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BULLETIN
Wednesday, 12 May 2004

>>

Laying the Groundwork for Universal Health Care Coverage
by Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D.
Testimony


March 10, 2003 | |



Testimony given March 10, 2003 before the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate.

My name is Stuart Butler. I am Vice President of Domestic and Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I

express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage

Foundation.

Mr. Chairman, any observer of the American health care system is immediately struck by two of its central features.
Gaps and unevenness in coverage. Despite the huge expenditures devoted to the system, there are enormous gaps in the degree

in to which it covers Americans and there are wide difference in the level and type of benefits available to people of

similar circumstances.
Millions of Americans lack any insurance protection at all, and many of these are middle class. Many poor and non-working

Americans are eligible for a wide range of benefits, while others struggle to keep their families just out of poverty yet

lack any insurance. A worker may have coverage one week, arranged by his employer, yet lose it the following week because he

switched jobs to a firm without coverage. Similarly, workers who are perhaps forced in to early retirement by economic

conditions, or their health, are not eligible for Medicare or any other program and can find themselves suddenly in dire

straits for lack of affordable coverage.
The level of benefits available also can widely differ. An elderly person who happens to qualify for veteran's benefits can

obtain general support for their outpatient pharmaceutical needs. Yet an otherwise identical retiree in Medicare has no such

coverage.
So our "system" is a system in name only. It is really a patchwork of public and private programs with widely differing

eligibility criteria. And many people end up falling between the eligibility requirements of the programs and many others

have benefits only loosely connected to their needs.
Multiple systems of health care. The second distinctive feature of the American system is that different parts of it are run

on totally different principles of design and economics. The Veterans Administration health system, for example, has

similarities to single payer systems in other countries, in that the VA maintains its own hospitals, pays its own staff, and

decides centrally on the distribution of medical resources. Meanwhile another government program, Medicare, runs on other

principles, with private providers reimbursed by government for the services they render to eligible beneficiaries. In

Medicare, the primary package of benefits is decided in detail by Congress. Moreover, Medicare is actually two separate

programs. The hospital insurance system functions as a traditional mandatory social insurance program. The other part of

Medicare, principally covering physician costs, is a voluntary system with a subsidy for government-sponsored insurance.
Yet another government program, The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), covers over nine million federal

employees, their families and federal retirees, and operates on yet another approach. The FEHBP provides a direct subsidy

which is used by eligible families to reduce the premium cost of the private plan of their choice, providing that plan meets

basic requirements laid down by the government. The benefits in FEHBP plans vary significantly. Congress sets down only a

very basic set of benefit classifications, and the actual content of each plan is determined by consumer demand in the

competitive market place.
In parallel to these widely differing government-sponsored programs is the extensive private insurance system that covers

most working age Americans. The primary component of this system is insurance sponsored by employers to cover their employees

and families. The families obtaining health coverage in this manner enjoy an often very large tax benefit since the value of

the employer sponsored component of there compensation is free of all taxes. Other individuals obtain private insurance by

purchasing it directly from insurance companies, often because their employers do not provide such coverage. While some tax

benefits are available for this form of purchased insurance the criteria for tax relief are so restricted that many in this

market have no tax subsidy at all.
Our experience with this fragmented patchwork of programs should lead us to draw some important lessons as we ponder ways to

achieve universal coverage in America. Among these lessons:

Lesson 1: The employment-based system, while successful for certain families, has severe weaknesses as the basis for

universal coverage

The employer-sponsored system is often pointed to as a success story, despite the current concerns about escalating costs. In

the case of coverage offered through larger firms, employment-based coverage does have advantages. For instance:
Pooling.A company with a large workforce obviously also has a large pool for insurance purposes. A large number of

individuals can be grouped together and insured as a group for a standard premium, despite possibly wide variations in

medical risks among employees. Large companies also have the economies of scale and the sophistication to provide insurance

at a low administrative cost per employee.

Advantages for bargaining and administration.Larger companies also can bargain very effectively with insurers and providers,

and so are able to deliver cost-effective coverage that is often tailored specifically for their work force.

Choice.Because of the size of their insurance pool and their sophistication, large companies can arrange a choice of health

plans, making it more likely that workers will be reasonably satisfied with their coverage.
Employment-based insurance is very convenient. When an employer provides coverage, it is normally very easy for an employee

to take part in the plan. Premiums are paid directly by the employer, and the worker does not have to apply for a tax

exclusion; the W-2 form, indicating the worker's income for tax purposes, simply makes no mention of the value of the

employer's contribution to his health insurance. Moreover, if the worker has to pay something toward the cost of his plan,

this is usually done in the form of a convenient payroll deduction during each pay period.


Problems for Small Firms Sponsoring Health Insurance
While these advantages of employer-sponsored coverage certainly apply to workers in many firms, they are less likely to apply

to certain specific categories of workers, especially those employed in small firms.[1] Among the reasons for this:
Small firms by definition are small insurance pools. A retail store with a handful of employees is a dismal pool for

insurance purposes. Hiring a new employee with a disability, for example, can mean a huge change in insurance costs for the

employer. States and the federal government recognize this and are exploring various ways to group small firms together to

form larger insurance pools. But the need for these efforts only underscores the fact that the place of employment is not a

particularly good basis for the pooling of these insurance risks for employees of small firms.
Small firms face relatively high administrative costs, and many small-business owners do not wish to organize insurance.

Because they lack the economies of scale and the management resources of larger firms, small businesses tend to face high

costs when administering plans. According to data collected by the Congressional Budget Office, overhead costs for providing

insurance can be over 30 percent of premium costs for firms with fewer than 10 employees, compared with about 12 percent for

firms with more than 500 employees.[2] Moreover, many small-business owners have little desire to engage in the demanding

task of trying to organize health insurance that meets the often-varied needs of their employees.
Small firms can rarely offer a choice of plans. If a small employer provides coverage, it tends to be a single "one-size-

fits-all" plan. Small companies rarely offer a choice of plans. While 81 percent of workers with insurance in firms of 5,000

or more employees had a choice of at least three plans in 2000, only 2 percent of covered workers in companies with fewer

than 25 employees had a similar choice of at least three plans. Meanwhile, 95 percent of covered workers in the smaller

companies had only one plan available to them.[3]
These obstacles to employment-based coverage in the small-business sector help to explain the high level of uninsurance among

families with workers in that sector. According to a recent survey by the Kaiser Foundation, 74 percent of the uninsured are

in families with at least one full-time worker, and while 99 percent of large firms offer insurance, only 55 of firms with

fewer than 10 employees do so. Among low-wage workers (defined as those who earned less than $7 an hour in 1996), 45 percent

are not even offered insurance.[4]

Lesson 2: The primary method for subsidizing insurance for working families is inequitable, inefficient and fundamentally

flawed.

Today we subsidize for insurance very efficiently. In fact, the current form of subsidy encourages an inefficient overuse of

medical care by most non-poor Americans while providing little or no help to the lower-paid uninsured, and it actually

exacerbates the problem of uninsurance for many Americans. This happens because by far the largest subsidy for insurance for

working Americans is the tax exclusion for employer-sponsored insurance. The exclusion means that the portion of a worker's

compensation devoted to employer-paid health insurance is not subject to federal or state income taxes, or payroll taxes. In

aggregate this subsidy dwarfs even the value of the mortgage interest deduction. John Sheils and Paul Hogan valued the

subsidy in 1998 at over $111 billion at the federal level and nearly another $14 billion in exemptions from state taxes.[5]

In contrast to a subsidy aimed at those who need help the most, a tax exclusion provides most help to upper-income workers (

who are in the highest tax bracket) with the most generous coverage. Sheils and Hogan have estimated the average annual

federal tax benefits in 1998 as ranging from $2, 357 for families with incomes of $100,00.
But the exclusion is highly inequitable. Sheils and Hogan estimated the average annual tax benefit at just $71 for families

with incomes of less than $15,000. Thus the exclusion provides little help to lower-paid workers, who often face hardship in

paying for family coverage or out-of-pocket costs, and it is not available to workers lacking an employer-sponsored plan. It

is hard to imagine a less efficient system of subsidies for helping people to obtain coverage.



Lesson 3: The Medicare program does not represent a sound structure for universal coverage.


The trust fund woes of the Medicare program indicate the financing dangers of a social insurance approach to health care.

Similar to the experience of maturing social insurance programs around the world, Medicare is plagued with huge unfunded

liabilities as political pressure for ever-larger defined benefits today mean ever-larger obligations on future generations.

The 2002 report of the Medicare trustees provided a dire picture of the program's finances, with expenditures rapidly

outstripping dedicated revenues in future decades.[6]
But the structural problems of Medicare are not confined to its financing. When Medicare was created in 1965, its benefit

package was based on the prevailing Blue Cross/ Blue Shield package for working Americans in large firms. As such, it was

seen as state-of-the-art coverage. Since that time, however, the benefits for Medicare recipients gradually slipped further

behind the benefits routinely available to working Americans. For example, Medicare provides no outpatient prescription drug

benefit. It would be virtually unthinkable for a large corporation today to offer its workers a plan without at least some

coverage for outpatient pharmaceuticals, or, for that matter, protection against catastrophic medical costs.
The main reason that Medicare's benefits package is out of date--despite the general awareness that it needs to be updated--is

that all major benefit changes require an act of Congress. Consequently, discussions about changing benefits (especially

about introducing new benefits by reducing coverage for less important ones) are necessarily entangled in the political

process. Providers included in the package fight diligently--and usually effectively--to block serious attempts to scale back

outdated coverage for their specialties. Meanwhile, talk of upgrading the Medicare benefits package unleashes an intense

lobbying battle among other specialties that seek to be included in the Medicare benefits package. Invariably, the result

depends as much (if not more) on shrewd lobbying than on good medical practice. The understandable reluctance of most

lawmakers to subject themselves to this pressure further slows the process of modernizing benefits.
Formula Payments. Medicare today uses complex formulas to determine its payments to managed care plans serving beneficiaries

and payments to physicians and hospitals under the traditional fee-for-service program. Through legislation and regulation,

the government tries to create a payment schedule that will work in all parts of the country and that takes into account

local conditions. But as is typical of attempts by government to set payments by formula, these schedules rarely match the

actual market, which constantly changes. As a result, policymakers and health care providers grumble constantly that the

formulas systematically and wastefully overpay some plans and underpay others, and that many payments to physicians and

hospital are far out of line with the cost and difficulty of providing specific services.
Bureaucratic Decisionmaking. Just as arcane and problematic the complex administrative process used by the Centers for

Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to modify benefits, to determine whether certain medical treatments or procedures are to

be covered under Medicare, and to define under what conditions or circumstances servicesare to be delivered and paid for.

This byzantine process is marked by intense pleading by medical specialty societies, and a degree of congressional

micromanagement that makes efficient management of the program impossible.[7]
Moving Towards Universal Coverage
If we are to construct a health care system in this country that focuses resources efficiently to help those who need

assistance to obtain health coverage, we need to take the following important steps:
Agree on a health care social contract between society and individuals that is explicit and fair.
Today there is a legal and moral obligation on society to provide some level of health care to those who become ill. Under

federal law almost all hospitals must provide immediate health services to individuals entering the emergency room. In

addition, physicians and hospitals routinely provide services to individuals unable to pay for these. A recent study by Jack

Hadley and John Holahan estimates that as much as $38 billion is spent each year in public and private resources on health

care services for the uninsured.[8]
This implicit "social contract" is both inefficient and unfair. It is inefficient because the method of providing services

often means they are delivered in the most expensive setting. And because the services are not part of a comprehensive plan

they are inefficient from a medical point of view. The contract is unfair because it discourages many families with the means

to obtain adequate coverage from doing so.
The current social contract should be replaced with a more rational one. In a civilized and rich country like the United

States, it is reasonable for society to accept an obligation to ensure that all residents have affordable access to at least

basic health care - much as we accept the same obligation to assure a reasonable level of housing, education and nutrition.
But as part of that contract, it is also reasonable to expect residents of the society who can do so to contribute an

appropriate amount to their own health care. This translates into a requirement on individuals to enroll themselves and their

dependents in at least a basic health plan - one that at the minimum should protect the rest of society from large and

unexpected medical costs incurred by the family. And as any social contract, there would also be an obligation on society. To

the extent that the family cannot reasonably afford reasonable basic coverage, the rest of society, via government, should

take responsibility for financing that minimum coverage.
The obligations on individuals does not have to be a "hard" mandate, in the sense that failure to obtain coverage would be

illegal. It could be a "soft" mandate, meaning that failure to obtain coverage could result in the loss of tax benefits and

other government entitlements. In addition, if federal tax benefits or other assistance accompanied the requirement, states

and localities could receive the value of the assistance forgone by the person failing to obtain coverage, in order to

compensate providers who deliver services to the uninsured family.
Provide support to people to obtain health care based on their need, not where they happen to work, or their eligibility for

welfare, or their military record, or their age. Enable individuals and families to use this support to enroll in a seamless

system of coverage according to their choice.
The central public policy objective of a health care system is to use public funds in an efficient and economical way to

enable every household to obtain at least an acceptable level of health care services and protection from large financial

burdens associated with ill health. Whether a US resident is able to count on that commitment should not depend on their

current circumstances. Moreover, resources should be used as efficiently as possible to provide help those who need it most

to obtain coverage. That requires us to overhaul current subsidy methods to target funds more efficiently and to achieve

horizontal equity between similar people.
An important step towards that would be to overhaul the tax treatment of health care, gradually ending the regressive tax

exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance and replacing it with a more progressive subsidy. That is the logic behind

the various refundable tax credit proposals in numerous proposals for addressing uninsurance. These proposals would increase

the subsidy to lower-income households relative to upper-income households.
The same rationale lies behind various approaches designed to alter the Medicare program to target a higher proportion of

benefits on lower-income seniors, in contrast with the traditional social insurance vision of equal benefits regardless of

income. And while there is fairly universal support for a residual safety net public program for indigent or dysfunctional

households, replacing part of the Medicaid program with a refundable tax credit or voucher-like assistance is in line with

the same goal.
It is also important to de-link financial support from household work status. In other words assistance for health care

coverage should not be based on employment or retirement status, and it should be available for the cost of coverage from any

reasonable source. Thus an unemployed person and his or her family should have the same degree of assistance as an employed

household of similar income with employer-sponsored coverage. A worker with employer-sponsored coverage should get the same

tax break or direct subsidy for coverage as a similar worker whose firm does not provide insurance. A 60 year-old early

retiree should be able to count on the same help as a similar person who is still in the workforce.
The value of the assistance should also not differ according on the source of coverage. Thus a household should receive the

same subsidy value were it to obtain coverage through an employment based insurance plan or by buying into a public program.

On the other side of the same coin, an individual or household should be able to continue the same form of coverage

throughout their life if they wish. Thus a worker with a private insurance plan should be able to continue that coverage into

retirement, receiving "Medicare" benefits in the form of assistance towards the cost of continued insurance coverage.
Make it possible for the place of work be the location through which most families can get coverage, without employers

necessarily being the sponsor of coverage.
Most people in America pay their taxes through a place of work. This is a very convenient system under which employers

withhold income and Social Security taxes and send the money to the government. In addition, employees typically adjust their

withholdings to take advantage of any tax breaks for which they may be eligible (for example, the mortgage interest

deduction). This means that employers actually operate the basic income tax system; but they do not in any sense design the

tax code for their employees or "sponsor" the tax system. They could more appropriately be considered a clearinghouse for tax

payments.
The place of employment is likewise particularly convenient and efficient for handling health insurance enrolment and

payments. Workers with employer-sponsored health insurance benefits typically sign up for the firm's plan when they take a

job and arrange for a payroll deduction to cover premium costs for them or their family. With individual tax credits or other

forms of subsidy discussed above, employers could carry out the critical clearinghouse role for plan choices, tax

adjustments, and premium payments. Such employers would not required to organize or sponsor a plan for their employees to

obtain tax relief or other subsidies for the cost of coverage.
In other words, smaller employers could handle the mechanical aspects of arranging for payroll deductions and premium

payments (similar to their role in the tax collection system) without having to sponsor a plan. Thus, the employer could play

a very important role in facilitating coverage without having to organize coverage. In this way the place of employment could

be the "point of service" for selection and payment decisions, and for the receipt of subsidies, without the employee being

restricted to coverage decisions made by the employer.
Using automatic enrollment to boost coverage. Whether or not they sponsored insurance, employers could be encouraged to

institute an automatic enrollment and payment system to make health insurance premium payments and to obtain health-related

subsidies. This means that employees would automatically be enrolled in a health plan unless they explicitly declined to do

so, perhaps by signing a document indicating that they understood the possible consequences of not enrolling in a plan.

Alternatively, a state could establish a default bare-bones health plan in conjunction with a private insurer, to which

anyone not otherwise choosing a plan would be assigned.
Evidence from pension plans indicates that an automatic enrollment system for health insurance could have dramatic effects on

sign-up rates.[9] This payment system is also very similar to the way in which the FEHBP enables a federal worker who may

work in a small workplace, such as the local office of a Member of Congress, to choose from possibly dozens of plans.

4. Use "creative federalism" to discover the best arrangements for organizing health coverage.
Any approach designed to secure universal coverage, and perhaps especially one which seeks to encourage greater equity and

freedom of choice in coverage, has to confront the challenge of organizing the system of coverage. There is no consensus on

which structures are best to deliver health care. Some argue for government-sponsored plans. Others for individual insurance.

Others still argue for various group arrangements. In addition, allowing people to make choices in health care, even within

government-sponsored programs, raises such issues as risk selection. Moreover, views differ on how to achieve the right

combination of subsidy and insurance regulation to secure affordable and efficient coverage for people of differing health

status.
Perhaps the fastest way to discover the best methods of organizing health coverage under a universal system would be to

institute a modified form of the idea of "creative federalism." Under this approach, federal-state covenants would be

instituted to test comprehensive and internally consistent strategies at the state level designed to move towards universal

coverage. Congress would provide federal funds to assist states to experiment with a chosen strategy for arranging health

insurance and services. In contrast to a simple system of block grants, these federal-state covenants would operate within

policy constraints designed to achieve national goals for achieving universal coverage.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM), one of the national academies, recently proposed a limited version of this strategy designed

to stimulate and test creative methods of expanding coverage for the uninsured.[10] The IOM proposed that the federal

government create a number of statewide 10-year demonstrations based on combinations of proposals, including federal and

state tax credits, as well as Medicaid and SCHIP expansions partly financed by the federal government.
Congress should consider the IOM recommendations. But it could also pursue a more comprehensive strategy to trigger state

experimentation. Under such a more comprehensive "creative federalism" approach the federal government would do four things:


1) Congress would establish goals for universal coverage. The goals could include a certain percentage reduction in

uninsurance rates in each state over a period, and steps towards ending multiple programs and eligibility criteria. Congress

would also establish boundaries in policies that could be adopted in reaching the goals (e.g. that no person could face

unreasonable coverage costs as a result of their medical condition)
2) Congress would enact a number of changes to provide an "a la carte menu" of federal policy options that would be

available to states to help achieve the goals. These options might include making a version of the FEHBP available within the

state, allowing some Medicaid/SCHIP money to be used in creative ways, removing regulatory/tax obstacles to churches, unions,

and other organizations providing health insurance plans, and the creation of association plans and other innovative health

organizations that would then be available to states.
3) Congress would provide an amount of funding. This would be fortwo purposes. Part of the money would help states fund

certain approaches. The other part would "reward" states according to how successful they were in meeting the goals.
4) The federal government would enter into agreements, or covenants, with states to achieve the goals. States would

propose some combination of modifications of their current programs, initiatives with their federal allocation, and a

selection from the federal menu. The states could also negotiate regulatory waivers to the extent allowed by law. The federal

agreement would have to agree to the covenant before it could proceed and evaluation procedures would have to be included.

The goal of universal coverage is likely to remain elusive under our current health care system. Today we provide help to

people to afford coverage in such an inefficient and inequitable way that it is impossible to help all those who need it to

afford coverage. In addition, we have a patchwork of programs and subsidy systems with a multitude of complex eligibility

requirements that guarantees people will fall through the cracks. Reaching the goal of universal coverage will be difficult.

But it will be much easier if we rationalize subsidies for health coverage, enable people to pick the form of coverage that

is best for them, and encourage state-federal experiments to explore innovative ways of organizing health care coverage.
---------------------
The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization operating under Section 501(C)(3). It is

privately supported, and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other

contract work.
The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2002, it had more than 200,000

individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2002 contributions came from the

following sources:

Individuals 61.21%
Foundations 27.49%
Corporations 6.76%
Investment Income 1.08%
Publication Sales and Other 3.47%

The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with less than 3.5% of its 2002 income. The Heritage

Foundation's books are audited annually by the national accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche. A list of major donors is

available from The Heritage Foundation upon request.
Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views

expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1]For a summary of the pros and cons of employer-sponsored coverage, see Uwe E. Reinhardt, "Employer-Based Insurance: A

Balance Sheet," Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 124-132.
[2]Congressional Budget Office, The Tax Treatment of Employment-Based Health Insurance, 1994, p. 8.
[3]Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits, 2000 (Menlo Park, Cal.:

Kaiser Family Foundation, 2000), p. 57.
[4]Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Uninsured in America: Key Facts (Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family

Foundation, 2000).
[5] John Sheils and Paul Hogan, "Cost Of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits In 1998," Health Affairs, vol. 18, no. 2, March-April

1999, pp. 176-181.
[6] The 2002 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Insurance

Trust Funds (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2002), p.10.
[7] For a recent review of management problems arising from congressional micromanagement, see Sheila Burke et. al.,

Improving Medicare's Governance and Management, (Washington, DC.: National Academy of Social Insurance, 2002), pp. 39-42.
[8]Jack Hadley and John Holahan, "How Much Medical Care Do The Uninsured Use, And Who Pays For It?" Health Affairs web

exclusive, February 12, 2003, available at: http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Hadley_Web_Excl_021203.htm
[9]A recent study found that automatic enrollment for 401(k) plans boosted participation rates from 37 percent to 86 percent

for such voluntary pensions, with even sharper increases for young and lower-paid employees. See Brigitte Madrian and Dennis

Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, National Bureau of Economic Research

Working Paper No. 7682, May 2000, p. 51.
[10]Janet M. Corrigan, Ann Greiner, Shari M. Erickson, Editors, Fostering Rapid Advances in Health Care: Learning from System

Demonstrations (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, 2002).



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
How the President's Health Care Plan Would Expand Insurance Coverage to the Uninsured
by Nina Owcharenko and Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D.
Backgrounder #1636
March 11, 2003 | |

Millions of Americans are without health insurance. As a result, these individuals and their families too often find that

their access to vital health care services is compromised while American taxpayers bear the burden of paying the costs.

President George W. Bush has proposed a number of positive policy initiatives that can reverse this situation and make health

care coverage more affordable for millions of individuals and families.
A Diverse and Dynamic Uninsured Population
According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 41.2 million Americans did not have health insurance coverage in 2001.1 Roughly

half of the members of this diverse population are uninsured for a period of six months or less, and about 40 percent are

uninsured for a period of 18 months or more.2
The overwhelming majority of the uninsured are young, between the ages of 18 and 34; over 80 percent are part of a working

family.3 They tend to be employed in small businesses and are concentrated in wholesale and retail trade industries as well

as in agricultural, forestry, fishing, mining, and construction.4 They are disproportionately minorities, largely Hispanic.5

While a substantial majority of these Americans are low-income working people, the fastest growing portion is comprised of

middle-income to upper-middle-income families.6
Although the majority of Americans have health care coverage through their place of work, lower-income working Americans are

less likely to have employer-sponsored coverage.7 Yet Americans get unlimited tax relief for the purchase of health insurance

if--and only if--coverage is provided through their employer. In 2000, the tax subsidy linked to employer-sponsored coverage

was estimated to be $126 billion.8
Lower-income working Americans who do not or cannot get health insurance at their place of work have few choices; they can

either purchase non-group coverage outside of the place of work (and do so with after-tax dollars) or go without coverage

altogether. Health care economists concluded long ago that this health care tax policy is inequitable and inefficient, and

that it distorts the insurance markets and contributes significantly to the number of the uninsured in the United States.9
Policymakers should also consider the "cost" of the uninsured to the public--including the costs of government payments and

programs and other public spending for health care. In a recent research paper, Urban Institute analysts Jack Hadley and John

Holohan estimate that, in 2001 dollars, the public paid $35 billion in uncompensated care and that $30.6 billion of this

payment was in the form of government spending.10 As Hadley and Holohan explain:
We...estimated that governments finance most of the uncompensated care received by the uninsured, spending about $30.6

billion on payments and programs largely justified to serve the uninsured and covering possibly as much as 80-85 percent of

the uncompensated care costs through a maze of grants, direct provision programs, tax appropriations, and Medicare and

Medicaid payment additions. Most of this money comes from the federal government, primarily through Medicare and Medicaid,

followed by state/local tax appropriations for hospitals, Medicaid DSH and UPL payments, and VA's direct care programs.11
Replacing this inefficient and messy system with direct assistance to the uninsured would be both simpler and more cost-

effective.

The President's Plan to Expand Coverage and Choice
President Bush is proposing changes to address the needs of America's uninsured by fixing the inequities of the current

system and mainstreaming uninsured individuals and families into the private insurance market. While liberal policymakers

would like to enroll the uninsured in public programs such as Medicaid (which are, even now, overwhelmed and underperforming

), available survey research shows that Americans prefer to have private health coverage rather than government-run public

programs.12 To achieve this objective, the Bush Administration would create a new system of tax credits for health care

coverage that targets low-income individuals and families who do not have employer-provided coverage.
In addition, President Bush has put forward a series of policy changes aimed at improving existing health care accounts.

These policy recommendations would enable individuals and families to control decisions regarding their own health care and

decide for themselves how best to spend their health care dollars.
The President's proposals to expand coverage and return personal choice and control to individuals and families include the

resubmission of a system of tax credits, targeting individuals and families who do not get health insurance through the

workplace; allowing the carryover of existing flexible spending arrangements (FSAs) to enable individuals and families to

build up savings for health care expenses; and the elimination of statutory restrictions on medical savings accounts (MSAs).

Health Care Tax Credits
The President is resubmitting an $89 billion health care tax credit proposal to assist millions of Americans who are without

health insurance provided through the workplace. The health care tax credit would provide a subsidy of up to 90 percent of

the cost of a health insurance premium, up to a dollar amount of $1,000 per person and $3,000 per family. Families with an

adjusted gross income of $25,000 or lower would be eligible for the maximum credit of $3,000. For families with incomes above

$25,000, the size of the credit would vary with income and would be phased out at income levels of $30,000 for an individual

with no dependents and $60,000 for families with children.13
In its structure, the proposed Bush tax credit would be refundable, meaning that low-income individuals and families who owe

minimal or no taxes would still receive a direct subsidy for the purchase of health insurance. It would also be "

advanceable," meaning that individuals or families would get the assistance at the time premium payment is due and not have

to wait until the end of the year for reimbursement.
The Bush tax credit proposal outlines a new role for the states, both in building an infrastructure that incorporates choice

and competition and in providing additional subsidies for low-income Americans. Under the terms of the original Bush tax

credit proposal outlined last year, a person could purchase individual health insurance with the tax credit; under the terms

of the revised version, in addition to options in the non-group market, a person could purchase health insurance through

private-sector purchasing pools, state-sponsored insurance-purchasing pools, and state high-risk pools.14 These state

purchasing arrangements are similar to those extended to states under the Trade Adjustment and Assistance (TAA) Act.15
At the discretion of state authorities, after December 31, 2004, individuals and families who would not otherwise be eligible

for public assistance could receive a federal tax credit to buy into certain state-sponsored purchasing groups where private

insurance is offered or to buy into state government employee health-purchasing groups.16 Moreover, states could supplement

the federal tax credits used for group purchasing of private health plans with additional state contributions. Under the

terms of the Bush proposal, states could make an additional contribution of up to $2,000 per adult for those with incomes at

133 percent of the poverty level; this contribution would be phased down to $500 per adult for those with incomes that are

200 percent of the poverty level.17

Health Care Accounts
Beyond the tax credit proposals, the Bush Administration has unveiled a broad range of policy improvements to make health

care coverage more affordable by giving individuals greater control of their health care spending. In 2002, the U.S.

Department of the Treasury issued a ruling to clarify the status of health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs). Through these

arrangements, employers could offer employees a health plan in combination with a tax-free spending account for health care

expenses, allowing any unspent funds to be carried over from year to year, tax-free.18
Beyond this administrative change in the system, the Bush Administration is also proposing statutory changes that would

expand and improve Archer MSAs and FSAs.19 Changes in Archer MSAs are particularly significant, given that nearly 73 percent

of MSA enrollees were previously uninsured.20

Flexible Spending Arrangements
Under current law, employees can participate in employer-based flexible spending arrangements, through which employees can

set aside a portion of their salaries in a special, pre-tax account to use for anticipated qualified health care expenses. If

employees do not use the funds they have set aside in their FSA by the end of the year, however, they lose them. They may not

carry over any unused funds to the following year. Under the Bush proposal, employees could carry forward up to $500 of

unused funds in their FSAs tax-free every year for medical expenses.

Medical Savings Accounts
Today, some Americans are permitted to open medical savings accounts from which individuals and families can pay for their

medical expenses. These accounts are tax-free and can be rolled over from year to year. Under current law, no more than 750,

000 individuals can have a medical savings account, and the MSA demonstration is scheduled to end after December 31, 2003.21

These stipulations are both a profound restriction on the health insurance market and a legal impediment designed to

discourage the growth of such plans.
In addition to these restrictions, there are a number of statutory and regulatory restrictions that determine how such

accounts may be used. For example, under current law, an MSA must be coupled with a high-deductible health plan. The law

specifically defines a high-deductible plan as one that has "deductible(s) in the range of $1,700 to $2,500 in the case of

individual coverage, and $3,350 to $5,050 in other coverage arrangements, with out-of-pocket limits set at $3,350 for

individual coverage and $6,150 in "all other cases."22
The Bush proposal would eliminate the artificial participation cap on MSAs and make the demonstration permanent. These

changes would remove market disincentives and allow supply to meet market demand. The Bush proposal would open up the MSA

option to any individual who wanted one (with the exception of those who would otherwise be eligible for a refundable tax

credit) and change the definition of a "high-deductible" plan to any plan with an annual deductible as low as $1,000 for an

individual and $2,000 for family or other coverage, with an additional provision to encourage preventive medical services. In

addition, it would allow both employers and employees to contribute to the account and would permit contributions up to 100

percent of the annual deductible.23
Making the President's Proposals Better
The problems of the uninsured reflect a broader problem of the health care system--the current federal and state tax

treatment of health insurance. The current system undermines the portability of insurance, inhibits personal ownership and

control of health plans, prohibits genuine consumer choice, and obstructs the functions of the market. Heritage Foundation

health policy analysts have long championed a comprehensive and universal reform of America's health care system and have

recommended replacing the existing federal and state tax structure for health insurance with a national system of tax

credits.24
Short of such a comprehensive reform, President Bush's health care policy agenda is laudably ambitious. It would make health

care coverage more affordable and would help millions of Americans secure health insurance coverage. The President's policy

would ensure the expansion and availability of private health insurance coverage for individuals and families.
Congress should work with the Bush Administration to make further improvements in health care policy. Specifically, Congress

should:
Permit states to determine the level of tax credit supplement and allow employers to contribute. As described above, the Bush

proposal allows states to supplement the federal tax credit. However, there are limits regarding the amount that states may

contribute and whom they may assist. States should have the flexibility to leverage all available resources to enhance the

federal tax credit as they see fit for their residents. Furthermore, for employees who are not receiving employer-sponsored

coverage, regulatory policy should be amended to permit employers to make a contribution on behalf of their employees.
Provide a partial tax credit for employer-sponsored health insurance. While a number of uninsured workers do not have access

to employer-sponsored coverage, there are those who simply decline employer coverage due to cost.25 Furthermore, those

insured low-income families who make a financial commitment to get insurance through their employer would not be eligible for

assistance. Therefore, to promote equity, certain income-eligible individuals should be able to receive a partial tax credit

that can be applied to an employer-sponsored policy. Such a policy could also encourage some small businesses to offer

coverage. According to a recent survey, "75 percent of uninsured small employers said that they would consider offering a

health plan if the government provided tax credits to workers to help them pay for coverage."26 Senator James Jeffords (I-VT)

incorporated such an approach in legislation introduced in the 107th Congress.27
Expand the FSA carryover to include all unused funds. There should be no limit to the carryover amount of unused FSA funds.

Monies contributed to an FSA are set aside from the employee's earned wages. It is the employee's money; therefore, any

unspent dollars in the account should be carried over year to year. Instead of simply anticipating planned annual medical

expenses, workers would also be able to save for future, unexpected, or uncovered services.
Establish individual ownership of HRAs. Currently, employers control health reimbursement arrangements, including the

accounts. While employees are able to carry over unspent funds from the account year to year, when an employee leaves his or

her job, the employer controls the account funds. Some employers have decided to allow their employees access to any

remaining funds in the accounts after they leave. However, if an employer chooses not to do so, there is little incentive for

an employee not to "spend down" the funds in the account before separating from the company. A better solution would be to

give employees control and ownership of these accounts so that, upon their departure, they would be able to maintain the HRA

policy on their own and continue to have full access to the account.
Expand the use of re-employment accounts for health care-related expenditures. President Bush has proposed establishing re-

employment accounts for certain unemployed workers. These accounts would be worth up to $3,000 and could be used to purchase

training and supportive services.28 Since most workers lose their health insurance when they lose their jobs, unemployed

workers should also be allowed to use the funds in these re-employment accounts to assist with health care-related costs,

including premium payments on a health insurance policy, during their period of unemployment.
CONCLUSION
The President has laid out an ambitious health care policy agenda that includes substantial revisions in the federal tax code

and the federal tax treatment of health insurance. These tax changes would broaden access to private health insurance

coverage, establish equity in the treatment of health insurance, and improve the overall function of the private health

insurance market by incorporating consumer choice and market competition.
The President's proposals establish a high bar for success. With the help and support of Congress, the bar can be reached--

and, in some cases, raised even higher.

Nina Owcharenko is Health Care Policy Analyst in, and Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., is Director of, the Center for Health Policy

Studies at The Heritage Foundation.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Health Insurance Coverage: 2001," September 2002, p. 1. Cited

hereafter as "Health Insurance Coverage: 2001."
2. "A Revolving Door: How Individuals Move in and out of Health Insurance Coverage," University of Michigan, Economic

Research Initiative on the Uninsured, ERIU Research Highlight No. 1, October 2002, p. 1.
3. Paul Frostin, "Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2002 Census

Population Survey," Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No. 252, December 2002, pp. 20, 11.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. "Health Insurance Coverage: 2001," p. 2.
6. BlueCross BlueShield Association, "The Uninsured in America," February 2003, p. 7.
7. Frostin, "Sources of Health Insurance," p. 16.
8. White House, Council of Economic Advisers, "Health Care Tax Credits," February 14, 2002, p. 4.
9. For an overview of the relationship between federal tax policy and insurance coverage, see Grace-Marie Arnett, ed.,

Empowering Health Care Consumers Through Tax Reform (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
10. See Jack Hadley and John Holohan, "How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who Pays for It?" Health Affairs,

February 12, 2003, at http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Hadley_Web_ Excl_021203.htm.
11. Ibid.
12. Jennifer Edwards et al., "The Erosion of Employer-Based Health Coverage and the Threat to Workers' Health Care," The

Commonwealth Fund, Issue Brief, August 2002, p. 7.
13. U.S. Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue Proposals,

February 2003, pp. 45-47. Cited hereafter as General Explanations.
14. Ibid., p. 47.
15. See Nina Owcharenko and Edmund Haislmaier, "State Opportunities to Provide Affordable Health Coverage Under the Trade

Law," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1626, February 25, 2003. Public Law 107-210, H.R. 3009, included provisions to

provide both workers who lost their jobs in part because of expanded international trade and certain other individuals a

refundable, advanceable health care tax credit worth 65 percent of the premium to assist them in securing health care

coverage. These tax credits could be used only for a select group of coverage options, which included state-sponsored

purchasing pools.
16. General Explanations, p. 47.
17. Ibid. Under the Bush proposal, persons with incomes in excess of 200 percent of the poverty level would not be eligible

for additional state subsidies or refundable tax credits.
18. Press release, "Treasury and IRS Guidance on Health Reimbursement," U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 26, 2002, at

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3204.htm.
19. White House, "The President's Proposals for Health Security in the World's Best Health Care System," at http://www.

whitehouse.gov/infocus/medicare/health-care/health-accts.html.
20. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Bulletin, October 7, 2002, p. 685, at http

://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-40.pdf.
21. General Explanations, p. 54.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 55. Under the Bush proposal, preventive health care services would get an additional incentive: "Such plans

would be...permitted to provide, without counting against the deductible, up to $100 of coverage for allowable preventive

services per covered individual each year."
24. See Stuart M. Butler, "Reforming the Tax Treatment of Health Care to Achieve Universal Coverage," in Jack A. Meyer and

Elliott K. Wicks, eds., Covering America: Real Remedies for the Uninsured (Washington: Economic and Social Research

Institute, 2001), pp. 21-42, at http://www.esresearch.org/RWJ11PDF/butler.pdf; see also Stuart M. Butler and Edmund F.

Haislmaier, A National Health Care System for America (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1989).
25. Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, "Employer Health Benefits 2002 Annual Survey,"

September 2002, p. 48.
26. BlueCross BlueShield Association, "The Uninsured in America," p. 11, referring to the 2002 Small Employer Health Benefit

Survey conducted by the BlueCross BlueShield Association, the Consumer Education Council, and the Employee Benefit Research

Institute.
27. For further detail, see S. 590, the Relief, Equity, Access, and Coverage for Health (REACH) Act, at www.thomas.loc.
28. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, p. 199.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
New Data on Health Insurance, the Working Poor, and the Benefits of Health Care Tax Changes
by Derek Hunter
WebMemo #492

April 28, 2004 | printer-friendly format |

Health care tax credits can make health insurance coverage affordable for millions of working Americans.
In 2002, 43.6 million Americans went without health insurance at some point.[1] Most were uninsured for a short period: 44.1

percent for less than four months and an additional 19.9 percent for between five and 8 months.[2] The shortness of the

coverage gap can be explained by any number of reasons, including the time spent between jobs after having lost work and the

probationary period, after which coverage begins, when switching jobs. However, that still leaves a significant number of

Americans without health insurance for long periods of time.
Policymakers have been struggling for years to find ways to help those without insurance obtain coverage. President George W.

Bush has proposed a tax credit, based on income, of up to $1,000 for an individual and $3,000 for a family. There has been

some criticism that this amount would be too little to help low-income individuals and families purchase coverage, but new

data from eHealthinsurance.com show the cost of individual plans to be well within reach of those numbers.
Congress and the Administration should aggressively promote health care tax credits, and thus help millions of Americans who

do not, or cannot, get health insurance through their places of work.
Current Tax Policy
There is currently a tax advantage for the purchase of health insurance for those who get that insurance through their

employer, but this favorable tax treatment is not available for people who purchase health insurance on their own in the

individual market. Workers with employer-provided coverage have their contribution toward their premiums taken out of their

compensation pre-tax and, therefore, are not taxed on that income; those in the individual market do not have that option. In

2004 there will be an estimated $188.5 billion tax break for individuals and families with employer-provided health

insurance, with 26.7 percent of that tax benefit going to families with incomes of $100,000 or more--roughly 14 percent of the

population.[3] Families with lower incomes see less of a benefit. (See Chart 1)
While the average family receives a tax break for health benefits of $1,482, lower-income families--those with incomes of less

than $30,000--get a break of only $725, with that amount being less the lower their income is.
Favorable tax treatment for health insurance should not be based on whether one has access to employment-based health

insurance. Congress can end this inequitable policy. A tax credit would be the most efficient and effective way to accomplish

this goal, and Congress could target the credits to individuals and families with the greatest needs including those who work

in small businesses. With a change in congressional policy, health insurance in the individual market would be within reach

for millions of uninsured citizens.
Premium Costs in the Individual Market
In the April 2004 study by eHealthinsurance.com, researchers analyzed the more than 62,000 plans the company sold to

individuals and families in 42 states and the District of Columbia since August 2003. What they found was that the average

annual premium for an individual was $1,812, or about $151 per month.[4]
Annual premiums varied widely by state, from a high of $4,044 in New Jersey to a low of $1,188 in Iowa and Wyoming, and the

average age of the consumer was 33 (See Table 1).[5]
The study also found the average cost of a family plan (average of 2.9 family members) to be $288 per month, or $3,456 per

year.[6]
Type of Coverage Purchased
Individual Plans
Seventy-five percent of individuals and 79 percent of families purchased Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) plans, while

14 percent of individuals and 9 percent of families purchased Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans.[7]
Of the plans purchased, "94% of policies purchased by individuals and 89% of policies purchased by families can be considered

'comprehensive' in coverage, where comprehensiveness is defined to include: Inpatient, Outpatient, Lab and Test benefits. 76%

of these plans also include Prescription Drug benefits."[8]
Deductibles
Ehealthinsurance.com reports that the vast majority of the plans purchased through its service had deductibles of $1,500 or

less. For individuals, 71.2 percent of plans purchased had deductibles of $1,500 or less, while that number was 60.8 percent

for families.[9]
Co-Payments
Fully three-quarters (75 percent) of purchasers bought plans with co-payments of $20 or less.[10] For individuals the number

was 74.9 percent, and for families it was 75.5 percent.[11]
Preliminary Data on Health Savings Accounts
Health Savings Accounts (HSA) were signed into law on December 8, 2003, as part of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and

became available for purchase on January 1, 2004. Ehealthinsurance.com has offered HSAs since that date and has released

preliminary data on who has bought them and how much they cost. The information, while from only a two and a half month

period, is very promising.
Given the option of an HSA, individuals and families of all sizes have chosen to enroll in them. Of the enrollees, 38 percent

were individuals, 16 percent were individuals and their spouses, and 4 percent were individuals with one child.[12] Families

of varying size make up the remaining 42 percent.[13]
The ages of those choosing to enroll in HSA-eligible plans ran the spectrum, with the largest group being 40 to 49 years old

(32.89 percent).[14] In fact, 55.7 percent of enrollees were over the age of 40.[15] Enrollees between the ages of 30 to 39

comprised another 30.26 percent of those choosing an HSA.[16]
The cost of HSA-eligible plans varies, but the majority of enrollees (52.83 percent) pay between $51 and $100 a month.[17]

Another 23.14 percent of enrollees pay between $101 and $200 per month, 5.65 percent pay between $201 and $300, and 17.67

percent pay $50 or less per month.[18]
Once enrollees meet their deductibles, 54 percent will have to pay 20 percent coinsurance for office visits, surgery,

hospitalization, Ob/Gyn, and X-Ray/lab tests, but 44 percent have chosen plans that require no coinsurance.[19]
While this data is very preliminary, it is promising. The option of an HSA is one that appeals, as the preliminary data show,

to a wide range of individuals and families. In the future, HSAs should continue to offer an affordable option for the

uninsured.
Conclusion
Tax benefits have long favored those who get health insurance through their employers. The policies and premiums of the

individual health insurance market are often dismissed as out of reach for millions of those who are uninsured. Based on the

data, however, this is not necessarily the case.
Comprehensive and affordable plans are available in the individual market. These health plans would be more prevalent and

more effective with tax credits that are refundable and advanceable for low-income individuals, who often work in small

businesses.
Congress can help millions of working Americans through a vital change in health care tax policy. The Bush Administration has

proposed a solid first step with a tax credit. Through refundable, advanceable tax credits, not only would more Americans be

able to afford health insurance, but the playing field would be closer to level between those with employer-provided coverage

and those who find themselves in the individual market. Thus, such a policy would be far more equitable than the existing

policy, which favors higher-income individuals with employment-based coverage in large companies.

Derek Hunter is Research Assistant in the Center for Health Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1]Robert J. Mills and Shailesh Bhandari, "Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2002," U.S. Census Bureau,

September 2003.
[2]Ibid.
[3]John Sheils and Randall Haught, "The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004," Health Affairs-Web Exclusive, February

25, 2004.
[4]"The Cost and Benefits of Individual Health Insurance Plans," eHealthinsurance.com, updated April 15, 2004.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Ibid.
[7]"The Cost and Benefits of Individual & Family Health Insurance Plans."
[8]Ibid.
[9]Ibid.
[10]"The Cost and Benefits of Individual & Family Health Insurance Plans."
[11]Ibid.
[12] "Health Savings Accounts Fact Sheet," eHealthinsurance.com, April 21, 2004.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Ibid.
[15]Ibid.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Ibid.
[18]Ibid.
[19]Ibid.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
Covering the Uninsured: How States Can Expand and Improve Health Coverage
by Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., and Nina Owcharenko
Backgrounder #1637


March 14, 2003 | |



Innovative governors and legislators in every state of the Union can take specific steps to increase health insurance

coverage and improve the range of choice and quality of that coverage for individuals and families.
State officials' range of action is constrained severely by federal law because America's health insurance markets are

shaped--and distorted--by the federal tax treatment of health insurance. But while state officials obviously cannot change

the federal tax code, they can still take major steps to create more expansive and efficient consumer-based health insurance

markets.

WORKING WITH WASHINGTON
State officials can work directly with the Bush Administration and Congress to increase access to health care coverage for

millions of Americans, including those who have difficulty obtaining coverage because they cannot get it at their places of

work, are low-income working people, or have lost their health coverage with their employment. Moreover, states can do it

right by creating new structural arrangements that would give millions of Americans more choice and control over their health

care decisions.

Specifically, the states can:

Cooperate with the Bush Administration in expanding private health insurance coverage and improving public programs. This

means making changes in state law and regulation to accommodate proposed federal changes in the tax treatment of health

insurance and medical care. These include new health care tax credits, tax-free rollover of funds in existing flexible

spending accounts, and the expansion of tax-free medical savings accounts.
State officials can also take advantage of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) waivers, particularly the new

Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) demonstration waivers.1 These federal waivers encourage state

officials to develop innovative coverage options using existing federal funds and incorporating private coverage options.

Seven states have already sought and obtained expedited waiver authority from HHS. The Administration is proposing to build

on this model by giving states even greater flexibility in improving the function of their Medicaid and State Children's

Health Insurance (SCHIP) programs.2

Create a state-based information system of health plans available in the state. Individuals and families who do not get

health insurance at the place of work or do not have Internet access to health plans often do not know how or where to secure

affordable coverage. State officials should break the "awareness barrier" and make that information, including consumer

information on quality care, available in an easy and accessible way through agencies that routinely contact working

families, such as the motor vehicle administration, the revenue department, or even local hospitals.
Allow displaced workers who are eligible for new federal assistance for health coverage to enroll in private plans offered to

state employees. Under the Trade Adjustment Reform Act of 2002, an estimated 260,000 American workers displaced by

international trade can now qualify for a 65 percent federal tax credit for the purchase of health insurance. While such

displaced workers are found in all states, they are particularly numerous in Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,

Texas, and Washington. State officials can make available a variety of congressionally authorized options for these workers,

but they could secure quick coverage for these workers by allowing them to enroll in the private health plans routinely

offered to state government employees.
Allow state and municipal employees to use the new health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs) to secure the doctors and medical

services of their choice. In 2002, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a major tax policy ruling allowing employers to

deposit funds in tax-free health care accounts for employees and roll over the unused funds year after year in these

accounts. Combining a wellness program with this new account, the Louisiana State University Healthcare Network (LSUHN), for

example, experienced a 9.6 percent increase in physician office visits and a 28 percent decrease in total health costs.3

Under the Treasury Department's ruling, employers can also make the accumulated funds in these accounts available to

employees when they retire to help them offset retirement health care expenses. State officials can now make the HRA option

available to their employees, just as it is available to federal employees and their families.
Create preventive care accounts for Medicaid beneficiaries. While Medicaid, the huge federal-state program for the poor and

indigent, is in desperate need of reform, state officials should seek waivers to improve the program for the 44 million

people enrolled in it. To improve access to physicians, states could establish state-based cash accounts for Medicaid

recipients with a PIN number and debit card. Payments for routine medical and preventive care services such as doctors'

visits and checkups could be paid directly out of the preventive care account. Not only would doctors get quick, hassle-free

reimbursement for their services, but Medicaid beneficiaries could avoid emergency rooms and roll over the unused funds in

the Medicaid account each year. When Medicaid beneficiaries leave welfare or get a job in the private sector, the unused

funds in their account could be transferred to pay for private insurance or put into a medical savings account. Using a

federal waiver, Florida officials have already created a consumer-driven option for disabled Medicaid beneficiaries.4
Make health care coverage more affordable for individuals and families through state regulatory reforms. Benefits are

mandated nationwide. A 1999 study of state-mandated benefits, conducted by the Health Insurance Association of America, found

that as many as one out of four Americans who are uninsured lack coverage because of the costs of state-mandated benefits.5

State officials should review the continuing and accumulating costs of state-mandated benefits and health insurance

regulations, and scale back or repeal those that exceed their regulatory benefits.
Enact serious medical malpractice reform. In several states, including Texas, Pennsylvania, and Nevada, soaring medical

malpractice costs have made the practice of medicine increasingly difficult for doctors and other medical professionals.

Beyond encouraging doctors to practice roughly $50 billion worth of defensive medicine annually to avoid litigation,6 flawed

medical malpractice laws are also causing doctors to leave their states or even quit medicine altogether. This is creating

serious access problems for patients in several states. At the very least, state officials should give malpractice relief to

all doctors who treat Medicaid patients or dispense charity care to the poor.
Create a statewide voluntary purchasing cooperative. Unlike other forms of insurance, health insurance is routinely insulated

from consumer choice. According to Alain Enthoven, a professor at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, 77

percent of all employees with employer-based coverage do not have a choice of health insurance carrier.7 State officials can

reverse these dynamics by creating a structure that gives individuals and families easy access to health plans and allows

private health plans to compete directly with each other for consumers' dollars. This is, in effect, what the federal

government does today for federal employees and their families in the popular and successful Federal Employees Health

Benefits Program (FEHBP). The components would include a state "clearinghouse" for comparative information, the enforcement

of minimum benefit requirements and consumer protection rules, a service center for enrollment and the collection of

premiums, a reinsurance pool for companies to cope with adverse selection, and a system of premium subsidies or state-based

tax credits for insurance coverage. The best way to establish an infrastructure for consumer choice and competition would be

to fold state employee health plans into the new system.
Study the cost of the uninsured and create a system of state-based tax credits or premium subsidies for private health

insurance. Faced with tight budgets, many state officials are understandably reluctant to create a new system of health care

tax credits or premium subsidies for low-income persons to purchase private health plans. But the cost of expanding coverage

must be balanced against the cost of not expanding coverage. According to Jack Hadley and John Holohan of the Urban

Institute, a prominent Washington public policy institution, Americans today pay $34.5 billion, mostly through government

spending, in uncompensated care costs on behalf of the uninsured.8 State officials should emulate the Texas Comptroller's

Office and undertake a similar analysis of the total cost of the uninsured to state taxpayers. The Texas Comptroller

estimated that in 2002, Texans paid roughly $1,000 for each uninsured Texan, or the same amount that President Bush has

proposed for his $89 billion program of health care tax credits for eligible uninsured adults.9
THE NEXT STEPS: CREATIVE FEDERALISM
Policy analysts at the Institute of Medicine, reflecting a growing consensus among health policy analysts, have suggested

that the states, in cooperation with the federal government, undertake innovative demonstrations to find out what works best

in expanding coverage for the uninsured.10 As one example of "creative federalism," Congress could specify a "menu" of

changes available for federal funding, including various consumer choice alternatives, a set of "performance goals" for the

states to meet as a condition for federal funding, and a bonus program to reward states that meet the agreed-upon goals of

expanding patient choice, insurance coverage, quality improvements, and patient satisfaction.11
In the 1990s, innovative state welfare initiatives helped to drive the overhaul of national policy to fix the crumbling

welfare system. Governors and other state officials can pattern their health care reform efforts after the success in welfare

reform. To assist states, Congress has already created a new source of federal funding to create pooling arrangements to

cover the uninsured under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002.

HOW STATES CAN EXPAND HEALTH CARE COVERAGE, IMPROVE QUALITY, AND CONTROL COSTS
Securing health insurance coverage for millions of Americans is both a federal and a state problem. State officials should

engage in a continuing dialogue with officials at HHS and take advantage of new opportunities to expand choice, control cost,

and reduce the number of the uninsured.
To advance this agenda, state officials can take a variety of steps:

STEP 1: Cooperate with the President in reducing the number of uninsured.
Over the past two years, the Bush Administration has outlined an ambitious and fairly comprehensive health care reform

agenda.12 It includes an $89 billion program of refundable tax credits for the uninsured, an annual rollover of up to $500 of

unused funds in employer-based flexible spending accounts (FSAs), and a lifting of existing statutory restrictions on medical

savings accounts (MSAs).13
In concert with congressional action on these items, or even in anticipation of such changes, state officials could start

changing state law and regulations to accommodate these federal initiatives in order to facilitate increases in patient

choice, control, and coverage. For example, the Bush tax credits would be available not only for private health insurance on

the individual market, but also for individuals and families who purchased health plans through "private purchasing groups,

state-sponsored insurance purchasing pools and state high risk pools."14
After December 31, 2004, under the Bush proposal, the states could permit eligible individuals and families to buy into state

employee purchasing groups using the new federal health care tax credits.15 Moreover, states could supplement federal health

care tax credits for individuals and families with incomes at or below 200 percent of poverty with additional state

contributions ranging from $500 to $2,000 per adult, depending on their income levels.16 State officials should start

planning for such changes.

STEP 2: Take a statewide inventory of private plans and design a consumer-friendly information clearinghouse for individuals

and businesses on available health plans.
Most Americans easily access the health insurance system through the place of work; but for those who do not get health

insurance through their places of work, the task of securing affordable coverage can be formidable. The 41.2 million

uninsured Americans are a dynamic population, uninsured largely because of a change in employment. According to a special

report on the uninsured produced by researchers at the University of Michigan, "Half of the uninsured go without coverage for

six months or less, while more than 40 percent are uninsured for at least 18 months."17
While expanding Internet access has helped make better information available to consumers, states could do more to make that

information more readily available for those without Internet access or those who just do not know where to secure health

care coverage. According to a 1999 study by the California Health Care Foundation, 53 percent of the "non-poor" uninsured

said that they would be more likely to buy insurance coverage once they knew the true cost of available plans.18
Breaking down barriers to awareness becomes increasingly important if Congress or the state legislatures start providing

individual tax relief or creating a system of premium supports for individuals and families to purchase health insurance. If

Congress or state legislators enact a health care tax credit, the mere existence of that assistance is of little help if the

persons who would benefit most from it are unaware of the health plans available to them. State officials could establish

information centers or clearinghouses for individuals and families seeking health insurance and make comparative information

available at state offices, including the revenue department and the motor vehicle administration.
There is precedent for the provision of consumer information in a consumer-driven health care system at the federal level.

The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the personnel offices of all federal agencies provide comparative plan

information for federal employees and retirees enrolled in the consumer-driven FEHBP. These enrollees can choose from many

private health plans and receive useful comparative information on the available health plans, including premium costs, co-

payments, the levels of benefits, and solid comparative information on health plan performance.

STEP 3: Make sure that health plans available to the uninsured are affordable.
A key advantage of group health insurance is that group coverage makes premiums affordable, but individual health care

policies can also be affordable for millions of Americans without coverage. A national on-line source of health insurance

policies, eHealthInsurance.com, has reported that the average premium for an individual policy purchased through their

Internet service was less than $1,500, with a typical deductible of $500 or less.19
Studies conducted by the National Health Underwriters and the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) report similar

findings. HIAA, for example, found that of its members who sell individual policies, the average premium was $2,070 for

single coverage and $4,000 for family coverage.20
Policy costs vary from state to state, reflecting differing economic conditions, demographics, and patterns of medical

practice. However, health plan costs also reflect the cost of state rules and regulations governing individual policies.
For example, states impose benefit mandates on individuals and families that purchase health insurance, regardless of whether

they want or need such benefits. In a recent analysis of the factors driving health care costs, PricewaterhouseCoopers

estimated that, nationwide, government mandates and regulations contributed 15 percent of the total increase in health care

premiums for 2001-2002.21 In 2001, Maryland led the nation with 54 such mandated benefits, including legislative requirements

to cover politically favored medical specialties, treatments, and procedures.
For various political reasons, state officials might hesitate to reduce or eliminate all such benefit mandates, but they

could at least reduce or eliminate such mandates for those who are uninsured or have endured a spell of uninsurance for a

specified period of time. Such a policy could make health plans more affordable for those young families who desperately need

coverage.22 A young family with two children needs a health plan that gives them access to physicians and hospitalization

services; they should not be forced to buy a health plan that incorporates dozens of benefits they do not want or need, some

of which--like alcohol and substance abuse treatments or coverage for in vitro fertilization--are very expensive.
Mandated benefits are often popular with provider groups and medical specialty societies, which battle ferociously to make

sure that state legislators include their treatments or procedures in all state-regulated health plans. Research shows that

health mandates increase health costs, pricing many individuals and families out of the private market. According to a 1999

HIAA study, as many as one in four of the uninsured are without coverage because of state health benefit mandates.23
Some states have begun to change their benefit mandate policies. North Carolina, for example, has imposed a moratorium on any

new benefit mandates.24 Hawaii, Texas, Louisiana, and Vermont require a cost assessment before imposing new benefit mandates

.25 Some states have considered "mandate-lite" plans, and others are taking similar steps.26
State officials should also order an independent econometric review of state health insurance regulations, including a cost-

benefit assessment and an assessment of their impact on the affordability and accessibility of private health plans. This

type of analysis should be performed by a top-ranked, private econometrics firm, not by a state agency or any other political

institution that has a vested interest in maintaining the regulatory status quo.
In many states, the health insurance market is heavily regulated, and this raises the cost of insurance and prices many

lower- and middle-income families out of coverage. In a state-by-state price comparison of insurance policies, analysts for

eHealthInsurance.com found significant price differences between states that have differing levels of insurance regulation.

Two of the most significant insurance rules include community rating, in which all enrollees pay the same premium regardless

of risk or health status, and guaranteed issue, in which insurers are required to offer policies to all, regardless of risk

or health status. For example, in Texas, a state with no community rating or guaranteed issue, the average single monthly

premium was $181, while in New York, a state with both community rating and guaranteed issue, the average monthly premium was

nearly $300.27
State legislators may strongly believe that there are very good policy reasons to impose such rules as community rating and

guaranteed issue of insurance; but there are trade-offs, and these trade-offs should be made visible. State officials should

realize that while community rating and guaranteed issue are often enacted to assure increased access of individuals and

families to health insurance, they often accomplish exactly the opposite result.

STEP 4: Conduct a study of the true cost of the uninsured and use that study to justify state credits or premium subsidies

for the uninsured.
As noted, a recent analysis by Urban Institute scholars indicates that Americans pay an estimated $34.5 billion in

uncompensated care for the uninsured.28 State officials should likewise get a clear idea of what they are already paying for

the uninsured.
The Texas Comptroller's Office, for example, found in a major study that the total cost of health care spending in 1998 for

uninsured Texans was $4.7 billion, including the costs to local governments, doctors, hospitals, and state agencies. In

effect, Texas citizens paid about $1,000 for health care for each uninsured Texan.29
State officials can use this kind of analysis if they wish to expand coverage further and piggyback on any federal health

care tax credits or premium subsidies. Additional state assistance, especially targeted at low-income or harder-to-insure

individuals and families, would bring the cost of coverage within closer reach of these low-income working families. As

noted, the Bush Administration encourages such assistance. State officials should follow through, especially if they believe

that the President's proposed federal health care tax credit would not be generous enough for certain populations.
Moreover, for the unemployed, state-based assistance could be administered quickly and easily through state unemployment

compensation offices. A person who is eligible for unemployment compensation could automatically be eligible for the credit

or the subsidy and for private health insurance. This process of "one-stop shopping" for displaced workers and their families

could be done with both a federal and a state credit or premium subsidy approach.

STEP 5: Secure HHS waivers to use existing federal funds to expand private health care coverage.
Officials at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services have created the Health Insurance Flexibility and

Accountability demonstration initiative, along with an expedited approval process, "to encourage new comprehensive state

approaches that will increase the number of individuals with health insurance coverage within current-level Medicaid and

SCHIP [State Children's Health Insurance Program] resources."30
HHS officials emphasize the value of "approaches that maximize private health insurance coverage options" and target

populations below 200 percent of the federal poverty level.31 Nationally, a substantial majority of uninsured Americans are

below 200 percent of the poverty line. State officials can take advantage of this new demonstration authority and use it to

secure innovative private-sector coverage options for low-income, uninsured populations.
Under HIFA, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson has approved several waivers. New Mexico and Oregon, for example, take advantage of

Medicaid and SCHIP funds and combine them with private-sector health plans to expand coverage to the uninsured. In New

Mexico, state officials can use unexpended SCHIP funds to subsidize private health insurance for 40,000 low-income residents.

Under the New Mexico waiver, employers can also contribute to private health plans. With a combination of government

subsidies from existing government programs and employer contributions, HHS estimates that these low-income employees will be

paying about $25 to $35 per month in insurance premiums.32
Based on its waiver, Oregon officials will expand the state's premium support program, the Family Health Insurance Assistance

Program, to cover as many as 25,000 beneficiaries. Under the Oregon waiver, Oregon residents earning up to 185 percent of the

federal poverty level would be eligible to receive "for the first time" federal premium assistance for employer-sponsored

coverage or individual health insurance.33
Finally, the President's budget proposal would provide states with increased flexibility under Medicaid and SCHIP. Under this

proposal, states would be able to implement program changes and improvements without having to go through the waiver process

.34

STEP 6: Improve care for Medicaid enrollees by creating a Medicaid preventive care account.
The best Medicaid policy gets low-income persons and their families out of the traditional Medicaid program and mainstreams

them into the private health insurance market.35 Meanwhile, states can adopt initiatives that give Medicaid patients more

control over their health care spending and decisions while ensuring that they get the care they need when they need it.
State Medicaid programs often have a rich benefits package. While Medicaid coverage looks good on paper, however, the program

has a well-deserved reputation for perverse economic incentives, disruptions in the continuity of care, and poor-quality

care. If Medicaid beneficiaries experience a change in income or assets, their eligibility will change, regardless of health

status, possibly resulting in a loss of coverage. As a Baltimore Sun report on the plight of Medicaid patients in Maryland

summarizes the problem, "They are poor, but not poor enough. They have medical bills that are high, but often not high

enough. They are insured some months, but uninsured others."36 Getting clarity with respect to Medicaid eligibility can be a

problem for doctors, patients, and state officials.
Faced with exploding Medicaid spending, states are cutting back on benefits, thereby causing a further deterioration in the

quality of care.37 As a recent Kaiser Commission survey of Medicaid directors shows, states are planning cost-cutting

measures such as limiting access to prescription drugs and reducing or freezing payments to doctors, hospitals, and other

medical professionals.38
Most doctors treat Medicaid patients, but they also find that Medicaid reimbursement levels are too low and loathe wrestling

with Medicaid paperwork and regulations. In 2001, roughly 20 percent of physicians were not accepting new Medicaid patients,

and the overall proportion of physicians serving Medicaid patients declined slightly.39 The danger, of course, is that

Medicaid patients will start to experience difficulty in getting access to doctors and, like the uninsured, will end up

either in hospital emergency rooms for routine medical services or, worse, being treated for deteriorating medical conditions

that could and should have been treated more effectively if treated much earlier in a doctor's office.
A partial solution to this problem would be to create a Medicaid preventive care account for each Medicaid recipient with a

specified amount accessed using a PIN number and a debit card. Payments for routine medical services--doctors' visits,

regular checkups, and preventive care--could be paid directly out of the Medicaid account. For Medicaid enrollees, states

could roll the unused funds over each year in an interest-bearing account. When enrollees leave welfare or get a job in the

private sector, the unused funds could be used to pay for private health insurance or transferred into a medical savings

account or health reimbursement account.
The creation of such a Medicaid account is thus compatible with welfare reform, helping low-income persons make the

transition not only into productive jobs, but also into the private insurance market. Such an account would combine the best

features of the private-sector-style health reimbursement arrangement with the public-sector-style administration of the food

stamp program.
HHS has already established a precedent for this approach with its "Independence Plus" initiative. This initiative both

improves the existing "cash and counseling" program and provides states with an expedited process to offer families with

disabled individuals the opportunity to have greater control of "the design and delivery of their own health care services."

40 State officials should examine the success of such programs in New Jersey, Arkansas, and Florida, where Medicaid

recipients decide how best to spend their allocated health care dollars instead of having government officials decide for

them.

STEP 7: Establish a statewide voluntary purchasing cooperative for the uninsured.41
To give residents more coverage options, states should consider designing voluntary purchasing cooperatives that would

function much like the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, which covers Members of Congress, federal workers and

retirees, and their families--roughly 9 million Americans.42 Nationally, hundreds of private health plans compete directly

for consumers' dollars. Unlike other government health care programs, the FEHBP functions with comparatively little

bureaucracy and regulation. It also enjoys a solid historical record of cost control, competitive benefits, programmatic

stability, and a high degree of patient satisfaction.43
Because of its historical record of solid performance, the FEHBP is a leading model for Medicare and health care reform.44 In

2001, the Maine legislature voted overwhelmingly, on a bipartisan basis, to create a voluntary purchasing pool called "an

insurance exchange," and Maine officials are in the first stages of implementing it.45 This policy initiative has precedents

in other states.46
To give individuals and families greater access to affordable coverage, a voluntary purchasing cooperative could incorporate

several features:
The state employees' health benefit program. All uninsured employees in the state could have access to existing health plans

in the state employees' system, which is usually a system of multiple health plans, plus any additional health plans that

meet basic benefit and fiscal solvency requirements.47 These plans, as well as the plans that serve state employees, could be

made available to every uninsured person in the state.
Initially, it might be prudent to separate the state employee pool from the private, non-state-employee pool and allow the

competing private plans to risk and rate these populations separately. Since most of the uninsured are young and healthy, it

is likely that state employee organizations will soon realize that the combination of the pools would directly benefit state

employees with lower premiums. In the meantime, it would be politically attractive for the governor and the state legislators

to open up their own health insurance system to the states' uninsured citizens.
Automatic sign-up for uninsured workers at their place of employment. More than four out of five uninsured workers are in

full-time working families. Lynn Etheredge, a prominent health care policy analyst at George Washington University, argues

vigorously that the most efficient way to target workers is therefore through their place of work.48 While employers would

not pay for health insurance, there is no reason why they could not serve as the place for employees and their families to

sign up for available health plans. Of course, employers could also contribute, if they wished, to their employees' premium

and reap the same tax breaks as corporate employers do in the conventional payment of health insurance premiums.
Automatic payroll deduction for premium collection at the place of work. Employers are legally required to use the payroll

deduction system for Social Security, Medicare, federal income tax, state taxes, and unemployment compensation. While

employers do not sponsor the tax code, they do enforce it. With a state voluntary purchasing cooperative, employers could

deduct the premium, over and above any tax credit assistance or state assistance (through SCHIP or Medicaid waivers) that

would be available, and send it to the plan of the employee's choice. National Federation of Independent Business surveys

show strong interest on the part of small employers in helping to administer a system of individual tax relief for insurance

for their employees.49
In order to stimulate maximum take-up, Etheredge and others have suggested that policymakers create a system of automatic

enrollment for employees, with the proviso that they can refuse in writing both the available health insurance and any state

tax relief or premium assistance.50 An employee's rejection of health insurance coverage and any refusal to accept help to

pay for health insurance would require the employee to make a conscious trade-off, making the direct costs transparent to the

employee and the employee's family.
A light regulatory regime. A system based on the principles of consumer choice and market competition cannot work without a

system of light and intelligent regulation. This means that the state agency administering such a system should act as a

referee--and not play favorites--in the competition among different types of health plans: traditional indemnity insurance,

managed care, preferred provider plans, high deductible plans, health reimbursement accounts, and medical savings accounts.

An efficient market requires free entry and exit of suppliers and the freedom of consumers to make the decisions in

accordance with their personal wants and needs.
A statewide reinsurance pool to cope with adverse selection. In the adoption of a voluntary choice cooperative for the

uninsured, or any similar consumer choice system that allows individuals and families to pick the kinds of plans and benefits

they want, state policymakers should establish a mechanism to cope with risk segmentation or adverse selection--a process

whereby higher-risk or higher-cost individuals congregate in one or more plans, contributing to spiraling costs and

encouraging younger, healthier, and lower-income enrollees to leave the higher-cost plan(s) or drop out of health care

coverage altogether.
There are many ways to cope with the possible issues of adverse selection. One might be for state officials to charter a

nonprofit, self-governing corporation that would be administered and financed by the health insurers themselves and that

would create a pool to finance high-cost individuals without disrupting the individual's continuity in coverage. In creating

such a system, state officials could require that all plans selling state-regulated health insurance, including plans writing

policies for state employees or Medicaid, participate and contribute to the pool. While every health plan that ceded a risk

to the pool would pay a premium to the pool for each risk ceded, there would be no taxpayer subsidies to the pool.
Such a mechanism could protect both carriers and enrollees from the effects of adverse selection. Plans would be encouraged

to cover the broadest possible pool of individuals and families and also would be able to recover a portion of the costs

incurred as a result of the enrollment of high-risk individuals.

STEP 8: Enact meaningful medical malpractice reform legislation.
The Bush Administration has put the medical malpractice problem front and center in the national policy agenda. This alone is

sparking a major debate. But the medical malpractice issue is essentially a matter of state tort law.
There is a medical malpractice crisis in several states. Median jury awards have increased dramatically. Malpractice premiums

are soaring, "defensive" medical procedures are common, and patient access to care is being compromised.
State legislators can take remedial action. While a sound malpractice reform measure would provide for unlimited economic

damages, state legislators can reduce the growing pressures on physicians through several amendments to state tort law. Such

changes could include an up-front disclosure of attorneys' fees; limiting non-economic damages (such as pain and suffering)

to $250,000; limiting punitive damages to $250,000 or twice the amount of economic damages (such as medical expenses or the

cost of domestic services); and limiting attorneys' fees to ensure that a maximum amount of recovery for damages would go to

patients. Moreover, if state legislators are unable to secure comprehensive medical malpractice reform, at the very least

they could provide legal relief for doctors who accept Medicaid patients and give doctors immunity from malpractice suits

when they provide charity care to the poor.
Several states have made significant progress in reforming medical malpractice laws: Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine,

Michigan, and Utah. A sound model for medical malpractice reform would be the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975,

enacted by the California legislature.

STEP 9: Take advantage of the new federal health care tax credits to cover workers displaced by international trade.
In the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002, Congress enacted a provision to give a 65 percent health care tax

credit to the roughly 260,000 workers nationwide who have lost employment and their health care coverage in part because of

expanded international trade.51 The purpose of this first-of-its-kind health care tax credit is to help these workers secure

health care coverage.
While the legislation contains artificial and complicated restrictions on personal choice, it does offer states broad

authority to determine new purchasing options available to these workers.52 Indeed, state officials can build such an

infrastructure with a view to facilitating the coverage of other classes of uninsured Americans, particularly if Congress

enacts significant health care tax credit legislation. As noted, the trade legislation also provides states with additional

federal assistance to help them administer newly created purchasing options.

STEP 10: Take advantage of the new health reimbursement arrangements for state and municipal employees.
In June 2002, the U.S. Department of the Treasury ruled that America's employers could set aside funds for their employees

under a new health reimbursement arrangement (HRA), a special tax-free account for the payment of health bills. Employers

could roll over unused funds in the employee's account from year to year and allow employees to use accumulated funds for

their health care needs in retirement.
For 2003, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal agency that runs the FEHBP, allowed the American Postal

Workers Union (APWU) health plan to offer an HRA to federal employees and retirees. Under the APWU plan, federal employees

can get an up-front credit of $1,000 per person or $2,000 per family in their account to pay for traditional medical expenses

as well as dental, vision, and other expenses that may not be covered by insurance. The funds are available before enrollees

pay deductibles, or out-of-pocket costs, and traditional insurance covers their health costs.53
State officials may also consider employing the new health accounts as a means of promoting innovative employee wellness

programs. For example, the LSU Health Care Network, which covers Louisiana State University health care employees, has

recently initiated such a plan, and its preventive care program ranges from routine checkups and tests to prostate exams,

mammograms, and children's vaccinations. As noted, the initial comparative data showed an increase in physician visits but an

overall reduction in costs.54 State officials should allow state employee to choose similar arrangements. Likewise, municipal

employees should also be able to take advantage of the new HRAs.

STEP 11: Engage faith-based organizations in preventive care and wellness programs.
State and local officials manage or oversee public health clinics and health centers. These organizations help low-income and

uninsured families secure health care services.55
An enormous resource exists among faith-based and religious organizations. These organizations can play a vigorous role in

promoting and sponsoring wellness and preventive care programs. State officials should make every effort to tap the power of

faith-based and religious organizations in their health care outreach into various communities, particularly inner-city and

ethnic communities.56 They should also find ways of integrating these faith-based wellness initiatives into their public

assistance programs.
Where conventional government efforts may not inspire trust or confidence, religious and faith-based organizations can often

succeed. That success could result in many more poor Americans getting the checkups and routine preventive care they need.
CONCLUSION
Innovative and imaginative governors and state legislators can make significant headway in reducing the number of America's

uninsured, improving access to quality health care, and expanding choice and competition in the state health insurance

markets.
They can achieve this by taking several key steps, including:
Cooperating with the President and the Administration in expanding health coverage,
Promoting solid information on available health plan options,
Reducing barriers to coverage by reviewing the costs of mandates and eliminating excessive regulation,
Accepting new HHS flexibility to expand private insurance coverage for individuals and families,
Taking an inventory of the costs of the uninsured in their states and offsetting those costs with state health care tax

credits or premium subsidies,
Creating preventive care accounts for Medicaid beneficiaries,
Cooperating with the Administration in securing coverage for displaced workers under the Trade Adjustment Reform Act of 2002,
Enacting serious medical malpractice reform, and
Engaging faith-based and religious organizations in public health efforts to secure preventive care services among poor and

low-income people.
The problems of the uninsured are problems for both federal and state officials. While the central weakness of the health

insurance market is the inefficient, inequitable, and restrictive federal tax treatment of health insurance, state officials

can nonetheless take direct action without waiting for Congress to enact major changes in the federal tax code.
States can work energetically with the Administration and also implement innovative solutions on their own. Millions of

Americans desperately need that federal-state cooperation.

Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., is Director of, and Nina Owcharenko is Health Care Policy Analyst in, the Center for Health Policy

Studies at The Heritage Foundation.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. For a description of the range of possibilities under the new HIFA waivers, see Nina Owcharenko, "How States Can Expand

Private Coverage with HIFA Waivers," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 846, December 16, 2002.
2. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, pp. 125-127. Cited

hereafter as Budget for Fiscal Year 2004.
3. Letter to Robert E. Moffit from Gerald Chandler, Chairman, Proweh Health Systems, Inc., December 18, 2002. Proweh Health

Systems compiled comparative data on utilization and costs for the first six months of 2002 and 2001.
4. For a description of the Florida consumer-directed Medicaid option, see James Frogue, "The Future of Medicaid: Consumer

Directed Care," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1618, January 10, 2003.
6. Robert L. Pollock, "Americans Need a Market for Medical Progress," The Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2003.
7. Alain C. Enthoven, "Where Are Health Care's Hondas?" The Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2002. As Enthoven points out,

employers often give employees a choice of "a plan," an HMO or a PPO, but the different plans are offered by the same carrier

and have the same doctors. Thus, there is no real free-market competition among delivery systems under current arrangements.
8. Jack Hadley and John Holohan, "How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who Pays for It?" Health Affairs, Web

Exclusive, February 12, 2003, p. 3, at www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Hadley_Web_Excl_021203.htm.
9. U.S. Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue Proposals, February

2003, pp. 45-48. Cited hereafter as General Explanations.
10. See Janet M. Corrigan, Ann Greiner, and Shari M. Erickson, eds., Fostering Rapid Advances in Health Care: Learning from

System Demonstrations (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, 2002).
11. For this "Creative Federalism" approach to health coverage and experimentation, the authors are indebted to Stuart M.

Butler, Vice President for Domestic and Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
12. For an excellent overview of the direction of the Bush Administration's health care policy, see the Hon. Mark McClellan,

M.D., "The Health Care Crisis: The President's Plan for High Quality, Affordable Care," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 768,

April 17, 2002.
13. General Explanations, pp. 45-55.
14. Ibid., p. 47.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. "A Revolving Door: How Individuals Move In and Out of Health Insurance Coverage," University of Michigan, Economic

Research Initiative on the Uninsured, University of Michigan, ERIU Research Highlight No. 1, October 2002, p. 1.
18. Cited by Vip Patel, "Raising Awareness of Consumers' Options in the Individual Insurance Market," Health Affairs, Web

Exclusive, October 23, 2002, p. 2, at www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Patel_Perspective_Web_Excl_102302.htm.
19. Cited in Mark McClellan and Katherine Becker, "Reducing Uninsurance Through the Non-Group Market: Health Insurance

Credits and Purchasing Groups," Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, October 23, 2002, p. 2, at www.healthaffairs.org/

webExclusives/McClellan_Perspective_
Web_Excl_102302.htm.
20. Health Insurance Association of America, "Individual Health Insurance: Access and Affordability," HIAA Brief Analysis,

October 2002, p. 1.
21. PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Factors Fueling Rising Health Care Costs, report prepared for the American Association of

Health Plans, April 2002, p. 3.
22. See, in this connection, Robert E. Moffit, "Maryland Health Care Mandate Policy," testimony before the House Economic

Affairs Committee, Maryland General Assembly, March 7, 2002, at www.heritage.org/library/keyissues/healthcare/.
23. Jensen and Morrisey, "Mandated Benefit Laws and Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance."
24. Paul Guppy, "How Mandates Increase Costs and Reduce Access to Health Care Coverage," Washington Policy Center, Policy

Brief, June 2002, at www.wips.org/HealthCare/PBGuppyHealthCareMandates.html.
25. Ibid.
26. Cheryl Jackson, "States Look at Costs of Insurance Mandates," American Medical Association, AMNews, November 11, 2002, at

www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_02/bisc1111.htm; "Major 2001 State Health Care Laws," BlueCross BlueShield Association,

BlueCross BlueShield Health Issues, at bcbshealthissues.com/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=20063.
27. Fact sheet, "The Cost and Benefit of Individual Health Insurance Plans," eHealthInsurance.com, September 30, 2002, p. 3,

at www.ehealthinsurance.com/ehealthinsurance/expertcenter/ExpertCenter.html.
28. Hadley and Holahan, "How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who Pays for It?"
29. See Texas Comptroller's Office, Texas Estimated Health Care Spending on The Uninsured, at www.window.state.tx.us/

uninsure/.
30. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability Demonstration Initiative,"

at www.cms.hhs.gov/hifa/default.asp.
31. Ibid.
32. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, "Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) Initiative Fact

Sheet: New Mexico," at www.cms.gov/hifa/nmfs.pdf.
33. Press release, "Oregon Receives Okay to Expand Oregon Health Plan at No Additional Cost to State," State of Oregon,

October 15, 2002, at www.governor.state.or.us/governor/press/p021015a.htm.
34. Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, pp. 125-127.
35. For an excellent discussion of broader Medicaid reform, see Michael T. Bond, John C. Goodman, Ronald Lindsey, and Richard

Teske, "Reforming Medicaid", National Center for Policy Analysis and Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions, NCPA

Policy Report No. 257, February 2003, at www.ncpa.org/pub/st/st257; see also Richard Teske, "Abolishing the Medicaid Ghetto:

Putting Patients First," American Legislative Exchange Council, The State Factor, April 2002.
36. See M. William Salganik, "Medicaid Revolving Door Frustrates Many in Maryland," The Baltimore Sun, September 1, 2002.
37. For a brief description of Medicaid spending pressures in the states, see "Medicaid Is Fastest Growing Item in State

Budgets," National Center for Policy Analysis Daily Policy Digest, January 14, 2002, at www.ncpa.org/iss/hea/2002/pd011402b.

html; see also Robert Pear and Robin Toner, "Grim Choices Face States in Making Cuts in Medicaid," The New York Times,

January 14, 2002.
38. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, "State Budgets Under Stress: How Are States Planning to Reduce the

Growth in Medicaid Costs?" July 30, 2002, at www.kff.org/content/2002/20020730/statbudupdate73002.pdf. For an excellent

overview of how state officials are restricting Medicaid prescription drugs, see Linda Gorman, "Treatment Denied: State

Formularies and Cost Controls Restrict Access to Prescription Drugs", Washington Policy Center, Policy Brief, February 2003,

at www.washingtonpolicy.org/HealthCare/PBGormanTreatmentDenied.html.
39. Peter J. Cunningham, "Mounting Pressures: Physicians Serving Medicaid Patients and the Uninsured, 1997-2001," Center for

Studying Health System Change, Tracking Report No. 6, December 2002, at www.hschange.com?CONTENT/505/?topic+topic01.
40. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, "Why Has CMS Developed the Independence Plus Programs?" Independence Plus:

Frequently Asked Questions, at cms.hhs.gov/independenceplus/.
41. The authors are indebted to Daniel S. Johnson, M.D., The Heritage Foundation's Visiting Fellow in Health Policy and

former President of the American Medical Association, for this concept of a state-based voluntary choice cooperative.
42. For a discussion of the FEHBP as a model for a purchasing cooperative for the uninsured, see Stan Dorn and Jack Meyer, "

Nine Billion Dollars a Year to Cover the Uninsured: Possible Common Ground for Significant Incremental Progress," Economic

and Social Research Institute, Current Policy Series No. 4, October 2002, pp. 5-10.
43. See Robert E. Moffit, "Promoting Choice and Controlling Cost: What Congress Can Learn--Again--From Its Own Health

Insurance Program," Heritage Foundation Web Memo No. 146, September 20, 2002, at www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm146.

cfm.
44. In 1999, the majority of the members of the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare, chaired by Senator

John Breaux (D-LA) and Representative Bill Thomas (R-CA), proposed to reform Medicare along the lines of the FEHBP. During

the 2000 presidential primary season, Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) proposed a reform of the Medicaid program along the lines

of the FEHBP.
45. Maine Consumer Choice Health Plan, Chapter 708, 120th Maine Legislature, 2nd Sess., at janus.state.me.us/legis/ros/lom
/LOM120th/6Pub701-713/Pub701-713-07.htm.
46. The Democratic leadership in the Maryland legislature also considered such a dramatic approach in 1992, when the

Honorable Casper Taylor, Chairman of the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee and later Speaker of the Maryland House,

unveiled a comprehensive and innovative reform of the Maryland health care system, based on a state-wide system of health

care tax credits and consumer choice and competition. For a description of the original Taylor bill, see Robert E. Moffit, "

Why the Maryland Consumer Choice Health Plan Could Be a Model for Health Care Reform," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.

902, June 17, 1992.
47. The addition of state employees to a new purchasing cooperative would help make the pool more attractive to carriers and

more effective as a vehicle for consumer choice and competition. According to Elliot Wicks, senior fellow at the Washington-

based Economic and Social Research Institute, a key lesson from the experience of purchasing cooperatives is the need to

achieve "critical mass." See Elliot K. Wicks, "Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives," Commonwealth Fund Issue Brief,

November 2002, p. 5.
48. Lynn Etheredge, "How to Administer Health Insurance Tax Credits for Working Families," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder

No. 1516, January 31, 2002.
49. See Robert E. Moffit, "Why Adopting the Common Ground Health Care Proposal Would Be a Costly Mistake," Heritage

Foundation Backgrounder No. 1445, June 1, 2001.
50. Etheredge, "How to Administer Health Insurance Tax Credits for Working Families."
51. See Public Law 107-210 at thomas.loc.gov.
52. For a discussion of state options, see Nina Owcharenko and Edmund Haislmaier, "State Opportunities to Provide Affordable

Health Coverage Under the Trade Law," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1626, February 27, 2003.
53. "Anatomy of a Premium Increase," remarks by the Hon. Kay Coles James, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management,

before the American Association of Health Plans National Policy Forum, February 25, 2003, pp. 29-31. Under the APWU plan,

once the funds in the account are exhausted, there is a $600 deductible for individual coverage and a $1,200 deductible for

family coverage before traditional insurance covers costs. Under the terms of the APWU plan, enrollees can roll over up to $

500 per year in their accounts, up to a maximum of $4,000. According to Director James, the initial data indicate that the

average age of the enrollee taking advantage of the new plan is 49.
54. Letter to Robert E. Moffit from Gerald Chandler, December 18, 2002.
55. According to HHS, 12 million Americans are served by the existing network of health centers at over 3,500 locally managed

sites across the nation. See Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 2004 Budget Proposal for the

Department of Health and Human Services, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/hhs.html.
56. On developments in the District of Columbia, for example, see Steven Gray, "In Northeast, Moved by a Fitness Revelation,"

The Washington Post, July 9, 2002, p. F1; see also Barbara Martinez, "How a City Aims to Give Minorities Better Health Care,"

The Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2002, p. 1.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.

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On the Art of Cinema
by Kim Jong-Il, Kim Jong Il
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0898756138/qid=1081762109/sr=8-2/ref=pd_ka_2/103-0799466-2183848?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

Another U.N. Scandal
At Turtle Bay, North Korean dissidents find only indifference.
BY CLAUDIA ROSETT
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
UNITED NATIONS--The U.N. Secretariat has been pouring noticeable energy lately into expressions of outrage over allegations that there was something rotten with its Oil-for-Food relief program in Iraq. In politics that is no doubt to be expected; it is probably too much to wish that the U.N. would simply seize the opportunity of this multibillion-dollar scandal to shed its entrenched habits of privilege and secrecy, and restructure itself as the model of decency it was meant to be. But amid the current fracas over Oil-for-Food, there are other points to be made, and one of them has to do with a very small demonstration held in front of the U.N. late last month.
The demonstration had nothing to do with Iraq or Oil-for-Food. It involved some three dozen protesters who were asking the U.N. to honor its commitment to help refugees from North Korea. They held posters showing photos of starving children in North Korea, and pictures of tyrant Kim Jong Il alongside slogans such as, "Stop subsidizing this regime." One man wore a sandwich board with big lettering that said: "China! Comply With the U.N. Resolution for North Korean Refugees"--a demand that Bejing honor its obligations as a signatory to the U.N.'s Convention on Refugees, instead of sending asylum-seekers back to what can often be hideous punishment or death in North Korea.
They were protesting the most horrific surviving totalitarian regime on the planet. They were making entirely reasonable demands. They knew what they were talking about. Among their number were several defectors from North Korea, who had come to New York after testifying before Congress about horrible abuses of human rights in North Korea, alleging biological and chemical weapons experiments on prisoners in the slave-labor camps of Kim's regime. One of these defectors, Dong Chul Choi, who escaped along with his mother in the mid-1990s and has since become one of an incredibly small handful to receive asylum in the U.S., was wielding a megaphone, calling in both English and Korean a few words that deserve to echo around the world: "Free North Korea."
There were perhaps half a dozen spectators. Apart from that, what registered in the surroundings on that lovely spring day was complete indifference. Tulips bloomed in a nearby flower bed. Traffic went by on First Avenue. Across the street, the long row of flags fluttered in front of the U.N. From within the landmark headquarters, as far as I could see, no one emerged to take a look.
One might argue, of course, that the U.N. office of the High Commissioner for Refugees is not in New York, but in Geneva, so that's where folks worried about refugee rights should go. One might also argue that the U.N., as currently configured, places the highest premium on deference to sovereign states, regardless of what abominations a prevailing regime might commit within its own borders--so Kim's regime must have its seat within the fancy building, while those who would like to end his regime must wait on the sidewalk outside. One might further add that a much larger group of demonstrators for freedom for North Koreans, and rights for North Korean refugees, had already had their say in Washington, at a series of events organized by activist Suzanne Scholte's Defense Forum Foundation, in which the testimony to Congress served as the centerpiece.
And the politics are, of course, complex. China, a veto-wielding member of the Security Council, and a member of the governing body of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, opposes any move to help the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have risked their lives to flee North Korea. As one humanitarian aid worker, Tim Peters, testified to Congress last month, "China continues to flout international law and world opinion by continuing to imprison the selfless and sacrificial souls who reach out with a helping hand to the vulnerable North Koreans who wander, vulnerable, in China." Mr. Peters went on to list five of these private aid workers now in Chinese prisons.
The points have been duly made. The procedures relating to such matters as North Korean refugee rights may not have been complied with, but they have at least been noted on paper. The U.N. can point to the resolution in which its own Human Rights Commission in Geneva actually worked around to condemning Pyongyang, for the second year running (after a decade in which state-inflicted famine in North Korea has killed an estimated two million or so). Surely such measures are enough? Why should anyone at the U.N.'s New York offices bother about this small group of demonstrators, however enormous their concerns? They have no official voice, no serious lobbying presence, nothing in fact that seems to carry true weight within the mighty debates of the U.N.
And maybe that's where the Oil-for-Food scandal comes into it. In watching the strenuous efforts at the U.N. to protect above all the U.N.'s own reputation; in seeing the circling of wagons, and appearances on television; in observing the efforts to ensure that none of the contractors involved in the Oil-for-Food saga speak a word out of school or spill a secret that might endanger the U.N.'s reputation--I have to wish that anything close to this kind of energy were going into support for that small band of protesters with their huge message: "Free North Korea."
The litmus test of the U.N.'s worth and integrity should not be how well it manages to protect its own image, regardless of the deeds within, or how well it navigates the nuances of the ruthless and repressive politics still practiced by dozens of its 191 member states. Kofi Annan was at pains in his recent "Meet the Press" interview to stress that he sees the U.N. as a "unique organization," one "that can bring the whole world together." To bring the whole world together, given how the world really works, requires in too many cases the sacrifice of precisely the integrity, freedom and decency that the U.N. was meant to serve.
In dealing with the current Oil-for-Food scandal, the best defense for the U.N., and particularly for Mr. Annan's Secretariat, would be to stop circling the wagons and fretting about image, and instead to seize the opportunity to reform its cloistered ways, and get with the program of a democratizing world--with all the transparency and accountability and genuine respect for the principles of liberty that this entails. The U.N. was put there to listen to people like those demonstrators who last month stood unheeded on the sidewalk, not to broadcast to the world a long series of messages about its own precious image and importance.

Ms. Rosett is a fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Hudson Institute. Her column appears here and in The Wall Street Journal Europe on alternate Wednesdays.

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Kofi's Coverup
Another U.N. letter saying shut up, or else.

Tuesday, May 11, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
So now there's a third "hush" letter from the United Nations demanding that an Oil for Food Program contractor cease cooperation with Congressional investigators. Dated April 27, the note--like earlier ones to inspection companies Saybolt and Cotecna--is signed by another U.N. official "for Benon V. Sevan," the outgoing Iraq Program chief. In this case the recipient was an individual consultant whose name was blacked out by our Capitol Hill source.
The letter informs the consultant of a contract clause stating: "contractors may not communicate at any time to any other person, Government or authority external to the United Nations any information known to them by reason of their association with the United Nations which has not been made public, except in the course of their duties or by authorization of the Secretary-General or his designate."
The purpose of the first of these letters to surface, U.N. spokesman Fred Eckhard argued last week, was to facilitate evidence gathering by the U.N.-backed inquiry headed by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. This excuse didn't make a whole lot of sense. It's not as if the Oil for Food-related documents in question could be shared with either Congress or Mr. Volcker but not both. But this latest hush letter adds a new wrinkle, stating twice that the U.N. demands control of "documentation or information" (emphasis added). Translation: Shut up or we'll sue.
We have every confidence Mr. Volcker will lead a thorough investigation, but the public should not be asked to take it on faith that he will be given access to all information and rely on his interpretation alone. As the above-quoted contract makes clear, the Secretary-General has the authority to waive all these confidentiality agreements. The fact that Kofi Annan has chosen instead to pursue a campaign of legal intimidation is a pretty good indication that he intends as much of a whitewash as he can get away with.
All this lends urgency to new accountability legislation that has been introduced in the Senate by John Ensign (R., Nevada) and Lindsey Graham (R., South Carolina), and in the House by Jeff Flake (R., Arizona). Modeled on language that passed Congress during a 1990s battle over U.N. reform, the law would have the United States withhold a modest percentage of its U.N. dues unless the President certifies that the U.N. is cooperating with Oil for Food investigations in the U.S. and other member states.
Speaking of the President, the White House's silence on this issue is becoming more notable by the day. We understand the Administration is trying to enlist the U.N.'s help in Iraq, but that's not a good reason to try to squelch the bad news until later like it did with its cost estimates for the Medicare drug bill. In particular, we hope it's not at White House request that Iraq czar L. Paul Bremer has been threatening to defund the Iraqi Governing Council's investigation of Oil for Food.

If abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers demands an accounting, so too does the world-wide conspiracy of bribery that helped prop up Saddam Hussein's torture-based regime. Now's hardly the time for the White House to be seen demanding anything less than full openness and accountability in any area of its Iraq policy.



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Out of Manila's Control
The Philippines terrorist problem.
By Brett M. Decker
MANILA -- For the past two months leading up to yesterday's national elections in the Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has led an all-out effort to try to sign a peace agreement with the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Although the Bush administration has provided Manila with more than $400 million in U.S. aid to combat local terrorist groups, the al Qaeda-linked MILF continues to operate in the Philippines without government interference. Arroyo successfully lobbied to keep the MILF off the State Department's terrorist-watch list, and thus off military-targeting maps. Bargaining with this group is doomed to fail, as it has in the past.
A telling hold-up to a peace accord is the MILF's refusal to disarm its armies -- which have been estimated as high as 45,000 strong by the U.S. -- and close down its paramilitary facilities, which number at least 40 on the island of Mindanao alone. Most of these camps are the product of the last time Manila tried to cut a peace deal by offering development funds to the MILF. In the early 1990s, aid was given directly to Muslim leaders for public works and infrastructure, which they instead used to construct training grounds, including Camp Abubakar, a 10,000-hectare compound run largely by Arabs that has trained 2,000 terrorists, many of them foreigners. Abubakar's course of study includes lessons in assault weapons, stealth operations, hand-to-hand combat, and bomb-making.
There is no reasonable justification for the Arroyo administration's efforts to negotiate a peace settlement with an enemy that does not desire peace. Most Muslims in the southern Philippines do not want to be part of the larger secular nation. A large majority of his people want an independent Muslim nation based on sharia, according to Congressman Hussin Amin, a former separatist leader who represents the Abu Sayyaf's home of Sulu island.
The MILF effectively runs its own state within the Philippine republic already. Across Mindanao and on some of the smaller islands in the Sulu archipelago, radical Islamists control the roads, rule the people through their own Islamic-based law and maintain their own armies, police, tax structure, and governing councils. The schools, which are separate from the national public-education system, teach Arabic and radical Wahhabi tenets of Islam.
Funded by Saudi and other Middle Eastern charities and drug proceeds from the northwest of the island, this nation within a nation provides a sanctuary for terrorists from all over the world. Even if the MILF leadership signs a peace deal later in the year, a splinter group is guaranteed to form to keep up the fight. The MILF itself split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1982 because the latter recognized the Philippine constitution and the secular government in Manila.
In an interview, Philippine National Security Advisor Norberto Gonzales told me that he had a "credible" intelligence report that Osama bin Laden was hiding in the Philippines. Other intelligence sources discount this, but the mere fact that the Philippine intelligence community considers it is a possibility reveals how little control the local authorities have over large parts of the country. Daily firefights make the southern islands a constant battle zone, and last week President Arroyo cancelled all of her campaign stops in the south because it was too dangerous. This is hardly a stable position from which to negotiate.
The Bush administration has been criticized for being too unilateralist. That is not a problem in Southeast Asia, where cooperation among American officials and local allies has brought impressive results, such as thwarting an attempt to blow up the U.S. embassy in Singapore and the capture in Thailand of Hambali, Osama bin Laden's operations chief. There are major problems in the Philippines, however, including multiple jailbreaks by al Qaeda, a reticence to act on U.S. intelligence, and arms sales to terrorists by military officials. Now Manila is hanging fire when it should be firing at will.
If the vote count confirms that Arroyo was elected to another term on Monday, the United States should pressure her to end negotiations with Philippine groups that harbor and train international terrorists.

-- Brett M. Decker, a Phillips Foundation fellow, is writing a book on al Qaeda in Southeast Asia.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/decker200405110859.asp

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Winning in Iraq
The public puts Abu Ghraib in perspective.
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
When all else fails, look to the good sense of the American people. Even amid a 24/7 news frenzy fed by dreams of Donald Rumsfeld's resignation, the U.S. public isn't even close to buying. In almost inverse proportion to the bizarre perceptions of political reality that obsess those inside the Beltway, recent polls show a 2-to-1 majority of Americans rejecting any move to oust the Secretary of Defense.
To put it another way, even amid one of the worst weeks the Bush Administration has endured in Iraq, the American people have digested the disgusting photographs from Abu Ghraib and put them in proper perspective. They understand that what's really at stake at this moment--underscored by yesterday's news of the beheading of an American civilian captured in Iraq--is the far larger question of American purpose. We read the overwhelming support for Mr. Rumsfeld as evidence that the public wants America not merely to stay in Iraq but to win.
We'll get back to winning in a moment. Most of the Rumsfeld survey results have been relegated to the back pages or their cable equivalent, so it's worth taking a fuller look at what they reveal. According to a Washington Post/ABC News poll, seven in 10 Americans agree the prison abuse story is "a big deal." No attempt at denial here. But by the same number, 69%, they don't want to see Mr. Rumsfeld go (20% desired resignation). A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll yields almost the exact same percentages.
If similar findings released by the National Annenberg Elections Survey are any clue, moreover, this support for a Rumsfeld Defense Department cuts across huge swaths of the American landscape. In this survey, 66% of respondents come down for keeping Rummy on. More telling still, when broken down into subgroups--Republicans, Democrats, African-Americans, Latinos, men, women--not a single category reported a majority favoring Mr. Rumsfeld's ouster. Even among those who describe themselves as "liberals," only a third want him given the boot.
We relay these results not so much to defend Mr. Rumsfeld, who is quite able on that score, but to add what has sorely been missing from the media bonfire the past week: perspective. Yes, Abu Ghraib is abhorrent, but as yesterday's hearing on Major-General Antonio Taguba's report made clear, this does not represent the behavior of most, or even many, U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
The war's domestic opponents are too obviously eager to expand the misdeeds of a few into a general repudiation of the war and all involved in it. For example, we are now reading that Geneva Convention status should be accorded to illegal combatants such as those at Guantanamo. We suspect the U.S. public understands that terrorists such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who wear no uniforms so as to more easily murder innocent civilians, do not deserve the same status accorded legitimate prisoners of war.
We went into Baghdad promising to liberate Iraqis from Saddam Hussein, to ensure that the country would no longer be a safe haven for those who mean America harm, and to hand power over to a free Iraqi people. Right now that is what is being put to the test. The terrorists' bet is that we don't have the stomach to fight a nasty, guerrilla war designed to transform last year's resounding military victory into a humiliating strategic defeat.
As Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong put it eloquently in his speech last week to the Council on Foreign Relations, "The key issue is no longer WMD or even the role of the U.N. The central issue is America's credibility and will to prevail." This was much the same point, made more brutally, by the tape put up on an al Qaeda-linked Web site yesterday showing the beheading of Nick Berg, an American from Philadelphia recently captured in Iraq.
In the face of these challenges and atrocities, Americans don't want to hear about "staying the course." They want to hear our commander-in-chief tell us how we are going to win. Primarily this means making good on our promise to go ahead with the June 30 handover of power to Iraqis and hold elections as soon as possible.
If Iraqis are to have a fighting chance of success, we need in the meantime to ensure that they are not menaced by those seeking to turn Fallujah into a Baathist protectorate or stir up a Shiite rebellion in the South. The news now coming out of Najaf--that our forces seem finally to be taking care of Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia--gives modest reason for hope.
If we end up losing in Iraq it won't be because the American people were too soft or unwilling to stick with the President and his team when the going got tough. The public understands something the pundit and political classes have mostly forgotten: We're still in a war. Our enemies understand that too. And we trust that even the most political part of the White House understands that the bigger challenge it faces is not who wins in November but who wins in Iraq.
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Abu Ghraib & Enemy Combatants
An opportunity to draw good out of evil.
By Andrew C. McCarthy
I was in Israel when the initial storm rained down over the appalling treatment of Iraqi war prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. As shameful as any proud American must feel at the arrant inhumanity and sinister glee the images exude, it was worse to experience the shock while in a foreign country -- especially one warmly disposed toward the U.S. To be caught in the searching eyes of one's friends and struggle for the words to explain that which one cannot himself understand is a tall order.
There are worthy arguments in mitigation. The measure of us as a people lies not only in the unspeakable that was done in our name, but in how it came to light (by the conscience and courage of a member of our armed forces), the promptness of aggressive investigation, the transparency with which we open our faults to the world, and the decisive way the guilty are ultimately rooted out and punished. Yet, while the determination to exact justice for Ghraib in a forceful, public way is all well and good, our concerns are broader than that. Another part of our measure lies in how well we come to terms with that, and what we do to address it.
THE ENEMY & THE AMERICAN WAY
The problem of captured enemy combatants in this new kind of war is immensely serious. Indeed, the whole crossroad of terrorism and law enforcement is complex. For those of us who contend that the criminal-justice system is a poor fit for terrorists, it has never been so thoughtless a matter as "lock them up and throw the key away." It is imperative that we defeat enemies who mean us existential harm; we cannot simply manage militant Islam as if it were a mere nuisance. But even as our cause is just so must our manner of execution be legitimate. The sanctity and dignity of human life is a bedrock premise of civilized society, expressed at the Founding in the Declaration of Independence itself -- as an unalienable right the preservation of which is the very purpose of forming governments. That even captured terrorists and enemies are treated with humanity and due process is no idle concern. It is an obligation. It is an instantiation of what distinguishes us from what we are fighting.
It is worth rehearsing why we are holding enemy combatants in the first place. The argument that terrorists and other opposing militias must be fought as a military enemies rather than criminal elements proceeds on three levels, the first two being straightforward and closely related. First, empirically, the justice system simply does not work. As a practical matter, it is incapable on its own of neutralizing more than a tiny fraction of the hordes that oppose us -- and that at prohibitive expense. Second, a military enemy is emboldened and becomes more brazen over time if it is not met with overwhelming responsive force and convinced that devastation will surely be the price of further attacks. By themselves, judicial proceedings that target a relative handful of committed (and some suicidal) jihadists do not dissuade them; they have the opposite effect.
The third point is most often missed, though equally compelling. The reluctance to treat terrorists as criminals, far from being caused by disdain for the rigorous demands of criminal justice, is instead a reflection of abiding reverence for our system's majesty. I have had the privilege of working with many dedicated prosecutors, agents, judges, and defense lawyers who see it as both a point of honor and an epigrammatic truism that our society best displays its enlightenment by affording even to those who would destroy it all the luminous protections of our Constitution. I was once one of them. Nonetheless, if we are to be honest with ourselves, it is a dangerous delusion.
Islamic militants are significantly different both in make-up and goals from run-of-the-mill citizens and immigrants accused of crimes. They are not in it for the money; they desire neither to beat nor cheat the system, but rather to subvert and overthrow it; and they are not about getting an edge in the here and now -- their aspirations, however grandiose they may seem to us, are universalist and eternal, such that their pursuit is, for the terrorist, more vital than living to see them attained. They are a formidable foe -- that should be plain enough by now. If the way of life we revere is to be preserved, they have to be completely defeated, just like the Nazis, the Communists, and all tyrannically inclined, would-be hegemons. In sum then, the national-security imperatives that they present are simply absent from the overwhelming run of criminal cases.
As a result, while we don't like to admit this, when we bring them into our criminal-justice system, we have to cut corners -- and hope that no one, least of all ourselves, will discern that with the corners we are cutting important principles. Innocence is not so readily presumed when juries -- often having been screened for their attitudes about the death penalty -- see intense courtroom security around palpably incarcerated defendants. The legally required showing of cause for a search warrant is apt to be loosely construed when agents, prosecutors, and judges know denial of the warrant may mean a massive bombing plot is allowed to proceed. Key government intelligence that is relevant and potentially helpful to the defense -- the kind of probative information that would be disclosed in a heartbeat in a normal criminal case -- may be redacted, diluted, or outright denied to a terrorist's counsel, for to disseminate it, especially in wartime, is to educate the enemy at the cost of civilian and military lives.
Since we obdurately declare we are according alleged terrorists the same quality of justice that we would give to the alleged tax cheat, we necessarily cannot carry all of this off without ratcheting down justice for the tax cheat -- and everyone else accused of crime. Civilian justice is a contained, zero-sum arrangement. Principles and precedents we create in terrorism cases generally get applied across the board. This, ineluctably, effects a diminution in the rights and remedies of the vast majority of defendants -- for the most part, American citizens who in our system are liberally afforded those benefits precisely because we presume them innocent. It sounds nice to say we treat terrorists just like we treat everyone else, but if we really are doing that, everyone else is being treated worse, and that is not the system we aspire to.
Worse still, this state of affairs incongruously redounds to the benefit of the terrorist. Initially, this is because his central aim is to undermine our system, so in a very concrete way he succeeds whenever justice is diminished. Later, as government countermeasures come to appear more oppressive, it is because civil society comes increasingly to blame the government rather than the terrorists. In fact, the terrorists -- the lightening rod for all of this -- often come perversely to be portrayed, and to some extent perceived, as symbols of embattled libertarian principles, the very ones it is their utopian mission to eradicate. The malignant campaign against the Patriot Act is an example of this dynamic.
A SILVER LINING
For me, the best escape from this downward spiral is forthrightly to concede that the existing civilian judicial system generally does not work for terrorists. By stretching precariously to assimilate them while accommodating national security, the system succeeds only in warping itself. Does that mean indefinite detentions and military tribunals, all at the say-so of executive-branch decision makers forever insulated from judicial review? Well, if the only choice is between that and compromising the judicial system to wage Pyrrhic battles that help the enemy defeat us, that is no choice at all -- we must proceed with the detentions and tribunals, withstanding the heat from the pie-in-the-sky libertarians.
But is that our only choice? I don't think it is, and that is the silver lining potentially to be drawn from the dark cloud of Ghraib.
As we now know, the military's reaction to this shameful episode has been swift and determined. Upon being alerted, the chain of command instantly and intensively began investigations. Those responsible, who have blighted our reputation and grievously endangered every American captured in combat, will obviously be severely punished. The cataclysm here, of course, is the media's decision to release the photographs. This has given the scandal outsized dimension and allowed a small cabal of sadists to sully the entirety of our armed forces and the whole of our nation. The media can say all they want that the people have a right to know. The people, however, have known about the abuse allegations for weeks, and it has never been true that the right to know means the right to see every gruesome detail. Indeed, in a criminal trial, in the so-called "search for the truth," shocking evidence is routinely withheld from juries, not because it is irrelevant but because of its powerful tendency to prejudice reasoned, dispassionate fact-finding -- to feed the very type of hysteria that now abounds.
All that, though, is academic. The images are out and we must move forward. Moreover, the world in which we must go forward is not limited to Iraq. We have for many months been holding captured unlawful combatant terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, as well as three other such combatants (including two American citizens) in United States military brigs.
As counsel for some of the combatants argued late last month in the Supreme Court, when the executive branch asserts that it should be permitted to detain indefinitely without judicial review, it is essentially saying, "Trust us." Trust us that we have captured the right people, that we are treating them humanely, and that we don't intend to keep them in limbo for a second longer than is necessary to elicit intelligence and prevent them from rejoining the battle against our troops. No, it's not fair that the barbarity of a few should be of such profound consequence, but anyone who thinks that "trust us" carries the same assurances today as it did two weeks ago is hallucinating.
Ghraib, however, is also an opportunity. It is a chance for the executive branch and Congress to craft some reasonable, well-deliberated safeguards that publicly reaffirm our national commitment to due process of law without materially harming our security or imperiling our armed forces -- and to do so before a far worse solution may be imposed by the courts, which institutionally are not well equipped for the task. And by "due process," I refer not to airy longings for cosmic justice but the strict sense of the term: the process that is due -- in this case, to hostile combatants who, for the most part, are foreigners (and thus not endowed with Bill of Rights protections) and terrorists (and thus "unlawful combatants" not entitled to the full protections of the Geneva Conventions). This is a project that would require dedicated and comprehensive thought, but a few ideas come ready to hand.
CUSTOMIZED COURT
For example, the libertarian opposition homes in principally on the current lack of judicial review of detentions. Like most contentions that are long on lofty rhetoric but short on clear-eyed analysis, this argument misses at least two critical points, both relating to death -- which, one might have thought, would by definition be anathema to the libertarians.
First, as long as we are in active hostilities, searching judicial proceedings to probe the detentions would not only interrupt interrogations to gather new intelligence but also inform the enemy of our current state of information; further, they would discourage our allies from sharing strategic and tactical intelligence with us for fear that it might be revealed in court. All of these factors would inevitably cause combat casualties to American and allied forces that would not otherwise have happened. Second, our forces are frequently in a position where the options on the battlefield include killing and capturing. The prospect of adversarial judicial proceedings would incentivize our forces to choose killing over the merciful alternative of capture-and-detention, necessarily resulting in more widespread loss of life than would otherwise have happened.
These potential harms, however, do not have to mean there is no place for judicial review. I believe we should create a special national-security court -- much like the court established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that now hears government applications for national-security wiretaps and searches. This court, which like the FISA court would be drawn from the talented national pool of experienced federal judges, would develop an expertise in issues peculiar to this realm: classified information, the Geneva Conventions, the laws and customs of war, etc., and would have jurisdiction over matters related to the detentions and any resulting trials of alleged unlawful combatants.
The Justice Department could similarly form a specialized unit (much like the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section and the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review, which already exist) to be the liaison with the Defense Department as well as the government's representative before the national-security court. That unit could then report to the Court the fact that an alleged unlawful combatant had been captured and was being detained, and certify both that hostilities were ongoing and that it was in the national-security interest of the United States that the combatant be held. For the first three years, that certification would be unreviewable. As we have seen from the Guantanamo experience, this would be enough time for many of these cases simply to go away -- the military has already released and repatriated scores of combatants.
After that point, the court could require the government to make a more informative representation, under seal, of the basis for continuing to hold a particular combatant. Such a proffer, which could be ex parte to the extent necessary to protect classified information, would include a certification that hostilities were still ongoing and a rational basis for concluding both that the prisoner was an enemy combatant and that it remained in the national interest to detain him. After three years, this should not be difficult to do -- the military will have done an initial screening at the time of capture (as it does now in any event), it would have had months to interrogate, and it would have developed a rationale for holding this prisoner while it was otherwise winnowing down the number of detainees.
The detainee might have access to counsel at this point and an option (but not a requirement) to present, by affidavit, any competing claim that he was not an unlawful combatant. This could serve as a basis for the court, if appropriate, to ask the government to provide additional, responsive information. As long as hostilities continued in the pertinent theater of combat, however, the court would be required to accept the government's representation. That representation, though, would be a matter of record and thus preserved for important future purposes, such as: the combatant's defense, judicial monitoring as the case proceeds, and congressional oversight of the executive branch's exercise of this detention power. The government, moreover, would be required to notify the court as soon as hostilities had ended in a particular combat theater, and could be made to report back to the court every six months if hostilities were still underway and it was still in the national interest to hold the detainee. Once hostilities were over in the pertinent theater, the government could then be compelled in the national-security court either to prove, at an adversarial proceeding, that continued detention was warranted or to file charges against the detainee.
A NEW JUDICIAL PARADIGM
This, among other things, would serve to blunt the resonant criticism that detainees could be held forever because the "War on Terror" may last, as Justice O'Connor surmised, for as much as 25 or 50 years. While that may be true of the "War on Terror," it is obviously not true of its component parts, such as the war against the Taliban. Combat in Afghanistan is still ongoing, but it is plainly winding down and with it the necessity to hold captured Taliban combatants. This, undoubtedly, is why the Defense Department has already released so many Guantanamo detainees. The proceedings described above would provide an oversight role for the independent judiciary without interfering in the conduct of the war; set a reasonable hurdle for the government to surmount if it is deemed necessary to hold combatants after hostilities have ended in the theater where they were captured (for example, by showing that there is a basis to believe a captured Taliban combatant is a member of al Qaeda and likely to join the continuing battle in another theater if freed); and prescribe a finite end-point at which it would be time to charge or release.
Thought must also be given to what trials of alleged combatants before the national-security court should look like. I would anticipate that they would more resemble military tribunals than civilian trials, but they would be neither -- they would part of the new paradigm. First, they would not be a unilateral executive-branch production; they would be held before an Article III court, albeit a specialized one. This would not only ensure development of the needed judicial expertise but would result in the government having to adapt to but a single body of jurisprudence rather than varying constructions by hundreds of federal judges all over America. It would also foster the salutary effects of legitimately disconnecting unlawful combatants from the justice system that applies to ordinary Americans accused of crimes.
Governing law for such a court would no doubt spur much debate, seeking to strike a due-process standard that balances national-security imperatives against what is essential to ensure the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. In my conception, the defendants would be detained until trials and any appeals (to a special national-security appellate court and, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court) were concluded. There would be non-jury trials before a national-security judge (or, in capital cases, perhaps a panel of three or five judges). Proceedings would be presumptively public but could be closed when necessary to avoid disclosure of sensitive information. The statute of limitations for terrorist crimes would be eliminated (as it is for murder in many jurisdictions) so that trials could be delayed as necessary to avoid holding them during combat in the pertinent theater.
Indictments would be drawn far more narrowly than they typically are in civilian courts -- for the more broadly charges are pled, the more due process implicates discovery. The biggest dilemma civilian trials have posed in the national-security context is the intelligence trove our generous discovery rules provide for the edification of terrorist organizations. A major reason for having a special court would be to plug that hole.
Along those lines, I would also tighten the government's so-called Brady obligation (i.e., its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence) to something far closer to Brady's original purpose than the elastic concept it has become in modern practice. Brady, as first promulgated, was a due-process rule that required the government to reveal to the defense any material evidence in its possession that actually demonstrated the defendant was not guilty. In the ensuing decades, the doctrine has been enlarged to embrace much that is neither exculpatory, admissible, nor particularly germane but that might be thought helpful to the defense presentation. That may be a healthy development in the civilian system, in which we willfully prefer the guilty to go free than a single innocent to be wrongfully convicted. It has no place in matters of national security. Thus, I would require the government, in cases before the national-security court, to disclose only (a) the evidence it intends to introduce at trial to prove the charges, and (b) any material, admissible evidence in its possession that actually indicates the defendant is not guilty of the charges.
Many other critical matters would have to be discussed. Most defendants, for example, would not be entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, and I would not afford it to them to the same degree it protects those to whom it rightfully applies. It is an ingrained principle of civilized societies that persons should not be compelled to be witnesses against themselves, and I would thus not require accused terrorists to testify. It is, however, a fairly recent jurisprudential development that silence can neither be commented on by the prosecution nor considered by the court. In national-security cases, I would personally prefer to see less evolved self-incrimination principles, while admitting that there is a vibrant counterargument to be made on this point.
Similarly, while I would place the burden of proof on the government, I do not believe we owe unlawful combatants (many of whom we could, after all, have killed on the battlefield) a presumption of innocence rebutted only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The government should be required to prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, the standard by which our system has long been satisfied to settle civil disputes even when billions of dollars are at stake. Finally, sentencing rules, including capital procedures, would have to be addressed. I would permit the death penalty only if the government convinced a super-majority of the court -- all members if we were to use three-judge panels, and at least four if five-judge panels were the rule.
Clearly, there is room for spirited disagreement on all of this, but it surely is a debate worth having. Nothing can cure the horror of sensational depictions of abuse, but if the legacy of Ghraib is that the United States manifestly reaffirms its commitments to human dignity and thoughtful due process, our current shame will have been well worth enduring.

-- Andrew C. McCarthy, a former chief assistant U.S. attorney who led the 1995 terrorism prosecution against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others, is an NRO contributor.



http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy200405110832.asp
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Free the Iraqi Press!
From the May 17, 2004 issue: The last thing they need in Baghdad is another statist medium.
by Stephen Schwartz
05/17/2004, Volume 009, Issue 34
AS IF THE COALITION in Iraq didn't have enough problems, on May 3 most of the staff of al-Sabah (Morning), the daily newspaper published with support from the Coalition Provisional Authority, walked out. Ismael Zayer, the paper's editor in chief, announced that a new, independent daily would be established, to be called al-Sabah al-Jedid (New Morning). Zayer moved his newsroom to a private house.
The story of al-Sabah, which claimed the largest daily circulation of any newspaper in Iraq, dramatizes numerous questions about how the Coalition can help construct a modern, stable, prosperous, and democratic country on the ruins of the Saddam dictatorship. These include: Can Iraqis be trusted to build new institutions? How responsible will Iraqis be in handling media? How much do foreigners need to control? Or can foreign officials simply act as mentors and advisers? Even after the scheduled "Iraqification" on June 30, such questions will remain.
Iraq now has between 100 and 200 newspapers and newsmagazines, depending on who counts. Iraqi media are often dismissed as low in quality; those who want to judge for themselves can read English-language summaries of front-page newspaper stories published daily by the Iraqi Press Monitor, at iwpr.net/index.pl?iraq_ipm_index.html. Al-Sabah itself has a website with an English page at alsabaah.com. There is also a considerable number of independent English-language websites and blogs coming out of Iraq.
Al-Sabah was created in May 2003, after the liberation of Iraq, with help from the Mare Foundation, a Netherlands NGO with a history of supporting Iraqi journalists in exile (marefoundation.org). Zayer himself had worked in Europe as a journalist for years. Early on, al-Sabah became one of three media outlets maintained by the CPA under the umbrella of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), the other two being a television channel, al-Iraqiyah, and a radio network.
The IMN has inherited the staff and facilities of the Ministry of Information of the former Saddam regime. This is not necessarily a bad thing when it comes to personnel. Under many dictators, media and other professionals have had to accept submission, against their will and conscience, in order to survive. Many of these people can be trusted to work as responsible journalists under free conditions. More problematic is the legacy of bureaucratic government control over the media sector.
Al-Sabah and the TV and radio components of the Iraqi Media Network have been administered since mid-January 2004 by the U.S.-based Harris Corporation, a producer of communications equipment. When the contract to run the IMN was put up for bid in the United States, however, it specified that the daily newspaper would be independent within a year, operating free of American subsidy, and on course to be privatized.
Al-Sabah's editor and staff welcomed this. They did not want the paper to remain dependent on American financial aid or to be seen forever as the voice of the Coalition.
In March, a rival newspaper, the daily al-Mutamar (The Congress), published by the Iraqi National Congress and considered the mouthpiece for Ahmad Chalabi, criticized al- Sabah. Al-Mutamar charged that Iraqi government ministries unfairly subsidized al-Sabah by giving it exclusive contracts for government advertising. Yet however its competitors viewed it, al-Sabah was clearly the dominant paper, printing between 40,000 and 75,000 copies per day and claiming millions of hits on its website. Al-Sabah got a new printing press early this year, and was preparing to launch itself into the world of free media. Zayer and his staff were confident of their ability to publish on their own, gaining revenue from advertisers.
Then came bad news. On March 20, the Coalition issued Decree Number 66, signed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, turning the Iraqi Media Network into the Iraqi Public Service Broadcaster, a government media enterprise equivalent to the British Broadcasting Corporation. Zayer and the al-Sabah staff professed shock that, under the decree, their newspaper would become a state-owned newspaper, with no prospect of the promised privatization.
Around the same time, the upheaval in Falluja and the confrontations between the Coalition and rebels elsewhere in Iraq were making their work--given their reputation as Coalition apologists--especially dangerous. Three al-Sabah workers were killed, five bombings were attempted and prevented at the al-Sabah building in the Baghdad district of al-Qahera, and Zayer himself was the target of two murder plots, according to the Washington Post. Even printers and drivers working for the paper were threatened.
Before announcing their attempt at independence, al-Sabah had published a detailed critique of the media laws set to be imposed in Iraq. Coalition Decree Number 65, also issued March 20, for example, had established an Iraqi Communications and Media Commission. This body would regulate all "telecommunications and telecommunications-related information services," including print media, broadcasting, coverage of elections, mobile telephone services, Internet providers, and Internet caf?s. The commission, which would issue licenses for all such enterprises, was to be supported by an array of chairmanships, boards, and panels.
In an editorial, al-Sabah described the commission as "bigger and more powerful than Iraq's former Ministry of Information--a state within the state." The newspaper continued, "This Commission will be lawmaker, prosecutor, and judge, technical engineer and moral guardian of the interests of, for example, children (against too much violence on television) and consumers (against fraudulent advertising)....[I]n order to be prosecutor and judge, this Commission will need considerable staff to monitor television and radio programs and read the newspapers and weeklies."
With so many print organs already in existence, al-Sabah's editorialists were justified in asking how the commission would find time to keep track of the press. Al-Sabah blamed this unwieldy plan on Simon Haselock, the British official named media commissioner by the Coalition in August 2003. The decree making al-Sabah part of the Iraqi Public Service Broadcaster also comprised the creation of another whole set of governorships, boards, committees, and related bodies.
In all this, three things should be obvious. The first is that imposing a massive bureaucratic apparatus on top of Iraqi media is a disincentive to independent reporting, entrepreneurial investment, and other essentials for media success in the free market.
The second is that these offices, boards, and other bodies will instantly become centers of political patronage and corruption, regardless of safeguards written into their constitutional documents.
The third and overarching fact is that this is no way to cure the Iraqis, or any other Arab society, of the statist legacy of the Baathist dictatorship.
After Ismael Zayer and his staff walked out of the al-Sabah offices, the Washington Post quoted the man left behind to run the paper for the Coalition--Maher Faisal, a veteran of al-Jumhuriya (The Republic), one of Saddam's newspapers--as saying, "These exiles have nothing to teach Iraqis. We can work without them." The message was: Iraqis who learned how media operate in free societies should not try to import their knowledge into the new Iraq.
This gets it precisely backwards. In their editorial criticizing the establishment of the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission, the al-Sabah journalists candidly admitted that "in Iraq irresponsible journalism is the norm, not the exception." But the solution to low journalistic standards in the new Iraq is straightforward:
* Iraq needs a free press, in the spirit of the First Amendment.
* Alleged abuses of press freedom should be addressed under a strong libel law along American lines when these abuses involve persons, and by enforcement of public order when it can be shown that media are inciting violence. Incitement to violence is not protected speech in the United States, and should not be in Iraq.
* Newspapers, radio stations, television channels, movie companies, Internet providers, Internet caf?s, cell-phone operators, and all other forms of communications enterprise should be encouraged to succeed or fail according to the markets they serve. No subsidies should be required in a country that, almost immediately after its liberation, generated countless new media organs. Iraqis have the resources and the will to create flourishing media.
* The licensing of radio and TV frequencies should be a neutral function administered by a small commission with a minimal staff, with no oversight over content. Broadcast content, like print news, can be regulated through libel law and enforcement of public order. Regarding children's exposure to violence through television, parents can be trusted to make choices.
* Foreign media experts should mentor, advise, and teach. They should not administer media, or write laws governing them, or issue licenses for media employees or investors.
* Iraqi journalists, like free journalists everywhere, should be encouraged to engage in a vigorous discussion among themselves and with the public of what responsible journalism is in a self-governing society. Adherence to high standards should remain a matter of personal and professional commitment, not submission to regulators or the police.
It is often said that the Coalition in Iraq needs a voice of its own. That is true: It should express its views at frequent press conferences open to all reporters. A vigorous, free press is the best possible place to begin the real democratization of Iraq.
Stephen Schwartz, a frequent contributor, consulted for a losing bidder on the Iraqi Media Network contract.

? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.

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Prison Mutiny
What the torturers of Abu Ghraib have wrought.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Tuesday, May 4, 2004, at 9:01 AM PT
The images from Abu Ghraib prison do not test one's convictions about the wrongness of torture. They test one's opinions about the wrongness of capital punishment. Just consider for a moment what this bunch of giggling sadists has done, with its happy snaps and recreational cruelties:
It has defiled one of the memorials of regime change. I was a visitor to Abu Ghraib last summer, and the stench of misery and evil was still palpable in those pits and cellars. It is as if British or American soldiers had not only executed German prisoners of war, but had force-marched them to Dachau in order to commit the atrocity.
It has been like a shot in the back to the many soldiers (active front-line duty, not safe-job prison guards) who were willing to take casualties rather than inflict them and who fought selectively and carefully. What are the chances of the next such soldier who is captured by some gang of Saddamists or Wahabbists or Khomeinists?
It seems, at least on its face, to have profaned the idea of women in the military. One does not have to concede anything to Islamist sexism in order to know what the impact of obscene female torturers will have in the wider society.
This is only the rehearsal for one's revulsion. One of two things must necessarily be true. Either these goons were acting on someone's authority, in which case there is a layer of mid- to high-level people who think that they are not bound by the laws and codes and standing orders. Or they were acting on their own authority, in which case they are the equivalent of mutineers, deserters, or traitors in the field. This is why one asks wistfully if there is no provision in the procedures of military justice for them to be taken out and shot.
Probably everyone has wondered what they might do--or might allow to be done--in the case of the "ticking bomb" and the stubborn terrorist detainee. At least when I saw the movie, Sean Connery in The Untouchables got a rousing cheer when he shot a corpse in the head, in the thick of combat, to convince a mobster that he was deadly serious. But no such excuse will conceivably do in this case. Junk videos made by mediocre pick-nose pornographers are evidence of a complete indifference to intelligence. Who is going to dare claim that a car bomb outside a school was thwarted by such tactics? One has to remember the crucial objection to torture in the first place. Moral considerations apply, as they must. But the vice of the torturer is that he or she produces confessions by definition. And soon, the whole business of confession has become polluted with falsity and madness. Even the medieval church was smart enough to work this out and to drop the practice.
Another objection is that the torturers very swiftly become a law unto themselves, a ghoulish class with a private system. It takes no time at all for them to spread their poison and to implicate others in what they have done, if only by coverup. And the next thing you know is that torture victims have to be secretly murdered so that the news doesn't leak. One might also mention that what has been done is not forgiven, or forgotten, for generations.
If anyone wanted to argue that torture is a matter of routine in many of the countries whose official media now express such shock, they would have to argue by way of double standards. This case would collapse at once and of its own weight if the standard was to become a single one, or if one torturer became an excuse for another. This point doesn't completely apply to the media themselves, who have yet to show the video execution of an Italian civilian kidnapped by Iraqi jihadists, or indeed many other lurid atrocities. But there's no hypocrisy in holding self-proclaimed liberators to a higher standard.
There it is in black and white in Bob Woodward's book, and we can be pretty sure that it's accurate, because we know that Colin Powell likes to talk to the composer of the first draft of blah. The secretary of state is quoted as saying that he often thinks our biggest problem in Iraq is Ahmad Chalabi. Just take a moment to roll that thought around your own cranium. Iraq ... mass murder, looted economy, mass trauma, incipient warlordism, devastated ecology, foreign infiltrators, crazed mullahs ... .you become a bit spoiled for choice when you select a main problem here. Picking Chalabi is presumably easier than picking a fight with Rumsfeld or Wolfowitz or even Bush.
It's a change, though, from the authorized smear and jeer of last year, which was that Chalabi was an American puppet. Since then he has called for an earlier transfer of sovereignty, earlier elections, and a sterner line on de-Baathification than the patrons of Abu Ghraib would like. He's said and done some other things that I'm not so sure about, and I don't know what happened in the Jordanian banking system many decades ago (and neither, dear reader, do you). But he's not a puppet, and anyone who thinks he is the problem is probably readying some puppets of his own whom you don't want to think about. Here one might also mention George Tenet's CIA, which doesn't have many recent successes to its credit, either in defending the homeland or in guessing right about enemies overseas, but which seems to have agents to spare to defame the Iraqi National Congress. Unpunished enemies, protected torturers, and punished friends ... not a great week for the good old cause of regime change.


Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair. His book Blood, Class and Empire has just been republished in paperback.

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The Right's Abu Ghraib Denial
Is the liberal outrage really worse than the torture?
By Timothy Noah
Posted Tuesday, May 11, 2004, at 3:52 PM PT
The rapidly emerging conservative line on Abu Ghraib is that Congress and the news media are exploiting the story in order to discredit the Bush administration. "Clearly, the images are serving the political agenda of many newspapers," sniffed Col Allen, editor-in-chief of the New York Post, to the New York Times. Until this past Saturday Abu Ghraib was kept off Page One of the Rupert Murdoch-owned Post, proving that the Post's loyalty to right-wing politics is greater than its not-inconsiderable loyalty to Fleet Street-style tabloid journalism. Murdoch publications have downplayed Abu Ghraib even more than the rest of the conservative press. The Weekly Standard's Web site had nothing to say until yesterday, and the Times piece quotes Fox News executive producer Bill Shine saying he's "dialing back" on use of the photographs.
But other conservative commentators, while less skittish about discussing Abu Ghraib, have adopted more or less the same argument. Torture is bad; liberal outrage against torture is worse. "Like reporters at a free buffet," intoned the Wall Street Journal editorial board on May 6, "Members of Congress are swarming to the TV cameras to declare their outrage and demand someone's head, usually Donald Rumsfeld's." Shame on Congress for wanting to hold the defense secretary responsible for losing control of the troops he sent to Baghdad! It's an "ersatz scandal," Midge Decter, author of a hagiographic Rumsfeld biography, pronounced in the May 7 Los Angeles Times. In an editorial headlined "A Few Bad Men," the Weekly Standard, which turned against Rumsfeld months ago for messing up its pretty war, has now come to his defense. The idea that anyone in addition to the prison guards currently facing court martial should bear any responsibility for the mayhem at Abu Ghraib is, the Weekly Standard says, a con perpetrated by defense lawyers.
The prison guards were badly trained, we hear; they thought they were doing what the interrogators/contractors/CIA wanted them to do; they were cogs in a corrupt military machine. We might say something like that if we were being paid to defend these lowlifes. And, yes, there do seem to have been lamentable weaknesses in training and command. But "sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light" is evidence of a lack of humanity, not a lack of training. And consider this lovely detail: The Washington Post reports that there is "a new batch of photographs similar to those broadcast a week ago [which include] pictures showing crude simulations of sex among soldiers." Did the CIA encourage them to do that, too?
No, but the utter chaos that apparently prevailed at Abu Ghraib might have something to do with a lack of oversight. The military moved quickly to investigate after Gen. Taguba filed his report, but better still would have been sufficient supervision to prevent the abuses from becoming widespread in the first place. A May 9 story by Scott Higham, Josh White, and Christian Davenport in the Washington Post makes clear that one of the reasons the guards were out of control at Abu Ghraib was that there weren't enough of them:
At Abu Ghraib, the guard-to-prisoner ratio was about one to 15, with one battalion guarding 7,000. Army doctrine calls for one battalion per 4,000 enemy soldiers. In civilian prisons, one guard per three inmates is considered ideal.
Why weren't there enough guards? Why aren't there enough American soldiers performing any other vital tasks in Iraq? Because Rumsfeld wouldn't spare them. Until last week, the Weekly Standard was justifiably exercised about this. Here are Robert Kagan and William Kristol in the April 26 issue:
The shortage of troops in Iraq is the product of a string of bad calculations and a hefty dose of wishful thinking. Above all, it is the product of Rumsfeld's fixation on high-tech military "transformation," his hostility to manpower-intensive nation-building in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, and his refusal to increase the overall size of the military in the first place. ... The question is whether Rumsfeld and his generals have learned from past mistakes. Or rather, perhaps, the question is whether George W. Bush has learned from Rumsfeld's past mistakes. ... If his current secretary of defense cannot make the adjustments that are necessary, the president should find one who will.
If this dump-Rummy analysis was correct on April 26, why isn't it now? Because Abu Ghraib has made it more scathing than Kagan and Kristol ever intended.
In the May 7 National Review Online, Kate O'Beirne was so offended by congressional outrage over Abu Ghraib that she abandoned rational thought altogether. Shame on "the Republican leadership in the House, who never got around to condemning the savage videotaped execution of Daniel Pearl," O'Beirne inveighed. Instead, they passed by "overwhelming approval ... a redundant resolution condemning 'the abuse of persons in U.S. custody.' " To state the obvious: Congress did not have oversight authority over the terrorists who killed Pearl. Congress does, however, have oversight authority over the Baghdad occupation. It is therefore morally and diplomatically necessary for Congress to condemn the humiliation and torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Chatterbox, who sat beside Pearl for a few years in the Wall Street Journal's Washington bureau, can assure you that Pearl would have been outraged to see his name invoked to silence protest against American war crimes. What decent person wouldn't?
Not even President Bush can escape conservative criticism for apologizing (albeit belatedly and clumsily) for the Abu Ghraib horrors and for urging the Iraqi people not to conclude that Americans are barbarians. How paternalistic, complains Jonathan V. Last today on the Weekly Standard's Web site. When Iraqis slaughtered military contractors in Falluja and desecrated their corpses, did Americans conclude that Iraqis were "savages or evildoers"? Um, yes. To be more precise, Americans concluded that Iraqis (Sunnis, anyway) were consumed by a dangerous and unceasing hatred toward Americans. But Last argues, absurdly, that the massacre was merely "[t]he product of a few deranged, dangerous men." If that's true, what was the military battle for Falluja all about? And why did we lose it?
Conservative Abu Ghraib denial reached its crudest expression today, at a Senate hearing, when Sen. James Inhofe, R., Okla., pronounced, "I'm probably not the only one up at this table that is more outraged by the outrage than we are by the treatment. ... I am also outraged that we have so many humanitarian do-gooders right now crawling all over these prisons looking for human rights violations, while our troops, our heroes are fighting and dying."
Deny though it may, the right can't avoid forever any engagement with the ugly things that happened at Abu Ghraib. It will have to grapple with what the prison guards did and what made them do it. But all is not lost. Conservatives have forgotten the most important rule from the neoconservative playbook. When all else fails, blame the 1960s. The sexual abuse, the exhibitionism in photographing it, and the general breakdown of moral authority, are all legacies of ... what, Class? The moral relativism and flight from responsibility that gained legitimacy when liberals surrendered to the radicals in the 1960s. (Or, if you're David Frum: the 1970s.) It's a cheap and shameless argument, but when did that ever stop the culture warriors? Hell, two years ago the Wall Street Journal blamed Enron on the 1960s. The Abu Ghraib argument is actually slightly less ridiculous than that one. Yet searching the Factiva news database for "Abu Ghraib and 1960s and liberalism," Chatterbox comes up empty. This is usually Decter's area of expertise, but obviously her allegiance to Rumsfeld has put any condemnation of Abu Ghraib out of bounds, no matter what the argument. Where have you gone, William J. "Death of Outrage" Bennett? Our nation turns its lonely eyes to you.
Timothy Noah writes "Chatterbox" for Slate.
E-mail Timothy Noah at chatterbox@slate.com.

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ECONOMIC SCENE
How Much Does Information Technology Matter?
By HAL R. VARIAN
IN May 2003, The Harvard Business Review published an article by a former editor, Nicholas G. Carr, titled "IT Doesn't Matter."
The reaction from industry chief executives was immediate. "Hogwash!" said Steven A. Ballmer of Microsoft. "Dead wrong," said Carleton S. Fiorina of Hewlett-Packard. Craig R. Barrett of Intel responded forcefully, "IT matters a whole lot."
Now, a year later, Mr. Carr has replied to his critics with a new book, "Does IT Matter?" (Harvard Business School Press).
It's a good book. Mr. Carr lays out the simple truths of the economics of information technology in a lucid way, with cogent examples and clear analysis.
His basic point is straightforward. At one time, information technology was so expensive and so difficult to manage that companies could make large amounts of money simply by being able to make systems work. (Think I.B.M.)
Companies that lacked the skills to manage information technology effectively suffered compared with competitors that had mastered those skills. But over the years, as information technology has become cheaper and more manageable, this source of competitive advantage has been reduced and perhaps eliminated. Hiring knowledgeable employees is much easier than it used to be, and the tools to manage this technology are far more powerful than they were a few short years ago. Nowadays anybody can set up a Web server, or an accounting system, or an inventory management system.
The ability to manage technology effectively is no longer the barrier to entry it once was. Hence, it no longer serves as a source of competitive advantage.
So it is with every new technology. When electric motors became small enough to drive individual machine tools, it became possible to set up assembly lines and greatly improve productivity.
Henry Ford and his colleagues created the assembly line and other techniques of mass production in the formative days of the automobile industry and enjoyed a significant advantage over their competitors for nearly 20 years.
But by the end of the 1920's, all automobiles were made using the techniques Ford pioneered, and his competitive advantage disappeared. The playing field tipped toward General Motors, which had developed more flexible procedures that allowed it to offer frequent updates in model styles. Knowing how to run an assembly line no longer conferred a competitive advantage, because everyone knew how to do it.
According to Mr. Carr, knowing how to use information technology is like knowing how to run an assembly line. It is a utility now, like telephone service or electricity.
Asking whether information technology matters is like asking whether electricity matters. In one sense it certainly does - without electricity, commerce would grind to a halt. But skill in the management of electricity isn't particularly useful to most companies, since electricity is now so cheap and so commonplace that it can't really be a source of competitive advantage to anyone.
Profit comes from scarcity. Companies that can provide products or services that others can't provide can charge premium prices. As more and more companies are able to supply something, competition works its magic and forces prices down.
"Complexity management" can still serve as a barrier to entry in some industries. Making integrated circuits is fiendishly complex, and Mr. Barrett of Intel is certainly right when he says information technology is critical in his industry.
But as he would readily agree, it is not the whole story. A potential competitor could go out and buy the same technology that Intel uses and still fail miserably in trying to compete with it.
Even Intel doesn't know quite why some chip manufacturing processes work better than others. In the late 1990's it instituted a program called "Copy EXACTLY!," which required that new plants use equipment and procedures replicated from existing plants, right down to the color of paint on the wall.
When a technology is so complex that the only way to make things work is to copy what you already have in place, you have a competitive advantage. After all, only the incumbents have something to copy, which makes it difficult for new companies to enter the industry.
But most businesses aren't as complex as chip manufacturing. If someone makes money selling fruit-flavored iced tea, you can be sure that other competitors will soon spring up. And if one of them gains some temporary competitive advantage by building an inventory management system, the others will soon follow.
So Mr. Carr's main thesis is right. It is not information technology itself that matters, but how you use it.
But even though it is true that when information technology is turned into a commodity it no longer serves as a source of unique competitive advantage, we still face a critical question: Are we now at that point?
Standardization and commoditization of a technology don't always mean that innovation stops. Once products become commodities, they can serve as components for further innovation.
In the 19th century, American manufacturers created standardized designs for wheels, gears, pulleys, shafts and screws. As such standardized parts became widely available and could be purchased "off the shelf," there was an outpouring of invention.
Sewing machines made clothing manufacture cheaper. Farm equipment made planting and harvesting cheaper. The locomotive made transportation cheaper. By the end of the century, the groundwork had been laid for the automobile and the next wave of innovation involving power tools and mass production.
In the 19th century the real innovations came after the basic building blocks were commoditized.
Perhaps information technology is like those standardized parts. Desktop PC's, Web servers, databases and scripting languages have become components in larger, more complex systems. As these components have become more standardized, the opportunities to create innovations have multiplied.
Do such innovations offer "sustainable competitive advantage"? Maybe, maybe not. Truly sustainable competitive advantage is a high hurdle. Doing something better and cheaper than the competition is always valuable, even if the competitive advantage is only temporary.
In my view, companies cannot afford to ignore information technology, or relegate it to the back burner. Commoditizing it does not necessarily mean innovation slows. If anything, it could accelerate as more and more innovators experiment and tinker with those cheap, ubiquitous information technology commodities.
Hal R. Varian is a professor of business, economics and information management at the University of California, Berkeley.
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
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Price Check
More inflation may be coming -- if only the Fed could see it.
By Larry Kudlow
A surprising new economic report suggests that the U.S. manufacturing sector is operating at or near full capacity. This raises threatening red flags about Federal Reserve interest-rate policy and higher future inflation.
According to Economy.com, the Institute for Supply Managers' biannual outlook shows manufacturing capacity utilization at 85.6 percent. This is way above the Fed's current estimate of 74.6 percent and could be a strong signal that more inflation is coming. (Economist Bruce Bartlett deserves thanks for alerting the profession to this report.)
Economy.com believes the difference between these numbers may lie in the fact that the Fed does not remove "dead" capacity nearly as quickly as the real-world ISM poll. "Capacity presumably `died' at a faster pace during the deep investment recession of the past few years," stated the economics website.
This helps explain the moonshot reading of 88 percent on the ISM price index for April. Near bottleneck factory conditions combined with globally driven oversized order books is a sure formula for big price hikes. The last time the ISM price index was this high was back in November 1979 -- the dark old days of stagflation.
For April, 77 percent of supply executives reported paying higher prices, while only 1 percent said prices were lower. (Twenty-two percent said prices were unchanged.) Across-the-board price hikes were reported on furniture, energy, wood, transportation, textiles, metals, chemicals, apparel, and many other items.
The year-to-date producer price index, which tracks the prices of wholesale business goods, is 5.1 percent at an annual rate, or 2.1 percent on a core basis (excluding food and energy). If the ISM capacity numbers are right and the Fed is wrong, then the PPI is going to accelerate markedly over the remainder of the year as industrial demands outstrip production capacity.
There is no automatic pass-through from the producer price index to the consumer price index, which is where inflation meets Main Street. However, through March, the CPI has also increased at a 5.1 percent annual rate, with a core reading of 2.9 percent. Many economists have held that the Fed will act much more aggressively if core inflation readings exceed 2 percent. Well, we may already be there.
The stock market, of course, is smarter than the Fed and all the rest of us put together. The recent big sell-offs may be discounting a tougher-than-expected 2004 (in terms of inflation and interest rates).
Ultimately, all these price movements are driven by excess liquidity supplied by the central bank in relation to the availability of goods in the economy. Inflation is always a monetary problem. Push in too much money to chase too few goods, and prices everywhere start rising.
Inflation-sensitive market-price signals have been warning of excess liquidity for at least a year. Gold and commodity prices have recently nosedived in market trading, but that's after a huge run-up in the prior 18 months. Meanwhile, sinking bond prices and rising yields, along with a steeply upward-sloping Treasury yield curve (an unusually wide gap between bond rates and the overnight rate on the fed funds policy target), continue to signal excess money and future inflation.
Taken together, too much liquidity in the economy, tighter capacity use in manufacturing, an energy-price spike, and unbelievably strong raw-material demands from China have set the stage for an inflation comeback.
Offsetting these inflationary factors, lower tax rates, record productivity, and more-rapid economic growth are now working to create a greater-than-usual supply of new goods and services. This positive supply shock, driven in particular by tax cuts, will absorb some of the excess money in circulation. That's why the mere expectation of Fed rate hikes and money-withdrawing actions has led to a recent drop in gold and commodity prices. This may suggest that the inflationary potential in the economy is more muted than price pessimists believe.
Nonetheless, Greenspan & Co. have incorrectly focused on lagging indicators of inflation, an approach that seems to have put them behind the curve for maintaining domestic price stability. The Fed's much-ballyhooed "output gap" difference between actual and potential gross domestic product, along with unit labor costs and mismeasured capacity use, are backward-looking and non-monetary signs of inflation.
Many supply-siders instead advocate a price-rule approach: the use of forward-looking market prices rather than backward-looking government data to track early warning inflation signs. For this reason, price-rulers have correctly warned of the monetary-based inflation threat. Today they have every reason to be concerned that the Fed has waited too long to rein in unusually easy money.
Ever try to drive a car through the rearview mirror? It's a dangerous stunt. Aiming forward through the windshield is the much safer bet. Hopefully the Fed will learn this before they drive economic recovery off the road.

-- Larry Kudlow, NRO's Economics Editor, is CEO of Kudlow & Co. and host with Jim Cramer of CNBC's Kudlow & Cramer.

http://www.nationalreview.com/kudlow/kudlow200405111038.asp

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The Neoconomists
The Bush administration's other revolutionaries.
By Daniel Altman
Posted Monday, May 10, 2004, at 11:17 AM PT
While neoconservatives in the Bush administration remake American foreign policy, another cadre of ideologues--call them the neoconomists--is busy attempting to transform American society.
The revolution in economic policy is not being televised. There was no big speech by President Bush to mark its birth, no "Axis of Evil" catchphrase designed to capture headlines. Yet it is every bit as dramatic and risky a change.
The neoconomists have one goal: to increase the rate at which the economy grows by changing how the nation uses its resources. It is a worthy goal, too. Following such as path could lead to a period of untold prosperity, with living standards rising faster than ever before. Or it might not. But even if the plan works, it might just lead to the collapse of the capitalist system.
The nation's current economic policy came to Washington in care of R. Glenn Hubbard and Lawrence B. Lindsey, who spent roughly the first two years of the Bush administration as the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and chairman of the National Economic Council, respectively.
For years, both men had been ardent supporters of the notion that income from savings and wealth was taxed too much. In 1990, Lindsey wrote that "with only a very modest loss of tax revenue, the tax system can be reformed to substantially encourage the savings we need to sustain our investment in a more productive economy." A decade later, Hubbard and a co-author wrote that savings and wealth had "long and widely been acknowledged as especially impaired by taxation."
Hubbard and Lindsey saw cutting taxes on savings and wealth as a recipe for faster growth. Their plans were consistent with supply-side economics, which had dominated Republican policy for decades, since they targeted the economy's long-run potential to grow rather than short-run fine-tuning of demand. But the focus on savings was a departure from earlier conservative doctrine.
During the Reagan administration, most talk about tax cuts centered on removing disincentives to work. In the years that followed, though, academic economists began to favor a new set of theoretical models where the savings rate took a more prominent role as a determinant of economic growth. In addition, the models suggested that the pace of technological change depended on changes in the size of the capital stock, which can only grow if investors save more. The neoconomists didn't invent these models--that was the job of theorists whose work sometimes looked more like physics than economics--but they quickly grasped the implications for policy. They used the models to postulate the following chain reaction:

1. Government cuts tax rates on savings and wealth.
2. Saving by households--bank accounts, stocks, bonds, etc.--increases.
3. More money becomes available to American businesses, since they're the ones offering the bank accounts, stocks, bonds, etc.
4. Businesses spend more on machinery, software, and other capital, as well as on research and development.
5. The nation's output of goods and services grows, and technological innovation accelerates.
6. Incomes and living standards rise more quickly for several years and perhaps forever.

With George W. Bush's cooperation, the first steps have already been taken. So far, the president has signed bills eliminating the estate tax, lowering the tax rates on dividends and capital gains, and helping companies to reduce the tax they pay on their profits. In addition, by cutting rates for "ordinary" income, the Bush administration has lowered taxes on interest payments, rental income and income from mutual funds, and pensions and retirement accounts. (Though slated to be temporary, the Bush administration is campaigning to make its tax breaks permanent.) All of these changes make it relatively more attractive to accumulate wealth than to spend money.
In addition, the White House is pushing for an initiative that would almost single-handedly accomplish Hubbard and Lindsey's goal: a huge expansion of tax-free savings accounts. And the growth of these tax-free savings accounts would dovetail well with the White House's plan for reforming Social Security, which calls for the creation of another type of tax-free investment account for every working American.
Hubbard and Lindsey's agenda is long-term, but it has already incurred some substantial costs. In the short term, their focus on savings has offered relatively little stimulus to the economy. Had the White House directed more incentives toward spending, the lag between recession and recovery might have been shorter.
In the long term, the cost of the Bush administration's policy has been forgone opportunities. The combination of the weak economy and the White House's decadelong schedule of tax cuts has left future administrations with little room to maneuver. Forecasts for budget balances from 2002 to 2011 have dropped from $5.6 trillion in surpluses to $2.9 trillion in deficits in the past three years. In the coming years, the federal government will have little money to invest in economic growth directly, by spending money on education, worker training, or basic research, which generate reliably high returns to society in the long run.
This latter cost is particularly germane, since there is no assurance that the positive chain-reaction the neoconomists envision will actually occur. Hubbard and Lindsey's strategy has never been tried in a large, wealthy economy. One flaw in the theory is that American savings do not always stay in America for use by American companies. In the past two decades, the share of savings sent abroad appears to have risen from about 10 percent to at least 40 percent. And when the Treasury borrows to make up for large deficits, more American savings will end up in the hands of government and less in investments by businesses.
The speedy growth of the economy in the last three quarters--averaging more than 5 percent at an annual rate--could signal impressive things to come. And the experience of the Clinton administration proved that even the biggest deficits can disappear given a broad enough expansion in the economy. But even if the Bush administration succeeds, its policies could create two problems that could undo all their positive effects: rising inequality and a drastic change in incentives.
Wealthier people derive more of their income from returns on saving--both in dollar terms and as a proportion of income--than poor people do. When taxes on the return from savings suddenly disappear, the wealthy benefit the most. It may be that people who depend on their jobs for income will benefit, too, in the long run, thanks to an expanding economy and rising wages. But for several years, in all likelihood, the income gap will continue to widen.
That income gap poses some real dangers to the economy and even to the earnings of the wealthy. With rising inequality, it's harder for poor people to obtain economic opportunities, because chances to get education and training, or to bring ideas to market, depend on money as well as talent, and because the number of these opportunities is limited.
The Bush administration has done little to alleviate either of these conditions. So, when income gaps widen, more of the potential of poor people--even the smartest and most innovative poor people--will inevitably be wasted. The wealthier people who own America's companies won't have as skilled a workforce, or as fast a flow of new ideas, as they might have had otherwise.
Perhaps more important, abolishing taxes on saving would give people every incentive to receive all their income from financial assets rather than wages and salaries. For some, spending all day adjusting one's portfolio might make more sense than taking a job. Even people who work will seek ways to avoid taxes, for example by being paid solely in stock options or high-interest bonds.
Of course, those people would probably be chief executives and other financial sophisticates, rather than home health workers, call-center operators, and short-order cooks. Eventually, the new incentives could lead to a whole new way of classifying people: working and upper-class would be replaced by taxpayer and free-rider. Titans of industry, heirs and heiresses, and wizards of Wall Street wouldn't pay for national defense, cancer research, or President Bush's trip to Mars. All those costs would be borne by America's breadwinners.
It sounds like a recipe for the kind of social unrest that can make an economy stagger, stagnate, or worse. A political backlash would seem almost inevitable. And something worse--like a riotous manifestation of anticapitalist sentiment--would become a real possibility for the first time in decades. And that's what could happen if the theory works.


Daniel Altman is the author of Neoconomy, which will be published this summer. He previously wrote economics columns for the Economist and the New York Times.

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Brazil to Expel NYT Reporter After Drink Story
Tue May 11, 2004 08:56 PM ET
By Claudia Pires
BRASILIA, Brazil (Reuters) - Brazil said on Tuesday it would expel a New York Times correspondent who wrote that President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was drinking too much.
Lula, a former union leader, said journalist Larry Rohter deserved to lose his visa after writing that Lula's drinking had raised "national concern" it was affecting his ability to rule.
"It's not for a president to respond to such a piece of stupidity. Certainly its author, who doesn't know me and who I don't know, must be more worried ... than I am. It doesn't deserve a response, it deserves action," Lula told reporters in Brasilia.
Brazil's justice ministry said it would cancel Rohter's visa in light of the article that was "lightweight, lying and offensive to the honor of the president."
The presidential palace has denied the president has a drinking problem and is considering legal action against The New York Times .
Officials for The New York Times were not immediately available for comment.
The nation's political opposition has joined the center-left government in condemning the article published on Sunday.
Lula is known to enjoy a drink or two socially and Brazilians generally do not look down on drinking.
In a letter published in The New York Times on Tuesday, Brazil's ambassador to Washington, Roberto Abdenur, said he had read the story with "perplexity and indignation."
"Mr. da Silva's personal prestige, coming as it does from a developing country, generates all kinds of reaction, some directed toward dimming the glitter of his leadership," the letter said. "It is surprising and regrettable that The Times should have given credit to such an offensive and totally unfounded story."
The story quoted a politician who was Lula's presidential running mate in 1998, but who has since distanced himself from the ruling Workers' Party.
In an online survey on the Web site of daily Folha de S. Paulo, 54 percent said the article was "disrespectful."
But 36 percent of the 7,185 people who responded to the survey agreed the article was "correct, as ultimately this is about a newspaper with international credibility." (Additional reporting by Axel Bugge)



Brasil
Ter?a, 11 de maio de 2004, 20h21 Atualizada ?s 21h12
Governo cancela visto de rep?rter do "NY Times"
O Minist?rio da Justi?a cancelou o visto tempor?rio do jornalista americano William Larry Rohter Junior, correspondente no Brasil do jornal norte-americano New York Times. Rother escreveu uma mat?ria sobre suposto envolvimento do presidente Luiz In?cio Lula da Silva com bebidas alco?licas. Com a decis?o do governo, ap?s receber a comunica??o oficial do cancelamento do visto o jornalista ter? oito dias para deixar o pa?s.

May 11, 2004
Brazil's President
To the Editor:
I read with perplexity and indignation your May 9 news article about the president of Brazil. Given the headline, "Brazilian Leader's Tippling Becomes National Concern," one would expect any serious journalist to indicate reliable local sources or solid local media coverage in support of such an assertion, certainly not what the reporter himself expressly refers to as "speculation," "innuendo" and "stories."
How can a long article be written to try to depict as real a fact that the journalist suggests may not actually exist?
President Luiz In?cio Lula da Silva is a respected leader and statesman in Brazil and all over the world. Only last month, Time magazine included him among the 100 most influential people on earth. This was done as a recognition of his role as the developing world's new spokesman, one who seeks a fairer world order through reforms, economic austerity and social justice.
Mr. da Silva's personal prestige, coming as it does from a developing country, generates all kinds of reaction, some directed toward dimming the glitter of his leadership. It is surprising and regrettable that The Times should have given credit to such an offensive and totally unfounded story.
ROBERTO ABDENUR
Ambassador of Brazil
Washington, May 10, 2004


May 11, 2004
Brazil President Denies Drinking Problem
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 8:19 a.m. ET
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil (AP) -- The office of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva angrily denied a published report that he has a drinking problem, calling it ``calumny and defamation.''
``It's infamy,'' Vice President Jose Alencar added Monday. ``President Lula is a good man. All of us Brazilians have to be indignant.''
Silva, Brazil's first working-class president, has never hidden his affection for alcohol, appearing on occasion with a glass of beer or whiskey. He has never been known to be drunken in public, however.
The nature of his drinking, a subject of speculation among local journalists, attracted particular attention after The New York Times published an article Sunday under the headline ``Brazilian Leader's Tippling Becomes National Concern.''
``We do not consider this article to be valid journalism,'' presidential spokeswoman Marcia Ornelas said. ``It is a piece of calumny and defamation and shows a prejudice against the president.''
She said the president's office was considering legal action.
Silva's chief of communications, Andre Singer, said late Sunday that Brazil asked its U.S. ambassador to express the nation's indignation to The New York Times over the ``gratuitous insults aimed'' at Silva, whose social habits are ``moderate.''
A spokeswoman for the Times, Catherine Mathis, said Monday by telephone that the newspaper stood by its story.
One source for the article was Leonel Brizola, a former Rio de Janeiro governor who was Silva's vice-presidential running mate in 1998. He said the president drank heavily during that unsuccessful campaign and still does.
Since that race, however, Brizola has not hidden his dislike for Silva, and even opposition politicians rallied to the president's defense.
``Some of (Silva's) remarks, especially the ones he improvises, are inadequate, but it would be imprudent to say that was the effect of his drinking,'' said Rep. Jose Carlos Aleluia, who leads the opposition in the lower house.
A former lathe operator with a fifth-grade education, Silva has been given more latitude by most voters in Brazil, a country where two-thirds of the people describe themselves as working class.
That tolerance extends to Silva's sometimes mangled use of the Portuguese language as well as his behavior.
A recent column by Diogo Mainardi in the respected weekly Veja called on Silva to stop drinking to set an example, but it did not accuse him of drinking to excess.
``Lula's drinking is not a national concern,'' said Alberto Dines, editor of the media-watching Web site and TV show Observatorio da Imprensa. ``Most people don't even think about it. There's a group of journalists in Brasilia who joke about it, and that's about it.''



Copyright 2004 The Associated Press
---------------------------------------------

May 9, 2004
Brazilian Leader's Tippling Becomes National Concern
By LARRY ROHTER

BRAS?LIA - Luiz In?cio Lula da Silva has never hidden his fondness for a glass of beer, a shot of whiskey or, even better, a slug of cacha?a, Brazil's potent sugar-cane liquor. But some of his countrymen have begun wondering if their president's predilection for strong drink is affecting his performance in office.
In recent months, Mr. da Silva's left-leaning government has been assailed by one crisis after another, ranging from a corruption scandal to the failure of crucial social programs. The president has often stayed out of the public eye and left his advisers to do most of the heavy lifting. That has spurred speculation that his apparent disengagement and passivity may somehow be related to his appetite for alcohol. His supporters, however, deny reports of heavy drinking.
Though political leaders and journalists are increasingly talking among themselves about Mr. da Silva's consumption of liquor, few are willing to express their misgivings in public or on the record. One exception is Leonel Brizola, the leader of the leftist Democratic Labor Party, who was Mr. da Silva's running mate in the 1998 election but now worries that the president is "destroying the neurons in his brain."
"When I was Lula's vice-presidential candidate, he drank a lot," Mr. Brizola, now a critic of the government, said in a recent speech. "I alerted him that distilled beverages are dangerous. But he didn't listen to me, and according to what is said, continues to drink."
During an interview in Rio de Janeiro in mid-April, Mr. Brizola elaborated on the concerns he expressed to Mr. da Silva and which he said went unheeded. "I told him 'Lula, I'm your friend and comrade, and you've got to get hold of this thing and control it,' " he recalled.
" 'No, there's no danger, I've got it under control,' " Mr. Brizola, imitating the president's gruff, raspy voice, remembers Mr. da Silva replying then. "He resisted, and he's resistant," Mr. Brizola continued. "But he had that problem. If I drank like him, I'd be fried."
Spokesmen for Mr. da Silva declined to discuss the president's drinking habits on the record, saying they would not dignify baseless charges with a formal reply. In a brief e-mail message responding to a request for comment, they dismissed speculation that he drank to excess as "a mixture of prejudice, misinformation and bad faith."
Mr. da Silva, a 58-year-old former lathe operator, has shown himself to be a man of strong appetites and impulses, which contributes to his popular appeal. With a mixture of sympathy and amusement, Brazilians have watched his efforts to try not to smoke in public, his flirtations at public events with attractive actresses and his continuing battle to avoid the fatty foods that made his weight balloon shortly after he took office in January 2003.
Aside from Mr. Brizola, political leaders and the news media alike seem to prefer to deal in innuendo, but do so with relish. Whenever possible, the Brazilian press publishes photos of the president bleary-eyed or ruddy-faced, and constantly makes references both to weekend barbecues at the presidential residence at which the liquor flows freely and to state events at which Mr. da Silva never seems to be without a drink in his hand.
"I've got a piece of advice for Lula," the gadfly columnist Diogo Mainardi wrote in late March in Veja, the country's leading newsmagazine, reeling off a list of articles containing such references. "Stop drinking in public," he counseled, adding that the president has become "the biggest advertising spokesman for the spirits industry" with his very conspicuous consumption of alcohol.
A week later, the same magazine printed a letter from a reader worrying about "Lula's alcoholism" and its effect on the president's ability to govern. Though some Web sites have been complaining for months about "our alcoholic president," it was the first time the mainstream national press had referred to Mr. da Silva in that manner.
Historically, Brazilians have reason to be concerned at any sign of heavy drinking by their presidents. J?nio Quadros, elected in 1960, was a notorious tippler who once boasted, "I drink because it's liquid"; his unexpected resignation, after less than a year in office during what was reported to be a marathon binge, initiated a period of political instability that led to a coup in 1964 and 20 years of a harsh military dictatorship.
Whether or not Mr. da Silva really has a drinking problem, the issue has seeped into the public consciousness and become the subject of gibes. When the government spent $56 million early this year to buy a new presidential plane, for instance, the columnist Claudio Humberto, a sort of Matt Drudge of Brazilian politics, sponsored a contest to give a tongue-in-cheek name to the aircraft.
One winning entry, recalling that the United States president's plane is called Air Force One, suggested that Mr. da Silva's jet should be designated "Pirassununga 51," which is the name of the most popular brand of cacha?a. Another suggestion was "Powered by Alcohol," a pun referring to a government plan to encourage cars to use ethanol as fuel.
Speculation about the president's drinking habits has been fed by various gaffes and faux pas that he has made in public. As a candidate, he once offended residents of a city regarded as a haven for gays by calling it "a factory that manufactures queers," and as president, his slips in public have continued and become part of Brazilian political folklore.
At a ceremony here in February to announce a large new investment, for example, Mr. da Silva twice referred to the president of General Motors, Richard Wagoner, as the president of Mercedes-Benz. In October, on a day honoring the nation's elderly, Mr. da Silva told them, "when you retire, don't stay at home bothering your family, find something to do."
Abroad, Mr. da Silva has also stumbled or spoken ill-advisedly. On a visit to the Middle East last year, he imitated an Arab accent in speaking Portuguese, mispronunciations and all; and in Windhoek, Namibia, he said the city seemed to be so clean that it "hardly seems like Africa."
Mr. da Silva's staff and supporters respond that such slips are only occasional, are to be expected from a man who likes to speak off the cuff and have nothing to do with his consumption of alcohol, which they describe as moderate in any case. As they see it, he is being held to a different and unfair standard than that of his predecessors because he is Brazil's first working-class president and received only a sixth-grade education.
"Anyone who has been at a formal or informal reception in Bras?lia has witnessed presidents sipping a shot of whiskey," the columnist Ali Kamel wrote in the Rio de Janeiro daily O Globo recently. "But you'll have read nothing in that respect about other presidents, just about Lula. That smacks of prejudice."
Mr. da Silva was born into a poor family in one of the country's poorest states and spent years leading labor unions, a famously hard-drinking environment. Brazilian press accounts have repeatedly described the president's father, Aristides, whom he barely knew and who died in 1978, as an alcoholic who abused his children.
Stories about drinking episodes involving Mr. da Silva are legion. After one night on the town when he was a member of Congress during the late 1980's, Mr. da Silva got off the elevator at the wrong floor of the building where he lived at the time and tried to batter down the door of an apartment he mistakenly thought was his own, according to politicians and journalists here, including some who are former residents of the building.
"Under Lula, the capirinha has become the national drink by presidential decree," the daily F?lha de S?o Paulo said last month in an article about Mr. da Silva's association with alcohol and referring to a cocktail made with sugar-cane liquor.



Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company |

Posted by maximpost at 1:44 AM EDT
Permalink
Tuesday, 11 May 2004


Venezuela Soldiers Raid U.S. Embassy Warehouse, Detain More Suspects in Alleged Paramilitary Plot
By Christopher Toothaker Associated Press Writer
Published: May 10, 2004
CARACAS, Venezuela (AP) - Venezuelan authorities raided a U.S. Embassy warehouse Monday and made more arrests, a day after President Hugo Chavez charged there was a plot to oust him.
Venezuela soldiers on Sunday arrested 53 Colombian right-wing paramilitary fighters in a raid on a farm outside Caracas, and another 24 recruits were caught after fleeing into the countryside, Chavez said.
Soldiers and federal agents searched another farm around the same area Monday, including a warehouse rented by the U.S. Embassy, said Leopoldo Sarria, a lawyer for the family who owns the farm.
The agents had orders to seize weapons and military uniforms but found nothing after a five-hour search, Sarria said.
U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Victoria Alvarado said the embassy used the warehouse to store furniture and denied any U.S. involvement in efforts to oust Chavez.
In Washington, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher rejected comments made by Chavez on Sunday suggesting the United States was behind the alleged conspiracy.
"Those kinds of charges are baseless and irresponsible, and we categorically reject these kinds of outrageous statements and accusations," Boucher said.
Chavez has frequently claimed that Venezuela's opposition, including a number of military officers have conspired to overthrow his government, with Washington's backing.
Opposition leaders said the raids were a government-hatched scheme meant to divert attention from their presidential recall effort now entering a decisive phase.

AP-ES-05-10-04 2250EDT

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Palestinian Authority Decides to Hold Municipal Elections

By Mohammed Daraghmeh Associated Press Writer
Published: May 10, 2004

RAMALLAH, West Bank (AP) - The Palestinian Authority decided Monday to hold its first local elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, bowing to pressure to end chaos and corruption plaguing many Palestinian towns.
The increasing anarchy persuaded a reluctant Yasser Arafat to allow the vote, the first electoral test of his government in eight years, officials said, despite fears that his opponents, particularly the violent Islamic Hamas, could gain ground.
Early Tuesday, Israeli forces entered Gaza City and exchanged fire with Palestinian gunmen, an operation the Israelis said was aimed at the "terrorist infrastructure" in the city.
An Israeli helicopter fired a missile at a group of men, killing one and wounding nine, three of them seriously witnesses and doctors said. In earlier exchanges of fire, one Palestinian gunman was killed and nine people were wounded, at least four of them armed, they said.
The clash occurred in the Zeitoun neighborhood, across from the isolated Jewish settlement of Netzarim. Zeitoun is known as a stronghold of Islamic militant groups. The Israeli military said only that an operation was in progress, aimed at the "terrorist infrastructure" in Gaza City.
The Palestinian elections are to be held in stages in coming months, with the first to take place in the West Bank town of Jericho by late August.
The Cabinet said an Israeli troop withdrawal from Palestinian population centers is not a prerequisite for the local vote, removing an obstacle that has thwarted elections before.
However, Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia reiterated Monday that legislative and presidential elections could take place only after Israeli troops leave. He said a June deadline set by his government is unrealistic.
Qureia said he would instead ask the Quartet of Mideast mediators - the United States, Russia, the United Nations and the European Union - to propose a date, apparently to prod Israel to withdraw its troops and remove roadblocks. He said he would raise the idea in a meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in Berlin next week.
Elections are needed to counter Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's claim he does not have a Palestinian negotiating partner, Qureia said.
"We cannot set a date because of the occupation," Qureia said after Monday's Cabinet meeting. "We will call on the Quartet to suggest or propose a new date so we can put an end to (people saying) there ... is no partner" for peace.
Sharon has been pushing for a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and four West Bank settlements, charging that he does not have a Palestinian partner, because the Palestinian Authority is not cracking down on violent groups responsible for deadly attacks against Israelis.
Sharon's plan, which was rejected by his Likud Party, irked Palestinians, who fear Israel is trying to impose a border and grab large chunks of the West Bank.
The Palestinians held their only general elections in 1996 as part of an interim peace deal with Israel. Arafat was overwhelmingly elected Palestinian Authority president, while his Fatah movement won a majority in the 88-member parliament.
Elections in 2001 were postponed after the outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian violence.
It is assumed Arafat would be re-elected, despite widespread dissatisfaction with his handling of the conflict with Israel, the collapse of the Palestinian economy and rampant official corruption and mismanagement.
Israeli and U.S. efforts to sideline Arafat have only contributed to his continued appeal. Many Palestinians also consider him a unifying force and fear his ouster could unleash bloody factional fighting.
Israeli officials said they didn't expect local elections to contribute to Palestinian reforms as long as Arafat controls the government. Israel accuses Arafat of corruption and involvement in violence.
Municipal elections were last held in the West Bank in 1976, under Israeli military rule, and there hasn't been a local vote in Gaza in more than four decades.
Since the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, mayors have been appointed, usually Fatah stalwarts loyal to Arafat.
Minister Qadoura Fares said the Cabinet agreed to local elections after many municipal officials threatened to resign amid increasing chaos.
Hamas leaders could not immediately be reached for comment. However, the group has said it is willing to take part in municipal voting and is even considering competing in a general election, at least in Gaza, if Israel withdraws.
In other developments Monday:
- Israeli troops demolished 13 Palestinian houses along a Gaza road, a day after Palestinian gunmen ambushed Jewish settlers there during an outdoor memorial service for an Israeli family killed at the spot last week. The demolitions left about 75 Palestinians homeless. The army said the gunmen had used the structures as cover during the shooting attack.
- Palestinian vandals with axes and shovels desecrated 32 graves in a Commonwealth military cemetery in Gaza City. Photographs of U.S. and British soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners were stuck to some of the tombstones. About 3,000 Commonwealth soldiers from 17 countries are buried in the plot.
- The anti-settlement group Peace Now said Israel is building up West Bank settlements and unauthorized outposts in defiance of a U.S.-backed peace plan. Sixty houses have been built in the outposts, along with 1,800 housing starts in veteran settlements last year, Peace Now said.
- An Israeli soldier charged with manslaughter in the shooting death of a pro-Palestinian British activist went on trial at an army base in southern Israel. The unidentified soldier is accused of shooting Tom Hurndall in the head during an army operation in Gaza last year. Witnesses said Hurndall, 22, was helping Palestinian children avoid Israeli tanks.

AP-ES-05-10-04 2223EDT


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Des cryptologues d?chiffrent un terme censur? dans un "m?mo" adress? par la CIA ? Geoges Bush
LE MONDE | 07.05.04 | 12h58 * MIS A JOUR LE 07.05.04 | 16h13
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Un passage recouvert ? l'encre noire dans un document r?cemment diffus? par la Maison Blanche a ?t? reconstitu?. La m?thode pourrait ?tre appliqu?e ? bon nombre d'archives d?classifi?es.
Il "s'ennuyait" devant la t?l?vision, le week-end de P?ques, "lorsque le m?mo de la CIA ? George Bush a ?t? diffus?", se souvient David Naccache, sp?cialiste du chiffrement des donn?es de la soci?t? fran?aise Gemplus. "J'ai aussit?t t?l?phon? ? Claire Whelan, une ?tudiante de la Dublin City University, dont je dirige la th?se, pour lui proposer de s'attaquer aux passages caviard?s", raconte-t-il. Mission accomplie, ou presque.

Le "m?mo" en question, adress? le 6 ao?t 2001 par la CIA au pr?sident Bush et intitul? "Ben Laden d?termin? ? frapper aux USA", venait d'?tre d?classifi? par la Maison Blanche. Celle-ci voulait prouver que la pr?cision des avertissements des services de renseignement n'?tait pas suffisante pour permettre au pr?sident d'emp?cher les attaques du 11 Septembre. Mais cinq passages pr?cisant les sources des renseignements collect?s avaient ?t? recouverts d'encre noire.

Pour le cryptologue David Naccache, ces fragments illisibles ?taient autant de chiffons rouges. Le r?sultat de ses efforts - "conduits ? titre priv?", pr?cise-t-il, soucieux de ne pas impliquer son employeur dans son initiative - a ?t? pr?sent? mardi 4 mai lors de la conf?rence Eurocrypt 2004 qui a r?uni jusqu'au 6 mai ? Interlaken, en Suisse, le gratin de la cryptographie mondiale. "La d?monstration ?tait fort impressionnante", juge Jean-Jacques Quisquater (universit? de Louvain-la-Neuve), sp?cialiste du domaine, qui salue cette entreprise de "reverse engineering de document censur?".

David Naccache et son ?l?ve ont en effet r?ussi ? d?couvrir l'un des mots censur?s. Le terme "Egyptian" leur semble le seul possible. Ils veulent peaufiner leur m?thode avant de rendre leur verdict sur un passage plus long, afin de ne pas la discr?diter. Et ils ont carr?ment jet? l'?ponge pour un mot totalement isol?, faute d'indices suffisants.

La technologie employ?e n'a, ? premi?re vue, rien de r?volutionnaire. Les deux chercheurs ont d'abord "redress?" le texte, d?form? lors de sa num?risation - l'inclinaison n'?tait que de 0,52?. Ils ont ensuite utilis? un logiciel de reconnaissance de caract?res pour d?terminer la police du texte qui fixe le nombre de signes par unit? de longueur. Le simple recours ? un dictionnaire d'anglais permet alors d'?tablir une liste de mots possibles. "1 530 correspondaient", indique David Naccache.

Mais l'article "an" pr?c?dant le mot myst?re impliquait que celui-ci commen?ait n?cessairement par une voyelle, ce qui a permis de ramener la liste ? 346 mots. En fran?ais, un indice fourni par des articles comme "un" ou "une" aurait, de la m?me fa?on, permis de resserrer les recherches. La s?lection a aussi ?t? facilit?e par le fait que la police de caract?re, l'Arial, est "proportionnelle", c'est-?-dire que la "chasse" des lettres varie. L'espace occup? par un i diff?re de celui pris par un w, ce qui peut donner des indices suppl?mentaires, par rapport aux polices dites "monospace", comme le Courrier, souvent utilis?, o? toutes les lettres se valent.

"Parmi les mots "survivants", cinq ou six pouvaient faire sens, mais seul Egyptian correspondait au contexte", indique le cryptologue. Cette derni?re ?tape rel?ve plus de l'intelligence humaine que de la g?om?trie du texte. Pour choisir parmi Ukrainian, univited, unofficial, incursive, Egyptian, indebted et Ugandan, les deux chercheurs se sont appuy?s sur leur bon sens, l'Ouganda et l'Ukraine semblant trop ?loign?s du th??tre des op?rations pour ?tre retenus, par exemple.

Sans doute l'analyse du "m?mo" de la CIA ne d?voile-t-elle qu'un "secret de polichinelle", reconna?t David Naccache. Mais la m?thode syst?matise les recherches. Dans un autre "m?mo", elle a r?v?l? que des h?licopt?res civils militaris?s par les Irakiens avaient ?t? achet?s ? la Cor?e du Sud. Et rien ne s'oppose ? l'application automatis?e de cette technique ? l'ensemble des documents d?classifi?s, dans lesquels elle pourrait mettre au jour "des mots isol?s, voire des groupes de deux ou trois mots". Avis aux censeurs...

Herv? Morin

* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 08.05.04
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IRANIENNES, VIES PRIV?ES (1)
Les mari?s de T?h?ran
LE MONDE | 10.05.04 | 14h08
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De la drague au divorce, en passant par le mariage : pour les Iraniennes, vingt-cinq ans apr?s la r?volution islamique, la vie en couple est toujours un parcours sem? d'emb?ches
C'?tait le d?but de la nuit. On ?tait entre filles, c'est-?-dire en libert?. Pas de voiles sur les t?tes, dans la partie r?serv?e au personnel soignant f?minin de cet h?pital d'un quartier tr?s populaire du sud-ouest de T?h?ran. Celles qui ?taient de garde passaient de la cuisine commune ? leur petite chambre, s'asseyant autour d'un th? en attendant les urgences. Comme cette gyn?cologue de 34 ans qu'on appellera Ferouzeh, le faux nom qu'elle s'est choisi pour rester tranquille. Cette nuit-l?, donc, Ferouzeh bavardait dans sa chambre avec une amie. Soudain, on l'appelle aux urgences.

En vitesse, elle met sa blouse blanche et un voile noir sur les cheveux, descend les marches, rejoint les salles de consultation. La cohue. Il y a du bruit, du d?sordre, des va-et-vient. Une femme et sa s?ur attendent l? avec une fillette de 2 ans. "Elle est tomb?e d'une chaise, il faut v?rifier", dit la m?re dans une grande confusion.

Ferouzeh a bien compris ce qu'il fallait v?rifier. Ce ne sont pas d'?ventuels os cass?s qui pr?occupent la m?re. La seule chose dont il importe de s'assurer qu'elle est intacte, c'est l'hymen. Des familles traditionalistes ? celles de la bourgeoisie ?duqu?e, un tabou traverse les si?cles en Iran, solide vestige archa?que, ant?-islamique, d'une soci?t? pourtant en pleine ?bullition : la virginit?.

La petite fille est d?shabill?e sous la lampe. Les t?tes se penchent sur son cas, l'air soucieux. Elle ne comprend pas, hurle. Deux ans ! Est-elle vraiment "tomb?e d'une chaise" ? Ferouzeh fronce les sourcils, redoute le pire, examine l'enfant. Avant le verdict, la seconde de silence dure une ?ternit?. La gyn?cologue secoue la t?te : "Non, ?a va."La m?re rhabille la petite. Elle ne demandera pas si elle s'est fait mal, si des m?dicaments s'imposent. L'inqui?tude, la seule qui compte, est ?cart?e.

Quand Ferouzeh exer?ait dans un cabinet, les filles affluaient pour demander des certificats de virginit? avant le mariage. La plupart, assure-t-elle, n'?taient pas vierges. Leurs m?res entendaient la sentence. Pleurs, cris, insultes. Certaines la suppliaient pour obtenir un faux certificat, qu'elle donnait parfois. D'autres partaient se faire op?rer pour reconstituer l'hymen. Clandestinement, en payant le prix. Et ? leurs risques et p?rils.

Ferouzeh la gyn?cologue a une amie, Anahita. Elles ont pass? leur scolarit? ensemble dans une ?cole du centre de T?h?ran. Ce centre-ville g?ant, ?tal? sans queue ni t?te, o? les classes sociales se m?langent. Ferouzeh vient d'un milieu populaire, traditionnel : m?re au foyer, p?re fonctionnaire. Anahita, elle, est issue d'une famille d'artistes, gens de th??tre au temps du chah. Toutes deux ont connu ? 10 ans la r?volution (qui, en 1979, mit fin au r?gime du chah pour instaurer la R?publique islamique) ; puis, pendant huit ans, la guerre Iran-Irak, les bombardements, la fermeture de l'?cole, les p?res et les fr?res qui ne revenaient pas, la peur.

Chacune a fait son chemin. Ferouzeh a ?tudi? la m?decine. Elle raconte l'universit?, la surveillance permanente des brigades des m?urs : "Si on te voyait donner une lettre ? un homme, tu ?tais exclue ou oblig?e de te marier." Anahita, elle, trop avide de libert?, s'est exil?e plusieurs ann?es en Europe. Avant de revenir, pour essayer encore une fois de vivre chez elle, en Iran, dans cette soci?t? qu'elle ne supporte pas, qui ne supporte pas la libert? des femmes.

Les deux copines se sont perdues de vue. Elles se retrouvent cette nuit-l? dans la petite chambre de l'h?pital. Et se racontent l'essentiel, c'est-?-dire leur mariage. Un passage oblig? dans ce pays de 65 millions d'habitants. Le concubinage ?tant hors la loi et les femmes seules mal vues, tous les couples se marient : c'est l'une des pesanteurs de cette soci?t? pourtant au seuil de la modernit?, o? l'archa?sme et la tradition r?sistent encore aux dynamismes qui la secouent. Les deux tiers de la population ont moins de 30 ans, plus de 60 % des ?tudiants sont des femmes, la source principale du revenu d'un quart des familles provient du travail des femmes, 88 % d'entre elles utilisent des contraceptifs, le taux de f?condit? avoisine les moyennes europ?ennes...

Tous les couples passent donc par ce goulot d'?tranglement : le mariage, n?ud crucial de la soci?t? iranienne, avec ses rites en plusieurs ?tapes - drague, tabou de la virginit?, cours d'?ducation sexuelle obligatoires, contrat de mariage, mariage... jusqu'au tribunal des affaires familiales, o? se r?glent les divorces. Car ici, o? l'on se marie d'abord pour ?tre en r?gle, environ 5 unions sur 10 s'ach?vent par un divorce.

Anahita et Ferouzeh, ainsi, se sont mari?es. Ferouzeh a attendu d'avoir 33 ans. Jusque-l?, pr?cise-t-elle en pouffant timidement, elle est rest?e vierge. "J'avais tr?s peur de ne plus l'?tre. Je savais o? ?a pouvait mener..." Elle ajoute, avec un naturel d?sarmant : "C'est tr?s dur de trouver un homme qui accepte une fille non vierge. Alors, puisque la virginit? est importante pour le mari, c'est important aussi pour moi." Comme beaucoup d'Iraniennes, Ferouzeh a rencontr? son futur mari dans un taxi collectif. La loi interdisant de "fr?quenter" librement avant le mariage, "c'est difficile de conna?tre un homme, note-t-elle. Tu ne vois que la surface. La plupart du temps, ils mentent... le temps de te convaincre".

Pour les jeunes Iraniens, sept ans de pouvoir des r?formateurs avaient vaguement d?tendu l'atmosph?re. Le nouveau Parlement conservateur (?lu le 20 f?vrier et le 7 mai) n'est pas l? pour arranger les choses. Mais, quel que soit le pouvoir en place, dans ce pays, on drague comme on peut.

On s'?change des num?ros de t?l?phone en se croisant dans les parcs ou les grands magasins. Des rues du nord de T?h?ran sont connues pour les rencontres en auto : voitures de filles, voitures de gar?ons, chass?-crois? de regards, et plus si affinit?s. Les plus modernes organisent des soir?es priv?es tr?s "occidentales".

Le mari choisi, Ferouzeh et Anahita sont pass?es, comme tout le monde, par le cours d'?ducation sexuelle obligatoire, dit "d'?quilibre familial".

Nous y voil? justement, ? ce cours. Le rendez-vous a lieu dans une clinique du centre de la capitale. Il y a l? une centaine de couples de tous ?ges. Des tr?s jeunes et des tr?s vieux. Des femmes en tchador, d'autres en habits plus modernes, le voile gliss? vers l'arri?re pour laisser les cheveux d?couverts. Chacun s'observe. Apr?s la prise de sang r?glementaire, c'est l'heure de la classe.

Les futurs ?poux s'asseyent c?te ? c?te. Au mur sont ?pingl?s diff?rentes plaquettes de pilules, un pr?servatif et des dessins de st?rilets. "Au nom d'Allah..." : de sa petite voix aigu?, une dame en blouse blanche et pantalon, voile noir sur la t?te, commence le cours. L'objectif est de recommander les contraceptifs, "comme ils font en Europe et en Am?rique".

Le raisonnement est simple : "Nous sommes en R?publique islamique d'Iran, et l'avortement est interdit. (...) Au d?but du mariage, ? cause de l'excitation, c'est difficile de se contr?ler, et 50 % des femmes tombent enceintes..."

Quelques couples pouffent bruyamment. Ceux d'allure plus occidentalis?e. Les autres ne voient pas ce qu'il y a de dr?le et restent concentr?s sans rien dire. Au bout d'une heure, les hommes sont invit?s ? quitter la salle. Les filles restent : certaines choses ne seront confi?es qu'? elles. La petite voix aigu? donne des d?tails pratiques d'une crudit? inou?e. Et termine par ce conseil : "Les hommes ne montrent pas leur vrai visage. La plupart d'entre vous divorceront dans un an, apr?s les avoir connus. Alors contr?lez-vous, attendez au moins un an avant de tomber enceintes !"

Ferouzeh et Anahita, les deux copines, ne manquent pas de se questionner ensuite sur cette tradition ancestrale, ce moment crucial de la vie iranienne : le montant de la mehreeye, sorte de dot ? l'envers fix?e par le couple au moment du mariage et que le mari doit ? sa femme en cas de divorce. Ferouzeh-la-traditionnelle y voit "une mesure visant ? prot?ger mat?riellement la femme". "C'est une mani?re insultante d'acheter la virginit?", r?torque Anihata-la-moderne.

"Qu'as-tu eu, toi, comme mehreeye ?, lui demande Anihata, l?g?rement ironique.

- Cinq pi?ces d'or -environ 400 euros-. Et toi ?

- Moi ? Un grattoir de guitare.

- ? ? ?"

Cette demande insolite, Anahita la formule maintenant devant le mollah charg? du contrat de mariage. La sc?ne a lieu dans le bureau de ce dernier, sous les portraits de l'ayatollah Khomeiny et du guide actuel du pays, Ali Khamenei. Anahita et Dariush, son fianc?, demandent que figurent dans leur contrat toutes les "options" laissant ? l'?pouse le droit de se d?placer, de travailler, d'avoir un compte en banque, de quitter l'Iran, de divorcer sans l'autorisation du mari... Le religieux tente de les en dissuader :

"Le droit de divorcer appartient ? l'homme !

- Je peux obtenir l'autorisation ?crite de mon mari, insiste Anahita.

- Une autorisation n'est pas un droit. Le tribunal ne la reconna?t pas.

- Alors ? quoi bon ce contrat de mariage ?

La r?union se passe tr?s mal. La demande fantoche de mehreeye n'arrange rien. "La mehreeye doit ?tre un don concret, explique le mollah. Vous pouvez ?ventuellement demander un coran, pas les nuages dans le ciel ni un grattoir de guitare." "Mon mari adore les grattoirs, dit Anihata. C'est un vrai sacrifice de sa part, une preuve d'amour." Ils partent sans conclure de contrat.

La jeune femme sort en larmes du bureau. Dariush est boulevers?. "J'ai honte d'?tre un homme dans ce pays." Des amis leur indiquent des "mollahs plus progressistes, plus compr?hensifs, qui encouragent ? signer les fameuses "options"". Ils iront. "De toute fa?on, on est forc?s de se marier. On te demande tes papiers. Il y a toujours des gens pour te d?noncer."

Pour les couples, c'est ici, bien souvent, que l'histoire se termine : au tribunal des affaires familiales, un b?timent ? colonnades situ? dans l'extr?me-sud de T?h?ran, l? o? se r?glent les divorces. Dans les couloirs, des hommes et des femmes attendent leur tour. On ouvre une porte : nous voil? dans le bureau d'un juge, visiblement en plein drame. Une femme et ses deux filles en tchador noir sanglotent ostensiblement, supplient le magistrat, montrent du doigt l'homme qui se tient ? leurs c?t?s.

"Il a une liaison, il ne paie rien pour nous et il refuse de divorcer !

- Elles mentent !,r?torque le mari en les mena?ant de l'index. J'aurai ma revanche !"

En tenue d?contract?e, sans cravate, le juge tapote son dossier, fixe la date de la prochaine audience. Dans le bureau voisin, un autre mari, piteux, se voit somm? de payer la mehreeye. L?-dessus, la justice ne transige pas : l'homme doit assumer ce devoir-l?. Sinon, c'est la prison. Le tribunal peut m?me se montrer sans piti? pour ceux qui sont jug?s en infraction. Alors les femmes l'emportent... mais dans le cadre d'une loi ?crite sur mesure pour les hommes.

Cette loi stipule en effet qu'un homme peut divorcer sans raisons. L'?pouse, elle, doit avancer des "motifs" contre son mari : usage de drogue, adult?re, impuissance, st?rilit?, mauvais comportement (violence, d?faut de paiement). Tout le probl?me est de prouver ces fautes."Ce syst?me juridique archa?que ne correspond plus ? la soci?t? iranienne", estime une avocate.

Les juges, ? de tr?s rares et r?centes exceptions pr?s, sont tous des hommes. Celui-ci est un mollah, habill? en robe blanche et turban blanc. On lui demande : pourquoi, selon le Coran et la Constitution iranienne, seule la femme doit-elle donner des "motifs" en cas de divorce ? Quelle question saugrenue ! "L'homme est responsable de la famille. C'est lui le patron. C'est douloureux pour lui de divorcer. En plus, il doit payer la merheeye. S'il divorce, c'est donc qu'il a de bonnes raisons, le tribunal n'a pas ? les demander." Logique.

Voici Mania. Pour obtenir le divorce, elle a renonc? ? tous ses droits : la garde de son fils, la mehreeye, la pension, ses meubles, tout. "Quand tu es divorc?e, dit-elle, c'est une ?preuve de chaque jour. Les gens te regardent comme une prostitu?e. Tous les commer?ants veulent coucher avec toi, puisque tu n'es plus vierge. Les hommes rechignent ? t'?pouser. Les appartements ? louer ne le sont plus pour toi. On t'accepte dans les quartiers plus ?duqu?s, plus riches, mais alors un seul salaire ne suffit pas pour le loyer." Le r?ve de Mania, c'est de se remarier. Pour redevenir une Iranienne normale.

Marion Van Renterghem L'art des limites

* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 11.05.04
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Un Sud-Africain, un N?o-Z?landais et un Irakien tu?s dans une attaque ? Kirkouk

AP | 10.05.04 | 12:13


BAGDAD (AP) -- Des hommes arm?s ont ouvert le feu sur un v?hicule ? Kirkouk, la ville p?troli?re du nord de l'Irak, tuant un Sud-Africain, un N?o-Z?landais et leur chauffeur irakien, a annonc? un responsable de la s?curit? irakienne.
Le Sud-Africain et le chauffeur irakien sont morts sur le coup tandis que le N?o-Z?landais est d?c?d? des suites de ses blessures.
Les deux ressortissants ?trangers travaillaient sur un projet de construction dans la ville.
Selon le g?n?ral Anouar Mohammed Amin, chef des forces de s?curit? pour Kirkouk, les deux ressortissants ?trangers se dirigeaient vers le centre-ville quand leur voiture a ?t? attaqu?e.
L'arm?e am?ricaine a d?clar? n'avoir aucune information sur cet incident. AP
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Guantanamo: Dominique Perben doit rencontrer son homologue am?ricain

AP | 10.05.04 | 16:27


PARIS (AP) -- En d?placement ? Washington dans le cadre d'une rencontre de G8, le ministre de la Justice, Dominique Perben, doit rencontrer lundi son homologue am?ricain John Ashcroft, pour ?voquer notamment le sort des sept Fran?ais d?tenus sur la base am?ricaine de Guantanamo ? Cuba.
Le 29 avril dernier, le secr?taire d'Etat am?ricain Colin Powell avait laiss? entendre que des Fran?ais d?tenus ? Guantanamo seraient bient?t lib?r?s. ?Je pr?vois du nouveau pour les d?tenus fran?ais dans un avenir proche?, avait-il d?clar?.
Plus de 600 hommes, arr?t?s apr?s le 11 septembre 2001, notamment en Afghanistan et au Pakistan, sont d?tenus sur cette base am?ricaine ? Cuba, soup?onn?s de relations avec des organisations terroristes. Les Etats-Unis, qui les qualifie de ?combattants ?trangers?, ont toujours exclu de leur accorder le statut de prisonnier de guerre, les privant notamment de tout contact avec un avocat.
La France r?clame depuis longtemps l'extradition des sept ressortissants fran?ais, dont plusieurs sont recherch?s dans des dossiers terroristes instruits ? Paris.
La justice fran?aise s'int?resse notamment ? Mourad Benchellali et Nizar Sassi, dans le cadre de l'enqu?te dite des ?fili?res tch?tch?nes?. Le nom de Brahim Yadel est apparu dans le dossier des campeurs de la for?t de Fontainebleau, entra?nements organis?s par des groupuscules islamistes, pr?lude ? leur d?part pour les camps d'entra?nement en Afghanistan et Tch?tch?nie.
Deux autres d?tenus de Guantanamo, Ridouane Khalid et Khaled ben Mustafa, sont impliqu?s dans des dossiers qui ont d?j? ?t? jug?s en France. AP

Posted by maximpost at 12:48 AM EDT
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The Two World Orders
by Jed Rubenfeld

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What's the source of America's growing unilateralism? The easy answer is self-interest: We act unilaterally to the extent that we see unilateralism as serving our interests. But the answer prompts a more searching question: Why do so many Americans view unilateralism this way, given the hostility it provokes, the costs it imposes, and the considerable risks it entails? Americans sometimes seem unilateralist almost by instinct, as if it were a matter of principle. Might it be?
It will not do to trace contemporary U.S. unilateralism to the 18th-century doctrine of isolationism, for unilateralism is a very different phenomenon. An isolationist country withdraws from the world, even when others call on it to become involved; a unilateralist country feels free to project itself--its power, its economy, its culture--throughout the world, even when others call on it to stop. Although there may still be a thread of isolationism in the United States today, unilateralism, the far more dominant trend, cannot usefully be derived from it.

The search for an explanation should begin instead at the end of World War II. In 1945, when victory was at hand and his own death only days away, Franklin Roosevelt wrote that the world's task was to ensure "the end of the beginning of wars." So Roosevelt called for a new system of international law and multilateral governance that would be designed to stop future wars before they began. Hence, the irony of America's current position: More than any other country, the United States is responsible for the creation of the international law system it now resists.

The decisive period to understand, then, runs roughly from the end of the war to the present, years that witnessed the birth of a new international legal order, if not, as widely reported, the death of the Westphalian nation-state. America's leadership in the new internationalism was, at the beginning, so strong that one might be tempted to see today's U.S. unilateralism as a stunning about-face, an aberration even, which may yet subside before too much damage is done. But the hope that the United States will rediscover the multilateralism it once championed assumes that America and Europe were engaged in a common internationalist project after World War II. Was that in fact the case?

It's undoubtedly true that, after the war, Americans followed the path Roosevelt had charted and led Europe and the world toward an unprecedented internationalism. We were the driving force behind the United Nations, the primary drafters of the initial international human-rights conventions, the champions of developing an enforceable system of international law. Indeed, America pressed on Europe the very idea of European union (with France the primary locus of resistance). At the same time, America promoted a new constitutionalism throughout Europe and the world, a constitutionalism in which fundamental rights, as well as protections for minorities, were laid down as part of the world's basic law, beyond the reach of ordinary political processes.

How then did the United States move from its postwar position of leadership in the new international order to its present position of outlier?

The Cold War played an essential role in the change, fracturing the new international order before it had taken root. At the same time, the Cold War also had the effect of keeping the Atlantic alliance intact for many decades by suppressing divisions that would show themselves in full force only after 1989. When, in the 1990s, the United States emerged as the last superpower standing, it became much easier for the forces of European union to move ahead and for the buried divisions between America and its European allies to be made apparent. The most fundamental of those divisions had been the most invisible: From the start, the postwar boom in international and constitutional law had had different meanings in America and Europe--because the war itself meant different things in America and Europe.

At the risk of overgeneralization, we might say that for Europeans (that is, for those Europeans not joined to the Axis cause), World War II, in which almost 60 million people perished, exemplified the horrors of nationalism. Specifically and significantly, it exemplified the horrors of popular nationalism. Nazism and fascism were manifestations, however perverse, of popular sovereignty. Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini rose to power initially through elections and democratic processes. Both claimed to speak for the people, not only before they assumed dictatorial powers but afterward, too, and both were broadly popular, as were their nationalism, militarism, repression, and, in Hitler's case, genocidal objectives. From the postwar European point of view, the Allies' victory was a victory against nationalism, against popular sovereignty, against demo?cratic excess.

The American experience of victory could not have differed more starkly. For Americans, winning the war was a victory for nationalism--that is to say, for our nation and our kind of nationalism. It was a victory for popular sovereignty (our popular sovereignty) and, most fundamentally, a victory for democracy (our democracy). Yes, the war held a lesson for Americans about the dangers of democracy, but the lesson was that the nations of continental Europe had proven themselves incapable of handling democracy when left to their own devices. If Europe was to develop democratically, it would need American tutelage. If Europe was to overcome its nationalist pathologies, it might have to become a United States of Europe. Certain European countries might even need to have democratic institutions imposed upon them, although it would be best if they adopted those institutions themselves, or at least persuaded themselves that they had done so.

These contrasting lessons shaped the divergent European and American experiences of the postwar boom in international political institutions and international law. For Europeans, the fundamental point of international law was to address the catastrophic problem of nationalism--to check national sovereignty, emphatically including national popular sovereignty. This remains the dominant European view today. The United Nations, the emerging European Union, and international law in general are expressly understood in Europe as constraints on nationalism and national sovereignty, the perils of which were made plain by the war. They are also understood, although more covertly, as restraints on democracy, at least in the sense that they place increasing power in the hands of international actors (bureaucrats, technocrats, diplomats, and judges) at a considerable remove from popular politics and popular will.

In America, the postwar internationalism had a very different meaning. Here, the point of international law could not ultimately be antidemocratic or antinationalist because the Allies' victory had been a victory for democracy (American democracy) and for the nation (the American nation). America in the postwar period could not embrace an antinationalist, antidemocratic international order as Europe did. It needed a counterstory to tell itself about its role in promoting the new international order.

The counterstory was as follows: When founding the United Nations, writing the first conventions on international rights, creating constitutions for Germany and Japan, and promoting a United States of Europe, Americans were bestowing the gifts of American liberty, prosperity, and law, particularly American constitutional law, on the rest of the world. The "new" international human rights were to be nothing other than the fundamental guarantees made famous by the U.S. Constitution. Wasn't America light-years ahead of continental Europe in the ways of democracy? International law would be, basically, American law made applicable to other nations, and the business of the new internationalism would be to transmit American principles to the rest of the world. So of course America could be the most enthusiastic supporter of the new international order. Why would it not support the project of making the world more American?

In the American imagination, then, the internationalism and multilateralism we promoted were for the rest of the world, not for us. What Europe would recognize as international law was law we already had. The notion that U.S. practices--such as capital punishment--held constitutional by our courts under our Bill of Rights might be said to violate international law was, from this point of view, not a conceptual possibility. Our willingness to promote and sign on to international law would be second to none--except when it came to any conventions that might require a change in U.S. domestic law or policy. The principal organs of U.S. foreign policy, including the State Department and, famously, the Senate, emphatically resisted the idea that international law could be a means of changing internal U.S. law. In the 1950s, the United States refused to join any of the major human-rights and antigenocide conventions. The rest of the world might need an American-modeled constitution, but we already had one.

In part, this exceptionalist attitude reflected American triumphalism in the wake of the war; in part, it expressed American know-nothing parochialism; and, in part, it placated southern fears that U.S. participation in international rights agreements could loosen the chokehold in which American blacks were held. But it reflected something more fundamental as well: a conception of constitutional democracy that had been reaffirmed by the war. It was impossible for Americans to see the new international constitutionalism as Europeans saw it--a constraint on democratic nationalism--for that would have contradicted America's basic understanding of constitutional democracy.

It's essential here to distinguish between two conceptions of constitutionalism. The first views the fundamental tenets of constitutional law as expressing universal, liberal, Enlightenment principles, whose authority is superior to that of all national politics, including national democratic politics. This universal authority, residing in a normative domain above politics and nation-states, is what allows constitutional law, interpreted by unelected judges, to countermand all governmental actions, including laws enacted by democratically elected legislators. From this perspective, it's reasonable for international organizations and courts to frame constitutions, establish international human-rights laws, interpret these constitutions and laws, and, in general, create a system of international law to govern nation-states. I call this view "international constitutionalism."


Let me make the abstract picture more concrete. The Council of Europe--the first postwar organization of European states, and the progenitor of today's European Union--has a quasi-judicial branch, called the Commission on Democracy through Law (also called the Venice Commission), on which I have served for several years as the U.S. representative or observer. One of my first duties was to sit on a committee charged with drafting a constitution for Kosovo. The committee consisted of distinguished jurists and constitutionalists from all over Europe. We met in Paris and Venice, and the proceedings were professional and expert in every respect. But though the committee had visited Kosovo for three days, it had no Kosovar members. Uncertain as to whether their absence was deliberate, I made inquiries among the committee members. It was indeed intentional. The framing of a constitution was a delicate business, I was told, and to have involved Kosovars in the process would have impeded the committee's work and mired it in political infighting.

Might it therefore be desirable, I asked, to draft an explicitly transitional document, on the model of the interim South African constitution, one that created institutions through which local drafting and ratification of a permanent charter could later take place? No, was the committee's answer. We were drafting a constitution, and constitutions are not meant to be transitional documents.

The committee's attitude perfectly exemplified international constitutionalism, which is the dominant constitutional worldview in Europe. From this viewpoint, it's not particularly important for a constitution to be the product of a national participatory political process. What matters is that the constitution recognize human rights, protect minorities, establish the rule of law, and set up stable, democratic political institutions, preferably of a parliamentary variety, in which the chief executive is not directly elected by the people. National ratification of a new constitution might be instrumentally valuable, but having a committee of expert foreign jurists draw up a constitution would be perfectly satisfactory in principle. Having that constitution imposed on the society by an occupying power would be awkward, but so long as the occupying power was recognized as valid under international law, and so long as the constitution took, imposing it by force would be entirely acceptable.

The alternative to international constitutionalism is American, or democratic, national constitutionalism. It holds that a nation's constitution ought to be made through that nation's democratic process, because the business of the constitution is to express the polity's most basic legal and political commitments. These commitments will include fundamental rights that majorities are not free to violate, but the countermajoritarian rights are not therefore counterdemocratic. Rather, they are democratic because they represent the nation's self-given law, enacted through a democratic constitutional politics. Over time, from this perspective, constitutional law is supposed to evolve and grow in a fashion that continues to express national interpretations and reinterpretations of the polity's fundamental commitments.

In American constitutionalism, the work of democratically drafting and ratifying a constitution is only the beginning. Just as important, if not more so, is the question of who interprets the constitution. In the American view, constitutional law must somehow remain the nation's self-given law, even as it is reworked through judicial interpretation and reinterpretation, and this requires interpretation by national courts. By contrast, in international constitutionalism, interpretation by a body of international jurists is, in principle, not only satisfactory but superior to local interpretation, which invariably involves constitutional law in partisan and ideological political disputes.

The overtly political nature of American constitutional law stuns Europeans; indeed it's one of the features of the American system at the root of the differences between American and European constitutionalism. Claims about "American realism" are often exaggerated, but there is undoubtedly in the United States a greater understanding than in Europe that all law, including judge-made law (i.e., judicial decisions), and even judge-made constitutional law, is a political product. From an American point of view, if the law is to be democratic, the law and the courts that interpret it must retain strong connections to the nation's democratic political system. By contrast, the processes through which EU law has emerged so far betray a disconnection with, and even a disrespect for, democratic processes that would be unacceptable as a basis for constitutional transformation in the United States.

Americans at bottom do not believe in the claims made for a nonpolitical, neutral constitutional law. They know that judges' values inevitably inform constitutional law. Europeans tend to have a different understanding. To be sure, there was for a long time, and perhaps still is, a European tradition of distrust of judges, especially constitutional judges, shared by left-wing and right-wing European political thinkers. Yet this skepticism about "government by judici?ary" coexisted with a belief in the possibility of an expert, neutral bureaucratic rationality and a dogmatic, apolitical legal reason. The result was a deeply ambiguous attitude toward judicial review and constitutional law. Before World War II, Europe had some constitutional courts, but these courts had almost no power to strike down laws on the ground that individuals' rights had been violated.

Postwar European constitutionalism has shed this equivocation. European constitutionalism today invests courts with full jurisdiction over individual rights, without fully acknowledging that judicial decisions about the meaning of constitutional rights are fundamentally political in character. On the contrary, what makes the new European constitutionalism cohere, and gives European constitutional courts their claim to legitimacy, is the ideology of universal or "international" human rights, which owe their existence to no particular nation's constitution, or which, if they derive from a national constitution, possess nonetheless a kind of supranational character, rendering them peculiarly fit for interpretation by international juridical experts. In America, by contrast, it would be nothing short of scandalous to suggest that U.S. constitutional questions had to be decided by an international tribunal claiming supremacy over our legal system.

From the American perspective, national constitutional courts are an essential feature of constitutional law, and it's critical that constitutional interpretation remain interwoven with the nation's processes of democratic self-governance. This is done in various ways: through a politically charged judicial nomination mechanism; through judges' membership in the national polity and the nation's particular political and legal culture; through the always-open possibility of amendment; and, perhaps most important but least understood, through periodic but decisive contests between the judicial and political branches. (The most famous 20th-century example was the confrontation between Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court of the 1930s, which repeatedly struck down New Deal legislation--a battle Roosevelt won only after pro?posing to appoint six additional justices to the court.) These clashes are too often portrayed as moments of institutional peril to be avoided at all costs. In reality, they play a crucial role in maintaining the judiciary's connections to a nation's long-term democratic development. The ideal is not to make constitutional courts responsive to popular will at any given moment, but to make sure that constitutional law remains answerable to the nation's project of political self-determination over time.

To summarize: International constitutionalism contemplates a constitutional order embodying universal principles that derive their authority from sources outside national democratic processes and that constrain national self-government. American or democratic national constitutionalism, by contrast, regards constitutional law as the embodiment of a particular nation's democratically self-given legal and political commitments. At any particular moment, these commitments operate as checks and constraints on national democratic will. But constitutional law is emphatically not antidemocratic. Rather, it aims at democracy over time. Hence, it requires that a nation's constitutional law be made and interpreted by that nation's citizens, legislators, and judges.

Let me give three illustrations--in turn, historical, theoretical, and practical--that make plain the contrast between American and European conceptions of constitutionalism. In 1789, the popular assembly of France promulgated the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The document spoke in the language of universal rights. The rights of man were at issue, not merely the rights of Frenchmen. That same year, the U.S. Congress promulgated the Bill of Rights, which, far from proclaiming universal law, originally applied only to the federal government and not to the state governments. Thus, the First Amend?ment forbade national religious establishments but not religious establishments in the states. The U.S. Constitution did not speak in the language of universal rights. It spoke in the language of popular sovereignty: "We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish. . . ." American constitutional law was understood from the outset to be part of the project of popular self-government, as op?posed to an external force checking that project. The Amer?ican language of constitutional rights, properly understood, does not claim the authority of universal law. It claims, rather, the authority of democracy.

A second illustration of the contrast between the two types of constitutionalism makes the point at the level of theory. Contemporary American constitutional theorists are unendingly concerned with the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty: Because constitutional law allows unelected judges to override the outcomes of the majoritarian democratic process, it's potentially in conflict with democracy. Europeans constitutionalists used to share this obsession, but since 1945, and particularly with the recent explosion of "international human-rights" law, the countermajoritarian difficulty rarely figures in European thinking any more. The reason is that Europeans have embraced international constitutionalism, according to which the whole point of constitutional law is to check democracy. For Americans, constitutional law cannot merely check democracy. It must answer to democracy--have its source and basis in a democratic constitutional politics and always, somehow, be part of politics, even though it can invalidate the outcomes of the democratic process at any given moment.

The third contrast is more practical. It involves the question of whether there must be one order of human rights applicable to all nations. In the European view, human rights transcend national politics and ought, at least ideally, to be uniform throughout the world. For example, European nations--or at least European governments--now see capital punishment as a human-rights violation. Accordingly, European diplomats and politicians not only excoriate the United States for allowing the death penalty but even call for our expulsion from international organizations such as the Council of Europe. The American view holds that democratic nations can sometimes differ on matters of fundamental rights. For example, freedom of speech is stronger in America than in many other nations; an individual has the constitutional right in the United States to make statements in favor of Nazism that might land the person in jail in Germany. Yet the United States does not demand that Germany change its law on this point or risk expulsion from international organizations. Again, in America today, it's a bedrock principle of constitutional freedom that there be no established church at any level of government. But the American position does not require every nation with an established church--such as England or Italy--to disestablish.

For Europeans, a great marker of successful constitutional development is international consensus and uniformity. They point to such consensus as if agreement through?out the "international community" were itself a source of legal validation and authority. The more consensus there is on a constitutional principle throughout the international community, the greater the strength of that principle. Americans do not share this view. We've learned to see our own constitutional judgments as worth defending even during periods when most of the nations of Europe scorned or violated them. For Americans, a democratic nation's constitutional law is supposed to reflect that nation's fundamental legal and political commitments. Consensus in the "international community" is not the compelling source of legal or constitutional authority that it's made out to be in the European perspective.

Whether out of hubris or principle, or both, the United States has not understood its support for international law and institutions to imply a surrender of its own commitment to self-government. As the international system became more powerful, and international law diverged from U.S. law, the United States inevitably began to show unilateralist tendencies--not simply out of self-interest but because the United States is committed to democratic self-government. The continental European democracies, with their monarchical histories, their lingering aristocratic cultures, and their tendency to favor centralized, bureaucratic governance, have always been considerably less democratic than the American democracy. It's not surprising, then, that in forging the European Union they should be so tolerant of what Europeans casually refer to as the Union's "democratic deficit."


Three specific developments over the past decade helped press the United States toward unilateralism: the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo; a growing skepticism about international law, including the concern that international law might be used as a vehicle for anti-Americanism; and the events of September 11, 2001. Each merits additional consideration.

For many in the United States, the Kosovo intervention stands today as a unilateralist precedent. Because the UN Security Council never approved the use of force in Kosovo, international lawyers regarded the U.S.-led bombing as plainly illegal. But this asserted illegality has not caused Amer?icans to regret the intervention. On the contrary, it has reinforced the view that events in the former Yugoslavia represented an appalling failure on the part of the international law system, the United Nations, and, in particular, the nations of Eur?ope. From the American perspective, if the UN-centered international law system could not bring itself to authorize the use of force in Kosovo, then that system was incapable of discharging the responsibility that is an essential corollary of authority.

The United States had no compelling territorial, imperial, or economic interests in Kosovo. The intervention sought rather, at least in the American account, to prevent manifest, grotesque, genocidal crimes. And if the United Nations did not respond to the most blatant, wanton, and massive of human rights violations in Kosovo, how could it be trusted to respond to less demonstrable but perhaps more dangerous threats elsewhere?

Kosovo is a doubly significant precedent because it illustrates how Americans do not quite recognize the UN Charter as law. American society is notorious for turning political questions into legal ones. Yet Americans, including American lawyers, were and are largely uninterested in the Kosovo bombing's asserted illegality under the UN Charter. The same broad indifference would emerge again when internationalists claimed that the war in Iraq was illegal.

To be sure, some American international-law specialists are interested in these issues, but they are often perceived by the rest of the U.S. legal world to be speaking a foreign language, or not so much a language as a kind of gibberish lacking the basic grammar--the grammar of enforceability--that alone gives legal language a claim to meaning. Kosovo symbolizes not merely an exceptional, exigent circumstance in which the United States was justified in going outside the UN framework, but rather an entire attitude about that framework, according to which the UN system, while pretending to be a legal system, isn't really a legal system. And what, in this view, is the United Nations really about? The several possible answers to the question are not attractive: hot air, a corrupt bureaucracy, an institution that acts as if it embodied world democracy when in reality its delegates represent illegitimate and oppressive autocracies, an invidious wonderland where Libya can be elected president of a human-rights commission.

A second spur to U.S. unilateralism has been a growing skepticism about the agenda the "international legal community" has been pursuing. The skepticism is partly due to the proliferation of human rights conventions that are systematically violated by many of the states subscribing to them. A good example is the convention banning discrimination against women, which the United States has been almost alone in refusing to ratify. But what is one to make of the fact that the signatory nations include Saudi Arabia and other states not exactly famous for respecting women's equality?

A deeper reason for the skepticism lies in the indications that international law may be used as a vehicle for anti-American resentments. A case in point is the position taken by the "international community" with respect to the continuing use of capital punishment in some American jurisdictions. Most Americans, whatever their view of capital punishment, can respect the moral arguments that condemn the death penalty. But what many Americans have trouble respecting or understanding is the concerted effort to condemn the United States as a human-rights violator because of the death penalty and to expel the United States from international organizations on that ground. When the international community throws down the gauntlet over the death penalty in America while merely clearing its throat about the slaughter in Yugoslavia, Americans can hardly be blamed if they see a sign that an anti-American agenda can be expected to find expression in international law.

This is not a purely speculative concern. Given that the U.S.-led military interventions in Kosovo and Iraq were probably in violation of international law, might U.S. officers therefore be liable to criminal prosecution in international courts? No, say the international lawyers. Americans need not fear criminal repercussions because international law "clearly" distinguishes between jus ad bellum, the law that determines whether the use of military force is legal, and jus in bello, the law that determines whether particular acts undertaken during armed hostilities are criminal. But academic certainty about the "clear" meaning of law has never been a reliable predictor of how the law will actually be interpreted by courts. How can Americans be certain that the international law system will not embrace the perfectly reasonable logic under which an unlawful bombing becomes a criminal act, especially when Americans have acted unilaterally? This possibility may help explain U.S. resistance to the International Criminal Court.

The events of September 11, 2001, had obvious implications for U.S. unilateralism. There was a critical period in the weeks following the massacre when a renewed U.S. multilateralism in the prosecution of the war against terrorism seemed a distinct possibility. Americans were stunned by the prevalence and intensity of anti-American sentiments expressed all over the world. Even Europeans who condemned the attacks frequently suggested, implicitly and explicitly, that the United States had it coming, that the motives behind the attack were understandable, and that the massacre, though reprehensible, might have a salutary effect on U.S. policy. A period of soul-searching followed in the United States. It lasted maybe a month and ended with a characteristically American reaction: to hell with them.

So began the rhetoric that continues to escalate today. The White House took increasingly belligerent positions, which elicited new denunciations of our bullying, and the denunciations spurred Americans to feel more and more that they would have to fight this world war on their own. The fighting in Afghanistan hardened that resolve. For whatever reason, the European nations, with the exception of Great Britain, contributed almost nothing to the war, and instead issued repeated warnings that the war might be illegal, that the bombings could be considered war crimes if too many civilians died, and that the fight, in any case, would be unwinnable once the opposition took to the mountains. Did we win? That remains to be seen. But the American experience of the Afghan campaign was of an overwhelming, unexpectedly swift victory--achieved essentially without the help of the international community. And this made possible the war in Iraq.

Because of that war, U.S. unilateralism is now identified in many people's minds with U.S. military aggression and the occupation of Iraq. I am not arguing here either for or against the Iraq War; the case for U.S. unilateralism does not turn on the justifiability of that war. The fundamental question is this: Which of two visions of world order will the United States use its vast power to advance? Since World War II, much of "old" Europe has been pursuing an antinational, antidemocratic world constitutionalism that, for all its idealism and achievements, is irreconcilable with America's commitment to democratic self-government.

There is, among international lawyers, a hazy notion that the emergence of the international community in the world of law and politics is itself a democratic development. The unfortunate reality, however, is that international law is a threat to democracy and to the hopes of democratic politics all over the world. For some, that may be a reason to support internationalism; for others, a reason to oppose it. Either way, the fundamental conflicts between democracy and international law must be recognized.

The United Nations and the other institutions of international law take world government as their ideal. In theory, there's no necessary conflict between democracy and the ideal of a world government. A world government could be perfectly democratic--if there were world democracy. But at present, there is no world democracy, and, as a consequence, international governance organizations are, at present, necessarily and irremediably antidemocratic.

The antidemocratic qualities of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international governance organizations--their centralization, their opacity, their remoteness from popular or representative politics, their elitism, their unaccountability--are well known. Internationalists counter this criticism by pointing to the growing influence of "nongovernmental organizations" (NGOs) in international law circles, as if these equally unaccountable, self-appointed, unrepresentative organizations somehow spoke for world public opinion. But the fundamentally antidemocratic nature of international governance is not merely a small hole that NGOs might plug. World government in the absence of world democracy is necessarily technocratic, bureaucratic, diplomatic--everything but democratic.

Nor are international organizations undemocratic only in themselves; they undermine the hopes and vitality of democratic politics elsewhere. The point is familiar to every nation in Latin America that has seen its internal policies dictated by IMF or World Bank directives. To an increasing extent, democratic politics throughout the developing world is being displaced by a relentless demand for competitiveness and growth, which are authoritatively interpreted by international organs to require the implementation of designated social, political, and economic policies (so far, these have had rather mixed success in delivering competitiveness and growth, though they have contributed to several national catastrophes, as in Argentina).

The irony is that the United States remains the world's greatest champion of internationalism in economic affairs. Weaker countries correctly perceive U.S.-led marketization programs as deeply undercutting their own ability to decide for themselves what their social and economic policies should be. To be sure, the United States does not exactly force economic policy on other countries. Ruling elites agree to the emasculation of their countries' politics in order to get their hands on the money. But the result is the same: Democracy is hollowed out.

So all the talk of U.S. unilateralism needs an important qualification. The United States plays utterly contradictory roles on the international stage: It champions multilateralism on the economic front, because worldwide free trade and marketization are perceived to serve U.S. interests, and resists it elsewhere. But if a commitment to democracy is what underlies America's growing unilateralism today on matters of war, criminal law, human rights, and the environment, that commitment is violated wherever U.S.-led international economic organizations cripple the possibilities of democracy under the guise of free-trade principles and loan conditionality.

The American and French revolutions tied democracy to the ideal of a self-determining nation. (If the European Union should successfully forge itself into a democratic mega-nation, it would be another example of this linkage, not a counterexample.) Two hundred years later, there remains no realistic prospect of world democracy, and if there were such a prospect, the United States would resist it, because world decision making would very likely be unfriendly to America. But though the United States would be no friend of world democracy, it ought to be a friend to a world of democracies, of self-governing nation-states, each a democracy in its own politics. For now, the hopes of democratic politics are tied to the fortunes of the nation-state.

Europeans tend to neglect or minimize the damage that universal constitutionalism does to the prospects for variation, experimentation, and radical change opened up by national democracy. So long as democracy is allied with national self-government rather than with world governance, it remains an experimental ideal, dedicated to the possibility of variation, perhaps radical variation, among peoples with different values and different objectives. Democratic national constitutionalism may be parochial within a given nation, but it's cosmopolitan across nations. Democratic peoples are permitted, even expected, to take different paths. They're permitted, even expected, to go to hell in their own way.

That is what the ideology of international human rights and of a global market will not allow. Both press for uniformity among nations on some of the most basic questions of politics. Both, therefore, stand against democracy.

The response from the Right will be that a market economy is a precondition of a flourishing democracy, so international free trade and lending institutions cannot be called antidemocratic. Rejecting the Right's claim to the transcendental democratic necessity of the IMF or the World Trade Organization, the Left will reply that the existence of a capitalist economy and the particular form it should take are matters for independent nations to decide for themselves. But the Left, for its part, will insist that international human rights, the abolition of the death penalty, and environmental protections are necessary preconditions of democracy. To which the Right will reply that these are matters for independent nations to decide for themselves.

Claims that any particular multilateral order, whether humanitarian or economic, is a necessary condition of democracy should be received with extreme skepticism. We all tend to sympathize with such claims when they're made in behalf of policies we support, but to see through the same claims when they're in behalf of policies we oppose. To be sure, in some cases of national crisis and political breakdown, international governance has brought about stability and democratization. And for the many nations incapable at present of sustaining a flourishing democratic politics, international law offers the hope of economic and political reforms these nations cannot achieve on their own. But every time a functioning, self-determining nation surrenders itself to the tender mercies of international economic or political regimes, it pays a price. The idea that men and women can be their own governors is sacrificed, and democracy suffers a loss.

The justification of unilateralism outlined here is not intended to condone American disdain for the views of other nations. On the contrary, America should always show a decent respect for the opinions of the rest of mankind, and America would be a far safer, healthier place if it could win back some of the support and affection it has lost. Unilateralism does not set its teeth against international cooperation or coalition building. What sets its teeth on edge is the shift that occurs when such cooperation takes the form of binding agreements administered, interpreted, and enforced by multilateral bodies--the shift, in other words, from international cooperation to international law. America's commitment to democratic self-government gives the United States good reason to be skeptical about--indeed, to resist--international legal regimes structured, as they now are, around antinationalist and antidemocratic principles.


The unilateralism I am defending is not a license for aggressive U.S. militarism. It is commanded by the aspirations of democracy and would violate its own essential principles if it were to become an engine of empire. But the great and unsettling fact of 21st-century global governance is that America is doomed to become something like a world policeman. With the development of small, uncontainable nuclear technologies, and with the inability of the United Nations to do the job, the United States will be in the business of using force abroad against real or feared criminal activity to a far greater extent than ever before.

This new American role will be deeply dangerous, to other nations and to our own, not least because American presidents may be tempted to use the role of world's law enforcer as a justification for a new American militarism that has the United States constantly waging or preparing for war. If the United States is going to act unilaterally abroad, it's imperative that in our domestic politics we retain mechanisms for combating presidential overreaching.

Since September 11, 2001, the White House has flirted with a dangerous double unilateralism, joining the president's willingness to act without international consent abroad to an effort to bypass Congress and the judiciary at home. In December 2001, without congressional approval, the president announced the withdrawal of the United States from an important missile treaty with Russia. In early 2002, the White House began claiming a presidential power to deem any individual, including an American citizen arrested on American soil, an "enemy combatant" and on that basis to imprison him indefinitely, with no judicial review. Later that year, the president came close to asserting a power to make war on Iraq without express congressional authorization.

This double unilateralism, which leaves presidential power altogether unchecked, is a great danger. If we are to be unilateralists abroad, we have a special responsibility--to ourselves and to the world--to maintain and reinvigorate the vital checks and balances of American constitutionalism at home.



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Jed Rubenfeld is the Robert R. Slaughter Professor of Law at Yale University and author of Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (2001).


Reprinted from Autumn 2003 Wilson Quarterly
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Leading Through Law
by Anne-Marie Slaughter

Related Articles
Green Fatigue by Stacy D. VanDeveer

The Two World Orders by Jed Rubenfeld

Sometimes a Great Notion by Michael J. Glennon

Two Cheers for International Law by Oona A. Hathaway


Does the United States need international law? At times in recent years, it has acted as if it does not. Yet international law provides the foundation not only for momentous undertakings, such as the efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to protect the ozone layer, but also for more routine endeavors, such as defining the boundaries of territorial seas and guaranteeing the right of diplomats to move freely. The United States needs international law acutely now because it offers a way to preserve our power and pursue our most important interests while reassuring our friends and allies that they have no reason to fear us or to form alliances as a counterweight to our overwhelming might. And we will need the law more than ever in the future, to regulate the behavior not only of states but of the individuals within them.

International law is not some kind of abstract end in itself. It's a complex of treaties and customary practices that govern, for example, the use of force, the protection of human rights, global public health, and the regulation of the oceans, space, and all other global commons. Each of its specialized regimes is based in the consent of states to a specific set of rules that allow them to reap gains from cooperation and thereby serve their collective interests. Overall, the rule of law in the global arena serves America's interests and reflects its most fundamental values. But in many specific areas, existing rules are too weak, too old, or too limited to address current threats and challenges. The United States must recommit itself to pursuing its interests in concert with other nations, according to principles of action that have been agreed upon and that are backed by legal obligation, political will, and economic and military power. At the same time, it has every right to insist that other nations recognize the extent to which many rules must be revised, updated, and even replaced.

International law provides the indispensable framework for the conduct of stable and orderly international relations. It does not descend from on high. Rather, it's created by states to serve their collective interests. Consider, for instance, the concept of sovereignty itself, which is routinely described as the cornerstone of the international legal system. Sovereignty is not some mysterious essence of statehood. It is a deliberate construct, invented and perpetuated by states seeking to reduce war and violence in a particular set of historical circumstances.

The founding myth of modern international law is that the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648, gave birth to the system of states and the concept of inviolable state sovereignty. The Thirty Years' War was the last of the great religious wars in Europe, which were fought not really between states as such but between Catholics and Protestants. As religious minorities in one territory appealed to the coreligionist monarch of another, the Continent burned for three decades, and its people bled in a series of battles among the Holy Roman Empire, France, Sweden, Denmark, Bohemia, and a host of smaller principalities. The Treaty of Westphalia restored the principle of cuius regio eius religio--that is, the prince of a particular region determines the religion of his people. In today's language, this means that one sovereign state cannot intervene in the internal affairs of another.

But in reality, it took centuries for the modern state system to develop, and absolute sovereignty has never existed in practice, as many states on the receiving end of great-power interventions would attest. The architects of the Treaty of Westphalia glimpsed a vision of a world of discrete states armored against one another by the possession of "sovereignty"--a doctrine of legal right against military meddling.

It's important to realize that the right of sovereignty did not mean the prohibition of war. States were still free to go to war, as a matter of international law, until the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 formally outlawed war (to evidently little effect). Sovereignty was the foundation on which modern states were built, but as they matured, their attacks on one another rapidly became the principal threat to international peace and security. After the conflagrations of World War I and World War II, it was evident that if interstate war continued unchecked, states--and their peoples--might not survive into the 21st century. Hence, the innovation of the United Nations Charter: Article 2(4) required all states to refrain from "the use of force in their international relations against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." The right of sovereignty no longer included the right to make war.

Further, given the apparent link between Adolf Hitler's horrific depredations against the German people and his aggression toward other states, the right of sovereignty became increasingly encumbered with conditions on a sovereign state's treatment of its own people. Thus was born the international human rights movement, which today has turned traditional conceptions of sovereignty almost inside out. A distinguished commission appointed by the Canadian government at the suggestion of the UN secretary general released a report at the end of 2001 that defined a state's membership in the United Nations as including a responsibility to protect the lives and basic liberties of its people--and noting that if a member state failed in that responsibility, the international community had a right to intervene.

Why such a shift? Because the decade after the Cold War, much like the decades before the Treaty of Westphalia, revealed a seething mass of ugly conflicts within states. The dividing lines in those conflicts were drawn by ethnicity as much as religion, and the divisions were almost always fueled by opportunistic leaders of one faction or another. But unlike in the 16th and 17th centuries, the danger as the 20th century drew to a close was not so much from one sovereign's meddling in the affairs of another as in the failure of regional and international institutions to intervene early enough to prevent the conflicts from boiling into violence--producing streams of refugees and heartbreaking pictures broadcast into living rooms around the world.

The story of sovereignty, even highly simplified, illustrates a basic point about international law. It is an instrumental rather than an essential body of rules, instrumental to achieving the goals of peace, order, justice, human dignity, prosperity, and harmony between human beings and nature--in short, those ends that reflect the changing hopes and aspirations of humankind. It is a highly imperfect instrument, as indeed is domestic law. Because international law regulates a society of states with no central authority, it lacks even the hint of coercion that's implicit in every encounter with a domestic police officer. It can be enforced by the military might of one or more nations, but that sort of enforcement is the exception rather than the rule.

Yet for all its imperfections, international law survives because it is the only alternative for nations seeking to regularize their relations with one another and bind together credibly enough to achieve common gains. Inter?national law allows diplomats to escape parking tickets in New York City because without diplomatic immunity embassies would close. It allows a nation to set aside 12 miles of territorial waters for the use of its own fishing boats rather than just three or five or seven. And it allowed the first President Bush to assemble a UN coalition against Iraq quickly and easily in 1991 because Iraq had so flagrantly violated the UN Charter by invading Kuwait.

In the 1980s, political scientists such as Robert Keohane, Steve Krasner, and John Ruggie demonstrated more precisely what international lawyers had long believed: "Regimes," meaning everything from treaties to organizations to customary practices, allow nations to overcome a dilemma. The best solution to a problem can be achieved only through cooperation, but any individual state risks a "sucker's payoff" if it acts cooperatively and other states do not. Rules and settled practices overcome this dilemma by making it easier for states to negotiate credible commitments, to gather and share information, and to monitor one another and develop reputations for good or bad behavior.

America's Founding Fathers knew that the United States needed international law as a shield to protect a new and weak nation. They went to great pains to declare their new democracy a law-abiding member of the society of nations. The Declaration of Independence set forth the legal case for revolution out of "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." The Constitution enshrined treaties as "the supreme law of the land," alongside the Constitution itself and federal law. The first Congress made it possible for aliens to sue in U.S. federal courts "for a tort only, in violation of the law of nations." The statute was originally intended to assure foreign citizens and their governments that they would find sure redress in U.S. courts for violations of the laws governing relations among countries, such as diplomatic immunity. Today, it allows foreign victims of grave human-rights violations to sue their torturers if they find them on U.S. soil.

Just over a century after its founding, the United States was an emerging power with a new prominence in world affairs. Yet its commitment to international law remained firm--much more so, in fact, than we generally recognize today. Though most accounts of the crucial period after World War I are dominated by the struggle between President Woodrow Wilson and the American isolationists who opposed his vision of world order, an important group of Republicans championed a view of international relations that rested on a commitment to
international law more zealous than Wilson's. The leader of
this group was Elihu Root (1845-1937), the most distinguished lawyer-statesman of his day, who served as secretary of war under William McKinley, secretary of state under Theo?dore Roosevelt, and as a U.S. senator from New York. As Jonathan Zasloff recalls in New York Uni?ver?sity Law Review (April 2003), more than a decade before Wilson championed his great cause, Root was developing and implementing a distinctive vision of world order based solely on law. Using the kind of rhetoric that would later be associated with Wilson, Root scornfully declared that diplomacy in the past had "consisted chiefly of bargaining and largely cheating in the bargain." But unlike Wilson, who would propose a new international system based on the global spread of democracy and the political and military power of the League of Nations, Root argued for a system based strictly on law.

During the debate over the League, Root, though retired from the Senate, was the principal architect of Republican strategy. Leading Republican senators embraced U.S. engagement with the world, but only on the basis of law, not of binding military and political obligations. They supported legal institutions such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (established in The Hague in 1899) and the new Permanent Court of International Justice (created by the League of Nations in 1921). But they rejected the collective security guarantee that lay at the core of the League Covenant. They would vote for the Covenant only with reservations attached. Root himself denounced the Covenant for abandoning "all effort to promote or maintain anything like a system of international law, or a system of arbitration, or of judicial settlement, through which a nation can assert its legal rights in lieu of war." Wilson, however, would accept no compromise, and the Covenant was defeated.

Root worked hard throughout his life to put his vision into effect (in 1912 he won the Nobel Peace Prize, in part for negotiating treaties of arbitration be?tween the United States and more than 40 other nations). But the Japanese invasion of Man?churia in 1931 and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 made the shortcomings of both isolationism and pure legalism evident. In 1945, Repub?licans and Democrats finally came together in strong support of a new international legal order in the United Nations, but one that melded law and power. The UN Charter was written, as Time put it, "for a world of power, tempered by a little reason." The provisions giving the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France, and the United States permanent seats on the Security Council, along with veto power over Council actions, were recognition that a law-based order has to accommodate the realities of great-power politics.

The interesting question is why the United States, the overwhelmingly dominant power at the end of World War II, would choose to embed itself in a web of international institutions--not just the United Nations but the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In After Victory (2000), political scientist John Ikenberry argues compellingly that the United States pursued an institutional strategy as a way of entrenching a set of international rules favorable to its geopolitical and economic interests. Along the way, however, it was repeatedly compelled to accept real restraints on American power in order to assure weaker states in its orbit that it would neither abandon nor dominate them. For instance, U.S. officials had a sophisticated strategy for rebuilding Western Europe and integrating West Germany into a Western European order but sought to keep America aloof from the process. The Europeans, Ikenberry writes, "insisted that the binding together of Europe was only acceptable if the United States itself made binding commitments to them." The power of the United States to build a political order thus required the nation's willingness and ability to tie itself to a legal order.

Since the end of the Cold War, as Americans seem never to tire of repeating, America's power relative to that of other nations has only increased. But instead of hastening to reassure weaker nations by demonstrating our willingness to accept rules that further the common good, the United States is coupling its explicit drive for primacy with an equally explicit disdain for a whole range of treaties. Consider the current U.S. opposition to virtually all arms-control treaties--land mines, small arms, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty--and to efforts to strengthen existing treaties on biological and chemical warfare. The result? Nations around the world are arming themselves, if not directly against us, then at least, as in the case of the European Union, to ensure that they have an independent military capability.

The 1945 strategy was the right one, and it is now more essential than ever. We have an opportunity to lead through law, not against it, and to build a vastly strengthened international legal order that will protect and promote our interests. If we are willing to accept even minimal restraints, we can rally the rest of the world to adopt and enforce rules that will be effective in fighting scourges from terrorism to AIDS. The Bush administration, or rather some of its leading members, have constructed and promoted a simplistic dichotomy: international law versus national sovereignty. The ridiculousness of that position is evident the minute one turns to the international economic arena, where the World Trade Organization has the power to impose enormous constraints on U.S. sovereignty. A panel of three independent trade experts, for example, can rule on the legality or illegality of a federal statute under international trade law, and then enforce its judgment by authorizing trade sanctions against the United States by all WTO members. No human rights or arms control treaty has teeth nearly as sharp. Yet the Bush administration strongly supports an expansion of the WTO regime. Why? Because the free-trade system ensured by the WTO yields benefits that greatly outweigh the costs of constraints on American freedom of action.

That is the right kind of calculus to make, rather than resorting to knee-jerk appeals to national sovereignty and fearmongering about world government. And by that sort of calculus, at a time when the United States is frightening and angering the rest of the world, the benefits--to ourselves and to other nations--of demonstrating once again that we are a superpower committed, at home and abroad, to the rule of law far outweigh the costs of self-imposed multilateralism.

International law today is undergoing profound changes that will make it far more effective than it has been in the past. By definition, international law is a body of rules that regulates relations among states, not individuals. Yet over the course of the 21st century, it will increasingly confer rights and responsibilities directly on individuals. The most obvious example of this shift can be seen in the explosive growth of international criminal law. Through new institutions such as the International Criminal Court, created in 2003 and based in The Hague, the international community is now holding individual leaders directly accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Most important, under a provision that was insisted on by the United States, all nations that are party to the treaty have committed themselves to domestic prosecutions of potential defendants before the court. Only if the states prove unable or unwilling to undertake these prosecutions will the court have jurisdiction. Under this arrangement, for example, Chile would have had primary responsibility to prosecute former dictator Augusto Pinochet as soon as he was out of office. If the Chilean prosecutors and courts had failed to act, he would have been remitted to The Hague. (Instead, Pinochet was arrested in Britain in 1998, under a warrant issued in Spain, and after being returned to Chile was ultimately spared prosecution because of ill health.) The political effect of this provision is a much-needed strengthening of those forces in every country that seek to bring to justice perpetrators of such crimes within their countries.

But criminal law is only one field of change. A similarly radical departure from the traditional model of state-to-state relations is reflected in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement. Under its terms, individual investors can sue NAFTA member states directly for failing to live up to their treaty obligations. In one celebrated case, a Canadian funeral home conglomerate is suing the United States for $725 million over a series of Mississippi state court decisions that it claims deliberately and unfairly forced it into bankruptcy; the decisions allegedly violated NAFTA guarantees that Canadian and Mexican inves?tors will be granted equal treatment with domestic U.S. corporations. The WTO grows out of a more traditional form of law in which only states can bring suit against one another, but even in the WTO, evidence of the new trend can be seen in the knots of lawyers who congregate outside WTO hearing rooms to represent the interests of individual corporations directly affected by the rulings of the organization's dispute resolution panels. And now nongovernmental organizations such as Environmental Defense and Human Rights Watch are fighting for the right to submit briefs directly in cases that raise important environmental or human-rights issues.

As they come increasingly to apply directly to individuals, future international legal regimes will have more teeth than ever before--through links to domestic courts and by building up a direct constituency of important voters in important countries. The United States has long complained about the weaknesses of international treaty regimes, worrying that they bind states with strong domestic traditions of the rule of law but allow rampant cheating by states that lack such traditions or are without systems of domestic governance that check the power of leaders disinclined to follow the rules. Now is the moment to begin putting these international regimes on a new foundation, allowing them to penetrate the shell of state sovereignty in ways that will make the regimes much more enforceable.

If the United States participates in the formation of these new regimes and the reformation of the old, in areas that include foreign investment, anticorruption measures, environmental protection, and international labor rights, it can help shape a new generation of international legal rules that advance the interests of all law-abiding nations. If it does not participate, U.S. citizens will be directly affected by international rules that ignore U.S. interests. To take only one example, suppose the EU participated with other nations in drafting an international environmental treaty that imposed sanctions on corporations that didn't follow certain pollution regulations. The United States could stay out of the treaty, but any American corporation seeking to do business in the EU would be affected.

The United States needs international law, but not just any international law. We need a system of laws tailored to meet today's problems. The Bush administration is right to point out that the rules developed in 1945 to govern the use of force don't fit the security threats the world faces in 2003. But those aren't the only rules in need of revision. Well before September 11, politicians and public figures were calling for major changes in the rules governing the global economy (remember the cries for a "new global financial architecture"?), a redefinition of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and major UN reform, including expansion of the Security Council's membership. All those appeals proceeded from the premise that the rules and institutions created to address the economic, political, and security problems present after World War II were inadequate, and sometimes counterproductive, in the face of a new generation of threats to world order--to name but a few, AIDS and other new contagions, global warming, failed states, regional economic crises, sovereign bankruptcies, and the rise of global criminal networks trafficking in arms, money, women, workers, and drugs.

The mismatch between old rules and new threats is even more evident today. Two years after September 11, and one year after President Bush called on the Security Council to prove its strength and relevance in world affairs by enforcing a decade of resolutions against Saddam Hussein, the UN General Assembly convened this fall in a world that had changed radically yet again. Now both the United States and the UN are targets in a country and a region that seem to be spinning out of control. It's time to end the finger-pointing and get serious about generating new rules and updating old ones. Institutions, too, must be reinvigorated and reinvented. The UN Trusteeship Council, for example, could be used to spearhead the civilian rebuilding of countries devastated by war, disease, debt, and the despair of seemingly endless poverty.

The world needs international law. The United States needs the world. The dream of a just world under law may be no more than a dream. But the United States has never been stronger than when it has led the world in trying to make the dream a reality.



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Anne-Marie Slaughter is dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and president of the American Society of International Law. She was formerly J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative Law at Harvard Law School.


Reprinted from Autumn 2003 Wilson Quarterly
This article may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from the author. For further reprint information, please contact Permissions, The Wilson Quarterly, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.
Phone:202/691-4200
E-mail:wq@wwic.si.edu
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Sometimes a Great Notion
by Michael J. Glennon

Related Articles
Green Fatigue by Stacy D. VanDeveer

The Two World Orders by Jed Rubenfeld

Leading Through Law by Anne-Marie Slaughter

Two Cheers for International Law by Oona A. Hathaway


Skepticism about international law abounds these days. A commentator in a national newsmagazine probably spoke for many when he wrote that international law is to law as professional wrestling is to wrestling: No one over the age of nine mistakes it for the real thing. International law has long had its critics, but in recent years they have seemed more numerous and included not only laypersons but specialists and diplomats. Meanwhile, its supporters express growing concern about its lack of clout. French president Jacques Chirac, for example, fears that the "law of the jungle" now prevails, and United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan has warned that we are "living through a crisis of the international system." In an extraordinary news conference on July 30, 2003, Annan wondered aloud "whether the institutions and methods we are accustomed to are really adequate to deal with all the stresses of the last couple of years." "What are the rules?" he asked.

Can it be that, 355 years after the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War and established the principle of the sovereign equality of nations, the "rules" of the international system are still in doubt? In fact, most of the rules are not in doubt, and for the most part the international legal system functions effectively, regulating air travel, telecommunications, and the like. The problem, rather, is that the two categories of rules that are in doubt--rules about rules, and rules regarding security--are vitally important.

Rules about rules--so-called metarules--are foundational and shape the content of every legal system. They specify what qualifies as a "rule"--how the rules that govern day-to-day conduct are made and unmade. The rest of a legal system depends for its vitality and coherence on the strength of its metarules, and three particular metarules of international law provide especially weak support. These rules relate to the issues of consent, obligation, and causation.

First, consent. It's commonly said that the international legal system is voluntarist, that is, that its rules are based on the consent of individual states. A state is not bound by any rule it does not accept. Thus, the system is grounded, ultimately, on self-restraint. Unless a state voluntarily restrains itself by consenting to be bound by a rule, it remains free to act in violation of the rule. This arrangement contrasts with the operation of domestic legal systems, which are based not on consent but on coercion. One can hardly decide that one will no longer be bound by the rule prohibiting bank robbery. A domestic legal system is voluntarist only in the sense that one can always leave it and relocate to a state with more congenial laws. In the international system, there's no overarching authority. All states have an equal right to accept or reject rules. It's sometimes claimed that this right of rejection exists only when a rule is first proposed, while it is in an inchoate state. But the whole logic of voluntarism undercuts this contention, for the notion of a consent-based system is meaningless if consent cannot be withdrawn in the same way it's given. States have not consented to the elimination of their consent.

But a system grounded on self-restraint creates serious problems--to the point of raising doubts as to whether it can accurately be described as "law." A leading international jurist, Judge Hersch Lauterpacht of the International Court of Justice, addressed the question in a narrower context in a 1957 case involving the validity of a state's acceptance of a treaty subject to an unusual reservation. The reservation in question would have rendered the treaty applicable only when the reserving state desired it to be applicable. In Judge Lauter?pacht's words, it would have left to the reserving state "the right to determine the extent and the very existence of its obligation," with the result that the state would have "undertaken an obligation to the extent to which it, and it alone, consider[ed] that it had done so." And this would have meant, the judge concluded, that the reserving state had "undertaken no obligation," for an "instrument in which a party is entitled to determine the existence of its obligation is not a valid and enforceable legal instrument." The treaty as modified would have lacked an "essential condition of validity of a legal instrument."


Judge Lauterpacht would no doubt be surprised to find that his logic in this one case could be extended to apply to the entire international legal system. But because the system is consent based, every state maintains the right to determine "the very existence of its obligation." The judge's reasoning suggests, therefore, that all international legal "obligations" undertaken by states are illusory because an "essential condition" of law is missing. Absent genuine obligation rather than mere self-restraint, it's hard to make the case that international law is really law.

U.S. domestic law rejects the notion that self-restraints are binding law. In constitutional law, a branch of the federal government cannot impose binding obligations on itself. For example, an executive order issued by President Gerald Ford, and still in effect, prohibits officials of the executive branch from engaging in assassination. Yet despite that executive order, President Bill Clinton ordered the assassination of Osama bin Laden. Though the earlier order had never been repealed, the later order simply superseded it. Self-restraints are not binding law.

This suggests a second systemic weakness of international law, deriving from the notion of obligation. The "glue that holds the system together," it's often said, is the rule that a state is bound to carry out treaties to which it is a party. But where does this rule to comply with treaties come from? In a consent-based system, from the states themselves. There's no alternative. So states can reject this rule just as they can reject any other rule. Yet if states can turn their backs on the rule that requires compliance with all rules, where does that leave the system?

Again, to respond that states may not withdraw their consent from the rule requiring compliance with treaties would be to reject the voluntarist foundation on which the whole system is based and to necessitate some alternative, transcendent source of obligation--"some brooding omnipresence in the sky," in the disparaging words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Such an obligation would be moral, not legal, and its source would be unclear. Whether there exists a moral obligation to obey laws of human making is an important question--can a city council, for example, create a moral obligation to cross streets only in crosswalks?--but the question is moral, not legal.

The issue of obligation suggests a third systemic weakness, relating to causation. Inter?national law scholars have long been concerned about distinguishing what states do as a matter of legal obligation from what states do for other reasons--motivated, for example, by considerations of comity, courtesy, or simple self-interest. In assessing whether a given practice constitutes a norm of customary international law, therefore, international law has insisted upon some evidence that states have followed the practice in question because they have believed such conduct to be legally required. Traditional analysis, in other words, requires both a consistent state practice and a belief on the part of the state that the practice is obligatory as a matter of law. The belief must cause the conduct.

But the difficulty here is obvious. States, like individuals, seldom if ever act from a single intent. Conduct almost always flows from a tangled web of motives. Some international lawyers resolve this problem by assuming that if a rule exists and conduct consistent with the rule also exists, the rule must be the cause of the conduct. But such an inference is manifestly unjustified. If a city council adopted an ordinance requiring residents to brush their teeth daily, would it be accurate to ascribe the practice of daily toothbrushing to the new requirement imposed by law? In fact, it's often impossible to separate self-interested behavior from behavior caused by legal requirements.

The International Court of Justice took a new crack at this conundrum in Nicaragua v. U.S.A (1986). The case arose after the United States mined Nicaragua's harbors and otherwise provided support to the
so-called contras, who were attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. In the course of rejecting arguments that the conduct of the United States was lawful, the court considered the status of the underlying rule. "If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule," the court said, "but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule." Unfortunately, the court's new approach is circular and self-referential. Some?times a breaching state may indeed agree with a rule that it violates. But again, there may be many reasons why a state appeals to "exceptions or justifications" contained within the rule other than an intent to confirm the rule. For example, the state may wholly object to a rule but appeal to an exception merely to avoid retribution. The assumption that the state's intent is necessarily to "confirm" the rule is arbitrary. If the state has engaged in a prima facie violation of a rule, it's more sensible to conclude that the state disagrees with the rule, not that it wants the rule strengthened.

These conceptual problems arise primarily in connection with customary international law, but they can also infect the application of treaty rules, for obligations imposed by treaties and customary international law often overlap. Consider once again the practice of assassination, which is commonly said to violate not only customary international law but also Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibiting any use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state. States rarely engage in assassination, but what's the proper inference to draw from their behavior? That assassination is legally prohibited? It's possible that states forgo assassination for reasons related entirely to self-interest: Many may believe that the risks of retaliatory assassination are too great. The source of the rule may be treaty or custom, then, but it's impossible to know whether the behavior in question represents compliance or coincidental conformance with the rule.

So is everything up for grabs in the international legal world? Hardly. As Columbia University law professor Louis Henkin has famously observed, "It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time." My point is simply that the international legal order is far more fragile than most domestic legal regimes because it rests on a foundation of problematic metarules. Most of the time, the system works well enough because most states derive greater benefit from honoring day-to-day rules than from breaching them. Issues concerning the metarules do not arise, and international life proceeds. States that deviate from expected patterns of practice face reprisals. Sometimes, the consequences of divergence take the form of immediate diplomatic, economic, or military sanctions, and sometimes they're reputational, with penalties long-term and indirect. Either way, violators suffer costs, even though those costs are imposed horizontally, at the hands of other actors within the system, rather than vertically, at the hands of some supranational authority.

Whether this is law, meaning a proper legal system, is, in many ways, beside the point. The real question is whether it works--whether the international legal system fulfills the functions that it's intended to serve. And here the record is decidedly mixed. Some rules work much better than others. As Georgetown University professor Anthony Arend has pointed out, legal rules have a stronger impact on state behavior in areas of "low politics" that "do not strike at the core security concerns of states"--international trade, communication, and transit--than they do in the realm of "high politics," where issues do touch on states' core security concerns. On issues of high politics, consensus is much harder to obtain, and legal regulation is correspondingly more difficult. Accordingly, states are more apt to rely on themselves than on international institutions, for often their very survival is at stake. The determinants of state behavior in the realm of high politics tend to be the cultural, historical, and power-related factors that affect states' calculations of their nerve-center security interests. In this realm, international rules are epiphenomenal, more effect than cause. So while it's important to know that most states observe most rules most of the time, it's equally important to realize that when some states violate some rules some of the time, those states are likely to be among the most powerful states, the rules are likely to be extraordinarily significant rules, and violations are likely to be highly visible and historically significant. Hence, the recent burst of skepticism about international law.

By their very effectiveness, the enormous body of international legal rules governing the quotidian dealings of states and nonstate actors--rules affecting such matters as finance and trade--have spun an increasingly tight web of interdependence and made globalization possible. But the fact that planes land, packages are delivered, and phone calls go through does not mean that the international legal order is operating as it should. The risks flowing from the failure of security rules are not lessened because many less important rules work. Though rules governing the use of force constitute only a small part of the international regulatory scheme, their dramatic collapse has overshadowed international law's many small successes--and understandably so, for the stakes could hardly be greater. Until international law does a better job of tackling the large issues, doubts about it will persist.



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Michael J. Glennon, a professor of international law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a former Wilson Center fellow, is the author of Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after Kosovo (2001).


Reprinted from Autumn 2003 Wilson Quarterly
This article may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from the author. For further reprint information, please contact Permissions, The Wilson Quarterly, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.
Phone:202/691-4200
E-mail:wq@wwic.si.edu
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Two Cheers for International Law
by Oona A. Hathaway

Related Articles
Green Fatigue by Stacy D. VanDeveer

The Two World Orders by Jed Rubenfeld

Leading Through Law by Anne-Marie Slaughter

Sometimes a Great Notion by Michael J. Glennon


In March of this year, as U.S. tanks began to roll toward Baghdad, international lawyers in the United States and abroad decried the action as a violation of the United Nations Charter. The invasion, some worried, would strip away the last pretense that international law could constrain state action. Today, as we face an increasingly conflict-ridden post-September 11 world, questions linger about the place of international law in maintaining international order. When states so openly flout it, is international law worth having?

Even before the invasion of Iraq, events had given pause to all but the staunchest defenders of international law. Near the end of the Clinton administration, for example, Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, bluntly declared before the UN Security Council that if the United Nations were to seek to impose its power and authority over nation states, it would "meet stiff resistance from the American people." The administration of George W. Bush, which came to power almost exactly one year later, immediately made clear that it shared Helms's disdain for international law. Within his first six months in office, President Bush withdrew from the Kyoto global climate accord, threatened to abrogate unilaterally the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and revoked the signature of the United States on the treaty creating the International Criminal Court.

But not all the blame for today's state of crisis in international law can be laid in Bush's lap. The issue of the role of international law in regulating international relations has bedeviled the world community for decades. After World War II, even as the world pressed ahead with the UN and other new international institutions, widespread dismay over the failure of earlier institutions to prevent the collapse of order prompted a wave of attacks on the Wilsonian ideal of an international system founded on global legal order. As long as there was no sovereign power to manage enforcement, critics argued, international law was meaningless. To regard it as anything else was not just unrealistic but dangerous.

And yet, these deep-seated doubts have done nothing to stem the growth of such laws. More than 50,000 international treaties are in force today, covering nearly every aspect of international relations and nearly every facet of state authority. The treaties range from ambitious multiparty agreements to narrow bilateral pacts. This great edifice is now under siege, yet those who built it have done little to explain or defend it to the public at large. Their inaction has allowed those who are skeptical of international law (and tend to know little about it) to fill the vacuum in the public debate. Little surprise, then, that the Bush administration has faced only a whimper of challenge to its policy of malign neglect.

The failure to mount a persuasive defense of international law has its roots in the universities, where so many of the ideas that inform public debate are incubated. With a few notable exceptions, legal scholars have remained largely above the fray. Instead of addressing critics, they have focused most of their attention on interpreting and creating international legal rules--and simply assumed that states will observe the rules. At the same time, an intellectual chasm has opened between students of law and students of politics: Legal scholars, for the most part, have ignored many questions about the role of political power, while political scientists, who think of power first and foremost, have tended to ignore international law. That division has prevented the emergence of a fuller view of the role of international law in the world.

But the chasm is closing. A new vein of scholarship, which takes international law seriously while examining it critically, confirms neither the greatest hopes of international law's advocates nor the greatest fears of its opponents. Consider a controversial study in the Journal of Public Economics (Feb. 1997) by James Murdoch and Todd Sandler. It suggests that the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone-Layer, often hailed as one of the most successful international agreements of modern times, had virtually no independent impact on countries' use of ozone-depleting gases. The authors argue that the treaty merely codified an existing trend of voluntary cutbacks in emissions. But a more recent study by Beth Simmons in the American Political Science Review (Dec. 2000) indicates that rules in the International Monetary Fund's Articles of Agreement governing the financial policies of national governments have indeed been effective in influencing behavior. It's not just IMF pressure that does the job, Simmons found, but the desire of individual countries to establish their credibility in world markets.

My own recent research on human rights treaties suggests that they have effects fairly different from what either friends or foes of international law would expect. Countries that sign and ratify human rights treaties turn out to have better human rights practices than those that fail to ratify. Yet the difference is not very large. And some of the countries that have joined human rights treaties have worse human rights practices than those that have not joined. For example, the countries that have ratified the 1987 Convention against Torture have torture practices that are, on average, nearly impossible to distinguish from those of countries that haven't ratified the convention. Among the ratifiers are states--including Algeria, China, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey--whose horrific abuses of their own citizens have been documented by the U.S. government and human rights organizations. Even more striking, states that have ratified regional conventions prohibiting torture, such as the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, have worse practices on average than those that have not.

The facts may be bad news for those who see human rights treaties as an instant elixir, but they also confound the predictions of critics, who see the treaties as mere window-dressing. States do not agree only to treaties that require them to do what they're already doing, as critics contend. They actually join treaties that commit them to do something more.

My research also indicates that human rights treaties do not always have the effect their proponents intend. For example, while states with better practices are, on the whole, more likely to join human rights treaties than those with worse practices, only the most democratic states appear to improve their practices after ratifying human rights treaties. Signing a treaty is no guarantee that a country will make improvements. Egypt, Cameroon, and Mexico were among the earliest to ratify the Convention against Torture, yet they continued to have some of the worst torture practices well into the 1990s. Among states with otherwise similar economic and political characteristics, some that ratify human rights accords actually indulge in worse practices than those that don't ratify them. And some of the most brutal episodes of mass killing since World War II--the massacres in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Yugo?slavia--occurred in countries that had ratified the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Understanding how international law works in the real world requires a reorientation of our thinking. The critics are undoubtedly right about at least one thing: International law is nothing like domestic law. Unlike effective domestic law, it lacks a sovereign with the power to enforce it. The closest thing to an international sovereign is the UN, and it has virtually none of the powers necessary for effective governance, most notably the power of enforcement (for which it must depend on member states). Fur?ther, international law is largely voluntary; states are, for the most part, not bound by it unless they accede to it. If the same were true in domestic law, we all could decide for ourselves whether the nation's criminal laws applied to us. Needless to say, the laws would work much less well if that were so.

Whether states will actually abide by international legal commitments once they are made is, of course, another issue altogether. Law that is not enforced will not be obeyed. That seems obvious. But a closer look suggests that the assertion is questionable. If enforcement were the only reason people followed the law, the world would be a much messier place. I refrain from taking property that does not belong to me not solely because I fear punishment by the state. I abide by the law for a complex mix of reasons, including--besides fear of enforcement by the state--my moral beliefs, internalization of the legal rule, fear of retribution by the wronged party, and concern for my reputation if others learn of my wrongdoing. Even if I know there's no chance the state will punish me, there are many reasons why I'm likely to abide by the law.

Countries, too, observe the law for multiple reasons, and fear of enforcement is unquestionably among the more important of them; international legal rules that incorporate penalties for violations are more likely to be followed. But states, like individuals, observe rules for many other reasons as well. Because central enforcement of international agreements is rare, parties to international legal agreements often enforce the agreements themselves. Indeed, many trade and arms control agreements are effectively enforced by the threat of tit-for-tat retaliation. States may also face internal political or legal pressure to adhere to international law. Especially in democratic nations, people outside government can use litigation, media exposure, and political challenges to compel governments to abide by their legal commitments. Such pressure is a key reason why states abide by their commitments under human rights treaties.

Concern for reputation is an additional powerful motivation for states to keep their international legal commitments. If violations are likely to be discovered (as is often true, for example, with violations of international trade laws), states will be disposed to follow international rules in order to foster a good impression among other members of the international community. By making themselves look good, they may hope to attract more foreign investment, aid donations, international trade, and other tangible benefits. They may also accept limits on their own actions to obtain similar limits on the actions of others. Thus, they may limit the tariffs they charge on imports, for example, to obtain a reciprocal easing of access to the markets of other states. But when violations of international commitments are difficult to detect--such as occurs with the dumping of toxic waste, excessive air pollution, or police abuse of suspects--violations are likely to be more common. And last but not least, let's not forget that government leaders may even be led, on occasion, by their own moral judgment to abide by international legal rules.

International law, in other words, is neither as weak as its detractors suggest nor as strong as its advocates claim. The events of the past year have made it painfully evident that international law is not the panacea some might hope it to be. Yet it remains a powerful tool for creating international order in a world that desperately needs it. The challenge now is to move beyond bitter and unproductive all-or-nothing debates over the effectiveness of international law and find ways of harnessing its real but limited power to change the world for the better.



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Oona A. Hathaway is an associate professor of law at Yale Law School. She is writing a book on the sources and effects of international law, and is co-authoring a volume with Harold Hongju Koh on the foundations of international law and politics.


Reprinted from Autumn 2003 Wilson Quarterly
This article may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from the author. For further reprint information, please contact Permissions, The Wilson Quarterly, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.
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Monday, 10 May 2004


Tehran's Hidden Hand
Iran's mounting threats in Iraq.

By Jonathan Schanzer
The State Department's annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report was issued earlier this month, complete with its usual hit parade of terrorist groups, state sponsors and emerging trends. Predictably, Iran was singled out for the "planning of and support for terrorist acts," as well as assistance to "a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals." The report also fingers Iran for pursuing "a variety of policies in Iraq aimed at securing Tehran's perceived interests there, some of which ran counter to those of the Coalition." A statement castigating Iran for such activities was long overdue. However, Washington must now challenge Iran over this growing list of nefarious activities in Iraq that have been plaguing coalition reconstruction efforts.
Conventional Fighting. Ash-Sharq al-Awsat ran this headline on March 16, 2004: "American and Iranian Forces Exchange Fire on the Border." American officials claimed that one Iranian border guard was killed, and other reports indicated that three Iranians were killed, but Tehran denied that any such incident took place. This was not the first time that open hostilities were reported. Coalition officials indicated in January and February that Abu al-Khasib, the port just below Basra on the Shatt al-Arab, has been the scene of Iranian violence against Iraqis. Iranian Revolutionary Guards have opened fire upon Iraqi water patrols along the estuary separating their two countries. Iranian fighters are also inside Iraq, and they may or may not be sanctioned by Tehran. On February 14, when a number of guerrillas attacked a police station in Fallujah, it was learned that two of the slain guerrillas were Iranian. An insurgency attack the week before, according to U.S. sources, was an attempt to free a number of Iranians who had only recently been arrested in Fallujah.
Hezbollah & IRGC. In February 2004, during a Washington Institute fact-finding mission to Iraq, one Coalition official reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) offices were spotted in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Moreover, officials noted an immense amount of Hezbollah activity in the city of Karbala. Most of the activity was "intimidation and threats of intimidation...Mafia-type stuff." During our delegation's one day in Basra, we spotted a building that openly advertised the offices of Hezbollah. Members of this organization insisted that their Hezbollah was not tied to Tehran, and that the name, which means "Party of God," is a common one. According to one report in the Arabic paper al-Hayat, Iran sent some 90 Hezbollah fighters into Iraq shortly after Saddam's Iraq fell. The group now receives financing, training and weapons from Iran, and has a rapidly growing presence in the Shi'a south. Western intelligence officials also allege that the man who planned the recent suicide attacks in Basra is Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah operative responsible for bombing the U.S. embassy in Beirut in the early 1980s.
Propaganda. Even before the U.S.-led war on Iraq, Iran had begun beaming in Arabic-language television programming in an effort to gain a strategic propaganda foothold in the country -- and it has not stopped. Indeed, American labors to win hearts and minds through the television station, al-Iraqiyya, and Radio Sawa have been steadily undermined by these efforts. In April 2003, an Iranian journalist reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards brought into Iraq radio-transmission equipment, posters, and printed matter for the militia known as the Badr Corps. The Badr Corps is a militia that has not yet challenged the U.S., but it is run by SCIRI (the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq), which is known to have close ties to the Iranian regime.
Ansar al-Islam. Not enough attention has been given to the established ties between Iran and Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish al Qaeda affiliate. Before the war, Iran allowed Ansar al-Islam to operate openly along its borders in the extreme northeast mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, just shy of the Iranian border. Kurdish intelligence, with corroboration from imprisoned Ansar fighters, has established that Iran provided logistical support to the group by allowing the flow of goods and weapons. During periods of conflict with Kurdish militia units, the Peshmerga, Iran further provided a safe haven for these Islamist fighters. One Turkish newspaper also notes that Ansar al-Islam militants actually checked cars going into Iran (rather than coming into their stronghold), indicating close security coordination with the Islamic Republic. When the U.S. struck the Ansar al-Islam enclave in March 2003, Iran permitted many Kurdish fighters to flee across the border. They were later assisted back over the border -- with the help of Iran's Revolutionary Guards -- so that they could fight against American soldiers in the heart of Iraq. Kurdish intelligence has since intercepted between three and ten foreign fighters crossing Iranian border each week.
Moqtada al-Sadr. Iran sent a delegation to Iraq in mid-April to mediate between the rogue cleric and the U.S. administration. However, at the same time, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, an Iranian agent, has been supporting al-Sadr's anti-American efforts. A source from ash-Sharq al-Awsat estimates that Iran may have provided al-Sadr some $80 million in recent months. Further, Sadr's Mahdi army may now be getting training from Hezbollah, according to new intelligence reports. One Iranian source told ash-Sharq al-Awsat that Iran created three training camps along the Iran-Iraq border to train fighters from Sadr's militia.
In sum, Iran may be spending up to $70 million per month in Iraq. This pales in comparison to the billions spent by the U.S. Still, it is enough to undermine U.S. efforts. As such, Washington needs not only to better patrol the Iranian border, but also to confront clandestine Iranian activity within Iraq itself. Failure to do so will only encourage Iran to redouble its efforts to destabilize Iraq.
-- Jonathan Schanzer recently took part in a 12-day fact-finding mission to Iraq, sponsored by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/schanzer200405100900.asp
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London's Jihadists
The U.K. must crack down on resident Islamists.

By Rachel Ehrenfeld
While the world is busy denouncing the United States for the deplorable behavior of a few soldiers, it is oblivious to growing incitement by Islamist clerics against America and the West. Calling for jihad earlier this month in London, Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammad told his disciples: "All Muslims of the West will be obliged to become his sword" in a new battle. At the same time, another Islamist, Imam Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri, is preaching in London that "it's okay to kill [those who] work against Islam, by slitting their throats, or by shooting them."
Such incitement is prohibited by law in the U.K. Under the heading of "Inciting Terrorism Overseas," section 59 1(a), the Terrorism Act of 2000 clearly states that "a person commits an offence if he incites another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the United Kingdom." Needless to say, such an act would also constitute an offense if committed in England. Yet these imams and their ilk are free to call for murder with impunity.
The British allowance of this "free speech" has already resulted in a suicide-bombing attack -- in April 2003 in Tel Aviv -- that cost the lives of three Israelis and wounded more than 50. According to the prosecution attorney at the Old Bailey last week, this attack was planned by Hamas, which recruited British citizens Asif Muhammad Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif, whose family members are on trial in London for failing to inform the U.K. authorities. Considering this, and the fact that British law enforcement is busy exposing terrorist plots and arresting members of al Qaeda and other Islamist cells, while British soldiers are dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.K.'s reluctance to go after advocates of terrorism is puzzling.
This disregard for the law extends to written incitement in the form of magazines and websites, originating from England, calling for jihad. Although Hamas was finally outlawed in the U.K. in September 2003, its publication, Filisteen Almuslima (Muslim Palestine), continued to be published in and distributed from London to the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S. In fact, the cover of that September issue carried the horrifying picture of the bloody casualties from a dissevered bus in Jerusalem, as well as the glorified image of the suicide bomber who murdered 23 innocent civilians, many of them babies, and wounded 136.
Inside, the magazine praises and justifies the terrorist attack against Israelis and glorifies the terrorist, Raid Misk, as a heroic role model for potential suicide bombers against oppressors of Islam everywhere. It quotes the Koranic verse that, according to Hamas, gives Islamic religious justification for suicide bombings: "Among the believers, there are men who have been true to their covenant with Allah: Some of them [have already fulfilled their vows and] found their death [in battle]; and some still wait [their turn]. However, they have not in any way broken [their vows]" (Sura 33, verse 23).
And Filisteen Almuslima is not the only Islamist magazine published in and distributed from England, inciting hate, spreading anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Semitic messages, with pro-jihad, pro-terrorist propaganda and calls for suicide bombings.
Al-Sunnah, another Islamist fundamentalist magazine published in the U.K., called in February 2003 for suicide operations against the United States, saying, "There is no other way for the youth of this nation [Islam] other than suicide operations."
Risalat al-Ikhwan (Message of the Brotherhood) is also a London publication with Muslim subscribers worldwide. This magazine serves as center stage for spreading radical Islamist ideology in the best tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood. This Egyptian terrorist organization was outlawed by Gamal Abd al-Nasser in the 1950s, and despite its influence on Hamas and other internationally outlawed terrorist organizations, it is still out in the open in Western countries.
In October 2003, Risalat al-Ikhwan called for: "Active resistance (muqaawamah) to the occupation and the use of any available means to resist it are a religious Moslem duty, a national duty and a natural right anchored in both international law and the United Nations Charter." More of this can be found on Hamas's website.
Judging by the opposition Prime Minister Blair is facing, it seems that these publications influence, among others, former British diplomats, 50 of whom sent him a letter on April 26, 2004, protesting his support of U.S. Middle East policy, stating: "To describe the resistance [in Iraq] as led by terrorists, fanatics and foreigners is neither convincing nor helpful." These diplomats, in the tradition of Islamist-Arab propaganda, continue to argue, like Lakhdar Brahimi, that Israel is the cause -- that it has for "decades poisoned relations between the West and the Islamic and Arab worlds." It is not surprising, therefore, that the resignation of Liberal Democrat MP Jenny Tonge was not required after she condoned Palestinian suicide bombings, stating in parliament, "I would be a suicide bomber in Israel."
A police source in London, when asked why this incitement is allowed, responded that law-enforcement officials are "unhappy with the situation," but that they are unable to prosecute the instigators because "our hands are tied. It's a political decision." Political leaders ought to heed the warning sirens before the terrorists strike -- as promised.

-- Rachel Ehrenfeld, author of Funding Evil; How Terrorism is Financed -- and How to Stop It, is director of the New York-based American Center for Democracy.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ehrenfeld200405100910.asp


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Study: Many Federal Sites Not Terror Risks

May 10, 1:52 PM (ET)
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN
WASHINGTON (AP) - Federal officials should consider reopening public access to about three dozen Web sites withdrawn from the Internet after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, a government-financed study says, because the sites pose little or no risk to homeland security.
The Rand Corp. said the overwhelming majority of federal Web sites that reveal information about airports, power plants, military bases and other potential terrorist targets need not be censored because similar or better information is easily available elsewhere.
Rand identified four Web pages that might merit the restrictions imposed after the attacks.
"It's a good time to take a closer look at the choices that they made at the time," said John Baker, principal author of the study, which was funded by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the government's intelligence mapping agency.
Advocates of open government said the report shows the Bush administration acted rashly after the suicide attacks when it scrubbed numerous government Web sites.
"It was a gigantic mistake, and I hope the study brings some rationality back to this policy," said Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists' project on government secrecy. "Up to now, decisions have been made on a knee-jerk basis."
Rand's National Defense Research Institute identified 629 Internet-accessible federal databases that contain critical data about specific locations. Co-author Beth Lachman said they "appeared to be the most sensitive sites" among 5,000 federal Web pages the researchers checked.
The study, conducted between mid-2002 and mid-2003, found no federal Web sites that contained target information essential to a terrorist - in other words, information a terrorist would need to launch an attack.
It identified four databases - less than 1 percent of the 629 - where restricting access probably would enhance homeland security. None was available to the general public anymore. Those sites included two devoted to pipelines, one to nuclear reactors and one to dams.
Researchers recommended that officials evaluate 66 databases with some useful information, but they didn't anticipate restrictions would be needed because similar or better data probably could be easily obtained elsewhere.
The remaining 559 databases "are probably not significant for addressing attackers' information needs and do not warrant any type of public restriction," the report said. It said that any information they contain that could be useful to terrorists is easily obtained elsewhere, often by simple, legal observation in an open society.
The Rand researchers found that 30 federal agencies or departments make public, on paper or online, "geospatial information" about critical or symbolic locations and structures. That kind of data can be as simple as a telephone book or as complex as an Internet database that discloses how many people live near each of the nation's power plants or toxic chemical storage sites.
After Sept. 11, federal agencies scrambled to pull such data off the Internet. The Transportation Department removed pipeline maps. The Environmental Protection Agency deleted descriptions of risk management plans for chemicals stored at 15,000 sites. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission took down its Web site, although much of it is now back online.
Using Internet archives that preserve old Web pages or detailed written descriptions, researchers identified 39 federal geospatial databases taken off-line since Sept. 11.
Other than the four databases that posed some risk, "these restrictions need to be more thoroughly assessed," the researchers wrote.
"Under the circumstances, these officials took prudent steps but in a very piecemeal, patchwork way," Baker said.
The study proposed a framework for analyzing and possibly restoring such data to the Internet:
_How useful would it be to an attacker? Far more detailed information is needed to plan an attack than to pick a target, but most federal Web sites are too general to help with more than target selection.
_Is similar or better data readily available elsewhere? If so, "the net security benefits of restricting access ... may be minimal or nonexistent" and could "possibly lead ... to a false sense of security at worst."
_Does the gain in security from restrictions outweigh any harm to those using the data, such as police and fire departments, economic planners or private companies?
For instance, Rand advocated that an Environmental Protection Agency Web site that discloses where toxic chemicals are stored and in what quantity should not be restricted because its value to terrorists is outweighed by its value to communities preparing for emergencies.
Restricting the site would "diminish the public good that comes from providing local communities access to information that can significantly affect the well-being of citizens," the study said.
To demonstrate the futility of removing government data that isn't unique, Rand researchers picked out 300 non-federal Web sites that had similar or better information about critical U.S. targets than federal pages.
For instance, an online scuba magazine contains a divers' description of the ocean depths and currents around an oil-drilling platform off the southern California coast that would be more useful to terrorists than the federal sites that described the platform.

On the Net:
Rand Corp. study: http://www.rand.org/publications
Federation of American Scientists secrecy project: http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction325&projectId5

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CHAIN OF COMMAND
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
How the Department of Defense mishandled the disaster at Abu Ghraib.
Issue of 2004-05-17
Posted 2004-05-09
In his devastating report on conditions at Abu Ghraib prison, in Iraq, Major General Antonio M. Taguba singled out only three military men for praise. One of them, Master-at-Arms William J. Kimbro, a Navy dog handler, should be commended, Taguba wrote, because he "knew his duties and refused to participate in improper interrogations despite significant pressure from the MI"--military intelligence--"personnel at Abu Ghraib." Elsewhere in the report it became clear what Kimbro would not do: American soldiers, Taguba said, used "military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee."
Taguba's report was triggered by a soldier's decision to give Army investigators photographs of the sexual humiliation and abuse of prisoners. These images were first broadcast on "60 Minutes II" on April 28th. Seven enlisted members of the 372nd Military Police Company of the 320th Military Police Battalion, an Army reserve unit, are now facing prosecution, and six officers have been reprimanded. Last week, I was given another set of digital photographs, which had been in the possession of a member of the 320th. According to a time sequence embedded in the digital files, the photographs were taken by two different cameras over a twelve-minute period on the evening of December 12, 2003, two months after the military-police unit was assigned to Abu Ghraib.
An Iraqi prisoner and American military dog handlers. Other photographs show the Iraqi on the ground, bleeding.
One of the new photographs shows a young soldier, wearing a dark jacket over his uniform and smiling into the camera, in the corridor of the jail. In the background are two Army dog handlers, in full camouflage combat gear, restraining two German shepherds. The dogs are barking at a man who is partly obscured from the camera's view by the smiling soldier. Another image shows that the man, an Iraqi prisoner, is naked. His hands are clasped behind his neck and he is leaning against the door to a cell, contorted with terror, as the dogs bark a few feet away. Other photographs show the dogs straining at their leashes and snarling at the prisoner. In another, taken a few minutes later, the Iraqi is lying on the ground, writhing in pain, with a soldier sitting on top of him, knee pressed to his back. Blood is streaming from the inmate's leg. Another photograph is a closeup of the naked prisoner, from his waist to his ankles, lying on the floor. On his right thigh is what appears to be a bite or a deep scratch. There is another, larger wound on his left leg, covered in blood.
There is at least one other report of violence involving American soldiers, an Army dog, and Iraqi citizens, but it was not in Abu Ghraib. Cliff Kindy, a member of the Christian Peacemaker Teams, a church-supported group that has been monitoring the situation in Iraq, told me that last November G.I.s unleashed a military dog on a group of civilians during a sweep in Ramadi, about thirty miles west of Fallujah. At first, Kindy told me, "the soldiers went house to house, and arrested thirty people." (One of them was Saad al-Khashab, an attorney with the Organization for Human Rights in Iraq, who told Kindy about the incident.) While the thirty detainees were being handcuffed and laid on the ground, a firefight broke out nearby; when it ended, the Iraqis were shoved into a house. Khashab told Kindy that the American soldiers then "turned the dog loose inside the house, and several people were bitten." (The Defense Department said that it was unable to comment about the incident before The New Yorker went to press.)
When I asked retired Major General Charles Hines, who was commandant of the Army's military-police school during a twenty-eight-year career in military law enforcement, about these reports, he reacted with dismay. "Turning a dog loose in a room of people? Loosing dogs on prisoners of war? I've never heard of it, and it would never have been tolerated," Hines said. He added that trained police dogs have long been a presence in Army prisons, where they are used for sniffing out narcotics and other contraband among the prisoners, and, occasionally, for riot control. But, he said, "I would never have authorized it for interrogating or coercing prisoners. If I had, I'd have been put in jail or kicked out of the Army."
The International Red Cross and human-rights groups have repeatedly complained during the past year about the American military's treatment of Iraqi prisoners, with little success. In one case, disclosed last month by the Denver Post, three Army soldiers from a military-intelligence battalion were accused of assaulting a female Iraqi inmate at Abu Ghraib. After an administrative review, the three were fined "at least five hundred dollars and demoted in rank," the newspaper said.
Army commanders had a different response when, on January 13th, a military policeman presented Army investigators with a computer disk containing graphic photographs. The images were being swapped from computer to computer throughout the 320th Battalion. The Army's senior commanders immediately understood they had a problem--a looming political and public-relations disaster that would taint America and damage the war effort.
One of the first soldiers to be questioned was Ivan Frederick, the M.P. sergeant who was in charge of a night shift at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, who has been ordered to face a court-martial in Iraq for his role in the abuse, kept a running diary that began with a knock on his door by agents of the Army's Criminal Investigations Division (C.I.D.) at two-thirty in the morning on January 14th. "I was escorted . . . to the front door of our building, out of sight from my room," Frederick wrote, "while . . . two unidentified males stayed in my room. `Are they searching my room?'" He was told yes. Frederick later formally agreed to permit the agents to search for cameras, computers, and storage devices.
On January 16th, three days after the Army received the pictures, Central Command issued a blandly worded, five-sentence press release about an investigation into the mistreatment of prisoners. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said last week that it was then that he learned of the allegations. At some point soon afterward, Rumsfeld informed President Bush. On January 19th, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the officer in charge of American forces in Iraq, ordered a secret investigation into Abu Ghraib. Two weeks later, General Taguba was ordered to conduct his inquiry. He submitted his report on February 26th. By then, according to testimony before the Senate last week by General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, people "inside our building" had discussed the photographs. Myers, by his own account, had still not read the Taguba report or seen the photographs, yet he knew enough about the abuses to persuade "60 Minutes II" to delay its story.
At a Pentagon news conference last week, Rumsfeld and Marine General Peter Pace, the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisted that the investigation into Abu Ghraib had moved routinely through the chain of command. If the Army had been slow, it was because of built-in safeguards. Pace told the journalists, "It's important to know that as investigations are completed they come up the chain of command in a very systematic way. So that the individual who reports in writing [sends it] up to the next level commander. But he or she takes time, a week or two weeks, three weeks, whatever it takes, to read all of the documentation, get legal advice [and] make the decisions that are appropriate at his or her level. . . . That way everyone's rights are protected and we have the opportunity systematically to take a look at the entire process."
In interviews, however, retired and active-duty officers and Pentagon officials said that the system had not worked. Knowledge of the nature of the abuses--and especially the politically toxic photographs--had been severely, and unusually, restricted. "Everybody I've talked to said, `We just didn't know'--not even in the J.C.S.," one well-informed former intelligence official told me, emphasizing that he was referring to senior officials with whom such allegations would normally be shared. "I haven't talked to anybody on the inside who knew--nowhere. It's got them scratching their heads." A senior Pentagon official said that many of the senior generals in the Army were similarly out of the loop on the Abu Ghraib allegations.
Within the Pentagon, there was a spate of fingerpointing last week. One top general complained to a colleague that the commanders in Iraq should have taken C4, a powerful explosive, and blown up Abu Ghraib last spring, with all of its "emotional baggage"--the prison was known for its brutality under Saddam Hussein--instead of turning it into an American facility. "This is beyond the pale in terms of lack of command attention," a retired major general told me, speaking of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. "Where were the flag officers? And I'm not just talking about a one-star," he added, referring to Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, the commander at Abu Ghraib who was relieved of duty. "This was a huge leadership failure."
The Pentagon official told me that many senior generals believe that, along with the civilians in Rumsfeld's office, General Sanchez and General John Abizaid, who is in charge of the Central Command, in Tampa, Florida, had done their best to keep the issue quiet in the first months of the year. The official chain of command flows from General Sanchez, in Iraq, to Abizaid, and on to Rumsfeld and President Bush. "You've got to match action, or nonaction, with interests," the Pentagon official said. "What is the motive for not being forthcoming? They foresaw major diplomatic problems."
Secrecy and wishful thinking, the Pentagon official said, are defining characteristics of Rumsfeld's Pentagon, and shaped its response to the reports from Abu Ghraib. "They always want to delay the release of bad news--in the hope that something good will break," he said. The habit of procrastination in the face of bad news led to disconnects between Rumsfeld and the Army staff officers who were assigned to planning for troop requirements in Iraq. A year ago, the Pentagon official told me, when it became clear that the Army would have to call up more reserve units to deal with the insurgency, "we had call-up orders that languished for thirty or forty days in the office of the Secretary of Defense." Rumsfeld's staff always seemed to be waiting for something to turn up--for the problem to take care of itself, without any additional troops. The official explained, "They were hoping that they wouldn't have to make a decision." The delay meant that soldiers in some units about to be deployed had only a few days to prepare wills and deal with other family and financial issues.
The same deliberate indifference to bad news was evident in the past year, the Pentagon official said, when the Army conducted a series of elaborate war games. Planners would present best-case, moderate-case, and worst-case scenarios, in an effort to assess where the Iraq war was headed and to estimate future troop needs. In every case, the number of troops actually required exceeded the worst-case analysis. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and civilian officials in the Pentagon continued to insist that future planning be based on the most optimistic scenario. "The optimistic estimate was that at this point in time"--mid-2004--"the U.S. Army would need only a handful of combat brigades in Iraq," the Pentagon official said. "There are nearly twenty now, with the international coalition drying up. They were wildly off the mark." The official added, "From the beginning, the Army community was saying that the projections and estimates were unrealistic." Now, he said, "we're struggling to maintain a hundred and thirty-five thousand troops while allowing soldiers enough time back home."
In his news conference last Tuesday, Rumsfeld, when asked whether he thought the photographs and stories from Abu Ghraib were a setback for American policy in Iraq, still seemed to be in denial. "Oh, I'm not one for instant history," he responded. By Friday, however, with some members of Congress and with editorials calling for his resignation, Rumsfeld testified at length before House and Senate committees and apologized for what he said was "fundamentally un-American" wrongdoing at Abu Ghraib. He also warned that more, and even uglier, disclosures were to come. Rumsfeld said that he had not actually looked at any of the Abu Ghraib photographs until some of them appeared in press accounts, and hadn't reviewed the Army's copies until the day before. When he did, they were "hard to believe," he said. "There are other photos that depict . . . acts that can only be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel, and inhuman." Later, he said, "It's going to get still more terrible, I'm afraid." Rumsfeld added, "I failed to recognize how important it was."
NBC News later quoted U.S. military officials as saying that the unreleased photographs showed American soldiers "severely beating an Iraqi prisoner nearly to death, having sex with a female Iraqi prisoner, and `acting inappropriately with a dead body.' The officials said there also was a videotape, apparently shot by U.S. personnel, showing Iraqi guards raping young boys."
No amount of apologetic testimony or political spin last week could mask the fact that, since the attacks of September 11th, President Bush and his top aides have seen themselves as engaged in a war against terrorism in which the old rules did not apply. In the privacy of his office, Rumsfeld chafed over what he saw as the reluctance of senior Pentagon generals and admirals to act aggressively. By mid-2002, he and his senior aides were exchanging secret memorandums on modifying the culture of the military leaders and finding ways to encourage them "to take greater risks." One memo spoke derisively of the generals in the Pentagon, and said, "Our prerequisite of perfection for `actionable intelligence' has paralyzed us. We must accept that we may have to take action before every question can be answered." The Defense Secretary was told that he should "break the `belt-and-suspenders' mindset within today's military . . . we `over-plan' for every contingency. . . . We must be willing to accept the risks." With operations involving the death of foreign enemies, the memo went on, the planning should not be carried out in the Pentagon: "The result will be decision by committee."
The Pentagon's impatience with military protocol extended to questions about the treatment of prisoners caught in the course of its military operations. Soon after 9/11, as the war on terror got under way, Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly made public his disdain for the Geneva conventions. Complaints about America's treatment of prisoners, Rumsfeld said in early 2002, amounted to "isolated pockets of international hyperventilation."
The effort to determine what happened at Abu Ghraib has evolved into a sprawling set of related investigations, some of them hastily put together, including inquiries into twenty-five suspicious deaths. Investigators have become increasingly concerned with the role played not only by military and intelligence officials but also by C.I.A. agents and private-contract employees. In a statement, the C.I.A. acknowledged that its Inspector General had an investigation under way into abuses at Abu Ghraib, which extended to the death of a prisoner. A source familiar with one of the investigations told me that the victim was the man whose photograph, which shows his battered body packed in ice, has circulated around the world. A Justice Department prosecutor has been assigned to the case. The source also told me that an Army intelligence operative and a judge advocate general were seeking, through their lawyers, to negotiate immunity from prosecution in return for testimony.
The relationship between military policing and intelligence forces inside the Army prison system reached a turning point last fall in response to the insurgency against the Coalition Provisional Authority. "This is a fight for intelligence," Brigadier General Martin Dempsey, commander of the 1st Armored Division, told a reporter at a Baghdad press briefing in November. "Do I have enough soldiers? The answer is absolutely yes. The larger issue is, how do I use them and on what basis? And the answer to that is intelligence . . . to try to figure out how to take all this human intelligence as it comes in to us [and] turn it into something that's actionable." The Army prison system would now be asked to play its part.
Two months earlier, Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander of the task force in charge of the prison at Guant?namo, had brought a team of experts to Iraq to review the Army program. His recommendation was radical: that Army prisons be geared, first and foremost, to interrogations and the gathering of information needed for the war effort. "Detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation . . . to provide a safe, secure and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence," Miller wrote. The military police on guard duty at the prisons should make support of military intelligence a priority.
General Sanchez agreed, and on November 19th his headquarters issued an order formally giving the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade tactical control over the prison. General Taguba fearlessly took issue with the Sanchez orders, which, he wrote in his report, "effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agenda assigned to each of these respective specialties."
Taguba also criticized Miller's report, noting that "the intelligence value of detainees held at . . . Guant?namo is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities in Iraq. . . . There are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib. These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaeda." Taguba noted that Miller's recommendations "appear to be in conflict" with other studies and with Army regulations that call for military-police units to have control of the prison system. By placing military-intelligence operatives in control instead, Miller's recommendations and Sanchez's change in policy undoubtedly played a role in the abuses at Abu Ghraib. General Taguba concluded that certain military-intelligence officers and civilian contractors at Abu Ghraib were "either directly or indirectly responsible" for the abuses, and urged that they be subjected to disciplinary action.
In late March, before the Abu Ghraib scandal became publicly known, Geoffrey Miller was transferred from Guant?namo and named head of prison operations in Iraq. "We have changed this--trust us," Miller told reporters in early May. "There were errors made. We have corrected those. We will make sure that they do not happen again."
Military-intelligence personnel assigned to Abu Ghraib repeatedly wore "sterile," or unmarked, uniforms or civilian clothes while on duty. "You couldn't tell them apart," the source familiar with the investigation said. The blurring of identities and organizations meant that it was impossible for the prisoners, or, significantly, the military policemen on duty, to know who was doing what to whom, and who had the authority to give orders. Civilian employees at the prison were not bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but they were bound by civilian law--though it is unclear whether American or Iraqi law would apply.
One of the employees involved in the interrogations at Abu Ghraib, according to the Taguba report, was Steven Stefanowicz, a civilian working for CACI International, a Virginia-based company. Private companies like CACI and Titan Corp. could pay salaries of well over a hundred thousand dollars for the dangerous work in Iraq, far more than the Army pays, and were permitted, as never before in U.S. military history, to handle sensitive jobs. (In a briefing last week, General Miller confirmed that Stefanowicz had been reassigned to administrative duties. A CACI spokeswoman declined to comment on any employee in Iraq, citing safety concerns, but said that the company still had not heard anything directly from the government about Stefanowicz.)
Stefanowicz and his colleagues conducted most, if not all, of their interrogations in the Abu Ghraib facilities known to the soldiers as the Wood Building and the Steel Building. The interrogation centers were rarely visited by the M.P.s, a source familiar with the investigation said. The most important prisoners--the suspected insurgency members deemed to be High Value Detainees--were housed at Camp Cropper, near the Baghdad airport, but the pressure on soldiers to accede to requests from military intelligence was felt throughout the system.
Not everybody went along. A company captain in a military-police unit in Baghdad told me last week that he was approached by a junior intelligence officer who requested that his M.P.s keep a group of detainees awake around the clock until they began talking. "I said, `No, we will not do that,'" the captain said. "The M.I. commander comes to me and says, `What is the problem? We're stressed, and all we are asking you to do is to keep them awake.' I ask, `How? You've received training on that, but my soldiers don't know how to do it. And when you ask an eighteen-year-old kid to keep someone awake, and he doesn't know how to do it, he's going to get creative.'" The M.I. officer took the request to the captain's commander, but, the captain said, "he backed me up.
"It's all about people. The M.P.s at Abu Ghraib were failed by their commanders--both low-ranking and high," the captain said. "The system is broken--no doubt about it. But the Army is made up of people, and we've got to depend on them to do the right thing."
In his report, Taguba strongly suggested that there was a link between the interrogation process in Afghanistan and the abuses at Abu Ghraib. A few months after General Miller's report, Taguba wrote, General Sanchez, apparently troubled by reports of wrongdoing in Army jails in Iraq, asked Army Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general, to carry out a study of military prisons. In the resulting study, which is still classified, Ryder identified a conflict between military policing and military intelligence dating back to the Afghan war. He wrote, "Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews."
One of the most prominent prisoners of the Afghan war was John Walker Lindh, the twenty-one-year-old Californian who was captured in December, 2001. Lindh was accused of training with Al Qaeda terrorists and conspiring to kill Americans. A few days after his arrest, according to a federal-court affidavit filed by his attorney, James Brosnahan, a group of armed American soldiers "blindfolded Mr. Lindh, and took several pictures of Mr. Lindh and themselves with Mr. Lindh. In one, the soldiers scrawled `shithead' across Mr. Lindh's blindfold and posed with him. . . . Another told Mr. Lindh that he was `going to hang' for his actions and that after he was dead, the soldiers would sell the photographs and give the money to a Christian organization." Some of the photographs later made their way to the American media. Lindh was later stripped naked, bound to a stretcher with duct tape, and placed in a windowless shipping container. Once again, the affidavit said, "military personnel photographed Mr. Lindh as he lay on the stretcher." On July 15, 2002, Lindh agreed to plead guilty to carrying a gun while serving in the Taliban and received a twenty-year jail term. During that process, Brosnahan told me, "the Department of Defense insisted that we state that there was `no deliberate' mistreatment of John." His client agreed to do so, but, the attorney noted, "Against that, you have that photograph of a naked John on that stretcher."
The photographing of prisoners, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, seems to have been not random but, rather, part of the dehumanizing interrogation process. The Times published an interview last week with Hayder Sabbar Abd, who claimed, convincingly, to be one of the mistreated Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib photographs. Abd told Ian Fisher, the Times reporter, that his ordeal had been recorded, almost constantly, by cameras, which added to his humiliation. He remembered how the camera flashed repeatedly as soldiers told to him to masturbate and beat him when he refused.
One lingering mystery is how Ryder could have conducted his review last fall, in the midst of the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, without managing to catch it. (Ryder told a Pentagon press briefing last week that his trip to Iraq "was not an inspection or an investigation. . . . It was an assessment.") In his report to Sanchez, Ryder flatly declared that "there were no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices." Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as an agent of the C.I.D., told me that Ryder was in a bureaucratic bind. The Army had revised its command structure last fall, and Ryder, as provost marshal, was now the commanding general of all military-police units as well as of the C.I.D. He was, in essence, being asked to investigate himself. "What Ryder should have done was set up a C.I.D. task force headed by an 0-6"--full colonel--"with fifteen agents, and begin interviewing everybody and taking sworn statements," Rowell said. "He had to answer questions about the prisons in September, when Sanchez asked for an assessment." At the time, Rowell added, the Army prison system was unprepared for the demands the insurgency placed on it. "Ryder was a man in a no-win situation," Rowell said. "As provost marshal, if he'd turned a C.I.D. task force loose, he could be in harm's way--because he's also boss of the military police. He was being eaten alive."
Ryder may have protected himself, but Taguba did not. "He's not regarded as a hero in some circles in the Pentagon," a retired Army major general said of Taguba. "He's the guy who blew the whistle, and the Army will pay the price for his integrity. The leadership does not like to have people make bad news public."

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CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE
by GEORGE PACKER
Will moderate Iraqis embrace democracy--or Islamist radicalism?
Issue of 2004-05-17
Posted 2004-05-10
On the March morning I visited the Baghdad morgue, which is in a decaying neighborhood near the Tigris River, a young forensic-medicine specialist named Dr. Bashir Shaker was on duty. It was the day after Ashura, one of the most important religious holidays on the Shiite calendar, which commemorates the murder of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, and the massacre of his followers at Karbala, in 680 A.D. Thirteen hundred and twenty-four years later, Baghdad was festooned with the symbols of Shiite piety and penitence: the red flags of Hussein's blood, the green flags of Islam, the black flags of grief bearing messages such as "Hussein Taught Us to Become Victims in Order to Gain Victory." For the first time in decades, Iraqi Shiites felt free to observe the day of martyrdom and the forty days of full-throated mourning that follow. The chants, the parades, the beating of chests, and the flaying of backs in ceremonies of atonement also became displays of collective power.
The shrines of Baghdad and Karbala were therefore unusually crowded with black-clad Shiite pilgrims that day--and when suicide bombers in their midst detonated a series of explosions it was the worst civilian massacre since the start of the war. The death toll in the two cities was at least a hundred and eighty, and the Baghdad morgue became a charnel house filled with bodies, heads, limbs, and buckets of flesh. Outside the morgue, a man waited to enter and look for the corpse of an eleven-year-old boy, a neighbor, whose father lay wounded in the hospital. Others were leaving with rags still pressed to their faces, a response to the stench inside. The authorities were rushing to complete the process of identification. There would be no forensic autopsies of the victims, Shaker told me; these followers of Hussein were Shiite martyrs, and Islam forbade the violation of their bodies.
Before the American invasion of Iraq, Dr. Shaker said, only one murder victim arrived at the city morgue each month. This statistic underscores two conditions of Iraqi life under Saddam Hussein: the state had a near-monopoly on killing, and most of the victims of the state disappeared into unmarked mass graves. One unintended effect of Iraq's liberation from Baathist tyranny has been the widespread dispersal of violence. In occupied Iraq, between fifteen and twenty-five murder victims arrive at the Baghdad morgue daily, most of them with gunshot wounds. Shaker estimated that five cases a week involve Baathists executed in reprisal killings; their families typically retrieve the bodies without informing the police. With barely functioning courts, a weak, ill-trained, and often corrupt new police force, a foreign occupier that has failed to provide security, and a pervasive atmosphere of lawlessness, Iraqis don't expect the justice that was denied them during the reign of Saddam Hussein to materialize anytime soon.
The day I visited, Shaker said that he was reviewing "an interesting case," unrelated to the Ashura bombings. The body of a woman, forty-one years old and never married, had recently been discovered with six gunshot wounds in the chest. Shaker's initial examination had found that the woman appeared not to be a virgin, and the number of gunshots suggested that the murder was premeditated. These details cast suspicion on her family: Shaker said that such a crime was called "washing the shame." Honor killing is an old custom in Iraq, he said, though in this case there was a new element: before the war, the family would have burned or drowned the woman to disguise the murder. "Now you can kill and go," Shaker said. "No need to cover the crime." The standard sentence for "washing the shame" is six months.
The woman's case was referred to a committee of five doctors, including Iraq's leading hymen expert. To Shaker's surprise, the committee found that the woman's hymen was extremely thin but intact. Case closed: the family would not be investigated, and, without the means to find other clues, the police would seal the woman's file.
Down the hall from the morgue, which is in a squat, two-story yellow building called the Medico-Legal Institute, is an examination room with a reclining chair and stirrups. This is where virginity exams on living subjects take place--most of them on suspected prostitutes, but also on runaways, kidnapping victims, and girls who have suffered an accident and whose parents, for the sake of marriageability, want a medical certificate establishing their purity.
An entire subspecialty of forensic medicine in Iraq deals with virginity, Shaker said. In any criminal case involving a woman, it's the most important piece of information. "It rules our life," he added. The surprising thing about these details of his profession is their ordinariness. In the West, Iraqis developed a reputation for cosmopolitan modernity that is now decades out of date. In order to win the support of Iraq's clerics, Saddam obliged people to adopt a harsh form of traditional Islam. In private matters of religion, family, and the treatment of women, the vast majority of Iraqis are far more conservative than most outsiders understand.
In March, 2003, a week before the start of the war, a sixteen-year-old girl whom the Baathist police had found wandering disoriented through the streets was brought to the Medico-Legal Institute. Upon examining her, Shaker found that her virginity had been recently and violently taken. The girl, named Raghda, was beautiful, with pale skin and large, dark eyes, and she was so miserable she could hardly speak. Raghda seemed nothing like the teen-age prostitutes Shaker examined, and he gently persuaded her to tell him what had happened.
Raghda had gone to audition as a television announcer at the studio owned by Uday Hussein, Saddam's psychopathic older son. Along with the six other finalists, she was taken to a room where Uday--crippled from a 1996 assassination attempt--was seated in a chair, holding a pistol in his lap. He ordered the girls to undress and walk in a circle around his chair. When one girl begged to be excused, Uday shot her dead. After that, the other girls, including Raghda, did as they were told. In the following days, Uday (who was committing some of his last crimes in power, while an invasion force gathered along Iraq's southern border) raped the girls, then threw them out on the street, drugged, with a wad of cash, which was how Raghda was found by the police. When she told them her story, they gave her a beating and then took her to the Medico-Legal Institute.
"If you want to help me," Raghda told the doctor, "go tell my parents their daughter was found dead."
On March 18th, two days before the war started, Shaker completed Raghda's paperwork. "Notice that there is the appearance of complete hymen rupture from the top to the base," he wrote. "In conclusion, the hymen membrane was ruptured longer than two weeks ago; I cannot say how long. End of report." Raghda was returned to the police; Shaker never learned her fate.
Shaker served in the Iraqi Army and, a decade ago, took part in the occupation of Kuwait. Now he handles Baghdad's nightly traffic of violent death. One Friday brought thirty-two bodies, including two foreign engineers--one German, one Dutch--who had been gunned down by insurgents on a road south of Baghdad, and two Iraqi journalists shot to death by American soldiers as they drove away from a checkpoint. For Shaker, such cases are purely intellectual matters. He told me without emotion that his testimony in trials has sent homosexuals to execution. The effect of this dispassion shows in the cold, handsome gaze of his blue eyes; in his direct, uninflected manner of speaking; and in the way his smile turns almost automatically into a sneer. But he hadn't got over Raghda.
When I met him, Shaker said he was looking for a change in his life: "Any change, better or worse." He had a restless mind and hated boredom, and, since the Americans represented something new, he welcomed spending time with me. I assumed that this forward-thinking man of science--with a flat-top haircut and clean-shaven jaw--wanted a relatively secular, liberal Iraq. I kept waiting for him to catch my eye in the middle of one of his clinical descriptions and shake his head over the backwardness of a society obsessed with virginity and prostitution. It never happened.
Shaker was born in 1968, the year the Baath Party came to power. "For thirty-five years, I feel I was dead," he said. "Only these last weeks I'm beginning to live." The fall of Saddam and the arrival of foreign occupiers--who happened to be the makers of his favorite old movies--had, at last, brought the chance for a new life. Eager to obtain travel documents and venture outside Iraq, he sold his private dermatology practice and a piece of land he'd received as a former soldier. His first foreign trip was to Amman, Jordan, where he had arranged to meet an Iraqi girl who was living in exile in Amsterdam. They married after two days. "Like a movie," he said. His wife is still in Amsterdam, but the plan is for her to move to Baghdad, once the city returns to calm.
Though Shaker was initially grateful to the foreign occupiers, the disorder on Baghdad's streets disillusioned him. The morgue reflected that chaos--it had the improvised, filthy atmosphere of a front-line hospital. There were pools of blood on the floor, and empty stretchers attracted flies. In the hall, bodies lay uncovered on tables: a man with a broad mustache and a slashed throat, found naked under a pile of garbage in a middle-class district; a man with a gunshot wound in his head, his blue eyes open and filmy; the small, blackened corpse of a badly burned woman. Amid the gloomy chill of the refrigerated room, six other naked bodies lay sprawled on the floor, two women and four men. One of the women, believed to be a prostitute, had been shot through the nipple--by a relative, Shaker assumed.
These days, the morgue overflows, but the examination room down the hall is usually empty. Before the war, it was the other way around; Shaker used to perform five or six virginity exams a day. Shaker is a Shiite Muslim, and he was appalled by this inversion of the normal order. In his view, a fragile moral relationship existed between the two sections of the Medico-Legal Institute--as if the social control of virginity offered a defense against the anarchy that led to murder. He noted that in Iran, an Islamist theocracy, prostitutes were publicly whipped. He thought the same practice should be instituted in Iraq--where the sex trade, he claimed, had reached epidemic proportions in the lawlessness of the occupation. "It's strict, it's horrible, but it has good results," he said of Islamic law. "Prostitution now is normal here." He blamed the Americans for the moral laxity in Baghdad, and especially L. Paul Bremer, the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, for threatening, in February, to veto any interim constitution that declared Islam to be the principal basis of federal law. "When they give everybody their rights, it's causing bad things in society--it's corrupting us," Shaker said. "If Islam is the main source of law, none of these things would happen."
The doctor said that he belonged to "the middle level of mind" in Iraqi society, somewhere between the strictly religious masses and the secular ?lite. "There are many Iraqis like me," he said. In Iraq, there is nothing unusual about a doctor who loves Marilyn Monroe and Cary Grant, desires the public whipping of prostitutes, and believes that executed homosexuals got what they deserved. Yet Shaker's mix of traditional and modern views causes him considerable inner conflict. "I hate Iraq," he said. "And I love it." He longs to live abroad, but fears the moral climate outside the country. He is wary of the Western images that appear on his television screen, though he installed a satellite dish on his roof when it was illegal, and dangerous, to own one. He adores his new wife, an independent-minded woman who wears low-cut shirts, but he wants her to start covering her hair and acting like a traditional Muslim woman when she moves to Baghdad. His work fascinates him, but he is concerned that his daily immersion in death will make him less spiritual. "The doctor of forensic medicine deals only with bodies," he said. "So maybe in the end I will become like you--an existentialist."
Dr. Shaker lives with his mother and his brothers and sisters on a tidy side street in Al Thawra, the heavily Shiite slum district in northeastern Baghdad. Last year, the neighborhood was renamed Sadr City, in honor of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a revered Shiite leader known for his subversive sermons against Baathist tyranny; he was assassinated in 1999, almost certainly on Saddam's orders. His son, Moqtada al-Sadr, declared himself his successor. With the overthrow of Saddam, Moqtada began stridently fomenting dissent against the American occupation. Throughout Sadr City, young men in black uniforms guided traffic: these were members of the Mahdi Army, Moqtada's militia.
A round sticker was affixed to the wooden front door of Shaker's house; it bore an image of Ayatollah Sadr, along with a quotation, from one of his sermons, insisting that women be veiled. In the Shakers' living room hung a picture of Imam Hussein crossing a river on horseback by moonlight, like one of the Christian saints. Compact disks containing forty-five sermons by Ayatollah Sadr were stacked inside the family's TV cabinet, alongside a pile of back issues of Al Hawza, the fiercely anti-American newspaper published by Moqtada al-Sadr. Shaker told me that he got his television news from Al Jazeera and Iranian broadcasts--he never watched Iraq's American-run network. His main source of information from the non-Islamic world, I realized, was old Hollywood movies. That wouldn't offer him much help in parsing the truth of a story I noticed in Al Hawza. The newspaper had reprinted photographs of President Bush and President Clinton holding up their index and pinkie fingers; the accompanying article offered the images as evidence of a Zionist-Masonic conspiracy.
Shaker's younger brothers, Ali and Samir, joined us in the living room. Ali was a secondary-school math teacher, Samir an unemployed telecom repairman. Unlike their dirty-blond, fair-skinned older brother, they were dark and bearded--respectful, serious, slightly wary.
"Samir is closer to God than me," Shaker said. "Ali is like me--flexible." Ali and Samir were devoted followers of Moqtada; they shared his hostility toward the occupation. From time to time, someone knocked on the door, and one of the brothers would get up to receive a tray of food or beverages from the hands of an unseen woman.
Ali brought up the Ashura bombings. "Ninety-five per cent of Iraqis knew the main purpose of this was to start a religious war between Shia and Sunnis," he said. He was skeptical of the Americans' assertion that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist with ties to Al Qaeda, was responsible for the attacks. "This Zarqawi--it's only a game that the Americans use," Ali declared. "Before the election of Bush, they'll show Zarqawi on TV. Just like Saddam--they captured him months before they showed him."
The brothers told me a joke about the occupation: An American soldier is about to kill a Shiite, who cries, "Please, no, in the name of Imam Hussein!" The American asks who Imam Hussein was, and then decides to spare the man's life. A few weeks later, this same soldier is sent to Falluja, where he is cornered by a Sunni insurgent. The soldier thinks fast and cries, "Please, no, in the name of Imam Hussein!" The insurgent says, "What? You're an American and a Shiite?," and blows him away.
There was a moment of laughter in the living room.
Ali sat cross-legged on a rug against the wall, and looked directly at me. "Before this war, I was waiting for the Americans to come--and now I feel sort of cheated. All this talk about rebuilding Iraq, and all we see is a couple of light coats of paint. And they say they renovated Iraq."
Samir, the unemployed younger brother, spoke in darker tones, with a faint smile. He had never had any illusions. "No enemy loves his enemy. We know very well that the Americans don't intend us any good."
The Americans had at least got rid of Saddam, I observed. "That's not enough," Ali said. "Now things are worse. We can't go outside at four in the morning, as before."
If within a year there were free elections in Iraq, I asked, would they be satisfied?
"Yes," Samir said.
Ali disagreed. "I don't think the people will be satisfied. So what if we have a President? The mobile phones we have here don't work. Why can't it be like the Gulf countries? Maybe in generations after generations. But we won't be here then. It pisses me off."
Shaker also spoke of the urgent need for improved services. Then he asked to borrow my satellite phone and disappeared up on the roof, to call his new wife in Amsterdam.
One Friday not long after the Ashura bombings, I went with Shaker to hear prayers in Kadhimiya, an old Shiite neighborhood in the northwestern part of Baghdad that is famous for its gold shops. One of the bombs killed nearly sixty people at the local shrine, which holds the remains of two imams who came after the martyred Hussein. Along a broad pedestrian market street that ends in the square in front of the sixteenth-century mosque, cordons of grim-looking young Mahdi Army militiamen, carrying Kalashnikovs, searched the throngs of pilgrims for weapons.
There were no Iraqi policemen or American soldiers on the streets. One Mahdi soldier, who was eighteen years old, said that the Americans had prevented Moqtada's militia from carrying their weapons on Ashura. This was a foolish decision, he said: if the militia had been armed, it would have been able to hold back the surges of worshippers and catch the suicide bombers mingling in the crowd.
While Shaker went into a shop to wash himself before prayers, a local cleric named Sheikh Muhammad Kinani told me that the bombers were Wahhabi members of Al Qaeda, working in concert with an American soldier employed by the John Kerry campaign. "I believe John Kerry is behind this so Bush will lose his Presidency and look bad in front of the world," he said. "But it's the Iraqis who pay for it."
Such rumors proliferate on the streets of Iraq's cities these days. In fact, the traffic in conspiracy theories is so heavy that an American intelligence unit began putting out "The Baghdad Mosquito," a daily compendium of rumors currently in circulation. According to several Shiites I spoke with in Kadhimiya, Wahhabi men all have light-colored beards and are the enemies of true Muslims. A merchant on the pedestrian market street said, "We caught a Wahhabi from Ramadi an hour ago." The captive, he said, was wearing a short dishdasha, in the Wahhabi style; although his feet were dirty, his body was suspiciously clean. A search of the Wahhabi man turned up blank paper and a map. Local people took him to the police station, where he would be tortured until he confessed.
Prayers began beneath a hot noon sun. The shrine itself, with its splendid golden domes and minarets, was closed because of bomb damage. Men filled the square; holding black signs and pictures of Shiite martyrs, and shaking their fists, they chanted, "Pray to Muhammad and the followers of Muhammad and hurry the damning of our enemies. Give victory to Moqtada! We follow Moq-ta-da!" Shaker knelt in the front row and prayed. He seemed alone in the crowd, the only worshipper who wasn't chanting.
One of Moqtada's aides, Hazem al-Araji, delivered the sermon. He is a thirty-five-year-old sayyid with a salt-and-pepper beard who spent two years in exile in Vancouver before the war. Later, in a conversation at his office, he proved to be a smooth, smiling politician who Googles himself several times a day to keep up with his press, and who made a theocratic Islamic state sound not very different from a parliamentary democracy. But, in front of the crowd of worshippers outside the shrine, Araji let loose an incendiary and conspiracy-laced analysis of the violence in Iraq. The attacks came from four sources, he declared, none of them Iraqi or Muslim: it was the Jews, the Americans, the British, and the Wahhabi. The Jews--who had been warned to stay away from the World Trade Center on September 11th, so that not one Jew died--"want Iraqis to die." America, the devil, allows the violence in order to have an excuse to continue occupying Iraq. The British, America's partners, are more directly responsible, since they invented Wahhabism and, therefore, Al Qaeda, which have "nothing to do with Islam."
Shaker knelt, slump-shouldered, and gazed down at his clasped hands, muttering prayers. He looked puzzled, as if he were trying to figure something out. I wondered if the cleric's ranting embarrassed him.
"If you read the modern books of history," Araji proclaimed, "you know that Wahhabism started in 1870 by the good graces of the British government in order to go against Islam, to make Islam look bad, to make Muslims fight each other. Those who know--good. Those who don't--know now."
Araji was referring to "Confessions of a British Spy," an apocryphal memoir attributed to a British colonial officer of the early eighteenth century named Hempher. (Araji was off by a hundred and fifty years.) Going undercover, Hempher befriends a gullible, hotheaded Iraqi in Basra named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and tempts him into founding a heretical sect of Islam that will bring disrepute to other Muslims and turn them against one another: "We, the English people, have to make mischief and arouse schism in all our colonies in order that we may live in welfare and luxury." Hempher cannot conceal his admiration for the spiritual grandeur of Islam, which more than once nearly causes him to abandon his mission. "Confessions of a British Spy" reads like an Anglophobic variation on "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion"; it is probably the labor of a Sunni Muslim author whose intent is to present Muslims as both too holy and too weak to organize anything as destructive as Wahhabism (or, Araji's listeners could deduce, to pull off a crime as appalling as the Ashura bombings, which took place two centuries after Wahhabis, on the same holiday, sacked the Shiite shrine at Karbala, slaughtering two thousand citizens). With its subtext of powerlessness, the "memoir" is ultimately a confession of Muslim humiliation--a text that was bound to find an audience in occupied Iraq, where the name Hempher has begun to circulate among militant Shiites.
"America, England, Israel, do whatever you have to do, build more missiles, more explosives, more terrorism all over the world," Araji said. "But it's not going to stop us."
The crowd chanted, "Yes, yes to Islam!"
"Just a speech," Shaker scoffed as we drove out of Kadhimiya. "If I knew this man is going to deliver the Friday prayers, I would not go." He would have preferred to hear Moqtada himself. If Moqtada had come, he said, there would have been less talk and more action.
It is one measure of America's inability to achieve its goals in Iraq that a man of "the middle level of mind" like Bashir Shaker--who had everything to gain from the overthrow of Saddam and the opportunities it opened up--feels himself pulled toward a harsher brand of Islam in reaction to the pervasive insecurity of the occupation. Many flaws of the occupation have by now been exhaustively documented: the lack of significant international support at the outset; the catastrophic looting that followed the fall of Baghdad; the commitment of a grossly insufficient number of American troops to provide security, rebuild infrastructure, and fight a widening insurgency; the decisions to abolish the Iraqi Army and purge higher-level Baathists from government jobs, which turned several hundred thousand mostly Sunni Arabs, who might have become partners, into jobless, well-armed, and well-funded potential enemies; the slipshod planning in Washington and political mistakes in Baghdad that have forced the occupation authority to toss out one road map for Iraq's future after another.
Yet perhaps the greatest mistake made by the architects of the war was to assume that their vision of a liberal state would be eagerly embraced by an ethnically divided, overwhelmingly Islamic country with a long history of dictatorship. The Coalition Provisional Authority managed the occupation as if benevolent American intentions guaranteed success. Giving Iraqis a chance to experience and participate in democracy became less important than achieving a desired outcome. As a result, Paul Bremer and his colleagues failed to anticipate the level of resistance that would emanate from Iraq's various factions--in particular, the Shia.
The C.P.A. has been consistently slow to respond to the simmering frustrations of ordinary Iraqis. Since conditions in Iraq were already unravelling when Bremer arrived, last May, his primary focus has been on establishing his authority. "One thing that the C.P.A. couldn't make a mistake about was showing that it was in control," Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the British envoy to Iraq, told me at the end of March, just before returning to London. "This place has to be controlled, and I think this is an area where Bremer has got it exactly right, has shown that he's boss. The Iraqis wanted a boss." But, Greenstock admitted, "we could have been more consultative."
Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, who served as a C.P.A. adviser on democracy, put it more bluntly: "There has always been a tension in our occupation between control and legitimacy. And the more we've sought control, the less legitimacy we've had. I think we have erred in general, from the start, much too heavily in the direction of control at the expense of legitimacy, and that has come back to haunt us."
This is a dilemma that Bremer has never been able to resolve. In January and February, he oversaw the drafting of an interim Iraqi constitution by the Governing Council, the Iraqi body appointed by the Coalition. If Bremer had encouraged widespread public discussion of the emerging document's main points, in order to make educated participants of Iraqis, he would have risked seeing the inevitable controversies fought out in the streets. Instead, the interim constitution was written under tremendous time pressure, in small, secretive committee meetings during all-night negotiating sessions inside the Green Zone, the impenetrable fortified area in the center of Baghdad. The signing ceremony, on March 5th, was elaborately planned for the cameras: twenty-five pens were laid out on a table, one for each council member, and a chamber ensemble provided music. At the last minute, however, five Shiite members who had agreed to sign the document ruined Bremer's script by failing to show up.
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most respected Shiite cleric, had belatedly expressed his opposition to Article 61c of the interim constitution. The article, which soon became notorious, essentially gave Iraq's minority Kurds and Sunnis veto power over any element of the permanent constitution. For the Kurds, who were long oppressed by Iraq's central government, Article 61c was a guarantee of minority rights in a federal republic. In January, Bremer had sent a young and inexperienced team of advisers to negotiate with the senior Kurdish leaders, who refused to back off heavy demands. Even after Bremer personally intervened, the Kurds got almost everything they wanted, including an autonomous region in the north. To the Shiite religious leadership, which apparently learned of the article's language only at the last hour, the same Article 61c appeared to stand in the way of majority rule.
On March 8th, after three days of persuasion, the five Shiite holdouts on the council signed the document. The interim constitution is a real achievement--the only one the Governing Council can claim. It represents political compromise and a broad consensus about individual rights. During the final day and night of negotiations, Bremer yielded control--a rare moment for an official who has been described as a micromanager--and for eight hours became a silent observer, allowing the Iraqis to work out the unavoidable conflicts between majority rule and minority rights. But, because the C.P.A. and the council had failed to build any support for the interim constitution outside the Green Zone, its unveiling inspired street demonstrations, mass confusion over its contents, and a sharp increase in tension between the Shia and the Kurds. At a meeting of the district council in Baghdad's Karrada neighborhood, I listened to Governing Council representatives patiently explaining the interim constitution to a roomful of increasingly agitated citizens who, confronted with a fait accompli, accused the council of dismembering the country.
Even as it became clear that the key article risked undermining the entire document's legitimacy in the eyes of Iraq's majority, Bremer refused to consider any changes. An official involved in the process said that Bremer wanted the interim constitution to be sold to the Iraqi public in a one-way conversation: "He has a tremendous investment in this as one of his prized accomplishments."
Other than the June 30th deadline for the transfer of sovereignty, the interim constitution is just about all that remains of the November 15th agreement between the C.P.A. and the Governing Council--the agreement that outlined Iraq's political future, replacing Bremer's original plan. Throughout the year of its existence, the C.P.A. has seen its blueprints overrun by events beyond the Green Zone that were to some degree predictable--and were caused partly by its own deep isolation.
One crucial example has been the fate of Moqtada al-Sadr. Last summer, Hume Horan, the C.P.A.'s senior liaison to the Shia religious community, spoke with me about the dilemma posed by Moqtada. On the day after the fall of Baghdad, an American-backed liberal cleric, Abdel Majid al-Khoei, was killed by a mob of Moqtada's followers outside the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf. (Eyewitnesses have said that Moqtada himself refused to save his rival when Khoei was dragged bleeding to his door.) The murder was a power grab by Iraq's most radical Shiite faction. Later, Al Hawza, Moqtada's newspaper, published a blacklist with the names of Iraqi "collaborators," at least one of whom was subsequently killed. As a result, Horan told me, Moqtada's paper could be shut down and he could be arrested. Then again, putting Moqtada in jail might make him a martyr and, therefore, more dangerous.
During our conversation, Horan sounded as if he were inclined to let the establishment Shiite clerics of Najaf deal with the demagogic young upstart who had planted himself in their midst. "His father would be so distressed if he'd seen his son," Horan said of Moqtada. "Here's this unchurched son of one of the great churchmen, who fills the role without any of the qualifications. What is he lashing out at? Is it his own sense of inadequacy that is being projected?"
Last August, an Iraqi judge issued a warrant charging Moqtada with having ordered the killing of Khoei, but the C.P.A. kept the warrant a secret while it deliberated. One Coalition official said that the C.P.A. prepared to seize Moqtada on two occasions. "The word was `Lock your doors, bring everybody in. We're going to snatch Moqtada,'" he said. Both operations were abruptly called off. "The decisions had to have occurred somewhere up the Defense Department chain," the official said. (A C.P.A. spokesman said that its plans to capture Moqtada were not that definitive.)
During this same period, the C.P.A. found itself in a series of protracted battles with Ayatollah Sistani, the Shiite leader. The first was over Bremer's decision to have the permanent constitution written by unelected Iraqis. That plan was finally scrapped, in favor of the November 15th agreement, which put the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty ahead of elections and a constitution. Then another dispute arose: Sistani objected to the C.P.A.'s proposal to hold regional caucuses for the selection of Iraq's interim government. Months went by before Bremer, having steadily misjudged Sistani's power, threw out the plan.
While the C.P.A. and Sistani took each other's measure in private, there was no political progress in Iraq. The local and provincial councils set up by the C.P.A.--which should have been seedbeds of Iraq's future leadership, offering the best hope for the emergence of moderate indigenous alternatives to the sectarian parties, with their armed militias and foreign backers--never received the means to exercise real power and show their constituents concrete results. For months, members went unpaid; I was told that a draft of the government order delineating the councils' powers was prepared in October--but it wasn't issued until April 6th. The councils' reconstruction efforts were constantly hindered by bureaucratic clots that kept money from flowing to local military commanders and civil authorities.
The absence of healthier politics created a dangerous vacuum, which was filled by the most extreme tendencies in Iraq: the Sunni resistance, made up of Baathist, Islamist, and nationalist elements; and the Shiite street politics of Moqtada al-Sadr. Sistani and Moqtada are natural foes, for personal and ideological reasons, and Sistani, because of his immensely greater religious authority, commands a much larger following among Iraqi Shiites. But after Sistani declared his opposition to the interim constitution the balance of power shifted. "As long as the Coalition had Sistani's tacit support, it didn't need to worry too much about Moqtada al-Sadr," Amatzia Baram, an Iraq scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace, in Washington, told me. "But when Sistani announced his objection to the interim constitution the Coalition lost him." Article 61c placed Sistani, who was born in Iran, in a terrible position: he couldn't seem to be selling out Arab interests to the Kurds, nor could he afford to give Shiite radicals the chance to accuse him of selling out Islam. "That was a watershed moment," Baram said. "Because, from now on, every crazy Shiite could claim that he was fighting the Americans in Sistani's name. The moment radicals could present themselves as fighting for Sistani's causes, that united the Shia community against the Americans and the Governing Council. They were using Sistani's slogans against Sistani. Sistani became marginalized in his own name."
Moqtada's amplified significance was lost on Coalition officials. In late March, I asked Greenstock about the size of his following. "Tiny--and with no political impact," he said. "Go around Sadr City again now and you will find fewer Moqtada al-Sadr followers than you would have done five months ago." He added, "We thought he had an opportunity to bubble up and grow--he hasn't done it. Partly because he knows that if he moves anywhere he'll be picked up."
A week later, on March 28th, Bremer ordered the closing of Al Hawza; within days, American soldiers had arrested an aide to Moqtada. Urged on by Moqtada's vitriolic speeches, the Mahdi Army responded with demonstrations that quickly escalated into armed confrontations with Coalition troops in Baghdad and a number of southern cities, several of which fell under the militia's control. The uprising seriously damaged the C.P.A.'s authority and undermined the occupation's legitimacy in the eyes of many Shiites who otherwise have no love for the erratic Moqtada and his violent followers. In early May, after a month of fighting, the Americans acted to end the uprising, confronting the Mahdi Army in Najaf and Karbala.
The timing of the C.P.A.'s move against Al Hawza was baffling, coming in the middle of the mourning period that follows Ashura. A senior official in Washington suggested to me that the Administration had been caught off guard: "Was there a series of decisions that seemed idiotic to those of us back here? Yes. Is one of them that, during a major Muslim holiday, Moqtada al-Sadr is suddenly a persona non grata? Yes." Worse, the C.P.A. seemed not to have prepared for the reaction from Moqtada's militia, betraying a serious miscalculation of the young cleric's strength. The Mahdi Army had been acquiring money and guns since last summer, and continued to intimidate townspeople in Najaf and elsewhere; at one point in January, militiamen occupied the shrine of Imam Ali.
Amatzia Baram faulted Bremer for the clumsy manner of the March crackdown on Moqtada, but not for the effort itself. As with so many other C.P.A. decisions, he said, "You're damned if you do and damned if you don't. That's the main problem in Iraq these days."
Moqtada's newfound power was in part a result of the failed communications effort by the C.P.A. Its Iraqi Media Network has been ineptly run, featuring vapid programming and Coalition-friendly news briefs. The Pentagon, which is in charge of the occupation of Iraq, kept tight control over the flow of news for domestic political reasons. It was a self-defeating effort, however: American propaganda was no match for Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya--and Moqtada's newspaper.
The C.P.A., having sacrificed legitimacy for control, has ended up with neither. A former Coalition official traced the failures in Baghdad directly back to Washington, and he identified the central irony of the occupation: "A lot of this is the unwillingness of the Bush Administration to rock the boat before the election. And it's laughable that it's pursued this policy. Because of the failure to confront Moqtada, because of the failure to disarm the militias, because of the lack of troops on the ground, Bush may well lose the election."
In March, during the standoff over the interim constitution, I went to see Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurd on the Governing Council. A small man with a large nose and an unblinking stare, Othman was for many years the personal doctor of Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish peshmerga guerrillas who fought the Iraqi central government. Before the American invasion, Othman was living in London, and, like most Kurdish politicians, he shares the Americans' vision of a relatively secular and liberal Iraq. But, much to the annoyance of the C.P.A., he has proved to be the Governing Council's in-house critic. When most of its other members were jockeying to perpetuate their positions beyond the June 30th transfer of sovereignty, Othman was calling flatly for the council to be dissolved, saying that it hadn't worked. He placed the blame for the debacle over Article 61c squarely on Bremer--who, Othman claimed, had coddled the council's Shiite bloc early on, encouraging its members to become intransigent. "It's a humiliation to him," he told me, with faint satisfaction. "He gave them that leverage, coming and going, and it was very bad."
I asked Othman if the occupation was a failure. "It's not a success, either security-wise or media-wise or economic-wise," he said. "But I can't say it's a failure." He believed that most Iraqis still hoped for a decent life and a better society. In fact, Othman declared, going further than most observers would, "if things are set right, I think liberalism and secularism have the majority in this country always. But are the people now free to express their points of view? They are not. Because the country now is ruled by militias, mullahs, and warlords. The simple citizen is not allowed to have his own rights, to say freely what he wants." In one way, he added, the Americans were like Saddam: "They are not caring much for a simple Iraqi citizen. They care for a chief of a tribe here, a mullah there, a religious man here, a militiaman here, head of a party there."
As the June 30th deadline approaches, with no Iraqi interim government in sight, the United States has turned reluctantly to the United Nations. Until recently, Washington consistently prevented the U.N. from establishing any real authority in Iraq (the words "United Nations" appear nowhere in the November 15th agreement). But the Administration now finds that the C.P.A. and the Governing Council have so little legitimacy in the eyes of most Iraqis--including Ayatollah Sistani--that the transfer of sovereignty can't occur without outside help. Enter Lakhdar Brahimi, the U.N.'s envoy to Iraq, and an Algerian diplomat who was Secretary-General Kofi Annan's representative in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. In April, Brahimi and his team travelled to Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra to meet with groups of Iraqis and begin preparations for an interim government. The senior Administration official told me, "Brahimi has identified--unlike the ivory-tower C.P.A.--a lot of passionate, talented Iraqis who want the same things we want: freedom, democracy, liberty."
Fairly quickly, Brahimi concluded that the Governing Council should not be part of the new Iraqi government. "The Governing Council in its current constitution doesn't have the confidence of most Iraqis," his spokesman, Ahmed Fawzi, told me. At the end of April, Brahimi briefed the U.N. Security Council, in New York; he called for a caretaker government of technocrats, whose main purpose will be to prepare the country for elections by January, 2005. "We are reaching out to the professional associations, the trade unions, the universities, and asking them to give us the best of their crop," Fawzi said. "The best five lawyers, the best five doctors, the best five accountants, the best five engineers, to form a short list acceptable to all for a short-term interim government." A Prime Minister and a cabinet will be chosen by Brahimi, Bremer, and the Governing Council by the end of May. It seems inevitable that some of Iraq's leading politicians, including members of the Governing Council, will end up with positions in the interim government, though this will surely be the subject of intense negotiations between rival factions. Brahimi, who oversaw Afghanistan's loya jirga, imagines Iraqis from all sectors of society gathering in a national conference soon after June 30th to choose an advisory body, or rump parliament. The conference could be the first chance for ordinary Iraqis to feel that they have a stake in the country's political future.
It's not clear that a U.S. Administration with a history of pronounced hostility to the U.N. will relinquish real authority in Iraq to it, even now. The senior official said, "There are people in this Administration who have led me to believe that the U.N. is a greater clear and present danger to the United States than any foreign enemy, including Osama bin Laden." Robert Blackwill, a director at the National Security Council, will be Washington's point man in the process; according to the senior official, Blackwill will keep the pressure on Bremer to accept Brahimi's recommendations. Will the U.N., for its part, having been so badly undermined by the Administration on Iraq, return in force now, when things are going so poorly? "Kofi's going to have a really hard time looking at this and saying, `Do I want a piece of this?'" the senior official said.
Annan and Brahimi, perhaps sensing that the U.N. is being set up to take the fall for what is bound to be an unstable, tumultuous period before elections, have tried to lower expectations about the organization's role in Iraq. Brahimi cannot answer some of the most important questions about the transition--such as how extensive Iraqi sovereignty will be, and what the relationship will be between the interim government and the U.S. military. Ahmed Fawzi expressed the hope that a sovereign Iraqi government will take the steam out of the insurgency. In the meantime, another U.N. official told me, the security situation in Iraq is so perilous that "it's going to be very difficult for any full-scale engagement of the U.N. in Iraq for the next couple of months." He added, "We're expected to take the lead--and we're not the lead. We're helping to do what we can. But the political reality is that the Americans are the biggest player in Iraq, and they're going to be before and after June 30th."
The only good reason left for the invasion of Iraq, and for an ongoing war involving a hundred and thirty-five thousand American troops, is the creation of a decent Iraqi government. The National Democratic Institute is an organization funded largely by the U.S. government and affiliated with the Democratic Party; it operates with relative independence, under the direction of the National Endowment for Democracy. The institute's purpose is to find what Mahmoud Othman called "the simple citizens" in a place like Iraq, and help them to participate in democratic political life. This tends to be obscure, poorly funded work--but the Bush Administration wants to pour half a billion dollars into Iraq for "democracy-building" programs before the transfer of sovereignty and national elections. The effort is floundering, however, because the escalation of violence has made it hard to spend the money.
Early one morning in mid-March, I drove to Hilla, which is ninety minutes south of Baghdad, with a group of Iraqis and Americans working for N.D.I. We travelled in non-armored vehicles, without guards. In the back seat of one of the sedans, wearing a navy-blue suit, a salmon-colored tie, and glasses, was David Dettman, a pale, chain-smoking political consultant from Ohio. For many years, Dettman, who is thirty-three and has the nervous, self-deprecating sense of humor of a Jack Lemmon character, worked successfully as a campaign consultant in Washington. Then he ran for the Ohio state legislature as a Democrat, got creamed, and had an epiphany. "What got me charged up is that I really believed in the process," he told me. He decided to leave his job, and he became one of N.D.I.'s democratization missionaries, posted in Ukraine. To the dismay of his wife, his mother, and his boss, Dettman had come to Iraq for two weeks to train groups of aspiring political-party activists in Baghdad, Tikrit, and Hilla.
The workshop in Hilla took place in the city's former secret-police headquarters, which has become a human-rights center. Forty Iraqis--including a political-science professor and an unemployed sports instructor--had travelled at some risk to attend the class. They listened intently and took careful notes as Dettman stood before a flip chart and presented a ten-step program on message development and voter contact. Mayasa al-Naimy, an Iraqi staff member of N.D.I., gamely translated the exotic campaign terminology: "earned media," "communications strategy," "wedge and base issues." (Dettman had told me earlier, "Politics is the art of getting people to vote for you. It's applicable all over the world. If it wasn't, I wouldn't have a job.")
After two hours of discussion, an Iraqi raised his hand. "This shows me we're making a transition from dictatorship to democracy," he said. "That makes me feel good. But this is the question: Will the American Administration leave it to us? Or just throw someone on us? Will all these efforts be lost?"
Outside, in the distance, there was an explosion--mortar fire--and then a second, closer one, which was followed by gunfire. Dettman glanced out the window and grinned with alarm.
"Does that answer your question?" someone asked.
"I'm not the government," Dettman said. "I'm N.D.I. We have to eat lunch. Can we talk about this later?"
After lunch, Dettman returned to the question. "My opinion is if America invaded Iraq for nothing other than to have a friendly dictator, then all of the American and Iraqi lives that were lost will have been wasted," he said. "I supported the invasion because I'm in the democratization business. I don't know anything about W.M.D.--I don't know if anyone was telling the truth or not--but I do know the Iraqi people deserve freedom. I can't say the Americans won't do anything wrong, because they already have done many things wrong in this occupation. And I'm sorry. But there's a reason N.D.I. is here now, and there's a reason we didn't bring a tank. We're the least armed Americans in Hilla. We're here trusting your hospitality. Because democracy is good and right." He went on, "If this traumatic war was fought for anything other than that, I'm gonna be mad. Here's the problem: I can't do much. I'm just the arrogant American in a suit standing up in front of you. I haven't suffered as much as you have. Only you can build democracy here. But if I just thought America was going to steal the freedom we fought for I would have stayed home with my wife and had a lovely time."
"Aren't you having a lovely time here?" someone asked.
"I am having a lovely time. But I miss my wife."
It was a heartfelt speech, and it was received with scattered applause. Then a man sitting near me muttered to himself, "A British guy named Hempher laid plans decades ago for Presidents to take turns ruling Iraq."
The people in the room belonged to Shaker's "middle level of mind." They were neither mullahs nor militiamen, and some of the parties they belonged to counted no more than several hundred members. One of the participants was Jawdet al-Obeidi, a former Army officer from Hilla. He fled Iraq after taking part in the Shiite uprising in 1991, and ended up in Portland, Oregon. He started a small limousine company there, and last year he sold it and returned to Iraq, as a member of a militia aligned with the U.S. invasion force. Since then, Obeidi has poured a hundred and fifty thousand dollars of his savings into building a coalition of almost two hundred small political parties that can challenge the larger parties in parliamentary elections. (Already, there are some three hundred political parties in Iraq.) The coalition's platform combines a moderate Muslim agenda with Iraqi nationalism and a respect for individual rights--a deliberately mild mixture that seems designed to have broad support. Obeidi, a balding, middle-aged man with a salesman's cheerfulness, has received death threats, and his brother-in-law survived three bullets in the head.
Also at the meeting was a married couple from Mahawil, a village of dirt roads and salt marshes near Hilla: Emad Dawood, who worked in a shop selling construction materials, and his wife, Saad, who had received a business degree in Baghdad but was unable to find work, and was now raising their three children. She was one of only three women at the meeting; like the others, she wore a hijab.
Her husband explained to me, "We go everywhere together."
"Any educated couple would do this," Saad said.
"Of course, we have religion, and we go by the rules," Emad added. "The Islamic religion doesn't say women can't mix with other men, but everything has to do with limits."
Saad pointed out that Islam doesn't deny women the right to participate in politics: "They should have a role in everything."
In Hilla, the repression of the 1991 Shiite uprising was particularly brutal, and, last year, mass graves containing thousands of victims were uncovered on the periphery of the town. Saad and Emad had each lost a brother, and many friends. The couple had only the vaguest notion of what was in Iraq's new interim constitution, but they knew very well what it was like to live under Saddam. "It's like a hammer on your head every day," Emad said, "and then they take it away."
The Dawoods had once seen the Americans as heroic liberators, but the feeling was short-lived. According to Emad, as the occupation ground on, with constant power outages and rampant crime, ordinary unhappiness was turning into a kind of insanity. "Things are just getting worse here," Saad added. "Of course, if there was democracy things would change."
"But democracy needs a long period of time, because we've been living so long under Saddam," Emad said.
"Most people do not get the idea of democracy," Saad said. "Ask anybody about democracy, and you'd find most people would say, `What am I going to do with democracy? Give me security first.'"
Emad told me, "I know a guy who shot two bullets at random. He said, `Isn't this freedom?'"
As for Dettman's presentation, it clearly meant something to this couple that Americans had come to meet with them in Hilla. Dettman had given them a lot of helpful information, they felt. Their only complaint was that there was no exam at the end, to test how much they'd learned about democracy.
The failures of the occupation and the violence of the insurgency have stranded moderate Iraqis like those who attended the meeting in Hilla. Lakhdar Brahimi wants to bring such Iraqis onto the national political stage, but, considering the disproportionate power of groups represented on the Governing Council and backed by foreign states, the chances for success are poor. Marina Ottaway, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me that, after the fall of dictatorships, "you always have a lot of political parties forming, and they never get anywhere." N.D.I., she concluded, is "bravely doing something that is completely futile."
Of course, electoral success isn't the only measure of what organizations like N.D.I. are trying to do. In Hilla, it felt like an achievement simply to hold a discussion, amid gunfire, about democracy, in which there was a genuine give-and-take between Iraqis and foreigners. The fact that Hempher, the supposed British spy blamed for so much trouble in the Muslim world, was invoked at the Hilla workshop was a less hopeful sign. The Americans' mistakes in Iraq have been only part of the story of disappointment. Many Iraqis--damaged beyond imagining by the cruelty of Saddam's rule, and afflicted with outsized expectations and suspicions of America--have fallen back on aspects of their culture and faith that offer a blind resistance to the new world that has been thrown open before them. In the past year, Iraq has undergone not just a war but a revolution. It's no wonder that Iraqis have responded not only with hope but with confusion, rage, and despair; the wonder is that Americans expected anything else.
We left Hilla just before dark, and set out for Baghdad. An hour later, on a nearby road, three people--an American woman working with Iraqi women's groups, a C.P.A. press officer, and their Iraqi translator--were ambushed and shot to death by men wearing Iraqi police uniforms. It was the start of a wave of attacks on foreign civilians and the Iraqis who worked with them. The violence had still not subsided by early May, and most of the non-governmental groups and contractors working for democracy in Iraq had evacuated their foreign employees. Les Campbell, the Middle East director of N.D.I., recently told me that the organization's foreign staff was in Amman, Jordan, waiting for the violence to diminish before returning to Baghdad, where the Iraqi staff continues to work. Meanwhile, Campbell is talking with private security firms, and looking for the right armored car.
He has not lost his optimism altogether. "Even with all the problems in Iraq, there is already far more civil-society space and party organizing than in any other Arab country," he said. He described how N.D.I.'s Iraqi staff members, such as Mayasa al-Naimy, have begun to blossom intellectually. "Even in the midst of the killings, which are terrible, and even though the planning and administration continue to be a joke, something interesting is going on here," Campbell said. "It makes me sort of sick to think it might not work."
Three days after the trip to Hilla, I paid another visit to Dr. Shaker at his house in Sadr City. His brother Samir had just come back from a demonstration against the interim constitution, led by one of Moqtada al-Sadr's top aides, in Firdus Square, the same spot where Saddam's statue was pulled down a year ago. "The Kurds have more rights than the others," Samir said. "They can veto anything we decide, but we don't have the right to veto."
Ali had watched a Shiite politician on television who said that Arabs could refuse the Kurds' demands for federalism. "We don't know anything about the constitution," Ali said. "It was written, handed over to the Governing Council to sign, and then shown to the people, who never saw it before."
As for Shaker, the controversy filled him with foreboding. He doubted that Iraq would remain intact. The Shia, the Kurds, and the Sunnis had agendas that could never be reconciled. "The story will be like Lebanon," Shaker told me. "A civil war."
Arab against Kurd? "A strong possibility." Shiite against Sunni? "It's a possibility," he said. "The constitution will be the starting point, and then the event will be gradually increased." I asked if he envisioned rival armies fighting each other. "That is how I imagine it," he said. But, the likeliest scenario of all, he added, was a civil war among his own people, the Shia.
It was my last visit to the house. Afterward, neighbors belonging to Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army warned Shaker against having any more American visitors.
It was a few weeks later, on March 28th, that Moqtada's uprising began, and Sadr City exploded in days and nights of firefights between militiamen and American soldiers. I spoke with the doctor by phone. He had spent days trapped at home, unable to go to the morgue, while the uprising continued. Twelve of his friends in the neighborhood had died in crossfire. His brothers, Ali and Samir, wanted to join the Mahdi Army and fight the Americans, but he had stopped them. The scale of the violence shocked him, but not its outbreak, which he had seen coming. The bravery of the young militiamen, standing up to tanks with small arms, impressed him, and though he deplored their tactics, he sympathized with their goal--"real Islamic democracy."
Shaker said, "My idea of the situation now: the Americans are at the high level and Moqtada is down at the bottom, and they can't understand each other. They should be in the middle." He added, "The Americans have to use the political way. Bremer must be more diplomatic, more flexible. He needs to go through the middle level of mind--as I told you. He must speak to people like me."

Posted by maximpost at 10:43 PM EDT
Permalink




FURIOUS BUSH DEMANDS TO SEE ALL PRISONER ABUSE PHOTOS, VIDEOS
**Exclusive**
A furious President Bush has demanded to see all photos and videos showing abuse of Iraq detainees, a senior White House source said late Sunday.
"The president was blindsided by the first TV images, he will not be blindsided again," the source, who demanded anonymity, explained to the DRUDGE REPORT.
The president has instructed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to present him with him all known images that could further deepen the crises.
Monday editions of the NEW YORKER feature photos of a dog attacking a naked Iraqi detainee at Abu Ghraib prison.
President Bush was aware of the photo, the top source claims.
The White House is preparing for more fallout, and leaks from lawmakers.
The Pentagon is considering the possibility of showing the unseen material to members of Congress.
"It's clear the moment the evidence is sent to the Congress, we will see a new feeding frenzy in the media."

Filed By Matt Drudge
Reports are moved when circumstances warrant
http://www.drudgereport.com for updates
(c)DRUDGE REPORT 2004
Not for reproduction without permission of the author
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Officials Grapple With How and When to Release Images
By THOM SHANKER

WASHINGTON, May 9 -- The Defense Department is planning to provide Congress with many more pictures of the abusive treatment of Iraqi detainees, but has not decided whether to release them to the public, Congressional leaders and Pentagon officials said Sunday.
In the end, President Bush is likely to make the determination on making the images public, aides said.
Inside the White House, several of Mr. Bush's aides have argued that he has little choice but to make them public. Sooner or later, they say, the images will leak out, prolonging the pain, fueling Iraqi and Arab suspicions of a Pentagon-orchestrated cover-up, and giving new life to calls for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's removal.
Many in the Pentagon, though, are resisting. Pentagon officials warned that a public release could jeopardize its criminal inquiry. They theorized that defense lawyers could cite a governmental release in motions to dismiss charges, arguing that their clients could not get a fair hearing. So far, seven soldiers are facing charges related to abuse of Iraqi detainees.
In meetings this weekend, officials who took part said, some senior military officials argued that releasing the pictures would only further inflame Iraqis, fuel the insurgency and make it nearly impossible to gain help from Arab allies. Moreover, the officials expressed fear in those meetings that any captured American soldiers would be placed at greater risk.
That argument broke out in public on Sunday when the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John W. Warner, Republican of Virginia, seemed to back keeping the images from public view, describing them as "of a classified nature" on the NBC News program "Meet the Press." He was immediately challenged by a fellow Republican, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, who shot back: "If there's a videotape out there, for God's sake let's talk about it, because men and women's lives are at stake, given how we handle this. So I want to get it all out on the table."
The Pentagon's chief spokesman, Larry Di Rita, confirmed that the Defense Department had been in discussions with Congress to find a way for members to view the photographs and videos. "We're looking for a mechanism to do that," Mr. Di Rita said.
One complication, he said, is that the Pentagon is not certain it has obtained all photographic and video material gathered as evidence in the case from military investigators in Iraq.
While pressure grew to push the images out for public review, the Pentagon was aware that such a decision could taint the criminal investigation.
On one hand, Mr. Di Rita said, is "an understandable desire for people to see and get a better sense of the range of activities that may be depicted in the photos." On the other, he noted, "is everybody's desire and obligation to be careful about not prejudicing an administrative review and criminal proceeding."
In an interview later Sunday, Mr. Graham, a colonel in the Air Force Reserve with 20 years' experience in the area of military justice, said: "We actually have an opportunity to prove to those who may still be open-minded that there is a difference between us and the Saddam Hussein regime. I really do believe that a lot of people are sort of checking under the hood of democracy to see if they want to be part of it."
He said the material was almost certain to become public eventually and that a "drip, drip" of damaging photos would only add to what he described as a public relations disaster. He said there might be a way to release the material and protect the investigation, but "at the end of the day there is a larger issue and this is of the credibility of the United States."
During back-to-back hearings on Friday on detainee abuse convened by the House and Senate, members from both parties warned that American troops in Iraq were less secure, and the United States was less secure, because the depraved acts of detainee abuse have so ignited world anger. Some members of Congress have called on Mr. Rumsfeld to resign.
Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, agreed that the public should view the images.
"It's best that this be seen for what it is," Senator Levin said. "Judgments then can be made by people. Any effort to hide this kind of material is just not going to work. We have an open society. We are proving it, I believe, by proceeding to investigate the way we are."
Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, who also serves on the Armed Services Committee, warned that scandals grow until information is released.
"Look, one thing I know about scandals: They go on and on and on until the American people feel they have a full and complete picture of what happened," Senator McCain said on "Fox News Sunday."
"And to hold back these pictures, or to hold back the videos and only show them to members of Congress or something like that, first, is foolish, because they'll leak out, but second of all, it is sending the wrong signal," he added.
But Senator McCain indicated that focusing on the images missed larger, more important questions, including whether the military police unit at Abu Ghraib, a notorious prison during the Hussein era, was acting on the specific orders of military intelligence to soften up detainees in advance of interrogation.
Senator Levin also warned that the degrading treatment of detainees might be "much more systemic than just a few guards abusing prisoners," and that it might have been part of a wider effort "to extract information from these prisoners."
"And this was part of a new intelligence policy which goes right on up to the Pentagon and perhaps even beyond," Senator Levin said.
He said that "some of the environment here was actually set at the White House when they said it was a bunch of legalisms to discuss whether or not the Geneva Conventions would apply to prisoners directly or whether they would be treated consistent with the Geneva Conventions or in the same way but not precisely."
This policy, Senator Levin said, was "splitting legal hairs about the application of Geneva Conventions, and it seems to me that sent exactly the wrong message to the intelligence people and to the guards themselves."

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company |

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CACI Defends Screening of Interrogators
By Ellen McCarthy
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A19


CACI International Inc. said yesterday that its interrogators were carefully screened and worked under the supervision of the U.S. military in Iraqi detention centers.
The Arlington government contractor, whose employee Steven Stefanowicz is implicated in an Army report on prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, said in a statement released yesterday that it reviewed 1,600 applications for interrogator positions and sent less than 3 percent on to the military for final approval.
The company also said all of its interrogators had secret clearances that required background investigations and the workers were briefed on military rules of engagement.The statement did not define the rules.
The military dictated "how CACI must operate in Iraq and included the required qualifications for interrogators and other allied specialties. The company has followed these instructions," the statement said.
Stefanowicz is cited in the report as one of four men who were either "directly or indirectly responsible" for the abuses at the prison near Baghdad.
The company has hired a law firm to conduct its own investigation of the allegations. It reiterated yesterday that none of its employees have been formally charged with wrongdoing and that the company was cooperating with the military's investigation of the abuses.
CACI's statement also supported Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's testimony before Congress last week that civilian contractors are "responsible to military intelligence who hire them, and have the responsibility for supervising them."
The firm again said it would take "appropriate action" against any employee found to have acted illegally. It also said its employees continue to perform a number of duties in Iraq, including interrogation services.
In an interview last night, CACI chief executive J.P. London said the company's contract with the military defined the terms of its service, including length of engagement and pricing. "It's pretty straight forward," he said. "We will provide services to the U.S. military. We don't provide supervisory services over anybody else. That's very clear."
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Analysts Say Iraqi Agencies Unlikely to Follow U.S. Rules

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A20
With less than two months before the Coalition Provisional Authority is to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi government, CPA administrator L. Paul Bremer III has been establishing rules for key agencies in the fields of intelligence, defense and the law that analysts say may not survive long because they reflect American rather than Middle Eastern values.
The new Iraqi intelligence service, which the CPA has created to replace Saddam Hussein's Mukhabarat, will not collect intelligence that helps or harms any "legal" political party or Iraqi government official, under an order Bremer signed April 1. Nor will the agency carry out covert activities against "any Iraqi citizen or group based on race, religion, sect, gender, language, origin or tribal affiliation," the order said.
In some cases, Bremer's orders go beyond U.S. government practices. For example, after the U.S.-led coalition transfers limited sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government June 30, officers in the new Iraqi armed forces will have to wait 18 months after resigning or retiring before they are permitted to hold any political office, under Bremer's order establishing the new Ministry of Defense.
"There is no chance at all that a follow-on government [in Baghdad] will observe these orders," said Patrick Lang, a retired colonel and former head of the Middle East division of the Defense Intelligence Agency. "They need to walk away from us."
"No one has any illusion that it all is going to last," said Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a specialist in the Middle East. He said Iraqis will reshape all the orders and ideas that Bremer's group is promulgating, no matter what is put down on paper.
"It makes perfect sense as attempts to lead into the future," Cordesman said, "but Americans need to understand we are just creating a climate for Iraqis . . . and it will be modified by them."
Lang agreed with Cordesman that the Iraqis will "adapt their government to their own traditions and culture."
"We can write all those things into law and it won't do any good," Lang said. "Saddam had a constitution with some of those same words, but none of it worked because they ignored it. That's their culture."
A poll of Iraqis taken in February found that only 42 percent of those surveyed understood that a transitional constitution had been approved, and that only half of that number understood that a constitution is "a nation's fundamental law," according to a recent Defense Department report.
Some of Bremer's orders are designed to keep military and intelligence officers out of the Iraqi political system to avoid having a new dictator emerge, as Hussein did 35 years ago. According to a Baghdad newspaper report, the newly named defense minister, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, and the director of the intelligence service, Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed Shehwani, have already moved into political activities, working behind the scenes to reach an understanding with Moqtada Sadr, the Shiite cleric leading an anti-coalition insurgency.
Juan Cole, a University of Michigan professor who specializes in Middle Eastern affairs, noted earlier this week that Allawi "clearly wants to build a future political career by bringing order to the country."
The Mukhabarat was a sort of hybrid of the FBI and CIA, and regularly surveilled, arrested, imprisoned, tortured and even killed both citizens and foreigners.
The new Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) "shall have no power to arrest or detain persons" under its charter, which supplemented Bremer's order. Instead, it will provide intelligence "to Iraqi law enforcement authorities not precluded by other law."
Under Bremer's order, the INIS will be headed by a director general named by the future prime minister and confirmed by the body vested with national legislative authority. The director general will serve for five years and "ensure that no information is obtained by the INIS except so far as necessary for the proper discharge of its responsibilities."
In conducting searches or wiretaps, INIS employees will "minimize the unintentional acquisition, retention and dissemination of information about citizens of Iraq that is not of value in its work on national security," its charter says. Warrants from a judge will be obtained in advance and will be operable for only 90 days, after which a renewal will be required.
Bremer's order setting up the new defense ministry includes a set of "principles" to be followed in its operation, including one that calls for the ministry to "play its full part in reinforcing national unity" and not be "used to foster or institutionalize disunity."
Another principle is that the armed forces act to gain the confidence of the Iraqi people by "acting in the country's interest" and "abiding by laws and telling the truth."
The new defense minister "shall exercise administrative control" over the Iraqi armed forces, but operational control will remain with the "command of coalition forces," under another order Bremer signed March 21.
Another order Bremer recently signed in effect gave legal protection, after the transfer of sovereignty, to U.S. and other coalition military forces. It said the Central Criminal Court authorities "shall not compel" foreign military forces to appear if they are in Iraq "in support of operations sanctioned by a U.N. Security Council resolution."
Normally such protection is included in a status-of-forces agreement signed between governments.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company



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Iraq Oil Exports Cut by Pipeline Sabotage

BAGHDAD (Reuters) - A sabotage attack against a southern pipeline has reduced Iraq (news - web sites)'s oil exports sharply, the South Oil Company President said on Monday.
"The situation is not good," Jabar al-Leaby told Reuters, but declined to say how much oil was still being exported.
Leaby said the attack affected flows to the Basra terminal, the export point for most of Iraq's 1.8 million barrels per day of overseas sales -- and the country's only means of earning foreign currency.
The attack came around two weeks after Western forces occupying southern Iraq foiled suicide boat attacks on oil tankers at the Basra terminal.
Violence has intensified in southern Iraq in recent weeks after occupying forces cracked down on followers of Shi'ite leader Moqtada al-Sadr.
(Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Baghdad newsroom)




SUDAN
Algerian bullets
Late last month, an Ilyushin-76 aircraft with clear Algerian air force markings unloaded ten tonnes of ammunition at Ab?ch? airport, 170 kilometres from Chad's border with Sudan, say Western diplomatic sources. Did President Idriss D?by swap Algerian Islamists for support for his fellow Zaghawa fighting Sudan's Islamist regime?


ZIMBABWE
Disappearing food
The government may turn away food aid as part of its ruthless election strategy
An internal United Nations' memorandum describes Zimbabwe's latest crop projections as 'complete nonsense' and 'quite impossible.' That's no surprise. Fanciful agricultural forecasts are common in Agriculture Minister Joseph Made's department but these particular projections are critical. The forecasts were used to justify the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front government's decision to turn down food aid this year. At a meeting on 30 March, a Ministry official claimed that the harvest would be 1.7 million tonnes, an impossibly big figure.
The following day, Minister of Labour Paul Mangwana met UN officials and diplomats, reiterated the figures and emphasised that the government had asked the UN to keep food aid out of the humanitarian assistance appeal. Yet the current debate within ZANU-PF shows that there are still practical constraints. Periodic fuel shortages and scarcity of spare parts limit the government's ability to move the food quickly to wherever it can win most votes. So a ruthless campaign to benefit from shutting out foreign food aid could still work against the ruling party. Politicians will lose votes if the gamble goes wrong; hungry Zimbabweans may lose their lives.


KENYA
Kibaki's crowded diary
The President has to take some tough decisions to rescue the coalition government
The next six months will be critical for President Mwai Kibaki and for the future of his National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government. After almost 18 months of power, NARC's standing with Kenyans has plummeted as partisan squabbling has overshadowed the government's efforts at economic revival and the promised creation of 500,000 jobs a year (AC Vol 45 No 4). After reopening parliament last month, Kibaki has attempted to assert the authority of the presidency. He has brokered a truce between rival wings of the ruling coalition, but the deal-making has just bought time before difficult decisions are made in the coming months. The key issues are: 1)constitutional reform; 2)political party reorganisation; 3)cabinet reshuffle; 4)the anti-corruption campaign; 5)civil service retrenchment; 6)drawing down IMF and World Bank credits; and 7)tackling security
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Rumsfeld Should Stay
By WILLIAM SAFIRE

WASHINGTON -- Donald Rumsfeld has been designated by Democratic politicians as the scapegoat for the scandal at Abu Ghraib prison. But any resignation would only whet their appetite to cut and run. The highly effective defense secretary owes it to the nation's war on terror to soldier on.
Because today's column will generate apoplectic e-mail, a word about contrarian opinion: Shortly after 9/11, with the nation gripped by fear and fury, the Bush White House issued a sweeping and popular order to crack down on suspected terrorists. The liberal establishment largely fell cravenly mute. A few lonely civil libertarians spoke out. When I used the word "dictatorial," conservatives, both neo- and paleo-, derided my condemnation as "hysterical."
One Bush cabinet member paid attention. Rumsfeld appointed a bipartisan panel of attorneys to re-examine that draconian edict. As a result, basic protections for the accused Qaeda combatants were included in the proposed military tribunals.
Perhaps because of those protections, the tribunals never got off the ground. (The Supreme Court will soon, I hope, provide similar legal rights to suspected terrorists who are U.S. citizens.) But in the panic of the winter of 2001, Rumsfeld was one of the few in power concerned about prisoners' rights. Some now demanding his scalp then supported the repressive Patriot Act.
In last week's apology before the Senate, Rumsfeld assumed ultimate responsibility, as J.F.K. did after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Pentagon chief failed to foresee and warn the president of the danger lurking in the Army's public announcement in January of its criminal investigation into prisoner abuse. He failed to put the nation's reputation ahead of the regulation prohibiting "command influence" in criminal investigations, which protects the accused in courts-martial.
The secretary testified that he was, incredibly, the last to see the humiliating photos that turned a damning army critique by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba into a media firestorm. Why nobody searched out and showed him those incendiary pictures immediately reveals sheer stupidity on the part of the command structure and his Pentagon staff.
But then Senator Mark Dayton of Minnesota rudely badgered the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Richard Myers, repeatedly hurling the word "suppression" at him. General Myers had been trying to save the lives of troops by persuading CBS to delay its broadcast of pictures that would inflame resistance. Rumsfeld quieted the sound-bite-hungry politician by reminding him that requests to delay life-threatening reports were part of long military-media tradition.
This was scandal with no cover-up; the wheels of investigation and prosecution were grinding, with public exposure certain. Second only to the failure to prevent torture was the Pentagon's failure to be first to break the bad news: the Taguba report should have been released at a Rumsfeld press conference months ago.
Now every suspect ever held in any U.S. facility will claim to have been tortured and demand recompense. Videos real and fake will stream across the world's screens, and propagandists abroad will join defeatists here in calling American prisons a "gulag," gleefully equating Bush not just with Saddam but with Stalin.
Torture is both unlawful and morally abhorrent. But what about gathering intelligence from suspected or proven terrorists by codified, regulated, manipulative interrogation? Information thus acquired can save thousands of lives. Will we now allow the pendulum to swing back to "name, rank, serial number," as if suspected terrorists planning the bombing of civilians were uniformed prisoners of war obeying the rules of war?
The United States shows the world its values by investigating and prosecuting wrongdoers high and low. It is not in our political value system to scapegoat a good man for the depraved acts of others. Nor does it make strategic sense to remove a war leader in the vain hope of appeasing critics of the war.
This secretary of defense, who has the strong support of the president, is both effective and symbolic. If he were to quit under political fire, pressure would mount for America to quit under insurgent fire. Hang in there, Rummy! You have a duty to serve in our "long, hard slog."
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company

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Analysis: Withdrawal on the cards?

By Paul Reynolds
BBC News Online world affairs correspondent

Events in Iraq have been spinning out of control - and out of control of the spinners - so fast on so many fronts that the W word - withdrawal - is now being mentioned.
Charles Heyman, senior defence analyst for Jane's Consultancy Group, wrote in the London Times on Monday:
"It begins to look as though there is going to be a rather messy political solution to the whole affair, possibly brokered by the United Nations.
"Expect to see an agreement where both sides can claim some sort of a victory, followed by a rather hasty withdrawal of coalition troops at some stage in the next six months."
It is certainly true that on three fronts the coalition is not doing too well:
On the military, the insurgency has clearly spread from the few "former regime elements" and "foreign fighters" whom coalition spokesmen regularly blame.
Will the interim government be able to command the loyalty of Iraqis to a sufficient degree to bring the insurgency under control?
And the ability of the coalition to impose its own solutions has slipped away.
The bizarre situation in Falluja is a prime example of this.
The sight of former Republican Guard General Jasim Saleh appearing on the scene in his chauffeur-driven Mercedes and his old uniform to negotiate a security role for himself could hardly have contradicted the coalition's original aim of driving out the fighters from Falluja more vividly.
And what has happened to Moqtada Sadr, the fiery young Muslim leader, who, we were told, was going to be brought to justice on a murder charge? Not much, it seems.
The propaganda war could not have gone worse with the publication of the photos of prisoner abuse.
Whatever the origin of some of these photos, the damage has been done on the street.
The pictures highlight the problem that the coalition, having failed to make the case for going to war over the elusive weapons issue, is now failing to make its second case - the moral argument that it can bring the rule of law to a land without law.
The third problem is political.
There is now only May and June to go before the handover of "sovereignty" to an interim government.
Yet this government will have no power. It will be able to make no new laws or change any law previously decreed by the Coalition Provisional Authority.
It will also have very limited powers over the occupation troops, to be renamed the multi-national force.
So will it be able to command the loyalty of Iraqis to a sufficient degree to bring the insurgency under control?
Tug of war
Against the gloomy predictions, one has to say that the will of the soon-to-be-appointed Iraqi Interim Government and that of the United States and the UK to see this through should not be underestimated.
And there is always a risk that the herd instinct of journalists and commentators often predicts one thing while events produce another.
Christopher Hitchens, the gadfly journalist who has been one of the war's great supporters, writes acerbically of his fellow hacks in Slate magazine:
"It's now fairly obvious that those who cover Iraq have placed their bets on a fiasco or 'quagmire'."
He is still hoping for an eventual settlement in Iraq, which might go democracy's way:
"There are vast numbers of Iraqis - as we know from the leaflets distributed in Najaf, and the blogs from Baghdad, and from the hundreds of thousands who are exercising their right of return to the country - who do not wish to live under the rule of demented mullahs. The pulse and heart rate of the society have barely had a chance to register."
The problem is that a year after the invasion, there are still no plans for an election before the end of this year and therefore the "chance to register" for all those moderates is still not available.
The whole idea was based on the belief that, as in Germany and Japan after the war, resistance would collapse and that the task of building institutions could therefore be given time.
It is instructive, for example, that even at this stage in Iraq, the drawing up of voting lists is only just being examined.
Time, as it turned out, has not been on the coalition's side and the race between chaos and stability is still on.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3681289.stm
Published: 2004/05/03 19:15:23 GMT
? BBC MMIV


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Daniel Pearl 'refused to be sedated before his throat was cut'
By Massoud Ansari in Karachi
(Filed: 09/05/2004)


Horrifying new details of how Daniel Pearl, the murdered Wall Street Journal reporter, met his death have emerged from the interrogation of new suspects by Pakistani police.
Pearl, who was kidnapped in Karachi in January 2002, knew for several hours that he was about to be killed, but resisted repeated attempts to sedate him, police now believe.
He was fully aware of what was happening when the Arab extremists who took control during his final days cut his throat, according to information gleaned from Pakistani militants now in police custody.
Shocking video film of Pearl's murder, seen around the world via the internet, was in fact a partial reconstruction of what had happened a few moments earlier, officers have been told.
The camera operator made a mistake and missed the moment of his death, which his murderers then re-enacted, before decapitating the reporter.
The revelations have fuelled anger among police investigators that at least a dozen leading suspects in the kidnap and murder of the 38-year-old journalist have been arrested, but have not been charged or tried in connection with his death.
Some have been accused of unrelated - and mostly lesser - offences. The three most recently captured suspects have not yet been charged, and their arrests have never been officially announced.
The only cases brought so far in connection with Pearl's death have been those against Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the British-born al-Qaeda terrorist, who was convicted of kidnap and conspiracy to murder the American journalist, and three others who played relatively minor roles in the kidnapping.
All were given life sentences for conspiracy to kidnap, but are now appealing against their convictions in the country's high court. Pakistani authorities are said to be reluctant to put the new suspects on trial lest their evidence helps the first four win their appeals.
A legal official said: "No matter what Sheikh is guilty of, if the police were forced to change their account of what happened because of newfound evidence, he might be given the benefit of the doubt on everything else, and be set free immediately."
Omar Sheikh, the mastermind of the kidnapping, set the trap which lured Pearl to his captors. He put the reporter in touch with a man who, he pretended, would introduce him to an extremist Muslim leader whom Pearl wished to interview.
Contrary to evidence given during Omar Sheikh's trial, police now believe he may not have been present when Pearl met Sajid Jabbar, the go-between, at a Karachi restaurant. It was after the meeting that Pearl disappeared.
Investigators say that senior officials in the Sindh police - the force responsible for Karachi - are "petrified" that if militants arrested in the past year were tried for their part in Pearl's murder, their earlier case against Omar Sheikh might unravel in the courts.
One official close to the investigation said: "Even if these men have admitted their roles in the kidnapping and killing of Daniel Pearl, we simply cannot charge them because of its impact on that earlier case."
Police have pieced together new details of how Pearl was held in captivity for two weeks, and eventually killed, from those involved - including two who witnessed his final hours.
Many of the details were unknown even to Mariane Pearl, the reporter's widow, who wrote a moving memoir about his death, A Mighty Heart.
They now believe that Pearl was not forcibly abducted from the restaurant, but at first went willingly with Sajid in his car, while four other militants followed. He was driven to the house on the outskirts of Karachi where he was to be held and killed.
There, four others who would guard Pearl dragged him inside at gun-point, tying his hands and blindfolding him. "Even at this point, Pearl didn't realise that he was already in trouble, and kept asking why they were behaving like this," one of those in custody told police.
He was held for two weeks before he was killed but made at least one escape attempt - according to the arrested men, just three days before he was murdered.
"He tried to scale the wall but couldn't do it because both his hands were tied," one told police. His captors said that Pearl had difficulty sleeping.
They brought him English-language newspapers and magazines to help him pass the time and let him exercise inside the room.
His efforts to converse with his captors were limited since they could speak only broken English. However, one said: "He made clear that he was a Jew and his wife a Buddhist. He used to imitate the way she prayed, and sing hymns and songs whenever he thought about her."
Eventually, Saud Memon, who is believed to be al-Qaeda's chief financier in Pakistan and owned the house where Pearl was held, contacted a group of Arab extremists who took over custody and decided he would be killed.
Armed with a video camera, three Arabs arrived, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, third-in-command of al-Qaeda - since handed over to the Americans.
For the first time, police have now identified the others as Abdul Rahman and Nasrullah - both Kuwaiti nationals fluent in Arabic, Balochi and Persian. Authorities are still searching for them.
On the day Pearl died, two of his Pakistani guards were present: Ali Khan, arrested just two weeks ago, and Fazal Karim, an employee of Saud Memon. One recently told interrogators how the Arabs tried to sedate Pearl, first by injection, then by doctoring his tea.
"I think he understood that he was going to be killed and refused to accept tea or to gulp pills. He even did not allow himself to be injected."
Before he was murdered, they forced him to relate his Jewish background and express sympathy with detainees in Guantanamo Bay before putting the knife to his throat once - and then again, a second time, owing to the faulty camera.
One of those present told police: "When they were slaughtering him in front of me I thought it was a bad dream. I had seen the cutting of a goat or chicken many times, but had never seen a human being slaughtered in front me."
Karim is among those who have been arrested and jailed for other crimes: narcotics smuggling, in his case. Investigators fear that Khan will also escape prosecution for his part in Pearl's capture and death.
Five others who took part in Pearl's capture or guarded him are behind bars for their part in unrelated sectarian killings, and Pakistani authorities have no plans to press charges related to Pearl. Authorities have yet to reveal publicly that they are holding three of the suspects: Khan, Naeem Bokhari and Faisal Bhatti.
Last night members of Pearl's family said they wanted all those involved in the journalist's death brought to book, and urged Pakistani authorities to hasten the hearing of Omar Sheikh's appeal.
In a statement to The Sunday Telegraph, Mariane Pearl and her parents-in-law, Ruth and Judea Pearl, said: "We are eager to see justice served and the truth come out. We are especially waiting to see a just conclusion of Omar Saeed Sheikh's conviction and the apprehension of all those involved."
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Chavez foils 'assassination plot'
By James Menendez
BBC correspondent in Caracas
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez says his forces have captured a group of about 50 Colombian paramilitaries who were plotting to kill or overthrow him.
According to Mr Chavez, the men had been trained by Venezuela's political opposition.
Opposition leaders say the claim is a crude attempt to discredit them.
The controversy comes at a time of rising political tension in Venezuela, with the opposition hoping to unseat Mr Chavez in a referendum.
In a few weeks' time President Chavez will find out whether his opponents have gathered enough support to hold the referendum against him and possibly force him from office.
Dawn raid
The government says 56 Colombians were arrested in a dawn raid at a farm on the outskirts of the capital, Caracas.
State television has been showing pictures of armed police guarding groups of young men dressed in green camouflage.
It has also shown what appears to be a camp complete with sleeping quarters and cooking facilities.
Security officials say the men were using the camp to plan an attack on a military installation in Caracas.
They say the farm belongs to a Cuban exile with close links to Venezuela's opposition.
According to President Chavez, the discovery is clear evidence that his opponents are trying to assassinate him.
That claim brought a swift denial from opposition leaders who dismiss the raid as a publicity stunt designed to justify a security clampdown.
In Colombia the leader of the main paramilitary group has also denied any involvement.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3699245.stm
Published: 2004/05/09 22:11:14 GMT
? BBC MMIV
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Top Korean soldier held for fraud
The military authorities in South Korea have arrested their top officer on the Korea-US Combined Forces Command on charges of embezzling army funds.
Shin Il-soon, a 57-year-old four-star general, was detained at a military jail after three days of interrogation by investigators.
Gen Shin denies the charges, saying the money missing was used for official parties and other army-related events.
He is the first serving general of his rank to be arrested for corruption.
He is second-in-command on the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to US Gen Leon LaPorte, who also commands the US military in South Korea and the UN Command overseeing the Korean War armistice.
The CFC is charged with defending South Korea against foreign attack and has nearly 700,000 Korean soldiers and 37,000 US troops at its disposal, facing North Korea's million-strong forces.
An unnamed officer at the South Korean defence ministry told Reuters news agency that Gen Shin was facing embezzlement charges "but no bribery charges".
The agency's sources added that the charges date back to 2000 when the general commanded South Korea's Third Army.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3697585.stm
Published: 2004/05/09 05:23:52 GMT
? BBC MMIV
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Medicine against the odds in N Korea
By Sarah Buckley
BBC News Online
Aid workers who visited victims of last week's explosion in North Korea have spoken of doctors dealing with horrific injuries in very basic conditions.
But this is not surprising in a country with limited medical supplies; where doctors have been known to take the skin off their own legs to help burns patients.
Gerald Bourke and Richard Ragan of the World Food Programme said the People's Provincial Hospital in Sinuiju, near the Chinese border, was fairly clean and spacious but that equipment was scarce.
They said that of the 40 or 50 critically injured patients they saw, only two of them were on intravenous drips.
"We saw no modern equipment, nothing that could be plugged in," said Mr Bourke, the WFP's representative in Beijing, told BBC News Online.
"A lot of the patients had been stitched up, but the thread... was more like twine, it was very thick," he said.
"It shows these guys were probably operating in a hurry trying to stabilise people," said Mr Ragan, WFP country director of North Korea.
The victims were suffering from facial and eye injuries, internal injuries and broken or severed limbs.
Many had lost the sight in one eye, sometimes both; one woman had had both feet blown off.
"The faces of the kids were a mix of being burned and lacerated and several of the children had had the skin ripped off of them," Mr Ragan said.
He said the doctor in charge of the hospital, who was assisted by about 10-15 staff, was "very calm", given he was responsible for 360 emergency cases.
The doctor "said only 15 patients had died, and this was two days after the blast. So one could argue that they're pretty skilled physicians but are working with very limited supplies and equipment", Mr Ragan said.
Both Mr Bourke and Mr Ragan said that what struck them most was the "eerie silence" in the hospital.
There's an absence of almost everything except beds and doctors and patients and desire
Stephen Linton, EugeneBell Foundation
"A couple of the children were whimpering and moaning but most of them were lying stock still in their beds," said Mr Bourke.
The relatives of the injured children were also quiet, Mr Ragan said. He described the parents of one eight- or nine-year-old boy who were having to hold their son down to stop him having spasms.
"You could clearly see the father didn't know where to turn", he said.
The rudimentary conditions the WFP officials witnessed are typical of many North Korean general hospitals, according to Stephen Linton, founder of the EugeneBell Foundation, a US NGO that provides the country with medical supplies and treatment facilities.
"The medical people are very dedicated, but the problem is modern medicine is predicated on a river of supplies and equipment, and that river has dried to a trickle in North Korea.
"There's an absence of almost everything except beds and doctors and patients and desire," he said.
He said some doctors were forced to grow cotton to make bandages, or to whittle their own splints; virtually every hospital grew its own herbal medicines; and surgeons often took their tools home to sharpen them.
"Most doctors have lots of scars on their legs because they give grafts from their own skin", he said.
Mr Linton said the medical training programmes were of a similar length to those in Europe and every province has a medical school.
"Doctors are recommended to prioritise herbal medicine before the harder to obtain Western medicine," he said.
"They're very creative and hard working but everything that most people take for advantage is lacking," he said.
He said the conditions in the buildings were also very basic.
"They're not even often well-lit... some of them aren't heated.
"Patients wear their parkas in bed in the winter."
As a result, a lot of people received out-patient care because they could eat better and keep warmer at home.
"I don't know if medicine would be so popular in the West if (doctors) had to operate under the conditions in North Korea," he said.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3669141.stm
Published: 2004/04/29 10:54:44 GMT
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What if...? Kim's close call
Last week's devastating train blast in North Korea has refocused attention on the murky question of leader Kim Jong-il's successor.
Mr Kim is believed to have passed through the station in Ryongchon, which was devastated in the explosion, just hours before the incident.
If he had been seriously injured or killed, diplomats and analysts are not sure who would have taken his place as North Korea's "Dear Leader".
It is likely that in the first instance, the nominal head of state - Kim Yong-nam, the president of the Supreme People's Assembly - would have assumed power.
Kim Jong-il was travelling back from China with a sizeable entourage, including the chief of general staff of the army, Kim Yong-chun and Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju, according to state media. But the reports did not mention Kim Yong-nam.
KIM'S FAMILY
Kim has several children
His eldest son disgraced himself in Japan
Therefore, power may pass to a younger boy, Kim Jong-chul
Even if Kim Yong-nam had initially taken the reins, it is far from clear what would have happened next. The relationship between the military, party and Kim Jong-il's family is difficult to fathom.
There has only been one change of leadership in North Korea so far - from Kim Il-sung to his son Kim Jong-il - and that was put in motion several years before the elder Kim's death.
Kim Jong-il is himself believed to be grooming one of his sons as successor, but the candidates may be considered too young to assume power any time soon.
A recent BBC News Online investigation into the country's "first family" found that many analysts believed a serious contender was Kim Jong-chul, Kim Jong-il's oldest son by the woman thought to be his favourite consort.
But Kim Jong-chul, who works in the Party propaganda department - the same job that Kim Jong-il did when he was being groomed for succession by his father - is only in his early 20s.
A factor which may further complicate the succession question is the reported illness of Kim Jong-chul's mother, Ko Young-hee.
A former dancer in the state dance troupe, Ms Ko is currently reported to be receiving treatment in a Paris hospital, according to the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3658729.stm
Published: 2004/04/26 09:27:11 GMT
? BBC MMIV
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>> AHEM 1

U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposal Project Languishing


By Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A17
With much fanfare, the world's two nuclear superpowers announced in 1998 that they would destroy 68 tons of plutonium stripped from bombs and warheads. The cost, counted in billions, would be borne largely by the United States and European governments intent on removing dangerous fissile material from circulation.
Six years later, the project sits stalled. The plutonium remains intact, and no construction has begun on either of the planned processing factories. In frustration, some U.S. analysts and politicians are doubting the Bush administration's commitment.
This has happened because the United States and Russia have been unable to agree on who would pay if an accident -- or sabotage -- occurred in Russia. The Bush administration wants Russia to take full responsibility, and the Russians are balking.
The stalemate comes when the fear of nuclear terrorism is growing and President Bush is pledging aggressive action. Nuclear specialists and some members of Congress say the case highlights a failure by the White House to back up its nonproliferation ambitions with action.
"How a little issue of indemnification can hold this up is beyond me," Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.) told top Energy Department officials at a recent hearing. "This is a way to get rid of a huge chunk of nuclear-grade plutonium."
The project was blocked by "trivial negotiating issues," Domenici said. He added that he told the White House "that maybe they ought to put some bigger people in the position of negotiating." Plutonium is not easily obtained, but Russia is considered to be the site of the largest and most vulnerable stockpiles.
"It's a very messy, messy situation," said Kenneth Luongo, executive director of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. The project, he said, has been "in the works for a decade, and we haven't moved beyond the talking phase."
Agreements to build parallel plants in Siberia and South Carolina expired last year. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said in March that the administration hoped to resolve the issue by this spring and asserted that it "is being worked at high levels."
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld are among those who have raised the issue with their Russian counterparts. Despite intensive discussions within the administration in recent weeks, a White House official conceded that the issue is "one of those things that have been on the one-yard line a long time." Abraham reported in his annual budget request that construction was officially 10 months behind schedule but should begin by May 2005 if an agreement can be reached. He said money will be needed to start building the plants that convert plutonium into mixed oxide fuel for nuclear reactors.
"We are confident that we can work it out. We are not that far apart, believe it or not," said Paul M. Longsworth, deputy Energy Department administrator, who acknowledged that the positions remain "pretty firm right now."
"Plutonium disposition is a 20-year program that is going to eliminate enough plutonium to make far more than 10,000 nuclear weapons," Longsworth said. "You've got to start it right."
On Feb. 11, in a speech intended to amplify his record on nonproliferation and inspire other countries to do more, the president declared that governments around the world "must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical and biological and radiological materials."
A particular worry is that terrorist organizations or rogue states will buy or steal a nuclear weapon or the fissile material that powers an atomic blast. Many scientists and public policy experts believe that an organized group or government that acquires fissile material would have little trouble assembling a crude weapon.
To build an atomic bomb from 50-year-old technology would require about 13 pounds of plutonium, said Thomas Cochran, director of nuclear projects at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Libya, which recently abandoned its fledgling secret nuclear program, acquired a bomb design of that vintage from the illicit supply network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
U.S. government facilities are also vulnerable, the General Accounting Office said in a report released late last month. The Energy Department's responses to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were "not sufficient" to ensure that all of its sites are prepared "to defend themselves against the higher terrorist threat present in a post-Sept. 11 . . . world," the GAO said.
In Russia, basic security improvements have not been made at dozens of military installations where more than 60 percent of the country's plutonium and weapons-grade uranium is kept, the GAO warned last year.
GAO auditors blamed Russia for failing to allow U.S. officials to visit key sites but also said Congress and the Bush administration exacerbated the delays by denying critical funds or refusing to grant contract waivers. When the report came out, the United States had spent $6 billion since 1992 to help Russia destroy or safeguard nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
"The big problem is there's a leadership gap. These are not big obstacles. They can be handled by leaders who are determined and can be focused," said former U.S. senator Sam Nunn, who with Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) backed the vast counterproliferation program that bears their names.
The project to destroy 68 tons of plutonium -- half in Russia and half in the United States -- was designed as part of the cooperative project to reduce the risk of fissile material falling into the wrong hands. Announced during the Clinton administration, the program was formally launched during a presidential summit in Moscow in 1998.
Domenici, who helped direct $200 million to the project in its first year, attended the summit as President Bill Clinton's guest. He has been among the sharpest critics of the Bush administration's inability to keep the program on track.
The sticking point is the issue of liability for potentially catastrophic problems. In threat-reduction agreements signed in the mid-1990s, Russia agreed to take responsibility in return for help from foreign governments in disarming former Soviet nuclear weapons and improving security.
"If something blew, Russia would pay. No ifs, ands or buts," said Leonard S. Spector, director of the Washington office for the Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center for Nonproliferation Studies. But on the plutonium program and a project known as the Nuclear Cities Initiative, the Russians insisted that if U.S. contractors were to blame, they or the federal government should be liable for damages and possible prosecution.
Sabotage is a particular worry, the Russians told U.S. negotiators, who have been led by Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton.
"They kept saying, 'Hey, you can hire Chechen rebels under contract and they could blow up our facilities, and we would be powerless to prosecute,' " said an administration official closely involved in the issues, speaking on the condition of anonymity. "We said that's ridiculous. We don't hire people who will conduct sabotage."
The Bush administration is adamant that U.S. companies and officials are engaged in a goodwill effort and should not be held liable for unintended problems. The liability negotiations commanded attention at the 2002 summit of the world's most industrialized countries, which pledged $20 billion for 10 years of nonproliferation programs in Russia.
There is a disagreement within the administration, where sources said the Defense and State departments have demanded the more stringent liability provision, while the Energy Department believed that a somewhat less rigorous formula was sufficient.
"What you would have thought was an incidental legal issue looms so large," said Spector, who suggested sharing the burden, a structure established in the civilian nuclear power sector. "Everybody is frustrated that an additional hurdle is being presented that has to be overcome."
As the negotiations continue, the potential dangers remain, critics believe.
"The implications are that you're going to have 68 additional tons of weapons-grade plutonium lying around the United States and Russia," said Luongo, the nuclear security specialist. "And Russia, in particular, is where security is not up to global standards."

? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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>> AHEM 2...

Conservatives Restive About Bush Policies
Fresh Initiatives Sought On Iraq, Domestic Issues

By Dana Milbank and Jonathan Weisman
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, May 10, 2004; Page A01
After three years of sweeping actions in both foreign and domestic affairs, the Bush administration is facing complaints from the conservative intelligentsia that it has lost its ability to produce fresh policies.
The centerpiece of President Bush's foreign policy -- the effort to transform Iraq into a peaceful democracy -- has been undermined by a deadly insurrection and broadcast photos of brutality by U.S. prison guards. On the domestic side, conservatives and former administration officials say the White House policy apparatus is moribund, with policies driven by political expediency or ideological pressure rather than by facts and expertise.
Conservatives have become unusually restive. Last Tuesday, columnist George F. Will sharply criticized the administration's Iraq policy, writing: "This administration cannot be trusted to govern if it cannot be counted on to think and, having thought, to have second thoughts." Two days earlier, Robert Kagan, a neoconservative supporter of the Iraq war, wrote: "All but the most blindly devoted Bush supporters can see that Bush administration officials have no clue about what to do in Iraq tomorrow, much less a month from now."
The complaints about Bush's Iraq policy are relatively new, but they are in some ways similar to long-standing criticism about Bush's domestic policies. In a book released earlier this year, former Bush Treasury secretary Paul H. O'Neill described Bush as "a blind man in a room full of deaf people" and said policymakers put politics before sound policy judgments.
Echoing a criticism leveled by former Bush aide John J. DiIulio Jr., who famously described "Mayberry Machiavellis" running the White House, O'Neill said "the biggest difference" between his time in government in the 1970s and in the Bush administration "is that our group was mostly about evidence and analysis, and Karl [Rove], Dick [Cheney], [Bush communications strategist] Karen [Hughes] and the gang seemed to be mostly about politics."
Michael Franc, vice president of the Heritage Foundation, said the criticism by O'Neill, Will and Kagan has a common thread: a concern that the administration is "using an old playbook" and not coming up with bold enough ideas, whether the subject is entitlement reform or pacifying Iraq. Conservative intellectuals "are saying, 'Don't do things half way,' " he said.
"It's the exhaustion of power," said a veteran of conservative think tanks who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Ideology has confronted reality, and ideology has bent. On the domestic side, it has bent in terms of the expansion of the government embodied in the Medicare prescription-drug law. On the foreign policy side, it has bent because of what has transpired in the last few weeks in Fallujah."
A Bush spokesman quarreled with that notion, saying there has been no let-up in Bush's policymaking. "We are marching ahead," said the spokesman, Trent Duffy, pointing to Bush's plans for community-college-based job training, space exploration and modernizing health records. "He's continuing to push the policies that have made the country better and stronger."
Part of the current perception of policy fatigue in the White House is a reflection of the political calendar: With a presidential election approaching, there is little possibility that the closely split Congress will enact serious legislation this year regardless of what the White House proposes. "It's a combination of how very challenging it is to move anything in the Senate these days, and it is an election year," said one former Bush aide, who like some of the conservatives interviewed for this article declined to be identified to avoid offending the White House.
But conservative policy experts and a number of former Bush administration officials say there are more systemic reasons for the policy sclerosis. For three years, the president pushed policies conceived during his 2000 campaign for the White House, but with most of those ideas either enacted or stalled, policymaking has run out of steam, they said.
Bush has also discouraged the sort of free-wheeling policy debates that characterized previous administrations, and he relies on a top-down management style that has little use for "wonks" in the federal bureaucracy. At the same time, many of the top domestic policy experts in the Bush White House have moved on to other jobs; in many cases they have been replaced by subordinates with much less experience in governing.
Bruce Bartlett, a conservative economist with the National Center for Policy Analysis, said policy ideas typically bubble up from experts deep inside federal agencies, who put together working groups, draft white papers, sell their wares in the marketplace of ideas and hope White House officials act on their suggestions. In this case, ideas are hatched in the White House, for political or ideological reasons, then are thrust on the bureaucracy, "not for analysis, but for sale," Bartlett said.
The result is a White House that has become unimaginative with domestic policy and, in foreign policy, has struggled to develop new policies to adapt to changing circumstances in Iraq, according to several conservatives.
"In Iraq, you don't see the thinking, 'Things have not happened as we had planned. What do we do now?' " said David Boaz, executive vice president of the libertarian Cato Institute, who last week organized a Cato forum entitled "The Triumph of the Hacks?"
Richard W. Rahn, a prominent Republican economist, excoriated the administration's telecommunications, antitrust and international economic policies in a Washington Times column April 30 along similar lines. "From the beginning of the Bush administration, sympathetic, experienced economists have warned its officials about the need to avoid some obvious mistakes," he wrote. "Unfortunately, these warnings have gone unheeded."
In an interview, Rahn said he has grown concerned over what he sees as "a lack of vision and policy consistency" in the Bush administration. "I mean, we knew where [President Ronald] Reagan was heading; at times there were deviations from the path, but we knew what it was all about," he said. In contrast, he said, now "there doesn't seem to be a clear policy vision."
Some attribute the policy lethargy to personnel changes, particularly on the domestic side. For example, three veterans of previous White Houses with lengthy experience in Washington have left their policymaking roles; their successors, though capable, have significantly less policymaking experience.
Joshua B. Bolten, the deputy chief of staff for policy, has been replaced by Harriet Miers, a Texas lawyer and former chairman of the Texas Lottery Commission. Jay Lefkowitz, director of the Domestic Policy Council, has been replaced by Kristen Silverberg, who was a young aide to Bolten. And Lawrence B. Lindsey was replaced as top economic adviser by investment banker Stephen Friedman.
Likewise, John Bridgeland, a former director of the Domestic Policy Council, was replaced as director of Bush's USA Freedom Corps initiative by Desiree Sayle, the former director of correspondence in the White House. And public-policy professor DiIulio was replaced as chief of Bush's "faith-based" initiative by Jim Towey, who had ties to the president's brother, Florida Gov. Jeb Bush. Leading experts in welfare and health policy have left the White House and been replaced by less experienced hands.
"It would be fair to say the policy shop is less policy-oriented in its apparatus and more administratively managed," said a Republican with close ties to the White House.
In interviews, former officials of the current and three previous administrations described Bush's domestic policy team as unusually green -- particularly compared with Bush's top political adviser, Karl Rove. At the Cato forum last week, former Bush speechwriter David Frum said Rove is "the top hack and the top wonk" in the White House.
"I don't think he should be the most important wonk in the White House," said Bruce Reed, former domestic policy chief to Bill Clinton and author of an article about how policy "wonks" had been bested by political "hacks" in the current White House. "Every White House takes on the enthusiasms and the interests of the president, and most of the time this president seems to take more joy in the politics than in the policy."
Defenders of the Bush policymaking apparatus agree that the volume of policymaking has diminished significantly from 2001 and 2002, when the White House was fighting for passage of policies developed during the presidential campaign, such as tax cuts and education accountability. But they say the cause is outside the administration.
Frum said much of the policy energy has been channeled into fighting terrorism at home and abroad because of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. "On the most critical issue of our time, they have been bold, creative, and in some cases, they have shocked the intelligentsia with their assertiveness," he said.
Whatever the cause, conservatives say the remedy to policy malaise won't come until the election. Conservative strategist Jeffrey Bell said the big items on the policy agenda -- such as an overhaul of Social Security -- are necessarily on hold as Bush fights for reelection. "He's having to defend the forward motion he's already had," Bell said. "Reagan in '84 was the same way. People who thought Reagan's creative period was going to end after '83 were wrong. I think Bush will be the same way."
? 2004 The Washington Post Company


Posted by maximpost at 2:23 AM EDT
Permalink
Sunday, 9 May 2004

U.N. BIDS TO SILENCE OIL-$$ WHISTLEBLOWER

By NILES LATHEM


May 7, 2004 -- WASHINGTON - The United Nations has sent a stern letter to an important witness in the Iraq oil-for-food investigation, demanding that he not cooperate with congressional probes of the scandal, The Post has learned.
The letter - in the name of oil-for-food program chief Benon Sevan - was sent to a U.N. consultant after it was learned he had been talking to congressional investigators about allegations of wholesale corruption, officials said last night.
"This particular individual is someone we have been in contact with for more than a month," said an investigator. "This letter has chilled his willingness to cooperate with the congressional investigation. This individual also appears to be genuinely frightened by the implications inherent in the letter."
Congressional officials would not identify the consultant because he is a potential whistleblower.
The U.N. letter, obtained by The Post, reminded the consultant that under his contract with the oil-for-food program, he "may not communicate at any time to any other person, government or authority external to the United Nations any information known to them by reason of their association with the United Nations, which has not been made public."
"In view of the contractual provisions referred to above and the fact that these matters relate to internal U.N. procedures for administering the Programme, we would ask that you consult with the U.N. before releasing any documentation or information," the letter said.
It is the third letter to surface this week from Sevan's office to companies that did business with the oil-for-food program that invoked confidentiality agreements and demanded that they not release documents to outside investigators.
U.N. spokesmen have said this week that the letters are following standard legal procedure and that U.N. lawyers want all documents to be collected by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who was appointed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to head an investigation into the scandal. But the letters have ignited a firestorm.
"These confidentiality agreements are fueling a perception on the Hill that the U.N. is deliberately seeking to thwart a congressional inquiry into these allegations," said one congressional investigator.
Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), whose subcommittee is one of three congressional committees investigating the scandal, noted this week that his panel recently heard sworn testimony that Sevan accepted sweetheart oil deals from Saddam Hussein's government.
"It would be a big mistake, I think, for him to suggest that people not cooperate in this investigation. It would further imply that he is totally mixed up in this," Shays said.
The United Nations has said Sevan, who is on vacation pending retirement, was not the author of the letters. They were drawn up by U.N. lawyers and sent out on his stationery.

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Iraqi probed in rigging of cell-phone pacts


By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES


An international financier with ties to Saddam Hussein's regime and the United Nations' oil-for-food program helped Middle Eastern and European cell-phone companies edge out American firms for lucrative Iraqi contracts, The Washington Times has learned.
Nadhmi Auchi, an Iraq-born British national who was involved in international arms trading, is being investigated for purportedly rigging bids with the Iraqi Communications Ministry and the Coalition Provisional Authority, which resulted in contracts being awarded to three companies tied to Europe, according to defense officials familiar with an internal investigation.


All the companies have links to Auchi, who was convicted in France last year for taking illegal payments. The contacts could be worth some $500 million annually in future cell-phone service in Iraq, said officials who discussed details ofthe investigation on the condition of anonymity.
"The winners of the Iraqi cellular tender were Saddam's most senior financiers, their Egyptian, Kuwaiti and Iraqi supporters, the bank BNP Paribas, European cellular corporations, particularly Alcatel and the European GMS technology it depends on, and Chinese telecom interests, such as Huawei, which had been active in breaking the Iraqi embargo," said a defense official.
"The losers were American bidders," the official said.
American firms that lost out in the contracting included a consortium of companies such as Qualcomm, which developed a more advanced cell-phone technology known as CDMA, and Lucent Technologies.
Auchi was convicted by a French court in November for his involvement in an illegal payment scheme involving the state-owned oil company Elf-Aquitaine. He received a 15-month suspended prison sentence and a $2.4 million fine.
He also has been linked by U.S. investigators to the United Nations' oil-for-food program, now under investigation by the world body and the U.S. Congress for skimming oil revenue meant to buy humanitarian goods in Iraq.
Auchi, 66, is viewed by U.S. officials as a key figure in the emerging scandal because of his close relationship with officials of the Saddam regime, and because most of the $65 billion involved in the eight-year program was deposited in the Paris bank BNP Paribas. Until 2001, Auchi was a major shareholder in the bank, and investigators believe as much as $10 billion from the program was stolen by Saddam and his associates.
A former Ba'ath Party member, Auchi is believed to have a net worth of about $3 billion.
David Corker, a London lawyer who represented Auchi in the French case, referred calls to Auchi's office. Auchi could not be reached at the headquarters of his company, General Mediterranean Holdings, in Luxembourg.
Officials said Auchi's attorneys in the past have dismissed corruption accusations against him as rumors, at least before the conviction in France.
Auchi also has claimed that the killing of his brother by agents of Saddam's government shows that he is not sympathetic to the ousted dictator.
According to the defense official, "significant and credible evidence" reveals "a conspiracy was organized by Auchi to offer bribes to 'fix' the awarding of cellular-licensing contracts covering three geographic areas of Iraq."
The contracts were won by Asia Cell Telecommunications Co. Ltd., Orascom Telecom Iraq Corp. and Atheer Telecom Iraq.
Officials believe that the contracts-award process was arranged so that companies linked financially to Auchi won the bids and that the common European cell-phone standard, known as GSM, would be the only standard used under the contracts.
As a result, Auchi succeeded in taking over the entire postwar cellular-phone system in Iraq by using contacts and front companies to design the architecture for the phone network in three sectors in Iraq, and to make sure that he owned or controlled the components.
Several American, British and Iraqi nationals are under investigation in addition to Auchi for the reputed cell-phone bid rigging, U.S. officials said.
Two American officials working within the Iraqi Communications Ministry resigned last month and accused a Pentagon official of improperly influencing another contracting process in Iraq. The matter involving all three officials is under investigation by the Pentagon's inspector general.
"The implications of [Auchi] having fixed the tender for the entire Iraqi cellular-telephone system go beyond mere corruption and technological empire building," the defense official said. "It put in control of Iraqi telecommunications a man with an anti-American, anticoalition mind-set and a history of illegal international arms traffic. That control could allow him to compromise the entire Iraqi telecommunications system and undermine the Iraqi security system on an ongoing basis."
One problem for investigators is the June 30 deadline for turning over sovereignty of Iraq to a new government in Baghdad. After July 1, it will be very difficult to figure out how the licensing process for telecommunications contracts was carried out.
The investigation by the Pentagon's Directorate of International Armament and Technology Trade, a special unit set up to track arms and technology transfers, is under way on the telecommunications-contracting improprieties.
According to officials familiar with the investigation, Auchi used "influence peddling and access to the Iraqi regime in conjunction with his European, North African and Middle Eastern financial and business empire to build a worldwide network."
Auchi has large cell-phone business interests in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Jordan in addition to the concessions in Iraq. He is also seeking to set up cell-phone networks in Iran.
Officials also believe Auchi was involved in illegal activities related to Iraqi intelligence officers under Saddam.
The information obtained by the officials shows that Auchi bribed foreign governments and individuals in the months leading up to the Iraq war to oppose the U.S.-led effort to oust Saddam.

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Democracy Now
From the May 17, 2004 issue: The Bush administration seems not to recognize how widespread, and how bipartisan, is the view that Iraq is already lost or on the verge of being lost.
by Robert Kagan and William Kristol
05/17/2004, Volume 009, Issue 34


WE DO NOT KNOW how close the American effort in Iraq may be to irrecoverable failure. We are inclined to believe, however, that the current Washington wisdom--that the United States has already failed and there is nothing to do now but find a not-too-damaging way to extricate ourselves--is far too pessimistic, a panicked reaction to the difficulties in Falluja and with Moktada al-Sadr, as well as to the disaster of Abu Ghraib. We are also appalled at the cavalier and irresponsible way people on both left and right now suggest we should pull out and simply let Iraq go to hell. We wonder how those who, rightly, complain about the American mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners, can blithely consign the entire Iraqi population to the likely prospect of a horrific civil war and the brutal dictatorship that would follow. Spare us that kind of "humanitarianism."
Thank goodness the president says he remains committed to victory. Thank goodness there are stalwarts like Senators Joe Biden, Joe Lieberman, and Evan Bayh in the Democratic party who are fighting against that party's growing clamor for withdrawal. But loss of confidence that the war is winnable goes well beyond left-wing Democrats and isolationist Republicans. The Bush administration seems not to recognize how widespread, and how bipartisan, is the view that Iraq is already lost or on the verge of being lost. The administration therefore may not appreciate how close the whole nation is to tipping decisively against the war. In a sense, it doesn't matter whether this popular and elite perception of the situation in Iraq is too simplistic and too pessimistic. The perception, if it lingers, may destroy support for the war before events on the ground have a chance to prove it wrong.
So Iraq could be lost if the Bush administration holds to the view that it can press ahead with its political and military strategy without any dramatic change of course, without taking bold and visible action to reverse the current downward trajectory. The existing Bush administration plan in Iraq is to wait for U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to name an interim Iraqi caretaker government by the end of May that will take power on July 1, and prepare for elections in January 2005. This plan might have been adequate a couple of months ago. But it is inadequate to meet the new challenge.
Among the biggest mistakes made by the Bush administration over the past year has been the failure to move Iraq more rapidly toward elections. It's true that many, inside and outside the administration, have long been clamoring to hand over more responsibility to Iraqis, responsibility above all for doing more of the fighting and dying. But the one thing even many of these friends of Iraq have been unwilling to hand over to Iraqis is the right to choose their own government. This is a mistake.
We do not believe in the present circumstances that the current administration plan moves quickly enough toward providing Iraqis real sovereignty. It is not real sovereignty when a U.N. official tells Iraqis who their next prime minister will be. We strongly doubt that the announcement of a new interim government--three to four weeks from now, to take office almost two months from now--will have sufficient impact on Iraqi public opinion to overcome the images of American soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners. Nor do we believe the present course will give the American people and their representatives sufficient reason to hope that a corner may be turned in the near future. The coming weeks are critical.
We don't claim to have a silver bullet. But we believe one answer to the current crisis would be to move up elections by several months, perhaps to September. The administration could announce very soon that nationwide Iraqi elections will be held on September 30. Brahimi could go ahead and announce his caretaker government, but it would be clear to all that the new government's primary purpose was to preside over the transition to elected government--first by preparing for the elections, with the help of the United States and the international community.
Accelerating the elections would have several virtues: First, it would change the subject. Instead of focusing on their anger at Americans, Iraqis would be compelled to begin focusing on the coming elections, where each and every Iraqi adult will have a chance to participate in shaping the future. Second, with elections coming quickly, those who continued to commit violence in Iraq would be understood to be attacking not only the United States, but also the elections process, and therefore democracy. The insurgents would be antidemocratic rather than anti-American. Sunnis could be told that if they want more power, they should begin organizing for the vote. Those Sunnis who committed violence would be harming the Sunni population's chances of fair representation, since violence that disrupts the voting could lead to nullification of the vote in the affected areas. The impending elections would encourage the majority of peaceful Sunnis and Shia to take sides against the guerrillas who seek power through force of arms instead of through the ballot.
Third, with elections pending, American military actions could be seen not just as an effort to suppress rebellious Iraqi movements but as a vital support for the elections process, and for democracy. Americans would be fighting to give Iraqis a chance to vote, soon. Fourth, and not least important, the holding of elections in Iraq within a few months might give Americans here at home greater confidence that things can be turned around in Iraq. Does it make that much difference whether elections are held in January 2005 or September 2004? In normal times, perhaps not. But these are not normal times. In terms of perception and psychology, both in Iraq and in the United States, we believe moving the elections to September can make a very big difference. As for those who rightly point out that the schedule we suggest would make for a hasty and imperfect election process and that much could go wrong, we agree. But even flawed elections in Iraq would contribute to a sense of political progress--of movement toward legitimate self-government--that would give us a chance of improving the situation.
In addition to setting a new date for elections, the administration would have to do a couple of other things. It would have to increase, substantially, the number of troops in Iraq in order to create a more secure environment for elections. Rep. John Murtha has been attacked by Republicans for insisting that we are unlikely to succeed in Iraq without a big increase in the number of troops. These attacks on Murtha are stupid, because he is absolutely right. The Pentagon continues to fiddle while Iraq burns. Everyone in Iraq with whom we talk bemoans the shortage of troops and equipment. It is now impossible to travel safely throughout most of Iraq. This is terrible news, and would be even if we weren't preparing for an election. But if elections are announced, the Pentagon could be forced to overcome its arrogant stubbornness and beef up the force.
Finally, the administration should use the new date for elections as an opportunity to make one more run at Europe and the international community for support. It could challenge the French and Germans to send troops to Iraq not to aid our occupation but to support elections. And aside from troops, Europeans could provide vital money and technical assistance to the elections process, which must be managed with care. We believe it would be hard for Europeans to say no when asked to support a more rapid electoral process in Iraq. The Bush administration, therefore, might be able to demonstrate to the American people that it was acting with greater success to bring the international community in to help. That too would help reverse the gloom and doom here at home.
As we say, this proposal is not a cure-all. It carries its own risks as well as benefits. If someone has a better idea, we're happy to hear it. But if the administration does not take dramatic action now, it may be unable to avoid failure.

--Robert Kagan and William Kristol




? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
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These Hollywood special effects may cost the world $15 trillion
By Bjorn Lomborg
(Filed: 09/05/2004)


In the final minutes of the Hollywood doomsday spectacular The Day After Tomorrow, which opens in Britain at the end of the month, the US president makes a ludicrously over-the-top State of the Nation speech. It is a great deal less realistic than the performance by the undoubted star of this $125 million blockbuster of a film: a 100 ft high tidal wave that engulfs New York.
Indeed, the film loses any credibility long before that. This is not because of any one of the far-fetched incidents that occur in the course of its 125 minutes. It isn't the flash freezing of a presidential motorcade, or even the escape of man-eating wolves from New York Zoo. No, this extremely enjoyable film has been let down by the simple fact that it has got its science all wrong. None of it could happen.
The story goes like this. As a consequence of global warming, the polar caps melt, sending vast quantities of fresh water into the world's salty oceans. The torrent stops the Gulf Stream, a major current in the North Atlantic, precipitating a global storm that instantly creates a new Ice Age. This is an excuse for breathtaking special effects: Manhattan is buried in 30-storey snowdrifts, Los Angeles is hit by 250 mph tornadoes, and a fearless paleoclimatologist, played by Denis Quaid, straps on his snow shoes to trek from Washington, DC to New York to rescue his son.
The bad guy is the vice president, who bears a striking resemblance to the real one. This Dick Cheney doppelganger arrogantly dismisses the Kyoto Protocol - it is too expensive - and rejects concern about climate change as fearmongering. The scriptwriters save him from death only to subject him to a mea culpa public address at the movie's climax, saying roughly, "We thought that we could affect the Earth's delicate systems without suffering the consequences. We were wrong. I was wrong." This State of the Nation address is broadcast live on the Weather Channel.
If The Day After Tomorrow had no claims to be anything more than another cheesy Hollywood movie with some fabulous special effects, we could happily turn a blind eye to its bogus science and concentrate on the sight of the Statue of Liberty up to her armpits in the water. But the film claims to be offering something more than this.
"There's more truth than hype," the film-makers promise in their publicity. The German director, Roland Emmerich, claims he tried to present us with a valuable fund of scientific information. The film's website provides links to news stories published in February about "a secret report prepared by the Pentagon" which warned that climate change would "lead to global catastrophe costing millions of lives". What this publicity does not reveal is that the Pentagon report was merely a hypothetical worst-case scenario - and one that has already been thoroughly debunked. In fact, the respected magazine Science has reviewed this Pentagon report and the alleged scientific support for The Day After Tomorrow and concludes that "it is highly unlikely that global warming will lead to a widespread collapse" of the Gulf Stream, and "it is safe to say that global warming will not lead to the onset of a new Ice Age".
In Nature, another highly-respected scientific journal, a researcher finds that halting the Gulf Stream would be impossible, arguing that "the only way to produce an ocean circulation without the Gulf Stream would be to turn off the wind system or stop the Earth's rotation, or both."
Now, although it is not going to kill us the day after tomorrow, global warming certainly is a reality. It is caused at least partly by mankind's use of fossil fuels. The effects will be predominantly adverse - although high-latitude nations might prosper in a warmer world, tropical countries will have to deal with more heat-days, altered precipitation and higher sea-levels. So what is wrong with using a piece of popular entertainment to campaign for action to save people from that? As the Nasa research oceanographer William Patzert says: "The science is bad, but perhaps it's an opportunity to crank up the dialogue on our role in climate change."
The problem is that if we overestimate the risk that climate change poses, then we will pay less attention to the other challenges that face us. That appears to be exactly the aim of the movie's creators. Emmerich believes that global warming is "the only problem big enough to force all the countries of the world to stop fighting and work together to save the planet"; he says that his great dream is that "this film will force politicians to act".
If politicians were to see The Day After Tomorrow and act on its agenda, what would happen? Implementing the Kyoto agreement on climate change would cost at least $150 billion each year, yet would do no more than postpone global warming for six years by 2100. That is to say, it would cause temperatures to increase slightly more slowly - the temperature we would have reached in 2100 without Kyoto, we would now reach in 2106. Those families in Bangladesh who will get flooded will have an extra six years to move. Even if the film's creators are right - and the scientists are wrong - and the Gulf Stream current does collapse within a decade, then Kyoto would have made no difference.
There is another reason why it is wrong - I would even say amoral - to overplay the case for combatting climate change. We cannot do everything. Our resources are limited, and our attention is quickly diverted from one fashionable cause to another. We must ask ourselves if spending $150 billion every year for the rest of the century to postpone warming for six years is really the best use of that money.
For the cost of implementing Kyoto in just one year, we could permanently provide clean drinking water and sanitation to everyone on the planet. Of course it is unlikely that Emmerich will cast Brad Pitt as a sewage engineer in Kenya for his next glamorous movie. Nor are there many good plotlines to be made from tales of a government which invests in malarial vaccines, or of a global conference called to remove trade barriers. But these are real options that policy-makers face every time they spend a dollar with the intention of easing human suffering.
The world needs a rational basis for making such priorities. That is the aim of a new project, Copenhagen Consensus, which will bring together nine economists - including four Nobel Prize winners - to prioritise solutions to 10 great challenges facing humanity. They will look at problems ranging from financial instability to communicable diseases, examining several different solutions to each challenge. The experts will produce a ranked list - at the top will be the solution that will achieve the most for humanity.
In an ideal world, we would be able to achieve everything - we should halt global warming and eradicate corruption, end malnutrition and win the war against communicable diseases. Because we cannot do everything, we need sound reasoning and high quality information to defeat the hysteria of Hollywood. I believe there is more hope in truth than in hype.


Bjorn Lomborg is the director of Copenhagen Consensus and Denmark's Environmental Assessment Institute. He is the author of The Skeptical Environmentalist
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Gas Cartel Gouging the Golden State
Roger Hedgecock, KOGO-AM 600, San Diego
www.RogerHedgecock.com

Gas prices are too high! These prices are caused by a near-monopoly ownership of the whole industry in California. From the oil well to the refinery to your local gas station, five oil companies control 90 percent of California's gas supply. And surprise, surprise! In 2003 gas prices were up 35 percent, and those five oil companies' profits went up 926 percent.
I'm all for profits, but profits like these tell me this monopoly feels no competitive pressure. In a real capitalistic economy, competition between companies produces better-quality products at lower prices. A monopoly produces obscene profits by conspiring to produce a scarce product at a higher and higher price.
The state has antitrust laws designed to give the attorney general the tools to fight this kind of monopoly. Where is our California Attorney General Bill Lockyer? He says he's studying the problem.
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Hillary's Hidden History of Persecuting the Press
Posted May 7, 2004

Though Hillary Clinton may be a media darling now, as a popular New York senator and author of a best-selling tome about her White House years, a new book by Richard Poe claims that, as first lady, she ran a secret police force that went after journalists who dug too deeply into Clinton scandals.
The New York Times best-selling author reveals in Hillary's Secret War: The Clinton Conspiracy to Muzzle Internet Journalists how reporters who the first lady considered a threat were harshly dealt with in myriad ways, including being the subjects of wiretaps, being blacklisted and being framed for crimes.

For more on this story, see the interview ...


Hillary's Secret War

By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | May 7, 2004
Frontpage Interview's guest today is Richard Poe, a New York Times bestselling author and cyberjournalist. Formerly the editor of Frontpagemag.com, he is the author of the new book Hillary's Secret War: The Clinton Conspiracy to Muzzle Internet Journalists. Visit his blog at RichardPoe.com.
Frontpage Magazine: Mr. Poe, welcome to Frontpage Interview. It is a pleasure to have you with us.
Poe: Thank you.
FP: So let's discuss your new book. First things first though: Hillary is out of the White House. Why should we even care about her anymore?
Poe: Well, as we all know, Hillary means to regain the White House, at any cost. I believe she will make her play this year, in 2004. John Kerry is imploding as we speak. He is unelectable. Kerry has too much baggage, too many skeletons in his closet.
Democrat strategists are already quietly discussing a "Torricelli option" - to pull Kerry from the race, just as they pulled Robert Torricelli from the New Jersey Senate race in 2002, replacing him at the last minute with Frank Lautenberg.
If the Democrats "pull a Torricelli" at their National Convention in July - that is, if they force Kerry to withdraw - Hillary will be the obvious frontrunner. I think there's a strong chance that, when Election Day rolls around, President Bush will face Hillary, not Kerry.
FP: Hillary's Secret War tells us that Hillary personally led a secret police force from her office in the White House. Tell us about your proof and evidence.
Poe: The operations of Hillary's secret police have been copiously documented, to the point where the topic can hardly be called controversial any longer.
During the Clinton years, journalists who probed too deeply into Clinton scandals ran terrible risks. Journalists were beaten, wiretapped, framed on criminal charges, fired and blacklisted. They experienced burglaries, IRS audits, smear campaigns and White-House-orchestrated lawsuits.
Some may have paid the ultimate price. In February, 1998, just as the Clinton impeachment was gathering steam, Sandy Hume, the 28-year-old son of Fox News anchorman Brit Hume, suddenly turned up dead of a gunshot to the head. He was covering the U.S. Congress for the magazine The Hill, and was known for his excellent sources among Republican insiders. Sandy Hume supposedly committed suicide, but friends and associates have questioned the official story.
Some of the White House "secret police" were private detectives, such as Terry Lenzner, Jack Palladino and Anthony Pellicano. Others were Clinton loyalists embedded in federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, the CIA, the IRS, the NTSB and so on. Many of these people are still in place, and still doing the Clintons' dirty work. I call them the Shadow Team.
FP: How does Hillary fit into all this?
Poe: Hillary is the muscle end of the Clinton mafia. It was she who organized and led the Shadow Team. Her role as White House enforcer was first revealed by the late Barbara Olson.
Mrs. Olson was a former federal prosecutor who served from 1995 to 1996 as Chief Investigative Counsel for the Clinger Committee - Rep. William F. Clinger Jr.'s House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, which probed the Filegate and Travelgate affairs. The evidence Mrs. Olson uncovered convinced her that Hillary Clinton had, among other things, conspired to use the Federal Bureau of Investigation unlawfully to intimidate, punish, harass, frame and otherwise harm innocent people who stood in her way.
In her 1999 book Hell to Pay, Mrs. Olson wrote, "Hillary is not merely an aider and abettor to this secret police operation. She has been its prime instigator and organizer. ... In one White House scandal after another, all roads led to Hillary. To investigate White House improprieties and scandals, the evidence necessarily led to her hidden hands guiding the Clinton operation."
FP: This is actually quite incredible. How did Hillary get away with all of this? Surely Ken Starr would have jumped on any excuse to indict Hillary, no?
Poe: Well, as I explain in my book, there are two Ken Starrs. There's the imaginary Ken Starr conjured up by Big Media - a ruthless, rightwing religious zealot, bent on toppling the Clintons. Then there's the real Ken Starr - a timid bureaucrat, afraid of his own shadow, who shrank from investigating any of the truly serious Clinton scandals. On the contrary, Starr actively helped to suppress and whitewash evidence of Clinton wrongdoing.
Take the Vincent Foster case. In September 1994, Starr appointed Miquel Rodriguez to lead the grand jury investigation into Foster's death. Rodriguez resigned in protest less than four months later, charging that the investigation was rigged. Rodriguez accused Starr's people of pressuring him to announce that Foster committed suicide, despite evidence to the contrary.
After resigning, Rodriguez tried to go public. But Big Media shut him out. According to WorldNetDaily, Rodriguez claims that he told his story to reporters from Time, Newsweek, ABC's Nightline, the Boston Globe, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and the New York Times. Rodriguez says that he spent six hours with a reporter from the New York Times. In every case, his story was spiked by higher-ups. No one reported it.
Clinton defenders often argue that five different investigations ruled Foster's death a suicide. But Rodriguez retorts, "In fact, all of the investigations were done by the same people, the FBI." Rodriguez says that FBI agents threatened his "physical well-being," if he did not shut up about the Foster case. Today, Rodriguez serves as an assistant U.S. Attorney in Sacramento.
FP: Why would Ken Starr cover for the Clintons?
It has been alleged that the Clintons had some sort of hold over Starr - that, in fact, Starr was "fixed," either by threats, blackmail or perhaps mutual self-interest.
According to White House whistleblower Nolanda Hill, Starr's team was thoroughly infiltrated by Clinton loyalists. Even Starr's FBI investigators reported secretly to Janet Reno. This gave the Clintons enormous leverage to guide and manipulate the investigation their way.
Moreover, Starr had a conflict of interest. In his private legal practice, he represented a subsidiary of CITIC, a company owned by the People's Liberation Army of China, and led by arms dealer Wang Jun, a Chinese military intelligence operative and a key player in the Chinagate scandal. The mere fact that Starr was on Wang Jun's payroll should have disqualified him from serving as Independent Counsel. But, for some reason, Starr did not recuse himself.
FP: You also accuse Hillary's secret police of blackmailing witnesses, journalists, Senators, Congressmen - even federal investigators and House impeachment managers. Can you prove these charges?
Poe: Well, in many cases, these threats were made quite openly. For example, on February 8, 1998, with pressure mounting to impeach Bill Clinton, George Stephanopoulos appeared on ABC's This Week with Sam Donaldson and Cokie Roberts. Stephanopoulos had resigned as White House communications chief in 1996 and become an ABC news analyst. But he was still carrying the Clintons' water, as his next words made clear.
Stephanopoulos announced that the Clinton White House was planning what he called an "Ellen Rometsch" strategy. He explained that Rometsch was an East German spy who had managed to become John F. Kennedy's lover. According to Stephanopoulos, the Kennedy White House threatened to open up the FBI files and divulge embarrassing or incriminating information on anyone who attempted to blow the whistle on JFK's affair with Rometsch. If pressed to the wall, the Clinton White House would do likewise, said Stephanopoulos.
Sam Donaldson asked, "Are you suggesting for a moment that what they're beginning to say is that if you investigate this too much, we'll put all your dirty linen right on the table? Every member of the Senate? Every member of the press corps?" To which Stephanopoulos replied, "Absolutely. The president said he would never resign, and I think some around him are willing to take everyone down with him."
This was a clear threat, delivered openly, on national television. Through Stephanopoulos, the Clintons were warning Congress and the media to back off. The threat worked. David P. Schippers, who was Chief Investigative Counsel for the Clinton impeachment, reveals in his book Sell-Out that Republican leaders, from the get-go, had no intention of holding a proper impeachment trial or of convicting Bill Clinton. It was all a charade.
FP: What is the New Underground?
Poe: The New Underground is the name I have given to the network of dissident journalists who began speaking out against Clinton corruption during the 1990s, through New Media outlets such as talk radio, cable TV and the Internet.
FP: How did Hillary persecute the New Underground?
Poe: In July 1995, Hillary's Shadow Team produced a secret report which identified the Internet as a special danger to the Clintons' power. The report proved prophetic when journalists such as Matt Drudge, Christopher Ruddy, Joseph Farah and, of course, David Horowitz, began using the Internet to publish stories that Big Media would never touch.
In February 1998, Hillary announced that the Internet needed an "editing or gatekeeping function." By the time she spoke those words, Hillary was already hard at work putting her gatekeeping machinery into place.
Her most damaging attacks against the Internet came disguised as private lawsuits, brought by third parties. For instance, Hillary operative Sid Blumenthal sued Matt Drudge for $30 million in 1997, charging defamation. The lawsuit was clearly orchestrated by the White House. David Horowitz came to Drudge's rescue, providing him with free legal representation, and got slapped with an IRS audit for his troubles. The case dragged on for years, but, soon after the Clintons left office, Blumenthal dropped his suit.
In September 1998, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times sued Jim Robinson's FreeRepublic.com for copyright violation. Like most message board operators, Robinson allowed users to post full-length newspaper articles on his discussion forum. However, unlike other message board operators, Robinson one day found himself deluged by cease-and-desist orders from Times Mirror, Dow Jones, Reuters and other leading news organizations. According to the Washington Weekly, the attack on FreeRepublic was coordinated by Debevoise & Plimpton - a law firm used by the Clintons and the Democratic National Committee.
FP: Have you experienced any persecution or harassment personally? Any threats or warnings? Do you have concerns for your and your family's safety?
Poe: Well, I doubt that I'm important enough to merit Hillary's personal attention. The Shadow Team has bigger fish to fry. For instance, I imagine they've got their hands pretty full, right now, trying to frame Rush Limbaugh on drug charges.
That said, I did have a devil of a time getting Hillary's Secret War published. Random House originally signed the book. After I turned in the manuscript, they refused to publish it. Things looked bad for awhile. Then Joseph Farah and WND Books came riding to the rescue, God bless them, and agreed to publish Hillary's Secret War.
FP: Tell us about Hillary's secret conspiracy report.
Poe: Its official title was The Communication Stream of Conspiracy Commerce. Hillary's Shadow Team produced this report in July 1995, in an attempt to squelch further discussion of the Vincent Foster case. Hillary's operatives quietly circulated the report to Clinton-friendly journalists, in order to give them ammunition for debunking and discrediting any journalist who dared to continue probing the Foster cover-up.
The report accused Pittsburgh newspaper mogul Richard Mellon Scaife of fabricating rumors about Foster's death and paying rightwing journalists to spread them. Significantly, the report featured a special section identifying the Internet as the most dangerous weapon in Scaife's arsenal, enabling him and his vast rightwing conspiracy to disseminate - and I quote - "an extraordinary amount of unregulated data and information..."
FP: We all know that Matt Drudge broke the Monica Lewinsky story. What other big stories did the New Underground break?
Poe: Virtually every Clinton scandal of any note was either broken on the Internet, or kept alive on the Internet long after Big Media had suppressed it. The list is endless: there's the Clintons' involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal; the Vincent Foster cover-up; the suspicious death of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown; the Clintons' ties to drug lords and global crime syndicates; the TWA 800 coverup; the Oklahoma City bombing coverup; Chinagate; Russiagate; the Clinton body count. You name it.
FP: You claim that the New Underground helped turn the tide for George W. Bush during the 2000 election. Please explain.
Poe: During the election crisis, FreeRepublic mobilized activists who took the fight to the streets. They created the now-famous "Sore Loserman" emblem brandished by protesters across America. When Jesse Jackson came to Florida to incite racial unrest, the Freepers shouted him down at a major rally and sent him packing. Freepers also joined the protest outside the Stephen Clarke government building in Miami, which helped stop the all-Democrat Miami-Dade canvassing board from carrying out an illegal, selective vote count behind closed doors.
Meanwhile, J.J. Johnson's SierraTimes.com acted as a central command post for Operation Truckstop 2000 - a nationwide, general trucking strike that would have gone into effect had Gore succeeded in stealing the election.
The real tie-breaker, however, was an exclusive series of stories published on Joseph Farah's WorldNetDaily, exposing Gore's ties to the criminal rackets of the "Hillbilly Mafia." Local observers say that story, which got wide play in Tennessee media, cost Gore his home state, with its crucial eleven electoral votes. Had Gore won Tennessee, he never would have needed those disputed votes in Florida.
FP: In your epilogue, you recount an interesting experience you had on the day of the 9-11 attack. Tell us about that.
Poe: I was then editor of David Horowitz's FrontPageMagazine.com -- as you are now. On the day of the attack, my wife Marie got a call from our friend Ann Coulter. She was stranded in a bar in Queens, and her cell phone was dying. Manhattan was locked down. The bridges were closed and Ann couldn't get home. So we got in the car and picked her up.
Ann had a column due that night, so we set her up in our library with her laptop. We were all there together when we got the news of Barbara Olson's death. Tragically, Mrs. Olson had gone down with American Airlines Flight 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon.
Barbara Olson was a personal friend of Ann's. The loss hit her very hard. That night, Ann sat in my library, with F-16 jet fighters screaming overhead every few minutes, and wrote her eulogy to her lost friend. It concluded with what would soon become Ann's most famous and controversial one-liner: "We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity."
FP: You compare the New Underground to the pamphleteers of the American Revolution. Do you believe we are headed for revolution?
Poe: God forbid. Revolutions usually end in dictatorship, no matter which side wins. Still, if the enemies of our Republic pick a fight - and I'm talking here about our internal foes - I don't believe that Americans are in any mood these days to back down from it.
FP: Mr. Poe, we are out of time. Thank you for joining us and everyone here at Frontpagemag.com would like to congratulate you on accomplishing this vital piece of work on the Clintons. We hope to see you again soon.
Poe: Thank you Jamie.
*
I welcome all of our readers to get in touch with me if they have a good idea/contact for a guest for Frontpage Interview. Email me at jglazov@rogers.com.
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Israel and the Ghost of Gonen

By P. David Hornik
FrontPageMagazine.com | May 7, 2004

In the days leading up to Likud voters' crushing defeat of Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan, an Oslo golden oldie reappeared in the Israeli media. Ex-Member of Knesset and cabinet minister Gonen Segev was arrested and remanded on charges of trying to smuggle 25,000 Ecstasy pills into Israel from the Netherlands. It seemed like a fortuitous reminder that so long as Israel is in the grip of the Oslo mentality, the Spirit of Gonen lives on.
Seemingly, the Likud anti-disengagement vote was a stellar example of democracy in action. A month ago Prime Minister Sharon, accused of negating his electoral platform and betraying his constituents from his own party, announced to those constituents that they'd have a chance to decide if his plan would go any further.
But now that they've said no, Sharon is already saying he's going to find a way to get around it. Gonen must be smiling in his jail cell.
Gonen Segev emblazoned his name forever in the annals of infamy back at the time of the Knesset's vote on the Oslo II agreement in October 1995. He was elected to the Knesset in 1992 on the ticket of the Tsomet Party--a hawkish party to the right of Likud that became thoroughly anti-Oslo as the "process" emerged. But Gonen and his sidekick Alex Goldfarb bolted Tsomet, joined Labor, and cast the two votes that enabled Oslo II to squeak past by a margin of 61-59. For the citizens' votes that they'd bargained away, Segev and Goldfarb were each rewarded, it was commonly understood, with a cabinet post and a new car by the Rabin-Peres Labor Party.
In other words, except for that glitch of corruption the Oslo II agreement would have been rejected by the elected representatives of the Israeli people (especially the Jewish representatives, among whom the anti-agreement margin was wide even after Segev and Goldfarb's treachery). But, rather than refusing to make further concessions to the genocidal Palestinian Authority or for that matter dismantling it, the "process" moved on, taking its toll of blood whose latest addition was a mother and four daughters murdered pointblank in their car by two "militants" in Gaza.
Sharon's plan for unilateral retreat from Gaza and northern Samaria (and, clearly, additional parts of Judea and Samaria further down the road) has a seductive appeal to many Israelis and friends of Israel, since Sharon speaks in terms of "strengthening" our position and being able to "fight terror more effectively." Yet Palestinian Media Watch reports that the Palestinian media unanimously views the plan as a victory for the Palestinians and a precedent for destroying Israel entirely. Let me put it this way: if you lived in New York City and anti-American terrorists were operating in Westchester County, would you want the U.S. army to be operating there too, or would you want it to be pulled out? Well, the Sharon Plan states: "upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of Gaza Strip territory which have been evacuated"--meaning the entire Strip except for a tiny "corridor" along the Gaza-Sinai border. Even there, the plan only promises that Israel will "initially" deploy forces.
It was because they recognized the Sharon plan as a further continuation of the Oslo giveaways, whose result has been to surround Israel with terror enclaves and turn it into a slaughterhouse, that an overwhelming majority of Likud members voted against it. Yet Sharon, in the true Oslo spirit, is now saying he'll go ahead with the plan anyway.
Israel is admired as an innovative country, but not all its innovations are something to be proud of. The idea here is: "O.K., you guys can vote on this. If the vote goes in my favor, it counts; if it goes against me, it doesn't count."
In seeking to get around a Likud vote that was supposed to be binding, Sharon is behaving about as honorably as Gonen Segev.
Unlike Gonen, Sharon's motives may not be--if one may put it so--pure corruption. True, some claim his disengagement plan is an attempt to escape his legal difficulties by currying favor with Israel's left-wing media and judicial establishments. Others claim that, with his roots in the Labor movement, he's showing his own true left-wing colors. Or, some say that like Likud prime ministers before him, Sharon now wants to prove his "peace" credentials while ignoring all the evidence that caving in to terror brings on further catastrophes.
But Sharon's determination to scotch the Likud verdict smacks of the Oslo paradigm of running roughshod over Israeli democracy. From Yitzhak Rabin's betrayal of his 1992 campaign promises not to negotiate with the PLO to the crooked Oslo-II vote to the use of Clinton-donated American spin doctors in Ehud Barak's election campaign to Sharon's current maneuvers, Oslo has always been a totalitarian impulse that sacrifices honor and morality to goals that turn out to be disastrous. Maybe that's why Gonen Segev came back to haunt us.

P. David Hornik is a freelance writer and translator living in Jerusalem whose work has appeared in many Israeli, Jewish, and political publications.


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Posted by maximpost at 10:40 PM EDT
Permalink

Dissension Grows In Senior Ranks On War Strategy
U.S. May Be Winning Battles in Iraq But Losing the War, Some Officers Say

By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, May 9, 2004; Page A01


Deep divisions are emerging at the top of the U.S. military over the course of the occupation of Iraq, with some senior officers beginning to say that the United States faces the prospect of casualties for years without achieving its goal of establishing a free and democratic Iraq.
Their major worry is that the United States is prevailing militarily but failing to win the support of the Iraqi people. That view is far from universal, but it is spreading and being voiced publicly for the first time.
Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, who spent much of the year in western Iraq, said he believes that at the tactical level at which fighting occurs, the U.S. military is still winning. But when asked whether he believes the United States is losing, he said, "I think strategically, we are."
Army Col. Paul Hughes, who last year was the first director of strategic planning for the U.S. occupation authority in Baghdad, said he agrees with that view and noted that a pattern of winning battles while losing a war characterized the U.S. failure in Vietnam. "Unless we ensure that we have coherency in our policy, we will lose strategically," he said in an interview Friday.
"I lost my brother in Vietnam," added Hughes, a veteran Army strategist who is involved in formulating Iraq policy. "I promised myself, when I came on active duty, that I would do everything in my power to prevent that [sort of strategic loss] from happening again. Here I am, 30 years later, thinking we will win every fight and lose the war, because we don't understand the war we're in."
The emergence of sharp differences over U.S. strategy has set off a debate, a year after the United States ostensibly won a war in Iraq, about how to preserve that victory. The core question is how to end a festering insurrection that has stymied some reconstruction efforts, made many Iraqis feel less safe and created uncertainty about who actually will run the country after the scheduled turnover of sovereignty June 30.
Inside and outside the armed forces, experts generally argue that the U.S. military should remain there but should change its approach. Some argue for more troops, others for less, but they generally agree on revising the stated U.S. goals to make them less ambitious. They are worried by evidence that the United States is losing ground with the Iraqi public.
Some officers say the place to begin restructuring U.S. policy is by ousting Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, whom they see as responsible for a series of strategic and tactical blunders over the past year. Several of those interviewed said a profound anger is building within the Army at Rumsfeld and those around him.
A senior general at the Pentagon said he believes the United States is already on the road to defeat. "It is doubtful we can go on much longer like this," he said. "The American people may not stand for it -- and they should not."
Asked who was to blame, this general pointed directly at Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz. "I do not believe we had a clearly defined war strategy, end state and exit strategy before we commenced our invasion," he said. "Had someone like Colin Powell been the chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], he would not have agreed to send troops without a clear exit strategy. The current OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] refused to listen or adhere to military advice."
Like several other officers interviewed for this report, this general spoke only on the condition that his name not be used. One reason for this is that some of these officers deal frequently with the senior Pentagon civilian officials they are criticizing, and some remain dependent on top officials to approve their current efforts and future promotions. Also, some say they believe that Rumsfeld and other top civilians punish public dissent. Senior officers frequently cite what they believe was the vindictive treatment of then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki after he said early in 2003 that the administration was underestimating the number of U.S. troops that would be required to occupy postwar Iraq.
Wolfowitz, the Pentagon's No. 2 official, said he does not think the United States is losing in Iraq, and said no senior officer has expressed that thought to him, either. "I am sure that there are some out there" who think that, he said in an interview yesterday afternoon.
"There's no question that we're facing some difficulties," Wolfowitz said. "I don't mean to sound Pollyannaish -- we all know that we're facing a tough problem." But, he said, "I think the course we've set is the right one, which is moving as rapidly as possible to Iraqi self-government and Iraqi self-defense."
Wolfowitz, who is widely seen as the intellectual architect of the Bush administration's desire to create a free and democratic Iraq that will begin the transformation of the politics of the Middle East, also strongly rejected the idea of scaling back on that aim. "The goal has never been to win the Olympic high jump in democracy," he said. Moving toward democratization in Iraq will take time, he said. Yet, he continued, "I don't think the answer is to find some old Republican Guard generals and have them impose yet another dictatorship in an Arab country."
The top U.S. commander in the war also said he strongly disagrees with the view that the United States is heading toward defeat in Iraq. "We are not losing, militarily," Army Gen. John Abizaid said in an interview Friday. He said that the U.S. military is winning tactically. But he stopped short of being as positive about the overall trend. Rather, he said, "strategically, I think there are opportunities."
The prisoner abuse scandal and the continuing car bombings and U.S. casualties "create the image of a military that's not being effective in the counterinsurgency," he said. But in reality, "the truth of the matter is . . . there are some good signals out there."
Abizaid cited the resumption of economic reconstruction and the political progress made with Sunni Muslims in resolving the standoff around Fallujah, and increasing cooperation from Shiite Muslims in isolating radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr. "I'm looking at the situation, and I told the secretary of defense the other day I feel pretty comfortable with where we are," he said.
Even so, he said, "There's liable to be a lot of fighting in May and June," as the June 30 date for turning over sovereignty to an Iraqi government approaches.
Commanders on the ground in Iraq seconded that cautiously optimistic view.
"I am sure that the view from Washington is much worse than it appears on the ground here in Baqubah," said Army Col. Dana J.H. Pittard, commander of a 1st Infantry Division brigade based in that city about 40 miles north of Baghdad. "I do not think that we are losing, but we will lose if we are not careful." He said he is especially worried about maintaining political and economic progress in the provinces after the turnover of power.
Army Lt. Col. John Kem, a battalion commander in Baghdad, said that the events of the past two months -- first the eruption of a Shiite insurgency, followed by the detainee abuse scandal -- "certainly made things harder," but he said he doubted they would have much effect on the long-term future of Iraq.
But some say that behind those official positions lies deep concern.
One Pentagon consultant said that officials with whom he works on Iraq policy continue to put on a happy face publicly, but privately are grim about the situation in Baghdad. When it comes to discussions of the administration's Iraq policy, he said, "It's 'Dead Man Walking.' "
The worried generals and colonels are simply beginning to say what experts outside the military have been saying for weeks.
In mid-April, even before the prison detainee scandal, Peter Galbraith, a former U.S. ambassador to Croatia, wrote in the New York Review of Books that "patience with foreign occupation is running out, and violent opposition is spreading. Civil war and the breakup of Iraq are more likely outcomes than a successful transition to a pluralistic Western-style democracy." The New York Review of Books is not widely read in the U.S. military, but the article, titled "How to Get Out of Iraq," was carried online and began circulating among some military intellectuals.
Likewise, Rep. John P. Murtha (Pa.), a former Marine who is one of most hawkish Democrats in Congress, said last week: "We cannot prevail in this war as it is going today," and said that the Bush administration should either boost its troop numbers or withdraw.
Larry Diamond, who until recently was a senior political adviser of the U.S. occupation authority in Iraq, argued that the United States is not losing the war but is in danger of doing so. "I think that we have fallen into a period of real political difficulty where we are no longer clearly winning the peace, and where the prospect of a successful transition to democracy is in doubt.
"Basically, it's up in the air now," Diamond continued. "That's what is at stake. . . . We can't keep making tactical and strategic mistakes."
He and others are recommending a series of related revisions to the U.S. approach.
Like many in the Special Forces, defense consultant Michael Vickers advocates radically trimming the U.S. presence in Iraq, making it much more like the one in Afghanistan, where there are 20,000 troops and almost none in the capital, Kabul. The U.S. military has a small presence in the daily life of Afghans. Basically, it ignores them and focuses its attention on fighting pockets of Taliban and al Qaeda holdouts. Nor has it tried to disarm the militias that control much of the country.
In addition to trimming the U.S. troop presence, a young Army general said, the United States also should curtail its ambitions in Iraq. "That strategic objective, of a free, democratic, de-Baathified Iraq, is grandiose and unattainable," he said. "It's just a matter of time before we revise downward . . . and abandon these ridiculous objectives."
Instead, he predicted that if the Bush administration wins reelection, it simply will settle for a stable Iraq, probably run by former Iraqi generals. This is more or less, he said, what the Marines Corps did in Fallujah -- which he described as a glimpse of future U.S. policy.
Wolfowitz sharply rejected that conclusion about Fallujah. "Let's be clear, Fallujah has always been an outlier since the liberation of Baghdad," he said in the interview. "It's where the trouble began. . . . It really isn't a model for anything for the rest of the country."
But a senior military intelligence officer experienced in Middle Eastern affairs said he thinks the administration needs to rethink its approach to Iraq and to the region. "The idea that Iraq can be miraculously and quickly turned into a shining example of democracy that will 'transform' the Middle East requires way too much fairy dust and cultural arrogance to believe," he said.
Finally, some are calling for the United States to stop fighting separatist trends among Iraq's three major groups, the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds, and instead embrace them. "The best hope for holding Iraq together -- and thereby avoiding civil war -- is to let each of its major constituent communities have, to the extent possible, the system each wants," Galbraith wrote last month.
Even if adjustments in troop presence and goals help the United States prevail, it will not happen soon, several of those interviewed said. The United States is likely to be fighting in Iraq for at least another five years, said an Army officer who served there. "We'll be taking casualties," he warned, during that entire time.
A long-term problem for any administration is that it may be difficult for the American public to tell whether the United States is winning or losing, and the prospect of continued casualties may prompt some to ask of how long the public will tolerate the fighting.
"Iraq might have been worth doing at some price," Vickers said. "But it isn't worth doing at any price. And the price has gone very high."
The other key factor in the war is Iraqi public opinion. A recent USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll found that a majority of Iraqis want the United States to leave immediately. "In Iraq, we are rapidly losing the support of the middle, which will enable the insurgency to persist practically indefinitely until our national resolve is worn down," the senior U.S. military intelligence officer said.
Tolerance of the situation in Iraq also appears to be declining within the U.S. military. Especially among career Army officers, an extraordinary anger is building at Rumsfeld and his top advisers.
"Like a lot of senior Army guys, I'm quite angry" with Rumsfeld and the rest of the Bush administration, the young general said. He listed two reasons. "One is, I think they are going to break the Army." But what really incites him, he said, is, "I don't think they care."
Jeff Smith, a former general counsel of the CIA who has close ties to many senior officers, said, "Some of my friends in the military are exceedingly angry." In the Army, he said, "It's pretty bitter."
Retired Army Col. Robert Killebrew, a frequent Pentagon consultant, said, "The people in the military are mad as hell." He said the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, should be fired. A spokesman for Myers declined to comment.
A Special Forces officer aimed higher, saying that "Rumsfeld needs to go, as does Wolfowitz."
Asked about such antagonism, Wolfowitz said, "I wish they'd have the -- whatever it takes -- to come tell me to my face."
He said that by contrast, he had been "struck at how many fairly senior officers have come to me" to tell him that he and Rumsfeld have made the right decisions concerning the Army.



? 2004 The Washington Post Company




>> BEYOND CVID...

US mantra: N Korea nukes must go, but how?
By Ralph A Cossa

(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)

With a six-party working-group meeting about to take place in Beijing, in which North Korea has agreed to participate, Washington has said that its position toward the Hermit Kingdom remains unchanged: it seeks the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs, or CVID for short. Yet, despite its repeated devotion to the acronym, Washington has not been entirely specific as to what CVID means, or to what it fully entails.
True, North Korea has agreed to participate in a six-party working-group meeting on May 12 to help lay the groundwork for the third session of the more senior-level six-party talks (among North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States), which are anticipated before the end of June. However, in regard to CVID, assistant secretary of state James Kelly, who heads the US delegation at the plenary sessions, recently told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "that acronym (CVID) and the important goal it represents [have] been accepted by all but the North Koreans."
While it is also true that all parties (including North Korea) profess to seek a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula, and the others (less North Korea) at least pay lip serve to the CVID objective, it is not clear that all agree on the definition of its components.
Dissecting CVID
Washington has made it clear that "complete" means the dismantlement of both plutonium and uranium enrichment-based programs. But, despite the highly publicized confession by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, that he had sold uranium-enrichment equipment to North Korea, Pyongyang continues to deny having a uranium-based weapons program, and several other members of the six-party process seem openly skeptical of Washington's accusations (or more willing to disregard the evidence, even if it might be true). Thus, it would appear that North Korea's (also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK's) acknowledgment of a uranium-enrichment program - and a willingness by the others to press Pyongyang on this point - must be the first order of business at the working-group meeting, if there is to be any hope for future progress.
"Verifiable" means just that. It has long been acknowledged that devising a verification regime intrusive enough to satisfy hardline skeptics will be no mean feat. This is why the "Libyan model" is potentially so important. As Kelly told Congress, "the DPRK needs to make a strategic choice for transformed relations with the United States and the world - as other countries have done, including quite recently - to abandon all of its nuclear programs." In case the reference was too subtle, Kelly later noted that he "discussed Libya's example with our North Korean counterparts, and we hope they understand its significance". In truth, verification can only work if the North cooperates in turning in its hidden hardware - not to mentioned reprocessed plutonium. Taking an Iraqi-style "catch me if you can" approach seems unworkable.
The definition of "irreversible" remains subject to the most interpretation. At a minimum, it would seem to require an end to all DPRK nuclear programs, including energy-associated efforts (both production and reprocessing), to guard against future backsliding. Pyongyang has, at times, intimated that its "peaceful nuclear energy program" might also be put on the bargaining table - if the price is right. Washington has argued that there is no "peaceful" program and has made no secret of its desire to avoid an Agreed Framework II. The first Agreed Framework was decided in 1994, when both the US and North Korea reaffirmed the importance of achieving peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, however, no serious movement came from the safeguards outlined in the framework, and much of it was later postponed. Thus, the US and the DPRK have decided to take the "freeze" approach for the resolution of the nuclear issue or a revival of any light water reactor (LWR) programs, although the US has yet to formally demand an end to all nuclear energy-related programs.
Washington sees "dismantlement" as an action, not as a future promise. Previously, it had dismissed North Korean "freeze" proposals, saying it would not reward North Korea for merely honoring past (broken) promises. However, a breakthrough now seems possible in this area, depending on how Pyongyang defines its current "reward for freeze" proposal. While US incentives will only come after dismantlement begins - which is itself a step beyond the [President George W] Bush administration's "no rewards until dismantlement is complete" approach - Washington has indicated that it would not object to a South Korean plan to offer energy assistance to North Korea in return for a "complete and verifiable" freeze, as long as the freeze were identified as "a first step toward dismantlement".
For any freeze proposal to work, however, it must encompass all of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs, both plutonium and uranium-based. It must also be accompanied by a return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and monitoring devices to North Korea, removed in 2002. Therefore, success at the May 12 working-level talks, like success at the more senior-level six-party talks that will hopefully follow before the end of June, continues to rest on North Korea becoming more forthcoming on the full extent of its nuclear programs, and for China, South Korea and others to insist that any freeze be "complete and verifiable" before significant new rewards are provided to Pyongyang.

Ralph A Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [pacforum@hawaii.rr.com], a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute, which made this article available.

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Iran, North Korea and proliferation
By Ritt Goldstein

Part 1: US neo-cons and war
Part 2: Preemption and an arms race with itself

In early February, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted that he was instrumental in the sale of nuclear weapons technology to Iran and Libya. America's top arms control official, John Bolton, outlined that the Pakistani network sold "technology for enriching uranium as well as warhead designs to Iran, North Korea and Libya", according to the San Francisco Chronicle. And concerns exist that the warhead blueprints may have gone considerably further.
Notably, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports that Pakistani nuclear weapons cooperation with North Korea "accelerated in the 1990s". But in an amazing example of Bush administration spin, Bolton described the February revelations of the Pakistani operation as "a great intelligence success", arguing that the incident represented "an enormous victory", the Chronicle reported. And while the Bush administration has accepted Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf's assertions that Khan acted independently, a Washington coverup is widely understood.
US security and defense expert John Pike of Global Security observed for Asia Times Online: "Pakistan has been an extremely good partner to the US in the war on terrorism, because the US, to include the president of the US, has been prepared to lie publicly about their nuclear proliferation activities ... it was an established government [of Pakistan] policy."
A CRS report from March 11 notes that one account of events "states generals Musharraf, [Jehangir] Karamat and [Abdul ] Waheed knew of aid to North Korea when they were chiefs of the army staff". And two former Pakistani prime ministers' political parties have expressed concerns that Khan - who was immediately granted a pardon on his "confession" - is merely a handy scapegoat.
The CRS notes that Pakistan and North Korea have had a long cooperation on missile technology. CRS also questions whether a 1996 Pakistani foreign-currency crisis led the government to swap nuclear weapons technology, doing so in lieu of missile payments then allegedly due to Pyongyang. Moreover, while North Korea has never tested a nuclear device, the CRS cites "some reports" that in 1998 Pakistan tested a plutonium bomb for them.
Pike also spoke to this issue, noting that the detonation in question took place far from the site of Pakistan's first nuclear test, and that "sniffer planes" detected plutonium traces - the material North Korean weapons are said to use - and not the uranium with which Pakistani weapons are built. But cutting to what many perceive as the heart of such nuclear efforts, Pike noted: "Historically, states which have felt existential threats, states which feel they have a well-founded fear of regime change, have wanted to get the bomb." And the reasons for this are widely acknowledged.
US nuclear weapons and policy expert Joseph Cirincione, director for non-proliferation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Asia Times Online: "Nuclear weapons are the only weapons in the world that could deter the US." Highlighting the validity of Cirincione's assertion, nuclear hawk C Paul Robinson, director of the US nuclear weapons complex of Sandia National Laboratories, told the National Journal: "Some people draw the lesson that the United States can be deterred by nuclear weapons, but not by chemical or biological ones. I can't argue with that conclusion."
In the same August 2003 National Journal interview, Robinson also said: "I disagree with people who infer that the NPT [nuclear non-proliferation treaty] is a real arms control treaty. It's not." By contrast, numerous US figures, including former president Jimmy Carter, are on record as both strongly endorsing the NPT and expressing strong concern regarding its future.
Between the US's "pressures" on one hand, and its treaty abrogation and avoidance on the other, administration critics believe the international structures which have limited nuclear proliferation are effectively being pulled apart.
In a now established pattern highlighting the Bush administration's commitment to its treaty obligations, it appears to have rescinded the NPT's so-called "negative assurance" to non-nuclear states, a guarantee that they would never face nuclear attack as long as they continued to renounce nuclear weaponry. And with Washington's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) initiating the pursuit of new nuclear weapons, the US has clearly violated article six of the accord - its treaty obligation to continually move towards nuclear disarmament.
As early as 2001, the Observer from Britain christened international acts in this genre as "Big dog diplomacy". But the "big dog" has even been chewing up things at home.
Notably, in a reflection of the reasons underpinning the dangerously destabilizing erosion of US international credibility, the administration appears to have both substantively misled Congress and violated domestic legislation, with a recent CRS update even citing it for this.
But prior to the CRS findings, a sharply critical January letter to the agency responsible for nuclear weapons research and production - the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) - by the chairman and ranking member of the House of Representatives sub-committee overseeing their efforts - the sub-committee on energy and water development - charged that a drive to "charge forward with unrestricted efforts on advanced nuclear weapons concepts" is ongoing, despite Congressional limitations.
The NNSA's "bunker-busting" mini-nuke project, "RNEP", then spawned subsequent and very considerable CRS attention, with a April 9 CRS update highlighting quite wide Congressional concerns. "For many members [of Congress], the five-year cost of RNEP as presented in the FY2005 budget document came as a surprise not only in the amount, but also in what appeared to be an intent contrary to legislation," the CRS wrote. Demonstrating the Congress' level of reservation, in addition to House members, both Republican and Democratic senators' concerns were quoted by CRS.
In addressing his reservations with energy secretary Spencer Abraham, CRS quoted Senator Ted Kennedy as charging: "... you're rushing ahead with the nuclear weapons, including mini-nukes and the nuclear bunker busters. I'll give you a chance to be able to explain how this program [RNEP], which was $45 million two years ago is now up to almost $.5 billion." Other legislators voiced equally strong reservations, particularly regarding the manner in which the administration has pursued the nuclear "flexibility" advocated by the NPR.
As the BBC reported in August 2003, bunker-busting bombs "would fit well with President George W Bush's preference for a preemptive strike capability". But the price of such programs includes considerably more than dollars.
Numerous international security experts have warned of the potential for a new and global nuclear arms race. The Carnegie Endowment's Cirincione warned that if "the most powerful military nation in the world says it needs nuclear weapons for its national security, why don't other countries". He warned that not only America's "enemies", but its friends would be prompted to enter the nuclear race.
Emphasizing such concerns, Brazil recently made international headlines for refusing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors access to a new facility for uranium enrichment. Notably, during his successful campaign for office, Brazil's widely respected and much acclaimed president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, pointedly noted: "If someone asks me to disarm and keep a slingshot while he comes at me with a cannon, what good does that do?" And while Brazil is not currently suspected of having a weapons program, the implications of the Bush administration's nuclear posture appear profound.
As regards Russia, executive director Daryl Kimball of the Washington-based Arms Control Association told Asia Times Online that "the US-Russian arms reduction process has, for all intents and purposes, halted". And a recent article in Izvestia quoted the deputy chief of the Russian general staff, Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky, as warning: "We will be compelled to modify the development of our own strategic nuclear forces depending on Washington's plans."
Cirincione saw the administration's plans in terms of expanding militarism, saying: "They place their faith in maximizing US military strength, not in establishing international law or international norms", noting this was despite US interests lying in the firm establishment of both. Spain's new premier, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, had previously emphasized the same point, saying: "Terrorism is combated by the state of law ... That's what I think Europe and the international community have to debate." But some experts believe another kind of debate may be on the administration's agenda.
On April 6, the Wall Street Journal editorialized: "If warnings to Tehran from Washington don't impress them, perhaps some cruise missiles aimed at the Busheir nuclear site will." Concerns that Iran may have acquired the plans for a nuclear device appear to provide the true rationale behind such headlines, particularly as Iran is building a large uranium enrichment plant before it has reactors which could utilize that plant's nuclear fuel.
IAEA inspectors are reported to have questioned this sequence. And speculation exists that a US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear-related targets is possible in an effort to delay Iran's potential acquisition of sufficient fissile material for a weapon's construction. But Global Security's Pike noted that the difficulty in striking the most significant extent of any clandestine program would make such an effort ill advised. And the substantive political implications also argue against such a precipitous move; yet, some analysts have expressed concern.
Though a number of observers believe Iran may well be in the process of going nuclear, the majority believe any Iranian weapon would be for defensive purposes. "Clearly Iran's motivation is not to obliterate Israel, but to limit the ability of the US, or any foreign power, from coercing them," nuclear expert Christopher Paine of the Natural Resources Defense Council told Asia Times Online. But even defensive weapons could have implications.
Saudi Arabia is said to have helped fund Pakistan's nuclear program through discounts on its oil shipments. And according to Pike, "probably every even-numbered Pakistani bomb has a little sticker on it saying 'property of Saudi Arabia'," with the less than jocular implication being that should Iran go nuclear, the Saudis would do so simultaneously, long-standing differences between the two states spawning the move. Pike pointedly mentioned that Egypt would then want to join "the club", and a deadly regional nuclear arms race would be on. Pike noted that a similar situation exists in Asia, with North Korean weapons providing the seeds for an equally disturbing scenario there.
While it is widely acknowledged that US "pressures" have precipitated the current global volatility, many observers look to the November US elections, hoping for American "regime change" as the best avenue for renewed world stability.

Ritt Goldstein is an American investigative political journalist based in Stockholm. His work has appeared in broadsheets such as Australia's Sydney Morning Herald, Spain's El Mundo and Denmark's Politiken, as well as with the Inter Press Service (IPS), a global news agency.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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South Korea and Japan Reaching Out to North Korea

By Anthony Faiola
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, May 9, 2004; Page A25


SEOUL -- Top U.S. allies in Asia are opening new lines of communication with North Korea, seeking direct dialogue on a host of sensitive issues such as nuclear proliferation, even as the Bush administration continues to reject broad engagement.
The South Korean and Japanese governments reacted with new urgency, analysts said, after U.S. intelligence indicated that North Korea had built up an arsenal of at least eight nuclear devices over the past 20 months.
Two rounds of disarmament talks in Beijing involving high-level delegations from the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea have failed to produce results. With North Korea and the United States at loggerheads, the negotiations have devolved into mid-level working group talks set to begin Wednesday, leaving few observers optimistic of a quick breakthrough.
As a result, South Korea and Japan -- which lie within easy range of North Korean missiles -- are engaging North Korea independently. President Bush, in contrast, has branded North Korea a member of the "axis of evil," rejecting bilateral talks with the government of Kim Jong Il.
South Korea, whose policy of rapprochement has brought unprecedented contacts with the North since the late 1990s, is pushing for more and better dialogue. Officials in Seoul, frustrated with the deadlocked multilateral talks, are convinced the North Koreans need to "be drawn out into trusting us," one official in Seoul said. During the last round of six-nation talks in Beijing, South Korean officials proposed to their North Korean counterparts that they open bilateral channels of communication on the nuclear issue.
"The biggest point with the North Koreans now, whether in dealing with the nuclear or other issues, is establishing trust," said a South Korean official familiar with the talks. "If they don't trust us or the United States, they will be less willing to reach an agreement. That is where dialogue comes in. We need to establish trust through more communication, not less."
In Washington, a Bush administration official said both South Korea and Japan had their own reasons for dealing directly with North Korea. "I think we're not too far out of line here," he said, noting there would be "tremendous opportunities" for direct meetings between U.S. and North Korean officials at the working-group talks. "I think there is enough opportunity for dialogue. We don't think that has been a major obstacle to moving on."
Improved North-South communications can already be seen in photos of South Korea's unification minister, Jeong Se Hyun, shaking hands with his counterparts in Pyongyang this week. The South Korean decision to dispatch a cabinet-level delegation for four days of talks on security issues -- the second such meeting this year -- resulted in a key breakthrough. North Korea's typically surly military agreed to hold a rare meeting between top generals from North and South on defense issues, perhaps this month.
Japan last week dispatched a high-level team to Beijing to meet with North Korean officials. Although the nuclear issue was reportedly raised, the meeting focused on Japan's demands for the return of family members of Japanese citizens abducted by the North Koreans and held in spy training camps during the 1970s and 1980s. Two years ago, North Korea allowed five Japanese citizens to return home and admitted they had been abducted, but it kept eight close family members -- including children -- in North Korea.
Japan and North Korea have been at bitter odds over their return, but Japanese officials described the North Koreans as showing a new willingness to cooperate during this week's talks. One Japanese official who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the negotiations said Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi "is prepared to do whatever it takes" to secure the return of the family members.
That includes, the official said, the possibility of jump-starting now-frozen talks to normalize relations with North Korea. Koizumi is reportedly prepared to fly to Pyongyang to receive the detainees if the North Koreans give them up -- an event that would mark Koizumi's first official visit there since his historic summit with Kim in September 2002.
The overtures by South Korea and Japan underscore the divergent opinions held by the three allies on how to handle North Korea.
South Korea, in particular, has called on the U.S. government to show "more flexibility" to resolve the nuclear crisis. The Bush administration has insisted on a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. But U.S. officials have been "vague," according to one South Korean government source familiar with the talks, on the eventual rewards the North can expect if it complies.
North Korea has a plutonium reactor and appears to have recently reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea told U.S. diplomats two years ago that it had a uranium enrichment program but has since denied the program's existence.
Analysts see Japanese and South Korean engagement of the North in two possible lights. On the one hand, the increased dialogue may turn into a useful, if indirect, channel for U.S. officials to hash out thorny issues and could help pave the way for a disarmament agreement.
But analysts warn there is also a risk that North Korea may succeed in what many see as its primary strategic goal: to drive a wedge between the United States and its key Asian allies.
The Japanese, for instance, share the Bush administration's hard line on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. But analysts say a decision by North Korea to return the relatives of the kidnapped Japanese citizens could be calculated to soften Tokyo's resolve.
It could also be pragmatic. The Japanese government is likely to be called upon to offer massive economic aid to North Korea if it dismantled its nuclear programs. But the Japanese have said they would not offer any aid until North Korea resolved the issue of the family members.
The United States, Japan and South Korea are allies "in the same bed but with different dreams," said Hideshi Takesada, professor at Tokyo's National Institute for Defense Studies. "Japan and the U.S. are united, but there is a gap between those two countries and South Korea," he said. "North Korea has already succeeded in drawing South Korea to the North's side. . . . Now it's trying aggressively to hammer a wedge between Bush and Koizumi."
Staff writer Glenn Kessler in Washington and special correspondent Sachiko Sakamaki in Tokyo contributed to this report.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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China Warns Hong Kong Legislators to Halt Debate on Elections

By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, May 9, 2004; Page A15

BEIJING, May 8 -- China warned Saturday that pro-democracy lawmakers in Hong Kong are violating the law by proposing legislative resolutions criticizing the government's refusal to allow the territory to choose its leaders in direct elections.
The warning, from the government's liaison office in Hong Kong, marked the first time Beijing has sought to limit discussion in Hong Kong's Legislative Council since the former British colony reverted to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Attributed to an unnamed senior official, the statement was the latest step in a government campaign seeking to end debate on its April 26 decision to bar direct elections for Hong Kong's chief executive in 2007 and the full legislature in 2008.
"The official says any move by Legislative Councilors in Hong Kong to advance motions to voice 'discontent' or 'condemn' the April 26 decision by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress over Hong Kong's constitutional development is against the law as well as the constitution," the statement said. "He says the moves do not accord with the Legislative Council's constitutional status as a local legislature and go beyond the limit of its duty and authority."
The statement, issued late Friday night in Hong Kong and relayed Saturday by the official New China News Agency, came in response to attempts by members of the Legislative Council to pass a resolution condemning the Beijing government and another expressing regret at its decision not to allow expanded voting.
Both motions have been blocked by the Legislative Council president, Rita Fan, on grounds they violate the Basic Law, negotiated between China and departing British officials, which outlines the "one country, two systems" arrangement for Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong.
Yeung Sum, chairman of the Democracy Party, told Hong Kong reporters that Fan's rulings in support of Beijing's views amount to restrictions on freedom of speech in the Legislative Council.
The first motion was introduced a week ago by Martin Lee, a leading pro-democracy legislator. It called on the Legislative Council to "strongly condemn" the April 26 decision by Beijing.
After Lee's motion was blocked, another pro-democracy legislator, Albert Ho, introduced a motion accusing Beijing of violating the Basic Law by infringing on the one-country, two systems arrangement that was supposed to guarantee Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy. In addition, it expressed "regret and discontent" at the April 26 decision.
With their motions stymied, pro-democracy activists had called a meeting for Monday to decide the next step in the confrontation. Legislators said they could introduce a third, softer resolution in hopes it would be allowed to come to a vote. If Fan remained firm, they could take the rulings to court seeking to have them overturned.
But Beijing's tough statement appeared designed as a warning that the debate had gone on long enough. The pro-democracy lawmakers are not entitled to voice any criticism of central government decisions through legislative resolutions, the Chinese government said, adding that the April 26 decision was "an important legal document" that "cannot be questioned or challenged."
Audrey Eu, one of 24 elected members in the 60-seat legislature, suggested Beijing's warning, if heeded, would rob the body of its oversight function. "The move implies that Legislative Councilors cannot speak freely, and how could you expect us to speak for the people, to monitor the government?" she said.
"It is not in the interest of Hong Kong's society," said Edward Chan, chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association.
Chinese authorities and their followers in Hong Kong have suggested repeatedly that the debate over political reform in Hong Kong should wane now that Beijing has spoken. Premier Wen Jiabao said during a recent visit to Europe that the April 26 decision did not rule out direct elections forever, only for now. But the message in Hong Kong has been that it is time to move on.
Chinese officials and like-minded Hong Kong officials have put forward two reasons for delaying the expansion of Hong Kong's voting rights. First, they suggest that moving swiftly toward full democracy could destabilize the territory and endanger its economic well-being. Second, they say that those who push for full democratic rights are not patriotic Chinese citizens but are following a U.S. or British agenda.

Special correspondent K.C. Ng in Hong Kong contributed to this report.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company


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Pakistan's Uneasy Role in Terror War
Conciliatory Approach to Tribal and Foreign Fighters Leaves U.S. Officials Frustrated

By Pamela Constable
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, May 8, 2004; Page A08


ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, May 7 -- It was a cinematic moment, heavy with symbolism. In the courtyard of a village Islamic school, uniformed army officers greeted tribal fighters wearing enormous turbans and bandoliers. Rusty rifles and swords were ceremonially presented, and the former adversaries embraced.
But the April 24 meeting, which formally ended a bloody month-long conflict between Pakistani troops and Islamic militants in the tribal region bordering Afghanistan, also signaled a setback for Pakistan's campaign to clear al Qaeda and Taliban operatives out of its border areas. And it underscored persistent contradictions between Pakistani and U.S. priorities despite the two governments' alliance against terrorism.
More than 21/2 years after the United States launched military operations in Afghanistan, U.S. officials continue to describe the threat from revived Taliban and al Qaeda forces there as an urgent and overriding concern. There are constant reports of armed attacks on military or civilian targets in several Afghan provinces along the Pakistani border, and extremist groups have vowed to intensify assaults before the Afghan national elections, which are scheduled for September.
While U.S. and Afghan forces pursue their quarry on the Afghan side of the border, they rely on Pakistan to take on guerrillas who have found refuge on the other side. From Washington's perspective, Pakistan's aborted military mission in the tribal area of South Waziristan was a job half done.
A series of raids in March ended with more than 120 people dead but did not result in the capture or killing of any senior Taliban or al Qaeda figure believed to be sheltered in the rugged, semi-autonomous region. Instead, the mission ended in a settlement that offered amnesty to foreign and tribal fighters who had fiercely resisted the raids, including one local leader who this week pledged loyalty to the Taliban and an anti-Western holy war.
On Monday, the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno, called on Pakistan to renew its military operations in the defiant tribal regions. Criticizing Pakistan's conciliatory approach, he said that "there are foreign fighters in those tribal areas who will have to be killed or captured."
The U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, has made similar critical remarks, expressing disappointment and impatience with Pakistan's performance. So far, U.S. officials noted, not a single foreign fighter has come forward to register under Pakistan's amnesty, though officials have twice extended the deadline for them to surrender or face military action. Last week, the cutoff date was extended to May 8.
Pakistani authorities have bristled at the American criticism, saying they remain determined to uproot Islamic terrorism but must balance the concerns of their allies with the need to respect public opinion and keep the peace at home.
"We are committed to the war on terror and we will pursue it to the end," said a senior government official. "We have a well-thought-out operational and political strategy. We need American support, but we are also sensitive to public opinion, and we do not want to add fuel to the extremists.
"It's a tricky situation, and we must be nimble," he added. "If we don't take care of our domestic constituents, we cannot deliver to the Americans either."
Pakistan is an impoverished Muslim country of 150 million people, rife with religious passions and bristling with weapons. Many Pakistanis are obsessed with national sovereignty and suspicious of Western motives; some adhere to radical interpretations of Islam and oppose efforts to modernize society. Tribesmen are especially protective of their autonomy and traditional way of life.
The agreement that was sealed at the April meeting in South Waziristan may have rewarded a group the government had vowed to punish for harboring foreign terrorists, but analysts say it also averted a wider clash with restive tribesmen, a potential split in the army and a backlash by the country's militant Islamic movement.
"The compromise was an acknowledgment of brutal reality," said Rifaat Hussain, an expert on Pakistani defense issues. "The government wanted to win international credibility, but it could not go too far without risking domestic opposition and possibly provoking a local war. The overriding goal became not to open another front and antagonize the tribal areas -- even at the price of international criticism."
A similar balancing act has blunted many of the initiatives promoted by Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, since he seized power in October 1999. He frequently has been forced to scale back or even abandon ambitious reform efforts, backed by Western governments, after encountering strong resistance from political, religious or economic groups at home.
But the dilemma has been sharpest when it comes to the war on terrorism, to which Musharraf has repeatedly committed his government since the Bush administration first demanded his support after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Musharraf's decision to back the U.S.-led effort abruptly put the Pakistani government, which supported not only the Taliban but also a handful of Muslim guerrilla groups fighting Indian forces in Kashmir, at odds with many powerful segments of society.
This week, for example, while U.S. officials were expressing concern that Pakistan had backed off in the border region, the Pakistani parliament erupted in indignation at the news that a handful of U.S. troops had briefly strayed across the poorly marked border from southeastern Afghanistan.
"There is not a single Pakistani who accepts the intrusion of a single foreign soldier on Pakistani soil," said Aitzaz Ahsan, a lawyer and legislator of the opposition Pakistan People's Party in parliament. He said the government must balance the need to combat terrorism with respect for due process, national sovereignty and domestic traditions, including the laws that limit state intervention in the tribal areas.
"We cannot countenance that foreign elements take refuge in Pakistan to destabilize Afghanistan or any other country, but we also cannot countenance a paramilitary operation that ignores the political system and brutalizes the human rights of Pakistani citizens," Ahsan said. "No one wants foreign elements in Pakistan, but this problem cannot be left to the military alone."
Pakistan's religious parties, whose influence has grown dramatically in recent years and who now wield significant power in several provinces and the national legislature, have been far harsher, repeatedly branding Musharraf as a Western lackey.
Under the April 24 agreement, five tribal guerrilla leaders received full amnesties in return for agreeing to lay down their weapons. Foreign guerrillas were allowed to remain in the tribal areas as long as they agreed to live peacefully and register with the government.
This week Naik Mohammed, 28, one of the tribal leaders, received local journalists in his village. He denied harboring any fighters from other countries, but he described himself as an Islamic holy warrior and said he had fought alongside the Taliban in the past.
Within Pakistan, reaction to the agreement has been mixed. Numerous critics said that while it temporarily pacified the tribal region, it also may have emboldened such troublemakers as Mohammed and set back efforts to reform the governance of tribal areas, which have traditionally been havens for crime, smuggling, violence and primitive forms of justice.
Some, however, saw the agreement as something more portentous: a tactical retreat from an anti-terrorist policy that government critics say could lead to further military intervention in Pakistani politics.
"The Americans are using Pakistan, and what their officials in Kabul are asking of us is the road to suicide," said Sen. Khursheed Ahmad, an Islamic scholar and member of the country's largest Islamic party. "We do not condone terrorism, but the Americans are trying to persuade us to kill our own people. If the war on terror leads the army to carve out an institutional role in politics, it will be bad for Pakistan and bad for America too."



? 2004 The Washington Post Company



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The Best of Bad Choices


Given the Iraq War's mounting costs and impossible goals, America should transfer sovereignty and come home.


By Christopher Layne

The administration's Iraq policy is in shambles. Iraq has become a geopolitical humpty-dumpty that America cannot put back together, and the time has come for the United States to withdraw.
We now face a full-blown uprising against the occupation of Iraq. Events plainly belie the administration's spin that order will soon be restored and that the revolt is just the work of a few Iraqi extremists and a handful of terrorists from other Middle Eastern states. Even top officials in the British government--America's most loyal ally--understand that the administration's take on Iraq is divorced from reality. As British Foreign Minister Jack Straw said, "The lid on the pressure cooker has come off. There is no doubt that the current situation is very serious and it is the most serious we have faced. It plainly is the fact today that there are larger numbers of people, and they are people on the ground, Iraqis, not foreign fighters, who are engaged in this insurgency." Americans should not allow the administration's "perception management" campaign--a fancy bureaucratic term for lying--to pull the wool over their eyes.
From a policy standpoint, an even greater concern is that the administration believes its own disinformation about events in Iraq. But there are three disturbing facts about the insurrection that cannot be swept under the rug. First, what began as a small-scale insurgency mounted by Sunni "dead-enders" and "former regime elements" now has morphed into a broad-based popular rebellion joined by large numbers of Shi'ites. The Shi'ite revolt is especially troubling because--to the extent that the Bush II administration had any strategy at all for administering postwar Iraq--it was based on the assumption that the United States could co-opt the Shi'ites and gain their support for Washington's plans to create a "democratic" Iraq. Second, Iraq's Sunnis and Shi'ites --heretofore deeply antagonistic to each other--now are finding common ground in resisting the occupation. Here U.S. policy seems to be having a bitterly ironic and quite unintended consequence. Previously, Iraq, which Britain artificially cobbled together from the Ottoman Empire's wreckage, lacked a sense of national identity. Now, however, resentment of the American occupation is creating an Iraqi nationalism shared by Sunnis and Shi'ites. Third, outrage at America's heavy-handed use of military power to suppress the uprising has alienated the very Iraqis Washington has counted upon to form the core of a new government to which "sovereignty" can be transferred. Although they were handpicked by U.S. officials, leading members of the Iraqi Governing Council now are condemning American policy and distancing themselves from Washington.
Where does U.S. policy go from here? There are three options: internationalizing the occupation, increasing U.S. troop strength and cracking down hard on the insurgency, or withdrawal.
Internationalizing the occupation by bringing in the UN and/or NATO is a non-starter--pure political grandstanding. First, Iraq now is so dangerous and chaotic it is doubtful that the UN wants to step in and take responsibility for trying to fix things. Second, for the same reasons, other nations are not going to rush in and send troops to restore order in Iraq. Indeed, it now is apparent that others are concluding that their best option is staying out--or, if they already have troops there, getting out--of Iraq. Third, although some individual NATO members have token contingents in Iraq, the alliance has its hands full in Afghanistan (and the Europeans are stretched to the breaking point by their non-NATO Balkan and West African peacekeeping commitments). NATO just doesn't have more troops that it can send to help the U.S. in Iraq.
There is another reason internationalization cannot be a real option as long as the Bush II administration remains in office. Even if the UN agreed to step in, it would do so only if Washington agreed to give the international community real decision-making authority in Iraq. The Bush administration will not do this because giving up control over Iraq would be tantamount to abandoning the very goals for which it went to war in the first place: using Iraq as a platform for establishing American military dominance in the Persian Gulf; transforming Iraq into a dependable, oil-supplying client state; and using Iraq as the launching pad for the proposed "democratic transformation" of the entire Middle East.
Increasing American troop levels and suppressing the insurgency is not a viable option, either. Although the U.S. has enough firepower to dampen down the insurrection--at least for a while--this would be a self-defeating policy because there no longer is a military solution in Iraq. There is a good reason --to quote the title of Andrew Mack's important article that appeared some years ago in the journal World Politics--big states lose small wars.
Insurgencies start small but gain widespread political support by driving a wedge between the civilian population and the occupation forces. Here, insurgents count on the occupation forces to be their unwitting accomplices. When the occupying forces resort to violent and coercive measures, they lose politically by alienating the population. As events in Fallujah and elsewhere demonstrate, such tactics fan widespread popular anger and resentment. Regardless of what happens in Iraq in the next several weeks, a watershed has been reached. Iraq's population is seething and hostile, and if the United States stays on in Iraq, henceforth it will face broad-based political, and armed, resistance to the occupation. In that setting, the U.S. will confront the asymmetry in motivation that causes big states to lose small wars; the Iraqis are fighting for their country, but the United States is fighting for goals that are ephemeral.
Contrary to what Mr. Bush has said, the growing numbers of Iraqis supporting the insurgency do not "hate freedom." It is just that they define "freedom" as freedom from American rule. Now, in this regard, the administration hopes it can placate Iraqi nationalism by handing over "sovereignty" on June 30. But Iraqis are not fooled by this, and Americans shouldn't be either. As things now stand, Iraq will be sovereign in name only because the U.S. will still be wielding military, economic, and political control in Baghdad.
The administration has dug a hole in Iraq. It is time to stopping digging deeper. The war was a tragic, avoidable mistake, and those who opposed it have been vindicated. The administration should be held accountable, both for leading the nation in war under false pretenses and for its willful failure to think through the consequences of going to war with Iraq. As James Fallows recently pointed out in the Atlantic, the administration was warned about many things. It was warned by the then-Army Chief of Staff that stabilizing postwar Iraq would require the long-term commitment of several hundred thousand U.S. troops. It was warned by the Army War College that if American forces remained in postwar Iraq for any length of time, they would soon cease to be viewed as liberators and be seen instead as a hostile occupation army. And it was warned that Iraq was a singularly poor candidate for a "democracy transplant" because it lacked the essential prerequisites for a successful democratic transition. (And if by some chance the U.S. did transplant democracy to Iraq, we would rue the day. A democratic Iraq would be virulently anti-American and anti-Israeli.) The administration turned a deaf ear to these warnings because it considered them to be "antiwar"--that is, undermining its already decided-upon policy of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. And, of course, the administration was correct: these warnings did cut the legs from underneath its case for going to war because they demonstrated that the administration's policy would lead the U.S. into an Iraqi quagmire.
Of course, it can be said that all this is true but is just water under the bridge: we are in Iraq now, and it is "defeatist" to suggest that the United States "cut and run." There are arguments that can be marshaled to support continuing American involvement, but they are not very convincing. And if they are accepted, it will mean that the U.S. has to stay in Iraq for a long, long time no matter what the cost in lives and treasure--and even though there is scant prospect of ultimate success.
First, some will claim that if the U.S. withdraws Iraq will fall into chaos. Of course, the U.S. has been in Iraq for a year and that country is in chaos. Second, it might be claimed that if America withdraws Iraq will become a terrorist haven. But the truth is that the longer the United States stays in Iraq, the more that country will become a magnet for Islamic fighters who want to take us on. Staying the course will not make things better, because America's bloody suppression of the current uprising not only is alienating many Iraqis who were--up to now--acquiescing in the occupation (however reluctantly) but also is stirring up anti-Americanism and creating more terrorism throughout the Middle East. Third, it is said that if America fails to prevail in Iraq, our enemies--not just in the Middle East, but worldwide--will doubt U.S. resolve and will be tempted to challenge the United States in future crises. Well, the same arguments were made against withdrawing from Vietnam. But the United States withdrew from Vietnam, and it survived to triumph in the Cold War: the dominoes did not topple, America's world position did not crumble, and neither its allies nor its adversaries questioned Washington's determination to defend vital U.S. interests.
There is a more heart-wrenching argument against U.S. withdrawal: how can we justify the loss of American lives to the parents of those military personnel who have been killed in Iraq? The real question, however, is how many more parents do we wish to send into mourning. The argument about sunk costs--whether in lives, in wounded (some 3,000 U.S. troops have been wounded in Iraq, many grievously), or dollars (some $121 billion in 2003 and another estimated $50-75 billion this year)--can always be invoked to stick with a failed policy. But staying the course--continuing to pay these costs in pursuit of policy objectives that cannot be attained--is not the answer. Instead of compounding our losses in Iraq, we should be cutting them.
The United States has no good options in Iraq but the least bad is this: Washington should transfer real sovereignty to the Iraqis on June 30. It should tell the Iraqis to work out their own political future among themselves and turn over full responsibility for Iraq's external and internal security to the new regime in Baghdad. Simultaneously, the United States also should suspend all offensive military operations in Iraq, pull its forces back to defensive enclaves well away from Iraq's cities, and commence a withdrawal of American forces from Iraq that will be completed on December 31 (or on January 20, 2005).
There is no point in being Pollyannaish. In the long run, the U.S. will be better off leaving Iraq. In the short-term, however, there will be consequences--not all of which are foreseeable--if the U.S. withdraws. But that misses the point. Sooner or later the U.S. is going to end up leaving Iraq without having attained its goals. Washington's real choice is akin to that posed in an old oil-filter commercial that used to run on television: America can pay now, or it can pay later when the costs will be even higher.
Some 45 years ago, France found itself involved in a conflict very much like that in which the U.S. is involved in Iraq. Algeria was a bitter, bloody, and interminable struggle. The French could not prevail but were unwilling to bow to reality. Charles de Gaulle--a statesman of great vision and courage--cut the Gordian knot and extricated France from the unwinnable war in Algeria. Although painful, it was the right decision. George W. Bush is no de Gaulle. He is incapable either of admitting that his administration blundered into Iraq or of cutting America's losses and disengaging. Whether any other political leader in the U.S. is capable of stepping up to the plate and demonstrating de Gaulle-like wisdom--which might require admitting to having made a misjudgment in initially backing the decision to go to war--remains to be seen. But plainly, the time has come for a statesman to step forward and ask the American people the question that must be asked: if the United States remains in Iraq, how do we tell the U.S. troops there that one of them will be the last one to die for a mistake?
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Christopher Layne, a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and a Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, writes frequently about American and international politics.


May 10, 2004 issue
Copyright ? 2004 The American Conservative

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Iraq through a rear-view mirror


By Paul Greenberg


Slowly, painfully slowly, after a long and increasingly bloody year, a hard truth dawns on American policymakers:
A New and Democratic Iraq cannot be created simply by repeating that phrase. There can be no new Iraq unless it is rooted in the old, or it will be swept away by the first wind out of the desert.

To quote some wisdom out of the East: Where there is no vision, the people perish. Democracy may be a grand vision, but where there is no appreciation of the realities, it is vision that perishes. And nowhere can visions be more dangerous and deluding than in the desert, where wishes may create cruel mirages. Especially to foreign eyes.
Looking at Iraq a year after the formal war ended while the informal, decisive one continues, there is no listing all the multiple mistakes made there, but some stand out like a mountain range, casting long shadows:
* It becomes clearer as the Rumsfeldian mirages are dispelled that the old Iraqi army should not have been disbanded but reformed under rehabilitatable leaders.
By dissolving the Iraqi army, the occupying authorities in one brilliant stroke assured high unemployment, created a critical mass of injured pride and deep resentment in the Iraqi population, and loosed bands of well-armed freebooters to roam the country -- much like the German Freikorps that bedeviled the Weimar Republic after the collapse of the Kaiser's Empire at the end of the First World War in 1918.
* Order should have been more strictly imposed -- instead of violence being tolerated in the name of freedom. Our own Gen. John Shinfeki had warned it might take some 200,000 American troops to occupy Iraq. At the time he may have seemed alarmist to the civilians running the Pentagon like any other high-tech, low-manpower, outsourcing corporation; now he seems prophetic.
* Established religious leaders should have been given greater sway, imported secular ones held in check. Democracy should have been given room to develop in accordance with the culture, not pitted against its Islamic basis.
Next to these massive misjudgments, American successes may not be the stuff of headlines, but they are just as real and impressive -- from a remarkably successful three-week military campaign a year ago to the peace and progress that generally reigns in Kurdish territory. Freedom of the press, individual rights, the liberation of Iraqi women ... all are signal contributions to this new-old Iraq.
But it is the mistakes that stand out in hindsight (they always do) and are brought home with every casualty report. Yet in hindsight it also becomes clearer the greatest mistake of all would have been to allow Saddam Hussein to stay in power, and to think/hope we could somehow contain his mad plans without a showdown at some point. The sooner it came, the better for America and the world.
The various weapons programs David Kay found in Iraq after the formal war there had been concluded, even if they had not yet produced weapons, needed to be stopped while they were still programs, not assembly lines. As George W. Bush observed soon after September 11, time was not on our side.
As for John Kerry, he has not yet made the mother of all mistakes; he still gives at least lip service to staying the course in Iraq, though it is clear he also hopes to appeal to the isolationist impulse at the core of the American psyche.
The senator who would be president has his own litany of empty phrases that on examination will not stand up any better than the superficial talk of a New and Democratic Iraq: He speaks loosely of recruiting NATO to supplant American forces, by which he means France and Germany -- the same powers that frustrated any real attempt to confront Saddam Hussein in the first place.
Mr. Kerry speaks just as loosely about relying on the United Nations, the same outfit that originated the oil-for-palaces program that enriched not just Saddam Hussein but the U.N. itself -- and maybe some high-ranking U.N. officials personally. (The investigation is only starting, and may still get sidetracked.)
Both NATO and the U.N. may provide useful diplomatic cover, but, please, let us not replace old delusions with new ones. Peace and freedom depend, as they have for the better part of a century now, on the power and perseverance of America, and the steadfastness of American public opinion. Make no mistake: If our national unity goes, so will American security. Among all the new lessons to be learned, an old one needs to be kept in mind: Divided we fall.

Paul Greenberg is a nationally syndicated columnist.

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Soldier: Role was to 'make it hell' for prisoners
Reservist tells of orders from intelligence officers

An undated family handout photo obtained by the Washington Post shows Army Specialist Sabrina D. Harman with a young Iraqi boy in Al Hillah., Iraq. Harman is among those charged with abuse of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison.
By Jackie Spinner
Updated: 11:45 p.m. ET May 07, 2004There were no rules, by her account, and there was little training. But the mission was clear. Spec. Sabrina D. Harman, a military police officer who has been charged with abusing detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, said she was assigned to break down prisoners for interrogation.
"They would bring in one to several prisoners at a time already hooded and cuffed," Harman said by e-mail this week from Baghdad. "The job of the MP was to keep them awake, make it hell so they would talk."
Harman, one of seven military police reservists charged in the abuse of detainees at the prison, is the second of those soldiers to speak publicly about her time at Abu Ghraib, and her comments echo findings of the Army's investigation into prisoner abuse there. That probe documented the maltreatment of detainees and found the prison was chaotically run, that there were no apparent rules governing interrogations and that Harman's military police unit was ill trained for the job it was asked to perform.

* Special reports: Military

Harman, a 26-year-old Army reservist from Alexandria, said members of her military police unit took direction from Army military intelligence officers, from CIA operatives and from civilian contractors who conducted interrogations. She did not discuss abusive treatment of prisoners or clarify who specifically ordered such treatment, and she referred questions about the charges against her to her attorney, who declined to comment.
Her face is now famous as belonging to one of two soldiers posing in the widely published photograph of naked Iraqi detainees stacked in a pyramid. The picture is one of several that have inflamed the Arab world and brought condemnation from President Bush and other U.S. political and military leaders.
Harman is accused by the Army of taking photographs of that pyramid and photographing and videotaping detainees who were ordered to strip and masturbate in front of other prisoners and soldiers, according to a charge sheet obtained by The Washington Post. She is also charged with photographing a corpse and then posing for a picture with it; with striking several prisoners by jumping on them as they lay in a pile; with writing "rapeist" on a prisoner's leg; and with attaching wires to a prisoner's hands while he stood on a box with his head covered. She told him he would be electrocuted if he fell off the box, the documents said.


The New Yorker via AP
Harman is among the soldiers who posed with Iraqi detainees. She is accused by the Army of videotaping prisoners who were ordered to strip.
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Private employees as interrogators
In her e-mails, Harman said detainees would be handed over to her military police unit by Army intelligence officers, by CIA operatives or by the contractors. The Army probe into Abu Ghraib said the U.S. government used employees of private companies as interrogators and interpreters along with intelligence officers. Two of the civilian contractors are under investigation in connection with the abuses.
Prisoners were stripped, searched and then "made to stand or kneel for hours," Harman said. Sometimes they were forced to stand on boxes or hold boxes or to exercise to tire them out, she said.
"The person who brought them in would set the standards on whether or not to 'be nice,' " she said. "If the prisoner was cooperating, then the prisoner was able to keep his jumpsuit, mattress, and was allowed cigarettes on request or even hot food. But if the prisoner didn't give what they wanted, it was all taken away until [military intelligence] decided. Sleep, food, clothes, mattresses, cigarettes were all privileges and were granted with information received."
She said the prison had no standard operating procedures and on Tier 1A, where suspected insurgents were held, Army and other intelligence officers "made the rules as they went."
Harman joined the Army as a reservist in 2001, after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. She was assigned to the 372nd, based in Cresaptown, Md. The company was called up for duty in February of last year and deployed to Fort Lee, Va., for three months before heading to Iraq.
Harman, an assistant manager at a Papa John's Pizza in Fairfax County before being sent to Iraq, said the company received additional training at Fort Lee, but it was for "combat support, not I/R," the military term for internment and resettlement. She said she was never schooled in the Geneva Conventions' rules on prisoner treatment.
"The Geneva Convention was never posted, and none of us remember taking a class to review it," Harman said. "The first time reading it was two months after being charged. I read the entire thing highlighting everything the prison is in violation of. There's a lot."
'They're passing the buck'
In the Army report on conditions at the prison, Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba said that "soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater and throughout their mission."
The Army has launched several investigations into the abuse and has notified seven officers and sergeants that they will receive letters of reprimand or admonishment that could end their careers.
Harman is charged with conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty and maltreatment, making a false statement, and assault. She faces an Article 32 hearing tentatively set in June, the military equivalent of a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is enough evidence to convene a court-martial.
In his investigation, Taguba used a portion of Harman's sworn statement to conclude that prisoners had been abused. Harman "stated . . . regarding the incident where a detainee was placed on box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, 'that her job was to keep detainees awake.' "
The other soldiers charged with abuse are Staff Sgt. Ivan L. Frederick II, Sgt. Javal S. Davis, Cpl. Charles A. Graner Jr., Spec. Jeremy C. Sivits, Spec. Megan M. Ambuhl and Pfc. Lynndie R. England. England was charged yesterday.
Harman's mother, Robin Harman, said her daughter would never hurt anyone.
"She has this . . . attitude that she is going to save the world," said Robin Harman, who lives in Northern Virginia. "She got over there and got an eye-opener. You don't put unqualified kids in that situation."
Yesterday, as Robin Harman watched Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld testify, she called her daughter a "scapegoat." "They're passing the buck, putting it all on the little kids," she said. "That's what makes me so mad."
Harman took many photographs while in Iraq, her family said.
Evidence of improper conditions
Among hundreds of digital pictures passed around her MP unit -- and obtained by The Post -- is one taken before the soldiers got to Abu Ghraib in October. In it, Harman is smiling, crouching slightly, a thumb up, and leaning toward a blackened, decaying corpse with long fingers and a gaping mouth.
The photo was taken at a makeshift combat morgue in Al Hillah, her family said, citing letters that Harman sent with the picture.
Sabrina Harman grew up around photographs of dead people, her family explained. Her father was a homicide detective, and her mother was a forensics buff. Robin Harman said her husband often brought home crime-scene photographs for the family to "profile."
"She has been looking at autopsies and crime-scene pictures since she was a kid," her mother said. "At 7 or 8, she could spot things I'd miss."
Shortly after Harman got to Abu Ghraib in October, her mother said, she began to take and collect pictures as evidence of the improper conditions.
Robin Harman said when her daughter told her what she was doing, she ordered her to stop. "We got into an argument about it at 4 a.m.," Robin Harman said. "Sabrina said she had to prove this. I told her to bring the pictures home, hide them and stay out of it."
Sabrina Harman brought the photographs home to Virginia in mid-November during a two-week leave. An Army investigator showed up on Jan. 16 and took a CD of photos and Harman's laptop computer, her roommate said.
In February, the Army moved Harman to Camp Victory, a base of trailers and tents near Baghdad's airport. Her weapon was confiscated, but she is not in confinement. She spends her days sweeping streets and planting flowers, her family said.
Robin Harman said her daughter had dreamed of following her father into a career as a homicide detective. Now she does not want to have anything to do with law enforcement, Robin Harman said.
"She just moved out two years ago," Robin Harman said. "She has no clue what people are really like. She thinks everyone is good."

? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Little Red Corvette
Do the pictures of John Kerry in his Lycra cycling suit make you wonder if he's running for the right reasons?
by Hugh Hewitt
05/06/2004 12:00:00 AM
WHEN JOHN KERRY took a spill from his bike this past weekend, it triggered thoughts of Jimmy Carter's collapse in a road race, Gerald Ford's much-mocked stumbles, and of Kerry's own misadventures on the ski slopes earlier this year. But it wasn't until the pictures of Kerry on his bike appeared that the real damage was done. The electric-lemon Lycra look probably won't play well outside the metrosexual caucus, and it can't be particularly inspiring to the troops living in holes outside of Falluja. Presidents can golf, and they can run, but they can't get dandied up and dart around on bikes in tights and fluorescent helmets.
Kerry's obsessive, if ill-fated, displays of physical activity also raise issues other than decorum. I've seen this sort of behavior before in men of a certain age, usually from their early 50s to their early 60s. And then the thought stuck: Are John Kerry's presidential ambitions and the shape and images of his campaign more about a mid-life crisis writ very large than any underlying set of ideas?
First, note that there aren't a lot of ideas over at Kerry Central, other than the U.N. blathering which, in the aftermath of oil-for-food-for-cash-for-Kofi's-friends, doesn't even persuade United Nations employees anymore. And Kerry's paper thin record of Senate accomplishments over two decades doesn't provide us with a reason for his running either.
So who's to say that it all isn't just an effort to head-off old age via the biggest sideshow of them all.
There are warning signs of mid-life crisis. At least a couple of these--excessive time spent on personal appearance and the constant reminiscing about one's youth--seem spot-on in the context of Kerry. And the big gun experts on male mid-life melt-down, such as Jim Conway, author of Men in Midlife Crisis, warn that some candidates for mid-life crisis "seem to have a lot of power, leadership, and ability, yet many of them express great insecurity, and feeling worthless." Kerry may be hiding a lot of angst behind his fa?ade of lift-tickets and SUVs and his Shrumian rhetoric.
Presidents Bush, Clinton, and Carter arrived in the White House before the age when the mid-life demons descend, and President Reagan and candidate Dole had passed the age of such smash-ups.
But Kerry's definitely in the danger zone. Maybe those Lycra shorts are just a cry for help. Maybe he needs help. Maybe what the Kerry campaign really needs is a red corvette.
Hugh Hewitt is the host of The Hugh Hewitt Show, a nationally syndicated radio talkshow, and a contributing writer to The Daily Standard. His new book, In, But Not Of, has just been published by Thomas Nelson.
? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
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HOW TO END-RUN KOFI'S COVERUP


May 6, 2004 -- U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan talks grandly of "transparency" in the so-called probe of the world body's festering Oil-for- Food scandal - but don't believe a word of it.
For he seems to be running a coverup.
Benon Savan - the former Oil-for-Food boss, whose name appears on a list of foreigners bribed by Saddam Hussein's regime and who has been on a mysterious "vacation" pending retirement since the scandal broke - has ordered the program's contractors not to cooperate with requests for information.
Even if officials proceeding in Savan's name are merely foot-dragging, a stonewall is a stonewall.
Specifically, two letters signed "for Benon V. Savan" have come to light, each ordering a company with material knowledge of the scandal not to share any details with investigators.
One of those companies, the Swiss firm Cotecna, had employed Annan's son Kojo on its payroll as a "consultant" when the Oil-for-Food rip-offs began.
And Kofi Annan's official spokesmen admit that the secretary-general has personally approved blocking the sharing of relevant Oil-for-Food details with investigators. Perhaps an unfettered probe would get a little too close to home?
Meanwhile, the U.N. Secretariat - which administered the Oil-for-Food program - refused to provide a number of audits to Congress.
Still awaiting his own copies of these (and other) critical documents is former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, hired by Annan to conduct a separate, parallel investigation of the scandal.
Good luck to Volcker, too - for it has become crystal clear that Annan & Co. have every intention of fighting every honest effort to shed sunlight on the scandal.
The latest line from Turtle Bay is that the Oil-for-Food mess isn't really a scandal at all, just an anti-U.N. plot inspired by "right-wingers" - or, alternatively, by former Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi.
Those are shameful lies.
In fact, the Iraqi Governing Council has been probing the mess since January, when the Baghdad newspaper Al-Mada published its now-famous list of the 270 officials from 44 countries who were bribed with oil vouchers by Saddam (see above: Benon Savan).
Indeed, reports of massive corruption in the $46 billion program began years before the liberation of Iraq opened government records to inspection.
And only last weekend Jalal Talabani, a Kurdish leader on the Governing Council, announced that the body has obtained larger and more comprehensive lists of individuals, companies and governments that received suspicious payments from U.N.-supervised oil sales.
This hasn't stopped ardent advocates of a U.N.-administered Iraq from trying to wish the scandal away. The New York Times, for example, has consistently editorialized for a U.N. takeover - and simply refused to cover the Oil-for-Food scandal for weeks after it first broke.
No talk of right-wing plots can alter the plain truth:

* That much of the food, hospital supplies and other humanitarian goods that were supposed to be bought with Oil-for-Food funds never were, because contractors overcharged the program and kicked back a percentage of the proceeds to Iraqi officials.

* That fully half of the 13 percent of Oil-for-Food revenues that were supposed to go to the Kurds living in the northern No-Fly Zone - some $4.4 billion - is still unaccounted for. The money seems to have been hijacked by Saddam's officials while U.N. "watchmen" turned a blind eye.

* That the Oil-for-Food office never transferred its database to the Coalition Provisional Authority - despite Benon Savan's assurances to the Security Council that it had done so.

* That many Oil-for-Food contractors turned out to be false fronts or non-existent when the CPA tried to contact them.

* That Oil-for-Food funds meant for a full range of humanitarian projects were instead diverted to pay for luxury cars and the construction of an Olympic Stadium for Saddam's son Uday - a project that Kofi Annan personally approved.

* That the United Nations can't begin to explain how all of this happened, or how its oversight system failed.

Assuming, of course, that the United Nations ever intended for the oversight system to work in the first place.
One way or another, it's time to find out.
Happily, the much-maligned (by Democrats) Patriot Act contains the tools needed to pry open some of Turtle Bay's box of dirty secrets.
Here's how it could work:
It's beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein paid money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.
And there is evidence that Saddam had financial and other ties to al Qaeda terrorists. For example, two firms doing business with Saddam via Oil-for-Food are reportedly linked to a financier associated with Osama bin Laden.
Since Oil-for-Food was Saddam's chief source of cash, it's safe to assume that the money he lavished on terrorists came from program kickbacks processed along with other Oil-for-Food revenues by BNP Paribas - a powerful French commercial bank chartered to do business in New York state.
Now, Kofi Annan may manage to keep U.N. information away from investigators - but you can be sure that BNP Paribas kept a full set of discoverable books.
And the Patriot Act grants Treasury Secretary John Snow substantial power to investigate U.S.-chartered banks suspected of having been involved - knowingly or otherwise - in terrorist activity.
Paribas may not have consciously bankrolled Osama.
But Snow nonetheless can subpoena its records to find out how much of Saddam's ill-gotten cash passed through the bank - and where it went.
And he has the power to look at all of the bank's Oil-for-Food dealings since the passage of the Patriot Act.
That's precisely what he needs to do.
And to hell with Kofi Annan's stonewall.

Posted by maximpost at 3:28 PM EDT
Permalink
Thursday, 6 May 2004


Warnings go unheeded over North Korea threat
Michael R. Gordon International Herald Tribune
Thursday, May 06, 2004
Dispatches
WASHINGTON Imagine a former official who toiled behind the scenes on the most sensitive national security issues leaving the Bush Administration in frustration and now charging that White House policies have left the United States exposed to a dangerous and growing threat.
I am not referring to Richard Clarke, the former National Security Council aide whose criticism of the Bush Administration's counterterrorism policies rocked Washington, but to Charles Pritchard, a retired U.S. Army colonel and the former point man on North Korea for the U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell.
Jack Pritchard, as he is known around Washington, is not a celebrity. He does not have a best-selling book. He makes more appearances at research institutes than at talk shows. But for months he has warned that the White House lacks an effective strategy to dissuade North Korea from building up its nuclear arms.
With the United States understandably occupied with the escalating violence in Iraq, the issue of North Korea has not attracted the attention it deserves. But North Korea's nuclear arsenal, which was once thought to number one or two weapons, appears to be growing substantially on President George W. Bush's watch.
The Bush Administration insists that the best way to put pressure on North Korea is through six-party talks, which also include China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. There can be unofficial side conversations between American and North Korean officials, but the United States will not be blackmailed into making concessions, administration officials say.
But Pritchard's basic critique is that the administration has neither offered much of a carrot nor wielded a stick. Wary of offering inducements to a totalitarian regime, the Bush Administration has not engaged the North Koreans in the sort of direct negotiations that might lead to a diplomatic breakthrough, he argues.
But fearful of sparking another crisis at a time when American forces are tied down in Iraq, the Bush administration has not put the North Koreans on notice that further nuclear developments will trigger economic sanctions or perhaps even military action.
"This administration has adamantly refused to deal directly with North Korea, and they are not going to make any progress until that happens," Pritchard said in an interview. "And there have been no red lines. We have never said 'if you do this here are the consequences.' Now they may have developed as many as six nuclear weapons to add to the two that they confirmed that they have."
Pritchard's path from policy insider to outside critic is an unusual odyssey. A son of an army officer, Pritchard joined the army after college. He served as a foreign area officer in Japan, an expert on the politics and military trends of the region, and later became the army attach? at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.
After President Bill Clinton was elected, Pritchard was assigned the Japan and Korea portfolio on the National Security Council, a responsibility he retained after he retired from the military. He was one of the officials who went to Powell's home to brief him on North Korea issues soon after Bush was elected president. After Powell became secretary of state, Pritchard, a political independent, went to the State Department as a special envoy for talks with North Korea.
But the Bush Administration was divided about how to deal with Pyongyang. While Powell wanted to engage Pyongyang hard-liners at the White House, the Defense Department cast North Korea as an untrustworthy regime that would implode over time. The North Koreans, for their part, set back chances for progress when it was discovered that they had begun a clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons from highly enriched uranium using technology imported from Pakistan, a development that violated their international commitments.
After three-party talks involving the United States, North Korea and China were arranged last year, Pritchard was expected to be the envoy. But senior State Department officials persuaded Powell that he would be unacceptable to the White House because of his past work for the Clinton Administration, Pritchard says. Pritchard figured he was an envoy without a role and submitted his resignation on April 18, 2003. Powell asked him to stay on and keep working on North Korea. So he kept his decision to resign confidential and waited to see what would happen.
What happened convinced him that the administration's policy was unlikely to succeed. As James Kelly, the State Department's top official on Asia, prepared for the three-party talks, Pritchard said he had drafted negotiating instructions that would allow Kelly to engage in "pull-aside," or informal discussions, with the North Koreans. The proposal for pull-aside discussions, he says, were cast aside after Kelly convened an interdepartmental meeting and hard-liners from Vice President Dick Cheney's staff and the Defense Department objected.
Pritchard was later asked to help organize the current six-party talks. Those negotiations do allow for informal side conversations between American and North Korean officials, but they stop short of the fuller dialogue Prichard believes is necessary to produce an agreement rolling back North Korea's nuclear program. Pritchard left the government in August.
Estimating North Korea's nuclear potential is an inexact science. But some experts say Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal is expanding and could grow by as many as six weapons if it produces plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods it has kept in a cooling pod. A parallel program to produce bomb grade uranium would allow Pyongyang to expand its arsenal even more in several years time.
"Jack was here for a couple of years," Powell told The Washington Times in April. "He was an expert in these matters, and he thought we ought to be moving in another direction. And I said, 'No, the president wants us to do it this way.' And he left, and now he's writing long, tortured articles about how we are doing it wrong." Pritchard says he loyally defended the administration's line while in government but now has an obligation to call it as he sees it.
The United States has two big security problems on its hands: a violent insurgency in Iraq and a simmering dispute with a nuclear North Korea that does not always make the headlines and which is full of complexities. North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the best way to contain or end them deserves fuller debate during this election year, and Pritchard's critique is a good place to start.
Gordon can be reached at pagetwo@iht.com.
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com
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>> PROGRESS NOTES...


Philippines uncovers al-Qaeda linked operation
By Roel Landingin in Manila
Published: May 6 2004 11:27 | Last Updated: May 6 2004 11:27
Philippine defence and police officials said Thursday they had uncovered a new Jemaah Islamiah (JI) logistics cell in the country and arrested a suspected member who might have helped transfer funds from the al-Qaeda and JI terror networks.
Eduardo Ermita, the defence secretary, said in a press briefing that the authorities had begun proceedings to freeze several bank accounts holding a total of $25,000 of funds transferred from suspected JI leader Riduan Islamudin, also known as Hambali, currently under US custody.
It was the first time that Philippine security officials had been able to establish a detailed money trail from international terror suspects to their local partners, he said.
Philippine security officials are on heightened alert amid reports that the JI and local terror groups are planning to sabotage the May 10 presidential election.
Last month, six suspected Muslim militants said to be plotting major bomb attacks on shopping malls and western embassies in Manila were arrested.
The authorities also arrested 46-year old Jordan Mamso Addullah based on leads provided by US officials who interrogated Mr Islamudin, said Hermogenes Ebdane Jr., the Philippine police chief.
He added that according to US intelligence, the $25,000 was transferred in July 2003 and was delivered to JI members by an unknown courier flying in from Kuala Lumpur.
The authorities believe that upon receiving the money, Mr Addullah changed it into local currency and sent half of it to an Indonesian JI cell leader called "Zulkipli". "Zulkipli" was then supposed to have deposited some of it in a bank and gave the rest to a JI bomber known only as "Marwan". Mr Ebdane said the remainder might have been used to finance a safe-house for the JI cell, Mr Addulah's money trading business and the dowry for Zulkipli's fiancee.
Apart from money laundering, Mr Addullah is also facing charges for possible involvement in at least three bombing incidents in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, where most of the country's Muslim minority live.

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>> EXIT STRATEGY?

http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700102004

NGO Says Trafficking Of Women Rampant In Kosovo
6 May 2004 -- Amnesty International says that trafficking of women and girls for sexual purposes in Kosovo comprises a disgraceful human rights abuse.
The London-based human rights organization said that the international community itself bears complicity for growth of a sex industry based on the abuse of trafficked women in Kosovo.
Amnesty cited reports that the number of establishments in Kosovo where trafficked women and girls may be exploited has increased from 18 in 1999 to more than 200 in 2003. The report said that clients include international police and troops.
It said the women come from Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine, and Kosovo itself. The report said that the women are sold into slavery.
(dpa)
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>> IF ONLY WATCH...

Iranian Hard-Liners OK Anti-Torture Law
5 May 2004 -- Iranian state television reports that a bill to ban torture in Iran has become law after its approval by the hard-line Guardians Council.
Iran's reformist-dominated parliament approved the bill yesterday.
State television said the bill was then approved by the 12-man Guardians Council, which has vetoed dozens of pro-reform bills.
Guardians Council spokesman Ebrahim Azizi was quoted as saying on state television that the council scrutinized the bill for its compliance with Islamic law and the Iranian Constitution and did not find it contradictory.
Parliament passed the anti-torture bill after the head of the hard-line judiciary, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi-Shahroudi, last week issued an order to police and security officials, calling for an end to torture.
Iran's constitution outlaws the use of torture, but human rights groups claim the Islamic Republic's security forces routinely use it to extract confessions.
(Reuters)
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Head Of Kyrgyz Anticorruption Department Killed
6 May 2004 -- Interior Ministry spokesman Joldoshbek Buzurmankulov told a press conference today in Bishkek that Chynybek Aliev, chief of the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry's anticorruption department, was shot dead as he was driving his car last night.
Buzurmankulov blamed "criminals" for the murder and said the killing was related to Aliev's work.
Aliev was reportedly hit by 17 bullets fired from an automatic weapon.
Buzurmankulov said Aliev was investigating contract killings and appeared to have become a victim of the crime he was fighting.
(ITAR- TASS)
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Fears that oil price is fuelling inflation
By our International Staff
Published: May 6 2004 19:51 | Last Updated: May 6 2004 19:51
Central bankers around the world raised concerns about the inflationary impact of higher oil prices on Thursday as crude rose to nearly $40 a barrel in New York - its highest level since October 1990.
Oil prices have risen by 22 per cent this year. Traders fear tight supplies will be even further stretched by rising tension and attacks in the Middle East.
World equity markets retreated in response to inflation fears and the prospect of rising interest rates. The Dow Jones Industrial Average had fallen by just over 1 per cent at mid-session on Thursday.
In the UK the Bank of England pointed to the need to keep inflation under control as a reason for raising its main interest rate by a quarter-point to 4.25 per cent on Thursday. In a statement explaining its decision the Bank's monetary policy committee cited sharply rising commodity prices.
Although the European Central Bank kept rates on hold at 2 per cent, Jean-Claude Trichet, its president, adopted a more hawkish tone towards price rises. He warned that increases in oil prices might pose "an upside risk to price stability" and that Eurozone inflation could rise above 2 per cent over the next few months.
Last week Alan Greenspan, chairman of the US Federal Reserve, warned that the "dramatic" rise of oil and gas futures was "an economic event that can significantly affect the long-term path of the US economy".
Earlier this week Mr Greenspan signalled that US interest rates would be raised soon, prompting speculative investors to start to reduce their risks. As a result, emerging market bond prices on Thursday suffered their worst one-day losses in nearly two years.
JP Morgan's EMBI+ emerging debt index was down 2.2 per cent as European markets closed, the biggest one-day decline since July 2002. John Bates, analyst at West LB, said: "There was an irrational stampede to get out - there were only sellers in the market."
Tony Blair, Britain's prime minister, said he had spoken to oil-producing countries about the impact of higher oil prices.
Mr Trichet also repeated his recent call for oil-producing countries to exercise "responsibility" on the price of oil. "It is is a matter of importance," he stressed.
However, an Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries official said there was nothing the oil cartel could do to reduce the soaring crude price.
Hossein Kazempour Ardebili, Iran's representative on Opec's board of governors, told Dow Jones newswires that security fears in the Middle East and the tight US petrol market had created a $6 a barrel premium in the oil price.
Opec, which accounts for about one-third of global oil output, quashed market rumours of an emergency meeting when an official said there were no plans for a meeting before the next scheduled gathering in Beirut on June 3.
Oil prices have risen about 5 per cent since Saudi militants attacked western expatriates at a petrochemical plant at the weekend.
Reporting by Tony Major in Helsinki, Ed Crooks, Kevin Morrison and P?ivi Munter in London


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Greenspan issues warning on deficits
AP ~~article_owner~~
Thursday, May 06, 2004
WASHINGTON America's soaring federal budget deficits represent a major obstacle to the country's long-term economic stability, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan warned on Thursday.
Greenspan told a banking conference that the federal budget deficit was a bigger worry to him than America's soaring trade deficit or the high level of household debt because those two problems can be corrected by market forces.
``Our fiscal prospects are, in my judgment, a significant obstacle to long-term stability because the budget deficit is not readily subject to correction by market forces that stabilize other imbalances,'' he said in remarks to a banking conference.
Greenspan noted that the federal deficit, estimated to climb above $500 billion this year, will amount to 4.25 percent of the total economy after being in surplus just a few years ago.
He said one of the biggest concerns was that the deficits now were occurring right before the first wave of baby boomers will begin retiring.
``We have legislated commitments to our senior citizens that, given the inevitable retirement of our huge baby-boom generation, will create significant fiscal challenges in the years ahead,'' Greenspan said in his remarks, which were delivered by satellite to the conference in Chicago.
Greenspan cautioned that the country should not be lulled into a false sense of security about the federal deficit just because at the moment interest rates on long-term Treasury securities remain at low levels.
He said that the dollar's foreign exchange value has remained close to the average level of the past two decades in spite of soaring trade deficits and there have been no major economic disruptions triggered by record high household debt.
``Has something fundamental happened to the U.S. economy and, by extension, U.S. banking, that enables us to disregard all the time-tested criteria of imbalance and economic danger?'' Greenspan asked.
Answering his own question, the Fed chairman said, ``Regrettably, the answer is no. The free lunch has still to be invented.''
Greenspan said he believed market forces would provide the impetus to move the trade deficit and high household debt to more sustainable levels.
But he said his concern was that there were no market forces that would push the country to deal with the federal budget deficit.
Greenspan did not offer a solution to the budget deficit in his speech Thursday although in the past he has called on Congress to move quickly to address the looming funding difficulties in Social Security by trimming the benefits of future retirees.
Two proposals he has suggested include raising the retirement age for receiving full Social Security benefits and reducing annual cost of living adjustments that Social Security recipients receive.
Federal Reserve policy-makers met on Tuesday and left a key interest rate at a 46-year low but signaled that they planned to start raising rates at a moderate pace in coming months. Greenspan did not address interest rates in his prepared remarks.
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com

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EU/China: Leaders Reaffirm Blossoming 'Strategic Partnership'
By Ahto Lobjakas
Brussels, 6 May 2004 (RFE/RL) -- European Commission President Romano Prodi today hailed the current rapprochement between the European Union and China as a "permanent" strategic link.
Prodi spoke in Brussels after a long meeting this morning with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.
"I congratulated the People's Republic of China on the strategic choice that it has made to build a partnership with Europe to promote our shared aims for peace and prosperity," Prodi said.
Prodi praised China's involvement in the Galileo global-navigation system and its support to the EU's efforts to set up the world's first nuclear-fusion facility.
Prodi said the EU would strive to step up political, economic, cultural, and social contacts with China, predicting also that the trade relationship between the two sides would grow to eclipse all other global trade links.
The EU is currently running a 55 billion euro ($66.9 billion) annual trade deficit with China, but officials in Brussels say they will not resort to appeals to the World Trade Organization to consider sanctions.
Both Prodi and Wen refrained from references today to partnerships with other countries, such as the United States or Russia.
Prodi stressed the EU's commitment to the "one China" policy ruling out formal ties with Taiwan.China failed today to elicit a promise from the EU to drop its weapons embargo imposed in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators in 1989.
"On this specific case, me and my colleagues listened carefully to the Chinese request that the European Union lift our embargo on arms sales to China, and I explained that the issue is currently under discussion between member states," Prodi said.
While France, Belgium and Germany back the move, Britain resists -- partly in response to U.S. pleas to keep the embargo in place -- while others remain concerned about the human rights situation.
China has argued it wants the embargo lifted for predominantly symbolic reasons, describing it as obsolete. It is assumed that lifting the ban would not dramatically boost EU arms sales to China, as a bloc-wide code of conduct would still prevent most exports.
"We have also expressed our hope at these talks to President Romano Prodi and the European Commission that the Chinese government hopes the European Union will lift the arms embargo against China and will recognize China as a full market economy," Wen said. "President Romano Prodi and the European Commission both expressed their positive stance, which we appreciate."
However, China made headway on its other major goal -- that of being recognized as a market economy by the EU. Prodi said today the EU is prepared to offer China provisional recognition by the end of June -- although such a move would not have a binding impact on an eventual final decision.
Prime Minister Wen today sought to separate both the arms embargo and market economy status from considerations such as human rights.
"In resolving those two issues, from the very beginning we have not been in favor of the view that those two issues should be linked with human rights or other political issues," Wen said.
Wen said China appreciates the long-standing human rights discussion it has conducted with the EU for years. He pointed to China's recent ratification of a UN covenant on economic, cultural, and social rights. He said the adoption of a similar convention on civil and political rights is "in preparation."
Prodi today said he believes a gradual, step-by-step approach to political reform is the best way to success.
He also stressed the EU's commitment to the so-called "one China" policy ruling out formal ties with Taiwan. China has made clear that compliance with the policy is a crucial precondition for closer links.
Both sides today also discussed the effects of the recent EU enlargement. Prodi said he was certain EU investment in China would not fall. Wen, for his part, said the size of the Chinese market and its labor force were "irreplaceable."
Wen also said China would not "unpeg" its national currency from the U.S. dollar before a "proper macroeconomic situation" has been achieved and a "prudent" banking system is in place in China. The United States, among others, has argued the peg gives China an unfair trading advantage by keeping its currency artificially cheap.
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China's Wen Seeks Slowdown, Opposes `Sudden Braking' (Update4)
May 6 (Bloomberg) -- Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said he is taking ``forceful'' steps to slow growth and inflation without triggering a slump in the world's seventh-largest economy.
China needs to ``reduce the speed, but not a sudden braking'' in an economy that grew 9.1 percent in 2003, the fastest pace in seven years, Wen told a business forum during a visit to the European Commission in Brussels. China is studying the switch to a ``market-oriented'' foreign-exchange mechanism that won't come before an overhaul of the bank system, he said.
The Chinese government is seeking to cool growth after investment in roads, factories and other fixed assets jumped 43 percent in the first quarter. The boom has led to shortages of oil, coal and power and driven up prices of raw materials.
China may overtake Italy this year to become the world's sixth-biggest economy, according to International Monetary Fund figures. The government is targeting growth of 7 percent this year, compared with the European Commission's forecast for expansion of 1.7 percent in the 12-nation euro economy.
Hong Kong stocks rose today, lifting an index of mainland shares to a two-week high, after the South China Morning Post reported similar comments from Wen yesterday. CNOOC Ltd. and PetroChina Co. advanced as the Hang Seng Index gained 59.85, or 0.5 percent, to 12,010.31 at the 4 p.m. close in Hong Kong.
`More Comfortable'
``People are a bit more comfortable'' with the outlook for the Chinese economy after Wen's comments, said Alex Wong at Rexcapital Asset Management Ltd. His Rexcapital Asian Pacific Fund rose 88 percent in the year through March 31, according to Bloomberg data, compared with a 65 percent advance by Morgan Stanley Capital International's Asia-Pacific Index.
China is calling on banks to curb lending for makers of cars, cement and steel to lessen the economy's momentum, while giving preferential treatment for energy and transport projects to cope with surging demand.
The credit restrictions and the government's halting of a $1.3 billion steel mill project have stirred expectations that the central bank will raise interest rates for the first time in nine years.
Calming Economy
Investment in fixed assets and real estate has led to ``excessively high growth in the M2 money supply and credit,'' Wen said. He promised ``firm, resolute and forceful'' steps to bring growth down to a more sustainable pace.
The Chinese leader said his administration will ``improve'' its handling of the yuan's exchange rate, which has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1994. The euro's 16 percent rise against the dollar since the end of 2002 has widened the European Union's trade deficit with China.
EU imports from China rose 16 percent to 94.9 billion euros ($115 billion) in 2003, while exports to the Asian nation climbed 17 percent to 39.9 billion euros, according to EU statistics. As a result, China's trade surplus with the EU widened to 54.9 billion euros from 47.6 billion euros.
``Our trade with China is growing fast -- and there is no denying that there is a certain imbalance,'' commission President Romano Prodi told the business meeting in Brussels. ``This is not yet a major issue in Europe.''
Wen said he is ``anxious'' to loosen China's currency peg to the dollar. The country needs ``Number one, a proper macroeconomic situation, and number two, a prudent banking system'' before that can happen, he said. ``We are now taking measures to create those two situations.''
Exchange Rates
Prodi said that Chinese leaders promised that ``they will not use the rate of exchange as an instrument of trade.''
China's economy expanded at a faster-than-expected 9.7 percent in the first quarter, barely slowing from a 9.9 percent pace in the previous three months.
Wen said he wanted the EU to grant China the status of full- market economy ``at an early date.'' The commission, the 25- nation EU's executive branch, said in a statement it would reach a ``preliminary assessment'' of this by the end of June.
A full-market economy status would mean that the commission, also the EU's trade authority, would use price and cost data provided by Chinese companies rather than third-country information when investigating unfair-trade complaints by EU industry, said commission spokeswoman Arancha Gonzalez. EU punitive tariffs resulting from such inquiries affect about 0.4 percent of China's exports to the EU, she said.
Arms Embargo
Wen also asked the EU to lift the arms embargo it imposed on China after the 1989 killings of pro-democracy protestors in Tiananmen Square. Prodi said he ``listened carefully'' to the request, on which national governments in the EU will decide. France is leading a European campaign to lift the embargo -- a move that would need the backing of all EU member nations.
During Wen's visit, China and the EU signed declaration on cooperation over the planned European Galileo satellite- navigation system, in which the Chinese government has already agreed to invest about 200 million euros.
The two sides also signed a customs accord to boost trade and an agreement for talks on competition issues including antitrust law and merger control. In addition, they agreed to hold talks aimed at addressing EU concerns about a possible rise in Chinese textile exports after the elimination next year of World Trade Organization quotas.
To contact the reporter on this story:
Jonathan Stearns in the Brussels bureau jstearns2@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editor of this story:
Catherine Hickley at chickley@bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: May 6, 2004 10:16 EDT

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Slowly but steadily, India will overtake China
Jonathan Power IHT
Thursday, May 06, 2004
An economy awakes
LONDON India is now in the middle of what many Chinese would give their right arm for - a general election. Yet China is the power that gets all the attention.
When President Richard Nixon first went to China it was widely assumed that he was ignoring India and courting China because China had nuclear weapons and could help balance the Soviet Union. But since 1998 India has possessed nuclear weapons and can balance China.
While Washington is slowly waking up to the fact that the tortoise soon might overtake the hare, the investors and the press continue in their old ways. Last year the inflow of foreign capital into China was two and a half times that into India. The press barely covers the Indian election while every day there is a story out of Beijing.
This skewed appreciation has been going on since the time of Mao. China basked in accolades in the 1960s and 70s, while India was mocked for its "Hindu growth rate." China's people were fed, housed, clean and tidy, while India's were ragged, hungry and sinking into a trough of despondency - "a wounded civilization," in the words of the novelist V.S. Naipaul.
With the 1981 famine we could see, to use George Watson's phrase, that "the intellectuals were duped." China had to beg around the world for grain while India had managed to survive the savage drought of 1979 without having to import a sack.
Now with Mao long dead and the capitalist reforms of Deng Xiaoping well into their stride, the story is being repeated but in a more complex way. To many, China's economic progress has been nothing less than spectacular. But inflationary pressures, bad bank loans, a rapidly increasing maldistribution of income and crime all threaten its economic stability.
India, meanwhile, has been gradually but with increasing speed loosening up its old Fabian socialist system. After a major economic crisis in 1991, Finance Minister Manmohan Singh introduced major promarket reforms and fiscal expansion and India's economy has never looked back.
India's annual growth has been averaging 5 percent - and is now 8 percent, thanks to a good monsoon. Singh, who has become Sonia Gandhi's principal economic adviser, believes that with more reforms than the present government has so far countenanced, an average annual growth rate of 6.5 percent is sustainable - which is what he privately thinks China's overhyped growth rate actually is.
India is better placed than China for future growth. Its capital markets operate with greater efficiency. They are also much more transparent. Companies can raise the money they need. India's legal system, while too slow, is much more advanced and is able to settle sophisticated and complex cases. Its banking system has relatively few nonperforming assets.
India's democracy and news media are alive and vital, which provides a safety valve for the incoherent changes that modern economic growth brings. India has religious riots, secessionist movements, urban squalor and bitter rural poverty. But the voters know they can throw the rascals out, and regularly do.
Moreover, the massive flows of foreign investment into China are a two-edged sword. It has become a substitute for domestic entrepreneurship. Few of the Chinese goods we buy are in fact made by indigenous companies. And the few that exist are besieged by regulatory constraints and find it hard to raise domestic capital. China's state-owned enterprises remain massive but bloated and possess a frightening number of nonperforming loans from China's vulnerable banking system.
India, by contrast, has created world-class companies that can compete with the best in the West, often on the cutting edge of software, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.
India's trump cards are its use of English, its emphasis on mathematics in its schools and the talents of its diaspora. For decades China has benefited from the wealth and the investment potential of its diaspora and the economic energy of Hong Kong and Taiwan. After years of ignoring its ?migr?s, India is now welcoming them back - and they have much more "intellectual capital" to offer than China's, much of it coming from Silicon Valley, where the Indian contribution has shone.
Watch the tortoise continue its course as the hare starts to lose its breath.
Jonathan Power is a commentator on foreign affairs.
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com

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New head named for British spy agency
AP ~~article_owner~~
Thursday, May 06, 2004
LONDON The primary author of a disputed British intelligence dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction will be the next head of the MI6 spy agency, Prime Minister Tony Blair's office said Thursday.
Blair's opponents said John Scarlett's promotion to head the foreign intelligence agency was tainted by politics, but Blair said he was recommended by an independent panel and chosen on merit.
``He's someone who is a fine public servant ... and I think it's very unfortunate if (the appointment) becomes a matter of political comment in any way,'' Blair said at a news conference with visiting Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski.
Scarlett, chairman of the government's Joint Intelligence Committee, was a key figure in the judicial inquiry into the death of weapons scientist David Kelly.
Scarlett testified that he, and not Blair's aides, had the final say on the disputed September 2002 dossier on Iraqi weapons.
The dossier said Iraq had an active program of making and deploying chemical and biological weapons, and had sought to buy uranium in Africa for a nuclear weapons program. Coalition forces in Iraq have found no evidence to back those claims.
That contention was the basis of the government's claim that the document was a summary of hard intelligence, not the work of political operatives.
Kelly killed himself after he was publicly identified as the source of a British Broadcasting Corp. story quoting him anonymously as saying officials exaggerated evidence about Iraq's alleged arsenal to justify war.
Scarlett's testimony matched that of Blair and his aides, who denied pressuring the intelligence committee to strengthen the dossier's claims. Lord Hutton, the judge in the highly charged case, ruled that the BBC was wrong to report that officials knowingly manipulated evidence.
``In view of the evidence at the Hutton inquiry, this appointment can only be described as highly controversial,'' said Menzies Campbell, foreign affairs spokesman for the opposition Liberal Democrat party.
Michael Ancram, foreign affairs spokesman for the Conservative Party, called the appointment ``inappropriate,'' saying Scarlett should not have been promoted while an inquiry into the quality of prewar intelligence on Iraqi weapons was still under way.
``In today's world Britain's Secret Intelligence Service is central to our national security,'' Ancram said. ``And it is essential the whole country has the fullest confidence in it.''
Scarlett graduated from Oxford University in 1970 and worked at MI6 until leaving for the Joint Intelligence Committee post in 2001. He speaks Russian and has served in Paris, Moscow and Nairobi, Kenya.
His testimony at the Hutton inquiry made him the first head of that committee to become widely known to the public.
Scarlett, 55, succeeds Sir Richard Dearlove, 60, who is leaving MI6 to become master of Pembroke College at Cambridge University.
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said he made the appointment on the recommendation of a selection panel chaired by Blair's security and intelligence co-ordinator, Sir David Omand.
``The Secret Intelligence Service is in the front line of our defense against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other threats,'' Straw said. ``John Scarlett has the operational background, personal qualities and wide experience to be a worthy successor to Richard Dearlove.''
Blair's office said Scarlett would follow MI6 practice in the future by not giving interviews, making public appearances or providing on-the-record comments.
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com
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New UK spy chief had key WMD dossier role
By Mark Huband, Security correspondent
Published: May 6 2004 12:48 | Last Updated: May 6 2004 20:34
The new chief of Britain's foreign intelligence service will be the man who played a key role in the writing of the controversial dossier used by the government to justify its decision to invade Iraq.
John Scarlett, who was head of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) that produced the Iraq dossier, will take over as head of the Secret Intelligence Service, better known as MI6, when Sir Richard Dearlove retires in August.
Mr Scarlett, who served as an MI6 intelligence officer in Nairobi, Paris and Moscow before becoming JIC chairman in 2001, is seen by some government officials as tainted by the close ties he established with the office of Tony Blair, prime minister, in the run-up to the Iraq war.
He appeared last year at the inquiry by Lord Hutton into the suicide of the government scientist David Kelly, whose information was used in a BBC report that cast doubt on claims about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes.
During the inquiry, Mr Scarlett said he "owned" the government dossier on Iraq's WMD, and it had not been manipulated by Downing Street officials. However, his defence of the dossier left him open to the accusation that he had allowed secret intelligence to be politicised.
Lord Hutton's report exonerated Mr Scarlett. But the subsequent failure to find WMD in Iraq has discredited the US and UK intelligence services, and is likely to raise questions about Mr Scarlett's stature.
Although government mandarins, intelligence officers and diplomats rarely speak for long about Mr Scarlett before the word "integrity" slips into the conversation, the problem for him will be whether his integrity can be distinguished from that of the "JIC process" of assessing intelligence.
His qualities are those of a discreet and successful spy who lists history, medieval churches and his family as his personal interests.
A fluent Russian speaker, he was recruited to MI6 in 1971 after gaining a first class degree in history at Oxford.


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Japan's tough sell: public trust in social security
James Brooke NYT
Thursday, May 06, 2004
TOKYO With almost 40 percent of young workers skipping out on their social security payments, Japan started an advertising campaign featuring a popular actress, who sternly lectured subway riders: "So you don't mind crying in the future? Pay now. Or later, you don't get paid."
Then, enterprising reporters discovered that the 20-something actress, a self-employed worker, had neglected to pay into the national pension system for years.
But with legislation in Parliament seeking to increase pension contributions gradually by 35 percent, other enterprising reporters have uncovered that seven ministers, a third of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's cabinet, have also neglected to pay into the National Pension Plan.
With the ministers of economy, of finance and of trade and industry on the list, the opposition thought it finally had an issue to take to voters in elections this summer. Then, through more enterprising reporting, it was discovered that Naoto Kan, leader of the opposition, had neglected to pay into the plan for 10 months in 1996, when, as health minister, he was in charge of the national pension system.
"This pathetic political theater leaves us more dumbfounded than angry," an editorial in The Asahi Shimbun stated.
The Japan Times printed a cartoon showing a dozen bureaucrats cavorting on a double-decker wooden festival float, marked "Public Pension System." As the four porters, labeled "Public," staggered bug-eyed under this enormous weight, the bureaucrats did a fan dance, singing a jolly chorus: "Trust us, trust us."
But, according to a poll conducted in March by the Mainichi newspaper, 81 percent of Japanese respondents in their 20s said they "don't trust" the national pension system. For people in their 30s, the figure was 74 percent. For all adults, the "don't trust" group was 60 percent.
"Those ministers not paying their premiums certainly exacerbated the already skeptical public view of the system," Shingo Hirata, a 21-year-old economics student said here on Wednesday. "The existing system is not sustainable, and drastic change is needed."
Yusuke Tomofuji, a classmate, agreed, saying: "Honestly, I cannot trust the current pension system. I am sure that system will soon go bankrupt."
The lack of trust derives from the widespread understanding that Japan's work force is already shrinking.
Japan now has one of the world's lowest birth rates. On Tuesday, the government's statistics bureau announced that the number of children aged 15 or under had fallen by 200,000 over the last year, to 13.9 percent of the population, the lowest level on record. By contrast, the comparable American figure is 21 percent.
In 1950, when the national pension system started to take shape, 35 percent of Japan's population was 15 years or younger, and 4.9 percent of Japanese were 65 or older. Since 1970, the number of workers supporting a pensioner has dropped from 8.5 to about 3.5.
If trends hold up, the elderly population will match the working population in 2044, according to Tadashi Nakamae, president of Nakamae International Economic Research. Birthrates could stay low for years to come.
As of 2000, 54 percent of Japanese women in their late 20s were single, more than double the 1980 level of 24 percent. The comparable rate in the United States today is about 31 percent. In contrast to the United States, Japan has few births outside of marriage; at last count, 99 percent of Japanese babies were born in wedlock.
Without future workers in the pipeline, many young workers view the mandatory pension system as a one-way intergenerational asset transfer.
Where will the money come from, they ask, to pay for their own retirements 40 years down the road? The Nikkei newspaper calculates a roughly $4 trillion gap between the government's future pension obligations and its future contributions. With politicians determined to maintain a level of government spending not related to tax receipts, Japan is already the most indebted of the major industrialized nations.
Taking one step, the Parliament is to approve in coming days the plan to raise premium payments gradually by about one-third and to cut pension benefits by 15 percent. Officials are also studying ways to simplify the system's complicated rules, a trap that apparently caught many of the ministers.
To keep the program solvent through 2012, "they are 85 percent there," Robert Feldman, chief economist for Morgan Stanley Japan, said. To keep Japan's pension system solvent and its living standards high, he said, the nation needs more immigration, more free market economic policies and an annual rate of capital investment of 4.3 percent a year.
The New York Times
Copyright ? 2004 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com

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Libya
Time to make human rights a reality




"You are the only people who have come to really listen to my story. I am not a political person. I just wanted to live a normal life with my family," Ahmad 'Abd al-Salam al-'Alam al-Sharif, a fisherman and football supporter, accused of being a political opponent in the so-called "Ahli Benghazi" Football Club case, told an Amnesty International delegate. He is currently serving life imprisonment, along with two others, after a death sentence against the three men was commuted (for case details, see section below, entitled the application of the death penalty).

Introduction
This report is published after a four-member Amnesty International delegation visited the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for two weeks in February 2004, following a 15-year absence from the country. During the visit, Amnesty International delegates had an unprecedented opportunity to meet political prisoners and were also able to hold meetings with the Libyan authorities, including with Colonel Mu'ammar al-Gaddafi, Leader of the Revolution.

Amnesty International has welcomed positive steps taken by the Libyan authorities in recent years, including the long overdue decisions in 2001 and 2002 to release hundreds of political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience detained since 1973. It is also pleased about the opportunities it had to discuss human rights matters during the visit of February 2004, and welcomes the assurances it received from the Libyan authorities at all levels that they would seriously consider its recommendations. However, as outlined in this report, Amnesty International continues to have grave concerns about the human rights situation in Libya.

The report is based on a comprehensive memorandum focused on civil and political rights that Amnesty International submitted to the Libyan authorities at the beginning of the visit of February 2004. It also reflects the views of the Libyan authorities and other findings during that visit. Since the visit, Amnesty International has urged the Libyan authorities to respond fully to its concerns outlined in the memorandum.

At the time of this report going to print, Amnesty International learnt of a speech given by Colonel al-Gaddafi to the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies and to other high-ranking members of the judiciary on 18 April 2004. In this speech, Colonel al-Gaddafi called for a number of legal and institutional reforms, and responded to a number of issues raised by Amnesty International and dealt with in this report. Specifically, Colonel al-Gaddafi urged the abolition of the People's Court, a special court known to try political cases, and the transfer of its jurisdiction to ordinary criminal courts. He called for a more stringent application of Libyan law, and for reducing the scope of the death penalty to the most serious crimes. Colonel al-Gaddafi also said that the authorities have no right to prevent lawyers and families visiting prisoners, and affirmed the right of families to know what happened to their relatives during incidents in Abu Salim Prison in 1996 during which large numbers of prisoners were reportedly killed. He also praised Amnesty International and other human rights groups for condemning the use of torture by governments and called on all countries to ratify international treaties that ban torture. Following Colonel al-Gaddafi's speech, the Libyan authorities indicated that they were reviewing legislation relating to the formation of associations, among other reforms.

Amnesty International welcomes Colonel al-Gaddafi's intervention addressing the organization's concerns in several areas. It hopes that it will give impetus to a comprehensive program of reform that will address fully the concerns outlined in this report.

Chapter 1 of the report gives background to the human rights situation in Libya. Chapter 2 focuses on current human rights violations faced by real or suspected political opponents, migrants, possible asylum-seekers and others. It identifies laws which severely restrict the right to freedom of expression and association; outlines a pattern of incommunicado detention by security forces, often accompanied by torture, and of unfair trials before special courts, in particular the People's Court, often leading to long-term prison sentences and the death penalty; and illustrates how, despite having set abolition of the death penalty as a goal for Libyan society, capital punishment remains prescribed, and continues to be carried out for a large number of offences including the peaceful exercise of political activities. A new rhetoric inspired by the "war on terror" has been used in recent years to justify the repetition of old practices at the expense of human rights.

In this context, Amnesty International was pleased to learn that the Libyan authorities are revising Libya's Penal Code, with a view to adopting a new code in June 2004. However, the new legal text, if adopted in the form existing in February 2004, will not redress the concerns outlined above. In particular, it still violates the rights to freedom of expression and association, and includes an extensive range of offences punishable by death.

Chapter 3 of the report examines past policies and events constituting grave human rights violations which continue to cast a shadow on Libya's human rights record, involving hundreds of victims and affecting the everyday lives of their families. It includes the policy of "physical liquidation" of political opponents of the 1980s; numerous deaths in custody without adequate explanation; the "disappearance" of political prisoners, especially since 1996; and the "disappearance" of Libyan nationals abroad and foreign nationals visiting Libya. Hundreds of families still do not know whether their relatives are alive or dead, or how they died. Many are too scared to ask about their relatives for fear of retaliation.

Chapter 4 of the report includes Amnesty International's specific recommendations to the Libyan authorities. These recommendations are aimed at ensuring that Libya complies fully, in law and in practice, with its obligations under international human rights law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture).

Amnesty International calls on the Libyan authorities to undertake without delay institutional reforms and other measures necessary to address the grave human rights concerns outlined in this report. There is an urgent need for the truth to emerge in respect of many events of the last three decades. Those responsible for violations must be held to account and the victims must receive full reparations. Libyan nationals in the country must feel confident that they can engage in human rights work without fear of reprisals.

Without prompt and concrete initiatives in this direction, human rights violations in Libya are likely to continue with their toll of human suffering. It is time to turn promises into action, and make human rights a reality.


1. Background

On 1 September 1969, following a military coup overthrowing the monarchy, Colonel al-Gaddafi came to power with a small group of army officers. The country was ruled by a Revolutionary Command Council with Colonel al-Gaddafi at its head. The following years were marked by the one-party system of the Arab Socialist Union, created in 1971. In 1972, Law 71 was adopted, which prohibited the formation of political parties(1).

In 1973 Colonel al-Gaddafi announced a "popular revolution", paving the way for a political system, known as "direct democracy", which continues to operate until today. In 1976 the Arab Socialist Union was abolished and replaced by the General People's Congress, the country's highest decision-making authority, which holds its ordinary sessions annually in Sirte. This gradually evolved towards the establishment in 1977 of the Jamahiriya system, a "state of the masses", whereby all citizens over the age of 18 are meant to contribute directly to decision-making processes in the country through their participation at a local level in Basic People's Congresses. Their decisions are eventually channelled through to the General People's Congress which makes decisions at a national level. Decisions are then implemented by General People's Committees, equivalent to Ministries.

In this system, Colonel al-Gaddafi, officially referred to as the "Leader of the Revolution", is not considered a head of state in the conventional sense but rather as an influential advisor to the people. Parallel to the Basic People's Congresses lie the Revolutionary Committees, whose function it is to mobilize the people to support the ideas and policies of Colonel al-Gaddafi. This system operates in a context in which the formation of political parties continues to be prohibited.

The 1970s and early 1980s were years marked by a policy of repression of those who expressed dissent at the policies of the Libyan authorities. Student demonstrations were violently put down and political opponents were arrested and imprisoned or "disappeared". In 1980 the Libyan authorities introduced a policy of extrajudicial executions of political opponents, termed "stray dogs". The policy, known as "physical liquidation", seemed to have been endorsed at the highest levels. The Revolutionary Committees were empowered to implement this policy both at home and abroad.

At the international level, relations between Libya and several European countries and the USA deteriorated during the mid-1980s. During a demonstration in 1984 in London organized by members of the Libyan opposition, British woman police officer, Yvonne Fletcher, was shot, apparently from the offices of the Libyan People's Bureau. In 1986 three people were killed and some 250 wounded in the bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin. The USA held Libya responsible, and launched bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi, hitting Colonel al-Gaddafi's residence among other places. Some 40 people died as a result.

In 1988 there was a period which appeared to herald important human rights reforms. The authorities released hundreds of political prisoners in a wide-ranging amnesty. During an extraordinary session of the General People's Congress convened that year, the Great Green Charter of Human Rights of the Jamahiriyan Era was adopted. This document restricted the scope of applicability of the death penalty, setting its abolition as an aim; outlawed degrading punishment and ill-treatment of prisoners; and proclaimed the right to a fair trial. Amnesty International was invited to visit the country, where the organization held talks with officials; met several political prisoners; gathered data on human rights developments; and attended a special session of the General People's Congress, held in June. Colonel al-Gaddafi, who had called on the General People's Congress to abolish the death penalty, intervened to seek the commutation of all death sentences in response to a request by Amnesty International. Following an undertaking in 1988, Libya became a state party to the first Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)(2) and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture) in 1989.

After this brief period of positive developments in 1988, the human rights record in Libya deteriorated and the country was closed to international scrutiny, including to the independent human rights experts of the UN and international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International(3). The subsequent years were characterized by widespread human rights violations, including mass arbitrary arrest and detention, "disappearances", torture and the death penalty(4). Repression further escalated in the mid-1990s at a time of clashes between the authorities and armed political groups. Repeated requests by Amnesty International, over a number of years, to visit Libya in order to attend hearings of trials, particularly those heard before the People's Court, were met without response from the authorities. Amnesty International's only access to the country since its visit in 1988 took place in April 2001, when two delegates attended the 29th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in Tripoli. Inside the country, independent human rights organizations were not able to emerge and a climate of fear prevailed, preventing victims of human rights violations or their relatives from communicating with the outside world.

This was accompanied by an era of isolation from the international community following the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988, in which 270 people were killed, and of UTA flight 772 over Niger in 1989, which resulted in the deaths of 170 people. In January 1992 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 748 which imposed an air and arms embargo on Libya. This was lifted in September 2003(5) following a period of suspension initiated in 1999 after the authorities handed over for trial two Libyan nationals suspected of carrying out the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie. This trial resulted in the conviction of 'Abd al-Basit al-Megrahi in January 2001 to life imprisonment; his co-defendant al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah was acquitted. This sentence was confirmed on appeal in March 2002. In 2003 the Libyan authorities accepted "responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials"(6) for the attacks on the Pan Am and UTA flights and reached agreement over compensation to the families of victims of the bombing. Negotiations regarding compensation for victims of the La Belle nightclub bombing were underway at the time of writing.

On 19 December 2003 Libya announced the dismantling of its programs of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, negotiations with the USA and the European Union rapidly intensified with a view to a full normalization of relations between the parties.

1.1 Human rights developments in recent years

In recent years the Libyan authorities have taken limited steps to address the human rights situation in their country, including the waves of releases of political prisoners beginning in 2001 and other initiatives illustrated below. In 2001 nearly 300 prisoners, among them political prisoners, were released. They included Libya's longest-serving political prisoner, Ahmad Zubayr Ahmad al-Sanussi, who had been accused of involvement in an attempted coup d'?tat in 1970 and who spent 31 years in prison, many of those in solitary confinement. In 2002 over 60 prisoners were released, including prisoners of conscience Muhammad 'Ali al-Akrami, al-'Ajili Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Azhari, Muhammad 'Ali al-Qajiji, Salih 'Omar al-Qasbi and Muhammad al-Sadiq al-Tarhuni. They had been imprisoned for almost three decades, following their arrest in 1973 for their peaceful involvement with the prohibited Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, Islamic Liberation Party.

To Amnesty International's knowledge, however, legal proceedings leading to reparation have not been initiated for any former prisoners with a view to compensating them for the abuses they have suffered. In many cases, they are unable to continue to live as they had prior to their imprisonment. For example, their former employers refuse to receive them back at work, a practice which has reportedly been most severe and widespread in the field of education. While some professors and lecturers were able to resume their jobs as academics after their release, others were reportedly told that, given their political background and imprisonment, they would not be allowed to return to their posts. Moreover, such restrictive practices take place in a context in which the authorities have failed to take responsibility for these past abuses, which include prolonged arbitrary detention and torture or ill-treatment.

In 2003 the Libyan authorities apparently lifted travel restrictions which had been imposed on thousands of Libyan nationals, who were forbidden from leaving the country. Since then, many have had their passports restored to them. The Libyan authorities have also embarked upon a policy of actively encouraging Libyan nationals residing abroad to return to Libya with guarantees that they will not face persecution after return. However, in at least one case known to the organization, a Libyan national returned to Libya in May 2002, after assurances from Libyan officials abroad that he would return safely, only to be arrested at the airport. When Amnesty International delegates met Mustapha Muhammad Krer in February 2004, he had still not been charged or tried. He told them: "I returned to Libya because I believed that it was changing for the better. I came here to see my family and because I love my country."(7)

While it continues to be virtually impossible for independent human rights organizations to develop in Libya, there has been limited progress with regard to allowing work on human rights violations in the country. Since its establishment in December 1998, the Human Rights Society of the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, presided over by Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, one of Colonel al-Gaddafi's sons, has become increasingly active in the field of human rights. Since 2003 this organization has made strong calls for long-term human rights violations, including deaths in custody, to be addressed. It has also launched a campaign against torture in Libya and in the Middle East, researched scores of allegations of torture within Libya and in several cases pursued the matter with the authorities; and conducted visits to places of detention, making recommendations to improve their conditions(8).

Libya has also played an important role in regional and international bodies relating to human rights. In 2003 Libya was elected as Chair of the 59th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, during which the Bureau of the Commission introduced a number of measures to strengthen the functioning of its mechanisms. However, Libya did not use its term as Chair of the Commission to take concrete steps to demonstrate its commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights; for example, by extending a standing invitation to the independent human rights experts of the UN to visit the country. In February 2004 Libya ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.

Libya has a good record of ratification of international human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention against Torture. However, Libya has failed to act on the majority of the recommendations made by UN treaty bodies, which monitor the implementation by states of these treaties. In addition, Libya has not yet become a state party to important human rights instruments, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.

1.2 An Amnesty International visit to Libya after a 15-year absence

Amnesty International was granted access to Libya in February 2004, the first visit of its kind since 1988(9). The organization had been requesting authorization to conduct research into its human rights concerns in the country for many years and finally received a positive response from the Libyan authorities in early February 2004. A two-week visit by Amnesty International delegates to Tripoli, Benghazi, Sirte and Bani Walid culminated in a meeting with Colonel al-Gaddafi on 29 February. Amnesty International delegates also held talks with Muhammad al-Misrati, then Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security(10), on several occasions, and with 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation. They also met Karima al-Madani at the Secretariat for Women's Affairs of the General People's Congress.

Upon their arrival, Amnesty International presented a detailed memorandum to the Libyan authorities, focusing on the need for legal reform and the ongoing gap between law and practice, with particular regard to arrest, detention and trial procedures. Issues and individual cases raised in this document provided a basis for discussion in lengthy meetings with the Libyan authorities. At all levels, Libyan officials showed a willingness to discuss issues of concern to the organization.

In their discussions with Amnesty International delegates, the Libyan authorities repeatedly promised to look seriously into the organization's concerns and recommendations. Colonel al-Gaddafi personally expressed his interest in and appreciation for Amnesty International's work. However, no concrete commitments were made with a view to beginning to resolve these issues.

Delegates held detailed discussions on a range of legal issues with 'Umar 'Ali Shalbak, the then Public Prosecutor, and other prosecutors, as well as with other members of the judiciary, in particular Supreme Court judges. At the time of writing, a draft Penal Code was under examination by a committee of legal experts assembled by the then Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security. In February 2004 the then Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, Muhammad al-Misrati, provided Amnesty International with a copy of the draft Penal Code for analysis and told Amnesty International delegates that the draft was scheduled to be discussed before the General People's Congress in June 2004 with a view to its adoption.

Delegates also met private lawyers and lawyers from the Popular Lawyers' Office(11), linked to the People's Court, an exceptional court known to try political cases, among other offences. They held meetings with the Director of the Prison Administration, Major Belqassem al-Gargum, and several prison directors, including Milad Daman, the Director of Abu Salim Prison, known for holding political prisoners. In addition, the visit provided an invaluable opportunity to meet representatives of charitable associations and those working in the field of human rights within the country.

Amnesty International was granted unprecedented access to prisoners of conscience and political prisoners, with whom delegates were able to conduct lengthy individual interviews and collect detailed testimonies. However, without explanation, some of those prisoners whom the organization had asked to see were not made available for interview. In most cases, delegates were able to interview prisoners at their place of detention. However, in several cases, prisoners were brought to the Public Relations Department of the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security. While some of those interviewed were able to speak with relative freedom, others clearly feared to do so.

There was limited opportunity to meet people outside prisons, either former victims of human rights violations or their relatives. Many of them were reluctant to relay their experiences, indicating a climate of fear which still prevails and in which full expression of human rights concerns is far from being a reality. Amnesty International sought and obtained assurances from the Libyan authorities that none of the people met during the visit would face reprisals.

Delegates also attended a hearing before the Benghazi Criminal Court in the trial relating to 426 children infected with the HIV virus while in the care of al-Fateh Children's Hospital in Benghazi. Delegates met the defendants and their lawyers as well as families and children of the Association for Child Victims of AIDS in Benghazi and their lawyers. They told Amnesty International that this had been their first opportunity to have their story heard by the outside world. In addition, they interviewed officers currently being tried on charges of torture in relation to the same case.

Following their visit, Amnesty International published preliminary findings in a press release(12), and called on the authorities to take prompt action to demonstrate their commitment to human rights reform. Amnesty International delegates also invited the authorities to provide the organization with a response in writing to the concerns, issues and questions raised in the memorandum. At the time of writing, Amnesty International had not received a written response to the memorandum. Neither had the authorities undertaken any concrete measures to begin to implement the organization's recommendations. This report is based largely on the memorandum and the findings of the February 2004 visit.


2. Continued human rights violations in law and practice

"It is normal in Libya to hear that your dad has died [in prison] because we have all seen it happen to a neighbour or a friend. It is only since I left Libya that I realize how bad the situation is."
These were the words said to Amnesty International by the son of a political prisoner living abroad, after he and his family, residing in Libya, were informed, years after the arrest, that his father had died in custody.

This section focuses on the need for changes in law, policy and practice in order to end the criminalization of activities merely amounting to the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and association. Unless reformed, the legal system, including a draft Penal Code currently under review, is bound to perpetuate arbitrary political imprisonment and a climate of fear among Libyan nationals.

In addition to the extensive provision of the death penalty within Libyan legislation, a variety of other punishments provided by law are also a matter of great concern. They include forms of "collective punishment", including house demolition, as well as corporal punishment, including flogging and cross-amputation (amputation of the right hand and the left foot).
2.1 Criminalization of rights to freedom of expression and association

In recent years, the Libyan authorities have used the international context and the language of the "war on terror" to further justify the continuation of a repressive policy at home which severely curtails the right of Libyan citizens to freedom of expression and association. The "counter-terrorism" argument is clearly used as a new justification for an old practice, enshrined in Libyan law, of repression of all political dissent.

Legislation prohibits the formation of associations or political parties outside the existing political system. Critics of the current system, who wish to voice their political dissent through peaceful means outside the official structures, are heavily sanctioned and even face the death penalty. They are forced to operate in secret. Movements such as al-Jama'a al-Islamiya al-Libiya, the Libyan Islamic Group, also known as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brothers, meet clandestinely in small groups, often in private houses. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood have told Amnesty International that these discussions include a variety of issues, such as reform of the system or the provision of informal support for families of political prisoners. Legislation further restricts freedom of association, making it almost impossible for independent human rights associations to emerge. Despite the risks, some Libyans, including lawyers, are calling for legal obstacles to be lifted to enable them to form independent human rights organizations.

If such activities are discovered by the security forces, those involved or suspected to be involved, are at risk of arrest, prolonged incommunicado detention often coupled with torture, followed by unfair trials and possibly the death penalty.

The "anti-terrorism" argument

In his annual address to the nation on 31 August 2002, Colonel al-Gaddafi reportedly argued that, following the 2002 releases of prisoners, those who remain in Libyan prisons, with the exception of those sentenced for "ordinary crimes", have links to al-Qa'ida or the Taleban and as such the Libyan authorities would, "...treat the heretics just like America is treating [the al-Qa'ida or Taleban detainees]... America said, these people do not have the right to defend themselves, it will neither provide them with lawyers nor respect their human rights".

At the end of December 2003, in an address to civil servants of the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, Colonel al-Gaddafi reportedly reiterated that Libya had no prisoners of conscience and that current prisoners were of two kinds only: either "ordinary criminals" or "heretics" (zanadiq). This position was again reiterated by the Libyan authorities in their discussions with Amnesty International in February 2004.

In recent years, the Libyan authorities have stated their commitment to fighting acts of "terrorism" and to cooperating with other states and inter-governmental organizations in this respect(13). While Amnesty International recognizes the duty of governments to protect their citizens from acts of violence and to bring to justice those responsible, Amnesty International has stressed worldwide(14) that all means taken in this respect, including investigations and trials, must always be in full compliance with international human rights standards(15).

In its second report to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Libyan authorities announced that "[a] new draft Penal Code is being prepared and will include crimes qualified as terrorist acts"(16). Based on an analysis of this draft Penal Code, Amnesty International is concerned that the definition of "terrorism", according to Article 260 of the draft, may be abused in order to punish people for non-violent acts, including those related to freedom of expression and human rights work(17). The broad definition provided could be subject to wide interpretation and abuse.

Several provisions contained in Article 260 do elaborate on violent acts or the threat of such acts which, according to the text, constitute "terrorist" activity. However, in several others, terms such as "terrorism" and "terrorist acts" are used without being further defined. For example, provision 4 relates to "setting up an association or gang or society or organization which uses terrorism in achieving or implementing its aims or membership to it...". Provision 5 criminalizes "approaching or communicating with an association or society or organization or group or gang, whose headquarters are abroad, or anyone working for their interests with a view to undertaking terrorist act/s in the country or against its interests, even if abroad". Amnesty International urges the Libyan authorities to ensure that all provisions relating to "terrorism" are well defined and exclude any form of peaceful exercise of rights protected under international law, such as the rights to freedom of expression and association.

Prisoners of conscience

Despite the authorities' categorical denial of the existence of prisoners of conscience, the organization is aware of scores of individuals whom it considers to qualify as such(18). They include professionals and students, who were arrested in and after June 1998 on suspicion of supporting or sympathizing with the banned Libyan Islamic Group(19) - also known as the Muslim Brothers - which is not known to have used or advocated violence.

On 16 February 2002 Salem Abu Hanak and Abdullah Ahmed 'Izzedin were sentenced to death before a People's Court in Tripoli following a grossly unfair trial(20) of 152 people on charges relating to affiliation to the Libyan Islamic Group. Salem Abu Hanak, born in 1957 and father of five, was the head of the Chemistry Department at the Faculty of Science at the University of Qar Younes in Benghazi. He was arrested on 5 June 1998. Abdullah Ahmed 'Izzedin, born in 1950 and father of four, was working as a lecturer at the Nuclear Engineering Faculty of al-Fateh University in Tripoli when he was arrested on 7 June 1998. Seventy-three of the defendants received sentences of life imprisonment, and 11 others received 10 years' imprisonment. A further 66 were reportedly acquitted.

The appeal trial before the People's Court of Appeal has been repeatedly adjourned, with hearings taking place approximately every three months and reportedly lasting just a few minutes. At the time of writing, the next hearing was reportedly scheduled to take place on 25 November 2004, when a verdict was expected.

In all meetings with the Libyan authorities in February 2004, Amnesty International delegates raised the question of freedom of expression and association. Colonel al-Gaddafi described the activities of the Muslim Brothers in the case above as being "terrorist work", "aiming at creating an Islamic state in Libya". He argued that "they tried to impose their opinions on others" and that they "confessed to using violence".

Other officials, including the Secretaries of the General People's Committees for Justice and Public Security and for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, tended not to differentiate between acts by individuals in a given case and a political grouping as a whole, nor between various political groupings. All those who carry out political activities, peaceful or otherwise, outside the official political structure were deemed by the authorities to be "heretics".

The Director of Abu Salim Prison, Milad Daman, said that those prisoners whom Amnesty International had requested to see were "terrorist" cases, including several prisoners sentenced in the Muslim Brothers case. He said that the Muslim Brothers had given birth to other Islamist groups, such as al-Salafia al-Jihadia, the Militant Traditionalist, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. All these groups, according to the Director, agree on the use of violence as a means to achieve their aim of assuming power in Libya. He argued that some prisoners had spent time in Afghanistan and trained with al-Qa'ida and therefore were a danger not only to Libya but also to other countries. Speaking with particular reference to his prison, he reaffirmed Colonel al-Gaddafi's point that there were no political prisoners; rather, all those imprisoned were people who had used violence.

However, in the case of the Muslim Brothers, the men were not charged with any violent acts. This was confirmed to Amnesty International in February 2004 following interviews with several lawyers defending the accused, appointed by the state Popular Lawyers' Office, and with several of the defendants themselves. The men faced charges under Law 71 of 1972 banning political parties(21) solely for the peaceful expression of their ideas and for meeting to discuss those ideas with others in secret. Abdullah Ahmed 'Izzedin told Amnesty International, "I am not against the regime, nor do I have any political aims. I just wanted to work towards reforming society and to making it a better place".

The Muslim Brothers are just one example of cases of prisoners of conscience and possible prisoners of conscience currently held in Libyan prisons. Others include members of the Harakat al-Tajammu' al-Islami, the Islamic Alliance Movement, who were arrested in the summer of 1998, at the same time as the arrests of the Muslim Brothers.

One of those imprisoned was Ramadan Mas'ud Shaglouf, a father of two who worked as a chemical engineer for an oil company in Benghazi. He was arrested on 27 September 1998 by several armed men in civilian clothes who announced that they were officers of the Internal Security Agency.
After being detained by the Internal Security Agency for a month, the interrogation began. Ramadan Mas'ud Shaglouf told Amnesty International that he was occasionally beaten and threatened with further beatings if he did not "confess" to accusations of membership of the Islamic Alliance Movement. At the end of a month of interrogation, he said he was coerced into signing papers which he was not able to read.

Ramadan Mas'ud Shaglouf's trial before a People's Court finally began on 8 October 2002, more than four years after his arrest. On 26 January 2003 he was sentenced to life imprisonment under Law 71 of 1972 banning political parties. Several others tried in the same case were sentenced to between 10 years' and life imprisonment.
Legal provisions

"All Libyans over the age of 18 can participate in the Basic People's Congresses and express their opinion freely. If others agree with them, their idea would be taken up, otherwise it would not. We are not like other countries in which there is one ruling party which may choose to imprison others from other parties. It is not possible to have a prisoner of conscience in this set-up," Colonel al-Gaddafi to Amnesty International in February 2004.

Libyan law provides certain guarantees to the rights to freedom of expression and association. According to Article 6 of the Great Green Charter of Human Rights of the Jamahiriyan Era, adopted in June 1988, "the members of the Jamahiriyan society are free to form associations, trade unions and leagues in order to defend their professional interest". However, these rights are strictly qualified. For example, Article 8 of Law 20 on the Promotion of Freedom, adopted in 1991, states that "Every citizen has the right to express his opinions and ideas and to publicise them at people's congresses and through jamahiri media. The citizen shall not be questioned in relation to the exercise of this right unless he uses it to undermine the authority of the people or for personal ends".

Within this system, all adults are allowed to express opinions and views in the Basic People's Congresses and in the local media, which provide the only vehicles for sanctioned debate. However, the system operates in a context in which the formation of political parties is prohibited and in which the media is fully controlled by the state(22). Further, vaguely-worded restrictions - such as those contained in Article 8 of the Law on the Promotion of Freedom - are placed on the expression of opinions even within the official forums, leaving even those who challenge the system from within at risk of punishment. In at least one case known to Amnesty International, a Libyan citizen was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in 2002 for the peaceful expression of his views in a Basic People's Congress.

On 19 October 2002 Fathi al-Jahmi, a civil engineer born in 1941 and married with seven children, attended a session of the Basic People's Congress in al-Manshia, Bin Ashour, a suburb of Tripoli. At the Congress, he reportedly stated that reform within Libya would never take place in the absence of a constitution, pluralism and democracy. He reportedly went on to ask how issues within the country could genuinely be addressed while Libya is "ruled by criminals", naming one particular example. It appears that he was known for his outspoken views prior to this incident.
Apparently as a result of this statement, he was arrested by members of the Internal Security Agency while at the Basic People's Congress and detained for several months. According to Fathi al-Jahmi, he was tried twice under the same charges by the People's Court in two different districts within Tripoli. He reportedly received two separate sentences, one of five years' imprisonment and the other, suspended, of eight months' imprisonment. On 10 March 2004 his case was heard before the People's Court of Appeal and he received a suspended sentence of one year's imprisonment. He was finally released on 12 March 2004(23).
After his release, Fathi al-Jahmi gave several media interviews, including to the US-based Arabic channel al-Hurrah and to the Dubai-based Arabic channel al-'Arabiya, in which he continued to call for reform within Libya. Apparently as a result, basic services, such as his telephone line, were reportedly suspended. On around 26 March 2004, he was reportedly beaten outside his house. Subsequently, relatives, friends and other interested parties appear to have lost contact with Fathi al-Jahmi, his wife, Fawzia, and eldest son, Muhammad. At the time of writing, family members had received no official confirmation as to their whereabouts.

The following laws, which severely restrict the rights to freedom of expression and association, have been used to repress those suspected of being opposed to or critical of the current political system.

- Law 71 of 1972 bans any form of group activity based on a political ideology opposed to the principles of al-Fateh Revolution of 1 September 1969. Article 3 of Law 71 provides for the death penalty for forming, joining or supporting groups prohibited by law.
- Article 206 of the Penal Code (Law 48 of 1956) provides for the death penalty for those who call "for the establishment of any grouping, organization or association proscribed by law", and even for those who belong to or support such an organization.
- Article 208, which bans forming or joining an international association, states that "The punishment is imprisonment for whoever sets up, establishes, organizes or directs international non-political organizations, associations or bodies, or a branch thereof, without government authorization, or where such authorization is based on false or insufficient information."
- Article 178 prescribes life imprisonment for the dissemination of information considered to "tarnish [the country's] reputation or undermine confidence in it abroad."
- Article 207 states that "The punishment is execution for whoever spreads within the country, by whatever means, theories or principles aiming to change the basic principles of the Constitution or the fundamental structures of the social system or to overthrow the state's political, social or economic structures or destroy any of the fundamental structures of the social system using violence, terrorism or any other unlawful means."

Amnesty International had hoped that the draft Penal Code, announced by the Libyan authorities in 2003, would provide for an improvement in the legislation. The aims set out in the draft include "limiting capital punishment to serious criminals who cannot be rehabilitated...". However, it goes on to define "serious criminals" as including those who have committed crimes against the integrity and security of society and dealing with foreign countries to harm the state. This phrasing, alongside vague terms - such as "spreading rumours", "insult", "harms the reputation of the country" or "incitement" - could lead to the imposition of the death penalty for peaceful political opponents and government critics. Even those who merely participate in conferences or publish their writings peacefully expressing their views could be at risk of imprisonment.

The draft Penal Code contains specific provisions providing harsh punishments, including capital punishment, for undertaking peaceful social or political activities:

- Article 152 imposes imprisonment on any Libyan national, who while abroad publishes news or rumours constituting lies or exaggeration or creates disturbances about the internal situation in Libya in a way that harms its reputation or shakes the confidence in it or carries out an activity that in any way harms the interests of the country.
- Article 164 imposes imprisonment on anyone who seeks to undermine the reputation of the goals of the Revolution or defames its Leader, as well as anyone who insults public authorities or the Libyan people.
- Article 167 imposes imprisonment on anyone who spreads rumours against the governing system or who demonstrates in protest against the governing system. Terms used in this section of the law include "spreading rumours" and "insult".
- Article 173 imposes the death penalty on anyone who calls for the establishment of any association or party which is against the Revolution in purpose and means, or which aims to harm its public authorities, or anyone who establishes, joins, administers or funds such an association or party.
- Article 174 imposes imprisonment of no less than 10 years on anyone who promotes in the country, in any way, principles or theories that aim at changing the governing system.
- Article 175 imposes imprisonment on anyone (except for the husband, children or grandchildren) with knowledge of the crimes in Articles 173-174.
- Article 176 imposes imprisonment on anyone who establishes, organizes, or administers an international organization in Libya, without permission from the relevant authorities or with permission based on falsified information. It also imposes imprisonment on any Libyan national resident in Libya who joins or participates in any way, without prior permission, in any such organization.

For many years, Amnesty International has urged the Libyan authorities to comply with their obligation to ensure consistency between Libyan legislation and international human rights law. This includes the ICCPR, Article 19 of which states that, "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice"(24).

Furthermore, Article 6(2) of the ICCPR states that "in countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes". This provision has been interpreted by several resolutions of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the latest of which is resolution 2003/67, which requires ensuring that the notion of "most serious crimes does not go beyond intentional crimes with lethal or extremely grave consequences and that the death penalty is not imposed for non-violent acts such as ...non-violent religious practice and expression of conscience".

The UN Human Rights Committee - the body of experts which monitors states parties' implementation of the ICCPR - expressed, in its Concluding Observations on Libya's periodic report on 6 November 1998, "its deep concern about the numerous restrictions, in law and in practice, on the right to freedom of expression, and in particular on the right to express opposition to or criticism of the Government, of the established political, social and economic system and of the cultural values prevailing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya."(25) The Committee urged the Libyan authorities "to undertake a truly critical analysis" of restrictions to articles guaranteeing the rights to freedom of expression and association within the ICCPR(26). The Libyan authorities have failed to implement those recommendations.
Obstacles to human rights work

Numerous charitable associations operate within Libya and Amnesty International met several of them(27) during its February 2004 visit, both on an individual level and at a broader meeting. Despite the existence of these charitable associations, human rights organizations or individuals wishing to carry out human rights work continue to be prevented from operating, with the exception of the Human Rights Society of the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations. The Human Rights Society, headed by Giuma Atiga, a lawyer and former political prisoner, has become a strong voice for human rights protection and promotion in the country. However, others wishing to carry out human rights work are forced to operate abroad.

During its visit to Libya in February 2004, Amnesty International learnt of the eagerness of a number of Libyan nationals to undertake human rights work in their country. Lawyers of the Tripoli Bar Association, who had recently established a Freedoms Committee, highlighted the legal and other constraints still faced by those seeking to operate in this field. One lawyer recounted his first short-lived attempt to create a 250-member human rights committee in 1977. In 1988 lawyers made a second attempt to establish an independent human rights body but this was soon co-opted by the authorities. In 1998 lawyers tried to form a human rights committee within the Bar Association. On this occasion, after issuing a report on the human rights situation in Libya, their activities were frozen. Recently, approximately 40 lawyers of the Tripoli Bar Association launched a Freedom's Committee. Among them, some expressed their interest in establishing an association independent from the Bar Association.

The fear of those wanting to work in this field is well-founded when faced with severely restrictive legislation. As mentioned above, Article 206 of the Penal Code imposes the death penalty on those who call for "the establishment of any grouping, organization or association proscribed by law", as well as for those who belong to or support such an organization. This provision has been maintained in Articles 141 and 145 of the new draft Penal Code, which imposes the death penalty on "any person who communicates with a foreign country or works in its service for the purpose of enabling it to attack Libya" or "who transfers news to [the enemy] or leads him or incites others to join the enemy". Furthermore, many Libyans, residing inside and outside the country, continue to be reluctant even to report human rights violations for fear of retaliation against themselves or their relatives.

This was a matter of concern for the UN Committee against Torture, the body of experts which monitors states parties' implementation of the Convention against Torture. It concluded that "the wording of article 206 of the Penal Code could be an obstacle to the creation of independent human rights non-governmental organizations"(28). International standards, such as the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders), adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1998, also grants the right to work on human rights issues both individually or in association with others(29).

2.2 Arbitrary arrest and detention

In recent years, the authorities have routinely violated international standards as well as the existing legal safeguards in Libyan law regarding arrest, detention and trial(30). These violations have disrupted the lives of hundreds of real and suspected political opponents as well as those of migrants and possible asylum-seekers. Amnesty International has documented numerous cases which illustrate such violations, including detention after expiry of sentence; arbitrary detention of Libyans returning from abroad; and prolonged incommunicado detention, where detainees are at risk of torture and ill-treatment.

Unlawful detention

Detention after expiry of sentence
The practice of unlawful detention after completion of sentence seems to be widespread and in some cases can have serious, even fatal, consequences, due to poor prison conditions or inadequate care for prisoners.

In February 2004, Amnesty International delegates met seven Eritrean nationals (Masfin Aman Adem, Mesghna Seium Tedla, Abiel Tekle Haile, Rezene Issak Yohanns, Zekerias Michael Belay, Yonas Neghasy Brhane and Michael Yemane Tekle) who had reportedly deserted the Eritrean army at different times during 2002 and fled from Eritrea to Sudan and then to Libya. They were arrested on 11 August 2002 as they attempted to cross the Mediterranean, heading for Italy where they planned to seek asylum. They were subsequently convicted of illegal entry but not released after the expiry of their three-month sentences on 19 November 2002. After being granted refugee status in March 2004, the UN High Commission for Refugees called on the Libyan authorities to release the seven men. At the time of writing, they remained in detention.

For some 18 months of arbitrary detention, the seven men lived in fear of being deported to Eritrea, where they would be at risk of serious human rights violations. They have been moved to several different prisons. In two separate instances, the men described being beaten with sticks; the first time prior to being transported in a lorry into which they were crammed with scores of others. The second time occurred while being transferred from Ghiryan Prison to three other prisons. Michael Yemane Tekle said that he was particularly badly injured on the second occasion and lost consciousness after being hit over the head with a truncheon. During a separate incident, Rezene Issak Yohanns was allegedly beaten by a guard with a wire while in Jdeida Prison in January 2004. The men told Amnesty International: "we just want to get out of detention. We have seen here in prison what we never saw in our country."

Another Eritrean national, Binyam Abraha, who was in his early 30s and married with one daughter, died in custody on the night of 16-17 September 2003. He was detained in Ghiryan Prison with the seven Eritreans mentioned above. He had reportedly been detained in Libya since early 2002 on alcohol-related charges, for which he had been sentenced to three months' imprisonment. He apparently contracted tuberculosis as a result of poor prison conditions and was allegedly denied access to medical care despite requesting it repeatedly. Just before his death, Masfin Aman Adem and the other Eritrean detainees asked again for Binyam Abraha to be sent to hospital for treatment. Instead he was apparently held in solitary confinement in a dirty room between 5 and 16 September 2003, when he died.

Arbitrary detention of Libyans returning from abroad
The Libyans authorities have publicly announced that they encourage Libyans in exile to return to the country(31), and that they would be able to resume a normal life upon return. Al-Sadeq Krimah, deputy head of the International Relations and Cooperation Department (also known as the External Security Agency, an intelligence apparatus), told Amnesty International in February 2004 that the External Security Agency had facilitated, in cooperation with the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, the return of Libyan nationals from countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. Al-Sadeq Krimah assured delegates that scores of Libyan nationals had returned to Libya in recent years without being arrested or detained after their return.

Amnesty International delegates interviewed some of the returnees. They stated that they were usually not detained upon arrival, but were summoned for questioning by the External Security Agency. Although they have to some extent succeeded in resuming a normal life, they faced financial difficulties and continued to be under close surveillance, usually by officers of the Internal Security Agency. One of them said to Amnesty International that he had shaved his beard for fear of being arrested as part of the policy against those the authorities describe as "heretics".

Amnesty International is concerned by the fate of others who have returned to Libya and have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. It is particularly disturbing to note that some Libyan nationals were arbitrarily detained upon arrival despite assurances they had received that they would be safe and able to resume a normal life.

On 2 May 2002 Mustapha Muhammad Krer, a Libyan national with Canadian citizenship, travelled to Libya after an absence of some 15 years. He was arrested on arrival and has been detained ever since. He initially travelled to Malta, where he was reportedly assured by members of the Libyan security forces and officials from the Libyan People's Bureau (the Libyan Embassy) in Malta that he would not be arrested on his return. Both his ticket and travel documentation were apparently provided by the Libyan People's Bureau in Malta.
On arrival at Tripoli airport, he was reportedly detained for questioning, initially in the airport and later by members of the Internal Security Agency. He has been held in 'Ayn Zara Prison for most of his detention. He first saw a lawyer on 15 March 2004, nearly two years after his arrest, when he appeared for the first time before the People's Court. He is charged alongside scores of others in connection with his alleged affiliation to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group(32). He denies the accusations against him.

Mustapha Muhammad Krer had left Libya in 1989 after apparently being sought by the Libyan authorities and following the arrest of his brother, al-Mukhtar Muhammad Krer. He reportedly chose to return to Libya after his family was informed by the Libyan authorities in mid-April 2002 of the death in custody of al-Mukhtar Muhammad Krer.
At least three Libyan nationals were arrested and arbitrarily detained upon arrival after being returned from Sudan to Libya at the end of 2002. 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Rahman, Muhammad 'Abd al-Hamid Rashid al-Jazawi and Isma'il 'Umar Jibril al-Lawati were arrested and detained in September 2002 in Sudan and fined for illegal residency there. They were then ordered to leave the country. When Amnesty International delegates met the three men in Abu Salim Prison in February 2004, they reported that Sudanese officials had promised them a safe return to Libya after they had apparently received guarantees from the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations and the Libyan People's Bureau in Khartoum. On 17 October 2002 the three men and their families were sent to Libya. Upon arrival in Tripoli, they were immediately separated from their families, blindfolded, handcuffed and reportedly held by officers of the External Security Agency (33).
After a period of detention with the External Security Agency, the men were held by the Internal Security Agency before being transferred to prison. In the first quarter of 2003, they were presented before the Popular Prosecution Office for the first time. Since then, the three men have been brought before the People's Court in separate cases linked to their alleged political activities.

According to one of the three men, Isma'il 'Umar Jibril al-Lawati, he faces trial along with more than 50 others, from many different backgrounds. They are charged with remaining outside Libya without authorization and fighting against a friendly country. He told Amnesty International that since his arrest, he had been denied the right to any contact with his family. Muhammad 'Abd al-Hamid Rashid al-Jazawi reported that he was being tried alongside scores of others(34). He said that he had never met his court-appointed lawyer. 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Rahman said that he was also being tried in connection with his alleged affiliation to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. He commented that he was not aware that he was being represented by a lawyer in court. A verdict was reportedly scheduled for late April 2004.

Amnesty International has also documented cases of Libyan nationals who were forcibly returned to Libya and whose fate has remained unknown for several years.

On 13 February 2000 a group of eight Libyans was forcibly returned from Jordan to Libya. They were arrested in Jordan at the end of December 1999 or beginning of 2000 on suspicion of being sympathizers with Islamist groups. There were reports that three of the eight Libyans were shot after their return to Libya. The allegations reported in the media(35) did not include details of the incident or provide the names of the victims. Amnesty International issued urgent appeals in March 2000(36) but received no response from the authorities. During their visit to Libya in February 2004, al-Sadeq Krimah, deputy head of the External Security Agency, assured the delegates that none of the Libyans returned in this case had been killed.

Amnesty International delegates also met 'Adel Salem Kamuka, one of the eight Libyans returned. He too said that, to his knowledge, there were no killings after their return. However, four years after the events, the authorities continue to fail to disclose information on the fate of the seven others returned in February 2000.
After his return on 13 February 2000, 'Adel Salem Kamuka told Amnesty International that he was blindfolded, handcuffed and taken for questioning at the headquarters of the External Security Agency in Tajoura, a suburb of Tripoli. According to his testimony, he was held in solitary confinement and handcuffed at night for 10 days. While being interrogated he was threatened with the use of an electric baton. At the beginning of March 2000, he was transferred to a wing of 'Ayn Zara Prison believed to be under the supervision of the Internal Security Agency, where his interrogation continued. There he witnessed that those who did not cooperate were beaten or otherwise ill-treated.
'Adel Salem Kamuka said that on 14 July 2000 he was brought before the People's Prosecutor, who interrogated him while he was blindfolded. He explained that he had left the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group but was nevertheless charged with membership of the group under Law 71 of 1972. He was then transferred to Abu Salim Prison. At the beginning of 2003, he was brought to trial before the People's Court with some 170 others(37). Apparently, some of the defendants tried in this case were arrested as far back as 1992 while others were arrested in the mid and late 1990s. The verdict is expected to be pronounced in late April 2004.
Widespread practice of prolonged incommunicado detention
At the heart of a series of violations lies the widespread practice of prolonged incommunicado detention. For periods of weeks or months, and in some cases even years, detainees in Libya have been held without any contact with the outside world, including their families or legal counsel. In the majority of cases known to Amnesty International, detainees are held by the Internal Security Agency. During this initial period of detention, their families usually do not know where they are being held. It is during this period that they are at greatest risk of torture or ill-treatment.

The practice of prolonged incommunicado detention breaches Libyan law. Under domestic law, detainees can be held immediately after arrest for up to 48 hours at a police station. They must then be brought before a prosecutor, who can hold them for six days under investigation. Following that, detainees must be brought before a judicial authority at regular intervals of 30 days in order to renew their detention order(38). In practice, however, Amnesty International has documented numerous cases where detainees are held for lengthy periods of time without access to the outside world.

The main agency said to be responsible for the practice of prolonged incommunicado detention and of torture or ill-treatment is the Internal Security Agency. Since March 2004, the Internal Security Agency has fallen under the jurisdiction of the General People's Committee for Public Security, after the abolition of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security. The Internal Security Agency appears to have its own places of detention. During their visit to Libya in February 2004, Amnesty International delegates repeatedly requested a meeting with the Head of the Internal Security Agency but this did not take place.

Ahmed 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi was arrested on 14 June 1997 at his house in the early hours by officers of the Internal Security Agency. He told Amnesty International that he was taken for interrogation with his head covered and his hands cuffed. He also said that he was threatened into signing a document without reading it.

He was then held apparently without charge or trial in various prisons, including al-Hawari Prison near Benghazi, 'Ayn Zara Prison in Tripoli, and later back and forth between 'Ayn Zara and Abu Salim prisons. On 18 October 2001, more than four years after the arrest, his father was allowed to visit him in 'Ayn Zara Prison for the first time. On two occasions, in March and October 2002, he and his family were informed that he would be released, but when the family came to the prison to greet him, they discovered that he had not been released.
According to Ahmed 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi's testimony, it was only on 3 April 2003, nearly six years after his arrest, that he was brought before the Popular Prosecution Office, without the presence of a lawyer. He found out that the date of arrest in the court file had been falsified and the signature was not his. He was accused of supporting a prohibited organization.
On 21 October 2003 Ahmed 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi was sentenced to life imprisonment by the People's Court(39). According to his testimony, the only evidence brought against him was a confession extracted under torture from another accused in the case, who later retracted his confession. He said that on 18 February 2004 the appeal trial before the People's Court of Appeal opened in a courtroom set up in the buildings of the Police Academy in Tripoli. The hearing reportedly took place without the presence of Ahmed 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi or his lawyer. The next hearing is apparently scheduled for 12 May 2004.

Amnesty International delegates repeatedly raised the urgent need to put an end to the practice of incommunicado detention in meetings with Libyan officials, including Colonel al-Gaddafi, during their visit in February 2004. In its Concluding Observations on Libya's periodic report, the UN Committee against Torture expressed concern that, "Prolonged incommunicado detention, in spite of the legal provisions regulating it, still seems to create conditions that may lead to violation of the Convention(40)".
2.3 Torture

According to the Libyan Penal Code, torture is considered a crime. Article 435 stipulates that "Any public official who orders the torture of the accused or tortures them himself is punished by a prison term of three to 10 years". This is confirmed in Article 341 of the draft Penal Code, which stipulates a maximum prison sentence of 10 years for those who order or carry out torture. Article 337 of the draft Penal Code imposes imprisonment on "any public official who uses violence against any person while on duty in a way that is degrading and causes physical pain".

However, Libyan legislation does not define the crime of torture. Amnesty International calls on the Libyan authorities to make explicit that torture is absolutely prohibited under all circumstances, including when committed by public officials off duty, and that it is "punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature"(41).

Amnesty International also calls on the Libyan authorities to ensure that Libyan law fully reflects the definition of torture included in Article 1 of the Convention against Torture, to which Libya is a state party: "For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."

Use of torture to extract confessions

From the testimonies collected by Amnesty International, it appears that if a detainee "confesses" quickly, they are usually subjected to light beatings or other forms of ill-treatment. However, if a detainee refuses to "confess", torture is used in order to extract a "confession". The most frequently reported techniques are beatings with electric cables, beatings on the soles of the feet (falaqa), the use of electric shocks and being suspended from a height by the arms.

The Muslim Brothers' case
A total of 152 professionals and students were arrested in and after June 1998, on suspicion of supporting or sympathizing with the Muslim Brothers. After their arrests, the detainees were held incommunicado and their whereabouts remained unknown for more than two years. It was only at a hearing before the People's Court in Tripoli in April 2001 that the families were for the first time allowed a brief contact with the detainees, and that the men were given legal representation, mostly by popular lawyers appointed by the court.

During this period of incommunicado detention, some of the defendants alleged that they were tortured, including being beaten on the soles of the feet (falaqa), after their arrest by members of the Internal Security Agency. Defendants were also reportedly forced to sign confessions.
One of the defendants, Salem Abu Hanak, who was later sentenced to death in February 2002, told Amnesty International delegates that he was arrested on 5 June 1998 from his home in the early hours and taken to the headquarters of the Revolutionary Committees at al-Birka in Benghazi. That day he was questioned about his connection with the Muslim Brotherhood.
According to his testimony, during the questioning, electric shocks were applied to his arms and he was beaten with electric cables on his feet in order to make him confess. Later that day, his wife was brought to him and he was threatened that she would be raped. He said: "once I saw my wife and realized what they might do to her, I said that I would tell them anything they wanted to know". Once he had agreed to confess, the torture stopped.
According to a lawyer from the Popular Lawyer's Office, who was representing some of the accused in this case, at least some of the accused were referred for medical examinations in order to verify whether they had been tortured. She argued that those acquitted and subsequently released in this case were those whose torture had been confirmed. The referral of the men for medical examinations was not corroborated by any of the accused whom Amnesty International delegates interviewed during their 2004 visit. It remains the case that according to Amnesty International's information, none of the suspected perpetrators of torture or ill-treatment have been brought to justice.

Foreign nationals in the so-called HIV trial
In a separate case, over five years after their arrest in January 1999, six Bulgarian health professionals (Kristiana Malinova Valcheva, Nasya Stojcheva Nenova, Valentina Manolova Siropulo, Valya Georgieva Chervenyashka, Snezhanka Ivanova Dimitrova and Zdravko Marinov Georgiev) and one Palestinian doctor (Ashraf Ahmad Jum'a) are still on trial, alongside nine Libyan doctors. The foreign defendants are accused of deliberately infecting 426 children with the HIV virus(42), while working in al-Fateh Children's Hospital in Benghazi. At the time of writing, a verdict was scheduled to be handed down on 6 May 2004.

While Amnesty International recognizes the pressing need to bring to justice anyone responsible for the tragic consequences for these children and their families, it is imperative that the rights of the accused are respected at all stages, from the moment of their arrest. It is only by means of a fair trial that follows due legal process that the truth will emerge about how these children became infected with the HIV virus and those responsible be held fully to account.

After their arrest, the seven foreign nationals were held for more than a year with only intermittent access to the outside world, namely to their relatives and lawyers and, in the case of the Bulgarian nationals, to representatives from their embassy. For the first nine months, representatives from the Bulgarian Embassy in Tripoli met the defendants three times before meetings with the Embassy became more regular from June 2000. They met defendants on 25 February 1999, 29 April 1999 and 30 October 1999. Not all of the defendants were present at the first two meetings. For example, Nasya Stojcheva Nenova and Valya Georgieva Chervenyashka were not brought to the meeting on 25 February 1999, apparently because they exhibited scars of torture which they had undergone.
The seven foreign nationals were first brought before the Popular Prosecution Office on 16 May 1999, approximately four months after their arrest. They were subsequently taken to the Popular Prosecution Office every 30 to 45 days in order to have their detention order renewed. The first time they were granted access to a lawyer was in February 2000, after their trial had opened before the People's Court.
The very limited access to the outside world, in the form of the representatives of the Bulgarian Embassy for the Bulgarian nationals and of the Popular Prosecution Office for all the foreign defendants, did not safeguard the defendants against torture or ill-treatment. When the defendants were granted limited access to the outside world, they explained that they were too frightened to report their allegations of torture. The Bulgarian defendants told Amnesty International delegates that those torturing them instructed them not to mention their treatment to their diplomatic representatives. At the level of the prosecution, defendants said that they were taken to the Popular Prosecutor by some of those who had carried out the torture and were threatened with further torture if they did not "confess" in front of him. In the case of Ashraf Ahmed Jum'a, he was reportedly beaten on one occasion in the Popular Prosecution Office.
The foreign defendants told Amnesty International that they had been tortured in order to extract confessions, which they later retracted on the basis that they had been forcibly coerced. Methods of torture they reported included: extensive use of electric shocks; being suspended from a height by the arms; blindfolding and threats with being attacked by barking dogs; and beatings, including falaqa (beatings on the soles of the feet) and with electric cables. They said that they were tortured for approximately two months; sometimes on a daily basis. After that, the torture ceased to be used on them routinely. When Ashraf Ahmed Jum'a's parents saw him for the first time on 30 November 1999, 10 months after his arrest, they described their reaction to Amnesty International: "We did not recognize our son because he looked so terrible. We stood there for 10 minutes just holding each other and crying."
All the foreign defendants deny the accusations against them. Valentina Manolova Siropulo told Amnesty International: "I was denying the accusations against me [even after the torture had started] until they began with the electric shocks. I began to "confess" in order to stop them using electric shocks. They would raise or lower the voltage according to what I said."
Their trial began before the People's Court. However, in February 2002 their case was transferred to the Criminal Prosecution Service, which forms part of the ordinary criminal justice system. In May 2002 the foreign nationals raised allegations of torture before the prosecutor. On the basis of these allegations, the prosecutor referred the defendants for a medical examination. In June 2002 a Libyan doctor, appointed by the prosecutor, examined the defendants and, in all cases except for Zdravko Marinov Georgiev, found traces on their bodies which he argued resulted from "physical coercion" or "beatings" or both. This evidence was subsequently refuted in court by another Libyan doctor, called to give expert opinion, who argued that it would have been impossible to identify traces of torture after so much time had passed but did not examine the defendants himself.
On the basis of these allegations, eight members of the security forces and two others (a doctor and a translator) in their employ were charged in connection with the torture. They face trial alongside the foreign and Libyan health professionals before the same criminal court in Benghazi. Some of the officers alleged that they themselves had been tortured in order to confess that they inflicted torture on the defendants in the trial. At least one of them confessed to having tortured some of the defendants and named several of the others as having tortured them too. Another officer reportedly denied torturing them himself but said that he had witnessed others torturing them. During the February 2004 visit, Amnesty International delegates interviewed two of the police officers accused of having inflicted torture, who denied the allegations against them.
A context of impunity

In all cases known to Amnesty International, except for the so-called HIV trial, no investigations are known to have been carried out and suspected perpetrators have not been brought to justice in connection with alleged human rights violations, including torture or ill-treatment.

In addition to prohibiting torture and ill-treatment under any circumstances, Libya's obligations under the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture include taking "effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture" (Article 2(1) of the Convention against Torture); investigating thoroughly and impartially all complaints of torture or ill-treatment (Article 12 of the Convention against Torture; Article 2 of the ICCPR); prosecuting suspected perpetrators in accordance with international standards for fair trial and punishing those found guilty (Article 4(2) of the Convention against Torture); and compensating victims of torture or ill-treatment (Article 14 of the Convention against Torture).

Amnesty International calls on Libya to also take preventive measures. In this context, it urges Libya to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (the Protocol), which allows independent international experts to conduct regular visits to places of detention within states parties, to assess the conditions of detention and the treatment of those detained and to make recommendations for improvements. The Protocol also requires states parties to set up national mechanisms to conduct visits to places of detention and to cooperate with the international experts. The Protocol received overwhelming support at the UN General Assembly when it was adopted in December 2002, but Libya abstained in the vote.

Amnesty International recalls that the UN Committee against Torture recommended on 11 May 1999 that 'the law and the practices of [Libya] be brought in line with article 3 of the Convention' (43). The Committee against Torture further recommended that Libya 'should send a clear message to all its law-enforcement personnel that torture is not permitted under any circumstances. In addition, those who committed the offence of torture should be subjected to a prompt and impartial investigation and rigorously prosecuted in accordance with the law' (44).


Corporal punishment

Corporal punishments provided by law remain in force. Amnesty International has received information that corporal punishments, including the amputation of the right hand and the left foot, have been carried out in recent years.

According to Libyan media reports(45), four men convicted of robbery under Law 13 of 1425(46) (Case 10/2002) had their right hand and left leg amputated on 3 July 2002, after the punishment was endorsed by the Supreme Court. Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharif, Sayyid Muhammad Ahmad, Dahmu Muhammad Abu Bakr al-Sharif and Barkah Sidi Jira Barkah had been accused by the Public Prosecution of seizing by force some vehicles, telecommunications sets, food supplies and a quantity of fuel belonging to a Chinese company for oil exploration. The amputation was carried out after the Supreme Court had ruled on 25 June 2002 that the sentences were endorsed.

A number of laws passed since the 1970s have introduced corporal punishment for various crimes. They include Law 70 of 1973 which provides flogging as a punishment for those convicted of the crime of zina - adultery or fornication -(Articles 3 and 4); Law 52 of 1974 on had al-qadhaf - defamation - which also provides for flogging (see Article 4). Law 13 of 1425 on theft and haraba - highway robbery or rebellion - states that the accused convicted of theft is to be punished by having his right hand amputated (Article 2); for the crime of haraba, the death penalty is prescribed if there has been a killing, or cross amputation (right hand and left foot) (Article 5).

Amnesty International is further concerned that corporal punishments are provided in several articles of the draft Penal Code, which is currently being discussed.
- Article 317 imposes the punishment of 100 lashes on anyone convicted of adultery. In the case of incestuous adultery, the punishment is increased to life imprisonment and flogging.
- Article 318, relating to the crime of rape, states that the punishment is increased to execution by stoning in the case of incestuous rape.
- Article 345 imposes 80 lashes on anyone who falsely accuses another in any way of adultery.
- Article 350 imposes the punishment of amputation of the right hand for theft.
- Article 352 imposes the death penalty for armed robbery that results in death (regardless of whether or not theft occurred), and amputation of the right hand and left foot if the robbery resulted in theft but no death.

Amnesty International unconditionally opposes the judicial punishments of flogging and amputation, which inflict pain and suffering amounting to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment(47). As a state party to the Convention against Torture, Libya is obliged not to impose any such punishments. In its Concluding Observations in 1999, the Committee against Torture stated that corporal punishment "should be abolished by law" (48).

2.4 Special courts and the independence of the judiciary


The People's Court

The principle of the independence of the judiciary is enshrined in the 1991 Law on the Promotion of Freedom, which states that "Judges are independent in their decisions and there is no authority above them [in their decision making] apart from the law" (Article 31). According to Article 5 of Law 5 of 1988 establishing the People's Court, "Members of the People's Court are independent and shall only be subject in their judgements to the law and their conscience".

However, Amnesty International is concerned that the People's Court continues to operate and that the legal proceedings before it fail to comply with minimum standards for fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 14 of the ICCPR. Many lawyers in Libya have already been refusing to practise before the People's Court in protest at the lack of adequate procedural guarantees for a fair trial. In February 2004 Amnesty International delegates were informed that the People's Court system was under review before the Basic People's Congresses and that there were recommendations for it to be abolished. 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, told Amnesty International that he personally agreed that the People's Court should be abolished. Moreover, while Colonel al-Gaddafi told Amnesty International that he thought the People's Court was a good idea in theory, he acknowledged that in reality it may not be. He expressed his willingness to review the system based on Amnesty International's analysis. Amnesty International supports calls within the country advocating the abolition of the People's Court.
In Libya, several judicial systems operate side by side. One is the ordinary criminal system, containing a prosecution service headed by the Public Prosecutor and criminal courts of first instance and appeal, presided over by a Supreme Court. Another relates to the People's Court(49). The current system of the People's Court, which has been in operation since the promulgation of Law 5 of 1988, contains its own prosecution service, the Popular Prosecution Office, in addition to courts of first instance and appeal. Within this second system, the Popular Prosecution Office has extensive powers, operating as both an examining magistrate and a prosecutor, as well as having the prerogatives of an arraignment chamber(50).

For over 15 years, the Libyan authorities have defended the system of the People's Court. In May 1988 the Libyan authorities wrote to Amnesty International, arguing that the People's Court was primarily established to promote human rights and enhance freedom. They also stated that the People's Court specializes in criminal offences, which include political and economic offences; complaints by citizens against the state, such as grievances relating to property confiscation and calls for compensation; and appeals against decisions taken by the Basic People's Congresses. In 1988 a new law was passed, redefining the role of the People's Court(51).

More recently, in a statement(52) commenting on Amnesty International Report 2002, the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security reiterated that the People's Court is an "independent body" which "maintains all legal safeguards with regard to levels of litigation and the rights of the defence"(53). In February 2004 Muhammad al-Misrati, then Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, argued that the People's Court is a specialized and not an exceptional court as it primarily examines cases of "terrorism", torture, human rights and administrative corruption. He further argued that it is designed to expedite justice because its procedures do not suffer from the same prolonged delays that plague ordinary courts.

In February 2004, senior members of the judiciary briefed Amnesty International delegates on the composition and workings of the People's Court. According to them, the People's Court is primarily composed of legally-trained judges, although the statute does not specify that as a condition. They explained further that the court focuses on administrative and civil offences as well as criminal and political cases. It is bound by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which also applies in ordinary courts. They added that it provides for the right of defence, has a three-judge chamber at first instance and a five-judge chamber at appeal. Members of the judiciary also argued that the existence of exceptional courts should not deprive ordinary courts from their jurisdiction over the same range of offences.

A special court trying political cases
Amnesty International has brought to the attention of the Libyan authorities the cases of scores of people brought before this court for their real or alleged political activities, particularly under Law 71 of 1972 prohibiting party activities. Amnesty International has documented numerous cases in which the People's Court has handed down harsh sentences, including the death penalty and life imprisonment, primarily on the basis of confessions allegedly extracted under torture. In other cases, confessions of co-defendants that are neither corroborated by independent evidence nor by the admittance of the defendant in question have been used to secure a guilty verdict. The example of Ahmed 'Ali Abd al-Hamid al-Khafifi (page 30) is a case in point.

The cases brought before the People's Court have confirmed its role as a special court trying political cases. The UN Human Rights Committee has clarified that while the ICCPR does not prohibit trials of civilians in special courts, "the trying of civilians by such courts should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in Article 14 [of the ICCPR]"(54). Article 5 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary guarantees the right "to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to ordinary courts or judicial tribunals."

Amnesty International believes that there is no justification for maintaining the special People's Court system, which has operated as an instrument of political repression. It should be abolished and its jurisdiction transferred to the ordinary judicial system.
Violations of the rights of the accused
In trials before the People's Court documented by Amnesty International, international standards for fair trial, such as Article 14 of the ICCPR, are flagrantly violated. The rights of the accused are routinely violated, even in instances where these rights are guaranteed in Libyan law. These include the rights of detainees to access to the outside world, the right to appoint a lawyer of their own choosing, the right to trial within a reasonable time, the right to a public hearing, the right to be tried without undue delay and the right to a full review before a higher tribunal.

Amnesty International is further concerned by the role of the Popular Prosecution Office and the role of the People's Court in overseeing its actions. Pre-trial procedures, including detention, are overseen by the Popular Prosecution Office, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Public Prosecutor and do not appear to fall under any judicial supervision. In the cases documented by Amnesty International, the People's Court has not questioned the lawfulness of incommunicado detention. To Amnesty International's knowledge, the court has neither ordered investigations into allegations of torture nor questioned the lawfulness of a confession said to have been extracted under torture. Inadequate legal representation has made it almost impossible for defendants to challenge the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention or to seek remedies for procedural irregularities.

Amnesty International is concerned that, with the exception of death penalty cases, appeals procedures fall entirely within the People's Court system and outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Law 7 of 1426 amending Law 5 of 1988 restricted the right to appeal (Article 16). Prior to this amendment, defendants had the right to two stages of review, one before a People's Court of Appeal and a second before the Supreme Court. Currently, only death penalty cases are subject to a further stage of review before the Supreme Court. Such a measure sustains the status of the People's Court as a special court with its own prosecution and appellate services. In addition, it lacks accountability to a higher judicial authority at all stages from arrest, interrogation and pre-trial detention, which may last for several years, to the verdict.


Violations of the right to trial without undue delay

One of the fundamental standards for a fair trial is the right to be tried without undue delay. The UN Human Rights Committee, commenting on Article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR, which guarantees everyone the right to be tried without undue delay, stated that: "This guarantee relates not only to the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time by which it should end and judgement be rendered; all stages must take place "without undue delay". To make this right effective, a procedure must be available in order to ensure that the trial will proceed 'without undue delay', both in first instance and on appeal." (55)

In February 2004 Muhammad al-Misrati, then Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, told Amnesty International that due to a backlog of cases more than 50 per cent of the prisoners in Libya are pre-trial detainees. The practice of prolonged pre-trial detention appears to be particularly widespread in political cases. There has been a long pattern in Libya of detaining political prisoners, in some cases for several years, without bringing them before a court of law. Until recently, political detainees were often held for many years without charge or trial.

The following cases illustrate the fate of detainees who have been denied the right to a trial without undue delay.

Detained for almost seven years without being presented before a judicial authority
Sudanese-born Jalal al-Din 'Uthman Bashir, born in 1969, was studying economics at Qar Younes University in Benghazi when he was summoned by the Internal Security Agency in connection with violent clashes in 1995 between armed Islamist groups and the authorities. He was arrested on 25 September 1995 and held initially by the Internal Security Agency. He told Amnesty International delegates that he was beaten, subjected to electric shocks, and had freezing water poured on him, and was then forced to sit in front of the air conditioning in order to force him to "confess". He said that, as a result of the torture, he was transferred to hospital on 7 October 1995 where he stayed for nearly three weeks.

Jalal al-Din 'Uthman Bashir further explained that he was brought before a prosecutor for the first time in August 2002 and that his trial before the People's Court began in mid-January 2003. He was sentenced on 13 October 2003 to life imprisonment in connection with his alleged support of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. He denies any connection with the accusations against him.

Detained more than four years without access to the judiciary
Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb, a 39-year-old school inspector from Benghazi, was arrested in the early hours of 14 July 1998 when armed officers of the Internal Security Agency stormed his house without a warrant. He told Amnesty International that he was blindfolded, handcuffed and put in a car and taken to an unknown location pending investigation. He said that, during the investigation which lasted approximately 10 days, he was accused of belonging to the Islamic Alliance Movement and forced to divulge the names of people allegedly connected to this group. Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb claimed that there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations made by the security forces and told Amnesty International delegates in February 2004: "I personally don't know the Islamic Alliance Movement".
After periods of detention in al-Hawari, al-'Uruba and 'Ayn Zara prisons, he was transferred on 5 December 1998 to Abu Salim Prison. For approximately two years his family did not know where he was. His mother, brother and sister visited him for the first time on 26 January 2002 after hearing only via 'unofficial' channels where he was held.
For more than four years, Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb reportedly had no access to the judiciary, and was not even able to have legal counsel. He said that he was finally brought in mid-August 2002 before the Popular Prosecution Office where he discovered that dates in the file had been falsified: the file indicated that the arrest and investigation took place in 2002 instead of 1998. When he protested, the Popular Prosecutor reportedly replied that he should not worry. Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb said that, "unfortunately, in Libya, people are not used to fair legal proceedings as there is no culture of the law nor of freedom".
According to Ahmed Muhammad al-Taleb, his trial began before the People's Court in the Police Academy in Tripoli in October 2002(56). His family were reportedly not allowed in the courtroom and he was defended by a court-appointed lawyer. On 16 January 2003, in a hearing reportedly held in camera, he was sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of belonging to a prohibited organization under Law 71 of 1972. In the same case, others received sentences of between 10 years' and life imprisonment. Following the first instance verdict, he lodged an appeal, which had not started by February 2004.

In recent years, in addition to the waves of releases of long-term political prisoners, the Libyan authorities have increasingly begun to put detainees on trial. The recent trials of alleged members of the Muslim Brothers, of the Islamic Alliance Movement, of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and others arrested years ago have been a welcome, though overdue, development. However, there have been further delays in the appeals process.

In the case of the 152 alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood arrested in 1998, hearings in the appeal trial have been repeatedly adjourned following the first instance verdict in February 2002. After the appeal trial began before the People's Court in the summer of 2002, hearings have taken place approximately every three months, and in many instances were reportedly adjourned without any discussion of the substance of the case.
Violations of the right to a lawyer of one's own choosing

While the right to have a lawyer is guaranteed by Libyan law(57), detainees are not advised of their right to legal representation during the period of interrogation. This was confirmed to Amnesty International delegates during a meeting with the then Public Prosecutor in February 2004, who clearly stated that the presence of a lawyer during the period of investigation was not prevented but that he did not see this as fundamentally important.

In many cases heard before the People's Court, defendants have not been allowed to choose their own lawyer. According to Article 13(58) of Law 5 of 1988 establishing the People's Court, the Popular Lawyers' Office is the institution which provides legal services for those standing trial before the People's Court. Neither this article nor others within Law 5 of 1988 explicitly give defendants the right to choose their own lawyer outside the Popular Lawyers' Office.

One lawyer described to Amnesty International delegates the way in which he was prevented from defending his client before the People's Court in Tripoli. At the end of 2000, following racist attacks against sub-Saharan Africans in Libya, a number of Libyans and sub-Saharan Africans were tried in connection with the events. This lawyer was appointed to defend a young Libyan accused of attacking a group of sub-Saharan Africans. When the lawyer went to the Popular Prosecution Office to look at the case file, he was refused access to the file and later prevented from entering the courtroom.

Once in court the accused is automatically appointed a lawyer, even if he declines the offer. Lawyers are usually appointed during the first hearing of the trial. The court appoints lawyers from the state Popular Lawyers' Office which, as explained to Amnesty International by the Director of its Tripoli Branch and his staff of lawyers, provides legal aid to those in financial need. While Amnesty International welcomes the opportunity offered to defendants in financial need to use court-appointed lawyers before the People's Court, there are many instances where court-appointed lawyers are imposed on defendants seeking to use lawyers of their own choice.

Several of the lawyers whom Amnesty International delegates met in February 2004 explained that in the vast majority of cases there is no time given to adequately review the case since they only receive the case file in the first trial session. With regard to cases featuring large numbers of defendants, it is not uncommon for the accused not to know who his or her lawyer is, particularly since each lawyer often represents dozens of clients. All of the individuals interviewed by Amnesty International said that their court-appointed Popular Lawyers had never met or questioned them about the charges brought against them. In short, there is usually very little contact, if any, between the lawyer and his or her client.

As a result of the shortcomings of trials before the People's Court, defendants often have little faith in a fair outcome of their trial. As Ramadan Mas'ud Shaglouf(59), sentenced by the People's Court to life imprisonment in January 2003 in connection with his peaceful activities relating to the Islamic Alliance Movement, told Amnesty International: "There is no point in having a private lawyer [of my own choosing]. It is just a waste of money because the verdict is already decided in advance"(60).


2.5 Application of the death penalty


No concrete steps toward the proclaimed objective of abolition

The abolition of the death penalty has been for the past 15 years a proclaimed objective of Libya. Article 8 of the Great Green Charter of Human Rights of the Jamahiriyan Era states that "the goal of the Jamahiriyan society is to abolish capital punishment". In February 2004 Colonel al-Gaddafi confirmed to Amnesty International his continued opposition to the death penalty. He said that he had called for its abolition since first asking the General People's Congress to do so in 1988, but Libya's decision-making bodies did not heed his appeals. 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, also stated to Amnesty International his personal opposition to the death penalty.

Amnesty International regrets that since 1988, no concrete steps seem to have been taken towards the abolition of the death penalty. The organization remains extremely concerned that capital punishment continues to be prescribed for a large number of offences, including for activities which merely amount to the peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and association, and that death sentences continue to be handed down and implemented. The authorities have clearly failed to reduce the scope of the death penalty to the "most serious crimes". Amnesty International is further concerned that the draft Penal Code contains 26 articles prescribing the death penalty. It maintains the death penalty for activities merely amounting to freedom of expression and association(61) and for a wide range of crimes, including hudud (62) crimes which are all punishable by death, among other punishments.

Amnesty International also regrets that Libya did not support the resolution on "The question of the death penalty" at the 59th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2003, which called for the abolition of capital punishment and a moratorium on executions. On the contrary, Libya not only voted against the resolution but also supported the statement of dissociation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, read out by Saudi Arabia, outlining the reasons for opposition to the resolution.

Executions continue to be carried out

Libyan law provides certain safeguards for the application of the death penalty. All death sentences, including those imposed by the People's Court, have to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, which can overturn the ruling in favour of the accused. When a death sentence is confirmed by the Supreme Court, it cannot be implemented without the consent of the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies(63). However, death sentences have been pronounced after proceedings which violated international standards for fair trial, particularly in cases before the People's Court.

Amnesty International has received information that several prisoners under sentence of death had their sentence commuted. However, prisoners met by Amnesty International testified about the trauma of being brought to the scene of execution and being informed at the last minute that the execution would not be carried out.

During their February 2004 visit, Amnesty International delegates met Libyan nationals Ahmed Muhammad Kheir Farag al-Zalawi, 'Abdel Salam 'Abdel Salam Jum'a al-Gamaty and Ahmed 'Abdel Salam al-'Alem al-Sherif. In a ruling issued on 30 October 2001(64), the Supreme Court in Tripoli confirmed death sentences against the three men(65). Following their arrest in 2000 along with several others, they were accused of having used the Ahli Benghazi Football Club as a cover to form a clandestine and illegal group based on political ideas opposing the principles of the al-Fateh Revolution(66). The men told Amnesty International that they had been tortured in order to make them "confess".


On 10 February 2002 they were brought to a place for execution in the Jdeida Prison. They told Amnesty International delegates that they were blindfolded, attached to crosses and held there for over one hour waiting for their execution by

firing squad to take place. Eventually, instruction was given not to carry out the execution. The prisoners understood that their death sentences had been commuted but had no further information regarding the exact procedure or when this happened. Ahmed Muhammad Kheir Farag al-Zalawi, 'Abdel Salam 'Abdel Salam Jum'a al-Gamaty and Ahmed 'Abdel Salam al-'Alem al-Sherif continued to serve a prison sentence in al-Kuweifiya prison in Benghazi.

In another case, a Nigerian national, Nathaniel Notibo, and three Ghanaian nationals, were convicted of murder on 21 January 2003 and sentenced to death. Their sentences were reportedly commuted, just days after their execution was due to have been implemented.

In line with the worldwide trend towards the abolition of the death penalty, it is imperative that Libya does not delay further in taking concrete measures to realize its long-standing aim to abolish the death penalty. The UN Commission on Human Rights calls on all states that still maintain the death penalty "to establish a moratorium on executions, with a view to completely abolishing the death penalty"(67). Amnesty International delegates called on Colonel al-Gaddafi in February 2004 to consider calling for a moratorium on death sentences, and he replied that it was a good idea. However, no calls for a moratorium seem to have been made during the latest session of the General People's Congress, convened in March 2004, or since.

In the meantime, Amnesty International continues to receive unconfirmed reports that executions of people sentenced to death continue to be carried out. In the memorandum addressed to the authorities in February 2004, Amnesty International asked for detailed information on the number of death sentences passed and executions carried out in recent years, but received no response.
2.6 Collective punishment

International and regional human rights treaties, by which Libya is bound, stipulate that punishment for an offence may be imposed only on the offender and that the imposition of collective punishment is prohibited. However, Amnesty International is concerned that forms of "collective punishment" are sanctioned and continue to take place in Libya.

Provisions for collective punishment fall under what is known as the "Charter of Honour", a notion inspired by tribal customary law and institutionalized by the political system. Its application appears to fall outside the ordinary judicial system. UN treaty bodies have expressed deep concern regarding this law. In 1998 the UN Human Rights Committee expressed "deep concern that the law enacted in 1997 known as the 'Charter of Honour', which authorizes collective punishment for those found guilty of collective crimes (including 'obstructing the people's authority..., damaging public and private institutions'), violates several articles of the Covenant, including articles 7, 9 and 16"(68). In 2003 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child stated that "the Collective Punishment Law, which may affect children, violates fundamental human rights principles"(69).

The transformation of a local tradition into a repressive political tool

Many Libyan tribes have, over decades, developed a "Charter of Honour", an unwritten customary law which regulates the behaviour of members of the tribe in many spheres of life, including at times of marriage and funerals, and is seen to act as a form of protection to the tribe as a whole.

In March 1997, during its annual session, the General People's Congress passed a resolution, also known as a "Charter of Honour", which was subsequently accompanied by Resolution 8 of 1428 relating to its application. These texts, while not as extensive as the tribal charters, do include provisions for what are termed "crimes", which are defined in very broad terms. Those deemed criminals are "[t]hose who carry out or encourage or give shelter to or defend any individual or group phenomenon or activity or behaviour, which can be described as treachery or heresy or corruption in any form...".

This "Charter of Honour" establishes the notion of collective responsibility for the actions of others at three main levels: the family; society; and at an official level. Further, the text of the Charter allows for the application of collective punishment to all members of a given group, whether small or large, believed to be linked to the "crime". As punishment, the Charter prescribes in broad terms deprivation of public services and publicly-funded projects. It appears that this can mean being deprived of the right to participate in the Basic People's Congress and of the right to benefit from public services, such as electricity, water and telephone, as well as access to food supplies, social benefits or basic administrative services.

During a visit on 26 February 2004 by Amnesty International delegates to the small town of Bani Walid, south of Tripoli, a local clan leader and local officials described the operation of a system, parallel to the official judicial system, in which clan leaders decide the innocence or guilt of an accused and allocate punishment for those found guilty of crimes such as murder and theft, as well as for "moral crimes", namely committing treacherous acts against the state or society. Therefore, those accused can face two punishments, one from the authorities, if legal proceedings are instigated, and another from the tribe.

The local clan leader went on to define "treacherous acts" as criticism of the state or society outside of the Basic People's Congresses and appropriate tribal channels. In his opinion, any criticism expressed outside the official structures necessarily implies personal ambitions to acquire political power. The crime of treachery is considered the most serious crime, resulting not only in the punishment of the individual who is alleged to have committed the act but also of his family. He told Amnesty International delegates that in such cases the appropriate punishment would be the expulsion of the immediate family from the area and removal of all traces of them, namely the demolition of their home.

While in Bani Walid, Amnesty International delegates met "offenders" and their relatives, who had been subjected to forms of collective punishment. Amnesty International was told that on 15 October 2002 six houses belonging to members of the al-Jadik clan were demolished in Bani Walid. Since 1993 members of the al-Jadik clan have reportedly been intermittently subjected to varying forms of punishment, including temporary suspension of basic services such as telephone and electricity, temporary eviction from their homes, not receiving a salary for prolonged periods, not being allowed to study or to work and being asked to leave the area.

Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik was reportedly among dozens of people, including army officers, who were arrested and held in prolonged incommunicado detention in unknown locations in connection with an attempted military coup, which took place in the city of Misrata in October 1993. Amnesty International met residents of Bani Walid who understood that they were being punished for Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik's alleged actions and his being cast as a "traitor". In late 1999 Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik's house was apparently demolished(70).
These measures can also be accompanied by others which fall within the official state structure, including the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention of family members of "traitors". In this case, Sawf al-Jadik, brother of Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik, was reportedly detained for almost five years without charge or trial between 16 August 1995 and 13 July 2000. He believes that this was also connected to the alleged activities of his brother.
On 10 September 2002 'Abd al-Wahab Sawf al-Jadik and Hussein Sawf al-Jadik, nephews of Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik, were arrested at a petrol station in Bani Walid. While detained, they were allegedly beaten with thick cables and beaten on the soles of the feet (falaqa). They were apparently given a blank piece of paper and asked to write their "confessions", which they reportedly related to the case of their uncle, Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik. 'Abd al-Wahab Sawf al-Jadik was released on 13 September 2002 but Hussein Sawf al-Jadik was apparently found hanging in the toilet in their cell. No investigation into the causes of his death is known to have been carried out and no death certificate has been provided to the family.
Amnesty International raised its concern about the treatment of members of the al-Jadik clan with the then Public Prosecutor, 'Umar 'Ali Shalbak, who said that he was not aware of the case but agreed to look into the matter and to open an investigation if he deemed that a crime may have taken place. At the time of writing, no such investigation is known to have been opened.

"If you try to affect our traditions and our customary law, you will cause many deaths amongst our people, you should realize that." These were the words said to the Amnesty International delegates in Bani Walid by the local clan leader, as he explained the house demolition of another former resident, Abdullah Muhammad Mas'ud Zubeida(71). While Amnesty International takes no position on tribal systems per se, it calls on the Libyan authorities to ensure that "Charters of Honour" are not used as a pretext to violate basic human rights.

3. The legacy of human rights violations

The legacy of human rights violations committed in the past continues to cast a long shadow on Libya's human rights record. They have taken place in a context of near-total lack of accountability over decades, which has perpetuated the suffering of victims and their relatives and continues to do so. The toll of this impunity has been the repetition of human rights violations and an undermining of the rule of law.

The Libyan authorities have not begun to address the gross human rights violations, to which hundreds of Libyan nationals have fallen victim in the past. These have included long-standing cases of political imprisonment and "disappearance". In addition, dozens of Libyan dissidents inside and outside the country have been killed over the past decades in circumstances suggesting that they were extrajudicially executed by members of the security forces or by agents working on behalf of the Libyan authorities(72). This formed part of a deliberate policy, known as "physical liquidation", used against political opponents, which appears to have been endorsed at the highest levels, including by Colonel al-Gaddafi himself.

Impunity denies truth and justice and undermines confidence in the justice system. Lasting human rights protection will not be achieved without proper investigations leading to fair trials in which perpetrators of human rights violations are brought to justice. By such measures, the authorities would send a clear message that human rights violations will not be tolerated and that those who commit such crimes will be held accountable before a court of law. Victims have the right to see justice done, to have the truth about what happened to them acknowledged and to receive compensation and other forms of reparations.


3.1 Deaths in custody


Inadequate information to families about the death of detained relatives

Around the time of the releases of political prisoners in 2001 and 2002, the authorities started to inform the families of other detainees that their relatives had died in custody. Initially, the authorities apparently posted lists of those who died on the walls of the prisons, including Abu Salim Prison in Tripoli. Soon afterwards, in what seems to have been the application of a new policy, officers of local branches of the Internal Security Agency either visited the families individually or summoned them to their office.

It appears that the families were usually informed orally of the death in custody of their relatives and that, at least initially, death certificates were not issued. When the families inquired about the date of the death, they reportedly either received no response or were told that the detainee had died some years earlier. Usually, no information was disclosed regarding the circumstances or cause of death. In at least three cases known to Amnesty International, when a death certificate was subsequently issued to the family it apparently stated simply that the prisoner had died of natural causes, without further explanation or any evidence. In all cases reported to Amnesty International, the authorities have refused to return the detainee's body to the family. The failure of the authorities to systematically deliver death certificates, to disclose fully the details of how the detainees died and to return their bodies has forced families to mourn the deceased without having formal evidence of the death or the circumstances surrounding it.


In May 2002 two such families were informed of the death of their relatives:
Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani, born in 1970 in al-Bayda; and Mustapha 'Ali al-Jihani, born in 1933 in Benghazi.
On 25 May 2002 members of the Internal Security Agency came to the house of Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani to inform his family that he had died in prison. When his brothers inquired about the cause of the death and asked for the body, they reportedly received no answer. Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani was arrested on 28 July 1995, along with one of his brothers, Faraj Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani, by several armed men dressed in civilian clothes, whose faces were covered with scarves. They were taken to a detention centre of the Internal Security Agency in al-Bayda. His brother was released three days later. Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani was transferred with eight others to an unknown location. After his transfer, there was no news about him whatsoever until the authorities informed the family nearly seven years later that he had died in custody. A death certificate was subsequently delivered to the family, which apparently stated that Ibrahim Khalifa Muhammad al-'Alwani died in Tripoli Hospital in 2001 without specifying the cause of death.
Mustapha 'Ali al-Jihani, a father of seven, was taken from his house on 19 June 1995 by members of the Internal Security Agency. When his family inquired about him at the office of the Internal Security Agency, they were informed that he had been transferred to Tripoli approximately seven days after his arrest. They heard that he was detained in Abu Salim Prison but received no official confirmation regarding his whereabouts. Despite all their efforts, Mustapha 'Ali al-Jihani's family had no contact with him from the time of his arrest and on 9 May 2002 officers of the Internal Security Agency informed the family that he had died. When they asked for the body and for a death certificate, officers of the Internal Security Agency reportedly refused, saying simply that Mustapha 'Ali al-Jihani had been ill and had died several years before. The Internal Security Agency gave the family permission to hold the mourning. A death certificate was subsequently delivered to the family.
Amnesty International does not have a comprehensive list of detainees who have died in custody and whose families have been informed of their deaths. In February 2004 the Geneva-based organization, Human Rights Solidarity, issued a list of 96 such prisoners. The majority were prisoners who had been arrested in mass arrests in 1989 and 1995. It is believed that some prisoners may have died as a result of diseases, such as epidemics of tuberculosis. Poor prison conditions, which were at their worst in the mid-1990s, may have contributed to these deaths. However, it is also feared that scores of others may have died in suspicious circumstances.
1996 events in Abu Salim Prison

It has been widely alleged that prisoners were killed in large numbers in June 1996 in Abu Salim Prison, located in a compound of the Military Police in the area of Abu Salim, a suburb of Tripoli. One of the reasons fuelling these allegations is that some families of prisoners who had received news from, or had been allowed visits to, their relatives up to 1996 were barred from visiting them and received no information at all since June 1996.

In February 2004, Colonel al-Gaddafi spoke to Amnesty International delegates about the events in Abu Salim Prison in 1996. This was the first time that the organization had heard official recognition that any such events took place. Colonel al-Gaddafi described the events as a tragedy. He said that one of the prison guards was handing out food to prisoners in their cells. When the guard reached the first cell, the prisoners attacked and killed him and stole his keys. Using his keys, they then opened all the other cells in the same block and the prisoners began to attack the guards, taking their weapons and killing some of them. Police from outside the prison intervened and there was an exchange of fire resulting in casualties, including deaths, on both sides. Those who were still alive were placed back in their cells. Colonel al-Gaddafi went on to say that a number of prisoners also managed to escape during these events and some even reached Afghanistan.

Another version heard by Amnesty International and based on the testimony of former prisoners is that, at the end of June 1996, a riot took place in Abu Salim Prison, apparently sparked off by appalling prison conditions. At least one guard was allegedly taken hostage by several prisoners who managed to steal his keys. The prisoners opened a number of cells but failed to escape from the prison as they were not able to open one of the gates. Security forces reportedly intervened at this stage, threatening to kill whoever attempted to approach the gate.

Shortly afterwards, a senior security official reportedly came to the prison and urged the prisoners to return to their cells. According to this version of events, as there was no sign of order being restored, the same senior official began to negotiate with a group of four prisoners. Their demands apparently included that the scores of prisoners in bad health be hospitalized; that adequate health care be provided to all prisoners; that they be allowed visits by their families; and that prisoners be given the right to a fair trial. Prisoners allegedly received guarantees that the first demand would be met. The negotiation continued until late in the night, after which prisoners returned to their cells.

Several prisoners have reported having heard shootings which lasted some two hours the following morning. At the time, they did not know what was happening but later heard from others that scores of prisoners had been killed. Estimated figures of the numbers of those killed range from tens to hundreds.

Immediately after the events of June 1996, Amnesty International wrote to Colonel al-Gaddafi urging that a prompt, thorough and impartial investigation be set up to establish the circumstances in which the prisoners were killed, and that the findings of the investigation and the names of those killed be made public(73). Since then, Amnesty International has repeatedly called for such an investigation but these calls have yielded no results. 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, told Amnesty International that he would provide the organization with information regarding these events but to date none had been received beyond what Colonel al-Gaddafi told Amnesty International's delegates.

Amid a general climate of fear in Libya to speak about human rights violations, the events of 1996 in Abu Salim Prison are of particular sensitivity. Many of those who had the courage to talk about the issue with Amnesty International delegates in February 2004 did so with great anxiety.

Abu Salim Prison's unique status was confirmed to Amnesty International by several Libyan officials in February 2004. 'Umar 'Ali Shalbak, the then Public Prosecutor, explained that Abu Salim Prison was supervised by the Internal Security Agency and did not fall under his jurisdiction. Major Belqassem al-Gargum, Director of the Prison Adminstration, also explained that it does not fall under his jurisdiction.

Urgent need for investigations into all deaths in custody

As Colonel al-Gaddafi told Amnesty International delegates in February 2004, "families have a right to know". In order for the truth to emerge, there is a pressing need for thorough, independent and impartial investigations to be carried out into all deaths in custody which occurred in the past, including those which took place at the time of the 1996 events in Abu Salim Prison.

Article 48 of Law 47 of 1975 on prisons requires that families be informed immediately when the life of relatives in prison is in danger in order that they can visit them. In cases of the death of a prisoner, the family must be informed and the body returned to them on request. The failure of the authorities to investigate all cases of death in custody is also a clear breach of their obligations under international human rights standards.

Amnesty International's calls for investigations into deaths in custody have recently been echoed within Libya. For example, the Human Rights Society of the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations called for investigations into cases of several prisoners who had died in custody in unclear circumstances(74). In recent years, several Libyan human rights organizations operating outside the country - including Human Rights Solidarity, the Libyan League for Human Rights and Libya Watch for Human Rights(75) - have made similar calls.

In a statement reported by the daily Arabic newspaper al-Hayat on 5 September 2003, the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security acknowledged "the death of some detainees in police stations" as "limited and known cases which are investigated by the public prosecution". However, it appears that the statement does not refer to the cases of people who died in prison and which have remained uninvestigated.

The Special Rapporteur on Torture raised seven cases of deaths in custody in Libya in a letter dated 3 September 1998, which remains without response. The cases raised by the Special Rapporteur on Torture include that of Muhammad al-Furtiya, who was aged in his early seventies, and who died at the end of 1994 or early 1995 in Abu Salim Prison. He was said to have been suffering from high blood pressure and diabetes and had reportedly not been receiving adequate medical care in the prison. He had been held without charge or trial since 1989(76).


3.2 Political prisoners who have "disappeared" in custody

According to Amnesty International's information, the fate of dozens of political prisoners, some imprisoned since the 1980s, remains unknown. They have effectively "disappeared". Human Rights Solidarity has published a list of 258 names of prisoners whose relatives have had no contact with them since their detention. In some cases, prisoners have been detained apparently without charge or trial for more than a decade. In other cases, even people who were acquitted by the court are believed to still be detained although their families have had no news for years.

Since his arrest in 1989, there has been no news of Belqassem al-Furtiya, an electrical engineer born in 1965 in Misrata. He was allegedly part of an unauthorized group calling peacefully for reform in society. In 1989, his family house was surrounded by members of the Internal Security Agency and Belqassem al-Furtiya, his father Muhammad and his brother Ismail were arrested. For the first few days, they were detained together in the office of the Internal Security Agency in Misrata. Shortly afterwards, Muhammad and Ismail were transferred to Tripoli and lost contact with Belqassem. Muhammad al-Furtiya died in Abu Salim Prison in 1994(77). Ismail al-Furtiya was released in 1995 without having been charged or tried.

There has been no news of Belqassem al-Furtiya since his arrest in 1989 despite repeated attempts by his family to approach the authorities or to get information from released prisoners. Like many other mothers in her situation, Belqassem al-Furtiya's mother, aged in her sixties, who already lost her husband in prison, lives with the daily reality of not knowing whether she will ever see her son again or whether she should mourn for him.

Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi, an engineer, born on 30 June 1955 in Benghazi, was taken for questioning on 18 April 1986. He remained held under investigation until July 1986. He returned home briefly before being arrested again on 26 July 1986.
He was reportedly accused of sabotage and membership of an illegal political organization, but was acquitted by a criminal court in 1987 due to a lack of evidence against him. However, he remained in detention. On 17 March 1990 Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi's family received a summons for him from the Popular Prosecution Office to appear before a criminal court in Tripoli. The court was apparently surprised to learn that Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi had not been released following his acquittal several years earlier.
Between 1981 and 1985, he had lived and studied in the United Kingdom (UK). During his time abroad, he became politically active in the opposition and organized many peaceful demonstrations in the UK, including a demonstration before the Libyan People's Bureau in London in 1984, during which British police officer, Yvonne Fletcher, was shot dead.
In April 1988 Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi's family was allowed to visit him in Abu Salim Prison where he was then detained. In June 1988 Amnesty International delegates visiting Libya were also able to visit him. Visits by the family then continued, with some interruptions, until June 1996. On 10 June 1996 his wife visited Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi for the last time.
Information from former prisoners indicates that he was last seen in Abu Salim Prison in June 1996. Other information has filtered out suggesting that until some three years ago, he was still alive. However, requests for information by his family to the authorities have gone unanswered. When he was arrested, his wife was pregnant. His now 17-year-old son, his elderly mother and the rest of the family have had no news about his fate and whereabouts for nearly eight years.
In February 2002 six men, including Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi(78), were reportedly sentenced to life imprisonment. Apparently, only two of the accused were present in the court room; they were Yousef Lahaywal and Najm al-Din al-Naquzi, who both later benefited from the wave of releases of political prisoners in September 2002.
During the February 2004 visit by Amnesty International, the Director of Abu Salim Prison, Milad Daman, told delegates that Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir al-Thulthi was "alive and well" and being held in Benghazi. Requests by delegates to visit him there were not granted.

3.3 Developments in other "disappearances"

"If we had detained them, we would have the courage to say that we had done it", 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation told Amnesty International in February 2004 with reference to Libyan nationals who had "disappeared" abroad. He continued, "Why not investigate? We must reach the truth. Those who participated in these 'disappearances' are criminals".

Over the years, Amnesty International has worked to seek the truth in the cases of "disappearances" within and outside of Libya(79). With regard to all the people named below, families and other concerned parties have also sought clarification from the authorities about their fate and whereabouts but have received no concrete information. They continue to try to obtain answers from the authorities on whether their relatives are held in secret detention, have died in custody or were killed. However, no thorough, independent and impartial investigations by the Libyan authorities are known to have taken place into any of these "disappearances" and nor have those responsible been held to account.

Mansur al-Kikhiya, a human rights activist and the Secretary General of the National Libyan Alliance, an opposition group based abroad, "disappeared" in Cairo, Egypt in 1993. He had worked in the Libyan government for a number of years and resigned from office in 1980 in protest at the execution of political opponents by the Libyan authorities that year. Before his "disappearance", Mansur al-Kikhiya was attending the general conference of the Arab Organization for Human Rights in Cairo and was last seen on the evening of 10 December 1993 at the al-Safir Hotel.

Baha al-Kikhiya, Mansur al-Kikhiya's wife, told Amnesty International: "As a woman and as a mother, I have had to live with the suffering of not knowing where my husband is and whether he is still alive. My children and I just want to know the truth, whatever that may be".

In 2002 the Libyan authorities wrote to Amnesty International, stating that they had "conducted a series of investigations to determine [Mansur al-Kikhiya's] whereabouts" but that "[his] disappearance remains a mystery". The letter further proffered the theory that he may have been "forcibly abducted as part of a settlement of conflicts among competing groups or as part of tactics orchestrated by foreign intelligence services"(80). However, in February 2004, 'Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, was not able to offer any details about investigations into this "disappearance".

Jaballah Hamed Matar and 'Ezzat Youssef al-Maqrif, two prominent members of the Libyan opposition group, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), "disappeared" in Cairo in March 1990. Their whereabouts since that time have remained unknown, although unconfirmed reports have suggested that they were both handed over to the Libyan authorities.

Amnesty International has received information that at least until 1995 Jaballah Hamed Matar was detained in Libya. In 1995 he was reportedly seen by another prisoner in Abu Salim Prison in Tripoli. Amnesty International also received an audio taped message, said to be recorded in the early 1990s, in which Jaballah Matar confirmed that he was being held in a Libyan prison.
In 2001 Jaballah Hamed Matar's name reportedly appeared on an indictment of several people accused of belonging to a secret and prohibited organization and smuggling explosives from abroad (Case 2001/1). During the trial, the defence reportedly asked for Jaballah Hamed Matar to be brought to court, but this request yielded no result. In the verdict, pronounced by the Permanent Military Court on 5 February 2002, Mahmud Hamed Matar, a brother of Jaballah Hamed Matar, was sentenced to life imprisonment. At the time of writing, Mahmud Hamed Matar was said to be held in Abu Salim Prison. Amnesty International requested to meet him in February 2004 but he was not made available for interview.

Imam Musa al-Sadr, a prominent Iranian-born Shi'a cleric of Lebanese nationality, "disappeared", along with two others, Sheikh Muhammad Ya'qub and 'Abbas Badr al-Din, during a visit to Libya in 1978. In 2002 the Libyan authorities wrote to Amnesty International, saying that there was evidence showing that Imam Musa al-Sadr "departed Libya to travel to a European country" and expressing readiness "to cooperate in finding the truth about his disappearance"(81). The case of Imam Musa al-Sadr was also mentioned by Colonel al-Gaddafi in his annual address to the nation on 1 September 2002. According to media reports, Colonel al-Gaddafi said Imam Musa al-Sadr had "'disappeared' in Libya" and that it was imperative that a solution be found to clarify his fate.

Amnesty International suggested in February 2004 that the Libyan authorities consider forming joint investigation commissions with the countries where these people allegedly "disappeared" or to which they were nationals. Such commissions, which should be chaired by independent and impartial experts, would ensure that all the available information is shared and that further investigative steps are taken to clarify the fate of those individuals.

Amnesty International recalls that "disappearances" are a continuing crime. In other words, the violation continues as long as the fate and whereabouts of the victims have not been established. The UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1992, states in Article 17, "Acts constituting enforced disappearances shall be considered a continuing offence as long as the perpetrators continue to conceal the fate and the whereabouts of persons who have disappeared and these facts remain unclarified".(82)
4. Conclusion and recommendations

The human rights situation in Libya remains a matter of grave concern to Amnesty International. Laws, institutions and practices violating human rights continue to operate and the truth about past events remains undisclosed. Perpetrators enjoy impunity and victims suffer, often in silence. With few but important exceptions, Libyans remain afraid to engage in human rights activities in the country.

Despite positive developments in recent years and expressions of readiness to engage seriously with the human rights situation in Libya, the Libyan authorities have yet to undertake structural reforms and take other measures to redress violations. In this context, the legal system continues to produce new generations of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners likely to spend decades behind bars. Making sure that there is full accountability for the perpetrators and justice for the victims is also necessary to prevent the repetition of the human rights violations witnessed over the last three decades.

Amnesty International recommends that the Libyan authorities take, as a matter of urgency, the following steps:

Ensuring the rights to freedom of expression and association

? Release all prisoners of conscience immediately and unconditionally;
? Repeal all laws, including Law 71 of 1972 and relevant articles of the Penal Code, which criminalize activities which merely amount to the peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and association;
? Ensure that the draft Penal Code, currently under review, is amended to ensure that the provisions relating to the rights to freedom of expression and association conform with Libya's obligations under the ICCPR; and
? Ensure that, in law and in practice, "collective punishment" is prohibited, and never imposed to punish families of opponents or suspected opponents to the political system, or for any other reason.


Protecting human rights activism
? Ensure that all Libyan citizens can engage freely in human rights work, including by forming independent human rights associations, without legal or practical obstructions;
? Allow Libyan nationals to freely communicate on human rights matters both in the country and outside it without fear of reprisal; and
? Fully implement the provisions of the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders).

Ending the practice of incommunicado detention

? Ensure that all detainees are brought before an independent judicial authority without delay to review the lawfulness and necessity of their detention;
? Give prompt and regular access to relatives, lawyers and doctors of the detainees' own choosing; and
? Send a clear message to the security forces, especially the Internal Security Agency, that incommunicado detention will not be tolerated and abuses will be punished.

Ending torture

? Amend the Penal Code to include a detailed definition of the crime of torture that fully reflects the definition of the Convention against Torture. All forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment should be prohibited;
? Ensure that all allegations of torture and ill-treatment are promptly, thoroughly, independently and impartially investigated and that the full findings of such investigations are made public;
? Ensure that confessions or other evidence obtained under torture are not admissible in a court of law;
? Ensure that all those responsible for torture and other human rights violations are brought to justice, as stipulated by Article 435 of the Libyan Penal Code;
? Stop implementing corporal punishments, including the amputation of a hand and foot as well as flogging;
? Repeal all provisions prescribing corporal punishment, including those contained in Law 70 of 1973, Law 52 of 1974 and Law 13 of 1425;
? Review the draft Penal Code, which is currently being discussed, to ensure that all forms of corporal punishment are abolished; and
? Ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.


Guaranteeing the right to a fair trial
? Ensure that all detainees have access to legal counsel of their choice, and that court-appointed lawyers are not imposed on detainees who have the financial means and desire to hire a private lawyer;
? Ensure that both private lawyers and court-appointed lawyers are free from improper interference in the exercise of their professional duties, including by having sufficient access to their clients in order to prepare their defence;
? Ensure that members of the judiciary are free from external intervention or influence, not only in law but also in practice;
? Abolish the People's Court and related institutions, including the Popular Prosecution Office, and transfer all pending cases to the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal court system; and
? Review all cases of prisoners who were tried by the People's Court. They should be retried before ordinary courts, in full compliance with international standards for fair trial, if they are not to be released.


Taking steps toward the abolition of the death penalty
? Announce a moratorium on executions, in line with the call by the UN Commission on Human Rights to all states that still maintain the death penalty "to establish a moratorium on executions, with a view to completely abolishing the death penalty";
? Review all Libyan laws and the draft Penal Code to ensure that the death penalty is restricted to the "most serious crimes", as required by the ICCPR, with a view to its early abolition; and
? Ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.


Ensuring truth, accountability and reparations for human rights violations
? Carry out thorough, independent and impartial investigations into all cases of extrajudicial executions, including those resulting from the policy of "physical liquidation";
? Ensure that the families of all those who died in custody over the years receive detailed information regarding the circumstances of the deaths of their relatives;
? Ensure that a thorough, independent and impartial investigation into the killings in Abu Salim Prison in June 1996 is carried out, that the findings are made public and that the families are informed of the fate of their relatives involved in those events;
? Transfer jurisdiction of Abu Salim Prison to the ordinary prison system;
? Fully clarify the fate of all other prisoners still unaccounted for;
? Make immediately public the information available regarding all those who "disappeared" inside or outside Libya, including the Libyan nationals abducted in Cairo in 1990 and 1993, and hold independent, impartial and thorough investigations into these cases;
? Consider establishing joint mechanisms of inquiry with states relevant to these cases, in order to facilitate the establishment of the truth about what happened to those who "disappeared";
? Ensure that no arbitrary measures are imposed on former prisoners after their release;
? Ensure that all those responsible for human rights violations are held to account, including through prosecutions where crimes were committed, regardless of the rank or status of the perpetrators; and
? Establish an independent and impartial body to ensure that all those who have been victims of human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detention or imprisonment after unfair trials receive full reparations, including rehabilitation and compensation.

Ratifying human rights treaties and cooperating with UN mechanisms

? Ratify further international human rights treaties, including the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
? Extend a standing invitation to all the UN Commission on Human Rights' special procedures and implement their recommendations;
? Submit periodic reports to the UN treaty monitoring bodies on time and in accordance with reporting guidelines; and
? Implement the recommendations of the treaty monitoring bodies following consideration of periodic reports and communications, in particular those made by the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee.


********


(1) After the independence of Libya in 1951, political parties were banned in 1952 under the monarchy of King Idris al-Sanusi.


(2) Libya became a State Party to the ICCPR in 1976.


(3) The first visit of this kind took place in October 2003 when the UK-based International Centre for Prison Studies conducted a visit focusing on prison conditions.


(4) For further details, see: Libya: Amnesty International's Concerns in the Light of Recent Legal Reforms (AI Index: MDE 19/02/91); and Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97).


(5) UN Security Council Resolution 1506


(6) ibid


(7) For full details of the case, see section below, entitled Unlawful detention


(8) More details of their activities can be found at http://www.gaddaficharity.org


(9) The delegation was composed of Claudio Cordone, Senior Director, International Law and Organizations; Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program; and Sara Hamood and J?r?me Bellion-Jourdan, experts on Libya in the Middle East and North Africa Program. During the 1990s, despite the lack of access to the country, Amnesty International issued several reports and made specific recommendations to the Libyan authorities. Among them: Libya: Amnesty International's prisoner concerns in the light of recent legal reforms (AI Index: MDE 19/02/91, June 1991); and Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: 19/08/97, June 1997).


(10) After a government reshuffle, reported on 6 March 2004, the post of Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security, previously held by Muhammad al-Misrati, was replaced by the creation of two new posts, one in charge of Justice, held by 'Ali 'Umar Abu Bakr, and one in charge of Public Security, held by Nasser al-Mabruk. Muhammad al-Misrati was appointed Public Prosecutor, replacing 'Umar 'Ali Shalbak.


(11) The Popular Lawyers' Office is comprised of state-appointed lawyers who provide legal aid services. They are linked to the system of the People's Court. For further details, see section below, entitled Special courts and the independence of the judiciary.


(12) Libya: Towards ensuring human rights protection - Initial findings of Amnesty International visit (AI Index: MDE 19/005/2004, March 2004)


(13) Reports of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the UN Counter-Terrorism: S/2001/1323, 31 December 2001 and S/2002/1021, 13 September 2002


(14) For example, see: USA: The threat of a bad example - Undermining international standards as "war on terror" detentions continue (AI Index: AMR 51/114/2003, August 2003); and The backlash: human rights at risk throughout the world (AI Index: ACT 30/027/2001, October 2001).


(15) This includes ensuring respect for fundamental rights, such as the requirement that detainees be brought before a judicial authority without delay, as stipulated by Article 9(4) of the ICCPR and by Principle 11(1) of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Body of Principles). People deprived of their liberty also have the right of prompt access to and assistance of a lawyer; the right to be informed immediately upon arrest of the reasons for their arrest and promptly informed of any charges brought against them; and the right to a fair trial. These rights are also contained in the ICCPR and the Body of Principles.


(16) Report of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the UN Counter-Terrorism, S/2002/1021, 13 September 2002.


(17) Amnesty International has also raised concerns relating to the definition of terrorism in the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, which Libya has ratified. For a detailed analysis of the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, see: Amnesty International. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism: A serious threat to human rights (AI Index: IOR 51/001/2002, January 2002).


(18) Amnesty International calls for the immediate and unconditional release of prisoners of conscience - those detained for their political, religious or other conscientiously-held beliefs or because of their ethnic origin, sex, colour, language, national or social origin, economic status, birth or other status - who have not used or advocated violence. The organization calls for political prisoners, who are accused or having used or advocated violence, to be tried for recognisably criminal offences in accordance with international standards for fair trial and without recourse to the death penalty, or be released.


(19) Al-Jama'a al-Islamiya al-Libiya, the Libyan Islamic Group, should not be confused with al-Jama'a al-Islamiya al-Libiya al-Muqatila, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. According to Amnesty International's information, the Libyan Islamic Group does not use or advocate the use of violence.


(20) Case 254/2000


(21) For details, see section below, entitled Legal provisions


(22) However, satellite television is widely viewed by Libyans and access to the Internet is available.


(23) Despite repeated requests by the Amnesty International delegation visiting Libya in February 2004 to meet Fathi al-Jahmi, he was not made available. He was reportedly transferred from Abu Salim Prison to 'Ayn Zara Prison, located in the outskirts of Tripoli, during the visit.


(24) Article 19(2). Article 19(3) recalls that this article carries special duties and responsibilities, rendering it subject to certain restrictions, namely "(a) ...respect of the rights or reputation of others; (b) ... protection of national security or of public order...or of public health."


(25) Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. CCPR/C/79Add.101, Para.15


(26) In its Concluding observations on the Republic of Korea's Second Periodic Report (1 November 1999, CCPR/C/79/Add.114, para. 9), the UN Human Rights Committee stated that "[t]he Covenant does not permit restrictions on the expression of ideas, merely because they coincide with those held by an enemy entity or may be considered to create sympathy for that entity."


(27) These included the Libyan Red Crescent Society; Hana Philanthropic Association for Orphans; Watismo Charity Society; and the Islamic Call Association, among others.


(28) Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 11/05/99, para.184


(29) Article 6 of the Declaration notably states:


"Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others: [...]


(b) As provided for in human rights and other applicable international instruments, freely to publish, impart or disseminate to others views, information and knowledge on all human rights and fundamental freedoms;


(c) To study, discuss, form and hold opinions on the observance, both in law and in practice, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and, through these and other appropriate means, to draw public attention to those matters."


(30) Safeguards within the Criminal Procedure Code include: the necessity to produce an arrest warrant (Article 30); limiting the period of detention (Articles 26, 115, 122, 123, 124 and 175); the right of detainees to challenge the legality of the detention (Article 33); the right to be informed of the charges brought against them (Article 105); the right to legal counsel (Article 106); and prompt access to a judicial authority (Article 112). In addition, Article 53 of Law 47 of 1975 on prisons provides the right to lawyers to visit their clients in custody.


(31) See, for example, the statement issued on 10 August 2003 by the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice and Public Security.


(32) Case 120/98


(33) In February 2004, the deputy head of the External Security Agency assured Amnesty International delegates that this agency did not hold people and ran no place of detention.


(34) Case 120/98


(35) The news was reported in al-Jazeera TV, Agence France Press and the British Broadcasting Corporation.


(36) Forcible return/fear of torture or ill-treatment of seven Libyans deported from Jordan (AI Index: MDE 19/01/00, EXTRA 21/00, 7 March 2000)


(37) Case 120/98


(38) In 2003 the Criminal Procedure Code was amended by Law 3 of 1371 reducing the maximum number of days a person can be detained before they must appear before a prosecutor from 45 to 30.


(39) Case 104/2003


(40) Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 11/05/99, para.182


(41) Article 4(2) of the Convention against Torture


(42) Prosecutors originally gave the number of infected children as 393, but at a trial session in September 2003, they increased the number to 426.


(43) Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 11 May 1999, para.11


(44) Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 11 May 1999, para.13


(45) Libya: Limbs of four people amputated, BBC (Text of report by Libyan radio), 4 July 2002.


(46) In Libya, three different calendars are used: the Gregorian calendar; the Hijra calendar; and another beginning in the year of the death of the Prophet Muhammad.


(47) In 2003 the UN Special Rapporteur on torture argued that he cannot accept the notion that the administration of such punishments as stoning to death, flogging or amputation - acts which would be unquestionably unlawful in, say, the context of custodial interrogation - can be deemed lawful simply because the punishment has been authorized in a procedurally legitimate manner. See Appendix 15, Corporal punishment: Observations of the Special Rapporteur on torture in combating torture - a manual for action (AI Index: ACT 40/001/2003, June 2003).


(48) Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 11/05/99.


A/54/44, para.189.


(49) In February 2004, Amnesty International also raised the issue of other special courts with the Libyan authorities, namely the Permanent Revolutionary Court and the Military Court. However, Amnesty International did not obtain detailed information about their functioning.


(50) Article 19 of Law 5 of 1988.


(51) Law 5 of 1988 establishing the People's Court


(52) Sent to Amnesty International on 29 October 2002


(53) During their February 2004 visit, Amnesty International delegates repeatedly requested a meeting with the President of the People's Court, who presides over the whole system, including the Popular Prosecution, but were not granted such a meeting. In addition, delegates requested numerous court documents from the People's Court but these were not made available.


(54) General Comment 13 of the Human Rights Committee: Equality before the courts and the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law (Article 14), 13 April 1984.


(55) ibid


(56) Case 333/2002


(57) Article 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code.


(58) As amended in 1427. It appears that in the original law of 1988 defendants enjoyed higher levels of guarantees of the right to legal counsel: Article 13 stated that the court would only appoint a lawyer from the Popular Lawyers' Office if the accused had not already chosen someone for his defence.


(59) For case details, see section entitled Prisoners of conscience


(60) Prisoners sentenced by the People's Court also reportedly suffer from different treatment, such as not being eligible for release on grounds of good behaviour after having completed three-quarters of their sentence; not being allowed to work while in prison; and not being allowed extended family visits.


(61) For further details, see section above, entitled Criminalization of rights to freedom of expression and association


(62) Specific penalties sanctioned by shari'a, Islamic law.


(63) Article 131 of Law 51 of 1976 on the organization of the judiciary, amended by Law 10 of 1425


(64) Case 48/1551


(65) Case 353/2000


(66) After these events took place, an article was added to the Penal Code by Law 15 of 2002 providing for punishment including the death penalty for taking part in riots or demonstrations during or after a sporting event (Article 198 bis of the Penal Code).


(67) UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/67 adopted on 24 April 2003


(68) Concluding observation of the Human Rights Committee: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, CCPR/C/79/Add.101, 6 November 1998, para.12


(69) Concluding observation of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, CRC/C/15/Add.209, 4 July 2003, para.45(c)


(70) Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik appeared, with three others, on Libyan television in early March 1994. While being interrogated at length on camera, they confessed to being American "spies" and to having been recruited as US intelligence agents by members of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. It was alleged they had been tortured into making these confessions. Charges against them included spying, treason, "instigation of violence, use of armed forces channels to achieve political and social goals" and "cooperation with the enemy to harm the interests of the country", all of which are punishable by death.


They were tried by a lower military court in 1995, which reportedly handed down sentences of up to life imprisonment on at least 12 people. However, the Libyan authorities were said to have ordered a retrial on the grounds that the initial sentences were too lenient. The men were retried by a military court at the end of December 1995 and 12 were sentenced to death.


On 2 January 1997 Libyan television stated that eight men - six senior army officers and two civilians - were executed after the Supreme Military Court upheld their death sentences. The court sentenced at least five men to prison terms and acquitted at least five others. The six army officers executed included Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik. (For further details, please refer to: Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation [AI Index: MDE 19/08/97]) Major Khalil Salem Muhammad al-Jadik's family was reportedly not directly informed of his execution.


(71) In its report, entitled Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97, June 1997), Amnesty International raised the case of 'Abdallah Muhammad Mas'ud Zubeida, an alleged member of the banned Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, the Islamic Liberation Party, who "disappeared" after his reported arrest in 1982.


(72) While not detailed in this report, such cases have been previously raised by Amnesty International. For further information, see Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97, June 1997).


(73) Libya: Political prisoners in Abu Salim Prison, Tripoli - Fear for safety / Deliberate killings / Medical neglect (Urgent Action 188/96, AI Index: MDE 19/05/96, July 1996).


(74) For details, see their five-page report, entitled Report on Human Rights in Libya (17/07/2003)


(75) For further details, see their websites: http://www.lhrs.ch and http://www.libya-watch.org. The Libyan League for Human Rights does not have a website but can be contacted at allibyah@yahoo.com


(76) See Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97, June 1997)


(77) For details, see section above, entitled Urgent need for investigations into all deaths in custody


(78) The five others were: Mustapha Bin Daga, 'Ali al-Zirqani and 'Ali Kanunu, who had been released in 1988; and Yousef Lahawyal and Najm al-Din al-Naquzi.


(79) For examples, see Libya: Gross human rights violations amid secrecy and isolation (AI Index: MDE 19/08/97) and Libya: Time to break the 10-year silence on Mansour al-Kikhiya (AI Index MDE 19/021/2003, December 2003).


(80) Response of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the 2002 Annual Report of Amnesty International - December 2002


(81) Response of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the 2002 Annual Report of Amnesty International - December 2002


(82) The continuing nature of "disappearances" is also explicitly mentioned in the draft International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance, Article 5 of which states:

"This offence is continuous and permanent as long as the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared person have not been determined with certainty."


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> DIRT BAG? WHERE?


Arafat Fortifies Compound Fearing Attack
By MOHAMMED DARAGHMEH
Associated Press Writer
RAMALLAH, West Bank (AP) -- Fearing Israel will seize him, Yasser Arafat fortified his West Bank headquarters with hundreds of concrete-filled barrels and wrecked cars Thursday, saying he's determined to go down fighting.
Israel, which has repeatedly threatened the Palestinian leader, said it has no immediate plan to go after Arafat. One senior Israeli official said Arafat and his aides are being "hysterical" - although Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned only last month he is no longer bound by a promise to the United States not to harm Arafat.
Palestinian officials said the obstacles in the courtyard are meant to slow tanks and prevent helicopters from landing nearby, but he acknowledged that heaps of scrap metal would not hold back the Middle East's mightiest army for long.
Israel has confined the 74-year-old Arafat to his Ramallah offices for more than two years. In September, Israel's Cabinet decided Arafat should be "removed" and has repeatedly threatened him since then, but never taken any action.
Arafat's aides would not say what spooked the Palestinian leader.
However, he has become increasingly jittery since Israel assassinated Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin in March. Yassin had widely been considered immune, with Palestinians assuming Israel would be held back by concern about a bloody backlash. After Israel killed Yassin - and Hamas failed to carry out a major revenge attack - Arafat increasingly feared he might be next, his aides said.
Israeli jeeps drive close to Arafat's compound from time to time, and sometimes park outside for hours. Recent visitors to Arafat's compound said he asked them on arrival whether they had seen Israeli jeeps in the vicinity. "They usually come after midnight. Today, they came early," Arafat was quoted as saying.
Arafat said he wouldn't go down without a fight. "I am going to enter this battle with my gun by my side," a visitor quoted Arafat as saying Wednesday over a supper of salads and cooked vegetables. "I will resist until I become a martyr."
Israel has contingency plans for seizing and expelling Arafat, and troops have practiced taking over his compound. However, it is believed Israel would not act without provocation, such as a major attack by Palestinian militants.
Sharon adviser Raanan Gissin said there is no immediate plan to raid Arafat's compound. "We are not going to carry out any operation, but they are hysterical," Gissin said of Arafat and his aides.
Sharon said last month he is no longer bound by a promise to President Bush not to harm Arafat. Although the United States rebuked Sharon for the comments, the veiled threat raised speculation that Israel might target Arafat, whom it accuses of backing Palestinian militants.
Earlier this week, Israeli troops briefly surrounded Arafat's compound during an overnight raid. The army said Arafat was not the target, but Palestinian officials said the veteran leader fears for his life.
"We have a real concern that they (Israeli troops) may come here," said Palestinian Cabinet minister Saeb Erekat.
On Thursday, cement mixers filled hundreds of blue barrels with concrete, and they were then scattered across the main courtyard outside Arafat's compound. Bulldozers also spread dozens of wrecked cars - remnants of previous Israeli raids - across the courtyard.
Security officials said they also set up a new system to alert Arafat's guards if Israelis approach the compound, but gave no details.
Addressing a rally in the Gaza Strip by phone Thursday, Arafat said the Palestinians are ready to meet their obligations under the U.S.-backed "road map" peace plan and hope to resume negotiations with Israel. However, the plan has been stuck since its launch last year, and neither side has kept its promises.
The Palestinians are to dismantle violent groups, and Israel is to freeze settlement construction and remove West Bank outposts. Instead, Israel's Housing Ministry has funneled nearly $6.5 million to outposts and illegal construction in the past three years, a government watchdog reported Wednesday.
Sharon has been weighing his options since his Likud Party on Sunday overwhelmingly rejected his proposal to pull out of the Gaza Strip and four West Bank settlements. Sharon had said the plan would boost Israel's security in the absence of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.


Posted by maximpost at 4:18 PM EDT
Permalink
Wednesday, 5 May 2004


When Islam Breaks Down
Theodore Dalrymple



My first contact with Islam was in Afghanistan. I had been through Iran overland to get there, but it was in the days of the Shah's White Revolution, which had given rights to women and had secularized society (with the aid of a little detention, without trial, and torture). In my naive, historicist way, I assumed that secularization was an irreversible process, like the breaking of eggs: that once people had seen the glory of life without compulsory obeisance to the men of God, they would never turn back to them as the sole guides to their lives and politics.

Afghanistan was different, quite clearly a pre-modern society. The vast, barren landscapes in the crystalline air were impossibly romantic, and the people (that is to say the men, for women were not much in evidence) had a wild dignity and nobility. Their mien was aristocratic. Even their hospitality was fierce. They carried more weapons in daily life than the average British commando in wartime. You knew that they would defend you to the death, if necessary--or cut your throat like a chicken's, if necessary. Honor among them was all.

On the whole I was favorably impressed. I thought that they were freer than we. I thought nothing of such matters as the clash of civilizations, and experienced no desire, and felt no duty, to redeem them from their way of life in the name of any of my own civilization's ideals. Impressed by the aesthetics of Afghanistan and unaware of any fundamental opposition or tension between the modern and the pre-modern, I saw no reason why the West and Afghanistan should not rub along pretty well together, each in its own little world, provided only that each respected the other.

I was with a group of students, and our appearance in the middle of a country then seldom visited was almost a national event. At any rate, we put on extracts of Romeo and Juliet in the desert, in which I had a small part, and the crown prince of Afghanistan (then still a kingdom) attended. He arrived in Afghanistan's one modern appurtenance: a silver convertible Mercedes sports car--I was much impressed by that. Little did I think then that lines from the play--those of Juliet's plea to her mother to abrogate an unwanted marriage to Paris, arranged and forced on her by her father, Capulet--would so uncannily capture the predicament of some of my Muslim patients in Britain more than a third of a century after my visit to Afghanistan, and four centuries after they were written:

Is there no pity sitting in the clouds
That sees into the bottom of my grief?
O sweet my mother, cast me not away!
Delay this marriage for a month, a week,
Or if you do not, make the bridal bed
In that dim monument where Tybalt lies.
How often have I been consulted by young Muslim women patients, driven to despair by enforced marriages to close relatives (usually first cousins) back "home" in India and Pakistan, who have made such an unavailing appeal to their mothers, followed by an attempt at suicide!

Capulet's attitude to his refractory daughter is precisely that of my Muslim patients' fathers:

Look to't, think on't, I do not use to jest.
Thursday is near, lay hand on heart, advise:
And you be mine, I'll give you to my friend;
And you be not, hang, beg, starve, die in the streets,
For by my soul, I'll ne'er acknowledge thee,
Nor what is mine shall ever do thee good.
In fact the situation of Muslim girls in my city is even worse than Juliet's. Every Muslim girl in my city has heard of the killing of such as she back in Pakistan, on refusal to marry her first cousin, betrothed to her by her father, all unknown to her, in the earliest years of her childhood. The girl is killed because she has impugned family honor by breaking her father's word, and any halfhearted official inquiry into the death by the Pakistani authorities is easily and cheaply bought off. And even if she is not killed, she is expelled from the household--O sweet my mother, cast me not away!--and regarded by her "community" as virtually a prostitute, fair game for any man who wants her.

This pattern of betrothal causes suffering as intense as any I know of. It has terrible consequences. One father prevented his daughter, highly intelligent and ambitious to be a journalist, from attending school, precisely to ensure her lack of Westernization and economic independence. He then took her, aged 16, to Pakistan for the traditional forced marriage (silence, or a lack of open objection, amounts to consent in these circumstances, according to Islamic law) to a first cousin whom she disliked from the first and who forced his attentions on her. Granted a visa to come to Britain, as if the marriage were a bona fide one--the British authorities having turned a cowardly blind eye to the real nature of such marriages in order to avoid the charge of racial discrimination--he was violent toward her.

She had two children in quick succession, both of whom were so severely handicapped that they would be bedridden for the rest of their short lives and would require nursing 24 hours a day. (For fear of giving offense, the press almost never alludes to the extremely high rate of genetic illnesses among the offspring of consanguineous marriages.) Her husband, deciding that the blame for the illnesses was entirely hers, and not wishing to devote himself to looking after such useless creatures, left her, divorcing her after Islamic custom. Her family ostracized her, having concluded that a woman whose husband had left her must have been to blame and was the next thing to a whore. She threw herself off a cliff, but was saved by a ledge.

I've heard a hundred variations of her emblematic story. Here, for once, are instances of unadulterated female victimhood, yet the silence of the feminists is deafening. Where two pieties--feminism and multiculturalism--come into conflict, the only way of preserving both is an indecent silence.

Certainly such experiences have moderated the historicism I took to Afghanistan--the naive belief that monotheistic religions have but a single, "natural," path of evolution, which they all eventually follow. By the time Christianity was Islam's present age, I might once have thought, it had still undergone no Reformation, the absence of which is sometimes offered as an explanation for Islam's intolerance and rigidity. Give it time, I would have said, and it will evolve, as Christianity has, to a private confession that acknowledges the legal supremacy of the secular state--at which point Islam will become one creed among many.

That Shakespeare's words express the despair that oppressed Muslim girls feel in a British city in the twenty-first century with much greater force, short of poisoning themselves, than that with which they can themselves express it, that Shakespeare evokes so vividly their fathers' sentiments as well (though condemning rather than endorsing them), suggests--does it not?--that such oppressive treatment of women is not historically unique to Islam, and that it is a stage that Muslims will leave behind. Islam will even outgrow its religious intolerance, as Christian Europe did so long ago, after centuries in which the Thirty Years' War, for example, resulted in the death of a third of Germany's population, or when Philip II of Spain averred, "I would rather sacrifice the lives of a hundred thousand people than cease my persecution of heretics."

My historicist optimism has waned. After all, I soon enough learned that the Shah's revolution from above was reversible--at least in the short term, that is to say the term in which we all live, and certainly long enough to ruin the only lives that contemporary Iranians have. Moreover, even if there were no relevant differences between Christianity and Islam as doctrines and civilizations in their ability to accommodate modernity, a vital difference in the historical situations of the two religions also tempers my historicist optimism. Devout Muslims can see (as Luther, Calvin, and others could not) the long-term consequences of the Reformation and its consequent secularism: a marginalization of the Word of God, except as an increasingly distant cultural echo--as the "melancholy, long, withdrawing roar" of the once full "Sea of faith," in Matthew Arnold's precisely diagnostic words.

And there is enough truth in the devout Muslim's criticism of the less attractive aspects of Western secular culture to lend plausibility to his call for a return to purity as the answer to the Muslim world's woes. He sees in the West's freedom nothing but promiscuity and license, which is certainly there; but he does not see in freedom, especially freedom of inquiry, a spiritual virtue as well as an ultimate source of strength. This narrow, beleaguered consciousness no doubt accounts for the strand of reactionary revolt in contemporary Islam. The devout Muslim fears, and not without good reason, that to give an inch is sooner or later to concede the whole territory.

This fear must be all the more acute among the large and growing Muslim population in cities like mine. Except for a small, highly educated middle class, who live de facto as if Islam were a private religious confession like any other in the West, the Muslims congregate in neighborhoods that they have made their own, where the life of the Punjab continues amid the architecture of the Industrial Revolution. The halal butcher's corner shop rubs shoulders with the terra-cotta municipal library, built by the Victorian city fathers to improve the cultural level of a largely vanished industrial working class.

The Muslim immigrants to these areas were not seeking a new way of life when they arrived; they expected to continue their old lives, but more prosperously. They neither anticipated, nor wanted, the inevitable cultural tensions of translocation, and they certainly never suspected that in the long run they could not maintain their culture and their religion intact. The older generation is only now realizing that even outward conformity to traditional codes of dress and behavior by the young is no longer a guarantee of inner acceptance (a perception that makes their vigilantism all the more pronounced and desperate). Recently I stood at the taxi stand outside my hospital, beside two young women in full black costume, with only a slit for the eyes. One said to the other, "Give us a light for a fag, love; I'm gasping." Release the social pressure on the girls, and they would abandon their costume in an instant.

Anyone who lives in a city like mine and interests himself in the fate of the world cannot help wondering whether, deeper than this immediate cultural desperation, there is anything intrinsic to Islam--beyond the devout Muslim's instinctive understanding that secularization, once it starts, is like an unstoppable chain reaction--that renders it unable to adapt itself comfortably to the modern world. Is there an essential element that condemns the Dar al-Islam to permanent backwardness with regard to the Dar al-Harb, a backwardness that is felt as a deep humiliation, and is exemplified, though not proved, by the fact that the whole of the Arab world, minus its oil, matters less to the rest of the world economically than the Nokia telephone company of Finland?

I think the answer is yes, and that the problem begins with Islam's failure to make a distinction between church and state. Unlike Christianity, which had to spend its first centuries developing institutions clandestinely and so from the outset clearly had to separate church from state, Islam was from its inception both church and state, one and indivisible, with no possible distinction between temporal and religious authority. Muhammad's power was seamlessly spiritual and secular (although the latter grew ultimately out of the former), and he bequeathed this model to his followers. Since he was, by Islamic definition, the last prophet of God upon earth, his was a political model whose perfection could not be challenged or questioned without the total abandonment of the pretensions of the entire religion.

But his model left Islam with two intractable problems. One was political. Muhammad unfortunately bequeathed no institutional arrangements by which his successors in the role of omnicompetent ruler could be chosen (and, of course, a schism occurred immediately after the Prophet's death, with some--today's Sunnites--following his father-in-law, and some--today's Shi'ites--his son-in-law). Compounding this difficulty, the legitimacy of temporal power could always be challenged by those who, citing Muhammad's spiritual role, claimed greater religious purity or authority; the fanatic in Islam is always at a moral advantage vis-?-vis the moderate. Moreover, Islam--in which the mosque is a meetinghouse, not an institutional church--has no established, anointed ecclesiastical hierarchy to decide such claims authoritatively. With political power constantly liable to challenge from the pious, or the allegedly pious, tyranny becomes the only guarantor of stability, and assassination the only means of reform. Hence the Saudi time bomb: sooner or later, religious revolt will depose a dynasty founded upon its supposed piety but long since corrupted by the ways of the world.

The second problem is intellectual. In the West, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, acting upon the space that had always existed, at least potentially, in Christianity between church and state, liberated individual men to think for themselves, and thus set in motion an unprecedented and still unstoppable material advancement. Islam, with no separate, secular sphere where inquiry could flourish free from the claims of religion, if only for technical purposes, was hopelessly left behind: as, several centuries later, it still is.

The indivisibility of any aspect of life from any other in Islam is a source of strength, but also of fragility and weakness, for individuals as well as for polities. Where all conduct, all custom, has a religious sanction and justification, any change is a threat to the whole system of belief. Certainty that their way of life is the right one thus coexists with fear that the whole edifice--intellectual and political--will come tumbling down if it is tampered with in any way. Intransigence is a defense against doubt and makes living on terms of true equality with others who do not share the creed impossible.

Not coincidentally, the punishment for apostasy in Islam is death: apostates are regarded as far worse than infidels, and punished far more rigorously. In every Islamic society, and indeed among Britain's Muslim immigrants, there are people who take this idea quite literally, as their rage against Salman Rushdie testified.

The Islamic doctrine of apostasy is hardly favorable to free inquiry or frank discussion, to say the least, and surely it explains why no Muslim, or former Muslim, in an Islamic society would dare to suggest that the Qu'ran was not divinely dictated through the mouth of the Prophet but rather was a compilation of a charismatic man's words made many years after his death, and incorporating, with no very great originality, Judaic, Christian, and Zoroastrian elements. In my experience, devout Muslims expect and demand a freedom to criticize, often with perspicacity, the doctrines and customs of others, while demanding an exaggerated degree of respect and freedom from criticism for their own doctrines and customs. I recall, for example, staying with a Pakistani Muslim in East Africa, a very decent and devout man, who nevertheless spent several evenings with me deriding the absurdities of Christianity: the paradoxes of the Trinity, the impossibility of Resurrection, and so forth. Though no Christian myself, had I replied in kind, alluding to the pagan absurdities of the pilgrimage to Mecca, or to the gross, ignorant, and primitive superstitions of the Prophet with regard to jinn, I doubt that our friendship would have lasted long.

The unassailable status of the Qu'ran in Islamic education, thought, and society is ultimately Islam's greatest disadvantage in the modern world. Such unassailability does not debar a society from great artistic achievement or charms of its own: great and marvelous civilizations have flourished without the slightest intellectual freedom. I myself prefer a souk to a supermarket any day, as a more human, if less economically efficient, institution. But until Muslims (or former Muslims, as they would then be) are free in their own countries to denounce the Qu'ran as an inferior hodgepodge of contradictory injunctions, without intellectual unity (whether it is so or not)--until they are free to say with Carlyle that the Qu'ran is "a wearisome confused jumble" with "endless iterations, longwindedness, entanglement"--until they are free to remake and modernize the Qu'ran by creative interpretation, they will have to reconcile themselves to being, if not helots, at least in the rearguard of humanity, as far as power and technical advance are concerned.

A piece of pulp fiction by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, first published in 1898, when followers of the charismatic fundamentalist leader Muhammad al-Mahdi tried to establish a theocracy in Sudan by revolting against Anglo-Egyptian control, makes precisely this point and captures the contradiction at the heart of contemporary Islam. Called The Tragedy of the Korosko, the book is the story of a small tourist party to Upper Egypt, who are kidnapped and held to ransom by some Mahdists, and then rescued by the Egyptian Camel Corps. (I hesitate, as a Francophile, to point out to American readers that there is a French character in the book, who, until he is himself captured by the Mahdists, believes that they are but a figment of the British imagination, to give perfidious Albion a pretext to interfere in Sudanese affairs.) A mullah among the Mahdists who capture the tourists attempts to convert the Europeans and Americans to Islam, deriding as unimportant and insignificant their technically superior civilization: " `As to the [scientific] learning of which you speak . . . ' said the Moolah . . . `I have myself studied at the University of Al Azhar at Cairo, and I know that to which you allude. But the learning of the faithful is not as the learning of the unbeliever, and it is not fitting that we pry too deeply into the ways of Allah. Some stars have tails . . . and some have not; but what does it profit us to know which are which? For God made them all, and they are very safe in His hands. Therefore . . . be not puffed up by the foolish learning of the West, and understand that there is only one wisdom, which consists in following the will of Allah as His chosen prophet has laid it down for us in this book.' "

This is by no means a despicable argument. One of the reasons that we can appreciate the art and literature of the past, and sometimes of the very distant past, is that the fundamental conditions of human existence remain the same, however much we advance in the technical sense: I have myself argued in these pages that human self-understanding, except in purely technical matters, reached its apogee with Shakespeare. In a sense, the mullah is right.

But if we made a fetish of Shakespeare (much richer and more profound than the Qu'ran, in my view), if we made him the sole object of our study and the sole guide of our lives, we would soon enough fall into backwardness and stagnation. And the problem is that so many Muslims want both stagnation and power: they want a return to the perfection of the seventh century and to dominate the twenty-first, as they believe is the birthright of their doctrine, the last testament of God to man. If they were content to exist in a seventh-century backwater, secure in a quietist philosophy, there would be no problem for them or us; their problem, and ours, is that they want the power that free inquiry confers, without either the free inquiry or the philosophy and institutions that guarantee that free inquiry. They are faced with a dilemma: either they abandon their cherished religion, or they remain forever in the rear of human technical advance. Neither alternative is very appealing; and the tension between their desire for power and success in the modern world on the one hand, and their desire not to abandon their religion on the other, is resolvable for some only by exploding themselves as bombs.

People grow angry when faced with an intractable dilemma; they lash out. Whenever I have described in print the cruelties my young Muslim patients endure, I receive angry replies: I am either denounced outright as a liar, or the writer acknowledges that such cruelties take place but are attributable to a local culture, in this case Punjabi, not to Islam, and that I am ignorant not to know it.

But Punjabi Sikhs also arrange marriages: they do not, however, force consanguineous marriages of the kind that take place from Madras to Morocco. Moreover--and not, I believe, coincidentally--Sikh immigrants from the Punjab, of no higher original social status than their Muslim confr?res from the same provinces, integrate far better into the local society once they have immigrated. Precisely because their religion is a more modest one, with fewer universalist pretensions, they find the duality of their new identity more easily navigable. On the 50th anniversary of Queen Elizabeth's reign, for example, the Sikh temples were festooned with perfectly genuine protestations of congratulations and loyalty. No such protestations on the part of Muslims would be thinkable.

But the anger of Muslims, their demand that their sensibilities should be accorded a more than normal respect, is a sign not of the strength but of the weakness--or rather, the brittleness--of Islam in the modern world, the desperation its adherents feel that it could so easily fall to pieces. The control that Islam has over its populations in an era of globalization reminds me of the hold that the Ceausescus appeared to have over the Rumanians: an absolute hold, until Ceausescu appeared one day on the balcony and was jeered by the crowd that had lost its fear. The game was over, as far as Ceausescu was concerned, even if there had been no preexisting conspiracy to oust him.

One sign of the increasing weakness of Islam's hold over its nominal adherents in Britain--of which militancy is itself but another sign--is the throng of young Muslim men in prison. They will soon overtake the young men of Jamaican origin in their numbers and in the extent of their criminality. By contrast, young Sikhs and Hindus are almost completely absent from prison, so racism is not the explanation for such Muslim overrepresentation.

Confounding expectations, these prisoners display no interest in Islam whatsoever; they are entirely secularized. True, they still adhere to Muslim marriage customs, but only for the obvious personal advantage of having a domestic slave at home. Many of them also dot the city with their concubines--sluttish white working-class girls or exploitable young Muslims who have fled forced marriages and do not know that their young men are married. This is not religion, but having one's cake and eating it.

The young Muslim men in prison do not pray; they do not demand halal meat. They do not read the Qu'ran. They do not ask to see the visiting imam. They wear no visible signs of piety: their main badge of allegiance is a gold front tooth, which proclaims them members of the city's criminal subculture--a badge (of honor, they think) that they share with young Jamaicans, though their relations with the Jamaicans are otherwise fraught with hostility. The young Muslim men want wives at home to cook and clean for them, concubines elsewhere, and drugs and rock `n' roll. As for Muslim proselytism in the prison--and Muslim literature has been insinuated into nooks and crannies there far more thoroughly than any Christian literature--it is directed mainly at the Jamaican prisoners. It answers their need for an excuse to go straight, while not at the same time surrendering to the morality of a society they believe has wronged them deeply. Indeed, conversion to Islam is their revenge upon that society, for they sense that their newfound religion is fundamentally opposed to it. By conversion, therefore, they kill two birds with one stone.

But Islam has no improving or inhibiting effect upon the behavior of my city's young Muslim men, who, in astonishing numbers, have taken to heroin, a habit almost unknown among their Sikh and Hindu contemporaries. The young Muslims not only take heroin but deal in it, and have adopted all the criminality attendant on the trade.

What I think these young Muslim prisoners demonstrate is that the rigidity of the traditional code by which their parents live, with its universalist pretensions and emphasis on outward conformity to them, is all or nothing; when it dissolves, it dissolves completely and leaves nothing in its place. The young Muslims then have little defense against the egotistical licentiousness they see about them and that they all too understandably take to be the summum bonum of Western life.

Observing this, of course, there are among Muslim youth a tiny minority who reject this absorption into the white lumpenproletariat and turn militant or fundamentalist. It is their perhaps natural, or at least understandable, reaction to the failure of our society, kowtowing to absurd and dishonest multiculturalist pieties, to induct them into the best of Western culture: into that spirit of free inquiry and personal freedom that has so transformed the life chances of every person in the world, whether he knows it or not.

Islam in the modern world is weak and brittle, not strong: that accounts for its so frequent shrillness. The Shah will, sooner or later, triumph over the Ayatollah in Iran, because human nature decrees it, though meanwhile millions of lives will have been ruined and impoverished. The Iranian refugees who have flooded into the West are fleeing Islam, not seeking to extend its dominion, as I know from speaking to many in my city. To be sure, fundamentalist Islam will be very dangerous for some time to come, and all of us, after all, live only in the short term; but ultimately the fate of the Church of England awaits it. Its melancholy, withdrawing roar may well (unlike that of the Church of England) be not just long but bloody, but withdraw it will. The fanatics and the bombers do not represent a resurgence of unreformed, fundamentalist Islam, but its death rattle.


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The Fruits of Appeasement
Victor Davis Hanson



Imagine a different November 4, 1979, in Teheran. Shortly after Iranian terrorists storm the American embassy and take some 90 American hostages, President Jimmy Carter announces that Islamic fundamentalism is not a legitimate response to the excess of the Shah but a new and dangerous fascism that threatens all that liberal society holds dear. And then he issues an ultimatum to Teheran's leaders: Release the captives or face a devastating military response.

When that demand is not met, instead of freezing Iran's assets, stopping the importation of its oil, or seeking support at the UN, Carter orders an immediate blockade of the country, followed by promises to bomb, first, all of its major military assets, and then its main government buildings and residences of its ruling mullocracy. The Ayatollah Khomeini may well have called his bluff; we may well have tragically lost the hostages (151 fewer American lives than the Iranian-backed Hezbollah would take four years later in a single day in Lebanon). And there may well have been the sort of chaos in Teheran that we now witness in Baghdad. But we would have seen it all in 1979--and not in 2001, after almost a quarter-century of continuous Middle East terrorism, culminating in the mass murder of 3,000 Americans and the leveling of the World Trade Center.

The twentieth century should have taught the citizens of liberal democracies the catastrophic consequences of placating tyrants. British and French restraint over the occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, the absorption of the Czech Sudetenland, and the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia did not win gratitude but rather Hitler's contempt for their weakness. Fifty million dead, the Holocaust, and the near destruction of European civilization were the wages of "appeasement"--a term that early-1930s liberals proudly embraced as far more enlightened than the old idea of "deterrence" and "military readiness."

So too did Western excuses for the Russians' violation of guarantees of free elections in postwar Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia only embolden the Soviet Union. What eventually contained Stalinism was the Truman Doctrine, NATO, and nuclear deterrence--not the United Nations--and what destroyed its legacy was Ronald Reagan's assertiveness, not Jimmy Carter's accommodation or Richard Nixon's d?tente.

As long ago as the fourth century b.c., Demosthenes warned how complacency and self-delusion among an affluent and free Athenian people allowed a Macedonian thug like Philip II to end some four centuries of Greek liberty--and in a mere 20 years of creeping aggrandizement down the Greek peninsula. Thereafter, these historical lessons should have been clear to citizens of any liberal society: we must neither presume that comfort and security are our birthrights and are guaranteed without constant sacrifice and vigilance, nor expect that peoples outside the purview of bourgeois liberalism share our commitment to reason, tolerance, and enlightened self-interest.

Most important, military deterrence and the willingness to use force against evil in its infancy usually end up, in the terrible arithmetic of war, saving more lives than they cost. All this can be a hard lesson to relearn each generation, especially now that we contend with the sirens of the mall, Oprah, and latte. Our affluence and leisure are as antithetical to the use of force as rural life and relative poverty once were catalysts for muscular action. The age-old lure of appeasement--perhaps they will cease with this latest concession, perhaps we provoked our enemies, perhaps demonstrations of our future good intentions will win their approval--was never more evident than in the recent Spanish elections, when an affluent European electorate, reeling from the horrific terrorist attack of 3/11, swept from power the pro-U.S. center-right government on the grounds that the mass murders were more the fault of the United States for dragging Spain into the effort to remove fascists and implant democracy in Iraq than of the primordial al-Qaidist culprits, who long ago promised the Western and Christian Iberians ruin for the Crusades and the Reconquista.

What went wrong with the West--and with the United States in particular--when not just the classical but especially the recent antecedents to September 11, from the Iranian hostage-taking to the attack on the USS Cole, were so clear? Though Americans in an election year, legitimately concerned about our war dead, may now be divided over the Iraqi occupation, polls nevertheless show a surprising consensus that the many precursors to the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings were acts of war, not police matters. Roll the tape backward from the USS Cole in 2000, through the bombing of the Khobar Towers and the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the destruction of the American embassy and annex in Beirut in 1983, the mass murder of 241 U.S. Marine peacekeepers asleep in their Lebanese barracks that same year, and assorted kidnappings and gruesome murders of American citizens and diplomats (including TWA Flight 800, Pan Am 103, William R. Higgins, Leon Klinghoffer, Robert Dean Stethem, and CIA operative William Francis Buckley), until we arrive at the Iranian hostage-taking of November 1979: that debacle is where we first saw the strange brew of Islamic fascism, autocracy, and Middle East state terrorism--and failed to grasp its menace, condemn it, and go to war against it.

That lapse, worth meditating upon in this 25th anniversary year of Khomeinism, then set the precedent that such aggression against the United States was better adjudicated as a matter of law than settled by war. Criminals were to be understood, not punished; and we, not our enemies, were at fault for our past behavior. Whether Carter's impotence sprang from his deep-seated moral distrust of using American power unilaterally or from real remorse over past American actions in the cold war or even from his innate pessimism about the military capability of the United States mattered little to the hostage takers in Teheran, who for some 444 days humiliated the United States through a variety of public demands for changes in U.S. foreign policy, the return of the exiled Shah, and reparations.

But if we know how we failed to respond in the last three decades, do we yet grasp why we were so afraid to act decisively at these earlier junctures, which might have stopped the chain of events that would lead to the al-Qaida terrorist acts of September 11? Our failure was never due to a lack of the necessary wealth or military resources, but rather to a deeply ingrained assumption that we should not retaliate--a hesitancy al-Qaida perceives and plays upon.

Along that sad succession of provocations, we can look back and see particularly critical turning points that reflected this now-institutionalized state policy of worrying more about what the enemy was going to do to us than we to him, to paraphrase Grant's dictum: not hammering back after the murder of the marines in Lebanon for fear of ending up like the Israelis in a Lebanese quagmire; not going to Baghdad in 1991 because of paranoia that the "coalition" would collapse and we would polarize the Arabs; pulling abruptly out of Somalia once pictures of American bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu were broadcast around the world; or turning down offers in 1995 from Sudan to place Usama bin Ladin into our custody, for fear that U.S. diplomats or citizens might be murdered abroad.

Throughout this tragic quarter-century of appeasement, our response usually consisted of a stern lecture by a Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, or Bill Clinton about "never giving in to terrorist blackmail" and "not negotiating with terrorists." Even Ronald Reagan's saber-rattling "You can run but not hide" did not preclude trading arms to the Iranian terrorists or abruptly abandoning Lebanon after the horrific Hezbollah attack.

Sometimes a half-baked failed rescue mission, or a battleship salvo, cruise missile, or air strike followed--but always accompanied by a weeklong debate by conservatives over "exit strategies" and "mission creep," while liberals fretted about "consultations with our allies and the United Nations." And remember: these pathetic military responses were the hawkish actions that earned us the resignation of a furious Cyrus Vance, the abrogation of overflight rights by concerned "allies" such as France, and a national debate about what we did to cause such animosity in the first place.

Our enemies and Middle Eastern "friends" alike sneered at our self-flagellation. In 1991, at great risk, the United States freed Kuwait from Iraq and ended its status as the 19th satrapy of Saddam Hussein--only to watch the restored kingdom ethnically cleanse over a third of a million Palestinians. But after the murder of 3,000 Americans in 2001, Kuwaitis, in a February 2002 Gallup poll (and while they lobbied OPEC to reduce output and jack up prices), revealed an overwhelming distaste for Americans--indeed the highest levels of anti-Americanism in the Arab world. And these ethnic cleansers of Palestinians cited America's purportedly unfair treatment of the Palestinians (recipients of accumulated billions in American aid) as a prime cause of their dislike of us.

In the face of such visceral anti-Americanism, the problem may not be real differences over the West Bank, much less that "we are not getting the message out"; rather, in the decade since 1991 the Middle East saw us as a great power that neither could nor would use its strength to advance its ideas--that lacked even the intellectual confidence to argue for our civilization before the likes of a tenth-century monarchy. The autocratic Arab world neither respects nor fears a democratic United States, because it rightly senses that we often talk in principled terms but rarely are willing to invest the time, blood, and treasure to match such rhetoric with concrete action. That's why it is crucial for us to stay in Iraq to finish the reconstruction and cement the achievement of our three-week victory over Saddam.

It is easy to cite post-Vietnam guilt and shame as the likely culprit for our paralysis. After all, Jimmy Carter came in when memories of capsizing boat people and of American helicopters lifting swarms of panicked diplomats off the roof of the Saigon embassy were fresh. In 1980, he exited in greater shame: his effusive protestations that Soviet communism wasn't something to fear all that much won him the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, while his heralded "human rights" campaign was answered by the Ortegas in Nicaragua and the creation of a murderous theocracy in Iran. Yet perhaps President Carter was not taking the American people anywhere they didn't want to go. After over a decade of prior social unrest and national humiliation in Vietnam, many Americans believed that the United States either could not or should not do much about things beyond its shores.

As time wore on and the nightmare of Vietnam began to fade, fear of the Soviet Union kept us from crushing the terrorists who killed our diplomats and blew up our citizens. These were no idle fears, given the Russians' record of butchering 30 million of their own, stationing 300 divisions on Europe's borders, and pointing 7,000 nukes at the United States. And fear of their malevolence made eminent sense in the volatile Middle East, where the Russians made direct threats to the Israelis in both the 1967 and 1973 wars, when the Syrian, Egyptian, and Iraqi militaries--trained, supplied, and advised by Russians--were on the verge of annihilation. Russian support for Nasser's Pan-Arabism and for Baathism in Iraq and Syria rightly worried cold warriors, who sensed that the Soviets had their geopolitical eyes on Middle East oil and a stranglehold over Persian Gulf commerce.

Indeed, these twin pillars of the old American Middle East policy--worry over oil and fear of communists--reigned for nearly half a century, between 1945 and 1991. Such realism, however understandable, was counterproductive in the long run, since our tacit support for odious anti-communist governments in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and North Africa did not address the failure of such autocracies to provide prosperity and hope for exploding populations of increasingly poor and angry citizens. We kept Russians out of the oil fields and ensured safe exports of petroleum to Europe, Japan, and the United States--but at what proved to be the steep price of allowing awful regimes to deflect popular discontent against us.

Nor was realpolitik always effective. Such illegitimate Arab regimes as the Saudi royal family initiated several oil embargoes, after all. And meanwhile, such a policy did not deter the Soviets from busily selling high-tech weaponry to Libya, Syria, and Iraq, while the KGB helped to train and fund almost every Arab terrorist group. And indeed, immediately after the 1991 Iraqi takeover of Kuwait, U.S. intelligence officers discovered that Soviet-trained Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas, and Abu Ibrahim had flocked to Baghdad on the invitation of the Baathist Saddam Hussein: though the Soviet Union did not interrupt Western petroleum commerce, its well-supplied surrogates did their fair share of murdering.

Neither thirst for petroleum nor fear of communists, then, adequately explains our inaction for most of the tumultuous late 1980s and 1990s, when groups like Hezbollah and al-Qaida came on to the world scene. Gorbachev's tottering empire had little inclination to object too strenuously when the United States hit Libya in 1986, recall, and thanks to the growing diversity and fungibility of the global oil supply, we haven't had a full-fledged Arab embargo since 1979.

Instead, the primary cause for our surprising indifference to the events leading up to September 11 lies within ourselves. Westerners always have had a propensity for complacency because of our wealth and freedom; and Americans in particular have enjoyed a comfortable isolation in being separated from the rest of the world by two oceans. Yet during the last four presidential administrations, laxity about danger on the horizon seems to have become more ingrained than in the days when a more robust United States sought to thwart communist intrusion into Arabia, Asia, and Africa.

Americans never viewed terrorist outlaw states with the suspicion they once had toward Soviet communism; they put little pressure on their leaders to crack down on Middle Eastern autocracy and theocracy as a threat to security. At first this indifference was understandable, given the stealthy nature of our enemies and the post-cold war relief that, having toppled the Soviet Union and freed millions in Eastern Europe, we might be at the end of history. Even the bloodcurdling anti-American shouts from the Beirut street did not seem as scary as a procession of intercontinental missiles and tanks on an average May Day parade in Moscow.

Hezbollah, al-Qaida, and the PLO were more like fleas on a sleeping dog: bothersome rather than lethal; to be flicked away occasionally rather than systematically eradicated. Few paid attention to Usama bin Ladin's infamous February 1998 fatwa: "The rule to kill Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is a sacred duty for any Muslim." Those who noticed thought it just impotent craziness, akin to Sartre's fatuous quip during the Vietnam War that he wished for a nuclear strike against the United States to end its imperial aspirations. No one thought that a raving maniac in an Afghan cave could kill more Americans in a single day than the planes of the Japanese imperial fleet off Pearl Harbor.

But still, how did things as odious to liberal sensibilities as Pan-Arabism, Islamic fundamentalism, and Middle Eastern dictatorship--which squashed dissent, mocked religious tolerance, and treated women as chattel--become reinvented into "alternate discourses" deserving a sympathetic pass from the righteous anger of the United States when Americans were murdered overseas? Was it that spokesmen for terrorist regimes mimicked the American Left--in everything from dress, vocabulary, and appearances on the lecture circuit--and so packaged their extremism in a manner palatable to Americans? Why, after all, were Americans patient with remonstrations from University of Virginia alumna Hanan Ashrawi, rather than asking precisely how such a wealthy Christian PLO apparatchik really felt about the Palestinian Authority's endemic corruption, the spendthrift Parisian Mrs. Arafat, the terrorists around Arafat himself, the spate of "honor killings" of women in the West Bank, the censorship of the Palestinian press, suicide murdering by Arafat affiliates, and the lynching of suspects by Palestinian police?

Rather than springing from realpolitik, sloth, or fear of oil cutoffs, much of our appeasement of Middle Eastern terrorists derived from a new sort of anti-Americanism that thrived in the growing therapeutic society of the 1980s and 1990s. Though the abrupt collapse of communism was a dilemma for the Left, it opened as many doors as it shut. To be sure, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, few Marxists could argue for a state-controlled economy or mouth the old romance about a workers' paradise--not with scenes of East German families crammed into smoking clunkers lumbering over potholed roads, like American pioneers of old on their way west. But if the creed of the socialist republics was impossible to take seriously in either economic or political terms, such a collapse of doctrinaire statism did not discredit the gospel of forced egalitarianism and resentment against prosperous capitalists. Far from it.

If Marx receded from economics departments, his spirit reemerged among our intelligentsia in the novel guises of post-structuralism, new historicism, multiculturalism, and all the other dogmas whose fundamental tenet was that white male capitalists had systematically oppressed women, minorities, and Third World people in countless insidious ways. The font of that collective oppression, both at home and abroad, was the rich, corporate, Republican, and white United States.

The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced these newer post-colonial and liberation fields of study by immunizing their promulgators from charges of fellow-traveling or being dupes of Russian expansionism. Communism's demise likewise freed these trendy ideologies from having to offer some wooden, unworkable Marxist alternative to the West; thus they could happily remain entirely critical, sarcastic, and cynical without any obligation to suggest something better, as witness the nihilist signs at recent protest marches proclaiming: "I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas."

From writers like Arundhati Roy and Michel Foucault (who anointed Khomeini "a kind of mystic saint" who would usher in a new "political spirituality" that would "transfigure" the world) and from old standbys like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre ("to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time"), there filtered down a vague notion that the United States and the West in general were responsible for Third World misery in ways that transcended the dull old class struggle. Endemic racism and the legacy of colonialism, the oppressive multinational corporation and the humiliation and erosion of indigenous culture brought on by globalization and a smug, self-important cultural condescension--all this and more explained poverty and despair, whether in Damascus, Teheran, or Beirut.

There was victim status for everybody, from gender, race, and class at home to colonialism, imperialism, and hegemony abroad. Anyone could play in these "area studies" that cobbled together the barrio, the West Bank, and the "freedom fighter" into some sloppy global union of the oppressed--a far hipper enterprise than rehashing Das Kapital or listening to a six-hour harangue from Fidel.

Of course, pampered Western intellectuals since Diderot have always dreamed up a "noble savage," who lived in harmony with nature precisely because of his distance from the corruption of Western civilization. But now this fuzzy romanticism had an updated, political edge: the bearded killer and wild-eyed savage were not merely better than we because they lived apart in a pre-modern landscape. No: they had a right to strike back and kill modernizing Westerners who had intruded into and disrupted their better world--whether Jews on Temple Mount, women in Westernized dress in Teheran, Christian missionaries in Kabul, capitalist profiteers in Islamabad, whiskey-drinking oilmen in Riyadh, or miniskirted tourists in Cairo.

An Ayatollah Khomeini who turned back the clock on female emancipation in Iran, who murdered non-Muslims, and who refashioned Iranian state policy to hunt down, torture, and kill liberals nevertheless seemed to liberal Western eyes as preferable to the Shah--a Western-supported anti-communist, after all, who was engaged in the messy, often corrupt task of bringing Iran from the tenth to the twentieth century, down the arduous, dangerous path that, as in Taiwan or South Korea, might eventually lead to a consensual, capitalist society like our own.

Yet in the new world of utopian multiculturalism and knee-jerk anti-Americanism, in which a Noam Chomsky could proclaim Khomeini's gulag to be "independent nationalism," reasoned argument was futile. Indeed, how could critical debate arise for those "committed to social change," when no universal standards were to be applied to those outside the West? Thanks to the doctrine of cultural relativism, "oppressed" peoples either could not be judged by our biased and "constructed" values ("false universals," in Edward Said's infamous term) or were seen as more pristine than ourselves, uncorrupted by the evils of Western capitalism.

Who were we to gainsay Khomeini's butchery and oppression? We had no way of understanding the nuances of his new liberationist and "nationalist" Islam. Now back in the hands of indigenous peoples, Iran might offer the world an alternate path, a different "discourse" about how to organize a society that emphasized native values (of some sort) over mere profit.

So at precisely the time of these increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, the silly gospel of multiculturalism insisted that Westerners have neither earned the right to censure others, nor do they possess the intellectual tools to make judgments about the relative value of different cultures. And if the initial wave of multiculturalist relativism among the elites--coupled with the age-old romantic forbearance for Third World roguery--explained tolerance for early unpunished attacks on Americans, its spread to our popular culture only encouraged more.

This nonjudgmentalism--essentially a form of nihilism--deemed everything from Sudanese female circumcision to honor killings on the West Bank merely "different" rather than odious. Anyone who has taught freshmen at a state university can sense the fuzzy thinking of our undergraduates: most come to us prepped in high schools not to make "value judgments" about "other" peoples who are often "victims" of American "oppression." Thus, before female-hating psychopath Mohamed Atta piloted a jet into the World Trade Center, neither Western intellectuals nor their students would have taken him to task for what he said or condemned him as hypocritical for his parasitical existence on Western society. Instead, without logic but with plenty of romance, they would more likely have excused him as a victim of globalization or of the biases of American foreign policy. They would have deconstructed Atta's promotion of anti-Semitic, misogynist, Western-hating thought, as well as his conspiracies with Third World criminals, as anything but a danger and a pathology to be remedied by deportation or incarceration.

It was not for nothing that on November 17, 1979--less than two weeks after the militants stormed the American embassy in Teheran--the Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the release of 13 female and black hostages, singling them out as part of the brotherhood of those oppressed by the United States and cloaking his ongoing slaughter of Iranian opponents and attacks on United States sovereignty in a self-righteous anti-Americanism. Twenty-five years later, during the anti-war protests of last spring, a group called "Act Now to Stop War and End Racism" sang the same foolish chorus in its call for demonstrations: "Members of the Muslim Community, Antiwar Activists, Latin-American Solidarity Groups and People From All Over the United States Unite to Say: `We Are All Palestinians!' "

The new cult of romantic victimhood became gospel in most Middle East departments in American universities. Except for the courageous Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, and Fouad Ajami, few scholars offered any analysis that might confirm more astute Americans in their vague sense that in the Middle East, political autocracy, statism, tribalism, anti-intellectualism, and gender apartheid accounted for poverty and failure. And if few wished to take on Islamofascism in the 1990s--indeed, Steven Emerson's chilling 1994 documentary Jihad in America set off a storm of protest from U.S. Muslim-rights groups and prompted death threats to the producer--almost no one but Samuel Huntington dared even to broach the taboo subject that there might be elements within doctrinaire Islam itself that could easily lead to intolerance and violence and were therefore at the root of any "clash of civilizations."

Instead, most experts explained why violent fanatics might have some half-legitimate grievance behind their deadly harvest each year of a few Americans in the wrong place at the wrong time. These experts cautioned that, instead of bombing and shooting killers abroad who otherwise would eventually reach us at home, Americans should take care not to disturb Iranian terrorists during Ramadan--rather than to remember that Muslims attacked Israel precisely during that holy period. Instead of condemning Wahhabis for the fascists that they were, we were instead apprised that such holy men of the desert and tent provided a rapidly changing and often Western-corrupted Saudi Arabia with a vital tether to the stability of its romantic nomadic past. Rather than recognizing that Yasser Arafat's Tunisia-based Fatah organization was a crime syndicate, expert opinion persuaded us to empower it as an indigenous liberation movement on the West Bank--only to destroy nearly two decades' worth of steady Palestinian economic improvement.

Neither oil-concerned Republicans nor multicultural Democrats were ready to expose the corrupt American relationship with Saudi Arabia. No country is more culpable than that kingdom in funding extremist madrassas and subsidizing terror, or more antithetical to liberal American values from free speech to religious tolerance. But Saudi propagandists learned from the Palestinians the value of constructing their own victimhood as a long-oppressed colonial people. Call a Saudi fundamentalist mullah a fascist, and you can be sure you'll be tarred as an Islamophobe.

Even when Middle Easterners regularly blew us up, the Clinton administration, unwilling to challenge the new myth of Muslim victimhood, transformed Middle Eastern terrorists bent on destroying America into wayward individual criminals who did not spring from a pathological culture. Thus, Clinton treated the first World Trade Center bombing as only a criminal justice matter--which of course allowed the United States to avoid confronting the issue and taking on the messy and increasingly unpopular business the Bush administration has been engaged in since September 11. Clinton dispatched FBI agents, not soldiers, to Yemen and Saudi Arabia after the attacks on the USS Cole and the Khobar Towers. Yasser Arafat, responsible in the 1970s for the murder of a U.S. diplomat in the Sudan, turned out to be the most frequent foreign visitor to the Clinton Oval Office.

If the Clintonian brand of appeasement reflected both a deep-seated tolerance for Middle Eastern extremism and a reluctance to wake comfortable Americans up to the danger of a looming war, he was not the only one naive about the threat of Islamic fascism. Especially culpable was the Democratic Party at large, whose post-Vietnam foreign policy could not sanction the use of American armed force to protect national interests but only to accomplish purely humanitarian ends as in the interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia.

Indeed, the recent Democratic primaries reveal just how far this disturbing trend has evolved: the foreign-policy positions of John Kerry and Howard Dean on Iraq and the Middle East were far closer to those of extremists like Al Sharpton and Dennis Kucinich than to current American policy under George W. Bush. Indeed, buffoons or conspiracy theorists like Noam Chomsky, Michael Moore, and Al Franken often turned up on the same stage as would-be presidents. When Moore, while endorsing Wesley Clark, called an American president at a time of war a "deserter," when the mendacious Sharpton lectured his smiling fellow candidates on the Bush administration's "lies" about Iraq, and when Al Gore labeled the president's action in Iraq a "betrayal" of America, the surrender of the mainstream Democrats to the sirens of extremism was complete. Again, past decorum and moderation go out the window when the pretext is saving indigenous peoples from American oppression.

The consensus for appeasement that led to September 11, albeit suppressed for nearly two years by outrage over the murder of 3,000, has reemerged in criticism over the ongoing reconstruction of Iraq and George Bush's prosecution of the War on Terror.

The tired voices that predicted a litany of horrors in October 2001--the impassable peaks of Afghanistan, millions of refugees, endemic starvation, revolution in the Arab street, and violations of Ramadan--now complain, incorrectly, that 150,000 looted art treasures were the cost of guarding the Iraqi oil ministry, that Halliburton pipelines and refineries were the sole reason to remove Saddam Hussein, and that Christian fundamentalists and fifth-columnist neoconservatives have fomented a senseless revenge plot against Muslims and Arabs. Whether they complained before March 2003 that America faced death and ruin against Saddam's Republican Guard, or two months later that in bullying fashion we had walked over a suddenly impotent enemy, or three months later still that, through incompetence, we were taking casualties and failing to get the power back on, leftist critics' only constant was their predictable dislike of America.

Military historians might argue that, given the enormity of our task in Iraq--liberating 26 million from a tyrant and implanting democracy in the region--the tragic loss of more than 500 Americans in a year's war and peace was a remarkable sign of our care and expertise in minimizing deaths. Diplomats might argue that our past efforts at humanitarian reconstruction, with some idealistic commitment to consensual government, have a far better track record in Germany, Japan, Korea, Panama, and Serbia than our strategy of exiting Germany after World War I, of leaving Iraq to Saddam after 1991, of abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban once the Russians were stopped, of skipping out from Haiti or of fleeing Somalia. Realist students of arms control might argue that the recent confessions of Pakistan's nuclear roguery, the surrender of the Libyan arsenal, and the invitation of the UN inspectors into Iran were the dividends of resolute American action in Iraq. Colonel Khadafy surely came clean not because of Jimmy Carter's peace missions, UN resolutions, or EU diplomats.

But don't expect any sober discussion of these contentions from the Left. Their gloom and doom about Iraq arises precisely from the anti-Americanism and romanticization of the Third World that once led to our appeasement and now seeks its return. When John Kerry talks of mysterious prominent Europeans he has met (but whose names he will not divulge) who, he says, pray for his election in hopes of ending George Bush's Iraqi nightmare, perhaps he has in mind people like the Chamberlainesque European Commission president Romano Prodi, who said in the wake of the recent mass murder in Spain: "Clearly, the conflict with the terrorists is not resolved with force alone." Perhaps he has in mind, also, the Spanish electorate, which believes it can find security from al-Qaida terrorism by refuting all its past support for America's role in the Middle East. But of course if the terrorists understand that, in lieu of resolve, they will find such appeasement a mere 48 hours after a terrorist attack, then all previously resolute Western democracies--Italy, Poland, Britain, and the United States--should expect the terrorists to murder their citizens on the election eve in hopes of achieving just such a Spanish-style capitulation.

In contrast, George W. Bush, impervious to such self-deception, has, in a mere two and a half years, reversed the perilous course of a quarter-century. Since September 11, he has removed the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, begun to challenge the Middle East through support for consensual government, isolated Yasser Arafat, pressured the Europeans on everything from anti-Semitism to their largesse to Hamas, removed American troops from Saudi Arabia, shut down fascistic Islamic "charities," scattered al-Qaida, turned Pakistan from a de facto foe to a scrutinized neutral, rounded up terrorists in the United States, pressured Libya, Iran, and Pakistan to come clean on clandestine nuclear cheating, so far avoided another September 11--and promises that he is not nearly done yet. If the Spanish example presages further terrorist attacks on European democracies at election time, at least Mr. Bush has made it clear that America--alone if need be--will neither appease nor ignore such killers but in fact finish the terrible war that they started.

As Jimmy Carter also proved in November 1979, one man really can make a difference.

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