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BULLETIN
Wednesday, 21 April 2004

>> UN SCANDAL ...NO SACRED COWS!

Monumental Rip-Off?
Allegations of Widespread Corruption Involve Saddam Hussein, U.N. Senior Officials
By Brian Ross
ABCNEWS.com
April 20-- At least three senior United Nations officials are suspected of taking multimillion-dollar bribes from the Saddam Hussein regime, U.S. and European intelligence sources tell ABCNEWS.


One year after his fall, U.S. officials say they have evidence, some in cash, that Saddam diverted to his personal bank accounts approximately $5 billion from the United Nations Oil-for-Food program.
In what has been described as the largest humanitarian aid effort ever undertaken, the U.N. Oil-for-Food program began in 1996 to help Iraqis who were suffering under sanctions imposed following the first Gulf War.

The program allowed Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil, under supposedly tight U.N. supervision, to finance the purchase of much-needed humanitarian goods.

Most prominent among those accused in the scandal is Benon Sevan, the Cyprus-born U.N. undersecretary general who ran the program for six years.

In an interview with ABCNEWS last year, Sevan denied any wrongdoing.

"Well, I can tell you there have been no allegations about me," he said. "Maybe you can try to dig it out." And in a Feb. 10 statement, Sevan challenged those making the allegations to "come forward and provide the necessary documentary evidence" and present it to U.N. investigators.

But documents have surfaced in Baghdad, in the files of the former Iraqi Oil Ministry, allegedly linking Sevan to a pay-off scheme in which some 270 prominent foreign officials received the right to trade in Iraqi oil at cut-rate prices.

"It's almost like having coupons of bonds or shares. You can sell those coupons to other people who are normal oil traders," said Claude Hankes-Drielsma, a British adviser to the Iraq Governing Council.

Investigators say the smoking gun is a letter to former Iraqi oil minister Amer Mohammed Rasheed, obtained by ABCNEWS and not yet in the hands of the United Nations.

In the letter, dated Aug. 10, 1998, an Iraqi oil executive mentions a request by a Panama-based company, African Middle East Petroleum Co., to buy Iraqi oil -- along with a suggestion that Sevan had a role in the deal. "Mr. Muwafaq Ayoub of the Iraqi mission in New York informed us by telephone that the abovementioned company is the company that Mr. Sevan cited to you during his last trip to Baghdad," the executive wrote in Arabic.

A handwritten note indicated that permission for the oil purchase was granted by "the Vice President of the Republic" on Aug. 15, 1998.

The second page of the letter contains a table titled "Quantity of Oil Allocated and Given to Mr. Benon Sevan." The table lists a total of 7.3 million barrels of oil as the "quantity executed" -- an amount that, if true, would have generated an illegal profit of as much as $3.5 million.

"Somebody who is running the Oil-for-Food program for the United Nations should not be receiving any benefit of any kind from a rogue dictator who was perpetuating terror in his country," said Hankes-Drielsma.

Full Investigation Announced

The United Nations, at first, dismissed the allegations about Sevan, but this week, Secretary General Kofi Annan said there would be a full investigation led by the former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, Paul Volcker.

"We are going to investigate these allegations very seriously," Annan said during a press conference.

In addition, Congress is scheduled to begin hearings into the bribery scandal this week.

As for Sevan, when news of the scandal first broke earlier this year, he took a long vacation to Australia.

He declined to answer questions when ABCNEWS found him last week staying at a luxury casino resort.

A U.N. spokesman says Sevan, who makes $186,000 a year, has submitted his retirement papers, effective May 21. The spokesman said Sevan would remain on full salary through the course of the U.N. investigation, which is expected to last at least three months.

Oil Contracts for Political Support

The inquiries into the United Nations Oil-for-Food program result from the release in January of a list of 270 individuals, companies and institutions that allegedly received lucrative oil contracts from Saddam Hussein's former regime in return for political support.

The list was published by an Iraqi independent newspaper which claimed the document was discovered in the files of the former Iraqi Oil Ministry in Baghdad.

Oil vouchers were allegedly given either as gifts or as payment for goods imported into Iraq in violation of the U.N. sanctions.

The following are the names of some of those listed as receiving Iraqi oil contracts (amounts are in millions of barrels of oil):

Russia
The Companies of the Russian Communist Party: 137 million
The Companies of the Liberal Democratic Party: 79.8 million
The Russian Committee for Solidarity with Iraq: 6.5 million and 12.5 million (two separate contracts)
Head of the Russian Presidential Cabinet: 90 million
The Russian Orthodox Church: 5 million


France
Charles Pasqua, former minister of interior: 12 million
Trafigura (Patrick Maugein), businessman: 25 million
Ibex: 47.2 million
Bernard Merimee, former French ambassador to the United Nations: 3 million
Michel Grimard, founder of the French-Iraqi Export Club: 17.1 million


Syria
Firas Mostafa Tlass, son of Syria's defense minister: 6 million

Turkey
Zeynel Abidin Erdem: more than 27 million
Lotfy Doghan: more than 11 million

Indonesia
Megawati Sukarnoputri: 11 million

Spain
Ali Ballout, Lebanese journalist: 8.8 million

Yugoslavia
The Socialist Party: 22 million
Kostunica's Party: 6 million

Canada
Arthur Millholland, president and CEO of Oilexco: 9.5 million

Italy
Father Benjamin, a French Catholic priest who arranged a meeting between the pope and Tariq Aziz: 4.5 million
Roberto Frimigoni: 24.5 million

United States
Samir Vincent: 7 million
Shakir Alkhalaji: 10.5 million

United Kingdom
George Galloway, member of Parliament: 19 million
Mujaheddin Khalq: 36.5 million

South Africa
Tokyo Saxwale: 4 million

Jordan
Shaker bin Zaid: 6.5 million
The Jordanian Ministry of Energy: 5 million
Fawaz Zureikat: 6 million
Toujan Al Faisal, former member of Parliament: 3 million

Lebanon
The son of President Lahoud: 5.5 million

Egypt
Khaled Abdel Nasser: 16.5 million
Emad Al Galda, businessman and Parliament member: 14 million

Palestinian Territories
The Palestinian Liberation Organization: 4 million
Abu Al Abbas: 11.5 million

Qatar
Hamad bin Ali Al Thany: 14 million

Libya
Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem: 1 million

Chad
Foreign minister of Chad: 3 million

Brazil
The October 8th Movement: 4.5 million

Myanmar (Burma)
The minister of the Forests of Myanmar: 5 million

Ukraine
The Social Democratic Party: 8.5 million
The Communist Party: 6 million
The Socialist Party: 2 million
The FTD oil company: 2 million

-----------------------------------------------

On Kerry's Honor
The symbols of service should mean something.

By Kate O'Beirne

"I've had thorns from a rose that were worse," says Grant Hibbard, John Kerry's former commanding officer about the wound the senator received on December 2, 1968, that earned him his first Purple Heart award. Earlier this month, the Boston Globe reported that Hibbard is among the Vietnam veterans who are questioning the awards that sent John Kerry home early from Vietnam. The controversy prompted Tim Russert to ask Kerry this past Sunday whether he would release all of his military records, including medical records and his officer evaluations. Kerry assured Russert that they're already publicly available at his headquarters. But they're not. And the tragic suicide of the Navy's Admiral Mike Boorda in 1996 is a reminder of why the media should be clamoring for their release.

The Boston Globe took Kerry at his word and headed to his campaign office to look at the records the senator claimed would be available, only to be told nothing further would be released. "All" of the military records Russert asked about would not be made available after all, including the medical records from his second and third purple hearts, and his officer evaluations. The newspaper recalled that the White House released 300 pages of documents on President Bush's National Guard service earlier this year.

In a press release this week, Tour of Duty author Douglas Brinkley announced that he thinks questions about whether Kerry legitimately earned those Purple Hearts are unseemly. Allowing that maybe he is "na?ve, or too pro-veteran," Brinkley declares: "Only somebody craven -- or with a political agenda -- could stoop so low." But, it's veterans who are raising questions. The ribbons we civilians admire as colorful adornments represent far more to veterans. Admiral Boorda recognized the importance of an award's integrity to men in uniform.

In 1996, a left-wing news service raised questions about two small "V" clips that the chief of Naval operations wore over two of the medals on his chest full of them. The clips are awarded for valor under fire, and there was some doubt about whether Boorda's two tours in Vietnam aboard combat ships qualified him for the awards, although the Washington Post reported that a 1965 Navy manual appeared to support Boorda's right to wear the clips. Unlike Kerry, the awards did not provide grounds for Boorda to shorten his tours of duty.

Hours before he was scheduled to meet with Newsweek reporters to discuss the controversy, the admiral went to his home at the Navy Yard and shot himself in the chest. The CNO had been in command of the Navy during a troubled period and his leadership was being criticized by its senior officers. Still, among the notes he left was one to "the sailors" expressing his fear that the controversy over his decorations might harm the Navy. Boorda had lied about his age to join the Navy and was the first CNO to rise through the enlisted ranks.

Evan Thomas, then Newsweek's Washington bureau chief who was scheduled to interview the Admiral, explained that he was devastated by his death, but defended his magazine's pursuit of the combat award story. "We've got to do our job," he said. "Part of that job is checking on the truthfulness of people in positions of power. Like the admiral." And, like a prospective president. So far, Newsweek has ignored the controversy over John Kerry's awards.

It might well be that the release of all of Kerry's military records would refute the criticisms of some of those who served with him. But, in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, craven or partisan motives shouldn't be attributed to Vietnam veterans who honor the symbols of honorable service.

http://www.nationalreview.com/kob/kob200404210833.asp


Posted by maximpost at 11:09 PM EDT
Permalink



>> THE WOODWARD BOOK RIPPLES...

M. Powell avait mis en garde M. Bush contre une invasion de l'Irak
LE MONDE | 19.04.04 | 13h31 * MIS A JOUR LE 19.04.04 | 16h07
Un livre raconte le m?canisme de la marche ? la guerre et les conflits internes qui l'ont accompagn?e.
Washington de notre correspondant
Un nouveau livre de Bob Woodward raconte, vus de l'int?rieur de l'?quipe dirigeante am?ricaine, les ?v?nements qui ont abouti au d?clenchement de la guerre d'Irak, le 19 mars 2003. Le m?canisme de la marche ? la guerre et les conflits internes qui l'ont accompagn?e sont expos?s pour la premi?re fois de fa?on aussi compl?te, si l'on en juge par les "bonnes feuilles" que le Washington Post a commenc? ? publier, dimanche 18 avril.
Enqu?teur vedette du Washington Post depuis le scandale du Watergate, il y a trente ans, Woodward avait d?j? b?n?fici? d'un acc?s sans ?gal aux acteurs et aux documents de la Maison Blanche pour son livre pr?c?dent, Bush at War (Bush s'en va-t-en guerre, ?ditions Deno?l), qui portait sur les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 et sur leurs suites. Pour Plan of Attack("Le Plan d'attaque", ?dit? chez Simon & Schuster), il a pu interroger 75 responsables de l'administration Bush, mais seuls les propos du pr?sident lui-m?me, avec lequel il a eu trois heures et demie d'entretiens au total, sont rapport?s au style direct.
Woodward raconte que, le 21 novembre 2002, George Bush a demand? au secr?taire ? la d?fense, Donald Rumsfeld, de mettre en route la pr?paration de plans pour une op?ration en Irak. La guerre n'?tait pas termin?e, alors, en Afghanistan. Le pr?sident am?ricain a donn? consigne ? M. Rumsfeld de faire en sorte que ces pr?paratifs se fassent en secret. Il s'en explique en disant que s'ils avaient ?t? rendus publics, ces plans auraient provoqu? "une angoisse internationale et une sp?culation int?rieure ?normes".
Cinq semaines plus tard, le 28 d?cembre, quand M. Bush a re?u, dans son ranch de Crawford, le g?n?ral Tonny Franks, chef du Commandement central, l'?tat-major comp?tent pour cette partie du monde, l'entretien a port? enti?rement sur l'Irak, mais ils ont affirm? ? la presse qu'ils avaient parl? de l'Afghanistan.
Lors de sa tourn?e en Europe et en Russie, fin mai 2002, le pr?sident am?ricain a d?clar? qu'il n'avait "pas de plans sur -son- bureau" pour agir militairement contre Saddam Hussein, alors que l'?tat-major y travaillait depuis six mois. Selon Bob Woodward, ce travail de planification a cr?? une dynamique en faveur de la guerre, quand bien m?me M. Bush affirmait n'avoir rien d?cid?. Cette dynamique ?tait aliment?e par le vice-pr?sident, Richard Cheney, et par ceux qui partageaient son point de vue, c'est- ?-dire M. Rumsfeld et, plus encore, le secr?taire adjoint ? la d?fense, Paul Wolfowitz, et le sous-secr?taire charg? de la politique, Douglas Feith.
L'auteur ?crit qu'aux yeux du secr?taire d'Etat, Colin Powell, oppos? ? l'option militaire, M. Cheney faisait "une fixation malsaine" sur l'Irak. M. Powell soup?onnait le vice-pr?sident et ses partisans d'avoir constitu? un gouvernement parall?le. Il donnait au groupe d'analystes du renseignement constitu? par M. Feith le surnom de "Gestapo".
M. Powell a mis en garde M. Bush, ? plusieurs reprises, contre une invasion de l'Irak. Au cours d'un d?ner ? la Maison Blanche, le 5 ao?t 2002, avant que le pr?sident ne parte en vacances, le secr?taire d'Etat lui a dit qu'il ne devait pas se laisser entra?ner dans cette entreprise. "Vous allez ?tre le fier propri?taire de 25 millions de personnes, de leurs espoirs, de leurs aspirations et de leurs probl?mes", a-t-il pr?venu.
Le secr?taire d'Etat est revenu plusieurs fois, par la suite, sur ce que son adjoint, Richard Armitage, appelait "la r?gle de Pottery Barn", du nom d'une cha?ne de magasins de vaisselle : "Ce que vous cassez vous appartient." La tension entre M. Powell et M. Cheney ?tait telle que c'?tait ? peine s'ils se parlaient.
Woodward raconte que, le 21 d?cembre, M. Bush s'est fait pr?senter les ?l?ments dont disposait la CIA (Agence centrale de renseignement) sur les armes de destruction massive que Saddam Hussein ?tait accus? de d?tenir. Etonn? de la faiblesse de ce qui lui ?tait montr?, il a interrog? le directeur de la CIA, George Tenet, qui lui a affirm? : "Ne vous inqui?tez pas, c'est un slam dunk !" Ce terme de basket-ball d?signe un point tellement facile que le joueur qui le marque se suspend un instant au panier pour narguer l'adversaire.
C'est au tout d?but janvier 2003, selon Woodward, que le pr?sident a pris la d?cision d'employer la force, mais en essayant d'obtenir l'accord du Conseil de s?curit? de l'ONU, parce que le premier ministre britannique, Tony Blair, y jouait sa survie politique.
Le 11 janvier, M. Cheney a inform? l'ambassadeur d'Arabie saoudite ? Washington. M. Powell l'a ?t? le 13, de peur qu'il ne l'apprenne par le diplomate saoudien. "Etes-vous avec moi l?-dessus ?", lui a demand? M. Bush au cours d'une entrevue de douze minutes. "Je ferai de mon mieux. Oui, Monsieur, je vous soutiendrai", a r?pondu le secr?taire d'Etat. Ancien militaire, ancien chef d'?tat-major interarmes, M. Powell a jug? qu'il ne pouvait pas d?missionner au moment o? son pays allait partir en guerre.
Patrick Jarreau

* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 20.04.04
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> AHEM...

Woodward book contradicts CIA director
By Andrew Tully
WASHINGTON - Two months ago, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director George Tenet gave a public response to the growing concern about the quality of US intelligence preceding the Iraq war. His remarks came amid questions about whether the administration of President George W Bush had pressured the US intelligence community to help make the case for war, by presenting evidence that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat.
But Tenet said CIA analysts never portrayed Saddam as an imminent threat to the region, the world, or the US. And he directly countered claims that Bush policymakers influenced how the CIA interpreted its own intelligence: "The question being asked about Iraq, in the starkest terms, is, 'Were we right or were we wrong?' In the intelligence business, you are almost never completely wrong or completely right. That applies, in full, to the question of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction," Tenet said.
But that is not how Tenet is characterized in a new book by journalist Bob Woodward of the Washington Post newspaper.
Woodward's reporting contributed to the resignation of president Richard Nixon three decades ago after the Watergate scandal. In his latest book, Plan of Attack, he writes that during a crucial meeting with Bush, Tenet twice reassured a wary president that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Woodward writes that in December 2002 - three months before the war began - Tenet and his deputy, John McLaughlin, gave Bush what the president hoped would be a convincing case against Saddam - convincing enough to prevail in a court of law.
According to the book, McLaughlin gave a detailed presentation with charts and photographs. But when he was done, Bush said it was not convincing. The US president is quoted as saying, "I've been told all this intelligence about [Saddam] having WMD, and this is the best we've got?"
Woodward writes that Tenet described the case as foolproof, literally calling it a "slam-dunk". When Bush again expressed skepticism, Tenet reiterated his conviction that the evidence against Saddam was sound.
During three-and-a-half hours of interviews with Woodward for the book, Bush recalled that Tenet's reassurance about the quality of the intelligence was "very important" in influencing his decision to go to war.
How to explain the two apparent faces of Tenet - one brashly confident of the case for war; one wary and defensive about the CIA's intelligence?
Retired US Army General Edward Atkeson said in an interview that he found the passage from Woodward's book very troubling on several levels. Atkeson served as an intelligence officer in Europe during the Cold War and several times was temporarily transferred to the CIA.
Was the head of the CIA truly surprised by the failure to find WMD in Iraq? If so, says Atkeson, his initial confidence is unsettling. Also, Atkeson says, Woodward's account presents Tenet in a way that is almost cavalier, and not consistent with the typical intelligence-community methods:
"I wouldn't have expected him to just pristinely lay the thing on the president's desk and say, 'That's it, and if you have any questions, give me a call.' Nor would I expect him to give a kind of a 'slam-dunk' kind of a demonstration," Atkeson said.
In fact, Atkeson says he is bothered by Tenet's demeanor as it is described by Woodward. He says analysts may speak in sports slang when discussing work-related matters among themselves in unguarded moments, but no one, not even the CIA director himself, would dare to speak so casually to a president, especially a president who has a reputation for demanding proper behavior from everyone.
"That's out of character for anybody in the business, so far as a presentation of some gravitas [is concerned]. That's unprofessional. If I were the president, I'd say, 'Go back to your office and call me when you're ready to give me a professional presentation,'" Atkeson said.
Atkeson also says he finds Woodward's account troubling because of its sourcing. Although the writer claims to have spoken to 75 officials close to the case, nearly all of them are unnamed. Only material from the Bush interviews is fully attributed to the president.
Atkeson says he questions how skeptical Bush really was about the intelligence regarding Saddam's suspected weapons arsenal. He also wonders whether Karl Rove, Bush's senior political adviser, may have urged the president to portray himself as reluctant to go to war.
"[Bush] may have Rove sitting right behind him saying, 'Tell [Woodward] this, tell him that.' That would fit in with the popular view of the way [Bush's] staff works - you know, where they're always trying to minimize damage and put the best light that they can on things," Atkeson said.
Tenet says his agency currently is evaluating whether it served the country well in the way it gathered and presented intelligence to the president. He has said the evaluation will be thorough, and the American people must be patient in awaiting the verdict.
But with Woodward's book putting the CIA on the defensive, it appears a reckoning may come sooner than anybody may have thought.
Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036.

(Copyright 2004 RFE/RL Inc.)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> THE VISION THING...

Lawmakers Press Administration for Detailed Iraq Plan
Wolfowitz, Myers Appear Before House Committee

By Pauline Jelinek
The Associated Press
Wednesday, April 21, 2004; 1:29 PM

Lawmakers will keep pressing the Bush administration until they get a detailed explanation of its strategy in Iraq, a senator said Wednesday, opening a second day of sometimes contentious hearings on the increasingly violent occupation.
Citing a host of questions about the planned transfer of power in Baghdad June 30, Sen. Dick Lugar said his Senate Foreign Relations Committee "will be persistent in asking these questions and others because the Americans should have the opportunity to understand the administration's plan and to carefully monitor its progress."
Later Wednesday, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz appeared before another panel of lawmakers, a day after he irritated some senators with a half-hour speech on how brutal Saddam Hussein was, and how much better off Iraq was without him.
Wolfowitz's testimony Tuesday opened three days of hearings that senators hoped would shed light on the administration's strategy for the increasingly troubled campaign in Iraq -- information that Democratic and Republican lawmakers alike say the administration has consistently denied them.
"What we've been given is a series of just glossy overstatements ... and how bad Saddam Hussein is ... really, really bad," Democratic Sen. Mark Dayton of Minnesota said sarcastically some three hours into a four-hour hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee. "We have a right to know, and we should be told, what is going on over there, in factual terms, in military terms."
On Wednesday before the House Armed Services Committee, Wolfowitz focused more on answering questions that have been raised, though he gave few new details.
"Some say we have no plan. We have a plan," he said referring to U.N. suggestions for forming an interim government to take over from occupation authorities. Senators want to know more -- exactly who those people will be, how they will be picked, what happens if fractious Iraqis cannot agree on their selection before the handover?
Appearing with Wolfowitz, Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the committee Wednesday that recent violence -- and the resulting extension of tours of duty for some 20,000 troops -- "is going to cost us more money" than budgeted.
He said defense officials are studying their budget now to determine how much. "We're in the middle of that analysis right now," he said.
Wolfowitz was attending two of five sessions planned before three separate panels this week -- military panels in the House and Senate and Lugar's foreign relations panel.
Former officials and think tank experts have made up the witness list the first two days. Lugar had strong words for the administration Tuesday when it appeared Wolfowitz was refusing to testify at the senator's hearing scheduled for Thursday.
Saying success in Iraq depends on the administration's credibility, Lugar noted that over the past year and a half the administration has "failed to communicate" its plans to Congress and the American people. But he announced Wednesday that Wolfowtiz had phoned him -- said he could not come to due to a family wedding -- and was sending another Pentagon official.
Some lawmakers have said that they not only want to hear more about the administration's plans for any problems in the transition of sovereignty back to Iraq, but they want to know what the pricetag will be for a continuing U.S. presence there.
"In this year's budget that we're voting on, for 2005, they haven't asked for one single penny for next year for Afghanistan and Iraq. Give me a break," Sen. Joseph Biden, ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said Wednesday on NBC"s "Today" show.
"They already know that it's going to cost a minimum of $60 billion to keep the troops there," the Delaware Democrat said.
Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., said on the same show that lawmakers want the administration "to be honest with the Congress. Be honest with the American people. ... It's going to be $50 to $75 billion in additional money."
The administration previously has relied in large part on so-called supplemental spending bills -- emergency legislation that is apart from the regular budgeting process -- to meet war costs.
Wolfowitz told the armed services panel that Iraq has seen the beginnings of a "tremendous transformation" in the year since the invasion, with improvements in health care, schools and other services as well as work toward forming a new government.
"I'm not here to paint a rosy picture or to view this through rose-colored glasses," he said, conceding there are "enormous problems." Officials need to speed up reconstruction work as well as the training of Iraqi forces to be responsible for their own security, he said.
He also noted the violence, in which 100 American troops have been killed fighting insurgencies this month.
During the violence, many lawmakers were in their home districts for spring recess and heard rising voter concerns about the violence.
Senators on Tuesday asked how the transfer of power in Iraq could be accomplished in so little remaining time, what the Pentagon would do if more troops are needed and what it would cost financially.
They also criticized the administration, saying too few troops were sent for the job; there was a lack of planning for postwar operations; troops are being overtaxed by repeated and extended deployments; and that unilateral action has left the United States bearing the bulk of the burden with little hope of getting more international troops to help.
? 2004 The Associated Press
--------------------------------------------------------------

Constituents' Iraq Worries Growing, Lawmakers Say

By Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, April 21, 2004; Page A04
Lawmakers returning from their spring break say constituents are increasingly concerned about what they see as a lack of progress toward stability in Iraq, and want President Bush to spell out a clear strategy for victory.
They also found their constituents to be troubled by hearings on the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, although many seemed more upset by outbursts of partisanship in the proceedings than by revelations of failure to prevent the attacks.
Together, people's reactions to the bloody insurgency in Iraq and the contentious hearings at home showed an American public that is growing more restive over Washington's response to its concerns -- an anxiety reflected in hearings that opened in the Senate yesterday on the outlook for Iraq.
As the Foreign Relations Committee launched the first of three hearings, both Chairman Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) and ranking Democrat Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.) urged the administration to be more forthcoming about its strategy for returning Iraq to the control of its people.
The Bush administration has sometimes failed in the past to "communicate its Iraq plans and cost estimates to Congress and the American people," Lugar said, and "must recognize that its domestic credibility on Iraq will have a great impact on its efforts to succeed."
Biden was more critical. U.S. forces in Iraq "may soon be confronted by an untenable situation . . . caught between hostile Iraqi populations that they were sent to liberate and an increasingly skeptical American public," Biden said. "No foreign policy can be sustained in this country without the informed consent of the American people, and there has not been an informed consent yet because we have not leveled with them."
At an Armed Services Committee hearing, Chairman John W. Warner (R-Va.) warned that the United States needs to be prepared for more violence as the June 30 deadline for transfer of power to an interim Iraqi government approaches. He cautioned against raising expectations too high.
Committee member Sen. Susan M. Collins (R-Maine) said she is concerned about the strain on reservists and National Guard members, and their families, because of longer-than-expected deployments. The 94th Military Police Company, which has a detachment based in her state, has been deployed more than half of the past four years, she said.
To a large extent, these senators' views mirrored what other lawmakers heard during Congress's spring recess -- one week for the Senate, two for the House. They held hundreds of town-hall-style meetings that were often dominated by concerns over Iraq. This, in itself, was unusual because such sessions are usually devoted to domestic concerns, such as the economy and health care.
The sentiments expressed by lawmakers appeared to signal the likelihood of increased pressure from Congress for a more definitive statement of strategy from the administration, including steps for an orderly transfer of power.
At home during the recess, lawmakers found that constituents are not ready to "cut and run" from Iraq, despite uncertainty about what lies ahead. Nor do many people disagree with Bush's broad objectives for promoting democracy in the country. But they are beginning to lose patience because they do not understand where U.S. policy is headed and when U.S. troops can expect to come home, Republicans and Democrats said.
"As long as people can see a reasonable [prospect] of Iraq as a functioning democracy, they will continue to support the sacrifice. But the lack of a well-defined plan for how to get there is getting to be more of a problem," said Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.).
"People inherently want to support the commander in chief, but they also want assurance that America's purposes are being achieved and that the troops are coming home," said Sen. Gordon Smith (R-Ore.).
"It's the idea of a commitment without an end or a strategy that is troubling," said Sen. Evan Bayh (D-Ind.).
Some Democrats said they encountered a more impatient and disapproving response from their constituents.
"People would like to know there is a strategy that will bring Americans home, but the situation appears to be going in the opposite direction," said Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.).
People express "dismay mixed with some puzzlement about how we got into this . . . varying degrees of anger and blame and widespread dismay," said Rep. David E. Price (D-N.C.).
Durbin said he believes Bush is being hurt politically, and Rep. Rahm Emanuel (D-Ill.) sees a "drip, drip, drip" effect that is gradually eroding support for the president. But Price said the "political fallout is not clear" and "it's not clear how much Bush is being held responsible."
Others, especially Republicans, said support for Bush remains strong -- an assessment that dovetails a recent Washington Post-ABC News poll showing that the president has gained strength politically despite widespread doubts over the success of his policies on Iraq.
Rep. Jim Leach (R-Iowa), a senior member of the House International Relations Committee, was struck by how his constituents have been "mesmerized" by Iraq. "Some are very supportive of the president, some are extremely skeptical, but they are all thoughtful," he said.
"All the talk about grittiness is not setting well with much of the public," Leach said. "People want a strategy for withdrawal, not a strategy for long-term commitments."
The latest concerns were triggered by a number of factors, including the increased violence, the desertion of some Iraqi security forces and disarray on the Iraqi Governing Council, said Rep. Thomas E. Petri (R-Wis.). "People are asking: Where are the democrats? Where is the democracy?" he said.
By contrast, lawmakers found a mixed reaction to testimony taken while they were home by the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks.
"People seem to see it as a partisan contest," said Rep. Jack Kingston (R-Ga.). But Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.) found people to be deeply concerned about the adequacy of U.S. intelligence.
People tend to see the government's lack of preparation as resulting from "multiple failings," Bayh said. "It's hard to assign blame to any one person," he said. "People want to focus on keeping it from happening again."
Staff writer Josh White contributed to this report.

? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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Pentagon official: Iraq work to cost more than expected
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Increased violence in Iraq is pushing the cost of the war over budget, possibly by as much as $4 billion by late summer, the top U.S. military officer said Wednesday. And billions more will be needed for the rest of the year.

U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard Myers testifies Tuesday before a Senate panel.
Richard Myers, Getty
Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the recent decision to extend the stay of some 20,000 troops will cost roughly $700 million more over three months. The White House is keeping open the possibility it will seek additional funds before the end of this election year.
"When the service chiefs last talked about this, there was, I think, a $4 billion shortfall," Myers told the House Armed Services Committee. "We thought we could get through all of August. We'd have to figure out how to do September."
The war is costing an estimated $4.7 billion a month, officials said. Defense officials are studying their current budget, which runs through Sept. 30, to determine whether some money can be moved from purchase programs or other Pentagon accounts, Myers said.
Lawmakers expect to have a defense bill in place by the time the new budget year begins Oct. 1. But the version President Bush proposed had no money for U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, legislators say the Pentagon could use money from that bill until extra money for the war is provided.
White House officials have already said they would propose a separate bill after this fall's elections -- costing up to $50 billion -- to pay for the two wars.
But Wednesday, presidential spokesman Scott McClellan said the final decision on what was needed -- and when -- would be "based on what the commanders in the field feel is necessary." McClellan said Pentagon officials have assured the White House they have the money they need.
On a day when nearly 70 people were killed by suicide bombers in Iraq's southern city of Basra, Myers and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz testified for a second day on Capitol Hill. American troops this month have endured the worst casualties of the year-old campaign, with 100 killed.
At the hearings this week, lawmakers also have asked what the Pentagon would do if more troops are needed; Myers said the military is working up a plan for who could go. Lawmakers hoped more foreign troops might come to Iraq, but Wolfowitz said not many would while the violence continues.
Some lawmakers complained the Bush administration consistently has denied them information about Iraq over past 18 months.
Because of increased costs, Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said he plans to add $20 billion for the current budget year to the 2005 defense bill now being considered.
Several lawmakers complained anew that the administration's 2005 budget request for the Defense Department was sent to them with no money in it for Afghanistan or Iraq.
Administration officials have acknowledged they will need $50 billion for those wars. But the officials said they would not ask for it until after January -- and after the presidential election in November.
"The administration would be well served here to come forward now, be honest about this, because the continuity and the confidence in this policy is going to be required to sustain it," Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., said in a television interview. "And that means be honest with the Congress, be honest with the American people."
"They are simply trying to conceal the cost of this operation until after the election," said Rep. David Obey of Wisconsin, top Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee.
Republican lawmakers planned to meet on Thursday with national security adviser Condoleezza Rice in the Capitol for an update on developments in Iraq.
Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.


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U.S. sees Syria 'facilitating' insurgents


By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Syria is "facilitating" the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq and helping supply them with arms, according to U.S. military officials with access to intelligence reports.
The sources said the reporting has not been clear on whether hard-line Syrian President Bashar Assad is involved directly in ordering the aid. But they say he has much to lose if Iraq becomes a pro-U.S. democratic country.
Foreign fighters from Syria have become a major stumbling block to stabilizing Iraq and turning over sovereignty by June 30.
The bloody fighting in Fallujah, for example, is inspired, in part, by well-armed foreign jihadists who crossed the Syrian border and have committed some of the most gruesome attacks against Americans and their allies.
Officials said Syrian help includes facilitating their border crossing, arming them and allowing them to return for fresh supplies.
Asked how conclusive U.S. intelligence is on Syrian aid, one official said, "No doubt about it."
It is not clear, however, whether Damascus is actively organizing the influx. Osama bin Laden, leader of al Qaeda, has urged his followers to travel to Iraq to kill Westerners.
Publicly, the Bush administration has stopped short of accusing Mr. Assad's socialist Ba'ath Party regime of facilitating the terrorists' migration. But it has accused Syria of inaction in stopping the flow of foreigners along its 600-mile border with Iraq.
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell last week sent a strong message to Mr. Assad through the U.S. ambassador in Damascus.
"It urged Syria to work closely with the rest of the international community to promote a stable Iraq," said State Department spokesman Richard Boucher. "It also made clear to Syria that it needs to control the transit of its border by terrorists and people supporting the insurgents in Iraq.
"It is a message that we have delivered to Syria in the past. What prompted it now, I think, is that it's an ongoing problem. It's something that we feel needs to be reiterated until it's taken care of, and it's not taken care of yet."
Mr. Powell said last week, "Our message to President Assad is that it is in our mutual interest to deal with this problem. It is not in Syria's interest to be seen as a base from which infiltrators can come across -- come across to kill innocent Iraqis or to kill coalition troops."
Mr. Powell faces a decision soon on whether the administration will slap economic sanctions on Syria. Congress gave the White House that power last fall in legislation that condemns Syria's support for terror organizations and its occupation of Lebanon.
For nearly 25 years, the United States has labeled Syria a state sponsor of terrorism. Syria gives help to the Lebanon-based Hezbollah, a Shi'ite terror group set up and sustained by Iran, which also is accused of sending agents into southern Iraq to help radical cleric Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr.
Officials said Syrian agents are aiding the Iraqi insurgency because it is not in Damascus' interest to have a pro-U.S. country on its border. Mr. Assad fears that a free Iraq could spur a wave of democracy in his country, jeopardizing his rigid socialist rule, officials say.
Mr. Assad also realizes that Washington is limited in how it can react. The U.S. military is overcommitted globally. It would be politically difficult for President Bush to launch military strikes, thus opening up yet another front in the war on terrorism.
"The Syrians know America can bark a lot, but what else can we do?" said one military source.
The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force last month took over control of western Iraq from the 82nd Airborne Division. The Marines promptly committed more troops to the border area and have engaged in a series of deadly firefights in the border town of al Qaim and at other points.
The United States has also sent military personnel into Syria on reconnaissance missions.
"To stop the source, the Marines did put a very intense effort, and it still continues up there," said Maj. Gen. John Sattler, chief of operations for U.S. Central Command. "We had an extreme amount of success on the front side, meaning that we did find, fix and ultimately finish a number of cells that were out there, that were facilitating this type movement."
The State Department's yearly report on global terrorism states, "Syrian and Iranian support for Hezbollah activities in the south [Lebanon], as well as training and assistance to Palestinian rejectionist groups in Lebanon, help permit terrorist elements to flourish."
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General: Much of Iraq's Forces Have Quit

By CONNIE CASS
Associated Press Writer
Bush says coalition forces have been facing a ruthless enemy in Iraq. (Audio)
WASHINGTON (AP) -- About one in every 10 members of Iraq's security forces "actually worked against" U.S. troops during the recent militia violence in Iraq, and an additional 40 percent walked off the job because of intimidation, the commander of the 1st Armored Division said Wednesday.
In an interview beamed by satellite from Baghdad to news executives attending The Associated Press annual meeting, Maj. Gen. Martin Dempsey said the campaign in Iraq was at a critical point.
"We have to get this latest increase in violence under control," Dempsey said. "We have to take a look at the Iraqi security forces and learn why they walked."
The militia violence aggravated underlying troubles in Iraq's new military and police forces - the unfulfilled desire for "some Iraqi hierarchy in which to place their trust and confidence" and a reluctance by Iraqis to take up arms against their countrymen, Dempsey said.
"It's very difficult at times to convince them that Iraqis are killing fellow Iraqis and fellow Muslims, because it's something they shouldn't have to accept," he said. "Over time I think they will probably have to accept it."
The failure of Iraqi security forces to perform is significant because it could hurt the United States' overall exit strategy from Iraq, which is dependent on moving U.S. troops out of the cities and handing authority to Iraqis. Officials have said the U.S. military would delay its withdrawal from parts of Iraq until Iraqi forces were ready to take control.
In one example of the problems, on April 5, a newly created Iraqi army battalion of several hundred soldiers refused to join U.S. Marines in their offensive against insurgents in the city of Fallujah.
Dempsey maintained in the interview that popular support for the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq is still "very solid."
But he acknowledged "a form of descending consent" for the U.S. military presence occurring among Iraqis as time passes.
"There is a point where it doesn't matter how well we're doing, it won't be accepted that we have a large military presence here," he said. "We're all working very diligently trying to figure out where that point is."
Dempsey was asked about the remarks of two other U.S. commanders who questioned the wisdom of banning former Baath Party members from government jobs when their skills are needed in the reconstruction effort.
"History is going to have to decide whether that was right or not," he said.
Dempsey recalled receiving a warning from Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah that the coalition forces would find it tough to bring order to Iraq after dissolving the country's only two powerful institutions - the army and the Baath Party.
"So part of me says our jobs may have been easier had we just found a way to keep some of the Baath Party in place," Dempsey said, echoing comments by Maj. Gen. John R.S. Batiste and Brig. Gen. Carter F. Ham published in The New York Times on Wednesday.
But Dempsey added: "On the other hand, the entire part of the population that was disenfranchised during these 35 years, largely the Shiite population, absolutely has no trust in any former member of the Baath Party. So we found ourselves exactly in the middle of this."
On the security forces, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has said he is sending Maj. Gen. David Petraeus back to Iraq to oversee the training and equipping of all Iraqi security forces, including those who had been the responsibility of the State Department or the Coalition Provisional Authority.
Dempsey said efforts are under way to ensure Iraqi security forces that there will be Iraqi authorities in place to back them up after U.S. troops leave.
During the recent militia attacks, "about 50 percent of the security forces that we've built over the past year stood tall and stood firm," he said.
"About 40 percent walked off the job because they were intimidated. And about 10 percent actually worked against us," said Dempsey, describing that group as infiltrators.
Dempsey commands the Army division in charge of Baghdad. He has been in Iraq for more than a year, focusing on intelligence gathering and combatting terrorism as he works to help Iraqi security forces take over those tasks.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.




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>> FOGGY BOTTOM BLUES? ASK HUMAN RESOURCES ABOUT CULTURAL SENSITIVITIES?


U.S.-Saudi Relations Show Signs of Stress
Reformers Labeled 'Agents of America'

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, April 21, 2004; Page A16


JIDDAH, Saudi Arabia -- Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, the U.S. consul general here, waited outside a restaurant for evening prayers to end so she could enter. Suddenly, a Saudi religious policeman barred her way, pointing out that she was not wearing an abaya, the black cloak required of Saudi women in public.
She was a U.S. diplomat, she told him. He spit in his hand and rubbed it on the sole of his shoe. "This is what I think of your diplomatic status," he said, Abercrombie-Winstanley recounted in a recent interview.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, 46, an ebullient career diplomat, was undeterred. She began meeting with Saudi reformers who were impressed by stories of last year's encounter, which gave her a taste of the realities they face.
Last month, it was the Saudi government that tried to block Abercrombie-Winstanley's path, warning the reformers in Jiddah to stop meeting with her and other U.S. diplomats. On March 22, the Saudi interior minister, Prince Nayef, delivered blunt words at a meeting of about a dozen reform leaders, according to two Saudi reformers who were there.
Disparaging the reformers as "agents of America," Nayef said: "The government is not weak and the United States will not protect you," according to one of them, who spoke on condition that he not be identified by name because he feared arrest.
Nayef's warning was one of the latest signs of friction between the two countries. The relationship has grown more tense since the Bush administration began in late 2002 to push for political, social and economic change in Saudi Arabia.
In a statement last month, Nayef confirmed that about a dozen reformers had been arrested on the eve of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's visit on March 19 in part because of their contacts with "foreigners," though he did not specifically mention Abercrombie-Winstanley or the United States. The Saudis also justified the arrests by citing the reformers' calls for a constitutional monarchy and an independent human rights commission.
Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington and the identification of 15 of the 19 hijackers as Saudis, testimony at congressional hearings has portrayed the kingdom as a center of terrorist financing and an extremist strain of Islam.
Tough new visa restrictions have also ended easy access for the thousands of Saudis who enter the United States every year. No new major U.S. military weapons deals have been announced. A plan for U.S. companies to play a major role in developing the country's energy sector has collapsed. The two governments are at odds over oil prices, Israel and the Palestinians, and Iraq, whose instability is a major concern here.
Officially, Saudi and U.S. spokesmen insist that all is well with the relationship. Both sides point to their increasingly close cooperation in the struggle against Islamic terrorists -- the CIA and FBI now provide raw intelligence to Saudi security authorities.
"The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States is not based on personalities. It's based on interests," said Adel Jubeir, foreign affairs adviser to Crown Prince Abdullah, the kingdom's de facto ruler. "I don't think it's ever been as strong as it is now."
Powell, at a news conference in Riyadh last month after his meeting with the crown prince, also repeatedly described ties as "quite strong."
Yet in a rare discordant note, Powell and his counterpart, Prince Saud Faisal, publicly aired U.S.-Saudi differences over the arrests of the reformers.
"We have concerns when people who are trying to express their views and do it in an open way, and a democratic way, are unable to do so," Powell said.
Saud retorted: "These people sought dissension when the whole country was looking for unity and a clear vision, especially at a time when it is facing a terrorist threat. This is not the time to seek dissension."
A more ominous development was the failure of U.S. firms to win Saudi contracts in early March, the first time in 30 years that foreign companies were allowed back into the kingdom to explore for new gas deposits. Saudi Aramco, the largest state oil company in the world, signed deals with Russian, Chinese and European firms.
The Saudis initially intended to give Exxon Mobil Corp., the U.S. oil giant, the leading role in the deal, viewing the move as part of a larger strategy to revitalize the entire U.S.-Saudi relationship. But nearly five years of negotiations unraveled in June for reasons still being hotly debated -- the post-Sept. 11 chill, U.S. policy in the Middle East and squabbles over profit margins.
"I think this carries political implications as well as commercial implications for the United States," said Robert Ebel, energy program chairman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, based in Washington.
These implications have become clear as U.S. gasoline prices have increased. Saudi Arabia was blamed for the higher costs, and the topic quickly became an issue in the U.S. presidential campaign.
No issue currently rankles the Saudi royal family more than the Bush administration's talk of promoting political reform. President Bush's latest plan, the Greater Middle East Initiative, is scheduled to be formally unveiled in June at the summit of the Group of Eight leading industrial powers in Sea Island, Ga.
"For 30 years, the U.S. worked to buttress the status quo in Saudi Arabia," Saleh Mani, a political scientist at King Saud University in Riyadh, said at a conference at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University in late January. "Now it wants regime change. It's not the status quo policy it used to be."
During a visit to neighboring Yemen in late March, Prince Saud, the foreign minister, said that U.S. "ideas and proposals" amounted to "flagrant accusations against the Arab countries and people."
"These initiatives look good from outside, but they are malicious in essence . . . as if we are waiting to receive direction from abroad to look into issues concerning our citizens."
U.S. administrations have for decades worried that the Saudi royal family would not institute reforms fast enough to stay in power and fend off Islamic extremists and Arab radicals. The former U.S. ambassador to the kingdom, Robert Jordan, who left Riyadh last fall, expressed the concern that has haunted every U.S. administration since the 1960s. "They are making progress," he said in a telephone interview last month. "The question is: What is the pace going to be?"
Last October, the Saudi government announced plans to elect half of the seats on municipal councils. Since then, it has allowed the creation of a human rights commission and an association of journalists. And it is making changes in its religiously oriented school curriculum.
But it has not announced a date for the voting, and it has rebuffed reformers' demands to elect one-third of the 120-member consultative Shura Council. The Saudi defense minister, Prince Sultan, recently said that the royal family wanted to "select people who are efficient, educated and cultured" for the council, and not "people without proper qualifications."
Nayef made similar comments to the reformers last month. "The country is not ready for elections because the people will either elect tribal leaders or those who can neither read nor write," according to the account of one participant.
The restaurant encounter involving Abercrombie-Winstanley never appeared in the government-controlled press but quickly became the talk of Jiddah. She might never have met Mohamed Saeed Tayeb were it not for the religious keepers of Saudi public morality, known as mutaween.
Tayeb, an Arab nationalist, has been agitating for political reforms for years, which has frequently landed him in jail.
Despite his well-known anti-Americanism, Tayeb was so appalled when he heard about the consul general's misadventure at the restaurant in Riyadh in February 2003 that he apologized to her for the mutawa's behavior.
In December, Tayeb invited Abercrombie-Winstanley to his regular Tuesday night political salon, where as many as 70 Saudi intellectuals, academics, writers and businessmen of a reformist bent gathered to quiz her.
"There are lots of questions from Saudis" about U.S. support for reform, Abercrombie-Winstanley said. "Can we be trusted? What is it we want to do? I always with great sincerity say: 'It isn't for us to say what we want to do. . . . While we intend to be as supportive as possible, we can't just tell you how to do it. It's got to be appropriate for Saudi Arabia.' "
The king's son, Abdelaziz bin Fahd, showed up half an hour after she had left to defend the kingdom's record on reform. Abercrombie-Winstanley later heard that he said it was "inappropriate" for an American diplomat to attend Tayeb's political meetings.
On March 16, three days before Powell's visit, Tayeb was arrested and held for two weeks.

? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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>> YOU DON'T SAY?


U.S. Goals for Middle East Falter
Peace Plan, Arab Reforms Prove Elusive

By Robin Wright and Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, April 21, 2004; Page A16
A year ago, the Bush administration had a grand strategy for the Middle East, betting real progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and removal of Iraq's Saddam Hussein would allow the United States to launch a bold initiative for democratic reform across the region.
Today, Washington faces growing Arab backlash for endorsing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's unilateral plan for Gaza and the West Bank, symbolized by the abrupt cancellation by Jordan's King Abdullah of a meeting with President Bush today. The U.S.-led coalition in Iraq is still searching for a formula to create a government to assume sovereignty on June 30, with other countries also reviewing their troop commitments. And prospects for the democracy initiative to get support from an Arab League summit are rapidly dimming, with fears that Arab resolutions may instead criticize Washington, U.S. officials say.
In all three areas, Washington is looking for direction, bailouts or leadership from others -- the United Nations, Iraqis, Israelis, Arabs and Europeans -- to generate movement that U.S. officials have been unable to achieve since the hopes were unleashed last spring.
"Our interests in the Middle East are more vital, more complex and larger than ever before, but our political capital has never been lower," said Walter Russell Mead, a Council on Foreign Relations fellow just back from the region.
Bitterness in the 22-nation Arab bloc has deepened particularly over the past month, Arab leaders warn, with Iraq deteriorating and Sharon's visit followed by Israel's "targeted killing" of Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi.
"After what has happened in Iraq, there is unprecedented hatred and the Americans know it," said President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, a stalwart U.S. ally, in an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde published yesterday. "There exists today a hatred never equaled in the region."
"What's more -- they see Sharon act as he wants, without the Americans saying anything," Mubarak added.
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell insisted yesterday that U.S. commitments on Iraq, a Palestinian state and democracy in the Middle East are unwavering -- and will eventually produce results.
"People will see over time that the United States is committed to the welfare, benefit and the hopes and dreams and aspirations of the Arab nations, and especially the hopes and dreams and aspirations of the Palestinian people," Powell told reporters in an appearance with Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher.
"I hope, as people understand that and see progress in all of these areas, the difficulties we're having with Arab opinion toward the United States will change," Powell added.
In a bid to shore up allied support on Iraq, Powell said yesterday that he had talked to the foreign ministers or leaders of almost every country in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq within the previous 24 hours. "I'm getting solid support for our efforts, commitments to remain and finish the job that they came to do," he told reporters after a meeting with European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana.
At the same time, the Bush administration is relying on the United Nations to complete a new plan to create a provisional Iraqi government next month, after two of its own proposals were rejected by Iraqis. Washington hopes U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi will return to Baghdad around May 1 to begin a final round of negotiations that will result in the appointment of a new president, prime minister and two vice presidents by mid-May, U.S. officials say.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage is today wrapping up a tour of Gulf states to win support for the U.N. plan and seek Arab help to win over Iraq's Sunni Muslims, the main political holdouts and security challenge.
On the Israeli-Palestinian front, U.S. officials appeared to be rolling back from Bush's agreement last week that Israel could keep some West Bank settlements and that Palestinian refugees from 1948 should not expect to return to Israel.
Powell told reporters yesterday that Bush's position on the Middle East peace process "is unchanged," and that he "is committed to the proposition that all final settlement issues have to be resolved between the two parties."
But the reality, foreign policy experts and diplomats say, is that the administration has largely subcontracted its Arab-Palestinian policy to Sharon to break the deadlock on the "road map" for peace launched at two major summits attended by Bush in June.
"A year ago, you had the Sharm el-Sheik and Aqaba summits and a new Palestinian prime minister, and frankly a lot of hope existed at the time," said Nabil Fahmi, Egypt's ambassador to the United States. "But in terms of the peace process, we've moved backwards."
On the Greater Middle East Democracy Initiative, the Bush administration still plans on rolling out an ambitious plan for political and economic liberalization at three summits with European and NATO allies in June -- and making the Arab world part of the dialogue, U.S. officials say. "We are anxious to work with the Arab nations on their ideas for reform within the region," Powell told reporters after his meeting with Muasher.
But the United States is counting on approval from European allies to get that initiative off the ground because suspicion of U.S. motives is so deep among Arabs. They recently postponed the annual Arab League summit in part because of a split over two resolutions -- one endorsing regional reform and the other renewing a peace overture to Israel.
The summit is tentatively rescheduled for late May, which U.S. officials admit may be too late -- and dangerous in light of recent events.
"The big question is what will come out of it. We are hoping they will focus on issues important to us in a positive way, but there are also a lot of negatives that could come out of it," said a State Department official involved in Middle East policy.
On all three key planks of U.S. policy, momentum that was sparked by bold U.S. initiatives is now running against the United States, said Geoffrey Kemp, a Reagan administration National Security Council staffer and now a Nixon Center fellow.
"Whether you're talking about the situation in Iraq or the unilateral agreement with Sharon or the wildly mishandled democracy initiative, it's very hard to pick up a head of steam once you lose credibility in your overall stated goals," he said.
To regroup, Kemp added, the administration will need to "go back to the drawing board" on the tactics of stabilizing Iraq, promoting the logic of democracy in the region and promoting peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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>> IRAN WATCH CONTINUED


Bush Would Not Tolerate Iranian Nuclear Weapon
Washington, 21 April 2004 (RFE/RL) -- U.S. President George W. Bush says the development of a nuclear weapon in Iran would be "intolerable."
Bush told American newspaper executives in Washington today that any effort by Tehran just trying to produce a nuclear weapon would be dealt with, first by the United Nations.
"One of my jobs is to make sure they [the International Atomic Energy Agency and European leaders] speak as plainly as possible to the Iranians and make it absolutely clear that the development of a nuclear weapon in Iran is intolerable and a program is intolerable; otherwise, they will be dealt with, starting through the United Nations," he said.
The president said Iran's stated objective is the destruction of the state of Israel. Iran has denied charges that it is trying to develop nuclear weapons, saying its atomic program is for peaceful purposes.
Meanwhile, in Paris, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said today that instability in Iraq is a threat to Iran's security.
Kharrazi also said Iran wants to help make the upcoming transfer of power in neighboring Iraq succeed. He is to have talks later today with UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, who favors dissolving the U.S.-backed Governing Council and setting up a caretaker government.
Kharrazi made the remarks after talks with French President Jacques Chirac. Brahimi is in Europe this week to outline his proposal for transferring power in Iraq on 30 June from U.S. occupation authorities to a caretaker Iraqi government. Chirac will meet with Brahimi on Saturday in Paris.

IRAN'S CABINET RESHUFFLE AIMED AT COHESION
Iranian government spokesman Abdullah Ramezanzadeh said on 20 April that the "principal aim of the cabinet reshuffle is to give it cohesion and create greater coordination in the government's economic team," IRNA reported the same day (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 19 April 2004). "The government is considering these changes to attain its economic aims in the remaining year and a half of activity." The Economic Affairs and Finance Ministry, he said, has faced problems over "the provision of basic laws on how to collect revenues and allocate resources," whence the nomination of a new candidate, Safdar Husseini, currently labor and social affairs minister. Ramezanzadeh described Husseini as "educated in economics" and with "a successful record of executive experience" in various state bodies. The head of the Management and Planning Organization will not change, he said. "The cabinet reshuffle may be considered as over." Parliament must approve the president's nominees. VS

IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS BELGIUM, FRANCE
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi met with his Belgian counterpart Louis Michel on 20 April and called on Europe to recognize Iran's right to develop nuclear power, iribnews.ir reported the same day. "Iran has had a sincere and fully transparent cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and Europe, and expects the opposite parties to recognize and respect Iran's rights." The agency cited Michel as saying that Brussels "will cooperate with Iran at the next session of the [IAEA] board of governors." Iran has promised to allow UN inspectors to check its nuclear activities, which the United States and Israel fear might be used to make nuclear bombs. Iran insists its program is peaceful. Kharrazi was expected to visit France on 21 April for talks with the French president and foreign minister, mehrnews.com reported, citing AFP. The agency cited a French official as saying that "Paris will this week ask Tehran to increase its cooperation with the IAEA. That is the best response to America's growing criticisms." VS

IRANIAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER OPPOSES U.S. PLANS FOR REGION
Parliamentary speaker Mehdi Karrubi on 20 April expressed Iran's opposition to stated U.S. plans to democratize the Middle East and said it must leave Iraq, IRNA reported. The "current American government" has shown its hostility to the Islamic world, he said, adding that "any of its plans are against the interests of regional peoples and governments, and we have explicitly declared our opposition to these plans." Karrubi warned U.S. forces not to enter the "sensitive, important, and sacred" Iraqi city of Al-Najaf in pursuit of Shi'a insurgents. "The occupiers have been warned to be careful lest there is a crisis in this and other holy cities in Iraq. Any unfortunate consequences of [entering the cities] will concern the American occupiers, who have complicated matters with their aggression." Karrubi is currently visiting Syria, a strategic ally since the 1979 revolution in Iran. He repeated Iran's backing for Palestinians fighting Israel. "Tehran's clear and transparent policy is the formation of an independent Palestinian state and the return of refugees to their real homeland." VS


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Moseley: Warplanes perform sharpshooter roles

By John Solomon
Associated Press
U.S. warplanes are running about 150 flights a day inside Iraq to conduct combat operations, provide air support to ground troops and gather intelligence to help crush pockets of resistance by extremists, a top Air Force general says.
Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the vice chief of staff for the Air Force, cited the nontraditional, post-combat flights as one example of how the military has adapted its tactics in the Iraq and Afghan wars to create a flexibility that will be key for future conflicts.
For instance, the Pentagon has experimented with unmanned airplanes armed with conventional weapons previously reserved for piloted aircraft, such as traditional bombs or air-to-air missiles capable of shooting down enemy planes, he said in an interview with The Associated Press.
With little public attention, Air Force planes also have been used in anti-terror operations from the Horn of Africa to Yemen since the Sept. 11 attacks, the four-star general said Tuesday.
"It is not like classic conduct of warfare," Moseley said. "It's a lot like a sharpshooter sitting on a piece of high ground ... and picking off people or a group of people singularly."
Moseley said groundwork for the new military tactics began to take shape during the mid-1990s combat in the Balkans and came to fruition as the Pentagon mapped plans to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.
He said the key to success is vastly improved coordination and communications between Marines, soldiers and special operations trops on the ground and the Navy and Air Force's warplanes, which can be called in for precise strikes within seconds if a valuable target -- such as fleeing terrorists or enemy commanders -- is identified.
Many times, he said, special operations soldiers on the ground "acted as sensors for us" to detect high-value targets in remote Afghan and Iraqi areas and called in precision strikes.
"A perfect example is our airmen with the special ops on horseback with a laptop and satellite connectivity to the CAOC (Command Air and Operations Center) so that you close in in real time at the speed of the light," he said.
Last week alone, Air Force planes flew more than 750 sorties as Iraqi rebels stepped up resistance during a month in which they have killed more than 100 soldiers and threw in doubt the planned transition of power from the United States to Iraqis this June.
Moseley said that during recent intense fighting between Marines and Iraqi rebels in Fallujah, Air Force F-16s and F-15s and Navy F-14 fighters interchangeably delivered strikes.
"Who would have thought three or four years ago that we would be at this level of jointness, where the battlefield airman is hooked with the land element on the ground and no one even knows the difference between whether it is Navy, Marine or Air Force airplanes that are delivering the effect," he said.
However, Moseley said, the evolving strategy was not without growing pains, citing Operation Anaconda in March 2002, when U.S. forces lost several soldiers and a helicopter during attacks on al-Qaida hideouts in the Shah-i-Kot mountains of eastern Afghanistan.
"We learned some interesting lessons there about orchestration and inclusion in planning that reinforce the notion that it is always better to be inclusive in your planning, and it is always better to have a full joint multidimensional plan," he said.
Moseley also said:

* Two-thousand-pound precision-guided bombs used in Iraq proved accurate enough to hit targets within the range of their 12-foot length.

* The Air Force has tested dropping 80 smaller 500-pound guided bombs in a single pass, with each bomb hitting within 4 feet of its intended target.

* At least 75 percent of current Air Force personnel are now combat-experienced, the highest level since World War II.

Moseley predicted unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) -- which before 2001 were used only for intelligence gathering -- will play an increasing role in warfare, allowing military commanders to put flights up for periods of time beyond human endurance and to conduct surveillance with the ability to fire missiles.
CIA and military officials have confirmed they have used an armed Predator to fire air-to-ground missiles and kill al-Qaida figures.
Moseley said the Air Force retrofitted one of its Predators to fire an air-to-air missile that could be used against enemy aircraft, and that it fired once at an Iraqi aircraft shortly before the war last year, startling the enemy pilot.
Moseley said the Pentagon is also retrofitting and testing the next generation of an unmanned aircraft known as the X-45 UCAV to carry small, conventional bombs.
"I love UAVs," he said. "It is the equivalent of a low-altitude satellite. It just parks itself out there except that you can task it in a different way than a satellite."
He cautioned, however, that unmanned aircraft probably won't save the Pentagon from having to send humans into dangerous combat.
"There is the human limit. If you want to keep it up there for 30, 40 or 50 hours, then take the human out of it. The other reason you might want to be uninhabited is that you think the threat is such that you don't want to lose the pilot," he said. "That one I'm not as convinced because we have never found a threat array that we couldn't penetrate."

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Copyright 2003 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
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Marines in Afghanistan welcome arrival of big guns

By Christian Lowe
Times staff writer
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan -- The big guns have arrived.
The Marines looked like expectant fathers as they watched an M198 155 mm howitzer roll off the ramp of a KC-130 Hercules aircraft and onto a dusty runway here.
"It's like delivering a baby," said a Marine walking by, clutching an instant camera to commemorate an event that perhaps only Marines would find so special.
The arrival of the howitzers, their huge barrels slathered in grease to stave off rust from the salty sea air, symbolized the Marines' entry into this warring country. More than 400 miles inland from their ships, the leathernecks of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit are glad to have the big guns ashore.
Officials here say the 155s are the biggest guns in the Afghan theater, an obvious point of pride to these Marines, who arrived nearly three weeks ago. The artillerymen, and even some of the infantrymen, are quick to mention that they are the stewards of the fiercest indirect firepower this side of the Hindu Kush mountain range.
The two guns delivered here from the ships of the Wasp Expeditionary Strike Group, sailing in the northern Indian Ocean, will be deployed to the MEU's forward operating base near Kandahar. With a range of more than 18 miles, the guns will provide long-range security for the base and for grunts humping through the steep hills and remote villages that pepper their new domain.
Most of the artillerymen with Golf Battery, 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines, have been split into provisional rifle platoons, since most of their guns are still aboard ship. A 14-man team will man the guns at the base, while the rest of the battery will provide security for vehicle convoys during the MEU's three-month deployment here. The stint in Afghanistan comes during the 22nd MEU's regularly scheduled six-month deployment from Camp Lejeune, N.C.
As the artillerymen struggled to lift the howitzer's muzzle break and thread it onto the end of the barrel, Gunnery Sgt. William Frye of Richmond, Va., explained that as soon as they get to the forward base, his men are going to send some rounds down range.
"That way we can, you know, let everyone up there know we're here," the battery gunny said with a grin.
Clearly, subtle diplomacy isn't an artillery Marine's strong suit.
Christian Lowe is covering U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.

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>> AHEM 2...

Iraq's doomed disarmament deal
By Ron Synovitz

Even as US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned that the chances for a political settlement of the armed standoff in the Iraqi city of Fallujah were "remote" because insurgency leaders probably won't surrender, fresh clashes erupted there on Wednesday.
And in Basra in the south, suicide bombers killed at least 60 people and wounded hundreds, many of them children, in coordinated attacks on four police stations. Near-simultaneous explosions rocked three police stations in Basra and one in the town of Zubair, 25 kilometers south of the mainly Shi'ite city, the British military confirmed.
In the Sunni city of Fallujah, residents said that Marines and guerrillas traded mortar, machinegun and rocket-propelled grenade fire in clashes that broke out early Wednesday morning and were still raging in the city's Golan district hours later.
US and Iraqi representatives had agreed on a preliminary plan for a full ceasefire in the embattled town. After three days of indirect talks, US military officials agreed that they would call off offensive operations at the town provided that local leaders could persuade insurgents to hand over their heavy weapons to Iraqi police.
The accord tasks a seven-man leadership council in Fallujah with convincing the fighters in the town to participate. The chief spokesman in Iraq for the US-led coalition, Dan Senor, described the disarmament obligations of the fighters in Fallujah.
"The parties agreed to call on citizens and groups to immediately turn in all illegal weapons. Illegal weapons are defined as mortars, [RPGs - rocket propelled grenade launchers], machine-guns, sniper rifles, [improvised explosive device-]making materials, grenades, and surface-to-air missiles and all associated ammunition. Those who give up their weapons voluntarily will not be prosecuted for weapons violations," Senor said.
In return, Senor said, up to 50 Iraqi families will be allowed to return to Fallujah each day. Also, sick or injured Iraqis will have a chance to receive treatment at hospitals in Fallujah. But Senor stressed that any delays on disarmament by the insurgents will cause the deal to collapse. "We've been very clear that time is running out. There is only so much longer we can continue this process before we have to re-engage and reinitiate operations," Senor said.
Senor says that the coalition also wants to see Iraqi investigations launched as soon as possible into criminal acts committed in Fallujah in recent weeks - including the killing and mutilation of four US contractors on March 31 and an attack on an Iraqi police station in February.
The deputy commander of coalition military operations in Iraq, Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, also has warned that US Marines will resume military operations if the insurgents fail to meet the disarmament obligations of the agreement.
However, as with a series of earlier, unofficial ceasefires announced in the Sunni stronghold since the US launched a major assault there two weeks ago, some fighters continued to attack US positions.
Reports say some of the thousands of civilians who fled fighting in Fallujah earlier this month were starting to trickle back. But although a few displaced civilians were allowed to walk back to the town, Marine checkpoints were still turning away vehicles.
More than 600 Iraqis - including many women, children and elderly people - have been reported killed in the fighting. But the US military says it is impossible to verify the figure.
Nearly 100 US soldiers have died in combat in Iraq since the start of April.
Meanwhile, Iraqi police who are to collect weaponry in Fallujah have confirmed that they are preparing to re-enter the town. At a US military base near Fallujah, a Reuters correspondent spoke to an unnamed Iraqi police commander who was training his officers for the mission:
"The police are going to enter the city [of Fallujah] and efforts are under way to facilitate the return of families. I think that two families have already been allowed into the city. Negotiations are going on to facilitate the return of families and there are no problems," the police commander said.
Some experts are questioning whether the fighters in Fallujah will be willing to surrender their weapons. Ian Kemp, the editor of the London-based publication Jane's Defense Weekly, told RFE/RL that the disarmament effort is unlikely to succeed.
"It seems highly unlikely that the militant groups are actually going to turn over their weapons. There's been no incentive for the militant groups to actually come forward and disarm. So it seems the repeated threat of military action is not going to compel these groups to disarm," Kemp said.
Even if some fighters participate, Kemp says it will be difficult for the US-led coalition to confirm how many weapons remain. "One of the difficulties for the coalition is [that] they have no idea how extensive the holding of weapons are. During the Saddam [Hussein] regime, small arms in particular - and that includes such things as rocket-propelled grenades - were very widely distributed," Kemp said. "And, of course, it is these rocket-propelled grenades [and] artillery ammunition being used to create improvised explosive devices that really concern the coalition. So long as that weaponry is widely distributed or hidden, it is always going to pose a risk to the security forces [whether they are Americans or Iraqi police.]"
Kemp said that any kind of local ceasefire deal in Iraq would seem to be at odds with the overall US strategy of "defeating and disarming" militants. But he acknowledged that the Fallujah deal would be in line with that strategy as long as fighters actually handed in their weapons.
Kemp also says intelligence sources suggest most of the anti-coalition fighters are former members of Saddam's military rather than foreign terrorists.
"It is worth noting that the intelligence services of some of the coalition forces believe there are foreign fighters there, but that the hard core of the opposition is actually composed of former Iraqi service personnel who have received their training from the Iraqi army. They might have been in other elements of the security forces at the time that Saddam was overthrown. But really, these former Iraqi security service personnel actually constitute the hard core of the resistance movement. And the sort of weapons that they are using, the sort of tactics they are using, would be consistent with that sort of military training," Kemp said.
Hachem Hassani, a Sunni Muslim politician who represented the Iraqi Governing Council in the Fallujah negotiations, says he agrees with Kemp's assessment. Hassani, who has traveled to the town every day during the past week, says most of the people attacking US Marine positions are residents of Fallujah, rather than foreign fighters. Thus, Hassani concludes, it is possible that local officials could have enough influence to calm the situation.
Ron Synovitz covers Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq as well as economic transition and human rights issues.
Copyright (c) 2004, RFE/RL Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington DC 20036


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>> AHEM 3...

SPEAKING FREELY
9-11: The big question remains unasked
By Jack A Smith
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.
The 9-11 Commission hearings in Washington these last weeks, for all the sound, fury, and front-page headlines, seem to have been constructed to produce a foreordained and narrow conclusion about only one aspect of the events of September 11 - the government's lack of preparedness to detect the attack plan before it was executed.
Entirely omitted from the probe, and from the presidential elections as well, is the other big question about September 11 - what was the real reason the attacks took place?
The omission is hardly unintentional. The commission members, evenly balanced between highly powerful Democrats and Republicans, may take partisan shots at each other during the hearings, but they are entirely agreed on leaving this crucial question unasked and unanswered.
The hearings have produced some fruitful movements, such as testimony from retired anti-terrorism chief Richard Clarke, based on his new book, Against All Enemies that the Bush administration was monomaniacal about invading Iraq from the day it took office. This wasn't new, but it provided important inside substantiation. Another interesting disclosure was the text of a memo to President George W Bush a month before September 11 informing him that Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization was planning an attack in the US with hijacked airplanes, but this actually proves nothing.
In all probability, the hearings will conclude that the reason for the September 11 hijacking attacks in Washington and New York City by 19 members of the fundamentalist fringe of Islam was "intelligence failure" by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Reforms will ensue, civil liberties will be further abridged in the name of homeland security, and hundreds of billions of dollars more will be invested in a long "war on terrorism" ostensibly against a few underground organizations that may have a total of 1,000 committed members.
Why is the question about the reasons for the attack not asked or answered? So far, the conventional political wisdom from Washington seems to be that the cause of September 11 is that, to paraphrase, "the terrorists are uncivilized and are motivated by a hatred for democracy and an envy of the American way of life". Such nonsense conveys the inescapable suggestion that the bipartisan Democratic-Republican political power structure ruling America would prefer not to probe too deeply into this question lest it be found complicit in creating a profound and not illogical antipathy to the United States on the part of most people in the Middle East and the world.
In our view, there are four reasons in combination why a small group of fanatics were willing to commit suicide to destroy the three symbols of US power in the world - the World Trade Center (financial power), the Pentagon (military power), and the White House, which evidently was spared because the final hijacked aircraft crashed before reaching its target (political power).
The primary reason for September 11 is the product of US policy and actions in the Middle East since the end of World War II - a policy based on exercising control over the world's greatest known reserves of petroleum. This has led Washington to continuously intervene in the region to support backward feudal monarchies and repressive, undemocratic regimes at the expense of social and political progress. The three secondary reasons involve the Afghan civil war (1978-1995), the first US-Iraq war (1990-2003), and one-sided US support for Israel (mainly 1967-2004).
Until the implosion of the USSR in 1990, the US was in a frenzy to prevent the Soviets from gaining influence in the region. Since 1990, Washington has sought to secure total hegemony throughout the entire Middle East, culminating in the Bush administration's plan to "re-make" the principal countries of the region into "democracies" subordinate to White House domination, by force if necessary, beginning with Iraq.
In some cases throughout these years the White House made deals with conservative religious regimes, such as with the royal family in Saudi Arabia soon after World War II. At the time Washington extended its military and political protection to the House of Saud in Riyadh in return for guaranteed access to oil and for support in keeping the USSR out of the region. The deal, which insures the suppression of democratic elements in Saudi Arabia, remains in place to this day.
In other instances, the White House ordered the CIA to overthrow democratically elected progressive governments, such as happened in Iran in 1953 when left-leaning president Muhammad Mossadegh was dispatched. The result was a quarter-century of repressive rule by the Shah of Iran, a US puppet finally overthrown by Shi'ite fundamentalists, who established another backward religious regime. The reason that only the religious faction was in a position to seize power was that Iran's sizable secular left and democratic forces had been killed, imprisoned or exiled by the Shah, with US approval.
The CIA repeatedly intervened in Iraq from 1958, when progressive General Abdul Karim Kassem overthrew the British-installed monarchy, until 1963 when he was overthrown with US help. Many thousands of leftists and communists were killed along with Kassem. This ultimately led to rule by the secular and at the time pan-Arab Ba'ath regime. In 1979, General Saddam Hussein gained control of the Ba'athist government, purged and killed any remaining leftists, and within a year launched an unjust war against Iran that was supported by the US until ending in a stalemate in 1988.
Over 50 years of constant American intervention - whether in Iran or Iraq, Egypt or Jordan, Lebanon or Syria, Saudi Arabia or Yemen, Oman or Kuwait, or across the Red Sea in Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia - have led to a plethora of ill fortune in the region. This includes the existence of weak, reactionary regimes dependent on the US; governments in thrall to religious factions; poverty amid great wealth; the violent destruction of left and progressive forces; the stultification of social progress; the rise of extreme religious fundamentalism as a means of establishing social and political power (particularly since the secular left has been repressed in so many of these countries); Arab disunity; and a deep sense of frustration and anger against the outside forces who have created most of these conditions, whether it be old style British and French colonialism or, since 1945, US imperialism.

Three more ingredients must be added to this witch's brew to concoct September 11:

1. The Afghan civil war (1978-1995): It was during this period that extremist Islamic fundamentalism became a serious military force, in large part because the US invested billions of dollars in training and equipping such a force, as well as providing bases and financing for fundamentalist religious schools in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden played an important role in the CIA's schemes for several years.

Washington was responding to a military coup in April 1978, principally led by left forces including progressive military officers determined to enact major social and political reforms to bring Afghanistan into the 20th century. The ruling People's Democratic Party began to introduce extensive reforms and to establish close relations with the neighboring Soviet Union. This was unacceptable to Washington.
Afghanistan's warlords and fundamentalist religious forces had immediately opposed the reforms for fear they would upset traditional power relations, and also because they guaranteed the equality of women. The reformers were in Kabul only a few months before president Jimmy Carter ordered the CIA to support the opposition forces, largely based in the vast countryside. When it was apparent a few months later that US-backed right-wing forces might overthrow the left government, the USSR sent thousands of troops to defend the progressive forces, withdrawing them in 1988.
The left government continued in power until it was crushed in 1992, followed by a horrendous three-year civil war between rival reactionary factions that was finally won by the Taliban in 1996, which was deeply indebted to bin Laden and the mujahideen "freedom fighters" responsive to his extreme fundamentalist leadership.
In 1998, Carter's national security adviser during the war, Zbigniew Brzezinski, finally acknowledged Washington's role and bragged that the US virtually induced the USSR to send soldiers to Afghanistan in order that it stumble into its own "Vietnam". He brushed aside any concern about the Taliban or their powerful mujahideen allies.

2. The first US-Iraq war (1990-2003): Iraq invaded the tiny, oil-rich principality in neighboring Kuwait in August 1990, presumably under the naive impression the US would not intervene, perhaps as a reward for exhausting Iran in a long war. Rejecting repeated Iraqi offers of a negotiated withdrawal, the regime of George Bush the First gradually built up a huge invasion force and massively retaliated in January 1990. Iraq's entire civilian infrastructure was destroyed - electricity, water supplies, factories, transportation, communications, bridges and so forth, along with its retreating army and many thousands of civilians. Extensive sanctions, which killed over a million people, along with frequent air attacks, continued until 2003, when George Bush the Second launched a new invasion.
In the eyes of Arabs and Muslims around the world, including those critical of Saddam, the first US war had turned into a nightmare of genocide, poverty and humiliation for the Iraqi people, further eroding Washington's credibility and enlarging on strong anti-American sentiments that had been building during previous decades of intervention in Middle Eastern affairs.
In addition, bin Laden, the leader of the mujahideen movement that emerged from Afghanistan, was outraged by the government of his native Saudi Arabia, which had allowed the "infidel" Americans to establish a military base on Arab/Muslim soil to attack another Arab/Muslim country. At around this time he dedicated himself to two goals: pushing the US out of the region and getting rid of the House of Saud.

3. One-sided US support for Israel (1967-2004): The US has been devoted to Israel as a surrogate for American military power in the region since the June 1967 war, though it has supported the Zionist state since its inception in 1948.

As far as the Arab world is concerned, these last 37 years that Israel has occupied much of the territory mandated to the Palestinians have been a period of great tragedy. Arabs view the Palestinians as refugees in their own country, oppressed by a violent colonial state supported by the US. Many Arabs have also expressed the conviction, shared by a number of progressives in the US, that the Bush administration's attack on Iraq - based on a plan emanating from the neo-conservative branch of right-wing reaction - was in part motivated by a desire to destroy Israel's principal opponents in the region, with Syria and Iran as potential targets as well.
Every time Washington vetoes a UN Security Council resolution seeking justice for the Palestinians, Arab anger mounts against the US. Every time Israeli tanks and soldiers fire at stone-throwing boys, the anger mounts further. Middle Eastern public opinion does not expect Washington to turn on Israel and embrace the Palestinian cause, but it cannot countenance America's total support for Israel at the expense of simple justice for millions of Arabs.
The latest example of Washington's indifference to the dreadful plight of the Palestinians is Bush's April 14 declaration of support for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's devious scheme to dismantle some unwanted Jewish settlements in Gaza for the right to permanently keep large settlements in the West Bank. In addition, Bush agreed that Palestinian refugees did not possess a "right to return" to their homes in what is now Israel. Both issues had been important Palestinian bargaining points with Israel, now swept off the negotiating table by the long arm of the White House.
These four examples of Washington's imperial deportment in the Middle East for a period of more than half a century have created great antagonism toward America on the part of the Arab masses. In the process, White House policies have unintentionally generated a small, extreme fringe of Islamic fundamentalism dedicated to visiting violent retribution on the US, which it accomplished on September 11, 2001.
The Bush administration's subsequent "war on terrorism" is wrong on two main counts: 1. It is much more intended to extend US hegemony than to track down the relatively few people involved in September 11 and al-Qaeda. Elsewise, why attack Iraq - which was innocent of complicity in the incident and with the target organization - or threaten similarly uninvolved Cuba, Iran and Syria, among others? 2. It is focused on symptoms, not causes, and thus cannot succeed in its stated objectives regardless of how many more billions of dollars are spent on homeland security and foreign wars.
What then will make mighty America - the most powerful military state in world history - more secure from the threat of another terrorist attack from a small fringe group? Treat the cause, not the symptoms. Change the outrageous imperial policies and actions that have created this situation. Here's how, for starters:
Deal with the people of the Middle East and the basis of equality and respect. Stop interfering in the politics and economy of the region. Discontinue the practice of supporting reactionary regimes and destroying progressive and leftist movements and governments. Instead of spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the "war on terrorism", invest that money in repairing the damage caused by over 50 years of intervention, oppression and exploitation in the region. Get out of Iraq now and permit these beleaguered people to resolve their own problems. Stop military interventions and close down the Pentagon's many military bases in the region. Adopt a balanced stance vis-a-vis the Palestine-Israel question, starting with the demand - backed by the threat of withdrawing Washington's annual subsidy, if necessary - that Sharon withdraw all troops and settlements from the occupied territories.
Of course, those who rule America have no intention of doing anything of the kind. Both the Republican and Democratic parties are dedicated to continuing the policies that have allowed the US to exercise economic, political and military hegemony over the region and in the world. Yes, a derivative of these policies has resulted in September 11, but despite the official hand-wringing about terrorism, it is apparently well worth the inconvenience in order to extend US domination over the Middle East and the liquid gold beneath its burning sands.
Anyway, isn't it just a matter of getting better "intelligence" from the FBI and the CIA?
Jack A Smith was the former chief editor of the now defunct US progressive newsweekly The Guardian, and presently the editor of a newsletter devoted to political activism. He resides in the Hudson Valley region of New York in the US.

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.
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Kim ends secretive China visit
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has completed a highly secretive visit to China where he reportedly discussed his country's nuclear standoff with the US.
There was official silence about the visit until it ended, but diplomats said China urged Mr Kim to soften his stance on the nuclear issue.
Mr Kim also reportedly discussed Pyongyang's ailing economy and visited a model farm at the end of his stay.
China is a key ally of North Korea and a mediator in the nuclear standoff.
Jiang Zemin told him the possibility of the US invading North Korea is very slim, indirectly suggesting he should change North Korea's tough line
South Korean newspaper Munhwa Ilbo
Mr Kim is believed to have arrived in China on Monday, but there was no mention of his visit in China's official media until Wednesday, when state broadcaster CCTV said the two countries had reached a "broad consensus" on a range of issues, including the nuclear crisis.
China's Xinhua news agency said the two sides had agreed to "continue jointly pushing forward" for six-party talks aimed at resolving the crisis, though it gave few further details.
"Leaders of the two parties and the two countries, amid a cordial, friendly and candid atmosphere, briefed each other on their respective domestic conditions, and exchanged views and reached wide-ranging consensus on further developing the relations between the two parties and the two countries, international and regional situations and the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula," Xinhua said.
During his stay, Mr Kim held talks with China's president and military officials, including ex-president Jiang Zemin, who remains in charge of the military.
Mr Kim voiced doubts about whether he would win the security guarantees he wants in return for stopping his nuclear programme, the South Korean newspaper Munhwa Ilbo said.
"Jiang Zemin told him the possibility of the US invading North Korea is very slim, indirectly suggesting he should change North Korea's tough line," it reported.
Model farm
Multi-party talks on the issue have made little progress on how North Korea's programme could be dismantled, or how Pyongyang's energy and security concerns would be addressed.
In February, China said North Korea had agreed to push towards a third round of international talks.
Xinhua quoted Mr Kim as saying North Korea would continue to take part in the talks, and that its approach would be "patient and flexible".
Discussions on North Korea's economy also figured prominently during Mr Kim's visit, his first since a new leadership was installed in Beijing last year.
The North Korean leader asked China's leaders for help with reforms and for aid, South Korean media said.
Mr Kim's party reportedly visited a model farm near Beijing on Wednesday, before he started a 15-hour journey back home on his special train.
The farm, which used to be poor but is now one of the richest in the country, pursued a rapid modernisation programme in the 1980s, according to South Korea's Yonhap news agency.
The secrecy surrounding Mr Kim's visit was not unusual.
His two previous known trips to China since 2000 were confirmed by the two governments only after he returned home.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3644787.stm
Published: 2004/04/21 10:53:36 GMT

? BBC MMIV
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>> WHAT TOOK YOU SO LONG?


Russia: High-Level EU Delegation Travels To Moscow To Discuss WTO Bid
By Ahto Lobjakas

A high-level European Commission delegation headed by President Romano Prodi heads to Moscow tonight for two days of talks with President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials. EU officials in Brussels say the visit will center on Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although recent progress has been made on the issue in talks between Moscow and Brussels, Russia might still have to wait before getting a green light from the EU.
Brussels, 21 April 2004 (RFE/RL) -- EU officials today downplayed speculation that a deal is about to be made on Russia's WTO membership.
Speaking in Brussels today, Matthew Baldwin, a top European Commission trade official, said Russia appears interested in speeding up talks, and may be hoping to strike a deal in time for the EU-Russia summit in May.
He said the EU is willing to support Russia's WTO timetable but cautioned that Brussels will not compromise on important issues simply in order to meet tight deadlines.
Baldwin indicated a breakthrough on the contentious issue of energy pricing may not be too far off. He said Russia has retreated from its earlier insistence that energy policy remain outside the WTO talks.
Arancha Sanchez, a spokeswoman for the EU's trade commissioner, Pascal Lamy, said the EU has made clear it is not trying to force a particular energy policy on Russia.
Instead, she said, the bloc is simply concerned with what it sees as preferential treatment given to Russian operators in the energy field in comparison with their EU counterparts.
"Energy is not the issue," Sanchez said. "It's trade-related energy questions that are the issue. As Matthew [Baldwin] said, we're not trying to regulate, through the WTO entry of Russia, what kind of energy policy they need to have. That's their own sovereign decision. If you talk about export duties on energy, export duties is clearly an issue that is regulated at the WTO. If you talk about freedom of transit, this is clearly an article of the WTO-GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] agreement. "
The EU is concerned by Russia's policy of charging EU companies four or five times more for gas than Russian counterparts are expected to pay.
"Some very tough things are out there, some very big political issues surrounding things like aircraft tariffs, car tariffs." -- Matthew Baldwin, a top European Commission trade officialBaldwin today said this practice gives Russia's industrial enterprises an unfair advantage over their EU competitors.
He said, however, that Russia has "in principle" accepted that an increase in domestic energy prices is inevitable. The question that remains is to what level and how fast.
Baldwin also underlined the importance for the EU of an energy partnership with Russia. Some 25 percent of the bloc's total gas consumption comes from Russia, as does 20 percent of its crude-oil imports.
Baldwin said the main issue for the 22-23 April meetings is customs tariffs -- a complex question that is likely to play a decisive role in EU-Russia talks overall.
"We've had complexities arising also from Russia's desire to protect its growing tax base -- and obviously you cut tariffs, you reduce your tax base. Now, our guys in Russia have been working very hard on this during the course of this week. We hope to make progress; some very tough things are out there, some very big political issues surrounding things like aircraft tariffs, car tariffs. That is the tough [issue] this week, and depending on how all that goes we'll have more or less a sense of how long the whole negotiation can go," Baldwin said.
Baldwin said talks are stalled on a number of issues. He mentioned financial sectors such as insurance and banking, where the EU wants its companies to be able to branch directly into Russia without having to set up local subsidiaries. Another key concern is the telecommunications sector. The EU has rejected recent Russian attempts to establish a monopoly on long-distance phone services.
Russia's WTO talks with the EU are complicated by a number of other important outstanding issues, such as the extension of the EU-Russia partnership to the bloc's new member states. Russia's unwillingness to sign the Kyoto Protocol on global warming is another obstacle.
Apart from the EU, Russia will also need to negotiate deals with its other major trade partners -- such as the United States and China -- before it can enter the WTO.

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>> THE VISION THING 2...

Health Savings Accounts: How To Broaden Health Coverage for Working Families
by Nina Owcharenko
WebMemo #481

April 16, 2004 | printer-friendly format |


Embodied in the recently enacted Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 were provisions to establish Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) for the general population. These accounts, while not directly related to reforming the troubled Medicare program, do offer a new health care coverage option for the non-Medicare population. HSAs offer a variety of unique benefits, including more choice, greater control, and individual ownership.

There are two key components to a Health Savings Account: (1) a high-deductible health plan and (2) a tax-preferred savings account. However, in order to qualify for the tax-preferred savings, a high-deductible health plan must accompany the account. The law establishes some basic parameters for both of these design features:

High-Deductible Health Plan (HDHP). A high-deductible health plan is a health plan that establishes a higher deductible for an individual to meet before the insurance plan begins to pay. Such plans help to reduce the premium but still provide protection from unexpected, catastrophic health care expenses.

To qualify for an HSA, a high-deductible plan must have a minimum deductible of $1,000 for an individual policy and $2,000 for a family policy. The maximum annual out-of-pocket spending (including deductibles and co-pays) can be no more than $5,000 for an individual and no more than $10,000 for a family. Such HDHPs are able to have first-dollar coverage for preventive care and allow for higher out-of-pocket payments (co-pays and co-insurance) for non-network services.

Tax-Preferred Savings Account. A tax-preferred savings account allows an individual to make deposits and distributions for health care expenditures "tax free" without a tax penalty. An individual may establish this tax-preferred savings account in conjunction with the HDHP.

The law establishes several basic rules for contributing to such an account. The maximum that can be contributed is the lesser of (1) the amount of the high deductible or (2), as specified by law, $2,600 for an individual and $5,150 for a family. Besides the individual owner of the account, an employer and others can contribute on behalf of the individual. "Catch-up" contributions are allowed for individuals who are 55 and older; however, contributions must stop once the individual is eligible for Medicare.

The law also establishes rules for distributions from account funds. Primarily, distributions can be made "tax free" if used for "qualified medical expenses" as described in existing law. They may not be used to pay for other health insurance except for (1) coverage while unemployed, (2) COBRA, and (3) qualified long-term care insurance. For those who are eligible for Medicare, the accounts may be used for the following: (1) Medicare premiums and other out-of-pocket expenses relating to Medicare and (2) the employee share of employer-based (retiree) coverage.
The Evolution of Health Savings Accounts

Even before the enactment of Health Savings Accounts, efforts to give individuals greater control of their health care spending were well underway. A variety of "consumer-directed" approaches still exist today, albeit with some awkward constraints. Health Savings Accounts attempt to overcome those constraints by combining the positive features of the existing approaches while making them more accessible and useful for consumers.

Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs). These tax-advantaged account options, offered through an employer, allow employees to set aside pre-tax dollars through salary reduction. The funds in these accounts can be used for medical and dental expense not covered by insurance. However, any funds left over at the end of the year are forfeited to the employer. Similar to FSAs, HSAs allow for the tax-preferred savings element, but they also permit an individual to carry over any unused funds from year to year, allowing those funds to accrue along the way.
Health Reimbursement Arrangements (HRAs). These employer-sponsored arrangements enable employers to make a financial contribution on behalf of their employees to help reimburse them for medical expenses. Any unused funds can be carried over from year to year but remain the property of the employer. Many employers combine these arrangements with a high-deductible health plan to ensure catastrophic protection. HSAs maintain the carry-over provisions of the HRA and require the high-deductible component; unlike HRAs, however, they grant ownership of the account and plan to the individual, not the employer, thereby giving the consumer full control and allowing for full portability.
Medical Savings Accounts (Archer MSAs). These accounts, similar to the new HSAs, were strangled by excessive and restrictive regulations. Not only were the accounts temporary, but the number available was limited to 750,000, and they were offered only to businesses with fewer than 50 employees and/or self-employed. Furthermore, contributions could be made only by the employee or the employer, not by both, and could not exceed 65 percent of the deductible for an individual policy and 75 percent for a family policy. The minimum deductible was set at $1,700 for an individual and $3,450 for a family policy. These restrictions, among others, confined the access and market opportunities of the Archer MSAs. As outlined earlier, the HSA keeps the basic framework of the traditional Archer MSA but gets rid of the numerous regulatory and design obstacles challenging MSAs in order to create a more conducive and stable marketplace for HSAs.
Recommendations

While HSAs are now law, their practical implementation is still critical. Several steps can be taken to ensure the success of Health Savings Accounts. For example:

Further rulings by the U.S. Treasury Department should remain broad and flexible. A variety of issues, such as the interaction between HSAs and HRAs/FSAs, remain unresolved and will need attention. Thus far, Treasury has been particularly accommodating in establishing the parameters within which these accounts can exist. It is important that such interpretations continue in order to encourage a responsive marketplace for HSAs.
States must make all legislative and regulatory changes needed to ensure that HSAs have market access. In some instances, state legislative and regulatory changes may need to be made in order to accommodate the availability of HSAs. For example, states may need to change their tax laws to adapt to the tax-free accounts. Changes or an exemption from state-mandated benefits may also be in order to ensure that HDHPs are qualified in the state.
All employers should integrate an HSA option into health benefit offerings for their employees. HRAs open up opportunities for businesses of all sizes to offer their employees a new coverage option. This includes federal and state employee benefit plans. With health care spending on the rise, an HSA helps to re-engage employees with their health care spending while giving employers the ability to make the transition from a defined benefit system, with open-ended costs, to a defined contribution system in which health care spending can be better managed.
Policymakers should encourage HSAs for the uninsured since they offer an alternative to more costly first-dollar coverage policies. Uninsured individuals will find that, due to the high-deductible component, the monthly premiums will be much lower than premiums for traditional policies. The HSA design ensures that individuals remain protected against unexpected, catastrophic medical costs while allowing them to save for future health care expenses tax-free.
Conclusions

Health Savings Accounts offer Americans a new coverage option for their health care needs. They give them a new choice in coverage design, greater control of their health care spending, and the ability to own their own health care plans. These are all key features in moving America's health care system to a consumer-based system.

To build a true consumer market, individuals should have access to all available coverage options. There should be a level playing field between each option, whether it is an HSA, an HMO, a PPO, or another form of coverage. Individuals should be able to choose, without penalty or artificial incentives, the policies they feel best fit their needs. Members of Congress should continue to look for ways to facilitate a system of consumer choice that will allow individuals to select the plans that best suit their individual medical and financial needs.

Nina Owcharenko is Senior Policy Analyst in the Center for Health Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
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>> 4...

'Dying Diana' pictures set to spark outrage
April 22, 2004 - 11:30AM

Pictures of a dying Diana, Princess of Wales are due to be broadcast on television in the United States, it emerged today, in a move that is set to provoke outrage.
Clarence House declined to comment on the matter but the images will no doubt bring further distress to Princes William and Harry, who have faced continued conspiracy theories.
They have also had to contend with old video footage of the princess talking about her life that was recently aired on US TV.
The never-before-seen photographs will show the stricken princess moments after the 1997 car crash in Paris, which led to her death hours later.
The pictures will be shown on the US network CBS, which said it had attained a copy of the confidential French investigation report into the crash.
CBS's 48 Hours program has obtained thousands of pages of confidential documents, including the forensic analysis and post-mortem examination of the driver Henri Paul and analysis of the car.
A program spokeswoman said the show would also include images of Diana at the scene after the crash, and would look at persistent rumours that the Princess was pregnant when she died.
According to CBS, the report says Mr Paul was receiving money from an unknown source.
Diana's former protection officer Ken Wharfe and Patrick Jephson, her chief of staff, are interviewed on the show.
They tell of the great lengths they went to to hide Diana's marriage difficulties, and how she conducted extramarital affairs.
Diana and Dodi Fayed were killed in the crash, which also claimed the life of driver Mr Paul.
A spokesman for Mohamed al Fayed said Dodi's father was waiting to see what the broadcast contained but that the use of photographs of Diana in the aftermath of the crash would be "distressing and distasteful".
Chester Stern said: "I know he would be upset by this."
He added: "All we know of is the stills which appeared in newspaper offices that night in Britain which were not published by the editors.
"We have always believed that was the correct decision.
"It would be distressing and distasteful."
Mr al Fayed has staged a lengthy legal battle against paparazzi photographers who were following Diana and Dodi that night for invasion of privacy.
Mr al Fayed tonight accused CBS of cashing in on the tragedy.
He said: "This was a crime - the murder of two innocent people.
"CBS obviously don't care about the appalling effect of showing images of murder victims.
"They simply want to cash in on the tragedy.
"It is disgraceful and insensitive of them to do this.
"It is devastating for me and for Prince William and Prince Harry."

PA

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>> AHEM 5...

Blushes at the Bundesbank

Apr 21st 2004
From The Economist Global Agenda

The Bundesbank has a new president, to replace the disgraced Ernst Welteke. But does Europe have too many central bankers for its own good?
AFP

Welteke regrets
Get article background

OH, TO be a central banker! A monopoly supplier of a much sought-after commodity (money), you have no competitors to worry about and no voters to answer to. You get a month between meetings and, to hear the European Central Bank tell it, all your decisions are made by cosy consensus.

Axel Weber, a professor of economics based in Cologne and an independent adviser to the German government, is the latest recruit to this privileged guild. On Tuesday April 20th, he was named as the new head of Germany's Bundesbank, a position that will also give him a vote on euro-area interest rates at the European Central Bank. Desirable as his new job may be, Mr Weber will be careful not to enjoy it quite as conspicuously as the man he replaces, Ernst Welteke.

Mr Welteke resigned last Friday, to end a two-week controversy over a hotel bill for ?7,661 (then around $7,200), paid by one of the commercial banks the Bundesbank helps to supervise. Mr Welteke and his family ran up the bill at one of Berlin's fanciest hotels while attending a party to celebrate the introduction of euro notes and coins at the start of 2002. After the junket came to light in the German press, Mr Welteke apologised, and he and the Bundesbank repaid the money. But that was not enough to save his job. Officials will now hesitate before accepting such junkets and jollies in the future.

Mr Welteke did not go quietly. Trust between him and the finance ministry had been "destroyed", he complained in his angry resignation letter. False claims leaked to the media were assailing his integrity and that of the Bundesbank, he said.

Several German newspapers have speculated that the finance ministry had tipped off the press about the hotel visit, which the ministry strongly denies. It wanted Mr Welteke gone, so the speculation goes, because he was critical of the government's budget deficit and wanted to keep the proceeds from a possible sale of Bundesbank gold away from the finance ministry's hands. Certainly, Hans Eichel, Germany's finance minister, did not rush to defend his former colleague in the state government of Hesse. "I consider it is not acceptable that the chief representative of the Bank, which also has supervisory functions, should accept a holiday for himself and his family paid for by a bank which is under supervision," he told Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

This lack of discretion on the part of the Bundesbank's boss may have encouraged Gerhard Schr?der, Germany's chancellor, to look outside the bank for Mr Welteke's successor. Mr Weber is no monetary naif: he "knows the central banks in Europe like the back of his hand," said Klaus Zimmermann, president of the DIW, a Berlin think-tank, according to the Reuters news agency. But Mr Weber will step into his new role at the Bundesbank unencumbered by any of the rancour and bitterness of the Welteke quarrel.

He will also arrive at the ECB at a delicate moment for European monetary policy. Europe's recovery has not proceeded as smoothly or as strongly as the ECB must have hoped. Surveys of confidence and activity are patchy. Inflation is comfortably below the ECB's ceiling of 2%. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development thinks a rate cut might be necessary. On the other hand, the euro has come down from its highs at the start of the year, and inflation may have bottomed out. Mr Schr?der has already called on the ECB to cut rates. But fears that he would appoint a political flunky to the Bundesbank to carry out his bidding have proven unfounded. Mr Weber is widely seen as an independent figure.

Even if Mr Schr?der does not get the interest-rate cut he wants, he will still be grateful to be spared any more of Mr Welteke's sermons on fiscal policy. Mr Welteke used the "bully pulpit" of the Bundesbank to call for tighter belts and bolder reforms in Germany. His unceremonious fall may deter anyone else from mounting the pulpit any time soon. That may be a pity. Six of the single currency's 12 member states are this year forecast to run deficits above the ceiling of 3% of GDP set in the euro area's stability and growth pact. The European Commission, the guardian of the pact, was defanged by member states last November when it tried to sink its teeth into the two most egregious offenders, France and Germany. It thus falls more than ever to the ECB and its governors to promote whatever co-ordination is possible between the euro area's 12 independent fiscal policies.

The ECB has no formal powers or responsibilities in the fiscal realm, of course. But it can still employ "moral suasion" and the implicit threat of higher interest rates. In America, for example, budgetmakers in the White House and Congress go looking for the approval, however tacit, of the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. He never gives his explicit endorsement, of course, but presidents and congressmen tend to claim it anyway.

Unfortunately, sermons on the virtues of lean government by Europe's central bankers ring hollow. The European System of Central Banks, as the ECB and the 12 national central banks are jointly called, is bloated and rife with duplication. The euro area employs twice as many central bankers as the United States, in proportion to their populations. Some of those monetary mandarins are also paid much more highly than their transatlantic equivalents. Mr Welteke, for example, earned more than twice Mr Greenspan's salary. He topped a Bundesbank payroll that, despite staff cuts last year, still exceeds 14,000--a number worthy perhaps of the bank's past role as monetary hegemon of Europe, but less suited to its new status as one of 12 "branch offices" of the ECB.

The slimming down of Europe's central banks should start at the top. At the moment, the ECB's monetary policy is made by 12 governors from the national central banks plus six ECB executives. Eighteen is already too many, argues Francesco Giavazzi of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, a London think-tank. The rate-setting committee would become quite unworkable should the remaining 13 members of the enlarged EU join the single currency. The ECB has proposed capping the number of voting seats at 21. It would reserve six for ECB officials and four for Italy, Spain, Germany, France and Britain (should it adopt the euro). The remaining seats would rotate among the other euro members according to a complicated formula that ensures Luxembourg, a tiny country with a relatively large financial system, votes more often than Poland, a large country with a relatively small financial system. Such a committee, critics suggest, would be unfair as well as unwieldy: a rigged game of musical chairs.

The single currency's champions always argued that it would usher in a leaner, more efficient Europe, as national industries that used to duplicate each other consolidated and operated at a more efficient, euro-wide scale. Europe's system of central banks, guardians of the single currency, should embrace this beneficial trend. As Mr Giavazzi points out, a smaller rate-setting council would be more decisive and less tied to national governments. It would also have fewer hotel bills to pay.

Copyright ? 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
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SPIEGEL ONLINE - 21. April 2004, 18:16
URL: http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,296407,00.html
Aufruhr an Bundesbankpr?sidenten-Uni

"Achtung, alle Vorlesungen finden statt!"

Von Tim H?finghoff

Die Universit?t K?ln freut sich, dass mit Axel Weber einer ihrer Hochschullehrer neuer Bundesbank-Pr?sident wird. Einige Studenten bringt der Aufstieg des Professors aber in N?te: Sie f?rchten um ihre eigene Karriere.
DDP
"Summa cum laude: W?hrungswissenschaftler Axel Weber mit Finanzminister Hans Eichel
Das Telefon stand nicht mehr still. Im Sekretariat des Lehrstuhls f?r Internationale ?konomie an der Universit?t zu K?ln meldeten sich pausenlos besorgte Studenten. Alle hatten nur eine Frage: "Wie geht es mit meinem Studium weiter?" Am Dienstagabend war durchgesickert, dass der K?lner Wirtschaftsprofessor Axel Weber neuer Bundesbankpr?sident werden soll, nachdem Ernst Welteke wegen der Adlon-Aff?re von seinem Amt zur?ckgetreten war.
Die Mitarbeiter von Axel Weber beruhigten die Studenten und platzierten auf der Webseite des Instituts die Meldung: "Achtung: Alle Vorlesungen finden wie gewohnt statt!" Im H?rsaal wurde Axel Weber, der nach Berlin zu Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schr?der und Finanzminster Hans Eichel eilte, durch einen Assistenten vertreten.
An der Universit?t l?ste die Entscheidung, Weber f?r das Amt zu nominieren, Freude aus: "Wir sind sehr stolz", sagt Pressesprecher Wolfgang Mathias, "aber es ?berrascht uns nicht total." Grund: Schon h?ufiger seien Absolventen der WISO-Fakult?t sp?ter ber?hmt geworden. Bundespr?sident Karl Carstens studierte ?konomie in K?ln und seit 20 Jahren arbeiten immer wieder Professoren aus K?ln als Wirtschaftsweise im Sachverst?ndigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
Ein Ruf wie Donnerhall
Die Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakult?t in K?ln ist mit 9700 Studenten die gr??te in Europa. "Die Fakult?t ist sehr attraktiv, weil sie nicht nur eine hohe wissenschaftliche Reputation, sondern auch einen hohen Praxisbezug hat," sagt Mathias.
Juergen B. Donges, 63, Professor f?r Wirtschaftspolitik, nutzte die Weber-Wahl, um in seiner Vorlesung den Praxisbezug des K?lner Studiums anzupreisen: "Was man hier lernt, kann man auch in der aktuellen Wirtschaftspolitik nutzen."
Donges war bis 2001 Vorsitzender der Wirtschaftsweisen, bis ihn Axel Weber im Sachverst?ndigenrat abl?ste. "Wir freuen uns, dass es einer von uns ist", sagte Donges. "Ich habe mit allen gerechnet, aber Weber hatte ich nicht auf meiner Liste."
Weber werde ein Bundesbankpr?sident werden, der sich "nicht von der Politik in die Enge treiben l?sst", glaubt Donges. Er beherrsche die wissenschaftliche Argumentation auf hohem Niveau. Im Rat der Europ?ischen Zentralbank wird Weber die Bundesbank vertreten und die europ?ische Geldpolitik mitbestimmen.
Stationen in Gro?britannien, USA und den Niederlanden
Seit November 2001 lehrt Weber an der Universit?t K?ln Neue Internationale Makro?konomik und Au?enwirtschaftslehre. Zuvor war er Professor f?r Angewandte monet?re ?konomie an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universit?t Frankfurt am Main.
Weber studierte von 1976 bis 1982 Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Verwaltungswissenschaften an der Universit?t Konstanz und promovierte 1987 in Siegen mit "Summa cum laude". Nach Stationen in Gro?britannien, den Niederlanden und den USA habilitierte er sich 1994 an der Universit?t Siegen. Seit 1998 ist er Direktor des Center of Financial Studies in Frankfurt am Main und gilt als Experte f?r Geldpolitik und internationale Wirtschaftspolitik.
Nicht nur Professoren auch Studenten loben den designierten Bundesbankpr?sidenten: "Es ist sehr schade, das Weber nun f?r die Lehre ausf?llt", sagt der Vorsitzende der WISO-Fachschaft, Joscha Brun?en.
Unter den Studenten gilt Weber als f?higer Praktiker und Didakt. "Als Professor hat er gute Qualit?ten und kann den Stoff gut vermitteln", sagt Gloria Rose, 25, die im zehnten Semester VWL studiert. "Ich halte ihn f?r einen der besten Professoren an der Universit?t." Weber habe p?dagogische F?higkeiten, von denen sich andere Professoren noch viel abschauen k?nnten. Er sei gut vorbereitet und gehe immer auf spontane Fragen der Studenten ein. Es habe ihr Spa? gemacht, sich auf Webers Vorlesungen vorzubereiten, erz?hlt Rose. "Dieses Gef?hl hatte ich an der Uni sonst noch nie."
F?r das Amt beurlaubt
Philip Vogel, 26-j?hriger VWL-Student im neunten Semester, beschreibt Weber weniger schmeichelhaft: "Er wirkte auf mich, als ob er die Lehre nicht immer so ernst nimmt." Weber mache lieber einw?chige Blockveranstaltung, als Vorlesungen ?ber einige Wochen verteilt zu halten. "Manchmal glaube ich, er will Ruhe vor den Studenten haben." Andere Studenten bezeichnen Weber auch als eitel.
Ob exzellent oder eitel, die Universit?t K?ln muss sich schleunigst um einen Vertreter f?r Weber bem?hen. "Weber bleibt der Fakult?t erst einmal erhalten und wird f?r die Zeit bei der Bundesbank beurlaubt", sagt Pressesprecher Mathias. Aber nach der Zeit bei der Bundesbank komme Weber bestimmt wieder nach K?ln zur?ck.
Studentin Gloria Rose plagen andere Sorgen: "Die Nachricht, dass Weber geht, ist schockierend", sagt Gloria Rose. "Ich wollte bei ihm Diplomarbeit schreiben."

? SPIEGEL ONLINE 2004
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Copenhagen Consensus

Curbing disease

Apr 15th 2004
From Economist.com

Across the developing world, disease causes a vast toll of avoidable suffering

IN RECENT years, researchers have developed methods to confront a range of diseases--illnesses, in many cases, that put an especially heavy burden on the world's poor. Across much of the planet, but particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the costs of diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS are enormous. So it would seem that the opportunities to do good by spending money wisely on treatment and prevention are very promising. A Copenhagen Consensus* "challenge paper" by Anne Mills and Sam Shillcutt of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine reviews the literature and tries to weigh the costs and benefits of different kinds of intervention.

The article concentrates on approaches that might be taken to control malaria and HIV/AIDS, and in addition on the economics of better basic health services. Malaria and HIV/AIDS cause enormous human and economic harm in developing countries, even though cost-effective methods for controlling them are well understood. There is also a strong case for looking at the broader issue of basic health services. This is because better services would not only directly reduce the burden of many treatable or preventable diseases, but also because some additional investment in these services may be necessary, or at the very least helpful, in improving the cost-effectiveness of interventions aimed specifically at malaria and HIV/AIDS.

The authors explain that the links between illness and economic loss are complicated. In the literature, two main approaches have been taken to study them. The first relies on microeconomic studies. Work of this kind looks at how disease affects individual households or people. One drawback of this approach, though, is that it neglects the broader effects of disease on the economy as a whole. As a result, this method may underestimate both the costs of disease and the benefits of combating it more effectively.

The second approach is to take a macroeconomic view: that is, to measure the influence of a disease on income at the level of the whole economy. This can be done by comparing different economies, to see how far high incidence of disease is correlated with lower incomes, other things being equal. This method is better in principle at capturing all the economic implications of disease, but it has problems of its own. Above all, of course, other things are never equal--so it is often difficult to be sure whether it is differences in the incidence of disease, or other influences, which are determining the differences in economic well-being.

The authors emphasise various shortcomings of the existing research. Differences in data and methods mean that comparing results across studies, countries and different periods is hit and miss. For some diseases, too little useful work has been done. Only two recent macroeconomic studies of malaria have been published, for instance, and thinking on methods and data is therefore at an early stage. Macroeconomic studies of HIV/AIDS are more plentiful, but give wildly differing results, "ranging from minimal impact on per capita income to a massive impact". Another difficult issue is that, in calculating health costs, it is sometimes necessary to put a value on life: the authors take a year of life to be worth a year's national income per head for the country concerned, a plausible working figure but nonetheless an arbitrary one. There are particular difficulties as well in expressing costs and benefits that are spread over time in a way that allows useful comparisons to be made.

Healthy and wealthy?

Nonetheless, the paper presses on, drawing where it may on an occasionally sparse and frequently inadequate literature, gleaning results from many different studies using many different methods of research. Despite all the complications and uncertainties, the answer that emerges is pretty clear: the best new investments in the control of communicable diseases would yield huge economic benefits. Across a wide range of interventions, and for all three categories of initiative under review--control of malaria, control of HIV/AIDS and improved basic health services--benefits typically exceed costs by a wide margin.

In some cases, the economic opportunities are simply spectacular. A programme to prevent HIV in Thailand, for instance, achieved a ratio of benefits to costs of 15 to one--a figure that governments could scarcely dream of achieving for typical public-investment projects in other economic sectors. A malaria-control programme in South Africa actually resulted in net cost savings, so that it paid for itself even before the benefits of the initiative were taken into account.

In its World Development Report of 1993, the World Bank proposed a package of health interventions, organised around the idea of scaling up basic health services. It included such efforts as expanding immunisation against measles, poliomyelitis, tetanus, whooping cough, yellow fever and hepatitis-B; AIDS prevention; school health programmes (aimed especially at treating intestinal worms); treatment of TB; treatment of sexually transmitted diseases; family planning; and so on. Considered as a package, the plan would be expensive by the standard of proposals in this area, but not so expensive, you might think, when seen in context: one estimate puts it at $12 per person in low-income developing countries and $22 in middle-income developing countries, for a developing-world average of $15 per person. This spending would, it is argued, reduce the economic burden of disease by some 32%, 15% and 25% respectively, with a net economic benefit on the order of $500 billion, and a ratio of benefits to costs of 2.6.

So far as establishing priorities among different health programmes is concerned, the authors conclude that it is unclear, given the present state of knowledge, whether better results can be gained from a concentrated effort to deal with specific diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS or from a strategy based on broader improvements in basic health services. To some degree, however, the two approaches overlap--and they are certainly not, in any case, mutually exclusive. In short, the evidence suggests that efforts to control disease offer an unusually good opportunity to spend aid productively.

* The Copenhagen Consensus project, organised by Denmark's Environmental Assessment Institute with the co-operation of The Economist, aims to consider, and to establish priorities among, a series of proposals for advancing global welfare. The initiative was described in our Economics focus of March 6th. That article, along with other material, can be read here.


Copyright ? 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.

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Economics focus

A remedy for financial turbulence?

Apr 15th 2004
From The Economist print edition

In the first of a series of articles on the Copenhagen Consensus project*, we look at financial instability

THE severity and frequency of financial crises, especially the combined currency and banking collapses of the past decade, have made financial instability a scourge of our times, one that bears comparison with damage inflicted by famine and war. In a new paper for the Copenhagen Consensus, Barry Eichengreen, from the University of California, Berkeley, has reviewed the literature, attempted to count these costs, and to weigh them against the costs of a particular proposal for remedial action.

The costs can be reckoned in stalled growth and stunted lives. The typical financial crisis claims 9% of GDP, and the worst crises, such as those recently afflicting Argentina and Indonesia, wiped out over 20% of GDP, a loss greater even than those endured as a result of the Great Depression. According to one authoritative study, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 pushed 22m people in the region into poverty. For developing countries, currency crises are an important subset of financial crises. Mr Eichengreen, while cautioning against taking the precision of such estimates too seriously, reckons that the benefit which emerging-market countries would reap if such crises could be avoided altogether would be some $107 billion a year.

One ready way to secure those benefits, you might think, would be to stifle financial markets. In impoverished parts of Africa, for example, credit crunches are relatively rare, because credit is always hard to come by. But as a rule such a solution would be more costly than the problem. Wherever financial markets are absent or repressed, savings go unused, productive economic opportunities go unrealised and risks go undiversified. If India's banks and stockmarkets were as well developed as Singapore's, India would grow two percentage-points a year faster, according to one study.

To grow fast, and keep growing quickly, countries need deep financial markets--and the best way to deepen financial markets, most economists agree, is to liberalise them. Does this mean that countries must open their financial markets to foreign capital, thus exposing themselves to the risk of currency crises? Or should they impose capital controls, confining the perversity of financial markets to national borders, where the central bank retains the power to offset it? Foreign direct investment aside, China's capital markets are still largely closed to outsiders. Yet it has no shortage of credit. For other countries, though, the evidence is mixed. A fair reading of the studies, and there have been many, suggests that, for most countries, opening up to foreign capital will deliver faster growth in most years--punctuated by a damaging financial crisis about every ten years. Some economists argue that periodic credit crunches are the price emerging markets must pay for faster growth.

What might be done to make financial crises less common? The answer depends on the causes of financial meltdown. Governments bring some crises on themselves by pursuing fiscal and monetary policies that are inconsistent and unsustainable. Such self-defeating policies may be the symptom of deeper flaws in the body politic. If so, there is little outsiders can do. But some countries' financial fragility results simply from their need for foreign investment. In the most susceptible countries, firms and banks borrow heavily in dollars, while lending in local currencies. If the value of the local currency wobbles, this mismatch between domestic assets and foreign liabilities is cruelly exposed.

Why are the assets and liabilities of emerging markets so ill matched? Perhaps because poorly supervised and largely unaccountable managers have scant reason to be careful with other people's money. But Mr Eichengreen offers another reason. International investors are very choosy about currencies. Most consider only bonds denominated in dollars, yen, euros, pounds or Swiss francs. This select club of international currencies is locked in for deep historical and structural reasons. Thus, poor countries that want to borrow abroad must bear currency mismatches through no fault of their own.

Match-making
If this is the problem, possible solutions follow naturally: either create a common world currency, used by rich and poor alike, or invent a liquid, international market for bonds denominated in the pesos, bahts and rupiahs that emerging markets are obliged to use. The first solution, even if it were desirable, is politically impossible; the second is merely very difficult. Mr Eichengreen spells out in his study an ingenious plan to make it a little easier. Briefly, he proposes the creation of a market for lending and borrowing in a synthetic unit of account, a weighted basket of emerging-market currencies. Such bonds would be popular with investors, since the currency would be more stable than the sum of its parts and, at first at least, carry attractive yields. Importantly, such a market, if it could be established, would eventually let emerging-market economies tap foreign capital without currency mismatches. This is because those, such as the World Bank, that issued such bonds would be keen to reduce their exposure to the basket by lending to the countries in that basket in their own currencies.

However, there is a cost: the extra yield that the Bank and others would need to offer to attract buyers of the new instruments. Mr Eichengreen estimates that this initial cost would be no more than $545m a year--a small sum compared with the $107 billion that would be saved if currency crises could be avoided.

* The Copenhagen Consensus project, organised by Denmark's Environmental Assessment Institute with the co-operation of The Economist, aims to consider, and to establish priorities among, a series of proposals for advancing global welfare. The initiative was described in our Economics focus of March 6th. That article can be read here, along with other material, including an article on disease published only online this week.


Copyright ? 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
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>> AHEM 6...

Le mythe de l'origine du sida li?e ? un vaccin polio contamin? r?fut?
LEMONDE.FR | 21.04.04 | 21h10
La th?orie qui attribue l'apparition du sida ? un vaccin polio oral contamin?, utilis? dans les ann?es 50 en Afrique, dans l'ancien Congo Belge, est "r?fut?e" par une ?quipe internationale conduite par un biologiste de l'?volution am?ricain, "preuve directe" ? l'appui. Leur recherche para?t dans la revue scientifique britannique Nature dat?e de jeudi.
Selon cette th?orie, persistante malgr? de solides arguments allant ? son encontre, rel?vent les chercheurs, la transmission du sida ? l'homme r?sulterait d'une contamination de ce vaccin par du virus du sida du singe (VIS). Michael Worobey, biologiste de l'?volution ? l'universit? d'Arizona, est retourn? sur place en 2003 en R?publique D?mocratique du Congo (RDC), dans la r?gion de Kisangani, Stanleyville ? l'?poque. Les chercheurs ont ainsi d?couvert un nouveau variant du virus du sida du singe - le VIScpzRDC1 (en Anglais SIVcpzDRC1) - parmi les chimpanz?s de cette r?gion.
La nouvelle souche de VIS n'est pas l'une de celles dont est issu le VIH-1, le virus responsable de la pand?mie du sida humaine, affirment les chercheurs, apr?s analyse g?n?tique. "Cette d?couverte apporte une preuve directe que ces chimpanz?s (de la r?gion en cause) ne sont pas la source de la pand?mie de sida humaine" et "r?fute la th?orie du vaccin" polio contamin?, ?crivent-ils.
Pour d?fendre leur point de vue, les chercheurs s'appuient en tout cas sur le fait qu'ils n'ont pas trouv? dans les 97 pr?l?vements de selles de chimpanz?s recueillis de virus apparent? ? celui du sida humain .
BARRI?RE D'ESP?CE
Deux journalistes am?ricains, Tom Curtis (1992, magazine Rolling Stone) et Edgard Hooper (1999, livre The River), ont mis en cause le vaccin anti-polio de l'Am?ricain Hilary Koprowski administr? de 1957 ? 1960 ? un million de personnes, en grande partie dans l'ex-Za?re (RDC).
Hooper a d?velopp? une th?orie reliant cette campagne de vaccination exp?rimentale et l'apparition du sida, arguant que des tissus de chimpanz?s, potentiellement contamin?s, auraient servi ? fabriquer cette ancienne version de vaccin oral. Les scientifiques sont d'accord sur un point : le virus du sida humain (VIH) a pour anc?tre un virus de l'immunod?ficience simienne (VIS) du chimpanz?. Mais reste ? d?terminer quand et comment ce virus de singe a franchi la barri?re d'esp?ce pour passer ? l'homme. Selon l'?tude, le nouveau virus du chimpanz? appartient ? une branche diff?rente de l'arbre g?n?alogique ("phylog?n?tique") des virus de chimpanz? apparent?s au VIH.
S'appuyant sur leur d?couverte et les analyses ant?rieures d'?chantillons du vaccin de l'?poque montrant l'absence de VIS, de VIH ou d'ADN de chimpanz?, les chercheurs estiment que l'hypoth?se reliant le sida ? ce vaccin contre la poliomy?lite "devrait ?tre abandonn?e". M.Worobey a poursuivi cette recherche en m?moire d'un confr?re britannique renomm?, Bill Hamilton, mort de paludisme en 2000 au retour de la premi?re exp?dition. Worobey d?sire maintenant "?tudier cette zone g?ographique, pr?lever plus d'?chantillons, comprendre comment le virus simien se maintient et se transmet parmi les chimpanz?s et comprendre pourquoi il (sa version humaine) est si pathog?ne pour l'Homme mais pas pour le chimpanz?". Ce travail est co-sign? par d'autres chercheurs za?rois, britanniques et am?ricains.
Avec AFP

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L'imam salafiste de V?nissieux, favorable ? la lapidation, a ?t? expuls? pour "atteinte ? l'ordre public"
LE MONDE | 21.04.04 | 13h58
Abdelkader Bouziane ?tait sous le coup d'un arr?t? depuis le 26 f?vrier. Ses propos sur le droit de battre les femmes dans le mensuel "Lyon Mag" ont pr?cipit? son d?part mercredi.
Lyon de notre correspondante

Abdelkader Bouziane, 52 ans, a ?t? expuls?, mercredi 21 avril, au matin et plac? dans un avion en partance pour l'Alg?rie, son pays d'origine. Le ministre de l'int?rieur, Dominique de Villepin, avait d?cid? la veille d'appliquer imm?diatement l'arr?t? d'expulsion de cet imam salafiste de V?nissieux (Rh?ne), pris le 26 f?vrier par son pr?d?cesseur Nicolas Sarkozy.

La parution des propos de l'imam, qui avait d?fendu au nom du Coran la lapidation des femmes dans le num?ro d'avril du mensuel Lyon Mag a pr?cipit? son d?part.

M. Bouziane avait ?t? interpell? mardi apr?s-midi ? Lyon et conduit au centre de r?tention Saint-Exup?ry dans l'attente de son expulsion. Depuis vingt-quatre heures les propos de cet imam de la mosqu?e dite "de l'Urssaf" avaient soulev? une vive pol?mique. Dans un entretien paru d?but avril dans Lyon Magun mensuel lyonnais, le responsable musulman, avait justifi? au nom du Coran l'inf?riorit? de la femme, sa lapidation, la polygamie, et le pros?lytisme. "Battre une femme, expliquait-t-il dans le magazine, c'est autoris? par le Coran, mais dans certaines conditions, notamment si la femme trompe son mari. Dans ce cas, son mari peut la frapper."

L'imam posait juste une restriction, "ne pas frapper n'importe o?" : "pas au visage, mais viser le bas, les jambes o? le ventre". "Il peut frapper fort pour faire peur ? sa femme, afin qu'elle ne recommence plus", pr?cisait-il en affichant sans d?tours sa polygamie, avec deux femmes qui lui ont donn? seize enfants.

Premier responsable politique ? r?agir, le d?put? et maire communiste de V?nissieux, Andr? Gerin avait rendu public lundi 19 avril un courrier envoy? le jour m?me au ministre de l'int?rieur et au garde des sceaux pour leur demander si une enqu?te avait ?t? diligent?e et leur annoncer son intention de d?poser plainte "pour atteinte ? l'ordre public et ? la R?publique". Interrog? sur France 2, Dominique Perben avait assur? mardi 20 avril qu'il avait demand? d?s la parution du mensuel ? la direction des affaires criminelles du minist?re de la justice "d'examiner comment une action en justice pourrait ?tre engag?e". Dans l'apr?s-midi, le parquet de Lyon d?cidait d'ouvrir une enqu?te pr?liminaire tout en pr?cisant n'avoir re?u aucune instruction pr?cise de la Chancellerie.

APPELS AU DJIHAD

En fait, le minist?re de l'int?rieur disposait, de son c?t?, de renseignements sur cet imam, surveill? depuis plusieurs mois. Une enqu?te administrative d?clench?e plusieurs mois avant son arr?t? d'expulsion, avait alert? la place Beauvau sur des pr?ches jug?s "contraires aux valeurs r?publicaines" d'Abdelkader Bouziane, qui s'?tait pos? en chef spirituel des groupes salafistes de la r?gion lyonnaise.Arriv? en France en octobre 1979, comme imam dans une mosqu?e de Ch?lons-sur-Marne, il aurait ensuite rejoint une mosqu?e de Villefranche-sur-Sa?ne, puis celle de la Duch?re ? Lyon avant de se former plusieurs mois en Arabie Saoudite, puis de s'installer ? V?nissieux. Portant barbe et gandoura, l'homme refusait d'?tre film? ou photographi?. Selon les policiers, il aurait lanc? des appels au djihad contre les int?r?ts am?ricains depuis le d?clenchement de la guerre en Irak.

EXPLIQUER LA LOI DU CORAN

Le minist?re de l'int?rieur redoutait qu'il favorise la constitution de groupes islamistes radicaux. Sa mosqu?e ?tait ?troitement surveill?e depuis l'arrestation d'un pr?parateur en pharmacie de V?nissieux, interpell? en m?me temps que l'imam Benchellali, le 6 janvier 2004. Le maire de V?nissieux a pr?cis? qu'il ne disposait, lui, d'aucune information particuli?re sur l'imam Bouziane :"Je ne le connaissais pas et je n'avais re?u aucune alerte sur ses pr?ches".

L'expulsion de l'imam ne cl?t pas l'enqu?te, m?me si les magistrats lyonnais restent sceptiques sur la possibilit? d'une action visant l'imam pour ses propos tenus dans Lyon Mag. L'enqu?te devrait faire la lumi?re sur les conditions de cette interview. Journal habitu? aux "coups" et ? la provocation, Lyon Mag affirme disposer de l'enregistrement de l'entretien, d'une dur?e d'une heure trente, dont seule une petite partie a ?t? publi?e. Interrog? avant son interpellation, mardi, l'imam a confirm? qu'il avait bien tenu ces propos mais seulement pour expliquer la loi du Coran. "La religion autorise cela, mais si la loi en France m'interdit de pr?cher de tel discours, je respecte la loi", a-t-il soutenu.

Les propos de l'imam ont en tout cas provoqu? un v?ritable toll? en France. Responsables politiques et religieux se sont relay?s pour s'indigner. Dalil Boubakeur le pr?sident du conseil fran?ais du culte musulman s'est dit lui "exc?d? d'?tre sans cesse harcel? par une m?diatisation compl?tement irresponsable autour de propos extorqu?s ? des imams frustres et ignorants qui alimente une islamophobie insupportable".

Sophie Landrin

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"Des propos d'un autre ?ge"

Azzedine Gaci, le secr?taire g?n?ral du comit? r?gional du culte musulman de Rh?ne-Alpes a annonc? que cette organisation allait se r?unir mercredi pour ?voquer l'expulsion de l'imam de V?nissieux. Ce responsable de l'UOIF s'est dit tr?s "choqu?" par les propos de M. Bouziane, "des propos d'un autre ?ge, une lecture ultraminoritaire de l'islam, qui vont ? contresens du travail d'adaptation des musulmans fran?ais". M. Gaci estime que cet incident r?v?le l'urgence qu'il y a en France ? imposer des conditions dans le recrutement des imams, notamment la connaissance de la langue et de l'histoire fran?aise, et l'ind?pendance financi?re, politique et intellectuelle afin que l'islam en France ne soit plus dirig? par l'Arabie saoudite, ou des pays du Maghreb.

* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 22.04.04

Posted by maximpost at 10:54 PM EDT
Permalink

>> APRIL 28 2004...
North Korea Freedom Day
Wednesday, April 28, 2004

Please Donate to NKFC
We need your help to promote human rights in North Korea and make North Korea Freedom Day more than just an event - we would like to make real freedom for North Koreans a reality!

http://www.nkfreedom.org/


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Confronting Evil: North Korea Freedom Day
Chuck Colson (archive)
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/chuckcolson/cc20040405.shtml

April 5, 2004 | Print | Send


In 1992, a North Korean television station aired a show that had a character singing a popular South Korean song.
Ji Hae Nam, who was part of the propaganda arm of North Korea's Workers Party, learned the catchy tune. Months later she was overheard singing the song and was arrested. Detained in a prison awaiting trial, she was beaten and sexually abused by the guards.
Then she was sentenced to three years of "rehabilitation-through-labor" at a brutal prison camp--all this for singing a South Korean song, or as the charge read, "disrupting the socialist order."
There are more than 200,000 prisoners in just five of the twelve North Korean Auschwitz-like camps. Conditions at those camps include systematic torture, arbitrary and cruel treatment of prisoners, extreme deprivation and starvation, and back-breaking forced labor that is so dangerous that accidents leading to disfigurement and death are commonplace.
One former prisoner reports, "At the camp, I witnessed public executions, forced labor, and other inhumane atrocities. A new prisoner in the North Korean political prison camps is taught not to consider themselves as human beings. The prisoners cannot complain of beatings or even murders. Even the children are subject to forced labor, and about one-third of them die of malnutrition and heavy labor."
Meanwhile, the Stalinist regime led by Kim Jong Il keeps itself in power through illegal arms sales, counterfeiting, and narcotics production and trafficking.
In addition, while North Korea receives more food aid than any other nation, more than 4 million North Koreans have starved to death since 1995, including those who have died in the camps. Why? Because food aid is diverted into military stockpiles and into gourmet delicacies, fine wines and liquor, and other luxury items for Kim and members of his elite.
In short, North Korea has what is probably the worst human rights record in the world. Because of the extreme isolation of North Korea , we only guessed at the atrocities until about two years ago. Now as a result of North Korea 's economic relationships beyond the Soviet bloc and a large enough group of refugees and escapees, the ugly truth is out.
In response, the Wilberforce Forum became a founding member of the North Korea Freedom Coalition in order "to bring freedom to the North Korean people and to ensure that the human rights component of U.S. and world policy toward North Korea receives priority attention."
On April 28, 2004 , the Coalition will sponsor "North Korea Freedom Day" here in Washington, D.C. The program includes a rally at the Capitol, congressional hearings, speakers, and music. Participants including North Korean defectors will also lobby on behalf of the North Korea Human Rights Act, a bill that seeks to bring about peaceful changes in North Korea on behalf of people who have suffered too much for too long. Call us here at BreakPoint (1-877-322-5527) or visit www.nkfreedom.org for more details about how you can be involved.
This is another example of how Christians need to take the lead in human rights, connecting a biblical understanding of humanity with practical and political efforts to confront intolerable evil.

For further reading and information:

Visit the website of the North Korea Freedom Coalition for more information on North Korea Freedom Day and other ways you can help. Also see its fact sheet on North Korea .

Jeff Jacoby, " The ordeal of a North Korean in Canada ," International Herald Tribune (from the Boston Globe), 8 March 2004 .

"Christians under dark reign of Kim Jong Il ," Asia News, 28 February 2004 .

Rich Lowry, " Out of the Dark Age ," National Review Online, 10 September 2003.

Read the Statement of Principles for U.S.-North Korean Relations signed by Charles Colson, William Bennett, Nicholas Eberstadt, Robert George, Michael Horowitz, and many others.

Kate Fowler, " Rescue the Perishing, Care for the Dying ," BreakPoint WorldView, January/February 2004.

Visit BreakPoint's resource and fact page on North Korea for more information.

Stand Today also provides other ideas for helping persecuted Christians abroad, including North Koreans .

Nina Shea, In the Lion's Den: Persecuted Christians and What the Western Church Can Do About It (Broadman and Holman, 1997).

Gary Haugen, The Good News about Injustice (InterVarsity, 1999).

John Stott, Human Rights and Human Wrongs (Baker Book House, 1999).


Chuck Colson is founder and chairman of BreakPoint Online, a Townhall.com member group.

?2004 BreakPoint Online
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Christians under dark reign of Kim Jong Il
http://www.asianews.it/view.php?l=en&art=428

Rome (AsiaNews) - During the Beijing summit meetings regarding the North Korean nuclear program requests from many exiled North Koreans were ignored. They had asked to discuss the serious violations human rights and religious freedom occurring in their homeland.
The situation experienced by Christians in North Korea is emblematic of the brutal human rights conditions found in the country. News that manages to leak out of the country speaks of violent persecutions and tight government control of religious freedom and worship.
Such news comes form Christians and political dissidents who have managed to escape abroad, as well as from tourists, government employees, foreign journalists and Christian delegations, whose mobility is limited and mostly restricted to the capital of Pyongyang and immediate surrounding areas.
According to the testimony of a North Korean refugee reported by Forum 18 News Service, some elderly Christians were killed in a small town on the Chinese border. The motive for their killings, which occurred in the year 2000, was because they had refused to renounce their faith. Former North Korean citizens and prisoners, like Soon-Ok Lee, have said that Christians in reeducation camps and jails are treated worse than other prisoners.
Due to the reign of terror which has existed in North Korean, persons living in nearby regions have only discovered after ten years that they shared the same faith. Human Rights Without Frontiers says that in order to escape from police repression Christians meet secretly in groups of ten, often with members of the same family.
In recent years Pyongyang has grown worried about "spiritual pollution" of North Koreans and has attempted to persecute such "corrupt" citizens living abroad. In China, for example, where there are 100,000-300,000 North Korean refugees, Pyongyang has obtained support from Beijing to hunt the "fugitives" down.
A Japanese human rights activist has revealed that the North Korean government built a fake church in China (in Yanji, Jilin province), just 20 km from the border. Chinese police arrested many North Korean refugees there and had them sent back to North Korea. During long interrogations, North Korean government authorities ask the repatriated refugees what kind of contact they've had with South Korean missionaries working in China, if they read the Bible or attend church services. Those they who admit to contact with missionaries or any other religious affiliations and activities are imprisoned and condemned to death. The church's Protestant pastor, as some reports indicate, is being blackmailed by Pyongyang which holds his family hostage.
The situation is not much better in North Korea. In the capital there are only 2 Protestant churches in addition to one priestless Catholic church and a new Orthodox center of worship. Many foreigners who have attended religious services do not believe that the celebrations and faithful are "fake" or dramatized by the government, but all noted that sermons were filled with many political references. Others have said that government propaganda is found to exist within these churches and are not in constant use.
There are no exact figures on the number of faithful and places of worship existing in North Korea. In July 2002, at the request of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the North Korean government released brief and evasive information on the status of Christians living in the country. In terms of Catholic numbers authorities said there were 800 faithful in the country with 2 "centers of public worship" and one sanctuary.
The governments said there were around 12,000 Protestants in North Korea with 2 churches, "500 centers of worship for families" and 20 pastors. In Jan. 2004 an exponent of Baptist Church-run Cornerstone Ministries told the US Commission on Religious Freedom that there were 100,000 Protestant North Koreans.
According to certain estimates there are about 100,000 Christians out of a total population of 24 million in North Korea, of which 12,000 are Protestants and 4000 Catholics. It is said that since communists took over the government in 1953, some 300,000 Christians have disappeared and there are no longer priests or nuns in the country, all likely killed during times of persecution. (MR)

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Rescue the Perishing, Care for the Dying
The Justice We Must Pursue
http://www.pfm.org/Content/ContentGroups/BreakPoint/Columns/Guest_Features/20043/Rescue_the_Perishing,_Care_for_the_Dying.htm
By Kate Fowler

March 18, 2004


This article first appeared in the January/February 2004 issue of BreakPoint WorldView magazine. Subscribe today or order a gift subscription!
All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.--Edmund Burke
Coming from a university setting where choosing dairy over soymilk at the independent, locally-owned latte shop suggested an alarming lack of character, I am well-acquainted with at least one, limited, understanding of social justice. Yet defining justice in terms of "compost vs. recycling" or "bike lanes vs. HOV lanes" falls far short of our calling as Christians to pursue and uphold true and lasting justice among people around the world.
The Christian's call to pursue justice emphasizes the dignity of man--a concern for the other--rather than seeking our own individual rights and "entitlements." It is critical to understand this call, given the countless, atrocious human rights violations around the world. For example, North Korea is deemed by many to be the worst human rights situation on the globe today. Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans are imprisoned in forced labor camps; thousands more are desperately seeking asylum because of its famine and injustice. Their well being should matter to us because seeking and upholding justice is a fundamental principle of the Christian life.
In Isaiah 1:17, we are called to "seek justice, encourage the oppressed. Defend the cause of the fatherless, plead the case of the widow." In James 1:27 we read, "Religion that God our father accepts as pure and faultless is this: to look after orphans and widows in their distress and to keep oneself from being polluted by the world." Isaiah 61:1 says, "He sent me to bind up the brokenhearted, to proclaim freedom for the captives and release for the prisoners." Thus, we are bound by the eternal, universal law of our Creator to administer justice and uphold human dignity.
Nonetheless, many evangelicals dismiss human rights initiatives as a political construct of the ideological left. There is merit in being cautious about social issues. As John Stott warns in his book Human Rights and Human Wrongs: "We will be wise not to blunder unprepared into the minefield of social ethics." He recalls a statement by the late John Mackay: "Commitment without reflection is fanaticism in action, though reflection without commitment is the paralysis of all action."
In his book The Good News about Injustice, Gary Haugen writes:
To say that God is a God of justice is to say that He is a God who cares about the right exercise of power or authority. God is the ultimate power and authority in the universe, so justice occurs when power and authority are exercised in conformity with His standards . . . justice occurs on earth when power and authority between people are exercised in conformity with God's standards of moral excellence.
Given Haugen's definition of justice on earth as an exercise of authority "between people," it is no coincidence that justice and injustice are most pronounced at the point in which human lives are touched. It is equally understandable why collective "social justice" is often co-opted into discussions about human rights. One of the most fundamental principles in God's universal law is that man is created in God's image. As such, we are endowed with a unique capacity and responsibility to be in relationship with God, with others, and with the earth.
It is important to keep in mind that, as Stott writes, "human rights are not unlimited rights, as if we were free to be and do absolutely anything we like. They are limited to what is compatible with being the human person God made us and meant us to be." Thus, human rights must always address, honor, and uphold man's freedom and responsibility as God's image-bearer. And evangelicals in recent years have made great progress in advocating this understanding of human rights.
Human Rights Today
Unlike other monuments that decorate the National Mall in Washington, D.C., marking man's victories, the United States Holocaust museum marks man's depravity in a fallen world. But it tells only one story, marks only one incidence, talks only about the past. Meanwhile, the same evil persists among nations and in individual lives around the world today.
In a Wall Street Journal opinion article, Oklahoma University professor Allen Hertzke drew public attention to contemporary atrocities. He also highlighted and defended the critical role evangelical activism has played in bringing justice and relieving oppression. He described the "massacres, ethnic cleansing, and enslavement by a despotic regime" endured by Christians in Sudan for more than twenty years and applauded evangelical leaders, laymen, and students for their role in the passage of the Sudan Peace Act in 2002. "This story of human rights activism offers one example among many of a new generation of evangelicals quite comfortable in forming coalitions with those they may oppose on some hot-button domestic concerns," Hertzke writes. When it comes to life-and-death issues, differing ideological stands diminish in relevance, and people come together to--as the hymn by Fanny Crosby goes--"rescue the perishing, care for the dying."
Hertzke also highlighted the evangelical-led, bipartisan coalitions that played a dominant and critical role in the passage of: the International Religious Freedom Act in 1998; the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2002, to protect women and children from the multi-billion dollar global sex trafficking industry; the Prison Rape Elimination Act signed by the president last September, to protect U.S. prisoners from rape and sexual assault; and the current initiative by evangelicals in coalition with other groups to bring freedom to the North Korean people under legislation called The Korean Freedom Act, which Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) introduced last fall.
The North Korean Freedom Act currently before Congress includes policy provisions that:
promote family reunification between North and South Koreans;
ensure direct aid and humanitarian relief reaches those in need;
protect refugees by amending and strengthening U.S. and UN immigration and refugee policies;
provide information to North Koreans by increasing the number of radios, newspapers, and democratic broadcasts;
engage South Korea in protecting its neighbor;
and raise public awareness about the situation in North Korea .
This initiative provides evangelicals with an incredible opportunity to pursue justice for North Korean citizens. Included by President Bush as part of the "Axis of Evil," the North Korean government has grossly abused its authority, oppressing its people in a land of darkness.
A Dark Country
Physically, North Korea is dark because economic disaster and chronic misuse of resources by its dictator, the "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il, is so extensive that even in the capital city of Pyongyang, power is cut off entirely at intervals throughout the day. The dire economic conditions have also caused more than 4 million North Koreans to die of starvation or malnutrition since 1995, according to humanitarian relief experts. One North Korean, Chung Goo Nam, who successfully escaped over the Chinese border, recalls, "I remember I went to a warehouse [in North Korea] to catch rats. I caught two rats but they were so thin and with very little meat. One of the things that surprises me in China is that the rats are so fat and big."
North Korea is also a land of spiritual darkness. Its systematic oppression of North Koreans through propaganda and a complex system of government-run gulags is unsurpassed in the world today. Soon Ok Lee became a Christian after observing the faith of persecuted Christians in the prison camp where she labored for six years. She recalls her own suffering once she became a Christian:
You can't imagine the water torture. They forcefully poured ten liters of water into my body. They used a specially designed kettle and inserted the spout into my throat so it was wide open. When I resumed my consciousness, my stomach was full of water. While it was full, the guards put a wide wooden board on my belly and trampled on it to make me vomit. They repeated this procedure several times. Water gushed from my mouth, nose, genitals, and anus. Their twisted faces are bound in my memory as those of wolves and demons.
Soon Ok Lee was imprisoned for the so-called "political crime" of failing to use government funds to pay for her supervisor's personal dry cleaning. Her son and husband were also punished for her alleged crime, and though she was able to reunite with her son after he served five years in a forced labor camp, her husband is still missing. This systematic imposition of guilt-by-association punishment for up to three generations and the frequent application of lifetime prison sentences are both identified as "phenomenon of repression" in a recent report by the U.S. Committee on North Korean Human Rights.
Modest estimates indicate at least 200,000 North Koreans are housed in government-run gulags. But it is likely that as many as a million or more are incarcerated in camps and colonies that have not yet been accounted for, as Suzanne Scholte of the Defense Forum Foundation and other human rights experts attest. Each camp spans up to twenty miles in length and fifteen to twenty miles in width. Prisoners are forced to perform hard labor, such as mining, logging, textile manufacturing, and brickmaking under dreadfully harsh conditions. Prisoners typically work up to twelve hours a day on a daily food ration of eighty grams of cornmeal, lightly salted. "Political crimes" that have resulted in imprisonment include humming a South Korean or American pop song, owning a Bible, complaining about a lack of food, or criticizing the government. North Korea 's oppression depends heavily on its isolation from the rest of the world, giving its leaders the power to control the minds and lives of its people. "We believed unreservedly that we lived in paradise on earth," former presidential bodyguard Lee Young-kuk said of North Korea .
Action and Inaction
Human rights challenges provide evangelicals with a valuable faith lesson. As Gary Haugen recognizes, "In the end the battle against oppression stands or falls on the battlefield of hope." Christians rejoice in the knowledge that their faith alone offers sufficient hope to account for the suffering of the world--Christ's redemption and promise of restoration ensure that. Yet even with the progress of evangelical activism, in the policy realm it is still too often Christians who abandon these issues to the political left.
Stott explores this phenomenon in a section titled "The paradox of our humanness" in Human Rights and Human Wrongs: "We human beings have a unique dignity as creatures made in God's image and a unique depravity as sinners under His judgment. The former gives us hope, the latter places limits on our expectation." He illustrates this principle as the tendency of Christians to assimilate too easily to either a "right" or "left" political ideology, both of which inevitably distort the true balance and tension of our call to live God-honoring lives. "Each [extreme political ideology] attracts because it emphasizes a truth about human beings," he writes, "either the need to give free play to their creative abilities or the need to protect them from injustice. Each repels because it fails to take with equal seriousness the complementary truth. Both can be liberating. Both can also be oppressive."
While this observation affirms the legitimate tension Christians often feel when it comes to pursuing justice through tangible programs, it does not in any way excuse Christians from thoughtful political action and awareness. Instead of resisting this tension, he argues, by embracing the truth of this paradox and choosing instead to live within that tension, Christians can better learn how to view justice and human rights policy not simply as a means to an end, but as a tool to better inform and cultivate an understanding of God's call to seek justice.

In December 2003, Kate Fowler , government affairs specialist for the Wilberforce Forum, traveled to Boliviato minister to impoverished children and prostitutes. She holds a bachelor's in journalism from the Universityof Coloradoat Boulder.
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The ordeal of a North Korean in Canada
Jeff Jacoby The Boston Globe
Monday, March 8, 2004

Fleeing Kim's tyranny

BOSTON If you have ever started to emerge from one nightmare only to find yourself plunged into a new one, you will find the ordeal of Ri Song Dae frighteningly familiar.
In August 2001, Ri entered Canada with his wife and their 6-year-old son, Chang Il. They were defectors from the monstrous dictatorship in North Korea and had come to Canada to seek asylum.
For 10 years, Ri had been a low-level trade functionary, periodically sent abroad to purchase foodstuffs. He had long known of the savage brutality of Kim Jong Il's regime, of course; no government official could fail to be aware of it. What finally prompted him to flee was seeing the horrible treatment meted out to escaped North Koreans who were caught and returned. According to human rights monitors, that treatment includes humiliation and torture, typically followed by slow starvation and slave labor in a prison camp - or public execution.
Ri filed a formal claim for refugee status for himself and Chang Il four months after arriving in Canada, but by then his second nightmare had begun. His wife, browbeaten by her Japanese parents for her "betrayal," attempted to commit suicide, then agreed to leave her husband and son and return to North Korea. She was executed in April 2002. Ri's father was executed as well, in keeping with the North Korean policy of ruthlessly punishing not only "criminals," but also their parents and children.
On Sept. 12, 2003, more than two years after Ri's plea for asylum was filed, Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board issued its ruling. It was an Orwellian stunner.
A board member, Bonnie Milliner, ruled that Ri's young son was entitled to stay in Canada, since he would face severe persecution if he were returned to Pyongyang. But Ri's appeal for refugee protection was denied, even though Milliner agreed that "he would face execution on return to North Korea." Why would Canada send a man back to his certain death? Because, Milliner wrote, "there are serious reasons for considering that (Ri) has committed crimes against humanity by virtue of his longstanding membership in the Government of North Korea."
In other words, Ri was deemed complicit in crimes against humanity solely because he had held a government job. Milliner acknowledged that there was no evidence he had committed atrocities. But Ri knew of the regime's savagery yet waited 10 years to defect. To the immigration board, that added up to a case for sending him back to be killed.
If the board's decision were to stand, Ri would be sent off to die, and his 6-year-old would be an orphan. His prospects grew even bleaker on Feb. 20, when Milliner's ruling was upheld by Canada's citizenship and immigration ministry. Canadians express pride in their country's humanitarian values, but it has been hard to detect any of those values as this case has moved through the Canadian bureaucracy.
Fortunately, Ri received a last-minute reprieve. On Wednesday, Public Safety Minister Anne McLellan granted him permission to stay in Canada indefinitely, since his life would be in danger if he were deported. Her decision effectively overruled the earlier decrees. Ri's long nightmare may at last be over.
Back in North Korea, however, there are no happy endings. News media coverage of Kim Jong Il's government has been focused on its illegal nuclear weapons program and its proliferation of missile technology. But even more ghastly is the suffering it inflicts on its own people.
The Los Angeles Times reported Wednesday on the use of political prisoners as chemical weapons guinea pigs. A senior North Korean chemist who escaped in 2002 described a testing chamber that was outfitted with a large window and a sound system so scientists could see and hear the victims' reactions when they were sprayed with the lethal poison.
"One man was scratching desperately," the defector testified. "He scratched his neck, his chest. . . . He was covered in blood. ... I kept trying to look away. I knew how toxic these chemicals were in even small doses." It took, he said, three agonizing hours for each man to die.
When I wrote in The Boston Globe last month about North Korea's concentration camps and gas chambers, many readers wrote to ask: What can I do? The first and most important step is to learn more. Three excellent sources of information on North Korea are The Chosun Journal (www.chosunjournal.com), the Citizens Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (www.nkhumanrights.or.kr), and the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (www.hrnk.org). They should be the first stop for anyone for whom "never again" is not just an empty slogan.
Ri Song Dae and his son are safe, but 22 million North Koreans remain trapped, at the mercy of the most evil government on earth. Learn what is happening to them. Cry out in protest. This is not a time for silence.
Jeff Jacoby's column runs regularly in The Boston Globe.

Copyright ? 2003 The International Herald Tribune
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Statement of Principles for U.S.-North Korean Relations



A repressive, powerfully armed communist regime headed by an odious despot creates a crisis in relations with the U.S. and the world's democracies. It does so by threatening nuclear war if the world's noncommunist powers fail to accede to its demands. The crisis manufactured by the regime results from its acute internal crisis of legitimacy and survival, and from the mounting collapse of its economy. The regime demands formal negotiations leading to economic assistance and broad support for its internal security. In particular, the regime demands formal U.S. and international recognition of the permanence of the borders under its control.
Faced with strong political pressures both at home and from U.S. allies to negotiate over the regime's "peace for security" demand, the president of the United States agrees to do so.
But the president takes a simple additional step; he broadens the negotiating agenda to make the regime's human-rights practices a legitimate item for discussion. Eager to begin negotiations over its "political-security basket" of demands, eager to establish trade relations and receive economic support, unable to sustain the public position that its internal security depends on the denial of basic human rights, and confident of its ability to repress human rights once its economy and security receive outside support, the regime accepts the president's negotiating proposal.


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This scenario is neither contemporary nor fanciful. It describes events in which the dictator was Leonid Brezhnev not Kim Jong Il, and the regime the Soviet Union, not North Korea.

History will record President Nixon's 1972 agenda-broadening decision as one of the wisest of modern history--one that converted a blustering threat from a nuclear-armed regime into a major cause of its implosion. The decision trumped and negated the false but damaging charges then being made that the U.S. was indifferent to the specter of war with the Soviet Union. It placed on the bargaining table more than the appeasement-or-war, red-or-dead "choices" the Soviets sought to posit. It rescued the world's democracies from being defensive respondents to crisis and helped bring about widespread liberation.

Beginning with the Soviet Union's initial agreement to a Helsinki process, the Brezhnev demands culminated in the Helsinki Agreement of 1975. The Soviet Union gained what it had primarily sought, and what proved meaningless: formal recognition of the permanence of its Eastern European borders. Yet what it gave in return--formal acknowledgment of the legitimacy of such rights as the free exchange of people, open borders and family reunification--opened the floodgates of dissent and led to its collapse.

The animating insight of Helsinki was that by publicly raising human rights issues to high priority levels, the U.S. would set forces in motion that would undermine the legitimacy of the communist empire. And so it turned out to be.

At the nongovernmental level, such monitoring groups as Czechoslovakia's Charter 77, Poland's Solidarity and Russia's Helsinki Monitors emerged from the Helsinki Agreement--often fragile, frequently persecuted, but nonetheless real and, as we know today, deathly potent to their totalitarian targets. At the governmental level, Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe review mechanisms gave U.S. negotiators a means of achieving the release of significant numbers of named political prisoners. As a result, dissident artists and cultural leaders, rebellious students, Jewish refuseniks, Pentecostal ministers and other gulag victims became brave icons of hope within and without the Soviet Union. Their freedom liberated others to challenge the regime's authority.

The "rights basket" of Helsinki issues thwarted the Soviet Union's efforts to create and exploit great divisions within the West over how best to respond to nuclear blackmail. They also unified the Free World by illuminating to its people the fundamental values they shared.


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Confronted today with significantly less potent threats from Kim Jong Il than those made by Brezhnev, the world's democracies are nonetheless faced, as they were in the early 1970s, with the zero-sum trap of either rewarding North Korea for violating its prior commitments or appearing indifferent to its threats of nuclear war.

Based on the lessons of Helsinki, we strongly believe that the U.S. must neither directly nor indirectly license a fragile and oppressive Pyongyang regime to commit heightened atrocities against its own people in exchange for yet another promise not to pose nuclear threats to the world order. We also believe that the U.S. can enter into formal negotiations with Pyongyang in a manner that promotes American and universal ideals and creates unity with our allies.

With that in mind, and acknowledging the complexity of all foreign policy decisions, we call upon President Bush to take the following steps:

Respond positively to Pyongyang's demand to negotiate with the U.S. over exchanging monitored renunciation of nuclear weaponry for a U.S. commitment of military "nonaggression"--but on condition that Pyongyang agrees to negotiate over allowing institutions that promote such human rights as the free exchange of people, religious liberty, open borders and family reunification.
Express willingness to negotiate an "economic basket" of issues in which the U.S. will consider lifting trade sanctions and offering economic assistance--but on condition that Pyongyang takes monitored steps that satisfy the president's newly announced "millennial standards" making U.S. foreign aid contingent on the adoption of market-based and rule-of-law reforms.
Announce, in simple, stark terms, that the central U.S. objective toward North Korea is the promotion of democracy so that its people can enjoy the same rights and progress enjoyed by the people of South Korea.
Significantly enhance U.S. public diplomacy toward North Korea. This can be achieved through steps including:
Greatly expanding the current, scandalously inadequate four-hour-a-day Korean-language Radio Free Asia broadcasts;
Investigating, compiling and disseminating the human-rights abuses of the regime through expanded satellite photography of gulags and broadly available computerized databanks; and
Paying special attention to the regime's religious persecution through expanded funding for investigations by the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom.
Give priority status to the plight of North Korean refugees and senior-level defectors. This can be achieved through many steps, including:
Pressing the Russian and, most particularly, Chinese governments to allow the reasonable processing of the refugee claims of North Korean escapees;
Strongly insisting that the U.N. High Commission for Refugees should invoke its express powers under a Dec. 1, 1995, China-UNHCR treaty to obtain binding international arbitration to resolve any dispute involving the failure of the Chinese government to give UNHCR personnel "at all times . . . unimpeded access to refugees."
Supporting the Brownback-Kennedy bill granting North Korean refugees the same Lautenberg Amendment rights to U.S. refugee status as are now provided to Cuban refugees;
Discreetly but actively encouraging senior-level defections by senior North Korean officials by aggressively countering the regime's disinformation campaign regarding the fate of post-collapse Soviet officials, and by offering financial support and amnesty for key defectors; and
Providing assurances to South Korea, China and Japan that the U.S. will assume a significant share of the financial costs of any collapse of the Pyongyang regime--thereby allaying a major if largely unacknowledged source of support for continuing the regime in power.


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The lessons of Helsinki allow the crisis now created by the Pyongyang regime to be seen as an opportunity for, not a threat to, the free world. They allow the U.S. to focus the current debate on the regime's policies of persecution and starvation and to the massive failure of its economic policies. They allow the president to strengthen democracy and human rights throughout the world, to strengthen the bonds of alliances now temporarily strained by efforts to portray the U.S. as indifferent to Korean peninsular peace, and to maintain his determination never to allow rogue regimes to benefit from threats or broken promises.

We believe that little is lost, and much gained, by immediately broadening negotiations with the Pyongyang regime to include the plight of those who live under its rule. As such, we call on the president to do so--in furtherance of historic American values, and the national interests of the U.S., its allies and the world at large.

Signed,

Leith Anderson William Bennett Charles Colson Nicholas Eberstadt Robert George Michael Horowitz Max Kampelman Penn Kemble Dianne Knippers Richard Land Richard Neuhaus Michael Novak Marvin Olasky Mark Palmer Nina Shea Radek Sikorski R. James Woolsey

This statement appeared in the Wall Street Journal on January 18, 2003.


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For further information:

BreakPoint Commentary No. 030129, "Chips Worth Bargaining For."

Stand Today offers many ways citizens can help persecuted Christians in North Korea and elsewhere. Also see BreakPoint's list of human rights organizations.

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Out of the Dark Age
A coalition floats a real Korean sunshine policy.
http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/lowry091003.asp


Will President Bush replicate one of Bill Clinton's worst foreign-policy failures?
The administration said last week that it will contemplate sending aid to North Korea before the nation has dismantled its nuclear program. At the end of this path is potentially the kind of deal Clinton cut, with Pyongyang gobbling up international goodies while, one way or the other, maintaining its weapons programs.
This approach will be celebrated by Bush's critics. It will allow them to bellow a delicious "told you so" about Clinton's Agreed Framework of 1994, casting it as the only realistic answer to the crisis, embraced by even the reluctant Bushies.
But there is another way in North Korea. A bipartisan coalition of conservatives, liberals, Christians, Korean Americans, and human-rights activists -- led by Sen. Sam Brownback, a Republican from Kansas -- is rising to promote an entirely different approach based on the premise that there can be no peace and security on the Korean peninsula without the collapse of the current regime in Pyongyang. The coalition's weapon in the struggle with the North is one of the most powerful the United States has -- the promise of freedom -- and it plans to wield it forcefully.
This will be considered inconvenient by South Korea. If there is a villain in the current Korean crisis besides the lunatic Kim Jong Il, it is Seoul. For the South Korean government, the worst threat isn't a totalitarian, nuclear-armed North, but the prospect of an enormous new line in its budget, with the fiscal strains that would come with the collapse of Pyongyang and reunification. South Korea thinks a good demilitarized zone makes for a good neighbor, even if the neighbor happens to be a prison camp.
South Korea calls its posture toward the North, in a perverse misnomer, "the sunshine policy" when it is really meant to keep the North plunged in darkness. The rising coalition wants a true sunshine policy, exposing the evil of the North, affording its people access to outside information, and offering the opportunity of escape.
A major bill that is set to be introduced in Congress would require the U.S. government to make reports on the North Korean human-rights situation, including releasing satellite photos of the gulag system, and to hold a series of hearings on persecution in North Korea. It would try to bring the outside world to the North, with extensive American radio broadcasting and the provision of transistor radios for North Koreans.
Importantly, the draft bill seeks to make it easier for North Koreans to leave the country. If North Koreans were allowed to vote with their feet, the Dear Leader would lose in a landslide. The model is Hungary and East Germany, where an immigration outflow in 1989 created the crisis that collapsed the Eastern Bloc.
There are an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 North Koreans already living in China. The bill would condition funding for the United Nations on its entering binding international arbitration with China over the status of North Korean refugees. China treats them as economic migrants who can be sent back to North Korea in the most brutal fashion possible, when they are really refugees who cannot be repatriated.
Meanwhile, U.S. immigration policy toward North Korea is shockingly stingy (if North Koreans were Mexicans, they would get much more generous treatment). The bill would make it possible for as many as 30,000 North Korean refugees to enter the United States this year, creating pressure -- by example -- on the South to honor its commitment to welcome North Korean refugees.
The bill's architects contemplate using an even more forceful stick: A provision would stipulate that South Korea gets no U.S. aid to handle the collapse in Pyongyang unless it has had a hand in helping bring it about. If all South Korea cares about is its budget, this at least should get its attention. And maybe one day again the South will understand that human rights, not bribes, is the answer in North Korea.


? 2003 by King Features Syndicate

-- Rich Lowry is author of the upcoming Legacy: Paying the Price for the Clinton Years.
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>> IRAQ...

Second Thinking
What I got wrong about Iraq.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, April 19, 2004, at 11:04 AM PT


At least there's no question about the flavor of the week. It's a scoop of regime-change second-thoughts, with a dash of "who lost Iraq by gaining it?" Colin Powell, who has never been wise before any event (he was for letting Bosnia slide and didn't want even to move an aircraft carrier on the warning--which he didn't believe--that Saddam was about to invade Kuwait), always has Bob Woodward at his elbow when he wants to be wise afterwards. Richard Clarke has never been asked any questions about his insistence that the United States stay away from Rwanda. Many of those who were opposed to any military intervention now tell us that they always thought it should have been at least twice as big.

To give an example of the latter school: E.J. Dionne in the Washington Post has just instructed his readers that Fallujah and the Sunni triangle would more likely have been under control the first time around, except that we refused the offer of help from the Turks. Dionne, whose politics are an etiolated version of the Dorothy Day/Michael Harrington Catholic-pacifist school, is the soft-Left's William Safire in this thirst for Turkish power. At the time, I thought it was impressive that the United States refused Turkey's arrogant pre-condition, which was a demand that Turkish troops be allowed into Iraqi Kurdistan. Apart from the fact that there was and is no threat from that quarter, such a concession would have negated our "regime change" claims.

Now we hear on all sides, including Lakhdar Brahimi of the United Nations, that de-Baathification was also a mistake. Can you imagine what the antiwar critics, and many Iraqis, would now be saying if the Baathists had been kept on? This point extends to Paul Bremer's decision to dissolve the Baathist armed forces. That could perhaps have been carried out with more tact, and in easier stages. But it was surely right to say that a) Iraq was the victim of a huge and parasitic military, which invaded externally and repressed internally; and b) that young Iraqi men need no longer waste years of their lives on nasty and stultifying conscription. Moreover, by making it impossible for any big-mouth brigadier or general to declare himself the savior of Iraq in a military coup, the United States also signaled that it would not wish to rule through military proxies (incidentally, this is yet another gross failure of any analogy to Vietnam, El Salvador, Chile, and all the rest of it).

In parallel with this kind of retrospective brilliance, we continue to hear from those whose heroic job it is to keep on exposing the open secret. Fresh bulletins continue to appear from the faction that knows the awful truth: Saddam's Iraq was considered a threat by some people even before Osama Bin Laden became famous. I still recommend Kenneth Pollack's book The Threatening Storm as the best general volume here. Published well before the war and by a member of the Clinton NSC whose pre-Kuwait warnings had been overruled by the first Bush administration, it openly said that continuing coexistence with Saddam Hussein had become impossible and that the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, made it thinkable at last to persuade public opinion that this was so. More than any other presentation, this prepared the ground for the intervention. I remember it being rather openly on sale and being considered the argument that you had to beat.

Pollack rested more of his case than he now finds comfortable on the threat from Iraqi WMD. That these used to be a threat is no more to be denied than the cheerful fact that we can now be sure that they no longer are. (And being sure is worth something, by the way, unless you would have preferred to take Saddam's word for it.) So, should it now be my own turn? What did I most get wrong? Hell, I'm not feeling masochistic today. But come on, Hitchens, the right-thinking now insist that you concede at least something.

The thing that I most underestimated is the thing that least undermines the case. And it's not something that I overlooked, either. But the extent of lumpen Islamization in Iraq, on both the Khomeinist and Wahhabi ends (call them Shiite and Sunni if you want a euphemism that insults the majority), was worse than I had guessed.

And this is also why I partly think that Colin Powell, as reported by Woodward, was right. He apparently asked the president if he was willing to assume, or to accept, responsibility for the Iraqi state and society. The only possible answer, morally and politically, would have been "yes." The United States had already made itself co-responsible for Iraqi life, first by imposing the sanctions, second by imposing the no-fly zones, and third by co-existing with the regime. (Three more factors, by the way, that make the Vietnam comparison utterly meaningless.) This half-slave/half-free compromise could not long have endured.

The antiwar Left used to demand the lifting of sanctions without conditions, which would only have gratified Saddam Hussein and his sons and allowed them to rearm. The supposed neutrals, such as Russia and France and the United Nations, were acting as knowing profiteers in a disgusting oil-for-bribes program that has now been widely exposed. The regime-change forces said, in effect: Lift the sanctions and remove the regime. But in the wasted decade of sanctions-plus-Saddam, a whole paranoid and wretched fundamentalist underclass was created and exploited by the increasingly Islamist propaganda of the Baath Party. This also helps explain the many overlooked convergences between the supposedly "secular" Baathists and the forces of jihad.

When fools say that the occupation has "united" Sunni and Shiite, they flatter the alliance between the proxies of the Iranian mullahs and the Saudi princes. And they ignore the many pleas from disputed and distraught towns, from Iraqis who beg not to be abandoned to these sadistic and corrupt riffraff. One might have seen this coming with greater prescience. But it would have made it even more important not to leave Iraq to the post-Saddam plans of such factions. There was no way around our adoption of Iraq, as there still is not. It's only a pity that the decision to intervene was left until so many years had been consumed by the locust.


Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair and a regular contributor to Slate. His most recent book is Blood, Class and Empire He is also the author of A Long Short War: The Postponed Liberation of Iraq.
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>> IRAQ ...""
Postwar Constitution-Building:
Comparing America's Situation with Iraq's Yields a Dismal Picture of Iraq's Likely Future
By EDWARD LAZARUS
elazarus@findlaw.com
----
Thursday, Apr. 15, 2004
The explosion of violence in Iraq has temporarily shifted the issue of "nation-building" off the front page. It has replaced that issue, instead, with the more pressing question of whether Iraq can be saved from utter chaos.
But assuming that the U.S.-led coalition can restore a semblance of order in the streets, the process of nation-building - its excruciating difficulty, and tantalizing hope - will regain its standing. In the end, that process will act as the ultimate test for whether history will judge the U.S. invasion as a wholesale disaster, albeit one mitigated by the removal of a terrible despot, or at least a partial success.
When this happens, a central focus will be the creation of a new Iraqi Constitution. Somehow this document, which is the subject of a raging debate, must provide the architecture for a democratic state that is hard even to imagine at the moment.
Rarely has a document had to bear such weight. With the disappearance of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the raison d'etre for the war, the liberation of the Iraqi people and the creation of a model democratic state have become the Administration's chief justifications for U.S. involvement in Iraq. Naturally, a real working Constitution - not some Soviet-style parchment of extravagant but meaningless guarantees - is essential to the creation of such a democracy. Thus, the Iraqi nation's fate significantly depends on the success of the Iraqi Constitution's Framers.
With these stakes in mind, it seems worth comparing some of the challenges facing Iraq with those that faced the American colonies after our Revolutionary War. The results of this thought experiment - even if briefly indulged - are depressing indeed.
America's Experience: From the Revolution, to the Constitution
After the Revolution, the Founding Fathers faced four profound structural questions for the government they were redesigning through the Constitution -- the new document that would replace the Articles of Confederation, which had proved grossly inadequate.
First, the Constitution's Framers had to strengthen the federal government (which had proven too weak under the Articles), without unduly diminishing the power of individual states. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government had had little power. But under the Constitution, things were very different.
In the Constitution, the Framers established a federal government of enumerated powers, with sufficient flexibility to meet whatever contingencies might arise. Meanwhile, the states retained significant authority over matters that did not require a uniform national approach.
Second, the Framers had to find an appropriate balance of power between the small states and the larger states. They solved this problem by devising a bicameral legislature with one chamber organized by state according to population and the other chamber providing equal representation of all states.
Third, the Framers needed to come up with a system of effective government that would not be overly dominated by either the executive or legislative branches. They managed this, as is familiar, through a careful "separation of powers" among three "co-equal" branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial.
And fourth, the Framers had to figure out how to deal with the problem of slavery and the large slave population that existed in the South. Here, they decided on a rather ignominious course - outlawing the slave trade after a substantial period of years, treating slaves as "three-fifths" of a person for determining state representation, and otherwise remaining silent on this potentially explosive subject.
How America's Framers Confronted Constitutional Challenges -- and Nearly Failed
None of this political balancing act came easily. But the Framers were inordinately fortunate to count among their number the wisest and most innovative minds - James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and many others -- of a highly creative moment in history.
They also benefited from all the wisdom they could glean from the rich intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment, to which they were direct heirs. Locke, Montesquieu, and the other great thinkers of this tradition gave philosophical footing to the American nation-building enterprise.
Further, the Framers, and the fledgling nation on whose behalf they were acting, enjoyed the luxury that, for all the difference between a typical Virginian and a typical New Yorker, they had a wealth of shared colonial experience and were united by powerful bonds forged in the fire of the revolutionary struggle against Britain. In short, they had a shared idea about what kind of government they did not want, and enough common experience to find a shared vision for a better way.
Even with all these advantages, the ultimate success of the American experiment was a nearer run they we like to admit. In 70 years, the Constitutional compromise over slavery, having eaten away at the nation's connective tissue, finally split the nation, causing the Civil War. Had it not been for Lincoln's perseverance and a chance turn at the battle of Gettysburg, we might well be two countries now.
The Iraqi Constitution: Facing More Daunting Challenge than Our Own Framers Did
By comparison, the challenges facing the Framers of the Iraqi Constitution seem immeasurably more daunting. The Iraqis have structural problems in spades.
To begin with, the Iraqi Constitution will have to find a workable balance between the interests of the country's Shiite Muslim majority and its ethnic and religious minorities, including the Kurds, who seek a degree of autonomy that the Shiites do not want to yield.
No less important, the Iraqi Constitution will also have to find a path to religious pluralism through the minefield of those Islamic factions who would like to make the country a theocracy. Already the key Iraqi players are at loggerheads about what role to give religious law in determining the laws of the nation.
These potentially intractable issues, moreover, come on top of the usual blockbuster Constitution-writing dilemmas -- such as how much power to give the national government vis-?-vis the regional authorities, and how to divide power within the national government.
Iraq's Framers Lack the American Framers' Advantages
Unfortunately, in confronting these seemingly insurmountable problems, the Iraqis enjoy few, if any, of the advantages that blessed their American counterparts in 1789.
At least according to recent news accounts, there are no Madisons or Hamiltons on the horizon. Instead, the two main Iraqi rivals negotiating over the Constitution's content, Faisal Istrabadi and Salem Chalabi. Istrabadi is a medical malpractice lawyer from Indiana. Chalabi is the nephew of Ahmed Chalabi -- the former exile group leader whose suspect advice turns out to have misled the Bush Administration at just about every turn.
Worse still, it appears that Istrabadi and Chalabi both view the Constitutional drafting process not so much as a way of creating a enduring governmental structure, but as a way of ensuring greater power for their respective political patrons. Istrabadi's patron is Adnan Pachachi, who is likely to become the new Iraq's first president; Chalabi's, unsurprisingly, is Ahmed Chalabi, who is likely to become the new Iraq's first prime minister.
No wonder, then, that Salem Chalabi pushes for a weak presidency and strong prime minister's role: His patron (and uncle) is slated for the prime ministership, so of course he'd like that position to be as powerful -- and the presidency's powers as modest -- as possible.
No doubt such parochialism could be overcome if other stars were in alignment. But the Iraqis have no indigenous philosophical tradition - no modern day analogue to the Enlightenment principles that informed America's Framers- to guide their transition to democracy. Although Iraq, of course, has its philosophers, their subject has been religion, not nation-building.
Nor do the Iraqi Framers have the same kind of deep reservoir of shared experience that served the American Framers so well. To the contrary, the Iraqi Framers operate in the context of a near-civil war.
Remember, this is a country artificially created by outsiders only a few generations ago. Now, the various factions vying to shape the Iraqi Constitution are divided by a history of profound ethnic and religious animosity that only Saddam's brutality kept in check.
The Immense Difficulty of Crafting a Meaningful Constitution For Iraq
All this makes the process of writing a meaningful Constitution darn near impossible. Constitutions may reflect shared purposes, but they really can't be expected to create them.
Of course, the Iraqi people richly deserve democracy: Self-government should be every person's birthright. But entitlement and reality can be worlds apart - and bridging that gap will take nothing short of the Baghdad version of our "Miracle at Philadelphia."
What Do You Think? Message Boards


Edward Lazarus, a FindLaw columnist, writes about, practices, and teaches law in Los Angeles. A former federal prosecutor, he is the author of two books - most recently, Closed Chambers: The Rise, Fall, and Future of the Modern Supreme Court.


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>> ...

Debate simmers on Saudi reform
By Peyman Pejman

RIYADH - Ever since Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, took power in 1995, many citizens have been anxiously waiting for the political reforms he has promised.
The question of the sincerity of the government in this highly conservative and tightly ruled kingdom, the birthplace of Islam, has been subject to unending debate.
Last month the government arrested half a dozen known reform activists. While a few have been released, others are still in custody, adding fuel to the arguments of those who say the government is not sincere about reforms that range from elections, greater involvement in day-to-day affairs, and voting by women, who do not have the right of suffrage in the oil-rich kingdom.
But many Saudis say they are convinced that the process has started and will not make an about-turn. It might not fly, but it will not grind to a halt, they say.
Khaled Batarfi, a political analyst in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia's second-largest city, says what is being debated is not whether to proceed with the reform, but its details: to what end, in which direction and at what speed. "Imagine, all of us, the people of Saudi Arabia, are on a plane, flying from one destination to another. There is no question that all of us would like to reach some destination," he said in an interview.
"The question is, to what destination? Nobody says stop in midair because we know we will crash. Nobody is saying, 'Let's go back.' Nobody is saying, 'Let's throw some people out.' We want more influence on the route [we take]," he said. "What kind of route and what kind of speed. Do we go east or do we go west? Do we go as far Washington or do we stop in Europe?"
With approval from the ruling family, Saudi Arabia has held a number of "national dialogue" conferences, during which hundreds of people from all walks of life - women, Islamists, liberals, professionals - have debated what changes they want to recommend to their leaders for implementation.
"The kingdom is committed to reforms. But reforms will be carried out at the appropriate time, in the appropriate way so as to not disturb the peace and stability of the country," Crown Prince Abdullah said during a meeting last month with Saudi intellectuals.
Many Saudis, whether in the government or not, find themselves in a quandary. On one hand, they want to continue to push their government to remain committed to an acceptable pace of reform. On the other hand, they do not want to be perceived as taking those measures because of pressure from the outside world, especially the United States.
But even those who believe in the government's sincerity are warning that they will not wait forever. Khaled Maeena, an outspoken pro-reform advocate and editor of Arab News, one of the country's two English newspapers, says reform should take place for the sake of Saudis, and not with the purpose of appeasing foreign governments.
"I think we should go with our own speed, but at the same time evaluate that speed. If it is slow, we should push it to a certain decent and respectable speed. We need not be prodded by the West. We have to protect our own interests. But let us remember, time waits for no man," he said.
Maeena said one reason some Saudi Arabians in general, whether officials or ordinary citizens, are hesitant to enforce faster reform is that they fear an invasion of foreign influence in this conservative society. That fear, he said, is baseless.
"There are those amongst us who are afraid from change, saying foreign influence will come. Foreign influence will not come because wherever Islam went, it took: Indian culture, the culture in Spain, culture in Persia, the culture in all these places," Maeena said.
"The Muslims came from the desert but yet they built some of the most beautiful gardens in the world, which is that indication that when bab al-ijtihad, or reason and logic prevailed, then they were able to advance. But if we wallow in self-pity [and say] the cultural invasion in the West is out to get us, then I think we are harming ourselves," he said.
There are, however, those in Saudi Arabia who believe the government is not serious about changes in the first place. Mohsen Awaji, a former political-science associate professor who spent time in jail for Islamic and anti-government activities, admitted that the "reform train has left the station". But, he added, the Saudi ruling family will do anything to stop the progress.
Crown Prince Abdullah's government has promised that the country will hold unprecedented elections by October to choose half of the members of all local councils in the country. "Municipal elections will be the beginning of the Saudi citizens' participation in the political system," Crown Prince Abdullah told a recent session of the Shura Council, the country's unelected consultative assembly.
The foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, similarly remarked that Saudi Arabia "has reached a stage in our development that requires expanding political participation".
Pro-reform activists hope this will lead to holding nationwide elections, even with the participation of women, who currently do not have the right to vote.
Awaji said that if the government were serious about holding elections, it would have started preparing people for the process. But this, he said, has not happened so far.
"You see, election means they have to adopt the idea of elections before the propaganda. The idea of the elections means that they have to allow the people to participate in ruling this country," Awaji said.
Saudi officials have said the pace of the reform will be dictated by the country's social and political norms and culture. They say faster-than-needed reform will cause instability in the country and leave the doors open for increased activities by terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, that have carried out a number of bombings in the country in the past year.

(Inter Press Service)
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>> MAHATIR LEGACY WATCH...


Malaysia's MSC: Super corridor or dead end?
By Ioannis Gatsiounis

KUALA LUMPUR - Nothing in Malaysia so embodies former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad's vision for the nation than the 50-kilometer stretch of palm and rubber-patched plains between the airport and the capital. Known as the Multimedia Super Corridor and ballyhooing world-class infrastructure, it was intended to attract foreign capital, trigger a technological revolution and lead the nation to fully developed status by 2020.
To Mahathir it was the next logical leap. The economy under his feisty 22-year rule had transformed from agrarian-based to export-manufacturing-driven. Why stop there? The MSC is the superhighway Mahathir has paved for Malaysia.
A visit to the corridor's capital, Cyberjaya, though, suggests the dream hasn't entirely lived up to expectations. Five years after ground was broken, it appears as if the 21st century has come and gone. Or hasn't come at all. Weedy, barren fields await the arrival of construction crews. "Smart" condominiums boasting "broadband access" and "online shopping" are running at low occupancy. The main shopping complex is often eerily quiet, as are the wide, flat roadways beneath which lie kilometers of fiber optics.
Some heavy hitters of the information-technology (IT) world such as Fujitsu, Ericsson, and most recently Motorola, have come, lured by tax breaks, grants and other incentives. A creative college plans soon to relocate to Cyberjaya. And around the end of this month the government is expected to make a vote of confidence when it unveils Phase 2 of the MSC, which will link the corridor to other cities around Malaysia and the globe.
But with the Mahathir era fast fading, Malaysians and the world seem less impressed by the grandiosity of the MSC than they did a few short years ago, when Malaysia looked primed to become one of the few countries to make the elusive leap from developing to developed status. Indeed terms that sprinkle Cyberjaya's marketing brochures and landscape, such as "connected", "wireless", "borderless", and "E-ready" verge on passe. ("Dot.com", the boom from which the dream spawned, has wisely gone missing.)
"Malaysia has fiber optics - so?" quipped one investor.
So do rivals India, Thailand and China, which while not exactly centers of innovation offer similar incentives, and in some cases much lower costs.
MSC officials point out that the corridor is home to 500 companies and since its inception seven years ago has employed 15,000 people, 87 percent home grown, and this surpasses targets. Sliding targets, perhaps - in 2000, officials said they expected the population of just Cyberjaya to surpass 20,000 by mid-2001. Regardless, numbers are rising, say MSC officials.
Mahathir, too, hasn't wavered much from the hard sell. "You are seeing beautiful buildings which are not empty but full of people working in there. That was what we expected," he said before retirement last year.
Others are less optimistic.
"Somewhere it lost a lot of steam along the way," opined Singapore-based economist Song Seng Wun, adding that too much emphasis has been placed on high tech and innovation, a call Malaysians haven't wholeheartedly stepped up to.
Responding to the concern last week, Technology and Innovations Minister Jamaludin Jarjis urged MSC companies not to overlap and duplicate research, calling this "wasteful".
The government has been loath, publicly at least, to acknowledge that the plan might need an overhaul - that would be to admit a US$17 billion blunder in the case of Cyberjaya alone. But it's becoming harder to ignore.
There's a growing sense around Malaysia that Mahathir's megaprojects may have hindered as much as hampered growth, and dealt as much in appearances as substance. By Mahathir's own admission, they were designed in part to woo potential investors. Two other Mahathir megaprojects make up the bookends to the MSC, the vitreous, streamlined airport to the south and the dazzling Petronas office towers in downtown Kuala Lumpur, until last year the world's tallest buildings; a high-speed express train shuttles passengers to and fro.
As a whole, the stretch pumped the spirit of Malaysia boleh, or "Malaysia can". Now when Malaysians utter the phrase it's more often than not with irony. In the case of the airport and twin towers they're starting to look a bit like eyesores, reminders of what once seemed possible; not much has come along to compliment their grandeur. And Malaysia is finding that it takes much more than a high-tech pipe dream to distinguish yourself, raising the unspoken: Is Malaysia plateauing? Must this stable, talented, functional, resource-rich nation rethink itself if it is to live up to its potential?
When Mahathir's deputy Abdullah Badawi took over as premier last October, a sense of optimism swept the country - in large part because he appeared set to diverge from his predecessor. He tabled a grand railway project and vowed to concentrate more on rural development. That and other promises catapulted his coalition to a huge if underhanded parliamentary election win last month. His vision, however, remains a puzzle.
"There's been talk about shifting priorities, but [the government] has not been clear what direction it's going to take," said economist Jomo K S, adding that rethinking a national strategy is overdue, but "it must be informed carefully".
Perhaps a hint lies in Biovalley, a 200-hectare site set to open near Cyberjaya in 2006, with the aim of attracting 150 biotech companies and $10 billion in investment by 2015. It might prove the equipoise Malaysia needs: a simultaneous investment in the MSC and a deviation from its original focus. Biotech - it almost sounds like a natural fit for Malaysia's fertile equatorial soil (see Malaysia's new dream: Biovalley, December 24, 2003).
The verdict on the MSC's fate is still out. And who knows, Phase 2 might capitalize on lessons learned and prove so brilliant as to silence skeptics.
Rob Cayzer, senior manager with the Multimedia Development Corp, the MSC's overseeing body, sees no reason not to be optimistic. "The talent in Malaysia is as good as it is in any other developing country: infrastructure's as good, and so is cost."
He may have a point, but as Malaysia is finding out the hard way, that's no guarantee investors will come.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>

Defector describes Iran's massive intelligence operation in Iraq
Iranian intelligence has been operating at least 18 covert centers in Iraq, according to a former Iranian official in Teheran's intelligence community. The defector disclosed the first details on Iran's intelligence presence in Iraq and described efforts to target Shi'ites deemed as aligned with the United States in a nearly $1 billion effort to prevent the spread of democracy in that Arab country...
Memo to 9/11 Commission: Fidel's spy in DIA convinced U.S. Cuba posed no WMD threat ...
Khan account of secret underground N. Korean nuclear facility questioned

N. Korea constructs 'class education' halls around nation in ideological offensive against U.S....
N. Korea scraps food rations, tells people to go shopping...
North Korea selling Scuds to Burma, which may be planning reactor...
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Pakistan: It's deja vu all over again
By Leonard Weiss

Pakistan's denials and duplicity over its nuclear weapons program, combined with a U.S. emphasis on short-term foreign policy goals, got it out of trouble before--and might again.
Berra's famous quote can certainly be applied to recent revelations about nuclear weapon-related transfers to Iran and Libya from a Pakistani-generated, worldwide nuclear-materials black market. The current story also includes a remarkable display of public insouciance by the current U.S. government to the worst case of conscious proliferation in history. [1]
But the larger story is no surprise to those of us who have followed Pakistan's nuclear activities for the past 25 years. There is a long history to Pakistan's nuclear mendacity and the U.S. abandonment of nonproliferation goals in South Asia for short-term advantage in other policy areas.
Pakistani nuclear assistance to Iran and Libya is nothing new. News reports in 1988 revealed that Pakistan was assisting Iran on nuclear enrichment technology; reports of a Pakistan-Libya nuclear connection appeared as early as 1979. [2] In 1987, a BBC documentary film revealed that Libya had provided financing for the Pakistani bomb project in 1973. The Saudis were also involved as bankrollers in those early days. [3]
Despite President Pervez Musharraf's claim that the nuclear transfers to Iran and Libya (and North Korea) are the result of personal greed on the part of "the father of the Pakistani bomb," Abdul Qadeer (A. Q.) Khan, who "confessed" and was immediately pardoned, no serious observer believes that Khan's was a "rogue" operation unknown to the highest levels of the Pakistani military. While the complete story is yet to be told, it is well to remember the words of Musharraf's predecessor, the late Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, who said: "It is our right to obtain [nuclear] technology. And when we acquire this technology, the entire Islamic world will possess it with us." [4] (Zia failed to mention that Pakistan would also be sharing its nuclear secrets with North Korea, but that was before North Korea could help Pakistan with missile technology as a quid pro quo.)
Zia's bold statement was itself a paraphrase of a statement by his predecessor, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who wrote in his 1979 memoirs: "We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilization have this capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change." [5]
Khan's early network
Khan's illicit nuclear trading activities are merely an extension of his activities in the 1970s and 1980s. He began by stealing blueprints for uranium-enrichment centrifuges from Urenco, a European consortium, and then set about buying the materials and components needed for manufacturing highly enriched uranium. Here is some of what Khan was able to purchase in the 1980s: [6]

* 6,200 tubes of maraging steel, used to construct centrifuges, from a firm in the Netherlands;

* vacuum valves and a gas feed system to regulate streams of uranium hexafluoride gas into and out of the centrifuge system from a company in Switzerland;

* inverters from companies in Britain, Germany, and the United States;

* other electronic equipment for centrifuges from firms in the United States by way of Canada and Turkey;

* a metal-finishing plant from Britain;

* special measuring equipment from the Netherlands;

* a tritium extraction plant, special steel and aluminum, optical equipment, and other sensitive goods from Germany;

* vessels and tanks for Pakistan's fledgling reprocessing plant from Italy; and

* precision equipment for a reprocessing plant from Switzerland.

These acquisitions enabled Pakistan to get maximum benefit from the nuclear weapon design and supplies of uranium it received from China in 1983. [7]
In the ongoing investigation of how Libya was able to obtain sophisticated sensitive components for its nuclear program from Malaysia and other countries, the Malaysian police's inspector general reported that "the supply of components by middlemen . . . involved suppliers from other countries to blur the source of the components. Some of the suppliers were believed to be aware that these components could be for uranium enrichment centrifuges. Generally, these suppliers, mostly from Europe, were those who had had dealings with [A. Q. Khan] since the 1980s, at a time when Pakistan was developing its nuclear technology." [8] Der Stern reported on March 21, 1989 that more than 70 German firms helped Pakistan get materials and equipment needed to manufacture the bomb.
Some of the firms from which Khan made his purchases in the 1980s may no longer be involved in the trade, but the ease with which Khan was able to find so many suppliers to satisfy his more recent nuclear demands shows that an international black market was readily created and has been sustained. This is the legacy of the many years during which the United States turned a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear activities.
Pakistan's brazenness during the 1980s is illustrated by its attempts to purchase and export materials from the United States--5,000 pounds of zirconium metal in 1981, and electronic parts known as krytrons for use in nuclear triggers in 1984. In July 1984 a man named Nazir Ahmed Vaid was arrested for the latter crime, but despite the fact that the government was in possession, on the day of his arrest, of information showing clearly that the intended recipient of the krytrons was the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, Vaid's indictment was rewritten to exclude any mention of the nuclear use of krytrons. He was then permitted to plea bargain to a reduced offense, thus avoiding a jury trial, and a gag order was placed on the case. He was found guilty of one count of export violation and quietly deported less than three weeks later. As in the current case with A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani government insisted that Vaid acted on his own, with no government authorization. [9] It was one of many denials of the obvious during the period.
No nuclear ambitions here
During the 1970s and 1980s, when all this illicit nuclear activity was going on, Pakistan denied to the West that it was developing nuclear weapons or had any interest in nuclear weapons. As President Zia told the Foreign Policy Association on December 9, 1982:
"I would like to state once again . . . that our ongoing nuclear program has an exclusively peaceful dimension and that Pakistan has neither the means nor, indeed, any desire to manufacture a nuclear device. I trust that this distinguished gathering will take note of my assurance, which is given in all sincerity and with a full sense of responsibility."
A. Q. Khan himself weighed in two years later in an interview on February 10, 1984, saying that "the 'Islamic bomb' is a figment of the Zionist mind."
Starting in the late 1970s, when the U.S. government became aware of Pakistan's nuclear weapon-related activities, I was engaged in seeking to stop or slow the program through congressional investigations and legislative action. My boss at the time was Ohio Democratic Sen. John Glenn, who gave me free rein to work on the issue and became the Senate's voice of protest against Pakistan's nuclear activities. Frustration was more often than not the end result of much of our work.
I either crafted or was otherwise involved in numerous legislative actions designed to stop the Pakistanis through the threat of sanctions. These actions were passed by Congress and dutifully signed into law by three presidents, but their implementation was nearly always blocked because of other foreign policy considerations.
It didn't start off that way. Pakistan had been cut off from economic and military assistance in 1979 under the Symington and Glenn amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, after it imported unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment technology and equipment. (The Pakistanis said the cutoff stemmed from the influence of "Zionist circles" seeking to protect Israel from the Muslim world.) [10] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year changed U.S. priorities.
Cold War considerations
When Ronald Reagan arrived in the White House in 1981, his administration came with a desire to send arms to the Afghani mujahideen. They could only be delivered through Pakistan, and nonproliferation took a back seat to Cold War politics. The new administration was so intent on sending arms that as then-Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel later admitted, "There was no explicit agreement . . . no explicit quid pro quo" that in return for U.S. assistance Pakistan would not develop nuclear weapons. [11]
The Pakistanis got the message when there was no adverse U.S. reaction to a tough position articulated by Agha Shahi, then-foreign minister of Pakistan, in a meeting with James Buckley, then-U.S. undersecretary of state. On December 14, 1981, Shahi described the meeting to the Council of Pakistani Editors:
"We told Mr. Buckley that our program is only for peaceful purposes . . . and we are fully aware of the concerns of the United States over our atomic energy program, which we think to be baseless, unwarranted, unjustified. But we understand and we have taken note of this concern. So if we decide to carry out an explosion, then we would be prepared to forgo this [U.S. aid] program. That is a matter for our judgment, but we have given no undertaking to Mr. Buckley about explosions."
Despite Shahi's "in-your-face" position, James Buckley subsequently told Congress: "We believe that a program of support which provides Pakistan with a continuing relationship with a significant security partner and enhances its sense of security may help remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. With such a relationship in place we are hopeful that over time we will be able to persuade Pakistan that the pursuit of a weapons capability is neither necessary to its security nor in its broader interest as an important member of the world community." [12]
Sanctions lifted
One month after Buckley's testimony, Congress passed the first of a series of legislated waivers of penalties under the Symington Amendment that lasted until the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1990. Although the legislation stipulated that a cutoff could still occur if Pakistan were to explode a nuclear device, the Pakistanis did not act worried that U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation would put their bomb program in jeopardy.
During the U.S. presidential election season in 1984, President Zia told the Wall Street Journal on July 10 that he was "confident that U.S. politics won't disrupt the flow of American weaponry to Pakistan." His confidence was not misplaced. Indeed, it must have been reinforced by the contemporaneous Vaid case, whose lesson to the Pakistanis could only be that the United States would bend over backwards to keep the arms flowing, even in the case of overt nuclear smuggling attempts by Pakistan from within the United States. It must also have satisfied him to read that Richard Kennedy, then-ambassador at large for nonproliferation, had said: "We accept President Zia ul-Haq's statement that Pakistan's nuclear program is devoted entirely to power generation." [13] Ironically, the State Department had written a secret memorandum the year before stating that the United States had "unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program. . . . We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly nuclear weapons." [14]
The Solarz and Pressler amendments
As a result of the outrageous outcome of the Vaid case, Congress passed a law, known as the Solarz Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, prohibiting military and economic assistance to any non-weapon state that illegally exports or attempts to export U.S. items that would contribute significantly to the ability of that country to make a nuclear explosive device.
The Solarz and Pressler amendments were signed into law on August 8, 1985. The Pressler Amendment made continued military assistance to Pakistan contingent on an annual presidential certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that U.S. assistance would significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan would possess a nuclear explosive device. The Pressler Amendment was the last barrier to Pakistan's construction of a device, but the Pakistanis treated it with the same contempt they showed other efforts to condition U.S. assistance on nuclear restraint.
On September 12, 1984, a year before the Pressler Amendment was passed, President Reagan sent a letter to Zia warning the Pakistanis not to "cross the red line" of enriching uranium beyond 5 percent or face "grave consequences." [15] In response, President Zia pledged not to do so, and high-level officials kept repeating that pledge, which was itself repeated by administration spokesmen in congressional hearings. [16]
It was revealed some months later that the Pakistanis had already passed the 5 percent level at the time of Reagan's letter. Crossing the "red line" resulted in no action by the administration, and when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited President George H. W. Bush in June 1989, the subject was not even mentioned. [17]
This undoubtedly reinforced the Pakistanis' feeling that they were under no limits by the administration save possibly for testing, and that Congress was equally feckless, with few exceptions. Attempts at smuggling materials from the United States continued, and another smuggler was caught in 1987. A Canadian citizen of Pakistani extraction named Arshad Pervez was arrested for illegally trying to buy and export a quantity of beryllium, along with 25 tons of maraging steel for centrifuges from an American manufacturer. He was ultimately convicted of the beryllium charge and of lying to investigators, but escaped conviction on the remaining charges on the grounds of entrapment, even though American intelligence officials found evidence that the Pakistani embassy in London was directly involved. [18] Pervez, who went to prison, admitted that he was working for a retired Pakistani brigadier general and that the final customer was the Pakistani nuclear program, thereby establishing a violation of the Solarz Amendment. But the U.S. government once again refused to sanction Pakistan, and the Pakistani nuclear program rolled on.
Pakistan gets the bomb
In an interview with Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar, A. Q. Khan admitted that Pakistan had enriched uranium to weapons grade, and added that Pakistan could build nuclear weapons. [19] In March 1987, Senator Glenn testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, arguing that "Pakistani nuclear weapons production will, sooner or later, whether by design or by espionage, result in the wider transfer of nuclear weapons technology to countries in the Middle East." Despite such warnings, and clear evidence that U.S. assistance was not reducing the risk that Pakistan would possess a nuclear explosive device, presidential certifications were issued in 1988 by Reagan and in 1989 by Bush. On November 26, 1987, a UPI story by Richard Sale quoted unnamed intelligence sources as saying that Pakistan had a workable nuclear device, although it was deemed too big "by those who have seen the new bomb" to be delivered by an F-16.
Too little and too late
By 1990, the fiction that Pakistan might not possess the bomb was completely unsustainable. The Soviets had left Afghanistan, so no certification was issued by President Bush and assistance was cut off. Having been the recipient of extreme indulgence for so long, the Pakistanis were surprised by the action, which halted a shipment of F-16s that they had already paid for. Nonetheless, 40 F-16s had already been delivered, at least some of which were being modified to carry nuclear warheads in contravention of the conditions under which the planes were originally transferred. Thus, in service to the Cold War, the United States suffered more than a decade of Pakistani lies and false promises about their nuclear activities, did not enforce its own laws or restrictions on Pakistan's nuclear program when it counted, and left Pakistan with a U.S.-made nuclear weapons delivery system.
Senator Glenn's response to this outrageous history was encapsulated in an op-ed: "The Reagan and Bush administrations have practiced a nuclear nonproliferation policy bordering on lawlessness. In so doing, they have undermined the respect of other countries for U.S. law and have done great damage to the nuclear nonproliferation effort. Keep this in mind the next time someone in the administration extols the need for military action to deal with some power hungry dictator who is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons in the Middle East or elsewhere." [20]
After 9/11
Unfortunately, the story did not end with the cutoff of 1990. Pakistan had the bomb, but it still had not tested a nuclear weapon. So, in a triumph of hope over experience, legislation was passed in 1994 requiring the imposition of draconian sanctions in the event of a test, in the hope of deterring both Pakistan and India.
When both countries exploded nuclear test devices in 1998, the severe economic sanctions in the law were automatically triggered. But once again, Congress removed them, in part because of domestic considerations involving agricultural exports. The prohibition on military assistance continued, however, until after 9/11, when the current Bush administration issued a waiver ending the implementation of nearly all other sanctions because of the perceived need for Pakistani assistance in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. This was the height of irony--it was U.S. support for Pakistan and the mujahideen in the 1980s that helped bring the Taliban and Al Qaeda to prominence in Afghanistan in the first place.
We are essentially back where we were with Pakistan in the 1980s. It is apparent that it has engaged in dangerous nuclear mischief with North Korea, Iran, and Libya (and perhaps others), but thus far without consequences to its relationship with the United States because of other, overriding foreign policy considerations--not the Cold War this time, but the war on terrorism.
But now there is a major political difference. It was one thing for Pakistan, a country with which the United States has had good relations generally, to follow India and produce the bomb for itself. It is quite another for Pakistan to help two-thirds of the "axis of evil," and the perpetrators of Pan Am 103, all of whom have, at one time or another, been accused of being sponsors of terrorism, to get the bomb as well.
The president's dilemma
The waivers given to Pakistan after 9/11 are only good with respect to past behavior. Anything the Pakistanis have done since the waivers were issued that is proscribed by law require new waivers to be issued. If the reports about the timing of Pakistan's exports are true--that some of the transfers occurred after the date of the most recent waivers--and the Pakistani government authorized the exports directly or indirectly, then Pakistan is in violation of U.S. laws and unprotected by past waivers. The same would be true if the Pakistani government was, as is likely, behind the recent incident of an Israeli businessman, operating out of South Africa, attempting illegally to buy and export nuclear trigger components for the Pakistani weapons program. [21]
No cutoff of the generous assistance that is being given and has been promised will occur unless and until the president makes a determination as to Pakistan's guilt. As in the 1980s with the Pressler Amendment, turning a blind eye means not having to make a difficult decision. And so far, the Bush administration appears to be pretending that Musharraf's claim of being the victim of a rogue operation headed by A. Q. Khan is the truth. It is reported that, in return, Musharraf has made some concessions facilitating the hunt for Osama bin Laden in northwest Pakistan. [22] But if the only concessions Pakistan makes because of the Khan case have to do with some immediate tactical advantage in the war on terror, and the nuclear program remains untouched, it is questionable whether U.S. national security has been enhanced in the longer term.
The president wants to be seen as not only a president fighting terrorism, but also as a staunch proponent of nonproliferation. Having gone to war with Iraq ostensibly to stop Iraq's possible proliferation, the president is now faced with a more serious violation of nonproliferation norms.
If the president does issue a new waiver for Pakistan, presumably on the grounds of the need for its support in the war on terror, he risks being accused of conducting business as usual. And, as indicated earlier, some will see this as a wholesale retreat from the nonproliferation rhetoric that fueled public support for the war in Iraq, and it will once again raise issues of U.S. credibility. A frequently voiced opinion abroad is that the United States does not oppose proliferation by its friends.
If, on the other hand, the president doesn't issue a waiver and pretends that no violation by the government of Pakistan has occurred, he risks being accused of misfeasance for having failed to carry out U.S. laws.
If the president wants to preserve U.S. credibility on nonproliferation, he can tell the Pakistanis that he is prepared to declare them in violation and impose sanctions unless they agree to a set of conditions that would cap their nuclear program and ensure the end of their illegal and immoral trade in nuclear weapons technology.
Among these conditions should be a demand that Pakistan sign a verifiable agreement to end its production of fissile material and make its nuclear trading records transparent to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so the world can know what they are doing and with whom they have been dealing. An interrogation of A. Q. Khan by the IAEA should also be part of the deal. These conditions, if met, could enable the United States, in concert with its allies, to roll up much of the current black market in nuclear materials and equipment.
The president should also announce that greater intelligence resources will be devoted to Pakistan's export activities, with interdiction ready to be carried out under the administration's new Proliferation Security Initiative whenever indicated. In return for Pakistan's cooperation, the United States should be willing to help the Pakistanis improve their own security in ways that do not exacerbate the tensions in the area and are not perceived as assisting their nuclear weapons program.
It's Santayana all over again
Some will argue that national pride would prevent Pakistan from accepting such terms and that the United States would lose a valuable ally in the fight against Al Qaeda if sanctions were imposed. Moreover, they will argue, sanctions could plunge Pakistan into economic and political chaos, with the possibility of takeover by a radical Islamic contingent that would then inherit Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
These arguments (just replace "Al Qaeda" with "communism") have been used for two decades in defense of a weak nonproliferation policy in South Asia that has brought nothing but grief. They do not take into account American credibility and the effect on other real or potential proliferators. It is true that Pakistan may be more prone to destabilization in response to economic stress than some other countries in the region, but it should be Pakistan's choice as to whether it wishes to belong to the community of responsible nations and receive the benefits it needs from that community. In any case, there needs to be an effective contingency plan for preventing Pakistan's weapons from falling into the hands of radical undemocratic elements in the country, something that could happen regardless of U.S. policy.
Pakistan presents a real and ongoing test of the seriousness of the Bush administration on the issue of nonproliferation. The choice between fighting proliferation or fighting terrorism is ultimately a false one. Sacrificing one for the other would have disastrous consequences for national security. George Santayana once wrote that those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it. In the case of Pakistan, we haven't forgotten, but the Bush administration insists on repeating it anyway.

Leonard Weiss, now a consultant, was a staff director on the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, a position he held from 1977-1999.




1. Seymour Hersh, "The Deal," New Yorker, March 8, 2004.
2. O. Gozani, "Pakistan 'Aiding Iran' in Nuclear Weapons Venture," Daily Telegraph, Nov. 26, 1988. See also Farzad Bazoft, "Iran Signs Secret Atom Deal," London Observer, June 12, 1988, p. 1; John Fialka, "West Concerned by Signs of Libyan-Pakistan A-Effort," Washington Star, Nov. 25, 1979.
3. E. Lenhart, "Saudis Offer to Help Zia Build H-Bomb," Sunday Times (London), Jan. 18, 1981.
4. Interview in Akhbar al-Khalij, March 13, 1986, p. F4. Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SAS-86-053, March 19, 1986.
5. See F. Hassan, "An Analysis of Propaganda Against Pakistan's Peaceful Nuclear Program," Nawa-I-Waqt (Lahore), March 16, 1984. See also Robert Windrem, "Pakistan: 'The Crazy Soup,'" MSNBC, February 8, 2004; Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosny, "Pakistan," in The Islamic Bomb (New York: New York Times Books, 1981), pp. 161-226.
6. Congressional Record, October 20, 1981, p. 24505; Mark Hibbs, "German Firms Exported Tritium Purification Plant to Pakistan," Nuclear Fuel, February 6, 1989, p. 6.
7. K. Malik, Times of India, Jan. 13, 1989, p. 1.
8. Press Release, "Inspector General of Police (Polis Diraja), Malaysia, in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Program," February 20, 2004, p. 3.
9. Seymour Hersh, "Pakistani in U.S. Sought to Ship A-Bomb Trigger," New York Times, Feb. 25, 1985, p. 1.
10. R. Trumbull, "Pakistan Denies It Plans A-Bomb; Denounces Washington Aid Cutoff," New York Times, April 9, 1979, p. 1.
11. Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel, testimony before the South Asia Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 14, 1995.
12. James Buckley, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 12, 1981.
13. Interview with Richard Kennedy, in Pakistan Affairs (newsletter), November 2, 1984.
14. U.S. State Department, Assessment of Pakistan's Nuclear Program, June 23, 1983. Declassified and released in March 1992 to the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
15. Simon Henderson, Financial Times, Dec. 7, 1984; Hedrick Smith, "A Bomb Ticks in Pakistan," New York Times Sunday Magazine, March 6, 1988, p. 38.
16. Simon Henderson, "Netherlands Drops Proceedings Against Nuclear Scientist," Financial Times, July 16, 1986, p. 3; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Peck, congressional testimony, July 31, 1987.
17. David Ottaway, "U.S. Relieves Pakistan of Pledge Against Enriching Uranium," Washington Post, June 15, 1989, p. A38.
18. Mark Hosenball and J. Adams, "A-Bomb Plot is Linked to Embassy," Sunday Times (London), July 26, 1987.
19. Shyam Bhatia, "Pakistan has the A-Bomb," London Observer, March 1, 1987, p. 1.
20. John Glenn, "On Proliferation Law, a Disgraceful Failure," International Herald Tribune, June 26, 1992.
21. David Rohde, "Pakistani Linked to Illegal Exports Has Ties to Military," New York Times, Feb. 20, 2004, p. 8.
22. Seymour Hersh, "The Deal."


? 2004 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists


Posted by maximpost at 12:24 AM EDT
Permalink
Tuesday, 20 April 2004

>> ANOTHER UN FRAUD?

The UN's Fraudulent War on Terror

By Arnold Beichman
Washington Times | April 20, 2004

I simply cannot understand why President Bush keeps appealing to United Nations for its help and cooperation when that institution has proven itself to be incapable of doing anything significant in the field of human rights let alone international terrorism. Nor can I understand why Secretary of State Colin Powell has called the U.N. a "Coalition partner" when it is at best a sneering onlooker.

I base this judgment on a long dead-letter U.N. resolution dated Dec. 9, 1994, passed by the General Assembly almost a decade ago, about which little is heard. In fact, few people even know it exists. And why should they, since the resolution died the day it passed?

To discuss this resolution is to prove beyond a shadow of doubt the U.N. is a fraud, a betrayer of our hopes to establish a rule of law among nations. This 10-year-old resolution, titled "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," passed with no opposition. And a fat lot of good it did.

The 1994 resolution text begins with this laudable preamble:

"Having considered in depth the question of measures to eliminate international terrorism, [and] convinced that the adoption of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism should contribute to the enhancement of the struggle against international terrorism.... "

Were such a resolution presented once again to the U.N. Sixth Committee, I doubt it would ever be considered. The rot is deep in the U.N. General Assembly. How deep? Mark these words of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan as late as Feb. 24, 1998: "Can I trust Saddam Hussein? I think I can do business with him." Mr. Annan was bestowing his confidence on a dictator whose genocidal practices were well-known, a dictator who poison-gassed 5,000 Iraqis in Halabja in 1991.

The 1994 U.N. resolution demands that member states "take all appropriate measures at the national and international levels to eliminate terrorism." Appended to the resolution is the "Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism."

Congress ought to appoint a special committee to find out why the U.N. has ignored its own resolution and why it has failed to fulfill what its own General Assembly demanded of the Secretariat.

The U.N. resolution said the General Assembly was "deeply disturbed by the worldwide persistence of acts of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations ... which endanger or take innocent lives." The GA, it said, was "firmly determined to eliminate international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations [and] that those responsible for acts of international terrorism must be brought to justice."

Mark those words: There is no justification, said the U.N., for international terrorism -- that is taking the lives of innocent people as at the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, or in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Terrorism is terrorism regardless of political slogans or issues, said yesterday's United Nations.

If Kofi Annan and the U.N. Security Council are serious about combating terrorism, they should immediately call a special General Assembly session to renew the General Assembly Declaration of 1994. Were this resolution in effect today, the Coalition forces in Iraq would have the legitimating support of the U.N. just as the United States had in 1950 when it almost single-handed rescued South Korea from being swallowed up by the military dictatorship of North Korea's Kim Il-sung.



>> UN OIL SCANDAL -


Insight on the News - World
Issue: 4/27/04

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Investigative Report
Documents Prove U.N. Oil Corruption
By Kenneth R. Timmerman

A team of international forensic investigators is preparing to blow the lid off the much-disputed U.N. oil-for-food program in Iraq and will present new evidence of corruption at an upcoming congressional hearing that directly will implicate world leaders and top U.N. officials, Insight has learned.

Investigators, led by Claude Hankes-Drielsma and the KPMG accounting firm, currently are in Baghdad sifting through mountains of Saddam Hussein-era records seized from his Oil Ministry and the State Oil Marketing Organization that detail payments by Saddam to his legions of foreign friends and political supporters. An Iraqi newspaper, Al-Mada, published the list of 270 recipients of special "allocations" (also known as vouchers) in January. But as Insight goes to press, the testimony of Hankes-Drielsma on April 22 before the House International Relations Committee is expected to provide new evidence of widespread international corruption.

In a scathing letter sent to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on March 3, which he made available to Insight, Hankes-Drielsma called the U.N. program "one of the world's most disgraceful scams," and said that "based on the facts as I know them at the present time, the U.N. failed in its responsibility to the Iraqi people and the international community at large."

In an earlier letter to Annan, to which he received no reply, Hankes-Drielsma noted that allocations of "very significant supplies of crude oil [were] made to ... individuals with political influence in many countries, including France and Jordan," both of which supported Saddam and his regime to the bitter end.

Under the U.N. program, the Dutch company Saybolt International BV was paid hefty fees to inspect oil tankers loading Iraqi crude in Basra, to make sure no cheating took place. "Now it turns out that the inspecting company was paid off," one investigator said, "while on the ground, individual inspectors were getting cash bribes." Saybolt denies it received an oil allocation, although the Iraqi documents show it was down for 3 million barrels.

Saybolt spokesman Peter Box tells Insight that the company's own investigation of two known incidents of "topping off" involving the oil tanker Essex in 2001 "found no involvement of our staff at that particular time." Saybolt continues to operate in Iraq today, although it now has an "entirely new group of people," Box adds.

Among the revelations at the April 22 hearings, Insight has learned from investigators directly working on the case, will be new details of oil vouchers allegedly granted to Patrick Maugein, a prominent crony of French President Jacques Chirac, said to total 72.2 million barrels.

Maugein's involvement in the U.N.-approved oil deals is significant, investigators say, because he is believed to be a conduit for backdoor payments to Chirac and his family. It was Chirac who spearheaded a worldwide coalition last year that opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and tried desperately to keep Saddam in power.

When the allegations of backdoor payments first surfaced in a Paris courtroom in 1998, Maugein swept them aside as "pure fantasy." And in a statement provided to Insight, he denies having raised funds for Chirac, his family or his political campaigns. But as more evidence begins to leak from the archives of Saddam's former oil ministry, such denials may become harder to sustain.

The vouchers were assigned to two trading companies, identified in the Iraqi documents as Trafigura and Ibex, both of which were involved in the Essex incident. Investigators say they believe both companies are tied to Maugein, either through beneficial ownership or contractual arrangement. Vouchers for an additional 11 million barrels were granted to Maugein business partner Cabecadas Rul de Soussa, according to the original Al-Mada list. The ties between de Soussa and Maugein were first revealed by Therese Raphael of the Wall Street Journal Europe.

Asked about the allegations by Insight, Maugein denied he was involved with either company, although he did acknowledge knowing their principals, with whom he had worked as an oil trader with Marc Rich in Switzerland. He insisted that all his dealings with Iraq were legal and conducted through the oil-for-food program. "Patrick Maugein bought oil for his refinery in Mantua, Italy," a spokesman said. "All the oil deals were run by the U.N. They were paid through the U.N. and monitored by the U.N."

But those denials might not withstand the onslaught of the documents about to be released, investigators say. "Already we've got details of all the accounts held in the names of individuals," one investigator tells Insight in an exclusive interview. "On these records are exact details of which accounts were held by whom," including the foreign proxies and their ultimate beneficiaries - in Iraq and overseas.

The Iraqi documents specifically tie Maugein to the 25 million barrels allocated to Trafigura Beheer BV, a company Maugein claims was a competitor of his own London-based SOCO International. Investigators say other information they have developed shows that Maugein could be a "beneficial owner" of Ibex Energy, a holding company registered in Bermuda that was awarded vouchers for 47.2 million barrels. "That is a very high allocation," an investigator tells this magazine. "If a Cabinet minister gets 12 million barrels, why would Ibex get 47 million barrels unless something much bigger was at stake?"

Other French recipients named in the Iraqi documents include former Interior minister Charles Pasqua (12 million barrels), former French U.N. ambassador Jean-Bernard Merimee (8 million barrels) and Lebanese-French middleman Elias Firzli (14.6 million barrels).

Firzli acknowledged in a lengthy interview with Insight in Paris that the Iraqis were desperate to meet with Chirac and were willing to pay a high price for access. Shortly before the war broke out in March 2003, Firzli says he introduced Iraqi diplomat Nizar Hamdoon - sent as an emissary from Saddam - to senior French government officials in Paris. But Firzli scoffed at the oil vouchers, calling them "small stuff compared to the billions of dollars people made in the 1980s."

Published reports to date have focused on oil vouchers granted to the head of the United Nation's oil-for-food program, Benan Sevan, who has been on an extended vacation since the allegations first surfaced at the end of January. He denied the charges through a U.N. spokesman. And Insight has learned that as investigators pursue the document trail, they believe they are getting closer to world leaders, including Chirac.

But can it be proved? "The Iraqi civil service, even under Saddam, was quite excellent. They kept meticulous records. Every order was cross-referenced, initialed and counterinitialed, so nobody could be accused of taking anything for himself," an investigator who recently returned from Baghdad tells Insight.

Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), chairman of the House International Relations Committee, sent a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Annan on April 1, which committee staffers tell this magazine was intended to "lay down a marker." It called the scandal "without precedent in U.N. history" and urged Annan to make his response "equally unprecedented." Annan has announced that he will name an independent panel to investigate.

Fears of a U.N. whitewash run high on Capitol Hill. Hyde urged Annan to take steps to ensure that all documents relating to the oil-for-food program "be preserved and secured," and asked that special measures be taken to protect potential whistle-blowers who could provide testimony on the illicit deals. The United States General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, told Hyde's committee recently that $10.1 billion of the estimated $60 billion handled by the United Nations under the program was paid in kickbacks, bribes and set-asides to Saddam and his cronies.

The KPMG forensic-accounting investigators were brought to Baghdad by the Iraqi Governing Council to get to the bottom of the scandal. But Insight has learned that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by J. Paul Bremer, recently took over the investigation, just as the accountants were stumbling over evidence of corruption by Americans working for the CPA. "We were hearing stories of contractors passing envelopes with huge amounts of cash to CPA officials," an investigator says. "As much as $300,000 in cash passed hands."

Speaking from Baghdad, an Iraqi official confirmed to this magazine that the CPA was now in charge of these matters, although the Iraqi Governing Council was footing the bill. "We no longer have control over the documents or the investigation," the official said.

In Washington, the State Department's Bureau of International Organizations is in charge of relations with the United Nations. In preparation for the April 22 hearing, Chairman Hyde has sent two letters to Assistant Secretary of State Kim Holmes requesting that State provide full documentation of the oil-for-food program, including commercial contracts. Since the United States is a permanent member of the Security Council and a leading member of the U.N. Sanctions Committee, State has access to the full United Nations record but has been unwilling to make incriminating information public until now for fear of angering U.S. allies. France accounted for approximately 25 percent of all U.N.-approved trade with Iraq, according to an estimate by the CIA.

"Give France a break," says French ambassador to the United States Jean-David Levitte, writing in the Los Angeles Times. He said allegations that France condoned kickbacks or took bribes "are completely false and can only have been an effort to discredit France, a longtime friend and ally of the U.S."

Kenneth R. Timmerman is a senior writer for Insight and author of The French Betrayal of America, just released from Crown Forum.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



>> WHERE IS DOV?


Treasury Checks and Unbalances
Posted April 14, 2004
By Kelly Patricia O Meara


Treasury Secretary John W. Snow.


It's that time of year again when Congress and the rest of us get the opportunity to pore over the government's financial statements and decide how well federal bureaucrats spent, and accounted for, the taxpayer dollars with which they were entrusted. The good news is that most of the federal agencies and departments are making progress. The bad news is that the federal government still cannot balance its checkbook.

The most interesting development concerning the 2003 financial statements may be that Treasury Secretary John Snow apparently caught the May 2002 edition of Insight in which this reporter questioned why the word money is never used in these financial reports. Rather than refer directly to the wholesale spending of your tax money, bloodless euphemisms have been concocted to refer to it as assets, transactions, unsupported entries, material-control weaknesses, adjusted records, unmatched disbursements and even abnormal balances.

But this year, on page 22 of the summary of the 2003 Financial Report of the United States Government, Secretary Snow, the top money man to whom all agencies and departments must report, explains: "A clean audit opinion provides assurance that agencies are responsibly accounting for the people's money." There it is. Undeniably there. Although the word money appears only once in the Treasury's 27-page report, critics say, admitting that what is being spent is actually money is the first step toward balancing the federal checkbook. Nonetheless, issuance of the 2003 financial statements marks the seventh year in a row that the federal government could not audit, let alone balance, its books.
-------------------------------------------

Treasury Secretary, Year and Audit Opinion


Robert E. Rubin, 1997, Unauditable
"We believe that the publication of these audited statements is an important step in providing American citizens with more information about the operations of their government."

Robert E. Rubin, 1998, Unauditable
"We believe that the publication of this financial report is an important
step in providing the American public with useful information about their government's assets, liabilities and operations."

Lawrence H. Summers, 1999, Unauditable
"We are committed to producing and reporting financial information that meets the highest standards of integrity and to provide to the American people the accountability and professionalism they expect from their government."

Paul H. O'Neill, 2000, Unauditable
"I am committed to producing and reporting financial information that meets the highest standards of integrity and to provide the American people the accountability and professionalism that they expect from the government."

Paul H. O'Neill, 2001, Unauditable
"I believe that the American people deserve the highest standards of accountability and professionalism from their government, and I will not rest until we achieve them."

John W. Snow, 2002, Unauditable
"I intend to continue the commitment to producing and reporting financial information that meets the highest standards of integrity and to provide to the American people the accountability and professionalism that they expect from their government."
-------------------------------------------------

This also was the case under Treasury secretaries Robert Rubin, Lawrence Summers and Paul O'Neill, so Snow is eager to note that "The federal government has come a long way since the first governmentwide report subject to audit issued in March of 1998 for fiscal year 1997," and "at that time only 8 of the 24 agencies received clean opinions." Today 20 of 24 federal agencies received clean audit opinions and the agency statements were for the first time produced before the end of the calendar year.

It is the job of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to audit the federal government's financial statements, and this year, as in all previous years in which the auditing requirement was in force, "certain material weaknesses in internal control and in selected accounting and reporting practices resulted in conditions that continued to prevent us from being able to provide Congress and American citizens an opinion as to whether the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government are fairly stated." Indeed, the GAO further reports, "As a result of material deficiencies in the federal government's systems, record-keeping, documentation and financial reporting, readers are cautioned that amounts reported in the consolidated financial statements and related notes may not be reliable."

So the books can't be audited and what information is made available "may not be reliable."

And why was the GAO unable to "provide an opinion"? According to David Walker, the comptroller general of the United States, "there are three primary reasons" why the consolidated financial statements remained unauditable for fiscal year 2003: (1) serious financial-management problems at the Department of Defense (DoD); (2) the federal government's inability to account for billions of dollars of transactions between federal entities; and (3) the federal government's ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements.

Walker explains in his report of the government's financial statements that "We designated the serious financial-management problems at DoD as high risk since 1995. Overhauling DoD's financial-management operations represents a challenge that goes far beyond financial accounting to the very fiber of DoD's range of business operations, management-information systems and culture. DoD's financial-management problems are pervasive, complex, long-standing and deeply rooted in virtually all business operations throughout the department. To date, none of the military services or major DoD components has passed the test of an independent financial audit because of pervasive weaknesses in financial-management systems, operations and controls."

Of course, the nation is at war, but not one military service or major component of DoD was able to pass an audit even as the department had the largest 2003 cost increase in the whole of the federal government - up more than 35 percent from the previous year to $143.4 billion. And, according to Snow, in 2003 more than $50 billion in additional funding was appropriated to DoD to fight the war on terrorism. Given the fact that systemic financial management at DoD is so bad institutionally that it cannot audit its books, even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cannot say whether that additional money was appropriately or effectively spent.

And why can't the DoD account for its money? During testimony last month before the House Government Reform subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, Walker reiterated what everyone knows, especially Rumsfeld - that "DoD's financial-management problems are pervasive, complex, long-standing and deeply rooted in virtually all business operations throughout the department." In other words, despite Rumsfeld's blistering insistence that the problem be solved, the financial-management systems still do not communicate with one another. In his testimony Walker does not provide information about the corporate contractors who have been paid hundreds of millions of dollars to correct what he calls "pervasive weaknesses in financial-management systems."

Rep. Todd Platts (R-Pa.), chairman of the subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, tells Insight that his subcommittee has been focused on trying to learn "what financial systems are working and those that aren't, and what is being done to fix the problems. The biggest challenge to getting a clean audit is DoD, and its biggest problem is its financial-management systems. The GAO has said that the challenge there is long-running institutionalized practices - they've identified several thousand different financial-accountability processes used there and they're trying to get those thousands of systems to be uniform and combined as one efficient system."

"Who the contractors are," the subcommittee chairman says, "isn't as important as what is being done. My focus is twofold: Is the work being done, and are the taxpayers being well served regardless of whether it's contractor X, Y or Z? Do the departments and agencies have a long way to go? Absolutely. Are they making strides in the right direction? Yes."

Even so, and despite the warning by Comptroller General Walker that the information in the financial statements may not be reliable, Platts says he believes "The big picture is that Congress has information available that tells us which departments and agencies are doing a good job in accounting for taxpayer funds and which are not. ... The consolidated financials tell us where to target our focus."

Meanwhile, critics say, the problem continues. In the Pentagon, for instance, institutionalized bureaucracies, military careerists and Pentagon procurement colonels continue to resist some of the world's best professional managers brought in to put the financial house in order. This has produced some very odd dual messaging. For instance, the DoD recently added to its Website a slide show that begins with "We are America's Oldest Company, Largest Company, Busiest Company and Most Successful Company." The accompanying slides describe the DoD as a corporation by explaining that it is bigger than Wal-Mart, Exxon-Mobil, GM and Ford and refers to President George W. Bush as the chief executive officer and Congress as the board of directors, with the American people being the "stockholders."

Critics point out that DoD has been the biggest impediment to getting the federal government's books balanced, that under Bill Clinton in fiscal 2000 the department could not account for $1.1 trillion (and still hasn't), and that for seven years it has been unable to audit its books. Rumsfeld has turned the air blue trying to impress both the Pentagon establishment and the entrenched and congressionally protected civil-service bureaucracy with the need to correct these problems. He is fully aware that if DoD were indeed a corporation the bankruptcy courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission long ago would have shut down this "corporation" on which the nation relies for its defense.

Kelly Patricia O'Meara is an investigative reporter for Insight magazine.



-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hu, Kim discuss nuclear program
By Stephanie Hoo
ASSOCIATED PRESS
BEIJING -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Il reportedly discussed his country's nuclear program with China's president at a meeting yesterday, just days after Vice President Dick Cheney urged Beijing to do more to defuse a growing threat from Pyongyang.
Mr. Kim told China's leader that he was ready to give up his country's nuclear programs if the United States changed its "hostile attitude," a South Korean newspaper reported, according to Reuters news agency.

"Kim reportedly explained the reasons behind the nuclear weapons to Hu and added that North Korea is willing to give up nuclear developments if the United States changes its hostile attitude," South Korea's most widely read daily, Chosun Ilbo, said, quoting a Chinese source.
Mr. Kim's visit was reported by South Korean media but not confirmed by China's Foreign Ministry, which in the past has released information about the secretive leader's visits only after he returns home.
Early yesterday, a convoy of armored cars with tinted windows was seen carrying a delegation from the main Beijing train station to a government guesthouse where Chinese leaders usually receive visiting leaders. Mr. Kim reportedly traveled to China by train.
The reports said Mr. Kim talked with President Hu Jintao over lunch about North Korea's nuclear-weapons program and asked for economic aid. They said the visit would last four days.
Mr. Cheney, who met with Mr. Hu last week, prodded China to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, citing new evidence that the North has atomic weapons.
"Time is not on our side," a senior U.S. official quoted Mr. Cheney as telling Chinese leaders.
Washington wants China to use its leverage as the North's last major ally and the leading supplier of food and energy for its ailing economy.
The U.S. official said Mr. Cheney gave Chinese leaders information from a top Pakistani nuclear scientist suggesting that North Korea had at least three nuclear devices and is capable of making more from both plutonium and enriched uranium.
China says it wants a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons and has hosted two rounds of talks on the issue with the two Koreas, the United States, Japan and Russia. Beijing is trying to organize a third round within the next few months.
China's Foreign Ministry said it had "no information" on Mr. Kim's meeting with the Chinese leader, which would be the first since Mr. Hu became president last year. When Mr. Kim visited China in 2000 and 2001, neither side announced the trips in advance.
A special train carrying Mr. Kim and his entourage of about 40 senior party and government officials arrived in Beijing yesterday morning, South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported.
---------------------------------------------------------------

>> FOOD FIGHT...

Heinz Co. Is Campaign Weapon for Bush

By LOLITA C. BALDOR
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Though John Kerry's wife is an heir to the H.J. Heinz Co. fortune, the food company and its executives are providing President Bush with money and a campaign issue - jobs flowing overseas - in this year's election.

Members of the board of the Fortune 500 company and its corporate political action committee have donated thousands of dollars to Republicans in recent years, including contributions to the Bush campaign. The corporate PAC has given nothing to Kerry.

The Republicans are accepting the cash even as they criticize the Pittsburgh-based company's job cuts and overseas moves - part of an effort to taint the presumptive Democratic nominee with the conglomerate's business practices.

While Teresa Heinz Kerry gained much of her $500 million portfolio through her Heinz inheritance, she does not serve on the board and is not involved with the management of the company. Even her late husband, Sen. H. John Heinz III, R-Pa., did not serve on the board.

No Heinz family member has been employed by the company or served on its board since H.J. "Jack" Heinz II, its chairman, died in 1987.

Heinz Kerry, who heads the separate Heinz Family Foundation and the Howard Heinz Endowment, owns less than 4 percent of the company's stock. Major Heinz stockholders include the company's top executives, led by Chairman William R. Johnson, as well as beer magnate Peter Coors and former Pittsburgh Steelers wide receiver and pro football Hall of Famer Lynn Swann.

During the campaign, Kerry has criticized companies that move jobs overseas or shift their tax status abroad to avoid federal taxes, calling them "Benedict Arnold" businesses. He has faulted the Bush administration for embracing a tax policy that rewards them.

Republicans, in response, have pointed to the Kerrys' ties to Heinz, calling the four-term Massachusetts senator a hypocrite for slamming policies that have poured millions into his wife's bank account.

Stuck in what it fears is a food fight is the Heinz Co., which is trying desperately to keep the campaign out of its ketchup sales. In the last few months, the company - which gets about 5,000 phone calls a month - has fielded 800 calls from consumers with questions or complaints about the company's connections to Kerry, his wife and the campaign, said spokeswoman Debbie Foster.

A look at the company's campaign donations shows a preference for Republicans. In the past six years, the Heinz company's political action committee gave more than $64,000 to GOP candidates, nearly three times the amount given to Democrats. It contributed $5,000 to Bush's campaign. It has shunned the Kerry campaign, but the PAC gave $5,000 to the Massachusetts Democratic Party.

Johnson also put his money on the GOP, giving more than $20,000 to Republican congressional committees and candidates since 1999. Other board members have also contributed to Republicans, giving money to Bush's campaign and Pennsylvania's two Republican senators, Arlen Specter and Rick Santorum.

Company spokesman Jack Kennedy said Heinz is nonpartisan and the PAC gives money to both parties. The heavy Republican totals, he said, may just be an indication of where corporate facilities are located.

Determined to make clear that it is not connected to the Kerry campaign, the Heinz company has issued statements about the relationship. "We want to make sure people buy our products on their merit. We're an equal-opportunity condiment," Kennedy said.

According to Kerry's financial disclosure report filed last May, Heinz Kerry owns more than $4 million worth of company stock. Heinz Kerry sold more than $14.8 million worth of Heinz stock in 2002.

"No, they don't run the company, but they still own a lot of stock. And Teresa has had a long relationship with the company," said James Glassman, a columnist and economic analyst at the conservative-leaning American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. "I think it's absolutely legitimate to point to Heinz and say here's a company with a close association with Kerry that is doing exactly the thing Kerry is condemning."

Republican National Committee spokeswoman Christine Iverson said the GOP is not going after the Heinz Co. but "will continue to point out John Kerry's hypocrisy when his record on the issues does not match his rhetoric."

Last month, the RNC issued a lengthy critique of the Heinz company, detailing hundreds of layoffs and plant closings in five states over the past nine years and pointing out jobs it created in other countries.

The multibillion-dollar Heinz Co. has about 38,900 workers worldwide, with 30 percent located in 27 factories scattered across 17 states. The other 70 percent work in facilities overseas.

About 60 percent of the company's sales are outside America, and the products sold in other countries are often made and marketed locally and in some cases are unique to that region. Tomatoes for ketchup sold in the United States are grown largely in the regions surrounding the major processing plants in Ohio, Iowa and California.

Besides its name brands, Heinz also makes and markets OreIda potatoes, Smart Ones frozen foods and Classico sauces. The company has 50 affiliates operating in 200 countries.

---

On the Net:

www.hjheinz.com
www.opensecrets.org
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> SAUL FILES - TALLEST "HEBREW"? OR KERRY WATCH...

Purple Hearts: Three and Out
Posted April 12, 2004
By Stephen Crump
Kerry glows with pride while wearing one of the Purple Hearts he desperately sought.
Democratic presidential nominee in waiting Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) frequently speaks of courage, brotherhood and responsibility when he mentions his brief service in Vietnam. He took Super-8 home movies there in which he staged heroics in full-battle dress, so that later he might use them for campaign ads. Kerry has made so much of his Vietnam medals which he once pretended to throw away that critics have begun to wonder why he has been so cagey about the dubious circumstances surrounding the Purple Hearts that got him out of Vietnam after only four months of combat service. Under the rules, a serviceman had to be awarded three Purple Hearts to apply to go home. Not one or two, but three. And, say critics, there's the rub.
Kerry, who piloted Patrol Crafts Fast (PCFs) as a young Lt.(jg) in the Vietnam War, has always made much of those Purple Hearts. An award often pinned on the pillow of a combat warrior so badly wounded that he cannot sit up to receive it, the Purple Heart recognizes the sacrifices of combat when a soldier or officer has sustained a wound "from an outside force or agent" and received treatment from a medical officer. The records for such treatment "must have been made a matter of official record," according to the military definition of the award.
According to Kerry's own description in Douglas Brinkley's Tour of Duty, the Dec. 2, 1968, mission behind what he has claimed to be his first Purple Heart was "a half-assed action that hardly qualified as combat." Indeed. Kerry was stationed with Coastal Division 14 at Cam Ranh Bay. At that time he piloted a small foam-filled boat, known as a Boston Whaler, with two enlisted men in the darkness of early morning. The intent, apparently, was to patrol an area that was known for contraband trafficking, but it was an undocumented mission. Upon approaching the objective point, the crew noticed a sampan crossing the river. As it pulled to shore, Kerry and his little team opened fire, destroying the boat and whatever its cargo might have been.
In the confusion, Kerry claims to have received a "stinging piece of heat" in the arm, the result of a tiny piece of shrapnel. He was not incapacitated and continued with regular swiftboat-patrol duty. William Shachte, who oversaw this ad hoc mission, was quoted by the Boston Globe as saying Kerry's injury, from whatever source, "was not a serious wound at all."
But Kerry met with his immediate superior officer, Lt.Cmdr. Grant Hibbard, the next morning and requested a Purple Heart for his wound. Hibbard recalls that Kerry had a "minor scratch" on his arm and was holding in his hand what appeared to be a fragment of a U.S. M-79 grenade, the shrapnel that had caused the wound. "They didn't receive enemy fire," Hibbard tells Insight. Since this was an essential requirement for the award, the commander rejected Kerry's request. Hibbard does not remember that Kerry received medical attention of any kind and confirms that no one else on the mission suffered any injuries.
Shortly thereafter, Kerry was transferred to Coastal Division 11 at An Thoi. Apparently, Kerry petitioned to have his Purple Heart request reconsidered. Hibbard remembers getting correspondence from Kerry's new division, asking for his approval. In the hurried process of moving to a new command himself, Hibbard thinks he might have signed off on the award. If so, "it was to my chagrin," Hibbard remembers. Kerry's second commander, Lt.Cmdr. G.M. Elliott, says he has no recollection of such an event ever occurring.
There are no written records of Kerry's magical first Purple Heart on file at the Naval Historical Center in Washington, the nation's primary repository for such documentation. A Purple Heart normally is not requested but is awarded de facto for a wound inflicted by the enemy - a wound serious enough to require medical attention. The Naval Historical Center keeps all documents connected to such awards to U.S. Navy and Marine personnel. These typewritten "casualty cards" list the date, location and prognosis of the wound for which the Purple Heart is given, and they are produced by the medical facility that provides treatment for the combat wound at the hands of the enemy. There are two such cards for Kerry - for his slight wounds on Feb. 20 and March 13, 1969, but none for his December 1968 claim.
After receiving a Purple Heart for the March 13 scratch and bruise, Kerry sought an early pass out of combat duty, invoking the informal Navy "instruction" known as 1300.39. According to the Boston Globe, 1300.39 meant an officer could request a reassignment from his superior officer after receiving three Purple Hearts. The instruction states that, rather than being automatic, the reassignment would "be determined after consideration of his physical classification for duty and on an individual basis." Of the 138 servicemen and officers in Kerry's unit who received Purple Hearts during the time he was there, records indicate only two received more than two. These were Lt.(jg) Jim Galvin and a boatswain's mate named Stevens. When Insight reached Galvin he said all three of his Purple Hearts were the result of shrapnel or glass shards. Such minor injuries were common on PCF boats with their glass windows and thin metal hulls, and, like Kerry's, Galvin's injuries were not serious enough to take him out of combat for more than a few days.
Unlike Kerry, Galvin elected to stay with his men. Indeed, though a professional Navy officer, he never had heard of instruction 1300.39. It was not until early April of 1969, when Galvin noticed that Kerry was preparing to leave the officers' barracks at An Thoi that he learned about "three Purple Hearts and you're out." According to Galvin, it was Kerry who told him, "There's a rule that gets you out of here and I'm getting out. You ought to do the same." Galvin remembers, "He seemed to take care of everything pretty quickly," because that was the last time Galvin saw Kerry in Vietnam.
The three-times wounded Galvin stayed with his men, transferred to Cam Ranh Bay to get them a respite from the dicey Mekong Delta, and eventually left the swiftboats for destroyer school.
Insight: contacted many men who served in Coastal Division at the same time Kerry did to ask if any of them had heard of anyone leaving the combat zone by invoking three minor wounds. Of the 12 who replied, none had heard of anyone doing so but John Kerry."
Less than a month after having claimed three wounds for which he lost no more than a total of two days of duty, Kerry reported as an aide to a navy yard admiral in Brooklyn, New York, leaving his crew in Vietnam. Two years later, preparing for a congressional race in a left-wing Massachusetts district - where the seat eventually was won by the even more radical Rev. Robert Drinan - Kerry was working with Maoists and other radicals in Vietnam Veterans Against the War, saying of those he left behind who were being killed and wounded for real that they were committing crimes "on a day-to-day basis with the full awareness of officers at all levels."
Indeed, Kerry said, he knew men who in Vietnam "had personally raped, cut off ears, cut off heads, razed villages in fashion reminiscent of Genghis Khan, shot cattle and dogs for fun, poisoned food stocks and generally ravaged the countryside." Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 22, 1971, about these and other alleged war crimes, he called on the United States to pay "extensive reparations."

Stephen Crump is an associate reporter for Insight magazine.

>> 2...

John Kerry's first Purple Heart
With questions lingering over President Bush's service in the Guard, conservatives hope to diminish Kerry's Vietnam heroics -- but they can't erase his real battle record.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
By Douglas Brinkley

April 17, 2004 | It was Dec. 2, 1968, and Lt. j.g. John Kerry was on a special nighttime covert mission in Vietnam. He had been ordered into a Viet Cong-infested peninsula north of Cam Ranh Bay to disrupt a smuggling operation. His vessel was a Boston Whaler, a boat that could float after taking 1,000 rounds of automatic weapons fire. Much of the evening was spent apprehending fishermen in a curfew zone. At approximately 2 a.m., however, they proceeded up an inlet with wild jungle on both sides of the boat. As they approached a bay, Kerry's whaler fired flares into the air. To their horror, not far from them, were a startled group of Viet Cong smugglers trafficking in contraband.
"We opened fire," Kerry told me in a Jan. 30, 2003, interview. "The light from the flares started to fade, the air was full of explosions. My M-16 jammed, and as I bent down to grab another gun, a stinging piece of heat socked into my arm and just seemed to burn like hell. By this time one of the sailors had started the engine and we ran by the beach strafing it. Then it was quiet."
- - - - - - - - - - - -

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http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/04/17/kerry_purple/index_np.html

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>> FOOD FIGHT 2...

Bush Spends Nearly $50 Million in March
By SHARON THEIMER
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- President Bush and John Kerry each added to their presidential fund-raising firsts last month: Bush in part by hitting $185 million and spending nearly a third of it and Kerry by raising nearly $55 million in one quarter.
Kerry's $54.8 million fund-raising total for January through March tops the $52.9 million Bush raised during the period. It also beats the previous presidential quarterly record of $50 million, set by Bush last summer.
The Democratic nominee-to-be has a long way to go to catch up with Bush's record overall fund raising, however. Kerry raised about $84 million from January 2003 through last month.
Bush and Kerry are now setting records with every dollar collected. That is in part because this is the first time both major-party nominees have skipped public financing for the primary season, freeing them from the program's $45 million spending limit.
Bush's spending in March, about $50 million, is the most ever in one month by a presidential campaign. Most of the money paid for the Republican's first wave of ads, timed to begin just after Kerry emerged from the Democratic primaries.
Nearly all of Bush's ad spending - about $40.8 million - went to Maverick Media, an admaking firm run by Bush media adviser Mark McKinnon, a campaign finance report Bush filed Tuesday with the Federal Election Commission shows.
In all, Bush has spent at least $99 million since officially starting his re-election effort last May, much of that reaching out to prospective voters and donors. In addition to ad spending, Bush has devoted at least $19 million to mailings, voter lists and related costs and at least $800,000 to "message" phone calls.
One campaign mailing sent to homes around the country this year includes a color photo of Bush and first lady Laura Bush with their signatures and the message "Grassroots leaders like you are the key to building a winning team."
Bush began April with millions of dollars on hand despite his spending spree. He raised $26.2 million last month and started April with $86.6 million on hand.
Kerry, who loaned his campaign about $6 million late last year to keep it afloat, surfaced from the primaries nearly broke but since has rebuilt his finances.
Kerry raised $42.8 million in March alone, thanks in part to a flood of small-dollar donations over the Internet as well as $1,000 and $2,000 checks from Democrats who delayed giving until after the primaries, or previously gave to his Democratic rivals.
Kerry started April with $31 million in the bank. He has spent about $69 million since starting his campaign, including roughly $30 million last month.
Bush's overall fund-raising advantage has shown on the airwaves in recent weeks. Bush has dedicated at least $50 million to ads over March and April, compared to about $12 million in ad spending by Kerry over that period.
But Kerry has benefited from at least $28 million in ad spending by outside groups that oppose Bush, including the Media Fund, MoveOn.org and the AFL-CIO. That has prompted complaints by the Bush campaign accusing some anti-Bush groups of illegally using unlimited donations known as "soft money" in the election; the groups say their activities are legal.
The two candidates remain virtually neck-and-neck in national voter polls.
Kerry is expected to increase his ad spending in coming weeks as his campaign fund grows.
The Massachusetts senator hopes to have reached $105 million in contributions by the party's nominating convention in late July. He is in the middle of a national tour to raise millions of dollars for his campaign and the Democratic National Committee.
His campaign sent an e-mail Tuesday thanking donors for giving $2.5 million online in the past week and asking them to give more. "We cannot slow down now. John Kerry can win this election but he needs your help," campaign manager Mary Beth Cahill wrote.

---

On the Net:

Federal Election Commission: http://www.fec.gov/

Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
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GOP Hoping to Push Through Asbestos Fund

By JESSE J. HOLLAND
Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Legislation to speed money to asbestos-disease sufferers could increase the federal deficit by $13 billion over the next decade, congressional budget officials said Tuesday in an estimate that could sour some of the bill's conservative support in the Senate.
This came as Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist prepared for a Thursday showdown in the Senate on whether to swap permanent business immunity from asbestos lawsuits for a $124 billion trust fund intended to speed money to sick litigants.
Democrats say they have enough votes to stop majority Republicans from pushing through their plan, saying it does not provide enough money to the victims for giving up their right to sue companies.
The Congressional Budget Office also said the fund would not have enough money.
"Including outlays for administrative costs and investment transactions of the Asbestos Fund, CBO estimates that operations of the fund would increase budget deficits by $13 billion," Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin said in a letter Tuesday to Senate Budget Chairman Don Nickles.
But Frist spokeswoman Amy Call said, "Those additional expenditures would be handled by the legal system and would not be a cost to the federal government."
Nickles' Budget Committee has said it's uneasy about the cost of the asbestos fund. In a March release, the Budget Committee said it worried that creating "a new uncapped government entitlement during a period requiring austere budget discipline, would be imprudent and inconsistent with financial responsibility."
Nickles is "still in favor of asbestos reform, but has always had reservations about the trust fund approach," Nickles spokeswoman Rachel Oliphant said. Nickles will support Frist's call for a Thursday debate, she said.
Frist is expected to try and force the Senate to debate the bill Thursday. It would take 60 votes to force a debate in the Senate, which is split with 51 Republicans, 48 Democrats and one independent senator, Jim Jeffords of Vermont. Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota said Tuesday he has enough votes to block the bill.
Under a bill promoted by Frist, R-Tenn., and Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, the Judiciary Committee chairman, the government would set up a trust fund that could reach as much as $124 billion. The fund, financed by businesses and insurance companies, would speed money to people with asbestos-related diseases.
Democrats say people who have sued companies over asbestos illnesses should not have their cases thrown out of court and be forced to participate in the fund.
They want assurances that all victims can be compensated.
Republicans argue the plan would get money to people who really need it.
Suing companies over asbestos is "almost like a lottery-like system where few claimants ... get very large awards, but many, many get little often based on simply where, for example, the claim was filed," Frist said. "The big winner is always the trial lawyers, who have taken billions of dollars out of the system, money that really should be going to those sick victims."
Democrats contend Republicans are pushing the bill to please businesses and insurers and are not working on a bipartisan solution.
"There are many on both sides of the aisle who truly and deeply want a resolution," Daschle said.
Republicans say the plan also will help the economy by removing the threat of bankruptcy for companies facing potential suits. They also say the bill is the only option the Senate will get.
"If we want to get something done, we are going to have to work with this bill," Hatch said.

---

On the Net:

Information on the original bill, S. 1125, and the revised one, S. 2290, is available at http://thomas.loc.gov

Centers for Disease Control background on asbestos: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/asbestos/

Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
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>> OUR FRIENDS IN JORDAN...

Security forces kill 4 terror suspects in shoot-out
By Rana Husseini
Anti-terrorist forces prepare on Tuesday to storm a Hashmi Shamali (northern) building, in which they killed in a shoot-out four suspected terrorists planning attacks against Jordan (Photo by Nader Daoud)
AMMAN -- Security forces on Tuesday killed four suspected terrorists in a Hashmi Shamali (northern) shoot-out, during which several officers were injured, a senior official said on Tuesday.
Minister of State and Government Spokesperson Asma Khader said anti-terrorist forces surrounded a building in the neighbourhood after receiving a tip that a group of armed men planning terrorist attacks were hiding in the area.
"The gunmen were ordered to surrender, but they fired on [security] forces, who returned fire, stormed the building and killed three suspects," Khader told reporters after a Cabinet session last night.
Few hours later, she added, the fourth gunman, who was hiding in a tunnel inside the same building, was killed after he opened fire on the security forces.
One of the four men was Jordanian, according to the spokesperson.
"Apparently, they were linked to a terrorist group, but investigations are still under way," Khader said. She did not elaborate.
Wednesday, April 21, 2004


Jordanian police kill three ''terror'' suspects in Amman shootout
In a rare incident, Jordanian police shot dead three "terror" suspects Tuesday in a shootout in the Jordanian capital, the authorities said.
Working on a tip, police stormed a hideout in east Amman where the suspects had been hiding, the police said in a statement carried by the official Petra news agency.
Police had called for the suspects to surrender, but they responded with gunfire, the statement said. The incident took place at 2:20 p.m. in downtown Amman at the district of Hashemi, the statement said.
"Information made available to security authorities pointed to the presence of an armed group which had plotted to carry out terror attacks," the statement added.
Two of the three men killed were foreigners, according to police.
Last week, Jordanian officials said an al-Qaeda-linked cell, recently dismantled in the kingdom, was plotting to detonate a chemical bomb capable of killing up to 20,000 people and to attack the U.S. Embassy and prime minister's office with poison gas. (Albawaba.com)




Report: Jordan foils huge chemical attack on inelligence HQ
The cell that was apprehended last week in Jordan planned to carry out a large-scale chemical attack, Jordanian officials told the London-based al-Hayat daily. According to the Friday's report, the prevention of the attack may have saved thousands of lives.
It added that the "majority of the members" were arrested. Jordanian officials said the plan was to detonate a powerful car bomb, which included chemical materials, at the Jordanian Military Intelligence headquarters. The cell also intended to use poison gas during attacks on the US embassy in Amman and a government building in the kingdom.
The officials said that following the interrogation of the cell members, it was revealed they were connected to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who is high up on the US most wanted list in Iraq.
Two detained men identified as Suleiman Khaled Darwish and Ali Adwan "established the cell, which was funded by al-Zarqawi from Iraq and Iran," Jordanian sources told al Hayat.
With the help of a third man, Azmi Abd al Fattah al Jayousi, they managed to smuggle three cars packed with explosives. In one of the cars, security forces found the chemical charge. The Jordanian authorities are still looking for al Jayousi.
The Jordanian officials were quoted as saying, "The bomb, had it been detonated, could have affected people in a one kilometer radius and cause the deaths of more 20,000 people, according to estimates by bomb experts".
King of Jordan Abdullah II on Wednesday sent a letter of appreciation to the Kingdom's security forces who managed to foil the plot. "Thank God, the plans of these criminals were foiled and thousands of souls were saved from a crime this country has never known". (Albawaba.com)




Kosovo: Jordanian policeman kills two American officers in jail shootout
A Jordanian policeman opened fire on a group of international UN police in Kosovo on Saturday, killing two Americans before he was killed when officers returned fire. 10 US officers and an Austrian were injured.
The motive was not exactly clear, however Reuters reported emotions over the situation in Iraq apparently prompted the gunbattle between members of the UN law enforcement mission.
The shootout broke out when a group of correctional officers - 21 Americans, two Turks and an Austrian - were leaving the detention center after a day of training. They came under fire from at least one of a group of Jordanians on guard at the prison, said Neeraj Singh, a United Nations spokesman.
The officers shot back in a gunbattle that lasted about 10 minutes. It was not immediately clear what prompted the Jordanian to shoot.
"As far as we know, there was no communication between the officer who fired and the group of victims," Singh said, adding that investigators probing the incident were questioning four Jordanian officers.
Meanwhile, the Jordanian government expressed regret for the incident in a statement and said it also was investigating the shooting, according to Petra news agency. The statement identified the Jordanian officer as Ahmed Mustafa Ibrahim Ali.
UN and local police officers sealed off the yard of the detention center, took pictures and marked the bullet cartridges with numbers. The body of a police officer, covered with what looked like a dark blue jacket, lay for hours in the yard of the prison compound.
A doctor at the hospital in Kosovska Mitrovica, told The AP that five American officers and one Austrian officer were being treated. It was not immediately clear where the other wounded were being treated, or what their nationalities were.
Kosovska Mitrovica has long been the scene of violence between Serbs and ethnic Albanians, including riots that broke out a month ago, killing 19 and injuring 900. (Albawaba.com)

Major terror attack thwarted: King Abdullah II

SAN FRANCISCO: Jordan's King Abdullah II said in an interview published yesterday that Jordanian security services thwarted a major terrorist attack aimed at toppling his government.
Jordanian police seized five trucks loaded with 17.5 tonnes of high explosives, the king told the San Francisco Chronicle.
"It was a major, major operation," Abdullah said. "It would have decapitated the government."
Casualties would have been "in the thousands," he added. "It couldn't have been more sinister."
King Abdullah is currently visiting California and spoke in San Francisco on Friday. He is scheduled to meet President George W. Bush in Washington on Wednesday.
The explosives were apparently intended for an attack on the Jordanian prime minister's office and the intelligence ministry, King Abdullah said, adding that it was uncovered after two suspected terrorists were arrested two weeks ago.
King Abdullah said that, although the trucks came from Syria, he was "completely confident that (Syrian President) Bashir (Assad) did not know about it."
The king told the Chronicle that European anti-terrorism experts were aiding the Jordanian police investigation, but gave few details.
Turning to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terror network, King Abdullah said it "has been very badly hurt, but ... that doesn't mean it can't hurt you, as we saw in Madrid."
He referred to the terrorist attacks in Spain last month. "They're still very, very effective."
The king avoided any direct comments on Bush's recent dramatic policy shift toward Israel, but did say that he had not been given any advance notice of the change.
"There were discussions beforehand with members of the administration, but what came out in Washington was different," King Abdullah told the Chronicle. "We really are at a loss for information. ... Washington has taken us a bit by surprise.
"Honestly, we don't know what the implications are," he added.
Jordan said yesterday it wanted American guarantees on the final status of Palestinian occupied territories, four days ahead of a White House meeting between King Abdullah and Bush.
"The meeting will enable Jordan's position to be reiterated on the Palestinian question and we want guarantees from the American administration on the final status," Foreign Minister Marwan Moasher said.
"We have heard the American administration stress in the past, and again on Friday, that the final status must not be decided in advance but during negotiations," said the minister, who heads for the United States today to join the king.
During a Washington Press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush said all questions linked to the final status must be negotiated between the parties. - AFP
Last update on: 18-4-2004

Posted by maximpost at 11:24 PM EDT
Permalink

Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan
Updated March 11, 2004
Sharon A. Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan
Summary
In October 2002, the United States confronted North Korea about its alleged
clandestine uranium enrichment program. Soon after, the Agreed Framework
collapsed, North Korea expelled international inspectors, and withdrew from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). U.S. intelligence officials claimed Pakistan
was a key supplier of uranium enrichment technology to North Korea, and some
media reports suggested that Pakistan had exchanged centrifuge enrichment
technology for North Korean help in developing longer range missiles.
U.S. official statements leave little doubt that cooperation occurred, but there
are significant details missing on the scope of cooperation and the role of Pakistan's
government. Further, both North Korea and Pakistan have denied that nuclear
technology was provided to North Korea. This report describes the nature and
evidence of the cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan in missiles and
nuclear weapons, the impact of cooperation on their weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs and on the international nonproliferation regime. It will be updated
as events warrant.
The roots of cooperation are deep. North Korea and Pakistan have been
engaged in conventional arms trade for over thirty years. In the 1980s, as North
Korea began successfully exporting ballistic missiles and technology, Pakistan began
producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratory. Benazir
Bhutto's 1993 visit to Pyongyang seems to have kicked off serious missile
cooperation, but it is harder to pinpoint the genesis of Pakistan's nuclear cooperation
with North Korea. By the time Pakistan probably needed to pay North Korea for its
purchases of medium-range No Dong missiles in the mid-1990s (upon which its
Ghauri missiles are based), Pakistan's cash reserves were low. Pakistan could offer
North Korea a route to nuclear weapons using HEU that could circumvent the
plutonium-focused 1994 Agreed Framework and be difficult to detect.
WMD trade between North Korea and Pakistan raises significant issues for
congressional oversight. Are there sources of leverage over proliferators outside the
nonproliferation regime? Do sanctions, interdiction, and intelligence as
nonproliferation tools need to be strengthened? How is the threat of proliferation
interpreted within the nexus of terrorism and WMD? Further, has counterterrorism
cooperation taken precedence over nonproliferation cooperation? If so, are there
approaches that would make both policies mutually supportive?
See also CRS Issue Brief IB91141 North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,
and CRS Report RS21391, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Rogue State Symbiosis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
North Korean Enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Pakistani Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Technical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Pakistan's Missile Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
North Korean Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Technical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Pakistan's Nuclear Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Government Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1 Several countries have made political decisions to stop WMD programs, sometimes
coinciding with regime changes, e.g., Argentina and Brazil halted their nuclear weapons
programs and South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons in the 1990s. The U.S. stopped
its biological weapons program in advance of the Biological Weapons Convention and
Libya decided in December 2003 to renounce all its WMD programs.
2 China has only belatedly joined supplier restraint groups. A member of the Zangger
Committee, but not the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, China joined the NPT in 1992 and has
agreed to adhere to MTCR guidelines. China has also given assurances that it will not
export nuclear-related items to unsafeguarded facilities. However, China continues to
supply technical assistance to Pakistan's missile program.
3 See CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation
Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade
Between North Korea and Pakistan
Introduction
More than thirty years ago, states agreed to control trade related to weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to complement the agreements comprising the
nonproliferation regime. Supplier controls are not foolproof, but many observers
believe that national and multilateral export controls can slow, deter, and make
WMD acquisition more difficult or costly for the determined proliferator until
political change makes the weapons irrelevant or no longer desirable.1
A recurrent problem in controlling technology transfers is that key states do not
participate in the regimes. Although they are still targets of supply-side restrictions,
some proliferating states now are able to reproduce WMD technologies and systems
and sell them abroad without formal restraints on trade. North Korea, Pakistan, and
India are three such examples in the case of nuclear weapons and missile technology.2
When export controls and interdiction fail, some U.S. laws impose penalties on
countries, entities, or persons for proliferation activities. The provisions are varied
and extend across the range of foreign assistance (aid, financing, government
contracts, military sales).3 Penalties for engaging in enrichment or reprocessing
trade were strengthened by the 1976 and 1977 Symington and Glenn amendments to
the Foreign Assistance Act (now Sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control
Act). Later penalties were added for nuclear detonations, and other provisions
established penalties for individuals. Missile proliferation-related sanctions were
established in the Missile Technology Control Act 1990, which added Chapter VII
to the Arms Export Control Act and similar language at Section 11B of the Export
Administration Act of 1979. In addition to legislated penalties, the U.S. government
also imposes sanctions through executive orders.
CRS-2
4 "A Nuclear North Korea: Intelligence; U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North
Korea," New York Times, October 18, 2002.
5 See "Pakistan's Benazir Oversaw Korea Nuclear Deal - sources," Reuters News, November
20, 2002.
6 Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 63, April 2, 2003, pp. 16113-16114. The U.S. imposed
sanctions on Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1993 for receipt of M-11 missiles from
China; in 1998 for missile-related cooperation with Changgwang Sinyong Corporation and
again in 2003.
7 "Pakistan Rejects Nuclear Inspection," London Financial Times, February 18, 2004.
8 "President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD," Remarks by the
President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair, National
Defense University, Washington, D.C.
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html]
In October 2002, the Bush Administration announced that North Korea had been
pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program; U.S. intelligence officials
leaked to the press a few days later that Pakistan, among other countries, was
implicated.4 The outlines of a missiles-for-nuclear technology trade were reported
in the press.5 Pakistani government officials denied such trade. The State
Department offered assurances that cooperation between the two was a thing of the
past. In March 2003, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on North Korean
and Pakistani entities for cooperation in missiles.6 In a letter to Congress, the State
Department explained that "the facts relating to the possible transfer of nuclear
technology from Pakistan to North Korea...do not warrant the imposition of sanctions
under applicable U.S. laws."
In late 2003, a convoluted turn of events involving nuclear safeguards
inspections in Iran and a decision by Libya in December to renounce its WMD
programs provided evidence that Pakistani scientists had supplied nuclear
technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Pakistani officials denied any
government knowledge of such cooperation and at first, denied that A.Q. Khan
(former head of Khan Research Laboratories) and his associates had assisted Libya
or North Korea. Khan confessed to his proliferation misdeeds in early February 2004
and was pardoned by President Musharraf immediately. Interviewed on February 17,
2004, Musharraf noted that Pakistan's investigation had not uncovered evidence of
transfers to other countries other than Iran and Libya."7
Nonetheless, President Bush, in a speech that focused on proliferation at the
National Defense University on February 11, 2004, stated that Khan and others sold
"nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from North Africa
to the Korean Peninsula." Bush further stated that "Khan and his associates provided
Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well
as designs for more advanced and efficient models."8
Both North Korea and Pakistan have been subject to sanctions in the past for
WMD trade. North Korea has been under one form or another of sanctions for close
to fifty years; Pakistan has been sanctioned in what some observers deem an "on
again, off again" fashion, mostly for importing WMD technology, and also for testing
CRS-3
9 See CRS Report, RS20995, India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack, for a discussion of sanctions on Pakistan.
10 Unpublished paper by Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "DPRK-Pakistan Ghauri Missile
Cooperation," 1996.
11 See CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry
Niksch. North Korea also tried to withdraw from the NPT in 1994,but suspended its
withdrawal.
12 See CRS Report RS21391, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?.
(Updated periodically.)
a nuclear device.9 The sanctions on the North Korean entity, Changgwang Sinyong
Corporation, were imposed pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the Export
Administration Act on the basis of knowing involvement in the transfer of Category
I (under the Missile Technology Control Regime) missiles or components. The
sanctions on the Pakistani entity, Khan Research Laboratories, were imposed
pursuant to Executive Order 12938, reportedly for making a material contribution to
Pakistan's missile program. Both of these entities have been sanctioned repeatedly
in the past for missile trade. On the nuclear side, all sanctions were waived following
September 11, 2001, and it is unlikely that such sanctions will be imposed again,
absent significant evidence of the Pakistani government's involvement in nuclear
trade.
Rogue State Symbiosis?
At first glance, North Korea and Pakistan do not seem the likeliest of
proliferation bedfellows. However, they have traded in conventional armaments for
over thirty years and forged a firm relationship during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988),
during which both provided assistance to Iran. North Korea's sale of Scuds and
production capabilities proved particularly important to Iran.10
Neither state lies completely outside the nonproliferation regimes. Despite its
extreme isolation, North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in
1985 under pressure from the Soviet Union, and is a party to the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC). However, North Korea never lived up to its NPT obligations
and formally withdrew from the treaty, effective April 10, 2003.11 Most observers
believe North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons (or at least the plutonium for
them) and may now be able to add five or six weapons to its arsenal, given successful
reprocessing of the spent fuel at Yongbyon. (North Korea announced in April 2003
that it was successfully reprocessing plutonium, and told an unofficial U.S.
delegation in January 2004 that the reprocessing campaign began in mid-January
2003 and ended at the end of June 2003. The unofficial delegation, including former
head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Sig Hecker, was shown an empty spent
fuel pond, but little else to prove North Korean claims).12 Most observers believe
North Korea probably has biological weapons. North Korea does not participate in
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), nor is it a party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). After successfully reverse-engineering Soviet-origin
Scud missiles, North Korea became a leading exporter of ballistic missiles beginning
in the 1980s. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), North Korea
CRS-4
13 See [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2003.htm]
14 Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001.
15 "Agencies Trace Some Iraqi URENCO Know-How to Pakistan Re-Export," Nucleonics
Week, November 28, 1991, pp. 1, 7-8.
attaches high priority to exporting ballistic missiles, which is a major source of hard
currency.13
Pakistan, on the other hand, has never been as isolated as North Korea. It has
relied significantly on outside sources of technology for its weapons programs but
has not been thought of as a major exporter of WMD-related items. It remains to be
seen whether the Pakistani military and/or government was involved at all with
Khan's nuclear deals. Pakistan has long rejected the NPT and tested nuclear
weapons in 1998, but is a party to the BWC and the CWC. Nonetheless, the U.S.
Department of Defense believes Pakistan has "the resources and capabilities to
support a limited BW research and development effort," and likely has a chemical
weapons capability.14 Pakistan has sought technical assistance in its ballistic missile
programs from North Korea and China for over a decade.
To some, proliferation by states that have newly acquired WMD is inevitable,
resulting from diffusion of technology, insufficient political will to enforce controls,
or demand fueled by perceived threats or the continuing prestige of WMD. In the
past, however, technology transfers between countries outside of the control regimes
seemed limited by the lack of technical skill and technology or hard currency. By the
mid-1990s, however, North Korea had a proven track record in ballistic missiles, and
Pakistan had demonstrated its uranium enrichment capabilities. Although Pakistan
apparently was hampered by a lack of hard currency, it could provide North Korea
with a route to nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium (HEU). This route
would not only circumvent North Korea's Agreed Framework with the United States,
but would also be difficult to detect using satellite imagery.
North Korean Enrichment
At the time the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea was negotiated, there
was concern about, but scant evidence of, North Korean interest in uranium
enrichment. Reports relating to North Korea's procurement of enrichment-related
equipment date as far back as the mid-1980s, a time when North Korea was
progressing rapidly in its plutonium production program. For example, in 1987,
North Korea reportedly received a small annealing furnace from the West German
company Leybold AG. Although they have many other uses, annealing furnaces can
be used in production of centrifuge rotors for uranium enrichment. A five-year-long
German intelligence investigation conducted from 1985 to 1990 concluded that Iraq,
and possibly Iran and North Korea obtained uranium melting information from
Pakistan in the late 1980s.15 U.S. intelligence sources also believed that technicians
employed by Leybold AG were involved in transferring equipment and information
to North Korea. One or two such technicians were in North Korea in 1989 and
another Leybold employee reportedly was seen there in 1990. Subsidiaries of
CRS-5
16 "Iraq's Bomb, Chip by Chip," New York Times, April 24, 1992.
17 Under North Korea's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), North Korea would only have to declare such facilities when safeguarded material
was introduced into the facility.
18 Testimony of Dr. Sigfried Hecker before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
"Update on the North Korean Nuclear Issue," January 21, 2004.
19 Untitled working paper on North Korea's nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment
distributed by CIA to Congressional staff on November 19, 2002.
Leybold AG were also involved in exporting centrifuge-related welding equipment
to Iraq in the late 1980s.16
Negotiators of the Agreed Framework were aware that North Korea's NPT
obligations did not prohibit uranium enrichment, and that the Agreed Framework did
not directly address uranium enrichment.17 North Korea was bound not to possess
plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities by virtue of the 1992 Joint
Declaration of a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula -- a bilateral agreement with South
Korea that called for subsequent meetings. The U.S.-North Korean Agreed
Framework required North Korea to make progress in implementing the joint
declaration, but the process languished. Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. government
continued to look for signs of enrichment and in 1998, the United States sent a team
to Kumchang-ni to look for undeclared nuclear activities, including uranium
enrichment. The team concluded that the site was not nuclear-related. By 1999,
according to one former official, however, there were clear signs of active North
Korean interest in uranium enrichment.
Current Status
North Korea has continued to deny it has an enrichment program. Vice Minister
Kim Gye Gwan told an unofficial U.S. delegation to Pyongyang in January 2004 that,
"We do not have a highly enriched uranium program, and furthermore we never
admitted to one."18 In addition, North Korea has not admitted that it has an
enrichment program in the course of the six-party talks, a negotiating position which
could bring talks to a standstill, at least from a U.S. perspective.
On February 24, 2004, CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that "We ...believe Pyongyang is pursuing a productionscale
uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by AQ Khan,
which would give North Korea an alternative route to nuclear weapons." This
estimate indicates either that North Korea has made progress since the CIA
distributed a one-page, unclassified white paper to Congress on North Korean
enrichment capabilities in November 2002, or that the CIA has new information on
North Korean capabilities. The November 2002 paper noted that the United States
had "been suspicious that North Korea has been working on uranium enrichment for
several years," and that it obtained clear evidence "recently" that North Korea had
begun constructing a centrifuge facility.19 The CIA concluded that North Korea
began a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program in 2000. Further, the paper
noted that, in 2001, North Korea "began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large
CRS-6
20 "N. Korea Keeps U.S. Intelligence Guessing," USA Today, March 11, 2003.
21 Ibid.
quantities. It also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and
withdrawal systems." The CIA "learned that the North is constructing a plant that
could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per
year when fully operational -- which could be as soon as mid-decade."
Media reports suggested that the CIA had evidence of construction and of
procurement. "Clear evidence" of construction of a centrifuge facility could mean
photographs of construction sites, but the phrasing that the CIA "learned that the
North has begun constructing a plant" is ambiguous enough to suggest the possibility
that such information comes from a defector. According to former U.S. ambassador
Donald Gregg, who became ambassador to South Korea in 1989 after retiring from
the CIA, North Korea is "an extraordinarily difficult target to go after."20 The
unclassified one-page paper distinguishes between North Korea seeking materials
and actually obtaining equipment.
According to U.S. intelligence officials, the CIA does not know where North
Korea is enriching uranium.21 According to a State Department official, the
Administration has narrowed possible uranium enrichment sites down to three.
Outside observers have suggested that Yongjo-ri, Hagap, Taechon, Pyongyang, and
Ch'onma-san might all be potential sites for enrichment. One defector, who was
debriefed by Chinese officials in 1999 (he later returned to North Korea, where, it is
assumed, he was killed), claimed that North Korea was operating a secret uranium
processing site under Mt. Chun-Ma. Commercial satellite photos of Hagap show
tunnel entrances but little else.
Detecting clandestine uranium enrichment is generally considered to be more
difficult than detecting clandestine plutonium production for several reasons. First,
satellite imagery is most useful when changes can be detected at known facilities, or
in detecting new facilities. Reactors and reprocessing facilities used in plutonium
production often have telltale signatures (shape, size, features like no windows in a
reprocessing plant, connection to a water source, power plants or connection to an
electricity grid, environmental releases), which facilitate remote detection. Uranium
enrichment plants often do not, although this varies among the techniques used. For
example, gaseous diffusion enrichment plants often are very large and require
tremendous amounts of electricity, offering some distinguishable features. In
contrast, centrifuge plants can be small, emit few environmental signatures, and do
not require significant amounts of energy to operate.
Pakistani Assistance
There is currently no detailed, unclassified information on the assistance
Pakistan might have offered. One media report, citing Western officials, said the aid
included a complete design package for a centrifuge rotor assembly, while a Japanese
report stated that Pakistan had exported actual centrifuge rotors (2,000-3,000) to
CRS-7
22 "CIA Assessment on DPRK Presumes Massive Outside Help on Centrifuges," Nuclear
Fuel, November 25, 2002.
23 "U.S. Followed the Aluminum; Pyongyang's Effort to Buy Metal was Tip to Plans,"
Washington Post, October 18, 2002.
24 "Scientist Claimed Nuclear Equipment Was Old, Official Says," Los Angeles Times,
February 10, 2004.
25 Untitled working paper on North Korea's nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment
distributed by CIA to Congressional staff on November 19, 2002.
26 The P-1 centrifuge design uses aluminum and is modified from a 1970s URENCO design,
which AQ Khan reportedly stole. The Pakistani program apparently now uses a P-2
centrifuge design, which is a more advanced design, with greater efficiency, using maraging
steel.
North Korea.22 The Washington Post reported that North Korean efforts to procure
high strength aluminum and significant construction activity tipped off the United
States.23 Apparently, North Korea attempted to obtain materials from China, Japan,
Pakistan, Russia, and Europe, but Pakistan provided most of the assistance related
to the rotors. A Pakistani official involved in Khan's investigation reportedly said
North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997 to 2000.24 The scope of
Pakistan's cooperation with Libya and Iran (including P-1 and P-2 designs, a nuclear
weapon design for Libya, and some complete rotor assemblies) raises significant
questions about how much other help Khan might have given to the North Koreans.
Technical Implications
If North Korea may already have plutonium-based nuclear weapons, what is the
technical significance of acquiring a uranium enrichment capability? On the one
hand, acquiring fissile material is, to many observers, the most difficult part of
nuclear weapons acquisition. On the other hand, North Korea's plutonium production
program is no longer bound by the Agreed Framework. North Korea began operating
its 5MW reactor and has claimed to have completed reprocessing the spent fuel in
storage (although the U.S. has not confirmed this). North Korea therefore now may
be able to augment its current stockpile of 1-2 weapons' worth of plutonium with
additional plutonium for about 5 to 6 weapons.
Currently, most accounts suggest that North Korea does not have a completed
enrichment plant. In order to produce enough HEU for 1 to 2 weapons (about 50kg),
North Korea would require cascades of thousands of centrifuges. If North Korea has
the capability to produce its own centrifuge rotors, or has completed assemblies
already, producing HEU might be considered easier that its other fissile material
production options. The unofficial U.S. delegation that visited North Korea in
January reported that the larger reactor under construction at Yongbyon was clearly
in disrepair. The unclassified CIA 2002 paper estimated that North Korea could
produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year
when the enrichment plant is fully operational.25 It is not clear how this estimate was
arrived at, and whether evidence that Pakistan provided P-1 or even P-2 centrifuge
technology was available at that time.26
CRS-8
27 The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) report, GOV/2004/12,
"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya," February 20, 2004 states Libya received "documentation related to a nuclear
weapon design and fabrication from a foreign source" p. 6.
28 "Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan Figure," New York Times, February
4, 2004; and "Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China," Washington Post, February 15,
2004. The implicit assumption is that Pakistan provided a nuclear weapon design it received
from China in the 1980s to Libya.
29 There are some reports that North Korean scientists were present at Pakistan's 1998
nuclear tests and some speculation that Pakistan tested a North Korean plutonium device
during those tests, but there is little public evidence to support this latter claim. See
"Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test," New York Times, February 27, 2004.
Revelations that Libya received a nuclear weapons design from a foreign source
raise concerns about whether North Korea also received such a nuclear weapons
design.27 According to media reports, the packet of information that Libya received
on the nuclear weapon included Chinese text and step-by-step instructions for
assembling a vintage-1960s HEU implosion device.28 The Chinese markings are
significant because of long-standing rumors that China provided Pakistan with a
nuclear weapons design. For North Korea, receiving a proven design for an HEU
implosion device would be a significant advantage for its nuclear weapons program,
since it has not overtly tested a nuclear device.29
Quite possibly, the main benefit of a centrifuge enrichment program -- the
ability to produce fissile material clandestinely -- may no longer be of great
importance to North Korea since it left the NPT in 2003. Nonetheless, such a
program may make the North Korean arsenal less vulnerable to possible military
strikes because centrifuge enrichment facilities are hard to detect. In addition, the
production of highly enriched uranium, together with plutonium production, could
give the North Koreans the option of producing more sophisticated nuclear weapons,
for example, using composite pits or boosted fission techniques (although there are
no indications that they have the technical skill to do so).
Pakistan's Missile Development
Pakistan, according to many observers, has two clearly distinct missile
development programs. The first program is run by the Pakistan National
Development Complex (PNDC) in collaboration with the Pakistan Space and Upper
Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) and has focused since the early 1980s on solid-fueled ballistic
missiles. Pakistan currently fields about 80 of the first variant, the Hatf 1. The Hatf
1 is a short-range, solid propellant, unguided missile considered by some to be too
small for a nuclear warhead, which was flight-tested in 1989 and fielded in 1992.
The 80km-range was extended to 300km in the Hatf 2a, and to 800km in the Hatf 3.
Despite claims of indigenous development, there are many indications that the Hatf
1, 2, and 3 benefitted from Chinese and European assistance. Some believe that
Pakistan renamed some imported Chinese M-11 missiles as Hatf 2a missiles in the
early 1990s; many believe that the Hatf 3 are variants of Chinese M-9 missiles, and
CRS-9
30 Simon Henderson, "Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. Policy," Policy Watch, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 12, 2004.
31 Duncan Lennox, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Thirty-Six, January 2002, p.
125.
32 ibid, p. 126
33 See Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,"
Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 2, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, 1999, pp. 23-24.
34 Daniel A. Pinkston, "When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin?"
[http://cns.mis.edu]
35 Duncan Lennox, editor, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue 36, January 2002, p. 125.
36 "Pakistan's Missile `Was a Nodong'," Jane's Missile and Rockets, Volume 2, Number 5,
May 1998, pp. 1-2.
there are those who believe that the Hatf 4 (Shaheen 1) may be based on Chinese M-
11s. Pakistan tested its Hatf 6 missile (Shaheen 2), which reportedly has a 2000-km
range, in early March 2004 for the first time.
The second development program has been headed by Khan Research
Laboratories. One report has suggested that these competing ballistic missile
development efforts were aligned with competing nuclear warhead efforts -- that is,
the team developing a plutonium warhead for Pakistan's bomb, the PAEC, worked
towards developing Chinese-derived nuclear-capable missiles, while the HEU team
(KRL), collaborated with North Korea on liquid-fueled missiles derived from
Scuds.30 In any event, it is clear that KRL cooperated with North Korea in
developing the Ghauri (Hatf 5), reportedly beginning around 1993.31 The Ghauri 1
is a liquid-propellant, nuclear-capable, 1500km-range ballistic missile, which was
successfully flight-tested in April 1998. Pakistan now fields approximately 5 to 10
of these missiles and is developing longer-range variants.
North Korean Assistance
Pakistani ballistic missile engineers developed working relationships with North
Korean engineers in the mid-1980s when they both assisted Iran during the Iran-Iraq
war. In fact, the close resemblance of Iran's Shahab missile and the Ghauri 1 has led
many to conclude that the development of the missiles was coordinated between
Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea around 1993.32 In 1992, Pakistani officials visited
North Korea to view a No Dong prototype, and again in 1993 for a No Dong flight
test.33 There are reports that then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Pyongyang
for one day in December 1993 and many analysts believe missile sales were on the
agenda of her visit, despite her public denial.34 According to one report, North Korea
sent 5 to 12 No Dong missile assembly sets to Pakistan between 1994 and 1997;
North Korea denies the allegation.35 At the end of 1997, intelligence agencies
observed regular flights from North Korea to Pakistan, accelerating in the beginning
of 1998 when there were about 9 flights per month. These flights reportedly
followed the visit of high-level North Korean officials to Pakistan.36 A.Q. Khan
CRS-10
37 Seymour Hersh, "The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew About Pakistan and the
North Korean Nuclear Program," New Yorker, January 27, 2003. "So Far U.S. Skirting
Sanctions Issue on Pakistan's Centrifuge Aid to DPRK," Nuclear Fuel, December 9, 2002,
quotes a Western source that A.Q. Khan was in the DPRK when the two countries'
representatives closed a deal to cooperate on ballistic missiles and uranium enrichment.
"The Evil Behind the Axis?" Los Angeles Times, January 5, 2003, quotes U.S. officials that
Khan initiated talks with the North Koreans in 1992 for No Dong missiles.
38 Duncan Lennox, editor, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue 36, January 2002, p. 126.
apparently made 13 visits to North Korea, beginning in the 1990s.37 Many observers
believe Pakistan accepted between 12 and 25 complete No Dong missiles in the late
1990s.
Some observers believe that cooperation has gone both ways -- that Pakistan
assisted North Korea in developing solid propellant technology. The Taepo Dong 1,
which was flight-tested in August 1998, reportedly had a third, solid-propellant stage.
Both Iranian and Pakistani personnel apparently were present for the flight test in
1998, and both Iran and Pakistan have expressed interest in space launch vehicles.
North Korean missiles have overwhelmingly used liquid propellants. If Pakistan
provided such cooperation, it likely would have come from PAEC and not KRL.
Technical Implications
In missile development, some important milestones include extending range and
payload, improving accuracy, and enhancing deployability (for example, through
stable propellants and mobile launchers). The medium-range Ghauri 1 missiles
significantly increase Pakistan's ability to target India and improve Pakistan's ability
to deploy nuclear warheads by increasing the payload. With a payload of 1200kg and
and a range of 1500km, the Ghauri well exceeds the MTCR standard for a Category
I, or nuclear-weapons capable, missile (500kg/300km). By contrast, the Hatf 1
missiles have a range and payload of 80km and 500kg. A.Q. Khan has stated that the
Ghauri is Pakistan's only nuclear capable missile. The Ghauri 2, still in
development, will have a range of between 1800 and 3000km. Both could reach
major Indian cities with large payloads.
The Ghauri missiles, because they use liquid propellant, are not as easily
deployed as the Shaheen 1 and 2 missiles (Hatf 4 and 6). These solid-fueled,
medium-range missiles apparently are based on Chinese M-11s. The Shaheens are
easier to prepare, require fewer support vehicles and personnel, and are far more
accurate than the Ghauris.38 There have been unconfirmed reports that the Ghauri
missiles will be shelved in favor of the Shaheens. On the other hand, the Shaheen
1 has a range of just 600km, while the Shaheen 2 has a range, reportedly, of 2000km.
North Korea has not flight-tested ballistic missiles since it pledged a moratorium
in September 1999. However, U.S. intelligence officials believe that it has continued
other kinds of testing. North Korea threatened to end the moratorium in November
2002 if normalization with Japan did not progress, and then in January 2003, after
North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT. Some officials believe it is only
CRS-11
39 "North Korea Prepares New Test of Missile," Washington Times, March 12, 2003.
40 "Agencies Trace Iraqi Urenco Know-how to Pakistan Re-Export," Nucleonics Week,
November 28, 1991.
41 B. Raman, "The Pakistan-North Korea Nexus," [http://www.rediff.com], March 10, 2004.
42 "Scientist Claimed Nuclear Equipment Was Old, Official Says," Los Angeles Times,
February 10, 2004.
a matter of time until North Korea breaks the moratorium.39 The implications of
ballistic missile testing for North Korean-Pakistani missile cooperation are not clear
because objectives of North Korean testing and future directions of the Pakistani
program are not known. However, Pakistan probably would be interested in
increasing the payload and improving the accuracy and mobility of its missiles, which
could indicate more interest in Chinese than North Korean assistance.
Pakistan's Nuclear Sales
The genesis of Pakistan's nuclear cooperation with North Korea is murky.
There are a few reports in trade journals of equipment passing through Pakistan on
the way to North Korea, but it is difficult to pinpoint when cooperation began. In
1986, Swiss officials seized equipment (autoclaves and desublimers) en route to
Pakistan that is typically used in uranium enrichment. Special steel containers were
also seized. One source reports that uranium enrichment information may have been
diverted from the German partner in URENCO, Uranit GmbH, to Pakistan via
Switzerland and then reexported to North Korea.40
Whether provided solely at the behest of Khan, or with the government's
blessing, it is clear that nuclear cooperation accelerated in the 1990s. One report
says that cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea expanded into the nuclear
and missile areas in Benazir Bhutto's second term (1993 to 1996) to include
exchanges of scientists and engineers.41 If Khan piggybacked his nuclear deals onto
missile cooperation, then he certainly would have had many more opportunities in
the mid- and late-1990s than before. As noted earlier, a Pakistani official involved
in Khan's investigation reportedly said North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge
components from 1997 to 2000.42
It is clear that the Pakistan government sought to reorganize some of its nuclear
programs and structure following the May 1998 tests, reportedly because it was now
a "declared" nuclear weapons state. Part of this restructuring apparently included
issuing regulations for controlling nuclear exports. In June 2000, the Pakistani
government published an advertisement announcing procedures for commercial
exports of nuclear material. Prospective exporters would need a "no objection
certificate" from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, which would also have
the authority to verify and inspect all prospective nuclear exports. According to an
article in the Pakistan daily, Dawn:
The items listed in the advertisement can be in the form of metal alloys, chemical
compounds, or other materials containing any of the following: 1. Natural,
CRS-12
43 "Government Regulates Export of Nuclear Materials," Dawn, July 24, 2000.
44 "Pakistan Clarifies Nuclear Export Control Guidelines, Arms Control Today, September
2000.
45 Srivastava, Anupam and Gahlaut, Seema, "Curbing Proliferation from Emerging
Suppliers: Export Controls in India and Pakistan," Arms Control Today, September 2003.
depleted, or enriched uranium; 2. Thorium, plutonium, or zirconium; 3. Heavy
water, tritium, or beryllium; 4. Natural or artificial radioactive materials with
more than 0.002 microcuries per gram; 5. Nuclear-grade graphite with a boron
equivalent content of less than five parts per million and density greater than
1.5g/cubic centimeter. 43
Many of those items would be useful in a nuclear weapons program. The
advertisement also listed equipment "for production, use or application of nuclear
energy and generation of electricity" including:
! Nuclear power and research reactors
! Reactor pressure vessels and reactor fuel charging and discharging
machines
! Primary coolant pumps
! Reactor control systems and items attached to the reactor vessels to
control core power levels or the primary coolant inventory of the
reactor core
! Neutron flux measuring equipment
! Welding machines for end caps for fuel element fabrication
! Gas centrifuges and magnet baffles for the separation of uranium
isotopes (emphasis added)
! UF6 mass spectrometers and frequency changers
! Exchange towers, neutron generator systems, and industrial gamma
irradiators
These guidelines, which implied that fissile material could be exported,
apparently conflicted with earlier regulations. Several days later, Pakistan's Ministry
of Commerce retracted the notice, saying that procedures were still under
consideration.44 The U.S. State Department reportedly responded by suggesting that
the regulations did not authorize such exports, but seemed to be drawn from
international control lists. U.S. and Pakistani officials apparently have been
discussing export control measures since at least 2000. A key feature of Pakistan's
regulations, however, is the explicit exemption of Ministry of Defense agencies from
controls, which suggests that weapons programs under military leadership could skirt
domestic export control laws.45
U.S. Government Responses
U.S. officials reportedly raised with Islamabad suspicions of nuclear technology
transfers between Pakistan and North Korea in 2000, prompting an investigation that
revealed that KRL scientists had large deposits of money in their personal bank
accounts. Pakistani officials reportedly informed the United States that the
CRS-13
46 "Pakistan Informed US of `Personal' Nuclear Technology Transfer: Report" December
25, 2002, Agence France-Presse.
47 "US Fears North Korea Could Gain Nuclear Capability through Pakistan," Financial
Times, June 1, 2001.
48 "North Korea Got a Little Help from Neighbors -- Secret Nuclear Program Tapped
Russian Suppliers and Pakistani Know-How," Wall Street Journal Europe, October 21,
2002; "North Korean-Pakistan Collusion Said Limited to KRL and Missiles," Nuclear Fuel,
June 25, 2001.
49 "Pakistan's N. Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny; Aid to Nuclear Arms Bid May Be Recent,"
Washington Post, November 13, 2002.
50 Reported in "North Korea Got a Little Help from Neighbors -- Secret Nuclear Program
Tapped Russian Suppliers and Pakistani Know-How," Wall Street Journal Europe, October
21, 2002. Transcript of ABC This Week from October 20, 2002.
51 Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2002.
52 "Musharraf Named In Nuclear Probe," Washington Post, February 3, 2004.
cooperation was conducted by individuals 46 In March 2001, reportedly at U.S.
insistence, AQ Khan was removed from his position as head of KRL, but retained the
post of presidential adviser until early 2004. Shortly after Khan's dismissal, Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage was quoted by the Financial Times as saying that
"people who were employed by the nuclear agency and have retired" could be
spreading nuclear technology to other states, including North Korea.47 A senior U.S.
nonproliferation official explained weeks later that Armitage's statement led to
confusion about the cooperation; that it was really limited to missile cooperation.48
Since the allegations of October 2002, Pakistani officials consistently have
denied any involvement with North Korea's nuclear program. Pakistan's ambassador
to the United States, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, told the Washington Post that "No
material, no technology ever has been exported to North Korea," adding that while
"Pakistan has engaged in trade with North Korea, nobody can tell us if there is
evidence, no one is challenging our word. There is no smoking gun."49 Nonetheless,
Secretary of State Powell told ABC's This Week that "President Musharraf gave me
his assurance, as he has previously, that Pakistan is not doing anything of that
nature...The past is that past. I am more concerned about what is going on now. We
have a new relationship with Pakistan."50 Powell stressed that he has put President
Musharraf on notice: "In my conversations with President Musharraf, I have made
clear to him that any, any sort of contact between Pakistan and North Korea we
believe would be improper, inappropriate, and would have consequences."51
Khan's confession in 2004 raises an important question of whether the Pakistani
government knew of, aided, or abetted his nuclear assistance to North Korea. Khan
has alleged that military officials knew of the transfers, but few details have emerged.
One account states that Generals Musharraf, Karamat and Waheed knew of aid to
North Korea when they were chiefs of the Army staff.52 Pakistani officials have
consistently averred that any nuclear technology was transferred on a personal basis,
CRS-14
53 "Pakistan informed US of `personal' nuclear technology transfer," Agence France-Presse,
December 25, 2002 (based on report from Jiji Press news agency). According to this and
other reports, the apparent tip-off was tens of thousands of dollars deposited into the
personal bank accounts of Pakistani scientists at Kahuta (Khan Research Laboratories).
54 "Pakistan Rejects Nuclear Inspection," London Financial Times, February 18, 2004.
55 Daniel A. Pinkston, "When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin?"
[http:/www./cns.mis.edu]
56 "Emerging Market ADRs -2: Pakistan Currency Reserves Low," Dow Jones News Service,
February 4, 1997.
57 Currently they stand at about $10 billion.
without the acquiescence or knowledge of the Pakistani government.53 This could
explain why the Bush Administration thus far, has not sought sanctions against
Pakistan. In a letter to key senators and members of Congress on March 12, 2003,
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Paul Kelly wrote that "the
Administration carefully reviewed the facts relating to the possible transfer of nuclear
technology from Pakistan to North Korea, and decided that they do not warrant the
imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws."
Both the Pakistani and North Korean governments thus far have denied that any
nuclear transfers took place at all. In particular, President Musharraf has sought to
dampen rumors that Pakistan traded nuclear secrets for missile help, by stating that
"whatever we bought from North Korea is with money."54 Evidence of such a barter
would clearly implicate the Pakistani military and government, which could
complicate U.S. decisions on aid to Pakistan and possibly trigger U.S. sanctions.
One analyst has suggested that Pakistan's foreign currency reserve crisis in 1996
might have made a barter arrangement attractive.55 In that year, the government was
able to avoid defaulting on external debt with help from the International Monetary
Fund and borrowed $500M from domestic banks.56 The reserves at that time were
$773 million, the equivalent of about three weeks of imports.57 The next year, visits
of North Korean and Pakistani officials accelerated, although this could be attributed
solely to missile cooperation.
Issues for Congress
North Korea's actions alone raise significant policy questions for Congress,
specifically, on how to roll back a capability that North Korea refuses to admit it has.
However, WMD trade between two proliferators raises a host of other issues that
may be pertinent to Congress' oversight of nonproliferation programs and strategy
and counterterrorism. First, leverage is needed from outside the traditional
nonproliferation framework, since neither North Korea nor Pakistan is a member of
the missile or nuclear control regimes. China is an obvious source of leverage
because of its longstanding diplomatic, military, and economic ties to both countries,
but the development of a new relationship between the United States and Pakistan
based on counterterrorism cooperation may also be a source of leverage.
CRS-15
58 Martin Indyk, "The Iraq War Did Not Force Gadaffi's Hand," London Financial Times,
March 9, 2004. Indyk reveals that Libya approached the United States in 1999 to discuss
eliminating its WMD.
59 Remarks by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage to Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing on North Korea, February 4, 2003.
Second, this example of secondary proliferation highlights the critical roles of
sanctions, interdiction, and intelligence. Nonproliferation sanctions appear to have
had little effect on North Korea and Pakistan, while comprehensive sanctions against
Libya, over thirty years, appear to have helped Libya decide to renounce its WMD.58
Although intelligence information was used to help alert Pakistani officials to Khan's
technology trade, interdiction appeared to play a secondary role. It is not yet clear
whether Khan's forced retirement in 2001 cut off trade (in which case intelligence
would have played a leading role) or whether it continued beyond that, until
inspections in Iraq and Libya's confessions made Khan's position untenable.
Further, intelligence information has not been able to locate uranium enrichment
facilities in North Korea. Congress may wish to explore, in the context of the
President's nonproliferation initiatives outlined on February 11, 2004, how to
improve these capabilities.
The example of WMD trade between North Korea and Pakistan raises particular
questions about how to interpret proliferation threats within the nexus of terrorism
and WMD. Do these developments compromise the security of the United States and
its allies because Pakistan and North Korea are developing new capabilities, or
because sales of sensitive technologies continue unabated and could expand to
terrorists? Since September 2001, the nexus of proliferation of WMD and terrorism
has been deemed one of the greatest threats to U.S. security. Although North Korea
is one of the seven state sponsors of terrorism, some in the administration believe that
the nexus of terrorism and WMD is not as pronounced in North Korea as it has been
elsewhere, for example, in Iraq.59 Others believe, however, that there is a danger of
North Korea proliferating its nuclear technology. Pakistan, while not a state sponsor
of terrorism, clearly has terrorist activities on its soil, and potential terrorist access
to its nuclear weapons has been a particular concern since September 11, 2001. At
that time, nonproliferation concerns about Pakistan centered on the security of the
Pakistani nuclear arsenal from terrorists and the activities of Pakistani nuclear
scientists providing assistance to terrorists or other states. The inadvertent leakage
of nuclear know-how appeared to be a serious threat. Although the Pakistani
government repeatedly has assured the world that its nuclear program is safe, there
are those who believe this may not be true. In the case of trade with North Korea, it
is unclear whether alleged nuclear transfers occurred with the blessing of the
Pakistani government or on the personal initiative of scientists. Some have
maintained that Pakistan should be able to provide evidence that it provided cash --
rather than nuclear technology -- in return for North Korean missiles and
components that apparently were loaded onto government-owned C-130 aircraft.
Others maintain the United States should press harder for direct access to Khan to
learn the scope of his activities.
A broader question is whether the Bush Administration has given higher
priority, since September 2001, to cooperation on counterterrorism than to
CRS-16
60 When asked at the daily press briefing on December 11, 2002 about waiving sanctions
against Yemen for its receipt of Scuds from North Korea, State Department Richard
Boucher said, "We decided to waive it because of the commitments that they [Yemen] had
made and in consideration of their support for the war on terrorism." He later elaborated
that: "We have done a lot of cooperation, training, exchange of information, law
enforcement cooperation with the Government of Yemen and we want to continue to do
that."
61 Transcript, White House press briefing, October 18, 2002.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

RL32336 -- FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress


April 6, 2004


Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division

Todd Masse
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Domestic Social Policy Division




CONTENTS
Summary
Introduction
FBI Intelligence Reforms
Business Process Changes
The Intelligence Cycle
Centralized Headquarters Authority
Organizational Changes
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence
New Field Office Intelligence Groups
New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s)
Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services
Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors
More Intelligence Analysts
Revamped Intelligence Training
Improved Technology
More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI
Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and State and Local Officials
Issues for Congress
The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening FBI Intelligence
Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI's Intelligence Program
Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program
Skeptics Believe FBI's Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Can Overcome FBI's Lack of Intelligence Experience
Implementation Challenges
Technology
FBI Field Leadership
Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics
Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform
Changes in The Intelligence Cycle
Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce Desired Results?
Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate?
Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient?
Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate?
Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements
Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and With Other Agencies, Is Improving For Additional Reasons
Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling Signs on Sharing
Some State and Local Officials Also Remain Dissatisfied With Level of Sharing
Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing Procedures
Congressional Oversight Issues
Oversight Effectiveness
Eliminating Committee Term Limits
Consolidating Oversight Under the Intelligence Committees
Options
Option 1: Status Quo
Option 2: Creation of a National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI
Option 3: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to Department of Homeland Security
Option 4: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to the DCI
Option 5: Creation of a New Domestic Security Intelligence Service
Conclusion
Appendix 1: Definitions of Intelligence
Appendix 2: The FBI's Traditional Role in Intelligence
Appendix 3: The FBI's Intelligence Programs -- A Brief History
FBI Excesses
Oversight and Regulation: The Pendulum Swings
Appendix 4: The Case File as an Organizing Concept, and Implications for Prevention
Appendix 5: Past Efforts to Reform FBI Intelligence
Appendix 6: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
Appendix 7: Relevant Legal and Regulatory Changes
Footnotes




Summary
The Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has been criticized for failing to warn of the attacks of September 11, 2001. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism and September 11, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, singled out the FBI in a significant manner for failing to focus on the domestic terrorist threat; collect useful intelligence; analyze strategic intelligence; and to share intelligence internally and with other members of the Intelligence Community. The Joint Inquiry concluded that the FBI was seriously deficient in identifying, reporting on, and defending against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States.

The FBI is responding by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as crimes. The major component of this effort is restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements; and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence.


Reactions to these FBI reforms are mixed. Critics contend the reforms are too limited and have implementation problems. More fundamentally, they argue that the gulf between law enforcement and intelligence cultures is so wide, that the FBI's reforms, as proposed, are unlikely to succeed. They believe the FBI will remain essentially a reactive law enforcement agency, significantly constrained in its ability to collect and exploit effectively intelligence in preventing terrorist acts.

Supporters counter that the FBI can successfully address its deficiencies, particularly its intelligence shortcomings, and that the Director's intelligence reforms are appropriate for what needs to be done. They argue that the FBI is unique among federal agencies, because it supplies the critical ingredient to a successful war against terrorism in the U.S. -- unmatched law enforcement capabilities integrated with an improving intelligence program.

The congressional oversight role includes deciding on whether to accept, modify, or reject the FBI's intelligence reforms currently underway. Congress may consider several options, ranging from support of the FBI's current reforms, to establishing a stand-alone domestic intelligence service entirely independent of the FBI. Congress may also reevaluate how it conducts oversight of the FBI. Pending legislation on FBI intelligence reform includes, but is not limited to, S. 410, The Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003, and S. 1520, The 9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act.





Introduction (1)
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have been labeled as a major intelligence failure, similar in magnitude to that associated with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (2) In response to criticisms of its role in this failure, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has introduced a series of reforms to transform the Bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on criminal investigations into a more mobile, agile, flexible, intelligence-driven (3) agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.

FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III initiated changes that were sparked by congressional charges that the Intelligence Community (IC), (4) including the FBI, missed opportunities to prevent, or at least, disrupt the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism, the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, (5) (JIC) criticized the FBI for failing to focus on the terrorist threat domestically; collect useful intelligence; strategically analyze intelligence, (6) and to share intelligence internally, and with the rest of the IC. According to the congressional inquiry, the FBI was incapable of producing significant intelligence products, and was seriously handicapped in its efforts to identify, report on (7) and defend against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States. (8)


Observers believe successful FBI reform will depend in large measure on whether the FBI can strengthen what critics have characterized as its historically neglected and weak intelligence program, particularly in the area of strategic analysis. They contend the FBI must improve its ability to collect, analyze and disseminate domestic intelligence so that it can help federal, state and local officials stop terrorists before they strike. If the FBI is viewed as failing this fundamental litmus test, they argue, confidence in any beefed up intelligence program will quickly erode.

Critics contend the FBI's intelligence reforms are moving too slowly (9) and are too limited. (10) They argue that the FBI's deeply rooted law enforcement culture and its reactive practice of investigating crimes after the fact, (11) will undermine efforts to transform the FBI into a proactive agency able to develop and use intelligence to prevent terrorism (for a more detailed discussion of the FBI's reactive "case file" approach, see Appendix 4). While the British Security Service (MI-5) may or may not be an appropriate organizational model for U.S. domestic intelligence for myriad reasons, the primacy it accords to intelligence functions over law enforcement interests may be worthy of consideration. (12) In justifying their pessimism, critics cite two previous failed attempts by the FBI to reform its intelligence program (for a more detailed discussion, see Appendix 5).


Critics also question whether Director Mueller, who has an extensive background in criminal prosecution but lacks experience in the intelligence field, (13) sufficiently understands the role of intelligence to be able to lead an overhaul of the FBI's intelligence operation. (14)

Supporters counter that they believe the FBI can change, that its shortcomings are fixable, and that the Director's intelligence reforms are appropriate, focused and will produce the needed changes. (15) They also argue that a successful war against terrorism demands that law enforcement and intelligence are closely linked. And they maintain that the FBI is institutionally able to provide an integrated approach, because it already combines both law enforcement and intelligence functions. (16)

A major role for Congress is whether to accept, modify or reject the FBI's intelligence reforms. Whether lawmakers believe the FBI to be capable of meaningful reform, and the Director's reforms to be the correct ones, could determine whether they accept or modify his changes, or eliminate them altogether in favor of a new separate domestic intelligence agency entirely independent of the FBI, as some have advocated. (17)

This report examines the FBI's intelligence program and its reform. Specifically, the section covers a number of issues that Congress might explore as part of its oversight responsibilities, to develop and understanding of how well the FBI is progressing in its reform efforts. The following section outlines the advantages and disadvantages of several congressional options to make further changes to the FBI's intelligence program. (18) Finally, a number of appendices concerning contextual issues surrounding FBI intelligence reform are provided.


FBI Intelligence Reforms
The FBI is responding to the numerous shortcomings outlined by the JIC by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as criminal acts. The major component of this effort is the restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements; and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The FBI also has reallocated its resources in an effort to establish an effective and efficient intelligence program.

The reforms are intended to address the numerous perceived shortcomings, including those outlined by the JIC Inquiry, which concluded the FBI failed to


Focus on the domestic threat. "The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qaida and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States." (19)

Conduct all-source analysis. (20) "... The FBI's traditional reliance on an aggressive, case-oriented, law enforcement approach did not encourage the broader collection and analysis efforts that are critical to the intelligence mission. Lacking appropriate personnel, training, and information systems, the FBI primarily gathered intelligence to support specific investigations, not to conduct all-source analysis for dissemination to other intelligence agencies." (21)

Centralize a nationally-coordinated effort to gain intelligence on Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida. "... The FBI's 56 field offices enjoy a great deal of latitude in managing their work consistent with the dynamic and reactive nature of its traditional law enforcement mission. In counterterrorism efforts, however, that flexibility apparently served to dilute the FBI's national focus on Bin Laden and al-Qaida." (22)

Conduct counterterrorism strategic analysis. "Consistent with its traditional law enforcement mission, the FBI was, before September 11, a reactive, operationally-driven organization that did not value strategic analysis ... most (FBI consumers) viewed strategic analytical products as academic and of little use in ongoing operations." (23)

Develop effective information technology systems. The FBI relied upon "... outdated and insufficient technical systems...." (24)

Business Process Changes
In an attempt to transform and upgrade its intelligence program, the FBI is changing how it processes intelligence by formally embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a long-time practice followed by the rest of the IC. It also is centralizing control over its national security operations at FBI Headquarters.

The Intelligence Cycle. FBI is attempting to formalize and discipline its approach to intelligence by embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a process through which (1) intelligence collection priorities are identified by national level officials, (2) priorities are communicated to the collectors who collect this information through various human and national technical means, (3) the analysis and evaluation of this raw intelligence are converted into finished intelligence products,( 4) finished intelligence products are disseminated to consumers inside and outside the FBI and Department of Justice, and (5) a feedback mechanism is created to provide collectors, analysts and collection requirements officials with consumer assessment of intelligence value. (See Figure 1, below). To advance that effort, the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) has developed and issued nine so-called concepts of operations, which essentially constitute a strategic plan identifying those areas in which changes must be made. These changes are seen as necessary if the FBI is to successfully establish an effective intelligence program that is both internally coordinated and integrated with its Intelligence Community counterparts.

Source: http://www.fbi.gov/, as altered by the Congressional Research Service


The FBI also is trying to improve and upgrade its functional capabilities at each step along the cycle. Success may turn, in part, on the performance of the new Office of Intelligence, which has the responsibility to "... manage and satisfy needs for the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence" within the FBI and to ensure requirements "levied on the FBI by national, international, state and local agencies" are met. (25)
FBI officials say their objective is to better focus intelligence collection against terrorists operating in the U.S. through improved strategic analysis that can identify gaps in their knowledge. As will be addressed later in the "Issues for Congress" section, the FBI faces numerous challenges as it formalizes its activities in each element of the intelligence cycle.

Centralized Headquarters Authority. Following September 11, Director Mueller announced that henceforth, the FBI's top three priorities would be counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime, respectively. (26) He signaled his intention to improve the FBI's intelligence program by, among other measures, consolidating and centralizing control over fragmented intelligence capabilities, both at FBI Headquarters and in the FBI's historically autonomous field offices. (27) He restated that intelligence had always been one of the FBI's core competencies (28) and organic to the FBI's investigative mission, (29) and asserted that the organization's intelligence efforts had and would continue to be disciplined by the intelligence cycle of intelligence requirements, collection, analysis, and dissemination.


Organizational Changes
The FBI is restructuring to support an integrated intelligence program. The FBI director has also created new intelligence-related positions and entities at FBI Headquarters and across its 56 field offices to improve its intelligence capacity.

New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence. As part of his effort to centralize control, Director Mueller established a new position -- the EAD-I. (30) The EAD-I manages a single intelligence program across the FBI's four investigative/operational divisions -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber. Previously, each division controlled and managed its own intelligence program. To emphasize its new and enhanced priority, the Director also elevated intelligence from program support to full program status, and established a new Office of Intelligence (OI). The OI is responsible for implementing an integrated FBI-wide intelligence strategy, developing an intelligence analyst career path, and ensuring that intelligence is appropriately shared within the FBI as well as with other federal agencies. (31) The Office also is charged with improving strategic analysis, implementing an intelligence requirements and collection regime, and ensuring that the FBI's intelligence policies are implemented. Finally, the office oversees the FBI's participation in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). (32)

The OI, headed by an Assistant Director who reports to the EAD-I, is comprised of six units: (1) Career Intelligence (works to develop career paths for intelligence analysts), (2) Strategic Analysis (provides strategic analyses to senior level FBI executives), (3) Oversight (oversees field intelligence groups), (4) Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management (establishes and implements procedures to manage the FBI intelligence process), (5) Administrative Support, and (6) Executive Support. (33)

New Field Office Intelligence Groups. The FBI has established field intelligence groups in each of its 56 field offices to raise the priority of intelligence and ultimately to drive collection, analysis and dissemination at the local level. Each field intelligence group is responsible for managing, executing and coordinating their local intelligence resources in a manner which is consistent with national priorities. (34) A field intelligence group is comprised of intelligence analysts, (35) who conduct largely tactical analyses; special agents, who are responsible for intelligence collection; and reports officers, a newly created position. (36) Reports officers are expected to play a key role by sifting raw, unevaluated intelligence and determining to whom it should be disseminated within the FBI and other federal agencies for further processing.

With regard to counterintelligence, which is any intelligence about the capabilities, intent, and operations of foreign intelligence services, or those individuals or organizations operating on behalf of foreign powers, working against the U.S., the FBI has established six field demonstration projects led by experienced FBI retirees. These teams are responsible for assessing intelligence capabilities at six individual field offices and making recommendations to correct deficiencies. (37)

New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s). In July 2002, the FBI established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), which coordinates its nation-wide network of 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). (38) The NJTTF also coordinates closely with the FBI's newly established Counterterrorism Watch, a 24-hour operations center, which is responsible for tracking terrorist threats and disseminating information about them to the JTTFs, to the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Operations Center and, indirectly, to state and local law enforcement. CT Watch is located at the FBI's 24-hour Strategic Intelligence Operations Center (SIOC). (39) With respect to regional JTTFs, the Bureau has increased their number from 66 to 84, and the number of state and local participants has more than quadrupled -- from 534 to over 2,300, according to the FBI.

Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center. President Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union address announced the establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which is to issue threat assessments based on all-source intelligence analysis. (40) The TTIC is a joint venture comprised of a number of federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities, and is directed by a CIA-named official, and a deputy director named by the FBI.

The Center, formally established in May 2003, employs 150, eight of whom are FBI analysts. When fully operational, in May 2004, the Center anticipates employing 300 professionals, approximately 65 (22%) of whom will come from FBI ranks. Of 300 total staff, 56 are expected to be strategic analysts.

New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services. As will be discussed in more detail below, the FBI has been criticized for failing to effectively share information with numerous consumer sets, including other members of the Intelligence Community, and state and local law enforcement authorities. In order to address these concerns Director Mueller established the EAD for Law Enforcement Services and under this new position, created an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. Staffed by a former state police chief, the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, working with the Office of Intelligence, ensures that relevant information is shared, as appropriate, with state and local law enforcement.


Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
There are numerous changes the FBI has made or is in the process of making to realize its intelligence goals. With the support of Congress, the FBI's budget has increased almost 50% since September 11, from $3.1 billion in FY2000 to $4.6 billion in FY2004. (41) The recently proposed FBI budget for FY2005 is $5.1 billion, including an increase of at least $76 million for intelligence and intelligence-related items. (42) According to Maureen Baginski, EAD for Intelligence, this year the FBI plans to hire 900 intelligence analysts, mostly in FBI field offices. (43) With the existing infusion of resources, the FBI is beefing up its intelligence-related staff, as well as functions which are integral to intelligence -- such as intelligence training, language translation, information technology, and intelligence sharing.

More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors. The FBI has increased the number of field agents it is devoting to its three top priorities -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), (44) in FY2004 the FBI allocated 36% of its agent positions to support Director Mueller's top the three priorities -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime -- up from 25% in FY2002. This represents an increase of approximately 1,395 agent positions, 674 of which were permanently reprogrammed from existing FBI drug, white collar, and violent crime programs. (45) From a recruitment perspective, the FBI recently established "intelligence" as a "critical skill need" for special agent recruitment. (46)

More Intelligence Analysts. The FBI estimates that of the 1,156 analysts employed as of July 2003, 475 of them were dedicated to counterterrorism analysis. (47) Prior to September 11, the FBI employed 159 counterterrorism analysts. (48) The FBI requested and received an additional 214 analytical positions as part of its FY2004 funding. (49) As mentioned above, in calendar year 2004, the FBI intends to hire 900 analysts, many of whom will be stationed across its 56 field offices. In an effort to convey that the FBI is attaching greater importance to the role analysts play, the Office of Intelligence has signaled to the FBI that analysts have a valid and valuable role to play within the organization. (50) The FBI, for the first time, is also attempting to establish a dedicated career path for its intelligence analysts, and for the purposes of promotion is now viewing its three types of analysts (formerly the Intelligence Research Specialists and Intelligence Operations Specialists, with the addition of a new category of employee, Reports Officers) all as generic intelligence analysts. As will be discussed more in-depth below, theoretically, all intelligence analysts, whether assigned to Headquarters or to a field office, will have promotion potential to the grade of GS-15 (non-managerial). Until now, generally, at the non-managerial level, analysts assigned to Headquarters had a promotion potential to the GS-14 level, and those in the field were only allowed to reach the GS-12 level. New recruitment standards, including the elimination of a requirement for a bachelor's degree (51) and a new cognitive ability testing process, have been developed.

Revamped Intelligence Training. (52) The FBI is revamping its training to reflect the role of intelligence. The FBI has revised its new agent training, established a College of Analytical Studies to train both new and more experienced analysts and has plans to re-engineer its overall training program. (53)

Specifically, the FBI is providing more intelligence training for new special agents. New special agents undertake a 17 week, 680 hour training program when they enter the FBI. The amount of time agents devote to studying National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) topics (54) -- principally Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism (55) -- in new agent training has increased from 28 hours (4.1% of total training) to 80 hours (11.8% of total training). (56) As part of this updated 680 hour curriculum for new agents, the FBI has instituted a two-hour block of training devoted solely to intelligence. Notwithstanding these changes, FBI officials recognize they have made relatively little progress in integrating intelligence into all aspects of new agent training.

The new training is intended to expose new employees to the intelligence cycle -- requirements, collection, analysis, reporting and dissemination -- and to how intelligence advances national security goals. Agents also are taught how to use strategic and tactical analysis effectively. (57)

All new analysts, or those new to the analytical function, are required to take an introductory analytical training course when they assume analytical responsibilities at the FBI. Historically, the curriculum for this course -- recently renamed the Analytical Cadre Education Strategy-I (ACES) so as to be "... more descriptive and create a positive image for the training effort" (58) -- included a substantial amount of time dedicated to orienting the new analyst to the FBI. According to FBI officials, this course has recently been re-engineered to focus more directly on intelligence, asset vetting, reporting writing, the Intelligence Community, and various analytical methodologies. According to FBI officials, more advanced intelligence analysis courses -- ACES II -- are in development.

Finally, the FBI plans to enhance training standardization and efficiency by consolidating all training in the FBI's Training Division. Historically, the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program has developed and provided its own substantive intelligence training programs. FBI analysts are also encouraged to avail themselves of the many geographic and functional analytic courses taught by other elements of the Intelligence Community.

Improved Technology. The FBI says it recognizes the critical importance of improving its antiquated information technology system, (59) so that it can more effectively share information both internally and with the rest of the Intelligence Community, and Director Mueller has made it one of his top ten priorities. But the FBI's technological center-piece -- the three-stage Trilogy Project -- continues to suffer from delays and cost overruns. Although the FBI has installed new hardware and software, and established local and wide area communications networks, (60) Trilogy's third, and perhaps most important component -- the Virtual Case File system (intended to give analysts access to a new terrorism database containing 40 million documents, and generally an improved ease of information retrieval) -- remains behind schedule and over budget. (61)

More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI. In the wake of the 1960s domestic intelligence scandals (for further discussion, see Appendix 3) various protective "walls" were put in place to separate criminal and intelligence investigations. As a result of these walls, information sharing between the two sets of investigators was "sharply limited, overseen by legal mediators from the FBI and Justice Department, and subject to scrutiny by criminal courts and the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." (62) The FBI recently eliminated an internal barrier to communication by allowing its criminal and intelligence investigators to physically work together on the same squads. As part of a new so-called Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy (MCIS), all counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset like an intelligence or espionage investigation. (63)


Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and State and Local Officials. The FBI also has taken steps to improve its intelligence and information sharing with other federal agencies as well as with state and local officials. It has established an Executive Assistant for Law Enforcement Services, who is responsible for coordinating law enforcement with state and local officials through a new Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. The FBI also has increased dissemination of weekly intelligence bulletins to states and localities as part of an effort to educate and raise the general awareness of terrorism issues. And the FBI is increasing its use of the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System and the National Criminal Information Center databases to disseminate threat warnings and the identities of individuals the FBI has listed on its Terrorist Watch List. (64) Other information sharing enhancements -- each addressed earlier -- include increasing the number of JTTFs and establishing the new position of Reports Officer.


Issues for Congress
Assessing the effectiveness of the FBI's intelligence reforms raises several potential issues for Congress. These include


The FBI's new focus on centralized headquarters decision-making;

Implementation challenges, including those in each area of the Intelligence Cycle;

Adequacy of resources to support reforms; and

Congressional oversight.

The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening FBI Intelligence (65)
Some observers believe a major issue is whether the FBI's new centralized management structure will provide the organization with the requisite formal and informal authority to ensure that its intelligence priorities are implemented effectively and efficiently by FBI field offices. Historically, and particularly with respect to the FBI's law enforcement activities, field offices have had a relatively high degree of autonomy to pursue locally determined priorities. A related issue is whether FBI employees will embrace, or resist, FBI Headquarters' enhanced management role and its new emphasis on intelligence.

Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI's Intelligence Program. Supporters argue that a centralized management structure is an essential ingredient of a counterterrorism program, because it will enable the FBI to strengthen its intelligence program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve headquarters-field coordination.

According to proponents, FBI Director Mueller has centralized authority by making four principal structural changes. He has established (1) a new position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) created a new Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence program; (3) established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force; and (4) established intelligence units in each field office to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence to FBI Headquarters.

Supporters contend that by centralizing decision-making, the FBI will be able to address several critical weaknesses which the JIC Inquiry attributed to decentralized management. First, a central management structure will enable the FBI to more easily correlate intelligence, and thereby more accurately assess the presence of terrorists in the U.S. Second, the FBI will be able to strengthen its analysis capabilities, particularly with regard to strategic analysis, which is intended to provide a broader understanding of terrorist threats and terrorist organization. Third, FBI Headquarters will be able to more effectively fuse and share intelligence internally, and with other IC agencies. Finally, centralized decision-making will provide FBI Headquarters a means to enforce intelligence priorities in the field. Specifically, it provide a means for FBI Headquarters to ensure that field agents spend less time gathering information to support criminal prosecutions -- a legacy of the FBI's law enforcement culture -- and more time collecting and analyzing intelligence that will help prevent terrorist acts.

Supporters contend that employees are embracing centralized management and the FBI's new intelligence priorities, but caution it is premature to pronounce centralized management a success. Rather, they suggest that, "with careful planning, the commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, progress should be well along in three or four years," (66) but concede that, "we're a long way from getting there." (67)

Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program. Skeptics agree that if the FBI is to prevent terrorism, it must strengthen its intelligence program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve headquarters-field coordination. But they question whether centralizing decision-making at FBI Headquarters will enable the FBI to accomplish these goals, and they cite two principal factors which they suggest will undermine the impact of centralized decision making. They question whether any structural management changes can (1) change a vested and ingrained law enforcement culture, and (2) overcome the FBI's lack of intelligence experience and integration with the Intelligence Community.

Skeptics Believe FBI's Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making. Skeptics assert that the FBI's entrenched law enforcement culture will undermine its effort to establish an effective and efficient intelligence program by centralizing decision-making at FBI Headquarters. They point to the historical importance that the FBI has placed on convicting criminals -- including terrorists. But those convictions have come after the fact, and skeptics argue that the FBI will continue to encounter opposition within its ranks to adopting more subtle and somewhat unfamiliar intelligence methods designed to prevent terrorism. Former Attorney General Janet Reno, for example, reportedly "leaned toward closing down surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) if they hindered criminal cases." (68) As one observer said, "law enforcement and intelligence don't fit ... law enforcement always wins." (69)

Some observers speculate that one reason law enforcement priorities prevail over those of intelligence is because convictions that can disrupt terrorist planning in advance of an attack often are based on lesser charges, such as immigration violations. FBI field personnel therefore may conclude that they should focus more effort on prosecuting criminal cases that result in longer jail terms. (70) Observers also suggest that because of the importance attached to successful criminal prosecutions, to the extent intelligence is used, it will be used to support criminal investigations, rather than to learn more about potential counterterrorism targets. (71)

Skeptics are convinced that the FBI's law enforcement culture is too entrenched, and resistant to change, to be easily influenced by FBI Headquarters directives emphasizing the importance of intelligence in preventing terrorism. They cite the Gilmore Commission, which concluded:


... the Bureau's long-standing traditional organizational culture persuades us that, even with the best of intentions, the FBI cannot soon be made over into an organization dedicated to detecting and preventing attacks rather than one dedicated to punishing them. (72)
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Can Overcome FBI's Lack of Intelligence Experience. Skeptics assert that the FBI's inexperience in the intelligence area has caused it to misunderstand the role intelligence can play in preventing terrorism, and they question whether centralized decision-making can correct this deficiency.


Specifically, they contend the FBI does not understand how to collect intelligence about potential counterterrorism targets, and properly analyze it. Instead, skeptics argue that notwithstanding the FBI's current efforts to develop detailed collection requirements, FBI agents will likely continue to "gather" evidence to support criminal cases. Moreover, skeptics argue, the FBI will undoubtedly "run faster, and jump higher," in gathering even more information at the urging of FBI Headquarters to "improve" intelligence. (73) Missing, however, according to critics, is the ability to implement successfully a system in which intelligence is collected according to a strategically determined set of collection requirements that specifically target operational clandestine activity. These collection requirements in turn must be informed by strategic analysis that integrates a broader understanding of terrorist threats and known and (conceptually) unknown gaps in the FBI's intelligence base. Critics fear that FBI analysts, instead, will continue to spend the bulk of their time providing tactical analytic support to FBI operational units pursuing cases, rather than systematically and strategically analyzing all-source intelligence and FBI intelligence gaps.



Implementation Challenges
The FBI is likely to confront significant challenges in implementing its reforms. Its most fundamental challenge, some assert, will be to transform the FBI's deeply entrenched law enforcement culture, and its emphasis on criminal convictions, into a culture that emphasizes the importance that intelligence plays in counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Although observers believe that FBI Director Mueller is identifying and communicating his counterterrorism and intelligence priorities, they caution that effective reform implementation will be the ultimate determinant of success. The FBI, they say, must implement programs to recruit intelligence professionals with operational and analytical expertise; develop formal career development paths, including defined paths to promotion; and continue to improve information management and technology. These changes, they say, should be implemented in a timely fashion, as over two and a half years have passed since the attacks of September 11, 2001. They also contend the FBI must improve intelligence sharing within the FBI and with other IC agencies, and with federal, state and local agencies.

Technology. Inadequate information technology, in part, contributed to the FBI being unable to correlate the knowledge possessed by its components prior to September 11, according to the congressional joint inquiry. (74) GAO and the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports conclude that the FBI still lacks an enterprise architecture, a critical and necessary component, they argue, to successful IT modernization. (75) In addition to lacking an enterprise architecture plan, according to the GAO, the FBI has also not had sustained information technology leadership and management. To demonstrate this point, a recent GAO report found the FBI has had five Chief Information Officers in the last 2003-2004, and the current CIO is temporarily detailed to the FBI from the Department of Justice. (76)

One important manifestation of the FBI's historical problems with information management is the deleterious effects it has had on analysis. For numerous information technology reasons, it has historically been difficult for FBI analysts at Headquarters, whose primary responsibility is to integrate intelligence from open sources, FBI field offices and legal attaches, and other entities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, to retrieve in a timely manner intelligence which should be readily available to them. Among other factors, this is the result of lack of appropriate information management and technology tools and, to a lesser extent, the lack of uniform implementation of policies relating to information technology usage.

Technology alone is not, however, a panacea. Existing information technology tools must be uniformly used to be effective. One FBI official responsible for intelligence analysis stated before the Joint Inquiry that "... Information was sometimes not made available (to FBI Headquarters) because field offices, concerned about security or media leaks, did not upload their investigative results or restricted access to specific cases. This, of course, risks leaving the analysts not knowing what they did not know." (77)

As mentioned above, supporters say that Director Mueller recognizes the important role technology must play in his reforms, and that despite setbacks to the Trilogy technology upgrade, the Director is making important progress. (78) However, the third and arguably most important stage of the Trilogy technology update, the deployment of the aforementioned Virtual Case File system, did not meet its December 2003 deadline. Moreover, according to the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, as of January 2003, the FBI confirmed the Inspector General's assessment that an additional $138 million (over the then estimated requirement of $458 million) would be necessary to complete the Trilogy project. (79) This would bring the total cost of the Trilogy update to $596 million.


FBI Field Leadership. An important issue is whether the FBI's field leadership is able and willing to support Director Mueller's reforms. Critics argue that the lack of national security experience among the existing cadre of Special Agents-in-Charge (SACs) of the FBI's field offices represents a significant impediment to change. According to one former senior FBI official, "... over 90 percent of the SACs have very little national security experience ...." (80) He suggested that lack of understanding and experience would result in continued field emphasis on law enforcement rather than an intelligence approach to terrorism cases.

Supporters counter that Director Mueller has made it inalterably clear that his priorities are intelligence and terrorism prevention. Some SACs who have been uncomfortable with the new priorities have chosen to retire. But critics also contend that it will require a number of years of voluntary attrition before field leadership more attuned to the importance of intelligence is in place.

Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics. Another issue is whether the FBI is effectively implementing its reforms and has established appropriate benchmarks to measure progress. Critics assert that although the FBI developed various concepts of operations to improve its intelligence program, in many cases it lacks specific implementation plans and benchmarks. The Department of Justice Inspector General has recommended that "an implementation plan that includes a budget, along with a time schedule detailing each step and identifying the responsible FBI official" (81) be drafted for each concept of operations.

Supporters say that the FBI recognizes the need for specific implementation plans and is developing them. They cite as an example the implementation plan for intelligence collection management, almost half of which they estimate is in place. (82)

Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform. Prior to September 11, FBI analytic resources -- particularly in strategic analysis -- were severely limited. The FBI had assigned only one strategic analyst exclusively to Al-Qaeda prior to September 11. (83) Of its approximately 1,200 intelligence analysts, 66% were unqualified, according to the FBI's own assessment. (84) The FBI also lacked linguists competent in the languages and dialects spoken by radicals linked to Al-Qaeda. (85)

Some supporters argue that appropriate resources now are being allocated to reflect the FBI's new intelligence priorities. "Dollars and people are now flowing to the FBI's most critical needs ... This trend is clearly reflected in the FBI's requested resources for FY2004," (86) according to former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who said intelligence analytic support, particularly for counterterrorism, has improved substantially. (87) As mentioned above, the Department of Justice is requesting at least $76 million in support of intelligence and intelligence-related programs for FY2005.

Supporters of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform describe a "dramatic increase" in intelligence analysts, both at headquarters and in the field -- from 159 in 2001, to 347 planned in 2003, and that an initial cadre of about a dozen analysts is supporting TTIC . (88) Moreover, as mentioned above, the FBI intends to hire 900 intelligence analysts in 2004. Supporters also point to the Daily Presidential Threat Briefings the FBI drafts, and 30 longer-term analyses and a comprehensive national terrorist threat assessment that have been completed. (89) But even supporters caution that institutional change now underway at the FBI "does not occur overnight and involves major cultural change." (90) They estimate that with careful planning, the commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, the FBI's "transformation" will be well along in three to five years, though it will take longer to fully accomplish its goals. (91)

GAO presents a more mixed assessment. According to GAO: "The FBI has made substantial progress, as evidenced by the development of both a new strategic plan and a strategic human capital plan, as well as its realignment of staff to better address the new priorities." Notwithstanding this progress, however, the GAO concluded "...an overall transformation plan is more valuable..." than "cross walks" between various strategic plans. (92) GAO also reports that 70% of the FBI agents and 29 of the 34 FBI analysts who completed its questionnaire said the number of intelligence analysts was insufficient given the current workload and priorities. (93) As a result, many field agents said they have no choice but to conduct their own intelligence analysis. Despite a lack of analysts apparent before September 11, if not after, the FBI did not establish priority hiring goals for intelligence analysts until 2003. (94) According to GAO, the FBI was well on its way to meeting its target of 126 new analytic hires in 2003 -- having hired 115 or 91%. (95)

The mix of analytic hires also is critical. But, according to GAO, the FBI lacks a strategic human capital plan, making it difficult to determine whether the FBI is striking an effective balance in its analytic core. (96) It also is difficult to assess whether the FBI is providing sufficient institutional support, the appropriate tools, and incentive system for these resources to be harnessed effectively in pursuit of its priority national security missions-counterterrorism and counterintelligence.

Skeptics of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform argue -- and supporters concede -- that this is not the first time the FBI has singled out intelligence for additional resources. The FBI did so in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, only to allow those resources to revert to the FBI's traditional priorities -- violent and organized crime, drug trafficking, and infrastructure protection. Additional intelligence analysts also were hired, but they were viewed as poorly trained, limited in experience, and lacking in needed information technology tools. They also were easily diverted to support the FBI's traditional anti-crime operations, (97) even though efforts were made during the intervening years to protect resources intended to support the agency's national security efforts, including intelligence. (98)

Changes in The Intelligence Cycle. As the FBI attempts to formalize its intelligence cycle, it will likely face challenges in each element of the intelligence cycle. Incomplete or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from the overall system's effectiveness.

Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce Desired Results? The FBI's new Office of Intelligence is establishing an internal intelligence requirements mechanism that will be part of an integrated IC national requirements system. Supporters of establishing this mechanism maintain that the FBI has outlined a rational process for managing collection requirements. According to FBI officials, the FBI is developing for each of its investigative/operational programs a detailed set of priority intelligence collection requirements. These requirements will be disseminated to FBI field offices through a classified FBI Intranet.

Skeptics question whether the FBI can overcome its historic lack of experience with a disciplined foreign intelligence requirements process. The FBI, they argue, traditionally has viewed domestic collection of foreign intelligence as a low priority "collateral" function, unless it helped solve a criminal case. And dissemination of any domestically collected foreign intelligence tended to be ad hoc.

Skeptics point to four hurdles that the FBI may have trouble surmounting. First, given that traditional intelligence tasking from the Intelligence Community to the FBI has generally been vague and voluminous; the FBI, they say, must be able to strike a balance between directing its collectors to answer questions that are either too nebulous or too specific. Questions that are overly vague can go unanswered for lack of direction. On the other hand, collection requirements that are too specific risk reducing intelligence to a formulaic science, when most analysts would agree the intelligence discipline is more art than science. In the final analysis, while appropriately drafted intelligence collection requirements are an essential element in the intelligence cycle, there is no substitute for experienced intelligence professionals who are capable of successfully collecting intelligence in response to the requirements. Second, they say, the FBI will need to dedicate appropriate resources to managing a requirements process that could easily overwhelm Headquarters and field intelligence staff with overlapping and imprecise requests for intelligence collection. Third, they say, the FBI will have to significantly upgrade its cadre of strategic analysts, who will play a critical role in identifying intelligence gaps. Fourth, they say, the FBI will have to support its requirements process with incentives and disincentives for agent intelligence collectors so that requirements are fulfilled. Enhanced performance of the intelligence requirements process depends largely on the accumulated successes the FBI has in each of these areas. Incomplete or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from the overall system's effectiveness.

Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate? Both supporters and skeptics of the adequacy of FBI's reforms agree that collecting intelligence by penetrating terrorist cells is critical to disrupting and preventing terrorist acts. Supporters argue that the FBI has a long and successful history of such penetrations when it comes to organized crime groups, and suggest that it is capable of replicating its success against terrorist cells. They assert that the FBI has had almost a century of experience recruiting and managing undercover agents and informers, and that it long ago mastered collection techniques such as electronic surveillance and witness interviews. They also argue that the FBI can uniquely use both money and the threat of prosecution to induce cooperation in recruiting human source assets. (99) They also cite as evidence of the FBI's commitment to improving its human intelligence collection the organization's recent deployment of six teams to "...examine ways to expand the FBI's human intelligence base and to provide additional oversight." (100)

Skeptics are not so certain. They say recruiting organized crime penetrations differs dramatically from terrorist recruiting. As one former senior level intelligence official put it, "It's one thing to recruit Tony Soprano, yet quite another to recruit an al Qaeda operative." (101) This official was alluding to the fact that terrorist groups may have different motivations and support networks than organized crime groups. (102) Moreover, terrorist groups may be less willing than organized crime enterprises to accept as members or agents individuals who they have not known for years and are not members of the same ethnocentric groups, or whose bona fides are not directly supported by existing members of the group.

As alluded to above, skeptics also argue that while the FBI is good at gathering information, it has little experience collecting intelligence based on a policy driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements. (103) As one observer commented:


While the FBI correctly highlights its unmatched ability to gather evidence and with it information, there is nonetheless a National Security imperative which distinguishes intelligence collection from a similar, but different, function found in law enforcement. "Gathering" which is not driven [and] informed by specific, focused, National Security needs is not the same as "intelligence collection"... which means intelligence activities which are dictated by, and coupled to, a policy driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements. (104)
Critics assert that the FBI's criminal case approach to terrorism produces a vacuum cleaner approach to intelligence collection. The FBI, they say, continues to collect and disseminate interesting items from a river of intelligence when, instead, it should focus collection on those areas where intelligence indicates the greatest potential threat. (105) But critics contend that there are few evident signs that the FBI has adopted such an approach. "They are jumping higher, faster," but not collecting the intelligence they need, according to one critic. (106) As a result, critics maintain, the process turns on serendipity rather than on a focused, directed, analytically driven requirements process. Another observer put it this way:


Using the metaphor "finding the needle in the haystack," since September 11 government agencies have been basically adding more hay to the pile, not finding needles. Finding the needles requires that we undertake more focused, rigorous and thoughtful domestic intelligence collection and analysis not collect mountains of information on innocent civilians.
(107)
Skeptics also question whether the FBI is prepared to recruit the type of individual needed to effectively collect and analyze intelligence. The FBI's historic emphasis on law enforcement has encouraged and rewarded agents who gather as many facts as legally possible in their attempt make a criminal case. Because a successful case rests on rules of criminal procedure, the FBI draws largely from the top talent in state and local law enforcement agencies, and the military; in short, some say, those individuals who focus on discrete facts rather than on the connections between them. (108)

Perhaps as fundamental to the collection of more targeted human intelligence is the implementation of a formal asset vetting program to assess the validity and credibility of human sources, according to informed observers, who note that only three to four percent of the FBI's human assets are vetted. (109) They point out the failure to effectively vet its human assets has contributed to serious problems in the FBI's criminal and national foreign intelligence programs. (110)

Supporters contend that the FBI is currently implementing its national intelligence collections requirements concept of operations, and so it may be premature to assess effectiveness. Critics contend, however, that it remains unclear what specific performance metrics the FBI is employing to measure the effectiveness of its collection. They say that when asked to assess its performance in the war on terrorism, the FBI continues to cite arrests and convictions of suspected terrorists. (111) They further contend that the FBI rarely cites the number of human sources recruited who have provided information essential to counterterrorism or counterintelligence as a performance metric. (112)

Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient? Some observers contend that the FBI has made notable progress in professionalizing its analytical program since September 11, and, indeed, over the past two decades. During this period, they assert that the FBI's analytic cadre, particularly at Headquarters, has evolved from a disjointed group of less than qualified individuals into a group of professionals which understands the role analysis plays in advancing national security investigations and operations. The majority of intelligence analysts at Headquarters possesses advanced degrees and has expert knowledge in various functional and geographic areas. Over the last two decades, they also cite the FBI's progress in internally promoting analysts to analytic management positions.

Supporters of Director Mueller's reforms also point to the new Office of Intelligence, and maintain that it is implementing a number of initiatives focused on improving the quality of analysis. They include a new promotion plan that will provide analysts GS-15 promotion opportunities (they now are capped at GS-14); new career development plans; an increased flexibility to continue working in their areas of expertise or to rotate to other functional, geographic or management positions; improved mid-career training; and improved and more standardized recruitment practices. They assert that these efforts will improve retention rates, a chronic problem. (113)

Critics, however, remain largely unpersuaded and argue that analysis remains a serious FBI vulnerability in the war on terrorism. The Congressional Joint Inquiry on September 11 urged the FBI, among other steps, to


... significantly improve strategic analytical capabilities by assuring qualification, training, and independence of analysts coupled with sufficient access to necessary information and resources. (114)
Although they applaud the FBI's new focus on analysis, critics question its effectiveness and point to a number of trends. For example, they cite the continuing paucity of analysts in the FBI's senior national security ranks, even more than two years after the September 11 attacks. This, they say, reflects the FBI's continuing failure to treat analysis as a priority and more fundamentally to understand how to leverage analysis in the war on terror. (115) They also point to the FBI's own internal study that found 66 percent of its analytic corps unqualified and question whether the FBI's changes are sufficiently broad to address this legacy problem. (116)

Critics support the new GS-15 promotion plan, but contend that implementation is lacking and that it falls short of senior executive service promotion which they advocate. (117) According to an FBI official, there are currently no FBI intelligence analysts at the non-managerial GS-15 grade level. They also are concerned that the FBI has eliminated the requirement that all new intelligence analysts possess a minimum of a bachelor's degree, and substituted instead a less rigorous requirement, in their view, of one year of analytic experience, or military or law enforcement employment. They insist that a bachelor's degree provides more formal and necessary academic training in research methodologies, written and oral communication and critical thinking. Moreover, according to some critics, the collapsing of all functional and cross-disciplinary analysts into one intelligence analyst position encourages a "one size fits all" approach to analysis that may undermine a need for functional, geographic and target-specific expertise. (118)


Finally, critics are concerned that although the FBI says it is trying to strengthen strategic analysis, it is failing to commit adequate resources. The new Office of Intelligence has a Strategic Intelligence Unit, but more in name only, according to some observers. Few analysts have been assigned to the unit, and those who have are being forced to balance management and executive briefing responsibilities with actually conducting strategic analysis. Further complicating the situation is the fact that tactical and strategic analysts still physically located in each of the FBI's operational divisions are now "matrixed" to the Office of Intelligence. That is, they report both to their own divisions and to the Office of Intelligence. Therefore, they potentially confront competing priorities -- analysis largely composed of briefing materials to support FBI executives, and tactical analyses to support ongoing cases. (119)

Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate? The FBI continues to be criticized for not sharing information -- a failure that variously has been blamed on a variety of shortcomings, including culture, an absence of information sharing strategy, technological problems, and legal and policy constraints. Some of the legal and policy constraints were eliminated by the USA PATRIOT Act. (120) And more recently, by a decision to allow criminal and intelligence investigators to work side by side. (121)

FBI supporters give the FBI high marks since the September 11th attacks for sharing threat information, building information bridges to the intelligence agencies and state and local law enforcement, collaborating with foreign law enforcement components, and opening itself up to external reviewers. (122) But even supporters believe that maintaining this commendable record will be a continuing management challenge, one which will require constant reinforcement. (123) They emphasize that the traditional values of FBI agents as independent and determined must give way to include values of information sharing and cooperation. (124)

Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements. Supporters argue that perhaps the most significant change -- a sea change, according to some -- is a recent decision to tear down the organizational wall that has separated criminal and intelligence investigations since the spying scandals of the 1960s. (125) As a result, criminal and intelligence investigators will now physically work as part of the same squads on terrorism investigations. All counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset like intelligence or espionage investigations, allowing investigators to more easily use secret warrants and other methods that are overseen by the surveillance court and are unavailable in traditional criminal probes. The FBI was able to do so as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act, which allows counterterrorism intelligence and criminal information to be more easily shared within the FBI. (126)

Supporters blame Congress for creating the wall in the first place. They assert that in the wake of the 1960s spy scandals, Congress weakened the FBI's domestic intelligence capabilities by imposing stricter standards. The result, they argue, was a dangerous lack of intelligence sharing. (127) According to the FBI, the recent change has resulted in the disruption of at least four terrorist attacks overseas and the uncovering of a terrorist sleeper cell in the United States. (128)

Although these changes undoubtedly will improve intelligence sharing between FBI's criminal and intelligence components, the question remains whether the information will be shared with other agencies and state and local law officials. Some critics do not dispute that Director Mueller's decision will enhance intelligence sharing within the FBI. They agree it will. Rather, they are concerned that more innocent people will become the targets of clandestine surveillance. (129)

Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and With Other Agencies, Is Improving For Additional Reasons. Advocates assert intelligence sharing, both internally and with other agencies is improving for other reasons -- the FBI is better training its personnel and providing them with improved sharing processes. In addition, they point to the FBI's new concept of operations for intelligence dissemination that collapses a number of current and different production processes into a single one that will be imbedded throughout the FBI. (130) Supporters also point favorably to Director Mueller's decision to establish the position of "Reports Officers," whose responsibility will be to extract pertinent intelligence from FBI collection and analysis and disseminate it to the widest extent possible. Supporters who believe that sharing with state and local authorities has improved point out that since September 11, the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are the principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law enforcement officials, has increased from 66 in 2001 to 84 in 2003. The number of state and local participants has more than quadrupled from 534 to over 2,300, according to the FBI.

Supporters also finally embrace Director Mueller for correctly emphasizing technology that emphasizes horizontal, rather than vertical, flow of information to produce better results. Director Mueller asserts that, "Our move to change the technology in the next two or three years will have a dramatic impact on the way we do business -- eliminating a lot of the bureaucratic hang-ups, giving the agents the tools they need to be interactive, pass among themselves the best ways of doing things and we will free up the FBI in a substantial number of ways." (131)

Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling Signs on Sharing. The FBI concedes that although it "... has always been a great collector of information," its "sharing of information was primarily case oriented rather than part of an enterprise wide activity." (132) Critics point to a number of troubling signs that they claim indicate continuing problems. According to the Gilmore Commission, the Federal government is far from perfecting a system of sharing national security intelligence and other information. Moreover, the flow of information remains largely one way -- from the local and state levels to the FBI. The prevailing view, according to the Commission, continues to be that the Federal Government likes to receive information but is reluctant to share it completely. One local law enforcement official said the FBI's intelligence sharing practices remain essentially unchanged since September 11. This official suggested that the FBI shares a great volume of threat information, but little of real value that would help state and local officials prevent terrorist attacks. (133) Another state office said, "We don't get anything (of value) from the FBI." (134)

Some skeptics argue that technology problems notwithstanding, willingness to share intelligence, both within the FBI and with other Intelligence Community agencies, remains a continuing problem. According to a recent report issued by the Markle Foundation, there has been only marginal improvement in the past year in the sharing of terrorist-related information between relevant agencies, including the FBI. The report states that sharing remains haphazard and still overly dependent on the ad hoc network of personal relations among known colleagues. It is not the result of a carefully considered network architecture that optimizes the abilities of all of the players, according to the report. (135)

The Markle report argues that the existing system of counterterrorism information sharing remains too centralized, federal government-centric, and bound by increasingly tenuous distinctions in U.S. regulations and law regarding domestic and foreign intelligence. (136) In order to combat a decentralized terrorist threat more effectively, Markle recommends a model of information sharing which runs counter to the existing "hub and spoke" information sharing model the FBI is building. Advocates envision a decentralized "peer-to-peer" network in which the various federal, state, local and private sector entities systematically collecting information relevant to counterterrorism, and according to established guidelines protecting civil liberties and privacy, share that information directly with one another. (137)

The Department of Justice's Office of Inspector General, recently reported that despite progress in terrorism information sharing, the FBI faces considerable impediments in establishing an effective information and intelligence sharing program, including changes to information technology constraints, ongoing analytical weaknesses, agency origination control procedures, (138) and lack of "... established policies and procedures that delineate the appropriate processes to be used to share information and intelligence, either internally or externally." (139)

Some State and Local Officials Also Remain Dissatisfied With Level of Sharing. Some state and local law enforcement officials continue to criticize what they characterize as FBI's continuing unwillingness to share intelligence, while expecting state and local law officials to share their information with them. Nevertheless, some state and local law enforcement officials concede that there has been some improvement in the sharing relationship since September 11. And there also is a growing recognition among some state and local law enforcement officials that "... there may be a mis-perception that the FBI has more detailed accurate or confirmed information than it actually has." (140)

While acknowledging some improvement, these officials insist the exchange of information remains largely one-way. (141) And although that hasn't prevented them from participating in their local JTTFs, one official said he believed that the FBI did not consider him an intelligence consumer. (142) According to another, the FBI has shared information through the JTTF but made clear it was doing so because "...he has a right to know, but not a need to know," and that the FBI told him not to share the information with anyone else in law enforcement or state government, including the governor, who, he said, possesses a Top Secret clearance. (143)

Some state and local law enforcement officials complain that although JTTFs are intended to be joint enterprises, combining federal, state and local law enforcement resources, they characterize the relationship as more of one of "co-habitation" where the FBI clearly is in charge and non-federal representatives are viewed as second tier participants, despite often having greater knowledge of a particular case. (144)

With respect to the case-orientation and law enforcement bias so often mentioned as challenges for the FBI as it shifts to having a more preventative bias, state and local law enforcement officials stated that notwithstanding recognition by FBI leadership that the "intelligence is in the case," the FBI agent on the street still starts with a case and has a bias in the direction of law enforcement. Moreover, one senior state law enforcement official stated that FBI leadership is "... still being led by individuals who have a criminal law mindset." (145)

Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing Procedures. Some state and local law enforcement officials are sufficiently displeased with the current sharing relationship that they have proposed that the Department of Homeland Security establish regional intelligence centers through which classified raw and finished foreign intelligence on terrorism could be disseminated. (146) The centers would be staffed by a cadre of Top Secret-cleared personnel drawn principally from State Police and State DHS Offices and would serve as "... regional repository and clearinghouse for terrorist related information gathered at the federal level, consisting of trends, indicators, and warnings." (147) Through a pending arrangement with the DHS, Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), the goal would be to "... create a national pipeline for pattern and trend analysis of terrorism intelligence," (148) at the state level. DHS has not acted on the proposal. (149)


Congressional Oversight Issues
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives each established intelligence oversight committees in the 1970s. The catalyst for the creation of these committees was public revelations resulting from press coverage and congressional investigations that the Intelligence Community had conducted covert assassination attempts against foreign leaders, and collected information concerning the political activities of some U.S. citizens during the late 1960s and early 1970s. (150) Intelligence Committee Members are selected by the majority and minority leadership of each chamber of Congress, and serve terms of eight years on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and six years on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Terms limited were established so that a greater number of Members could become knowledgeable on intelligence matters over time. Membership rotation was also viewed as the best way to maintain a flow of new ideas. Committee membership was also structured so that Members serving on other committees with interests in intelligence issues -- the Appropriations, Armed Services, Judiciary, and Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate) and Committee on International Relations (House) -- would be represented. Finally, in the Senate, the majority was given a one-vote, rather than a proportional margin, to ensure bipartisanship. The House apportions its membership using the traditional proportional method.

One oversight issue is whether the current congressional structure is sufficiently focused to monitor effectively the FBI's intelligence reforms. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI has been criticized for failing to more effectively collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence. The congressional committees principally responsible for conducting FBI oversight -- the Intelligence, Judiciary and Appropriations Committees -- on the other hand, have been subject to little or no criticism. (151) Some critics argue that those responsible for conducting oversight should be held accountable as well. They have questioned the diligence of the committees and, in the case of the Intelligence Committees, the committees' structure. (152)

Ellen Laipson, former director of the National Intelligence Council (1997-2002) suggests while the balance between intelligence collection and analysis is unlikely to be corrected soon:


What are needed are more radical steps to dismantle the bloated bureaucratic behavior of the large agencies and retool most employees to contribute more directly to the intelligence mission. The fault lies both with Congress and with the intelligence community's bureaucrats. This is not an argument for less collection, but perhaps less collection management, less complicated requirements process, and more priority given to a workforce whose productivity is measured in terms of output, of more useful processing of data, and creation of more analytic product. It seems that even the best intentioned intelligence community leaders cannot effect this change alone; a serious push by the oversight process and the senior customers must take place.
(153)
At the same time, GAO recommends that continuous internal and independent external, monitoring and oversight are essential to help ensure that the implementation of FBI reforms stays on track and achieves its purpose. "It is important for Congress to actively oversee the proposed transformation." (154)

Oversight Effectiveness. According to Representative David Obey, congressional oversight, at times, has been "miserable."


I've been here 33 years and I have seen times when Congress exercised adequate oversight, with respect to [the FBI], and I've seen times when I thought Congress' actions in that regard were miserable ... I can recall times when members of the committee seemed to be more interested in getting the autographs of the FBI director than they were in doing their job asking tough questions. And I don't think the agency was served by that any more than the country was. And I hope that over the next 20 years we'll see a much more consistent and aggressive oversight of the agency, because your agency does have immense power. (155)
Some observers agree, and have singled out the oversight exercised by the two congressional intelligence committees for particular criticism. According to Loch Johnson, a former congressional staff member and intelligence specialist at the University of Georgia, "They [the intelligence committees] didn't press hard enough [with regard to 9/11]. There's all the authority they need. They didn't press hard enough [for change]." Another observer commented, "They should be held as accountable as the intelligence agencies." (156)

Some Members of Congress, however, contend that the congressional committees have their limits. "Our job is to see that the agencies are focused on the right problems as we think them to be and they have the capabilities to meet those mission requirements," former Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham is reported to have said. (157) One of Graham's predecessors seems to agree. "We can legislate, but there is little we can do to compel compliance," according to a press account of former Chairman Senator Richard Shelby, who said the committees face an unacceptable choice from a security standpoint when it comes to fencing spending in an effort to force change. (158)

"As you examine the record, you will discover numerous examples of complete disregard for congressional direction, not to mention the law." Shelby is reported to have said. But as one Senate aide pointed out, "When you're in the middle of a war on terror, holding money back from the Intelligence Community -- that's the problem." (159)

Eliminating Committee Term Limits. Some have suggested that the current eight-year cap on intelligence committee service be eliminated. Critics of the term limits argue that members often are just beginning to grasp the complexities of the Intelligence Community by the time their term ends. "I was at a peak of my knowledge and ability to carry out effective oversight," Graham, who already had received a two-year extension of his eight-year term when he had to leave the committee at the end of the 107th Congress in 2002 is quoted as saying. (160)

Critics also argue that term limits, although seen as a well-intentioned efforts to prevent to members from becoming co-opted by the Intelligence Community, have outlived whatever usefulness they may have had. The community, they assert, has become technically so complex that effective oversight requires members who are knowledgeable and well-versed in its intricacies. Term limits work against that goal by robbing the committee of institutional memory, knowledge and expertise. That outcome can only be avoided if members are permitted to serve on an open-ended basis; of all congressional committees, only the intelligence committees are term-limited.

Supporters of term limits argue that the eight-year cap still effectively prevents Members of Congress from becoming too close to the Intelligence Community -- including the FBI; and this remains an important objective given the sensitive role the Intelligence Community plays in a democracy. Term limits, supporters argue, also provide exposure to the arcane world of intelligence to a greater number of members. Finally, they argue, by ensuring a stream of new members with relatively little experience in intelligence, term limits bring more new ideas to the table.

Consolidating Oversight Under the Intelligence Committees. Some observers argue that Congress could more effectively oversee the FBI's intelligence operation if the joint jurisdiction now exercised by the intelligence and judiciary committees was eliminated, and the sole responsibility given to the intelligence committees. They concede, however, that such an outcome could result only if a stand-alone collection and analysis entity, was separate and became independent from the FBI, effectively removing the rationale for judiciary committee oversight. In recommending such an outcome, they at least imply that the intelligence committees would bring a more focused oversight expertise to judging the effectiveness of domestic intelligence analysis, collection and dissemination. They further suggest that putting the intelligence committees in charge would provide an even better mechanism for protecting civil liberties than do "current structure and processes." (161)

However, opponents of consolidation argue that the intelligence committees are ill-quipped to focus on questions of civil liberties in connection with a domestic intelligence agency. They also could argue that the sensitivity of such issues requires the transparency that comes with regular public hearings. The intelligence committees, by contrast, conduct the majority of their work behind closed doors.


Options
The debate over Congressional options on FBI reform centers on two fundamentally opposing views on how best to prevent terrorist acts and other clandestine foreign intelligence activities directed against the United State before they occur. Adherents to one school of thought believe there are important synergies to be gained from keeping intelligence and law enforcement functions combined as they are currently under the FBI. They argue that the two disciplines share the goal of terrorism prevention; that prevention within the U.S. will invariably require law enforcement to arrest and prosecute alleged terrorists; and, that the decentralized nature of terrorist cells is analogous to that of organized crime. (162)

A second school of thought counters that the chasm between the exigencies of the two disciplines, both cultural and practical, is simply too broad to effectively bridge, and, therefore, that the two should be bureaucratically separated.

These two opposing views raise several options for Congress, including the following:


Option 1: Support Director Mueller's reform package.

Option 2: Create a semi-autonomous National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI.

Option 3: Establish a separate domestic intelligence agency within the Department of Homeland Security.

Option 4: Establish a separate domestic intelligence agency under the authority of the DCI, but subject to oversight of the Attorney General.

Option 5: Create an entirely new stand-alone domestic intelligence service.

Option 1: Status Quo
Under this option Congress would continue to support Director Mueller's reforms with necessary funding. Proponents of this could argue that Director Mueller's reforms constitute the most effective way to address weaknesses and improve the FBI's intelligence program, and ultimately, to prevent terrorism in the U.S. They could also argue that the reforms accomplish three important and inter-related goals. First, the FBI would continue to benefit from the synergies that integrated intelligence-law enforcement provides in the war on terror. Second, by keeping the intelligence program within the FBI and under the watchful eye of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General would be better able to reassure the American people that the FBI's use of intelligence will not be allowed to infringe on their civil liberties. Third, the reforms would improve the FBI's intelligence capabilities, while minimizing the bureaucratic disruption, confusion and resource constraints that would result if the FBI's intelligence program were re-established in a new stand-alone entity separate from the FBI. More specifically, they could maintain that Director Mueller's changes are improving day-to-day collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.

Opponents to this option could counter that the reforms are necessary but insufficient. While applauding Director Mueller's new focus on the intelligence, some could contend that his reforms are too limited and that intelligence still and always will be, undermined by its arguably second-class status in an FBI that has long been proud of its law enforcement culture. They could cite past instances when additional resources were provided to the FBI's intelligence program, only later to be siphoned off to support criminal priorities. Or, they could also go further, arguing that the disciplines of intelligence and law enforcement are so different that they must be separated, and the FBI's intelligence program housed in and directed by a new agency.


Option 2: Creation of a National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI
Under this option, Congress could establish a semi-autonomous national security intelligence service (NSIS) within the FBI, and provide it with sufficient staff and protected resources. The service would have its own budget to ensure sustainable resources. The service's principal responsibility would be to develop and nurture an integrated intelligence program, and to establish well-defined career paths for special agents and analysts that would hold out realistic promise of advancement to the highest levels of the FBI and the Intelligence Community. (163) Current FBI employees who decide to join the service could be protected from mandatory transfers to the FBI's criminal programs. The service director, experienced in all-source domestic and foreign intelligence, would be presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed. Regional service squads could be established to focus intelligence resources in the field.

There are multiple ways such an organization could be structured. One such construct, however, would pull all (investigative, operational and analytical -- headquarters and field) of the FBI's international terrorism, foreign counterintelligence, JTTF, and security countermeasures resources into the NSIS. While the NSIS Director would report to the FBI Director and the Attorney General, and operate under the Attorney General Guidelines, the NSIS Director would also be tasked to ensure seamless coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence on issues for which the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence are increasingly blurred, such as terrorism. Analysts within the NSIS would have access to all the FBI's intelligence relevant to national security, including criminal intelligence. Moreover, formal analytical working groups could be established to ensure analytical integration across counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal programs. Finally, field intelligence groups could be fewer in number to ensure focus and deployment of experienced human resources, and could report to both the NSIS Deputy Director, and local Special Agent in Charge.

Proponents could argue this option would enhance the FBI's focus on intelligence without building any "walls" between the various types of intelligence the FBI collects, analyzes, and exploits. They could contend that the FBI could build a more effectively leveraged intelligence program on the foundation that the Director is currently putting in place. And that it could do so without severing the connection with law enforcement and the FBI's 56 field offices and 46 legal attaches (164) serving in U.S. embassies. Such an approach would also ease efforts to establish intelligence career paths and strengthen the role of intelligence. Some proponents of a "service within a service" also argue that it may serve as an interim or bridge solution to the eventual creation of an autonomous domestic intelligence agency (see option 5 below). (165)

Opponents could argue that this option is still too limited, and that intelligence and law enforcement should be separated. They could also contend such an effort could be bureaucratically confusing as the new service seeks to build its independence while the FBI continues to exert control. Opponents could also argue that this option would disrupt Director Mueller's current reforms at the very time they are taking hold.


Option 3: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to Department of Homeland Security
A third option could be to establish a separate domestic intelligence service and house it in the Department of Homeland Security. (166) The service would be a member of the Intelligence Community and its authorities would be limited to collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence inside the United States, including the plans, intentions and capabilities of international terrorist groups operating in the U.S. As envisioned, the agency, like Great Britain's MI5, (167) would not have arrest authority.

Proponents of this option could argue that folding the new entity into DHS, as opposed to creating a new stand-alone agency, would avoid creating more bureaucracy while also establishing an organization unencumbered by the FBI's law enforcement culture. They could argue that such an entity would be able to more sharply focus on intelligence while also better safeguarding the rights of citizens, provided new checks on its ability to collect intelligence against innocent people were put in place.

Opponents could counter that placing the new organization in DHS would undermine its ability to play the role of an honest broker that could produce intelligence products not only for DHS but for other federal agencies, as well as for state and local authorities. They could also argue that placing the new entity within DHS would force it to compete with other DHS offices for scarce resources. (168) They also could oppose the idea for the same reason they might oppose a new entity separate from the FBI -- that the essential synergistic relationship between intelligence and law enforcement would be severed. Finally, opponents could argue that establishing a separate agency is tantamount to creating an MI5-like agency, which may be unworkable in the U.S. context for political, cultural and legal reasons despite any efforts to mold it to conform to American experience. (169)


Option 4: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to the DCI
A fourth option could be to establish a domestic intelligence service under the direction of the Director Central Intelligence, either as a separate entity reporting directly to the DCI in that capacity, (170) or incorporated into the CIA. The Attorney General would retain the authority to establish and enforce rules to assure that the rights of Americans would be preserved.

Supporters of this option could contend that providing the DCI additional operational capability would improve the integration of analysis and collection and would ensure that security rather than criminal concerns would be emphasized. (171) Opponents could argue that legal, policy perception, and cultural concerns militate against expanding DCI control over domestic intelligence collection and analysis. They could assert that there is a risk that the IC could misuse information it collected on American citizens. (172) They could also argue that as a practical matter if a decision was made to incorporate this entity into the CIA, it, like the FBI, simply may not up to the task of reorienting its efforts quickly enough to take on this added responsibility. (173)


Option 5: Creation of a New Domestic Security Intelligence Service
A fifth option could be to create an entirely new agency within the IC -- but, one which is independent of the FBI, CIA and DHS. The new agency would fuse all intelligence -- from all sources, domestic and foreign -- on potential terrorist attacks within the United States and disseminate it to appropriately cleared federal, state, local and private sector customers. (174) This stand-alone entity also would include a separate but collocated collection units, which would be authorized to collect domestic intelligence on international terrorism threats within the United States. The new organization would be prohibited from collecting intelligence un-related to international terrorism. Counterterrorism intelligence collection outside the United States would continue to fall under the purview of the CIA, NSA, and other foreign IC components. (175) It also would lack arrest authorities, but would provide "actionable" intelligence to those entities, such as the FBI, with authority to take action. The new entity would have authority to task the IC for collection. It would be overseen by a policy and steering committee comprised of the new agency's director, the DCI, the Attorney General and the DHS Secretary. The steering committee would ensure that the new entity adheres to all relevant constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements.

Proponents of this option could argue that because of its law enforcement culture, the FBI is incapable of transforming itself into an agency capable of preventing terrorist attacks. (176) And even if it could, proponents could argue that failing to separate intelligence collection from law enforcement could give rise to the fear that the U.S. was establishing a secret police. (177) Proponents also could assert that the federal government artificially distinguishes between foreign and domestic terrorist threats, when those distinctions increasingly are blurred. And they could contend, given the historical record, that the FBI and CIA are incapable of changing direction quickly enough to work together effectively to bridge that divide. (178)

Opponents could counter that establishing another agency will simply create more bureaucracy. They could argue that it would take years for a new organization to be fully staffed, and become effective in the fight against terrorism, and that pushing for better CIA-FBI cooperation is a more practical approach. (179) They also could argue that establishing a separate domestic intelligence service (like MI-5) is impractical in the U.S. context (180) and would move the country in the wrong direction by creating a more stove-piped bureaucracy that would undermine the country's ability to wage an integrated war on terrorism. (181) And they could argue that the FBI has never been solely a law enforcement agency but rather an investigative and domestic security agency that is well prepared to collect and analyze intelligence, and they could cite the FBI's successes against organized crime as proof. (182)

Opponents could also counter that the FBI in the past has effectively collected intelligence, but, that its ability to do so over time has been eroded. Former U.S. Attorney General Barr and others argue that historically the FBI has been effective in the collection of domestic intelligence, but that it was undermined by policymakers, such as Congress and the courts, through the placement of legal constraints on the FBI over the past 30 years. (183) Finally, opponents could argue that Britain's MI-5 has a mixed record of effectiveness. (184)


Conclusion
Congressional policymakers face FBI intelligence reform options in a dynamic context. The FBI has made or is in the process of making substantial organizational, business process, and resource allocation changes to enhance its ability to deter, detect, neutralize and prevent acts of terrorism or espionage directed against the United States. Some experts believe that the remedial measures currently being taken by the FBI, to include a centralization of national security-related cases, enhanced intelligence training for agents and analysts, increased recruitment of intelligence analysts, and the development of a formal and integrated intelligence cycle are all appropriate and achievable. Other experts are more critical of the current intelligence reforms believing that the culture of the FBI, including its law enforcement-oriented approach to intelligence, may prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to necessary intelligence reforms. Some argue that the pace and scope of reform may be too slow and not radical enough.

One of the central points of distinction between supporters and critics of the current FBI intelligence reforms is the extent to which they believe that the two disciplines of law enforcement and intelligence are synergistic, that is that the commonalities among them would benefit from continued integration. In general, those believing that law enforcement and intelligence should be integrated argue for the status quo. However, other experts believe that given the conceptual and operational differences between law enforcement and intelligence, the national interest would be best served by having them located in separate organizations with systematic and formal mechanisms in place to share information and protect civil liberties. Should the Congress choose to influence the direction and/or outcome of the FBI's intelligence reform, numerous options, from support of the status quo to the establishment of an autonomous domestic security intelligence service, are available for consideration.


Appendix 1: Definitions of Intelligence
Three formal categories of intelligence are defined under statute or regulation:


Foreign Intelligence. Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons. (185)

Counterintelligence. Information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (186)

Criminal Intelligence. Data which has been evaluated to determine that it is relevant to the identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by an individual who or organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity. [Certain criminal activities including but not limited to loan sharking, drug trafficking, trafficking in stolen property, gambling, extortion, smuggling, bribery, and corruption of public officials often involve some degree of regular coordination and permanent organization involving a large number of participants over a broad geographical area]. (187)

Appendix 2: The FBI's Traditional Role in Intelligence
According to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, signed December 4, 1981, and the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S. Code ?401), the FBI is a statutory member of the United States Intelligence Community. Specifically, and in accordance with section 1.14 of Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, the intelligence roles of the FBI are outlined as follows:

Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:


(a) Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coordinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community. When a counterintelligence activity of the military involves military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with the Department of Defense;

(b) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;

(c) Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the Intelligence Community, or, when requested by the Director of the National Security Agency, to support the communications security activities of the United States Government;

(d) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; and

(e) Carry out or contract for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.

Appendix 3: The FBI's Intelligence Programs -- A Brief History
The FBI's is responsible for deterring, detecting and preventing domestic activities that may threaten the national security, and, at the same time, respecting constitutional safeguards. (188) The FBI, a statutory member of the IC, is able to collect foreign intelligence within the U.S. when authorized by IC officials.

The FBI and its predecessor, the Bureau of Intelligence, have collected intelligence -- foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and criminal intelligence -- in the U.S. since 1908, (189) and, at times, effectively. (190) During the Cold War, the FBI successfully penetrated the Soviet leadership through a recruited U.S. Communist Party asset. The FBI also battled the Kremlin on the counterintelligence front. (191) In 1985 -- dubbed the Year of the Spy, the FBI arrested 11 U.S. citizens for espionage, -- including former U.S. warrant officer John Walker, who provided the Soviets highly classified cryptography codes during a spying career that began in the 1960s. The FBI also arrested Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA employee, a spy for the People's Republic of China; Jonathan Pollard, a Naval Investigative Service intelligence analyst who stole secrets for Israel; and Ronald Pelton, a former National Security Agency communications specialist who provided the Soviet Union classified material. (192) More recently convicted spies include FBI Special Agent Robert P. Hanssen, who spied on behalf of Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, and pleaded guilty to 15 espionage-related charges in 2001; and former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Ana Belen Montes, arrested in 2001 and subsequently convicted for spying for Cuba.


FBI Excesses
The FBI has been applauded for its historical successes, but also criticized for overstepping constitutional bounds by targeting U.S. citizens who were found to be exercising their constitutional rights. (193) For example, during the 1919-1920 "Palmer Raids," the FBI's so-called Radical Division (later renamed the General Intelligence Division) arrested individuals allegedly working to overthrow the U.S. government, but who were later judged to be innocent. (194)

Between 1956 and 1970, the FBI investigated individuals it believed were engaging in "subversive" activities as part of the FBI's so-called COINTELPRO Program. (195) In the mid-1960s, the FBI surveilled such prominent Americans as Martin Luther King, Jr., collecting "racial intelligence." (196) And in the 1980s, the FBI was found to have violated the constitutional rights of members of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) who the FBI believed violated the Foreign Agent Registration Act. (197) Although congressional investigators concluded that the FBI's investigation did not reflect "significant FBI political or ideological bias ...," its activities "resulted in the investigation of domestic political activities protected by the First Amendment that should not have come under governmental scrutiny." (198)


Oversight and Regulation: The Pendulum Swings
In response to these FBI abuses, the Department of Justice imposed domestic intelligence collection standards on the IC, including the FBI. For example, in 1976, Attorney General Edward H. Levi issued specific guidelines governing FBI domestic security investigations. Congress also established House and Senate intelligence oversight committees to monitor the IC. And President Carter signed into law the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which established legal procedures and standards governing the use of electronic surveillance within the U.S.

Critics argue that until Congress approved the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act granting the FBI additional authority to investigate suspected terrorists, increased oversight and over-regulation had seriously weakened the FBI's intelligence capabilities. Some thought that not only had regulations curtailed the FBI's surveillance authorities, but that they had undermined the risk-taking culture thought to be essential to successful intelligence work. (199) The Levi Guidelines (200) were singled out as being particularly onerous. (201)


Some observers blamed the restrictions for discouraging domestic intelligence collection unless the FBI could clearly show that its collection was tied to a specific alleged crime. They also said the restrictions led the FBI to transfer responsibility for parts of its counterterrorism program from the FBI's former Intelligence Division to its Criminal Division. The result, they contend, was an anemic intelligence program that contributed to the failure to prevent the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. (202)


Appendix 4: The Case File as an Organizing Concept, and Implications for Prevention
The FBI uses a case approach to categorize each of its investigations. Each case receives an alphanumeric indicator signifying the target country, or issue, and the level of priority. Some observers have criticized this approach as reactive; a case is opened only after a crime has been committed. Traditionally, ex post investigation is the FBI's greatest investigative strength. It can deploy thousands of agents, as it did after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to track domestic and international leads, conduct witness interviews and develop a "story board" about how the act and the events surrounding it took place. Although well suited for assembling a criminal case, this operational approach is ill-suited for terrorism prevention.

While the FBI reacts to crimes after the fact, it adopts a proactive approach in some counterintelligence cases, For example, FBI counterintelligence agents, working with their IC counterparts, may open a "case" to recruit a human asset, usually a foreign national, who may have access to information which would fulfill an existing intelligence gap.

The FBI says it is attempting to adopt a proactive approach to counterterrorism. FBI Director Mueller says that the new USA PATRIOT Act has helped. According to FBI Director Mueller, the FBI can now, "... move from thinking about 'intelligence as a case' to finding 'intelligence in the case'...." (203) While the reactive opening a criminal case, such as those against cigarette smugglers, may yield intelligence relevant to counterterrorism, it is generally a serendipitous occurrence. Extracting preventative and predictive intelligence from a case arguably presupposes first, that the case was opened pro-actively, and not necessarily in response to some adverse event. Second, in order to extract intelligence from any case, well-trained and experienced reports officers and intelligence analysts must be integrated into the flow of intelligence resulting from investigations, and be able to sift the "signal" from the "noise" in the sea of raw intelligence to which they have access. According to one local law enforcement official, the FBI is unable to strip the intelligence from their own cases, much less share that intelligence with state and local law enforcement officials. (204) Finally, for the FBI to succeed in using this new approach, it will likely have to implement successfully all the complex and inter-related elements of the intelligence cycle.


Appendix 5: Past Efforts to Reform FBI Intelligence
The FBI's current intelligence reform is not its first. Twice before -- in 1998, and then again in 1999 -- the FBI embarked on almost identical efforts to establish intelligence as a priority, and to strengthen its intelligence program. Both attempts are considered by some to have been failures. (205)

Both previous attempts were driven by concerns that FBI's intelligence effectiveness was being undercut by the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence program. The FBI's three operational divisions, at the time -- criminal, counterterrorism and counterintelligence -- each controlled its own intelligence program. (206) As a result, the FBI had trouble integrating its intelligence effort horizontally between its divisions. In intelligence world parlance, the programs were "stove-piped."


In 1998, the FBI attempted to address the stove pipe problem by consolidating control over intelligence under the authority of a newly established Office of Intelligence. It also took steps to improve the quality of its intelligence analysis, particularly in the criminal area, which was viewed as particularly weak.

Dissatisfied with the results, the FBI launched a second round of reforms the following year aimed at more thoroughly integrating FBI intelligence analysis in support of investigations. A new Investigative Services Division (ISD) was established to replace the Office of Intelligence, and to house in one location all FBI analysts that until then had been "owned" by FBI's operational divisions. Although the ISD was intended to provide each of the divisions "one-stop shopping" for their intelligence needs, it was never accepted by the operational divisions, which wanted to control their own intelligence analysis programs. In the wake of September 11, the FBI concluded that analysts would be more effective if they were controlled by the operational divisions. ISD was abolished, and analysts were dispersed back to the divisions in which they originally served.

Although observers blame the failure of both prior reform efforts on several complex factors, they put the FBI's deeply-ingrained law enforcement mentality at the top of the list. As one observer described it, efforts to integrate intelligence at the FBI were substantially hampered because resources dedicated to intelligence were gradually siphoned back to the FBI's traditional counter crime programs. Moreover, there was also little sustained senior level support for an intelligence function that was integrated with the Intelligence Community. (207)


Appendix 6: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence (208)
The FBI's two principal national foreign intelligence program responsibilities are counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Some observers of FBI intelligence reform have suggested that these two disciplines be integrated, but not necessarily under the control of the FBI. (209) Numerous interviewees indicated their belief that of the FBI's NFIP responsibilities, the counterintelligence program was most closely integrated into the Intelligence Community.

Historically, the FBI has shifted its organization to counter both terrorist and clandestine foreign intelligence activity directed against the United States. Although the FBI in the past has integrated both missions as part of the same division, currently the FBI has separate counterterrorism and counterintelligence divisions. The Assistant Directors for each division report to an Executive Assistant Director having responsibility for both functions. In a debate that mirrors the ongoing discussion about the appropriate relationship between law enforcement and intelligence, some observers believe counterterrorism and counterintelligence should be reintegrated. (210) They make the following arguments:


Commonality of Adversary Methods of Operation. No matter whether the threat the United States is confronting is that of a loosely affiliated foreign terrorist group, or a centrally controlled foreign intelligence service, the method of operation is consistent -- a covertly organized set of activities designed to undermine U.S. national security. As such, the countermeasures are similar -- primarily the penetration and surveillance of the inimical activity, up to, and until, the point at which action may be taken against the United States.

Linkages between Foreign Intelligence Services and Terrorist Groups. Some argue that there are linkages between foreign intelligence services and terrorist groups. (211) Information documenting these links, should they exist, are likely to be classified.
Supporters of the status quo argue the following:


Similar Disciplines -- Different Time Lines and Pressures. While the damage that can result from a successful espionage operation directed against the United States by a foreign power can be just as damaging to national security as the terrorist attacks of September 11, counterintelligence moves at a different pace than counterterrorism. Building counter-espionage cases can sometimes consume months, if not years, of monitoring actions of those suspected of passing national defense information to an unauthorized third party, or committing economic espionage. In the case of a potential terrorist act, there is pressure to collect actionable intelligence, and to act quickly to prevent terrorists from striking.

Diminution of Resources/Organizational Focus on Counterintelligence. Of the FBI's two principal National Foreign Intelligence Program priorities, the counterintelligence program, arguably, has been accorded a lower priority in the wake of the Cold War. Counterterrorism has become the FBI's first priority. Reintegrating the two could lead to situations in which, particularly from an FBI human resources perspective, counterintelligence personnel serve as a reserve pool of educated labor for counterterrorism. Such an occurrence may result in a diminished strategic focus on counterintelligence, a function which requires a long-term outlook and commitment.

The Law Enforcement Nexus with Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence. Given the decentralized nature of the terrorist threat, and criminal activities engaged in to provide financial support for such activities, there is a close relationship between the FBI's criminal programs and its counterterrorism program. While there is also a nexus between the FBI's counterintelligence activities and its criminal programs, arguably, given that very few counterintelligence cases ever go to trial for espionage or economic espionage prosecution, the nexus is weaker.

Appendix 7: Relevant Legal and Regulatory Changes
Intelligence Community operations, including domestic intelligence collection, and collection of intelligence on U.S. persons, (212) are governed by a body of laws, regulations and guidelines. (213) With regard to the domestic intelligence collection, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice has promulgated seven successive sets of guidelines (214) governing these efforts since 1976.

Following September 11, Congress also approved the USA PATRIOT Act, which makes it easier for the FBI to share intelligence with IC agencies, and to conduct electronic surveillance. (215) For example, with respect to electronic surveillance, a substantially broader legal standard authorized in the USA PATRIOT Act allows for electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as long as, among other requirements, the application includes a certification by an appropriate national security official that "a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information." (216) Among the other criteria which must be met for an application for electronic surveillance to be approved under FISA, a court must find that the surveillance "... is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." (217) Moreover, the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY2004 authorized the enhanced use of administrative subpoenas, also known as national security letters, by the FBI in order to gather information from financial institutions. (218)

The USA PATRIOT Act has had a substantial impact on FBI intelligence gathering and sharing. For example, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorizations for electronic surveillance increased 21.3% during the two-year period, 2000 to 2002. (219) According to FBI Director Mueller, the act has been "extraordinarily beneficial in the war on terrorism ... Our success in preventing another catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, without the Act." (220)


The USA PATRIOT Act also has provided a legal framework that makes it easier for the FBI's four investigative/operational divisions -- criminal, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber -- to integrate their intelligence efforts. As a result, the FBI has adopted a new strategy, known as the Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy, which permits the FBI to treat counterterrorism cases as intelligence cases from the outset, making it easier to initiate electronic surveillance. Special Agent John Pistole, FBI Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, stated, "We're still interested in the criminal violations that many people may be involved in. But, in many cases we are going to put that in the back seat and go down the road until we have all that we need." (221) If implemented and institutionalized, the new policy may significantly enhance the effectiveness of the FBI's intelligence program. The question becomes whether the FBI can implement the policy and stay within constitutional limits. Some civil libertarian advocates say they are concerned that by making it easier for the FBI to employ surveillance under FISA, the USA PATRIOT Act might lead the FBI to use such FISA surveillance to investigate criminal cases in a manner that may be inconsistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. (222)






Footnotes
1. (back)While the FBI initially provided the authors access to FBI officials and documents, it later declined to do so, despite numerous requests. Although this paper would have benefitted from continued cooperation, the authors note with gratitude that some FBI officials continued to share their insights into the current reforms. Numerous current and former employees of the FBI and Cental Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as state and local law enforcement entities, were interviewed for this report. Some sources wish to remain anonymous and, therefore, have not been identified by name in this report.

2. (back)William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 187.

3. (back)For purposes of this report, intelligence is defined to include foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and criminal intelligence. For a statutory definition of each see Appendix 1. For a brief summary of the FBI's traditional role in intelligence, see Appendix 2. Finally, Appendix 3 provides a brief history of FBI intelligence.

4. (back)The IC is comprised of 15 agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Treasury; the Department of Energy; the Coast Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; and; the Department of Homeland Security.

5. (back)See Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, a report of the U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S.Rept. 107-351; H.Rept. 107-792, Dec. 2002, pp. xv, xvi, 37-39, 337-338. (Hereafter cited as JIC Inquiry)

6. (back)An analyst conducts counterterrorism strategic intelligence analysis in order to develop a national and international understanding of terrorist threat trends and patterns, as well as common operational methods and practices. An analyst conducts tactical counterterrorism analysis in order to support specific criminal or national security-oriented cases and operations. While not mutually exclusive, each type of analysis requires a unique set of analytical methodologies and research skills.

7. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

8. (back)Ibid., p. 39.

9. (back)See "Statement of John MacGaffin to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," Dec. 8, 2003. MacGaffin testified, "In the domestic context, it is clear that the FBI needs to improve greatly its intelligence collection so that there are meaningful "dots" to connect and analyze. Some observers believe the FBI since 9/11 has made real progress in this direction. I and many others do not."

10. (back)A former senior FBI official stated in an Aug. 21, 2003 interview that if FBI Director Mueller was serious about achieving more than a limited reform, he would establish an intelligence career path. To date the Director has not implemented fully an intelligence career path for special agents.

11. (back)Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Implementing the National Strategy, Dec. 15, 2002, pp. 43-44. (Hereafter cited as Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress.) Organizational culture is a product of many factors, including, but not limited to, an organization's history, mission, self-image, client base and structure. According to William E. Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency, however, organizational culture is principally the product of structural conditions. See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, p. 3.

12. (back)For an analysis of the applicability of Great Britain's MI-5 model to the U.S., see CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

13. (back)Director Mueller has headed the Department of Justice Criminal Division, served as U.S. Attorney in San Francisco, and generally focused on criminal prosecution during his career.

14. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, with an extensive intelligence background, Aug. 21, 2003.

15. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, Former Attorney General of the United States, in U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.

16. (back)Ibid., pp. 16-17.

17. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. pp. 43-44.

18. (back)The Congressional Research Service has recently published a related report on the FBI. For a history of the FBI, see CRS Report RL32095(pdf), The FBI: Past, Present and Future, by Todd Masse and William Krouse.

19. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. xv.

20. (back)All-source intelligence analysis is that analysis which is based on all available collection sources.

21. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

22. (back)Ibid., pp. 38-39.

23. (back)Ibid., pp. 337-338.

24. (back)Ibid., p. xvi.

25. (back)See Concept of Operations, FBI Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Process, prepared jointly by FBI Headquarters divisions, reviewed by FBI field office representatives and coordinated by the FBI's Office of Intelligence, Aug. 2003. The Assistant Director, Office of Intelligence, reports to the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence.

26. (back)According to the FBI's 1998-2003 Strategic Plan, issued in May 1998, the FBI, prior to Sept. 11, had established three tiers of priorities: (1) National and Economic Security, aimed at preventing intelligence operations that threatened U.S. national security; preventing terrorist attacks; deterring criminal conspiracies; and deterring unlawful exploitation of emerging technologies by foreign powers, terrorists and criminal elements; (2) Criminal Enterprise and Public Integrity; and (3) Individuals and Property. Countering criminal activities was a prominent feature of each tier. See Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human Resource Allocation, Audit Division, Sept. 2003, pp. 03-37.

27. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.

28. (back)Core competencies are defined as a related group of activities central to the success, or failure, of an organization. In the private sector, core competencies are often the source of a company's competitive advantage. See C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, "The Core Competency of the Corporation," Harvard Business Review, Apr. 1, 2001.

29. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, July 23, 2003.

30. (back)The FBI established the position of EAD-I in early 2003, and the position was filled in April 2003, when Maureen Baginski, the former Director of Signals Intelligence, National Security Agency, was appointed. It was another four months before EAD-I Baginski began working in her new capacity, and an additional four months before Congress approved the reprogramming action formally establishing the EAD-I position. Some critics date whatever progress the FBI has made in upgrading intelligence to Baginski's arrival, but contend that because this critical position was left vacant for an extended period of time, the FBI made little, or no progress, between September 11 and Baginski's arrival almost one-and-a-half years later.

31. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Joint Inquiry, Oct. 17, 2002.

32. (back)The establishment of TTIC, and its mission, is addressed later in this section.

33. (back)The Office of Intelligence has had an uneven, albeit short, leadership history since its establishment. Although Director Mueller announced OI's established in Dec. 2001, the position of OI Assistant Director was vacant for one-and-a-half years, until Apr. 2003. The selected individual served four months before being appointed to another FBI position. The position then was vacant for almost five additional months before Michael Rolince, Special-Agent-in-Charge of the FBI's Washington Field Office, was appointed to lead the office on an acting basis in mid-Dec. 2003.

34. (back)See FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations, Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

35. (back)For the purposes of this report, intelligence analysts are defined as all-source analysts who conduct tactical and strategic analysis. Until recently, the FBI had two categories of analysts -- Intelligence Research Specialists, who were responsible for all-source analysis, and Intelligence Operations Specialists, who provided tactical analytic support for cases and operations. The FBI is merging these two positions with the newly created "Reports Officer" position, and re-titling the consolidated position as "intelligence analyst." The FBI says its purpose in doing so is to standardize and integrate intelligence support for the FBI's highest priorities. Within the intelligence analyst position, there are four "areas of interest" -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal; and three specific work "functions" -- all source, case support, and reports.

36. (back)The number of individuals in a field intelligence group varies, depending upon the size of the field office. See "FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations," Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

37. (back)Funding was authorized under the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-177). The legislation permits the FBI Director to "... enter into personal services contracts if the personal services to be provided under such contracts directly support the intelligence or counterintelligence missions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

38. (back)JTTFs are FBI-led and are comprised of other federal, state and local law enforcement officials. JTTFs serve as the primary mechanism through which intelligence derived from FBI investigations and operations is shared with non-FBI law enforcement officials. JTTFs also serve as the principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law enforcement officials.

39. (back)See statement of Larry A. Mefford, Executive Assistant Director -- Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, Research and Development; and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security of the U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Sept. 4, 2003.

40. (back)See CRS Report RS21283, Homeland Security: Intelligence Support, by Richard A. Best, Jr.

41. (back)See http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2003summary/html/FBIcharts.htm and Where the Money Goes: Fiscal 2004 Appropriations, -- House Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives (House Conf. Rept. 108-401).

42. (back)See U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, "2005 Budget and Performance Summary," winter 2004, pp.113-122. Elements of this request include 1) $35 million in non-personnel funding to support collocation of a portion of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division with the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and the interagency Terrorist Threat Integration Center; 2) $13.4 million to launch the Office of Intelligence; 3) $14.3 million to Counterterrorism FBI Headquarters program support, including intelligence analysis; and 4) $13 million to launch the National Virtual Translation Center. Some elements of the $46 million request for Counterterrorism Field Investigations and the $64 million request for various classified national security initiatives, also likely will be dedicated to intelligence.

43. (back)See Michelle Mittelstadt, "FBI Set to Add 900 Intelligence Analysts," The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 17, 2004. The near doubling of intelligence analysts in one year could present the FBI with a significant absorption challenge.

44. (back)The GAO has drafted two reports (GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003 and GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004) on the FBI reform efforts cited in this report. These GAO reports assess the FBI's transformation from a program management and results perspective, that is, the extent to which the FBI is expending its resources and dedicating its management in a manner consistent with its stated priorities. This CRS report focuses on the more policy-oriented question of FBI intelligence reform and related policy options, as well as the ability of the FBI to implement successfully its strategic plans related to intelligence.

45. (back)FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), periodically audits resource allocations, to determine if human resources are being committed in a manner consistent with stated priorities and strategies. In a recent report, the OIG found that since Sept. 11, the FBI "... continued to devote more of its time to terrorism-related work than any other single area," consistent with its post-Sept. 11 terrorism priority. To ensure that the FBI systematically and periodically analyzes its programs, the OIG recommended that the FBI Director "... regularly review resource utilization reports for the Bureau as a whole, as well as for individual investigative programs, and explore additional means of analyzing the Bureau's resource utilization among the various programs." See Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human Resource Allocation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 03-37), Sept. 2003. While the quantity of human resources must be adequate, appropriate quality is essential. One asset developed by an experienced, well-trained FBI special agent could have a significant effect on U.S. national security.

46. (back)As currently structured, the FBI special agent recruitment procedure has five entry programs, with numerous other areas defined as "critical skill needs." Agents must be hired under one of the five programs (law, accounting/finance, language, computer science/information technology and diversified); yet, the FBI will establish priorities for those having expertise in the critically needed skills. Unlike intelligence analysts, who are not required to possess a bachelor's degree, candidates for FBI special agent positions "must possess a four-year degree from an accredited college or university ...." See
https://www.fbijobs.com/jobdesc.asp?requisitionid=368.

47. (back)See Concept of Operations, Human Talent for Intelligence Production, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 2003.

48. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, June 18, 2003, p. 3.

49. (back)See Making Appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 2004, and For Other Purposes, U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report (H.Rept. 108-401).

50. (back)See "Human Talent for Intelligence Production," FBI Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

51. (back)In place of a bachelors degree, the FBI now allows a candidate for intelligence analyst to substitute a minimum of one year of related law enforcement or military experience.

52. (back)The authors were unable to compare training, before and after Sept. 11, because the FBI's Office of Congressional Affairs denied requests for a copy of the training curriculum.

53. (back)See statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 14.

54. (back)The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget includes a number of national-level intelligence programs, which are approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and submitted to the President and Congress as a single consolidated program. The NFIP budget funds those departments and agencies constituting the U.S. Intelligence Community. Historically, the FBI's NFIP has included the headquarters and field elements associated with the following programs: 1) international terrorism, 2) counterintelligence, 3) security countermeasures, and 4) dedicated technical activities.

55. (back)Some observers have suggested that as part of its intelligence reform, the FBI should consider re-integrating counterterrorism and counterintelligence. For an assessment of these arguments, see Appendix 6.

56. (back)Notwithstanding this increase in intelligence training, a new special agent collector, at least early in his career, still is at a disadvantage, compared to a foreign intelligence officer, or terrorist, who has likely received intensive clandestine operations training.

57. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 15, 2004.

58. (back)See "Human Talent for Intelligence Production," the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 2003.

59. (back)Numerous GAO studies, including the recent Information Technology: FBI Needs an Enterprise Architecture to Guide Its Modernization Activities (GAO Report 03-959, Sept. 25, 2003) have found substantial deficiencies in the FBI's formal procedures to implement recommended information technology changes. See also The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003).

60. (back)See "FBI Director Says Technology Investments Are Paying Off," Government Executive, Apr. 10, 2003.

61. (back)According to the Department of Justice Inspector General (IG), FBI officials originally estimated the cost of the Virtual Case File system to be $380 million. The current actual cost, according to the IG, exceeds $596 million. See also Wilson P. Dizard, "FBI's Trilogy Rollout Delayed; CSC Misses Deadline," Government Computer News, Nov. 4, 2003. Critics have attributed the FBI's chronic information management problems to, among other factors, deficient data mining capabilities, and the FBI's continuing inability to effectively upload information collected by field offices onto accessible FBI-wide databases.

62. (back)Dan Eggen, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Washington Post, Dec. 13, 2003, p. A1.

63. (back)In addition to easing constraints on intelligence sharing, this change will allow investigators to more easily employ secret warrants and other intelligence collection methods permitted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended. Those foreign intelligence gathering tools cannot be used in traditional criminal probes. The change stems from a Nov. 2002 intelligence appeals court ruling that upheld the USA PATRIOT Act provisions that provided more latitude for the sharing of foreign intelligence between criminal prosecutors and intelligence/national security personnel. See United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, In re: Sealed Case 02-001, Decided Nov. 18, 2002.

64. (back)For information on terrorist watch lists, see CRS Report RL31019, Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, by William Krouse and Raphael Perl.

65. (back)An organization's structure and business processes influence its performance. Large organizations with dispersed operations continually assess the appropriate balance between decentralized and centralized elements of their operations. Although the mission of National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) is unrelated to that of the FBI, it too has dispersed operations. In a review of the causes of the 1986 Columbia shuttle accident, the board investigating the accident found that "The ability to operate in a centralized manner when appropriate, and to operate in a decentralized manner when appropriate, is the hallmark of a high-reliability organization." See Columbia Accident Investigation Report, Volume I, Aug. 2003. http://www.caib.us/news/report/volume1/default.html

66. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 118, 2003, p. 3.

67. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

68. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

69. (back)Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

70. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

71. (back)See testimony of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003, p. 4.

72. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, pp. 43-44.

73. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

74. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 245.

75. (back)Statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 19. See also The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003), p. v.

76. (back)See "FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities," statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 13.

77. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 358.

78. (back)Statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.

79. (back)The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003), p. xiv.

80. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

81. (back)See The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.x.

82. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

83. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 337.

84. (back)Ibid., p. 340. The vast majority of FBI analysts are located in the FBI's 56 regional field offices.

85. (back)Ibid., p. 245.

86. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 3.

87. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

88. (back)Ibid., p. 4.

89. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

90. (back)Ibid., p. 3.

91. (back)Ibid.

92. (back)See "FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities," statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 33. A congressional requirement concerning resource management was levied on the FBI by P.L. 108-199. By Mar. 15, 2004, the FBI is to provide a report to the Committees on Appropriations a report which "...details the FBI's plan to succeed at its terrorist prevention and law enforcement responsibilities, including proposed agent and support personnel levels for each division."

93. (back)Ibid., p. 14.

94. (back)Ibid., p. 23.

95. (back)Ibid., p. 22.

96. (back)See "FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, But Major Challenges Continue," statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 8.

97. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 4.

98. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

99. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former Attorney General of the United States, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p.18.

100. (back)See "FBI Creates Structure to Support Intelligence Mission," U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, press release, Apr. 3, 2003. The results of these examinations remain classified.

101. (back)Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

102. (back)See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, 2003, (Yale University Press) p. 177.

103. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

104. (back)See statement of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003.

105. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

106. (back)Ibid.

107. (back)See statement of John J. Hamre before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003. Hamre is a former deputy secretary of defense.

108. (back)See Siobhan Gorman, Government Executive Magazine, FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart, Aug. 1, 2003. See also Frederick P. Hitz and Brian J. Weiss, "Helping the FBI and the CIA Connect the Dots in the War on Terror," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; volume 17, no. 1, Jan. 2004.

109. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

110. (back)Former FBI Special Agent John J. Connally, Jr., was recently convicted of racketeering and obstruction of justice for secretly aiding organized crime leaders in the Boston, Massachusetts area. See Fox Butterfield, "FBI Agent Linked to Mob is Guilty of Corruption," New York Times, May 29, 2002, p.14. Special Agent James J. Smith recently was indicted on one count of gross negligence in handling national defense information [Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 793(f)] and with four counts of filing false reports on an asset's reliability to FBI Headquarters [18 U.S. Code ??1343, 1346]. See http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/fbi/ussmith50703ind.pdf It is alleged that Smith and former Special Agent William Cleveland had sexual relationships with Katrina Leung, an FBI operational asset informing the FBI on the intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It is further alleged that Ms. Leung may have been a double agent for the PRC. Leung has been charged with unauthorized access and willful retention of documents relating to national defense [Title 18 U.S. Code, ?793(b)]. See http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/fbi/usleung403cmp.pdf James Smith has pleaded guilty and his trial has been set for February 2005. Katrina Leung's trial is scheduled for September. In addition to appointing an Inspector-in-Charge to investigate the integrity of the Chinese counterintelligence program in the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office (the last FBI Office of employment for Mr. Smith), the FBI has launched organizational and administrative reviews to determine why its established accountability system for the handling of intelligence assets apparently failed in this case. See FBI press release dated Apr. 9, 2003.

111. (back)See Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 11, 2003.

112. (back)For further information on how to assess performance of the FBI, and the U.S. Government in the war on terrorism, see Daniel Byman, "Measuring the War on Terrorism: A First Appraisal," in Current History, Dec. 2003.

113. (back)The FBI has never experienced problems in recruiting educated analysts, at least at FBI Headquarters. The FBI, however, has from suffered a retention problem.

114. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, Recommendations Section Errata, p. 7.

115. (back)See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, p. 298. (Random House).

116. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 340.

117. (back)Other IC agencies permit analysts to rise to the analytical equivalent of Senior Executive Service, or Senior Intelligence Service. One such program, the Senior Analytic Service (SAS), was established at the CIA in the late 1990s by CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin. The SAS track allows analysts to rise to the senior-most analytic level, without assuming managerial responsibilities.

118. (back)This approach is manifested in a recent intelligence analyst job announcement (04-FO-0515). While the FBI used to recruit intelligence analysts according to the functional or geographic area of need, it now asks potential candidates to identify one of four areas of interest, choosing from: counterintelligence, counterterrorism, criminal or cyber. According to the announcement, "... Applicants must identify the program area or interest, however, this does not guarantee placement in the particular program...." See

https://www.fbijobs.com/JobDesc.asp?src=001&requisitionid=1614&r=021811042620.

119. (back)Although these types of analyses are not mutually exclusive, they serve two different sets of consumers -- the executive who is supporting policymakers, and the special agent who is running an investigation or operation.

120. (back)For a policy-oriented discussion of relevant legal and regulatory changes, see Appendix 7.

121. (back)Dan Egan, The Washington Post, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Dec. 12, 2003, p. A-1. (Hereafter cited as Egan, FBI Applies New Rules.)

122. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Chairman, and Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, pp. 21-22.

123. (back)Ibid., p. 22.

124. (back)Ibid.

125. (back)See Dan Egan, "FBI Applies New Rules."

126. (back)Ibid.

127. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.

128. (back)Ibid.

129. (back)See Dan Egan,"FBI Applies New Rules."

130. (back)See statement of Steven C. McCraw, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, July 24, 2003.

131. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary June 21, 2002, transcript, p. 30.

132. (back)See Statement of Assistant Director Steven C. McCraw, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, July 24, 2003.

133. (back)Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

134. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Nov. 13, 2003.

135. (back)See "Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security," The Markle Foundation, Dec. 2, 2003, p. 2.

136. (back)See Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, Dec.2, 2003.

137. (back)The Markle Foundation has recommended the creation of a System-wide Homeland Analysis and Resources Exchange (SHARE) Network, in which the Department of Homeland Security would assume a central role in working with federal, state, local and private sector organizations to establish a strategy and implementing mechanisms and policies to share and analyze information in a decentralized manner. See Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, Exhibit A: "Action Plan for Federal Government Development of the SHARE Network," Dec. 2, 2003, p. 10.

138. (back)Originator control, or ORCON, is a process designed to protect categories of (generally) classified information from being sharing with unauthorized third parties. If an agency wishes to share ORCON information it received from another agency, it must first request ORCON release from the originating agency to share the information with a specific third party consumer. In terms of providing security clearances to state and local law enforcement officials with a "need to know," the FBI has established a streamlined security process that allows law enforcement officials to receive expedited "secret" clearances in about nine weeks. See Dan Eggen, "Bridging the Divide Between FBI and Police," The Washington Post, Feb. 16, 2004, p. A25.

139. (back)See The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.iv.

140. (back)See Gerard R. Murphy and Martha R. Plotkin, Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement (Volume 1 -- Local-Federal Partnerships), Police Executive Research Forum, as supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing, Mar. 2003.

141. (back)Many of the state and local law enforcement officials interviewed for this report also had substantial experience at the federal level, both in the IC and in law enforcement. They said they therefore well understand the inherent capabilities and limitations of intelligence and the roles foreign intelligence and criminal intelligence play in preventing terrorism.

142. (back)Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

143. (back)Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

144. (back)One local law enforcement official suggested that the JTTFs are where the investigative expertise lies, and should be retained. However, he suggested that in order to be more valuable in preventing terrorist acts domestically, the JTTFs should be reorganized around the concept of "joint ness," and cited the "Goldwater Nichols" Department of Defense Reorganization Act as a model. The "joint ness" envisioned by this official would have state and local law enforcement, federal law enforcement, and IC entities responsible for counterterrorism, operate in an integrated and seamless environment. As envisioned by this local law enforcement official, consistent with joint officers in the military, promotion to senior level positions at the parent agency would be contingent upon a successful rotation to the "Joint" Terrorism Task Forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433) integrated the operational capabilities of the military services. For further information on Goldwater-Nichols, see

http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html. H.R. 3439, the "JTTF Enhancement Act of 2003" proposes that 1) there be a greater degree of participation in the JTTFs from DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials; and 2) a program be established to detail state and local law enforcement officers to the CIA, or CIA personnel to state and local law enforcement organizations.

145. (back)Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

146. (back)See "Blue Spies for City," New York Post, June 29, 2003. The New York Police Department (NYPD), in what it describes as a substantial resource investment, has dedicated more than 100 officers to the New York JTTF. According to NYPD officials, there has been a steady improvement in the flow of information between the NY JTTF and the NYPD. But there also have been occasions when police officials have requested information from the FBI and the IC, but failed to receive a timely response. As result, the NYPD has stationed several of its officers overseas to better protect the city's security needs by collecting information regarding terrorist activities. As one New York City official commented, "We're not looking to supplant anything that is being done by the Federal government. We're looking to supplement. We're looking to get the New York question asked."

147. (back)See Northeast Regional Agreement Information Sharing Proposal, Sept. 22, 2003. The states engaged in this effort include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. These proposed "centers" are distinct from the existing Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). The HSIN uses the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) to foster communication among federal, state and local officials involved in counterterrorism information. Currently, the system contains only information categorized as "sensitive but unclassified." See "Homeland Security Information Network to Expand Collaboration, Connectivity for States and Major Cities," Department of Homeland Security, Press Release, Feb. 24, 2004.

148. (back)Ibid.

149. (back)Proponents contend that state and localities should have access to raw foreign intelligence, because the analysts they have been able to recruit are often superior to those the FBI employs in its field offices. Moreover, they argue that FBI analysts, unlike their local counterparts, are unfamiliar with local infrastructure needing protection, and provide inferior analysis. In asking for more intelligence sharing, state and local officials say they recognize and respect the FBI's authority to conduct terrorism investigations, but insist they need access to unfiltered foreign intelligence in order to protect state and local security needs.

150. (back)See Appendix 3 (page 48) for additional information.

151. (back)At the beginning of the 108th Congress, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security was established. Along with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, this new committee now shares FBI oversight responsibilities.

152. (back)See Cory Reiss, "Graham's security complaints might bite back," The Gainesville Sun, May 27, 2003.

153. (back)See Ellen Laipson, President and Chief Executive Officer, the Henry L. Stimson Center, "Foreign Intelligence Challenges post September-11," a paper delivered at the Lexington Institute's conference titled "Progress Towards Homeland Security: An Interim Report Card," Feb. 27, 2003. http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/homeland/Laipson.pdf.

154. (back)See statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Government Accounting Office, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, June 21, 2002, p. 18.

155. (back)See remarks of Congressman David Obey during a hearing in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Justice, State and Judiciary, June 21, 2002.

156. (back)See Cory Reiss, "Graham's Security Complaints Might Bite Back," The Gainesville Sun, May 27, 2003.

157. (back)Ibid.

158. (back)Ibid.

159. (back)Ibid.

160. (back)Ibid.

161. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. pp. 44-45.

162. (back)For a treatment of the evolution of the relationship between law enforcement and intelligence, see CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., by Richard A. Best Jr.

163. (back)The Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Analytic Service might serve as a possible model for elevating senior analysts to the non-managerial analytical equivalent of Senior Executive Service special agents.

164. (back)FBI legal attaches serve in overseas posts, and are declared to the host country. Legal attaches serve as the FBI's link to foreign law enforcement and security services. While legal attaches conduct overt liaison with foreign services, they do not engage in clandestine intelligence collection overseas.

165. (back)See Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, (Free Press, 2004), pp. 254-256.

166. (back)U.S. Senator John Edwards introduced S. 410, The Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003,which would establish a Homeland Intelligence Agency within DHS.

167. (back)See CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

168. (back)See Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. p. 42.

169. (back)See CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

170. (back)The Director of Central Intelligence serves as both the leader of the Central Intelligence Agency, and as Director of the broader U.S. Intelligence Community. The proposed 9/11 Intelligence Memorial Reform Act (S. 1520) would create a Director of National Intelligence. That individual would be precluded from simultaneous service as the Director of the CIA and Director of National Intelligence. Some have argued this proposal would undermine the DCI's power base. See Robert M. Gates, "How Not to Reform Intelligence," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 3, 2003. Finally, while the TTIC reports to the Director of Central Intelligence as leader of the Intelligence Community, the organization has been categorized as a "joint venture" of Intelligence Community participants.

171. (back)See statement by John Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Oct. 15, 2003, p. 5.

172. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

173. (back)See Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, p. 41.

174. (back)Ibid., pp. 41-47.

175. (back)Ibid., p. 44.

176. (back)Ibid., pp. 43-44.

177. (back)Ibid., p. 44.

178. (back)Ibid., p. 41.

179. (back)According to former House Intelligence Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton, "if the shortcomings leading up to Sept. 11 were systemic in nature, the solution lies in better system management, the handling and analysis of vast amounts of information, and the distribution in a timely manner of the key conclusions to the right people." See the JIC Inquiry, p. 350.

180. (back)Ibid, p. 351. According to former FBI Director William Webster, the MI-5 concept is inapplicable in the U.S. context. "We're not England," Webster said. "We're not 500 miles across our territory. We have thousands of miles to cover. Would you propose to create an organization that had people all over the United States, as the FBI does?" He instead supports training FBI personnel to be more responsive to terrorist threats. He further argues that, "More than any other kind of threat, there is an interrelationship between law enforcement and intelligence in dealing with the problem of terrorism...We need investigative capability and intelligence collection capability, as well as those who go through the bits and pieces and fill in the dots."

181. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 13.

182. (back)Ibid, p. 18. Former Attorney General Barr testified, "An idea making the rounds these days is the notion of severing "domestic intelligence" from the FBI and creating a new domestic spy agency akin to Britain's MI-5. I think this is preposterous and goes in exactly the wrong direction. Artificial stove-piping hurts our counterterrorism efforts. What we need to do now is meld intelligence and law enforcement more closely together, not tear them apart. We already have too many agencies and creating still another simply adds more bureaucracy, spawns intractable and debilitating turf wars, and creates further barriers to the kind of seamless integration that is needed in this area."

183. (back)Ibid., p. 14.

184. (back)See Center for Democracy, "Domestic Intelligence Agencies: The Mixed Record of the UK's MI5," Jan. 27, 2003.

185. (back)See National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S. Code, Chapter 15, 401(a) and Executive Order 12333, 3.4.

186. (back)Ibid.

187. (back)See Code of Federal Regulations, Part 23.

188. (back)For a more detailed description of the FBI's traditional intelligence role, see Appendix 2.

189. (back)For an official history of the FBI, see http://www.fbi.gov/fbihistory.htm. See also CRS Report RL32095(pdf), The FBI: Past, Present and Future, by William Krouse and Todd Masse.

190. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 3, 2003.

191. (back)The successful prosecution of an espionage case can be viewed as both a counterintelligence success, and failure. It is a success insofar as the activity is stopped, but is a failure insofar as the activity escaped the attention of appropriate authorities for any period of time.

192. (back)See CRS Report 93-531, Individuals Arrested on Charges of Espionage Against the United States Government: 1966-1993, by Suzanne Cavanagh (available from the authors of this report). For a compilation of espionage cases through 1999, see

http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage.

193. (back)See Tony Poveda, Lawlessness and Reform: The FBI in Transition, Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1990.

194. (back)See Edwin Hoyt Palmer, The Palmer Raids,1919-1921: An Attempt to Suppress Dissent, Seabury Press, 1969.

195. (back)For further information on the history of COINTELPRO, see S.Rept. 94-755, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports of Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, (Washington, Apr. 23, 1976); (Hereafter cited as the Church Committee Report).

196. (back)See Church Committee Report, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, p.71.

197. (back)The Foreign Agent Registration Act requires that persons acting as foreign agents (as defined by the act) register with the U.S. Department of Justice for, among other reasons, transparency. (see 22 U.S.C. Chap. 611)

198. (back)See "The FBI and CISPES," a report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. (S.Rept. 101-46, July 1989).

199. (back)See Bill Gertz, Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, 2002, pp. 83-125. (Regnery Publishing).

200. (back)According to the Levi guidelines, domestic security investigations were to be limited to gathering information on group or individual activities "... which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve a violation of federal law...."

201. (back)See Testimony of Francis J. McNamara, former Subversive Activities Control Board Director, before the National Committee to Restore Internal Security, May 20, 1986. Quoted in W. Raymond Wannall, "Undermining Counterintelligence Capability," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 15, winter 2002, pp. 321-329.

202. (back)Interviews with former senior FBI officials.

203. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress Senate Judiciary Committee, July 23, 2003.

204. (back)Interview with local law enforcement official, Apr. 5, 2004.

205. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

206. (back)A fourth division -- cyber crime -- was established in Apr. 2002. Until the appointment of the EAD-I, it, too, had its own intelligence component.

207. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

208. (back)According to Executive Order 12333, counterintelligence includes international terrorist activities. See Appendix 1.

209. (back)See "Spying," The Economist, July 10, 2003.

210. (back)Ibid.

211. (back)Ibid.

212. (back)United States persons means a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except in the case of a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government, or governments. See United States Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 12333, Dec. 4, 1981.

213. (back)Richard Betts, Member of the National Commission on Terrorism and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, contends that the balance between civil liberties and security is one in which a differentiation between two types of constraints on civil liberties (political censorship and compromises of individual privacy via enhanced surveillance) should be made. According to Betts, although the former (largely manifested through the suppression of free speech) will not measurably advance the war against terrorism, and should not be tolerated, greater acceptance of the latter, with appropriate measures for keeping secret irrelevant byproduct intelligence, may yield "...the biggest payoff for counterterrorism intelligence." See "Fixing Intelligence," Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2002.

214. (back)These policy guidelines include The Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Security Investigations (April 5, 1976 -- Attorney General Edward H. Levi), The Attorney General Guidelines on Criminal Investigations of Individuals and Organizations Dec. 2, 1980 -- Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security,/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 7, 1983 -- Attorney General William French Smith), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 21, 1989 -- Attorney General Richard Thornburgh), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General Jo Ann Harris to Attorney General Janet Reno recommending a change in the guidelines; approved by Attorney General Reno on April 19, 1994.), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (May 30, 2002 - Attorney General John Ashcroft), and The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (U) (Oct. 31, 2003 - Attorney General John Ashcroft). Other guidelines -- classified and unclassified - regulating the use of confidential informants, undercover operations, and procedures for lawful, warrant less monitoring of verbal conversations may also play a role in the gathering of domestic intelligence.

215. (back)See CRS Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions, Mar. 31, 2003, by Elizabeth B. Bazan. See also CRS Report RL31377, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, by Charles Doyle. See also CRS Report RL31200(pdf), Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act, by Charles Doyle. See Title II - Enhanced Surveillance Procedures (Section 203 "Authority to Share Criminal Investigative Information," altered rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure[2003 Edition] to permit the sharing of grand jury information with "federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security officials for official duties.") Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorized sharing of information gathered through electronic surveillance as part of a criminal investigation under 18 U.S.C. ?2517, as well as the sharing of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence gathered as part of a criminal investigation with any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist that official in performance of his official duties, 50 U.S.C. ? 403-5d. See also P.L. 107-56, Title V -- Removal of Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism, and Title IX -- Improved Intelligence.

216. (back)The requirement and standard was changed from "the purpose" to "a significant purpose." Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, codified at 50 U.S.C. ? 1804(a)(7)(B).

217. (back)50 U.S.C. ?1805(a)(3)(A). See numerous references to this standard in USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, Title II -- Enhanced Surveillance Procedures. Prohibitions against electronic surveillance or physical searches under FISA based solely on First Amendment protected activities pre-date the USA PATRIOT Act. However, the USA PATRIOT Act added similar language to the pen register and trap and trace devices part of FISA. See FISA, 50 U.S.C. ??1842 and 1843.

218. (back)The definition of financial institution as set out in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-177), adopts the language of Title 31, U.S. Code, ??(a) (2) and (c) (1), which includes any credit union, thrift institution, broker or dealer in equities or commodities, currency exchange, insurance company, pawn broker, travel agency, and/or operator of a credit card system, among others.

219. (back)See annual reports of the U.S. Justice Department to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, as required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (Title 50 U.S. Code, ?1807). Statistics and annual reports compiled by the Federation of American Scientists (see http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/). This increase is attributable, at least in part, to Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) which changed the legal standard concerning the purpose of the surveillance and its relationship to foreign intelligence information. According to the original language, "the purpose" of the surveillance had to be to obtain foreign intelligence information. The new language demands certification that foreign intelligence gathering is a "significant purpose" of the requested surveillance.

220. (back)See Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, July 23, 2003.

221. (back)See Dan Eggen, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Washington Post, Dec. 13, 2003, p. A1.

222. (back)Ibid.





Return to CONTENTS section of this Long Report.

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The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context
Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence
George J. Tenet
before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

24 February 2004

(as prepared for delivery)
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, last year I described a national security environment that was significantly more complex than at any time during my tenure as Director of Central Intelligence. The world I will discuss today is equally, if not more, complicated and fraught with dangers for United States interests, but one that also holds great opportunity for positive change.

TERRORISM
I'll begin today on terrorism, with a stark bottom-line:

The al-Qa`ida leadership structure we charted after September 11 is seriously damaged--but the group remains as committed as ever to attacking the US homeland.
But as we continue the battle against al-Qa`ida, we must overcome a movement--a global movement infected by al-Qa`ida's radical agenda.
In this battle we are moving forward in our knowledge of the enemy--his plans, capabilities, and intentions.
And what we've learned continues to validate my deepest concern: that this enemy remains intent on obtaining, and using, catastrophic weapons.
Now let me tell you about the war we've waged against the al-Qa`ida organization and its leadership.

Military and intelligence operations by the United States and its allies overseas have degraded the group. Local al-Qa`ida cells are forced to make their own decisions because of disarray in the central leadership.
Al-Qa`ida depends on leaders who not only direct terrorist attacks but who carry out the day-to-day tasks that support operations. Over the past 18 months, we have killed or captured key al-Qa`ida leaders in every significant operational area--logistics, planning, finance, training--and have eroded the key pillars of the organization, such as the leadership in Pakistani urban areas and operational cells in the al-Qa`ida heartland of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The list of al-Qa`ida leaders and associates who will never again threaten the American people includes:

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, al-Qa`ida's operations chief and the mastermind of the September 11 attacks.
Nashiri, the senior operational planner for the Arabian Gulf area.
Abu Zubayda, a senior logistics officer and plotter.
Hasan Ghul, a senior facilitator who was sent to case Iraq for an expanded al-Qa`ida presence there.
Harithi and al-Makki, the most senior plotters in Yemen, who were involved in the bombing of the USS Cole.
Hambali, the senior operational planner in Southeast Asia.
We are creating large and growing gaps in the al-Qa`ida hierarchy.

And, unquestionably, bringing these key operators to ground disrupted plots that would otherwise have killed Americans.

Meanwhile, al-Qa`ida central continues to lose operational safehavens, and Bin Ladin has gone deep underground. We are hunting him in some of the most unfriendly regions on earth. We follow every lead.

Al-Qa`ida's finances are also being squeezed. This is due in part to takedowns of key moneymen in the past year, particularly the Gulf, Southwest Asia, and even Iraq.

And we are receiving a broad array of help from our coalition partners, who have been central to our effort against al-Qa`ida.

Since the 12 May bombings, the Saudi government has shown an important commitment to fighting al-Qa`ida in the Kingdom, and Saudi officers have paid with their lives.
Elsewhere in the Arab world, we're receiving valuable cooperation from Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, the UAE, Oman, and many others.
President Musharraf of Pakistan remains a courageous and indispensable ally who has become the target of assassins for the help he's given us.
Partners in Southeast Asian have been instrumental in the roundup of key regional associates of al-Qa`ida.
Our European partners worked closely together to unravel and disrupt a continent-wide network of terrorists planning chemical, biological and conventional attacks in Europe.
So we have made notable strides. But do not misunderstand me. I am not suggesting al-Qa`ida is defeated. It is not. We are still at war. This is a learning organization that remains committed to attacking the United States, its friends and allies.

Successive blows to al-Qa`ida's central leadership have transformed the organization into a loose collection of regional networks that operate more autonomously. These regional components have demonstrated their operational prowess in the past year.

The sites of their attacks span the entire reach of al-Qa`ida--Morocco, Kenya, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia.
And al-Qa`ida seeks to influence the regional networks with operational training, consultations, and money. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad sent Hambali $50,000 for operations in Southeast Asia.
You should not take the fact that these attacks occurred abroad to mean the threat to the US homeland has waned. As al-Qa`ida and associated groups undertook these attacks overseas, detainees consistently talk about the importance the group still attaches to striking the main enemy: the United States. Across the operational spectrum--air, maritime, special weapons--we have time and again uncovered plots that are chilling.

On aircraft plots alone, we have uncovered new plans to recruit pilots and to evade new security measures in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of 11 September remain within al-Qa`ida's reach. Make no mistake: these plots are hatched abroad, but they target US soil or that of our allies.
So far, I have been talking only about al-Qa`ida. But al-Qa`ida is not the limit of terrorist threat worldwide. Al-Qa`ida has infected others with its ideology, which depicts the United States as Islam's greatest foe. Mr. Chairman, what I want to say to you now may be the most important thing I tell you today.

The steady growth of Usama bin Ladin's anti-US sentiment through the wider Sunni extremist movement and the broad dissemination of al-Qa`ida's destructive expertise ensure that a serious threat will remain for the foreseeable future--with or without al-Qa`ida in the picture.

A decade ago, bin Ladin had a vision of rousing Islamic terrorists worldwide to attack the United States. He created al-Qa`ida to indoctrinate a worldwide movement in global jihad, with America as the enemy--an enemy to be attacked with every means at hand.

In the minds of Bin Ladin and his cohorts, September 11 was the shining moment, their "shot heard `round the world," and they want to capitalize on it.
And so, even as al-Qa`ida reels from our blows, other extremist groups within the movement it influenced have become the next wave of the terrorist threat. Dozens of such groups exist. Let me offer a few thoughts on how to understand this challenge.

One of the most immediate threats is from smaller international Sunni extremist groups who have benefited from al-Qa`ida links. They include groups as diverse as the al-Zarqawi network, the Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
A second level of threat comes from small local groups, with limited domestic agendas, that work with international terrorist groups in their own countries. These include the Salifiya Jihadia, a Moroccan network that carried out the May 2003 Casablanca bombings, and similar groups throughout Africa and Asia.
These far-flung groups increasingly set the agenda, and are redefining the threat we face. They are not all creatures of Bin Ladin, and so their fate is not tied to his. They have autonomous leadership, they pick their own targets, they plan their own attacks.

Beyond these groups are the so-called "foreign jihadists"--individuals ready to fight anywhere they believe Muslim lands are under attack by what they see as "infidel invaders." They draw on broad support networks, have wide appeal, and enjoy a growing sense of support from Muslims are not necessarily supporters of terrorism. The foreign jihadists see Iraq as a golden opportunity.

Let me repeat: for the growing number of jihadists interested in attacking the United States, a spectacular attack on the US Homeland is the "brass ring" that many strive for--with or without encouragement by al-Qa`ida's central leadership.

To detect and ultimately defeat these forces, we will continually need to watch hotspots, present or potential battlegrounds, places where these terrorist networks converge. Iraq is of course one major locus of concern. Southeast Asia is another. But so are the backyards of our closest allies. Even Western Europe is an area where terrorists recruit, train, and target.

To get the global job done, foreign governments will need to improve bilateral and multilateral, and even inter-service cooperation, and strengthen domestic counterterrorist legislation and security practices.
Mr. Chairman, I have consistently warned this committee of al-Qa`ida's interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Acquiring these remains a "religious obligation" in Bin Ladin's eyes, and al-Qa`ida and more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN materials.

We particularly see a heightened risk of poison attacks. Contemplated delivery methods to date have been simple but this may change as non-Al-Qa`ida groups share information on more sophisticated methods and tactics.
Over the last year, we've also seen an increase in the threat of more sophisticated CBRN. For this reason we take very seriously the threat of a CBRN attack.

Extremists have widely disseminated assembly instructions for an improvised chemical weapon using common materials that could cause a large numbers of casualties in a crowded, enclosed area.
Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al-Qa`ida's program to produce anthrax as one of the most immediate terrorist CBRN threats we are likely to face.
Al-Qa`ida continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability. It remains interested in dirty bombs. Terrorist documents contain accurate views of how such weapons would be used.
I've focused, and rightly so, on al-Qa`ida and related groups. But other terrorist organizations also threaten US interests. Palestinian terrorist groups in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza remain a formidable threat and continue to use terrorism to undermine prospects for peace.

Last year Palestinian terrorist groups conducted more than 600 attacks, killing about 200 Israelis and foreigners, including Americans.
Lebanese Hizballah cooperates with these groups and appears to be increasing its support. It is also working with Iran and surrogate groups in Iraq and would likely react to an attack against it, Syria, or Iran with attacks against US and Israeli targets worldwide.

Iran and Syria continue to support terrorist groups, and their links into Iraq have become problematic to our efforts there.

Although Islamic extremists comprise the most pressing threat to US interests, we cannot ignore nominally leftist groups in Latin America and Europe. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia's second largest leftist insurgent group have shown a willingness to attack US targets. So has the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front--a Turkish group that has killed two US citizens and targeted US interests in Turkey.

Finally, cyber vulnerabilities are another of our concerns, with not only terrorists but foreign governments, hackers, crime groups, and industrial spies attempting to obtain information from our computer networks.

IRAQ
Mr. Chairman, we are making significant strides against the insurgency and terrorism, but former regime elements and foreign jihadists continue to pose a serious threat to Iraq's new institutions and to our own forces.

At the same time, sovereignty will be returned to an interim Iraqi government by 1 July, although the structure and mechanism for determining this remain unresolved.
The emerging Iraqi leadership will face many pressing issues, among them organizing national elections, integrating the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing Kurdish autonomy in a federal structure, and the determining the role of Islam in the Iraqi state.
Meanwhile, Mr. Chairman, the important work of the Iraqi Survey Group and the hunt for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction continues. We must explore every avenue in our quest to understand Iraq's programs out of concern for the possibility that materials, weapons, or expertise might fall into the hands of insurgents, foreign states, or terrorists. As you know, I'll talk about this at length next week.

Despite progress in Iraq, the overall security picture continues to concern me. Saddam is in prison, and the Coalition has killed or apprehended all but 10 of his 54 key cronies. And Iraqis are taking an increasing role in their own defense, with many now serving in the various new police, military, and security forces.

But the violence continues. The daily average number of attacks on US and Coalition military forces has dropped from its November peak but is similar to that of August.
And many other insurgent and terrorist attacks undermine stability by striking at, and seeking to intimidate, those Iraqis willing to work with the Coalition.
The insurgency we face in Iraq comprises multiple groups with different motivations but with the same goal: driving the US and our Coalition partners from Iraq. Saddam's capture was a psychological blow that took some of the less-committed Ba'thists out of the fight, but a hard core of former regime elements--Ba'th Party officials, military, intelligence, and security officers--are still organizing and carrying out attacks.

Intelligence has given us a good understanding of the insurgency at the local level, and this information is behind the host of successful raids you've read about in the papers.
US military and Intelligence Community efforts to round up former regime figures have disrupted some insurgent plans to carry out additional anti-Coalition attacks. But we know these Ba'thist cells are intentionally decentralized to avoid easy penetration and to prevent the roll-up of whole networks. Arms, funding, and military experience remain readily available.

Mr. Chairman, the situation as I've described it--both our victories and our challenges--indicates we have damaged, but not yet defeated, the insurgents.

The security situation is further complicated by the involvement of terrorists--including Ansar al-Islam (AI) and al-Zarqawi--and foreign jihadists coming to Iraq to wage jihad. Their goal is clear. They intend to inspire an Islamic extremist insurgency that would threaten Coalition forces and put a halt to the long-term process of building democratic institutions and governance in Iraq. They hope for a Taliban-like enclave in Iraq's Sunni heartland that could be a jihadist safehaven.

AI--an Iraqi Kurdish extremist group--is waging a terrorist campaign against the coalition presence and cooperative Iraqis in a bid to inspire jihad and create an Islamic state.
Some extremists go even further. In a recent letter, terrorist planner Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi outlined his strategy to foster sectarian civil war in Iraq, aimed at inciting the Shia.
Stopping the foreign extremists from turning Iraq into their most important jihad yet rests in part on preventing loosely connected extremists from coalescing into a cohesive terrorist organization.

We are having some success--the Coalition has arrested key jihadist leaders and facilitators in Iraq, including top leaders from Ansar al-Islam, the al-Zarqawi network, and other al-Qa`ida affiliates.
The October detention of AI's deputy leader set back the group's ambition to establish itself as an umbrella organization for jihadists in Iraq.
And we're also concerned that foreign jihadists and former regime elements might coalesce. This would link local knowledge and military training with jihadist fervor and lethal tactics. At this point, we've seen a few signs of such cooperation at the tactical or local level.

Ultimately, the Iraqi people themselves must provide the fundamental solutions. As you well know, the insurgents are incessantly and violently targeting Iraqi police and security forces precisely because they fear the prospect of Iraqis securing their own interests. Success depends on broadening the role of the local security forces.

This goes well beyond greater numbers. It means continuing work already under way--fixing equipment shortages, providing training, ensuring adequate pay--to build a force of increasing quality and confidence that will have the support of the Iraqi people.
It is hard to overestimate the importance of greater security for Iraqis particularly as we turn to the momentous political events slated for 2004.

The real test will begin soon after the transfer of sovereignty, when we'll see the extent to which the new Iraqi leaders embody concepts such as pluralism, compromise, and rule of law.
Iraqi Arabs--and many Iraqi Kurds--possess a strong Iraqi identity, forged over a tumultuous 80 year history and especially during the nearly decade-long war with Iran. Unfortunately, Saddam's divide and rule policy and his favored treatment of the Sunni minority aggravated tensions to the point where the key to governance in Iraq today is managing these competing sectional interests.

Here's a readout on where these groups stand:

The majority SHIA look forward to the end of Sunni control, which began with the British creation of Iraq. The Shia community nevertheless has internal tensions, between the moderate majority and a radical minority that wants a Shia-dominated theocracy.
The KURDS see many opportunities to advance long held goals: retaining the autonomy they enjoyed over the past twelve years and expanding their power and territory.
The minority SUNNI fear Shia and Kurdish ambitions. Such anxieties help animate Sunni support for the insurgents. The Sunni community is still at a very early state of establishing political structures to replace the defeated Ba'th party.
I should qualify what I've just said: no society, and surely not Iraq's complex tapestry, is so simple as to be captured in three or four categories. Kurds. Shia. Sunni. In reality, Iraqi society is filled with more cleavages, and more connections, than a simple typology can suggest. We seldom hear about the strong tribal alliances that have long existed between Sunni and Shia, or the religious commonalities between the Sunni Kurd and Arab communities, or the moderate secularism that spans Iraqi groups.

We tend to identify, and stress, the tensions that rend communities apart, but opportunities also exist for these group to work together for common ends.
The social and political interplay is further complicated by Iran, especially in the south, where Tehran pursues its own interests and hopes to maximize its influence among Iraqi Shia after 1 July. Organizations supported by Iran--Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its Badr Organization militia--have gained positions within the Iraqi police and control media outlets in Basrah that tout a pro-Iran viewpoint.

Tehran also runs humanitarian and outreach programs that have probably enhanced its reputation among Iraqi Shia, but many remain suspicious.
The most immediate political challenge for the Iraqis is to choose the transitional government that will rule their country while they write their permanent constitution. The Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Ali al-Sistani has made this selection process the centerpiece of his effort to ensure that Iraqis will decide their own future and choose the first sovereign post-Saddam government.

Sistani favors direct elections as the way to produce a legitimate, accountable government.
Sistani's religious pronouncements show that, above all, he wants Iraq to be independent of foreign powers. Moreover, his praise of free elections and his theology reflect, in our reading, a clearcut opposition to theocracy, Iran-style.
Once the issues involving the selection of an transitional government are settled, Iraq's permanent constitution will begin to take shape. Here the Iraqi government and the framers of the constitution will have to address three urgent concerns: integrating the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing Kurdish autonomy in a federal structure, and determining the role of Islam in the Iraqi state.

The Sunni. Sunnis are at least a fifth of the population, inhabit the country's strategic heartland, and comprise a sizable share of Iraq's professional and middle classes. The Sunni are disaffected as a deposed ruling minority, but some are beginning to recognize that boycotting the emerging political process will weaken their community. Their political isolation may be breaking down in parts of the Sunni triangle, where some Sunni Arabs have begun to engage the Coalition and assume local leadership roles. And in the past three months we have also seen the founding of national-level Sunni umbrella organizations to deal with the Coalition and the Governing Council on questions like Sunni participation in choosing the transitional government.

Federalism. The Transitional Administrative Law is just now being completed, and the way it deals with the relationship between the political center and Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious communities will frame the future constitutional debate. To make a federal arrangement stick, Kurdish and Arab Iraq leaders will need to explain convincingly that a federal structure benefits all Iraqis and not just the Kurds. And even so, a host of difficult issues--control over oil and security being perhaps the most significant--may provoke tension between Kurdish and central Iraqi authorities.

Islam. The current draft of the Transitional Administrative Law makes Islam Iraq's official creed but protects religious freedom. It also creates an Iraqi legal system that is a mix of traditions, including Islamic law--but as only one legal element among many. This compromise is already under fire by Sunni Islamists who want Islam to be the sole source of law.

I don't want to allow the important security and political stories to crowd out others we should also be telling, including the often neglected one about Iraq's sizable economic potential. It's true that rebuilding will go on for years--the Saddam regime left in its wake a devastated, antiquated, underfunded infrastructure. But reconstruction progress and Iraq's own considerable assets--its natural resources and its educated populace--should enable the Iraqis to see important improvement in 2004 in their infrastructure and their quality of life.

Over the next few years, they'll open more hospitals and build more roads than anyone born under Saddam has witnessed.
The recovery of Iraqi oil production will help. Production is on track to approach 3.0 million barrels per day by the end of this year. Iraq hasn't produced this much oil since before the 1991 Gulf war. By next year, revenues from oil exports should cover the cost of basic government operations and contribute several billion dollars toward reconstruction. It is essential, however, that the Iraq-Turkey pipeline be reopened and oil facilities be well protected from insurgent sabotage.

Much more needs to be done. Key public services such as water, sewage, and transportation will have difficulty reaching prewar levels by July and won't meet the higher target of total Iraqi demand.

Electric power capacity approaches prewar levels but still falls short of peak demand. Looting and sabotage may make supplies unreliable.
Finally, unemployment and underemployment, which afflicts about a half of the workforce, will remain a key problem and a potential breeding ground for popular discontent.
PROLIFERATION
Mr. Chairman, I'll turn now to worldwide trends in proliferation. This picture is changing before our eyes--changing at a rate I have not seen since the end of the Cold War. Some of it is good news--I'll talk about the Libya and AQ Khan breakthroughs, for example--and some of it is disturbing. Some of it shows our years of work paying off, and some of it shows the work ahead is harder.

We are watching countries of proliferation concern choose different paths as they calculate the risks versus gains of pursuing WMD.

Libya is taking steps toward strategic disarmament.
North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear program into at least a bargaining chip and also international legitimacy and influence.
And Iran is exposing some programs while trying to preserve others.
I'll start with LIBYA, which appears to be moving toward strategic disarmament. For years Qadhafi had been chafing under international pariah status. In March 2003, he made a strategic decision and reached out through British intelligence with an offer to abandon his pursuit of WMD.

That launched nine months of delicate negotiations where we moved the Libyans from a stated willingness to renounce WMD to an explicit and public commitment to expose and dismantle their WMD programs. The leverage was intelligence. Our picture of Libya's WMD programs allowed CIA officers and their British colleagues to press the Libyans on the right questions, to expose inconsistencies, and to convince them that holding back was counterproductive. We repeatedly surprised them with the depth of our knowledge.

For example, US and British intelligence officers secretly traveled to Libya and asked to inspect Libya's ballistic missile programs. Libyan officials at first failed to declare key facilities, but our intelligence convinced them to disclose several dozen facilities, including their deployed Scud B sites and their secret North Korean-assisted Scud C production line.
When we were tipped to the imminent shipment of centrifuge parts to Libya in October, we arranged to have the cargo seized, showing the Libyans that we had penetrated their most sensitive procurement network.
By the end of the December visit, the Libyans:

Admitted having a nuclear weapons program and having bought uranium hexafluoride feed material for gas centrifuge enrichment.
Admitted having nuclear weapon design documents.
Acknowledged having made about 25 tons of sulfur mustard CW agent, aerial bombs for the mustard, and small amounts of nerve agent.
Provided access to their deployed Scud B forces and revealed details of indigenous missile design work and of cooperation with North Korea on the 800-km range Scuds Cs.
From the very outset of negotiations, Qadhafi requested the participation of international organizations to help certify Libyan compliance. Tripoli has agreed to inspections by the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to abide by the range limitations of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). We have briefed information on Tripoli's programs to various international monitoring organizations. IAEA and OPCW officials have already followed up with visits to Libya. Some discrepancies remain, but we will continue to collect additional information and closely monitor Libya's adherence to the commitments it has made.

In contrast to Libya, NORTH KOREA is trying to leverage its nuclear programs into international legitimacy and bargaining power, announcing its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent.

Since December 2002, Pyongyang has announced its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and expelled IAEA inspectors. Last year Pyongyang claimed to have finished reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods that had been sealed by US and North Korean technicians and stored under IAEA monitoring since 1994.

The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. The 8000 rods the North claims to have processed into plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several more.
We also believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by AQ Khan, which would give North Korea an alternative route to nuclear weapons.

Of course, we are concerned about more than just North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea has longstanding CW and BW capabilities and is enhancing its BW potential as it builds its legitimate biotechnology infrastructure. Pyongyang is sending individuals abroad and is seeking dual-use expertise and technology.

North Korea also continues to advance its missile programs. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in ballistic missiles, and has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its extensive ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources. The North also has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that have enabled other states to acquire longer-range capabilities and a basis for domestic development efforts earlier than would otherwise have been possible.

North Korea has maintained a unilateral long-range missile launch moratorium since 1999, but could end that with little or no warning. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2--capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload--may be ready for flight-testing.
IRAN is taking yet a different path, acknowledging work on a covert nuclear fuel cycle while trying to preserve its WMD options. I'll start with the good news: Tehran acknowledged more than a decade of covert nuclear activity and agreed to open itself to an enhanced inspection regime. Iran for the first time acknowledged many of its nuclear fuel cycle development activities--including a large-scale gas centrifuge uranium enrichment effort. Iran claims its centrifuge program is designed to produce low-enriched uranium, to support Iran's civil nuclear power program. This is permitted under the Nonproliferation Treaty, but--and here's the downside--the same technology can be used to build a military program as well.

The difference between producing low-enriched uranium and weapons-capable high-enriched uranium is only a matter of time and intent, not technology. It would be a significant challenge for intelligence to confidently assess whether that red line had been crossed.
Finally, Iran's missile program is both a regional threat and a proliferation concern. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle Eastand includes the 1300-km range Shahab-3 MRBM as well as a few hundred SRBMs. Iran has announced production of the Shahab-3 and publicly acknowledged development of follow-on versions. During 2003, Iran continued R&D on its longer-range ballistic missile programs, and publicly reiterated its intention to develop space launch vehicles (SLVs)--and SLVs contain most of the key building blocks for an ICBM. Iran could begin flight-testing these systems in the mid- to latter-part of the decade.

Iran also appears willing to supply missile-related technology to countries of concern and publicly advertises its artillery rockets and related technologies, including guidance instruments and missile propellants.
Let me turn now to a different aspect of the evolving WMD threat. I want to focus on how countries and groups are increasingly trying to get the materials they need for WMD. I'll focus on two important stories:

The roll-up of AQ Khan and his network, one of the most significant counter-proliferation successes in years and one in which intelligence led the way.
The difficulty of uncovering both proliferators masquerading as legitimate businessmen and possible BW or CW plants appearing to be legitimate "dual-use" facilities.
As I pointed out last year, Mr. Chairman, WMD technologies are no longer the sole province of nation-states. They might also come about as a result of business decisions made by private entrepreneurs and firms.

As you now know, those comments were my way of referring to AQ Khan without mentioning his name in open session. Until recently, Khan, popularly known as the "father of the Pakistani bomb," was the most dangerous WMD entrepreneur. For 25 years Khan directed Pakistan's uranium enrichment program. He built an international network of suppliers to support uranium enrichment efforts in Pakistan that also supported similar efforts in other countries.

Khan and his network had been unique in being able to offer one-stop shopping for enrichment technology and weapons design information. With such assistance, a potentially wide range of countries could leapfrog the slow, incremental stages of other nuclear weapons development programs.
The actions taken against Khan's network--like the example of Libya I laid out earlier--were largely the result of intelligence.

Intelligence discovered, pieced together, tracked, and penetrated Khan's worldwide hidden network.
But every public success we enjoy can be used by people like Khan to adjust, adapt, and evade. Proliferators hiding among legitimate businesses, and countries hiding their WMD programs inside legitimate dual-use industries, combine to make private entrepreneurs dealing in lethal goods one of our most difficult intelligence challenges.

In support of these WMD programs, new procurement strategies continue to hamper our ability to assess and warn on covert WMD programs. Acquisitions for such programs aren't the work of secret criminal networks that skirt international law. They're done by businessmen, in the open, in what seems to be legal trade in high-technology.

The dual-use challenge is especially applicable to countries hiding biological and chemical warfare programs. With dual-use technology and civilian industrial infrastructure, countries can develop BW and CW capabilities. Biotechnology is especially dual-edged: Medical programs and technology could easily support a weapons program, because nearly every technology required for biological weapons also has a legitimate application.

Now I'll turn to a brief run-down of some significant missile programs apart from those I've already discussed.

China continues an aggressive missile modernization program that will improve its ability to conduct a wide range of military options against Taiwan supported by both cruise and ballistic missiles. Expected technical improvements will give Beijing a more accurate and lethal missile force. China is also moving on with its first generation of mobile strategic missiles.

Although Beijing has taken steps to improve ballistic missile related export controls, Chinese firms continue to be a leading source of relevant technology and continue to work with other countries on ballistic missile-related projects.
South Asian ballistic missile development continues apace. Both India and Pakistan are pressing ahead with development and testing of longer-range ballistic missiles and are inducting additional SRBMs into missile units. Both countries are testing missiles that will enable them to deliver nuclear warheads to greater distances.

Last year Syria continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant ballistic missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance, primarily from North Korean entities. Syria is developing longer-range missile programs, such as a Scud D and possibly other variants, with assistance from North Korea and Iran.

Many countries remain interested in developing or acquiring land-attack cruise missiles, which are almost always significantly more accurate than ballistic missiles and complicate missile defense systems. Unmanned aerial vehicles are also of growing concern.

To conclude my comments on proliferation, I'll briefly run through some WMD programs I have not yet discussed, beginning with Syria.

Syria is an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards and has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are closely monitoring Syrian nuclear intentions. Meanwhile, Damascus has an active CW development and testing program that relies on foreign suppliers for key controlled chemicals suitable for producing CW.

Finally, we remain alert to the vulnerability of Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion. We are also concerned by the continued eagerness of Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers--which makes Russian expertise an attractive target for countries and groups seeking WMD and missile-related assistance.

PIVOTAL STATES
I'm going to comment now on three countries we obviously pay a great deal of attention to: North Korea, China, and Russia.

The NORTH KOREAN regime continues to threaten a range of US, regional, and global security interests. As I've noted earlier, Pyongyang is pursuing its nuclear weapons program and nuclear-capable delivery systems. It continues to build its missile forces, which can now reach all of South Korea and Japan, and to develop longer-range missiles that could threaten the United States.

The North also exports complete ballistic missiles and production capabilities, along with related components and expertise. It continues to export narcotics and other contraband across the globe.

Moreover, the forward-deployed posture of North Korea's armed forces remains a near-term threat to South Korea and to the 37,000 US troops stationed there. Recall that early last year as tensions over the nuclear program were building, Pyongyang intercepted a US reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace.

Kim Chong-il continues to exert a tight grip on North Korea as supreme leader. The regime's militarized, Soviet-style command economy is failing to meet the population's food and economic needs. Indeed, the economy has faltered to the point that Kim has permitted some new economic initiatives, including more latitude for farmers' markets, but these changes are a far cry from the systemic economic reform needed to revitalize the economy. The accumulated effect of years of deprivation and repression places significant stresses on North Korean society.

The Kim regime rules largely through fear, intimidation, and indoctrination, using the country's large and pervasive security apparatus, its system of camps for political prisoners, and its unrelenting propaganda to maintain control.
Mr. Chairman, CHINA continues to emerge as a great power and expand its profile in regional and international politics--but Beijing has cooperated with Washington on some key strategic issues.

The Chinese have cooperated in the war on terrorism and have been willing to host and facilitate multilateral dialogue on the North Korean nuclear problem--in contrast to Beijing's more detached approach to that problem a decade ago.
Beijing is making progress in asserting its influence in East Asia. Its activist diplomacy in the neighborhood is paying off, fueled in large part by China's robust economy. China's growth continues to outpace all others in the region, and its imports of goods from other East Asian countries are soaring. As a result, Beijing is better positioned to sell its neighbors on the idea that what is good for the Chinese economy is good for Asia.

That said, China's neighbors still harbor suspicions about Beijing's long-term intentions. They generally favor a sustained US military presence in the region as insurance against potential Chinese aggression.
Our greatest concern remains China's military buildup, which continues to accelerate. Last year, Beijing reached new benchmarks in its production or acquisition from Russia of missiles, submarines, other naval combatants, and advanced fighter aircraft. China also is downsizing and restructuring its military forces with an eye toward enhancing its capabilities for the modern battlefield. All of these steps will over time make China a formidable challenger if Beijing perceived that its interests were being thwarted in the region.

We are closely monitoring the situation across the Taiwan Strait in the period surrounding Taiwan's presidential election next month.
Chinese leadership politics--especially the incomplete leadership transition--will influence how Beijing deals with the Taiwan issue this year and beyond. President and Communist Party leader Hu Jintao still shares power with his predecessor in those positions, Jiang Zemin, who retains the powerful chairmanship of the Party's Central Military Commission.

In RUSSIA, the trend I highlighted last year--President Putin's re-centralization of power in the Kremlin--has become more pronounced, especially over the past several months. We see this in the recent Duma elections and the lopsided United Russia party victory engineered by the Kremlin and in the Kremlin's domination of the Russian media.

Putin has nevertheless recorded some notable achievements. His economic record--even discounting the continuing strength of high world oil prices--is impressive, both in terms of GDP growth and progress on market reforms. He has brought a sense of stability to the Russian political scene after years of chaos, and he restored Russians' pride in their country's place in the world.

That said, Putin now dominates the Duma, and the strong showing of nationalist parties plus the shutout of liberal parties may bolster trends toward limits on civil society, state interference in big business, and greater assertiveness in the former Soviet Union. And the Kremlin's recent efforts to strengthen the state's role in the oil sector could discourage investors and hamper energy cooperation with the West.

He shows no signs of softening his tough stance on Russia's war in Chechnya. Russian counterinsurgency operations have had some success. Putin's prime innovation is the process of turning more authority over to the Chechen under the new government of Akhmad Kadyrov, and empowering his security forces to lead the counter-insurgency.

Although this strategy may succeed in lowering Russia's profile in Chechnya, it is unlikely to lead to resolution.
Moscow has already become more assertive in its approach to the neighboring states of the former Soviet Union, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Russian companies--primarily for commercial motives, but in line with the Kremlin's agenda--are increasing their stakes in neighboring countries, particularly in the energy sector.

The Kremlin's increasing assertiveness is partly grounded in a growing confidence in its military capabilities. Although still a fraction of their former capabilities, Russian military forces are beginning to rebound from the 1990s nadir. Training rates are up--including some high-profile exercises--along with defense spending.

Even so, we see Moscow's aims as limited. Russia is using primarily economic incentives and levers of "soft" power, like shared history and culture, to rebuild lost power and influence. And Putin has a stake in relative stability on Russia's borders--not least to maintain positive relations with the US and Europeans.

Russian relations with the US continue to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. On balance, they remain more cooperative than not, but the coming year will present serious challenges. For example, Russia remains supportive of US deployments in Central Asia for Afghanistan--but is also wary of US presence in what Russia considers to be its own back yard.

Let me turn now to AFGHANISTAN, where the Afghan people are on their way to having their first legitimate, democratically elected government in more than a generation.

The ratification of a new constitution at the Constitutional Loya Jirga in January is a significant milepost. It provides the legal framework and legitimacy for several initiatives, including elections, scheduled for later this year.

Within the next 12 months, the country could have, for the first time, a freely elected President and National Assembly that are broadly representative, multi-ethnic, and able to begin providing security and services at some level.
Even if the date of elections slips--the Bonn Agreement requires a June date--the central government is extending its writ and legitimate political processes are developing nationwide through other means. Regional "warlords" are disruptive but disunited--and appear to realize the Bonn process and elections are the only way to avoid relapsing into civil war.

Defense Minister Fahim Khan is cooperating with President Karzai and seems able to keep his large body of Panjshiri supporters in line in favor of Bonn and stability.
Meanwhile, the infusion of $2 billion in international aid has propelled Afghan economic performance. The IMF estimates GDP grew--from an admittedly low base--by 29 percent last year. The completion of the Kabul to Kandahar road in December was a success, but the international community will need to ensure that funds are channeled toward projects that make the most impact and are balanced among the regions and ethnic groups.

Building a National Army is another long-term international challenge. So far, almost 6,000 Afghan soldiers have been trained by US, British, and French trainers. It will take years to reach the goal of a 70,000-strong ethnically-balanced forcebut with continued Coalition and international community support and assistance over the next two years, Afghanistan need not become either a "security welfare state," or, again, a breeding ground for terrorists and extremism.
Last year's most worrisome events were the continued attacks by the Afghan Transitional Authority's enemies--particularly the Taliban, along with al-Qa`ida and followers of Afghan extremist Hikmatyar--who want to disrupt routine life and the reconstruction effort in the south and east. This is still a problem, because none of these groups has abandoned the ultimate goal of derailing the process by which legitimate democratic government and the rule of law will be established in Afghanistan.

I don't want to overstate the Taliban's strength. It is far from having sufficient political and military might to challenge the Karzai Government. It is, however, still able to interfere with the political, economic, and social reconstruction of the country by fomenting insecurity and thereby undermining public confidence in Kabul.

Like other extremists bent on restoring the terrorist-sponsored state that existed before the liberation of Afghanistan, Taliban remnants remain intent on using any available means to undermine President Karzai and his government, to drive international aid organizations and their workers from the areas that most need them, and to attack US and Coalition forces.
For this reason the security situation in the south and east is still tenuous and Kabul will need considerable assistance over at least the next year or two to stabilize the security environment there.
In IRAN, Mr. Chairman, I'll begin with a sobering bottom line:

With the victory of hardliners in elections last weekend, governmental led reform received a serious blow. Greater repression is a likely result.
With the waning of top-down reform efforts, reformers will probably turn to the grass roots--working with NGOs and labor groups--to rebuild popular support and keep the flame alive.
The strengthening of authoritarian rule will make breaking out of old foreign policy patterns more difficult at a time when Tehran faces a new geopolitical landscape in the Middle East.
The concerns I voiced last year are unabated. The recent defeats will have further alienated a youthful population anxious for change. Abroad, Tehran faces an altered regional landscape in the destruction of radical anti-Western regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq and growing international concern about nuclear proliferation.

And, as has so often happened in Iran's history, Iran's leaders appear likely to respond to these challenges in rigid and unimaginative ways.
The current setback is the latest in a series of contests in which authoritarian rule has prevailed over reformist challengers. The reformists--President Khatami in particular--are in no small part to blame. Their refusal to back bold promises with equally bold actions exhausted their initially enthusiastic popular support.

When the new Majles convenes in June, the Iranian government will be even more firmly controlled by the forces of authoritarianism. In the recent election, clerical authorities disqualified more than 2500 candidates, mostly reformists, and returned control of the legislature to hardliners. The new Majles will focus on economic reform, with little or no attention to political liberalization.

And with the Majles securely behind the hardliners, we expect to see many of the outlets for political dissent shut down by the clerical regime.
The prospect of internal violence remains. Hardliners may now resort to new heavy-handedness that produces public outrage and protest. At least eight people were killed and 30 injured in elected-related violence last weekend.
Although greater repression is likely to be the most immediate consequence, this will only further deepen the discontent with clerical rule, which is now discredited and publicly criticized as never before. In the past year several unprecedented open letters, including one signed by nearly half the parliament, were published calling for an end to the clergy's absolute rule.

Iran's recent history is studded with incidents of serious civil unrest that erupted in response to the arrogance of local officials--events like the 1999 student riots that broke out when security forces attacked a dormitory.
Even so, the Iranian public does not appear eager to take a challenge to the streets--in Tehran, apathy is the prevailing mood, and regime intimidation has cowed the populace. This mix keeps the regime secure for now.
The uncertainty surrounding Iran's internal politics comes as Tehran adjusts to the regional changes of a post-Saddam Iraq. Because Khamenei and his allies have kept close rein on foreign policy, we do not expect the defeat of the reformists to lead to a sudden change in Iranian policy. Tehran will continue to use multiple avenues--including media influence, humanitarian and reconstruction aid, diplomatic maneuvering, and clandestine activity--to advance its interests and counter US influence in Iraq.

We judge that Iran wants an Iraqi government that does not threaten Tehran, is not a US puppet, can maintain the country's territorial integrity, and has a strong Shia representation.
These interests have led Tehran to recognize the Iraqi Governing Council and work with other nascent Iraqi political, economic, and security institutions.
In INDONESIA, the world's most populous Muslim country, authorities have arrested more than 100 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) suspects linked to the terrorist attacks in Bali in October 2002 and the Jakarta Marriott Hotel last year. However, coming presidential and legislative elections appear to have blunted the government's efforts to root out JI.

Megawati remains the presidential frontrunner, but continuing criticism of her leadership and the growing prospect that her party will lose seats in the legislative election increase the likelihood of a wide-open race. The secular-nationalist Golkar--the former ruling party of Soeharto, now riding a wave of public nostalgia for his bygone era--could overtake Megawati's party to win the plurality of legislature seats. Most local polls suggest that the Islamic parties are unlikely to improve their percentage of the vote.

Vocal religious extremists, however, are challenging Indonesia's dominant moderate Muslim groups. A growing number of Indonesian Muslims now advocate the adoption of Islamic law, and dozens of provincial and district governments around the archipelago are taking advantage of the devolution of authority since 1998 to begin enforcing elements of Islamic civil law and customs.

Let me turn briefly to SOUTH ASIA. When I commented on the situation there last year, I warned that, despite a lessening of tensions between India and Pakistan, we remained concerned a dramatic provocation might spark another crisis.

This year I'm pleased to note that the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan has made steady progress. Building on Prime Minister Vajpayee's April 2003 "hand of friendship" initiative, the leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad have begun to lay a promising foundation for resolving their differences through peaceful dialogue.

Both countries have since made further progress in restoring diplomatic, economic, transportation, and communications links and--most importantly--both sides have agreed to proceed with a "composite" dialogue on a range of bilateral issues that include Kashmir.
Further progress will hinge largely on the extent to which each side judges that the other is sincere about improving India-Pakistan relations. For example, India is watching carefully to see whether the level of militant infiltration across the Line of Control (LOC) increases this spring after the snows melt in the mountain passes.

In this hemisphere, President Uribe of COLOMBIA is making great strides militarily and economically. Colombia's military is making steady progress against the illegal armed groups, particularly around Bogot?; last year the Army decimated several FARC military units. In the last two months, Colombian officials have apprehended the two most senior FARC leaders ever captured.

Foreign and domestic investors are taking note: last year, [2003] the growth rate of 3.5 percent was the highest in 5 years.
But some of Uribe's hardest work awaits him. The military has successfully cleared much of the insurgent-held territory, but the next stage of Uribe's "clear-and-hold" strategy is securing the gains thus far. That entails building the state presence--schools, police stations, medical clinics, roads, bridges, and social infrastructure--where it has scarcely existed before.

Finally, we should bear in mind that Uribe's opponents will adjust their strategies, as well. The FARC may increasingly seek to target US persons and interests in Colombia, particularly if key leaders are killed, captured, or extradited to the United States.

Drug gangs are also adapting, relocating coca cultivation and production areas and attacking aerial eradication missions. All of this translates into more money and more resources for traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary forces.
And in HAITI, the situation is, of course, extremely fluid at this moment. What continues to concern us is the possibility that the increasing violence will lead to a humanitarian disaster or mass migration. Forces opposed to the government control key cities in northern Haiti and they have identified Port-au-Prince as their next target. Those forces include armed gangs, former Haitian Army officers, and members of irregular forces who allegedly killed Aristide supporters during his exile.

Future battles could be bloody, as the armed opposition is arrayed against pro-government irregular forces equally disposed to violence. Moreover, food, fuel, and medical supplies already have been disrupted in parts of Haiti because of the fighting, making living conditions even worse for Haiti's many poor.
The government is looking for international help to restore order. Improving security will require the difficult tasks of disarming both pro- and anti-government irregulars and augmenting and retraining a national security force.
In SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, progress in continuing peace processes requires further careful Western cultivation and African regional cooperation.

In Liberia, UN peacekeepers and the transitional government face a daunting challenge to rein in armed factions, including remnants of Charles Taylor's militias.
Sudan's chances for lasting peace are its best in decades, with more advances possible in the short term, given outside guarantees and incentives.
A fragile peace process in Burundi and struggling transitional government in Congo (Kinshasa) have the potential to end conflicts that so far have claimed a combined total of over 3 million lives.
Tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their disputed border is jeopardizing the peace accord brokered by US officials in 2000.
THE OTHER TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
Let me conclude my comments this morning by briefly considering some important transnational concerns that touch on the war against terrorism.

We're used to thinking of that fight as a sustained worldwide effort to get the perpetrators and would-be perpetrator off the street. This is an important preoccupation, and we will never lose sight of it.

But places that combine desperate social and economic circumstances with a failure of government to police its own territory can often provide nurturing environments for terrorist groups, and for insurgents and criminals. The failure of governments to control their own territory creates potential power vacuums that open opportunities for those who hate.

We count approximately 50 countries that have such "stateless zones." In half of these, terrorist groups are thriving. Al-Qa`ida and extremists like the Taliban, operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, are well known examples.
As the war on terrorism progresses, terrorists will be driven from their safe havens to seek new hideouts where they can undertake training, planning, and staging without interference from government authorities. The prime candidates for new "no man's lands" are remote, rugged regions where central governments have no consistent reach and where socioeconomic problems are rife.

Many factors play into the struggle to eradicate stateless zones and dry up the wellsprings of disaffection.

Population trends. More than half of the Middle East's population is under the age of 22. "Youth bulges," or excessive numbers of unemployed young people, are historical markers for increased risk of political violence and recruitment into radical causes. The disproportionate rise of young age cohorts will be particularly pronounced in Iraq, followed by Syria, Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Infectious disease. The HIV/AIDS pandemic remains a global humanitarian crisis that also endangers social and political stability. Although Africa currently has the greatest number of HIV/AIDS cases--more than 29 million infected--the disease is spreading rapidly. Last year, I warned about rising infection rates in Russia, China, India, and the Caribbean. But the virus is also gaining a foothold in the Middle East and North Africa, where governments may be lulled into overconfidence by the protective effects of social and cultural conservatism.
Humanitarian need. Need will again outpace international pledges for assistance. Sub-Saharan Africa and such conflict-ravaged places like Chechnya, Tajikistan, and the Palestinian Occupied Territories will compete for aid against assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan. Only 40 percent of UN funding requirements for 2003 had been met for the five most needy countries in Africa.
Food insecurity. More than 840 million people are undernourished worldwide, a number that had fallen in the first half of the 1990s but in now on the increase. USDA estimates the food aid needed to meet annual recommended minimum nutrition levels at almost 18 million metric tons, far above the recent average of 11 million tons donated per annum.
And I'll take this opportunity to remind you, Mr. Chairman, of the continued threat the global narcotics industry poses to the United States.

As evident by the doubling of the Afghan opium crop in 2003, the narcotics industry is capable of moving quickly to take advantage of opportunities presented by the absence of effective government authority.
Although the linkages between the drug trade and terrorism are generally limited on a global basis, trafficking organizations in Afghanistan and Colombia pose significant threats to stability in these countries and constitute an important source of funding for terrorist activity by local groups.
This combination of flexibility and ability to undermine effective governmental institutions means that dealing with the narcotics challenge requires a truly global response.
And that, Mr. Chairman, concludes my formal remarks. I welcome any questions or comments you and the members may have for me.



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Source: CIA




RL32336 -- FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress


April 6, 2004


Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division

Todd Masse
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Domestic Social Policy Division




CONTENTS
Summary
Introduction
FBI Intelligence Reforms
Business Process Changes
The Intelligence Cycle
Centralized Headquarters Authority
Organizational Changes
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence
New Field Office Intelligence Groups
New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s)
Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services
Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors
More Intelligence Analysts
Revamped Intelligence Training
Improved Technology
More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI
Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and State and Local Officials
Issues for Congress
The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening FBI Intelligence
Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI's Intelligence Program
Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program
Skeptics Believe FBI's Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Can Overcome FBI's Lack of Intelligence Experience
Implementation Challenges
Technology
FBI Field Leadership
Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics
Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform
Changes in The Intelligence Cycle
Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce Desired Results?
Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate?
Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient?
Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate?
Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements
Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and With Other Agencies, Is Improving For Additional Reasons
Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling Signs on Sharing
Some State and Local Officials Also Remain Dissatisfied With Level of Sharing
Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing Procedures
Congressional Oversight Issues
Oversight Effectiveness
Eliminating Committee Term Limits
Consolidating Oversight Under the Intelligence Committees
Options
Option 1: Status Quo
Option 2: Creation of a National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI
Option 3: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to Department of Homeland Security
Option 4: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to the DCI
Option 5: Creation of a New Domestic Security Intelligence Service
Conclusion
Appendix 1: Definitions of Intelligence
Appendix 2: The FBI's Traditional Role in Intelligence
Appendix 3: The FBI's Intelligence Programs -- A Brief History
FBI Excesses
Oversight and Regulation: The Pendulum Swings
Appendix 4: The Case File as an Organizing Concept, and Implications for Prevention
Appendix 5: Past Efforts to Reform FBI Intelligence
Appendix 6: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
Appendix 7: Relevant Legal and Regulatory Changes
Footnotes




Summary
The Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has been criticized for failing to warn of the attacks of September 11, 2001. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism and September 11, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, singled out the FBI in a significant manner for failing to focus on the domestic terrorist threat; collect useful intelligence; analyze strategic intelligence; and to share intelligence internally and with other members of the Intelligence Community. The Joint Inquiry concluded that the FBI was seriously deficient in identifying, reporting on, and defending against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States.

The FBI is responding by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as crimes. The major component of this effort is restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements; and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence.


Reactions to these FBI reforms are mixed. Critics contend the reforms are too limited and have implementation problems. More fundamentally, they argue that the gulf between law enforcement and intelligence cultures is so wide, that the FBI's reforms, as proposed, are unlikely to succeed. They believe the FBI will remain essentially a reactive law enforcement agency, significantly constrained in its ability to collect and exploit effectively intelligence in preventing terrorist acts.

Supporters counter that the FBI can successfully address its deficiencies, particularly its intelligence shortcomings, and that the Director's intelligence reforms are appropriate for what needs to be done. They argue that the FBI is unique among federal agencies, because it supplies the critical ingredient to a successful war against terrorism in the U.S. -- unmatched law enforcement capabilities integrated with an improving intelligence program.

The congressional oversight role includes deciding on whether to accept, modify, or reject the FBI's intelligence reforms currently underway. Congress may consider several options, ranging from support of the FBI's current reforms, to establishing a stand-alone domestic intelligence service entirely independent of the FBI. Congress may also reevaluate how it conducts oversight of the FBI. Pending legislation on FBI intelligence reform includes, but is not limited to, S. 410, The Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003, and S. 1520, The 9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act.





Introduction (1)
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have been labeled as a major intelligence failure, similar in magnitude to that associated with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (2) In response to criticisms of its role in this failure, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has introduced a series of reforms to transform the Bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on criminal investigations into a more mobile, agile, flexible, intelligence-driven (3) agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.

FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III initiated changes that were sparked by congressional charges that the Intelligence Community (IC), (4) including the FBI, missed opportunities to prevent, or at least, disrupt the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism, the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, (5) (JIC) criticized the FBI for failing to focus on the terrorist threat domestically; collect useful intelligence; strategically analyze intelligence, (6) and to share intelligence internally, and with the rest of the IC. According to the congressional inquiry, the FBI was incapable of producing significant intelligence products, and was seriously handicapped in its efforts to identify, report on (7) and defend against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States. (8)


Observers believe successful FBI reform will depend in large measure on whether the FBI can strengthen what critics have characterized as its historically neglected and weak intelligence program, particularly in the area of strategic analysis. They contend the FBI must improve its ability to collect, analyze and disseminate domestic intelligence so that it can help federal, state and local officials stop terrorists before they strike. If the FBI is viewed as failing this fundamental litmus test, they argue, confidence in any beefed up intelligence program will quickly erode.

Critics contend the FBI's intelligence reforms are moving too slowly (9) and are too limited. (10) They argue that the FBI's deeply rooted law enforcement culture and its reactive practice of investigating crimes after the fact, (11) will undermine efforts to transform the FBI into a proactive agency able to develop and use intelligence to prevent terrorism (for a more detailed discussion of the FBI's reactive "case file" approach, see Appendix 4). While the British Security Service (MI-5) may or may not be an appropriate organizational model for U.S. domestic intelligence for myriad reasons, the primacy it accords to intelligence functions over law enforcement interests may be worthy of consideration. (12) In justifying their pessimism, critics cite two previous failed attempts by the FBI to reform its intelligence program (for a more detailed discussion, see Appendix 5).


Critics also question whether Director Mueller, who has an extensive background in criminal prosecution but lacks experience in the intelligence field, (13) sufficiently understands the role of intelligence to be able to lead an overhaul of the FBI's intelligence operation. (14)

Supporters counter that they believe the FBI can change, that its shortcomings are fixable, and that the Director's intelligence reforms are appropriate, focused and will produce the needed changes. (15) They also argue that a successful war against terrorism demands that law enforcement and intelligence are closely linked. And they maintain that the FBI is institutionally able to provide an integrated approach, because it already combines both law enforcement and intelligence functions. (16)

A major role for Congress is whether to accept, modify or reject the FBI's intelligence reforms. Whether lawmakers believe the FBI to be capable of meaningful reform, and the Director's reforms to be the correct ones, could determine whether they accept or modify his changes, or eliminate them altogether in favor of a new separate domestic intelligence agency entirely independent of the FBI, as some have advocated. (17)

This report examines the FBI's intelligence program and its reform. Specifically, the section covers a number of issues that Congress might explore as part of its oversight responsibilities, to develop and understanding of how well the FBI is progressing in its reform efforts. The following section outlines the advantages and disadvantages of several congressional options to make further changes to the FBI's intelligence program. (18) Finally, a number of appendices concerning contextual issues surrounding FBI intelligence reform are provided.


FBI Intelligence Reforms
The FBI is responding to the numerous shortcomings outlined by the JIC by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as criminal acts. The major component of this effort is the restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements; and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The FBI also has reallocated its resources in an effort to establish an effective and efficient intelligence program.

The reforms are intended to address the numerous perceived shortcomings, including those outlined by the JIC Inquiry, which concluded the FBI failed to


Focus on the domestic threat. "The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qaida and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States." (19)

Conduct all-source analysis. (20) "... The FBI's traditional reliance on an aggressive, case-oriented, law enforcement approach did not encourage the broader collection and analysis efforts that are critical to the intelligence mission. Lacking appropriate personnel, training, and information systems, the FBI primarily gathered intelligence to support specific investigations, not to conduct all-source analysis for dissemination to other intelligence agencies." (21)

Centralize a nationally-coordinated effort to gain intelligence on Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida. "... The FBI's 56 field offices enjoy a great deal of latitude in managing their work consistent with the dynamic and reactive nature of its traditional law enforcement mission. In counterterrorism efforts, however, that flexibility apparently served to dilute the FBI's national focus on Bin Laden and al-Qaida." (22)

Conduct counterterrorism strategic analysis. "Consistent with its traditional law enforcement mission, the FBI was, before September 11, a reactive, operationally-driven organization that did not value strategic analysis ... most (FBI consumers) viewed strategic analytical products as academic and of little use in ongoing operations." (23)

Develop effective information technology systems. The FBI relied upon "... outdated and insufficient technical systems...." (24)

Business Process Changes
In an attempt to transform and upgrade its intelligence program, the FBI is changing how it processes intelligence by formally embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a long-time practice followed by the rest of the IC. It also is centralizing control over its national security operations at FBI Headquarters.

The Intelligence Cycle. FBI is attempting to formalize and discipline its approach to intelligence by embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a process through which (1) intelligence collection priorities are identified by national level officials, (2) priorities are communicated to the collectors who collect this information through various human and national technical means, (3) the analysis and evaluation of this raw intelligence are converted into finished intelligence products,( 4) finished intelligence products are disseminated to consumers inside and outside the FBI and Department of Justice, and (5) a feedback mechanism is created to provide collectors, analysts and collection requirements officials with consumer assessment of intelligence value. (See Figure 1, below). To advance that effort, the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) has developed and issued nine so-called concepts of operations, which essentially constitute a strategic plan identifying those areas in which changes must be made. These changes are seen as necessary if the FBI is to successfully establish an effective intelligence program that is both internally coordinated and integrated with its Intelligence Community counterparts.

Source: http://www.fbi.gov/, as altered by the Congressional Research Service


The FBI also is trying to improve and upgrade its functional capabilities at each step along the cycle. Success may turn, in part, on the performance of the new Office of Intelligence, which has the responsibility to "... manage and satisfy needs for the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence" within the FBI and to ensure requirements "levied on the FBI by national, international, state and local agencies" are met. (25)
FBI officials say their objective is to better focus intelligence collection against terrorists operating in the U.S. through improved strategic analysis that can identify gaps in their knowledge. As will be addressed later in the "Issues for Congress" section, the FBI faces numerous challenges as it formalizes its activities in each element of the intelligence cycle.

Centralized Headquarters Authority. Following September 11, Director Mueller announced that henceforth, the FBI's top three priorities would be counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime, respectively. (26) He signaled his intention to improve the FBI's intelligence program by, among other measures, consolidating and centralizing control over fragmented intelligence capabilities, both at FBI Headquarters and in the FBI's historically autonomous field offices. (27) He restated that intelligence had always been one of the FBI's core competencies (28) and organic to the FBI's investigative mission, (29) and asserted that the organization's intelligence efforts had and would continue to be disciplined by the intelligence cycle of intelligence requirements, collection, analysis, and dissemination.


Organizational Changes
The FBI is restructuring to support an integrated intelligence program. The FBI director has also created new intelligence-related positions and entities at FBI Headquarters and across its 56 field offices to improve its intelligence capacity.

New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence. As part of his effort to centralize control, Director Mueller established a new position -- the EAD-I. (30) The EAD-I manages a single intelligence program across the FBI's four investigative/operational divisions -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber. Previously, each division controlled and managed its own intelligence program. To emphasize its new and enhanced priority, the Director also elevated intelligence from program support to full program status, and established a new Office of Intelligence (OI). The OI is responsible for implementing an integrated FBI-wide intelligence strategy, developing an intelligence analyst career path, and ensuring that intelligence is appropriately shared within the FBI as well as with other federal agencies. (31) The Office also is charged with improving strategic analysis, implementing an intelligence requirements and collection regime, and ensuring that the FBI's intelligence policies are implemented. Finally, the office oversees the FBI's participation in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). (32)

The OI, headed by an Assistant Director who reports to the EAD-I, is comprised of six units: (1) Career Intelligence (works to develop career paths for intelligence analysts), (2) Strategic Analysis (provides strategic analyses to senior level FBI executives), (3) Oversight (oversees field intelligence groups), (4) Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management (establishes and implements procedures to manage the FBI intelligence process), (5) Administrative Support, and (6) Executive Support. (33)

New Field Office Intelligence Groups. The FBI has established field intelligence groups in each of its 56 field offices to raise the priority of intelligence and ultimately to drive collection, analysis and dissemination at the local level. Each field intelligence group is responsible for managing, executing and coordinating their local intelligence resources in a manner which is consistent with national priorities. (34) A field intelligence group is comprised of intelligence analysts, (35) who conduct largely tactical analyses; special agents, who are responsible for intelligence collection; and reports officers, a newly created position. (36) Reports officers are expected to play a key role by sifting raw, unevaluated intelligence and determining to whom it should be disseminated within the FBI and other federal agencies for further processing.

With regard to counterintelligence, which is any intelligence about the capabilities, intent, and operations of foreign intelligence services, or those individuals or organizations operating on behalf of foreign powers, working against the U.S., the FBI has established six field demonstration projects led by experienced FBI retirees. These teams are responsible for assessing intelligence capabilities at six individual field offices and making recommendations to correct deficiencies. (37)

New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s). In July 2002, the FBI established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), which coordinates its nation-wide network of 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). (38) The NJTTF also coordinates closely with the FBI's newly established Counterterrorism Watch, a 24-hour operations center, which is responsible for tracking terrorist threats and disseminating information about them to the JTTFs, to the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Operations Center and, indirectly, to state and local law enforcement. CT Watch is located at the FBI's 24-hour Strategic Intelligence Operations Center (SIOC). (39) With respect to regional JTTFs, the Bureau has increased their number from 66 to 84, and the number of state and local participants has more than quadrupled -- from 534 to over 2,300, according to the FBI.

Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center. President Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union address announced the establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which is to issue threat assessments based on all-source intelligence analysis. (40) The TTIC is a joint venture comprised of a number of federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities, and is directed by a CIA-named official, and a deputy director named by the FBI.

The Center, formally established in May 2003, employs 150, eight of whom are FBI analysts. When fully operational, in May 2004, the Center anticipates employing 300 professionals, approximately 65 (22%) of whom will come from FBI ranks. Of 300 total staff, 56 are expected to be strategic analysts.

New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services. As will be discussed in more detail below, the FBI has been criticized for failing to effectively share information with numerous consumer sets, including other members of the Intelligence Community, and state and local law enforcement authorities. In order to address these concerns Director Mueller established the EAD for Law Enforcement Services and under this new position, created an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. Staffed by a former state police chief, the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, working with the Office of Intelligence, ensures that relevant information is shared, as appropriate, with state and local law enforcement.


Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
There are numerous changes the FBI has made or is in the process of making to realize its intelligence goals. With the support of Congress, the FBI's budget has increased almost 50% since September 11, from $3.1 billion in FY2000 to $4.6 billion in FY2004. (41) The recently proposed FBI budget for FY2005 is $5.1 billion, including an increase of at least $76 million for intelligence and intelligence-related items. (42) According to Maureen Baginski, EAD for Intelligence, this year the FBI plans to hire 900 intelligence analysts, mostly in FBI field offices. (43) With the existing infusion of resources, the FBI is beefing up its intelligence-related staff, as well as functions which are integral to intelligence -- such as intelligence training, language translation, information technology, and intelligence sharing.

More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors. The FBI has increased the number of field agents it is devoting to its three top priorities -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), (44) in FY2004 the FBI allocated 36% of its agent positions to support Director Mueller's top the three priorities -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime -- up from 25% in FY2002. This represents an increase of approximately 1,395 agent positions, 674 of which were permanently reprogrammed from existing FBI drug, white collar, and violent crime programs. (45) From a recruitment perspective, the FBI recently established "intelligence" as a "critical skill need" for special agent recruitment. (46)

More Intelligence Analysts. The FBI estimates that of the 1,156 analysts employed as of July 2003, 475 of them were dedicated to counterterrorism analysis. (47) Prior to September 11, the FBI employed 159 counterterrorism analysts. (48) The FBI requested and received an additional 214 analytical positions as part of its FY2004 funding. (49) As mentioned above, in calendar year 2004, the FBI intends to hire 900 analysts, many of whom will be stationed across its 56 field offices. In an effort to convey that the FBI is attaching greater importance to the role analysts play, the Office of Intelligence has signaled to the FBI that analysts have a valid and valuable role to play within the organization. (50) The FBI, for the first time, is also attempting to establish a dedicated career path for its intelligence analysts, and for the purposes of promotion is now viewing its three types of analysts (formerly the Intelligence Research Specialists and Intelligence Operations Specialists, with the addition of a new category of employee, Reports Officers) all as generic intelligence analysts. As will be discussed more in-depth below, theoretically, all intelligence analysts, whether assigned to Headquarters or to a field office, will have promotion potential to the grade of GS-15 (non-managerial). Until now, generally, at the non-managerial level, analysts assigned to Headquarters had a promotion potential to the GS-14 level, and those in the field were only allowed to reach the GS-12 level. New recruitment standards, including the elimination of a requirement for a bachelor's degree (51) and a new cognitive ability testing process, have been developed.

Revamped Intelligence Training. (52) The FBI is revamping its training to reflect the role of intelligence. The FBI has revised its new agent training, established a College of Analytical Studies to train both new and more experienced analysts and has plans to re-engineer its overall training program. (53)

Specifically, the FBI is providing more intelligence training for new special agents. New special agents undertake a 17 week, 680 hour training program when they enter the FBI. The amount of time agents devote to studying National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) topics (54) -- principally Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism (55) -- in new agent training has increased from 28 hours (4.1% of total training) to 80 hours (11.8% of total training). (56) As part of this updated 680 hour curriculum for new agents, the FBI has instituted a two-hour block of training devoted solely to intelligence. Notwithstanding these changes, FBI officials recognize they have made relatively little progress in integrating intelligence into all aspects of new agent training.

The new training is intended to expose new employees to the intelligence cycle -- requirements, collection, analysis, reporting and dissemination -- and to how intelligence advances national security goals. Agents also are taught how to use strategic and tactical analysis effectively. (57)

All new analysts, or those new to the analytical function, are required to take an introductory analytical training course when they assume analytical responsibilities at the FBI. Historically, the curriculum for this course -- recently renamed the Analytical Cadre Education Strategy-I (ACES) so as to be "... more descriptive and create a positive image for the training effort" (58) -- included a substantial amount of time dedicated to orienting the new analyst to the FBI. According to FBI officials, this course has recently been re-engineered to focus more directly on intelligence, asset vetting, reporting writing, the Intelligence Community, and various analytical methodologies. According to FBI officials, more advanced intelligence analysis courses -- ACES II -- are in development.

Finally, the FBI plans to enhance training standardization and efficiency by consolidating all training in the FBI's Training Division. Historically, the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program has developed and provided its own substantive intelligence training programs. FBI analysts are also encouraged to avail themselves of the many geographic and functional analytic courses taught by other elements of the Intelligence Community.

Improved Technology. The FBI says it recognizes the critical importance of improving its antiquated information technology system, (59) so that it can more effectively share information both internally and with the rest of the Intelligence Community, and Director Mueller has made it one of his top ten priorities. But the FBI's technological center-piece -- the three-stage Trilogy Project -- continues to suffer from delays and cost overruns. Although the FBI has installed new hardware and software, and established local and wide area communications networks, (60) Trilogy's third, and perhaps most important component -- the Virtual Case File system (intended to give analysts access to a new terrorism database containing 40 million documents, and generally an improved ease of information retrieval) -- remains behind schedule and over budget. (61)

More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI. In the wake of the 1960s domestic intelligence scandals (for further discussion, see Appendix 3) various protective "walls" were put in place to separate criminal and intelligence investigations. As a result of these walls, information sharing between the two sets of investigators was "sharply limited, overseen by legal mediators from the FBI and Justice Department, and subject to scrutiny by criminal courts and the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." (62) The FBI recently eliminated an internal barrier to communication by allowing its criminal and intelligence investigators to physically work together on the same squads. As part of a new so-called Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy (MCIS), all counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset like an intelligence or espionage investigation. (63)


Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and State and Local Officials. The FBI also has taken steps to improve its intelligence and information sharing with other federal agencies as well as with state and local officials. It has established an Executive Assistant for Law Enforcement Services, who is responsible for coordinating law enforcement with state and local officials through a new Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. The FBI also has increased dissemination of weekly intelligence bulletins to states and localities as part of an effort to educate and raise the general awareness of terrorism issues. And the FBI is increasing its use of the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System and the National Criminal Information Center databases to disseminate threat warnings and the identities of individuals the FBI has listed on its Terrorist Watch List. (64) Other information sharing enhancements -- each addressed earlier -- include increasing the number of JTTFs and establishing the new position of Reports Officer.


Issues for Congress
Assessing the effectiveness of the FBI's intelligence reforms raises several potential issues for Congress. These include


The FBI's new focus on centralized headquarters decision-making;

Implementation challenges, including those in each area of the Intelligence Cycle;

Adequacy of resources to support reforms; and

Congressional oversight.

The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening FBI Intelligence (65)
Some observers believe a major issue is whether the FBI's new centralized management structure will provide the organization with the requisite formal and informal authority to ensure that its intelligence priorities are implemented effectively and efficiently by FBI field offices. Historically, and particularly with respect to the FBI's law enforcement activities, field offices have had a relatively high degree of autonomy to pursue locally determined priorities. A related issue is whether FBI employees will embrace, or resist, FBI Headquarters' enhanced management role and its new emphasis on intelligence.

Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI's Intelligence Program. Supporters argue that a centralized management structure is an essential ingredient of a counterterrorism program, because it will enable the FBI to strengthen its intelligence program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve headquarters-field coordination.

According to proponents, FBI Director Mueller has centralized authority by making four principal structural changes. He has established (1) a new position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) created a new Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence program; (3) established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force; and (4) established intelligence units in each field office to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence to FBI Headquarters.

Supporters contend that by centralizing decision-making, the FBI will be able to address several critical weaknesses which the JIC Inquiry attributed to decentralized management. First, a central management structure will enable the FBI to more easily correlate intelligence, and thereby more accurately assess the presence of terrorists in the U.S. Second, the FBI will be able to strengthen its analysis capabilities, particularly with regard to strategic analysis, which is intended to provide a broader understanding of terrorist threats and terrorist organization. Third, FBI Headquarters will be able to more effectively fuse and share intelligence internally, and with other IC agencies. Finally, centralized decision-making will provide FBI Headquarters a means to enforce intelligence priorities in the field. Specifically, it provide a means for FBI Headquarters to ensure that field agents spend less time gathering information to support criminal prosecutions -- a legacy of the FBI's law enforcement culture -- and more time collecting and analyzing intelligence that will help prevent terrorist acts.

Supporters contend that employees are embracing centralized management and the FBI's new intelligence priorities, but caution it is premature to pronounce centralized management a success. Rather, they suggest that, "with careful planning, the commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, progress should be well along in three or four years," (66) but concede that, "we're a long way from getting there." (67)

Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program. Skeptics agree that if the FBI is to prevent terrorism, it must strengthen its intelligence program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve headquarters-field coordination. But they question whether centralizing decision-making at FBI Headquarters will enable the FBI to accomplish these goals, and they cite two principal factors which they suggest will undermine the impact of centralized decision making. They question whether any structural management changes can (1) change a vested and ingrained law enforcement culture, and (2) overcome the FBI's lack of intelligence experience and integration with the Intelligence Community.

Skeptics Believe FBI's Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making. Skeptics assert that the FBI's entrenched law enforcement culture will undermine its effort to establish an effective and efficient intelligence program by centralizing decision-making at FBI Headquarters. They point to the historical importance that the FBI has placed on convicting criminals -- including terrorists. But those convictions have come after the fact, and skeptics argue that the FBI will continue to encounter opposition within its ranks to adopting more subtle and somewhat unfamiliar intelligence methods designed to prevent terrorism. Former Attorney General Janet Reno, for example, reportedly "leaned toward closing down surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) if they hindered criminal cases." (68) As one observer said, "law enforcement and intelligence don't fit ... law enforcement always wins." (69)

Some observers speculate that one reason law enforcement priorities prevail over those of intelligence is because convictions that can disrupt terrorist planning in advance of an attack often are based on lesser charges, such as immigration violations. FBI field personnel therefore may conclude that they should focus more effort on prosecuting criminal cases that result in longer jail terms. (70) Observers also suggest that because of the importance attached to successful criminal prosecutions, to the extent intelligence is used, it will be used to support criminal investigations, rather than to learn more about potential counterterrorism targets. (71)

Skeptics are convinced that the FBI's law enforcement culture is too entrenched, and resistant to change, to be easily influenced by FBI Headquarters directives emphasizing the importance of intelligence in preventing terrorism. They cite the Gilmore Commission, which concluded:


... the Bureau's long-standing traditional organizational culture persuades us that, even with the best of intentions, the FBI cannot soon be made over into an organization dedicated to detecting and preventing attacks rather than one dedicated to punishing them. (72)
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Can Overcome FBI's Lack of Intelligence Experience. Skeptics assert that the FBI's inexperience in the intelligence area has caused it to misunderstand the role intelligence can play in preventing terrorism, and they question whether centralized decision-making can correct this deficiency.


Specifically, they contend the FBI does not understand how to collect intelligence about potential counterterrorism targets, and properly analyze it. Instead, skeptics argue that notwithstanding the FBI's current efforts to develop detailed collection requirements, FBI agents will likely continue to "gather" evidence to support criminal cases. Moreover, skeptics argue, the FBI will undoubtedly "run faster, and jump higher," in gathering even more information at the urging of FBI Headquarters to "improve" intelligence. (73) Missing, however, according to critics, is the ability to implement successfully a system in which intelligence is collected according to a strategically determined set of collection requirements that specifically target operational clandestine activity. These collection requirements in turn must be informed by strategic analysis that integrates a broader understanding of terrorist threats and known and (conceptually) unknown gaps in the FBI's intelligence base. Critics fear that FBI analysts, instead, will continue to spend the bulk of their time providing tactical analytic support to FBI operational units pursuing cases, rather than systematically and strategically analyzing all-source intelligence and FBI intelligence gaps.



Implementation Challenges
The FBI is likely to confront significant challenges in implementing its reforms. Its most fundamental challenge, some assert, will be to transform the FBI's deeply entrenched law enforcement culture, and its emphasis on criminal convictions, into a culture that emphasizes the importance that intelligence plays in counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Although observers believe that FBI Director Mueller is identifying and communicating his counterterrorism and intelligence priorities, they caution that effective reform implementation will be the ultimate determinant of success. The FBI, they say, must implement programs to recruit intelligence professionals with operational and analytical expertise; develop formal career development paths, including defined paths to promotion; and continue to improve information management and technology. These changes, they say, should be implemented in a timely fashion, as over two and a half years have passed since the attacks of September 11, 2001. They also contend the FBI must improve intelligence sharing within the FBI and with other IC agencies, and with federal, state and local agencies.

Technology. Inadequate information technology, in part, contributed to the FBI being unable to correlate the knowledge possessed by its components prior to September 11, according to the congressional joint inquiry. (74) GAO and the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports conclude that the FBI still lacks an enterprise architecture, a critical and necessary component, they argue, to successful IT modernization. (75) In addition to lacking an enterprise architecture plan, according to the GAO, the FBI has also not had sustained information technology leadership and management. To demonstrate this point, a recent GAO report found the FBI has had five Chief Information Officers in the last 2003-2004, and the current CIO is temporarily detailed to the FBI from the Department of Justice. (76)

One important manifestation of the FBI's historical problems with information management is the deleterious effects it has had on analysis. For numerous information technology reasons, it has historically been difficult for FBI analysts at Headquarters, whose primary responsibility is to integrate intelligence from open sources, FBI field offices and legal attaches, and other entities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, to retrieve in a timely manner intelligence which should be readily available to them. Among other factors, this is the result of lack of appropriate information management and technology tools and, to a lesser extent, the lack of uniform implementation of policies relating to information technology usage.

Technology alone is not, however, a panacea. Existing information technology tools must be uniformly used to be effective. One FBI official responsible for intelligence analysis stated before the Joint Inquiry that "... Information was sometimes not made available (to FBI Headquarters) because field offices, concerned about security or media leaks, did not upload their investigative results or restricted access to specific cases. This, of course, risks leaving the analysts not knowing what they did not know." (77)

As mentioned above, supporters say that Director Mueller recognizes the important role technology must play in his reforms, and that despite setbacks to the Trilogy technology upgrade, the Director is making important progress. (78) However, the third and arguably most important stage of the Trilogy technology update, the deployment of the aforementioned Virtual Case File system, did not meet its December 2003 deadline. Moreover, according to the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, as of January 2003, the FBI confirmed the Inspector General's assessment that an additional $138 million (over the then estimated requirement of $458 million) would be necessary to complete the Trilogy project. (79) This would bring the total cost of the Trilogy update to $596 million.


FBI Field Leadership. An important issue is whether the FBI's field leadership is able and willing to support Director Mueller's reforms. Critics argue that the lack of national security experience among the existing cadre of Special Agents-in-Charge (SACs) of the FBI's field offices represents a significant impediment to change. According to one former senior FBI official, "... over 90 percent of the SACs have very little national security experience ...." (80) He suggested that lack of understanding and experience would result in continued field emphasis on law enforcement rather than an intelligence approach to terrorism cases.

Supporters counter that Director Mueller has made it inalterably clear that his priorities are intelligence and terrorism prevention. Some SACs who have been uncomfortable with the new priorities have chosen to retire. But critics also contend that it will require a number of years of voluntary attrition before field leadership more attuned to the importance of intelligence is in place.

Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics. Another issue is whether the FBI is effectively implementing its reforms and has established appropriate benchmarks to measure progress. Critics assert that although the FBI developed various concepts of operations to improve its intelligence program, in many cases it lacks specific implementation plans and benchmarks. The Department of Justice Inspector General has recommended that "an implementation plan that includes a budget, along with a time schedule detailing each step and identifying the responsible FBI official" (81) be drafted for each concept of operations.

Supporters say that the FBI recognizes the need for specific implementation plans and is developing them. They cite as an example the implementation plan for intelligence collection management, almost half of which they estimate is in place. (82)

Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform. Prior to September 11, FBI analytic resources -- particularly in strategic analysis -- were severely limited. The FBI had assigned only one strategic analyst exclusively to Al-Qaeda prior to September 11. (83) Of its approximately 1,200 intelligence analysts, 66% were unqualified, according to the FBI's own assessment. (84) The FBI also lacked linguists competent in the languages and dialects spoken by radicals linked to Al-Qaeda. (85)

Some supporters argue that appropriate resources now are being allocated to reflect the FBI's new intelligence priorities. "Dollars and people are now flowing to the FBI's most critical needs ... This trend is clearly reflected in the FBI's requested resources for FY2004," (86) according to former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who said intelligence analytic support, particularly for counterterrorism, has improved substantially. (87) As mentioned above, the Department of Justice is requesting at least $76 million in support of intelligence and intelligence-related programs for FY2005.

Supporters of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform describe a "dramatic increase" in intelligence analysts, both at headquarters and in the field -- from 159 in 2001, to 347 planned in 2003, and that an initial cadre of about a dozen analysts is supporting TTIC . (88) Moreover, as mentioned above, the FBI intends to hire 900 intelligence analysts in 2004. Supporters also point to the Daily Presidential Threat Briefings the FBI drafts, and 30 longer-term analyses and a comprehensive national terrorist threat assessment that have been completed. (89) But even supporters caution that institutional change now underway at the FBI "does not occur overnight and involves major cultural change." (90) They estimate that with careful planning, the commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, the FBI's "transformation" will be well along in three to five years, though it will take longer to fully accomplish its goals. (91)

GAO presents a more mixed assessment. According to GAO: "The FBI has made substantial progress, as evidenced by the development of both a new strategic plan and a strategic human capital plan, as well as its realignment of staff to better address the new priorities." Notwithstanding this progress, however, the GAO concluded "...an overall transformation plan is more valuable..." than "cross walks" between various strategic plans. (92) GAO also reports that 70% of the FBI agents and 29 of the 34 FBI analysts who completed its questionnaire said the number of intelligence analysts was insufficient given the current workload and priorities. (93) As a result, many field agents said they have no choice but to conduct their own intelligence analysis. Despite a lack of analysts apparent before September 11, if not after, the FBI did not establish priority hiring goals for intelligence analysts until 2003. (94) According to GAO, the FBI was well on its way to meeting its target of 126 new analytic hires in 2003 -- having hired 115 or 91%. (95)

The mix of analytic hires also is critical. But, according to GAO, the FBI lacks a strategic human capital plan, making it difficult to determine whether the FBI is striking an effective balance in its analytic core. (96) It also is difficult to assess whether the FBI is providing sufficient institutional support, the appropriate tools, and incentive system for these resources to be harnessed effectively in pursuit of its priority national security missions-counterterrorism and counterintelligence.

Skeptics of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform argue -- and supporters concede -- that this is not the first time the FBI has singled out intelligence for additional resources. The FBI did so in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, only to allow those resources to revert to the FBI's traditional priorities -- violent and organized crime, drug trafficking, and infrastructure protection. Additional intelligence analysts also were hired, but they were viewed as poorly trained, limited in experience, and lacking in needed information technology tools. They also were easily diverted to support the FBI's traditional anti-crime operations, (97) even though efforts were made during the intervening years to protect resources intended to support the agency's national security efforts, including intelligence. (98)

Changes in The Intelligence Cycle. As the FBI attempts to formalize its intelligence cycle, it will likely face challenges in each element of the intelligence cycle. Incomplete or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from the overall system's effectiveness.

Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce Desired Results? The FBI's new Office of Intelligence is establishing an internal intelligence requirements mechanism that will be part of an integrated IC national requirements system. Supporters of establishing this mechanism maintain that the FBI has outlined a rational process for managing collection requirements. According to FBI officials, the FBI is developing for each of its investigative/operational programs a detailed set of priority intelligence collection requirements. These requirements will be disseminated to FBI field offices through a classified FBI Intranet.

Skeptics question whether the FBI can overcome its historic lack of experience with a disciplined foreign intelligence requirements process. The FBI, they argue, traditionally has viewed domestic collection of foreign intelligence as a low priority "collateral" function, unless it helped solve a criminal case. And dissemination of any domestically collected foreign intelligence tended to be ad hoc.

Skeptics point to four hurdles that the FBI may have trouble surmounting. First, given that traditional intelligence tasking from the Intelligence Community to the FBI has generally been vague and voluminous; the FBI, they say, must be able to strike a balance between directing its collectors to answer questions that are either too nebulous or too specific. Questions that are overly vague can go unanswered for lack of direction. On the other hand, collection requirements that are too specific risk reducing intelligence to a formulaic science, when most analysts would agree the intelligence discipline is more art than science. In the final analysis, while appropriately drafted intelligence collection requirements are an essential element in the intelligence cycle, there is no substitute for experienced intelligence professionals who are capable of successfully collecting intelligence in response to the requirements. Second, they say, the FBI will need to dedicate appropriate resources to managing a requirements process that could easily overwhelm Headquarters and field intelligence staff with overlapping and imprecise requests for intelligence collection. Third, they say, the FBI will have to significantly upgrade its cadre of strategic analysts, who will play a critical role in identifying intelligence gaps. Fourth, they say, the FBI will have to support its requirements process with incentives and disincentives for agent intelligence collectors so that requirements are fulfilled. Enhanced performance of the intelligence requirements process depends largely on the accumulated successes the FBI has in each of these areas. Incomplete or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from the overall system's effectiveness.

Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate? Both supporters and skeptics of the adequacy of FBI's reforms agree that collecting intelligence by penetrating terrorist cells is critical to disrupting and preventing terrorist acts. Supporters argue that the FBI has a long and successful history of such penetrations when it comes to organized crime groups, and suggest that it is capable of replicating its success against terrorist cells. They assert that the FBI has had almost a century of experience recruiting and managing undercover agents and informers, and that it long ago mastered collection techniques such as electronic surveillance and witness interviews. They also argue that the FBI can uniquely use both money and the threat of prosecution to induce cooperation in recruiting human source assets. (99) They also cite as evidence of the FBI's commitment to improving its human intelligence collection the organization's recent deployment of six teams to "...examine ways to expand the FBI's human intelligence base and to provide additional oversight." (100)

Skeptics are not so certain. They say recruiting organized crime penetrations differs dramatically from terrorist recruiting. As one former senior level intelligence official put it, "It's one thing to recruit Tony Soprano, yet quite another to recruit an al Qaeda operative." (101) This official was alluding to the fact that terrorist groups may have different motivations and support networks than organized crime groups. (102) Moreover, terrorist groups may be less willing than organized crime enterprises to accept as members or agents individuals who they have not known for years and are not members of the same ethnocentric groups, or whose bona fides are not directly supported by existing members of the group.

As alluded to above, skeptics also argue that while the FBI is good at gathering information, it has little experience collecting intelligence based on a policy driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements. (103) As one observer commented:


While the FBI correctly highlights its unmatched ability to gather evidence and with it information, there is nonetheless a National Security imperative which distinguishes intelligence collection from a similar, but different, function found in law enforcement. "Gathering" which is not driven [and] informed by specific, focused, National Security needs is not the same as "intelligence collection"... which means intelligence activities which are dictated by, and coupled to, a policy driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements. (104)
Critics assert that the FBI's criminal case approach to terrorism produces a vacuum cleaner approach to intelligence collection. The FBI, they say, continues to collect and disseminate interesting items from a river of intelligence when, instead, it should focus collection on those areas where intelligence indicates the greatest potential threat. (105) But critics contend that there are few evident signs that the FBI has adopted such an approach. "They are jumping higher, faster," but not collecting the intelligence they need, according to one critic. (106) As a result, critics maintain, the process turns on serendipity rather than on a focused, directed, analytically driven requirements process. Another observer put it this way:


Using the metaphor "finding the needle in the haystack," since September 11 government agencies have been basically adding more hay to the pile, not finding needles. Finding the needles requires that we undertake more focused, rigorous and thoughtful domestic intelligence collection and analysis not collect mountains of information on innocent civilians.
(107)
Skeptics also question whether the FBI is prepared to recruit the type of individual needed to effectively collect and analyze intelligence. The FBI's historic emphasis on law enforcement has encouraged and rewarded agents who gather as many facts as legally possible in their attempt make a criminal case. Because a successful case rests on rules of criminal procedure, the FBI draws largely from the top talent in state and local law enforcement agencies, and the military; in short, some say, those individuals who focus on discrete facts rather than on the connections between them. (108)

Perhaps as fundamental to the collection of more targeted human intelligence is the implementation of a formal asset vetting program to assess the validity and credibility of human sources, according to informed observers, who note that only three to four percent of the FBI's human assets are vetted. (109) They point out the failure to effectively vet its human assets has contributed to serious problems in the FBI's criminal and national foreign intelligence programs. (110)

Supporters contend that the FBI is currently implementing its national intelligence collections requirements concept of operations, and so it may be premature to assess effectiveness. Critics contend, however, that it remains unclear what specific performance metrics the FBI is employing to measure the effectiveness of its collection. They say that when asked to assess its performance in the war on terrorism, the FBI continues to cite arrests and convictions of suspected terrorists. (111) They further contend that the FBI rarely cites the number of human sources recruited who have provided information essential to counterterrorism or counterintelligence as a performance metric. (112)

Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient? Some observers contend that the FBI has made notable progress in professionalizing its analytical program since September 11, and, indeed, over the past two decades. During this period, they assert that the FBI's analytic cadre, particularly at Headquarters, has evolved from a disjointed group of less than qualified individuals into a group of professionals which understands the role analysis plays in advancing national security investigations and operations. The majority of intelligence analysts at Headquarters possesses advanced degrees and has expert knowledge in various functional and geographic areas. Over the last two decades, they also cite the FBI's progress in internally promoting analysts to analytic management positions.

Supporters of Director Mueller's reforms also point to the new Office of Intelligence, and maintain that it is implementing a number of initiatives focused on improving the quality of analysis. They include a new promotion plan that will provide analysts GS-15 promotion opportunities (they now are capped at GS-14); new career development plans; an increased flexibility to continue working in their areas of expertise or to rotate to other functional, geographic or management positions; improved mid-career training; and improved and more standardized recruitment practices. They assert that these efforts will improve retention rates, a chronic problem. (113)

Critics, however, remain largely unpersuaded and argue that analysis remains a serious FBI vulnerability in the war on terrorism. The Congressional Joint Inquiry on September 11 urged the FBI, among other steps, to


... significantly improve strategic analytical capabilities by assuring qualification, training, and independence of analysts coupled with sufficient access to necessary information and resources. (114)
Although they applaud the FBI's new focus on analysis, critics question its effectiveness and point to a number of trends. For example, they cite the continuing paucity of analysts in the FBI's senior national security ranks, even more than two years after the September 11 attacks. This, they say, reflects the FBI's continuing failure to treat analysis as a priority and more fundamentally to understand how to leverage analysis in the war on terror. (115) They also point to the FBI's own internal study that found 66 percent of its analytic corps unqualified and question whether the FBI's changes are sufficiently broad to address this legacy problem. (116)

Critics support the new GS-15 promotion plan, but contend that implementation is lacking and that it falls short of senior executive service promotion which they advocate. (117) According to an FBI official, there are currently no FBI intelligence analysts at the non-managerial GS-15 grade level. They also are concerned that the FBI has eliminated the requirement that all new intelligence analysts possess a minimum of a bachelor's degree, and substituted instead a less rigorous requirement, in their view, of one year of analytic experience, or military or law enforcement employment. They insist that a bachelor's degree provides more formal and necessary academic training in research methodologies, written and oral communication and critical thinking. Moreover, according to some critics, the collapsing of all functional and cross-disciplinary analysts into one intelligence analyst position encourages a "one size fits all" approach to analysis that may undermine a need for functional, geographic and target-specific expertise. (118)


Finally, critics are concerned that although the FBI says it is trying to strengthen strategic analysis, it is failing to commit adequate resources. The new Office of Intelligence has a Strategic Intelligence Unit, but more in name only, according to some observers. Few analysts have been assigned to the unit, and those who have are being forced to balance management and executive briefing responsibilities with actually conducting strategic analysis. Further complicating the situation is the fact that tactical and strategic analysts still physically located in each of the FBI's operational divisions are now "matrixed" to the Office of Intelligence. That is, they report both to their own divisions and to the Office of Intelligence. Therefore, they potentially confront competing priorities -- analysis largely composed of briefing materials to support FBI executives, and tactical analyses to support ongoing cases. (119)

Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate? The FBI continues to be criticized for not sharing information -- a failure that variously has been blamed on a variety of shortcomings, including culture, an absence of information sharing strategy, technological problems, and legal and policy constraints. Some of the legal and policy constraints were eliminated by the USA PATRIOT Act. (120) And more recently, by a decision to allow criminal and intelligence investigators to work side by side. (121)

FBI supporters give the FBI high marks since the September 11th attacks for sharing threat information, building information bridges to the intelligence agencies and state and local law enforcement, collaborating with foreign law enforcement components, and opening itself up to external reviewers. (122) But even supporters believe that maintaining this commendable record will be a continuing management challenge, one which will require constant reinforcement. (123) They emphasize that the traditional values of FBI agents as independent and determined must give way to include values of information sharing and cooperation. (124)

Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements. Supporters argue that perhaps the most significant change -- a sea change, according to some -- is a recent decision to tear down the organizational wall that has separated criminal and intelligence investigations since the spying scandals of the 1960s. (125) As a result, criminal and intelligence investigators will now physically work as part of the same squads on terrorism investigations. All counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset like intelligence or espionage investigations, allowing investigators to more easily use secret warrants and other methods that are overseen by the surveillance court and are unavailable in traditional criminal probes. The FBI was able to do so as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act, which allows counterterrorism intelligence and criminal information to be more easily shared within the FBI. (126)

Supporters blame Congress for creating the wall in the first place. They assert that in the wake of the 1960s spy scandals, Congress weakened the FBI's domestic intelligence capabilities by imposing stricter standards. The result, they argue, was a dangerous lack of intelligence sharing. (127) According to the FBI, the recent change has resulted in the disruption of at least four terrorist attacks overseas and the uncovering of a terrorist sleeper cell in the United States. (128)

Although these changes undoubtedly will improve intelligence sharing between FBI's criminal and intelligence components, the question remains whether the information will be shared with other agencies and state and local law officials. Some critics do not dispute that Director Mueller's decision will enhance intelligence sharing within the FBI. They agree it will. Rather, they are concerned that more innocent people will become the targets of clandestine surveillance. (129)

Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and With Other Agencies, Is Improving For Additional Reasons. Advocates assert intelligence sharing, both internally and with other agencies is improving for other reasons -- the FBI is better training its personnel and providing them with improved sharing processes. In addition, they point to the FBI's new concept of operations for intelligence dissemination that collapses a number of current and different production processes into a single one that will be imbedded throughout the FBI. (130) Supporters also point favorably to Director Mueller's decision to establish the position of "Reports Officers," whose responsibility will be to extract pertinent intelligence from FBI collection and analysis and disseminate it to the widest extent possible. Supporters who believe that sharing with state and local authorities has improved point out that since September 11, the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are the principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law enforcement officials, has increased from 66 in 2001 to 84 in 2003. The number of state and local participants has more than quadrupled from 534 to over 2,300, according to the FBI.

Supporters also finally embrace Director Mueller for correctly emphasizing technology that emphasizes horizontal, rather than vertical, flow of information to produce better results. Director Mueller asserts that, "Our move to change the technology in the next two or three years will have a dramatic impact on the way we do business -- eliminating a lot of the bureaucratic hang-ups, giving the agents the tools they need to be interactive, pass among themselves the best ways of doing things and we will free up the FBI in a substantial number of ways." (131)

Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling Signs on Sharing. The FBI concedes that although it "... has always been a great collector of information," its "sharing of information was primarily case oriented rather than part of an enterprise wide activity." (132) Critics point to a number of troubling signs that they claim indicate continuing problems. According to the Gilmore Commission, the Federal government is far from perfecting a system of sharing national security intelligence and other information. Moreover, the flow of information remains largely one way -- from the local and state levels to the FBI. The prevailing view, according to the Commission, continues to be that the Federal Government likes to receive information but is reluctant to share it completely. One local law enforcement official said the FBI's intelligence sharing practices remain essentially unchanged since September 11. This official suggested that the FBI shares a great volume of threat information, but little of real value that would help state and local officials prevent terrorist attacks. (133) Another state office said, "We don't get anything (of value) from the FBI." (134)

Some skeptics argue that technology problems notwithstanding, willingness to share intelligence, both within the FBI and with other Intelligence Community agencies, remains a continuing problem. According to a recent report issued by the Markle Foundation, there has been only marginal improvement in the past year in the sharing of terrorist-related information between relevant agencies, including the FBI. The report states that sharing remains haphazard and still overly dependent on the ad hoc network of personal relations among known colleagues. It is not the result of a carefully considered network architecture that optimizes the abilities of all of the players, according to the report. (135)

The Markle report argues that the existing system of counterterrorism information sharing remains too centralized, federal government-centric, and bound by increasingly tenuous distinctions in U.S. regulations and law regarding domestic and foreign intelligence. (136) In order to combat a decentralized terrorist threat more effectively, Markle recommends a model of information sharing which runs counter to the existing "hub and spoke" information sharing model the FBI is building. Advocates envision a decentralized "peer-to-peer" network in which the various federal, state, local and private sector entities systematically collecting information relevant to counterterrorism, and according to established guidelines protecting civil liberties and privacy, share that information directly with one another. (137)

The Department of Justice's Office of Inspector General, recently reported that despite progress in terrorism information sharing, the FBI faces considerable impediments in establishing an effective information and intelligence sharing program, including changes to information technology constraints, ongoing analytical weaknesses, agency origination control procedures, (138) and lack of "... established policies and procedures that delineate the appropriate processes to be used to share information and intelligence, either internally or externally." (139)

Some State and Local Officials Also Remain Dissatisfied With Level of Sharing. Some state and local law enforcement officials continue to criticize what they characterize as FBI's continuing unwillingness to share intelligence, while expecting state and local law officials to share their information with them. Nevertheless, some state and local law enforcement officials concede that there has been some improvement in the sharing relationship since September 11. And there also is a growing recognition among some state and local law enforcement officials that "... there may be a mis-perception that the FBI has more detailed accurate or confirmed information than it actually has." (140)

While acknowledging some improvement, these officials insist the exchange of information remains largely one-way. (141) And although that hasn't prevented them from participating in their local JTTFs, one official said he believed that the FBI did not consider him an intelligence consumer. (142) According to another, the FBI has shared information through the JTTF but made clear it was doing so because "...he has a right to know, but not a need to know," and that the FBI told him not to share the information with anyone else in law enforcement or state government, including the governor, who, he said, possesses a Top Secret clearance. (143)

Some state and local law enforcement officials complain that although JTTFs are intended to be joint enterprises, combining federal, state and local law enforcement resources, they characterize the relationship as more of one of "co-habitation" where the FBI clearly is in charge and non-federal representatives are viewed as second tier participants, despite often having greater knowledge of a particular case. (144)

With respect to the case-orientation and law enforcement bias so often mentioned as challenges for the FBI as it shifts to having a more preventative bias, state and local law enforcement officials stated that notwithstanding recognition by FBI leadership that the "intelligence is in the case," the FBI agent on the street still starts with a case and has a bias in the direction of law enforcement. Moreover, one senior state law enforcement official stated that FBI leadership is "... still being led by individuals who have a criminal law mindset." (145)

Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing Procedures. Some state and local law enforcement officials are sufficiently displeased with the current sharing relationship that they have proposed that the Department of Homeland Security establish regional intelligence centers through which classified raw and finished foreign intelligence on terrorism could be disseminated. (146) The centers would be staffed by a cadre of Top Secret-cleared personnel drawn principally from State Police and State DHS Offices and would serve as "... regional repository and clearinghouse for terrorist related information gathered at the federal level, consisting of trends, indicators, and warnings." (147) Through a pending arrangement with the DHS, Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), the goal would be to "... create a national pipeline for pattern and trend analysis of terrorism intelligence," (148) at the state level. DHS has not acted on the proposal. (149)


Congressional Oversight Issues
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives each established intelligence oversight committees in the 1970s. The catalyst for the creation of these committees was public revelations resulting from press coverage and congressional investigations that the Intelligence Community had conducted covert assassination attempts against foreign leaders, and collected information concerning the political activities of some U.S. citizens during the late 1960s and early 1970s. (150) Intelligence Committee Members are selected by the majority and minority leadership of each chamber of Congress, and serve terms of eight years on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and six years on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Terms limited were established so that a greater number of Members could become knowledgeable on intelligence matters over time. Membership rotation was also viewed as the best way to maintain a flow of new ideas. Committee membership was also structured so that Members serving on other committees with interests in intelligence issues -- the Appropriations, Armed Services, Judiciary, and Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate) and Committee on International Relations (House) -- would be represented. Finally, in the Senate, the majority was given a one-vote, rather than a proportional margin, to ensure bipartisanship. The House apportions its membership using the traditional proportional method.

One oversight issue is whether the current congressional structure is sufficiently focused to monitor effectively the FBI's intelligence reforms. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI has been criticized for failing to more effectively collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence. The congressional committees principally responsible for conducting FBI oversight -- the Intelligence, Judiciary and Appropriations Committees -- on the other hand, have been subject to little or no criticism. (151) Some critics argue that those responsible for conducting oversight should be held accountable as well. They have questioned the diligence of the committees and, in the case of the Intelligence Committees, the committees' structure. (152)

Ellen Laipson, former director of the National Intelligence Council (1997-2002) suggests while the balance between intelligence collection and analysis is unlikely to be corrected soon:


What are needed are more radical steps to dismantle the bloated bureaucratic behavior of the large agencies and retool most employees to contribute more directly to the intelligence mission. The fault lies both with Congress and with the intelligence community's bureaucrats. This is not an argument for less collection, but perhaps less collection management, less complicated requirements process, and more priority given to a workforce whose productivity is measured in terms of output, of more useful processing of data, and creation of more analytic product. It seems that even the best intentioned intelligence community leaders cannot effect this change alone; a serious push by the oversight process and the senior customers must take place.
(153)
At the same time, GAO recommends that continuous internal and independent external, monitoring and oversight are essential to help ensure that the implementation of FBI reforms stays on track and achieves its purpose. "It is important for Congress to actively oversee the proposed transformation." (154)

Oversight Effectiveness. According to Representative David Obey, congressional oversight, at times, has been "miserable."


I've been here 33 years and I have seen times when Congress exercised adequate oversight, with respect to [the FBI], and I've seen times when I thought Congress' actions in that regard were miserable ... I can recall times when members of the committee seemed to be more interested in getting the autographs of the FBI director than they were in doing their job asking tough questions. And I don't think the agency was served by that any more than the country was. And I hope that over the next 20 years we'll see a much more consistent and aggressive oversight of the agency, because your agency does have immense power. (155)
Some observers agree, and have singled out the oversight exercised by the two congressional intelligence committees for particular criticism. According to Loch Johnson, a former congressional staff member and intelligence specialist at the University of Georgia, "They [the intelligence committees] didn't press hard enough [with regard to 9/11]. There's all the authority they need. They didn't press hard enough [for change]." Another observer commented, "They should be held as accountable as the intelligence agencies." (156)

Some Members of Congress, however, contend that the congressional committees have their limits. "Our job is to see that the agencies are focused on the right problems as we think them to be and they have the capabilities to meet those mission requirements," former Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham is reported to have said. (157) One of Graham's predecessors seems to agree. "We can legislate, but there is little we can do to compel compliance," according to a press account of former Chairman Senator Richard Shelby, who said the committees face an unacceptable choice from a security standpoint when it comes to fencing spending in an effort to force change. (158)

"As you examine the record, you will discover numerous examples of complete disregard for congressional direction, not to mention the law." Shelby is reported to have said. But as one Senate aide pointed out, "When you're in the middle of a war on terror, holding money back from the Intelligence Community -- that's the problem." (159)

Eliminating Committee Term Limits. Some have suggested that the current eight-year cap on intelligence committee service be eliminated. Critics of the term limits argue that members often are just beginning to grasp the complexities of the Intelligence Community by the time their term ends. "I was at a peak of my knowledge and ability to carry out effective oversight," Graham, who already had received a two-year extension of his eight-year term when he had to leave the committee at the end of the 107th Congress in 2002 is quoted as saying. (160)

Critics also argue that term limits, although seen as a well-intentioned efforts to prevent to members from becoming co-opted by the Intelligence Community, have outlived whatever usefulness they may have had. The community, they assert, has become technically so complex that effective oversight requires members who are knowledgeable and well-versed in its intricacies. Term limits work against that goal by robbing the committee of institutional memory, knowledge and expertise. That outcome can only be avoided if members are permitted to serve on an open-ended basis; of all congressional committees, only the intelligence committees are term-limited.

Supporters of term limits argue that the eight-year cap still effectively prevents Members of Congress from becoming too close to the Intelligence Community -- including the FBI; and this remains an important objective given the sensitive role the Intelligence Community plays in a democracy. Term limits, supporters argue, also provide exposure to the arcane world of intelligence to a greater number of members. Finally, they argue, by ensuring a stream of new members with relatively little experience in intelligence, term limits bring more new ideas to the table.

Consolidating Oversight Under the Intelligence Committees. Some observers argue that Congress could more effectively oversee the FBI's intelligence operation if the joint jurisdiction now exercised by the intelligence and judiciary committees was eliminated, and the sole responsibility given to the intelligence committees. They concede, however, that such an outcome could result only if a stand-alone collection and analysis entity, was separate and became independent from the FBI, effectively removing the rationale for judiciary committee oversight. In recommending such an outcome, they at least imply that the intelligence committees would bring a more focused oversight expertise to judging the effectiveness of domestic intelligence analysis, collection and dissemination. They further suggest that putting the intelligence committees in charge would provide an even better mechanism for protecting civil liberties than do "current structure and processes." (161)

However, opponents of consolidation argue that the intelligence committees are ill-quipped to focus on questions of civil liberties in connection with a domestic intelligence agency. They also could argue that the sensitivity of such issues requires the transparency that comes with regular public hearings. The intelligence committees, by contrast, conduct the majority of their work behind closed doors.


Options
The debate over Congressional options on FBI reform centers on two fundamentally opposing views on how best to prevent terrorist acts and other clandestine foreign intelligence activities directed against the United State before they occur. Adherents to one school of thought believe there are important synergies to be gained from keeping intelligence and law enforcement functions combined as they are currently under the FBI. They argue that the two disciplines share the goal of terrorism prevention; that prevention within the U.S. will invariably require law enforcement to arrest and prosecute alleged terrorists; and, that the decentralized nature of terrorist cells is analogous to that of organized crime. (162)

A second school of thought counters that the chasm between the exigencies of the two disciplines, both cultural and practical, is simply too broad to effectively bridge, and, therefore, that the two should be bureaucratically separated.

These two opposing views raise several options for Congress, including the following:


Option 1: Support Director Mueller's reform package.

Option 2: Create a semi-autonomous National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI.

Option 3: Establish a separate domestic intelligence agency within the Department of Homeland Security.

Option 4: Establish a separate domestic intelligence agency under the authority of the DCI, but subject to oversight of the Attorney General.

Option 5: Create an entirely new stand-alone domestic intelligence service.

Option 1: Status Quo
Under this option Congress would continue to support Director Mueller's reforms with necessary funding. Proponents of this could argue that Director Mueller's reforms constitute the most effective way to address weaknesses and improve the FBI's intelligence program, and ultimately, to prevent terrorism in the U.S. They could also argue that the reforms accomplish three important and inter-related goals. First, the FBI would continue to benefit from the synergies that integrated intelligence-law enforcement provides in the war on terror. Second, by keeping the intelligence program within the FBI and under the watchful eye of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General would be better able to reassure the American people that the FBI's use of intelligence will not be allowed to infringe on their civil liberties. Third, the reforms would improve the FBI's intelligence capabilities, while minimizing the bureaucratic disruption, confusion and resource constraints that would result if the FBI's intelligence program were re-established in a new stand-alone entity separate from the FBI. More specifically, they could maintain that Director Mueller's changes are improving day-to-day collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.

Opponents to this option could counter that the reforms are necessary but insufficient. While applauding Director Mueller's new focus on the intelligence, some could contend that his reforms are too limited and that intelligence still and always will be, undermined by its arguably second-class status in an FBI that has long been proud of its law enforcement culture. They could cite past instances when additional resources were provided to the FBI's intelligence program, only later to be siphoned off to support criminal priorities. Or, they could also go further, arguing that the disciplines of intelligence and law enforcement are so different that they must be separated, and the FBI's intelligence program housed in and directed by a new agency.


Option 2: Creation of a National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI
Under this option, Congress could establish a semi-autonomous national security intelligence service (NSIS) within the FBI, and provide it with sufficient staff and protected resources. The service would have its own budget to ensure sustainable resources. The service's principal responsibility would be to develop and nurture an integrated intelligence program, and to establish well-defined career paths for special agents and analysts that would hold out realistic promise of advancement to the highest levels of the FBI and the Intelligence Community. (163) Current FBI employees who decide to join the service could be protected from mandatory transfers to the FBI's criminal programs. The service director, experienced in all-source domestic and foreign intelligence, would be presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed. Regional service squads could be established to focus intelligence resources in the field.

There are multiple ways such an organization could be structured. One such construct, however, would pull all (investigative, operational and analytical -- headquarters and field) of the FBI's international terrorism, foreign counterintelligence, JTTF, and security countermeasures resources into the NSIS. While the NSIS Director would report to the FBI Director and the Attorney General, and operate under the Attorney General Guidelines, the NSIS Director would also be tasked to ensure seamless coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence on issues for which the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence are increasingly blurred, such as terrorism. Analysts within the NSIS would have access to all the FBI's intelligence relevant to national security, including criminal intelligence. Moreover, formal analytical working groups could be established to ensure analytical integration across counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal programs. Finally, field intelligence groups could be fewer in number to ensure focus and deployment of experienced human resources, and could report to both the NSIS Deputy Director, and local Special Agent in Charge.

Proponents could argue this option would enhance the FBI's focus on intelligence without building any "walls" between the various types of intelligence the FBI collects, analyzes, and exploits. They could contend that the FBI could build a more effectively leveraged intelligence program on the foundation that the Director is currently putting in place. And that it could do so without severing the connection with law enforcement and the FBI's 56 field offices and 46 legal attaches (164) serving in U.S. embassies. Such an approach would also ease efforts to establish intelligence career paths and strengthen the role of intelligence. Some proponents of a "service within a service" also argue that it may serve as an interim or bridge solution to the eventual creation of an autonomous domestic intelligence agency (see option 5 below). (165)

Opponents could argue that this option is still too limited, and that intelligence and law enforcement should be separated. They could also contend such an effort could be bureaucratically confusing as the new service seeks to build its independence while the FBI continues to exert control. Opponents could also argue that this option would disrupt Director Mueller's current reforms at the very time they are taking hold.


Option 3: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to Department of Homeland Security
A third option could be to establish a separate domestic intelligence service and house it in the Department of Homeland Security. (166) The service would be a member of the Intelligence Community and its authorities would be limited to collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence inside the United States, including the plans, intentions and capabilities of international terrorist groups operating in the U.S. As envisioned, the agency, like Great Britain's MI5, (167) would not have arrest authority.

Proponents of this option could argue that folding the new entity into DHS, as opposed to creating a new stand-alone agency, would avoid creating more bureaucracy while also establishing an organization unencumbered by the FBI's law enforcement culture. They could argue that such an entity would be able to more sharply focus on intelligence while also better safeguarding the rights of citizens, provided new checks on its ability to collect intelligence against innocent people were put in place.

Opponents could counter that placing the new organization in DHS would undermine its ability to play the role of an honest broker that could produce intelligence products not only for DHS but for other federal agencies, as well as for state and local authorities. They could also argue that placing the new entity within DHS would force it to compete with other DHS offices for scarce resources. (168) They also could oppose the idea for the same reason they might oppose a new entity separate from the FBI -- that the essential synergistic relationship between intelligence and law enforcement would be severed. Finally, opponents could argue that establishing a separate agency is tantamount to creating an MI5-like agency, which may be unworkable in the U.S. context for political, cultural and legal reasons despite any efforts to mold it to conform to American experience. (169)


Option 4: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to the DCI
A fourth option could be to establish a domestic intelligence service under the direction of the Director Central Intelligence, either as a separate entity reporting directly to the DCI in that capacity, (170) or incorporated into the CIA. The Attorney General would retain the authority to establish and enforce rules to assure that the rights of Americans would be preserved.

Supporters of this option could contend that providing the DCI additional operational capability would improve the integration of analysis and collection and would ensure that security rather than criminal concerns would be emphasized. (171) Opponents could argue that legal, policy perception, and cultural concerns militate against expanding DCI control over domestic intelligence collection and analysis. They could assert that there is a risk that the IC could misuse information it collected on American citizens. (172) They could also argue that as a practical matter if a decision was made to incorporate this entity into the CIA, it, like the FBI, simply may not up to the task of reorienting its efforts quickly enough to take on this added responsibility. (173)


Option 5: Creation of a New Domestic Security Intelligence Service
A fifth option could be to create an entirely new agency within the IC -- but, one which is independent of the FBI, CIA and DHS. The new agency would fuse all intelligence -- from all sources, domestic and foreign -- on potential terrorist attacks within the United States and disseminate it to appropriately cleared federal, state, local and private sector customers. (174) This stand-alone entity also would include a separate but collocated collection units, which would be authorized to collect domestic intelligence on international terrorism threats within the United States. The new organization would be prohibited from collecting intelligence un-related to international terrorism. Counterterrorism intelligence collection outside the United States would continue to fall under the purview of the CIA, NSA, and other foreign IC components. (175) It also would lack arrest authorities, but would provide "actionable" intelligence to those entities, such as the FBI, with authority to take action. The new entity would have authority to task the IC for collection. It would be overseen by a policy and steering committee comprised of the new agency's director, the DCI, the Attorney General and the DHS Secretary. The steering committee would ensure that the new entity adheres to all relevant constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements.

Proponents of this option could argue that because of its law enforcement culture, the FBI is incapable of transforming itself into an agency capable of preventing terrorist attacks. (176) And even if it could, proponents could argue that failing to separate intelligence collection from law enforcement could give rise to the fear that the U.S. was establishing a secret police. (177) Proponents also could assert that the federal government artificially distinguishes between foreign and domestic terrorist threats, when those distinctions increasingly are blurred. And they could contend, given the historical record, that the FBI and CIA are incapable of changing direction quickly enough to work together effectively to bridge that divide. (178)

Opponents could counter that establishing another agency will simply create more bureaucracy. They could argue that it would take years for a new organization to be fully staffed, and become effective in the fight against terrorism, and that pushing for better CIA-FBI cooperation is a more practical approach. (179) They also could argue that establishing a separate domestic intelligence service (like MI-5) is impractical in the U.S. context (180) and would move the country in the wrong direction by creating a more stove-piped bureaucracy that would undermine the country's ability to wage an integrated war on terrorism. (181) And they could argue that the FBI has never been solely a law enforcement agency but rather an investigative and domestic security agency that is well prepared to collect and analyze intelligence, and they could cite the FBI's successes against organized crime as proof. (182)

Opponents could also counter that the FBI in the past has effectively collected intelligence, but, that its ability to do so over time has been eroded. Former U.S. Attorney General Barr and others argue that historically the FBI has been effective in the collection of domestic intelligence, but that it was undermined by policymakers, such as Congress and the courts, through the placement of legal constraints on the FBI over the past 30 years. (183) Finally, opponents could argue that Britain's MI-5 has a mixed record of effectiveness. (184)


Conclusion
Congressional policymakers face FBI intelligence reform options in a dynamic context. The FBI has made or is in the process of making substantial organizational, business process, and resource allocation changes to enhance its ability to deter, detect, neutralize and prevent acts of terrorism or espionage directed against the United States. Some experts believe that the remedial measures currently being taken by the FBI, to include a centralization of national security-related cases, enhanced intelligence training for agents and analysts, increased recruitment of intelligence analysts, and the development of a formal and integrated intelligence cycle are all appropriate and achievable. Other experts are more critical of the current intelligence reforms believing that the culture of the FBI, including its law enforcement-oriented approach to intelligence, may prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to necessary intelligence reforms. Some argue that the pace and scope of reform may be too slow and not radical enough.

One of the central points of distinction between supporters and critics of the current FBI intelligence reforms is the extent to which they believe that the two disciplines of law enforcement and intelligence are synergistic, that is that the commonalities among them would benefit from continued integration. In general, those believing that law enforcement and intelligence should be integrated argue for the status quo. However, other experts believe that given the conceptual and operational differences between law enforcement and intelligence, the national interest would be best served by having them located in separate organizations with systematic and formal mechanisms in place to share information and protect civil liberties. Should the Congress choose to influence the direction and/or outcome of the FBI's intelligence reform, numerous options, from support of the status quo to the establishment of an autonomous domestic security intelligence service, are available for consideration.


Appendix 1: Definitions of Intelligence
Three formal categories of intelligence are defined under statute or regulation:


Foreign Intelligence. Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons. (185)

Counterintelligence. Information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (186)

Criminal Intelligence. Data which has been evaluated to determine that it is relevant to the identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by an individual who or organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity. [Certain criminal activities including but not limited to loan sharking, drug trafficking, trafficking in stolen property, gambling, extortion, smuggling, bribery, and corruption of public officials often involve some degree of regular coordination and permanent organization involving a large number of participants over a broad geographical area]. (187)

Appendix 2: The FBI's Traditional Role in Intelligence
According to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, signed December 4, 1981, and the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S. Code ?401), the FBI is a statutory member of the United States Intelligence Community. Specifically, and in accordance with section 1.14 of Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, the intelligence roles of the FBI are outlined as follows:

Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:


(a) Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coordinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community. When a counterintelligence activity of the military involves military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with the Department of Defense;

(b) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;

(c) Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the Intelligence Community, or, when requested by the Director of the National Security Agency, to support the communications security activities of the United States Government;

(d) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; and

(e) Carry out or contract for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.

Appendix 3: The FBI's Intelligence Programs -- A Brief History
The FBI's is responsible for deterring, detecting and preventing domestic activities that may threaten the national security, and, at the same time, respecting constitutional safeguards. (188) The FBI, a statutory member of the IC, is able to collect foreign intelligence within the U.S. when authorized by IC officials.

The FBI and its predecessor, the Bureau of Intelligence, have collected intelligence -- foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and criminal intelligence -- in the U.S. since 1908, (189) and, at times, effectively. (190) During the Cold War, the FBI successfully penetrated the Soviet leadership through a recruited U.S. Communist Party asset. The FBI also battled the Kremlin on the counterintelligence front. (191) In 1985 -- dubbed the Year of the Spy, the FBI arrested 11 U.S. citizens for espionage, -- including former U.S. warrant officer John Walker, who provided the Soviets highly classified cryptography codes during a spying career that began in the 1960s. The FBI also arrested Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA employee, a spy for the People's Republic of China; Jonathan Pollard, a Naval Investigative Service intelligence analyst who stole secrets for Israel; and Ronald Pelton, a former National Security Agency communications specialist who provided the Soviet Union classified material. (192) More recently convicted spies include FBI Special Agent Robert P. Hanssen, who spied on behalf of Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, and pleaded guilty to 15 espionage-related charges in 2001; and former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Ana Belen Montes, arrested in 2001 and subsequently convicted for spying for Cuba.


FBI Excesses
The FBI has been applauded for its historical successes, but also criticized for overstepping constitutional bounds by targeting U.S. citizens who were found to be exercising their constitutional rights. (193) For example, during the 1919-1920 "Palmer Raids," the FBI's so-called Radical Division (later renamed the General Intelligence Division) arrested individuals allegedly working to overthrow the U.S. government, but who were later judged to be innocent. (194)

Between 1956 and 1970, the FBI investigated individuals it believed were engaging in "subversive" activities as part of the FBI's so-called COINTELPRO Program. (195) In the mid-1960s, the FBI surveilled such prominent Americans as Martin Luther King, Jr., collecting "racial intelligence." (196) And in the 1980s, the FBI was found to have violated the constitutional rights of members of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) who the FBI believed violated the Foreign Agent Registration Act. (197) Although congressional investigators concluded that the FBI's investigation did not reflect "significant FBI political or ideological bias ...," its activities "resulted in the investigation of domestic political activities protected by the First Amendment that should not have come under governmental scrutiny." (198)


Oversight and Regulation: The Pendulum Swings
In response to these FBI abuses, the Department of Justice imposed domestic intelligence collection standards on the IC, including the FBI. For example, in 1976, Attorney General Edward H. Levi issued specific guidelines governing FBI domestic security investigations. Congress also established House and Senate intelligence oversight committees to monitor the IC. And President Carter signed into law the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which established legal procedures and standards governing the use of electronic surveillance within the U.S.

Critics argue that until Congress approved the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act granting the FBI additional authority to investigate suspected terrorists, increased oversight and over-regulation had seriously weakened the FBI's intelligence capabilities. Some thought that not only had regulations curtailed the FBI's surveillance authorities, but that they had undermined the risk-taking culture thought to be essential to successful intelligence work. (199) The Levi Guidelines (200) were singled out as being particularly onerous. (201)


Some observers blamed the restrictions for discouraging domestic intelligence collection unless the FBI could clearly show that its collection was tied to a specific alleged crime. They also said the restrictions led the FBI to transfer responsibility for parts of its counterterrorism program from the FBI's former Intelligence Division to its Criminal Division. The result, they contend, was an anemic intelligence program that contributed to the failure to prevent the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. (202)


Appendix 4: The Case File as an Organizing Concept, and Implications for Prevention
The FBI uses a case approach to categorize each of its investigations. Each case receives an alphanumeric indicator signifying the target country, or issue, and the level of priority. Some observers have criticized this approach as reactive; a case is opened only after a crime has been committed. Traditionally, ex post investigation is the FBI's greatest investigative strength. It can deploy thousands of agents, as it did after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to track domestic and international leads, conduct witness interviews and develop a "story board" about how the act and the events surrounding it took place. Although well suited for assembling a criminal case, this operational approach is ill-suited for terrorism prevention.

While the FBI reacts to crimes after the fact, it adopts a proactive approach in some counterintelligence cases, For example, FBI counterintelligence agents, working with their IC counterparts, may open a "case" to recruit a human asset, usually a foreign national, who may have access to information which would fulfill an existing intelligence gap.

The FBI says it is attempting to adopt a proactive approach to counterterrorism. FBI Director Mueller says that the new USA PATRIOT Act has helped. According to FBI Director Mueller, the FBI can now, "... move from thinking about 'intelligence as a case' to finding 'intelligence in the case'...." (203) While the reactive opening a criminal case, such as those against cigarette smugglers, may yield intelligence relevant to counterterrorism, it is generally a serendipitous occurrence. Extracting preventative and predictive intelligence from a case arguably presupposes first, that the case was opened pro-actively, and not necessarily in response to some adverse event. Second, in order to extract intelligence from any case, well-trained and experienced reports officers and intelligence analysts must be integrated into the flow of intelligence resulting from investigations, and be able to sift the "signal" from the "noise" in the sea of raw intelligence to which they have access. According to one local law enforcement official, the FBI is unable to strip the intelligence from their own cases, much less share that intelligence with state and local law enforcement officials. (204) Finally, for the FBI to succeed in using this new approach, it will likely have to implement successfully all the complex and inter-related elements of the intelligence cycle.


Appendix 5: Past Efforts to Reform FBI Intelligence
The FBI's current intelligence reform is not its first. Twice before -- in 1998, and then again in 1999 -- the FBI embarked on almost identical efforts to establish intelligence as a priority, and to strengthen its intelligence program. Both attempts are considered by some to have been failures. (205)

Both previous attempts were driven by concerns that FBI's intelligence effectiveness was being undercut by the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence program. The FBI's three operational divisions, at the time -- criminal, counterterrorism and counterintelligence -- each controlled its own intelligence program. (206) As a result, the FBI had trouble integrating its intelligence effort horizontally between its divisions. In intelligence world parlance, the programs were "stove-piped."


In 1998, the FBI attempted to address the stove pipe problem by consolidating control over intelligence under the authority of a newly established Office of Intelligence. It also took steps to improve the quality of its intelligence analysis, particularly in the criminal area, which was viewed as particularly weak.

Dissatisfied with the results, the FBI launched a second round of reforms the following year aimed at more thoroughly integrating FBI intelligence analysis in support of investigations. A new Investigative Services Division (ISD) was established to replace the Office of Intelligence, and to house in one location all FBI analysts that until then had been "owned" by FBI's operational divisions. Although the ISD was intended to provide each of the divisions "one-stop shopping" for their intelligence needs, it was never accepted by the operational divisions, which wanted to control their own intelligence analysis programs. In the wake of September 11, the FBI concluded that analysts would be more effective if they were controlled by the operational divisions. ISD was abolished, and analysts were dispersed back to the divisions in which they originally served.

Although observers blame the failure of both prior reform efforts on several complex factors, they put the FBI's deeply-ingrained law enforcement mentality at the top of the list. As one observer described it, efforts to integrate intelligence at the FBI were substantially hampered because resources dedicated to intelligence were gradually siphoned back to the FBI's traditional counter crime programs. Moreover, there was also little sustained senior level support for an intelligence function that was integrated with the Intelligence Community. (207)


Appendix 6: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence (208)
The FBI's two principal national foreign intelligence program responsibilities are counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Some observers of FBI intelligence reform have suggested that these two disciplines be integrated, but not necessarily under the control of the FBI. (209) Numerous interviewees indicated their belief that of the FBI's NFIP responsibilities, the counterintelligence program was most closely integrated into the Intelligence Community.

Historically, the FBI has shifted its organization to counter both terrorist and clandestine foreign intelligence activity directed against the United States. Although the FBI in the past has integrated both missions as part of the same division, currently the FBI has separate counterterrorism and counterintelligence divisions. The Assistant Directors for each division report to an Executive Assistant Director having responsibility for both functions. In a debate that mirrors the ongoing discussion about the appropriate relationship between law enforcement and intelligence, some observers believe counterterrorism and counterintelligence should be reintegrated. (210) They make the following arguments:


Commonality of Adversary Methods of Operation. No matter whether the threat the United States is confronting is that of a loosely affiliated foreign terrorist group, or a centrally controlled foreign intelligence service, the method of operation is consistent -- a covertly organized set of activities designed to undermine U.S. national security. As such, the countermeasures are similar -- primarily the penetration and surveillance of the inimical activity, up to, and until, the point at which action may be taken against the United States.

Linkages between Foreign Intelligence Services and Terrorist Groups. Some argue that there are linkages between foreign intelligence services and terrorist groups. (211) Information documenting these links, should they exist, are likely to be classified.
Supporters of the status quo argue the following:


Similar Disciplines -- Different Time Lines and Pressures. While the damage that can result from a successful espionage operation directed against the United States by a foreign power can be just as damaging to national security as the terrorist attacks of September 11, counterintelligence moves at a different pace than counterterrorism. Building counter-espionage cases can sometimes consume months, if not years, of monitoring actions of those suspected of passing national defense information to an unauthorized third party, or committing economic espionage. In the case of a potential terrorist act, there is pressure to collect actionable intelligence, and to act quickly to prevent terrorists from striking.

Diminution of Resources/Organizational Focus on Counterintelligence. Of the FBI's two principal National Foreign Intelligence Program priorities, the counterintelligence program, arguably, has been accorded a lower priority in the wake of the Cold War. Counterterrorism has become the FBI's first priority. Reintegrating the two could lead to situations in which, particularly from an FBI human resources perspective, counterintelligence personnel serve as a reserve pool of educated labor for counterterrorism. Such an occurrence may result in a diminished strategic focus on counterintelligence, a function which requires a long-term outlook and commitment.

The Law Enforcement Nexus with Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence. Given the decentralized nature of the terrorist threat, and criminal activities engaged in to provide financial support for such activities, there is a close relationship between the FBI's criminal programs and its counterterrorism program. While there is also a nexus between the FBI's counterintelligence activities and its criminal programs, arguably, given that very few counterintelligence cases ever go to trial for espionage or economic espionage prosecution, the nexus is weaker.

Appendix 7: Relevant Legal and Regulatory Changes
Intelligence Community operations, including domestic intelligence collection, and collection of intelligence on U.S. persons, (212) are governed by a body of laws, regulations and guidelines. (213) With regard to the domestic intelligence collection, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice has promulgated seven successive sets of guidelines (214) governing these efforts since 1976.

Following September 11, Congress also approved the USA PATRIOT Act, which makes it easier for the FBI to share intelligence with IC agencies, and to conduct electronic surveillance. (215) For example, with respect to electronic surveillance, a substantially broader legal standard authorized in the USA PATRIOT Act allows for electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as long as, among other requirements, the application includes a certification by an appropriate national security official that "a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information." (216) Among the other criteria which must be met for an application for electronic surveillance to be approved under FISA, a court must find that the surveillance "... is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." (217) Moreover, the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY2004 authorized the enhanced use of administrative subpoenas, also known as national security letters, by the FBI in order to gather information from financial institutions. (218)

The USA PATRIOT Act has had a substantial impact on FBI intelligence gathering and sharing. For example, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorizations for electronic surveillance increased 21.3% during the two-year period, 2000 to 2002. (219) According to FBI Director Mueller, the act has been "extraordinarily beneficial in the war on terrorism ... Our success in preventing another catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, without the Act." (220)


The USA PATRIOT Act also has provided a legal framework that makes it easier for the FBI's four investigative/operational divisions -- criminal, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber -- to integrate their intelligence efforts. As a result, the FBI has adopted a new strategy, known as the Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy, which permits the FBI to treat counterterrorism cases as intelligence cases from the outset, making it easier to initiate electronic surveillance. Special Agent John Pistole, FBI Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, stated, "We're still interested in the criminal violations that many people may be involved in. But, in many cases we are going to put that in the back seat and go down the road until we have all that we need." (221) If implemented and institutionalized, the new policy may significantly enhance the effectiveness of the FBI's intelligence program. The question becomes whether the FBI can implement the policy and stay within constitutional limits. Some civil libertarian advocates say they are concerned that by making it easier for the FBI to employ surveillance under FISA, the USA PATRIOT Act might lead the FBI to use such FISA surveillance to investigate criminal cases in a manner that may be inconsistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. (222)






Footnotes
1. (back)While the FBI initially provided the authors access to FBI officials and documents, it later declined to do so, despite numerous requests. Although this paper would have benefitted from continued cooperation, the authors note with gratitude that some FBI officials continued to share their insights into the current reforms. Numerous current and former employees of the FBI and Cental Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as state and local law enforcement entities, were interviewed for this report. Some sources wish to remain anonymous and, therefore, have not been identified by name in this report.

2. (back)William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 187.

3. (back)For purposes of this report, intelligence is defined to include foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and criminal intelligence. For a statutory definition of each see Appendix 1. For a brief summary of the FBI's traditional role in intelligence, see Appendix 2. Finally, Appendix 3 provides a brief history of FBI intelligence.

4. (back)The IC is comprised of 15 agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Treasury; the Department of Energy; the Coast Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; and; the Department of Homeland Security.

5. (back)See Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, a report of the U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S.Rept. 107-351; H.Rept. 107-792, Dec. 2002, pp. xv, xvi, 37-39, 337-338. (Hereafter cited as JIC Inquiry)

6. (back)An analyst conducts counterterrorism strategic intelligence analysis in order to develop a national and international understanding of terrorist threat trends and patterns, as well as common operational methods and practices. An analyst conducts tactical counterterrorism analysis in order to support specific criminal or national security-oriented cases and operations. While not mutually exclusive, each type of analysis requires a unique set of analytical methodologies and research skills.

7. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

8. (back)Ibid., p. 39.

9. (back)See "Statement of John MacGaffin to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," Dec. 8, 2003. MacGaffin testified, "In the domestic context, it is clear that the FBI needs to improve greatly its intelligence collection so that there are meaningful "dots" to connect and analyze. Some observers believe the FBI since 9/11 has made real progress in this direction. I and many others do not."

10. (back)A former senior FBI official stated in an Aug. 21, 2003 interview that if FBI Director Mueller was serious about achieving more than a limited reform, he would establish an intelligence career path. To date the Director has not implemented fully an intelligence career path for special agents.

11. (back)Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Implementing the National Strategy, Dec. 15, 2002, pp. 43-44. (Hereafter cited as Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress.) Organizational culture is a product of many factors, including, but not limited to, an organization's history, mission, self-image, client base and structure. According to William E. Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency, however, organizational culture is principally the product of structural conditions. See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, p. 3.

12. (back)For an analysis of the applicability of Great Britain's MI-5 model to the U.S., see CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

13. (back)Director Mueller has headed the Department of Justice Criminal Division, served as U.S. Attorney in San Francisco, and generally focused on criminal prosecution during his career.

14. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, with an extensive intelligence background, Aug. 21, 2003.

15. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, Former Attorney General of the United States, in U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.

16. (back)Ibid., pp. 16-17.

17. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. pp. 43-44.

18. (back)The Congressional Research Service has recently published a related report on the FBI. For a history of the FBI, see CRS Report RL32095(pdf), The FBI: Past, Present and Future, by Todd Masse and William Krouse.

19. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. xv.

20. (back)All-source intelligence analysis is that analysis which is based on all available collection sources.

21. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

22. (back)Ibid., pp. 38-39.

23. (back)Ibid., pp. 337-338.

24. (back)Ibid., p. xvi.

25. (back)See Concept of Operations, FBI Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Process, prepared jointly by FBI Headquarters divisions, reviewed by FBI field office representatives and coordinated by the FBI's Office of Intelligence, Aug. 2003. The Assistant Director, Office of Intelligence, reports to the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence.

26. (back)According to the FBI's 1998-2003 Strategic Plan, issued in May 1998, the FBI, prior to Sept. 11, had established three tiers of priorities: (1) National and Economic Security, aimed at preventing intelligence operations that threatened U.S. national security; preventing terrorist attacks; deterring criminal conspiracies; and deterring unlawful exploitation of emerging technologies by foreign powers, terrorists and criminal elements; (2) Criminal Enterprise and Public Integrity; and (3) Individuals and Property. Countering criminal activities was a prominent feature of each tier. See Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human Resource Allocation, Audit Division, Sept. 2003, pp. 03-37.

27. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.

28. (back)Core competencies are defined as a related group of activities central to the success, or failure, of an organization. In the private sector, core competencies are often the source of a company's competitive advantage. See C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, "The Core Competency of the Corporation," Harvard Business Review, Apr. 1, 2001.

29. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, July 23, 2003.

30. (back)The FBI established the position of EAD-I in early 2003, and the position was filled in April 2003, when Maureen Baginski, the former Director of Signals Intelligence, National Security Agency, was appointed. It was another four months before EAD-I Baginski began working in her new capacity, and an additional four months before Congress approved the reprogramming action formally establishing the EAD-I position. Some critics date whatever progress the FBI has made in upgrading intelligence to Baginski's arrival, but contend that because this critical position was left vacant for an extended period of time, the FBI made little, or no progress, between September 11 and Baginski's arrival almost one-and-a-half years later.

31. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Joint Inquiry, Oct. 17, 2002.

32. (back)The establishment of TTIC, and its mission, is addressed later in this section.

33. (back)The Office of Intelligence has had an uneven, albeit short, leadership history since its establishment. Although Director Mueller announced OI's established in Dec. 2001, the position of OI Assistant Director was vacant for one-and-a-half years, until Apr. 2003. The selected individual served four months before being appointed to another FBI position. The position then was vacant for almost five additional months before Michael Rolince, Special-Agent-in-Charge of the FBI's Washington Field Office, was appointed to lead the office on an acting basis in mid-Dec. 2003.

34. (back)See FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations, Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

35. (back)For the purposes of this report, intelligence analysts are defined as all-source analysts who conduct tactical and strategic analysis. Until recently, the FBI had two categories of analysts -- Intelligence Research Specialists, who were responsible for all-source analysis, and Intelligence Operations Specialists, who provided tactical analytic support for cases and operations. The FBI is merging these two positions with the newly created "Reports Officer" position, and re-titling the consolidated position as "intelligence analyst." The FBI says its purpose in doing so is to standardize and integrate intelligence support for the FBI's highest priorities. Within the intelligence analyst position, there are four "areas of interest" -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal; and three specific work "functions" -- all source, case support, and reports.

36. (back)The number of individuals in a field intelligence group varies, depending upon the size of the field office. See "FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations," Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

37. (back)Funding was authorized under the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-177). The legislation permits the FBI Director to "... enter into personal services contracts if the personal services to be provided under such contracts directly support the intelligence or counterintelligence missions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

38. (back)JTTFs are FBI-led and are comprised of other federal, state and local law enforcement officials. JTTFs serve as the primary mechanism through which intelligence derived from FBI investigations and operations is shared with non-FBI law enforcement officials. JTTFs also serve as the principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law enforcement officials.

39. (back)See statement of Larry A. Mefford, Executive Assistant Director -- Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, Research and Development; and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security of the U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Sept. 4, 2003.

40. (back)See CRS Report RS21283, Homeland Security: Intelligence Support, by Richard A. Best, Jr.

41. (back)See http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2003summary/html/FBIcharts.htm and Where the Money Goes: Fiscal 2004 Appropriations, -- House Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives (House Conf. Rept. 108-401).

42. (back)See U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, "2005 Budget and Performance Summary," winter 2004, pp.113-122. Elements of this request include 1) $35 million in non-personnel funding to support collocation of a portion of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division with the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and the interagency Terrorist Threat Integration Center; 2) $13.4 million to launch the Office of Intelligence; 3) $14.3 million to Counterterrorism FBI Headquarters program support, including intelligence analysis; and 4) $13 million to launch the National Virtual Translation Center. Some elements of the $46 million request for Counterterrorism Field Investigations and the $64 million request for various classified national security initiatives, also likely will be dedicated to intelligence.

43. (back)See Michelle Mittelstadt, "FBI Set to Add 900 Intelligence Analysts," The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 17, 2004. The near doubling of intelligence analysts in one year could present the FBI with a significant absorption challenge.

44. (back)The GAO has drafted two reports (GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003 and GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004) on the FBI reform efforts cited in this report. These GAO reports assess the FBI's transformation from a program management and results perspective, that is, the extent to which the FBI is expending its resources and dedicating its management in a manner consistent with its stated priorities. This CRS report focuses on the more policy-oriented question of FBI intelligence reform and related policy options, as well as the ability of the FBI to implement successfully its strategic plans related to intelligence.

45. (back)FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), periodically audits resource allocations, to determine if human resources are being committed in a manner consistent with stated priorities and strategies. In a recent report, the OIG found that since Sept. 11, the FBI "... continued to devote more of its time to terrorism-related work than any other single area," consistent with its post-Sept. 11 terrorism priority. To ensure that the FBI systematically and periodically analyzes its programs, the OIG recommended that the FBI Director "... regularly review resource utilization reports for the Bureau as a whole, as well as for individual investigative programs, and explore additional means of analyzing the Bureau's resource utilization among the various programs." See Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human Resource Allocation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 03-37), Sept. 2003. While the quantity of human resources must be adequate, appropriate quality is essential. One asset developed by an experienced, well-trained FBI special agent could have a significant effect on U.S. national security.

46. (back)As currently structured, the FBI special agent recruitment procedure has five entry programs, with numerous other areas defined as "critical skill needs." Agents must be hired under one of the five programs (law, accounting/finance, language, computer science/information technology and diversified); yet, the FBI will establish priorities for those having expertise in the critically needed skills. Unlike intelligence analysts, who are not required to possess a bachelor's degree, candidates for FBI special agent positions "must possess a four-year degree from an accredited college or university ...." See
https://www.fbijobs.com/jobdesc.asp?requisitionid=368.

47. (back)See Concept of Operations, Human Talent for Intelligence Production, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 2003.

48. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, June 18, 2003, p. 3.

49. (back)See Making Appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 2004, and For Other Purposes, U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report (H.Rept. 108-401).

50. (back)See "Human Talent for Intelligence Production," FBI Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

51. (back)In place of a bachelors degree, the FBI now allows a candidate for intelligence analyst to substitute a minimum of one year of related law enforcement or military experience.

52. (back)The authors were unable to compare training, before and after Sept. 11, because the FBI's Office of Congressional Affairs denied requests for a copy of the training curriculum.

53. (back)See statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 14.

54. (back)The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget includes a number of national-level intelligence programs, which are approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and submitted to the President and Congress as a single consolidated program. The NFIP budget funds those departments and agencies constituting the U.S. Intelligence Community. Historically, the FBI's NFIP has included the headquarters and field elements associated with the following programs: 1) international terrorism, 2) counterintelligence, 3) security countermeasures, and 4) dedicated technical activities.

55. (back)Some observers have suggested that as part of its intelligence reform, the FBI should consider re-integrating counterterrorism and counterintelligence. For an assessment of these arguments, see Appendix 6.

56. (back)Notwithstanding this increase in intelligence training, a new special agent collector, at least early in his career, still is at a disadvantage, compared to a foreign intelligence officer, or terrorist, who has likely received intensive clandestine operations training.

57. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 15, 2004.

58. (back)See "Human Talent for Intelligence Production," the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 2003.

59. (back)Numerous GAO studies, including the recent Information Technology: FBI Needs an Enterprise Architecture to Guide Its Modernization Activities (GAO Report 03-959, Sept. 25, 2003) have found substantial deficiencies in the FBI's formal procedures to implement recommended information technology changes. See also The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003).

60. (back)See "FBI Director Says Technology Investments Are Paying Off," Government Executive, Apr. 10, 2003.

61. (back)According to the Department of Justice Inspector General (IG), FBI officials originally estimated the cost of the Virtual Case File system to be $380 million. The current actual cost, according to the IG, exceeds $596 million. See also Wilson P. Dizard, "FBI's Trilogy Rollout Delayed; CSC Misses Deadline," Government Computer News, Nov. 4, 2003. Critics have attributed the FBI's chronic information management problems to, among other factors, deficient data mining capabilities, and the FBI's continuing inability to effectively upload information collected by field offices onto accessible FBI-wide databases.

62. (back)Dan Eggen, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Washington Post, Dec. 13, 2003, p. A1.

63. (back)In addition to easing constraints on intelligence sharing, this change will allow investigators to more easily employ secret warrants and other intelligence collection methods permitted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended. Those foreign intelligence gathering tools cannot be used in traditional criminal probes. The change stems from a Nov. 2002 intelligence appeals court ruling that upheld the USA PATRIOT Act provisions that provided more latitude for the sharing of foreign intelligence between criminal prosecutors and intelligence/national security personnel. See United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, In re: Sealed Case 02-001, Decided Nov. 18, 2002.

64. (back)For information on terrorist watch lists, see CRS Report RL31019, Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, by William Krouse and Raphael Perl.

65. (back)An organization's structure and business processes influence its performance. Large organizations with dispersed operations continually assess the appropriate balance between decentralized and centralized elements of their operations. Although the mission of National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) is unrelated to that of the FBI, it too has dispersed operations. In a review of the causes of the 1986 Columbia shuttle accident, the board investigating the accident found that "The ability to operate in a centralized manner when appropriate, and to operate in a decentralized manner when appropriate, is the hallmark of a high-reliability organization." See Columbia Accident Investigation Report, Volume I, Aug. 2003. http://www.caib.us/news/report/volume1/default.html

66. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 118, 2003, p. 3.

67. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

68. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

69. (back)Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

70. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

71. (back)See testimony of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003, p. 4.

72. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, pp. 43-44.

73. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

74. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 245.

75. (back)Statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 19. See also The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003), p. v.

76. (back)See "FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities," statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 13.

77. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 358.

78. (back)Statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.

79. (back)The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003), p. xiv.

80. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

81. (back)See The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.x.

82. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

83. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 337.

84. (back)Ibid., p. 340. The vast majority of FBI analysts are located in the FBI's 56 regional field offices.

85. (back)Ibid., p. 245.

86. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 3.

87. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

88. (back)Ibid., p. 4.

89. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

90. (back)Ibid., p. 3.

91. (back)Ibid.

92. (back)See "FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities," statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 33. A congressional requirement concerning resource management was levied on the FBI by P.L. 108-199. By Mar. 15, 2004, the FBI is to provide a report to the Committees on Appropriations a report which "...details the FBI's plan to succeed at its terrorist prevention and law enforcement responsibilities, including proposed agent and support personnel levels for each division."

93. (back)Ibid., p. 14.

94. (back)Ibid., p. 23.

95. (back)Ibid., p. 22.

96. (back)See "FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, But Major Challenges Continue," statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 8.

97. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 4.

98. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

99. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former Attorney General of the United States, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p.18.

100. (back)See "FBI Creates Structure to Support Intelligence Mission," U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, press release, Apr. 3, 2003. The results of these examinations remain classified.

101. (back)Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

102. (back)See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, 2003, (Yale University Press) p. 177.

103. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

104. (back)See statement of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003.

105. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

106. (back)Ibid.

107. (back)See statement of John J. Hamre before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003. Hamre is a former deputy secretary of defense.

108. (back)See Siobhan Gorman, Government Executive Magazine, FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart, Aug. 1, 2003. See also Frederick P. Hitz and Brian J. Weiss, "Helping the FBI and the CIA Connect the Dots in the War on Terror," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; volume 17, no. 1, Jan. 2004.

109. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

110. (back)Former FBI Special Agent John J. Connally, Jr., was recently convicted of racketeering and obstruction of justice for secretly aiding organized crime leaders in the Boston, Massachusetts area. See Fox Butterfield, "FBI Agent Linked to Mob is Guilty of Corruption," New York Times, May 29, 2002, p.14. Special Agent James J. Smith recently was indicted on one count of gross negligence in handling national defense information [Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 793(f)] and with four counts of filing false reports on an asset's reliability to FBI Headquarters [18 U.S. Code ??1343, 1346]. See http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/fbi/ussmith50703ind.pdf It is alleged that Smith and former Special Agent William Cleveland had sexual relationships with Katrina Leung, an FBI operational asset informing the FBI on the intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It is further alleged that Ms. Leung may have been a double agent for the PRC. Leung has been charged with unauthorized access and willful retention of documents relating to national defense [Title 18 U.S. Code, ?793(b)]. See http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/fbi/usleung403cmp.pdf James Smith has pleaded guilty and his trial has been set for February 2005. Katrina Leung's trial is scheduled for September. In addition to appointing an Inspector-in-Charge to investigate the integrity of the Chinese counterintelligence program in the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office (the last FBI Office of employment for Mr. Smith), the FBI has launched organizational and administrative reviews to determine why its established accountability system for the handling of intelligence assets apparently failed in this case. See FBI press release dated Apr. 9, 2003.

111. (back)See Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 11, 2003.

112. (back)For further information on how to assess performance of the FBI, and the U.S. Government in the war on terrorism, see Daniel Byman, "Measuring the War on Terrorism: A First Appraisal," in Current History, Dec. 2003.

113. (back)The FBI has never experienced problems in recruiting educated analysts, at least at FBI Headquarters. The FBI, however, has from suffered a retention problem.

114. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, Recommendations Section Errata, p. 7.

115. (back)See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, p. 298. (Random House).

116. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 340.

117. (back)Other IC agencies permit analysts to rise to the analytical equivalent of Senior Executive Service, or Senior Intelligence Service. One such program, the Senior Analytic Service (SAS), was established at the CIA in the late 1990s by CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin. The SAS track allows analysts to rise to the senior-most analytic level, without assuming managerial responsibilities.

118. (back)This approach is manifested in a recent intelligence analyst job announcement (04-FO-0515). While the FBI used to recruit intelligence analysts according to the functional or geographic area of need, it now asks potential candidates to identify one of four areas of interest, choosing from: counterintelligence, counterterrorism, criminal or cyber. According to the announcement, "... Applicants must identify the program area or interest, however, this does not guarantee placement in the particular program...." See

https://www.fbijobs.com/JobDesc.asp?src=001&requisitionid=1614&r=021811042620.

119. (back)Although these types of analyses are not mutually exclusive, they serve two different sets of consumers -- the executive who is supporting policymakers, and the special agent who is running an investigation or operation.

120. (back)For a policy-oriented discussion of relevant legal and regulatory changes, see Appendix 7.

121. (back)Dan Egan, The Washington Post, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Dec. 12, 2003, p. A-1. (Hereafter cited as Egan, FBI Applies New Rules.)

122. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Chairman, and Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, pp. 21-22.

123. (back)Ibid., p. 22.

124. (back)Ibid.

125. (back)See Dan Egan, "FBI Applies New Rules."

126. (back)Ibid.

127. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.

128. (back)Ibid.

129. (back)See Dan Egan,"FBI Applies New Rules."

130. (back)See statement of Steven C. McCraw, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, July 24, 2003.

131. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary June 21, 2002, transcript, p. 30.

132. (back)See Statement of Assistant Director Steven C. McCraw, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, July 24, 2003.

133. (back)Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

134. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Nov. 13, 2003.

135. (back)See "Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security," The Markle Foundation, Dec. 2, 2003, p. 2.

136. (back)See Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, Dec.2, 2003.

137. (back)The Markle Foundation has recommended the creation of a System-wide Homeland Analysis and Resources Exchange (SHARE) Network, in which the Department of Homeland Security would assume a central role in working with federal, state, local and private sector organizations to establish a strategy and implementing mechanisms and policies to share and analyze information in a decentralized manner. See Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, Exhibit A: "Action Plan for Federal Government Development of the SHARE Network," Dec. 2, 2003, p. 10.

138. (back)Originator control, or ORCON, is a process designed to protect categories of (generally) classified information from being sharing with unauthorized third parties. If an agency wishes to share ORCON information it received from another agency, it must first request ORCON release from the originating agency to share the information with a specific third party consumer. In terms of providing security clearances to state and local law enforcement officials with a "need to know," the FBI has established a streamlined security process that allows law enforcement officials to receive expedited "secret" clearances in about nine weeks. See Dan Eggen, "Bridging the Divide Between FBI and Police," The Washington Post, Feb. 16, 2004, p. A25.

139. (back)See The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.iv.

140. (back)See Gerard R. Murphy and Martha R. Plotkin, Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement (Volume 1 -- Local-Federal Partnerships), Police Executive Research Forum, as supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing, Mar. 2003.

141. (back)Many of the state and local law enforcement officials interviewed for this report also had substantial experience at the federal level, both in the IC and in law enforcement. They said they therefore well understand the inherent capabilities and limitations of intelligence and the roles foreign intelligence and criminal intelligence play in preventing terrorism.

142. (back)Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

143. (back)Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

144. (back)One local law enforcement official suggested that the JTTFs are where the investigative expertise lies, and should be retained. However, he suggested that in order to be more valuable in preventing terrorist acts domestically, the JTTFs should be reorganized around the concept of "joint ness," and cited the "Goldwater Nichols" Department of Defense Reorganization Act as a model. The "joint ness" envisioned by this official would have state and local law enforcement, federal law enforcement, and IC entities responsible for counterterrorism, operate in an integrated and seamless environment. As envisioned by this local law enforcement official, consistent with joint officers in the military, promotion to senior level positions at the parent agency would be contingent upon a successful rotation to the "Joint" Terrorism Task Forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433) integrated the operational capabilities of the military services. For further information on Goldwater-Nichols, see

http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html. H.R. 3439, the "JTTF Enhancement Act of 2003" proposes that 1) there be a greater degree of participation in the JTTFs from DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials; and 2) a program be established to detail state and local law enforcement officers to the CIA, or CIA personnel to state and local law enforcement organizations.

145. (back)Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

146. (back)See "Blue Spies for City," New York Post, June 29, 2003. The New York Police Department (NYPD), in what it describes as a substantial resource investment, has dedicated more than 100 officers to the New York JTTF. According to NYPD officials, there has been a steady improvement in the flow of information between the NY JTTF and the NYPD. But there also have been occasions when police officials have requested information from the FBI and the IC, but failed to receive a timely response. As result, the NYPD has stationed several of its officers overseas to better protect the city's security needs by collecting information regarding terrorist activities. As one New York City official commented, "We're not looking to supplant anything that is being done by the Federal government. We're looking to supplement. We're looking to get the New York question asked."

147. (back)See Northeast Regional Agreement Information Sharing Proposal, Sept. 22, 2003. The states engaged in this effort include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. These proposed "centers" are distinct from the existing Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). The HSIN uses the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) to foster communication among federal, state and local officials involved in counterterrorism information. Currently, the system contains only information categorized as "sensitive but unclassified." See "Homeland Security Information Network to Expand Collaboration, Connectivity for States and Major Cities," Department of Homeland Security, Press Release, Feb. 24, 2004.

148. (back)Ibid.

149. (back)Proponents contend that state and localities should have access to raw foreign intelligence, because the analysts they have been able to recruit are often superior to those the FBI employs in its field offices. Moreover, they argue that FBI analysts, unlike their local counterparts, are unfamiliar with local infrastructure needing protection, and provide inferior analysis. In asking for more intelligence sharing, state and local officials say they recognize and respect the FBI's authority to conduct terrorism investigations, but insist they need access to unfiltered foreign intelligence in order to protect state and local security needs.

150. (back)See Appendix 3 (page 48) for additional information.

151. (back)At the beginning of the 108th Congress, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security was established. Along with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, this new committee now shares FBI oversight responsibilities.

152. (back)See Cory Reiss, "Graham's security complaints might bite back," The Gainesville Sun, May 27, 2003.

153. (back)See Ellen Laipson, President and Chief Executive Officer, the Henry L. Stimson Center, "Foreign Intelligence Challenges post September-11," a paper delivered at the Lexington Institute's conference titled "Progress Towards Homeland Security: An Interim Report Card," Feb. 27, 2003. http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/homeland/Laipson.pdf.

154. (back)See statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Government Accounting Office, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, June 21, 2002, p. 18.

155. (back)See remarks of Congressman David Obey during a hearing in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Justice, State and Judiciary, June 21, 2002.

156. (back)See Cory Reiss, "Graham's Security Complaints Might Bite Back," The Gainesville Sun, May 27, 2003.

157. (back)Ibid.

158. (back)Ibid.

159. (back)Ibid.

160. (back)Ibid.

161. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. pp. 44-45.

162. (back)For a treatment of the evolution of the relationship between law enforcement and intelligence, see CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., by Richard A. Best Jr.

163. (back)The Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Analytic Service might serve as a possible model for elevating senior analysts to the non-managerial analytical equivalent of Senior Executive Service special agents.

164. (back)FBI legal attaches serve in overseas posts, and are declared to the host country. Legal attaches serve as the FBI's link to foreign law enforcement and security services. While legal attaches conduct overt liaison with foreign services, they do not engage in clandestine intelligence collection overseas.

165. (back)See Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, (Free Press, 2004), pp. 254-256.

166. (back)U.S. Senator John Edwards introduced S. 410, The Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003,which would establish a Homeland Intelligence Agency within DHS.

167. (back)See CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

168. (back)See Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. p. 42.

169. (back)See CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

170. (back)The Director of Central Intelligence serves as both the leader of the Central Intelligence Agency, and as Director of the broader U.S. Intelligence Community. The proposed 9/11 Intelligence Memorial Reform Act (S. 1520) would create a Director of National Intelligence. That individual would be precluded from simultaneous service as the Director of the CIA and Director of National Intelligence. Some have argued this proposal would undermine the DCI's power base. See Robert M. Gates, "How Not to Reform Intelligence," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 3, 2003. Finally, while the TTIC reports to the Director of Central Intelligence as leader of the Intelligence Community, the organization has been categorized as a "joint venture" of Intelligence Community participants.

171. (back)See statement by John Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Oct. 15, 2003, p. 5.

172. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

173. (back)See Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, p. 41.

174. (back)Ibid., pp. 41-47.

175. (back)Ibid., p. 44.

176. (back)Ibid., pp. 43-44.

177. (back)Ibid., p. 44.

178. (back)Ibid., p. 41.

179. (back)According to former House Intelligence Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton, "if the shortcomings leading up to Sept. 11 were systemic in nature, the solution lies in better system management, the handling and analysis of vast amounts of information, and the distribution in a timely manner of the key conclusions to the right people." See the JIC Inquiry, p. 350.

180. (back)Ibid, p. 351. According to former FBI Director William Webster, the MI-5 concept is inapplicable in the U.S. context. "We're not England," Webster said. "We're not 500 miles across our territory. We have thousands of miles to cover. Would you propose to create an organization that had people all over the United States, as the FBI does?" He instead supports training FBI personnel to be more responsive to terrorist threats. He further argues that, "More than any other kind of threat, there is an interrelationship between law enforcement and intelligence in dealing with the problem of terrorism...We need investigative capability and intelligence collection capability, as well as those who go through the bits and pieces and fill in the dots."

181. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 13.

182. (back)Ibid, p. 18. Former Attorney General Barr testified, "An idea making the rounds these days is the notion of severing "domestic intelligence" from the FBI and creating a new domestic spy agency akin to Britain's MI-5. I think this is preposterous and goes in exactly the wrong direction. Artificial stove-piping hurts our counterterrorism efforts. What we need to do now is meld intelligence and law enforcement more closely together, not tear them apart. We already have too many agencies and creating still another simply adds more bureaucracy, spawns intractable and debilitating turf wars, and creates further barriers to the kind of seamless integration that is needed in this area."

183. (back)Ibid., p. 14.

184. (back)See Center for Democracy, "Domestic Intelligence Agencies: The Mixed Record of the UK's MI5," Jan. 27, 2003.

185. (back)See National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S. Code, Chapter 15, 401(a) and Executive Order 12333, 3.4.

186. (back)Ibid.

187. (back)See Code of Federal Regulations, Part 23.

188. (back)For a more detailed description of the FBI's traditional intelligence role, see Appendix 2.

189. (back)For an official history of the FBI, see http://www.fbi.gov/fbihistory.htm. See also CRS Report RL32095(pdf), The FBI: Past, Present and Future, by William Krouse and Todd Masse.

190. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 3, 2003.

191. (back)The successful prosecution of an espionage case can be viewed as both a counterintelligence success, and failure. It is a success insofar as the activity is stopped, but is a failure insofar as the activity escaped the attention of appropriate authorities for any period of time.

192. (back)See CRS Report 93-531, Individuals Arrested on Charges of Espionage Against the United States Government: 1966-1993, by Suzanne Cavanagh (available from the authors of this report). For a compilation of espionage cases through 1999, see

http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage.

193. (back)See Tony Poveda, Lawlessness and Reform: The FBI in Transition, Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1990.

194. (back)See Edwin Hoyt Palmer, The Palmer Raids,1919-1921: An Attempt to Suppress Dissent, Seabury Press, 1969.

195. (back)For further information on the history of COINTELPRO, see S.Rept. 94-755, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports of Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, (Washington, Apr. 23, 1976); (Hereafter cited as the Church Committee Report).

196. (back)See Church Committee Report, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, p.71.

197. (back)The Foreign Agent Registration Act requires that persons acting as foreign agents (as defined by the act) register with the U.S. Department of Justice for, among other reasons, transparency. (see 22 U.S.C. Chap. 611)

198. (back)See "The FBI and CISPES," a report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. (S.Rept. 101-46, July 1989).

199. (back)See Bill Gertz, Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, 2002, pp. 83-125. (Regnery Publishing).

200. (back)According to the Levi guidelines, domestic security investigations were to be limited to gathering information on group or individual activities "... which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve a violation of federal law...."

201. (back)See Testimony of Francis J. McNamara, former Subversive Activities Control Board Director, before the National Committee to Restore Internal Security, May 20, 1986. Quoted in W. Raymond Wannall, "Undermining Counterintelligence Capability," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 15, winter 2002, pp. 321-329.

202. (back)Interviews with former senior FBI officials.

203. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress Senate Judiciary Committee, July 23, 2003.

204. (back)Interview with local law enforcement official, Apr. 5, 2004.

205. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

206. (back)A fourth division -- cyber crime -- was established in Apr. 2002. Until the appointment of the EAD-I, it, too, had its own intelligence component.

207. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

208. (back)According to Executive Order 12333, counterintelligence includes international terrorist activities. See Appendix 1.

209. (back)See "Spying," The Economist, July 10, 2003.

210. (back)Ibid.

211. (back)Ibid.

212. (back)United States persons means a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except in the case of a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government, or governments. See United States Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 12333, Dec. 4, 1981.

213. (back)Richard Betts, Member of the National Commission on Terrorism and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, contends that the balance between civil liberties and security is one in which a differentiation between two types of constraints on civil liberties (political censorship and compromises of individual privacy via enhanced surveillance) should be made. According to Betts, although the former (largely manifested through the suppression of free speech) will not measurably advance the war against terrorism, and should not be tolerated, greater acceptance of the latter, with appropriate measures for keeping secret irrelevant byproduct intelligence, may yield "...the biggest payoff for counterterrorism intelligence." See "Fixing Intelligence," Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2002.

214. (back)These policy guidelines include The Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Security Investigations (April 5, 1976 -- Attorney General Edward H. Levi), The Attorney General Guidelines on Criminal Investigations of Individuals and Organizations Dec. 2, 1980 -- Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security,/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 7, 1983 -- Attorney General William French Smith), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 21, 1989 -- Attorney General Richard Thornburgh), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General Jo Ann Harris to Attorney General Janet Reno recommending a change in the guidelines; approved by Attorney General Reno on April 19, 1994.), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (May 30, 2002 - Attorney General John Ashcroft), and The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (U) (Oct. 31, 2003 - Attorney General John Ashcroft). Other guidelines -- classified and unclassified - regulating the use of confidential informants, undercover operations, and procedures for lawful, warrant less monitoring of verbal conversations may also play a role in the gathering of domestic intelligence.

215. (back)See CRS Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions, Mar. 31, 2003, by Elizabeth B. Bazan. See also CRS Report RL31377, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, by Charles Doyle. See also CRS Report RL31200(pdf), Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act, by Charles Doyle. See Title II - Enhanced Surveillance Procedures (Section 203 "Authority to Share Criminal Investigative Information," altered rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure[2003 Edition] to permit the sharing of grand jury information with "federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security officials for official duties.") Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorized sharing of information gathered through electronic surveillance as part of a criminal investigation under 18 U.S.C. ?2517, as well as the sharing of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence gathered as part of a criminal investigation with any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist that official in performance of his official duties, 50 U.S.C. ? 403-5d. See also P.L. 107-56, Title V -- Removal of Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism, and Title IX -- Improved Intelligence.

216. (back)The requirement and standard was changed from "the purpose" to "a significant purpose." Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, codified at 50 U.S.C. ? 1804(a)(7)(B).

217. (back)50 U.S.C. ?1805(a)(3)(A). See numerous references to this standard in USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, Title II -- Enhanced Surveillance Procedures. Prohibitions against electronic surveillance or physical searches under FISA based solely on First Amendment protected activities pre-date the USA PATRIOT Act. However, the USA PATRIOT Act added similar language to the pen register and trap and trace devices part of FISA. See FISA, 50 U.S.C. ??1842 and 1843.

218. (back)The definition of financial institution as set out in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-177), adopts the language of Title 31, U.S. Code, ??(a) (2) and (c) (1), which includes any credit union, thrift institution, broker or dealer in equities or commodities, currency exchange, insurance company, pawn broker, travel agency, and/or operator of a credit card system, among others.

219. (back)See annual reports of the U.S. Justice Department to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, as required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (Title 50 U.S. Code, ?1807). Statistics and annual reports compiled by the Federation of American Scientists (see http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/). This increase is attributable, at least in part, to Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) which changed the legal standard concerning the purpose of the surveillance and its relationship to foreign intelligence information. According to the original language, "the purpose" of the surveillance had to be to obtain foreign intelligence information. The new language demands certification that foreign intelligence gathering is a "significant purpose" of the requested surveillance.

220. (back)See Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, July 23, 2003.

221. (back)See Dan Eggen, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Washington Post, Dec. 13, 2003, p. A1.

222. (back)Ibid.





Return to CONTENTS section of this Long Report.




Attachment A
Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions,

1 January Through 30 June 2003

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Scope Note
Acquisition by Country:
Iran
Iraq
North Korea
Libya
Syria
Sudan


Key Suppliers:
Russia
North Korea
China
Other Countries


Emerging State and Non State Suppliers
Acrobat? PDF Version


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Scope Note
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:

"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."

At the DCI&'s request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of the Intelligence Community&'s assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.

Acquisition by Country
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 30 June 2003. We have excluded countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern.

Iran
Nuclear. The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in violation of its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, Iran sought technology that can support fissile material production for a nuclear weapons program.

Iran tried to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group disclosed that Iran was secretly building a heavy water production plant and a "nuclear fuel" plant. Press reports later in the year confirmed these two facilities using commercial imagery and clarified that the "fuel" plant was most likely a large uranium centrifuge enrichment facility located at Natanz. Commercial imagery showed that Iran was burying the enrichment facility presumably to hide it and harden it against military attack. Following the press disclosures, Iran announced at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) September 2002 General Conference that it had "ambitious" nuclear fuel cycle plans and intended to develop all aspects of the entire fuel cycle. By the end of 2002, the IAEA had requested access to the enrichment facility at Natanz, and the IAEA Director General (DG) for the first time visited the facility in February 2003. The IAEA is investigating the newly disclosed facilities, and previously undisclosed nuclear material imports to determine whether Iran has violated its NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement in developing these facilities and their related technologies. At the June 2003 Board of Governors meeting, the IAEA DG presented a report on the Iranian program noting Tehran had failed to meet its safeguards obligations in a number of areas. The DG's report described a pattern of Iranian safeguards failures related to the undeclared import and processing of uranium compounds in the early 1990s, expressed concern over the lack of cooperation from Iran with IAEA inspections, and identified a number of unresolved concerns in Iran's program that the IAEA will continue to investigate. The IAEA Board on 19 June welcomed the report and called on Iran to answer all IAEA questions, cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors, and sign and implement an Additional Protocol immediately and unconditionally.

Although Iran claims that its nascent enrichment plant is to produce fuel for the Russian-assisted construction projects at Bushehr and other possible future power reactors, we remain concerned that Iran is developing enrichment technology to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons under the cover of legitimate fuel cycle activities. Iran appears to be embarking on acquiring nuclear weapons material via both acquisition paths--highly enriched uranium and low burn-up plutonium. Even with intrusive IAEA safeguards inspections at Natanz, there is a serious risk that Iran could use its enrichment technology in covert activities. Of specific proliferation concern are the uranium centrifuges discovered at Natanz, which are capable of enriching uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Iran claims its heavy water plant is for peaceful purposes. In June, Iran informed the IAEA that it is pursuing a heavy water research reactor that we believe could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. We also suspect that Tehran is interested in acquiring fissile material and technology from foreign suppliers to support its overall nuclear weapons program.

Ballistic Missile. Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during the first half of 2003 continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)--including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8)--as well as a variety of large unguided rockets. Already producing Scud SRBMs, Iran announced that it had begun production of the Shahab-3 MRBM and a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-110. [Iranian press reporting, Tehran IRNA, 11 Sep 2002] In addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran is also pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles.

Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents--and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them--which it previously had manufactured.

Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran&'s biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Tehran also sought high-quality products, particularly weapons components and dual-use items, or products that proved difficult to acquire through normal governmental channels.

Iraq
During the period covered by this report, coalition forces took action under Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq. A large-scale effort is currently underway to find the answers to the many outstanding questions about Iraq&'s WMD and delivery systems.

North Korea
Nuclear. In December 2002, North Korea announced its intention to resume operation of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, which had been frozen under the terms of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. IAEA seals and monitoring equipment were removed and disabled, and IAEA inspectors expelled from the country.

On 10 January 2003, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT Treaty). In late February 2003, North Korea restarted its 5 Mwe reactor which could produce spent fuel rods containing plutonium.

In late April 2003, North Korea told US officials that it possessed nuclear weapons, and signaled its intent to reprocess the 1994 canned spent fuel for more nuclear weapons. On 9 June, North Korea openly threatened to build a nuclear deterrent force. We continued to monitor and assess North Korea's nuclear weapons efforts.

Ballistic Missile. North Korea also has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its extensive ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources. In the first half of 2003, North Korea continued to abide by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests adopted in 1998, but announced it may reconsider its September 2002 offer to extend the moratorium beyond 2003. [FBIS KPP20021117000001] The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2--capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload--may be ready for flight-testing. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles, and has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that have enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts.

Chemical. North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). During the reporting period, Pyongyang continued to acquire dual-use chemicals that could potentially be used to support Pyongyang's long-standing chemical warfare program. North Korea's chemical warfare capabilities included the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agent, using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. North Korea possesses a stockpile of unknown size of these agents and weapons, which it could employ in a variety of delivery means.

Biological. North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, but nonetheless has pursued biological warfare (BW) capabilities since the 1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used to support North Korea's BW efforts. As of the first half of 2003, North Korea was believed to have possessed a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents, and may have such weapons available for use.

Libya
Nuclear. An NPT party with full-scope IAEA safeguards, Libya continued to develop its nuclear infrastructure. The suspension of UN sanctions provided Libya the means to enhance its nuclear infrastructure through foreign cooperation and procurement efforts. Tripoli and Moscow continued talks on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center and a potential power reactor deal. Such civil-sector work could have presented Libya with opportunities to pursue technologies also suitable for military purposes. In addition, Libya participated in various technical exchanges through which it could have tried to obtain dual-use equipment and technology that could have enhanced its overall technical capabilities in the nuclear area. Although Libya made political overtures to the West in an attempt to strengthen relations, Libya&'s assertion that Arabs have the right to nuclear weapons in light of Israel and its nuclear program--as Qadhafi stated in a televised speech in March 2002, for example--and Tripoli's continued interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear infrastructure upgrades raised concerns.

Ballistic Missile. The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 allowed Libya to expand its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. During the first half of 2003, Libya continued to depend on foreign assistance--particularly from Serbian, Indian, Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese entities--for its ballistic missile development programs. Libya&'s capability therefore may not still be limited to its Soviet-origin Scud-B missiles. With continued foreign assistance, Libya will likely achieve an MRBM capability--a long-desired goal--probably through direct purchase from North Korea or Iran.

Chemical and Biological. Libya also remained heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for CW precursor chemicals and other key related equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions, Tripoli reestablished contacts with sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Libya has indicated--as evidenced by its observer status at the April 2003 Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference and previous Convention Conferences of States Parties--a willingness to accede to the CWC. Such efforts are consistent with steps that Tripoli is taking to improve its international standing. Tripoli still appeared to be working toward an offensive CW capability and eventual indigenous production. Evidence suggested that Libya also sought dual-use capabilities that could be used to develop and produce BW agents.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Libya continued to seek new advanced conventional weapons and received assistance from other countries in maintaining its inventory of Soviet-era weapons.

Syria
Nuclear. Syria--an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards--has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are looking at Syrian nuclear intentions with growing concern.

Ballistic Missile. During the first half of 2003, Damascus continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria&'s liquid-propellant missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance--primarily from North Korean entities. Damascus also continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition, Syria was developing longer-range missile programs such as a Scud D and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran.

Chemical and Biological. Syria continued to seek CW-related expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also continued to develop an offensive BW capability.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Syria continued to acquire limited quantities of ACW, mainly from Russia. Damascus's Soviet-era debt to Moscow and inability to fund large purchases continued to hamper efforts to purchase the large quantity of equipment Syria requires to replace its aging weapons inventory.

Sudan
Chemical and Biological. Although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the US is working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to seek capabilities from abroad.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. During the reporting period, Sudan sought a variety of military equipment from various sources and received Mi-24 attack helicopters from Russia. In the long-running civil war, as well as for a general military modernization campaign, Khartoum has generally sought older, less expensive ACW and conventional weapons that nonetheless offered more advanced capabilities than the weapons of its opponents and their supporters in neighboring countries. [Source: B&A, CIA Arms Trade Database] We continued to remain concerned that Sudan might seek a ballistic missile capability in the future.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism

The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials remained high. Many of the 33 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors worldwide have expressed interest in CBRN. Although terrorist groups probably will continue to favor long-proven conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings, the arrest of ricin plotters in London in January 2003 indicated that international mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting to conduct chemical and biological attacks.

Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the September 11 attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian and government targets to CBRN attacks.

One of our highest concerns is al-Qa'ida's stated readiness to attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Usama Bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was "a religious duty."

Individuals from terrorist groups worldwide undertook poison training at al-Qa'ida-sponsored camps in Afghanistan and have ready access to information on chemical, biological, radiological, and to some extent, even nuclear weapons, via the Internet, publicly available scientific literature, and scientific conferences, and we know that al-Qa&'ida was working to acquire some of the most dangerous chemical agents and toxins. A senior Bin Ladin associate on trial in Egypt in 1999 claimed his group had chemical and biological weapons. Documents and equipment recovered from al-Qa&'ida facilities in Afghanistan show that Bin Ladin had a more sophisticated unconventional weapons research program than was previously known.

[FBIS, EUP20030109000129, U]

We also know that al-Qa&'ida has ambitions to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and was receptive to any outside nuclear assistance that might become available. [White House Fact Sheet, 20 Dec 2001] In February 2001, during the trial on the al-Qa&'ida bombings of the American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, a government witness--Jamal Ahmad Fadl--testified that al-Qa&'ida pursued the sale of a quantity of purported enriched uranium (which in fact probably was scam material) in Sudan in the early 1990s.

We assess that terrorist groups are capable of conducting attacks using crude radiological dispersal devices--i.e., ones that would not cause large-scale casualties, even though they could cause tremendous psychological effects, and possibly create considerable economic disruption as well. This type of threat first appeared in November 1995 when Chechen rebels placed a package containing radioactive cesium on a bench in Moscow's Izmailovo Park. In addition, we are alert to the very real possibility that al-Qa&'ida or other terrorist groups might also try to launch conventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States to cause panic and economic disruption.


Key Suppliers:
Russia
During the first half of 2003, Russia&'s cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and nuclear industries continued to be eager to raise funds via exports and transfers. Some Russian universities and scientific institutes also showed a willingness to earn much-needed funds by providing WMD or missile-related teaching and training for foreign students. Given the large potential proliferation impact of such exports, transfers, and training, monitoring the activities of specific entities as well as the overall effectiveness of the Russian Government&'s nonproliferation regime remained an important element of the US bilateral dialogue with Russia on nonproliferation.

Nuclear. During the first half of 2003, Russia continued to play a key role in constructing the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project in Iran. However, President Putin has insisted that all Iranian programs in the nuclear field be placed under IAEA control.

President Putin in May 2000 amended the presidential decree on nuclear exports to allow Russia in exceptional cases to export nuclear materials, technology, and equipment to countries that do not have full-scope IAEA safeguards. For example, Russia supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear program in 2001.

Ballistic Missile. Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China. Iran&'s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production.

Chemical and Biological. During the first half of 2003, Russian entities remained a key source of dual-use biotechnology equipment, chemicals and related expertise for countries of concern with active CBW programs. Russia&'s well-known biological and chemical expertise made it an attractive target for countries seeking assistance in areas with CBW applications.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Russia continued to be a major supplier of conventional arms. Following Moscow&'s abrogation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement in November 2000, Russian officials stated that they saw Iran as a significant source of potential revenue from arms sales and believed that Tehran could become Russia&'s third-largest conventional arms customer after China and India. In 2001, Russia was the primary source of ACW for China, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, and one of the largest sources for India. As an example, Russia actively marketed its thermobaric weapons at international arms shows, which likely increases the availability of this type of weapon in the open market.

Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India&'s and China&'s naval nuclear propulsion programs. In addition, Russia discussed leasing nuclear-powered attack submarines to India.

Export Controls. The Duma enacted new export control legislation in 1999, and Putin in 2000 and 2001 reorganized the export control bureaucracy to establish an interdepartmental export control coordinating body, the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation. This organization was to establish federal oversight over export control, including compliance with international export control standards. Further, in 2001, Putin signed into effect several of the new law&'s implementing decrees, which updated export control lists for biological pathogens, chemicals, missiles, and related dual-use technologies and equipment. In May 2002, Russia amended its criminal code to allow for stricter punishment for violations involving the illegal export of material, equipment, and scientific-technical information that may be used in creating WMD or military equipment. The Code of Administrative Violations was also updated and became law as of July 2002. This enactment provided the Department for Export Control (under the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade) with significant administrative enforcement authority. In May 2003, President Putin signed the new Customs Code of the Russian Federation that simplifies customs rules and procedures with the ultimate goal of reducing red tape and arbitrary actions of customs officers. The Code also brings Russia in compliance with the Kyoto Convention on Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures.

[CEP20020530000303, CEP20020508000315, CEP20020423000166]

Despite progress in creating a legal and bureaucratic framework for Russia&'s export controls, lax enforcement remained a serious concern. To reduce the outward flow of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and expertise, top officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities--as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them--that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law will be prosecuted.

North Korea
Nuclear. In late April 2003 during the Beijing talks, North Korea privately threatened to export nuclear weapons.

Ballistic Missile. Throughout the first half of 2003, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Pyongyang attached high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology were one of the North&'s major sources of hard currency, which supported ongoing missile development and production.

China
Over the past several years, Beijing improved its nonproliferation posture through commitments to multilateral arms control regimes, promulgation of export controls, and strengthened oversight mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of great concern.

Nuclear. In October 1997, China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on supplying a uranium conversion facility (UCF), not to enter into any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and to bring to conclusion within a reasonable period of time the two existing projects. We remained concerned that some interactions of concern between Chinese and Iranian entities were continuing. China also made bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. For example, in May 1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. We cannot rule out, however, some continued contacts subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan&'s nuclear weapons program.

Ballistic Missile. In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and in August 2002, as part of its commitment, promulgated a comprehensive missile-related export control system, similar in scope to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex. China is not a member of the MTCR, but on several occasions has pledged not to sell MTCR Category I systems.

Although Beijing has taken some steps to educate firms and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations--offering its first national training course on Chinese export controls in February 2003--Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the first half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant MRBMs. Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. In addition, firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern--such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

Chemical. Since 1997, the US imposed numerous sanctions against Chinese entities for providing material support to the Iranian CW program. Evidence during the current reporting period showed that Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran. In October 2002, China promulgated new controls on biological items and updated chemical-related regulations, and now claims to control all major items on the Australia Group lists.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. During the first half of 2003, China remained a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan and Iran. Islamabad also continued to negotiate with Beijing for China to build up to four frigates for Pakistan's navy and to develop the FC-1 fighter aircraft.

Other Countries
Countries of proliferation concern continued to approach entities in Western Europe, South Asia, and the US to provide needed acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs. Proliferators and associated networks continued to seek machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals. Although western European countries strove to tighten export control regulations, Iran continued to successfully procure dual-use goods and materials from Europe. In addition, several Western European countries remained willing to negotiate ACW sales to Libya, India, Pakistan, and other countries in order to preserve their domestic defense industries. North Korea approached Western Euro-pean entities to obtain acquisitions for its uranium enrichment program. A shipment of aluminum tubing--enough for 4,000 centrifuge tubes--was halted by German authorities.

Western European countries were still an important source for the proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and training. The relatively advanced research of European institutes, the availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, the enthusiasm of scientists for sharing their research, and the availability of dual-use training and education may have shortened development time for some WMD and missile programs.

Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers
As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable technologies continued to be more available around the world, new sources of supply emerged that made the challenge of stemming WMD and missile proliferation even more complex and difficult. Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related technologies have spread to the point that, from a technical view, additional states may be able to produce sufficient fissile material and to develop the capability to weaponize it. As developing countries expanded their chemical industries into pesticide production, they also advanced toward at least latent chemical warfare capability. Likewise, additional non-state actors became more interested in the potential of using biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage. The proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile designs and technology posed the threat of more countries of concern developing longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks to regional stability.

In this context, there was a growing concern that additional states that have traditionally been recipients of WMD and missile-related technology might have followed North Korea's practice of supplying specific WMD-related technology and expertise to other countries or by going one step further to supply such expertise to non-state actors. Even in cases where states took action to stem such transfers, there were growing numbers of knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD- and missile-related materials and technology, who were able to act outside government constraints. Such non-state actors were increasingly capable of providing technology and equipment that previously could only be supplied directly by countries with established capabilities.





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Source: http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm

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Italy Seizes Weapons From U.S.-Bound Ship
AIDAN LEWIS
Associated Press Writer
ROME (AP) -- Authorities in southern Italy seized about 7,500 Kalashnikov assault rifles and other combat-grade firearms from a ship headed for New York, officials said Tuesday.
The weapons - AK-47s, AKM rifles and machine guns worth more than $6 million - were found mixed in with properly labeled guns in cargo containers on board a Turkish-flagged ship that docked at the port of Gioia Tauro, a police official said.
Documents accompanying the cargo indicated the weapons were destined for a company in the U.S. state of Georgia, the official said, declining to name the company.
During customs controls in Italy, officials found that two of the ship's containers held combat-grade Kalashnikov rifles hidden under conventional firearms that included SKA rifles and Mauser rifles. The rifles were designated combat weapons because they had bayonets affixed and cartridges that held up to 30 rounds, the official said.
The official said police suspected the arms were being smuggled, and he declined to give the name of the company in Georgia, citing the need for secrecy during the investigation.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the weapons were discovered 10 days ago, but that police delayed an announcement until they had carried out further checks.
The ship was traveling from the Romanian port of Constanta to New York.
The AK-47 rifles had been altered so they couldn't be used for rapid fire, but the alteration could be easily reversed, police said.
A 1994 ban prevents the U.S. gun industry from making, importing or selling military style semiautomatic weapons because. But that law expires in September.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

Posted by maximpost at 10:09 PM EDT
Permalink

>> PROGRESS REPORTS?...


Iraq awards oil contracts to U.S., European firms

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, April 19, 2004
BAGHDAD - Iraq has awarded oil contracts to companies from Europe and the United States.
The Iraqi Oil Ministry awarded these companies the right to purchase six million barrels of oil from the Kirkuk fields. The leading award was relayed to ExxonMobil of the United States, which won the right to purchase three million barrels of oil.
ExxonMobil, which won a similar award in March, was followed by Spain's Repsol, Greece's Hellenic Petroleum and Turkey's Tupras. They were awarded one million barels each.
The ministry said the oil will be loaded at the Turkish terminal of Ceyhan, along the Mediterranean Sea. The oil will be transported via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, operations of which were renewed in March after a seven-month recess.
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Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.


U.S. Marines engaged in 'silent war' near Syrian border

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, April 19, 2004
BAGHDAD - The United States has been fighting what officials term a silent war with Syria which killed at least five soldiers over the weekend.

U.S. officials said U.S. Marines have deployed along the Syrian border to stop the flow of insurgents and equipment to Iraq. They said Marines have engaged with both Sunni insurgents as well as some Syrian security personnel along the border in clashes that have intensified over the last few weeks.
The U.S. military presence - increased by more than a third over the last two months - was said to be focused on the western Iraqi towns of Al Qaim and Qusaybah, regarded as key points in the smuggling of insurgents and weapons from Syria to Iraq.
Officials acknowledged that at least five soldiers of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, who replaced the 82nd Airborne Division, were killed in battle with 150 insurgents in Husaybah over the weekend, Middle East Newsline reported.
"The Marines did suffer some casualties there," Maj. Gen. John Sattler, director of operations for U.S. Central Command, said. "But in the end, they were able to go ahead and calm that area down. I would say the last six, seven, eight days, we've had some sporadic fighting up in that area, but very limited casualties on the part of the Marines."
In a briefing on April 16, Sattler outlined the mission of the Marines along the Syrian border. He said the mission included constant air and mobile patrols as well as operation of reconnaissance and sensor assets.
Sattler said the Marines have deployed a quick reaction force that includes helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft for attacks along the Syrian border. He said the insurgents move through the Syrian border past Al Qaim to Ramadi and Fallujah. Eventually, he said, many of the insurgents arrive in Baghdad.
"It is a large border and at nighttime there's a lot of wadis and places where individuals can go in and work their way across," Sattler said. "But once they get across they still have a vast portion of desert to come through, and we constantly patrol that to either A. deter them because we are out there in such force, or B. catch them and go ahead and bring them to justice."
U.S. officials said that despite numerous warnings Syria continues to allow Al Qaida-aligned insurgents to enter Iraq. The officials said Syrian border guards have been bribed to ignore the infiltration of insurgents into Iraq.
So far, they said, the Syrian military has not engaged the U.S. Marines along the Iraqi-Syrian border. But they said in some cases Syrian border guards were involved in clashes between insurgents and U.S. troops. They did not report casualties among the Syrian guards.

Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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>> OIL FOR SCANDAL CONTINUED...


Oil-for-Terror?
There appears to be much worse news to uncover in the Oil-for-Food scandal.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/rosett200404182336.asp
By Claudia Rosett

Beyond the billions in graft, smuggling, and lavish living for Saddam Hussein that were the hallmarks of the United Nations Oil-for-Food program in Iraq, there is one more penny yet to drop.

It's time to talk about Oil-for-Terror.
Especially with the U.N.'s own investigation into Oil-for-Food now taking shape, and more congressional hearings in the works, it is high time to focus on the likelihood that Saddam may have fiddled Oil-for-Food contracts not only to pad his own pockets, buy pals, and acquire clandestine arms -- but also to fund terrorist groups, quite possibly including al Qaeda.
There are at least two links documented already. Both involve oil buyers picked by Saddam and approved by the U.N. One was a firm with close ties to a Liechtenstein trust that has since been designated by the U.N. itself as "belonging to or affiliated with Al Qaeda." The other was a Swiss-registered subsidiary of a Saudi oil firm that had close dealings with the Taliban during Osama bin Laden's 1990's heyday in Afghanistan.
These cases were reported in a carefully researched story published last June by Marc Perelman of the New York-based Forward, relying not only on interviews, but on corporate-registry documents and U.S. and U.N. terror-watch lists. It was an important dispatch but sank quickly from sight. At that stage, the U.N. was still busy praising its own $100-billion-plus Oil-for-Food program, even while trying quietly to strip out the huge graft overlay from the remaining $10 billion or so in contracts suddenly slated for handover to the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). That was shortly before the records kept in Baghdad by Saddam began surfacing in such damning profusion that Secretary-General Kofi Annan was finally forced last month to stop stonewalling and agree to an independent investigation -- though just how independent remains to be seen.
As it now appears, Oil-for-Food pretty much evolved into a BCCI with a U.N. label. The stated aim of the program, which ran from 1996-2003, was to reduce the squeeze of sanctions on ordinary Iraqis by allowing Saddam to sell oil strictly to buy food and other relief supplies. As Oil-for-Food worked in practice, however, the program gave Saddam rich opportunity not only to pad his own pockets, but to fund almost anything and anyone else he chose, while the U.N. assured the world that all was well. (For the full saga, see my article in the May issue of Commentary, "The Oil-for-Food Scam: What Did Kofi Annan Know and When Did He Know It?").
For a sample of the latitude enjoyed by Saddam, there's Treasury's announcement last week that the U.S., in its latest round of efforts to recover Saddam's loot, is asking U.N. member states to freeze the assets of a worldwide group of eight front companies and five individuals that were "procuring weapons, skimming funds, operating for the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and doing business in support of the fallen Saddam Hussein regime." The list includes a Dubai-based firm, Al Wasel & Babel General Trading, a major contractor under the Oil-for-Food program that turned out to be a front company set up by Saddam's regime specifically to sell goods (and procure arms) via the program -- right under the U.N.'s approving eye. Indeed, Al Wasel & Babel's website boasts that the company was set up in 1999 especially to "cater to the needs of Iraq Government under 'Oil for Food Program.' "
HOW SADDAM GOT HIS WAY
In this context, which suggests just how easily money might also have been passed right along to terrorists, Perelman's tale of terrorist links deserves a reprise. We will get to that below. The details are complex, which in matters of terrorist financing tends to be part of the point. Complications provide cover. So before we dive into a welter of names and links, let's take a look at how Oil-for-Food was configured and run by the U.N. in ways that left the program wide open not only to the abuses and debaucheries by now well publicized, but also to the funneling of money to terrorists -- if Saddam so chose.
And though this avenue remains to be explored, it is at least worth noting that the explosive growth of Oil-for-Food -- from a limited program for Iraqi relief introduced in 1996 to a kickback-wracked fiesta of fraud and money-laundering by the late 1990s and beyond -- coincided neatly with the period in which al Qaeda really took off. It was in 1998 that Oil-for-Food began to expand and more fully accommodate Saddam's scams. If allegations detailed in a Wall Street Journal story on March 11 prove correct, 1998 was also the year that Saddam may have begun sending oil to a Panamanian front company linked to the head of the program, Benon Sevan. And it was in 1998 that Osama bin Laden issued his fatwa, specifically denouncing U.S. intervention in Iraq and urging Muslims to "Kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they can find it."
To be sure, there is no evidence of a causal connection. But there is certainly room to wonder whether Saddam, a master of manipulation, on record as sharing bin Laden's sentiments at least in regard to U.S. involvement in Iraq, would not have been tempted to involve himself in the terrorist boom of the next few years. In principle he was still under sanctions, but Oil-for-Food gave him loopholes through which billions of dollars could pass.
As Oil-for-Food worked in practice, there were two glaring flaws that lent themselves to manipulation by Saddam. One was the U.N. decision to allow Saddam to choose his own buyers of oil and suppliers of goods -- an arrangement that Annan himself helped set up during negotiations in Baghdad in the mid-1990s, shortly before he was promoted to Secretary-General. The other problem was the U.N.'s policy of treating Saddam's deals as highly confidential, putting deference to Saddam's privacy above the public's right to know. Even the Iraqi people were denied access to the most basic information about the deals that were in theory being done in their name. The identities of the contractors, the amounts paid, the quantity and quality of goods, the sums, fees, interest, and precise transactions involved in the BNP Paribas bank accounts -- all were kept confidential between Saddam and the U.N.
With Saddam allowed to assemble a secret roster of favorite business partners, the only hope of preserving any integrity under Oil-for-Food was that the U.N. would ferociously monitor every deal, and veto anything remotely suspect. Instead, the Security Council looked for weapons-related goods; the Secretariat looked for ways to expand the program (while collecting its three-percent commission on Saddam's oil sales); and Saddam looked for -- and found -- ways to pervert the program.
To grasp just how easily the U.N. let Saddam turn Oil-for-Food to his own ends, it helps to see his lists of contractors, which the U.N. kept confidential. Luckily, some lists have leaked, and in paging through the wonderland of Saddam's U.N.-approved clientele, including many hundreds of oil buyers and goods suppliers, what one finds is a vast web of business partners that -- had the U.N. followed any reasonable policy of disclosure -- should have set off major alarms from beginning to end of the program. Why, for instance, was Saddam allowed to peddle oil (especially under-priced oil -- yielding fat profits) to clusters of what were clearly middlemen in such financial hideouts as Cyprus, Liechtenstein, and Panama? Was it wise to let him kick off the program by including among the first 50 or so oil buyers a full dozen based in Switzerland? Did nobody at the U.N. wonder about his choice of business partners -- such as a holding company in the Seychelles; the Burmese state lumber enterprise; and the Center for Joint Projects at the executive committee of the Belarus-Russia Union?
On the suppliers' list, the entries are no less intriguing. To take just one typical example: On the vague and generic lists provided by the U.N. to the public, you can see that Saddam bought both milk and oil-industry equipment from Russia. Once you see the in-house spreadsheet, however, what emerges is that Saddam bought not only oil equipment, but more than $5 million worth of milk from a Russian state oil company, Zarubezhneft. What look like diverse suppliers in various countries in some cases track back to fronts elsewhere, or to parent companies that in the graft-rich environment of Oil-for-Food clearly had enough of an inside track with Saddam to garner hundreds of millions worth of business -- hidden at least to some extent from both their competitors and the wider public, which was asked to trust the U.N.
In other words, Saddam did pretty much what he wanted, and the U.N. role seems to have consisted largely of occupying one more slot -- and not a terribly vigilant one -- on his patronage payroll.
AIDING AL QAEDA?
Which brings us to back to terrorist ties, and Perelman's story of June 20, 2003, for which the reporting checks out. In brief (hang on for the ride): One link ran from a U.N.-approved buyer of Saddam's oil, Galp International Trading Corp., involved near the very start of the program, to a shell company called ASAT Trust in Liechtenstein, linked to a bank in the Bahamas, Bank Al Taqwa. Both ASAT Trust and Bank Al Taqwa were designated on the U.N.'s own terror-watch list, shortly after 9/11, as entities "belonging to or affiliated with Al Qaeda." This Liechtenstein trust and Bahamian bank were linked to two closely connected terrorist financiers, Youssef Nada and Idris Ahmed Nasreddin -- both of whom were described in 2002 by Treasury as "part of an extensive financial network providing support to Al Qaeda and other terrorist related organizations," and both of whom appear on the U.N.'s list of individuals belonging to or affiliated with al Qaeda.
The other tie between Oil-for-Food and al Qaeda, noted by Perelman, ran through another of Saddam's handpicked, Oil-for-Food oil buyers, Swiss-based Delta Services -- which bought oil from Saddam in 2000 and 2001, at the height of Saddam's scam for grafting money out of Oil-for-Food by way of under-priced oil contracts. Now shut down, Delta Services was a subsidiary of a Saudi Arabian firm, Delta Oil, which had close ties to the Taliban during Osama bin Laden's heyday in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. In discussions of graft via Oil-for-Food, it has been assumed that the windfall profits were largely kicked back to Saddam, or perhaps used to sway prominent politicians and buy commercial lobbying clout. But that begs further inquiry. There was every opportunity here for Saddam not solely to pocket the plunder, but to send it along to whomever he chose -- once he had tapped into the appropriate networks.
Are there other terrorist links? Did Saddam actually send money for terrorist uses through those named by the Forward? Given the more than $100 billion that coursed through Oil-for-Food, it would seem a very good idea to at least try to find out. And while there has been great interest so far in the stunning sums of money involved in this fraud, there has been rather less focus on the potential terrorist connections. While Treasury has been ransacking the planet for Saddam's plunder, there is, as far as I have been able to discover, no investigation so far in motion, or even in the making, focused specifically on terrorist ties in those U.N. lists of Saddam's favored partners.
Indeed, the whereabouts of the full U.N. Oil-for-Food records themselves remain, to say the least, confusing. By some official U.N. accounts, they were all turned over to the Coalition Provisional Authority; by others they were not. A U.N. source explained to me last week that some of the records might be in boxes somewhere on Long Island; yet another says they were sent over to the U.S. Mission to the U.N. Especially crucial, one might suppose, would be the bank records, which should show into which accounts, and where, the Oil-for-Food funds were paid. But what is clear is that no one has so far sat down with access to the full records and begun piecing together the labyrinth of Saddam's financing with an eye, specifically, to potential terrorist ties.
If there is a silver lining to all this, it is that those contract lists and bank records could be a treasure trove of information -- an insider tour of what Saddam's regime knew about the dark side of global finance. There are plenty of signs that the secret U.N. lists became, in effect, Saddam's little black book (papered over with a blue U.N. label). Though perhaps "little" is not the correct word. The labyrinth was vast. The wisest move by the U.N., the U.S., or any other authority with full access to these records, would be to make them fully public -- thus recruiting help from observers worldwide, not least the media, in digging through the hazardous waste left by Oil-for-Food. The issue is not simply how much Saddam pilfered, or even whether he bought up half the governments of Russia and France -- but whether, under the U.N. charade of supervision, he availed himself of the huge opportunities to fund carnage under the cover of U.N. sanctions and humanitarian relief. We are way overdue to pick up that trail.

-- Claudia Rosett is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and an adjunct fellow with the Hudson Institute.
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KILLER GOT U.N. OIL 'REWARD'

By NILES LATHEM
Lebanese businessman George Tarkhaynan
http://www.nypost.com/news/worldnews/22925.htm
April 19, 2004 -- WASHINGTON - In a sinister oil-for-murder plot, Saddam Hussein used the scandal-plagued U.N. oil-for-food program to set up the assassination of a prominent Iraqi exile politician, the slain man's family has charged.
A mysterious George Tarkhaynan appears on an Iraqi Oil Ministry list, published by a Baghdad newspaper, of 270 politicians and businessmen who received sweetheart oil deals under the U.N. humanitarian program.
Safia al-Souhail, a leading political figure in post-Saddam Iraq, told The Post she has evidence that Tarkhaynan is a former Beirut shirtmaker and once-trusted family friend who helped Iraq assassinate her father, anti-Saddam dissident Sheik Taleb al-Souhail al-Tamimi, in Lebanon in 1994.
"George Tarkhaynan was a good agent for them. He facilitated the killing of my father who was an enemy of the regime. This oil voucher was like a present for what he did," al-Souhail said by phone from Baghdad.
The plot is the latest allegation to surface in the mushrooming U.N. scandal in which Saddam is said to have pocketed a staggering $10.1 billion through illegal oil sales and kickbacks.
Tarkhaynan and three Iraqi diplomats in Beirut spent two years in jail for murdering the 64-year old al-Souhail, who had helped organize an unsuccessful 1993 coup against Saddam.
Although media reports at the time said Lebanese prosecutors had solid evidence against them, including coded messages from Baghdad, they were released in 1996 and sent to Iraq as part of a controversial deal to reopen economic ties between the two countries.
Tarkhaynan was later allocated vouchers enabling him to buy up to 7 million barrels of Iraqi oil at below-market prices that could be resold at profits of between 25 and 50 cents a barrel.
That means he was slated to receive up to $3.5 million in oil profits.
Al-Souhail was outraged to learn that Tarkhaynan and others had gotten oil deals.
"These people were covering for Saddam, they were lobbying for him . . . The money they got belongs to the Iraqi people," she said.
Tarkhaynan, who has in the past protested his innocence, could not be reached for comment.
Al-Souhail said Tarkhaynan spent at least seven years in Iraq after being sprung from jail and fled Baghdad days before Saddam fell. She said he'd been employed by the State Oil Marketing Organization, which sold Iraqi oil abroad, and was often a point of contact for foreigners seeking deals with SOMO under the U.N. program.
Al-Souhail described Tarkhaynan as a trusted advisor to her father, who fled Iraq in 1968.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Oil-for-Food Scam: What Did Kofi Annan Know, and When Did He Know It?
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/SpecialArticle.asp?article=A11705017_1
Claudia Rosett

For years, the United Nations Oil-for-Food program was just one more blip on the multilateral landscape: a relief program for Iraq, a way to feed hungry children in a far-off land until the world had settled its quarrels with Saddam Hussein. Last May, after the fall of Saddam, the UN Security Council voted to lift sanctions on Iraq, end Oil-for-Food later in the year, and turn over any remaining business to the U.S.-led authority in Baghdad. On November 20, with some ceremony, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan lauded the program's many accomplishments, praising in particular its long-serving executive director, Benon Sevan. The next day, Oil-for-Food came to an end.

But it has not ended. Suddenly, Oil-for-Food is with us again, this time splashed all over the news as the subject of scandal at the UN: bribes, kickbacks, fraud, smuggling; stories of graft involving tens of billions of dollars and countless barrels of oil, and implicating big business and high officials in dozens of countries; allegations that the head of the program himself was on the take. In February, having at first denied any wrongdoing, Sevan stopped giving interviews and was then reported to be on vacation, heading into retirement. By March, the U.S. Congress was preparing to hold hearings into Oil-for-Food. Kofi Annan, having denied any knowledge of misdeeds by UN staff, finally bowed to demands for an independent inquiry into the UN program, saying, "I don't think we need to have our reputation impugned."

The tale has been all very interesting, and all very complicated. For those who look yearningly to the UN for answers to the world's problems, it has provoked, perhaps, some introspection about the pardonable corruption that threatens even the most selfless undertakings. For those who believe the UN can do nothing right, Oil-for-Food, whatever it was about, is a delicious vindication that everyone and everything at the world organization is crooked, the institution a fiasco, and politicians who support it fit for recall at the next electoral opportunity.

The excitement may be justified, but a number of important facts and conclusions have gone missing. Oil-for-Food, run by the UN from 1996 to 2003, did, in fact, deliver some limited relief to Iraqis. It also evolved into not only the biggest but the most extravagant, hypocritical, and blatantly perverse relief program ever administered by the UN. But Oil-for-Food is not simply a saga of one UN program gone wrong. It is also the tale of a systematic failure on the part of what is grandly called the international community.

Oil-for-Food tainted almost everything it touched. It was such a kaleidoscope of corruption as to defy easy summary, let alone concentration on the main issues. But let us try.

Oil-for-Food had its beginnings in the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq following Saddam Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. These prohibited UN member states from trading with Iraq until the regime had satisfactorily disarmed. Saddam refused to comply, and in the aftermath of the first Gulf war the sanctions remained in place. (Even under sanctions, Iraqis were theoretically allowed to import essential foods and medicines, but Saddam's repressive system prevented them from earning the necessary foreign exchange.) Reports fed by Saddam's regime soon began to surface that the sanctions were imposing severe suffering on ordinary Iraqis. The UN, then led by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, broached the idea of allowing Iraq to sell oil in limited quantities, strictly to buy relief supplies.

At first, Saddam resisted this, too. But in the mid-1990's, perhaps because he was feeling the pinch, or quite likely because he had by then seen ways and built up the leverage to turn such a plan to his advantage, he finally agreed. On April 14, 1995, the UN (then under Boutros Boutros-Ghali) passed Resolution 986, authorizing as a "temporary measure" what become known as the Oil-for-Food program, and then spent months working out with Saddam the details of implementation.

From the start, the program was poorly designed. Saddam had blamed the fate of starving Iraqi children on the sanctions regime and specifically on the United States. Seeking to address these charges, the Clinton administration went looking for a compromise; with the Secretariat in the lead, the Security Council agreed to conditions on Oil-for-Food that were, to say the least, amenable to manipulation. Saddam, the author of the miseries of Iraq, was given the right to negotiate his own contracts to sell Iraqi oil and to choose his own foreign customers. He was also allowed to draw up the shopping lists of humanitarian supplies--the "distribution plans"--and to strike his own deals for these goods, picking his foreign suppliers. The UN also granted Saddam a say in the choice of the bank that would mainly handle the funds and issue the letters of credit to pay these suppliers; the designated institution was a French bank now known as BNP Paribas.1

To be sure, the UN reserved for itself the authority to reject Saddam's proposed contracts and his plans for distribution of goods inside Iraq; to control the program's bank accounts; and to ensure that Saddam's buying and selling were in compliance with the UN's humanitarian plan. As spelled out in Resolution 986, oil was to be sold "at fair-market value," and the proceeds were to pay solely for goods and services that would be used "for equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country."

To all this, the UN added another twist. Unlike most of its relief programs, in which both the cost of the relief itself and UN overhead were paid for by contributions from member states, Oil-for-Food would in every respect be funded entirely out of Saddam's oil revenues. The UN Secretariat would collect a 2.2-percent commission on every barrel of Iraqi oil sold, plus 0.8 percent to pay for UN weapons inspections in Iraq.

If the aim of this provision was to make Saddam bear the cost of his own obstinacy, the effect was to create a situation in which the UN Secretariat was paid handsomely, on commission, by Saddam--to supervise Saddam. And the bigger Oil-for-Food got, the bigger the fees collected by Annan's office. Over the seven years of the program, oil sales ultimately totaled some $65 billion. On the spending side, the UN says $46 billion went for aid to Iraq, and $18.2 billion was paid out as compensation to victims of Saddam's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait. As for commissions to the Secretariat, these ran to about $1.9 billion, of which $1.4 billion was earmarked for administrative overhead for the humanitarian program (the UN says it turned over $300 million of this to help pay for relief, but no public accounting has ever been given) and another $500 million or so for weapons inspections in Iraq. Discrepancies in these numbers can be chalked up to interest paid on some of the funds, exchange-rate fluctuations, or simply the murk in which most of the Oil-for-Food transactions remain shrouded to this day.

Whether Saddam should have enjoyed the right to dispose of all Iraqi oil was never questioned. In Iraq, oil was the province of a state monopoly, which Saddam in effect claimed for his own, and on that basis was the UN deal struck. The arrangement actually helped strengthen Saddam's chokehold at home. With sanctions effectively forbidding all other foreign commerce, Iraq's only legitimate trade was whatever flowed through Saddam's ministries under the supervision of the UN program. Thus the UN gave to Saddam the entire import-export franchise for Iraq, taking upon itself the responsibility for ensuring that he would use this arrangement to help Iraq's 26 million people. The success of the program depended wholly on the UN's integrity, competence, and willingness to prevent Saddam from subverting the setup to his own benefit.

This was perhaps an impossible brief. But the Secretariat eagerly shouldered the burden, accepting along with it the commissions that flowed straight from Iraq's oil spigots. Introduced as an ad-hoc deal, Oil-for-Food soon took on the marks of a more permanent arrangement. It was a project in which Annan had a direct hand from the beginning. As Under-Secretary General, he had led the first UN team to negotiate with Saddam over the terms of the sales under Oil-for-Food. The first shipment went out in December 1996; the following month, Annan succeeded Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General.

Nine months later, in October 1997, Annan tapped Benon Sevan, an Armenian Cypriot and longtime UN official, to consolidate and run the various aspects of the Iraq relief operation under a newly established agency called the Office of the Iraq Program (but usually referred to simply as Oil-for-Food). Sevan served as executive director for the duration, reporting directly to Annan. The program was divided into roughly six-month phases; at the start of each phase, Sevan would report and Annan would recommend the program's continuation to the Security Council, signing off directly on Saddam's "distribution plans."

An issue that would later become important was how, precisely, the responsibilities for executing the program were parceled out between the Security Council--a committee of fifteen member states--and the Secretariat, run by Annan. All of Saddam's proposed contracts flowed through the Security Council, which doubled as the Iraq "sanctions committee." But in practice, the fifteen member governments were mostly on the watch for so-called dual-use items: goods that might be used to make weapons.

As it turned out, only two of the five permanent, veto-wielding members appear to have done any overseeing at all. These were the UK and the U.S., both of which had almost no direct business with Saddam's Iraq. The UN representatives of the other three--France, Russia, and China--devoted their energies chiefly to urging expansion of the program and forwarding the paperwork submitted by the many contractors in their respective nations whom Saddam had selected as his buyers and suppliers. As for the ten rotating members of the Security Council, some--like Syria--were among Saddam's favored trading partners, while most of the others lacked the resources to keep track of the huge volume of business the program soon generated.

If final responsibility lay anywhere at all, it lay with the Secretariat. It was this body that fielded a substantial presence in Iraq (the U.S., apart from weapons inspectors ejected early on, had none), employing at the height of the program some 3,600 Iraqis plus 893 international staff working in Iraq for the nine UN agencies coordinated by the Oil-for-Food office; another 100 or so were employed back in New York. The Secretariat was the keeper of the contract records and the books, and controller of the bank accounts, with sole power to authorize the release of Saddam's earnings to pay for imports to Iraq. The Secretariat arranged for audits of the program, was the chief interlocutor with Saddam, got paid well for its pains, and disseminated to the public extremely long reports in which most of the critical details of the transactions were not included.

One of the first changes introduced by Sevan was greater secrecy. According to John Fawcett, the co-author of a 70-page report on Saddam's finances released in 2002 by the Washington-based Coalition for International Justice, the UN had been fairly open about the specifics of Saddam's contracts during the first year of the program. From about 1998 on, however, it categorized the most germane details as "proprietary"--carefully guarding Saddam's privacy in his business deals. Thus, there was no disclosure of such basic information as the names of individual contractors or the price, quality, or quantity of goods involved in any given deal--all vital to judging the integrity of contracts.

Instead, the Office of the Iraq Program released long lists representing billions of dollars in business but noting only the date, country of origin, whether or not the contract had been approved for release of funding, and highly generic descriptions of goods. Typical of the level of detail were notations like "electric motor" from France, "adult milk" from Saudi Arabia, "detergent" from Russia, "cable" from China. Who in particular might be profiting, or at what price, was kept confidential. Nor did the UN disclose interest paid on the Oil-for-Food accounts at BNP Paribas or (possibly) other banks, which toward the end of the program held balances of more than $12 billion. Nor did it ever share with the public the details of how the $1.9 billion in commissions flowing from Saddam for aid and arms inspections (the latter were discontinued from late 1998 to late 2002) were spent by the UN Secretariat.

The year 1998, the first full year of the program under Sevan's directorship, is of special interest in this connection. For starters, if evidence cited in the Wall Street Journal turns out to be correct, this was the year in which Saddam's government may have begun covertly sending gifts of oil to Sevan himself by way of a Panamanian firm. It was also the year in which the UN terminated a contract with a UK-based firm, Lloyd's Register, for the crucial job of inspecting all Oil-for-Food shipments into Iraq, and replaced it with a Swiss-based firm, Cotecna Inspections, with ties to Kofi Annan's son Kojo. At the time, neither Cotecna nor the UN declared these ties as a possible conflict of interest, which they were.2

Also in 1998, at Sevan's urging, the UN expanded Oil-for-Food to allow Saddam to import not just food and medicine but oil-industry equipment, and at Annan's urging more than doubled the amount of oil Iraq was allowed to sell, raising the cap from roughly $4 billion to more than $10 billion per year. That same year, after much hindering and dickering, Saddam threw out the UN weapons inspectors--forbidding their return until the U.S. and Britain finally forced the issue four years later.

This brings us to 1999-2000, when, following Sevan's urging, the program expanded yet further; with more funds devoted to the oil sector, and with the weapons inspectors gone, the UN now removed the limits on sales. In 2000, Saddam enjoyed a blockbuster year. By this time he was not only selling vastly more oil but had institutionalized a system for pocketing cash on the side.

It worked like this. Saddam would sell at below-market prices to his hand-picked customers--the Russians and the French were special favorites--and they could then sell the oil to third parties at a fat profit. Part of this profit they would keep, part they would kick back to Saddam as a "surcharge," paid into bank accounts outside the UN program, in violation of UN sanctions.

By means of this scam, Saddam's regime ultimately skimmed off for itself billions of dollars in proceeds that were supposed to have been spent on relief for the Iraqi people. When the scheme was reported in the international press--in November 2000, for example, Reuters carried a long dispatch about Saddam's demands for a 50-cent premium over official UN prices on every barrel of Iraqi oil--the UN haggled with Saddam but did not stop it.

Beyond that, Saddam had also begun smuggling out oil through Turkey, Jordan, and Syria. This was in flagrant defiance of UN sanctions and made a complete mockery of Oil-for-Food, whose whole point was to channel all of Saddam's trade. The smuggling, too, was widely reported in the press--and shrugged off by the UN. In the same period, Saddam imposed his own version of sanctions on the U.S., demanding that Oil-for-Food funds be switched from dollars into euros. The UN complied, thereby making it even harder for observers to keep track of its largely secretive and confusing bookkeeping.

As Oil-for-Food grew in size and scope, the U.S. mission to the UN began putting a significant number of its relief contracts on hold for closer scrutiny. Both Sevan and Annan complained publicly and often about these delays, describing them as injurious to the people of Iraq and urging the Security Council to push the contracts through faster. What Sevan did not convey was that, by 2000, complaints had begun reaching him about Iraqi government demands for kickbacks from suppliers on the relief side. These (according to a recent report in the Financial Times) Sevan simply buried, telling complainants to submit formal documents to the Security Council through their countries' UN missions (something they had no incentive to do since Saddam would most likely have responded by scrapping the deals altogether).

By 2002, the sixth year of the program, it was no longer credible that the UN Secretariat could be clueless about Saddam's systematic violations and exploitation of the humanitarian purpose of Oil-for-Food. On May 2, in a front-page story by Alix M. Freedman and Steve Stecklow, the Wall Street Journal documented in detail Saddam's illicit kickbacks on underpriced oil contracts, noting that "at least until recently, the UN has given Iraq surprising influence over the official price of its oil." In fact, against the resistance of Russia, France, China, and the UN Secretariat, the U.S. and Britain had been trying to put a halt to the kickbacks through an elaborate system to enforce fairer pricing--but with only limited success. Sevan, clearly aware of the scam, was quoted in the Journal article as saying he had "no mandate" to stop it.

Apparently, however, there was a near-boundless mandate for the Secretariat to expand the scope of the spending. A mere fortnight later, on May 14, 2002, the Security Council passed a resolution cutting itself out of the loop entirely on all Oil-for-Food contracts deemed humanitarian, and giving direct power of approval to the Secretary-General. Henceforth, the Security Council would confine its oversight to items of potential dual use, such as chemical spraying equipment, or forbidden goods like highly enriched uranium, nuclear-reactor components, and the like. Unimpeded responsibility for the "humanitarian" aspect of the program fell to Annan.

The next month, "humanitarian" became a broad category indeed. On June 2, Annan approved a newly expanded shopping list by Saddam that the Secretariat dubbed "Oil-for-Food Plus." This added ten new sectors to be funded by the program, including "labor and social affairs," "information," "justice," and "sports." Either the Secretary-General had failed to notice or he did not care that none of these had anything to do with the equitable distribution of relief. By contrast, they had everything to do with the running of Saddam's totalitarian state. "Labor," "information," and "justice" were the realms of Baathist party patronage, propaganda, censorship, secret police, rape rooms, and mass graves. As for sports, that was the favorite arena of Saddam's sadistic son Uday, already infamous for torturing Iraqi athletes.

Then came the autumn of 2002, when President Bush delivered his warning to Saddam to comply with sixteen previous UN resolutions to disarm, and the U.S. persuaded the Security Council to pass a seventeenth. Though there was by this time no dearth of damning information in the public domain, Oil-for-Food rolled on. On September 18, the Coalition for International Justice released its heavily researched report, Sources of Revenue for Saddam & Sons, documenting rampant corruption and smuggling under UN sanctions and Oil-for-Food, warning of an Iraqi shift from "informal, on-the-sly deals" to increasingly "brazen and formal government-to-government arrangements," and asking how, "given . . . the world's largest humanitarian program ever, can there remain shortages of basic medicines and foodstuffs" in Iraq? Four months later, with Saddam still defiant and war looking likely, Annan signed a letter to the Security Council in which, among other things, he approved the use of $20 million in Oil-for-Food funds to pay for an "Olympic sport city" and $50 million to equip Saddam's propaganda arm, the Ministry of Information.3

By then, of course, debate over Iraq was raging in the Security Council, and the U.S. and Britain were bitterly at odds with France and Russia. Annan weighed in publicly on the side of the latter, urging yet more time and tolerance. He did not mention his own interest as the boss of a massive relief program funded by Saddam. Neither did he mention that Saddam's commercial deals heavily favored French and Russian companies, though he had access to actual numbers about those deals that, thanks to UN secretiveness, the public did not.

On March 17, with the U.S.-led coalition poised to invade, Annan pulled his international staff out of Iraq. Three days later, as coalition forces rolled into Iraq, he expressed regret that war had come "despite the best efforts of the international community and the United Nations." Describing the UN as the keeper of international "legitimacy," he assured the Iraqi people that, as soon as possible, the UN would be back to do "whatever it can to bring them assistance and support."

Following the fall of Saddam's regime, the U.S.-led coalition decided that Iraq had experienced enough of UN-style "assistance and support," at least as far as Oil-for-Food was concerned. With Russia and France suddenly willing to go along, perhaps to avoid scrutiny of Oil-for-Russia and Oil-for-France, the Security Council voted unanimously on May 22 that the program should be wound down. No more oil revenues were to flow in, but the UN Secretariat was to continue administering the remaining relief contracts until November, when any unfinished business would be turned over to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad.

At that stage, Oil-for-Food had close to $13 billion in BNP Paribas's Iraq accounts, most of it set aside to pay for contracts already approved. During the summer and early fall, the New York office began tidying up loose ends, renegotiating, "prioritizing," and basically removing the graft elements from the remaining contracts before handover to the CPA. In these efforts, the UN got some prompting from the U.S. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)--the agency that has been auditing Halliburton's recent activities in Iraq.

From the thousands of remaining contracts, the DCMA (together with the Defense Contract Audit Agency) culled a batch of 759 of the largest deals, valued altogether at $6.9 billion. The reviewers estimated that among these contracts, almost half were overpriced by about 21 percent, for a total of $656 million that Saddam's regime had overpaid. This was in all likelihood the kickback component, part of which the suppliers were meant to share illicitly with the regime. Dryly, the DCMA's report adds that, in the course of its researches, "Some items of questionable utility for the Iraqi people (e.g., Mercedes Benz touring sedans) were identified."

By the time the Oil-for-Food office was finished renegotiating its contracts, it had scrapped more than a quarter of them. Some of the reasons, listed in UN public documents, are intriguing. There was, for example, the Syrian supplier of "spare parts for rotating equipment" whom it was "not possible to contact"; the Lebanese vendor of "welding machines" who was "unwilling to accept the 10-percent deduction"--i.e., a price minus the bribe-plus-kickback; and the Jordanian seller of school furniture whose contract had to be dropped because "company does not exist and the person in charge moved to Egypt."

Then came the formal ceremonies to which I have already alluded. On November 19, Sevan's office put out a press release praising Oil-for-Food as "one of the most efficient of UN programs." On November 20, Annan chimed in with his own praise for Oil-for-Food, paying tribute to the staff and "particularly to its executive director, Benon Sevan." On November 21, almost seven years after setting up shop as a temporary and limited measure to bring food and medicine to hungry people in Iraq, the program shut down, handing the CPA a royal mess.

Sevan had assured the Security Council that, along with control of the more than $8 billion in funds and contracts still to be administered, the CPA would get "the entire Oil-for-Food database." In fact, the transfer was incomplete. Plenty of contract information was missing. So Byzantine were the BNP Paribas accounts that, rather than risk interrupting relief deliveries, the CPA simply left them under the management of the UN treasurer, who until almost a year after the fall of Saddam never got around to sending any current bank statements, let alone prior records.4

Meanwhile, however, the Iraqi Governing Council had itself begun to pore over records of the Saddam regime from various ministries, and former Baath officials were also starting to talk. On December 5, a British adviser to the Council, Claude Hankes-Drielsma, wrote from Baghdad to Annan, urging the UN to "take the moral high ground" and appoint an independent commission to investigate profiteering under Oil-for-Food.

Not a moment too soon: now the revelations were beginning to flow rapidly. On January 25 of this year, the Iraqi newspaper Al-Mada published a list, reportedly recovered from the Iraqi oil ministry, of some 270 individuals and entities in some 50 countries who were alleged to have received vouchers good for oil from Saddam Hussein. The list was an eye-opener. It included the former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, British MP George Galloway, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a large number of Russian oil companies, the Russian state, and the Russian Orthodox Church. It also included the family name of the head of the UN Oil-for-Food program: Sevan.

Those named in Al-Mada's list ignored, denied, or dismissed it on grounds that they had legitimately bought oil from Saddam. As for Sevan, he categorically repudiated the notion that he had ever received oil or oil money from the Iraqi regime, while Annan, in a statement more artfully hedged, said: "As far as I know, nobody in the Secretariat has committed any wrongdoing." A spokesman for the UN Secretariat repeated the by-now usual line that Oil-for-Food had been the most audited program at the UN--"audited to death" was the exact phrase--and in late February the Oil-for-Food office released a seven-page statement clearly aimed at deflecting blame for any graft involved with the program.

According to this official account, the Secretariat had no responsibility for confirming that contract-pricing was fair, or that suppliers were legitimate (that was the job of Saddam and the UN country missions); no responsibility for implementing the program (that too was the job of Saddam); no responsibility for either spotting or stopping corruption by Saddam via Oil-for-Food contracts (that was the job of the Security Council); and no awareness of unauthorized oil exports (though the office confirmed its knowledge of "media reports on alleged violations"). By the light of this clarification, indeed, it was hard to tell what the Oil-for-Food program was, in fact, responsible for, beyond controlling the opaque bank accounts, checking that the contracts--honest or not--were properly punctuated, watching Saddam do whatever he chose, and collecting a 2.2-percent commission on his oil.

And so we arrive at the denouement--at least so far. On February 29, the New York Times published a long news article based on "a trove of internal Iraqi government documents and financial records" unearthed by the Iraqi Governing Council. The article described oil traders lugging suitcases full of illicit cash to the ministries and cited stacks of evidence showing that, through Oil-for-Food, Saddam's regime had squirreled away billions for itself while ordinary Iraqis received expired medicines and substandard rations.

Still the UN hung tough. On March 3, Hankes-Drielsma notified Annan that Iraqi authorities had asked an auditing firm, KPMG International, and a law firm, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, to prepare an independent report. In his letter, Hankes-Drielsma explained his reasoning:

Based on the facts as I know them at the present time, the UN failed in its responsibility to the Iraqi people and the international community at large. The UN should not be surprised that the Iraqi people question the UN's credibility at this time and any future role for the UN in Iraq. It will not come as a surprise if the Oil-for-Food program turns out to be one of the world's most disgraceful scams and an example of inadequate control, responsibility, and transparency, providing an opportune vehicle for Saddam Hussein to operate under the UN aegis to continue his reign of terror and oppression.

On March 10 came confirmation that Annan's son Kojo had held a consultancy with Cotecna right around the time the company won the UN job to inspect goods coming into Iraq. On March 11 came an article in the Wall Street Journal detailing further links between Saddam's oil largesse and Sevan. The following week came word that Congress would hold hearings on Oil-for-Food. And on March 19, having ignored, stonewalled, and denied, Annan finally conceded that "it is highly possible there has been quite a lot of wrongdoing," and called for an independent inquiry.

As the various audits, investigations, and hearings gear up to delve into the saga of UN involvement in Saddam's Iraq, we may learn even more about his worldwide net of corruption. With skill, we may locate some of the billions he is believed to have salted away under UN oversight. With luck, we may get to this money ahead of the terrorists with whom he consorted--if they have not gotten to it already. Already known, for example, is that two firms doing business with Saddam through Oil-for-Food were linked to financier Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, now on the UN's own watchlist of individuals "belonging to or associated with" al Qaeda.

But let us retain our focus. That Saddam Hussein was a monster and a corrupt monster is not news. That he would exploit, for massive personal gain, a humanitarian program meant to relieve the miseries of his countrymen is horrifying but hardly astonishing. Nevertheless, any investigation that confines itself to detailing the abundantly evident corruption of Saddam Hussein will have missed the point.

What lies at the core of this story is the United Nations, and how it came to pass that an institution charged with bringing peace and probity to the world should have offered itself up--willingly, even eagerly--as the vehicle for a festival of abuse and fraud.

To begin with, Oil-for-Food was an enormous venture in central planning, the biggest project of its kind launched in many a decade and one that utterly ignored the lessons about such systems learned at agonizing cost over the past century. The UN Secretariat, in its well-paid arrogance, set out to administer virtually the entire economy of Iraq. Under its eye, all legitimate trading privileges became the franchise of a tyrant who laid first claim to every barrel of oil and every dollar (or euro) of proceeds. How could Oil-for-Food not help consolidate Saddam's grip on power? Nevertheless, it was with this grand thief of Baghdad that the UN cut its humanitarian deal, chalking in a fat commission for the Secretariat.

Nor did anyone in the UN system so much as lift an eyebrow, even after questions began to be raised. Last November, before the Security Council of the United Nations, the organization's Secretary-General proclaimed it a splendid achievement that the UN had legitimized a scheme by which 60 percent of Iraq's population depended entirely on the rationing cards of a totalitarian state. This was an event that should have seized the vaunted international community with horror. Instead, from out of the mouth of the Angolan ambassador who that month was chairing the UN Security Council there issued only unctuous praise for "the exceptionally important role of the program in providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq."

But all that is only prelude. The scope of UN dereliction is much broader, encompassing factors institutional, personal, and, finally, political.

It is true that Oil-for-Food managed to deliver to Iraqis some portion of what it promised. On sales totaling $65 billion, some $46 billion (by Annan's uncheckable reckoning) went for "humanitarian" spending. Of this amount, an official total of $15 billion worth of food and health supplies--the original rationale for the program--had been received by the time Saddam fell. The actual figure was no doubt considerably less if you factor in the kickbacks and spoiled goods; from the remainder came the equipment for Saddam's oil monopoly, the construction materials, the TV studio systems, the carpets and air conditioners for the ministries, and all the rest.

But at what cost? Are we supposed to conclude that, in order to deliver this amount of aid, the UN had to approve Saddam's more than $100 billion worth of largely crooked business, had to look the other way while he skimmed money, bought influence, built palaces, and stashed away billions on the side, at least some of which may now be funding terror in Iraq or beyond?

No, something was at work here other than passive acquiescence. At precisely what moment during the years of Oil-for-Food did the UN Secretariat cross the line from "supervising" Saddam to collaborating with him? With precisely what deed did it enter into collusion? Even setting aside such obvious questions as whether individual UN officials took bribes, did the complicity begin in 1998, when Saddam flexed his muscles by throwing out the weapons inspectors and when Oil-for-Food, instead of leaving along with them, raised the cap on his oil sales? Did it come in 1999, when, even as Saddam's theft was becoming apparent, the UN scrapped the oil-sales limits altogether? Or in 2000 and 2001, when Sevan dismissed complaints and reports about blatant kickbacks? Did it start in 2002, when Annan, empowered by Oil-for-Food Plus, signed his name to projects for furnishing Saddam with luxury cars, stadiums, and office equipment for his dictatorship? Or did the defining moment arrive in 2003, when Annan, ignoring the immense conflict posed by the fact that his own institution was officially on Saddam's payroll, lobbied alongside two of Saddam's other top clients, Russia and France, to preserve his regime? Certainly by the time Annan and Sevan, neck-deep in revelatory press reports and standing indignantly athwart their own secret records, continued to offer to the world their evasions and denials, the balance had definitively tipped.

Annan's studied bewilderment is itself an indictment not only of his person but of the system he heads. If anyone is going to take the fall for the Oil-for-Food scandal, Sevan seems the likeliest candidate. But it was the UN Secretary-General who compliantly condoned Saddam's ever-escalating schemes and conditions, and who lobbied to the last to preserve Saddam's totalitarian regime while the UN Secretariat was swimming in his cash.

Annan has been with the UN for 32 years. He moved up through its ranks; he knows it well. He was there at the creation of Oil-for-Food, he chose the director, he signed the distribution plans, he visited Saddam, he knew plenty about Iraq, and one might assume he read the newspapers. We are left to contemplate a UN system that has engendered a Secretary-General either so dishonest that he should be dismissed or so incompetent that he is truly dangerous--and should be dismissed.

The final perfidy, though, is not personal but political. The UN, in the name of its own lofty principles, and to its rich emolument, actively helped sustain and protect a tyrant whose brutality and repression were the cause of Iraqi deprivation in the first place. What can this mean? The answer may be simply that, along with its secrecy, its massed cadres of bureaucrats beholden to the favor of the man at the top, its almost complete lack of accountability, external oversight, or the most elementary checks and balances, the UN suffers from an endemic affinity with anti-Western despots, and will turn a blind eye to the devil himself in order to keep them in power. Certainly there is much in its history and its behavior to support this view.

Perhaps, then, the complicity was there all along, built in, and was merely reinforced year after year as the UN collected the commissions and processed the funds that transformed Oil-for-Food into the sleaziest program ever to fly the UN flag and the single largest item on every budget of all nine UN agencies involved, plus the Secretariat itself. That, in the end, may be the dirty secret at the center of the Oil-for-Food scandal.

And is this the same United Nations that, now, we are planning to entrust with bringing democracy to Iraq?


Claudia Rosett, who contributes a bi-weekly column on foreign affairs to the Wall Street Journal's online edition, OpinionJournal.com, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and an adjunct fellow of the Hudson Institute.

1 As of 2001, one of the largest shareholders in BNP was Iraqi-born Nadhmi Auchi, among Britain's richest citizens. In the 1980's Auchi had brokered business deals for Saddam; last year he was convicted in France of illicit profiteering as part of the huge Elf oil scandal. The UN says the Oil-for-Food contract was awarded to BNP on a strictly competitive basis.

2 According to a spokesman at the UN Secretary-General's office, Kojo Annan had been a trainee at Cotecna from December 1995 to February 1998, and two months later was back at work for the firm as a consultant; his consultancy, which lasted until December 1998, thus coincided with the period during which the UN would have been receiving and reviewing bids for the Oil-for-Food inspection job. Both Kojo and Kofi Annan have denied that Kojo's consulting work was in any way related to the UN.

3 This is especially significant in light of the role that would be played by Saddam's televised propaganda during the war. In the event, Saddam may have had to rely on equipment brought in earlier under Oil-for-Food from places like France and Jordan. He was unable to take delivery of TV studio equipment ordered from Russia and approved and funded by the Secretariat on February 7, 2003, just six weeks before the war. But that was not for want of Kofi Annan's approval.

4 Not only the occupation authority but the Iraqis themselves have failed to penetrate the UN wall of disdain, although it is their own money they wish to know about. The Iraqi Central Bank began requesting copies of the relevant BNP bank statements in July 2003. Not until late March of this year, after I aired the matter in a piece in National Review Online, was there some halting sign of movement in the UN treasurer's office. Similar stonewalling--no accounting given, no access to statements--has met the repeated efforts of Kurds in northern Iraq to find out what happened to about $4 billion in separate allocations owed to them under Oil-for-Food.


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Volcker's U.N. Cleanup
The Russians are blocking a proper Oil for Food probe.

Monday, April 19, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
Meanwhile, back at the United Nations Oil for Food scandal, the news leaked Friday that Secretary-General Kofi Annan has picked Paul Volcker to lead a three-man panel to investigate what we now know was a Saddam Hussein skimming operation. What we'd also like to know is why it is taking so long for the Volcker appointment to be formally announced.
Mr. Annan first offered the job to Mr. Volcker, the former Federal Reserve Chairman, some two weeks ago. It shouldn't take this long to close the deal--unless some members of the U.N. Security Council really don't want a probe. Word is that Mr. Volcker, who is nobody's toady, doesn't want to lend his reputation to this exercise unless the Security Council passes a new resolution calling on members to cooperate with his team. Under pressure from the U.S. and Britain, Mr. Annan has agreed.
But, lo, the Russians are objecting to any resolution. "We don't mind for the Secretary-General to appoint the commission but we don't see the need to support his decision in the form of a resolution," says Russia's U.N. Ambassador Gennady Gatilov. In other words, he wants Mr. Volcker to serve as eyewash for the U.N. but without the political clout to expose what really happened. We don't suppose it is a coincidence, comrade, that Russians were among Saddam's best business partners. No word yet on where the French stand on a resolution, but we can guess.
The Oil for Food program was designed to let Iraq sell some oil to finance food and humanitarian aid for Iraqis hurt by sanctions against Saddam's regime. But we have learned that Saddam skimmed off as much as $10 billion to build his own palaces and pay off apologists for his regime around the world.
Only last week, Detroit businessman Shakir al-Khafaji admitted to the Financial Times that he received Oil for Food allocations. Mr. al-Khafaji had earlier denied receiving such allocations in an interview with our Robert Pollock, who recently reported that Mr. al-Khafaji had helped to finance a pro-Saddam documentary by former weapons inspector Scott Ritter and had donated to antiwar Congressional Democrats. Another hearing in Congress is scheduled this week into what is already the worst corruption scandal in U.N. history.
A new resolution would be especially helpful because Security Council nations and members of the U.N. Secretariat have been implicated in the scandal. If Mr. Volcker is going to conduct a credible probe, he'll need the political clout that a new resolution would provide. We trust he's also asking for an independent staff of his own choosing and ample funding. And while a public accounting is necessary, we hope Mr. Volcker will also conduct the probe with an eye to U.S. banking and other laws that may have been broken.
All of this relates not merely to a "look backwards," as Mr. Gatilov dismissively puts it, but directly to the U.N.'s current ambitions in Baghdad. Iraqis now know that the U.N. and some of its leading members conspired with their former dictator to fleece them of their national wealth. The very least Iraqis should expect is that the U.N. will come clean about its sins and punish those who profited at their expense. George Bush, John Kerry and others who now want to give the U.N. control in Baghdad should also settle for nothing less.


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Texas Talk on Palestine
The president's critics attack him for telling the truth.

Saturday, April 17, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
Listening to the furious reaction to President Bush's letter to Ariel Sharon, you would never know that it reiterated his call for a Palestinian state that is "viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent."
Instead, Mr. Bush now finds himself blasted for a "drastic and unfortunate policy reversal" that will "put the final nail in the coffin of the peace process." His move, say critics, risks "inflaming the Arab world," angers "moderate" Arab governments and might aggravate the situation in Iraq.
There may indeed be a lost opportunity here, but it's not the one Mr. Bush's opponents think. In his declaration that any two-state resolution of the crisis could include some Israeli settlements on post-1949 lands and the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, Mr. Bush did not so much break new ground as acknowledge demographic reality. Those attacking him for daring to speak this frankly only encourage Palestinian hardliners to continue along their debilitating course of rejectionism.
Rather than losing his credibility as an honest broker, as critics charge, the President's straight talk has strengthened his position. Anyone who claims to be a moderator in the pursuit of a just, two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians cannot at the same time tolerate ideas that would lead to the demise of one of those states. A "right of return" for Palestinians to Israel is such an idea.
All this passion over Mr. Bush's words, moreover, overshadows the significance of the withdrawal plan itself. After three years of relentless terror, Prime Minister Sharon--the father of the settlement movement--has agreed to withdraw all 7,500 Israeli settlers and all military installations from Gaza and four settlements from the West Bank.
At the very least, such a withdrawal will remove frictions between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza, ending daily confrontations over roadblocks, checkpoints and curfews. The security barrier Israel builds in conjunction with the disengagement plan is designed to make it harder for terrorists to carry out their attacks, reducing the number of Israeli counterattacks. This will be the first positive step in the region in more than three years. By leaving Gaza, Mr. Sharon puts the ball squarely into the Palestinian court.
In his letter, Mr. Bush lays out the obligations Palestinians have: to stop the terror, to demonstrate a commitment to political reform, to start behaving like a respectable government. But the underlying message--underscored by the U.S. embrace of the Sharon plan--is that the Palestinian failure to meet those obligations will have consequences in American foreign policy.
In this light, keeping alive the myth that Palestinian refugees will "return" to Israel does the Palestinian people a disservice by emboldening hard-liners and making it impossible for moderate voices to gain popular support. Mr. Bush makes plain that he remains willing to work with the Palestinians in pursuit of a viable state and lays out the terms for doing so. The real question here is whether they will take him up on it.




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>> WHAT? - NO WIRES WATCH...

Analysis: Nuke-for-energy deal for Kim?
By Jong-Heon Lee
UPI Correspondent
Published 4/19/2004 11:40 AM
SEOUL, South Korea, April 19 (UPI) -- Will North Korean leader Kim Jong Il bring a breakthrough on the nuclear impasse?
Kim's surprise visit to Bejing this week for a summit with Chinese President Hu Jintao raised hopes of progress in the long-stalled nuclear issue.
China is considered one of few nations that have leverage over Kim's defiant regime, which has been heavily dependent on Beijing's food and energy aid. Beijing's economic assistance is vital for the North's tattered economy. China also needs North Korea to ease the nuclear standoff to boost its leverage in pressing for a more accommodating U.S. stance toward Taiwan.
"The two nations need each other's help. The Beijing summit was arranged for mutual benefit," said Moon Heung-ho, a China expert at Hanyang University in Seoul. "We hope to see progress in the nuclear stalemate in the North Korea-China summit," Seoul's Foreign Ministry official said.
Kim held talks with Chinese President Hu on Monday in Beijing after arriving in the Chinese capital by train earlier in the day for an informal visit, according to South Korea's media reports and diplomatic sources in Seoul.
Neither the South Korean nor the Chinese government would confirm Kim's visit, which was cloaked in secrecy. But both sides are widely expected to announce his visit after Kim returns to Pyongyang, as they have done in the past.
When Kim visited China in 2000 and 2001, neither side announced the visits in advance or commented on the trips until after he returned home. "North Korea has requested that Kim's schedule be kept secret due to security concerns," a diplomatic source in Seoul said.
Kim crossed the border city of Sinuiju into China around 9 p.m. Sunday after leaving his office in Pyongyang at 1 p.m. that day by special train. Kim was greeted at the Chinese border city of Dandong by Wang Jiarui, the Communist Party's director of international relations, South Korea's official Yonhap News Agency said in a report from the Chinese capital that quoted "informed diplomatic sources."
Kim's train, carrying an entourage of some 40 high-level ruling party, state and military officials, drew into Beijing's main railway station around 6 a.m. Monday amid tight security. Beijing's railway station was guarded by military police and a station official said it was closed for the arrival of a "special visitor."
A convoy of unmarked cars, including a black Mercedes limousine, pulled out of the railway station and headed west towards the state guesthouse, where Kim has stayed on previous trips, said Yonhap and Seoul's state-run television, KBS.
Kim reportedly met Hu over lunch at Zhongnanhai, the leadership compound in Beijing. It was the first summit between the two communist allies since the new Chinese leaders took office last year.
No details of the summit were available, but media reports quoted sources as saying it was focused on how to end the standoff over Pyongyang's nuclear arms ambitions, Beijing's food and energy assistance, and North Korea's economic reforms.
At the summit, Kim said his country was ready to give up its nuclear development program if the United States dropped its hostile policy towards Pyongyang. He also asked for economic and energy aid from China.
In return, Hu reportedly called for Pyongyang to move to ease the nuclear crisis, saying U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney on a visit to Beijing last week warned that time was running out for a resolution on the issue.
Analysts in Seoul said Beijing wanted to hear Kim's position on North Korea's nuclear program and use the summit to make progress toward six-party talks to end the nuclear crisis. "China invited the North Korean leader to visit Beijing to offer economic aid and persuade Pyongyang to make concessions to break the nuclear impasse," said Paek Seung-joo, an analyst at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis in Seoul.
China has been mediating between North Korea and the United States at the six-way talks, which also involve South Korea, Japan and Russia, aimed at seeking a peaceful resolution to the crisis. China hosted two rounds of six-party talks, the latest one in February, but no agreement has been reached.
"North Korea is not in a position to dismiss Chinese pressure," said Lee Tae-hwan, a China specialist at the Sejong Institute, a private think tank in Seoul, "because China provides between 70 percent and 90 percent of North Korea's oil and more than one-third of its imports and food aid."
"Beijing wants to use its role in defusing the nuclear crisis as leverage in dealing with Washington over the Taiwan issue," a Western diplomat said, requesting anonymity. "With the North Korea card in hand, China would call for the United States to discourage Taiwan from adopting a confrontational stance with the mainland following Chen Shui-bian's re-election as the island's president.
Kim Jong Il's China trip came after Cheney came to China last week armed with fresh evidence of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities and pressing Beijing to take a tougher line with its communist neighbor.
After the summit, Kim visited Zhongguancun technology park, China's leading high-tech development zone. He is scheduled to have a series of meetings with Chinese leaders, including former President Jiang Zemin, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, parliamentary leader Wu Bangguo and Vice President Zeng Qinghong.
On his way back to North Korea on Wednesday, he is expected to visit Shenyang or Dalian in China's northeast to study government efforts to boost the economy with outside investment.

Copyright ? 2001-2004 United Press International

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N. Korea's Kim in Beijing for Rare, Secretive Talks
Mon Apr 19, 5:45 AM ET

By John Ruwitch and Benjamin Kang Lim

BEIJING (Reuters) - Reclusive North Korean leader Kim Jong-il arrived unannounced in Beijing on Monday and went straight into talks on his nuclear weapons ambitions after Washington urged Beijing to push to end the crisis.
Kim, whose special train drew into Beijing after an overnight journey from Pyongyang, will be in China for up to four days, during which he expects to meet his counterpart, military chief Jiang Zemin, and do some sightseeing, said a Chinese source familiar with the talks.
He met President and Communist Party chief Hu Jintao for lunch in the high-walled Zhongnanhai leaders' compound and for talks dominated by the nuclear crisis and the North's economic and food problems, South Korea (news - web sites)'s Yonhap news agency said.
Kim was likely to tour a Beijing high-tech zone dubbed "China's Silicon Valley," it said.
Solving the nuclear issue is key to unlocking outside aid to the ailing and isolated North Korean economy, including from China, the North's closest friend.
Kim's trip, cloaked in the secrecy that traditionally surrounds his rare overseas journeys, comes less than a week after Vice President Dick Cheney (news - web sites) warned in Beijing that time was running out to resolve the crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions that has gripped North Asia since late 2002.
China's leaders are likely to dangle the prospect of economic help while repeating that they oppose a nuclear-armed Pyongyang and insist on a peaceful resolution to a problem that has enraged Washington and triggered nervousness among neighbors.
"Putting pressure on North Korea (news - web sites) isn't a good way to do things," said Korea expert Piao Jianyi with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "But we have emphasized all along that the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully."
Kim's first visit to China in three years was expected to last about four days. His previous two trips were not publicized until after he left.
Chinese officials declined formally to confirm the visit but a second source said Kim had originally been scheduled to visit last week.
"The arrangements are being kept secret," he said. "He was supposed to have arrived last week. But it was delayed because things had not been sorted out."
Cheney was in Beijing last Tuesday and Wednesday. And Thursday marked the 92nd anniversary of the birth of Kim's father, North Korea's late founder Kim Il-sung.
The first sign of his arrival was a convoy of unmarked cars, including a black Mercedes limousine, that pulled out of Beijing's main railway station. The station was guarded by military police and an official said it was closed for the arrival of a special visitor, whose identity was a secret.
ECONOMIC NEEDS
Kim's entourage included 40 high-level ruling party, state and military officials in a trip aimed to shore up ties, South Korean state broadcaster KBS said. Kim, who avoids travel by plane, was also seeking economic aid and might tour the northeastern city of Shenyang or Dalian, Yonhap said.
Kim is also to meet Premier Wen Jiabao, who is at the helm of China's booming economy, and former president and Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin, KBS said. Jiang and Kim both command the military in their respective countries.
In 2001, the leader of the communist North toured Shanghai and was reportedly impressed with the glitz of China's financial hub. He later began to experiment with market reforms.
"The backdrop of the Kim Jong-il trip is that North Korea is in a situation where it has to resolve the nuclear issue before there can be progress on the economic front," said Koh Yoo-hwan, Dongguk University professor on North Korea studies.
The United States is key.
Cheney came to China last week armed with fresh evidence of the North's nuclear weapons capabilities and pressing Beijing to take a firmer line with its communist neighbor.
China has played host at two rounds of inconclusive six-party talks with the two Koreas, the United States, Japan and Russia aimed at ending the crisis. A third round is planned before July.
Regional tensions have simmered since October 2002, when U.S. officials say Pyongyang disclosed it was working on a clandestine program to enrich uranium -- in addition to a plutonium-based program that had been mothballed in 1994.
In the talks in February, the six agreed to meet again before mid-year and to start working-level talks before that to discuss the dispute. No progress has been reported since. (Additional reporting by Paul Eckert and Jack Kim in Seoul)





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Iran gets its hands dirty
By Safa Haeri

PARIS - It took a hail of bullets into the car of Iranian envoy Khalil Naimi in Baghdad on Thursday to jeopardize Tehran's attempts to become an influential mediator in Iraq, with the strong hope of seeing itself removed from George W Bush's "axis of evil".
Press and cultural attache Naimi died instantly when the car in which he was traveling near the Iranian embassy was raked by three heavily-armed men.
Against all odds, Iran had embarked on an unlikely diplomatic mission to get the American "Satan" out of its difficulties in Iraq. A five-man Iranian foreign ministry delegation, headed by the ministry's director for Persian Gulf affairs, Hossein Sadeqi, is in Najaf to assist in the crisis over the rebel leadership of cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Shi'ite followers have been engaged in week-long battles with US-led occupation forces.
Muqtada, whom US forces have vowed to "kill or capture", is barricaded inside Najaf, Iraq's holiest city. The US has massed more than 2,000 troops for an offensive, though both sides have said that they want to avoid bloodshed.
Now, though, Iran finds itself as yet another victim of the spiral of violence in Iraq that has seen citizens of a host of countries - ranging from Italy to Japan - either killed or kidnapped over the past weeks, and its official involvement in the country becomes problematical. It was not immediately clear whether the assassination had any direct impact on Sadeqi's plans in Iraq, although the envoy ruled out holding any talks with Muqtada after earlier hinting that this might be a possibility.
And the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, on an unannounced visit to Baghdad, said that the last thing Iraq needed was "influence from neighboring countries trying to promote or protect their own self interest".
Sunni Muslims in Iraq, who for many years under Saddam Hussein and even before dominated the corridors of power, are known to be extremely fearful of Shi'ites - who form the majority in the country - becoming the new rulers. And they constantly warn in newspapers and at mosques of Iran interfering in Iraq and attempting to stir sectarian trouble.
In their first reaction, authorities in Tehran vehemently condemned the murder of Naimi, blaming it indirectly on the American presence in Iraq. But diplomats did not rule out a possible connection between the killing and the mediation efforts undertaken by Tehran to assess the chances of calming down Muqtada, the young and volatile cleric who has plunged American forces and their allies into their fiercest battles since their triumphant entry into Baghdad a year ago.
This was the first time that an Iranian diplomat had been assassinated in Iraq, where Iran, with its strong Shi'ite ties to the Shi'ite majority in Iraq, would think itself "immune" to such attacks.
"Those who killed our diplomat are the same that do not want to see Iraq living in peace and stand up on its feet," one Iranian diplomat in Baghdad said, while in Tehran, Hamid Reza Asefi, the Iraqi-born official spokesman of the foreign affairs ministry squarely accused the Americans, saying: "The violence and bloodshed in Iraq are the direct result of American's foolish policies in the region, making the whole world an unsafe place for humanity."
Officials in Washington confirmed that Britain had invited the Iranian delegation to help restore calm and security in Iraq, as, in the words of Mehdi Karroobi, the speaker of the majlis, or parliament, "it is obvious that Iran has strong influence in Iraq, where the people have traditional brotherly bonds with the Iranians".
An aide to Muqtada told French news agency Agence France Presse that the cleric welcomed the Iranian initiative because it came from an Islamic country. He said Muqtada was ready to meet the Iranian diplomats.
A senior State Department official said in Washington of the Iranian mediation: "They were invited by the British trying to put an end to the bloody standoff between American-led coalition forces with the Mahdi Army of Mr al-Sadr," explaining, however, that although the US went along with the British initiative, the proposal did not come from the Bush administration.
Iranian foreign affairs minister Kamal Kharrazi said in Tehran hours after the delegation left for Iraq that "naturally, there are such requests from the US and Britain that we help improve the situation in Iraq, and we are making efforts in this regard. There has been a lot of correspondence with the US about Iraq and the Swiss embassy in Tehran, which represents US diplomatic interests in the Islamic republic, played a mediating role in the recent exchanges," Kharrazi added, accusing at the same time the US of breaking its promises in Iraq and "taking a wrong path".
"When the Americans, or their most close and trusted ally, the British, call on Iran to help, this shows the influence Iran exercises in Iraq and the region, something that is not to the liking of many Arab nations and their proxies in Iraq hating the Iranians," one Iraqi diplomat told Asia Times Online.
Jean Pierre Perrin, chief of the foreign desk at the leftist French paper Liberation and a former correspondent of the French news agency AFP in Tehran, commented: "Iran's main adversary is not Washington but the two traditional enemies of the Iranian political Shi'ism: the exacerbated Arabian nationalism that carried to Iran the hardest strokes under Saddam Hussein and the imported Islam Wahhabite of Saudi Arabia that always sees in Shi'ism a 'plot of the Jewish on the one hand and the other groups that are currently engaged against the Americans in the Sunnite regions of Iraq'."
Tehran's attempts to help the US out of its troubles in Iraq (even if for self-serving reasons) have not dulled the rhetoric coming out of Tehran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, leader of Iran, told the country's state-run, conservative-controlled television: "The United States accuses other countries of intervening in Iraq and of inciting the Iraqis, but it is very clear that the crimes of the occupation and their insulting behavior with regard to the young and the women are at the origin of the reaction of the Iraqis, Shi'ite or Sunni."
For the Supreme Leader, it is obvious that "sooner or later, the Americans will be forced to leave Iraq in shame and humiliation".
The assassination happened just hours before Sadeqi and his delegation were to leave for Najaf, from where Muqtada had earlier announced that he would obey the supreme religious authorities, and if necessary give himself up to an independent Iraqi court and dismantle his army, transforming it into a political party.
Michael Rubin, who recently resigned as an "advisor" to the US-installed Iraqi Governing Council, wrote: "The British government, with tacit US approval, has initiated discussions with the Iranian foreign ministry. A team led by top Iranian diplomat Hossein Sadeqi visited Iraq in recent days, but his talks went nowhere. The Iranian regime used Washington and London's outreach not to promote dialogue, but to humiliate the United States at a time our soldiers make sacrifices to preserve Iraq's freedom."
Leaking news of the talks on Iranian television, foreign minister Kharrazi demonstrated to his domestic audience that the US was not in control and had run to Iran for assistance. Moving in for the propaganda kill, Kharrazi stated: "The solution is for the occupiers to leave Iraq."
And Iran's repeated offer for a meeting of Iraq's neighbors to "advise" the Americans who "ignore both the situation in Iraq and the psychology of the Iraqi people", helping them "not to repeat and cumulate mistakes" there.
But at the same time, though the Iranian leaders call on Iraqis to give a lesson to the "wounded American monster", they are nevertheless worried of impending chaos in Iraq, and have avoided any direct praise for the Sunnite opposition in Fallujah, and even for Muqtada's revolt.
So while the Arab press in general glorifies Muqtada, describing him as a "hero", a "popular figure" fighting the occupation of Iraq by foreign forces, etc, the Iranian media are more cautious, observing that the young cleric is "a noise", without any religious or political legitimacy.
The Iranian daily Aftab Yazd said that the media were "wrongly" presenting the activities of Muqtada and his followers as the widespread resistance of the Iraqi people. "It is quite erroneous for our media to give implicit or open backing to people like Sadr, whose causes are not entirely known to us," it said, adding that "clearly no friend of liberty would defend the occupation in Iraq, but it is one thing to oppose occupation and another to take sides in a fight where none of the potential winners are favorably inclined toward Iran".
Columnist Ali Hamade said in the an-Nahar of Beirut, referring to the handling of Muqtada and his Mahdi Army, "The United States administration has made a major blunder in Iraq by thinking it could follow Israel's heavy-handed example against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza without having to pay the political price."
"The Americans are on their way to doom in Iraq. In addition, the US failure in Iraq will have drastic implications on US plans for the region ... Iraq has shown that it was one thing to bring down an unpopular regime in an Arab state, but quite another to be able to rule that state. Iraq has shown that ruling post-war Iraq was the closest thing to hell for the Americans," Hamade said.
Columnist Rafik Khoury wrote in al-Anwar, another Lebanese Arabic-language daily: "Muqtada al-Sadr, the young Shi'ite militia leader, has shown that the Americans did not come to introduce democracy, but to rule Iraq and lay their hands on its vast oil resources. Washington, which came to Iraq under the pretext of liberating its people from the previous regime of Saddam Hussein, has now saddled them with a more repressive authority," he said, adding: "Meanwhile, Sadr has become the symbol of anti-American Iraqi armed resistance, and Fallujah has become the symbol of Iraqi cities being oppressed by allied force."
Commented the London-based al-Qods al-Arabi. "It was impossible for the United States to succeed in wiping out Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army because it is not an organized group, but a popular movement that expresses a religious ideology."
The paper said that US forces represented the largest power in the world, one that could defeat the Iraqi army and "perhaps the entire Arab armies united in a few days, because of the military disparities, but the US army is unable to defeat the ideas and religious ideologies in a country like Iraq".
According to this paper, capturing and killing Muqtada, as promised by the Americans, would "make him a martyr, while if he is arrested alive, he will become a symbol of resistance, just like Nelson Mandela or the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin", the founder and spiritual leader of the Palestinian Islamic resistance movement Hamas. However, that if the US forces fail to arrest Muqtada, it will constitute "a blow to US credibility".
Meanwhile, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports that US officials have repeatedly accused Iran of trying to meddle in Iraq's internal affairs. Iran has rejected the accusations.
On April 12, the head of US forces in the Gulf region, General John Abizaid, said that Iran and Syria had been involved in what he called "unhelpful actions" in Iraq. But he acknowledged that there are elements in Iran who are trying to limit the influence of Muqtada.
Iranian officials have distanced themselves from the cleric. On April 10, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami indirectly criticized the insurgency led by Muqtada. He said Iran "considers any policy that would intensify the crisis in Iraq and jeopardize the establishment of security to be harmful for Shi'ite and Islam".
Gary Sick is a professor of Middle East politics at New York's Columbia University and was a top White House aide for Iran during the 1979 Islamic Revolution and ensuing hostage crisis. Sick said that, despite US criticism of Tehran, Washington has been relying on Iran's assistance in Iraq.
"There have always been two strains to US policy. Just as Iran often seems to follow policies where the one part of the government seems to differ from what the other part of the government is doing, we see the same thing in the United States very much. We have, from the beginning, in fact, relied on Iran and its assistance, especially in the south and its relations with the Shi'ite, to maintain peace and order and to lend support to a more moderate perspective in Iraqi politics. At the same time, almost without stop, we have been criticizing Iran's activities in Iraq," Sick said.
Sick said the US had been maintaining indirect contacts with Iran through British officials and also through members of the Iraqi Governing Council, some of whom have made several official trips to Tehran.
"If you really want to work out cooperation on the ground, you have to do it in person. It's very difficult to send a letter and say, 'Why don't you do such-and-such', and the other side comes back and says, 'Why don't you do such-and-such'. You really need to sit down and talk to each other to do that," Sick said.
Sick said Tehran's role in Iraq cannot be ignored, given Tehran's influence among Iraq's Shi'ite and its past experiences with Baghdad. "If Iran wishes to cooperate with the United States, it's going to be helpful. If Iran decides to openly oppose the United States, that is going to be very unhelpful from the US point of view and could, in fact, be disastrous. So it seems to me that developing a working relationship - it doesn't mean that the countries have to reestablish diplomatic relations, it doesn't mean that they have to express love for each other - it basically means working together on issues that are of mutual significance. What happens in Iraq is tremendously important to Iran, and it's tremendously important to the United States," Sick said.
Iran and the United States cut diplomatic ties following the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis. Since then, the two countries have communicated through the Swiss embassy in Tehran, which represents US interests in Iran. Diplomats from the two sides have reportedly held talks in Geneva over the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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>> OKC SLEEPER...

Document: Oklahoma City Bombing Was Taped

By JOHN SOLOMON, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON - A Secret Service document written shortly after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing described security video footage of the attack and witness testimony that suggested Timothy McVeigh (news - web sites) may have had accomplices at the scene.
"Security video tapes from the area show the truck detonation 3 minutes and 6 seconds after the suspects exited the truck," the Secret Service reported six days after the attack on a log of agents' activities and evidence in the Oklahoma investigation.
The government has insisted McVeigh drove the truck himself and that it never had any video of the bombing or the scene of the Alfred P. Murrah building in the minutes before the April 19, 1995, explosion.
Several investigators and prosecutors who worked the case told The Associated Press they had never seen video footage like that described in the Secret Service log.
The document, if accurate, is either significant evidence kept secret for nine years or a misconstrued recounting of investigative leads that were often passed by word of mouth during the hectic early days of the case, they said.
"I did not see it," said Danny Defenbaugh, the retired FBI (news - web sites) agent who ran the Oklahoma City probe. "If it shows what it says, then it would be significant."
Secret Service spokesman Charles Bopp declined to discuss the video footage reference, saying it would be addressed by witnesses later this week at the capital murder trial of McVeigh co-defendant Terry Nichols. "It is anticipated Secret Service employees will testify in court concerning these matters," he said.
Other documents obtained by AP show the Secret Service in late 1995 gave prosecutors several computer disks of enhanced digital photographs of the Murrah building, intelligence files on several subjects in the investigation and a file detailing an internal affairs inquiry concerning an agent who reconstructed key phone evidence against McVeigh.
"These abstract sheets are sensitive documents which we have protected from disclosure in the past," said a Secret Service letter that recounted discussions in late 1995 with federal prosecutors on what evidence would be turned over to defense lawyers.
Lawyers for Nichols say they have never been given the security video, photo disks or internal investigative file referenced in the documents.
The trial judge has threatened to dismiss the death penalty case if evidence was withheld. McVeigh was executed in 2001 on a separate federal conviction. Nichols was sentenced to life in prison on federal charges before being tried by the state this year.
The government has maintained for years that McVeigh parked the Ryder rental truck carrying a massive fertilizer bomb outside the Murrah building and left alone in a getaway car he parked around the corner. The bombing killed more than 160 people.
The only video prosecutors introduced at trial showed the Ryder truck without any visible passengers as it passed a security camera inside a high-rise apartment building a block away from the Murrah building.
But the Secret Service log reported on April 24 and April 25, 1995, that there was security footage showing the Ryder truck pulling up to the Murrah building. The log does not say where such video came from or who possessed it.
A log entry on April 25 states that the security footage allowed agents to determine the time that elapsed between suspects leaving the truck and the explosion.
An entry a day earlier on the same log reported that the security video was consistent with a witness' account that he saw McVeigh's getaway car in the lead before a woman guided the truck to its final parking spot in front of the Murrah building.
"A witness to the explosion named Grossman claimed to have seen a pale yellow Mercury car with a Ryder truck behind it pulling up to the federal building," the log said. The witness "further claimed to have seen a woman on the corner waving to the truck."
A Secret Service agent named McNally "noted that this fact is significant due to the fact that the security video shows the Ryder truck pulling up to the Federal Building and then pausing (7 to 10 seconds) before resuming into the slot in front of the building," the log said. "It is speculated that the woman was signaling the truck when a slot became available."
Defenbaugh said the FBI had talked to several witnesses suggesting two people had left the truck, but prosecutors never introduced the scenario at trial because it couldn't be corroborated. That's why a new security video would be significant, he said.
"It would have taken the investigation in a very specific direction," Defenbaugh said. "Rather than having to go down an eight-lane highway during rush hour, we would have gone down a faster path with just two or four lanes."
Defenbaugh said the FBI kept a log similar to the Secret Service document inside the Oklahoma City investigation command center that might help solve the mystery of the video. Justice officials declined to discuss documents, citing the ongoing Nichols' trial.
In addition to the witness mentioned in the Secret Service document, a woman working in Murrah's Social Security (news - web sites) office who was rescued from the rubble and a driver outside the building both reported to the FBI seeing two men leave the truck, according to government documents.
The Secret Service (news - web sites) log contained other information about the case -- including that McVeigh made 30 calls to an Illinois gun dealer in the months before the attacks to seek dynamite and that the gun dealer subsequently failed a lie detector test. The Secret Service lost six employees in McVeigh's bombing, the single largest loss in agency history.
Nichols' attorneys last week asked the judge to dismiss the case on grounds the government withheld evidence, including the security video footage.
New documents obtained by AP show the Secret Service provided prosecutors other evidence that may not have been provided to defense lawyers, including a file showing the Secret Service agent who reconstructed crucial phone evidence against McVeigh was subjected to an internal affairs investigation and eventually cleared for her conduct in the case.
FBI officials say that file details allegations the agent wrongly collected grand jury-subpoenaed phone information about McVeigh's calls without FBI knowledge, and kept it for weeks while she produced analysis that helped the investigation.
The internal investigation caused complications for prosecutors. They decided it tainted the agent as a witness and they chose instead to hire an outside expert to re-do the phone analysis for trial, officials said.
Bopp said the Secret Service did nothing wrong.
"The Secret Service worked cooperatively with the FBI and other federal state and local law enforcement throughout the investigation," Bopp said. "The expertise of the Secret Service on electronic crimes and telecommunications provided unique and timely information to the ongoing investigation."

On the Net:

The FBI: http://www.fbi.gov

The documents obtained by The Associated Press can be viewed at http://wid.ap.org/documents/okc/okcdoc2.pdf

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OKC BOMBING FALLOUT
Video shows McVeigh had accomplices?
Secret Service account indicates previously unknown footage

Posted: April 19, 2004
5:45 p.m. Eastern

? 2004 WorldNetDaily.com
A Secret Service document to be entered as new evidence this week contradicts government accounts of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, indicating the existence of a videotape showing Timothy McVeigh with accomplices at the scene.
"Security video tapes from the area show the truck detonation 3 minutes and 6 seconds after the suspects exited the truck," says the document according to the Associated Press.
The Secret Service report, six days after the bombing, was a log of agents' activities and evidence in the investigation, the AP said.
The government, which has concluded McVeigh acted along at the scene, contends there was no video of the blast or of the area minutes before the April 19, 1995, explosion that killed more than 160 people.
Danny Defenbaugh, the retired FBI agent who led the investigation, told the AP he had not seen the document, but if it "shows what it says, then it would be significant."
Others who worked the case said it either could be a misconstrued accounting of investigative leads or significant evidence kept hidden for nine years.
Secret Service agents are expected to testify on the log this week at the capital murder trial of McVeigh co-defendant Terry Nichols, Secret Service spokesman Charles Bopp told the AP.
McVeigh was executed in 2001 on a separate federal conviction. Nichols was given a life sentence on federal charges and now is being tried by the state of Oklahoma.
The Secret Service log has an entry April 24 consistent with the account of a "witness to the explosion named Grossman claimed to have seen a pale yellow Mercury car with a Ryder truck behind it pulling up to the federal building and a "woman on the corner waving to the truck."
A Secret Service agent named McNally "noted that this fact is significant due to the fact that the security video shows the Ryder truck pulling up to the Federal Building and then pausing (7 to 10 seconds) before resuming into the slot in front of the building," the log said. "It is speculated that the woman was signaling the truck when a slot became available."
Defenbaugh said a security video would be significant because it would corroborate the accounts of several witnesses who told the FBI two people had left the truck.
Their testimony was not introduced at trial because it lacked corroboration, the agent told the AP, noting it would have led the investigation in a new direction.
Prosecutors entered a security video at McVeigh's trial, but it showed no passengers.
Other government documents, the AP said, report a rescued woman working in the Murrah building's Social Security office and a driver outside the building both told the FBI they saw two men leave the truck.
Investigative reporter Jayna Davis' new book, "The Third Terrorist: The Middle Eastern Connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing," convincingly concludes McVeigh and Terry Nichols did not act alone.
The new release by WND Books presents substantial evidence of Iraqi involvement and a refusal by federal government agents to investigate the bombing.
As WorldNetDaily reported, Davis said last week Sept. 11 Commission testimony by former FBI Director Louis Freeh lent credibility to the theory. She repeatedly has tried since 1997, without success, to convince the FBI to examine her investigation, but when asked by a commissioner to respond to assertions in her book, Freeh was careful to say he knew of no other "credible source," instead of dismissing the premise of the book outright.
"I find it very encouraging," she said, "because every time the FBI has been asked to officially comment in any fashion about my research, we have the same canned response that the Department of Justice is confident that all those responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing have been arrested, charged and prosecuted."
Davis's reporting was vetted by former CIA director James Woolsey and given credibility by the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals last April when it dismissed a lawsuit filed against her after finding "defendants did not recklessly disregard the truth" in reporting on an Iraqi soldier's alleged involvement in the bombing.
"After eight years of oppressive litigation, the courts have vindicated my work ethic as a dedicated journalist," Davis told WorldNetDaily at the time. "The lawsuit was obviously designed to silence a legitimate investigation into Middle Eastern complicity in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing."
In an interview with WND in October 2001, attorney David Schippers, who prosecuted the House of Representatives' impeachment case against Bill Clinton, said his examination of the evidence Davis presented him was conclusive.
"I am thoroughly convinced that there was a dead-bang Middle Eastern connection in the Oklahoma City bombing," he said.
Read WorldNetDaily's extensive coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing case.


Jayna Davis's blockbuster - "The Third Terrorist: The Middle Eastern Connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing" - is available now from the source, WorldNetDaily. Order today and qualify for three FREE issues of WND's acclaimed Whistleblower magazine.



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OKC BOMBING FALLOUT
Ex-congressman's aide has video of explosion?
Police raid home for evidence Nichols' attorneys say investigators never saw

Posted: February 1, 2004
1:00 a.m. Eastern

This story appears in today's edition of the McCurtain Daily Gazette.
By J.D. Cash
? 2004 McCurtain Daily Gazette
The Fairfax County, Va., home of John Culbertson - once a member of former U.S. Rep. James Traficant's scandal-plagued congressional office - was raided Friday afternoon by Oklahoma City police detectives searching for evidence related to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.
A copy of the search warrant obtained by the McCurtain Daily Gazette described the evidence sought by detectives as including any and all computer equipment, letters, correspondence, electronic mail and image files.
The raid follows a Jan. 27 closed-door meeting attended by prosecutors and defense attorneys involved with the Terry Nichols murder trial, set to begin one month from now in Oklahoma.
During the meeting, it was brought to the attention of prosecutors Culbertson could have critical evidence concerning the bombing - evidence that had not come to the attention of state or federal prosecutors.
According to the affidavit filed with the search warrant, Nichols' defense attorneys filed a motion under seal with the court and further advised prosecutors Culbertson ''may have possession of a video and/or still photographs of a Ryder truck parked in front of the Alfred P. Murrah building before the explosion and during the explosion.''
The affidavit also indicates Nichols' defense attorneys said they attempted to contact Culbertson and he was not cooperative in showing them the possible evidence.
The motion presented by defense attorneys also stated Dallas, Texas, attorney Thomas W. Mills Jr. observed and described a video and still photos that Culbertson showed him.
Oklahoma City police detective Mark R. Easley interviewed Mills at his law office after District Judge Steven Taylor recommended an investigation into the matter.
Mills said he had gone to Washington, D.C., years ago to meet with Culbertson and actually viewed the video on Aug. 26, 1998.
Mills specifically told police detectives he saw a portion of a video and possibly three still pictures that were stored on Culbertson's laptop computer.
In an affidavit obtained by this newspaper, Detective Easley said Mills told him the images he was shown included the Murrah building in ''pristine condition.''
Mills then said, ''Mr. Culbertson pushed a button and a second photograph came up with a small glow at the bottom of the building. Mr. Culbertson pushed another button and another frame appeared of a ball of fire rising from the building and the building fell.
''Mr. Mills asked where the video and pictures came from (and) Mr. Culbertson said it came from an ATF agent.''
In the motion filed by Nichols' defense earlier, attorney Mark Earnest explained he interviewed both Mills and Culbertson about the potential evidence. He said Culbertson told him his request for a copy of the video and photographs ''placed Culbertson in a tight spot.''
When contacted by telephone late last week, Culbertson told an Oklahoma City police detective he had turned over a copy of the evidence to the House Judiciary Committee several years ago. Asked if he still had a copy of the material, Culbertson was described as evasive - refusing to divulge that information.
Appearing July 27, 2000, before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, the record shows Culbertson alluded to the subject of the possible existence of a videotape of the bomb blast in Oklahoma City.
Speaking as the director of the Center for Reform in Washington, D.C., Culbertson told members of the committee: ''With respect to the statements made by the Department of Justice that there are no photos or videos of the explosions of the Murrah Building, we have discovered that some indeed exist and are known to members of the law enforcement community.
''We have a short video presentation with a federal police officer describing a surveillance tape he personally witnessed at a gathering of law enforcement officers and comparing it to similar photos we have obtained in the Oklahoma City investigation, which will be presented after this opening statement, with your consent, Mr. Chairman. It is about two minutes long.
''This is a video taken April 13 of this year. It is a federal police officer describing a surveillance tape from Oklahoma City he personally witnessed and comparing it to other photos we have uncovered.''
During his appearance before the House Committee, Culbertson filed an affidavit containing statements he says were made by a federal agent who, Culbertson claimed, told him he was present at a training seminar after the bombing when the videotape was alleged to have been shown to several federal agents.
The statement included in the official record of the hearing is as follows:
''The federal police officer described two distinct explosions the locations of which are consistent with evidence uncovered in the course of investigating the attack on the Murrah Federal Building. The federal police officer also stated that the photos and video frames recovered as described above are consistent with the surveillance video that he witnessed in the training seminar. The officer's statement as well as photos obtained in the investigation is contained in this document.''
Culbertson went on to testify: ''The Department of Justice has deprived the public of this important information as well as the courts in various jurisdictions charged with trying cases related to the bombing. This act is nothing short of callous and malicious obstruction of justice in what many might consider one of the most important cases of the 20th century.''
However, under direct examination by a member of the committee, Culbertson admitted he did not have possession of the film.

The transcript of the hearing contains this exchange between Culbertson and Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York:

NADLER: Have you seen it?

CULBERTSON: I actually conducted the interview in Mr. Traficant's office.

NADLER: Have you seen the tape, I asked.

CULBERTSON: The surveillance tape?

NADLER: No. You have not seen the surveillance tape. Do you have it with you today?

CULBERTSON: The videotape?

NADLER: No, the surveillance tape.

CULBERTSON: No.

NADLER: So this is a tape of an officer talking about a different tape that we cannot see?

CULBERTSON: We are attempting to get this tape. This is a tape of a police officer describing what he saw and comparing it to photographs and videotape frames that we have in our possession. There are more than one series of surveillance.

On July 30, 2002, a federal judge sentenced Culbertson's boss, James Traficant, to eight years in prison and fined him $150,000 after a jury found the Ohio Democrat guilty on 10 counts of bribery, racketeering and tax evasion.
The guilty verdict led the House to strip Traficant of his seat, making him only the second member of Congress kicked out since the Civil War. Culbertson remained on the former congressman's office staff for a short time until elections could be held to fill the vacancy.
An inventory of the items removed from the Culbertson residence has not been made public.
Read WorldNetDaily's extensive coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Top Guerrilla Killed in Chechnya
Saudi Who Led Arab Fighters Was Suspect in Moscow Bombing
Reuters
Monday, April 19, 2004; Page A14
MOSCOW, April 18 -- A Saudi who led Arab fighters in Chechnya was killed there a few days ago, his brother said Sunday.
Russian officials have said the Saudi, known as Abu Walid, was among those who organized a bombing in the Moscow subway that killed about 40 people in February.
"My brother has been martyred," Abdullah Saeed Ghamdi said from the Saudi capital, Riyadh. "We don't have any details but we know he was killed recently. We received the news yesterday and now people are coming to congratulate us on his martyrdom."
In Russia, a spokesman for the Federal Security Service declined to comment.
The pro-Moscow Chechen president, Akhmad Kadyrov, said there was a "real possibility" that Abu Walid had been killed.
"Those who offered armed resistance [in the past week] have been killed. In particular, more than 10 rebels have been killed in Vedensky region near village Tazen-Kale and Ersenoi. Among them were fighters who looked like Arab fighters," Kadyrov was quoted as saying by the Russian Tass news agency.
On Sunday, Russian news agencies said troops had killed four Chechen rebels linked to the guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev in a shootout with militants near the Chechen border.
Separately, troops in the Chechen capital, Grozny, killed a Wahhabi militant who Russian security services said could be linked to a suicide bomb attack on President Murat Zyazikov of the Ingushetia region. The austere Wahhabi creed is Saudi Arabia's mainstream Muslim denomination.
The insurgency in mainly Muslim Chechnya has attracted mujaheddin, or holy fighters, from Saudi Arabia and many other Arab countries.
In March, the al-Jazeera satellite television network broadcast a videotape it said featured Abu Walid vowing to stage a new wave of attacks in Russia.
The Kremlin blames Chechen rebels for a spate of attacks, including a suicide bombing that killed almost 50 people on a train in southern Russia before last December's parliamentary elections. The Kremlin believes Abu Walid was also among those behind the 1999 apartment bombings across Russia.

Russia has been fighting separatists in Chechnya for a decade.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Gorelick role raised early


By Charles Hurt
THE WASHINGTON TIMES


Former acting FBI Director Thomas J. Pickard told the September 11 commission in a private interview earlier this year that he was surprised that Jamie S. Gorelick is serving on the panel because she had played a key role in setting the very counterterrorism policies being investigated.
According to a summary of that interview obtained by The Washington Times, Mr. Pickard said Ms. Gorelick -- who was No. 2 in the Clinton Justice Department under Attorney General Janet Reno -- resisted efforts by the FBI to expand the counterterrorism effort beyond simple law enforcement tactics and agencies.

"Mr. Pickard indicated that it was a growing concern that the international terrorism threat was 'bigger than law enforcement,' " according to the notes from a Jan. 20 meeting at the commission's New York office.
"Despite expression of these concerns by FBI executive management, Attorney General Reno and her Deputy Jamie Gorelick believed that a law enforcement approach was appropriate," the notes say.
In a footnote, the FBI employee who attended the meeting and kept the notes wrote: "Mr. Pickard stated that he finds her 'membership on your Commission surprising since it [the decision to counter international terrorism with a law enforcement-only approach] was her and Reno's policy.' "
The notes show that concerns about Ms. Gorelick's impartiality on the commission were raised months before House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Wisconsin Republican, called for her resignation last week.
Mr. Sensenbrenner's demand came after a memo Ms. Gorelick wrote was declassified by Attorney General John Ashcroft and blamed for hampering U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Mr. Pickard, who spent most of his career at the FBI as deputy director during the Clinton administration, testified publicly before the commission last week and talked about his brief tenure as acting director of the FBI in 2001 before the terrorist attacks.
But in that open, televised testimony, he never mentioned Ms. Gorelick, her role in confining the counterterrorism effort, or his concerns about Ms. Gorelick's service on the commission.
Nor did Ms. Gorelick recuse herself from Mr. Pickard's testimony or refrain from questioning him, as she did when Miss Reno and former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh testified.
According to the commission guidelines on recusals: "Commissioners and staff will recuse themselves from investigating work they performed in prior government service."
The rules also state: "Where a commissioner or staff member has a close personal relationship with an individual, or either supervised or was supervised by an individual, the commissioner or staff member should not play a primary role in the Commission interview of that person."
Ms. Gorelick has defended her impartiality to sit on the panel and judge U.S. counterterrorism efforts even as she has strenuously defended her own actions in the past on some of those very efforts. She appeared last week on several TV programs to say she won't step down from the board and has the support of the Republican chairman of the panel.
During one television interview, Chris Matthews of MSNBC asked her if the release of her 1995 memo and current calls for her resignation were in response to her tough questioning about Mr. Ashcroft's policies and those of the Bush Justice Department.
Ms. Gorelick did not speculate on any political motives by her opponents, but said, "I'm not bringing a partisan ax to grind here."
Yesterday, however, in an opinion piece that appeared in The Washington Post, Ms. Gorelick implied a link between Mr. Ashcroft's release of the memo and prior questioning about his department.
"At last week's hearing, Attorney General John Ashcroft, facing criticism, asserted that 'the single greatest structural cause for September 11 was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents' and that I built that wall through a March 1995 memo," she wrote. "This is simply not true."
In that column -- as well as during her TV appearances last week -- she also defended her role in fighting terrorism at the Justice Department, distancing herself from the "wall" separating law enforcement fighting terrorism and intelligence services that gather counterterrorism information.
She didn't raise the wall, Ms. Gorelick said, and her memo was simply intended to define the boundaries between law enforcement and intelligence services so that cases against terrorists would not be thrown out of court because law enforcement had overstepped its bounds.
"Look: In my view, if we could have lowered that wall sooner, we should have," she told Mr. Matthews.
But that was not what she was saying around the time she wrote her memo. Ms. Gorelick appeared in October 1995 before the Senate Intelligence Committee, where she testified that many people wondered why the government doesn't merge law enforcement and counterintelligence agencies.
"I mean, they have a lot of resources. You have a lot of resources, you have all got the same enemies, why don't you just merge to achieve greater efficiency?" she said to the assembled senators, including Sen. Bob Kerrey, Nebraska Democrat, who has since left the Senate and now sits with Ms. Gorelick on the 9/11 commission.
"I think on both sides of the river, if you will, we think this would be a serious mistake," she said. "There are ample reasons, both in history and in constitutional principles, to maintain a clear demarcation between the missions of the two communities."
Even in her 1995 memo, she noted that the separation procedures outlined "go beyond what is legally required."

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The Wall Truth
Gorelick provides the clearest proof yet that she should resign.

By Andrew C. McCarthy

The grandstanding Richard Clarke having made apologies all the rage, one should expect that President Bush and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will be getting one in the next day or two. Something like this:



Dear Mr. President and Dr. Rice:
Very sorry about all that high dudgeon a couple of weeks ago. You remember, when we couldn't pass a microphone, a pencil, or a camera without perorations about the vital need to have the President waive executive privilege and ignore scads of history so Dr. Rice could be permitted to testify under oath and publicly (and improve our Nielson numbers) to address provocative allegations by another commission fave -- er, witness -- Richard Clarke. Turns out we should have mentioned that if Condi had just zipped an op-ed over to the Washington Post that would have done the trick. We regret any inconvenience to you, your staff, or the Constitution.
Respectfully, the 9/11 Commissioners.

If that note is not forthcoming, then someone's got some explaining to do about "The Truth About 'the Wall,'" Jamie Gorelick's remarkable Washington Post op-ed from Sunday, which purports to put to rest the nettlesome squawking about her untenable position as a commissioner judging the causes of pre-9/11 intelligence failure, a matter in which she was a key participant. Leaving aside, for a moment, how off-the-wall her account of the wall is, the fact that she well knows she needed to say something is the clearest indication yet that she belongs in the witness chair, not on the commissioners' bench.

Gorelick's op-ed intentionally raises five different points in her purported defense. Around them are sandwiched two others -- opening and closing salvos that she can't resist mentioning but avoids identifying as argument points because she is too smart not to know that they scream out for her recusal. I'll take them in the order in which she makes them.

1. Ashcroft is wrong. Gorelick starts by asserting that Attorney General John Ashcroft gave testimony that was "simply not true" when he claimed both that "the single greatest structural cause for September 11 was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents[,]" and that Gorelick "built that wall through a March 1995 memo." In fact, Ashcroft's testimony was entirely true: The wall was a policy that virtually guaranteed intelligence failure, and the March 1995 memo was its first building block, a harbinger of the further institutionalizing of the wall that would come, from Gorelick, only a few months later. That, however, is beside the point.

When witnesses give differing accounts, it is left to an impartial arbiter -- not one of the witnesses -- to sort it out. Moreover, the commission's standard, announced to maximum preening effect only three weeks ago after Clarke's testimony spawned demands for Rice's testimony, is that essential witnesses, and particularly those who are in a position to clarify or refute the testimony of prior essential witnesses (i.e., the position Rice was in vis-?-vis Clarke), must testify under oath and in public. Not surprisingly, while brazenly accusing the attorney general of the United States of giving false testimony, Gorelick elides mention of the Clarke/Rice dust-up. But it did happen, and Gorelick was gleefully in the thick of it. Why is what's sauce for the goose not sauce for the commissioner?

2. "I did not invent the "wall," which is not a wall but a set of procedures implementing a 1978 statute (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA) and federal court decisions interpreting it." Gorelick did invent the wall. The wall was not a set of procedures implementing FISA as construed by federal decisional law. To quote Gorelick's 1995 memorandum (something she carefully avoids doing), the procedures her memorandum put in place "go beyond what is legally required...[to] prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation." (Emphasis added.) As this rather straightforward English sentence illuminates, the wall exceeded the requirements of FISA and then-existing federal case law.

What the wall implemented was not the FISA statute as construed by the courts but rather Gorelick's overheated view of what would be useful to avoid being accused of misusing FISA. To be sure, it is often prudent for the government to hamstring itself beyond legal requirements; going-the-extra-mile improves the (already good) chances that courts will reject motions by defendants to suppress damaging evidence (like incriminating recorded conversations). It is, however, irresponsible for the government to hamstring itself when that means national security will be imperiled -- which is what happens when agents are forbidden from communicating with one another.

3. The prohibition on prosecutors directing intelligence investigations was in effect long before the 1995 guidelines issued by the Reno Justice Department. This is transparent misdirection. The government usually collects evidence of ordinary crimes under the criminal law, not FISA; but there is nothing inherently wrong with collecting evidence of ordinary crimes under FISA. The error that was made during the 1980s was FISA's certification requirement (which merely called for a representation that the government was seeking FISA-interception authority for the purpose of collecting national-security intelligence) was read as if it limited the government's ability to use FISA-derived evidence in ordinary criminal cases. The federal courts compounded this error by fashioning a "primary purpose" test which required the government, before it could use FISA evidence in a criminal case, to prove that it had been motivated to use FISA by national-security concerns -- i.e., that it hadn't used FISA as a pretext to conduct what was really a criminal investigation.

This was the state of play in 1995, when the Reno Justice Department -- with Gorelick pulling the laboring oar -- instituted the wall. Gorelick may be correct -- we'd have to hear her testify subject to cross-examination to be sure -- when she declares that "[t]he point [of the Reno guidelines] was to preserve the ability of prosecutors to use information collected by intelligence agents." (My own sense, for what little it may be worth, is that the point was to mollify civil-liberties activists and conspiracy theorists who trumped up baseless fears that the government would dishonestly use FISA authority to investigate people who were not national-security risks -- but I am not the person who wrote the guidelines, and we should probably give her the benefit of the doubt regarding her intentions. But good intentions hardly mean the actions they spawn will be sound.)

The wall generally forbidding intelligence agents from communicating with their criminal counterparts was a suicidally excessive way to ensure that what little information intelligence agents were permitted to pass would be admissible in court. This is the product of a mindset that insists, beyond all reason and common sense, that terrorism is just a law-enforcement problem. The object of a rational counterterrorism approach is to prevent mass murder from happening in the first place, not to improve your litigating posture for the indictment you return after thousands of people have been slaughtered.

4. The Ashcroft Justice Department failed to dismantle the wall prior to the 9/11 attacks. Yes, that's true. And it was dumb, which was why Ashcroft got grilled over it by Gorelick's fellow commissioners. But Gorelick's argument actually makes my point. If it was relevant, probative and highly material for the commission to probe why Ashcroft did not eradicate the wall when he had the chance in the months before 9/11, it is doubly relevant, probative, and highly material to probe why on earth Gorelick erected the wall in the first place.

5. Gorelick's March 1995 memo concerned only two cases and permitted "freer coordination between intelligence and criminal investigators than was subsequently permitted by the 1995 guidelines" and the Ashcroft Justice Department. So what? The fact is that Gorelick's 1995 memo was excessively prohibitive. Who cares if it was somewhat less excessively prohibitive than the July 1995 guidelines -- especially given that Gorelick was responsible for the 1995 guidelines (that were reaffirmed in 2001). If Gorelick is looking for a medal because she was, at least as she sees it, marginally less irresponsible in March 1995 than she was in July 1995, she should not hold her breath.

And her hyperventilating about acting to protect the two cases (including mine) from the threat of having convictions reversed is specious. By the time she penned her March 1995 memo, the first World Trade Center bombing prosecution had been over for a year and my case was in its third month of trial. The only conceivable threat to eventual convictions would have been (a) if the prosecutors and agents in my case had learned information about defense strategy by virtue of the government's continuing investigation of some of our indicted defendants for possible new crimes; or (b) if the continuing investigation had turned up exculpatory information about the defendants in my case and I had not been told about it so I could disclose it. Far from being unique to national-security matters, that situation is a commonplace when the government deals with violent organizations (which tend to obstruct justice and routinely plot to kill or influence witnesses, prosecutors, and/or jurors, thus requiring continuing investigations even as already indicted cases proceed).

To avoid constitutional problems in such a situation, the government regularly assigns a prosecutor and agent who are not involved in the already indicted case to vet information from the continuing investigation before it is permitted to be communicated to agents and prosecutors on the indicted case. This way, the team on the indicted case learns only what it is allowed to know (viz., evidence of new crimes the defendants have committed), but not what it should not know (viz., defense strategy information and incriminating admissions about the indicted case made without the consent of counsel); and the government maintains the ability to reveal any exculpatory information (as federal law requires). As Gorelick's 1995 memorandum recounts, the U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York had already made sure that was done in my case long before Gorelick's memo. There was no need for Gorelick to do more; what she did served only to place additional, unnecessary barriers to information sharing which -- her memo, again, acknowledges -- were not required by existing law.

6. The July 1995 guidelines -- the wall -- did not really prevent information sharing and merely implemented court decisions. The guidelines did prevent information sharing -- that was their purpose. They literally permitted some information to be passed over the wall if intelligence agents realized that evidence they'd developed might prove the commission of a serious crime. Intelligence agents, however, were hardly in a position to come to such a realization with any confidence because the wall generally forbade them from coordinating with criminal agents. Thus, they were ill equipped to recognize the significance of information to which they were privy.

More importantly, the hyper-technical 1995 guidelines were so byzantine as to be inscrutable for non-lawyer agents in the field, who found it far easier to assume they weren't allowed to communicate with one another than to venture into Gorelick's labyrinth without benefit of Ariadne's golden cord. That is why, for example, the FBI's criminal division declined to assist its intelligence division in August 2001, when an astute agent was frantically trying to find Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, the eventual suicide hijackers who steered Flight 77 into the Pentagon. Whether or not the wall procedures dictated that decision, the culture of dysfunction the procedures had fostered was by then firmly entrenched.

7. The relevant history regarding the wall is well known, Gorelick has recused herself from consideration of her own actions and those of the Justice Department while she was there, and her fellow commissioners have spoken up in her defense. This is offered as Gorelick's wind-up. If it is adopted as the new standard, the commission should stop wasting everyone's time and money right now. First, the relevant history of many aspects of the 9/11 investigation is extensively well documented; yet, the commission has insisted on calling witnesses -- despite the fact that our nation is at war and many of the witnesses have been taken away from their wartime responsibilities for hours (and sometimes days) to comply with commission requests for information and testimony. To this point, no witness has been permitted to get away with a curt "you don't need me -- you've already got enough information."

Second, Gorelick's conflict is not so tidy as to be solved by avoiding inquiry into her time in the Justice Department. If that were the case, John Ashcroft could have been a commissioner -- and just imagine the howling if someone had proposed that. Gorelick's conflict, central to the matter of intelligence lapse, goes to the heart of the commission's investigation. Whenever she asks a question on another subject -- even if she does it in good faith -- the public is entitled to wonder whether she is trying to shift blame or scrutiny away from herself. The legitimacy of the commission is thus critically undermined.

Finally, the support of Gorelick's fellow commissioners is irrelevant. Again, these are the same guys who were screaming for Rice three weeks ago, for no better reason than that Clarke had made allegations Rice was in a position to shed light on. Ashcroft has now made assertions far more central to the salient matter of institutional impediments to information sharing. That those same commissioners are not being consistent, that they are not calling for Gorelick to step down and be sworn as a witness, is inexplicable. I'm sure they have all bonded; I'm quite certain they admire and respect Gorelick's powerful mind and exemplary work ethic -- they'd be foolish not to. But imagine for a moment that Gorelick had not been appointed to serve on the commission. Is there anyone on the planet who doesn't think she'd have been subpoenaed to testify after her memorandum came to light during last week's proceedings? Is there anyone who thinks she could have avoided testifying under such circumstances by writing an op-ed?

Gorelick's "defense" merely underscores how inappropriate it is for her to sit in judgment as a commissioner. Obviously, she's hell-bent on staying. And so we watch as the commission slowly mutates from a potentially useful exercise, to a politicized teledrama, to a hopelessly suspect irrelevancy.

-- Andrew C. McCarthy, a former chief assistant U.S. attorney who led the 1995 terrorism prosecution against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others, is an NRO contributor.


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>> NOW SELL THEM NUKE TECH?

China Lets Cheney Speak on TV but Censors Remarks Afterward
By JOSEPH KAHN

Published: April 20, 2004

Pool photo by Eugene Hoshiko
Vice President Dick Cheney speaking to students at Fudan University in Shanghai. The session was broadcast on Chinese television.
BEIJING, April 19 -- Before his high-profile visit to China last week, Vice President Dick Cheney insisted that Beijing leaders allow him to speak, live and uncensored, to the Chinese people.
After weeks of intense negotiations, Mr. Cheney was granted that measure of openness -- but not one millimeter more.
Anyone who tuned in to CCTV-4, China's all-news television channel, shortly after 10 a.m. on Thursday could watch Mr. Cheney deliver an address to students at Fudan University in Shanghai. A State Department translator provided simultaneous interpretation.
But the broadcast received no advance promotion or even listing in the Chinese news media and was not repeated. The authorities promptly provided leading Web sites with a "full text" of the vice president's remarks, including his answers to questions after the speech, that struck out references to political freedom, Taiwan, North Korea and other issues that propaganda officials considered sensitive.
The censorship showed that even a hopeful sign of political progress in China can be more like a mirage. Officials sought to convey a relaxed attitude about what Mr. Cheney might say in public but worked to alter the record. "What they do to control the media is sometimes surreal," said Yu Maochun, a China expert at the United States Naval Academy who noticed discrepancies between Mr. Cheney's speech and the Chinese transcript. "Censorship is a habit they can't kick."
In a similar sleight of the invisible hand late last year, a government-owned Chinese publisher issued an authorized Chinese version of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton's autobiography, "Living History," that removed most of Ms. Clinton's references to her and former President Bill Clinton's visits to China.
The Chinese company did not notify Ms. Clinton's publisher that it was making any changes to the text, and it was sold as an unabridged translation.
American officials say that to the best of their knowledge the Chinese side lived up to the letter of their agreement on Mr. Cheney's speech, but expressed frustration that the record was later expunged.
"It was extremely important to the White House to have a live and uncensored broadcast," said a United States consular official in Shanghai. "We feel good that we were able to do that."
Bush administration officials said they had not negotiated how the Chinese transcript would be handled. When the excised version came to their attention, they worked to prepare their own Chinese version. It was posted on Friday to the American Embassy's Web site, which is not blocked within China.
Although Mr. Cheney was accorded the trappings of a state visit by a major foreign leader -- motorcades, television coverage and meetings with top officials -- there were no large crowds, and interest among the public most likely was limited to the well informed in urban areas.
In his speech last Thursday, Mr. Cheney spoke broadly about American foreign policy. But he devoted much of the talk and a subsequent exchange with students to links between political and economic freedom in China, as well as Taiwan, the most delicate topic in United States-China relations.
The Chinese transcript was prepared by the official People's Daily immediately after the address, and was distributed to newspapers and Web sites across the country. While faithful to most of what Mr. Cheney said, it dropped many references to "political freedom" and "individual freedom."
While Mr. Cheney praised "rising prosperity and expanding political freedom" across Asia, the official Chinese transcript refers only to "rising prosperity." It drops his statements that "the desire for freedom is universal" and that "freedom is indivisible."
It also wiped out any record of what Mr. Cheney had said about the Taiwan Relations Act, an American law mandating that the United States sell Taiwan military equipment so it can defend itself against any attack from the Chinese mainland. China maintains that the act violates agreements with the United States.
Mr. Cheney said the campaign against terror must not be used to suppress "legitimate dissent." The Chinese, who have battled dissidents in their largely Muslim region of Xinjiang, dropped that phrase.
The longest elisions involved Mr. Cheney's references to the North Korean nuclear crisis, North Korea's acquisition of nuclear technology from Pakistan and the problem of weapons proliferation generally. China, which has close ties to North Korea, is acting as a broker in negotiations over how to end the North's nuclear arms program.
The full address was carried live by China Central Television on its Chinese-language news channel and a second channel that broadcasts in English. Although China Central Television is the country's main television news provider, the number of people who watch its specialty news channel during working hours is thought to be quite small.
The edited text, without indications of editing changes, was posted on the Web sites of People's Daily, the New China News Agency and other online locations.
An editor at the People's Daily Web site involved with preparing the transcript denied that any censorship had occurred. The editor, who declined to be identified, said missing sentences or sections were attributable solely to the speed with which the transcript had been prepared.
Administration officials have been on guard against censorship since the visit of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to China in February 2003. State Department officials arranged an interview with Mr. Powell on China Central Television that by diplomatic agreement was to be broadcast unedited, administration officials said. The broadcast nonetheless left out Mr. Powell's references to human rights abuses, among other sensitive issues.
The consular official said the American side had tried to anticipate how the Chinese might censor Mr. Cheney's remarks but could not prevent all alterations. "It's a challenge," the official said.

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Brazil Refusal on Inspection Angers IAEA
By GEORGE JAHN
ASSOCIATED PRESS

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - Brazil's refusal to allow the U.N. atomic agency to fully inspect one of its nuclear facilities has led to frustration within the organization, even though its officials do not believe the country is hiding a weapons program, diplomats said Monday.
The diplomats, who are familiar with the International Atomic Energy Agency's work, suggested the Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog is more annoyed than worried about Brazil's decision to deny access earlier this year to uranium enrichment centrifuges at a facility being built near Rio de Janeiro.
"It's not a question of suspecting that Brazil has a covert nuclear weapons program," said one of the diplomats, who all spoke on condition of anonymity. "It's more a question of principle."
Although Brazil signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1997 and said its nuclear program has purely peaceful objectives, questions about its commitment have simmered for more than a year.
The government earlier this month confirmed that IAEA inspectors were denied access in February and March to centrifuges at the facility, in the town of Resende.
It cited the need to protect industrial secrets and said the centrifuges were, and will remain, off-limits for visual inspection.
The diplomat in Vienna, however rejected that argument.
"The agency monitors some 900 facilities around the world with a myriad of technologies and has a good record of protecting those trade secrets," he said.
Another diplomat said Brazil's argument could set a worrying precedent at a time the agency is fighting to gain full access to Iran's nuclear secrets to test Tehran's assertions that it was not pursuing a weapons program.
Iran became a focus of world concern after last year's discovery that it was assembling thousands of centrifuges for uranium enrichment, which has uses ranging from generating power to making nuclear weapons. Iran denies any weapons ambitions, saying it only wants to produce electricity.
"Brazil's reticence could lead other countries to follow suit," and make the agency's job of policing nuclear programs more complicated, said the diplomat.

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>> THEIR NEW FRIEND...

Gadhafi Seeks Abolition of Courts, Laws

ASSOCIATED PRESS
TRIPOLI, Libya (AP) - Moammar Gadhafi on Sunday called for the abolition of Libya's three decade-old exceptional courts and other strict laws criticized by human rights groups.
During talks in Tripoli with judges and prosecutors, the Libyan leader urged delegates meeting across the country since Saturday in weeklong annual People's Congress forums to annul the laws, which were passed three years after Gadhafi seized power in a 1969 military coup.
Libya's exceptional laws have, among other things, banned the formation of political parties and stipulated death penalties for dissidents.
The official news agency JANA reported that Gadhafi also called for an end to arrests without warrant and urged the congresses to endorse international anti-torture conventions.
Long considered a rogue state and sponsor of terrorism, Libya recently started winning back international support with Gadhafi's decision to abolish the nation's weapons of mass destruction program and accept responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie jetliner bombing.
His appeal Sunday came after the March visit to Libya by a team of human rights workers from Amnesty International, the organization's first to the North African nation in 15 years.
The Amnesty team visited Libyan prisons and met with Gadhafi, urging him to abolish the country's exceptional laws and People's Court, which handles political and security cases, and replace them with ordinary criminal courts.
Those convicted by the People's Court have no recourse to appeal and no right to obtain independent legal counsel.
Gadhafi had promised to consider Amnesty's recommendations.
The regional People's Congress forums usually adopt Gadhafi's recommendations, which eventually reach the General People's Congress, Libya's version of a parliament that meets annually in March, for ratification.
There have been occasions when Gadhafi's calls have not been accepted, such as his appeal for free primary school education.
Gadhafi, who holds that Libya is ruled by the people, abolished the country's constitution when he came to power. His "Green Book" - a political philosophy that mixes socialism, populism and Arab nationalism - is the closest thing his country has to a constitution.

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Powell Asks Syria to Boost Iraq Patrols
By GEORGE GEDDA
ASSOCIATED PRESS
WASHINGTON (AP) - Secretary of State Colin Powell on Monday said he has asked Syrian President Bashar Assad to send more forces to the border area with Iraq to prevent infiltration by militants opposed to the U.S. military presence there.
Powell said in an interview with The Associated Press that a letter he sent to Bashar last week did not link Syrian border control efforts to the administration's plan to impose sanctions against Syria that Congress has approved.
The legislation has a range of options for sanctions from which the administration can choose.
"We're exploring ways of working with the Syrians to increase the density of forces with surveillance over that (the Iraqi) border," Powell said.
He said Syria has taken steps to control border crossing sites but added that more can be done. He acknowledged the difficulty in patrolling an area 600 miles long.
"It is in our mutual interest to deal with the problem," Powell said. "It is not in Syria's interest to be seen as a base from which infiltrators can come across to kill innocent Iraqis or to kill coalition troops."
Last week, Maj. Gen. John Sattler, director of operations for Central Command, said Marines have had great success in shutting off the flow of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq.
"We had an extreme amount of success on the front side, meaning that we did find, fix and ultimately finish a number of cells that were up there that were facilitating" the infiltration, he said.
The Bush administration is assessing how to administer Syria sanctions legislation signed by President Bush in December. Powell said the administration will take action on the sanctions in the near future.
The legislation, passed by broad majorities in both houses, reflects the view that Syria has been a detriment to the fight against terrorism in the Middle East and Iraq.
It notes that Syria provided a safe haven for anti-Israeli militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad and is accused of pursuing the development and production of biological and chemical weapons.
It states that Syria must end its support of terrorists, terminate its 27-year military presence in Lebanon, stop efforts to obtain or produce weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles and prevent terrorists and weapons from entering Iraq.
If Syria fails to meet those conditions, the president must ban sales of dual-use items, which can have both civilian and military applications.
He also must impose at least two out of a list of six possible penalties: a ban on exports to Syria, prohibition of U.S. businesses' operating in Syria, restrictions on Syrian diplomats in the United States, limits on Syrian airline flights in the United States, reduction of diplomatic contacts or a freeze on Syrian assets in the United States.

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>> ARKANSAS MAFIA WATCH...

Clinton leaves Jamaica Holidayed at Tryall

Monday, April 19, 2004
FORMER US first lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, left Jamaica yesterday after a one-week vacation at the exclusive Tryall Club in Hanover, highly placed sources confirmed.
Hotel officials declined to confirm or deny Rodham Clinton's stay at the property, but one knowledgeable source told the Observer: "She had a quiet, delightful and restful holiday. That was the way she wanted it."
According to Observer sources, between her aides, friends and Secret Service protectors Rodham Clinton's entourage occupied 40 rooms.
Her visit, like that of President George Bush's daughter, ??, was kept quiet for privacy and security reasons.
The wife of former president Bill Clinton, Rodham Clinton is now a member of the US Senate from New York, the first former first lady ever to be elected to the US legislature. She is being touted as a likely Democratic presidential candidate in 2009.
Rodham Clinton had planned to holiday at an old Jamaican plantation house after her Senate campaign in November 2000, but shelved the plan in the wake of the close, and controversial, presidential race between Bush and Bill Clinton's vice president Al Gore that was eventually decided by the US Supreme Court.
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FEC investigating
Hillary fund-raiser
2000 Hollywood event collected
$1 million for Senate campaign

Posted: April 19, 2004
5:00 p.m. Eastern

? 2004 WorldNetDaily.com

The Federal Elections Commission is investigating a Hollywood fund-raiser that brought in more than $1 million for Hillary Rodham Clinton's 2000 Senate campaign.
According to a report in the Los Angeles Times, a source familiar with the probe supplied information about the investigation, which began several weeks ago.
Sen. Hillary Clinton, D-N.Y.
In addition to the FEC action, the paper reported a federal grand jury in Los Angeles has been examining evidence of wrongdoing by a number of people in connection with the activities of Aaron Tonken, the fund-raising guru who staged the Hillary event.
Sources say Tonken, who in December pleaded guilty to fraud charges involving charity events, is cooperating with investigators.
The Hollywood gala took place in August 2000 on the eve of the Democratic National Convention in L.A. Billed as a tribute to outgoing President Clinton, the event also brought in much-needed cash for Hillary's campaign, the Times reported.
Peter Paul, an Internet entrepreneur who helped pay for the event, is locked in a court battle with the Clintons over allegations the then-first couple defrauded him in connection with the fund-raiser. According to the report, Paul is one of those being questioned in the FEC probe.
The FEC normally works in secret and would not comment on the investigation for the Times.
Part of Tonken's current bankruptcy proceedings includes his contention that over $2 million in charity funds was diverted to nearly three dozen Hollywood celebrities and power players.
Philip Dapeer, Tonken's attorney, tells the paper his client "has been personally threatened." Tight security was provided at a bankruptcy creditors' meeting last week. According to the report, Tonken refused to answer some questions at the meeting because California Attorney General Bill Lockyer's office had served notice that it was considering criminal charges against him.
Tonken is writing a book for WND Books with a working title of "King of Cons: Exposing the Dirty Rotten Scandals of the Washington Elite and Hollywood Celebrities." The book is due out next year. Negotiations are under way with film producer Michel Shane to make a movie version of the book. Shane was credited as executive producer on the recent Steven Spielberg film "Catch Me If You Can."
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Now Can We Talk About Health Care?
By HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

know what you're thinking. Hillary Clinton and health care? Been there. Didn't do that!

No, it's not 1994; it's 2004. And believe it or not, we have more problems today than we had back then. Issues like soaring health costs and millions of uninsured have yet to fix themselves. And now we are confronting a new set of challenges associated with the arrival of the information age, the technological revolution and modern life.

Think for a moment about recent advances in genetic testing. Knowing you are prone to cancer or heart disease or Lou Gehrig's disease may give you a fighting chance. But just try, with that information in hand, to get health insurance in a system without strong protections against discrimination for pre-existing or genetic conditions. Each vaunted scientific breakthrough brings with it new challenges to our health system. But it's not only medicine that is changing. So, too, are the economy, our personal behaviors and our environment. Unless Americans across the political spectrum come together to change our health care system, that system, already buckling under the pressures of today, will collapse with the problems of tomorrow.

Twenty-first-century problems, like genetic mapping, an aging population and globalization, are combining with old problems like skyrocketing costs and skyrocketing numbers of uninsured, to overwhelm the 20th-century system we have inherited.

The way we finance care is so seriously flawed that if we fail to fix it, we face a fiscal disaster that will not only deny quality health care to the uninsured and underinsured but also undermine the capacity of the system to care for even the well insured. For example, if a hospital's trauma center is closed or so crowded that it cannot take any more patients, your insurance card won't help much if you're the one in the freeway accident.

Let's face it -- if we were to start from scratch, none of us, from dyed-in-the-wool liberals to rock-solid conservatives, would fashion the kind of health care system America has inherited. So why should we carry the problems of this system into the future?

21st-Century Problems
At the dawn of the last century, America was coping with the effects of the industrial revolution -- crowded living conditions, dangerous workplaces, inadequate sanitation and infrastructure in cities and pollution and infectious diseases like typhoid fever and cholera that exacted a huge toll on the oldest and youngest in society.

Since then, a century's worth of advances yielded remarkable results. Antibiotics were developed. Anesthesia was improved. Public health programs like mosquito control and childhood immunizations succeeded in reducing or even eradicating diseases like malaria and polio in this country. Congress passed legislation regulating the quality of food and drugs and assuring that safety and science guided medical developments. Workplace and product-safety standards resulted in fewer deaths and injuries from accidents. Effective campaigns cut tobacco use and alcohol abuse. Employers began providing some workers with health care coverage, primarily for hospitalization costs. And to aid some of those left out, President Lyndon B. Johnson persuaded Congress to establish Medicare and Medicaid to address the poorest, sickest, oldest and highest-risk patients in our society. As a result of these accumulated gains, life expectancy grew from 47 years in 1900 to 77 years for those born in 2000.

As astounding as those changes were, we are likely to see even more revolutionary changes in the next 100 years. Advances in medicine coincide with advances in computers and communications. The American workplace is changing in response to global pressures. But even positive advances may come with a negative underside. Our affluence contributes to an increasingly sedentary lifestyle that, combined with a diet filled with sugar and fat-rich foods, undermines our ability to fend off chronic diseases like diabetes. And research is proving that the pollutants and contaminants in our environment cause disease and mortality.

It is overwhelming just thinking about the problems, never mind dealing with them. But we have to begin applying American ingenuity and resolve or watch the best health care system in the world deteriorate.

Medical Advances
The pace of scientific development in medicine is so rapid that the next hundred years is likely to be called the Century of the Life Sciences. We have mapped the human genome and seen the birth of the burgeoning field of genomics, offering the opportunity to pinpoint and modify the genes responsible for a whole host of conditions. Scientists are exploring whether nanotechnology can target drugs to diseased tissues or implant sensors to detect disease in its earliest forms. We can look forward to ''designer drugs'' tailored to individual genetic profiles. But the advances we herald carry challenges and costs.

Think about the potential for inequities in drug research. Today, pharmaceutical and biotech companies have little incentive to research and develop treatments for individuals with rare diseases. Never heard of progeria? That's the point. This fatal syndrome, also called premature-aging disease, affects one in four million newborns a year. It's rare enough that there is no profit in developing a cure. This is known as the ''orphan drug'' problem. Genetic profiles and individualized therapies have the potential to increase the problem of orphaned drugs by further fragmenting the market. Even manufacturers of drugs for conditions like high blood pressure might focus their efforts on people with common genetic profiles. Depending on your genes, you could be out of luck.

The increasing understanding and use of genomics may also undermine the insurance system. Health insurance, like other insurance, exists to protect against unpredictable, costly events. It is based on risk. As genetic information allows us to predict illness with greater certainty, it threatens to turn the most susceptible patients into the most vulnerable. Many of us will become uninsurable, like the two young sisters with a congenital disease I met in Cleveland. Their father went from insurance company to insurance company trying to get coverage, until one insurance agent looked at him and said, ''We don't insure burning houses.''

Many have worked to get laws on the books to protect people from genetic discrimination, but we have yet to pass legislation that addresses job security and health coverage. The challenges do not stop there. Health insurance will have to change fundamentally to cope with predictable, knowable risks. Will health insurance companies offer coverage tailored to a person's future health prospects? Right now, if you have asthma, or even just allergies, insurers in the individual market can exclude your respiratory system from your health insurance policy. Will all health plans stop offering benefits that relate to genetic diseases?

The ability to predict illness may overwhelm more than just the insurance system; it may overwhelm the patient and the provider. Studies in The Journal of the American Medical Association found that nearly 6 out of 10 patients at risk for breast and ovarian cancer declined a genetic test, and a similar fraction of those at risk for colon cancer also declined testing. Why? One reason is probably to avoid higher insurance premiums. But the decision to undergo genetic testing is a complex one that involves many issues. Positive test results often indicate increased risk but no certainty that a disease will occur. Negative results also come without guarantees. The development of genetic profiles and individual therapies will exponentially increase the amount of information a physician is expected to manage. Instead of remembering one or two drugs for any condition, a physician will have to analyze all the different genetic, demographic and behavioral variables to generate optimal treatment for a patient.

Medical advances have the potential to overwhelm the health care system top to bottom. At the very least, the pace of technological progress is so rapid that our antiquated health care system is ill equipped to deliver the fruits of that progress. But these advances are not occurring in isolation from other factors affecting both how we finance health care and how much care we need and expect.

Globalization
The globalization of our economy has changed everything from how we work as individuals to what we produce as a nation to how quickly diseases can spread. American companies -- and workers -- compete not only with one another but all over the world. It is called competitive advantage, but it can put American businesses and workers at a disadvantage.

The United States' closest economic rivals have mandatory national health care systems rather than the voluntary employer-based model we have. Automakers in the United States and Canada pay taxes to help finance public health care. But in the United States, automakers also pay about $1,300 per midsize car produced for private employee health insurance. Automakers in Canada come out ahead, according to recent news reports, even after paying higher taxes.

At the same time, American companies are outsourcing jobs to countries where the price of labor does not include health coverage, which costs Americans jobs and puts pressure on employers who continue to cover their employees at home.

And many new jobs, especially those in the service sector and part-time jobs, don't include comprehensive health benefits. More uninsured and underinsured workers impose major strains on a health system that relies on employer-based insurance. In addition, the failure of government to help contain health costs for employers has led to a fraying of the implicit social contract in which a good job came with affordable coverage.

Gone are the days when a young person would start in the mail room and stay with the company until retirement. Employee mobility is now the rule rather than the exception. Those who pay for health care -- insurance companies and employers -- increasingly deal with employees who change jobs every few years. This has the effect of not only increasing the numbers of uninsured but also of decreasing the incentive for employers to underwrite access to preventive care.

At the same time, war, poverty, environmental degradation and increased world travel for business and pleasure mean greater migration of people across borders. And with people go diseases. The likes of SARS can travel quickly from Hong Kong to Toronto, and news of a strange flu in Asia worries us in New York. Welcome to the world without borders.

The Pulitzer Prize-winning science writer Laurie Garrett has described it as ''payback for decades of shunning the desperate health needs of the poor world.'' No matter the blame, the need to act now to address issues of global health is no longer just a moral imperative; it is self-interest.

Lifestyle and Demographic Changes
One hundred years ago, who could have predicted that living longer would be a problem?

In three decades, the number of Medicare beneficiaries will double. By the year 2050, one in five Americans will be 65 or older. We will have to find a way to finance the growing demand not only for health care but also for long-term care, which is now largely left out of Medicare.

Our society's affluence is only half of the story. Widening disparities in wealth and in health care too often cleave along ethnic lines. Today, a Hispanic child with asthma is far less likely than a non-Hispanic white child to get needed medication. African-Americans are systematically less likely to get state-of-the-art cardiac care. As our country becomes more and more diverse, these disparities become more obvious and more intolerable.

Our changing lifestyles also contribute to behavior-induced health problems. We can shop online, order in fast food, drive to our errands. Entertainment -- movies, TV, video games and music -- is one click away. The physical activity required to get through the day has decreased, while the pace and stress of daily life has quickened, affecting mental health. Persistent poverty, risky behaviors like substance abuse and unprotected sex and pollution from cars and power plants all add to the country's health problems. As Judith Stern of the University of California at Davis so aptly put it, genetics may load the gun, but environment pulls the trigger.

Old Problems Persist
If all we had to do was face these tremendous changes, that would be daunting enough. But many of the systemic problems we have struggled with for decades -- like high costs and the uninsured -- are simply getting worse.

In 1993, the critics predicted that if the Clinton administration's universal health care coverage plan became law, costs would go through the roof. ''Hospitals will have to close,'' they said, ''Families will lose their choice of doctors. Bureaucrats will deny medically necessary care.''

They were half-right. All that has happened. They were just wrong about the reason.

In 1993, there were 37 million uninsured Americans. In the late 90's, the situation improved slightly, largely because of the improved economy and the passage of the Children's Health Insurance Program. But now some 43.6 million Americans are uninsured, and the vast majority of them are in working families.

While employer-sponsored insurance remains a major source of coverage for workers, it is becoming less accessible and affordable for spouses, dependents and retirees. In 1993, 46 percent of companies with 500 or more employees offered some type of retiree health benefit. That declined to 29 percent in 2001. When you think about the new economy and worker mobility, it's no wonder employers are dropping retiree health benefits. You can only wonder how many yet-to-retire workers are next.

Even those Americans not among the ranks of the uninsured increasingly find themselves underinsured. In 2003, two-thirds of companies with 200 or more employees dealt with increasing costs by increasing the share that their employees had to pay and dropping coverage for particular services. With rising deductibles and co-pays, even if you have insurance, you may not be able to afford the care you need, and some benefits, like mental health services, may not be covered at all.

The problem of the uninsured and underinsured affects everyone. A recent Institute of Medicine study estimates that 18,000 25- to 64-year-old adults die every year as a result of lack of coverage. But even if you are insured, if you have a heart attack, and the ambulance that picks you up has to go three hospitals away because the nearby emergency rooms are full, you will have suffered from our inadequate system of coverage.

If, as a nation, we were saving money by denying insurance to some people, you could at least say there's some logic to it -- no matter how cruel. But that's not the case. Despite the lack of universal coverage in our country, we still spend much more than countries that provide health care to all their citizens. We are No. 1 in the world in health care spending. On a per capita basis, health spending in the United States is 50 percent higher than the second-highest-spending country: Switzerland. Our health costs now constitute 14.9 percent of our gross domestic product and are growing at an alarming rate: by 2013, per capita health care spending is projected to increase to 18.4 percent of G.D.P.

What drives skyrocketing spending? The cost of prescription drugs rose almost twice as fast as spending on all health services, 40 percent in just the last few years.

Hospital costs have been rising as well, in large measure because more than one in four health care dollars go to administration. In 1999, that meant $300 billion per year went to pay for administrative bureaucracy: accountants and bookkeepers, who collect bills, negotiate with insurance companies and squeeze every possible reimbursement out of public programs like Medicare and Medicaid. Asthma and other pulmonary disorders linked to pollution contribute significantly to these costs, according to the health economist Ken Thorpe. Diabetes, high blood pressure and mental illness are also among the conditions that keep these costs rising.

If we spend so much, even after administrative costs, why does the United States rank behind 47 other countries in life expectancy and 42nd in infant mortality?

A lot of the money Americans spend is wasted on care that doesn't improve health. A recent study by Dartmouth researchers argues that close to a third of the $1.6 trillion we now spend on health care goes to care that is duplicative, fails to improve patient health or may even make it worse. A study in Santa Barbara, Calif., found that one out of every five lab tests and X-rays were conducted solely because previous test results were unavailable. A recent study found that for two-thirds of the patients who received a $15,000 surgery to prevent stroke, there was no compelling evidence that the surgery worked.

In situations in which the benefits of intervention are clear, many patients are not receiving that care. For example, few hospitalized patients at risk for bacterial pneumonia get the vaccine against it during their hospital stays. A recent study in The New England Journal of Medicine by Elizabeth McGlynn found that, overall, Americans are getting the care they should only 55 percent of the time.

As a whole, our ailing health care system is plagued with underuse, overuse and misuse. In a fundamental way, we pay far more for less than citizens in other advanced economies get.

How We Deliver Care
There is no ''one size fits all'' solution to our health care problems, but there are common-sense solutions that call for aggressive, creative and effective strategies as bold in their approach as they are practical in their effect.

First, the way we deliver health care must change. For too long our model of health care delivery has been based on the provider, the payer, anyone but the patient. Think about the fact that our medical records are still owned by a physician or a hospital, in bits and pieces, with no reasonable way to connect the dots of our conditions and our care over the years.

If we as individuals are responsible for keeping our own passports, 401(k) and tax files, educational histories and virtually every other document of our lives, then surely we can be responsible for keeping, or at least sharing custody of, our medical records. Studies have shown that when patients have a greater stake in their own care, they make better choices.

We should adopt the model of a ''personal health record'' controlled by the patient, who could use it not only to access the latest reliable health information on the Internet but also to record weight and blood sugar and to receive daily reminders to take asthma or cholesterol medication. Moreover, our current system revolves around ''cases'' rather than patients. Reimbursements are based on ''episodes of treatment'' rather than on a broader consideration of a patient's well-being. Thus it rewards the treatment of discrete diseases and injuries rather than keeping the patient alive and healthy. While we assure adequate privacy protections, we need care to focus on the patient.

Our system rewards clinicians for providing more services but not for keeping patients healthier. The structure of the health care system should shift toward rewarding doctors and health plans that treat patients with their long-term health needs in mind and rewarding patients who make sensible decisions about maintaining their own health.

Harnessing Modernization
As paradoxical as it is that advances in medical technology could potentially break our antiquated system, advances in other technologies may hold the answer to saving it. Using a 20th-century health care system to deal with 21st-century problems is nowhere more true than in the failure to use information technology.

Ten years ago, the Internet was used primarily by academics and the military. Now it is possible to imagine all of a person's health files stored securely on a computer file -- test results, lab records, X-rays -- accessible from any doctor's office. It is easy to imagine, yet our medical system is not there.

The average emergency-room doctor or nurse has minutes to gather information on a patient, from past records and from interviewing the patient or relatives. In the age of P.D.A.'s, why are these professionals forced to rely on a patient's memory?

Information technology can also be used to disseminate research. A government study recently documented that it takes 17 years from the time of a new medical discovery to the time clinicians actually incorporate that discovery into their practice at the bedside. Why not 17 seconds?

Why rely solely on the doctor's brain to store that information? Computers could crunch the variables on a particular patient's medical history, constantly update the algorithms with the latest scientific evidence and put that information at the clinician's fingertips at the point of care.

Americans may not be getting the care they should 45 percent of the time, but the tools exist to narrow that gap. Research shows that when physicians receive computerized reminders, statistics improve exponentially. Reminders can take the form of an alert in the electronic health record that the hospitalized patient has not had a pneumonia vaccine or as computerized questions to remind a doctor of the conditions that must be fulfilled before surgery is considered appropriate.

Newt Gingrich and I have disagreed on many issues, including health care, but I agree with some of the proposals he outlines in his book ''Saving Lives and Saving Money,'' which support taking advantage of technological changes to create a more modern and efficient health care system. I have introduced legislation that promotes the use of information technology to update our health care system and organize it around the best interests of patients. Improvements in technology will end the paper chase, limit errors and reduce the number of malpractice suits.

I strongly believe that savings from information technology should not just be diffused throughout the system, never to be recaptured, but should be used to make substantial progress toward real universal coverage. By better using technology, we can lower health care costs throughout the system and thereby lower the exorbitant premiums that are placing a financial squeeze on businesses, individuals and the government. At the same time, some of those savings should be used to make substantial progress toward real universal coverage. (I may have just lost Newt Gingrich.)

Taking the Broader View: Public Health And Prevention
While we focus on empowering the individual through technology, we also have to recognize the larger factors that affect our health -- from the environment to public health.

If asthma and other pulmonary disorders are the main drivers of increased health spending, that argues strongly that we should rethink how social and environmental factors impact our collective health. Consider that over the last century we have extended life expectancy by 30 years but that only 8 of those years can be credited to medical intervention. The rest of our gains stem from the construction of water and sewer systems, draining mosquito-infested swamps and addressing spoilage, quality and nutrition in our food supply. Yet we continue to underinvest in these important systematic measures -- resulting in expensive health consequences like the explosion of asthma among children living in New York City or the harmful levels of lead found among children drinking water from the District of Columbia water system.

Our neglect of public health also contributes to spiraling health costs. We tend to address health care -- as a nation and as individuals -- after the sickness has taken hold, rather than addressing the cause through public health. Public health programs can help stop preventable disease and control dangerous behaviors. Take obesity, for example. Individuals should understand that they put their lives at risk with unhealthy behavior. But let's face it -- we live in a fast-food nation, and we need to take steps, like restoring physical-education programs in schools, that support the individual's ability to master his or her own health. Studies conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have identified ''Programs That Work,'' which should be financed. It comes down to individual responsibility reinforced by national policy.

The public health system also needs to be brought up to date. The current public health tools were developed when the major threats to health were infectious diseases like malaria and tuberculosis. But now chronic diseases are the No. 1 killer in our country. We need to be concerned not just about pathogens but also about carcinogens.

Over the last three years, I have introduced legislation to increase investment in tracking and correlating environmental and health conditions. I have met with people from Long Island to Fallon, Nev., who want answers about cancer clusters in their communities. The data we have seen about lead and mercury contamination in our food and water suggest that the effects they have on the fetus and children may have contributed to the increasing number of children in special education with attention and learning disorders. We need more research to determine once and for all if increasing pollution in our communities and increasing rates of learning-related disabilities are cause and effect.

We should also be looking at sprawl -- talking about the way we design our neighborhoods and schools and about our shrinking supply of safe, usable outdoor space -- and how that contributes to asthma, stress and obesity. We should follow the example of the European Union and start testing the chemicals we use every day and not wait until we have a rash of birth defects or cancers on our hands before taking action. And we should look at factors in our society that lead to youth violence, substance abuse, depression and suicide and ultimately require insurance and treatment for mental health.

After Sept. 11, mental health was a significant factor in the health toll on our nation's first responders. And yet our mental health delivery system is underfinanced and unprepared.

Finally, as a society, we need greater emphasis on preventive care, an investment in people and their health that saves us money, because when families can't get preventive care, they often end up in the emergency room -- getting the most expensive care possible.

Expanding Coverage
All that we have learned in the last decade confirms that our goal should continue to be what every other industrialized nation has achieved -- health care that's always there for every citizen.

For the first time, this year a nonpartisan group dedicated to improving the nation's health, the Institute of Medicine, recommended that by 2010 everyone in the United States should have health insurance. Such a system would promote better overall health for individuals, families, communities and our nation by providing financial access for everyone to necessary, appropriate and effective health services.

It will, as I have been known to say, take the whole village to finance an affordable and accountable health system. Employers and individuals would share in its financing, and individuals would have to assume more responsibility for improving their own health and lifestyles. Private insurers and public programs would work together, playing complementary roles in ensuring that all Americans have the health care they need. Our society is already spending $35 billion a year to treat people who have no health insurance, and our economy loses $65 billion to $130 billion in productivity and other costs. We are already spending what it would cost if we reallocated those resources and required responsibility.

In the post 9/11 world, there is one more reason for universal coverage. The anthrax and ricin episodes, and the continuing threat posed by biological, chemical and radiological weapons, should make us painfully aware of the shortcomings of our fragmented system of health care. Can you imagine the aftermath of a bioterrorism attack, with thousands of people flooding emergency rooms and bureaucrats demanding proof of insurance coverage from each and every one? Those without coverage might not see a doctor until after they had infected others.

Insurance should be about sharing risk and responsibility -- pooling resources and risk to protect ourselves from the devastating cost of illness or injury. It should not be about further dividing us. Competition should reward health plans for quality and cost savings, not for how many bad risks they can exclude -- especially as we enter the genomic age, when all of us could have uninsurable risks written into our genes.

So achieving comprehensive health care reform is no simple feat, as I learned a decade ago. None of these ideas mean anything if the politi