would have burned or drowned the woman to disguise the murder. "Now you can kill and go," Shaker said. "No need to cover the crime." The standard sentence for "washing the shame" is six months.
The woman's case was referred to a committee of five doctors, including Iraq's leading hymen expert. To Shaker's surprise, the committee found that the woman's hymen was extremely thin but intact. Case closed: the family would not be investigated, and, without the means to find other clues, the police would seal the woman's file.
Down the hall from the morgue, which is in a squat, two-story yellow building called the Medico-Legal Institute, is an examination room with a reclining chair and stirrups. This is where virginity exams on living subjects take place--most of them on suspected prostitutes, but also on runaways, kidnapping victims, and girls who have suffered an accident and whose parents, for the sake of marriageability, want a medical certificate establishing their purity.
An entire subspecialty of forensic medicine in Iraq deals with virginity, Shaker said. In any criminal case involving a woman, it's the most important piece of information. "It rules our life," he added. The surprising thing about these details of his profession is their ordinariness. In the West, Iraqis developed a reputation for cosmopolitan modernity that is now decades out of date. In order to win the support of Iraq's clerics, Saddam obliged people to adopt a harsh form of traditional Islam. In private matters of religion, family, and the treatment of women, the vast majority of Iraqis are far more conservative than most outsiders understand.
In March, 2003, a week before the start of the war, a sixteen-year-old girl whom the Baathist police had found wandering disoriented through the streets was brought to the Medico-Legal Institute. Upon examining her, Shaker found that her virginity had been recently and violently taken. The girl, named Raghda, was beautiful, with pale skin and large, dark eyes, and she was so miserable she could hardly speak. Raghda seemed nothing like the teen-age prostitutes Shaker examined, and he gently persuaded her to tell him what had happened.
Raghda had gone to audition as a television announcer at the studio owned by Uday Hussein, Saddam's psychopathic older son. Along with the six other finalists, she was taken to a room where Uday--crippled from a 1996 assassination attempt--was seated in a chair, holding a pistol in his lap. He ordered the girls to undress and walk in a circle around his chair. When one girl begged to be excused, Uday shot her dead. After that, the other girls, including Raghda, did as they were told. In the following days, Uday (who was committing some of his last crimes in power, while an invasion force gathered along Iraq's southern border) raped the girls, then threw them out on the street, drugged, with a wad of cash, which was how Raghda was found by the police. When she told them her story, they gave her a beating and then took her to the Medico-Legal Institute.
"If you want to help me," Raghda told the doctor, "go tell my parents their daughter was found dead."
On March 18th, two days before the war started, Shaker completed Raghda's paperwork. "Notice that there is the appearance of complete hymen rupture from the top to the base," he wrote. "In conclusion, the hymen membrane was ruptured longer than two weeks ago; I cannot say how long. End of report." Raghda was returned to the police; Shaker never learned her fate.
Shaker served in the Iraqi Army and, a decade ago, took part in the occupation of Kuwait. Now he handles Baghdad's nightly traffic of violent death. One Friday brought thirty-two bodies, including two foreign engineers--one German, one Dutch--who had been gunned down by insurgents on a road south of Baghdad, and two Iraqi journalists shot to death by American soldiers as they drove away from a checkpoint. For Shaker, such cases are purely intellectual matters. He told me without emotion that his testimony in trials has sent homosexuals to execution. The effect of this dispassion shows in the cold, handsome gaze of his blue eyes; in his direct, uninflected manner of speaking; and in the way his smile turns almost automatically into a sneer. But he hadn't got over Raghda.
When I met him, Shaker said he was looking for a change in his life: "Any change, better or worse." He had a restless mind and hated boredom, and, since the Americans represented something new, he welcomed spending time with me. I assumed that this forward-thinking man of science--with a flat-top haircut and clean-shaven jaw--wanted a relatively secular, liberal Iraq. I kept waiting for him to catch my eye in the middle of one of his clinical descriptions and shake his head over the backwardness of a society obsessed with virginity and prostitution. It never happened.
Shaker was born in 1968, the year the Baath Party came to power. "For thirty-five years, I feel I was dead," he said. "Only these last weeks I'm beginning to live." The fall of Saddam and the arrival of foreign occupiers--who happened to be the makers of his favorite old movies--had, at last, brought the chance for a new life. Eager to obtain travel documents and venture outside Iraq, he sold his private dermatology practice and a piece of land he'd received as a former soldier. His first foreign trip was to Amman, Jordan, where he had arranged to meet an Iraqi girl who was living in exile in Amsterdam. They married after two days. "Like a movie," he said. His wife is still in Amsterdam, but the plan is for her to move to Baghdad, once the city returns to calm.
Though Shaker was initially grateful to the foreign occupiers, the disorder on Baghdad's streets disillusioned him. The morgue reflected that chaos--it had the improvised, filthy atmosphere of a front-line hospital. There were pools of blood on the floor, and empty stretchers attracted flies. In the hall, bodies lay uncovered on tables: a man with a broad mustache and a slashed throat, found naked under a pile of garbage in a middle-class district; a man with a gunshot wound in his head, his blue eyes open and filmy; the small, blackened corpse of a badly burned woman. Amid the gloomy chill of the refrigerated room, six other naked bodies lay sprawled on the floor, two women and four men. One of the women, believed to be a prostitute, had been shot through the nipple--by a relative, Shaker assumed.
These days, the morgue overflows, but the examination room down the hall is usually empty. Before the war, it was the other way around; Shaker used to perform five or six virginity exams a day. Shaker is a Shiite Muslim, and he was appalled by this inversion of the normal order. In his view, a fragile moral relationship existed between the two sections of the Medico-Legal Institute--as if the social control of virginity offered a defense against the anarchy that led to murder. He noted that in Iran, an Islamist theocracy, prostitutes were publicly whipped. He thought the same practice should be instituted in Iraq--where the sex trade, he claimed, had reached epidemic proportions in the lawlessness of the occupation. "It's strict, it's horrible, but it has good results," he said of Islamic law. "Prostitution now is normal here." He blamed the Americans for the moral laxity in Baghdad, and especially L. Paul Bremer, the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, for threatening, in February, to veto any interim constitution that declared Islam to be the principal basis of federal law. "When they give everybody their rights, it's causing bad things in society--it's corrupting us," Shaker said. "If Islam is the main source of law, none of these things would happen."
The doctor said that he belonged to "the middle level of mind" in Iraqi society, somewhere between the strictly religious masses and the secular ?lite. "There are many Iraqis like me," he said. In Iraq, there is nothing unusual about a doctor who loves Marilyn Monroe and Cary Grant, desires the public whipping of prostitutes, and believes that executed homosexuals got what they deserved. Yet Shaker's mix of traditional and modern views causes him considerable inner conflict. "I hate Iraq," he said. "And I love it." He longs to live abroad, but fears the moral climate outside the country. He is wary of the Western images that appear on his television screen, though he installed a satellite dish on his roof when it was illegal, and dangerous, to own one. He adores his new wife, an independent-minded woman who wears low-cut shirts, but he wants her to start covering her hair and acting like a traditional Muslim woman when she moves to Baghdad. His work fascinates him, but he is concerned that his daily immersion in death will make him less spiritual. "The doctor of forensic medicine deals only with bodies," he said. "So maybe in the end I will become like you--an existentialist."
Dr. Shaker lives with his mother and his brothers and sisters on a tidy side street in Al Thawra, the heavily Shiite slum district in northeastern Baghdad. Last year, the neighborhood was renamed Sadr City, in honor of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a revered Shiite leader known for his subversive sermons against Baathist tyranny; he was assassinated in 1999, almost certainly on Saddam's orders. His son, Moqtada al-Sadr, declared himself his successor. With the overthrow of Saddam, Moqtada began stridently fomenting dissent against the American occupation. Throughout Sadr City, young men in black uniforms guided traffic: these were members of the Mahdi Army, Moqtada's militia.
A round sticker was affixed to the wooden front door of Shaker's house; it bore an image of Ayatollah Sadr, along with a quotation, from one of his sermons, insisting that women be veiled. In the Shakers' living room hung a picture of Imam Hussein crossing a river on horseback by moonlight, like one of the Christian saints. Compact disks containing forty-five sermons by Ayatollah Sadr were stacked inside the family's TV cabinet, alongside a pile of back issues of Al Hawza, the fiercely anti-American newspaper published by Moqtada al-Sadr. Shaker told me that he got his television news from Al Jazeera and Iranian broadcasts--he never watched Iraq's American-run network. His main source of information from the non-Islamic world, I realized, was old Hollywood movies. That wouldn't offer him much help in parsing the truth of a story I noticed in Al Hawza. The newspaper had reprinted photographs of President Bush and President Clinton holding up their index and pinkie fingers; the accompanying article offered the images as evidence of a Zionist-Masonic conspiracy.
Shaker's younger brothers, Ali and Samir, joined us in the living room. Ali was a secondary-school math teacher, Samir an unemployed telecom repairman. Unlike their dirty-blond, fair-skinned older brother, they were dark and bearded--respectful, serious, slightly wary.
"Samir is closer to God than me," Shaker said. "Ali is like me--flexible." Ali and Samir were devoted followers of Moqtada; they shared his hostility toward the occupation. From time to time, someone knocked on the door, and one of the brothers would get up to receive a tray of food or beverages from the hands of an unseen woman.
Ali brought up the Ashura bombings. "Ninety-five per cent of Iraqis knew the main purpose of this was to start a religious war between Shia and Sunnis," he said. He was skeptical of the Americans' assertion that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist with ties to Al Qaeda, was responsible for the attacks. "This Zarqawi--it's only a game that the Americans use," Ali declared. "Before the election of Bush, they'll show Zarqawi on TV. Just like Saddam--they captured him months before they showed him."
The brothers told me a joke about the occupation: An American soldier is about to kill a Shiite, who cries, "Please, no, in the name of Imam Hussein!" The American asks who Imam Hussein was, and then decides to spare the man's life. A few weeks later, this same soldier is sent to Falluja, where he is cornered by a Sunni insurgent. The soldier thinks fast and cries, "Please, no, in the name of Imam Hussein!" The insurgent says, "What? You're an American and a Shiite?," and blows him away.
There was a moment of laughter in the living room.
Ali sat cross-legged on a rug against the wall, and looked directly at me. "Before this war, I was waiting for the Americans to come--and now I feel sort of cheated. All this talk about rebuilding Iraq, and all we see is a couple of light coats of paint. And they say they renovated Iraq."
Samir, the unemployed younger brother, spoke in darker tones, with a faint smile. He had never had any illusions. "No enemy loves his enemy. We know very well that the Americans don't intend us any good."
The Americans had at least got rid of Saddam, I observed. "That's not enough," Ali said. "Now things are worse. We can't go outside at four in the morning, as before."
If within a year there were free elections in Iraq, I asked, would they be satisfied?
"Yes," Samir said.
Ali disagreed. "I don't think the people will be satisfied. So what if we have a President? The mobile phones we have here don't work. Why can't it be like the Gulf countries? Maybe in generations after generations. But we won't be here then. It pisses me off."
Shaker also spoke of the urgent need for improved services. Then he asked to borrow my satellite phone and disappeared up on the roof, to call his new wife in Amsterdam.
One Friday not long after the Ashura bombings, I went with Shaker to hear prayers in Kadhimiya, an old Shiite neighborhood in the northwestern part of Baghdad that is famous for its gold shops. One of the bombs killed nearly sixty people at the local shrine, which holds the remains of two imams who came after the martyred Hussein. Along a broad pedestrian market street that ends in the square in front of the sixteenth-century mosque, cordons of grim-looking young Mahdi Army militiamen, carrying Kalashnikovs, searched the throngs of pilgrims for weapons.
There were no Iraqi policemen or American soldiers on the streets. One Mahdi soldier, who was eighteen years old, said that the Americans had prevented Moqtada's militia from carrying their weapons on Ashura. This was a foolish decision, he said: if the militia had been armed, it would have been able to hold back the surges of worshippers and catch the suicide bombers mingling in the crowd.
While Shaker went into a shop to wash himself before prayers, a local cleric named Sheikh Muhammad Kinani told me that the bombers were Wahhabi members of Al Qaeda, working in concert with an American soldier employed by the John Kerry campaign. "I believe John Kerry is behind this so Bush will lose his Presidency and look bad in front of the world," he said. "But it's the Iraqis who pay for it."
Such rumors proliferate on the streets of Iraq's cities these days. In fact, the traffic in conspiracy theories is so heavy that an American intelligence unit began putting out "The Baghdad Mosquito," a daily compendium of rumors currently in circulation. According to several Shiites I spoke with in Kadhimiya, Wahhabi men all have light-colored beards and are the enemies of true Muslims. A merchant on the pedestrian market street said, "We caught a Wahhabi from Ramadi an hour ago." The captive, he said, was wearing a short dishdasha, in the Wahhabi style; although his feet were dirty, his body was suspiciously clean. A search of the Wahhabi man turned up blank paper and a map. Local people took him to the police station, where he would be tortured until he confessed.
Prayers began beneath a hot noon sun. The shrine itself, with its splendid golden domes and minarets, was closed because of bomb damage. Men filled the square; holding black signs and pictures of Shiite martyrs, and shaking their fists, they chanted, "Pray to Muhammad and the followers of Muhammad and hurry the damning of our enemies. Give victory to Moqtada! We follow Moq-ta-da!" Shaker knelt in the front row and prayed. He seemed alone in the crowd, the only worshipper who wasn't chanting.
One of Moqtada's aides, Hazem al-Araji, delivered the sermon. He is a thirty-five-year-old sayyid with a salt-and-pepper beard who spent two years in exile in Vancouver before the war. Later, in a conversation at his office, he proved to be a smooth, smiling politician who Googles himself several times a day to keep up with his press, and who made a theocratic Islamic state sound not very different from a parliamentary democracy. But, in front of the crowd of worshippers outside the shrine, Araji let loose an incendiary and conspiracy-laced analysis of the violence in Iraq. The attacks came from four sources, he declared, none of them Iraqi or Muslim: it was the Jews, the Americans, the British, and the Wahhabi. The Jews--who had been warned to stay away from the World Trade Center on September 11th, so that not one Jew died--"want Iraqis to die." America, the devil, allows the violence in order to have an excuse to continue occupying Iraq. The British, America's partners, are more directly responsible, since they invented Wahhabism and, therefore, Al Qaeda, which have "nothing to do with Islam."
Shaker knelt, slump-shouldered, and gazed down at his clasped hands, muttering prayers. He looked puzzled, as if he were trying to figure something out. I wondered if the cleric's ranting embarrassed him.
"If you read the modern books of history," Araji proclaimed, "you know that Wahhabism started in 1870 by the good graces of the British government in order to go against Islam, to make Islam look bad, to make Muslims fight each other. Those who know--good. Those who don't--know now."
Araji was referring to "Confessions of a British Spy," an apocryphal memoir attributed to a British colonial officer of the early eighteenth century named Hempher. (Araji was off by a hundred and fifty years.) Going undercover, Hempher befriends a gullible, hotheaded Iraqi in Basra named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and tempts him into founding a heretical sect of Islam that will bring disrepute to other Muslims and turn them against one another: "We, the English people, have to make mischief and arouse schism in all our colonies in order that we may live in welfare and luxury." Hempher cannot conceal his admiration for the spiritual grandeur of Islam, which more than once nearly causes him to abandon his mission. "Confessions of a British Spy" reads like an Anglophobic variation on "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion"; it is probably the labor of a Sunni Muslim author whose intent is to present Muslims as both too holy and too weak to organize anything as destructive as Wahhabism (or, Araji's listeners could deduce, to pull off a crime as appalling as the Ashura bombings, which took place two centuries after Wahhabis, on the same holiday, sacked the Shiite shrine at Karbala, slaughtering two thousand citizens). With its subtext of powerlessness, the "memoir" is ultimately a confession of Muslim humiliation--a text that was bound to find an audience in occupied Iraq, where the name Hempher has begun to circulate among militant Shiites.
"America, England, Israel, do whatever you have to do, build more missiles, more explosives, more terrorism all over the world," Araji said. "But it's not going to stop us."
The crowd chanted, "Yes, yes to Islam!"
"Just a speech," Shaker scoffed as we drove out of Kadhimiya. "If I knew this man is going to deliver the Friday prayers, I would not go." He would have preferred to hear Moqtada himself. If Moqtada had come, he said, there would have been less talk and more action.
It is one measure of America's inability to achieve its goals in Iraq that a man of "the middle level of mind" like Bashir Shaker--who had everything to gain from the overthrow of Saddam and the opportunities it opened up--feels himself pulled toward a harsher brand of Islam in reaction to the pervasive insecurity of the occupation. Many flaws of the occupation have by now been exhaustively documented: the lack of significant international support at the outset; the catastrophic looting that followed the fall of Baghdad; the commitment of a grossly insufficient number of American troops to provide security, rebuild infrastructure, and fight a widening insurgency; the decisions to abolish the Iraqi Army and purge higher-level Baathists from government jobs, which turned several hundred thousand mostly Sunni Arabs, who might have become partners, into jobless, well-armed, and well-funded potential enemies; the slipshod planning in Washington and political mistakes in Baghdad that have forced the occupation authority to toss out one road map for Iraq's future after another.
Yet perhaps the greatest mistake made by the architects of the war was to assume that their vision of a liberal state would be eagerly embraced by an ethnically divided, overwhelmingly Islamic country with a long history of dictatorship. The Coalition Provisional Authority managed the occupation as if benevolent American intentions guaranteed success. Giving Iraqis a chance to experience and participate in democracy became less important than achieving a desired outcome. As a result, Paul Bremer and his colleagues failed to anticipate the level of resistance that would emanate from Iraq's various factions--in particular, the Shia.
The C.P.A. has been consistently slow to respond to the simmering frustrations of ordinary Iraqis. Since conditions in Iraq were already unravelling when Bremer arrived, last May, his primary focus has been on establishing his authority. "One thing that the C.P.A. couldn't make a mistake about was showing that it was in control," Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the British envoy to Iraq, told me at the end of March, just before returning to London. "This place has to be controlled, and I think this is an area where Bremer has got it exactly right, has shown that he's boss. The Iraqis wanted a boss." But, Greenstock admitted, "we could have been more consultative."
Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, who served as a C.P.A. adviser on democracy, put it more bluntly: "There has always been a tension in our occupation between control and legitimacy. And the more we've sought control, the less legitimacy we've had. I think we have erred in general, from the start, much too heavily in the direction of control at the expense of legitimacy, and that has come back to haunt us."
This is a dilemma that Bremer has never been able to resolve. In January and February, he oversaw the drafting of an interim Iraqi constitution by the Governing Council, the Iraqi body appointed by the Coalition. If Bremer had encouraged widespread public discussion of the emerging document's main points, in order to make educated participants of Iraqis, he would have risked seeing the inevitable controversies fought out in the streets. Instead, the interim constitution was written under tremendous time pressure, in small, secretive committee meetings during all-night negotiating sessions inside the Green Zone, the impenetrable fortified area in the center of Baghdad. The signing ceremony, on March 5th, was elaborately planned for the cameras: twenty-five pens were laid out on a table, one for each council member, and a chamber ensemble provided music. At the last minute, however, five Shiite members who had agreed to sign the document ruined Bremer's script by failing to show up.
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most respected Shiite cleric, had belatedly expressed his opposition to Article 61c of the interim constitution. The article, which soon became notorious, essentially gave Iraq's minority Kurds and Sunnis veto power over any element of the permanent constitution. For the Kurds, who were long oppressed by Iraq's central government, Article 61c was a guarantee of minority rights in a federal republic. In January, Bremer had sent a young and inexperienced team of advisers to negotiate with the senior Kurdish leaders, who refused to back off heavy demands. Even after Bremer personally intervened, the Kurds got almost everything they wanted, including an autonomous region in the north. To the Shiite religious leadership, which apparently learned of the article's language only at the last hour, the same Article 61c appeared to stand in the way of majority rule.
On March 8th, after three days of persuasion, the five Shiite holdouts on the council signed the document. The interim constitution is a real achievement--the only one the Governing Council can claim. It represents political compromise and a broad consensus about individual rights. During the final day and night of negotiations, Bremer yielded control--a rare moment for an official who has been described as a micromanager--and for eight hours became a silent observer, allowing the Iraqis to work out the unavoidable conflicts between majority rule and minority rights. But, because the C.P.A. and the council had failed to build any support for the interim constitution outside the Green Zone, its unveiling inspired street demonstrations, mass confusion over its contents, and a sharp increase in tension between the Shia and the Kurds. At a meeting of the district council in Baghdad's Karrada neighborhood, I listened to Governing Council representatives patiently explaining the interim constitution to a roomful of increasingly agitated citizens who, confronted with a fait accompli, accused the council of dismembering the country.
Even as it became clear that the key article risked undermining the entire document's legitimacy in the eyes of Iraq's majority, Bremer refused to consider any changes. An official involved in the process said that Bremer wanted the interim constitution to be sold to the Iraqi public in a one-way conversation: "He has a tremendous investment in this as one of his prized accomplishments."
Other than the June 30th deadline for the transfer of sovereignty, the interim constitution is just about all that remains of the November 15th agreement between the C.P.A. and the Governing Council--the agreement that outlined Iraq's political future, replacing Bremer's original plan. Throughout the year of its existence, the C.P.A. has seen its blueprints overrun by events beyond the Green Zone that were to some degree predictable--and were caused partly by its own deep isolation.
One crucial example has been the fate of Moqtada al-Sadr. Last summer, Hume Horan, the C.P.A.'s senior liaison to the Shia religious community, spoke with me about the dilemma posed by Moqtada. On the day after the fall of Baghdad, an American-backed liberal cleric, Abdel Majid al-Khoei, was killed by a mob of Moqtada's followers outside the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf. (Eyewitnesses have said that Moqtada himself refused to save his rival when Khoei was dragged bleeding to his door.) The murder was a power grab by Iraq's most radical Shiite faction. Later, Al Hawza, Moqtada's newspaper, published a blacklist with the names of Iraqi "collaborators," at least one of whom was subsequently killed. As a result, Horan told me, Moqtada's paper could be shut down and he could be arrested. Then again, putting Moqtada in jail might make him a martyr and, therefore, more dangerous.
During our conversation, Horan sounded as if he were inclined to let the establishment Shiite clerics of Najaf deal with the demagogic young upstart who had planted himself in their midst. "His father would be so distressed if he'd seen his son," Horan said of Moqtada. "Here's this unchurched son of one of the great churchmen, who fills the role without any of the qualifications. What is he lashing out at? Is it his own sense of inadequacy that is being projected?"
Last August, an Iraqi judge issued a warrant charging Moqtada with having ordered the killing of Khoei, but the C.P.A. kept the warrant a secret while it deliberated. One Coalition official said that the C.P.A. prepared to seize Moqtada on two occasions. "The word was `Lock your doors, bring everybody in. We're going to snatch Moqtada,'" he said. Both operations were abruptly called off. "The decisions had to have occurred somewhere up the Defense Department chain," the official said. (A C.P.A. spokesman said that its plans to capture Moqtada were not that definitive.)
During this same period, the C.P.A. found itself in a series of protracted battles with Ayatollah Sistani, the Shiite leader. The first was over Bremer's decision to have the permanent constitution written by unelected Iraqis. That plan was finally scrapped, in favor of the November 15th agreement, which put the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty ahead of elections and a constitution. Then another dispute arose: Sistani objected to the C.P.A.'s proposal to hold regional caucuses for the selection of Iraq's interim government. Months went by before Bremer, having steadily misjudged Sistani's power, threw out the plan.
While the C.P.A. and Sistani took each other's measure in private, there was no political progress in Iraq. The local and provincial councils set up by the C.P.A.--which should have been seedbeds of Iraq's future leadership, offering the best hope for the emergence of moderate indigenous alternatives to the sectarian parties, with their armed militias and foreign backers--never received the means to exercise real power and show their constituents concrete results. For months, members went unpaid; I was told that a draft of the government order delineating the councils' powers was prepared in October--but it wasn't issued until April 6th. The councils' reconstruction efforts were constantly hindered by bureaucratic clots that kept money from flowing to local military commanders and civil authorities.
The absence of healthier politics created a dangerous vacuum, which was filled by the most extreme tendencies in Iraq: the Sunni resistance, made up of Baathist, Islamist, and nationalist elements; and the Shiite street politics of Moqtada al-Sadr. Sistani and Moqtada are natural foes, for personal and ideological reasons, and Sistani, because of his immensely greater religious authority, commands a much larger following among Iraqi Shiites. But after Sistani declared his opposition to the interim constitution the balance of power shifted. "As long as the Coalition had Sistani's tacit support, it didn't need to worry too much about Moqtada al-Sadr," Amatzia Baram, an Iraq scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace, in Washington, told me. "But when Sistani announced his objection to the interim constitution the Coalition lost him." Article 61c placed Sistani, who was born in Iran, in a terrible position: he couldn't seem to be selling out Arab interests to the Kurds, nor could he afford to give Shiite radicals the chance to accuse him of selling out Islam. "That was a watershed moment," Baram said. "Because, from now on, every crazy Shiite could claim that he was fighting the Americans in Sistani's name. The moment radicals could present themselves as fighting for Sistani's causes, that united the Shia community against the Americans and the Governing Council. They were using Sistani's slogans against Sistani. Sistani became marginalized in his own name."
Moqtada's amplified significance was lost on Coalition officials. In late March, I asked Greenstock about the size of his following. "Tiny--and with no political impact," he said. "Go around Sadr City again now and you will find fewer Moqtada al-Sadr followers than you would have done five months ago." He added, "We thought he had an opportunity to bubble up and grow--he hasn't done it. Partly because he knows that if he moves anywhere he'll be picked up."
A week later, on March 28th, Bremer ordered the closing of Al Hawza; within days, American soldiers had arrested an aide to Moqtada. Urged on by Moqtada's vitriolic speeches, the Mahdi Army responded with demonstrations that quickly escalated into armed confrontations with Coalition troops in Baghdad and a number of southern cities, several of which fell under the militia's control. The uprising seriously damaged the C.P.A.'s authority and undermined the occupation's legitimacy in the eyes of many Shiites who otherwise have no love for the erratic Moqtada and his violent followers. In early May, after a month of fighting, the Americans acted to end the uprising, confronting the Mahdi Army in Najaf and Karbala.
The timing of the C.P.A.'s move against Al Hawza was baffling, coming in the middle of the mourning period that follows Ashura. A senior official in Washington suggested to me that the Administration had been caught off guard: "Was there a series of decisions that seemed idiotic to those of us back here? Yes. Is one of them that, during a major Muslim holiday, Moqtada al-Sadr is suddenly a persona non grata? Yes." Worse, the C.P.A. seemed not to have prepared for the reaction from Moqtada's militia, betraying a serious miscalculation of the young cleric's strength. The Mahdi Army had been acquiring money and guns since last summer, and continued to intimidate townspeople in Najaf and elsewhere; at one point in January, militiamen occupied the shrine of Imam Ali.
Amatzia Baram faulted Bremer for the clumsy manner of the March crackdown on Moqtada, but not for the effort itself. As with so many other C.P.A. decisions, he said, "You're damned if you do and damned if you don't. That's the main problem in Iraq these days."
Moqtada's newfound power was in part a result of the failed communications effort by the C.P.A. Its Iraqi Media Network has been ineptly run, featuring vapid programming and Coalition-friendly news briefs. The Pentagon, which is in charge of the occupation of Iraq, kept tight control over the flow of news for domestic political reasons. It was a self-defeating effort, however: American propaganda was no match for Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya--and Moqtada's newspaper.
The C.P.A., having sacrificed legitimacy for control, has ended up with neither. A former Coalition official traced the failures in Baghdad directly back to Washington, and he identified the central irony of the occupation: "A lot of this is the unwillingness of the Bush Administration to rock the boat before the election. And it's laughable that it's pursued this policy. Because of the failure to confront Moqtada, because of the failure to disarm the militias, because of the lack of troops on the ground, Bush may well lose the election."
In March, during the standoff over the interim constitution, I went to see Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurd on the Governing Council. A small man with a large nose and an unblinking stare, Othman was for many years the personal doctor of Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish peshmerga guerrillas who fought the Iraqi central government. Before the American invasion, Othman was living in London, and, like most Kurdish politicians, he shares the Americans' vision of a relatively secular and liberal Iraq. But, much to the annoyance of the C.P.A., he has proved to be the Governing Council's in-house critic. When most of its other members were jockeying to perpetuate their positions beyond the June 30th transfer of sovereignty, Othman was calling flatly for the council to be dissolved, saying that it hadn't worked. He placed the blame for the debacle over Article 61c squarely on Bremer--who, Othman claimed, had coddled the council's Shiite bloc early on, encouraging its members to become intransigent. "It's a humiliation to him," he told me, with faint satisfaction. "He gave them that leverage, coming and going, and it was very bad."
I asked Othman if the occupation was a failure. "It's not a success, either security-wise or media-wise or economic-wise," he said. "But I can't say it's a failure." He believed that most Iraqis still hoped for a decent life and a better society. In fact, Othman declared, going further than most observers would, "if things are set right, I think liberalism and secularism have the majority in this country always. But are the people now free to express their points of view? They are not. Because the country now is ruled by militias, mullahs, and warlords. The simple citizen is not allowed to have his own rights, to say freely what he wants." In one way, he added, the Americans were like Saddam: "They are not caring much for a simple Iraqi citizen. They care for a chief of a tribe here, a mullah there, a religious man here, a militiaman here, head of a party there."
As the June 30th deadline approaches, with no Iraqi interim government in sight, the United States has turned reluctantly to the United Nations. Until recently, Washington consistently prevented the U.N. from establishing any real authority in Iraq (the words "United Nations" appear nowhere in the November 15th agreement). But the Administration now finds that the C.P.A. and the Governing Council have so little legitimacy in the eyes of most Iraqis--including Ayatollah Sistani--that the transfer of sovereignty can't occur without outside help. Enter Lakhdar Brahimi, the U.N.'s envoy to Iraq, and an Algerian diplomat who was Secretary-General Kofi Annan's representative in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. In April, Brahimi and his team travelled to Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra to meet with groups of Iraqis and begin preparations for an interim government. The senior Administration official told me, "Brahimi has identified--unlike the ivory-tower C.P.A.--a lot of passionate, talented Iraqis who want the same things we want: freedom, democracy, liberty."
Fairly quickly, Brahimi concluded that the Governing Council should not be part of the new Iraqi government. "The Governing Council in its current constitution doesn't have the confidence of most Iraqis," his spokesman, Ahmed Fawzi, told me. At the end of April, Brahimi briefed the U.N. Security Council, in New York; he called for a caretaker government of technocrats, whose main purpose will be to prepare the country for elections by January, 2005. "We are reaching out to the professional associations, the trade unions, the universities, and asking them to give us the best of their crop," Fawzi said. "The best five lawyers, the best five doctors, the best five accountants, the best five engineers, to form a short list acceptable to all for a short-term interim government." A Prime Minister and a cabinet will be chosen by Brahimi, Bremer, and the Governing Council by the end of May. It seems inevitable that some of Iraq's leading politicians, including members of the Governing Council, will end up with positions in the interim government, though this will surely be the subject of intense negotiations between rival factions. Brahimi, who oversaw Afghanistan's loya jirga, imagines Iraqis from all sectors of society gathering in a national conference soon after June 30th to choose an advisory body, or rump parliament. The conference could be the first chance for ordinary Iraqis to feel that they have a stake in the country's political future.
It's not clear that a U.S. Administration with a history of pronounced hostility to the U.N. will relinquish real authority in Iraq to it, even now. The senior official said, "There are people in this Administration who have led me to believe that the U.N. is a greater clear and present danger to the United States than any foreign enemy, including Osama bin Laden." Robert Blackwill, a director at the National Security Council, will be Washington's point man in the process; according to the senior official, Blackwill will keep the pressure on Bremer to accept Brahimi's recommendations. Will the U.N., for its part, having been so badly undermined by the Administration on Iraq, return in force now, when things are going so poorly? "Kofi's going to have a really hard time looking at this and saying, `Do I want a piece of this?'" the senior official said.
Annan and Brahimi, perhaps sensing that the U.N. is being set up to take the fall for what is bound to be an unstable, tumultuous period before elections, have tried to lower expectations about the organization's role in Iraq. Brahimi cannot answer some of the most important questions about the transition--such as how extensive Iraqi sovereignty will be, and what the relationship will be between the interim government and the U.S. military. Ahmed Fawzi expressed the hope that a sovereign Iraqi government will take the steam out of the insurgency. In the meantime, another U.N. official told me, the security situation in Iraq is so perilous that "it's going to be very difficult for any full-scale engagement of the U.N. in Iraq for the next couple of months." He added, "We're expected to take the lead--and we're not the lead. We're helping to do what we can. But the political reality is that the Americans are the biggest player in Iraq, and they're going to be before and after June 30th."
The only good reason left for the invasion of Iraq, and for an ongoing war involving a hundred and thirty-five thousand American troops, is the creation of a decent Iraqi government. The National Democratic Institute is an organization funded largely by the U.S. government and affiliated with the Democratic Party; it operates with relative independence, under the direction of the National Endowment for Democracy. The institute's purpose is to find what Mahmoud Othman called "the simple citizens" in a place like Iraq, and help them to participate in democratic political life. This tends to be obscure, poorly funded work--but the Bush Administration wants to pour half a billion dollars into Iraq for "democracy-building" programs before the transfer of sovereignty and national elections. The effort is floundering, however, because the escalation of violence has made it hard to spend the money.
Early one morning in mid-March, I drove to Hilla, which is ninety minutes south of Baghdad, with a group of Iraqis and Americans working for N.D.I. We travelled in non-armored vehicles, without guards. In the back seat of one of the sedans, wearing a navy-blue suit, a salmon-colored tie, and glasses, was David Dettman, a pale, chain-smoking political consultant from Ohio. For many years, Dettman, who is thirty-three and has the nervous, self-deprecating sense of humor of a Jack Lemmon character, worked successfully as a campaign consultant in Washington. Then he ran for the Ohio state legislature as a Democrat, got creamed, and had an epiphany. "What got me charged up is that I really believed in the process," he told me. He decided to leave his job, and he became one of N.D.I.'s democratization missionaries, posted in Ukraine. To the dismay of his wife, his mother, and his boss, Dettman had come to Iraq for two weeks to train groups of aspiring political-party activists in Baghdad, Tikrit, and Hilla.
The workshop in Hilla took place in the city's former secret-police headquarters, which has become a human-rights center. Forty Iraqis--including a political-science professor and an unemployed sports instructor--had travelled at some risk to attend the class. They listened intently and took careful notes as Dettman stood before a flip chart and presented a ten-step program on message development and voter contact. Mayasa al-Naimy, an Iraqi staff member of N.D.I., gamely translated the exotic campaign terminology: "earned media," "communications strategy," "wedge and base issues." (Dettman had told me earlier, "Politics is the art of getting people to vote for you. It's applicable all over the world. If it wasn't, I wouldn't have a job.")
After two hours of discussion, an Iraqi raised his hand. "This shows me we're making a transition from dictatorship to democracy," he said. "That makes me feel good. But this is the question: Will the American Administration leave it to us? Or just throw someone on us? Will all these efforts be lost?"
Outside, in the distance, there was an explosion--mortar fire--and then a second, closer one, which was followed by gunfire. Dettman glanced out the window and grinned with alarm.
"Does that answer your question?" someone asked.
"I'm not the government," Dettman said. "I'm N.D.I. We have to eat lunch. Can we talk about this later?"
After lunch, Dettman returned to the question. "My opinion is if America invaded Iraq for nothing other than to have a friendly dictator, then all of the American and Iraqi lives that were lost will have been wasted," he said. "I supported the invasion because I'm in the democratization business. I don't know anything about W.M.D.--I don't know if anyone was telling the truth or not--but I do know the Iraqi people deserve freedom. I can't say the Americans won't do anything wrong, because they already have done many things wrong in this occupation. And I'm sorry. But there's a reason N.D.I. is here now, and there's a reason we didn't bring a tank. We're the least armed Americans in Hilla. We're here trusting your hospitality. Because democracy is good and right." He went on, "If this traumatic war was fought for anything other than that, I'm gonna be mad. Here's the problem: I can't do much. I'm just the arrogant American in a suit standing up in front of you. I haven't suffered as much as you have. Only you can build democracy here. But if I just thought America was going to steal the freedom we fought for I would have stayed home with my wife and had a lovely time."
"Aren't you having a lovely time here?" someone asked.
"I am having a lovely time. But I miss my wife."
It was a heartfelt speech, and it was received with scattered applause. Then a man sitting near me muttered to himself, "A British guy named Hempher laid plans decades ago for Presidents to take turns ruling Iraq."
The people in the room belonged to Shaker's "middle level of mind." They were neither mullahs nor militiamen, and some of the parties they belonged to counted no more than several hundred members. One of the participants was Jawdet al-Obeidi, a former Army officer from Hilla. He fled Iraq after taking part in the Shiite uprising in 1991, and ended up in Portland, Oregon. He started a small limousine company there, and last year he sold it and returned to Iraq, as a member of a militia aligned with the U.S. invasion force. Since then, Obeidi has poured a hundred and fifty thousand dollars of his savings into building a coalition of almost two hundred small political parties that can challenge the larger parties in parliamentary elections. (Already, there are some three hundred political parties in Iraq.) The coalition's platform combines a moderate Muslim agenda with Iraqi nationalism and a respect for individual rights--a deliberately mild mixture that seems designed to have broad support. Obeidi, a balding, middle-aged man with a salesman's cheerfulness, has received death threats, and his brother-in-law survived three bullets in the head.
Also at the meeting was a married couple from Mahawil, a village of dirt roads and salt marshes near Hilla: Emad Dawood, who worked in a shop selling construction materials, and his wife, Saad, who had received a business degree in Baghdad but was unable to find work, and was now raising their three children. She was one of only three women at the meeting; like the others, she wore a hijab.
Her husband explained to me, "We go everywhere together."
"Any educated couple would do this," Saad said.
"Of course, we have religion, and we go by the rules," Emad added. "The Islamic religion doesn't say women can't mix with other men, but everything has to do with limits."
Saad pointed out that Islam doesn't deny women the right to participate in politics: "They should have a role in everything."
In Hilla, the repression of the 1991 Shiite uprising was particularly brutal, and, last year, mass graves containing thousands of victims were uncovered on the periphery of the town. Saad and Emad had each lost a brother, and many friends. The couple had only the vaguest notion of what was in Iraq's new interim constitution, but they knew very well what it was like to live under Saddam. "It's like a hammer on your head every day," Emad said, "and then they take it away."
The Dawoods had once seen the Americans as heroic liberators, but the feeling was short-lived. According to Emad, as the occupation ground on, with constant power outages and rampant crime, ordinary unhappiness was turning into a kind of insanity. "Things are just getting worse here," Saad added. "Of course, if there was democracy things would change."
"But democracy needs a long period of time, because we've been living so long under Saddam," Emad said.
"Most people do not get the idea of democracy," Saad said. "Ask anybody about democracy, and you'd find most people would say, `What am I going to do with democracy? Give me security first.'"
Emad told me, "I know a guy who shot two bullets at random. He said, `Isn't this freedom?'"
As for Dettman's presentation, it clearly meant something to this couple that Americans had come to meet with them in Hilla. Dettman had given them a lot of helpful information, they felt. Their only complaint was that there was no exam at the end, to test how much they'd learned about democracy.
The failures of the occupation and the violence of the insurgency have stranded moderate Iraqis like those who attended the meeting in Hilla. Lakhdar Brahimi wants to bring such Iraqis onto the national political stage, but, considering the disproportionate power of groups represented on the Governing Council and backed by foreign states, the chances for success are poor. Marina Ottaway, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me that, after the fall of dictatorships, "you always have a lot of political parties forming, and they never get anywhere." N.D.I., she concluded, is "bravely doing something that is completely futile."
Of course, electoral success isn't the only measure of what organizations like N.D.I. are trying to do. In Hilla, it felt like an achievement simply to hold a discussion, amid gunfire, about democracy, in which there was a genuine give-and-take between Iraqis and foreigners. The fact that Hempher, the supposed British spy blamed for so much trouble in the Muslim world, was invoked at the Hilla workshop was a less hopeful sign. The Americans' mistakes in Iraq have been only part of the story of disappointment. Many Iraqis--damaged beyond imagining by the cruelty of Saddam's rule, and afflicted with outsized expectations and suspicions of America--have fallen back on aspects of their culture and faith that offer a blind resistance to the new world that has been thrown open before them. In the past year, Iraq has undergone not just a war but a revolution. It's no wonder that Iraqis have responded not only with hope but with confusion, rage, and despair; the wonder is that Americans expected anything else.
We left Hilla just before dark, and set out for Baghdad. An hour later, on a nearby road, three people--an American woman working with Iraqi women's groups, a C.P.A. press officer, and their Iraqi translator--were ambushed and shot to death by men wearing Iraqi police uniforms. It was the start of a wave of attacks on foreign civilians and the Iraqis who worked with them. The violence had still not subsided by early May, and most of the non-governmental groups and contractors working for democracy in Iraq had evacuated their foreign employees. Les Campbell, the Middle East director of N.D.I., recently told me that the organization's foreign staff was in Amman, Jordan, waiting for the violence to diminish before returning to Baghdad, where the Iraqi staff continues to work. Meanwhile, Campbell is talking with private security firms, and looking for the right armored car.
He has not lost his optimism altogether. "Even with all the problems in Iraq, there is already far more civil-society space and party organizing than in any other Arab country," he said. He described how N.D.I.'s Iraqi staff members, such as Mayasa al-Naimy, have begun to blossom intellectually. "Even in the midst of the killings, which are terrible, and even though the planning and administration continue to be a joke, something interesting is going on here," Campbell said. "It makes me sort of sick to think it might not work."
Three days after the trip to Hilla, I paid another visit to Dr. Shaker at his house in Sadr City. His brother Samir had just come back from a demonstration against the interim constitution, led by one of Moqtada al-Sadr's top aides, in Firdus Square, the same spot where Saddam's statue was pulled down a year ago. "The Kurds have more rights than the others," Samir said. "They can veto anything we decide, but we don't have the right to veto."
Ali had watched a Shiite politician on television who said that Arabs could refuse the Kurds' demands for federalism. "We don't know anything about the constitution," Ali said. "It was written, handed over to the Governing Council to sign, and then shown to the people, who never saw it before."
As for Shaker, the controversy filled him with foreboding. He doubted that Iraq would remain intact. The Shia, the Kurds, and the Sunnis had agendas that could never be reconciled. "The story will be like Lebanon," Shaker told me. "A civil war."
Arab against Kurd? "A strong possibility." Shiite against Sunni? "It's a possibility," he said. "The constitution will be the starting point, and then the event will be gradually increased." I asked if he envisioned rival armies fighting each other. "That is how I imagine it," he said. But, the likeliest scenario of all, he added, was a civil war among his own people, the Shia.
It was my last visit to the house. Afterward, neighbors belonging to Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army warned Shaker against having any more American visitors.
It was a few weeks later, on March 28th, that Moqtada's uprising began, and Sadr City exploded in days and nights of firefights between militiamen and American soldiers. I spoke with the doctor by phone. He had spent days trapped at home, unable to go to the morgue, while the uprising continued. Twelve of his friends in the neighborhood had died in crossfire. His brothers, Ali and Samir, wanted to join the Mahdi Army and fight the Americans, but he had stopped them. The scale of the violence shocked him, but not its outbreak, which he had seen coming. The bravery of the young militiamen, standing up to tanks with small arms, impressed him, and though he deplored their tactics, he sympathized with their goal--"real Islamic democracy."
Shaker said, "My idea of the situation now: the Americans are at the high level and Moqtada is down at the bottom, and they can't understand each other. They should be in the middle." He added, "The Americans have to use the political way. Bremer must be more diplomatic, more flexible. He needs to go through the middle level of mind--as I told you. He must speak to people like me."

FURIOUS BUSH DEMANDS TO SEE ALL PRISONER ABUSE PHOTOS, VIDEOS
**Exclusive**
A furious President Bush has demanded to see all photos and videos showing abuse of Iraq detainees, a senior White House source said late Sunday.
"The president was blindsided by the first TV images, he will not be blindsided again," the source, who demanded anonymity, explained to the DRUDGE REPORT.
The president has instructed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to present him with him all known images that could further deepen the crises.
Monday editions of the NEW YORKER feature photos of a dog attacking a naked Iraqi detainee at Abu Ghraib prison.
President Bush was aware of the photo, the top source claims.
The White House is preparing for more fallout, and leaks from lawmakers.
The Pentagon is considering the possibility of showing the unseen material to members of Congress.
"It's clear the moment the evidence is sent to the Congress, we will see a new feeding frenzy in the media."

Filed By Matt Drudge
Reports are moved when circumstances warrant
http://www.drudgereport.com for updates
(c)DRUDGE REPORT 2004
Not for reproduction without permission of the author
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Officials Grapple With How and When to Release Images
By THOM SHANKER

WASHINGTON, May 9 -- The Defense Department is planning to provide Congress with many more pictures of the abusive treatment of Iraqi detainees, but has not decided whether to release them to the public, Congressional leaders and Pentagon officials said Sunday.
In the end, President Bush is likely to make the determination on making the images public, aides said.
Inside the White House, several of Mr. Bush's aides have argued that he has little choice but to make them public. Sooner or later, they say, the images will leak out, prolonging the pain, fueling Iraqi and Arab suspicions of a Pentagon-orchestrated cover-up, and giving new life to calls for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's removal.
Many in the Pentagon, though, are resisting. Pentagon officials warned that a public release could jeopardize its criminal inquiry. They theorized that defense lawyers could cite a governmental release in motions to dismiss charges, arguing that their clients could not get a fair hearing. So far, seven soldiers are facing charges related to abuse of Iraqi detainees.
In meetings this weekend, officials who took part said, some senior military officials argued that releasing the pictures would only further inflame Iraqis, fuel the insurgency and make it nearly impossible to gain help from Arab allies. Moreover, the officials expressed fear in those meetings that any captured American soldiers would be placed at greater risk.
That argument broke out in public on Sunday when the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John W. Warner, Republican of Virginia, seemed to back keeping the images from public view, describing them as "of a classified nature" on the NBC News program "Meet the Press." He was immediately challenged by a fellow Republican, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, who shot back: "If there's a videotape out there, for God's sake let's talk about it, because men and women's lives are at stake, given how we handle this. So I want to get it all out on the table."
The Pentagon's chief spokesman, Larry Di Rita, confirmed that the Defense Department had been in discussions with Congress to find a way for members to view the photographs and videos. "We're looking for a mechanism to do that," Mr. Di Rita said.
One complication, he said, is that the Pentagon is not certain it has obtained all photographic and video material gathered as evidence in the case from military investigators in Iraq.
While pressure grew to push the images out for public review, the Pentagon was aware that such a decision could taint the criminal investigation.
On one hand, Mr. Di Rita said, is "an understandable desire for people to see and get a better sense of the range of activities that may be depicted in the photos." On the other, he noted, "is everybody's desire and obligation to be careful about not prejudicing an administrative review and criminal proceeding."
In an interview later Sunday, Mr. Graham, a colonel in the Air Force Reserve with 20 years' experience in the area of military justice, said: "We actually have an opportunity to prove to those who may still be open-minded that there is a difference between us and the Saddam Hussein regime. I really do believe that a lot of people are sort of checking under the hood of democracy to see if they want to be part of it."
He said the material was almost certain to become public eventually and that a "drip, drip" of damaging photos would only add to what he described as a public relations disaster. He said there might be a way to release the material and protect the investigation, but "at the end of the day there is a larger issue and this is of the credibility of the United States."
During back-to-back hearings on Friday on detainee abuse convened by the House and Senate, members from both parties warned that American troops in Iraq were less secure, and the United States was less secure, because the depraved acts of detainee abuse have so ignited world anger. Some members of Congress have called on Mr. Rumsfeld to resign.
Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, agreed that the public should view the images.
"It's best that this be seen for what it is," Senator Levin said. "Judgments then can be made by people. Any effort to hide this kind of material is just not going to work. We have an open society. We are proving it, I believe, by proceeding to investigate the way we are."
Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, who also serves on the Armed Services Committee, warned that scandals grow until information is released.
"Look, one thing I know about scandals: They go on and on and on until the American people feel they have a full and complete picture of what happened," Senator McCain said on "Fox News Sunday."
"And to hold back these pictures, or to hold back the videos and only show them to members of Congress or something like that, first, is foolish, because they'll leak out, but second of all, it is sending the wrong signal," he added.
But Senator McCain indicated that focusing on the images missed larger, more important questions, including whether the military police unit at Abu Ghraib, a notorious prison during the Hussein era, was acting on the specific orders of military intelligence to soften up detainees in advance of interrogation.
Senator Levin also warned that the degrading treatment of detainees might be "much more systemic than just a few guards abusing prisoners," and that it might have been part of a wider effort "to extract information from these prisoners."
"And this was part of a new intelligence policy which goes right on up to the Pentagon and perhaps even beyond," Senator Levin said.
He said that "some of the environment here was actually set at the White House when they said it was a bunch of legalisms to discuss whether or not the Geneva Conventions would apply to prisoners directly or whether they would be treated consistent with the Geneva Conventions or in the same way but not precisely."
This policy, Senator Levin said, was "splitting legal hairs about the application of Geneva Conventions, and it seems to me that sent exactly the wrong message to the intelligence people and to the guards themselves."

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company |

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CACI Defends Screening of Interrogators
By Ellen McCarthy
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A19


CACI International Inc. said yesterday that its interrogators were carefully screened and worked under the supervision of the U.S. military in Iraqi detention centers.
The Arlington government contractor, whose employee Steven Stefanowicz is implicated in an Army report on prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, said in a statement released yesterday that it reviewed 1,600 applications for interrogator positions and sent less than 3 percent on to the military for final approval.
The company also said all of its interrogators had secret clearances that required background investigations and the workers were briefed on military rules of engagement.The statement did not define the rules.
The military dictated "how CACI must operate in Iraq and included the required qualifications for interrogators and other allied specialties. The company has followed these instructions," the statement said.
Stefanowicz is cited in the report as one of four men who were either "directly or indirectly responsible" for the abuses at the prison near Baghdad.
The company has hired a law firm to conduct its own investigation of the allegations. It reiterated yesterday that none of its employees have been formally charged with wrongdoing and that the company was cooperating with the military's investigation of the abuses.
CACI's statement also supported Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's testimony before Congress last week that civilian contractors are "responsible to military intelligence who hire them, and have the responsibility for supervising them."
The firm again said it would take "appropriate action" against any employee found to have acted illegally. It also said its employees continue to perform a number of duties in Iraq, including interrogation services.
In an interview last night, CACI chief executive J.P. London said the company's contract with the military defined the terms of its service, including length of engagement and pricing. "It's pretty straight forward," he said. "We will provide services to the U.S. military. We don't provide supervisory services over anybody else. That's very clear."
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Analysts Say Iraqi Agencies Unlikely to Follow U.S. Rules

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A20
With less than two months before the Coalition Provisional Authority is to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi government, CPA administrator L. Paul Bremer III has been establishing rules for key agencies in the fields of intelligence, defense and the law that analysts say may not survive long because they reflect American rather than Middle Eastern values.
The new Iraqi intelligence service, which the CPA has created to replace Saddam Hussein's Mukhabarat, will not collect intelligence that helps or harms any "legal" political party or Iraqi government official, under an order Bremer signed April 1. Nor will the agency carry out covert activities against "any Iraqi citizen or group based on race, religion, sect, gender, language, origin or tribal affiliation," the order said.
In some cases, Bremer's orders go beyond U.S. government practices. For example, after the U.S.-led coalition transfers limited sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government June 30, officers in the new Iraqi armed forces will have to wait 18 months after resigning or retiring before they are permitted to hold any political office, under Bremer's order establishing the new Ministry of Defense.
"There is no chance at all that a follow-on government [in Baghdad] will observe these orders," said Patrick Lang, a retired colonel and former head of the Middle East division of the Defense Intelligence Agency. "They need to walk away from us."
"No one has any illusion that it all is going to last," said Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a specialist in the Middle East. He said Iraqis will reshape all the orders and ideas that Bremer's group is promulgating, no matter what is put down on paper.
"It makes perfect sense as attempts to lead into the future," Cordesman said, "but Americans need to understand we are just creating a climate for Iraqis . . . and it will be modified by them."
Lang agreed with Cordesman that the Iraqis will "adapt their government to their own traditions and culture."
"We can write all those things into law and it won't do any good," Lang said. "Saddam had a constitution with some of those same words, but none of it worked because they ignored it. That's their culture."
A poll of Iraqis taken in February found that only 42 percent of those surveyed understood that a transitional constitution had been approved, and that only half of that number understood that a constitution is "a nation's fundamental law," according to a recent Defense Department report.
Some of Bremer's orders are designed to keep military and intelligence officers out of the Iraqi political system to avoid having a new dictator emerge, as Hussein did 35 years ago. According to a Baghdad newspaper report, the newly named defense minister, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, and the director of the intelligence service, Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed Shehwani, have already moved into political activities, working behind the scenes to reach an understanding with Moqtada Sadr, the Shiite cleric leading an anti-coalition insurgency.
Juan Cole, a University of Michigan professor who specializes in Middle Eastern affairs, noted earlier this week that Allawi "clearly wants to build a future political career by bringing order to the country."
The Mukhabarat was a sort of hybrid of the FBI and CIA, and regularly surveilled, arrested, imprisoned, tortured and even killed both citizens and foreigners.
The new Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) "shall have no power to arrest or detain persons" under its charter, which supplemented Bremer's order. Instead, it will provide intelligence "to Iraqi law enforcement authorities not precluded by other law."
Under Bremer's order, the INIS will be headed by a director general named by the future prime minister and confirmed by the body vested with national legislative authority. The director general will serve for five years and "ensure that no information is obtained by the INIS except so far as necessary for the proper discharge of its responsibilities."
In conducting searches or wiretaps, INIS employees will "minimize the unintentional acquisition, retention and dissemination of information about citizens of Iraq that is not of value in its work on national security," its charter says. Warrants from a judge will be obtained in advance and will be operable for only 90 days, after which a renewal will be required.
Bremer's order setting up the new defense ministry includes a set of "principles" to be followed in its operation, including one that calls for the ministry to "play its full part in reinforcing national unity" and not be "used to foster or institutionalize disunity."
Another principle is that the armed forces act to gain the confidence of the Iraqi people by "acting in the country's interest" and "abiding by laws and telling the truth."
The new defense minister "shall exercise administrative control" over the Iraqi armed forces, but operational control will remain with the "command of coalition forces," under another order Bremer signed March 21.
Another order Bremer recently signed in effect gave legal protection, after the transfer of sovereignty, to U.S. and other coalition military forces. It said the Central Criminal Court authorities "shall not compel" foreign military forces to appear if they are in Iraq "in support of operations sanctioned by a U.N. Security Council resolution."
Normally such protection is included in a status-of-forces agreement signed between governments.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company



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Iraq Oil Exports Cut by Pipeline Sabotage

BAGHDAD (Reuters) - A sabotage attack against a southern pipeline has reduced Iraq (news - web sites)'s oil exports sharply, the South Oil Company President said on Monday.
"The situation is not good," Jabar al-Leaby told Reuters, but declined to say how much oil was still being exported.
Leaby said the attack affected flows to the Basra terminal, the export point for most of Iraq's 1.8 million barrels per day of overseas sales -- and the country's only means of earning foreign currency.
The attack came around two weeks after Western forces occupying southern Iraq foiled suicide boat attacks on oil tankers at the Basra terminal.
Violence has intensified in southern Iraq in recent weeks after occupying forces cracked down on followers of Shi'ite leader Moqtada al-Sadr.
(Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Baghdad newsroom)




SUDAN
Algerian bullets
Late last month, an Ilyushin-76 aircraft with clear Algerian air force markings unloaded ten tonnes of ammunition at Ab?ch? airport, 170 kilometres from Chad's border with Sudan, say Western diplomatic sources. Did President Idriss D?by swap Algerian Islamists for support for his fellow Zaghawa fighting Sudan's Islamist regime?


ZIMBABWE
Disappearing food
The government may turn away food aid as part of its ruthless election strategy
An internal United Nations' memorandum describes Zimbabwe's latest crop projections as 'complete nonsense' and 'quite impossible.' That's no surprise. Fanciful agricultural forecasts are common in Agriculture Minister Joseph Made's department but these particular projections are critical. The forecasts were used to justify the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front government's decision to turn down food aid this year. At a meeting on 30 March, a Ministry official claimed that the harvest would be 1.7 million tonnes, an impossibly big figure.
The following day, Minister of Labour Paul Mangwana met UN officials and diplomats, reiterated the figures and emphasised that the government had asked the UN to keep food aid out of the humanitarian assistance appeal. Yet the current debate within ZANU-PF shows that there are still practical constraints. Periodic fuel shortages and scarcity of spare parts limit the government's ability to move the food quickly to wherever it can win most votes. So a ruthless campaign to benefit from shutting out foreign food aid could still work against the ruling party. Politicians will lose votes if the gamble goes wrong; hungry Zimbabweans may lose their lives.


KENYA
Kibaki's crowded diary
The President has to take some tough decisions to rescue the coalition government
The next six months will be critical for President Mwai Kibaki and for the future of his National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government. After almost 18 months of power, NARC's standing with Kenyans has plummeted as partisan squabbling has overshadowed the government's efforts at economic revival and the promised creation of 500,000 jobs a year (AC Vol 45 No 4). After reopening parliament last month, Kibaki has attempted to assert the authority of the presidency. He has brokered a truce between rival wings of the ruling coalition, but the deal-making has just bought time before difficult decisions are made in the coming months. The key issues are: 1)constitutional reform; 2)political party reorganisation; 3)cabinet reshuffle; 4)the anti-corruption campaign; 5)civil service retrenchment; 6)drawing down IMF and World Bank credits; and 7)tackling security
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Rumsfeld Should Stay
By WILLIAM SAFIRE

WASHINGTON -- Donald Rumsfeld has been designated by Democratic politicians as the scapegoat for the scandal at Abu Ghraib prison. But any resignation would only whet their appetite to cut and run. The highly effective defense secretary owes it to the nation's war on terror to soldier on.
Because today's column will generate apoplectic e-mail, a word about contrarian opinion: Shortly after 9/11, with the nation gripped by fear and fury, the Bush White House issued a sweeping and popular order to crack down on suspected terrorists. The liberal establishment largely fell cravenly mute. A few lonely civil libertarians spoke out. When I used the word "dictatorial," conservatives, both neo- and paleo-, derided my condemnation as "hysterical."
One Bush cabinet member paid attention. Rumsfeld appointed a bipartisan panel of attorneys to re-examine that draconian edict. As a result, basic protections for the accused Qaeda combatants were included in the proposed military tribunals.
Perhaps because of those protections, the tribunals never got off the ground. (The Supreme Court will soon, I hope, provide similar legal rights to suspected terrorists who are U.S. citizens.) But in the panic of the winter of 2001, Rumsfeld was one of the few in power concerned about prisoners' rights. Some now demanding his scalp then supported the repressive Patriot Act.
In last week's apology before the Senate, Rumsfeld assumed ultimate responsibility, as J.F.K. did after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Pentagon chief failed to foresee and warn the president of the danger lurking in the Army's public announcement in January of its criminal investigation into prisoner abuse. He failed to put the nation's reputation ahead of the regulation prohibiting "command influence" in criminal investigations, which protects the accused in courts-martial.
The secretary testified that he was, incredibly, the last to see the humiliating photos that turned a damning army critique by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba into a media firestorm. Why nobody searched out and showed him those incendiary pictures immediately reveals sheer stupidity on the part of the command structure and his Pentagon staff.
But then Senator Mark Dayton of Minnesota rudely badgered the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Richard Myers, repeatedly hurling the word "suppression" at him. General Myers had been trying to save the lives of troops by persuading CBS to delay its broadcast of pictures that would inflame resistance. Rumsfeld quieted the sound-bite-hungry politician by reminding him that requests to delay life-threatening reports were part of long military-media tradition.
This was scandal with no cover-up; the wheels of investigation and prosecution were grinding, with public exposure certain. Second only to the failure to prevent torture was the Pentagon's failure to be first to break the bad news: the Taguba report should have been released at a Rumsfeld press conference months ago.
Now every suspect ever held in any U.S. facility will claim to have been tortured and demand recompense. Videos real and fake will stream across the world's screens, and propagandists abroad will join defeatists here in calling American prisons a "gulag," gleefully equating Bush not just with Saddam but with Stalin.
Torture is both unlawful and morally abhorrent. But what about gathering intelligence from suspected or proven terrorists by codified, regulated, manipulative interrogation? Information thus acquired can save thousands of lives. Will we now allow the pendulum to swing back to "name, rank, serial number," as if suspected terrorists planning the bombing of civilians were uniformed prisoners of war obeying the rules of war?
The United States shows the world its values by investigating and prosecuting wrongdoers high and low. It is not in our political value system to scapegoat a good man for the depraved acts of others. Nor does it make strategic sense to remove a war leader in the vain hope of appeasing critics of the war.
This secretary of defense, who has the strong support of the president, is both effective and symbolic. If he were to quit under political fire, pressure would mount for America to quit under insurgent fire. Hang in there, Rummy! You have a duty to serve in our "long, hard slog."
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company

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Analysis: Withdrawal on the cards?

By Paul Reynolds
BBC News Online world affairs correspondent

Events in Iraq have been spinning out of control - and out of control of the spinners - so fast on so many fronts that the W word - withdrawal - is now being mentioned.
Charles Heyman, senior defence analyst for Jane's Consultancy Group, wrote in the London Times on Monday:
"It begins to look as though there is going to be a rather messy political solution to the whole affair, possibly brokered by the United Nations.
"Expect to see an agreement where both sides can claim some sort of a victory, followed by a rather hasty withdrawal of coalition troops at some stage in the next six months."
It is certainly true that on three fronts the coalition is not doing too well:
On the military, the insurgency has clearly spread from the few "former regime elements" and "foreign fighters" whom coalition spokesmen regularly blame.
Will the interim government be able to command the loyalty of Iraqis to a sufficient degree to bring the insurgency under control?
And the ability of the coalition to impose its own solutions has slipped away.
The bizarre situation in Falluja is a prime example of this.
The sight of former Republican Guard General Jasim Saleh appearing on the scene in his chauffeur-driven Mercedes and his old uniform to negotiate a security role for himself could hardly have contradicted the coalition's original aim of driving out the fighters from Falluja more vividly.
And what has happened to Moqtada Sadr, the fiery young Muslim leader, who, we were told, was going to be brought to justice on a murder charge? Not much, it seems.
The propaganda war could not have gone worse with the publication of the photos of prisoner abuse.
Whatever the origin of some of these photos, the damage has been done on the street.
The pictures highlight the problem that the coalition, having failed to make the case for going to war over the elusive weapons issue, is now failing to make its second case - the moral argument that it can bring the rule of law to a land without law.
The third problem is political.
There is now only May and June to go before the handover of "sovereignty" to an interim government.
Yet this government will have no power. It will be able to make no new laws or change any law previously decreed by the Coalition Provisional Authority.
It will also have very limited powers over the occupation troops, to be renamed the multi-national force.
So will it be able to command the loyalty of Iraqis to a sufficient degree to bring the insurgency under control?
Tug of war
Against the gloomy predictions, one has to say that the will of the soon-to-be-appointed Iraqi Interim Government and that of the United States and the UK to see this through should not be underestimated.
And there is always a risk that the herd instinct of journalists and commentators often predicts one thing while events produce another.
Christopher Hitchens, the gadfly journalist who has been one of the war's great supporters, writes acerbically of his fellow hacks in Slate magazine:
"It's now fairly obvious that those who cover Iraq have placed their bets on a fiasco or 'quagmire'."
He is still hoping for an eventual settlement in Iraq, which might go democracy's way:
"There are vast numbers of Iraqis - as we know from the leaflets distributed in Najaf, and the blogs from Baghdad, and from the hundreds of thousands who are exercising their right of return to the country - who do not wish to live under the rule of demented mullahs. The pulse and heart rate of the society have barely had a chance to register."
The problem is that a year after the invasion, there are still no plans for an election before the end of this year and therefore the "chance to register" for all those moderates is still not available.
The whole idea was based on the belief that, as in Germany and Japan after the war, resistance would collapse and that the task of building institutions could therefore be given time.
It is instructive, for example, that even at this stage in Iraq, the drawing up of voting lists is only just being examined.
Time, as it turned out, has not been on the coalition's side and the race between chaos and stability is still on.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3681289.stm
Published: 2004/05/03 19:15:23 GMT
? BBC MMIV


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Daniel Pearl 'refused to be sedated before his throat was cut'
By Massoud Ansari in Karachi
(Filed: 09/05/2004)


Horrifying new details of how Daniel Pearl, the murdered Wall Street Journal reporter, met his death have emerged from the interrogation of new suspects by Pakistani police.
Pearl, who was kidnapped in Karachi in January 2002, knew for several hours that he was about to be killed, but resisted repeated attempts to sedate him, police now believe.
He was fully aware of what was happening when the Arab extremists who took control during his final days cut his throat, according to information gleaned from Pakistani militants now in police custody.
Shocking video film of Pearl's murder, seen around the world via the internet, was in fact a partial reconstruction of what had happened a few moments earlier, officers have been told.
The camera operator made a mistake and missed the moment of his death, which his murderers then re-enacted, before decapitating the reporter.
The revelations have fuelled anger among police investigators that at least a dozen leading suspects in the kidnap and murder of the 38-year-old journalist have been arrested, but have not been charged or tried in connection with his death.
Some have been accused of unrelated - and mostly lesser - offences. The three most recently captured suspects have not yet been charged, and their arrests have never been officially announced.
The only cases brought so far in connection with Pearl's death have been those against Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the British-born al-Qaeda terrorist, who was convicted of kidnap and conspiracy to murder the American journalist, and three others who played relatively minor roles in the kidnapping.
All were given life sentences for conspiracy to kidnap, but are now appealing against their convictions in the country's high court. Pakistani authorities are said to be reluctant to put the new suspects on trial lest their evidence helps the first four win their appeals.
A legal official said: "No matter what Sheikh is guilty of, if the police were forced to change their account of what happened because of newfound evidence, he might be given the benefit of the doubt on everything else, and be set free immediately."
Omar Sheikh, the mastermind of the kidnapping, set the trap which lured Pearl to his captors. He put the reporter in touch with a man who, he pretended, would introduce him to an extremist Muslim leader whom Pearl wished to interview.
Contrary to evidence given during Omar Sheikh's trial, police now believe he may not have been present when Pearl met Sajid Jabbar, the go-between, at a Karachi restaurant. It was after the meeting that Pearl disappeared.
Investigators say that senior officials in the Sindh police - the force responsible for Karachi - are "petrified" that if militants arrested in the past year were tried for their part in Pearl's murder, their earlier case against Omar Sheikh might unravel in the courts.
One official close to the investigation said: "Even if these men have admitted their roles in the kidnapping and killing of Daniel Pearl, we simply cannot charge them because of its impact on that earlier case."
Police have pieced together new details of how Pearl was held in captivity for two weeks, and eventually killed, from those involved - including two who witnessed his final hours.
Many of the details were unknown even to Mariane Pearl, the reporter's widow, who wrote a moving memoir about his death, A Mighty Heart.
They now believe that Pearl was not forcibly abducted from the restaurant, but at first went willingly with Sajid in his car, while four other militants followed. He was driven to the house on the outskirts of Karachi where he was to be held and killed.
There, four others who would guard Pearl dragged him inside at gun-point, tying his hands and blindfolding him. "Even at this point, Pearl didn't realise that he was already in trouble, and kept asking why they were behaving like this," one of those in custody told police.
He was held for two weeks before he was killed but made at least one escape attempt - according to the arrested men, just three days before he was murdered.
"He tried to scale the wall but couldn't do it because both his hands were tied," one told police. His captors said that Pearl had difficulty sleeping.
They brought him English-language newspapers and magazines to help him pass the time and let him exercise inside the room.
His efforts to converse with his captors were limited since they could speak only broken English. However, one said: "He made clear that he was a Jew and his wife a Buddhist. He used to imitate the way she prayed, and sing hymns and songs whenever he thought about her."
Eventually, Saud Memon, who is believed to be al-Qaeda's chief financier in Pakistan and owned the house where Pearl was held, contacted a group of Arab extremists who took over custody and decided he would be killed.
Armed with a video camera, three Arabs arrived, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, third-in-command of al-Qaeda - since handed over to the Americans.
For the first time, police have now identified the others as Abdul Rahman and Nasrullah - both Kuwaiti nationals fluent in Arabic, Balochi and Persian. Authorities are still searching for them.
On the day Pearl died, two of his Pakistani guards were present: Ali Khan, arrested just two weeks ago, and Fazal Karim, an employee of Saud Memon. One recently told interrogators how the Arabs tried to sedate Pearl, first by injection, then by doctoring his tea.
"I think he understood that he was going to be killed and refused to accept tea or to gulp pills. He even did not allow himself to be injected."
Before he was murdered, they forced him to relate his Jewish background and express sympathy with detainees in Guantanamo Bay before putting the knife to his throat once - and then again, a second time, owing to the faulty camera.
One of those present told police: "When they were slaughtering him in front of me I thought it was a bad dream. I had seen the cutting of a goat or chicken many times, but had never seen a human being slaughtered in front me."
Karim is among those who have been arrested and jailed for other crimes: narcotics smuggling, in his case. Investigators fear that Khan will also escape prosecution for his part in Pearl's capture and death.
Five others who took part in Pearl's capture or guarded him are behind bars for their part in unrelated sectarian killings, and Pakistani authorities have no plans to press charges related to Pearl. Authorities have yet to reveal publicly that they are holding three of the suspects: Khan, Naeem Bokhari and Faisal Bhatti.
Last night members of Pearl's family said they wanted all those involved in the journalist's death brought to book, and urged Pakistani authorities to hasten the hearing of Omar Sheikh's appeal.
In a statement to The Sunday Telegraph, Mariane Pearl and her parents-in-law, Ruth and Judea Pearl, said: "We are eager to see justice served and the truth come out. We are especially waiting to see a just conclusion of Omar Saeed Sheikh's conviction and the apprehension of all those involved."
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Chavez foils 'assassination plot'
By James Menendez
BBC correspondent in Caracas
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez says his forces have captured a group of about 50 Colombian paramilitaries who were plotting to kill or overthrow him.
According to Mr Chavez, the men had been trained by Venezuela's political opposition.
Opposition leaders say the claim is a crude attempt to discredit them.
The controversy comes at a time of rising political tension in Venezuela, with the opposition hoping to unseat Mr Chavez in a referendum.
In a few weeks' time President Chavez will find out whether his opponents have gathered enough support to hold the referendum against him and possibly force him from office.
Dawn raid
The government says 56 Colombians were arrested in a dawn raid at a farm on the outskirts of the capital, Caracas.
State television has been showing pictures of armed police guarding groups of young men dressed in green camouflage.
It has also shown what appears to be a camp complete with sleeping quarters and cooking facilities.
Security officials say the men were using the camp to plan an attack on a military installation in Caracas.
They say the farm belongs to a Cuban exile with close links to Venezuela's opposition.
According to President Chavez, the discovery is clear evidence that his opponents are trying to assassinate him.
That claim brought a swift denial from opposition leaders who dismiss the raid as a publicity stunt designed to justify a security clampdown.
In Colombia the leader of the main paramilitary group has also denied any involvement.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3699245.stm
Published: 2004/05/09 22:11:14 GMT
? BBC MMIV
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Top Korean soldier held for fraud
The military authorities in South Korea have arrested their top officer on the Korea-US Combined Forces Command on charges of embezzling army funds.
Shin Il-soon, a 57-year-old four-star general, was detained at a military jail after three days of interrogation by investigators.
Gen Shin denies the charges, saying the money missing was used for official parties and other army-related events.
He is the first serving general of his rank to be arrested for corruption.
He is second-in-command on the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to US Gen Leon LaPorte, who also commands the US military in South Korea and the UN Command overseeing the Korean War armistice.
The CFC is charged with defending South Korea against foreign attack and has nearly 700,000 Korean soldiers and 37,000 US troops at its disposal, facing North Korea's million-strong forces.
An unnamed officer at the South Korean defence ministry told Reuters news agency that Gen Shin was facing embezzlement charges "but no bribery charges".
The agency's sources added that the charges date back to 2000 when the general commanded South Korea's Third Army.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3697585.stm
Published: 2004/05/09 05:23:52 GMT
? BBC MMIV
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Medicine against the odds in N Korea
By Sarah Buckley
BBC News Online
Aid workers who visited victims of last week's explosion in North Korea have spoken of doctors dealing with horrific injuries in very basic conditions.
But this is not surprising in a country with limited medical supplies; where doctors have been known to take the skin off their own legs to help burns patients.
Gerald Bourke and Richard Ragan of the World Food Programme said the People's Provincial Hospital in Sinuiju, near the Chinese border, was fairly clean and spacious but that equipment was scarce.
They said that of the 40 or 50 critically injured patients they saw, only two of them were on intravenous drips.
"We saw no modern equipment, nothing that could be plugged in," said Mr Bourke, the WFP's representative in Beijing, told BBC News Online.
"A lot of the patients had been stitched up, but the thread... was more like twine, it was very thick," he said.
"It shows these guys were probably operating in a hurry trying to stabilise people," said Mr Ragan, WFP country director of North Korea.
The victims were suffering from facial and eye injuries, internal injuries and broken or severed limbs.
Many had lost the sight in one eye, sometimes both; one woman had had both feet blown off.
"The faces of the kids were a mix of being burned and lacerated and several of the children had had the skin ripped off of them," Mr Ragan said.
He said the doctor in charge of the hospital, who was assisted by about 10-15 staff, was "very calm", given he was responsible for 360 emergency cases.
The doctor "said only 15 patients had died, and this was two days after the blast. So one could argue that they're pretty skilled physicians but are working with very limited supplies and equipment", Mr Ragan said.
Both Mr Bourke and Mr Ragan said that what struck them most was the "eerie silence" in the hospital.
There's an absence of almost everything except beds and doctors and patients and desire
Stephen Linton, EugeneBell Foundation
"A couple of the children were whimpering and moaning but most of them were lying stock still in their beds," said Mr Bourke.
The relatives of the injured children were also quiet, Mr Ragan said. He described the parents of one eight- or nine-year-old boy who were having to hold their son down to stop him having spasms.
"You could clearly see the father didn't know where to turn", he said.
The rudimentary conditions the WFP officials witnessed are typical of many North Korean general hospitals, according to Stephen Linton, founder of the EugeneBell Foundation, a US NGO that provides the country with medical supplies and treatment facilities.
"The medical people are very dedicated, but the problem is modern medicine is predicated on a river of supplies and equipment, and that river has dried to a trickle in North Korea.
"There's an absence of almost everything except beds and doctors and patients and desire," he said.
He said some doctors were forced to grow cotton to make bandages, or to whittle their own splints; virtually every hospital grew its own herbal medicines; and surgeons often took their tools home to sharpen them.
"Most doctors have lots of scars on their legs because they give grafts from their own skin", he said.
Mr Linton said the medical training programmes were of a similar length to those in Europe and every province has a medical school.
"Doctors are recommended to prioritise herbal medicine before the harder to obtain Western medicine," he said.
"They're very creative and hard working but everything that most people take for advantage is lacking," he said.
He said the conditions in the buildings were also very basic.
"They're not even often well-lit... some of them aren't heated.
"Patients wear their parkas in bed in the winter."
As a result, a lot of people received out-patient care because they could eat better and keep warmer at home.
"I don't know if medicine would be so popular in the West if (doctors) had to operate under the conditions in North Korea," he said.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3669141.stm
Published: 2004/04/29 10:54:44 GMT
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What if...? Kim's close call
Last week's devastating train blast in North Korea has refocused attention on the murky question of leader Kim Jong-il's successor.
Mr Kim is believed to have passed through the station in Ryongchon, which was devastated in the explosion, just hours before the incident.
If he had been seriously injured or killed, diplomats and analysts are not sure who would have taken his place as North Korea's "Dear Leader".
It is likely that in the first instance, the nominal head of state - Kim Yong-nam, the president of the Supreme People's Assembly - would have assumed power.
Kim Jong-il was travelling back from China with a sizeable entourage, including the chief of general staff of the army, Kim Yong-chun and Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju, according to state media. But the reports did not mention Kim Yong-nam.
KIM'S FAMILY
Kim has several children
His eldest son disgraced himself in Japan
Therefore, power may pass to a younger boy, Kim Jong-chul
Even if Kim Yong-nam had initially taken the reins, it is far from clear what would have happened next. The relationship between the military, party and Kim Jong-il's family is difficult to fathom.
There has only been one change of leadership in North Korea so far - from Kim Il-sung to his son Kim Jong-il - and that was put in motion several years before the elder Kim's death.
Kim Jong-il is himself believed to be grooming one of his sons as successor, but the candidates may be considered too young to assume power any time soon.
A recent BBC News Online investigation into the country's "first family" found that many analysts believed a serious contender was Kim Jong-chul, Kim Jong-il's oldest son by the woman thought to be his favourite consort.
But Kim Jong-chul, who works in the Party propaganda department - the same job that Kim Jong-il did when he was being groomed for succession by his father - is only in his early 20s.
A factor which may further complicate the succession question is the reported illness of Kim Jong-chul's mother, Ko Young-hee.
A former dancer in the state dance troupe, Ms Ko is currently reported to be receiving treatment in a Paris hospital, according to the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3658729.stm
Published: 2004/04/26 09:27:11 GMT
? BBC MMIV
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>> AHEM 1

U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposal Project Languishing


By Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A17
With much fanfare, the world's two nuclear superpowers announced in 1998 that they would destroy 68 tons of plutonium stripped from bombs and warheads. The cost, counted in billions, would be borne largely by the United States and European governments intent on removing dangerous fissile material from circulation.
Six years later, the project sits stalled. The plutonium remains intact, and no construction has begun on either of the planned processing factories. In frustration, some U.S. analysts and politicians are doubting the Bush administration's commitment.
This has happened because the United States and Russia have been unable to agree on who would pay if an accident -- or sabotage -- occurred in Russia. The Bush administration wants Russia to take full responsibility, and the Russians are balking.
The stalemate comes when the fear of nuclear terrorism is growing and President Bush is pledging aggressive action. Nuclear specialists and some members of Congress say the case highlights a failure by the White House to back up its nonproliferation ambitions with action.
"How a little issue of indemnification can hold this up is beyond me," Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.) told top Energy Department officials at a recent hearing. "This is a way to get rid of a huge chunk of nuclear-grade plutonium."
The project was blocked by "trivial negotiating issues," Domenici said. He added that he told the White House "that maybe they ought to put some bigger people in the position of negotiating." Plutonium is not easily obtained, but Russia is considered to be the site of the largest and most vulnerable stockpiles.
"It's a very messy, messy situation," said Kenneth Luongo, executive director of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. The project, he said, has been "in the works for a decade, and we haven't moved beyond the talking phase."
Agreements to build parallel plants in Siberia and South Carolina expired last year. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said in March that the administration hoped to resolve the issue by this spring and asserted that it "is being worked at high levels."
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld are among those who have raised the issue with their Russian counterparts. Despite intensive discussions within the administration in recent weeks, a White House official conceded that the issue is "one of those things that have been on the one-yard line a long time." Abraham reported in his annual budget request that construction was officially 10 months behind schedule but should begin by May 2005 if an agreement can be reached. He said money will be needed to start building the plants that convert plutonium into mixed oxide fuel for nuclear reactors.
"We are confident that we can work it out. We are not that far apart, believe it or not," said Paul M. Longsworth, deputy Energy Department administrator, who acknowledged that the positions remain "pretty firm right now."
"Plutonium disposition is a 20-year program that is going to eliminate enough plutonium to make far more than 10,000 nuclear weapons," Longsworth said. "You've got to start it right."
On Feb. 11, in a speech intended to amplify his record on nonproliferation and inspire other countries to do more, the president declared that governments around the world "must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical and biological and radiological materials."
A particular worry is that terrorist organizations or rogue states will buy or steal a nuclear weapon or the fissile material that powers an atomic blast. Many scientists and public policy experts believe that an organized group or government that acquires fissile material would have little trouble assembling a crude weapon.
To build an atomic bomb from 50-year-old technology would require about 13 pounds of plutonium, said Thomas Cochran, director of nuclear projects at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Libya, which recently abandoned its fledgling secret nuclear program, acquired a bomb design of that vintage from the illicit supply network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
U.S. government facilities are also vulnerable, the General Accounting Office said in a report released late last month. The Energy Department's responses to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were "not sufficient" to ensure that all of its sites are prepared "to defend themselves against the higher terrorist threat present in a post-Sept. 11 . . . world," the GAO said.
In Russia, basic security improvements have not been made at dozens of military installations where more than 60 percent of the country's plutonium and weapons-grade uranium is kept, the GAO warned last year.
GAO auditors blamed Russia for failing to allow U.S. officials to visit key sites but also said Congress and the Bush administration exacerbated the delays by denying critical funds or refusing to grant contract waivers. When the report came out, the United States had spent $6 billion since 1992 to help Russia destroy or safeguard nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
"The big problem is there's a leadership gap. These are not big obstacles. They can be handled by leaders who are determined and can be focused," said former U.S. senator Sam Nunn, who with Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) backed the vast counterproliferation program that bears their names.
The project to destroy 68 tons of plutonium -- half in Russia and half in the United States -- was designed as part of the cooperative project to reduce the risk of fissile material falling into the wrong hands. Announced during the Clinton administration, the program was formally launched during a presidential summit in Moscow in 1998.
Domenici, who helped direct $200 million to the project in its first year, attended the summit as President Bill Clinton's guest. He has been among the sharpest critics of the Bush administration's inability to keep the program on track.
The sticking point is the issue of liability for potentially catastrophic problems. In threat-reduction agreements signed in the mid-1990s, Russia agreed to take responsibility in return for help from foreign governments in disarming former Soviet nuclear weapons and improving security.
"If something blew, Russia would pay. No ifs, ands or buts," said Leonard S. Spector, director of the Washington office for the Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center for Nonproliferation Studies. But on the plutonium program and a project known as the Nuclear Cities Initiative, the Russians insisted that if U.S. contractors were to blame, they or the federal government should be liable for damages and possible prosecution.
Sabotage is a particular worry, the Russians told U.S. negotiators, who have been led by Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton.
"They kept saying, 'Hey, you can hire Chechen rebels under contract and they could blow up our facilities, and we would be powerless to prosecute,' " said an administration official closely involved in the issues, speaking on the condition of anonymity. "We said that's ridiculous. We don't hire people who will conduct sabotage."
The Bush administration is adamant that U.S. companies and officials are engaged in a goodwill effort and should not be held liable for unintended problems. The liability negotiations commanded attention at the 2002 summit of the world's most industrialized countries, which pledged $20 billion for 10 years of nonproliferation programs in Russia.
There is a disagreement within the administration, where sources said the Defense and State departments have demanded the more stringent liability provision, while the Energy Department believed that a somewhat less rigorous formula was sufficient.
"What you would have thought was an incidental legal issue looms so large," said Spector, who suggested sharing the burden, a structure established in the civilian nuclear power sector. "Everybody is frustrated that an additional hurdle is being presented that has to be overcome."
As the negotiations continue, the potential dangers remain, critics believe.
"The implications are that you're going to have 68 additional tons of weapons-grade plutonium lying around the United States and Russia," said Luongo, the nuclear security specialist. "And Russia, in particular, is where security is not up to global standards."

? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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>> AHEM 2...

Conservatives Restive About Bush Policies
Fresh Initiatives Sought On Iraq, Domestic Issues

By Dana Milbank and Jonathan Weisman
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A01
After three years of sweeping actions in both foreign and domestic affairs, the Bush administration is facing complaints from the conservative intelligentsia that it has lost its ability to produce fresh policies.
The centerpiece of President Bush's foreign policy -- the effort to transform Iraq into a peaceful democracy -- has been undermined by a deadly insurrection and broadcast photos of brutality by U.S. prison guards. On the domestic side, conservatives and former administration officials say the White House policy apparatus is moribund, with policies driven by political expediency or ideological pressure rather than by facts and expertise.
Conservatives have become unusually restive. Last Tuesday, columnist George F. Will sharply criticized the administration's Iraq policy, writing: "This administration cannot be trusted to govern if it cannot be counted on to think and, having thought, to have second thoughts." Two days earlier, Robert Kagan, a neoconservative supporter of the Iraq war, wrote: "All but the most blindly devoted Bush supporters can see that Bush administration officials have no clue about what to do in Iraq tomorrow, much less a month from now."
The complaints about Bush's Iraq policy are relatively new, but they are in some ways similar to long-standing criticism about Bush's domestic policies. In a book released earlier this year, former Bush Treasury secretary Paul H. O'Neill described Bush as "a blind man in a room full of deaf people" and said policymakers put politics before sound policy judgments.
Echoing a criticism leveled by former Bush aide John J. DiIulio Jr., who famously described "Mayberry Machiavellis" running the White House, O'Neill said "the biggest difference" between his time in government in the 1970s and in the Bush administration "is that our group was mostly about evidence and analysis, and Karl [Rove], Dick [Cheney], [Bush communications strategist] Karen [Hughes] and the gang seemed to be mostly about politics."
Michael Franc, vice president of the Heritage Foundation, said the criticism by O'Neill, Will and Kagan has a common thread: a concern that the administration is "using an old playbook" and not coming up with bold enough ideas, whether the subject is entitlement reform or pacifying Iraq. Conservative intellectuals "are saying, 'Don't do things half way,' " he said.
"It's the exhaustion of power," said a veteran of conservative think tanks who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Ideology has confronted reality, and ideology has bent. On the domestic side, it has bent in terms of the expansion of the government embodied in the Medicare prescription-drug law. On the foreign policy side, it has bent because of what has transpired in the last few weeks in Fallujah."
A Bush spokesman quarreled with that notion, saying there has been no let-up in Bush's policymaking. "We are marching ahead," said the spokesman, Trent Duffy, pointing to Bush's plans for community-college-based job training, space exploration and modernizing health records. "He's continuing to push the policies that have made the country better and stronger."
Part of the current perception of policy fatigue in the White House is a reflection of the political calendar: With a presidential election approaching, there is little possibility that the closely split Congress will enact serious legislation this year regardless of what the White House proposes. "It's a combination of how very challenging it is to move anything in the Senate these days, and it is an election year," said one former Bush aide, who like some of the conservatives interviewed for this article declined to be identified to avoid offending the White House.
But conservative policy experts and a number of former Bush administration officials say there are more systemic reasons for the policy sclerosis. For three years, the president pushed policies conceived during his 2000 campaign for the White House, but with most of those ideas either enacted or stalled, policymaking has run out of steam, they said.
Bush has also discouraged the sort of free-wheeling policy debates that characterized previous administrations, and he relies on a top-down management style that has little use for "wonks" in the federal bureaucracy. At the same time, many of the top domestic policy experts in the Bush White House have moved on to other jobs; in many cases they have been replaced by subordinates with much less experience in governing.
Bruce Bartlett, a conservative economist with the National Center for Policy Analysis, said policy ideas typically bubble up from experts deep inside federal agencies, who put together working groups, draft white papers, sell their wares in the marketplace of ideas and hope White House officials act on their suggestions. In this case, ideas are hatched in the White House, for political or ideological reasons, then are thrust on the bureaucracy, "not for analysis, but for sale," Bartlett said.
The result is a White House that has become unimaginative with domestic policy and, in foreign policy, has struggled to develop new policies to adapt to changing circumstances in Iraq, according to several conservatives.
"In Iraq, you don't see the thinking, 'Things have not happened as we had planned. What do we do now?' " said David Boaz, executive vice president of the libertarian Cato Institute, who last week organized a Cato forum entitled "The Triumph of the Hacks?"
Richard W. Rahn, a prominent Republican economist, excoriated the administration's telecommunications, antitrust and international economic policies in a Washington Times column April 30 along similar lines. "From the beginning of the Bush administration, sympathetic, experienced economists have warned its officials about the need to avoid some obvious mistakes," he wrote. "Unfortunately, these warnings have gone unheeded."
In an interview, Rahn said he has grown concerned over what he sees as "a lack of vision and policy consistency" in the Bush administration. "I mean, we knew where [President Ronald] Reagan was heading; at times there were deviations from the path, but we knew what it was all about," he said. In contrast, he said, now "there doesn't seem to be a clear policy vision."
Some attribute the policy lethargy to personnel changes, particularly on the domestic side. For example, three veterans of previous White Houses with lengthy experience in Washington have left their policymaking roles; their successors, though capable, have significantly less policymaking experience.
Joshua B. Bolten, the deputy chief of staff for policy, has been replaced by Harriet Miers, a Texas lawyer and former chairman of the Texas Lottery Commission. Jay Lefkowitz, director of the Domestic Policy Council, has been replaced by Kristen Silverberg, who was a young aide to Bolten. And Lawrence B. Lindsey was replaced as top economic adviser by investment banker Stephen Friedman.
Likewise, John Bridgeland, a former director of the Domestic Policy Council, was replaced as director of Bush's USA Freedom Corps initiative by Desiree Sayle, the former director of correspondence in the White House. And public-policy professor DiIulio was replaced as chief of Bush's "faith-based" initiative by Jim Towey, who had ties to the president's brother, Florida Gov. Jeb Bush. Leading experts in welfare and health policy have left the White House and been replaced by less experienced hands.
"It would be fair to say the policy shop is less policy-oriented in its apparatus and more administratively managed," said a Republican with close ties to the White House.
In interviews, former officials of the current and three previous administrations described Bush's domestic policy team as unusually green -- particularly compared with Bush's top political adviser, Karl Rove. At the Cato forum last week, former Bush speechwriter David Frum said Rove is "the top hack and the top wonk" in the White House.
"I don't think he should be the most important wonk in the White House," said Bruce Reed, former domestic policy chief to Bill Clinton and author of an article about how policy "wonks" had been bested by political "hacks" in the current White House. "Every White House takes on the enthusiasms and the interests of the president, and most of the time this president seems to take more joy in the politics than in the policy."
Defenders of the Bush policymaking apparatus agree that the volume of policymaking has diminished significantly from 2001 and 2002, when the White House was fighting for passage of policies developed during the presidential campaign, such as tax cuts and education accountability. But they say the cause is outside the administration.
Frum said much of the policy energy has been channeled into fighting terrorism at home and abroad because of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. "On the most critical issue of our time, they have been bold, creative, and in some cases, they have shocked the intelligentsia with their assertiveness," he said.
Whatever the cause, conservatives say the remedy to policy malaise won't come until the election. Conservative strategist Jeffrey Bell said the big items on the policy agenda -- such as an overhaul of Social Security -- are necessarily on hold as Bush fights for reelection. "He's having to defend the forward motion he's already had," Bell said. "Reagan in '84 was the same way. People who thought Reagan's creative period was going to end after '83 were wrong. I think Bush will be the same way."
? 2004 The Washington Post Company