>> GASP! ?...ARCH CHINA SKEPTIC?


Cheney to promote nuke reactors to China

By H. JOSEF HEBERT
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

Vice President Dick Cheney, center, shakes hands with Anchorage, Alaska mayor Mark Begich at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska, Friday, April 9, 2004. Cheney is en route to Asia. (AP Photo/Michael Dinneen)
WASHINGTON -- On a trip to China next week to talk about high-stakes issues like terrorism and North Korea, Vice President Dick Cheney will have another task - making a pitch for Westinghouse's U.S. nuclear power technology.
At stake could be billions of dollars in business in coming years and thousands of American jobs. The initial installment of four reactors, costing $1.5 billion apiece, would also help narrow the huge U.S. trade deficit with China.
China's latest economic plan anticipates more than doubling its electricity output by 2020 and the Chinese government, facing enormous air pollution problems, is looking to shift some of that away from coal-burning plants. Its plan calls for building as many as 32 large 1,000-megawatt reactors over the next 16 years.
No one has ordered a new nuclear power reactor in the United States in three decades and the next one, if it comes, is still years away. So, China is being viewed by the U.S. industry as a potential bonanza.
Cheney's three-day visit to Beijing and Shanghai next week is part of a weeklong trip to Asia that will also include a stop in Tokyo. He departed Washington on Friday.
A senior administration official, briefing reporters about the trip, said Cheney will not "pitch individual commercial transactions." But he intends to make clear "we support the efforts of our American companies" and general access to China's markets, said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Some critics are concerned about such technology transfers.
"This pitch could not be more poorly timed," Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told a hearing of the House International Relations Committee recently.
Citing recent Chinese plans to help Pakistan build two large reactors that are capable of producing plutonium, he said it is not the time for China to be rewarded with new reactor technology. U.S. officials said the Chinese have given adequate assurances that such sales will not pose a proliferation risk.
Bid solicitations for four new reactors are expected to be issued by the Chinese within months.
The leading competitors are U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Co. and a French rival, Areva, which is peddling its next-generation reactor built by its Framatome subsidiary.
Westinghouse is putting its hopes on its 1,100 megawatt AP1000 reactor, an advanced design that is still waiting approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission before it can be built in the United States. Westinghouse, owned by the British nuclear firm BNFL, is the only U.S.-based manufacturer of a pressurized water reactor, the type of design China has said it wants to pursue.
"Clearly the China market is very important to the industry and a supplier like Westinghouse," said Vaughn Gilbert, a spokesman for the Pittsburgh-based reactor vendor. "The Chinese market is one that we're pursuing."
Each of the AP1000 reactors are expected to cost about $1.5 billion. "We would assume there would be more than one order," Gilbert said, since China has indicated it wants a standardized design across its reactor program. A successful bid could mean 5,000 American jobs, Gilbert said in an interview.
For the nuclear industry, the potential windfall goes beyond building the power plants.
"The opportunity is not just in selling the Chinese a number of reactors, but engaging them for a longer term in a strategic partnership," says Ron Simard, who deals with future plant development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry trade group. That could mean future construction contracts as well as plant service business.
The reactor business has been nonexistent in the United States since the 1970s. No American utility has ordered a new reactor since the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident.
So, vendors like Westinghouse are relying on business elsewhere, especially Asia.
China currently has nine operating reactors, including French, Canadian, Russian, and Japanese designs as well as their own model, producing 6,450 megawatts of power, or about 1.4 percent total capacity. Chinese officials have estimated that by 2020 the country will need an additional 32,000 megawatts from its nuclear industry, or about 32 additional reactors.
Even with the surge in reactor construction, nuclear power will only account for 8 percent of China's future electricity needs. Chinese officials said at an energy conference in Washington last year their country must more than double its coal-fired generation and build more dams, erect windmills and tap natural gas to meet future electricity demands.
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Cheney Reaching Out to Asia
Iraq, N. Korea's Nuclear Crisis Top Likely Agenda
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, April 9, 2004; Page A12


Vice President Cheney departs today on only his third foreign trip since taking office, a week-long tour of Japan, China and South Korea designed to cement ties and press for progress in the North Korea nuclear crisis. But the sudden flare-up of violence in Iraq -- including the seizure of Japanese and South Korean nationals -- could dominate Cheney's talks with key leaders.
A senior administration official, briefing reporters in advance of the trip, said the kidnappings will be "very much on their minds" in Tokyo and Seoul and thus will be a likely topic for discussion. Japan and South Korea each have more than 500 military personnel in Iraq assisting reconstruction, and the possible deployment of 3,000 South Korean troops has become an issue in next Thursday's parliamentary elections.
Seven South Korean missionaries were briefly kidnapped yesterday and later freed unharmed. But an Iraqi group said yesterday that it will burn alive three Japanese hostages -- two aid workers and a journalist -- unless Tokyo withdraws its troops from Iraq within three days. The deadline would be during Cheney's time in Tokyo, the first stop on his tour.
Cheney, who will travel only with his own foreign policy advisers rather than State Department officials or National Security Council staffers, will tell the Asian allies that the Bush administration believes "it is very important to stay on course" and that the United States will stay in Iraq "as long as necessary to get the job done," said the senior official, speaking on the condition of anonymity.
"It's a classic case, I think, of those who are opposed to what we're trying to do in Iraq, trying to change the behavior of governments through terror, intimidation, the threat of violence," he said. "It's important that those of us who are working on this overall effort not allow that to happen."
North Korea's nuclear ambitions had been expected to be at the center of the discussions with all three countries, though the official sought to play down expectations of any breakthrough. "We've got to keep working the problem; it's three yards and a cloud of dust," he said. "There is no touchdown pass here, so to speak."
Another administration official said that Beijing, after a meeting between the Chinese foreign minister and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, recently informed a U.S. envoy that the onus was on the United States to show more flexibility. But Cheney is expected to emphasize that the administration is determined to insist that North Korea resolve the impasse over its nuclear programs. The administration has insisted that North Korea irreversibly and verifiably dismantle them.
"It will be useful for the Chinese to hear him say plainly, as he does, that when we say no incentives, we mean no incentives," the official said, also speaking on the condition of anonymity.
The White House has not disclosed precise details of Cheney's trip, but Asian news services have reported that Cheney will arrive in Tokyo tomorrow. He will meet with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the Japanese emperor. Before leaving for China, Cheney will give a speech celebrating 150 years of U.S.-Japan relations.
In China, Cheney will meet Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan, Premier Wen Jiabao, former president Jiang Zemin and President Hu Jintao in Beijing and give a speech at Fudan University in Shanghai. He will then fly to Seoul to meet with Prime Minister Goh Kun, also South Korea's acting president during the country's impeachment trial of Roh Moo Hyun, and address U.S. troops.
The timing of Cheney's trip -- originally scheduled for a year ago but later scrubbed by the White House -- was dictated by the Senate schedule, the senior official said. Cheney, who in his role as president of the Senate can cast the tie-breaking vote, does not like to leave the country when the Senate is in session.
But traveling next week leaves the vice president vulnerable to possible awkward moments. He is to arrive in Seoul on the day parliamentary elections are held. And he may be in China when the dispute over Taiwan's elections are resolved.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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North Korea says standoff with US at "brink of nuclear war"
North Korea said Friday the standoff over its atomic ambitions was on the brink of nuclear war as US Vice President Dick Cheney headed to the region for talks with key Asian allies.
The Stalinist state's official news agency accused Washington of "driving the military situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war" with plans for a pre-emptive strike on North Korea.
Cheney is expected in Tokyo on Saturday on the first leg of an Asian tour that also takes him to China and South Korea.
North Korea described six-party talks held in Beijing in February as "fruitless," their harshest assessment so far of the meeting that brought together the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.
"The US demand that the DPRK (North Korea) scrap its nuclear programme first is the main obstacle in the way of solving the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the US," the Korean Central News Agency said in a commentary.
"It is a well-known fact that the second round of the six-way talks held in Beijing last February proved fruitless due to the US demand that the DPRK dismantle its nuclear program first."
Washington is demanding the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear prorgammes, both plutonium and enriched uranium schemes, before it will offer concessions to the impoverished state.
Pyongyang denies having a uranium programme and has said it will freeze its plutonium weapons programme in return for simultaneous rewards from Washington.
A new round of six-party talks is expected before the end of June while working parties are supposed to be set up to resolve address contentious issues.
South Korea's foreign ministry said all participating countries were ready for working level talks apart from North korea, which has yet to give the go ahead.
In the commentary the North Korean news agency said Pyongyang had no choice but to boost its nuclear weapons drive in the face of US intransigence and its "moves to put the strategy of pre-emptive nuclear attack into practice."
Cheney's trip to Asia has been overshadowed by the deteriorating security situation in Iraq where insurgents are threatening to kill three Japanese hostages unless Tokyo pulls out troops from the war-torn region.
Seven South Koreans were released earlier Friday after also falling into the hands of insurgents.
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>>...2

Muslim charity asks U.S. for frozen funds
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
WASHINGTON -- A Muslim charity is seeking permission to have some of its money, which was frozen by the government, released for legitimate aid purposes.
The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development filed a request Friday to the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control to unfreeze $50,000 to be sent to the Palestine Children's Relief Fund, which seeks to provide free medical care for Palestinian children in the Middle East.
The Bush administration in 2001 accused Holy Land, a Texas-based group, of financing the militant Islamic group Hamas and ordered U.S. banks to freeze its assets. Holy Land says it has never donated money or provided services to Hamas, a group the government says is a foreign terrorist organization.
The Treasury Department had no immediate comment on Holy Land's request. Last year, a Treasury official said the general notion of taking frozen charitable assets and releasing them for legitimate aid purposes was a complex matter worth exploring.
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Saudis dismiss U.S. oil diversification efforts

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Friday, April 9, 2004
Saudi Arabia appears unimpressed with U.S. efforts to diversify its energy suppliers.
Saudi Oil Minister Ali Al Nueimi predicted that alternatives to Persian Gulf crude oil would diminish over the next decade, Middle East Newsline reported. Al Nueimi said there were no proven oil or natural gas reserves that could compete with those in the Gulf region -- including those in Africa, the North Sea, Caspian Sea or Russia.
"And so eventually it's going to come down, in the next 10 years or so, to the [Persian] Gulf area," Al Nuemi said in an interview with the Oil & Gas Journal. "I know people today are clamoring for diversification of sources of supply and stability in the gulf area. Believe me, in the final analysis, the world will be better off to depend on the Gulf. That's where God has put those reserves."
The Saudi minister dismissed claims by U.S. experts that Saudi oil reserves were depleting. He said the kingdom has proven reserves of 260.4 billion barrels of which half has been developed.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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>>...3
Pentagon: Tanker plan needs major changes

By MATTHEW DALY
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON -- The Pentagon should not move forward on a $23.5 billion plan to acquire 100 midair refueling tankers from Boeing Co. until significant changes are made to the deal, the Pentagon's inspector general said Friday.
In a highly critical report, Inspector General Joseph Schmitz said procedural and financial problems with the deal could cause the government to spend up to $4.5 billion more than necessary.
Once the changes are made, however, there is no compelling reason not to complete the deal, the report said.
The long-anticipated report said the Air Force's decision to acquire the tankers as a commercial item put the Pentagon at "high risk for paying excessive prices and profits and precludes good fiduciary responsibility" for Defense Department funds.
It also said senior Air Force officials failed to comply with military contracting laws; accepted insufficient or inaccurate Boeing data during negotiations; and wrongly waived any right to audit the program once it gets started.
The Air Force, in a response included in the report, said it followed procedures outlined by Congress "and reviewed and improved within the (Defense) Department using approved acquisition processes."
The Air Force and Boeing also disputed the report's claim that the Air Force "cannot ensure to the war fighter" that the tankers will meet the military's operational requirements.
In a detailed statement, Boeing said it met 26 key performance standards set out in a November 2001 Air Force document and modified the following March. The company created "a totally compliant design" that meets all Air Force requirements, as well as standards set by senior Pentagon officials, Boeing said.
The Air Force said in its response that the new KC-767s "will be the world's newest and most advanced tanker" and are "critical to the defense of our country."
Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., a leading supporter of the deal, said the report "confirmed what I have been saying for nearly three years: We need these airplanes, and there is no reason to stop the tanker lease from moving forward."
The planes will be made at Boeing's Everett, Wash., plant, and modified for military use in Wichita, Kan. In the unusual deal, the Defense Department would lease 20 767 tankers and buy another 80 planes.
"The bottom line is that the IG found no reason not to proceed with the tanker deal - and that's good," said Jim Albaugh, president and CEO of Boeing Integrated Defense Systems.
Lt. Col. Jennifer Cassidy, an Air Force spokeswoman, said the report demonstrates "fundamental differences in interpretation" between the audit team's experts and Air Force acquisition and legal experts.
"Although this was an admittedly complex and novel proposal to lease commercial aircraft modified to serve as tanker aircraft, the audit team found no compelling reason to not proceed with the leasing arrangement," Cassidy said.
The Air Force believes that language enacted by Congress in late 2001 supports the lease program, and that its terms provide sufficient protection for taxpayers, Cassidy said.
The inspector general has been looking into the deal since last year, after questions arose about ethical issues surrounding the way Boeing pursued the multibillion-dollar contract.
A grand jury in Virginia is investigating potentially illegal actions by Darleen Druyun, a top Air Force official involved in the contract talks who was later hired by Boeing. Druyun was fired last year, after an internal review found improprieties in her hiring.
Boeing also fired its chief financial officer over what it depicted as an attempted cover-up of the hiring procedures. The Pentagon later suspended the contract pending completion of the inspector general's report and separate studies by the Pentagon's general counsel, the Defense Science Board and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
The report released Friday outlines three options for the Pentagon, including delaying the entire project until an analysis of alternatives is completed - which could force officials to reopen the project to new bids.
In the best option for Boeing, the report advises the Pentagon to alter more than a dozen aspects of the deal before moving forward with the existing plan.
Another option calls for the Pentagon to make changes and acquire 100 tankers, and then initiate an analysis of alternatives for any remaining planes.
On the Net:
Boeing Co.: http://www.boeing.com
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>> 9/11 UH...

DAY OF INFAMY 2001
Osama brief 'old intel'
senator stated in 2002
Bob Graham said Aug. 6 memo to president had details his panel had known for 3 years

Posted: April 9, 2004
5:00 p.m. Eastern
? 2004 WorldNetDaily.com
The Presidential Daily Brief at the heart of contentious exchanges in Condoleezza Rice's 9-11 Commission testimony yesterday contained old information about Osama bin Laden's threat to the United States, according to comments made two years ago by Democratic Sen. Bob Graham of Florida.
The May 21, 2002, interview with Human Events magazine backs up Rice's insistence that an Aug. 6, 2001, memo to President Bush did not warn of specific attacks inside the United States, but rather was "historical information based on old reporting."
In the 2002 interview, Graham said the Senate Intelligence Committee, which he chaired, saw all the information given to the president.
The senator said the threats of hijacking in the Aug. 6 memo were based on very old intelligence the committee had seen earlier.
"The particular report that was in the President's Daily Briefing that day was about three years old," Graham said. "It was not a contemporary piece of information."
Yesterday, however, commission member and Democratic lawyer Richard Ben-Veniste pressed Rice on the memo.
Ben-Veniste: Isn't it a fact, Dr. Rice, that the August 6th PDB [Presidential Daily Briefing] warned against possible attacks in this country? And I ask you whether you recall the title of that PDB?
Rice: I believe the title was, Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.
Now, the . . .
Ben-Veniste: Thank you.
Rice: No, Mr. Ben-Veniste . . .
Ben-Veniste: I will get into the . . .
Rice: I would like to finish my point here.
Ben-Veniste: I didn't know there was a point.
Rice: Given that - you asked me whether or not it warned of attacks.
Ben-Veniste: I asked you what the title was.
Rice: You said, did it not warn of attacks. It did not warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old reporting. There was no new threat information. And it did not, in fact, warn of any coming attacks inside the United States.
Presidential Daily Briefs are a compilation of information from law enforcement and intelligence agencies which normally are seen only by top presidential officials.
The commission already has had access to the Aug. 6, 2001, brief, but chairman Thomas Kean said he wants it released to the public "because we feel it's important that the American people get a chance to see it."
National Security Council spokesman, Sean McCormack said yesterday, "We have every intention to declassify it."

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>> SLATE NOTES...
Vox Populi
Rice is tasked to fall on her sword.
Compiled by Kevin Arnovitz
Updated Friday, April 9, 2004, at 1:59 PM PT


Subject: "Rice is Tasked to Fall on Her Sword"
Re: "Condi Lousy: Why Rice is a bad national security adviser."
From: BeverlyMann
Date: Fri Apr 9 1229h
One clear inference can be drawn from Condoleezza Rice's testimony before the 9/11 commission this morning: She has been a bad national security adviser--passive, sluggish, and either unable or unwilling to tie the loose strands of the bureaucracy into a sensible vision or policy. In short, she has not done what national security advisers are supposed to do.
Actually, what is clear to me now--after watching Rice's testimony and then reading some of the more astonishing quotes from it last evening in various news reports--is that Rice isn't a national security adviser at all. That is, her job--unlike that of all the others, such as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, John Poindexter, Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger--was, and is, not to give the president national security advice but instead to carry out orders given by those who actually were devising national security policy: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith.
Rice was simply a glorified supervisory bureaucrat. Her job was to take and carry out orders--or, as she repeatedly put it, to be "tasked"--to carry out this or that bureaucratic aspect of the national security policy set by Cheney and Rumsfeld with the input of Wolfowitz and Feith. Rice was almost as much out of the loop as was Richard Clarke; she was present at these "principles' meetings, but only to receive her marching orders.
Rice didn't get Clarke a meeting with the principles because Rice couldn't get Clarke a meeting with the principles. Rice didn't order the FBI director to "shake the trees" of that agency--nor even to notify the field offices of the stunningly clear indications from al Qaeda intercepts about a very, very, very, very big and imminent terrorist attack possibly within this country, or even inquire whether the field offices that were tracking al Qaeda cells within this country had any information that, viewed in light of the intercepted messages, might help pinpoint any such plot within the U.S.--because Rice lacked the authority to do so on her own.
Nor, apparently, did she even have the authority to decide on her own to demand that the FBI director (and later the acting FBI director) do so. Apparently, she lacked the authority even to notify the FBI director of the threats--excuse me, of the non-threats--about some "unbelievable news in coming weeks," about a "big event" that will cause "a very, very, very, very big uproar," about the announcement that "there will be attacks in the near future".
And she didn't have the authority--or maybe the proper word here is clout--to persuade Bush meet not just with the CIA director but also with the FBI director. In that dramatic exchange between her and Ben-Veniste in which Ben-Veniste demanded a yes-or-no answer to his question whether Rice had told Bush "at any time prior to August 6th, of the existence of al-Qaida cells in the United States" although Rice herself had been told of this in early 2001, she answered, finally, that she didn't recall whether or not she had done so.
Rice wasn't tasked to tell the president of the existence of al Qaeda cells in the United States, and so she didn't. Rice was tasked with furthering Cheney's and Rumsfeld's goals of pushing the missile defense system's funding and development and of toppling Saddam Hussein.
The threat posed by Al Qaeda cells in the U.S. didn't further either of these two goals, and in fact hindered the first of them; a big argument against the obscenely expensive and scientifically unperfected missile system was precisely that with the end of the Cold War, the biggest security threat to the U.S. was the potential for terrorists to wreak havoc simply by infiltrating the country. So Rice, untasked to tell the president of the presence of al Qaeda cells within the U.S., didn't tell the president of the presence of al Qaeda cells within the U.S.
Bizarre though it was, her weirdest statement was not the one in which she that the intercepts about "a very, very, very, very big uproar" that will be caused by "unbelievable news in coming weeks" about "attacks in the near future" were "[t]roubling, yes," but because "they don't tell us when; they don't tell us where; they don't tell us who; and they don't tell us how" they were not quite troubling enough for her to task herself to notify the FBI director and the field offices about them.
No, of all the many bizarre comments Rice made yesterday, the loopiest, in my opinion-- and anyway the most starkly factually inaccurate--was her incessant claim that because of "structural" and legal prohibitions, the CIA director couldn't tell the FBI director that there were certain known al Qaeda operatives who had entered the country.
Is she claiming that at the "battle stations" shake-the-trees meetings that Clarke and others say occurred in late 1999 among the various national security "principles" including the CIA director and the FBI director didn't really occur because of structural problems? Or that those meetings occurred but that the CIA director didn't tell the FBI director any valuable information he had because it would have been illegal to do so? Or that the CIA director did pass along to the FBI director the information he had, and that his doing so violated the law?
Good heavens. What law, pray tell, is she talking about? What law would have prevented George Tenet from giving to the FBI director the pertinent information he had--about the contents of the al Qaeda intercepts and about the few al Qaeda operatives the CIA knew already had entered the country?
"Every day now in the Oval Office in the morning," Rice said in answer to a question about whether the structural problems that hampered communications between the CIA and the FBI had been resolved, "the FBI director and the CIA director sit with the president, sharing information in ways that they would have been prohibited to share that information before." Indeed. And that's precisely what Clarke said transpired during the Clinton administration in the weeks before the millennium, in order to try to thwart any planned terrorist attacks then. And it's exactly what Clarke says he tried to communicate with Bush, via Rice, that he, Bush should do.
Perhaps the most revealing answer Rice gave yesterday was in answer to a question inquiring about the steps, if any, Bush took in response to the information in the Aug. 6 security briefing that said [according to Bob Kerrey and Ben-Veniste] "that the FBI indicates patterns of suspicious activity in the United States consistent with preparations for hijacking." Rice said Bush met every day with the CIA director.
Not with the CIA director and the FBI director. Just with the CIA director. The structural problem that kept the FBI director and the CIA director from communicating the most critical information to each other during the months preceding 9/11 was, in other words, a structural problem of the Bush administration's own making.
That structural problem was, in turn, created by a truly profound one, a thoroughly stunning one--even to me. It's a structural problem revealed most starkly by Bush's failure, upon being told on Aug 6, 2001 that "that the FBI indicates patterns of suspicious activity in the United States consistent with preparations for hijacking" especially in light of George Tenet's warnings to him throughout that summer that al Qaeda intercepts were speaking of a very, very, very big event.
The structural problem is simply this: Bush was the president in name only, a genuine figurehead, with no intellectual decisionmaking capability whatsoever, and that Cheney was the actual president at least with respect to national security matters. The information in the Aug. 6 "PDB"--the presidential daily briefing--wasn't given to the actual president. Nor were Tenet's daily oral and written reports. They were given only to the figurehead president, and not transmitted to the real one, who already had determined the administration's national security agenda and therefore wasn't interested in them.
Thus Rice's constant references to policy rather than to responding to--acting in light of--information being received. Rice wasn't tasked to attempt to learn of the nature and locale of the impending very, very, very big event al Qaeda was planning because the policy regarding invading Afghanistan, and what they thought was the requisite of getting Pakistan on board, wasn't yet in place.
Among the more annoying euphemisms in currently in vogue among the punditry is the one they use to acknowledge that Bush is very seriously lacking in intellectual capacity: they say he is "incurious". But stupid as I recognize him to be, even I wouldn't have suspected that, handed information that the FBI indicates patterns of suspicious activity in the United States consistent with preparations for hijacking, and handed information that al Qaeda was planning an attack it thought would cause a huge uproar, George W. Bush would be so incurious as to not phone the FBI director and ask what exactly were those patterns of suspicious activity in the United States consistent with preparations for hijacking.
But now, thanks to Rice's testimony yesterday, I and all the world know that that wasn't tasked to Bush. It was tasked to Cheney--or rather it would have been, had Cheney rather than Bush been the one to receive the Aug. 6 PDB, and had he been the one to meet daily with Tenet.
I had thought throughout the Clarke controversy, until yesterday, that the real political damage to Bush from would come from the recognition by a majority of the public, finally, that it makes us less rather than more safe--both physically and economically--to have a strong-'n-decisive leader whose strength-'n-decisive leadership amounts to determining policy based purely on ideology and patronage rather than on the actual needs of the county and on facts, and who forces through these polices irrespective of circumstances and evidence about their actual effects on the country.
But I think now that that, even more than that, the political damage Bush will suffer will come from the ultimate epiphany that the most damning caricature of this president is true: He's jaw-droppingly stupid, and so Dick Cheney is the actual president. Cheney isn't obsessively secretive for nothing.
Troubling, yes. Very.
Condi Rice was asked to fall on her sword in order to try to keep this secret from escaping. She obliged and destroyed herself, but didn't succeed in her mission.

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>> SLATE 2...

LexiCondi
Decoding Rice's self-serving testimony.
By William Saletan
Updated Thursday, April 8, 2004, at 4:16 PM PT



Condi: in her own words

Four years ago, when the Justice Department deposed Al Gore in the Clinton fund-raising scandal, I poked fun at Gore's self-serving, hypocritical redefinitions of everyday words. Today, National Security Adviser Condi Rice resorted to similar tactics in her testimony before the 9/11 commission. Here's a glossary of her terms.

Gathering threats: Unclear perils that previous administrations irresponsibly failed to confront quickly. Example: For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically, democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late.

Vague threats: Unclear perils that the Bush administration understandably failed to confront quickly. Example: The threat reporting that we received in the spring and summer of 2001 was not specific as to time, nor place, nor manner of attack. ... The threat reporting was frustratingly vague.

Up-to-date intelligence: The precise, useful information the administration responsibly demanded and got. Example: President Bush revived the practice of meeting with the director of Central Intelligence almost every day. ... At these meetings, the president received up-to-date intelligence. ... From Jan. 20 through Sept. 10, the president received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on al-Qaida.

Specific threat information: The precise, useful information the administration didn't get, thereby absolving it of responsibility. Example: On Aug. 6, 2001, the president's intelligence briefing ... referred to uncorroborated reporting, from 1998, that a terrorist might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists. ... This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information.

Specific warnings: The precise, useful alerts the administration issued based on the information it got. Example: I asked Dick [Clarke] to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond. ... The FAA issued at least five civil aviation security information circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel, including specific warnings about the possibility of hijacking.

Briefing: Addition to a warning, without which the warning is insufficient. Example: To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, this kind of analysis about the use of airplanes as weapons actually was never briefed to us.

Recommendation: Addition to a briefing, without which the briefing is insufficient. Example: In the memorandum that Dick Clarke sent me on Jan. 25, he mentions sleeper cells. There is no mention or recommendation of anything that needs to be done about them.

Historical: Communications that mentioned the past and were therefore irrelevant to the future. Example: The Aug. 6 PDB [president's daily briefing] ...was not a particular threat report. And there was historical information in there about various aspects of al-Qaida's operations. ... This was not a warning. This was a historic memo.

Analytical: Documents given to the administration that were general and therefore useless. Example: On the Aug. 6 memorandum to the president, this was not threat reporting about what was about to happen. This was an analytic piece. ... Threat reporting is, "We believe that something is going to happen here and at this time, under these circumstances." This was not threat reporting. ... The PDB does not say the United States is going to be attacked. It says Bin Laden would like to attack the United States."

Broad: Documents issued by the administration that were general and therefore effective. Example: Our counterterrorism strategy was a part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.

Structural: Factors that the administration couldn't influence because they were systematic. Example: The absence of light, so to speak, on what was going on inside the country, the inability to connect the dots, was really structural.

Chance: Factors that the administration couldn't influence because they were non-systematic. Example (answering charges that the administration might have disrupted the 9/11 plot by holding regular Cabinet "principals" meetings on terrorism): You cannot depend on the chance that some principal might find out something in order to prevent an attack. That's why the structural changes that are being talked about here are so important. Synonym: Lucky. Example: I do not believe that it is a good analysis to go back and assume that somehow maybe we would have gotten lucky by "shaking the trees." ... We had a structural problem.

Bureaucratic impediments: Factors that the administration couldn't influence because they involved the administration. Example: We did have a systemic problem, a structural problem. ... It was there because there were legal impediments, as well as bureaucratic impediments.

Set of ideas: Richard Clarke's proposals for fighting al-Qaida, prior to being adopted by Bush. Antonym: Plan. Example: We were not presented with a plan. ... What we were presented on Jan. 25 was a set of ideas.

Strategy: Clarke's proposals for fighting al-Qaida, as adopted by Bush. Example: We decided to take a different track. We decided to put together a strategic approach to this that would get the regional powers. ... But by no means did [Clarke] ask me to act on a plan. He gave us a series of ideas.

Swatting flies: Bill Clinton's weak, partial counterterrorist measures. Example: [Bush] made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al-Qaida one attack at a time. He told me he was tired of swatting flies. ... He felt that what the agency was doing was going after individual terrorists here and there, and that's what he meant by swatting flies.

Disrupting: Bush's strong, partial counterterrorist measures. Example: [Bush] directed the director of Central Intelligence to prepare an aggressive program of covert activities to disrupt al-Qaida.

Law enforcement: Clinton's weak policy of targeting individual terrorists. Example: That's actually where we've had the biggest change. The president doesn't think of this as law enforcement. He thinks of this as war.

Hunting down terrorists one by one: Bush's strong policy of targeting individual terrorists. Example: Under his leadership, the United States and our allies are disrupting terrorist operations, cutting off their funding and hunting down terrorists one by one.

Diplomacy: Clinton's impotent pleas to foreign governments. Example: We were continuing the diplomatic efforts. But we did want to take the time to get in place a policy that was more strategic toward al-Qaida, more robust.

Strong messages: Bush's potent pleas to foreign governments. Example: Within a month of taking office, President Bush sent a strong private message to President Musharraf, urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida training camps.

Deferral: Clinton's irresponsible postponement of counterterrorism ideas. Example: We also made decisions on a number of specific anti-al-Qaida initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke to me in an early memorandum after we had taken office. Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last administration.

Taking time: Bush's prudent postponement of counterterrorism ideas. Example: We did want to take the time to get in place a policy that was more strategic toward al-Qaida, more robust. It takes some time to think about how to reorient your policy toward Pakistan. It takes some time to think about how to have a more effective policy toward Afghanistan.


William Saletan is Slate's chief political correspondent and author of Bearing Right: How Conservatives Won the Abortion War.

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>> HEIMAT GASP...

Seattle an al-Qaida target? Local security officials left out of loop

By PAUL SHUKOVSKY
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told the nation yesterday -- and apparently for the first time law enforcement in Seattle -- that the CIA warned President Bush that al-Qaida terrorists might try to hijack an airplane and free would-be terrorist bomber Ahmed Ressam.
Ressam, who has become an important government witness in terrorism cases, has spent most of the time since his December 1999 arrest in the Federal Detention Center at SeaTac.
In testimony before the Sept. 11 commission, Rice added that checks had been made on whether a courthouse involving the Ressam case in 2001 was under surveillance and that "the FBI had full field investigations under way."
But the special agent in charge of the FBI's Seattle office at the time said yesterday that he never heard of any such investigations. And retired agent Charles Mandigo added that no one ever informed him of threats to the prison or the courthouse.
Mandigo is not alone:
The chief district judge who presided over Ressam's case said that his courthouse said no one told him his courthouse was under threat.
A deputy U.S. marshal charged with courthouse security said no one informed the Marshal's Service about the danger.
An assistant U.S. attorney prosecuting Ressam said he never heard a thing about it.
A federal anti-terrorism agent said if there was an investigation into threats against the courthouse and the prison, no one told the local joint terrorism task force.
But a White House spokesman defended Rice's testimony as accurate.
"These statements represent what was in the PDB (president's daily brief from the CIA) -- the information presented to the president," said spokesman Frederick Jones.
Asked why information about the threats appears not to have been passed on to federal and local law enforcement in Seattle, Jones said:
"I cannot take at prima facie value that you've contacted the correct FBI agents. I don't know what the ground truth is."
And Jones added that "whether the information (in the CIA briefing) is correct or not" is a matter for the intelligence agencies to address.
Jones urged that publication of a story wait until the White House declassifies the Aug. 6, 2001, briefing. He said it is highly likely that it will be made public today.
Rice's comments came in response to aggressive questioning from Sept. 11 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste about the content of the intelligence briefing.
Rice responded by saying that:
"The fact is that this August 6th PDB was in response to the president's questions about whether or not something might happen or something might be planned by al-Qaida inside the United States. He asked because all of the threat reporting or the threat reporting that was actionable was about the threats abroad, not about the United States.
"This particular PDB had a long section on what bin Laden had wanted to do -- speculative, much of it -- in '97, '98; that he had, in fact, liked the results of the 1993 bombing.
"It had a number of discussions of -- it had a discussion of whether or not they might use hijacking to try and free a prisoner who was being held in the United States -- Ressam. It reported that the FBI had full field investigations under way.
"And we checked on the issue of whether or not there was something going on with surveillance of buildings, and we were told, I believe, that the issue was the courthouse in which this might take place."
Rice's mention of the 1993 bombing apparently refers to the attack in February of that year on the World Trade Center in New York.
Customs agents arrested Ressam in December 1999 after he arrived in Port Angeles on a ferry from Victoria, B.C. He had explosives in his trunk and had plans to use them at Los Angeles International Airport.
He is awaiting sentencing after striking a deal with the government to testify in other terrorism cases.
Proceedings in the Ressam case took place in two federal courthouses, Seattle and Los Angeles. The case began in Seattle before Chief District Judge John Coughenour, who moved the trial to Los Angeles because of pretrial publicity. Coughenour presided over the case in both cities. Asked yesterday whether he was told about a terrorist surveillance on the courthouse, he said: "No sir. No, I never heard anything about it." Coughenour has a top-secret security clearance.
The U.S. Marshals Service, an agency of the Department of Justice, is responsible for courthouse security. One deputy marshal present during the Ressam proceedings said yesterday: "I never heard it. If I knew they were doing surveillance of our building, we would have done countersurveillance."
A chief deputy marshal at the Los Angeles federal courthouse yesterday refused to comment.
But former Assistant U.S. Attorney Steven Gonzalez, a member of the team who prosecuted Ressam, said yesterday that he was not told of any FBI investigations or threats to the courthouse. "I knew nothing of it," said Gonzalez, now a state court judge.
And a member of Ressam's defense team, federal public defender Tom Hillier, said yesterday that no one informed him of such a threat. Hillier said yesterday that security arrangements surrounding Ressam did not hurt the defense team's ability to do its job.
Hillier said Ressam has spent most of his time since he was arrested at the federal detention center in SeaTac.
P-I reporter Paul Shukovsky can be reached at 206-448-8072 or paulshukovsky@seattlepi.com

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Side Show
Bush pursued continuity; who knows what the 9/11 Commission is pursuing.
Give Condoleezza Rice credit for candor. Testifying before the 9/11 Commission today, President Bush's national-security adviser acknowledged that the United States "simply was not on a war footing" at the time the terrorist atrocities of 9/11 were committed.
When should the U.S. government have taken the threat of radical, ideological Islamism seriously? Perhaps as far back as 1979, when our embassy in Tehran was seized by Iranian theocrats; perhaps as far back as 1983 when Hezbollah suicide terrorists slaughtered hundreds of U.S. Marines and diplomats in Beirut; certainly as far back as the attacks over Lockerbie, at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa and the USS Cole.
But that's not what happened. Instead, one American administration after another, Democratic and Republican alike, made gestures, sent signals, and mobilized lawyers armed with subpoenas. The terrorists and their masters could only have been amused. Yes, it would have been brilliant had President Bush entered the Oval Office, looked at this pattern and quickly concluded: "From this moment on, defeating terrorism and the ideologies driving terrorism should be seen as America's top priority. I want these networks rolled up ASAP. Use whatever means necessary."
Actually, President Bush came close to saying that. He asked for a policy review and a comprehensive strategy. But even had Dr. Rice -- or counterterrorism "czar" Richard Clarke -- come up with such a plan within 24 hours, President Bush could not have implemented it during his first eight months in office. The U.S. government simply did not have the means at its disposal. Consider:
The FBI's mission and culture stressed solving crimes, not preventing them.
The intelligence community didn't have good enough intelligence -- which led, for example, to Clinton bombing a Sudanese aspirin factory a few years earlier, thinking it was a WMD factory.
The Pentagon didn't know much about terrorists -- the Defense Department's manual on fighting "small wars" was written in 1940.
The Foreign Service hadn't prepared the ground -- Pakistan was still cozy with the Taliban and would not have permitted the U.S. to mount acts of war from their territory. Key foreign-service officers were still supporting what they called "moderate" Taliban elements.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service was too hopeless a muddle to distinguish between tourists eager to see the Statue of Liberty and terrorists eager to mass murder infidels.
And Congress -- Democrats, for sure, but also such Republican mandarins as Senators Chuck Hagel and Richard Lugar -- would have been apoplectic had President Bush attempted to take any of the measures necessary to root out the long-established weeds of terrorism. Imagine the uproar had Bush begun assassinating terrorist leaders around the world or preemptively invaded Afghanistan.
Instead, of course, as Condoleezza Rice made clear today, the new Bush administration did the reasonable thing, the responsible thing, the bipartisan thing: It maintained continuity. It sailed the course set by President Clinton, and it even used key members of the Clinton crew.
George Tenet was retained as director of Central Intelligence. Dick Clarke kept his job as White House terrorism adviser. Others who might have expected to receive pink slips were instead given a pat on the back and told to keep up the good work. A Democrat -- Norman Mineta -- was named secretary of transportation, the Cabinet position most responsible for airline safety.
President Roosevelt waited until after World War II to put in place a commission to investigate what mistakes led to Pearl Harbor. That was a wise move, but then Roosevelt did not face the kind of hyper-partisanship that plagues America these days. (Washington Post columnist David Broder recently pointed out that when FDR ran for reelection during World War II, he emphasized his record as a war leader. Broder might have added that FDR's Republican opponent, Thomas Dewey, declined to criticize the president in regard to foreign policy during a time of war. It's almost hard to believe that there was a time when Americans knew the difference between their foreign enemies and their political adversaries.)
Increasingly, it seems the 9/11 Commission is losing its way. Its mission is to learn lessons -- not to lay blame. Its mission is to come up with recommendations for a more effective antiterrorism strategy.
Its mission is not to stage a reality-TV show, not to hold an inquisition, not to promote books (and, no doubt, movie deals), not to scold Rice as though she were a student who claimed her dog had eaten her homework.
But that's what the public is seeing out here in TV-land.
-- Clifford D. May, a former New York Times foreign correspondent, is president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on terrorism.
http://www.nationalreview.com/may/may200404081530.asp
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9/11 documents show hijacking warnings

By CURT ANDERSON
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

Commission member Richard Ben-Veniste questions National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice during testimoney to the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks Thursday, April 8, 2004, in Washington Commission chairman Thomas Kean watches at left. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)
WASHINGTON -- U.S. government agencies issued repeated warnings in the summer of 2001 about potential terrorist plots against the United States masterminded by Osama bin Laden, including a possible plan to hijack commercial aircraft, documents show.
While there were no specific targets mentioned in the United States, there was intelligence indicating al-Qaida might attempt to crash a plane into the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. And other reports said Islamic extremists might try to hijack a plane to gain release of comrades.
The escalating seriousness was reflected in a series of warnings issued by the State Department, Federal Aviation Administration, Defense Department and others detailing a heightened risk of terror attacks targeting Americans.
Whether the Bush administration had enough information to take more aggressive action is at the heart of the dispute over the contents of an Aug. 6, 2001, intelligence briefing the White House was working to declassify at the urging of the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks. White House officials said the document would not come out Friday and probably would not be ready for release until early next week.
Several Democrats on the commission claim the memo, called a presidential daily brief, or PDB, included current intelligence indicating a high threat of hijackings. It was titled "Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States."
"Something was going to happen very soon and be potentially catastrophic," said one of the Democrats, former Indiana Rep. Timothy Roemer. "I don't understand, given the big threat, why the big principals don't get together."
National security adviser Condoleezza Rice repeatedly told the panel Thursday that the document was a history of al-Qaida threats and contained no new imminent threat information requiring different government action. The possibility of hijackings was being investigated by the FBI and the Federal Aviation Administration, she said, adding that most of the summer 2001 threats concerned U.S. interests abroad.
"The country had taken the steps that it could given that there was no threat reporting about what might happen within the United States," Rice said.
Congress already has conducted an investigation into the attacks and its final report includes a detailed timeline of the increasing threats U.S. officials picked up during the summer of 2001. It also includes some of the material from the PDB.
The memo mentioned intelligence that bin Laden wanted to hijack aircraft to gain release of prisoners in the United States. The PDB also contains FBI information about "patterns of activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other attacks," according to congressional investigators.
A key event occurred on June 21, 2001, when a federal grand jury in Alexandria, Va., returned a 46-count indictment charging 13 Saudis and one Lebanese with the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. service personnel.
Rumors of the coming indictment had been circulating for weeks before that, according to officials familiar with the intelligence, leading to increased worries that terrorists might take some action in connection with the case.
The next day, June 22, the FAA issued a nationwide circular "referring to a possible hijacking plot by Islamic terrorists to secure release of 14 persons incarcerated in the United States" in the Khobar Towers case. In fact, the 14 were still at large, although the circular did not mention that. They remain fugitives to this day.
More terrorism warnings quickly followed, including:
- A worldwide caution issued June 22 by the State Department warning Americans abroad of increased risk of terror attacks.

- Four Defense Department alerts between June 22 and July 20 alerting U.S. military personnel that "bin Laden's network was planning a near-term, anti-U.S. terrorist operation."

- A July 2 bulletin from the FBI to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies describing "increased threat reporting" about bin Laden or groups allied with al-Qaida. The bulletin suggested the greatest risk of an attack was overseas "although the possibility could not be discounted" of an attack inside the United States.

- Intelligence received by U.S. agencies in August about the plot to either bomb the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi from an airplane or crash an aircraft into the building. The report cited two unidentified people who met in October 2000 to discuss this plot on instructions from bin Laden.

A senior law enforcement official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the FBI issued at least two other bulletins in 2001 about the terror threat intelligence but did not include directives for field offices to take specific actions because there was no imminent threat to the homeland.
There had been numerous earlier reports of bin Laden's interest in using aircraft for terror attacks, including a 1998 plot to fly an explosives-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center and an April 2000 plot to hijack a Boeing 747 and either fly it to Afghanistan or blow up.
But in December 2000, the FBI and FAA issued a classified threat assessment that played down the possibility of a threat to domestic aviation from terror operatives known to be in the United States.
"Terrorist activity within the U.S. has focused primarily on fund-raising, recruiting new members and disseminating propaganda," that report says. "While international terrorists have conducted attacks on U.S. soil, these acts represent anomalies in their traditional targeting which focuses on U.S. interests overseas."
The congressional intelligence inquiry's report suggests that this mind-set, less than a year before the Sept. 11 attacks, may have contributed to an overall U.S. view that there was a low probability of attacks on American soil, particularly using aircraft as weapons.

On the Net:

Joint intelligence report: http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/911rpt

9/11 Commission: http://www.9-11commission.gov

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>> HEIMAT GASP...

Possible local tie to Al Qaeda probed
Alleged operative and Saudi had same apartment
By Farah Stockman, Globe Staff, 4/9/2004

Newsweek reported yesterday that US investigators tracing wire transfers from the Saudi Arabian government found a possible connection to Al Qaeda in Boston.
According to the magazine, a Pakistani graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology who is alleged to have been an Al Qaeda operative had the same address as a Saudi national who received $20,000 from the Saudi government in July 2001.
Citing documents it had obtained, the magazine said that a unit at Fleet Bank that traces suspicious wire transfers had tracked $20,000 in transfers from a Saudi Arabian armed forces bank account to the Saudi national, Abdullah Al Reshood, in Boston. Al Reshood listed the same apartment number at the high-rise building at 75 St. Alphonsus Street as Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani MIT graduate who was wanted for questioning by the FBI last year and is alleged to be an Al Qaeda operative, Newsweek reported.
The transfer aroused suspicion, the magazine said, because as soon as Al Reshood received the money, he wrote a check for $20,000 to another Saudi named Hatem Al Dhahri, with whom he lived while he was in Boston. Al Dhahri then wired $17,193 to Saudi Arabia 10 days later to Al Reshood's bank account in Saudi Arabia.
An individual who works for the Saudi government in Washington told the Globe yesterday that there was nothing sinister about the wire transfers from the Saudi government, which routinely supports Saudi citizens seeking degrees and medical treatment in the United States. The money was sent by the Saudi government to pay for liver treatment for Al Reshood's wife, who arrived at Brigham and Women's Hospital, arriving on April 24, 2001, and stayed in Boston for about 10 weeks, according to the person, who asked not to be identified. When Al Reshood returned to Saudia Arabia with his wife, he wrote the check to Al Dhahri because he wanted his friend to settle his bills, according to the person. Al Dhahri did, and sent him the balance. The building where Al Reshood and Al Dhahri stayed is near Brigham and Women's Hospital. The fact that Siddiqui, a microbiologist, had also lived in that building in the same apartment was "a coincidence," the person said, asserting "there is no connection."

Calls from the Globe to Fleet Bank and the FBI were not immediately returned.

? Copyright 2004 Globe Newspaper Company.
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>> OUR FRIENDS THE SAUDIS...

Tangled Ties
Law-enforcement officials follow the money trail among suspected terrorists straight to the doors of the Saudi Embassy NewsweekApril 7 - Within weeks of the September 11 terror attacks, security officers at the Fleet National Bank in Boston had identified "suspicious" wire transfers from the Saudi Embassy in Washington that eventually led to the discovery of an active Al Qaeda "sleeper cell" that may have been planning follow-up attacks inside the United States, according to documents obtained by NEWSWEEK.

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U.S. law-enforcement officials familiar with the matter say there is no evidence that officials at the Saudi Embassy were knowingly financing Al Qaeda activity inside the country. But documents show that while trying to trace a tangled money trail beginning with the Saudi Embassy, investigators soon drew startling connections between a group of Saudi nationals receiving financial support from the embassy and a 34-year-old microbiologist and MIT graduate who officials have since concluded was a U.S. operative for 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

The microbiologist, Aafia Siddiqui, a mother of three young children, has since fled the country--most likely to her native Pakistan-and is now wanted for questioning by the FBI. But "suspicious-activity reports" (SARS) filed by Fleet Bank with the U.S. Treasury Department, suggest that Siddiqui and her estranged husband, Dr. Mohammed Amjad Khan, an anesthesiologist, may have been active terror plotters inside the country until as late as the summer of 2002.

The reports show that Fleet Bank investigators discovered that one account used by the Boston-area couple showed repeated debit-card purchases from stores that "specialize in high-tech military equipment and apparel," including Black Hawk Industries in Chesapeake, Va., and Brigade Quartermasters in Georgia. (Black Hawk's Web site, advertises grips, mounts and parts for AK-47s and other military-assault rifles as well as highly specialized combat clothing, including vests designed for bomb disposal.)

Fleet accounts associated with the couple also showed "major purchases" from U.S. airlines and hotels in Pittsburgh and North Carolina as well as an $8,000 international wire transfer on Dec. 21, 2001, to Habib Bank Ltd., a big Pakistani financial institution that has long been scrutinized by U.S. intelligence officials monitoring terrorist money flows.

NEWSWEEK first reported, in a June 23, 2003, cover story, that the FBI had identified Siddiqui and Khan as suspected Al Qaeda agents. Internal FBI documents showed that, after his capture in March 2003, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told U.S. interrogators that Siddiqui was supposed to support "other AQ operatives as they entered the United States." Agents also found evidence that she had rented a post-office box to help another Baltimore-based Al Qaeda contact who had been assigned by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to blow up underground gasoline-storage tanks. Bureau documents also stated that Khan, Siddiqui's husband, had purchased body armor, night-vision goggles and a variety of military manuals that were supposed to be sent to Pakistan.

The newly obtained SARS documents filed by Fleet shed additional light on the federal government's effort to track Siddiqui and Khan's activities--and raise questions about possible links to other Saudis in the United States. As early as October 2001, long before Khalid Shaik Mohammed's capture, FBI and Treasury Department investigators were alerted to the couple's possible terror links in a series of SARS filed by Fleet. At the time, Fleet's Financial Intelligence Unit was trying to trace $70,000 in wire transfers on the same day, July 10, 2001, to two Saudis in the United States. One, for $50,000 from the Saudi Armed Forces Account at the Riggs Bank in Washington, D.C., went to a Saudi student at Clark University in Worcester, Mass. Two others, totaling $20,000 from the same Saudi military account, went to a Saudi national named Abdullah Al Reshood in Boston.

NEWSWEEK has been unable to locate either Saudi. But a spokesman for the Saudi Embassy in Washington said both wire transfers were consistent with the Saudi government's longstanding practice of providing educational and medical assistance to fellow countrymen living in the United States. The spokesman said the embassy has no reason to believe either Saudi has any connection to terrorist activity.

But Fleet security officers were concerned about the transactions from the start. Immediately after receiving the $20,000 wire from the Saudi Embassy in Washington, Al Reshood wrote a $20,000 check to another Saudi, Hatem Al Dhahri, who five days later wired $17,193 back to an account controlled by Al Reshood at the Al Rahji Bank in Saudi Arabia. "There appears to be no commercial reason nor reasonable explanation for the series of transactions," wrote one Fleet security officer in an Oct. 24, 2001, SARS report. Both Saudis lived at the same address, a high-rise apartment building in Boston's Mission Hill neighborhood that was frequented by Arab nationals. If the purpose of the expenditures was to provide medical expenses for either Al Reshood or Al Dhahri and their families in the United States, as the Saudis claimed, the security officials wanted to know why the money was being wired back to Saudi Arabia. Al Dhahri also listed as his address the same apartment number, 2008, as another Fleet Bank customer--Aafia Siddiqui.

It is still not clear what connection, if any, Al Dhahri had with Siddiqui or whether they shared the apartment at the same time. (The Fleet Bank records suggest that Al Dhahri and Siddiqui's accounts were both active and current in the fall of 2001 and do not indicate a change of address had been filed.) A Saudi Embassy spokesman said that the payments to Al Dhahri were to pay for liver treatments for one of his children in the United States. A Saudi Embassy spokesman said that Al Dhahri has been interrogated by the FBI and has denied any knowledge of the microbiologist.

But the common address prompted Fleet auditors to zero in on Siddiqui, resulting in more "links" that "shocked" the security officers, according to a source familiar with the matter. In addition to the expenditures for high-tech military equipment--items that seemed unusual for a microbiologist--the security officers found that Siddiqui was making regular debit-card payments to one Islamic charity, Benevolence International, that was under active investigation by federal agents for raising funds for terrorist causes. (The charity has since been shut down and its founder jailed.) In addition, Siddiqui was found to be active with the Al-Kifah Refugee Center, another Islamic charity that was ostensibly raising funds for Bosnian orphans but which also was under scrutiny by federal investigators.

A spokeswoman for Fleet, which last week was purchased by Bank of America, declined to comment on the bank's role, noting that it is a violation of federal law to even refer to the existence of a SARS. But investigators noted that Fleet Bank SARS stand in stark contrast to the lack of similar reports from Riggs Bank, where the Saudi Embassy kept its accounts and the wire transfers began. Riggs Bank's failure to alert investigators to a large number of unusual cash transactions by the Saudi Embassy and other foreign bank customers has led to a wide-ranging investigation by Treasury Department regulators that is likely to result in substantial civil fines imposed on the bank in the next few weeks, according to sources familiar with the matter. "Anytime, you have suspicious money movements, and it's not reported as needed, it hurts our overall efforts," a senior U.S. counterterrorism official said about Riggs' failure to file the SARS. Riggs recently terminated the Saudi Embassy as a client and, according to a story in today's Wall Street Journal, may be planning to drop its diplomatic business entirely.)

Riggs officials say they've initiated a program to more vigorously monitor financial accounts. And the bank late last year filed more than two-dozen reports involving Saudi Embassy transactions, including large overseas wire transfers and cash deposits made by Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan; his executive assistant, Ahmed A. Kattan; his chief military aide, Gen. Abdual Rahman Al-Noah, and other embassy officials.

Most of these transactions have no apparent links to terrorism and may simply reflect the Saudis' longstanding habit of mixing government and personal accounts. In one case, Kattan, who carries the rank of ambassador, deposited $6 million in embassy funds into his personal account at Riggs, wired $5.5 million to the agents of a school in Egypt and the remaining $500,000 to his own account in Saudi Arabia. Al-Noah, the military officer, made a total of $1.6 million in cash deposits--most in cash, one of them for $210,000--and then wired the money to pay for the purchase of furniture for a new palace in Saudi Arabia. Bandar himself wired $17 million last year to his construction manager for a new palace in Saudi Arabia. Just last December, one of Bandar's personal aides deposited $3 million in international drafts, converted them to dollars, and then wired substantial sums back overseas--including about $200,000 to a luxury-car dealer in Great Britain. (A Saudi spokesman said that Bandar has substantial business interests overseas, so it is not surprising that he would conduct such transactions.)

But other transactions raised eyebrows at the FBI. The Riggs accounts showed a number of checks to flight schools and flight-school students in the United States as well as 50 separate $1,000 American Express travelers checks issued by Bandar to Saudi employees between July 9, 2001 and Aug. 28, 2001--including seven that were deposited that summer at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas. Riggs also reported $19,200 in payments from the Saudi Embassy to Gulshair al-Shukrijumah, a Florida-based imam who once served as an interpreter for the "blind Sheik" Omar Abdul Rahman, who was convicted in 1996 of a plot to blow up New York City landmarks. Gulshair al-Shukrijumah's son, Adnan al-Shukrijumah, also known as "Jaffar the Pilot," is a suspected Al Qaeda operative who is the subject of a worldwide FBI manhunt. (In response to U.S. demands to impose tighter controls, the Saudis have since terminated the payments to Gulshair al-Shukrijumah, along with a number of other clerics who were being supported by the embassy.)

A Saudi Embassy spokesman stressed that the Saudis have been actively cooperating with U.S. officials on all aspects of the war on terrorism and that the embassy has recently been assured by top FBI officials that the bureau "has no concerns" about any of the embassy accounts. But senior law-enforcement officials told NEWSWEEK that Saudi Embassy accounts--including the wire transfers related to Siddiqui--remain under active investigation. Told that the Saudis have been assured the FBI "has no concerns," a law-enforcement official made additional checks and reported back to NEWSWEEK: "That is not the case."

? 2004 Newsweek, Inc.
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>> SYRIAN UPDATE...
Syria's Gulag

By Farid N. Ghadry and Nir T. Boms
FrontPageMagazine.com | April 9, 2004

Close to a hundred Kurds were killed during a series of riots that started in the soccer game in the city of Qamoshli last month. Over 1,200 Kurds were arrested for treason, espionage, incitement and the disruption of the public order. This is the story of one of them, a 14 year old boy we will call Ahmed, who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

We received this email from Syria yesterday. It was a private message but we felt compelled to have it translated and shared with the world. We are not in liberty to share the real names of the people who sent this email or who wrote the memory of that experience since they are very much afraid to be the next in line at the torture chamber. The irony in all of this is that Baschar al-Assad visited the Kurds in 2002 and promised them a better future. The ability of the Syrian government to bring about a better future to the Syrian people should be measured by the eyes of Ahmed and his friends. Democracy in Syria remains the only hope and the only answer.

"I saw with my own eyes what I used to see in horror and scary movies and I heard with my own ears what I used to hear in stories told to me about the various savaged ways of torture" Yes... Yes... Here in my own country, in my own nation Syria, the one that just entered the civilization of the 21st century.

He told me this crying. "oh uncle", --he calls me uncle since he is my nephew, and he is almost 14-years old--"when they took me from the car near a hall with stairs going down, I was met by one agent after the other, counting all five of them, beating me on my back, on my stomach, on my arm, and every inch of my body. They forced me into a basement, then into a dark room full of people with a stench smell of feet and sweat and another smell that reminded me of a butcher shop. I stretched my leg to enter the dark room but instead I hit a body lying on the floor. He emitted a crying sound, so I tried to step away from the body and then I hit another one who sounded even worse than the first and then I froze. I started crying and fear gripped my whole body. I felt like I was in hell, all I could hear were the different sounds of pain coming from the different corners of the dark room. In about half an hour, the door to the room opened and finally I could see a bit of light. Only then, I realized that the room was no bigger than our modest kitchen at home with about 30 to 40 people in it. They were of different ages but the majorities were young, like me. I even recognized two of them who lived in our quarter.

A person shouted my name and I said "Present" as if I was in school. The man said `you are a Kurd, right? Come with me you son of a whore'. Upon exiting the room, trying hard not to bump into any body lying on the ground, I was, once again, met with punches from all sides to all parts of my body and my face. They were swearing and punching at the same time. I lifted my arms to protect myself only to have them brought down followed by more punches and more insults. Two or three held me and asked if my name is so and so, and when I said yes, they started again beating me with their fists coming from all sides and angles. Along the way, I remember them saying my mother became a whore for having had me and that my father was a dog. That is all I remember because the punches were making me weaker and I felt my feet buckle from under me. Several strong arms held me up and the punching continued accompanied by a crescendo of swearing, especially against my mother. They used terms against my sister and mother that I cannot repeat"

"Then they covered my eyes with a black cloth and continued the beating. But this time, I could not see where the punches were coming from. Again, I felt myself weak. I remember screaming and crying for help.

They stopped and started an interrogation. `What is your name? Which quarter do you come from? Why did you burn and throw stones?' Why? Why? Why? A barrage of questions that I could not answer for lack of focus. Then they asked who else was there with me. `Give us names, names, names'. Why were you marching?' I told them that I was not marching. Then someone called to bring me downstairs. I started crying again, uncontrollably. While still blindfolded, one asked to strip me down. They did. Then cold water hit me and I started shivering. The beating restarted but I slipped because of the water and they continued beating me with their feet while still on the ground. Someone stepped on my stomach hard, which I did not expect. All I remember next is that someone saying, place it in his mouth. It was my own feces.

Then they took me to another room, still naked, blindfolded and shivering. I felt them kneeling and attaching something to my toes, then to my fingers. Then, without any warning, I felt being electrocuted, yes uncle, electrocuted and I started crying again, not knowing what else to do. I was electrocuted twice while there for seven days. And each time, I cried like a baby, oh uncle, like a baby.

Each time, they asked do you confess. And each time I said I will confess. To what, I do not know. But I said yes, oh uncle, because I felt these were not humans, these people were not from our planet. While still blindfolded, they lifted my arm and placed my finger on a paper and told me that this was my confession.

They returned me to the room and took away the blindfold. I realized then all the people in that room were naked like me, naked, naked, and all crying and in pain. There were those with broken ribs; I could tell because when you bump into them, their scream is the loudest and it lifts them off the ground. Then, there were those whose blood has turned black and their bruises covered more areas of their body than their normal flesh. Some had salt sprinkled on their opened wounds and we were whispering to each other the pain they felt. One cried that they electrocuted him through his penis and testicles. He felt ashamed and could not stop crying. All young like me, oh uncle, all young like me.

Some had their finger nails removed. Another said that he was beaten with cables aimed at his penis as if it were a target. There was a young man, oh uncle, who stood all the time because he could not sit down or rest against the wall. We took turns, during these seven days, holding his head in our arms and body so that he could get some sleep. What I saw from these killers, I will never forget all my life, oh uncle; and I will never forgive them, never, ever forgive them. Never, oh uncle, Never".

Farid Ghadry is the President of the Syrian Reform Party. Nir Boms is a fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Council for Democracy and Tolerance.

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>> BRING IT ON?


Crime, Politics and Kerry's Missing FBI Files
By Marc Morano
CNSNews.com Senior Staff Writer
April 09, 2004
(CNSNews.com) - The author who alleges that three boxes of FBI files dealing with Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry's anti-war group were stolen from his home last month, did not allow police officers the opportunity to process the crime scene.
The police report of the incident also neglects to mention that the Kerry campaign dispatched a messenger to the home of author Gerald Nicosia to pick up copies of the FBI files a week before the alleged theft of the documents.
CNSNews.com has obtained a copy of the police report related to the alleged theft of three of the 14 boxes containing FBI files that Nicosia was keeping in his home. Nicosia is the author of the book Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans' Movement and is a Kerry supporter. In addition to the three boxes, Nicosia alleges that "several file folders have been removed from the remaining 11 boxes," according to the police report.
The March 26, 2004 report from the Twin Cities Police Department in Larkspur, Calif., noted that "there were no signs of forced entry into the residence" and the department confirmed Thursday that there were still no leads or suspects in the case.
Absent from the police report was any mention of the fact that the Kerry campaign had sent an aide to Nicosia's house in Corte Madera, Calif., to review the documents. Kerry's campaign dispatched the aide on the same day CNSNews.com reported that the FBI files showed Kerry was in attendance at a controversial 1971 meeting in Kansas City of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW).
That meeting allegedly involved the discussion of possibly trying to assassinate several U.S. senators still committed to the American war effort in Vietnam. Prior to the publication of the CNSNews.com article on March 18, Kerry had repeatedly denied being in attendance at the meeting.
Nicosia said he reached out to Kerry's campaign a week before the documents were allegedly stolen.
"Senator Kerry was obviously [at the Kansas City Meeting in 1971]. I called the Kerry office and said, 'You know, I think you folks really should look at these documents before you make any further statements,' Nicosia told Joe Scarborough, the host of MSNBC's Scarborough Country on April 2.
"And ... they immediately sent a messenger to my house, got copies of the documents and that evening Senator Kerry did issue a retraction and said based on the documents, he now believed that he was at that meeting," Nicosia added.
The police report noted that journalists, including those from the Los Angeles Times and CNN had had access to Nicosia's home. The report also indicated that a sliding glass door repairman had been granted access to the home. But there is no mention of the Kerry campaign having sent a representative there.
In a statement Nicosia submitted to the Twin Cities Police Department, which was included in the report on the alleged theft, he stated that, "the [FBI] documents have significant political value in the upcoming Presidential election, as they cast John Kerry in various lights, both good and bad."
Nicosia also did not want the alleged crime "scene processed," according to the police report.
The narrative of the police report filed by officer Theo Mainaris reads: "I checked the residence and I did not locate any signs of forced entry. After talking about that situation with Nicosia, he informed me he did not want the scene processed."
Detective Patrick Eddinger of the Twin Cities Police Department told CNSNews.com that Nicosia's refusal to have the scene processed was not "normal."
"It's not usually normal. Normally, we come in and we actually process the scene to see if we can find any fingerprints or anything else," Eddinger explained. "There was no force to anything in the residence -- what we could find -- in order to gain entry," he added.
Nicosia declined to be interviewed for this article.
Despite the lack of any evidence or leads, Nicosia is now publicly speculating that Republican Party operatives may have stolen the FBI documents from his home.
"I would say that the Republicans had the largest motivation," Nicosia told Scarborough last week. Scarborough said the case "almost sounds like a "West Coast version of Watergate, 2004."
When pressed on the issue, Nicosia went further in his accusations. "Oh, I would think it would be the Republicans, not John Kerry. I was cooperating with John Kerry. I'm a Kerry supporter," Nicosia said.
But Eddinger said he has no suspects at the moment. "It's an ongoing investigation. I am still trying to gather information," he said.
The Twin Cities Police department may seek some of that information from the Kerry campaign itself. "There is a couple of other people I need to talk to, including possibly the Kerry campaign," Eddinger said.
According to the police report, Nicosia alleged that the crime occurred on Thursday, March 25 while the house was empty from 2:30 p.m. until 5:30 p.m.
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>> BRING IT ON?


Treasury news releases on taxes attacked
By JEANNINE AVERSA
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER
WASHINGTON -- The Treasury Department issued a batch of tax-related press releases Friday that each carried a message saying America has a choice between growing the economy and raising taxes that could hurt the recovery.
Democrats immediately denounced the action as an improper use of government resources to subsidize political propaganda.
While the sentiment is a long held position of the Bush administration, it was the first time the department included this message in dark type at the bottom of some its news releases, said Treasury Department spokesman Rob Nichols.
"America has a choice: It can continue to grow the economy and create new jobs as the president's policies are doing; or it can raise taxes on American families and small businesses, hurting economic recovery and future job creation," the message on the releases said.
The message, on four of five different releases issued by the department, doesn't mention presumptive Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry, a critic of President Bush's tax policies, or anyone else by name.
Asked whether the message was referring to Kerry, Nichols said: "No, it is a reference to anyone who suggests that raising taxes is the right thing to do. There have been many who suggest that taxes should be raised. We don't share that view."
Kerry spokesman David Wade said the language appears to be an improper use of official government resources for political purposes.
"Once again, there are questions to be asked about American taxpayers subsidizing political propaganda to distort the debate in our country and to whitewash President Bush's failed economic policies," Wade said.
"Those are questions that should be answered by the government itself, but they certainly don't refer to John Kerry's plan to provide middle-class tax relief and create incentives for American businesses which create good jobs here at home," Wade added.
Nichols said there was nothing improper with including the message on the tax releases. "That is nonsense, baseless and groundless," he said.
Treasury's decision to include the message on the bottom of several "April 15th Tax Day Reminder" releases follows the department's in-house analysis of Kerry's tax proposal last month. The analysis, requested by House Republican Leader Tom DeLay, was posted on the department's Web site March 22.
That ignited criticism from Kerry and other Democrats and prompted the department's inspector general to launch a preliminary inquiry into the matter.
"First the Bush Treasury Department did campaign research on the Kerry tax plan and now they are blatantly putting out Bush campaign statements that masquerade as a news release," said Rep. Charles Rangel, D-N.Y. "This release has nothing to do with April 15 and everything to do with Nov. 2."
Democratic National Committee spokeswoman Debra DeShong said there should be an investigation to determine whether the language represents a violation of the Hatch Act, which restricts the political activities of government employees.
"For them to say it's not political, you know, it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, it's not a goose," DeShong said.
Democrats protested in 2001 when the Bush administration printed "Tax Relief for America's Workers" on tax refund checks sent to 92 million people. The checks refunded some $38 billion to taxpayers as part of the $1.35 trillion tax cut passed that year.
At the time, Democratic National Committee Chairman Terry McAuliffe called the wording a "Republican campaign slogan." The Treasury Department said the line informed taxpayers about the purpose of the check, distinguishing it from other federal payments like Social Security and veterans' benefits.
Associated Press writer Sam Hananel in Washington contributed to this report.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> IS THE PRC COMING OUR WAY?


Beijing seeks multilateral Northeast Asian security
By Pang Zhongying
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)

BEIJING - It's time to promote the establishment of a Northeast Asian regional security mechanism.

The nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is of increasing concern to Northeast Asian countries. The two rounds of six-party North Korea nuclear talks brought together key regional governments: China, Russia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan - as well as the United States. And the discussions have kindled a gleam of hope for the establishment of a multilateral security system in the region.
Many people say that the six-party talks, a special multilateral arrangement aimed at defusing the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, could develop into a general system to ensure security in Northeast Asia, if these meetings were to become a systematic and regular event.
The progress already made in the talks demonstrates that a permanent multilateral regional security system could help solve even the most sensitive security problems.
Northeast Asia should not base its security measures on bilateral frameworks any longer, according to many analysts. A multilateral security arrangement would offer a more effective and complementary guarantee of regional peace and stability. The regional security arrangement could coexist with alliance-oriented bilateral security relations.
Constructing a multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia is not a new idea. Countries such as Russia and Japan suggested setting up a Northeast Asian security mechanism after the end of the Cold War. Countries in the region have also conducted security dialogues at various levels with their neighbors. But a systematized regional security arrangement has remained a distant prospect.
The threat of instability in Northeast Asia is very real. The Korean nuclear issue and the Taiwan question remain unresolved, and these two serious issues, if not properly handled, could cause regionwide instability. The ROK and even Japan are exhibiting strong desires to explore more self-reliant foreign policies, while the influence of the "peaceful rise" of China increasingly is being felt. On the other hand, the US has never veiled its worries about the alleged intention of China to recover its traditional centrality in the region.
With regional security issues unresolved and no long-term development plans established, peaceful development in Northeast Asia cannot be brought about through the wishes of any individual country, according to many observers. Regional peace and stability can only be achieved through the collective and objective actions of countries in the region. In other words, neither self-help (China is a good example) nor military alliances are enough to face a changing security environment in the region.
Many common security concerns, despite differences
In the beginning, a Northeast Asian security framework could serve as a multilateral mechanism based upon the common security interests of member states. Although there are huge differences, regional governments still have many common security concerns that make a regional multilateral security framework worth working for.
However, a multilateral security framework built on common interests cannot be easily achieved, since the interests of all countries involved are continuously changing.
Any regional security arrangement in Northeast Asia that did not have US involvement would be unrealistic and impossible to achieve.
Although many people have criticized the unilateralism of President George W Bush's administration, the US will try multilateralism to deal with regional security challenges, as the six-party talks demonstrated. It is not clear whether the US has any interest in establishing a Northeast Asian security mechanism, but an all-inclusive and permanent arrangement for dealing with Northeast Asian security issues is in the interests of all countries - including the United States. Some Americans support the idea of this type of security mechanism. Others worry that it would contravene Washington's regional bilateral security arrangements.

From a Chinese perspective, a Northeast Asian security mechanism would have the following characteristics:

It would include China, and even a denuclearized North Korea.
It would co-exist with US-led bilateral security relations.
It would be justified or legitimized by ongoing cooperative and constructive China-US relations.
It could help solve other regional security problems, including the Taiwan problem.
It would lay the foundation for a future-oriented regional security community.

The prospect of regularized six-party talks has provided an opportunity to revisit the idea of building a regional security mechanism. Thus the efforts of all parties are needed to ensure success. A regional security mechanism should embrace the concept of mutual security. If North Korea were to participate, its reasonable security concerns should be assured and considered. The transformation of the regional security environment in Northeast Asia needs a successful conclusion of the six-party talks.
China increasingly shows interest in a six-party-talks-based regional security arrangement, so it is not impossible that some China-related security problems, such as the Taiwan issue, could be discussed at the regional level rather than just bilaterally. Proper discussions on most such sensitive issues might not only be helpful for the solution of the issue but also could help promote the building of the regional security mechanism.

Pang Zhongying is a Beijing-based analyst of international affairs and director of the Institute of Global Issues, Nankai University, China. He can be reached at pzying@yahoo.com. This article was made available by Pacific Forum CSIS.




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US: From nation-building to religion-building
By Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON - One thing that can be said about United States neo-conservatives is that they do not lack for ambition.
"We need an Islamic reformation," Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz confided on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq last year, "and I think there is real hope for one".
Echoing those views one year later, another prominent neo-conservative, Daniel Pipes of the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum (MEF), recently declared that the "ultimate goal" of the war on terrorism had to be Islam's modernization, or, as he put it, "religion-building".
Such an effort needs to be waged not only in the Islamic world, geographically speaking, added Pipes, who last year was appointed by President George W Bush to the board of directors of the US Institute for Peace, but also among Muslims in the West, where, in his view, they are too often represented by "Islamist (or militant Islamic)" organizations.
Pipes is currently seeking funding for a new organization, tentatively named the "Islamic Progress Institute" (IPI), which "can articulate a moderate, modern and pro-American viewpoint" on behalf of US Muslims and that, according to a grant proposal by Pipes and two New York-based foundations, obtained by IPS, can "go head-to-head with the established Islamist institutions".
"Through adroit media activity and political efforts", says the proposal, "advocates for a supremacist and totalitarian form of Islam in the United States - such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations [CAIR], the Islamic Society of North America [ISNA] and the Islamic Circle of North America - have effectively established themselves as the spokesmen for all Muslims in the country."
"This situation is fraught with dangers for moderate Muslims as well as for non-Muslims," the proposal continues, adding, "Islam in America must be American Islam or it will not be integrated; there can be no place for an Islam in America that functions as a seditious conspiracy aimed at wiping out American values, undermining American inter-faith civility, and, in effect, dictating the form of Islam that will be followed in America."
Leaders of the three groups named by Pipes strongly deny his characterizations of their views, and stress that they, like Catholic, Protestant and Jewish groups in the US that promote the interests of their members, are neither more nor less radical or chauvinistic in their political or theological views than their non-Muslim counterparts.
"We are non-sectarian," said Sayyid M Syeed, ISNA's secretary general, who added that his group has had leaders from both the Shi'ite and Sunni currents of Islam and whose current vice president is a woman. "If we were Saudi-oriented, we would never have a Shi'ite president or a woman in such a role," he said, adding that his group is also actively engaged in many "inter-faith partnerships".
CAIR's spokesman, Ibrahim Hooper, said his organization strives to represent the views of all US Muslims, and pointed to a new survey of the views of mosque leaders and congregants in Detroit, which has one of the largest Muslim populations in the country, as an example of the fundamental moderation of US Muslims and those of his group.
The survey, carried out by the Michigan-based Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, found that only about eight percent of the leadership and members of Detroit's 33 mosques described themselves as adherents of a fundamentalist, "Salafi" approach to Islam - the kind that is identified with the "Wahhabi", or "Islamist" views of concern to Pipes and other neo-conservatives, who have said that as many as 80 percent of US mosques preach Wahhabism.
The vast majority of both mosque leaders and participants, according to the Detroit survey, were registered to vote and supported active engagement in the political process; wanted to engage in civic and educational activities with people of non-Muslim faiths; and even took part in public school or church events designed to teach others about Islam.
"Detroit mosques are not isolationist ... and very few mosque participants hold Wahhabi views," said Ihsan Bagby, who conducted the survey and teaches Islamic studies at the University of Kentucky.
Pipes, who has written four books on Islam and taught Islamic studies at several leading universities, came to national prominence after the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and the Pentagon. While he has long insisted that there is nothing inherently violent about Islam, "moderate Muslims", in his view, have been intimidated by radicals both in the Islamic world and in the US.
"While Muslims in some Muslim-majority countries (like Turkey) have demonstrated a commitment to moderate Islam," he writes in his grant application, "Muslim communities in the United States, Canada and Western Europe are dominated by a leadership identified with Wahhabism and other radical trends, such as the Muslim Brethren and Deobandism ... they seek a privileging of Islam and intimidate their critics."
Within the United States, "all Muslims, unfortunately, are suspect", Pipes wrote in a recent book, which called for the authorities to be especially vigilant towards Muslims with jobs in the military, law enforcement, or diplomacy.
Last year, he cited as evidence of this insight the arrest on suspicion of espionage of Muslim chaplain James Yee at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility that houses hundreds of prisoners from Bush's "war on terrorism". The Yee case later fell apart.
Pipes is also the founder of Campus Watch, a group that monitors university professors of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies and exposes them for alleged anti-American or anti-Zionist views. That effort, which has been denounced by leading Middle East scholars, has become the basis for a far-reaching bill pending in Congress that would provide unprecedented government oversight of regional studies programs in universities.
Pipes has also criticized Bush for meeting with, and thus he argues legitimizing, the leaders of major Islamic organizations, including CAIR and ISNA, which he believes are pursuing radical, if partially hidden, agendas that he attempts tirelessly to expose on his personal website. CAIR has called him "the nation's leading Islamophobe".
Like many of his fellow-neo-conservatives, Pipes has also been an outspoken supporter of positions taken by the governing Likud Party in Israel, to the extent even of opposing the US-backed "road map" designed to lead to an independent Palestinian state.
To encourage "moderation" among Palestinians, he has written, "the Palestinians need to be defeated even more than Israel needs to defeat them".
In his grant proposal, Pipes writes that he is working on launching the Islamic Progress Institute, IPI, with "a group of anti-Islamist Muslims", whom he does not identify. Contacted about the proposal, Pipes told IPS, "I can't confirm anything. MEF doesn't talk about its proposals. We don't talk about projects that have not been announced. We don't talk about internal matters to the press."
In a trip to Cleveland in February, Stephen Schwartz, a writer and former Trotskyite activist who claims to have converted to Islam in the mid-1990s, and Hussein Haqqani, a former Pakistani government official now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, unveiled plans for a new "Institute for Islamic Progress and Peace", of which Schwartz identified himself as executive director.
Schwartz, who has praised Pipes' work and claims to be personally close to Wolfowitz, has published articles in "The Weekly Standard" and other neo-conservative publications, where Pipes' writings also appear regularly. Schwartz was quoted by the "Cleveland Jewish Press" as saying that the new group would serve as a "platform" for "people who view Islam as a private faith".
"This is a unique chance to change the position of the Muslim community in America," he said. "If we don't do it, no one else will." Schwartz and Haqqani also did not return messages left at their offices.
Muslim leaders say they are not worried their membership will desert them for either new group.
"There's a big difference between organizations that emerge organically from a community in response to the demand of their constituencies and one which is manufactured for political reasons by people who dislike what the consensus views of that community are," said Hussein Ibish of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, which has also been a target of Pipes.
"For Mr Pipes to create an organization that purports to represent the community that he makes a living systematically defaming demonstrates an amazing degree of effrontery."
"It's a free country," said Hooper of the Council on Islamic-American Relations. "If Pipes and his friends think they can gain legitimacy in the Islamic community, good luck, but I wouldn't hold my breath."

(Inter Press Service)
----------------------------------------------------

>> MALAYSIA WATCH...

Malaysian media try trial by TV
By Anil Netto
PENANG, Malaysia - Malaysian groups as well as a lawyer representing several alleged Jemaah Islamiya (JI) members have slammed a private television station's screening of "confessions" by several suspected Malaysian militants detained by Indonesian police, saying they amounted to trial by media.
Last Friday, the Malaysian station TV3 screened an "interview" with four alleged JI members that was recorded in Jakarta on March 11. TV3, though private, is one of the most pro-government television stations in Malaysia, and the interview was arranged with the help of Malaysian and Indonesian police.
The four suspects, Nasir Abas, Jaafar Anwarul, Samsul Bahari Hussein and Amran Mansor, admitted in the interview that they were JI members and had links to al-Qaeda. They also said they were repentant over their involvement in the group and no longer subscribed to its fanatical ideologies.
But critics said the interview amounted to trial by media and that the "confessions" were flawed as they were not given in a free environment.
The station's decision to televise the "confessions" was sharply criticized by the Abolish ISA Movement, a coalition of 82 civil-society groups seeking to dissolve Malaysia's draconian Internal Security Act (ISA). But some of the strongest remarks came from Edmund Bon, the lawyer representing several other alleged JI members now being held under the ISA, which allows for detention without trial.
"Firstly, TV3 may have committed contempt of court," Bon said. "The issues covered are sub judice," meaning they are still under judicial consideration. He also said 10 ISA detainees in Malaysia, alleged to be JI members, had filed habeas corpus applications in the Malaysian courts. Though their appeals were dismissed recently by the Kuala Lumpur High Court, their appeals to the Federal Court are still pending.
Among the issues covered in these applications are what the alleged terrorist activities of JI are, and whether there is evidence that JI even exists, Bon said. "It is my view that TV3's program of the 'confessions' would tend to influence the Federal Court to decide against the detainees," he added.
Nasir is said to be the regional JI chief in charge of Sabah, Labuan, North and Central Sulawesi, and Mindanao. Arrested by Indonesian police last April, he is alleged to have trained several top JI leaders in military warfare. These include convicted Bali bombers Ali Imron and Imam Samudera, and Saad Fathurrahman Al Ghozi, the alleged mastermind of bombings in the Philippines in 2000 that killed 22 people.
Nasir is also alleged to have trained lecturers Dr Azahari Husin, who is on the run, and Wan Min Wan Mat, detained in Malaysia in October 2002, in guerrilla warfare.
Amran, from Johor, Malaysia, is alleged to have been directly involved in the Christmas Eve church bombings in Batam, Pekan Baru and Medan in 2000. He has expressed regret over the deaths of innocent people and asked for forgiveness from God and the victims' families.
Nasir claimed there was a fatwa (edict) that was passed on to them by Riduan Isamuddin or Hambali, now in US custody, urging Muslims to defend their religion and to attack Americans who had killed many Muslims around the world.
Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi said the televised confessions proved that terrorists were a major threat in the region. "I hope Malaysians will be able to understand the reality of such a threat after the confessions," he was reported as saying. Abdullah, who is also internal security minister, is responsible for the detentions of some 90 Malaysians under the ISA.
Most of these are alleged militants are said to belong to the Malaysian Militant Group (KMM) and JI. Many of them have already spent more than two years in jail without trial and have had their two-year detention orders extended by another two years. The ISA allows detainees to be held for an initial 60-day interrogation period, and, if they are not released by the end of that period, they can receive renewable two-year detention orders. Most detainees are held in the Kamunting Detention Center in Perak state, north of Kuala Lumpur.
In addition to Abdullah's comments, Defense Minister Najib Razak remarked that although the activities of JI had been crippled, they "can still operate in smaller groups and pose security problems".
Televised "confessions" from detainees are not new in Malaysia. During the communist insurgency, and up until the late 1970s, detainees, including political activists, alleged to be Communist Party members were made to confess on national television and say they had realized the error of their ways.
In the mid-1990s, Ashaari Mohamad, the leader of al-Arqam, a banned "deviationist" Islamic sect with a sizable following, "confessed" on television to spreading deviant religious teachings after a spell in detention.
Regarding the latest "confessions", Bon has made several pertinent observations. "The participants were under the supervision, direction and rule of the police," he said. "There was no escaping. It was a controlled environment."
He said the questions posed were leading, as if the answers were already known. "The answers forthcoming from the participants appear to have been scripted and rehearsed," he said. "They were not full, candid and frank confessions."
Observers are wondering about the timing of the "confessions" as well. "Why this was done is unclear, but one can speculate that the authorities are trying very hard now to justify their allegations of JI terrorist activities and JI's existence," said Bon. "The world knows that they could not do it at the [Abu Bakar] Ba'asyir trial, and he, being the supposed head of JI, is going to be released in April 2004, whereas his poor purported 'followers' in Indonesia, such as the participants and many others in Kamunting [in Malaysia], will linger on in detention."
Even the government-appointed and nominally independent Human Rights Commission of Malaysia has spoken out against the confessions. Its commissioner, Hamdan Adnan, questioned the ethics involved in showing the program and said it amounted to trial by media. "I hope this will not be a trend," he said. "Under what circumstance were they made to confess?" he asked, stressing that people should be regarded as innocent until proven guilty in a court of law and that TV3 should not make a mockery of media ethics.
He also warned that the confessions should not implicate others, especially those detained in Malaysia under the ISA for suspected involvement in the similar alleged activities.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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Indonesia vs Malaysia: The media and democracy
By Ioannis Gatsiounis
KUALA LUMPUR - Neighbors Malaysia and Indonesia are often depicted in opposing lights. Indonesia is the turbulent big brother with deep scars from a brutal dictatorship and a crisis of Islamic militancy on its hands. Malaysia is the rapidly developing "model Islamic democracy", a beacon of hope in the region - a reputation reinforced by the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional's (BN) rout of the Muslim fundamentalist-led opposition in parliamentary general elections last month.
Ironically, though, Indonesia, which just completed what was only its second general election since independence in 1945, has already embraced a more democratic tradition than Malaysia, which purports to have held "free and fair" elections since the 1950s. And the decision of Indonesian president B J Habibie, after the fall of Suharto in 1998, to free up the media is a large reason why.
In Indonesia on Monday, 24 parties contested for parliamentary seats. They may not all have gotten equal media coverage, but there are few if any allegations that a state-organized conspiracy impaired their showing. In Malaysia's elections last month, on the other hand, just two coalitions were represented, and only one received what might be called "fair" coverage.
For those in the BN, the state-controlled media's performance was nothing short of stellar. They not only gave the "moderates" an unfair advantage in the weeks leading up to the election (the leading opposition party's paper cannot publish more than twice a month and distribution is restricted), but in effect, quelled public concern over numerous allegations that the Election Commission and the BN conspired to commit election fraud.
Wong Chun Wai, deputy chief group editor of Malaysia's largest pro-government English-language daily, The Star, bristled at this analysis. He said his paper ran the opposition's advertisements. "The Malaysian media [are] as democratic as [they] can be. There's no need to change [them]." He pointed out that the opposition Chinese-led Democratic Action Party actually gained seats in the March 21 election, and as for other opposition parties that scored poorly, this was because of their stated aims, not because of media coverage.
But others say the power of the media to influence voters, especially during election time, should not be underestimated.
By many accounts the Malaysian media's campaign coverage was slicker and more ambitious than in past elections. At the least, it was unabashed and relentless. One front-page headline called Malaysia's economy "booming" - a description some economists would hardly endorse. Non-disparaging coverage of the opposition was often relegated to the lower corners of inside pages. A frequently run television spot featured Malaysians extolling how tolerant, vibrant and blissful life is in Malaysia. The ad listed no sponsor. But with the BN ruling since the 1950s, the message was implicit enough.
Five months ago there was a twinge of hope that the media situation here in Malaysia might change. That's when Abdullah Badawi was appointed prime minister by his predecessor, the long-ruling strongarm Mahathir Mohamad. Abdullah was seen as the tolerant gentleman determined to stamp out corruption. But optimism waned when Abdullah sacked an editor of an English-language daily for publishing an article that criticized government foreign policy. And it has eroded further, say experts, with the election rout.
With the media's strong showing, "What incentives do [the government] have to open the doors?" asked Eric Paulsen, coordinator of the Voice of People of Malaysia.
One can think of plenty - to develop a knowledge-based economy; to check power and stamp out corruption; to spur public debate on important issues. But getting the government to sign on is a different matter. BN's performance last month was its best since 1955. Why tamper with success?
A number of analysts say mass public mobilization is perhaps the only thing that will pressure the Malaysian government to change. In Indonesia, public protest led to the dictator Suharto's resignation and consequently the repeal of media restrictions. And although the government has since occasionally threatened to curb those freedoms, myriad activists in Indonesia have made clear that the freedoms won't be lifted without a fight.
By contrast, Malaysians historically have shown little affinity for social activism. And times are good for many. The economy is stable; the standard of living here is higher than in Indonesia; Malaysia lacks the sense of desperation that can galvanize action. As well, the government has strict laws preventing public demonstration; the Internal Security Act, which reserves the right to jail offenders without trial, has scared away many would-be activists.
"Barring no meltdown, nothing will change," said Ibrahim Suffian of the Merdeka Center for Opinion Research.
The closest thing to a "meltdown" in Malaysia in recent times came in the late 1990s, when Mahathir jailed his charismatic deputy Anwar Ibrahim on allegations of sodomy and corruption. Public distrust of the government and media, coinciding with the Internet boom, witnessed a proliferation of reformation websites, and thousands taking to the streets.
"Now one or two [reformation] sites - from over a hundred - are left," said Suffian.
During the scandal, the hardline opposition Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) won control of a second state. And while many voters turned to the opposition because they felt betrayed by Mahathir and the BN, the media in no small way helped people and parties mobilize.
Since that election a few credible independent websites have surfaced. (Mahathir promised not to interfere with web-based content.) But generally Malaysians are content taking in the state-controlled press. From food stalls to dentist offices, Malaysians can be found soaking up the state press, even when complimentary copies of international papers are available.
A Merdeka Center poll found that most Malaysians don't believe what they read in the state-controlled press. But then one has to wonder what they're reading "serious" newspapers for if not for "useful" information - to be mindlessly entertained?
Sometimes the public's indifference has led to outright defense of the situation. One hears often enough from Malaysians that they are not mature enough yet for open media, echoing a line left over from the colonial days and milked often by the ruling coalition ever since.
But lawyer Siva Rasa Rasia, a vice president of the opposition Keadilan party, does not blame the public. "It's quite normal not to seek information," Rasia said. "The onus is on us, and we have failed to get to them."
Rasia said that for the opposition to stand any chance in future elections (Malaysia's next parliamentary election isn't until 2009), they will have to rethink how to reach the public. "It's the main obstacle we face," he said. "It's the only way we can break down the [ruling coalition's] blockade.
Opposition leaders say they will tap into the Internet but know it won't be enough. One leader said without irony, "We might have to do what they did in Eastern Europe in the communist era: quietly roam in long coats and sell on street corners."
Indeed, many observers are too pleased with the election results to reflect on its meaning - or simply find the ends justify the means. One editorial writer noted that with this election, "Malaysia demonstrated that the 'green wave' - the tide of political Islam that seems to be engulfing the Muslim world - can be stopped democratically."
M G Pillai, writing on his independent website, sees it differently: "With this general election we have descended firmly into the Third World we had spent years to get out of."
But as long as the state-controlled media are calling the shots, Malaysians will continue to get a more flattering view of themselves. The morning after Indonesia's elections, Malaysia's state-controlled Star newspaper's front-page headline read: "Shortages and confusion over voting card hamper Indonesian elections". That news was hard to find outside Malaysia.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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>> AHEM

The UN's sinking law of the sea
By Alan Boyd

SYDNEY - A conservative revolt that waylaid Washington's latest attempts to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has also set back hopes of a more effective disputes mechanism for contested natural resources in Asia.
Continuing a standoff that has existed since the treaty was enacted in 1982, the United States Senate again declined to debate a Foreign Relations Committee resolution, backed by the administration of President George W Bush, that might have led to recognition of the world's most ambitious forum for conflict resolution.
Another bid is expected to be made through one of six alternate committees that have jurisdiction on the issue, but it is unlikely this will happen before the end of the year, even if the White House liberals behind the initiative can still attract Bush's support.
Ratified by 145 of the UN's 195 independent members, the treaty has never been allowed to realize its full potential because a vocal US lobby argues that it would impinge on the right of Americans to decide how to exploit their natural resources.
The chief point of contention is a provision under the treaty for an International Seabed Authority (ISA) that would regulate the offshore marine environment and rule on sovereignty battles through a multinational court. It would be empowered to levy taxes, issue permits for fishing and mining, impose quotas for the exploitation of gas and oil reserves, fix the prices of marine products, and control research and exploration activities.
Conservative groups such as the Heritage Foundation, American Policy Center and the Free Congress Foundation are worried that the ISA will operate outside Security Council jurisdiction, which could leave it open to domination by sectoral interests, especially from the Third World.
"The best thing we can do with this treaty is never to sign it - to sink it. Unfortunately, this is a very difficult task given the fact that there is an element within the Bush administration that wants it and, if they do not succeed in getting it, then there is likely to be a push by succeeding administrations," said Paul M Weyrich, chairman of the Free Congress Foundation.
Former president Ronald Reagan engineered the original US boycott of the treaty in 1982 by simply ensuring that it never went beyond the committee stages. Likewise, Reagan's successor George H W Bush, stonewalled when he was in office.
Bill Clinton's administration put the issue back on the congressional agenda in 1994, though only after winning substantial concessions from the UN that watered down the ISA's mandate while leaving the treaty's basis intact. But his tenure ended before the revamped resolution could reach the Senate.
In stepped Foreign Relations Committee chairman Richard Lugar, a Republican senator with strong White House support who is convinced the US has more to lose from staying aloof from the international community. Bush's own sentiments toward the treaty are not clear.
Whether it is in or out, Washington will decide how effective the treaty can be in policing what is potentially the most volatile area of global security. But ratification might at least remove technical ambiguities and encourage the ISA to cut across political sensitivities.
The UN secretariat complained last month that many countries were wrongly applying the treaty, presumably for their own ends, while warning that mediation efforts would not realize their potential unless there was more consistency.
China has been accused by the US of using some statutes to further its economic interests and advance security objectives. These include a requirement for information sharing on sea exploration that would amount to mandatory technology transfers.
Defense adviser Dr Peter M Leitner, a longtime critic of ratification, testified to a congressional committee in March that Beijing had been able to acquire "sensitive technology vital to our national security" through offshore mining permits. Despite Pentagon protests, the technology, which he alleged could be used to bolster China's capability in submarine warfare, had been handed over by government agencies "so as not to undermine the spirit of the treaty".
Beijing has also challenged the Proliferation Security Initiative, an anti-terrorism operation led by the US and the United Kingdom that includes interdiction measures against vessels suspected of aiding in the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea, a close ally of China, has been a prime target of the sea blockade. But during a recent committee hearing, none of the White House's senior legal aides were able to confirm whether the US would be liable for retaliatory measures if it allowed a ship to be boarded - even if this happened within the economic zone claimed by the US.
All Asian countries other than Cambodia, North Korea, Thailand and East Timor have ratified the treaty. However, it has had virtually no impact on regional tensions due to the widely differing interpretations adopted by signatories.
This is partly because of hazy legal definitions. While the treaty recognizes innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage, and high seas as the four types of navigation rights, the specifics are not spelled out.
There are also numerous let-out clauses that allow signatories and non-signatories alike to set the parameters of treaty provisions, usually successfully.
Hence South Korea has been able to assert control over much of the volatile Cheju Strait by contesting its status as a major navigation route on the grounds that ships can use an alternative route closer to the sea.
Taking this process a step further, Seoul has declared an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles that includes a "security zone" of 150 by 75 nautical miles in which most shipping operations are prohibited.
For its part, North Korea has established a 200-mile EEZ with a 50-mile "military zone" that also has limited access rights. Both zones, as well as a separate EEZ maintained by Japan, intrude into waters in the Sea of Japan that are contested by all four countries and Russia.
Japan, China and South Korea could technically be prosecuted by the ISA for blocking navigational rights. But this is not likely to happen until there have been separate rulings on the various national boundaries, and there is little political will to intervene.
One reason for the free-for-all is the impotency of the US, which is understandably loath to help police the statutes, even for the sake of regional stability, as long as it doesn't accept their legitimacy.
"A most fertile source of dispute may be the question of whether or not a non-ratifying state like the United States may avail itself of the [treaty's] provisions governing the various navigational regimes," said Mark J Valencia, a researcher at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.
"The United States argues that these navigational 'rights' are customary international law, and negotiated an agreement with the former Soviet Union declaring these rights and guaranteeing mutual observance thereof.
"However, some ratifiers like China may not agree, and since the United States is not a party to the treaty, it cannot avail itself of the dispute-resolution provisions. This then leaves the resolution of such disputes purely in the political arena."
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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>> AHEM...WHAT THEY DID NOT ASK?

9-11 AND THE SMOKING GUN
Part 1: 'Independent' commission
By Pepe Escobar

"The overwhelming bulk of the evidence was that this was an attack that was likely to take place overseas."
- White House National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, May 16, 2002

"Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US." - CIA's August 6, 2001 briefing memo to President George W Bush

"If you invade Iraq you will create a hundred bin Ladens." - Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, January 2003

The 9-11 Commission, according to its own website, is "an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation and the signature of President George W Bush in late 2002". The commission is "chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks".
A key consequence of the political theater/media circus around former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke's revelations - in his testimony to the commission and in his best-selling book Against All Enemies - was to force the White House to "deliver" National Security Advisor Condoleezza ("Condi") Rice. She is due to testify to the commission on Thursday - just as the Iraq occupation is confronted to the ultimate nightmare: Fallujah as the new Gaza in the Sunni triangle, and an uprising by the millions of angry, destitute followers of firebrand Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
But as far as the 9-11 Commission is concerned, and at least for the moment, the White House got what it wanted. President George W Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney will have a private conversation with the commission as a tandem, not under oath, and behind closed doors. This testimony won't be recorded. The commission will hardly have more than two or three hours to ask crucial questions to both, when it could have at least double the time to ask questions to each of them separately. The arrangement of course prevents them from contradicting each other - a basic premise of any criminal investigation. It makes sure that the all-powerful, all-seeing Cheney is the Praetorian Guard capable of preventing any Bush rhetorical disaster.
Andrew Rice, chair of the 9-11 Commission Committee of the September 11 Families for Peaceful Tomorrows organization, is one among millions of terribly frustrated Americans. He believes that as far as this official 9-11 Commission is concerned, the "fix was in" from the beginning. Beverly Eckert, whose husband died on September 11, adds: "We wanted journalists, we wanted academics ... We did not want politicians."
The commission comprises nine men and a woman, five Republicans and five Democrats. They include two former governors, a former navy secretary, a former deputy attorney-general, two former Congressmen, two former senators and a former White House counsel. It's a consummate bunch of establishment arch-insiders, all inter-connected. One wonders how such a body can possibly investigate what's behind the myriad of political, military and intelligence interplay. Even the commission itself has been forced to admit that of the 16 federal agencies covered by its investigation, only the State Department is being "fully cooperative", with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a distant second. This is leading to a growing perception, not only in Washington but in other parts of the world, of a "hidden agenda". "They seem to be interested in putting up a good show as a coverup; and of course they're very worried about damage control," says a diplomat from the European Union.
Independents in conflict
There are devastating cases of conflict of interest in the commission. Chairman Thomas Kean may be the most obvious. The US$1 trillion lawsuit filed in August 2002 by the families of the victims of September 11 includes two of Kean's business partners among the accused: Saudi billionaires Khalid bin Mahfouz (who is Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, no less), and Mohammed Hussein al-Amoudi. They are key financial players behind al-Qaeda: Mahfouz transferred millions of dollars from a Saudi pension fund to bank accounts in London and New York linked with al-Qaeda. He is a former director of BCCI, the bank in the center of a notorious $12 billion bankruptcy scandal during the presidency of Bush senior.
Kean is director and shareholder of Amerada Hess Corporation, an oil giant involved in a joint venture with Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia - which is owned by the clans of Mahfouz and Amoudi - to explore Caspian Sea oilfields. Amerada Hess severed the joint venture only three weeks before Kean was appointed chairman of the 9-11 Commission by his friend George W Bush.
It's unlikely fellow members at the 9-11 Commission will ask Kean to reveal to what extent he was aware of Mahfouz's links to al-Qaeda; or ask Amerada Hess to open its books and reveal what kind of deals it was cooking up with Mahfouz. After all, Bush himself also had a business connection with Mahfouz, owner of various investments in Houston, Texas. As to the 28 pages of the joint congressional committee detailing Saudi support to al-Qaeda, they also seem to have vanished into thin air.
The commission, for instance, also will not investigate the foreign policy that started it all in the late 1970s and early 1980s: the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) full support to the hardcore international Islamic brigades which joined the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan - and then turned against the US after the first Gulf War in 1991. This would mean that the commission would have to seriously investigate Secretary of State Colin Powell and his number two, Richard Armitage, key players in those 1980s proceedings.
Former national security adviser to Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, also one of the key members of the Council on Foreign Relations, was the mastermind behind the building of an Islamic network in Afghanistan - as part of a huge, covert CIA operation. To a large extent, the modern Islamic jihad exists thanks to Brzezinski. There are four members of the Council on Foreign Relations in the commission. There's hardly any chance of them investigating their fellow Brzezinski.
The commission's executive director, Philip D Zelikow, is a crucial player. This is the man who directs all the investigative research of the commission. On October 5, 2001 - two days before the beginning of the bombing of Afghanistan - he was appointed as one of the three members of Bush's foreign intelligence advisory board. Zelikow is the ultimate Bush insider.
Andrew Rice says that Zelikow "worked with these people and now he is defending them". Zelikow also worked for Jim Baker, former secretary of state of Bush senior. He spent three years on Bush senior's National Security Council. He is close to Bush junior, and even closer to Condi Rice: they worked together, and he even co-wrote two books with her.
Commissioner Jamie S Gorelick is very close to CIA director George Tenet. No wonder: she works on the CIA's National Security Advisory Panel, as well as on the president's Review of Intelligence. Tenet is one of the masterminds of the Bush administration "war on terror". This means no chance for the commission to investigate dubious covert operations by the CIA which may foment terrorism instead of fighting it.
Commissioner Fred Fielding is a former White House counsel during Reagan's time, at the time of the Iran-Contra scandal. He is very close to all major players in the Bush administration, in fact one of the White House men in the commission alongside Zelikow.
Commissioner John Lehman was navy secretary under Reagan. He served alongside two of the commission's key witnesses: Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and former counterterrorism head Richard Clarke. He is close to all major players in the Bush administration and also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, with very close personal ties to Henry Kissinger. Lehman is Kissinger's man in the commission.
Commissioner Timothy J Roemer is a former member of the Intelligence Committee's task force on Homeland Security and Terrorism and the joint inquiry on 9-11 of the Senate and House. He is very close to Congressman Porter Goss and Senator Bob Graham, who co-headed the joint inquiry. Graham and Goss, as we will see on part 2 of this series, have very suspicious links to former Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence director Lieutenant General Mahmoud Ahmad.
If the intellectual masterminds of the "war on terror" in the Council on Foreign Relations won't be investigated, neither will be those members of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). PNAC was prophetic in the sense that even before the Bush administration, in a 2000 white paper, their members were betting on "some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor" so the American people would support their agenda of global politico-military dominance. All neo-conservative superstars - like Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle - are members of PNAC (see Asia Times Online, March 20, 2003, This war is brought to you by ...)
Clarke writes about their obsession on page 30 of his book: "I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq." On page 231, Clarke recalls in vivid detail an April 2001 meeting where Wolfowitz is obsessed with Iraq, while the CIA dismisses the Wolfowitz-peddled notion of Iraqi terrorism and the State Department agrees with Clarke's assessment of al-Qaeda as "a major threat" and "an urgent priority".
Andrew Rice could not but be a serious critic of the commision: "It is not about transparency, it is just there to appease the public. But it won't appease me or many other family members. We need a truly independent commission that is outside the realm of government. The worst case scenario is that I fear this could be a whitewash and a coverup." The final report of the commission won't be published until April 2005 - long after the November presidential election.
Clarke , Condi and the Bush doctrine
Clarke insists that he explicitly warned the Bush administration about al-Qaeda as early as January 25, 2001, five days after the inauguration: "It was very explicit. [Condoleezza] Rice was briefed ... and Zelikow sat in.". Clarke said that he gave Condi Rice a detailed memo on how to fight al-Qaeda, based on CIA briefings and lots of information collected under the Bill Clinton administration. On page 229 of his book, he writes: "... her facial expression gave me the impression she had never heard the term [al-Qaeda] before."
In 2002, the White House had to admit on the record that the August 6, 2001 president daily briefing (PDB) quoted at the start of this article said that al-Qaeda might use hijacked planes in an attack inside the US. A portion of this PDB, written by the CIA, predicted that al-Qaeda would launch an attack "in the coming weeks" and that it "will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning." So Bush knew: he's supposed to have read the PDB while on holiday in Crawford, Texas. But Bush has claimed executive privilege and the White House has refused to release the full text of the PDB.
In her famous May 16, 2002 press conference, Condi Rice said: "I don't think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, take another one and slam it into the Pentagon, that they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile." Apparently Rumsfeld could have predicted it. Speaking to the 9-11 Commission last month, Rumsfeld said he, personally, didn't know. But he admitted having received "a civil aviation circular that people did know ... They sent it out on June 22, 2001".
Rumsfeld may know much more than he's willing to admit. According to a report on the US army's Internet site, a simulation of a plane crashing on the Pentagon was carried 10 months before September 11. Rumsfeld told the 9-11 Commission, under oath, that "he did not know" about this simulation, which was conducted by the Emergency Management Team at the Pentagon and involved a lot of employees. The simulation could have been just one more in an endless series of coincidences. Or it could be part of the planning for an event the Pentagon - or at least his director - knew was going to happen.
After the outbursts of the Clarke-smearing campaign - brutal even by the standards of the Bush White House - it has emerged that Condi Rice is also contradicted by none other than the all-powerful Dick Cheney. The White House insists that it did know exactly what it was doing before September 11. And Rice said the White House counterterrorism czar was indeed "in the loop". But Cheney said that Clarke was "not in the loop" - the ultimate Washington put-down. So who was outlooped, Clarke or Condi?
Clarke's central accusation is relatively mild. He says that the Bush administration was lost in space as far as al-Qaeda was concerned because of its ideological fixation on Saddam Hussein. This may have generated non-stop character assassination from the Bush camp, but the fact is Clarke has produced no smoking gun. Essentially, the only major difference between Clarke and the neo-cons is that Clarke was obsessed with bin Laden, while the neo-cons were obsessed with Saddam. Both bin Laden and Saddam, as we know, are former CIA assets.
On page 243 of his book, Clarke qualifies as "somewhat off the mark" the critique of Bush as "a dumb, lazy rich kid". But then he crucially adds: "I doubt that anyone ever had the chance to make the case to him that attacking Iraq would actually make America less secure and strengthen the broader radical Islamic terrorist movement. Certainly he did not hear that from the small circle of advisors who alone are the people whose views he respects and trusts." Condi Rice has always been in favor of regime change in Iraq.
In an article she wrote to Foreign Affairs in early 2000, Rice outlined what amounted to be a semi-official Bush foreign policy platform. She lists five key foreign policy priorities. Only the last one made any mention of terrorism. Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Afghanistan, madrassas in Pakistan, al-Qaeda-style financial networks, Islamist sleeper cells in America, Spain and Germany, none of this is even mentioned. Rice only talks about North Korea, Iraq and Iran - which two years later, in early 2002, would graduate to "axis of evil" status. She is in favor of regime change in Iraq. And her top policy recommendation is national missile defense - aimed at rogue states.
Sibel Edmonds, a former FBI wiretap translator, fluent in English, Turkish, Farsi and Azerbaijani and with top-secret security clearance, told Salon news publication that she is nothing but outraged: "Especially after reading Condoleezza Rice where she said, 'we had no specific information whatsoever of domestic threat or that they might use airplanes'. That's an outrageous lie. And documents can prove it's a lie." Edmonds wants the commission to ask real questions to FBI director Robert Mueller when he testifies later this month: "Like, in April 2001, did an FBI field office receive legitimate information indicating the use of airplanes for an attack on major cities? And is it true that through an FBI informant, who'd been used [by the bureau] for 10 years, did you get information about specific terrorist plans and specific cells in this country? He couldn't say no." Edmonds' recent interviews also raise the fascinating possibility that al-Qaeda penetrated internal security both at the Pentagon and at the State Department. In this case, are the moles still in place?
The Bush administration as a whole took over the media to tell everyone how they had identified the al-Qaeda danger long ago - so they could not be accused of passive responsibility on September 11. But the single evidence of these later allegations was the long build up to the post-September 11 war on Afghanistan. What this actually means is that the war on Afghanistan cannot possibly be described any more as an act of legitimate defense. As to the Bush doctrine of preventive war, which was nothing more than a rhetorical artifact in the first place, it has become a significant casualty of the Clarke-White House shouting match. The doctrine has only lasted enough time to allow the Bush administration to attack Iraq.
It is expected that the 9-11 Commission will keep rolling a huge data bank of unconnected "intelligence failures" and instances of lack of dialogue between FBI and CIA. In the end, it's fair to assume there will be a fall guy to be blamed for all these "intelligence failures". It's also fair to assume it won't be one of the big guns.

TOMORROW: Part 2: A real smoking gun in Pakistan

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)


9-11 AND THE SMOKING GUN
Part 2: A real smoking gun
By Pepe Escobar

Part 1: 'Independent' commission

If the 9-11 Commission is really looking for a smoking gun, it should look no further than at Lieutenant-General Mahmoud Ahmad, the director of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) at the time.
In early October 2001, Indian intelligence learned that Mahmoud had ordered flamboyant Saeed Sheikh - the convicted mastermind of the kidnapping and killing of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl - to wire US$100,000 from Dubai to one of hijacker Mohamed Atta's two bank accounts in Florida.
A juicy direct connection was also established between Mahmoud and Republican Congressman Porter Gross and Democratic Senator Bob Graham. They were all in Washington together discussing Osama bin Laden over breakfast when the attacks of September 11, 2001, happened.
Mahmoud's involvement in September 11 might be dismissed as only Indian propaganda. But Indian intelligence swears by it, and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has confirmed the whole story: Indian intelligence even supplied Saeed's cellular-phone numbers. Nobody has bothered to check what really happened. The 9-11 Commission should pose very specific questions about it to FBI director Robert Mueller when he testifies this month.
In December 2002, Graham said he was "surprised at the evidence that there were foreign governments involved in facilitating the activities of at least some of the [September 11] terrorists in the United States ... It will become public at some point when it's turned over to the archives, but that's 20 or 30 years from now." He could not but be referring to Pakistan and Mahmoud. If Mahmoud was really involved in September 11, this means the Pakistani ISI -"the state within the state" - knew all about it. And if the intelligence elite in Pakistan knew it, an intelligence elite in Saudi Arabia knew it, as well as an intelligence elite in the US.
Get Osama bin Laden
On August 22, 2001, Asia Times Online reported Get Osama! Now! Or else ...
On September 9, the legendary "Lion of the Panjshir", Ahmed Shah Masoud, the key Northern Alliance commander, was assassinated by two suicide bombers posing as journalists in his base in northern Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance tells Washington that the ISI may be involved. Masoud himself had told this correspondent, two weeks before he was killed, of the incestuous link between bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the ISI. A 2002 Asia Times Online investigation would later establish that Masoud was killed as a gift from al-Qaeda to the Taliban, with heavy involvement by Abdul Sayyaf, an Afghan mujahideen commander very close to the ISI and the Saudis. From Washington's perspective, this was also a gift. Masoud was the crucial Afghan nationalist leader, supported by Russia and Iran; after the Taliban being smashed he would never have accepted a feeble, US-sponsored, Hamid Karzai-style government.
On September 10, the Pakistani daily The News reported that the Mahmoud visit to the United States "triggered speculation about the agenda of his mysterious meetings at the Pentagon and National Security Council". If he'd been to the National Security Council, he had certainly met Rice. Mahmoud did meet with his counterpart, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director George Tenet. Tenet and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage had been in Islamabad in May, when Tenet had "unusually long" meetings with Musharraf. Armitage for his part has countless friends in the Pakistani military and the ISI. Mahmoud also met a number of high officials at the White House and the Pentagon and had a crucial meeting with Marc Grossman, the under secretary of state for political affairs. Rice maintains she did not meet Mahmoud then.
On the morning of September 11, Mahmoud was having a breakfast meeting at the Capitol with Graham and Goss. Goss spent as many as 10 years working on numerous CIA clandestine operations. He is very close to Vice President Dick Cheney. It's interesting to note that two weeks ago Goss suggested to the Justice Department to bring perjury charges against the new Cheney nemesis, Clarke. As it is widely known, Graham and Goss were co-heads of the joint House-Senate investigation that proclaimed there was "no smoking gun" as far as President George W Bush having any advance knowledge of September 11.
According to the Washington Post, and also to sources in Islamabad, the Mahmoud-Graham-Goss meeting lasted until the second plane hit Tower 2 of the World Trade Center. Graham later said they were talking about terrorism coming from Afghanistan, which means they were talking about bin Laden.
Pakistani intelligence sources told Asia Times Online that on the afternoon of September 11 itself, as well as on September 12 and 13, Armitage met with Mahmoud with a stark choice: either Pakistan would help the US against al-Qaeda, or it would be bombed back to the Stone Age. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented an ultimatum in the form of seven US demands. Pakistan accepted all of them. One of the demands was for Musharraf to send Mahmoud to Kandahar again and force the Taliban to extradite bin Laden. Mahmoud knew in advance Mullah Omar would refuse. But when he went to Kandahar the Taliban leader said he would accept, as long as the Americans proved bin Laden was responsible for September 11. There was no proof, and Afghanistan was bombed anyway, a policy already decided well in advance.
It's important to remember than on September 13 Islamabad airport was shut down - allegedly because of threats against Pakistan's strategic assets. On September 14, Islamabad declared total support for the US: the airport was immediately reopened. Mahmoud remained in Washington until September 16 - when the war on Afghanistan was more than programmed, and Pakistan was firmly in the "with us" and not the "against us" column.
Million-dollar questions remain. Did Mahmoud know when and how the attacks of September 11 would happen? Did Musharraf know? Could the Bush administration have prevented September 11? It's hard to believe high echelons of the CIA and FBI were not aware of the direct link between the ISI and alleged chief hijacker Mohammed Atta.
On October 7, Mahmoud was demoted from the ISI. By that time, Washington obviously knew of the connection between Mahmoud, Saeed Sheikh and Mohamed Atta: the FBI knew it. The official version is that Mahmoud was sacrificed because he was too close to the Taliban - which, it is never enough to remind, are a cherished creature of the ISI. Two other ISI big shots, Lieutenant-General Mohammed Aziz Khan and Chief of General Staff Mohammed Yousouf, are also demoted along with Mahmoud. Saeed Sheikh was under orders to Khan.
The fact remains that even with this Musharraf-conducted purge of the ISI elite, the bulk of ISI officers remained, and still are, pro-Taliban. Other former ISI directors living in Pakistan, such as the colorful, outspoken Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul, did not "disappear" and always renew their support for the Taliban. But as Asia Times Online has reported, Mahmoud did disappear. He lives in near seclusion in Rawalpindi. And he is definitely not talking. Graham and Goss may not be interested in talking to him either. Because he may be the ultimate September 11 smoking gun.
Conclusion
The Karl Rove-designed campaign to re-elect Bush is in essence anchored on September 11. The Republican convention in New York will happen in the first week of September. Bush's speech will be on September 2 - to force the connection with the three-year commemoration of September 11.
This whole affair is not about whether Clarke committed "perjury"; whether Rice was really up to her job; or whether George W Bush knew something and then "forgot" about it. The families of September 11 victims, US public opinion, the demonized Islamic world, the whole world for that matter, all everybody wants to know is what really happened on September 11. The only party that does not seem interested in getting to the bottom of it is the Bush administration. The official fable of 19 kamikaze Arabs turning Boeings into missiles with military precision, armed only with box cutters and a few flight lessons and directed from an Afghan cave by a satellite phone-shy bin Laden simply does not hold. The commission is not asking the really hard questions. Here are just a few - and they are far from being the most embarrassing.

1) The "stand down" order: Why, despite more than an hour's warning that an attack was happening, were no F-16s protecting US airspace? Documents easily available online reveal why the Pentagon could not act: because of bureaucracy. Why did the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) claim it took 25 minutes after the transponder was shut down to learn that Flight 11 - which hit World Trade Center Tower 1 - was hijacked? Why did fighters not take off from Andrews Air Force base just outside Washington to protect the Pentagon?

2) The pre-September 11 suspicious stock option trades in American Airlines and United Airlines were never fully investigated. Who profited?

3) What happened to the FBI investigation into flight schools - when it was proved that at least five of the 19 hijackers were trained in US military schools?

4) Why did Bush keep reading a pet-goat story for more than half an hour after the first WTC hit, and 15 minutes after Chief of Staff Andrew Card told him there had been an attack?

5) What really happened to Flight 93? An Associated Press story last August quoting a congressional report said the FBI suspected the plane was crashed on purpose. The FBI has a flight-simulation video of what happened: the video - as well as the black box - remain top secret. And as far as four "indestructible" black boxes are concerned, how come none were found, unlike Mohammed Atta's intact passport lying in the WTC rubble?

6) Why have no scientific experts examined the physical and mathematical evidence that a Boeing 757 could not have possibly "disappeared" without a trace after hitting the Pentagon? For the most exhaustive and practically incontrovertible analysis available on the net, see this report.

7) What remains of the very tight 1980s bin Laden-ISI-CIA connection? How much did the CIA know about what the ISI was up to? And how much did the ISI know about what al-Qaeda was up to?

8) What does Rice really know about the very close relations between Mahmoud and the top echelons of the Bush administration?

The genie - the crucial information - is still in the bottle.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

>> JOHN BURNS ON IRANIAN INFLUENCE...
http://www.moretothepoint.com/
US Fights Sunni Militants and Shiite Insurgents listen
In Sunni and Shiite cities across Iraq, US forces are now engaged in the kind of urban warfare they've tried to avoid for the past year. House-to-house fighting, helicopter gun-ships and 500-pound bombs are producing high casualties on both sides. There's concern that angry moderates will join militants in an anti-American "jihad, raising uncertainty whether the Coalition has the forces it needs to provide security in Iraq in time for the transfer of power scheduled for June 30. Joining Warren Olney for an overview of the fighting and an eyewitness account of what Muqtada al-Sadr's "Mahdi Army" is really like are reporters in Iraq for the Christian Science Monitor, New York Times and Los Angeles Times. A Middle East expert and defense analyst assess the prospect for military success, and we get some insight into the political impact on the ongoing presidential campaign from journalists with Congressional Quarterly and National Journal.
Will air Wednesday, April 7, 2004.



ANALYSE
Les myst?res du programme nucl?aire iranien
LE MONDE | 07.04.04 | 14h06
L'iran a-t-il d?finitivement renonc? ? se doter de la bombe atomique, en ?change d'une coop?ration accrue des Occidentaux ? Ou se r?serve-t-il malgr? tout cette possibilit?, pour acc?der co?te que co?te au statut de puissance r?gionale, au risque de provoquer une crise g?n?ralis?e du trait? de non-prolif?ration nucl?aire (TNP), d?j? mal en point au Moyen-Orient et en Asie ? Alors qu'en octobre 2003 le r?gime islamique paraissait avoir tranch? en faveur de la premi?re option, gr?ce aux efforts conjugu?s de l'Allemagne, de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France, les signes d'un raidissement iranien se sont multipli?s. C'est sur fond de m?fiance mutuelle que le directeur de l'Agence internationale de l'?nergie atomique (AIEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, est retourn? ? T?h?ran, mardi 6 avril, dans l'espoir de remettre sur les rails le processus amorc? en 2003. Une semaine auparavant, la tro?ka europ?enne avait appel? les autorit?s iraniennes ? "s'expliquer".
Furieuses de la r?solution adopt?e le 13 mars par le conseil des gouverneurs de l'Agence, qui soulignait les lacunes de leur coop?ration, les autorit?s iraniennes ont repouss? ? la mi-avril la premi?re mission d'inspection des experts onusiens au titre du protocole additionnel ? l'accord de garantie du TNP, qu'elles avaient pourtant sign? fin d?cembre. Elles ont aussi annonc? fin mars, par la voix du vice-pr?sident iranien et chef de la commission ? l'?nergie atomique, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, la mise en route ? Ispahan d'une unit? de conversion d'uranium en gaz, premi?re ?tape vers la fabrication de mat?riaux fissiles.
H?SITATION ? WASHINGTON
Cette annonce a alarm? le si?ge de l'AIEA, ? Vienne, comme les chancelleries occidentales. Car elle s'ajoute ? d'autres indices de mauvaise volont? : le refus de T?h?ran de d?livrer aux inspecteurs des visas d'un an ? entr?es multiples (ce qui limite le caract?re "inopin?" de leurs visites sur les sites), ou encore le fait que les experts onusiens n'aient pas ?t? autoris?s ? utiliser leurs propres appareils pour photographier ou prendre des mesures ?lectroniques dans les ateliers - souvent situ?s dans des bases militaires - o? ?taient mont?es les centrifugeuses destin?es ? enrichir l'uranium. Le dialogue avec les Europ?ens pi?tine, T?h?ran leur r?clamant des ?quipements - avions ou construction de centrales nucl?aires -, alors que ses interlocuteurs pensent qu'il faut d'abord reconstruire un rapport de confiance min? par vingt ans de cachotteries.
Enfin, l'Iran n'a toujours pas donn? d'explication convaincante ? la d?couverte, au printemps 2003, dans des ateliers longtemps tenus secrets ? T?h?ran, de traces d'uranium hautement enrichi : ? 36 % (un taux caract?ristique des r?acteurs de recherche russes), mais aussi ? plus de 80 %, donc tr?s proche d'une qualit? militaire.
Les responsables iraniens ont beau assurer que les "exp?riences"de conversion ne remettent pas en cause leur engagement envers les Europ?ens de cesser toute activit? d'enrichissement, leur d?cision a ?t? critiqu?e comme un "mauvais signal" ? Paris, ? Berlin et ? Londres : "L'Iran doit expliquer ses intentions", ont exig? les trois capitales dans un communiqu? publi? le 31 mars. La veille, ? Washington, le sous-secr?taire d'Etat am?ricain charg? du contr?le des armements, John Bolton, avait ?t? plus direct : "L'Iran semble d?termin? ? poursuivre son programme nucl?aire militaire de fa?on discr?te et clandestine, afin d'obtenir plus ais?ment les technologies-cl?s dont il a besoin."
Pour lui comme pour les autres faucons de l'administration Bush, la cause est entendue : si elle veut pr?server sa cr?dibilit?, l'AIEA sera contrainte t?t ou tard de d?f?rer le dossier iranien devant le Conseil de s?curit? de l'ONU.
Jusqu'? pr?sent, les Europ?ens ont r?sist? aux pressions am?ricaines, jugeant qu'un dialogue avec T?h?ran, m?me insatisfaisant, vaut mieux que de pousser le r?gime islamique ? la rupture. L'exemple de la Cor?e du Nord, qui est sortie d?but 2003 du TNP, apr?s que son cas eut ?t? port? devant l'ex?cutif onusien ? New York, et qui se livre depuis ? un chantage ? la bombe pour arracher des concessions ? la communaut? internationale, incite les Occidentaux et leurs alli?s asiatiques ? la prudence. L'administration am?ricaine est elle-m?me h?sitante sur la conduite ? tenir ? l'?gard de T?h?ran. Si les faucons pr?nent une strat?gie offensive, visant ? terme ? faire tomber le r?gime des mollahs, les bataillons de diplomates investis dans la transition en Irak per?oivent de fa?on aigu? ? quel point ils ont besoin de l'Iran, qui peut user de son influence pour stabiliser la communaut? chiite - ou, au contraire, la dresser contre les arm?es ?trang?res. Il sera de toute fa?on difficile ? Washington d'arr?ter sa strat?gie iranienne avant l'?lection pr?sidentielle - de fait, avant le d?but de 2005. Fins joueurs d'?checs, les Iraniens veulent-ils mettre ? profit cette ann?e de r?pit non seulement pour pousser leurs pions sur la sc?ne g?opolitique, mais aussi pour passer dans la cat?gorie redout?e de puissance nucl?aire r?gionale, marchant ainsi sur les traces de l'Inde, du Pakistan et d'Isra?l - trois pays qui se sont cependant bien gard?s d'adh?rer au TNP ?
"LE CHOIX DU PIRE"
"On ne peut pas exclure, poursuit un diplomate proche de l'Agence, qu'un clan ? T?h?ran ait fait le choix du pire, avec l'argument que seule l'arme nucl?aire permettra de se faire respecter par les Occidentaux." Le fait que M. Aghazadeh, qui avait d?fendu en mai 2003, devant les gouverneurs de l'AIEA, une version tr?s peu cr?dible du programme nucl?aire iranien, soit revenu sur le devant de la sc?ne au d?triment de Hassan Rohani, un conservateur en qui les Europ?ens voyaient un interlocuteur fiable, laisse craindre que les ultranationalistes ne l'aient emport? sur les pragmatiques. Comme le soulignait ? l'automne un rap-port de l'International Crisis Group, jamais T?h?ran ne s'est senti aussi menac? : "Id?ologiquement hostile ? Isra?l mais culturellement en porte- ?-faux avec le monde arabe, convaincu qu'il n'a pas de v?ritable alli? mais beaucoup d'adversaires potentiels, entour? de gouvernements amis des Etats-Unis ou qui abritent d'importantes forces militaires am?ricaines, voire les deux ? la fois", l'Iran - qui convoitait d?j? la bombe au temps du chah - pourrait essayer de franchir ? marche forc?e les ?tapes qui le s?parent encore de la ma?trise compl?te du cycle nucl?aire.
Le difficile pari des Europ?ens consiste ? montrer aux Iraniens qu'ils ont beaucoup ? gagner s'ils coop?rent, et trop ? perdre dans la confrontation. Un Iran nucl?aris? inciterait la Turquie et l'Arabie saoudite ? suivre la m?me pente. L'axe construit depuis quelques ann?es entre Riyad et T?h?ran, notam-ment au sein de l'Organisation des pays exportateurs de p?trole, qui s'assure ainsi une meilleure ma?trise des prix, n'y survivrait pas longtemps. Pas plus que le TNP, dont la conf?rence de mise ? jour, ? Gen?ve en 2005, promet d?j? d'?tre houleuse. L'avenir du r?gime de non-prolif?ration nucl?aire, affaibli par la d?fection nord-cor?enne et les r?v?lations sur la fili?re pakistanaise, se joue sans doute, au cours des prochains mois, sur l'?chiquier iranien.

Jo?lle Stolz
* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 08.04.04
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L'Iran va construire un r?acteur ? eau lourde
LEMONDE.FR | 07.04.04 | 19h33
Pour les Iraniens, le r?acteur d'Arak doit servir ? la recherche et ? des fins m?dicales et industrielles, mais les instances de l'ONU craignent qu'il ne servent ? produire du plutonium ? usage militaire.
L'Iran doit commencer en juin ? construire un r?acteur ? eau lourde qui pourrait servir ? la production de plutonium ? usage militaire, ont affirm? mercredi 7 avril des diplomates ? Vienne, au lendemain de promesses iraniennes de coop?ration faites au directeur g?n?ral de l'Agence internationale de l'?nergie atomique (AIEA), Mohamed ElBaradei.
T?h?ran avait signal? en automne vouloir lancer un tel chantier, mais le passage ? l'acte ne peut que pr?occuper la communaut? internationale, qui craint que l'Iran cherche ? se doter de l'arme atomique sous couvert de nucl?aire civil, selon ces sources.
"L'Iran doit annoncer prochainement qu'il va commencer en juin ? travailler sur un r?acteur de recherche ? l'eau lourde ? Arak", ? 200 km au sud-ouest de T?h?ran, a d?clar? un diplomate proche de l'AIEA. Mardi, ? T?h?ran, l'Iran avait promis au directeur g?n?ral de l'AIEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, d'intensifier sa coop?ration et de r?pondre rapidement aux questions en suspens pour dissiper les doutes sur son programme nucl?aire.
Le r?acteur d'Arak, d'apr?s cette source, ne serait pas en violation des garanties du trait? de non-prolif?ration nucl?aire (TNP), mais sa construction adresserait ? nouveau un signal politique n?gatif ? la communaut? internationale, qui demande aux Iraniens de prouver qu'ils ne sont pas en train de fabriquer la bombe atomique.
D?j?, l'Iran avait annonc? fin mars qu'il voulait commencer ? convertir de l'uranium, une ?tape pr?alable ? l'enrichissement, dans le complexe d'Ispahan. Mardi, les Iraniens ont refus? ? M. ElBaradei de reporter ces activit?s de conversion. "Ce n'est pas par hasard" si le chantier d'Arak doit commencer en juin, le mois m?me o? le conseil des gouverneurs de l'AIEA tiendra une nouvelle session, selon ce diplomate.
D'apr?s lui en effet, T?h?ran, qui clame son bon droit, veut affirmer son ind?pendance et apaiser les durs du r?gime islamique qui vivent mal les inspections obtenues par l'AIEA.
POSSIBILIT? DE PRODUIRE DU PLUTONIUM
Pour les Iraniens, le r?acteur doit servir ? la recherche et ? la production de radio-isotopes ? des fins m?dicales et industrielles. Cependant, il pourrait in fine servir ? produire du plutonium ? usage militaire, a not? le diplomate.
En novembre, l'Iran avait indiqu? dans un rapport soumis ? l'agence nucl?aire de l'ONU que pour remplacer son r?acteur de recherche vieux de trente ans et obsol?te, pr?s de la capitale, il avait tent? d'acqu?rir un r?acteur ? l'?tranger, mais en avait ?t? emp?ch? ? cause des sanctions occidentales.
Il convient d'emp?cher les Iraniens de commencer le chantier, car sinon "'il y aura un fait accompli", selon un diplomate. D'apr?s lui, "on peut toujours r?gler ?a en installant un r?acteur d'un autre type ? Arak et en donnant du combustible nucl?aire" ? usage civil aux Iraniens. Encore faut-il, selon lui, que l'AIEA re?oive des r?ponses satisfaisantes aux questions qu'elle se pose sur les programmes iraniens.
L'Iran avait remis ? l'agence onusienne, en octobre 2003, une d?claration pr?sent?e comme compl?te sur ses activit?s nucl?aires. Mais T?h?ran a ensuite ?t? condamn? par l'agence de s?ret? nucl?aire de l'ONU pour avoir cach? des activit?s sensibles notamment un projet de fabrication de centrifugeuses P2 capables d'enrichir de l'uranium. L'Iran s'est engag? mardi ? fournir des informations ? ce sujet.
T?h?ran a sign? en 2003 le protocole additionnel au TNP, qui autorise des inspections surprises de ses sites, et s'est engag? ? l'appliquer avant m?me sa ratification par le Parlement.

Avec AFP
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Iran Plans Reactor That Can Make Weapons-Grade Plutonium
NewsMax.com Wires
Wednesday, April 7, 2004
VIENNA, Austria - Iran will start building a nuclear reactor in June that can produce weapons-grade plutonium, diplomats said Wednesday. Although Tehran insists the heavy-water facility is for research, the decision heightens concern about its nuclear ambitions.
One diplomat said the planned 40-megawatt reactor could produce enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon each year, an amount experts commonly say is 8.8 pounds.
The diplomats told The Associated Press that Iran informed the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency last year of its plans to build a reactor, and Iranian officials have previously suggested the reactor was already being built.
But the diplomats said construction had not yet begun and that Iranian officials announced the June start date for the first time during talks Tuesday in Tehran with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency.
With Iran open about its desire to build the facility, the diplomats said the Iranian decision to go ahead with the plan was not an overt example of Tehran backtracking on pledges to dispel suspicions it is pursuing nuclear weapons.
Still, it "sends a bad signal at a time all eyes are on Iran," one of the diplomats said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
International scrutiny of Iran's nuclear program has been growing since the IAEA discovered last year that Tehran had not disclosed large-scale efforts to enrich uranium, which can be used in nuclear warheads.
Traces of weapons-grade uranium found by inspectors and evidence of suspicious experiments led to a series of critical resolutions by the IAEA's board of governors.
The resolutions stopped short of forcing Iran to go before the U.N. Security Council, as demanded by the United States. But if ElBaradei gives a negative progress report on Iran when the IAEA board of governors meets in June, just as construction of the reactor is getting under way, Tehran could face action by the security council.
Iran argues that it needs the reactor to produce radioisotopes for medical research. But spent fuel rods from the planned reactor can be reprocessed to produce plutonium, also used for nuclear warheads, although the facility would be subject to IAEA inspections and other controls intended to make sure no plutonium is created.
Still, the United States and other countries might seize on Iran's plans as further evidence that the Islamic republic is not serious about quelling suspicions about its intentions.
"We feel strongly that there is no need for indigenous heavy water in Iran," said a Western diplomat, also speaking on condition of anonymity. "It's not necessary and highly suspicious."
The reactor site is at Arak, next to a heavy-water production plant. It is to replace a reactor using non-weapons-grade enriched uranium that the Iranians mothballed, saying it was outmoded and lacked fuel.
Because enrichment can be used to generate power and to make nuclear warheads, Iran has said it has suspended all enrichment to prove its peaceful intentions. It cannot buy enriched fuel on legal markets because of international suspicions about its intentions.
Seeking to counter accusations of continued deceit, Iran on Tuesday pledged to deliver a complete dossier to the IAEA detailing all its present and future nuclear activities by the end of April, ElBaradei said.
"We have agreed on an action plan with a timetable with how to move forward on the major outstanding issues," he said after meeting with Hasan Rowhani, secretary of Iran's powerful National Security Council.
Critics say Iran reneged on commitments to win international trust as IAEA inspectors discovered evidence of past experiments that could be used to develop weapons.
Adding to the skepticism was Iran's announcement last month that it inaugurated a uranium conversion facility in Isfahan, 155 miles south of Tehran, to process uranium ore into gas, a crucial step before uranium enrichment.
Iran insists the move does not contradict its pledge to suspend enrichment. But Britain, France and Germany, which have stymied past U.S. attempts to castigate Iran, said the plant sent the wrong signal.
Last year, the three secured Iran's agreement to suspend enrichment and cooperate with the IAEA in exchange for promised access to Western technology.
? 2004 Associated Press. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chirac Shuffle May Spell Long-Term U.S. Bashing
by John Gizzi
Posted Apr 7, 2004
Reeling from the setback his government got in regional elections last week, French President Jacques Chirac dramatically reshuffled his government. The likeliest long-term impact of the Chirac shuffle, Paris watchers in Washington said last week, is more strained relations with the U.S. after Chirac's term is up in '07 and the French elect a new president.
Although Chirac retained Jean-Pierre Raffarin as prime minister, he turned his Cabinet upside down. The most dramatic changes were the naming of Foreign Minister (and long-assumed Chirac heir apparent for president) Dominique de Villepin as Interior Minister and shifting the present Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy (who is not close to Chirac and makes no secret of his desire to succeed him) as finance minister.
While the titles and power therein may not sound significant to most Americans, they have a profound impact on France and Europe. Translated from French, de Villepin--even more notorious than Chirac at the U.S. State Department and on the Washington diplomatic cocktail circuit for his relentless criticism of U.S. action in Iraq and support of a French-dominated European Union--now gets the domestic clout to lay the groundwork for a presidential campaign when Chirac steps down in '07--overseeing security from local to the national level, homeland security, immigration. Machiavelli admirer de Villepin also now controls the all-powerful counterintelligence service.
In contrast, the 49-year-old Sarkovzy was given what is tantamount to a demotion among Frenchmen: put in charge of launching a recovery of what is now the most stagnant and moribund among European economies. Unemployment in France is now a striking 9.6% and finances are at their lowest ebb since the oil shock of 1973.
In a country where statism seems a required religion for most office-holders, Sarkozy is an admirer of Margaret Thatcher-esque economics and, as the equivalent of Office of Management and Budget chief in the '90's, he was a vigorous advocate of reducing taxes. The man Frenchmen call "Sarko" is also no Chirac clone; his mentor was former Premier and Finance Minister Eduard Balladur, the French pol admired by American conservatives such as economist Paul Craig Roberts, and Chirac has reportedly never forgiven Sarkozy for campaigning for Balladur against him in the 1995 election.
So what the Chirac shuffle means is that, if "Le Grand Jacques" is unelectable himself in '07, he wants the next best thing in de Villepin.


Copyright ? 2003 HUMAN EVENTS. All Rights Reserved.
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Secret Taiwan missile program aims at Mainland targets
Taiwan is planning to develop surface-to-surface missiles capable of hitting key targets on the Mainland as China continues its own missile buildup. East-Asia-Intel.com has learned that Taiwan is involved in a secret program, dubbed Tiching, to develop both a short-range (SRBM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Taiwan is attempting to develop a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) capable of hitting Shanghai and Hong Kong...
Czech selling advanced stealth-detecting radar to China over Western objections...

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>> ft.com

US lacked a clear, cohesive policy on Iraq, says Perle
By Peter Spiegel in Washington
Published: April 7 2004 20:58 | Last Updated: April 7 2004 20:58

It has suddenly become the season of the tell-all tome. First, there was Paul O'Neill, the former Treasury secretary who told of a Bush administration obsessed by Iraq from day one. Most recently came Richard Clarke, the ex-counterterrorism chief who alleges the White House ignored al-Qaeda until it was too late.
Sandwiched in between, however, and given far less notice, was another book highly critical of those around President George W. Bush, but from a much more surprising source: Richard Perle, the former Pentagon adviser often regarded as the intellectual godfather of the administration's aggressive foreign policy.
Unlike the other books, An End to Evil - co-written by yet another administration ?migr?, David Frum, a former speechwriter - is careful to steer clear of Mr Bush himself as well as Mr Perle's patron, Donald Rumsfeld, defence secretary.
But Mr Perle's book takes aim at almost everyone else in the senior reaches of the Bush foreign policy team and accuses many of them of significant failures in the run-up to, and the aftermath of, the war in Iraq.
On the armed forces: "Much of the planning for, and debate about, the Iraq campaign exposed the grip of the dead hand of military tradition." On the State department: "Seldom has the foreign policy bureaucracy inflicted such shameful damage on American interests than in its opposition to working with Saddam's Iraqi opponents." On the CIA: "George Tenet has been the director of central intelligence since 1997, time enough to have changed the agency's culture. He has failed. He should go."
Mr Perle acknowledges that part of the reason he quit the Defence Advisory Board, the Pentagon panel he used to chair, in February was to give full voice to such criticisms.
"I say a number of things in the book that are critical of a number of government departments," he says. "Often, administrations feel compelled to defend their agencies."
Indeed, in a hour-long interview, Mr Perle is even more critical of those agencies than in the book, arguing that the administration failed in its policymaking both before the war - he would have trained Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress as a government-in-exile months before the war started - and after.
"There were a lot of divisions about how we prepare for the postwar period, and some of those divisions prevented the emergence of a clear, cohesive, orderly policy," he muses. "I think you need a much more disciplined approach to the activities of separate institutions, who all have a role in a situation like that. I think the CIA was often at cross-purposes with national policy. The military often made their own more-or-less independent judgments about what was highest priority."
Asked whether such criticisms are an attack on Condoleezza Rice, whose job as national security adviser includes such policy co-ordination, Mr Perle demurs: "All I'm prepared to say is that there was not sufficient co-ordination. I don't want to assign blame."
And such criticisms do not extend to the war itself, of course. "We should have done it sooner, we should have done it differently in my view, but we did it and I'm glad we did it," he says.
Mr Perle has never been a shrinking violet, and while he complains repeatedly that his views are frequently twisted by political opponents, he clearly relishes his role as provocateur. But his views are also far more nuanced than critics on the right or left give him credit for. Patrick Buchanan, the conservative commentator, argued recently that Mr Perle's book called for "no end to war" but perhaps surprisingly, Mr Perle readily acknowledges democracy at the point of a gun is virtually impossible.
"I don't believe democracy can be imposed from outside. . . I certainly prefer change from within to military action from the outside," he says. "They make it sound as though we're proposing war with Syria, war with Iran. It's not true. I don't propose war with anyone. Libya is an example of what I and some others hope will result from a more robust American policy."
By more robust, Mr Perle means constant, almost harassing diplomatic pressure. Stopping the flow of oil from Iraq to Syria. Smuggling communications equipment to Iranian dissidents. Backing independence for Saudi Arabia's oil-producing Eastern Provinces.
It sounds like a recipe for destabilising an entire region, one that is home to one of the US's most important interests - oil - and its most dangerous enemy, Islamic fundamentalism.
Press him about whether that truly is his vision for the Middle East, and it suddenly becomes hard to pin Mr Perle down. At times, it appears the threats he advocates are just that: threats to be used to twist arms, rather than to be actually carried out.
"We're asking the governments to do certain things, and they're well aware that it is in within our power to do things that would destabilise their situation," he says elliptically. "They don't want that, so is it wrong for us to say we can make life very difficult for you if you don't want to do it?"
And what of signs that some of the region's regimes are softening, such as Iran's nascent moves towards openness on its nuclear programme? Should they not be rewarded? "I'm not against carrots," he says. "But it's stick first, and then the carrots."
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>> KOFI WATCH...

Senators condemn UN's oil-for-food programme
By Salamander Davoudi in Washington and Claudio Gatti and Mark Turner in New York
Published: April 7 2004 21:56 | Last Updated: April 7 2004 21:56

Leading Democratic and Republican figures on Wednesday united in condemnation of the United Nation's oil-for-food programme in Iraq through which Saddam Hussein's regime diverted billions of dollars despite international supervision.
Speaking at a hearing of the US Senate foreign relations committee, Richard Lugar, the Republican chairman, said there was "no doubt that the billions of dollars that should have been spent on humanitarian needs in Iraq were siphoned off".
Mr Hussein depended on "members of the UN Security Council who were willing to be complicit in his activities, and he required UN officials and contractors who were dishonest, inattentive or [willing] to make damaging compromises", he said.
The criticisms come amid growing controversy about the UN's policing of the oil-for-food programme.
Fresh insights into how the system was manipulated are revealed in Thursday's Financial Times, in a joint investigation with Il Sole 24 Ore, the Italian business daily.
The US General Accounting Office, a congressional investigatory body, estimates Mr Hussein earned $10.1bn (?8.37bn) in illegal revenues. Of this, $5.7bn came from oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4bn in illicit surcharges on oil sales and procurement deals.
Several senators urged the publication of the names of companies and individuals that did business with Saddam's regime.
Oil sales contracts, the committee heard, were drawn up on a forward-cost basis, so the Iraqis could take the difference between the sale price and the market price. After the US and Britain advocated a retroactive pricing system, where the price was set at a later date, the scope for kickbacks was "substantially reduced", John Negroponte, US ambassador to the UN, said.

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Lawmakers Seek Probe of U.N. Oil-for-Food Program
NewsMax Wires
Thursday, Apr. 08, 2004
U.S. lawmakers are calling on the United Nations to conduct a thorough investigation of alleged corruption in its oil-for-food program in Iraq. They say such a probe is crucial if the world body is to maintain credibility as it prepares to play a role in the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq in late June.
Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Wednesday criticized the United Nations for corruption and graft in Iraq's oil-for-food program.
Congress' investigative arm, the General Accounting Office, estimates the regime of ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein siphoned billions of dollars in illegal revenue from the program between 1997 and 2002.
The program allowed Iraq to make some humanitarian purchases through limited oil sales at a time when Baghdad was under international sanctions for its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee suggested the United Nations' failure to adequately monitor the program calls into question its ability to help Iraq make a transition to a sovereign government June 30.
"There are serious allegations about mismanagement and corruption that must be addressed," said Delaware Senator Joe Biden, the panel's top Democrat. "Not only to hold accountable those who are guilty of corruption, but to make sure we get it right in the future, because we are going to lose credibility, the institution will lose credibility and the ability in the future to act is going to be seriously damaged.
Committee chairman, Republican Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, agreed. "The credibility of the United Nations in attempting to referee, supervise, or help to transform Iraq in this situation is really at stake," he said.
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has called for an independent probe into the corruption allegations.
The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, told the Foreign Relations Committee that he is urging the secretary general to appoint experienced investigators who will handle the process in a viable and transparent way.
"I think it is important that he [Secretary General Annan] choose very high caliber people of outstanding reputation to lead this panel. I understand he intends to name the panel members in the near future," he said.
Some senators blamed Russia, France and China for blocking past U.S. efforts to investigate the corruption allegations. Those nations played a key role in the oil-for-food program.
Senator Lugar suggested those countries may have opposed the U.S.-led coalition's decision to use force to topple Saddam Hussein because ousting the regime would expose corruption in the oil-for-food program.

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U.N.Reliable
U.N. investigations focus on process, not substance.

By Claudia Rosett
"Cover-up" may sound farfetched, given the number of hearings and investigations now zeroing in on the United Nations Oil-for-Food scandal. The Iraq Governing Council began its own inquiry back in March. The U.S. Congress has scheduled three hearings this month, the first of them taking place today (Wednesday) before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At the U.N. itself, where more than 100 audits over the course of the seven-year program apparently managed to miss more than $10 billion in smuggling and graft, Secretary-General Kofi Annan finally gave in last month to demands for an independent inquiry, and is now convening a team of investigators.
But when it comes to Oil-for-Food, there seem to be a lot of inquiring minds that don't want to know. Nor is the itch for ignorance confined to those most directly in the line of fire: the vast number of U.N.-approved contractors who paid kickbacks to Saddam Hussein; the U.N. staff who will now be investigated; the executive director of Oil-for-Food, Benon Sevan, alleged to have had his hand in the pot; or even the U.N. auditors -- whatever they did with their time.
No, the bigger problem is the prevailing notion -- and it seems to prevail all the way up to the White House -- that the U.N.'s image must somehow be kept pure enough so that it can soon (June 30) replace the Coalition Provisional Authority in post-Saddam Iraq as the primary outsider involved in Iraqi daily affairs. The fear, in New York and Washington, repeated by many a source speaking strictly on background, is that if we ever get to the bottom of this U.N.-funneled geyser of graft, it might discredit the U.N. too badly to allow it yet another influential role in Iraq.
Since Annan's epiphany last month, that "It is highly possible that there has been quite a lot of wrongdoing," the whitewashing has begun. The chief vehicle for this effort looks likely to be the U.N.'s own investigation, which will now be carried out under terms devised by none other than Kofi Annan himself -- the same Kofi Annan who presided over this cornucopia of corruption in the first place.
On the face of it, the impending U.N. investigation sounds satisfactory. According to the "terms of reference" -- meaning the ground rules proposed last month by Annan and welcomed by the Security Council -- the investigators are to have "unrestricted access to all relevant United Nations records and information" and to all U.N. personnel, "regardless of their seniority." They will check into such matters as whether U.N. staff or contractors took bribes "in the carrying out of their respective roles in relation to the Programme," and determine whether the accounts were kept "in accordance with the relevant Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations."
All that's left to do is wait for Annan to name the members of the panel. Within three months, they will then submit to Annan, in quintuplicate, a summary and underlying report. These materials he will share with the public, up to a point -- that point involving various judgments about "the rights of staff members" at the U.N., as well as anything the investigators might decide to keep confidential.
That's interesting, as far as it goes. In the event that any U.N. employees did happen to pocket the office paper clips, take bribes strictly through official U.N. channels, or leave the commas off some of the thousands of U.N.-processed contracts through which Saddam Hussein skimmed billions out of the Oil-for-Food program, Annan's ground rules may quite possibly nail a few wrongdoers.
But when the entire investigation is done, even if brilliantly performed under these guidelines, there will still be no accounting for the gross failures that allowed the U.N. to devise, implement, approve, and expand this monstrosity of a program until the transition had been made from food-for-children to palaces,-sports-stadiums,-smuggling,-and-kickbacks-for-Saddam-and-his-worldwide-network-of-cronies. When Annan sifts through the underlying report (in quintuplicate) there will still be no explanation of why top U.N. officials (including Annan himself) -- charged not with cleaning the copy machines, but with protecting the integrity of the institution and serving the public interest -- chose instead to shrug, gloss over Saddam's gross abuses, blame others, deny, stonewall, and finally come up with an investigation focused mainly on paper clips.
In a letter last week to Annan, Rep. Henry Hyde (R., Ill.), who will preside at an Oil-for-Food hearing later this month, wrote that the program "represents a scandal without precedent in U.N. history." Hyde's suggestion to Annan was: "Your response to these allegations must be equally unprecedented."
Hyde is onto something big. Oil-for-Food is important not simply as a stellar story of fraud, but for what it highlights about pervasive flaws in the structure and habits of the U.N. There is first the problem of responsibility: When something goes wrong, as we are now witnessing, the Security Council blames the Secretariat, and the Secretariat blames the Security Council. If something goes very badly wrong, then there is finally an investigation, maybe one or two people get fired, but there is no change of paradigm. Perhaps that's the only arrangement by which the U.N. can hold together. If so, we need to absorb the message that the U.N. is an institution that should never be trusted to carry out missions requiring integrity or responsibility. (Engendering a free society in Iraq, for instance.)
Then there's the U.N. custom of secrecy, usually explained by U.N. officials as a matter of deference to the "sensitivities" of member nations. How convenient. Chronic secrecy is a policy best geared to serve those who have the most to hide: the tyrants, the crooks, and the cheats (which, not coincidentally, turned out to be precisely the stew served up by Oil-for-Food). In setting up Oil-for-Food, the U.N. deferred greatly to the sensitivities of Saddam, protecting the privacy of his totalitarian regime and his business partners -- which included the commission-collecting U.N. itself. Had the details of the contracts been made public all along, had the accounts and the famous 100-and-then-some audits been released, often, there would have been at least a better chance of keeping Oil-for-Food honest.
None of this will be addressed by the independent U.N. investigation. Instead, once Annan has sorted through the findings and sifted out whatever is judged by U.N. standards to violate the "rights of staff members," we are all too likely to emerge with a U.N. just as irresponsible, unaccountable, and secretive as when it spawned Oil-for-Food, back in the mid-1990s. (Though the paperwork may, for a while, be kept in better order.)
Hope must turn, then, to the congressional hearings, and the investigation of the Iraq Governing Council. On the congressional front, staffers have been struggling to get a grip on Oil-for-Food, a program that was simply so vast, so complicated, and for so long so busily confidential, that it will be miraculous if they are able to piece it together thoroughly enough to lever any motion toward real reform at the U.N. The only serious point of leverage, actually, is U.S. funding, which provides about 22 percent of Annan's core budget. In the case of Iraq, the U.N. in return for this delivered a decade of busted sanctions, culminating in financial collaboration with a murderous tyrant, topped off by a knockdown fight in the Security Council pitting the U.S. and the U.K. against Saddam's U.N.-approved clientele, all topped off by Oil-for-Food. And, oh yes, now we have the U.N.'s offer to return to Iraq -- to confer legitimacy.
Quite likely, the best chance of a report that is both fully informed and frank lies with the investigation, in Baghdad, under the authority of the Iraq Governing Council. Early on, the Iraqis understood the need to look into Oil-for-Food -- while Annan, who for almost seven years ran the program, was still professing his doubts that anything might have been wrong. But in the current climate of complicated worries about discrediting the U.N., it should come as no surprise that the Iraqi investigation recently hit a bump. The U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, in its own version of U.N.-style procedure, at this late date suddenly required the IGC-hired investigating team to drop their work in order to write a proposal, bidding for the right to carry out the investigation already well underway. In response, an adviser to the IGC, Claude Hankes-Drielsma, sent a letter to the CPA, noting: "I would certainly hope that the independent report commissioned and approved by the Iraq Governing Council will not become a political football either through confusion or interference." It seems the IGC investigation will now be able to go forward. That would be a very good thing, especially in the way of helping the Iraqi people decide just how much legitimacy they themselves would like to confer upon the U.N.

-- Claudia Rosett is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and an adjunct fellow with the Hudson Institute.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/rosett200404070853.asp

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>> BUNDES AHEM...

Bundesbank head suspended after accepting ?5,000 stay at hotel

Charlotte Denny
Thursday April 8, 2004
The Guardian
An embarrassed Bundesbank was forced to send its president, Ernst Welteke, on gardening leave yesterday following the revelation that the country's most
senior financial official had accepted four nights' accommodation for himself and his family at a luxury Berlin hotel paid for by a private bank.
In a statement following an all-day emergency meeting of its board, the Bundesbank said there were not sufficient grounds to fire Mr Welteke, who has apologised and offered to repay half the ?8,000 (?5,000) cost of his stay.
Despite the lukewarm backing of the board, his future was looking uncertain last night. On Monday Frankfurt prosecutors launched a formal investigation into the scandal.
Dresdner Bank, which paid Mr Welteke's bill for the four-day stay in January 2001 during the launch of the euro's new notes and coins, is regulated by the Bundesbank. Prosecutors will examine whether Mr Welteke broke laws governing the conduct of public officials by accepting the company's hospitality.
The affair has enraged politicians at a time when the German economy is struggling to shrug off three years of economic stagnation. The government is reported to have privately asked Mr Welteke to resign and yesterday urged the fiercely independent central bank to make a quick decision about his future.
"It would be in the interest of the Bundesbank, which is a very special institution and in Germany's history enjoys a particularly high reputation ... that one reaches a quick decision," government spokesman Thomas Steg said ahead of the meeting.
Public opinion has been inflamed by the story of Mr Welteke's lavish lifestyle at a time when Germans are being told to accept painful economic reforms. The central bank has been particularly critical of the government's fiscal laxity, an irony not lost Mr Welteke's enemies.
Mr Welteke has not ruled out resigning to limit the damage to the bank's reputation. Names of possible candidates to succeed him are already floating in government circles, with deputy finance minister Caio Koch-Weser and Bundesbank vice-president J?rgen Stark seen as front runners.
The Bundesbank declined to spell out how long Mr Welteke's leave would last but added that Mr Stark would in the meantime take over Mr Welteke's seat on the European Central Bank's policy-making council.
Mr Steg made it clear that Berlin would prefer to see Mr Welteke go.
Given public criticism it was "understandable and justified if Welteke publicly asks himself the question whether he can put family, himself, his office and the institution of the Bundesbank through this" the spokesman said.

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Bundesbank chief to "temporarily" step down
By Patrick Jenkins in Frankfurt
Published: April 6 2004 18:14 | Last Updated: April 8 2004 0:34

The board of the German Bundesbank Wednesday night asked Ernst Welteke, the central bank's president, to take an indefinite leave of absence following his involvement in a row over corporate hospitality.
The decision, after a seven-hour board meeting, gives Mr Welteke the chance to resume his position if he is found innocent of wrongdoing by an ongoing investigation into the affair by the Frankfurt state prosecutor.
However, the prosecutor said the probe could take "weeks or months" to determine whether Dresdner Bank sought to gain advantage when it paid a ?7,661 ($8,965) hotel bill for Mr Welteke and his family two years ago.
In a statement last night, the Bundesbank board said: "The president of a national central bank can only be sacked if he has committed a serious misdemeanour." J?rgen Stark, the Bundesbank's vice-president, will take charge during Mr Welteke's leave of absence.
The decision ignored urging from the government for a "swift clarification". The affair has been an embarrassment for the government of Gerhard Schr?der, the chancellor, as the controversy surrounding Mr Welteke hit the Bundesbank's reputation.
The Bundesbank is one of the bodies responsible for regulating Germany's banking sector.
In an interview with ZDF television on Wednesday, Mr Welteke said: "I don't believe I've ever done anything to compromise my independence. But if the board and the Frankfurt public prosecutor see things differently, then clearly one has to consider resignation."
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Bundesbank is losing last of its mystique
By Bertrand Benoit
Published: April 8 2004 0:52 | Last Updated: April 8 2004 0:52
"Not all Germans believe in God," Jacques Delors, the former French finance minister and European Commission president, once remarked. "But they all believe in the Bundesbank."
That may have been true, once. Since the German central bank surrendered the tools of monetary policy to the European Central Bank five years ago, however, the halo has all but disappeared.
Against such a backdrop, this week's hospitality scandal involving Ernst Welteke, the bank's president, looks like the latest milestone on the institution's slow road towards insignificance.
"The myth of the Bundesbank has taken another blow," said J?rgen Michels, economist at Citigroup. "At stake here is no longer its influence, but its reputation in the mind of Germans and Europeans."
Up to the late 1990s, the bank's low-rise concrete headquarters in the Frankfurt suburb of Ginnheim was arguably the beating heart of monetary Europe, where short-term interest rates for the entire continent were, de facto, set.
That changed in 1999 with the creation of the euro and transfer of monetary policy across town to the Eurotower, the Frankfurt home of the European Central Bank, which sets rates for the eurozone.
The head of the "Buba", today has no more say in the continent's monetary affairs than the 11 other central bank presidents and six ECB executive council members who sit on the ECB's governing council.
The bank's other prerogatives have also been gradually eroded. Mr Welteke, for instance, failed to persuade Hans Eichel, finance minister and fellow Social Democrat, to give it the lead in supervising Germany's banking sector.
Remaining are secondary activities as operator of a payment system for financial institutions, collector of economic statistics and custodian of Germany's gold and currency reserves.
The concrete fortress on the river Main could still have put its statistical resources and independence from government to good use, by turning itself into a prime economic think-tank. Yet even there, it has been found wanting.
Bankers say Mr Welteke, a former finance minister in the state of Hesse and a political appointee in his current position, has demonstrated none of the intellectual brilliance of Karl Blessing, Karl Otto P?hl, or Hans Tietmeyer, his predecessors.
Gerhard Schr?der, German chancellor, had already finalised "Agenda 2010" on structural reforms when "Ways out of the crisis", the Bundesbank's contribution, came out in March 2003.
Having lost authority, the bank also shrank physically.
Under Mr Welteke, its payroll of 14,589 was due to be cut by a quarter by 2007.
Seventy-three of its 118 regional branches have been earmarked for closure.
Yet the news that Mr Welteke had Dresdner Bank pay ?7,661.20 ($9,330, ?5,070) for a luxury hotel for him and his family three years ago, while he was attending an event it sponsored, still matters, bankers say, as it could rob the Bundesbank of one of its few remaining attributes: its moral authority.
In a country where financial journalists routinely accept lavish hospitality from the companies they report on, it was less the hotel that shocked than Mr Welteke's initial reaction to the revelations in the Spiegel news magazine.
"When I attend somebody else's event, I assume the costs will be covered," he told journalists last Sunday.
He then paused, frowned and rhetorically added: "Should I pay for it myself?"

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German government asks federal bank chief to resign

www.chinaview.cn 2004-04-08 09:31:35
BERLIN, April 7 (Xinhuanet) -- The German government on Wednesday asked German central bank chief Ernst Welteke to resign immediately for his so-called "hotel scandal."
Earlier in the day, Welteke, president of the Bundes bank, decided to step aside from his duties temporarily at a recommendation of the bank's board of directors.
But a statement from the German Finance Ministry said that to step aside on a temporary basis was not enough and "we expect this matter to be clarified immediately."
Welteke and his family members spent a couple of nights at a luxury five-star hotel in Berlin at the expenditure of a private bank during celebrations marking the circulation of euro on January 1, 2001.
German prosecutors have launched an investigation on whether Welteke violated laws by accepting favors from the private bank. Enditem

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SPIEGEL ONLINE - 07. April 2004, 20:03
URL: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,294501,00.html
Kritik an Vorstands-Beschluss
Bundesregierung dr?ngt Welteke zum R?cktritt
Bundesbankpr?sident Ernst Welteke wird sein Amt ruhen lassen, bis die Vorw?rfe im Zusammenhang mit einem Luxus-Aufenthalt im Berliner Adlon-Hotel gekl?rt sind. Dies gab der Vorstand der Notenbank nach einer fast achtst?ndigen Krisensitzung bekannt. Die Bundesregierung dr?ngt derweil auf einen R?cktritt des Beh?rdenchefs.
REUTERS
Bundesbankchef Welteke: Abwarten, bis die Luxus-Vorw?rfe gekl?rt sind
Frankfurt am Main/Berlin - "Die Bundesregierung geht davon aus, dass der Bundesbankpr?sident in seiner Verantwortung vor dem Amt und der Institution Bundesbank die notwendigen Konsequenzen ziehen wird", erkl?rte das Bundesfinanzministerium am Mittwochabend in Berlin.
Die Entscheidung des Bundesbankvorstands gegen eine Entlassung Weltekes wegen der Hotelkostenaff?re kritisierte das Ministerium als unangemessen. "Die Bundesregierung ist der Auffassung, dass sowohl das Amt des Bundesbankpr?sidenten als auch die Bundesbank als Institution vor weiterem Schaden bewahrt werden m?ssen", hie? es in der Erkl?rung. "Dies gebietet ihre Stellung gegen?ber den Finanzm?rkten als auch die Mitgliedschaft im Rat der EZB."
Der Vorstand der Notenbank hatte zuvor entschieden, dass Vizepr?sident J?rgen Stark die Gesch?fte kommissarisch f?hren soll, hie? es in einer schriftlichen Erkl?rung. Stark ?bernehme auch vorl?ufig Weltekes Amt als Mitglied im Rat der Europ?ischen Zentralbank (EZB).
Die Entscheidung im Bundesbank-Vorstand sei sehr schwierig gewesen. "Die Bewertung des Sachverhalts auf der Grundlage des Europ?ischen Systems der Zentralbanken-Status, des Bundesbankgesetzes und des Anstellungsvertrages von Herrn Welteke bietet dem Vorstand keinen hinreichenden Grund, einen Antrag auf Abberufung des Bundesbank-Pr?sidenten aus seinem Amt zu stellen", hie? es in der schriftlichen Mitteilung des Vorstands. "Der Pr?sident einer nationalen Zentralbank kann nach Art.14 Absatz 2 des ESZB-Status nur entlassen werden, wenn er eine schwere Verfehlung begangen hat."
Der Bundesbankvorstand habe Welteke im Hinblick auf die staatsanwaltschaftlichen Ermittlungen empfohlen, seine Amtsgesch?fte ruhen zu lassen. Welteke habe dem entsprochen. Mit der Entscheidung, dass er sein Amt zun?chst nur ruhen l?sst, solle ihm erm?glicht werden, sein Gesicht zu wahren.
DDP
Interimspr?sident Stark: Sitz im Rat der EZB
W?hrend der Vorstand der Zentralbank in Frankfurt die Vorw?rfe gegen den Pr?sidenten pr?fte, dr?ngte die Bundesregierung auf eine rasche Entscheidung. Die Beratungen des siebenk?pfigen Gremiums ?ber den umstrittenen Hotel-Aufenthalt hatten mittags begonnen, gegen 19.10 Uhr war die Sitzung beendet. Vorstandsmitglied Franz-Christoph Zeitler war per Telefon zugeschaltet. Welteke, der an den Beratungen nicht teilnahm, war kurz vor 18 Uhr dazu gesto?en und verlie? den Raum kurze Zeit sp?ter wieder.
Der Bundesbank-Pr?sident hatte noch am Nachmittag in einem ZDF-Interview erkl?rt, er halte an seinem Posten fest. Wenn jedoch der Vorstand Verfehlungen feststelle und ihn die Ermittlungen der Staatsanwaltschaft belasteten, "dann muss man nat?rlich ?ber R?cktritt nachdenken".
Eine z?gige Kl?rung w?re f?r ihre "weitere Funktionsf?higkeit" und angesichts ihrer Rolle als eine "ganz besondere Institution" im Interesse der Bundesbank, sagte der stellvertretende Regierungssprecher Thomas Steg, w?hrend der Bundesbank-Vorstand tagte. Falls es nach einer Entscheidung des Gremiums notwendig werde, sei die Bundesregierung ihrerseits sofort in der Lage, die notwendigen Personalentscheidungen zu treffen, betonten sowohl Steg als auch der Sprecher des Bundesfinanzministeriums, J?rg M?ller, ohne sich auf Personalspekulationen einzulassen.
Im Laufe des Tages hatte sich der Staatssekret?r im Bundesfinanzministerium, Caio Koch-Weser, 59, als Favorit der Bundesregierung f?r die Nachfolge Weltekes herauskristallisiert. Neben ihm wurden auch Bundesbank-Vize Stark, 55, und die SPD-Finanzpolitikerin Ingrid Matth?us-Maier, 58, die im Vorstand der ehemaligen Kreditanstalt f?r Wiederaufbau (heute KfW-Bankengruppe) sitzt, als Kandidaten f?r die Nachfolge gehandelt.
Welteke hatte zu Silvester 2001 an einer Feier zur Euro-Bargeldeinf?hrung in Berlin teilgenommen. Die Kosten f?r den Aufenthalt von Welteke, der vom 29. Dezember bis zum 2. Januar im Nobelhotel "Adlon" wohnte, hatte die Dresdner Bank ?bernommen. ?berdies kam die Bank auch noch f?r die Kosten von Weltekes Frau, seines Sohnes und dessen Freundin auf. Insgesamt wurden Kosten in H?he von 7661,20 Euro ?bernommen.


? SPIEGEL ONLINE 2004
Alle Rechte vorbehalten
Vervielf?ltigung nur mit Genehmigung der SPIEGELnet GmbH

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D O K U M E N T A T I O N
Die Erkl?rung des Bundesbank-Vorstands

Die Adlon-Aff?re des Bundesbank-Pr?sidenten Ernst Welteke hat einen Konflikt zwischen Bundesbank und Bundesregierung ausgel?st. F?r eine Abberufung sah das Pr?sidium der Zentralbank keinen hinreichenden Grund. manager-magazin.de dokumentiert die Erkl?rung im Wortlaut.
ANZEIGE
Frankfurt am Main/Hamburg - Das Leitungsgremium der Deutschen Bundesbank hat am Mittwoch knapp acht Stunden lang ?ber die so genannten Adlon-Aff?re beraten. Auf einen Antrag, Welteke deswegen abzuberufen, verzichtete der Bundesbank-Vorstand jedoch. Seine Erkl?rung im Wortlaut:
"Frankfurt am Main, 7. April 2004 - Der Vorstand der Deutschen Bundesbank hat in seiner heutigen Sitzung die gegen Pr?sident Welteke im Zusammenhang mit einer Veranstaltung zur Einf?hrung des Euro-Bargeldes in Berlin zum Jahreswechsel 2001/2002 erhobenen Vorw?rfe gepr?ft. Pr?sident Welteke wurde zum Sachverhalt angeh?rt.
Der Vorstand best?tigt seine am Montag, den 5. April 2004, getroffene Entscheidung, dass die Kosten f?r die Teilnahme von Herrn Welteke an der Veranstaltung f?r zwei Tage von der Deutschen Bundesbank ?bernommen und dar?ber hinausgehende Kosten privater Natur von Herrn Welteke getragen werden.
Die Bewertung des Sachverhalts auf der Grundlage des ESZB-Statuts, des Bundesbankgesetzes und des Anstellungsvertrages von Herrn Welteke bietet dem Vorstand keinen hinreichenden Grund, einen Antrag auf Abberufung des Bundesbankpr?sidenten aus seinem Amt zu stellen. Der Pr?sident einer nationalen Zentralbank kann nach Art. 14 Absatz 2 des ESZB-Statuts nur entlassen werden, wenn er eine schwere Verfehlung begangen hat.
Der Vorstand der Deutschen Bundesbank hat Herrn Pr?sident Welteke im Hinblick auf die gestern wegen eines Anfangsverdachts auf Vorteilsannahme aufgenommenen staatsanwaltschaftlichen Ermittlungen empfohlen, seine Amtsgesch?fte mit dem heutigen Tage ruhen zu lassen. Pr?sident Welteke hat dem entsprochen. Vizepr?sident Dr. Stark wurde mit der Wahrnehmung der Aufgaben als Mitglied des EZB-Rats betraut."
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Kerry bezeichnet US-Besatzung im Irak als "Chaos"
Washington (APA/ag.) - Der demokratische Pr?sidentschaftskandidat John Kerry hat die US-Besatzung im Irak als "Chaos" bezeichnet. Die US-F?hrung gehe "ungeschickt" mit der Lage um, sagte Kerry gegen?ber CNN. Es sei an der Zeit, dass Pr?sident Bush die Probleme eingestehe und eine andere Politik einschlage. Verteidigungsminister Rumsfeld betonte indes, die USA h?tten die Kontrolle im Irak nicht verloren.
Kerry erkl?rte in dem TV-Interview weiter, es sei ein Fehler gewesen, Kriegsgegner vom Wiederaufbau des Irak auszuschlie?en. "Das ist eine f?rchterliche Botschaft an die Staaten", sagte er. Bush m?sse den Wiederaufbau und die Einsetzung einer ?bergangsregierung "einer legitimierten internationalen Einheit" ?berlassen. Rumsfeld betonte angesichts der anhaltenden Gewalt, dass die USA die Kontrolle im Irak nicht verloren h?tten. Die Zahl der Angreifer sei gering, sagte der Verteidigungsminister am Mittwoch in Washington. Zugleich r?umte Rumsfeld jedoch ein, dass die Stadt Najaf nicht mehr der Kontrolle der US-gef?hrten Besatzungstruppen unterliegt. Die Koalition habe sich auf Bitten der Iraker aus der Schiiten-Hochburg zur?ckgezogen, weil zurzeit sowohl zahlreiche Pilger als auch Milizen in der Stadt seien, sagte Rumsfeld. In Najaf waren am Sonntag bei K?mpfen zwischen Schiiten und den Besatzungstruppen 20 Iraker get?tet und etwa 200 verletzt worden. Die Stadt geh?rt zu den heiligsten St?tten der Schiiten. Angesichts der schweren Unruhen wollen die USA ihre Truppen im Irak l?nger im Einsatz lassen als geplant. Rumsfeld deutete an, dass das Milit?r den derzeit laufenden Truppenwechsel so weit hinausz?gern wird, dass "die fronterfahrenen Soldaten die aktuelle Situation durchfechten" k?nnten. Nach Angaben des Pentagons sind derzeit 135.000 US-Soldaten im Irak, ihre Zahl soll nach den Rotationen wieder auf 115.000 absinken.

APA 3:17 8.04.2004
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Communists Infiltrated Kerry's Anti-War Group, Historian Says

by Marc Morano
Posted Apr 6, 2004
The 1970s anti-war group that included John Kerry was "heavily infiltrate[d]" by individuals dedicated to the teachings of Chinese communist leader Mao Tse-Tung and to the use of violence, if necessary to achieve their goals, according to a historian friendly to Kerry.
"The RCP (Revolutionary Communist Party) was already beginning to heavily infiltrate the [Vietnam Veterans Against the War in 1971]. They eventually took it over around '73 and basically pushed out all the real veterans and brought in all the RCP functionaries and destroyed the organization," Gerald Nicosia, author of Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans' Movement and a Kerry supporter, told CNSNews.com.
"Even in 1971, there was an RCP presence ... [RCP is] a crackpot organization, very violent, extremely violent, far left Maoist organization," led by a man named Bob Avakian, Nicosia said.
"[In 1971] they were trying to take over and eventually did take over VVAW," he added.
Nicosia said Kerry was aware of communism's increasing presence in the VVAW operations and it was one of the factors that led to his resignation as one of the leaders of the group in November 1971.
But even though Kerry resigned from the group's leadership in November 1971, several published news accounts cite Kerry as a representative of VVAW into 1972.
The RCP's efforts to control VVAW came to a head in 1978, when the communist factions split off to form their own group called Vietnam Veterans Against the War - Anti-Imperialist (VVAW-AI.) This group still exists today and refers to the U.S. as "AmeriKKKa" on its website.
Other radical factions influenced VVAW, according to Nicosia.
"There were guys that were not Maoist, but guys who were like Scott Camil," Nicosia said, referring to the man who allegedly advocated the possible assassination of U.S. senators still supportive of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. "They were veterans and still believed in the U.S and still saluted the flag, but believed this government was all wet and wanted to get rid of it," Nicosia said.
"There was Al Hubbard, who was a Black Panther who was also pushing the organization toward violent confrontation," Nicosia added. Hubbard, who had appeared at Kerry's side in April of 1971 on NBC's "Meet the Press," was later shown to have lied about his military record.
Current VVAW member David Cline dismissed the communist presence in VVAW during the time Kerry served as the group's spokesman.
"Some people had philosophies of varying types. There [were] people who were driven by religious views ... there was one guy who was involved in Veterans for [the George] McGovern campaign. So there [were] people coming from different areas," Cline told CNSNews.com . "Anytime you are going to get a big organization, you are going to get a lot of different views."
Cline, who joined VVAW in 1970 and today serves as a national coordinator for the group, said the veterans were not concerned with the political views of their fellow members.
"We were coming from having been in war, so we were coming from, in a lot of ways, gut level knowledge and feelings, and high blown political philosophies weren't really the main thing people were concerned about," Cline explained.
VVAW reached out to radical individuals and groups in part to achieve racial harmony, he said.
"VVAW -- it was interracial, but it was more white soldiers in general. A lot of Vietnam Veterans joined the Black Panthers and the American Indian movement and groups of that nature and we were trying to build bonds with our fellow veterans of different nationalities and races," Cline said.
"In [those] days there [were] a lot of radical ideas in the air -- a lot of s*** was going down back then," he added.
Cline said he recalls avowed communists being a part of the VVAW in the early 1970s, but dismissed their importance. "Mainly I thought they were just people just trying to sell their papers," he said.
John Zutz, a current VVAW national coordinator, confirmed the Maoist communist influence in his group.
"That in fact did happen. The RCP was attempting to take over [VVAW]," Zutz told CNSNews.com. And the group's influence grew even larger in 1973, he said.
"The war was basically over, so the membership in VVAW started dropping, which gave the RCP a chance to try to take it over," Zutz said.
The RCP communists were hard workers and eventually obtained leadership roles in VVAW, he added. "They were veterans and they were active and they became leaders. Because they were active and they were willing to do the work, they started working themselves up the leadership ladder," he said.
Cline believes that much of the recent scrutiny of Kerry's anti-war activism has originated from a "far right segment" of veterans trying to influence the election.
"I think that there is a segment of the veteran's community, a far right segment. They are working to try and whip this up," Cline said.


Copyright ? 2003 HUMAN EVENTS. All Rights Reserved.
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B.G. Burkett: Navy Commanders to Cast Doubt on Kerry's War Record

Several Navy officers who supervised Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry when he commanded a swift boat in Vietnam are preparing to publicly question his war record - including the circumstances under which he was awarded three Purple Hearts - a noted Vietnam War historian revealed on Sunday.
Burkett, whose book, "Stolen Valor," is considered to be the definitive history of of falsified Vietnam War claims, told WABC Radio's Steve Malzberg that Kerry's former commanders would allege that the top Democrat's Purple Hearts were awarded for "self-reported injuries that were virtually nonexistent."
"He never got a day of treatment, he never spent a day in a medical facility," Burkett said. "These were all self-reported wounds, which you're going to hear from some swift boat guys in the future as to the nature of those wounds."
NewsMax has a special FREE offer for this book Click Here
Burkett said he had personally spoken to the Navy commanders who were preparing to go public about Kerry's decorations.
"You're going to get quite a showing [of those speaking out]," Burkett told Malzberg. "I don't know [the number] yet. They're trying to get it to be unanimous of every swift boat guy who ever served."
As to the timetable for the upcoming revelations, Burkett said that Kerry's superior officers "were still discussing that."
Burkett's book was the first to expose Kerry's false claims made in the early 1970s about U.S. war atrocities, as well as Kerry's claim -- later found to be untrue -- that he trashed his war medals.
"You've got some major rallys being planned against John Kerry by Vietnam veterans on the mall, at the convention - this type of thing," he said. "And we're going to make America aware of John Kerry's military record."


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Kerry: Terrorist Shiite Al-Sadr 'a Legitimate Voice'

In an interview broadcast Wednesday morning, Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry defended terrorist Shiite imam Muqtada al-Sadr as a "legitimate voice" in Iraq, despite that fact that he's led an uprising that has killed nearly 20 American GIs in the last two days.
Speaking of al-Sadr's newspaper, which was shut down by coalition forces last week after it urged violence against U.S. troops, Kerry complained to National Public Radio, "They shut a newspaper that belongs to a legitimate voice in Iraq."
In the next breath, however, the White House hopeful caught himself and quickly changed direction. "Well, let me ... change the term 'legitimate.' It belongs to a voice -- because he has clearly taken on a far more radical tone in recent days and aligned himself with both Hamas and Hezbollah, which is a sort of terrorist alignment."
But Kerry again seemed to voice sympathy for the Shiite terrorist when asked whether he supported al-Sadr's arrest. "Not if it's an isolated act without the other kinds of steps necessary to change the dynamics on the ground in Iraq," Kerry told NPR, in quotes first reported by the New York Sun.
"If all we do is make war against the Iraqi people and continue an American occupation, fundamentally, without a clarity as to who and how sovereignty is being turned over, we have a very serious problem for the long run here," Kerry added. "And I think this administration is just walking dead center down into that trap."
On March 28, the U.S.-led coalition authorities closed al-Sadr's newspaper, al-Hawza, for 60 days, the Sun reported. L. Paul Bremer, the chief U.S. administrator in Iraq, charged that the newspaper had published false stories blaming the coalition forces for local acts of terrorism.


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>> SHELL SAGA CONTINUED...

Oman's Oil Yield Long in Decline, Shell Data Show
By JEFF GERTH and STEPHEN LABATON

The Royal Dutch/Shell Group's oil production in Oman has been declining for years, belying the company's optimistic reports and raising doubts about a vital question in the Middle East: whether new technology can extend the life of huge but mature oil fields.
Internal company documents and technical papers show that the Yibal field, Oman's largest, began to decline rapidly in 1997. Yet Sir Philip Watts, Shell's former chairman, said in an upbeat public report in 2000 that "major advances in drilling" were enabling the company "to extract more from such mature fields." The internal Shell documents suggest that the figure for proven oil reserves in Oman was mistakenly increased in 2000, resulting in a 40 percent overstatement.
The company's falling production and reduced reserves in Oman are part of a broader problem facing Shell, the British-Dutch oil giant that earlier this year lowered its estimate of worldwide reserves, a crucial financial indicator, by 20 percent, or 3.9 billion barrels.
Documents show that senior executives were told the calculations of reserves were too high in 2002, at least two years before the company downgraded its estimate this January.
While Oman represents a small part of Shell's reserves, oil industry experts say the company's experience there highlights broader questions about the future role of Western oil companies and their technology in the Persian Gulf, which has most of the world's oil reserves.
In the case of the Yibal field, for example, Shell and Omani oil engineers and auditors have expressed concerns that a technique Sir Philip said would recover more oil not only did not do so, but also increased the amount of water in the extracted oil to as much as 90 percent of the total volume, increasing production costs.
"In Oman, Shell seems to have fumbled on technology," said Ali Morteza Samsam Bakhtiari, a senior official with the National Iranian Oil Company.
Perhaps more ominously for the world's oil outlook, he added that the failure of Shell's horizontal drilling technology in Oman suggested that even advanced extraction techniques "won't bring back the good old days."
In the last 10 years, horizontal drilling has become one of the most important innovations in the oil production business and is widely used around the world. If properly managed, it can extract more oil from some fields, and can pump it out sooner and more efficiently than traditional vertical drilling.
Shell helped pioneer the technique, and it did accelerate production in Yibal, documents show. But a Shell document last fall did oes not project the technique to increase the amount of oil that will ultimately be recovered from the field, and it resulted in additional water being mixed in with the oil, increasing production costs. That suggests that although it may work in some places, horizontal drilling may not always be the answer to declining production rates in the mature fields of the Middle East.
Sir Philip made his optimistic assessment of the Oman field in May 2000, when he was the company's head of exploration and development. He was named chairman a year later. The board dismissed him and Walter van de Vijver, chief executive of the exploration and production business in early March, about two months after Shell reduced its reserves estimate.
Regulators in Europe and Washington, as well prosecutors at the United States Justice Department are investigating whether Shell's disclosures about its reserves complied with securities laws. The company says it is cooperating with the investigations and expects to announce the results of an internal review in the next few weeks.
"Shell has been open about the production shortfall in Oman, most recently in the presentation to analysts on Feb. 5," Simon Buerk, a company spokesman, said in an e-mail message responding to questions. Mr. Buerk said that production targets were met in 2003. Pending investigations limited the company's ability to comment on Sir Philip's statements, he said.
Shell has been involved in Oman since the 1930's, when oil was first discovered there. It owns 34 percent of Petroleum Development Oman, the dominant oil and gas exploration company. The Omani government owns 60 percent of the joint venture, which accounts for 90 percent of the sultanate's oil production and virtually all of its natural gas production. The rest is owned by other European companies.
Oman's oil problems are relatively recent. Annual production rose from 1980 to 1997, when the 35-year-old Yibal field began to decline.
Two engineering papers written last year by Petroleum Development Oman officials show that production in Yibal has fallen at an annual rate of about 12 percent for six years; that is more than twice the normal rate of 5 percent in the region. Moreover, Shell overstated its proven oil reserves in Oman, a December 2003 Shell report found, primarily because the company had failed to trim the figures back "in light of recent downturns in oil production rates."
This sober internal analysis differs from optimistic public statements by Shell that continued even after news of production difficulties began to circulate outside the company. When an analyst asked in 2002 about problems in Oman, for example, Sir Philip likened them to "a bit of hiccup."
Joseph I. Goldstein, Sir Philip's lawyer in Washington, did not return a phone call.
Nasser bin Khamis al-Jashmi, an under secretary at Oman's Ministry of Oil and Gas and a member of the board of Petroleum Development Oman, declined to speak publicly about the matter this week. "I will not be able to answer your questions as we are still discussing the whole issue with our partners," he said.
But some insight into Oman's views are contained in remarks made a few years ago by its minister of oil and gas and another director of Petroleum Development Oman. The remarks were published in the venture's newsletter and posted on Shell's Web site. "We have been too preoccupied with trying to get that extra barrel" now, said the minister, Mohammed bin Hamad al-Rumhy, "rather than formulating a plan for the long term."
Countries like Oman seek to husband their oil and gas to extend their income over the long run, but Shell, aiming to increase value for its shareholders, has a shorter time horizon: its license in Oman expires in 2012, so it has emphasized pumping more oil sooner.
A Dec. 8, 2003, report to Shell's top managers about the impending restatement of reserves criticized the operation in Oman. The cause of the problems, the report said, was "the extreme focus on short-term development opportunities (`keep the rigs busy to keep the oil rate up') to the detriment of defining long-term projects."
Oil experts say the situation in which Shell and Oman, which form one of the few government-company alliances in the region, find themselves may portend problems for the West's quest for energy security. Major energy companies that had run oil operations in the Persian Gulf before they were nationalized decades ago are looking to return to the region and obtain concessions like the one Shell has in Oman.
"There is considerable ambivalence about foreign oil companies in the Persian Gulf," said Valerie Marcel, an expert on oil and the Middle East at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. "Persian Gulf producers would like to see their reservoirs handled with velvet gloves -- and that means a longer and flatter production curve."
Mr. Buerk of Shell said that his company was supporting efforts of the joint venture to "maximize long-term oil production," and that Shell and the Omani government had "a close and strong relationship spanning more than six decades."
But the arrangement can also be "extremely sensitive," according to the internal Shell report of last December, which recommended that the lowered amount of Oman's proven reserves be kept confidential. (Shell officials have said that the revision in Oman accounts for no more than 10 percent of the worldwide restatement, or 390 million barrels.)
The sensitive matter, according to the report, involves negotiations over bonuses that the company can win for increasing reserves. The basis for the bonus is a less rigorous standard -- called expectation reserves -- than the proven-reserves yardstick that the company is required by American rules to list in periodic filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The report said "the expectation reserves may be overstated."
The declines in the Yibal field are spelled out by officials of the joint venture in two papers that were published last year by the Society of Petroleum Engineers. The papers have different numbers: both say production peaked in 1997, but one said it declined to its current rate of 88,057 barrels a day by 2000 from a peak of 251,592, while the other said it fell to 95,000 barrels from 225,000. A spokeswoman for the society said she could not explain the difference.
Both papers say that about 90 percent of the liquid coming out of the ground is water and 10 percent is oil. The high volume of water, one paper said, comes in part from the water that Shell injects into the ground as part of its horizontal drilling technique, which it introduced to Oman in the early 1990's. The relatively high volume of water being pumped up adds considerably to the costs of extracting the oil.
While the field was declining, Sir Philip described it as a marvel of "advances in well technology" that had, in four years, produced additional production and "substantial additional reserves," according to an account of remarks he made on March 9, 1999, that is posted on Shell's Web site.
The next year, Shell officials advised the joint venture "to make an upward correction to proved reserves" based on steady production rates for all of Oman over the next eight years, according to Shell's senior management report dated last December.
The reserve estimate was increased even as overall production began to decline. Nonetheless, Sir Philip, in his remarks on May 29, 2000, continued to talk positively about the effect of horizontal drilling and other technologies on Yibal, saying it was "still the country's most important producer three decades after coming on-stream."
Last December's Shell report said, "With hindsight, it might have been more appropriate to correct the expectation estimate down rather than the proved estimate upwards." The report said that it was understood at the time when the reserve estimate was increased that a more detailed assessment would follow.
But it was not until 2003, four years after the previous audit, that Shell did an audit of proven reserves of its operations in Oman. The audit found that "proved total reserves are currently overstated by some 40 percent."
Exxon Mobil, a competitor of Shell, says that it audits its proven reserves annually.
The lack of a timely assessment of Oman by Shell's auditors, the internal December report explained, was "due to the attention required by serious production decline problems."

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
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From the Institute of Advanced Hindsight...
Winston Churchill said famously, "A lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on." That was 1945. Today, lies are capable of circling the globe at the speed of light -- especially when a Leftmedia outlet like CBS's "60 Minutes" hosts "The Dick Clarke Show."

Richard Clarke, a leftover from the Clinton regime, seems to have confused George W. Bush for William J. Clinton. Errantly, Clarke claims President Bush ignored the al-Qa'ida threat and implies culpability for the attack on our countrymen 11 September 2001, eight months after Mr. Bush took office. That attack, you'll recall, was orchestrated by Osama bin Laden, the Islamist terrorist whom Bill Clinton ignored for eight years.

Why is Clarke stepping forward now? Politics and publicity.

George Bush's military record as Commander-in-Chief is far more impressive than anything John Kerry has been able to conjure up. Thus, Kerry and company are determined to undermine President Bush's credibility as CiC by accusing him of dereliction of duty with regard to 9/11 and the war against Jihadi terrorists. To that end, a few weeks back, Kerry's operatives rallied a small group of family members of 9/11 victims against the Bush administration in a shameless exploitation of 3,000 dead Americans. And now they have enlisted Clarke to further erode the perception of the President's CiC performance.

As for Clarke's accusation that President Bush "ignored terrorism for months, when maybe we could have done something to stop 9/11," it doesn't hold up to even the most fundamental scrutiny.

Contrary to Clarke's "recollection," long before 9/11 President Bush told his National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that he was "tired of swatting flies," as had been the policy of the Clinton Administration. Instead, the U.S. would need to take the fight to al-Qa'ida. After all, under Clinton's watch, al-Qa'ida operatives had already bombed the World Trade Center, plotted to bomb simultaneously a dozen U.S. trans-Pacific flights, successfully bombed U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, attempted to bomb Los Angeles International Airport, and bombed the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen. Did we mention the bombing of Khobar Towers?

In effect, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida terrorist network had operated with impunity since 1993.

To support President Bush's directive, spending for covert action against al-Qa'ida was increased 400%, while the administration's National Security Council deputies began to develop an operations plan to destroy al-Qa'ida. During that time, the Counterterrorism Security Group, the government's interagency counterterrorism crisis-management forum chaired by Dick Clarke, met on a near-daily basis prior to 9/11 out of concern for a potential al-Qa'ida attack. The new plan, a complete departure from the previous administration's policy of appeasement, was on the President's desk by 4 September 2001. Tragically, this wasn't soon enough to prevent the actions of al-Qa'ida one week later -- actions that were planned two years before President Bush took office.

Clarke, testifying before the commission investigating intelligence failures prior to 9/11, should have spent less time peddling books and more time preparing his story. Indeed, when asked by former Sen. Slade Gorton if there was "the remotest chance" the events of 9/11 could have been avoided if the Bush administration had adopted ALL of Clarke's recommendations for dealing with al-Qa'ida, Clarke answered, "No."

Additionally, Clarke's big adventure into the realm of Clinton-sized prevarication was not solely a politically-motivated assault on the President's integrity, but timed to give maximum exposure by the Leftmedia to his new book, which is little more than a Leftist diatribe against the Bush doctrine of preemption. To that end, it is worth noting that the parent company of CBS (Clarke's principal promoter) is Viacom -- which also happens to be the parent company of Simon & Schuster, the publisher of Clarke's dubious new book, "Against All Enemies." (Recall that in January, CBS and Viacom orchestrated the same "60 Minutes" book promotion for another Bush-bashing tome -- that of fired former treasury secretary Paul O'Neill.)

Quote of the week...

"You can't walk away from this challenge. You can't say it isn't going to affect me. You can't say let's not take any actions that a terrorist might not like, like say, participating in the Coalition in Iraq or doing other things ... because you are afraid of what the terrorist reaction might be. This is the time to fight terrorism, not to walk away or be terrified by terrorism." --Secretary of State Colin Powell

On cross-examination...

"For us, today, the hearings and frantic finger-pointing about September 11 are as silly and pointless as they are inevitable. The emergence of Islamist terrorism has been a good half century in the making -- from the theoretical writings by Egyptian intellectuals at the middle of the last century to September 11 and beyond. The clash between our civilization and that force was probably inevitable. If the events of September 11 had failed for any reason, there would have been another day and another disaster." --Tony Blankley

Open query...

"...Wednesday, Clarke ... testified before the 9/11 commission. Was his testimony helpful to those seriously attempting to craft an effective policy to defeat terrorism? Or was he selling books and giving a job interview? You ... make the call." --Clifford D. May

The BIG lie...

"In the march to war, the president exaggerated the threat. It was not nuanced. It was pure, unadulterated fear-mongering, based on a devious strategy to convince the American people that Saddam's ability to provide nuclear weapons to Al-Qa'ida justified immediate war. Why would the administration go to such lengths to go to war? Was it trying to change the subject from its failed economic policy, the corporate scandals, and its failed effort to capture Osama bin Laden? The only imminent threat was the November congressional election. The politics of the election trumped the stubborn facts. What happened was not merely a failure of intelligence, but the result of manipulation and distortion of intelligence and the selective use of unreliable intelligence to justify a decision to go to war. The administration had made up its mind and would not let stubborn facts stand in the way." --Teddy Kennedy (D-Lirious)

On the Warfront with Jihadistan...

While John Kerry and his band of malcontents continued to undermine U.S. resolve in the war against Jihadistan ("aiding and abetting the enemy," it's called), four American civilians and seven American military personnel were murdered by al-Qa'ida wannabes in the Sunni Triangle around Baghdad. "The insurgents in Fallujah are testing us," says USMC Captain Chris Logan. "They're testing our resolve. But it's not like we're going to leave."

Despite these attacks, there was additional evidence that the U.S. presence in Iraq is having the desired effect on Iran and Syria. Syria has asked U.S. ally Australia for help in repairing its relations with the U.S. Australia, you'll recall, helped "negotiate the peace" between the U.S. and Libya earlier this year. Seems that Syria's Baathists are running scared....

From the Department of military readiness...

All those Lefties suggesting the U.S. has a "hollow military" will be sad to learn this week that the five Army divisions that have units deployed in the Middle East for the past 12 months have met virtually every re-enlistment goal. Retention targets for enlisted soldiers -- the 416,000 privates, corporals and sergeants of the Army's 490,000 active force, are standing firm. The all-volunteer force remains strong despite the stress of frequent deployments and hazardous duty. "This tends to rebut armchair critics who said the sky is falling and the vultures are circling and the Army is gong to lose all its troops," said Lt. Col. Franklin Childress. "This is not true. The soldiers get it." Hooah!


Don't even think about ending your week without arming yourself with The Federalist's comprehensive, conservative digest of the week's most important news, policy and opinion.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> WHO?

Who Lost Osama?
From the April 12 / April 19, 2004 issue: Richard Clarke is far tougher on the Clinton failures than advertised.
by Daniel C. Twining
04/12/2004, Volume 009, Issue 30


Against All Enemies
Inside America's War on Terror
by Richard Clarke
Free Press, 304 pp., $27
"THIS IS THE STORY, from my perspective, of how al Qaeda developed and attacked the United States on September 11," Richard Clarke begins Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, his new book that has been widely ballyhooed as the bomb that will destroy President Bush's reelection campaign.
In fact, only in his preface and the book's final sixty-five pages does Clarke's partisanship boil over into the invective, vitriol, and spite that have transformed this career national-security hawk into the anti-Bush Democrats' American Idol. The rest of the book, Clarke's unwitting indictment of the Clinton administration's terrorism policy, ought to make the whole of the nation vote for four more years of Bush.
After a warm-up chapter that offers a readable account of the first twenty-four hours of the White House's response to the attacks, a nonpartisan chapter on how America transformed its strategic posture in the Middle East during the 1980s, and a sensible chapter on the first Gulf War, the subsequent one hundred and fifty pages of Against All Enemies chronicle the formation and rise of al Qaeda--and the American government's failure to prevent it from metastasizing into the existential threat it had become by the time Clinton left office.
Clarke explains al Qaeda's rise, from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing through subsequent foiled and successful terrorist attacks in Mogadishu in 1993, the Philippines in 1995, Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, Africa in 1998, and Yemen in 2000, as well as the foiled Millennium Plot--all of which is required reading for those who want to understand what the government knew about al Qaeda on President Clinton's watch (a lot) and what it did about it (considerably less than it should have).
Although critical of the failure to retaliate against Iran for the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, Clarke credits President Reagan with transforming the United States' strategic posture in the Middle East. When Reagan took office, the Central Command, now arguably our most important command, was a backwater; the United States had no bases in the Persian Gulf; and events in Iran had left the United States vulnerable to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and another wave of devastating oil shocks.
Clarke admiringly recalls how Reagan moved the United States closer to Israel, instituting joint exercises and extensive military-to-military cooperation. Reagan also built new military relationships with Egypt, Oman, and Bahrain, and established the headquarters of the Navy's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain to patrol the Persian Gulf. According to Clarke, Reagan "checkmated the Iranians by strengthening Saddam Hussein." Reagan's support of the Afghan opposition brought about the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, a significant strategic defeat. Reagan's policies not only transformed America's position in the wider Middle East but enabled the military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
CLARKE'S REVIEW of the diplomacy preceding the first Gulf War is also interesting. Traveling with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Riyadh, Clarke was at the pivotal meeting in which the king of Saudi Arabia agreed to the stationing of American forces in his country, even as his intelligence chief, Prince Turki, was secretly asking Osama bin Laden to assemble Afghan volunteers to defend the kingdom from Saddam's army. Clarke recalls the breathless pace at which American officials flew from one capital to another around the Gulf. He dissects the famous judgment to stop General Barry McCaffrey's forces from finishing off Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard as they retreated from Kuwait, and the flawed American decision "to stand by and let the Republican Guard mass murder the Shia and Kurds."
The failure of Bush's father to end Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq segued into the first test of the Clinton administration's determination to act against terrorism. Clarke helped plan the initial use of force in the Clinton administration, to retaliate against Iraq for its plot to assassinate George H.W. Bush in Kuwait. The strike was an early indicator of the schizophrenia that characterized Clinton's national security policy: a laudable willingness to use military force strangely matched with a fierce determination that it cause the least possible pain to our enemies. In Clarke's rendition, Secretary of State Warren Christopher "argued strongly on legal grounds that the list [of targets] be limited to one facility, the Iraqi intelligence headquarters. He also wanted it hit on Saturday night, to minimize casualties. Christopher won."
In addition to ending, purportedly, Iraqi terrorism against the United States by bombing Iraq's empty intelligence headquarters, Clarke also claims credit for ending Iranian terrorism against the United States after the Khobar Towers attack. Today's proponents of rapprochement with Tehran should pay close attention. Clarke has no doubt the Iranian government sponsored the Khobar bombing, which killed nineteen Americans: "The larger attack in Saudi Arabia at Khobar was conducted by Saudi Hezbollah under the close supervision of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Qods Force," he writes. At the time, the CIA judged that "further Iranian-sponsored terrorism against the United States was likely."
This should have been grounds for war, and we learn in Against All Enemies the White House considered it, examining options including a full-scale invasion, attacking Iranian-sponsored terrorist camps in Lebanon, persuading our allies to impose a multilateral economic boycott, and conducting an unspecified "intelligence operation."
Inevitably, the Clinton administration chose the lesser option of a covert operation against Iran, underscoring another theme of the Clinton years: hawkish instincts ("Clinton told us that if it came to using force against Iran, 'I don't want any piss-ant half measures'") that invariably devolved into a policy that did not accomplish the objective but gave the illusion of having acted decisively.
Clarke unwittingly highlights the Clinton administration's lack of credibility by linking Saudi Arabia's failure to cooperate on the Khobar Towers investigation to Saudi skepticism about Clinton's backbone: "Some in the Saudi royal family . . . reportedly welcomed the possibility of a U.S. war with Iran, if America could remove the Tehran regime. [Saudi Ambassador Prince] Bandar . . . suggested that all that was stopping the Saudis from implicating Iran was the fear that American retaliation would be halfhearted. If the U.S. could promise a full-scale fight to the finish, then the kingdom would probably tell all that it knew about the Iranian role in the Khobar attack."
Of course, Clinton did not take such measures, and Saudi Arabia never told us what it knew about the Khobar bombing. Clarke contradicts his own claim that the covert operation against Iran ended Iranian terrorism by acknowledging that "the Iranian security services continued to support escalating terrorism against Israel and allowed al Qaeda safe passage and other support"--including, I would add, after September 11, 2001.
BY FAR THE MOST FASCINATING PART of Against All Enemies, and the bulk of the book, chronicles the rise of al Qaeda as seen by the Clinton White House. As with Iraq and Iran, the best of intentions and initially sound instincts achieved brief tactical goals without defining a strategic course for victory. In sketching an image of an engaged president who, in his own words, believed that the United States was at war with al Qaeda, but who failed to weaken the organization, Clarke paints a portrait of Clinton in some ways more devastating than the caricature created by his political opponents.
The critique comes down to this fact: President Clinton, who commanded the world's most powerful military and presided over nearly a decade of peace between the world's great powers, knew al Qaeda was operating in fifty countries, running agents and sleeper cells inside the United States, seeking weapons of mass destruction, churning out terrorists from its Afghan training camps, attacking targets around the world, and planning major terrorist offensives against the United States.
Full awareness of al Qaeda was not some slow awakening that came only late in the Clinton presidency. Clarke explains that "because of the many known terrorism events of 1993, the Clinton team, from the president down, was seized with the issue by 1994." Presidential Decision Directive 39, the "United States Policy on Counterterrorism" issued in 1994, called for both offensive and defensive actions to "reduce terrorist capabilities" and minimize the nation's vulnerabilities. It stated that U.S. policy would have "no greater priority than preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction" by terrorists.
By 1995, the Clinton administration had witnessed the World Trade Center bombing, for which it had "a lot of evidence" pointing to bin Laden's organization. It had discovered Ramzi Yousef's plots to assassinate President Clinton and Pope John Paul II. It had learned of Yousef's plot to blow up eleven American airliners over the Pacific. It had witnessed a terrorist assassination attempt against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. And it had seen the hand of al Qaeda at work in Bosnia, which Clarke calls "a guidebook to the bin Laden network, though we didn't recognize it as such at the time." According to Clarke, "There were signs in 1995 of [bin Laden's] money and support in Bosnia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Egypt, Morocco, and in Europe. Rumors connected him to attacks in New York, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen."
SO, ACCORDING TO CLARKE, "Clinton talked incessantly about what it would be like if terrorists used a weapon of mass destruction to attack a United States city." Between late 1995 and April 1996, Clinton gave a series of speeches about the terrorist threat. Equating the threat to that we faced in World War II and the Cold War, the president said, "Terrorism is the enemy of our generation, and we must prevail." In 1996, the work of a newly created bin Laden station at the CIA revealed a "widespread and active" al Qaeda organization with bin Laden as its "mastermind." In 1996, Clarke's Counterterrorism Security Group was already developing plans for a covert operation to snatch bin Laden from Afghanistan.
This is where things stood at the end of Bill Clinton's first term as president. Clarke succeeds in demonstrating that, by 1996, the administration was deeply aware of the threat al Qaeda posed, and that Clinton himself was "seized with" the issue. The administration was putting in place a domestic program to respond rapidly in the event of a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction. The administration had conducted covert operations against suspected terrorists and was discussing an operation to snatch Osama bin Laden himself. In short, Clarke successfully makes the case that the administration was fully engaged and ready to take the offensive against al Qaeda--by the end of Clinton's first term.
So what happened? It is true that the bureaucracy failed Clinton in some ways, but the more complete answer is that the president was unable to impose his will on a reluctant government, including his senior cabinet officials responsible for national security affairs. Unlike their successors in the Bush administration, they were not willing to risk other American interests, and public and world opinion, for the sake of defeating al Qaeda--and unlike President Bush, President Clinton was unwilling to force the issue. In November 2001, after he left office, Clinton said, "I tried to take bin Laden out . . . the last four years I was in office." He must be judged by the fact that he failed.
CLARKE BLAMES in particular the CIA's professed doubts about their authorization to use lethal force against the terrorists. In Clarke's words, "I still to this day do not understand why it was impossible for the United States to find a competent group of Afghans, Americans, third-country nationals, or some combination who could locate bin Laden in Afghanistan and kill him. . . . The president's intent was very clear: kill bin Laden. I believe that those in the CIA who claim the authorizations were insufficient or unclear are throwing up that claim as an excuse to cover the fact that they were pathetically unable to accomplish the mission."
Yet the president and his national security cabinet made accomplishing the mission difficult. As Clarke explains, "In three meetings during 1998 and 1999, the [Counterterrorism Security Group] requested emergency meetings of the principals to recommend to the president a cruise missile strike on the facility in which bin Laden was believed to be at the time." The missiles were never fired. CIA Director George Tenet later confirmed that bin Laden was present at the suspected site on one of those occasions; yet each time fear of collateral damage or considerations of subsidiary American interests prevented the administration from pulling the trigger.
Again and again, Clarke proposed attacking bin Laden's training camps, whether or not the terrorist mastermind was confirmed to be there, telling his colleagues, "We have to stop this conveyor belt, this production line. Blow them up every once in a while and recruits won't want to go there." But the principals objected--for reasons as diverse as wasting million-dollar missiles, undermining U.S. credibility with Pakistan, burdening a stretched military, and reinforcing a perception abroad of the United States as a "Mad Bomber." The administration ruled out an assault on bin Laden's farm in Afghanistan, for fear the CIA's Afghan assets could be killed in the attempt.
CLARKE WANTS TO GIVE the Clinton administration credit for trying. It did recognize the threat, he insists; it did engage in serious strategic planning to counter it; the threat did consume the president and his senior staff. "Listen," Clarke quotes Clinton as telling his national security staff after the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, "retaliating for these attacks is all well and good, but we gotta get rid of these guys once and for all. You understand what I'm telling you?"
And yet, somehow, little came of all this. The Clinton administration failed to coerce the weak and failing states of Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to capture bin Laden. Without elaborating, Clarke calls reports that Sudan was prepared to hand bin Laden over to the United States for the right price "a fable" invented by "Americans friendly to the Sudan regime." He also tells us that it was impracticable to seize bin Laden in Sudan, where the administration knew his whereabouts. National Security Advisor Tony Lake ruled out a proposed Special Forces operation against al Qaeda facilities in Sudan on the grounds that, in Lake's words, "This is going to war with Sudan." According to Clarke, the CIA "had no capability to stage significant operations against al Qaeda in Sudan." On Clarke's watch as counterterrorism czar, the United States apparently never acquired that capability.
Later, Clarke tells us that the State Department was "hard at work trying to put pressure on the Taliban" to close terrorist camps and hand over bin Laden. "Unfortunately, we had little leverage with the Taliban." The mullahs wouldn't cooperate, and the Clinton administration threatened them with nothing more than negotiations. On Pakistan, Clarke observes, "I believed that if Pakistan's [Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate] wanted to capture bin Laden or tell us where he was, they could have done so with little effort." Did the United States, under Clinton's leadership, have so little leverage over other nations on an issue it had identified as a top national priority? President Bush demonstrated otherwise--in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
Clinton was committed to defeating terrorism, Clarke insists. But his administration could not or would not deliver. "Whether it was catching war criminals in Yugoslavia or terrorists in Africa and the Middle East, it was the same story," Clarke adds. "The White House wanted action. The senior military did not and made it almost impossible for the president to overcome their objections." An attempt to catch September 11-mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Qatar in 1997 failed because the administration felt obliged to inform officials in Doha, one of whom promptly warned Mohammed to flee. An attack on an al Qaeda meeting at which bin Laden was present failed when, as Clarke himself had predicted, Navy destroyers positioning to fire their cruise missiles were detected by Pakistan, which may have warned bin Laden to clear the area before the strike.
CLARKE BLAMES most of this on the failure of the CIA, FBI, and the Pentagon to cooperate with the Clinton administration. Clinton "identified terrorism as the major post-Cold War threat," but "could not get the CIA, Pentagon, and FBI to act sufficiently to deal with this threat."
Is he right? During his long years as the nation's counterterrorism czar, working for both Clinton and Bush, Clarke never put in place a workable system to screen airline passenger manifests--yet was shocked to learn, on September 11, that known terrorists had freely boarded American airlines. After al Qaeda attacked the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, killing seventeen American sailors, Clarke proposed the United States bomb every al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. "There was no support for bombing [within Clinton's national security cabinet]. . . . The principals had decided to do nothing, to wait for proof of who committed the attack." Clarke quotes his colleague, Mike Sheehan, as asking, "What's it gonna take, Dick? Who the sh--t do they think attacked the Cole, f--in' Martians? The Pentagon brass won't even let the Air Force carpet-bomb the place. Does al Qaeda have to attack the Pentagon to get their attention?"
THE ANSWER would appear to be yes. Clarke reports actually seeing Osama bin Laden in Afghan training camps on three occasions in real time as he watched live video from a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle hovering over the sites. Each time, U.S. military assets were not in a position to fire on bin Laden, and the Predator was not armed with missiles to conduct an offensive strike, as it would be during the Bush administration.
Clarke later criticizes the Bush administration for failing to push aggressively for deployment of Predator drones armed with Hellfire missiles before September 11. Yet he also quotes a report that the head of the CIA's directorate of operations opposed use of the armed Predator against bin Laden on the grounds that it would "endanger the lives of CIA operatives around the world." And in a White House meeting one week before September 11, Clarke cites a source quoting CIA director Tenet as saying, "It would be a terrible mistake for the [Deputy of Central Intelligence] to fire a weapon like this."
So who is at fault? In 1998, al Qaeda issued a statement declaring war on the United States Clarke writes, "It did not come as a shock to us. We had considered ourselves at war with al Qaeda even before we knew its name or its reach."
Yet despite the continuing string of attacks, and intelligence warning of more to come, Clarke doesn't blame Clinton. Says Clarke,
Because of the intensity of the political opposition that Clinton engendered, he had been heavily criticized for bombing al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, for engaging in 'Wag the Dog' tactics. . . . For similar reasons, he could not fire the recalcitrant FBI director who had failed to fix the bureau or uncover terrorists in the United States. He had given the CIA unprecedented authority to go after Osama bin Laden personally and al Qaeda, but had not taken steps when they did little or nothing. Because Clinton was criticized as a Vietnam War opponent without a military record, he was limited in his ability to direct the military to engage in anti-terrorist commando operations they did not want to conduct. . . . In the absence of a bigger provocation from al Qaeda to silence his critics, Clinton thought he could do no more.
Clarke lost his access to the president when the Bush administration came to power. His principal complaint is that the Bush team's focus on Iraq after September 11 diverted America from the war against al Qaeda. Yet it was Clarke who, by his own admission, authored the founding document of Clinton counterterrorism policy in 1994 underlining the threat of terrorists' acquiring weapons of mass destruction and stating that the United States had "no greater priority" than preventing it--an argument the Bush administration employed in its decision to go to war against Iraq nearly a decade later, at a time when terrorists had demonstrated their ability to attack the United States and were actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, which Iraq had a demonstrated record of producing and using.
GIVEN WHAT EVERY SERIOUS intelligence service in the West believed it knew about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the Bush administration's decision to go to war was a prudent response to what, by Clarke's own standard, constituted a credible threat to the United States in an age of catastrophic terrorism.
Clarke's argument that the Bush administration did not accord the terrorist threat sufficient priority before September 11 is not wholly fair. The Clinton administration had eight years to deal with the threat; the Bush administration eight months. It is by this gap that the Bush administration's early counterterrorism policy must be judged.
The challenges facing any new administration--appointing and confirming senior staff, conducting broad-ranging policy reviews, and generally getting its sea legs--as well as the Bush administration's determination to set a course in foreign policy radically different from that of its predecessor, may have hindered a clear assessment of the threat al Qaeda posed to the United States. During their first months in office, officials who had been out of office for eight years may not have had the same sense of urgency about terrorism as Clarke, who had spent every day of those same eight years watching the terrorist threat spread. Unquestionably, the Bush administration, once it fully grasped the threat, acted decisively to end it. The Clinton administration did not.
Clarke himself points out that a memo he prepared for the incoming Bush administration listed key antiterrorist initiatives that the Clinton administration had not agreed to take. "The [Clinton] principals had asked me to update the pol-mil plan for the transition, flagging the issues where there was not a consensus, where decisions had not been agreed." By Clarke's own admission, the Clinton administration had not done these things. Had they, the Bush administration may have found themselves confronting a significantly reduced terrorist threat. As it happens, Republican officials were putting in place these very policies when the terrorists struck on September 11.
In the final chapter of Against All Enemies, Clarke suggests that Clinton, were he still in office after September 11, would have tried to "understand" the phenomenon of terrorism; tried to build a "world consensus" to address its root causes; tried "one more time" to forge an Israeli-Palestinian settlement; gone to Saudi Arabia to "address the Muslim people" in "a moving appeal for religious tolerance"; promoted peace between India and Pakistan; and worked to stabilize Pakistan. Hearing Clarke's wish list for American policy at a time when hardened terrorists are killing innocents from Madrid to Bali makes one glad that Clarke has given up his day job.
CLARKE'S DECISION to write what he means to be an indictment of the Bush administration's counterterrorism policy, at a time when the president he served is still in office--and, particularly, to record the president's conversations with him on sensitive matters of national security--is unprecedented. By his act, Clarke has made it difficult, if not impossible, for future presidents to retain senior national security staff members from previous administrations. In Against All Enemies, Clarke laments that political appointees often move aside career national security officials who possess valuable institutional knowledge on national security matters. Clarke's decision to release his memoirs in an election year, and to do so in a way that violates confidentiality and transparently benefits the political opponent of the last president he served, makes it more likely that future administrations will not retain people like Dick Clarke.
The tragedy of recent American politics is not that President Bush acted to end the threat of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction from rogue states like Iraq, at the cost of angering allies and subordinating secondary American interests. The tragedy is that President Clinton, knowing al Qaeda was at war with us and understanding both its global reach and its plans to kill Americans, did not act in a similarly bold manner.
Against All Enemies is too serious to be called a farce, for it highlights the tragedy of American foreign policy in this age of terrorism. Clarke's deep anger with the current administration notwithstanding, he has performed a service by reminding America of how the Clinton administration failed to protect us from the terrorist threat.

Daniel C. Twining, a former adviser to Senator John McCain, is director of foreign policy, United States, at the German Marshall Fund. The views expressed here are his own.

? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
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>> FOGGY BOTTOM BLUES...1

Crunch Time in Baghdad
Bush must prove he's determined to win.

Tuesday, April 6, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

The next few days in Iraq may be the most critical since President Bush ordered the invasion a year ago. Millions of Iraqis, and millions of Americans, are waiting to see if the U.S. is still fighting in Iraq to win.

Marines were digging in around Fallujah yesterday, in anticipation of a military response to last week's mutilation of four U.S. civilians in that part of the Sunni Triangle. Meanwhile, the coalition announced that an Iraqi judge had issued a murder arrest warrant for the Shiite Muslim cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who ordered the riots on Sunday that resulted in the deaths of eight Americans and a Salvadoran. If Mr. Bush fails to show that there is a price to pay for killing Americans, he might as well bring everyone home today.

Americans will support their President in war--far more than liberal elites appreciate. But they won't support a President who isn't fighting with enough force and the right strategy to prevail. Unlike Mr. Bush's determination to topple Saddam Hussein, the transition back to Iraqi rule has been marked in recent months by drift and indecision. Especially in the runup to the transfer of power on June 30, the worst Iraqis are rushing in to exploit this uncertainty.

What's needed now is a reassertion of U.S. resolve, notably on security but also on the transition to Iraqi sovereignty, and even if it means no drawdown of American forces any time soon. The coalition had hoped to turn over more of this task to Iraqis, and this remains both desirable and inevitable. But they clearly aren't yet up to that task in the face of well-armed insurgents or private militias.
Partly this is America's fault for not arming Iraqis on our side with enough firepower soon enough. The State Department (rather than the Pentagon) is responsible for disbursing the small arms that are now available, while Congress's desire to micromanage Defense procurement has delayed contracts from being let for more and better equipment. If Senate soundbite kibbitzers Richard Lugar and Joe Biden want to be constructive, this is a problem they could work on. In the meantime, U.S. forces will have to re-enter such cities and towns as Fallujah and work with Iraqis friendly to the coalition to restore order and kill or arrest those who target Americans.

This has to include Mr. Sadr. The young cleric has been stirring trouble for months, but with Sunday's riots he has crossed a line that makes him an urgent threat to the coalition and any new Iraqi government. Yesterday's judicial warrant implicates him in the mob slaying of another Shiite leader, the moderate Abdel-Majid al-Khoei, shortly after he had returned to Najaf from exile in London in April 2003.

Unlike Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Mr. Sadr never mentions the word "democracy" in his fatwas and talks openly of creating an Iranian-style Islamic Republic in Iraq. Mr. Sadr has visited Tehran since the fall of Saddam, and his Mahdi militia is almost certainly financed and trained by Iranians. Revolutionary Guards may be instigating some of the current unrest. As recently as last Friday, Mr. Sadr declared that "I am the beating arm for Hezbollah and Hamas here in Iraq." Hezbollah has been financed by Iran for years.

Having let Mr. Sadr's militia grow, the coalition now has no choice but to break it up. It should also warn the Dawa Islamic political party that its dealings with Iran won't be tolerated. As for Tehran, we would hope the Sadr uprising puts to rest the illusion that the mullahs can be appeased. As Bernard Lewis teaches, Middle Eastern leaders interpret American restraint as weakness. Iran's mullahs fear a Muslim democracy in Iraq because it is a direct threat to their own rule. If warnings to Tehran from Washington don't impress them, perhaps some cruise missiles aimed at the Bushehr nuclear site will concentrate their minds.

Proof of U.S. resolve is especially important as the transfer of sovereignty on June 30 nears. Millions of Iraqis are grateful for their liberation from Saddam and are willing to help us finish the job. But too many Iraqis already suspect that June 30 has more to do with our elections than with theirs. If they now see the U.S. failing to respond forcefully to the past week's unrest, they will conclude that the Americans are preparing to leave. Then the mayhem and jockeying for power will only get worse.

Yesterday, Mr. Bush reiterated his support for the June 30 transfer. But the timing is less important than the fact that the U.S. still has no plan for what will happen on that date. The current non-plan is for U.S. regent L. Paul Bremer to toss the ball to U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and hope he can figure it out.
With elections put off for some months anyway, the default transfer plan will probably involve retaining the Iraqi Governing Council in some form. The coalition is better off doing this on its own and leaving the U.N. out of it. It isn't as if Kofi Annan is offering any troops, and Mr. Brahimi--a Sunni Arab nationalist close to nations that coddled Saddam--makes Shiites nervous. This latest Bush Administration dance with the U.N. is just one more signal to many Iraqis that the U.S. is eager to get out.

While we're at it, Mr. Bush can send an important signal with his choice of who should succeed Mr. Bremer as U.S. ambassador to Iraq. The worst choice would be a career diplomat. We'd recommend Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy Defense secretary, who has his own reputational stake in Iraq's success and would be seen by Iraqis as someone committed for the long haul. He also wouldn't need on-the-job training. Rudy Giuliani would also be a serious choice.

We trust that Mr. Bush knows that his reaction to Fallujah and Mr. Sadr matters far more to his re-election prospects than does Richard Clarke's book tour. Americans realize that the current 20-20 Beltway hindsight over 9/11 is mostly political. But they also know that Iraq was Mr. Bush's undertaking, and they will hold him responsible for any failure of will.
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>> CREATURE OF FOGGY BOTTOM BLUES...2



The Essential Bremer
From the April 12 / April 19, 2004 issue: What the American administrator in Iraq has accomplished.
by Fred Barnes
04/12/2004, Volume 009, Issue 30

Baghdad
IN THE BEGINNING, no American funds were to be used for the reconstruction of Iraq. It would be paid for, gradually, out of Iraqi oil revenues. Two months after Saddam Hussein was toppled, the American administrator for Iraq, Paul Bremer, concluded the oil plan wouldn't work. He asked for $5 billion to $7 billion to rebuild Iraq's crumbling and looted infrastructure. The White House was shocked and said this was too much. Take another look at what's needed, Bremer was told. He did and came back with a request for $22 billion. Bremer had a strong ally on his side, President Bush. So the White House swallowed hard and cut the request to $20 billion. Congress trimmed it to $18.4 billion. The reconstruction money begins flowing into Iraq this spring, with the promise of one million to two million new jobs for Iraqis and a jump-started economy.

That episode demonstrates Bremer's clout. More than anyone in Washington, including Bush or Pentagon officials, he shapes policy in Iraq. And it is an ambitious policy--the creation, in Bremer's phrase, of a "new Iraq." The president's confidence seems to have emboldened Bremer. Ask about Bush and Bremer and every White House aide gives the same answer: "The president likes Bremer." On reconstruction funding, Bremer insisted that none of it be a loan saddling a democratic Iraqi government with more debt. The White House was persuaded, fought against a loan, and won. Bremer, 62, usually gets what he wants from Washington.

But there are limits to getting what he wants from Iraqis. A year after Saddam was ousted, Bremer follows a simple game plan: strategic clarity, tactical flexibility. The prize in this game is a free and democratic Iraq at peace at home and with its neighbors. Exactly how Iraq arrives there is less important than getting there in a timely fashion without jeopardizing the goal itself. Bremer has retreated when necessary. He backed down from demanding Iraqis draft a permanent constitution before the Coalition Provisional Authority, which he heads, hands over sovereignty. But he refused pleas to keep the Iraqi army intact and use it as a police and security force. Despite terrorist attacks, Bremer has no regrets about that decision.

One measure of Bremer's extraordinary success is that his selection has numerous fathers. State Department officials claim he was their pick. In truth, Bremer's name was suggested to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld by his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz. Rumsfeld sold it to Bush, who didn't know Bremer, and to others in the administration. Bremer was a well-known terrorism expert who'd worked for Henry Kissinger both in government and as a director of Kissinger Associates. What wasn't known was Bremer's political skill. He has the ideal qualities. He's relentlessly cheerful and upbeat, but serious and tough at the same time.

The best way to judge Bremer is to look at his most significant decisions. Here are a half-dozen of them:

* DE-BAATHIFICATION. This was a no-brainer. Barred from serving in the new government was anyone in the top three layers of the Baath party or the top four layers of a ministry in Saddam's regime, roughly 1.5 million Iraqis. In Iraq, this has been Bremer's most popular decision. The Baathists were Stalinists responsible for the disappearance of well over one million of their fellow Iraqis. Now Iraq has "an Adenauer problem." In postwar Germany, Konrad Adenauer quickly emerged as a national leader. No strong leader has stepped forward in Iraq. Exiles like Ahmad Chalabi have no political base. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq had no king or Hamid Karzai to tap for leadership. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the Shia leader, has political influence but doesn't want direct political power.

* DISBANDING SADDAM'S ARMY. This was Bremer's most controversial decision. Despite an $80 to $120 monthly stipend depending on their rank, some former soldiers joined what the press euphemistically calls the "insurgency" against the United States. But Bremer was right to dismiss them. For one thing, the army had spontaneously dispersed in the face of the American invasion. To reconstitute it, the officers, many of them Sunnis aligned with Saddam, would have had to be called back. Besides, this was the army that had brutally oppressed the majority Shia and the minority Kurds, who would have rebelled against its return. Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani told Bremer disbanding the army was as important as the capture of Saddam. Indeed it was.

* THE NOVEMBER 15 AGREEMENT. This is the best example of Bremer's tactical flexibility. He dropped his plan for provincial caucuses to elect an interim government that would write a permanent constitution, to be followed by the turnover of sovereignty and a democratic election. Bremer yielded to political reality. Both Sistani and the appointed Iraqi Governing Council wanted sovereignty sooner. Bremer traveled to Washington and met one-on-one with the president before approving a new plan with transfer of sovereignty on June 30. The election of a new government will be held sometime before next January 31. Iraqis may not be ready to rush to democracy. Certainly Falluja isn't. But Bremer and Bush believe delay could be worse.

* SAYING NO TO PRIVATIZATION. This may be Bremer's worst (though understandable) decision. The privatization of Iraq's oil industry was always off the table, if only for fear that Washington would be accused of going to war for oil. Bremer believes, however, that oil production could be doubled if the new Iraqi government seeks help from private companies. Also for political reasons, dollarizing the currency was rejected in favor of issuing a new currency without Saddam's picture on the bills. And to avoid worsening unemployment, the 200 or so nationalized enterprises with 500,000 employees haven't been cut loose. Nor have the massive subsidies for gasoline, food, and energy been eliminated. Bremer intends to trim the subsidies by June 30, when he leaves. But privatization has essentially been left to the government elected next year. So the prospects for full privatization are uncertain.

* THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION. This was a political breakthrough engineered by Bremer. He stood firm on minority rights and no Islamic law while overseeing the drafting of the constitution. When Sistani complained and five of the 25 members of the Iraqi Governing Council balked, Bremer left it to the council to reach agreement. They finally did. Sistani, by the way, doesn't meet with Bremer or other coalition officials. But Bremer has effectively communicated with him since last May through intermediaries. On the constitution, it was Sistani who backed down.

* THE UNITED NATIONS. Bush and Bremer favor a U.N. role in Iraq for the specific purposes of organizing the election and giving the new government legitimacy. But Sistani and other Shia opposed a U.N. role after U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi concluded a few months ago that a quickie election was impossible. Bremer wanted Brahimi to return and help establish an election process. Security Council approval would bestow legitimacy. Robert Blackwill, a senior National Security Council official at the White House, was dispatched to backstop Bremer, but it was Bremer who persuaded the governing council and Sistani to go along. His cleverest argument was that Iraq would need the U.N. later. Barring it now would put U.N. aid to independent Iraq at risk.

No American official of recent vintage has taken on a task on the scale of Bremer's. It amounts to the creation not just of a government and an economy but of a country. Douglas MacArthur had seven years to achieve in Japan what Bremer is trying to do in less than 15 months. Rich Galen, an American press officer in Baghdad, calls it "MacArthur on steroids." Bremer has won the support of many but not all Iraqis. When an Iraqi journalist told him he was loved by Iraqis, Bremer responded, "Except for those who want to kill me." He's regarded by security officials as more threatened by assassins than even Bush. That hasn't impeded him or the impressive staff of volunteers who've joined him in Iraq. They are rushing to put in place before they leave on June 30 as many elements of a democracy--a securities and exchange commission, a stock market, a public broadcasting system--as they can. Then the future of Iraq will be left to Iraqis. For all the obstacles, I think democracy will prevail. If it does, Bremer will rightly be deemed the father of free Iraq.


Fred Barnes is executive editor of The Weekly Standard.


? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.

In the Red
Draining the Sunni Triangle swamp.

It is less than 90 days before we are scheduled to turn Iraq over to an interim government, and neither is the nation ready for the government, nor is the government ready for the nation. We're finally taking action -- after months of diplo-dithering -- to drain the Sunni Triangle swamp. As Monday dawned, American Marines, accompanied by about two battalions of Iraqi security forces, cordoned off the city of Fallujah to hunt for the soulless barbarians who ambushed, killed, and mutilated four American civilians last week. They are accompanied by units with loudspeakers who are driving through Fallujah telling the Iraqis to abide by the new curfew, and not to worry: the Coalition is in town to capture or kill the terrorists. An arrest warrant (issued months ago) for 30-year old radical Shiite mullah Moqtadar Sadr is now being enforced as a result of Sadr ordering his Iranian-funded militia to attack Coalition forces.
For many months, Ambassador Paul Bremer has been far too soft and indecisive in dealing with those inciting violence. He brought in Gen. John Abizaid -- our highest-ranking officer of Arab descent -- to speak with Ali al-Sistani and the other principal religious leaders and obtain their cooperation in pacifying Iraq. They made comforting noises but ignored Abizaid's admonitions. As one Iraqi source e-mailed me Monday, "Look what is happening now to Al Sadr and his radical followers. Why [was] Al Sadr was not arrested from day one? He killed Abdul Majid Al-Khoie [a leading Shiite cleric who favored peace] in Najaf, established his own courts, intimidated even Al Sistani, and [yet was] left alone.... As if, if you leave bad guys alone they will leave you alone."
Our policy toward the radical mullahs has to be consistent and firm. Those who plan and organize terrorism, like Sadr, must be arrested and imprisoned. The only real difference between Sadr and Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani -- the most prominent Shia cleric -- is that al-Sistani hasn't openly called for violence. If he crosses that line, he should have a cell next to Sadr's. Because you call yourself a cleric doesn't give you immunity from capture and punishment if you're organizing violence. Just as the Israelis were right in killing Yassin, the "spiritual leader" of Hamas, we have not only the right but the obligation to arrest and silence those Iraqi "spiritual leaders" who are organizing and inciting murder.
The Sunni Triangle is a war zone. You need only to look at the pictures of the Fallujah incident to see the proof. If you want to see the inhumanity of the enemy -- and I don't recommend it -- you can see the atrocity, and the faces of some of the barbarians who perpetrated it at www.bambili.com. It's as bad as anything I've ever seen, including the pictures of American soldiers murdered by Iraqi troops during last year's campaign.
Because we haven't destroyed the terrorist networks in the Sunni Triangle and elsewhere, it is almost impossible to see how we can turn Iraqi sovereignty over on the schedule we so foolishly announced. The president unwisely reaffirmed his commitment to the June 30 date Monday. Of the many lessons Vietnam taught us -- or should have -- one of the most important is that if you establish a schedule, it's not just yours: It's the enemy's as well. It's no accident that the violence is escalating as our "deadline" approaches. The enemy is preparing the battlefield for their fight against any democratic Iraqi government. We must also prepare the battlefield to ensure that when a new government is ready, it can function with authority and credibility.
The occupation force has been drawn down to less than 150,000. We may need to add more troops temporarily, but the issue is not how many troops we have there, but what we're ordering them to do. If we had started cleaning out the Sunni Triangle six months ago -- and used the forces we have there effectively -- the area would be far quieter today. And we have not done nearly enough to end the outside interference from Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis and the Syrian Baathists keep the Sunni Triangle ablaze while the Iranians are sending everything from money to silk Persian rugs to pay mullahs like Sadr to stir up violence. There will be no real peace in Iraq until we force these nations to end their interference.
The Fallujah incident illustrates all too vividly the difference between what we have been doing and what we should have been doing. I've gotten an earful about Fallujah from the spec-ops community. The problem, they say, is not only with the mullahs and terrorists there. It is also with some of the "PMCs" -- private military companies -- we have hired to support the Coalition.
Under contract with the CIA, these men are tasked with protecting dignitaries, making sure that Coalition installations are safe from terrorist attacks, and performing any other mission the "customer" imposes. Most of these men are former Navy SEALs, Army special forces, Marine Recon, or Air Force PJs. When they join the civilian companies, they have the skills they need to seize ships, rescue hostages, and the other things the spec-ops guys do so well. But, as one of the former operators who worked for a PMC in Afghanistan told me, their skill sets and trained mental attitude aren't what's needed on the streets of Iraq.
One man I spoke to was sent to Afghanistan with hardly any training. The PCM planned a patently inadequate three days of preparation to test basic skills and make an operator ready for the Afghan streets. There was apparently no training in small-unit tactics designed to create cohesion among the operators. This operator told me that the pressure to get men in the field overcame the contractor's already too-low training standards, and people were sent out long before they were ready.
It's almost certain that we'll never know just what the four men killed last week were doing driving around Fallujah. It's just as certain that some or all of them would have been killed even if their training had been different. But their training and alertness should have enabled them to avoid the ambush in the first place. Apparently, they were neither "switched on" nor "in the red," meaning that they weren't acting like they were in a war zone, at the highest state of alert in every waking moment. They hadn't been trained in avoiding ambushes like the Fallujah attack, or in the escape-and-evasion tactics necessary to any chance of escaping it.
One of the other puzzles is why the $18 billion in reconstruction money appropriated last fall still isn't being spent. The reason: The political gurus don't want another "Halliburton" campaign issue, and are trying to award the contracts as they would in peacetime, and it's taking far too long. Thousands of Iraqis who could be employed building their nation now are unemployed. They have nothing better to do than sit around and listen to the mullahs preaching violence against Americans. Bremer's contracting shop is too politically sensitive to get this under way, and someone needs to light a fire under them right now. (There are other problems in that shop. One source investigating the U.N. oil-for-food scam told me that while Bremer and his immediate staff appear perfectly honest, there is corruption in contract award and administration.)
In the next 90 days, the anti-Coalition violence in Iraq will continue to escalate, aimed at preventing the new government from establishing itself. Regardless of the progress made in building Iraqi security forces, it's obvious that the Iraqis aren't going to be able to defeat the terrorists or end the mullahs' incitement any time soon. Which means everyone from Bremer on down needs to be "in the red" and "switched on" from now on. And it also means that we have to delay turnover until several milestones are reached.
First, security has to be established in each of the major population centers. Without it, nothing else can succeed. Second, the Iraqis need to have basic services, such as water and electricity, reliably available. Third, we have to push the construction contracts through, and get as many Iraqis as possible working to build their nation, taking the audience away from the radical clerics. Fourth, the Iraqis have to establish their constitution and courts and begin trying criminals such as Saddam.
Functioning courts, reliable basic services, and ongoing construction of Iraq's infrastructure would be important evidence that the government is real and working. It is only after the Iraqis can manage to meet these goals that the turnover of sovereignty can occur. If we force it before those goals are met, Iraq may end up like Vietnam.

-- Jed Babbin, an NRO contributor, is author of the forthcoming book, Inside the Asylum: Why the U.N. and Old Europe are Worse than You Think.
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Sadr Signs
The sky is not falling.
By Michael Rubin
Eight American troops died in Baghdad, as fighting erupted between Coalition troops and followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. Hearing the news, Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) declared Iraq to be "George Bush's Vietnam." Evening-news anchors question whether this weekend's violence marked the start of a Shii revolt. Quite the contrary.
Far from rebelling, the majority of Shia are breathing sighs of relief. Iraqis consider action to rein in Muqtada al-Sadr long overdue. An Iraqi judge issued a warrant for Muqtada's arrest last summer, charging him with instigating the April 10, 2003, murder of respected cleric Majid al-Khoie, hacked to death in Najaf's holiest shrine. American hand wringing and delay has allowed Muqtada al-Sadr's operation to metasticize into a more lethal network.
In Najaf, Baghdad, and Basra, followers of the 30-year-old firebrand cleric have terrorized the local population. Since liberation, Iraqis have had the freedom to watch satellite television stations, except in Najaf, where Muqtada al-Sadr's militia members invade homes and smash satellite dishes in a scene more reminiscent of the Taliban's Afghanistan than of Iraq. In Baghdad and Basra, Muqtada's vigilantes beat and harass women. Doctors, lawyers, tribal leaders, and shopkeepers repeatedly ask visiting Americans why the Coalition has failed to rein in Muqtada al-Sadr.
Muqtada al-Sadr does not represent Iraq's Shia community. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the leading Shii religious figure in Iraq, will have nothing to do with him, nor will the myriad of lesser ayatollahs or the large, secular Shia community. Even in Sadr City, a large Shia slum on the outskirts of Baghdad (named not after Muqtada but rather the late Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr), Muqtada's support is weak. Since his power peaked shortly after Baghdad's liberation, Muqtada has steadily lost his Sadr City constituents to Ibrahim Jaafari of Dawa and Abdulaziz Hakim of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
Muqtada al-Sadr's real symbolism is not as the personification of Shia struggle, but rather in his challenge to rule of law. On March 8, Governing Council members representing Iraq's major political trends agreed to an interim constitution. Salma al-Khufaji, whom Governing Council colleagues identify as Muqtada al-Sadr's de facto proxy, signed off on the document. Most members I spoke with acknowledged the transitional law was a political compromise ideal to none, but fair to all. Some pundits may say that the Coalition Provisional Authority imposed the TAL on a rubberstamp Governing Council. Such a charge is not only false (negotiations and drafting occurred absent the presence of Coalition officials), but also racist in its assumption that Iraqis are not sophisticated enough to operate independently.
While President Bush hailed the signing of the Iraq's interim constitution "as a historic milestone in the Iraqi people's long journey from tyranny and violence to liberty and peace," Iraqis are cynical. The Baath party has long ignored legal and constitutional guarantees. Constitutions are not worth the paper upon which they are printed if they are not enforced. Shia in Najaf and Nasriyah as well as Kufa and Kut, watched as Muqtada al-Sadr's 3,000-member militia, the Jaysh al-Mahdi, kidnapped people off the street, tried them before ad hoc courts, and meted out medieval punishment. In recent days, Muqtada al-Sadr has increased the virulence of his rhetoric and threats. On April 2, Muqtada announced "solidarity" with Hezbollah and Hamas. "Let them consider me their striking hand in Iraq when the need arises," he declared in his sermon. On April 4, the Qatar-based Al Jazeera network reported Sadr's call to commence armed operations.
Most Iraqis recognize that Muqtada al-Sadr is not a true grassroots figure. He receives money through Ayatollah Kazim al-Husayni al-Haeri, an Iraqi cleric based in Iran who himself is a close confidant of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In a brazen power grab deemed illegitimate by Iraq's entire Shia hierarchy, on April 7, 2003, Haeri sent a handwritten note to the houzeh declaring Muqtada al-Sadr his representative in Najaf. "His position is our position," Haeri declared. Muqtada, not educated enough to write his own sermons, relies on supporters in Iran. He has made several trips to Qom to pick-up instructions and money. Much of his violence has been directed not against "occupation forces," but against tolerant, traditional clerics like al-Khoie, who in challenge to Khamenei, favored separation of mosque and state. While pundits and ivy-tower academics speak of Muqtada's appeal to the poor and downtrodden, they fail to question where he gets the money to charter hundreds of buses each weak to transport followers the two hours from Baghdad to Kufa, where they listen to his sermon and enjoy a free meal.
The sky is not falling. The decision to confront the Muqtada al-Sadr's challenge to rule-of-law and liberty will cause a short-term spike in violence, but lead to long-term improvement. Iraqis see any failure to defend rule-of-law as Coalition weakness. How could the United States be serious about democracy, Iraqis ask, when we left such a challenge to rule-of-law go unchallenged? Thankfully, Iraqis now know that we will meet challenges head-on. It is a lesson that should also be understood in Syria and Iran.

-- Michael Rubin, a former CPA political officer -- the only one who lived outside the American security bubble -- is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
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US pushing arms, reforming export controls
By John Feffer
WASHINGTON - Secretary of State Colin Powell okayed the arms deal with a tap of a finger, unveiling the State Department's new D-Trade, a fast, paperless process for granting licenses to US military contractors for arms sales. After joking that State had only recently junked its last vintage Wang computer, Powell pushed one button to approve the sale of a pair of night-vision goggles to the United Kingdom. US government oversight of the arms trade had officially entered the virtual age.
The electronic licensing of D-Trade is only one of a range of pending reforms that would substantially recast and expedite the way the US government handles arms exports, from lowly and innocuous spare parts to the latest unmanned aerial vehicles. The implications for Asia are significant. The United States hopes to facilitate arms sales to such allies as Australia and South Korea, but also to expand new relationships with Pakistan and Indonesia. Taiwan was the world's largest arms importer in the late 1990s, and the US wants a bigger piece of this market. The Europeans, contemplating a lifting of the arms embargo against China, are eyeing an equally lucrative market.
The global arms market is fiercely competitive, and sellers are always looking for an edge. Although the US is the world's largest arms exporter, controlling nearly half of the international market of about US$30 billion a year, both the government and industry have been pushing for the better part of a decade to increase this market share. One way of boosting exports is to make it easier for sellers to get licenses. Every year, the US government processes more than 50,000 export licenses for military goods. Defense contractors frequently complain about bureaucratic delays, which they argue make the US less competitive against other high-ranking exporters such as Russia and France.
But what looks like a delay to one person is a justifiable concern about national security or proliferation to another. In streamlining the process of exporting arms and equipment, skeptics question whether the administration of President George W Bush is seizing market share at the expense of national security.
"Since the late 1990s, industry has been pushing the State Department to remove what they perceive are barriers to defense trade cooperation and US competitiveness in the international arms market," says Matt Schroeder, an arms-trade specialist with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). "The problem is that many of these barriers help to prevent military technologies from ending up in the wrong hands."
Cutting red tape on innocuous items
Joel Johnson of the Aerospace Industries Association disagrees. He lists various components - steering wheels, air conditioners, hydraulic hoses - that have been only very slightly modified from their commercial versions to serve military functions and yet require separate licenses. "There's still an awful lot in the system that shouldn't be there," he says. "Just give me an 'officer of common sense' - I'd hold [these components] up to him and he'd said, 'Nah, we're not interested in that, that's not what we have in mind.'"
The push for arms-export reform originated in the administration of former president Bill Clinton. As part of its geo-economic philosophy, his administration urged the defense industry to become more competitive, enter new markets such as Eastern Europe and Latin America, and ink global co-production agreements for the latest high-tech bomber, the Joint Strike Fighter. The Bush administration enthusiastically embraced this policy. After September 11, 2001, the administration used the "war on terrorism" to boost military aid to countries such as the Philippines and India and to provide anti-terrorism funding for the first time to such countries as Tajikistan and Indonesia.
Last month, the administration designated Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally". Once a pariah state because of its nuclear program with potential military uses, Pakistan now has access to a wide range of US military goods, even though it remains under a cloud for selling advanced military technology to such countries as North Korea and Libya.
The Bush administration also wants systemic change in the arms export system. For instance, the administration hopes to expedite sales to the UK and Australia by granting them exemptions from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The US provided an ITAR exemption to Canada but narrowed it in 1999 after the discovery of several cases of unauthorized re-export of US military goods.
The arms-control community is concerned that something similar will happen with the UK and Australia. Rachel Stohl of the Center for Defense Information cites a high-profile cases of arms-trade violations in the UK, including the 1998 Sandline scandal in which the British government broke a United Nations arms embargo by supplying weapons to Sierra Leone. She also worries that US weapons, such as small arms bound for Australia, will end up in places such as Indonesia and the Philippines, which are fighting insurgencies and separatist movements that some label as terrorist. "I lose more sleep over the United Kingdom than Australia," Stohl says, "but because of the geographic position of Australia, we have to be concerned there as well."
Export of C-130 transports might be expedited
Also up for its rolling quadrennial review is the US Munitions List (USML). One possible item to be removed, according to a source in the arms-control community, is the C-130 transport plane, which Pakistan has been offered through a foreign military financing grant and which China also would like to acquire. The China military market, which the United States has not supplied since the 1980s, is particularly controversial.
"Changes to the Munitions List thus far have been modest and demonstrate an acute awareness of the security threats posed by decontrol of US defense articles," says Schroeder, the FAS arms-trade specialist. "We hope that changes to the remaining USML categories will reflect similar thinking and priorities."
The European Union, meanwhile, is debating lifting the arms embargo on China imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. According to Ian Anthony, a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "The embargo was never intended to be a permanent policy, and there does not seem to be a large volume of trade with China in those items of defense equipment that are not subject to the current embargo. The statements from the European and Chinese sides are that they do not anticipate any sudden increase in arms sales - rather the removal of a political impediment to improved EU-China relations." A 1998 code of conduct restricts EU arms sales to China that could be used for waging war or suppressing internal dissent.
The US sees this policy debate very differently. A State Department official confirmed that lifting the EU ban "cannot help but have a very negative impact" on winning congressional approval for facilitating arms trade with allies such as the UK, "even if the European Union views this only as a symbolic step".
The Bush administration has further assailed the EU on this issue by pointing to continued Chinese violations of human rights. Rachel Stohl of the Center for Defense Information says the human-rights argument is a red herring. "We can't underestimate the power of competition behind these [US arms export] reforms," she points out. "Markets are very tight. The United States wants to make sure it has access to these new markets."
All-or-nothing controls make poor policy
Joel Johnson of the Aerospace Industries Association proposes a compromise on exports to China. "All-or-nothing controls are probably poor policy," he says. "We should be sitting down with our European brethren to talk about the high-end things we don't want exported to China."
The Bush administration was expected to push arms-trade reforms through more than a year ago. But a string of more critical events - September 11, the war in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq - have delayed the unveiling of plans to overhaul defense-trade relations with allies. According to one State Department official, "We're hoping to have it rolled out soon. It has not yet gone to the president."
The delays involve not only war but politics. The administration "might have gotten tripped up on its own rhetoric of 'you're either with us or against us'," says William Hartung, arms-trade expert and author of the recent book How Much Are You Making on the War, Daddy? Isolationists within the Republican Party are not happy with the idea of facilitating arms transfers to allies that may not always support US policy. As Hartung summarizes this argument, "If you can't trust them, it doesn't make sense to sell them everything on an open basis."
Although D-Trade is now up and running, the other elements of the reforms may wait until after the US elections in November. The State Department is optimistic. But Hartung predicts that if the Bush administration were smart, "it would wait until after the elections - to avoid being accused of loosening restrictions on the merchants of death". Joel Johnson also expects further delays. "We'll have to wait until after the elections. Congress will be sidetracked, the executive branch will be sidetracked. In the next administration, whether Bush or [Democratic presidential contender John] Kerry, lots of people will change and you'll have another shot at finding someone who thinks export controls need to be changed."
John Feffer (www.johnfeffer.com) is the author, most recently, of North Korea, South Korea: US Policy at a Time of Crisis.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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EU turns to India's arms market
By Stephen Blank
Much diplomatic and journalistic ink has flowed recently concerning China's efforts to get the European Union to terminate its sanctions and resume arms sales to it. France and Germany, too, have each expressed the desire to persuade the European Commission, the EU's governing authority, to lift the sanctions. On the other hand, Washington weighed in strongly against this move, creating substantial pressure on the EU. Therefore it is not surprising that at its meeting on March 25-26, the commission said nothing publicly about the entire issue.
However, the EU has already decided conclusively to move in a big way into the Asian arms market, and not only with China, at least for now. Instead, its flagship arms company, the European Aeronautical Defense and Space Company (EADS) is pushing joint ventures with India, China's main continental rival in Asia.
The EU's motives are quite obvious. EADS executives predict that 20 percent of its arms sales will come from the Asia-Pacific by 2009, and 30 percent by 2015, and that does not necessarily include China or the Chinese defense market. Since current sales account for 7 percent of its revenues, this means a tripling and then quadrupling of current sales within a decade.
Moreover, India is increasingly viewed as a promising market for all kinds of high-tech ventures. Its economy is expected to grow nearly 10 percent this year, and Indians hope that this means the breakthrough to sustained long-term development, like China's trajectory in the past decade. But even if the Indian economy grows at about 6 percent annually, as it has over the past decade, this opens up substantial opportunities for foreign arms companies, especially as India has recently undertaken a vast modernization of its weapons systems, and is also trying to overhaul its dysfunctional defense industry.
Although EADS concluded an agreement in 2003 with China's state-owned AVIC II aircraft manufacturing group, the sanctions still in place inhibit military sales to China. No such barrier exists regarding India. And it is highly unlikely that Washington, which is itself expanding its defense sales to India, will object on the same grounds to EADS or the EU's presence in India, although the commercial rivalry between them may cause tensions. EADS' civilian center of gravity is the Airbus to deal with an expected increase of Asian passenger traffic, which will be considerably fueled by India and China. But its defense sales to India are equally, if not more interesting. The EU, like other sellers to India: Russia, Israel and the United States, will move away from "sub-contracting helicopters or selling missiles" to a more elaborate system. As reported by Aviation Week and Space Technology, this system entails long-term partnerships with both state and privately owned Indian defense firms.
This development is in line with India's program for reforming its indigenous defense industry through privatization and opening it up to foreign competition so that it will be forced to become more competitive and allow India to become a major weapons exporter in its own right.
Thus Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, (HAL), India's major defense company, will become a global supplier for EADS of parts, components and assemblies. In other words, EADS and HAL will become partners in designing, developing and producing specific versions of helicopters, and this relationship might then spread to other weapons plants. In this respect, the development of EU relations with India's defense industry will resemble the Indo-Russian agreement to design, develop and produce a fifth-generation fighter aircraft.
So this kind of relationship is now becoming a common one in international defense relationships. Similarly, other EU members' firms are now submitting proposals to India's Ministry of Defense to build engines and air-to-air, air defense and anti-tank missiles. Undoubtedly, such partnerships will spread to other weapons systems and create a network that goes beyond leasing and sub-contracting to encompass joint design, development, production and marketing for a whole range of weapons. This goes far beyond anything now possible with China.
And it certainly accords with the growing diversification of India's foreign weapons purchases, a process that has led to major contracts with France, Israel, Great Britain and Italy, not to mention the US and Russia. Indeed, Indian analysts suspect that India will further Westernize its purchases due to the high price and relatively low quality of Russian weapons, parts and servicing compared to European, Israeli, and American systems. While this does not mean suspension of purchases from Russia, it does raise disturbing trends for the Russian defense industry. Both official and expert commentaries have expressed growing resentment and concern over India's excessive dependence on Russian arms, high prices, poor quality and service, and the slow pace of negotiations with Russia. For example, the negotiations for the Gorshkov aircraft carrier lasted for 10 years, almost as long as it would take to build one, and India ultimately had to pay dearly for the retrofitting of the carrier's Mig-29 fighters, which are no longer state of the art.
If India turns away from Russia it will represent a major blow to Russia's struggling defense industry, which gets 40 percent of its foreign sales revenues from exports to India, its largest customer. It will become even harder for that industry to compete globally or to become a reliable supplier to Russia's armed forces, a condition which it has yet to achieve. In turn, this could seriously set back Russia's industrial, defense industrial and overall military modernization.
EU sales to China, if they do materialize, will similarly affect Russian defense manufacturers, who now sell about 30 percent of their annual exports to China. Though China now buys between US$2 billion and $2.5 billion annually from them, increasingly it is buying technology and know-how rather than new weapons. Certainly, China, too, would prefer, all things being equal, to buy high quality foreign systems that it could then indigenize as India is now trying to do. Its track record with Russian purchases suggests as much to foreign observers. Thus if the EU lifts sanctions, not only will that seriously affect its relations with Washington and US ties to major EU producers like France and Germany, that decision will also seriously hurt Russian interests.
Though the Russian angle has not been explored publicly in the diplomatic moves and countermoves now under way, one can rest assured that the Kremlin fully understands what is at stake. Its efforts to obtain or at least retain market share in these two countries will necessarily increase, making the international arms market even more of a buyers' market, where India and China can make demands of sellers that would hitherto have been unthinkable.
Moreover, if the Asian-Pacific market becomes so much more competitive, we can expect a renewed push by Russia elsewhere: Southeast Asia, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and South America in particular. But it is by no means clear that these areas can make up for what the Russian defense industry might lose if these projects go through and if sanctions are lifted. Nevertheless, the growth of Asian-Pacific economies clearly coincides with growth in their overall technological, and especially defense technological, and defense capabilities. And these growing capabilities may well come at the further expense of Russia's already fragile economic and strategic position in Asia.
Stephen Blank is an independent security affairs analyst residing in Harrisburg, PA.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)


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France 'sought secret UN deal' in bid to avert row
Blair told of US plans in 2001, says report
Ewen MacAskill, diplomatic editor
Monday April 5, 2004
The Guardian
The French government offered a surprise compromise to the US president, George Bush, in the run-up to the war in Iraq, according to a detailed investigation published in Vanity Fair this week.
The report undermines the public perception of France standing resolutely against the US and Britain in the United Nations security council as the two countries tried to win a second resolution in support of war.
According to a 25,000-word investigation into the diplomatic wranglings in that pre-war period, the French government was offering to cut a behind-the-scenes deal with the US government.
At a lunch in the White House on January 13 last year, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, an adviser to the president, Jacques Chirac, and Jean-David Levitte, the French ambassador in Washington, put the deal to Condoleezza Rice, the US national security adviser.
In an effort to avoid a bitter US-French row, the French officials suggested that if the US was intent on war, it should not seek the second resolution, according to highly placed US sources cited by Vanity Fair.
Instead, the two said that the first resolution on Iraq, 1441, passed the previous year, provided enough legal cover for war and that France would keep quiet if the US went to war on that basis.
The deal would suit the French by maintaining its "good cop" status in the Arab world and safeguarding Franco-US relations.
But the deal died when Tony Blair led a doomed attempt to secure a second resolution to try to satisfy Labour MPs and government lawyers who questioned the legitimacy of the war. France ultimately vetoed the resolution.
The investigation also claims that Mr Blair and Mr Bush discussed war against Iraq only nine days after the attack on New York on September 11 2001, even though Mr Blair was insisting up until just before the Iraq war began on March 20 last year that no decision had been taken.
Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British ambassador to Washington, is quoted in Vanity Fair as saying Mr Blair told Mr Bush over dinner that the US president should not be distracted by Iraq from the war against al-Qaida.
But Mr Bush replied: "I agree with you, Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq."
Sir Christopher said it was clear "that when we did come back to Iraq, it wouldn't be to discuss smarter sanctions". The government line is that war was never inevitable because Mr Blair and his foreign secretary, Jack Straw, successfully pressed the US to go down the UN route, which it did, and that Iraq could have avoided war by complying with UN demands.
In another twist, the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, admitted over the weekend that his claim at a UN security council meeting before the war about Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction might have been incorrect. He told US reporters that his allegation that Iraq had mobile laboratories for preparing WMD might not have been based, as he claimed at the time, on solid evidence.
Mr Powell said: "I'm not the intelligence community, but I probed and I made sure, as I said in my presentation, these are multi-sourced. Now, if the sources fell apart we need to find out how we've gotten ourselves in that position."

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Never say inevitable
An Islamist terrorist cell is surrounded and blows itself up in Spain; eight terror suspects are arrested in greater London; a plot to gas the tube is apparently foiled. We shouldn't be surprised, says intelligence expert Crispin Black - we have all the resources we need to overcome this terrorist threat
Wednesday April 7, 2004
The Guardian
In his recent evidence to the 9/11 Commission, Richard Armitage, George Bush's deputy secretary of state, said: "I don't think we had the imagination required to envisage such an attack." I sympathised, because the same thing had happened to me - as it has, I suspect, happened to most intelligence analysts at some time or other. My own imagination failed in the run-up to the fall of the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica in July 1995, when I was the head of the Yugoslav crisis cell in the defence intelligence staff. I expected Mladic, the Serb commander, to shoot any Bosnian Muslim fighters who fell into his hands, but it never occurred to me that he would murder all the men and boys in the city. I never made the same mistake again. In the current war against Islamist terrorists, we must ensure that we are never again taken by surprise as we were on September 11 2001.
So how are we doing so far? In many ways, the news is good. The raids in the home counties on March 30, and the rumours of the thwarting of a chemical attack that emerged yesterday, suggest that our security services are able to acquire actionable intelligence on which to act. Source information is rightly highly classified, but the March 30 swoops, which netted not only men but bomb-making material, indicate either good signals intelligence (better than the "chatter" we so often hear about), or a very good human source.
To an extent this is hardly surprising. The US and UK, in concert with other English-speaking allies, operate the most powerful interception system on the planet. Codenamed Echelon, this system of listening stations and computers is able to "sniff" millions of messages a day for hints of terrorists communicating with each other. We should remember that the majority of the UK's Islamic community is just like everyone else - they condemn terrorism and would alert the authorities to suspicious groups or individuals. And there will always be men prepared to keep their eyes and ears open in return for money or the promise of a helping hand with the immigration or welfare authorities.
So we should be encouraged by our recent successes against terrorists. We can also take some reassurance from a good general counter-terrorism record stretching back nearly 60 years. Most recently, our record against the IRA has been good. After a steep learning curve in the early years, the army and the intelligence services managed to squeeze the IRA, primarily through surveillance. IRA teams never knew when their operations had been compromised. This kind of life is wearing and diverts the energies of terrorists away from attacks and towards their own security. To some extent this kind of atmosphere can deter even suicide terrorists - the last thing they want is Parkhurst rather than Paradise.
So how do Islamist terrorists plan and mount their attacks - and how can intelligence help to thwart them? Although most such groups attempt to maintain a low profile, we already have one inestimable advantage in our battle against them: we know where to look. This kind of terrorism has a kind of epidemiology that tends to lead back to various forms of extremist preaching or mentoring. It is generally practised by young men in their 20s - the individuals arrested in the UK on March 30 are between 17 and 32.
They do not attack out of nowhere. Nearly all attacks are a long time in gestation, and even a suicide terrorist is invariably the final link in a long organisational chain involving others who have no intention of killing themselves. Remember, it is only the finished-product suicide bomber who is supposedly undeterred by death. Everyone else within the chain or in support roles falls within the usual rules.
For example, target selection, the first stage of a terrorist operation, usually requires some reconnaissance. The Spanish authorities will probably discover in time that the Madrid terrorists took the appropriate trains more than once, and probably held a dress rehearsal for the operation. Secondly, the terrorists have to be recruited. Suicide terrorists usually require some form of brainwashing, or "grooming". In addition, terrorists have to get hold of explosives: in Madrid they appear to have bartered hashish in return for explosives used in the mining industry, while in London the March 30 plotters appear to have stolen a large quantity of fertiliser from a farm in Abergavenny. All these activities are difficult to mount without attracting attention.
Sometimes the intelligence is not specific. Usually this means that electronic intelligence alludes to the possibility of an attack - this is what is meant by "chatter". Or it may be that a human source has picked up a rumour of an attack, but is unable to pin down details. This is probably what lay behind the cancelling of BA flights to Washington and Riyadh earlier this year and the alert at Heathrow in 2003.
This kind of warning is difficult for the authorities to handle. If they put in place extra security measures, they are accused of over-reacting. But if you are a GCHQ officer at Cheltenham monitoring email traffic between Islamist extremists and you start to pick up vague messages that might suggest Heathrow is being targeted, you have little choice but to act. In the days when the IRA was our principal problem, it was easier: a slight increase in security and vigilance around Heathrow could well deter an IRA operation.
The Madrid bombings on March 11 also give us some pointers in how to uncover terrorist plots. Far from being a daring and brilliant attack, it looks, on deeper examination, to have been a ruthless but bog-standard terrorist operation which could have been revealed at any stage if the authorities had enjoyed a little more luck. The mobile phones used to set off the bombs were bought from a dealer already under observation by the Spanish police. A stolen car carrying the terrorists and their payload was stopped for a routine traffic check in February. A further attack on the high-speed Madrid - Seville railway line on Friday April 2 appears to have been thwarted by basic security checks.
The mechanics of the plot became apparent soon after the attacks. A number of arrests were made quickly, and most of the remainder of the gang, including the ringleader, were tracked down to a flat in the Madrid suburb of Leganes on the Saturday night, where they blew themselves up. Two further members of the gang may be still on the run, but within three weeks of the outrages this cell appears to be neutralised: a significant post-attack success for the Spaniards. All of which suggests that despite the organisation behind the original bombings on March 11, the terrorists' own security plans were not that sophisticated.
Will it happen here? Certainly, public alertness in this country has increased over the past few weeks, but preaching the "inevitability" of an attack, as the Metropolitan police commissioner did on March 16, is a dangerous message. It suggests that we cannot so arrange our security affairs as to stand a good chance of thwarting catastrophic attacks. This is a bad idea, as any general or football manager will explain. Assigning inevitability to Islamist terror attacks risks aggrandising the terrorist in his own mind as well as that of the public. The home secretary has rightly now modified the message.
My guess is that both our political and security force leaders are going to have to raise their game in the years ahead. European countries must ensure that they improve cooperation with each other. It may also be necessary to consider restricting free movement throughout the EU, which may be giving terrorists too much operational freedom. (Interestingly, the Spanish authorities intend to suspend the Schengen agreement temporarily prior to the wedding of the heir to the Spanish throne in May.)
But tightening existing procedures may not be enough. We need to think imaginatively about how we will combat Islamist terrorism in the medium to long term. I have two suggestions which I believe will help us win this war. First, the English-speaking intelligence world, so often dismissive of European agencies, should learn from their European counterparts, especially the French. Both the American and British models have come to rely too much on technical intelligence, monitoring of electronic bits and pieces which rarely present a coherent picture. The French arrange things differently, basing their work on the human intelligence acquired by the Renseignements G?n?raux, a section of the French police based in Paris. France's president and prime minister receive a daily report on the mood of the capital, which frequently concentrates on the mood within France's five million-strong Islamic community. Although it will report unfolding operational developments rapidly up the chain of command, it is principally interested in moods and intentions. This system is manpower-intensive and expensive, but it provides France with a better understanding of the sources of Islamist terror within its own population than any other European government.
Second, we should widen the recruiting base of our intelligence services. Currently, we have highly effective and professional "doers". What we need now is "thinkers", men and women who can steal a conceptual and intellectual march on Islamist terror. Somehow we need to entice our best analytical brains into the intelligence services. After all, the great triumphs of British intelligence in the second world war were largely the responsibility of talented individuals imported from the private sector at short notice. Some of the most outstanding analysts at Bletchley Park were recruited through a crossword competition held by the Daily Telegraph in November 1941.
Islamist terror is not as great a threat to our way of life as nazism, but the dangers are sufficient, and will persist for long enough, for us to look imaginatively at who we should employ in the intelligence war that will underpin our safety in the decades to come.

? Crispin Black was a government intelligence analyst until 2002.

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Jingle trucks don't pass without OK from the `J-Team'

By Christian Lowe
Times staff writer
PFC Justin Payne, from Burlington Iowa, climbs down after inspecting a "jingle truck." The decorated trucks, driven by local drivers, are used to ferry supplies to forward operating bases in Afghanistan. -- Steve Elfers / Military Times
FORWARD OPERATING BASE SOLERNO, Afghanistan -- They call themselves the "J-Team." Judging from the seriousness of their gaze, these warriors clearly aren't going to break under pressure.
Their job is crucial and they know it. And it doesn't look like there's any way they're going to be jawed into bending their will.
Desperate Afghan drivers are begging them anyway, hoping these stern soldiers will let them pass so they can drop off their cargo and be on their way.
Rather than ship supplies to this base 100 miles from Bagram on secured Army convoys, the soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment who occupy this base contract out trucking to local drivers who brave the sometimes-treacherous byways of Afghanistan for the daylong trip.
Each day, dozens of trucks wait to enter the base. They are required to wait outside the wire for a few days -- a quarantine intended to set off any timed explosives they might be hiding or to force away a would-be terrorist on a tight schedule.
"If they start getting edgy or acting strange, we'll know they've got something bad in there," said Capt. Dave Butler, a native of Long Island, N.Y., and the unit's logistics officer.
Rows of colorful trucks parked end to end waited to enter camp, their innocuous cargoes enlivened by intricate paintings and dangly accents festooned above their cabs. The soldiers here call them "jingle trucks," and their entry into this base is at the mercy of the four-man J-Team.
They've been doing this mission nearly their whole deployment here, and these airborne infantrymen relish the power.
"No way, man. Tell him if he keeps up with this he's not going to get in for a week!" one of the J-Team said to an interpreter. The crowd backed off, kicking up a fine dust that clung to their tattered sandals.
The four soldiers with Headquarters Company, Support Platoon certainly would rather be humping it in these rugged mountains looking for bad guys -- what are colloquially called "anti-coalition members," or ACMs. But they're keeping busy with their job and finding time to have a little fun, too.
As PFC Matthew Carstensen checks the truck cabs for weapons, Spc. David Farnsworth peers beneath the undercarriage for hidden bombs with a mirror at the end of a pole. They shuffle through the crowd, pulling drivers toward the trucks that will make it in today, sweeping a metal detecting wand around them for one final check.
But sometimes, as on this day, something stops them in their tracks.
"They say that truck won't start and needs to be pushed," the Afghan interpreter, Wazir Jan, said, pointing to a road-weary rig just a few feet away.
"You think these things will start with a key," Farnsworth jibed, "you gotta be kidding me!"
The drivers looked at the soldiers, their eyes expectant.
"They got all these guys here, tell them to push it themselves," team leader, Sgt. Luke Bunner, said.
After Jan translated Bunner's answer, the crowd erupted in what sounded like an argument over responsibility. Then they all moved over to the broken down truck, and with a heave, the engine turned and it was soon in line to enter the base.
With that, the soldiers bundled up their interpreter and mounted back into their Humvee, escorting the Afghan trucks to the logistics areas one more time.
They'll do this again tomorrow and the next day, each time another argument with the truckers, more stalled vehicles and lousy excuses, until they leave this arid land for their home base in Alaska.
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Troops in Korea take part in urban-warfare anti-terror drill
By Hans Greimel
Associated Press
SEOUL, South Korea -- Soldiers are training this week for possible urban warfare with terrorists or communist commandos in South Korea, practicing house-to-house combat against a fictitious North Korean platoon leader dubbed "Kim Murderman."
Sweeping through a model city outside the capital, Seoul, about 160 military police are taking part in the drills -- shooting down pop-up targets, raiding mock apartment blocks and clearing buildings of "opposition forces," said Lt. Col. Steven Boylan, a spokesman for the 8th Army.
The drills, which end April 8, are part of regular training for U.S. troops on the divided Korean peninsula -- where North Korea operates the world's largest special forces, with more than 100,000 commandos.
But the training also comes amid stepped up anti-terrorism security in South Korea after the Spain train bombings that killed more than 200 people, and new threats against allies of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
Seoul plans to send 3,600 troops to Iraq, making it the biggest coalition partner after the United States and Britain.
This week's training scenarios include one in which a platoon of North Korean terrorists, led by "Kim Murderman," seizes an apartment block and must be captured or killed.
Kim is a common Korean surname -- and also that of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, whose country is on the State Department's list of terrorism-sponsoring nations.
"It's a made-up scenario that is close enough to what you might consider realism to give them something to train toward," Boylan said.
Col. Peter Champagne, chief of the 8th Military Police Brigade drilling this week, told the U.S. military newspaper Stars & Stripes that preparation would be key if war breaks out with communist North Korea.
"We see what our soldiers are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan in urban environments," Champagne said. "Korea has a lot of cities too, and if we ever get into a conflict with North Korea, one of our missions is to defeat North Korean special forces in urban environments."
The United States keeps 37,000 troops in South Korea as a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War.
Combined with about 600,000 South Korean soldiers, they stare off across the world's most heavily fortified border at North Korea's army of 1.1 million troops, the world's fifth largest.
If war occurs, North Korea's special operations forces are expected to try opening a "second front" in the South by infiltrating and attacking air bases and communications nodes, and by interrupting the flow of U.S. reinforcements, the U.S. Forces Korea predicted in a background paper on North Korean capabilities.
Washington branded North Korea a terrorism-sponsoring country after linking it to the 1987 bombing of a South Korean jet near Myanmar that killed 115 people.
The isolated country is currently engaged in a standoff with its neighboring nations and the United States over the development of nuclear weapons. Washington believes North Korea already has one or two atomic bombs and could quickly make more.

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Stryker Brigade draws praise for Iraq work
By Matthew Cox
Times staff writer
Most know the soldiers from 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT) as the Army's first Stryker Brigade Combat Team. But in some parts of Iraq, they're known as the "Ghost Soldiers."
That's what came out of reporters round-table meeting at the Pentagon Monday, where Army acquisitions officials praised the performance of the first Stryker brigade in Iraq.
"The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division is performing extremely effectively in combat in Iraq. The SBCT has effectively used speed and situational understanding to kill and capture dozens of enemy fighters, said Col. Nick Justice, acting assistant deputy for acquisition and systems management for the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics and Technology.
Most of the meeting dealt with the Army's plan for fielding five additional Stryker brigades.
But officials pointed out that the senior leadership is pleased with the Fort Lewis, Wash.-based 3-2's ability to launch its infantry forces on short notice into areas such as Samarra in December during a combined operation with the 4th Infantry Division to clean out former regime loyalists and other troublemakers.
"They have earned the nickname of the "Ghost Soldiers," as the non-compliant forces have great difficulty detecting their arrival," Justice said.
Before 3-2 deployed to the Iraqi theater in November, a key concern among observers was whether the Stryker vehicles would provide enough protection against rocket-propelled grenade attacks.
Justice said that the slat armor installed on the Strykers in Kuwait had performed well so far.
"The [Stryker] system has proven survivable as advertised," he said. "There have been five separate documented attacks with improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades. The most serious injury as a result of those attacks has been a broken ankle."
However, three soldiers from 3-2's 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment troops died Dec. 8 when a road embankment at Duluiyah apparently collapsed under two Stryker vehicles, causing them to roll over into the canal upside down. The Army Safety Center is still investigating the accident.
Overall though, Justice and other Army officials maintain that the Stryker program is a success, since it started out as a concept just four years ago.
"From concept, to acquisition, to fielding of systems, to testing, evaluation, training and employment of the first brigade took only four years, Justice said. "That is precedent-setting. It historically takes the Army about 10 years to acquire, test, and field a major system to the force."
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Saddam being held in Qatar: report
Tue Apr 6, 7:19 PM ET Add Mideast - AFP to My Yahoo!

LONDON (AFP) - Deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein (news - web sites) is being held at a US military base in Qatar, rather than in Iraq (news - web sites).
Following his capture by US forces in December last year, Saddam was first moved to a US aircraft carrier in the Gulf for interrogation, a British newspaper reported, without citing its sources.
He was then -- at a time not specified by the report -- transferred to Qatar under great secrecy, with even the state's royal family not informed of his presence.
Major violence in Iraq over recent days which has seen more than 100 Iraqis killed as well as 20 coalition troops, meant Qatar was now seen as a far safer place to keep the ousted leader, the paper added.
In December, Qatar's government dismissed earlier news reports that Saddam had been moved to the emirate, while Iraq's interim Governing Council insisted that he was still being held in Baghdad.
At the end of the last month, Saddam's wife left Syria for Qatar, according to a Jordanian lawyer who says she retained him to represent her husband.


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Mrs. Clinton Pens Afterword for Paperback
Tue Apr 6, 4:22 PM ET

By HILLEL ITALIE, AP National Writer
NEW YORK - Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (news - web sites) says that she's still not quite sure why her memoirs, "Living History," sold so well.
In a four-page afterword to the paperback edition, which comes out April 19, the former first lady lists a few possibilities.
"I knew that some readers just wanted to see how I would explain the personal challenges I had faced," she writes. "Apparently, a few wanted a signed copy to sell on eBay. Others were eager to see me in the flesh and decide for themselves whether or not I was a normal human being."
Clinton received $8 million from Simon & Schuster to write "Living History" and didn't take long to earn back her advance. Nearly 1.7 million copies of the hardcover are in print and a 525,000 first printing is planned for the paperback.
Her afterword is both earnest and lighthearted, an author's reflections and a politician's commentary.
She accuses the Bush administration of hostility to the middle class, and says that efforts to get along with her opponents, "including a few who led the charge for my husband's impeachment," have often been defeated by "ideology and partisanship."
Clinton toured five countries for the book and signed copies until her hands became swollen, leading to a "newfound appreciation for ice packs and hand braces." By tour's end, her signature resembled "the tracks of a confused chicken."
She became convinced that her "life, though lived in the spotlight and blessed with greater opportunities, echoed the experiences of millions of other Americans." Some readers, however, had other agendas.
Clinton writes of being approached by two long-haired, bearded men, "looking like characters from `Lord of the Rings,'" who wanted her to join their campaign to "let men look as God intended." She recalls a man who handed her a business card with the handwritten inscription, "If you're ever single, give me a call."
Lines were long and one young fan entertained the crowd by playing the violin. Another time, Clinton looked up and saw her grinning daughter, Chelsea, waiting her turn for a signed book.
At one stop, "Living History" was upstaged by an even greater publishing phenomenon. Clinton describes a night last summer when she was signing copies, only to have hundreds of kids rush into the store, "not to see me, but to camp out until midnight to snatch up the first copies of the new Harry Potter (news - web sites)."

>> STATE OF CONCERN - ISRAEL?


http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/25_identity_crisis_israel_arab_citz.pdf

Israel's House Divided
From the April 12 / April 19, 2004 issue: Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and identity politics.
by Peter Berkowitz
04/12/2004, Volume 009, Issue 30
Jerusalem
FENCES LOCK OUT. In the process, they lock in. So it is perfectly foreseeable that Israel's decision to keep out terrorists by constructing a security fence separating itself from 3 million West Bank Palestinian Arabs will also work to keep in 1.2 million Arab citizens of Israel and tie their fate more closely to that of the Jewish state. Less foreseeable are the precise consequences for the Arab minority, now almost 20 percent of the population and growing, and for Israel's character as a state that is both Jewish and democratic.
A new report of the International Crisis Group--an influential NGO with headquarters in Brussels that conducts "field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict"--argues that the real issue is Israel's lamentable history of discrimination against its Arab minority. Entitled "Identity Crisis: Israel and its Arab Citizens," the report calls for massive investment by the government in Arab communities. And it recommends an extensive array of programs to promote mutual understanding between Israeli Jews and Arabs, because "mutual perceptions typically have been characterized at best by indifference, at worst by total misunderstanding and mistrust."
On a mid-March trip to Israel, I had an opportunity to discuss the condition of Israel's Arab minority with Israeli Jews and Arabs. Contrary to the International Crisis Group report, the deeper problem seems to lie in the conflicting opinions Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs have about Israel's guiding principles and core promise.
The collapse of Oslo at Camp David in the summer of 2000 and the violent demonstrations by Israeli Arabs in October 2000 in which Israeli police killed 13 marked a watershed in the two communities' relationship. Long pent-up grievances among Israeli Arabs were brought out into the open, and doubts among Israeli Jews about the loyalty to the state of their fellow citizens were crystallized. But if there was a single turning point in Jewish perceptions, it came long before--in 1947, when the Arabs in Palestine emphatically rejected the option of a Jewish state and indeed any option other than an Arab state in all of Mandatory Palestine. Israelis were compelled to conclude that the Arabs were not interested in coexistence. The conclusion was fortified by the war launched by five Arab states on the fledgling Jewish state--which spurred the exodus of hundred of thousands of Palestinian Arabs from their homes and resulted in an Israel more than 50 percent larger than contemplated by the U.N. partition plan.
Even after 1966, when Israel lifted the martial law it had imposed on Arab communities after the 1949 Armistice agreement, Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs continued to live separate lives. While one could and still can find small towns where Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs mingle in markets and caf?s, the two peoples have mainly coexisted by attending different schools, shopping at different stores, and socializing in different circles. Most Israeli Jews have never really ceased to regard Israeli Arabs as a potential fifth column. And most Israeli Arabs are at best unmoved by and generally estranged from Israel's Jewish symbols and public culture.
It can't be emphasized enough that Israeli law promises all citizens full civil and political rights--and because of Israel's commitment to this promise its Arab citizens remain far and away the freest Arabs in the Middle East. It should also be stressed, as Knesset member Amnon Rubenstein pointed out in a recent article, that the Israeli welfare state has significantly reduced the tremendous gaps between Jews and Arabs--in education, health, and social and economic well-being--that Israel inherited from British Mandatory Palestine. Yet it must also be said, as a substantial majority of Israelis now recognize, that Israel failed--out of fear, out of indifference, out of bigotry--to allocate to Arab communities a fair share of state resources for roads, hospitals, and schools, and to fully integrate their fellow citizens into the nation's social and political life.
The 1993 Oslo accords seemed to many to herald a new era, starting with mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank and promising something approaching social and economic integration. Oslo was both welcomed and feared by Israeli Arabs. While feeling a sense of liberation from the dilemma of having to choose between Israel and the Palestinian cause, they were also apprehensive that once a final agreement was reached, they would find themselves marginalized in both states. The collapse of Oslo and Arafat's launching of the second Intifada reinstated, and intensified, the old dilemma.
What do Arab citizens of Israel ask from the state today? One demand, espoused by an increasing number of relatively moderate Arabs, is to turn Israel into what Knesset member Azmi Bishara calls "a state of all its citizens." Head of the National Democratic Assembly party (Balad), which holds 3 of the 120 seats in the Knesset and has a growing Arab following, Bishara has outraged Israeli Jews by his friendly visit with Syrian dictator Bashar Assad and by his warm words for the Palestinians' "national liberation struggle." But it is his party's political program that is genuinely radical. For by the anodyne slogan "a state of all its citizens," Bishara, former head of the philosophy department at Bir Zeit University, means a secular, democratic, and most emphatically non-Jewish state. In contrast to American minorities, which have traditionally demanded to fully share in the state's founding principles, Israel's Arab minority increasingly demands that Israel revise its founding principles by ceasing to be a Jewish state.
For their part, Israeli Jews today are more likely than not to forthrightly acknowledge Israel's history of discrimination against its Arab minority. They are quick to add that making good on the promise of civic equality, written into Israel's Declaration of Independence and Basic Laws, is indispensable, both as a moral imperative and as a strategic necessity. But for an overwhelming majority, the "red-line," the point beyond which they will not go in accommodating Arab demands, is abandoning the idea that Israel is by right and must remain a state that is both Jewish and democratic.
Sitting in the Tel Aviv University faculty club, Likudnik and three-time former defense minister Moshe Arens gets right to the point. "For 55 years, Israeli Arabs have suffered from total neglect." The only solution, says Arens, who regards himself as an old-fashioned liberal, is to integrate the Arab population fully into Israeli society. Reform, for him, involves two essentials. Beyond providing equal resources to Arab communities, Israel also must, Arens believes, insist that Arabs--who at present are exempted--serve in the army. Arens takes obvious pride in his role in forming the army's first Bedouin brigade, which, he notes beaming like a father, serves today with distinction in the Gaza Strip. And he adds that the small community of non-Jewish and also non-Arab Druze in Israel have demonstrated valor as soldiers and officers. In his view, no proposals for alternative forms of national service will do. "If you create the impression that an Arab young man who does national service as a laboratory assistant in Umm Al-Fahm [an Arab village] is doing the same thing for Israel as a young man who goes into the infantry, that is not the case. It is not true. You are only going to push the two communities farther apart."
I ask Arens about what is controversially referred to as the "demographic threat," the fear that high birth rates will someday produce an Arab majority in Israel. He scowls. The old-fashioned liberal in him is offended. "I don't talk about the demographic threat. I don't like that phrase. I don't even like to allow it to pass my lips. I can easily see where the Arab population feels insulted." Arens does think that Israel should work to reduce the birth rate of Israeli Arabs, which, among the 90 percent who are Muslim, is among the highest in the world. Not, he explains, because of demographic considerations, but because lowering the birth rate and increasing literacy will improve the quality of their lives.
In Jerusalem, over breakfast at the guest house at Mishkenot Sha'ananim, just a few hundred yards from the great stone walls of the Old City, I discuss this delicate subject with Ruth Gavison. Slight in build and fearsome in intellect, Gavison is a widely respected professor of constitutional law whose natural political home is on the left, but who increasingly finds herself at odds with her longtime political allies for her willingness to find the fault on both sides, not just the Israeli.
While she is adamant about protecting the civil and political rights of Arab citizens of Israel, and stresses that Israel must immediately invest in infrastructure in Arab communities, Gavison believes that solving the conflict with the Palestinians beyond the Green Line is the indispensable precondition to tempering tensions with Arab citizens in Israel: "It is very hard to separate the question of the Israeli Arabs from the question of the political situation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The two issues are totally intertwined. Because, without a two-state solution, it is very difficult for Israel to say credibly to the Arabs in Israel, you have to choose between being proud citizens of a Palestinian nation-state or loyal citizens of the Jewish state. If there is no two-state solution, you really don't give Arab citizens of Israel an adequate response to their claim that they too want to have a place where their culture and where their language are dominant. However, if you give them their own nation-state, it is possible to ask them to remain a minority in the Jewish nation-state."
Nevertheless, Gavison is worried about the readiness of Israel's Arab citizens to live with a state whose symbols and public culture reflect the national aspirations of the Jewish people. She tells me that the younger generation is more radical, that its sense of Palestinian identity is much stronger, as is its determination to have that identity affirmed by the state. "You see it in their writings," she said. "I do quite a lot of reading in their texts. They talk a lot about human rights and they talk about cultural and national identity, but they don't give much weight to duties of citizenship. On the one hand, they enjoy, and they invoke, and they use the rights of citizenship very effectively. On the other hand, they don't give the responsibilities of citizenship any moral weight whatsoever."
I ask her about Azmi Bishara's party. She is skeptical. "They invoke the ideal of a secular democratic state. But they don't really want a neutral state. They don't want to assimilate. They don't want to integrate. They want their autonomy, they want equal status for their language. They want a national existence. They want recognition as a national minority. They want institutions. They say it is a provisional condition that they are a minority here. They want Israel to stop being Jewish but they insist that there will be an Arab Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. They want Palestinian self-determination without conceding that Jews too are entitled to it."
Indeed, if there was a common thread running through the conversations I had with a variety of Arab citizens--including a star student at the Tel Aviv University Law School, a bureaucrat in the ministry of higher education, a high school teacher from the Galilee, and an editor for Israel's Arabic language broadcasts--it was the necessity of Israel's abandoning the Jewish character of the state in the name of its democratic character. Nobody put it more pointedly than Awatef Shiekh and Rim Alhatib, staff assistants respectively to Jamal Zahalka and Wasil Taha, the other two Knesset members of Bishara's National Democratic Assembly.
I interview them, in English with a smattering of Hebrew, in Shiekh's Knesset office. In dress, in demeanor, in facility at multitasking, in confident command of the issues, and in political passion, these twentysomething women could pass for Capitol Hill staffers. I told them it appeared that the heart of the matter was whether Israel, as a Jewish and democratic state, can respect the rights of its Arab minority. Her voice rising with indignation, Alhatib responded, "If Israel is both Jewish and democratic, it does not separate between religion and state. So therefore it can't be a democracy. A liberal democracy. Because one of the defining features of a democracy is to separate these things." Moreover, according to Alhatib, a state that is both Jewish and democratic imposes a cruel requirement on its non-Jewish minority: "If you want me to act like a Jewish citizen, it's like asking me to act against myself. Because if I want to stay Arab or Palestinian, I erase myself." She goes on to explain her party's mission in the Knesset: "What is very, very important for us, the most important thing that we do here, is to ask for equality in the civic area. But also to try to conserve our culture and our Palestinian identity." I follow up: In the end, though, are you saying that Israel cannot be "a state of all its citizens" so long as it remains both Jewish and democratic? "For sure," replies Awatef Shiekh.
Their sense of grievance is intense. I tell them that Israeli Jews to whom I have spoken insist on the urgent need to invest in their communities and to achieve civic equality. They scoff that talk is cheap. I ask them about alternative forms of national service. They distrust the idea of any form of national service because they think it will be used by the government as propaganda to distract from the question of their rights. They think that any appeal to Israel's security predicament in the effort to understand Israel's mistakes in the treatment of its Arab citizens is "just an excuse." Their presence at the Knesset, their freedom to make harsh criticism of the government, indeed the ability of their representatives to demand publicly that Israel renounce its Jewish character, is in their judgment not a credit to democracy in Israel but the least that the state owes them. Awatef Shiekh sums up the work of her party: "Balad is putting the government in front of a mirror and saying you are a cripple. You are not a democracy."
Later that day, I sit in the lobby of the American Colony Hotel in East Jerusalem with Sheerin Alaraj. She is a Palestinian woman in her early thirties who wears a head scarf and is a member of Fatah. She holds an Israeli identity card, but lives in a village near Jerusalem on the Palestinian side of the Green Line and cannot vote in national elections. I ask her to what extent Arab citizens of Israel are caught between two worlds. First she lets me know, in excellent English, that she prefers to speak of Palestinian citizens of Israel. Then she proceeds: "I'll tell you my problem with them. I think they are actually loyal to two conflicting sides. This creates serious problems. At the same time, it has lots of advantages. They are sort of standing in a liminal position. It is very convenient for them living in the state of Israel. At the same time, they are seen by Israeli Jews as joining the other side, joining the enemies of the state."
Are the perceptions of Israeli Jews accurate? "I do ask [Palestinian citizens of Israel] to be loyal to the Palestinian goals," Sheerin declares. You do? "Yes. And I have a problem with those who identify themselves as Israelis." Really? "Oh, I have a serious problem with them. It happened with me once in my life. Only once. We were in a group of Jews and Arabs, Palestinians from Israel, Jordanians, Egyptians, Lebanese, and Syrians. It was an international gathering and we decided to deal with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. And they asked us to go into groups. Arabic-speaking and Hebrew-speaking. And one of the Palestinians from Israel decided that he is an Israeli and that he would join the Israeli side. That was it. I never spoke to him again."
The crux of the problem for Alaraj is Israel's determination to be both Jewish and democratic. "That contradicts itself," she says as if it were self-evident. "It can't be democratic and Jewish at the same time. It is either democratic or it is Jewish." How should Arab citizens of Israel live in the face of this contradiction? "The first thing," explains Sheerin, "is not to serve in the army. This is the minimum I expect from them." But she wants more, including protest and demonstration. And she maintains hope: "By the time the Israelis give up this Jewish state thing, peace will emerge."
IS THERE IN THE END a fatal contradiction between Israel's Jewish character and its democratic form of government? Only if you accept the idea--rooted in Rousseau, promulgated for more than a century by Marxists, and embraced by left-leaning intellectuals throughout the Western world--that the aim of democracy is to reflect in its institutional forms peoples' highest hopes, overcome individual alienation, and make all its citizens whole in heart and soul. But there is a more reasonable understanding of liberal democracy, one more in keeping with its first principles and classical formulations and less bound up with utopian hopes and Communist nightmares.
In this understanding, majorities are given wide latitude to legislate, circumscribed principally by energetic protection of the individual rights that belong to all citizens. In this understanding, states do not have an obligation to affirm equally the grandest aspirations of all citizens, but they do have an obligation to ensure that all are equal before the law and that none falls below minimum or basic requirements for education, health, and material well-being. And in this understanding, there is no reason in principle why a Jewish state--one which is open to Jews throughout the world, and gives expression in its public culture to Jewish history, Jewish hopes, and Jewish ideals--cannot protect the political rights and civil liberties, including religious freedom, of all its citizens, provide them with equal opportunities, and require that they take their fair share of responsibility for maintaining the state. And there is every reason, grounded in both democratic and Jewish imperatives, why Israel ought to do precisely that.

Peter Berkowitz teaches at George Mason University School of Law and is a fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution.


? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.

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AP: Terror Group Trained in Indonesia
By JIM GOMEZ
ASSOCIATED PRESS

MANILA, Philippines (AP) -

Indonesian Islamic militants taught dozens of Abu Sayyaf recruits how to make cell phone-triggered bombs and other terror skills while dodging helicopters and troops in a jungle camp last year, one of several former hostages told The Associated Press.
About 40 men completed the bomb-making course and 60 were taught sniping and combat techniques from late 2002 to the middle of 2003 by two unidentified Indonesians, who officials believe were members of the al-Qaida-linked Jemaah Islamiyah network, the ex-hostage said.
The eyewitness accounts by Rolando Ulah and several other Filipinos once held by Abu Sayyaf provide a glimpse into clandestine terror training by suspected militants with ties to al-Qaida and to rebels in the southern Philippines, home to this mostly Roman Catholic nation's Muslim minority.
Philippine authorities have long suspected that Jemaah Islamiyah, the Indonesia-based al-Qaida ally, has links with the brutal Abu Sayyaf and the larger Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a Muslim separatist group accused of providing sanctuary and training grounds to foreign militants.
Jemaah Islamiyah has been blamed for numerous attacks and plots across Southeast Asia, including the Bali nightclub bombings that killed 202 people. Jemaah Islamiyah seeks to establish a hard-line Islamic caliphate comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the southern Philippines.
The Abu Sayyaf, known for kidnap-for-ransom schemes, has been blamed for bombings in the Philippines, including an attack in 2002 outside an army camp in southern Zamboanga city that killed an American Green Beret and two Filipino civilians. It has claimed responsibility for an explosion and fire on a ferry a month ago that killed more than 100 people.
According to the former hostage accounts, training started with a dawn jog and was capped at night by an Arabic reading of the Quran, the Muslim holy book and prayers led by the Indonesians, who spoke a smattering of Tagalog, English and Arabic. Their yells of "Allahu Akbar," or God is Great, echoed through the jungle as they trained, Ulah told AP.
"They were taught sniping, combat, tae kwon do and dismantling bombs and making bombs that could be set off using cell phones and alarm clocks," said Ulah, who escaped from the Abu Sayyaf last June after more than three years of captivity on southern Jolo island.
The Indonesians taught the young guerrillas, mostly recruits from Jolo and the nearby island of Basilan, how to safely open mortar rounds or unexploded bombs dropped by Philippine air force planes and picked up by villagers, who sold them to the rebels. The explosives could be rigged as timed bombs or their powder could be used to make separate bombs, he said.
Breaking into smaller groups, the recruits were taught to make bombs that could be remotely detonated using mobile phones or alarm clocks. Such bombs, made using soldering irons and other electrical equipment, were detonated in explosive tests in the jungle, he said. Ulah said the homemade bombs he saw were made from mortar rounds and unexploded bombs dropped by twin-propeller OV-10 Bronco attack planes.
The recruits also were taught to use the locally available M16 and M14 rifles as well as the grenade-firing M203, aiming at red targets on trees, he said. The training occasionally was disrupted by troops.
"Sometimes a Sikorsky (helicopter) would fly over and everybody would run for cover to avoid being seen. After it passed, they would resume training again," Ulah said.
The training, mostly at temporary encampments on Mount Buod Bagsak, in Jolo's coastal town of Patikul, was witnessed by three other former captives, including a sailor who escaped last year and told military interrogators the trainers were fellow Indonesians.
Ulah, 44, and four other hostages surfaced Monday when they were called by authorities to identify some of six alleged Abu Sayyaf guerrillas who reportedly were planning Madrid-style bombings in Manila. They sat down with AP on Monday for interviews.
Abu Sayyaf chief Khaddafy Janjalani left Jolo aboard boats with the two Indonesians and about 40 of the newly trained guerrillas a month before he escaped in June, Ulah said. The military, sometimes helped by U.S. surveillance planes, has been hunting Janjalani since.
Former hostages also disclosed seeing two Arab nationals who met Janjalani and stayed with the guerrillas for about a month in 2001 on southern Basilan island, where the rebels had a strong presence until they were crippled and displaced by U.S.-backed assaults. Basilan is near Jolo and Abu Sayyaf guerrillas are active in both impoverished islands.
Ulah was kidnapped in April 2000 with 20 Western tourists and Asian workers from Malaysia's Sipadan resort, where he was a handyman. The other hostages were ransomed off. Now under a government witness protection program, Ulah said he was helping the government prosecute the guerrillas so they would not be able to destroy innocent people's lives.

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>>

Interior accused of shortchanging Indians

By ROBERT GEHRKE
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON -- A court-appointed investigator has resigned from the multibillion-dollar lawsuit by American Indians against the Interior Department, contending the government wanted him off the case after he found evidence that energy companies got special treatment at the expense of impoverished Indians.
Alan Balaran, the special master in the case, contends his findings could have cost the companies millions of dollars and that department officials with ties to the industry "could not let this happen."
"Justice has been much too long in coming for the hundreds of thousands of Native Americans. ... Billions of dollars are at stake," according to the resignation letter made public Tuesday by U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth.
Balaran, who submitted his resignation on Monday, said his continued involvement in the case would only be a distraction.
The department had not seen the letter and declined comment Tuesday.
Balaran reported in August that private landowners near the Navajo Nation got as much as 20 times more money than Indian landowners from gas pipeline companies for rights to cross their land.
He also found holes in the department's Internet security that could put hundreds of millions of dollars in Indian royalties at risk from computer hackers. As a result, the department's Internet connections have been shut down three different times.
Keith Harper, a lawyer for the Indians, praised Balaran's work.
"Now we see what they do when you go and investigate something that touches their sacred cow, which is energy companies," Harper said.
The class-action suit, filed in 1996, on behalf of more than 300,000 Indians, alleges that for more than a century the government had mismanaged, misplaced or stolen billions of dollars in oil, gas, timber and grazing royalties that the department, by law and treaty, was assigned to manage on the Indians' behalf.
In 1999, Lamberth found that the department had breached its trust responsibility. He ordered the department to tally what the Indians were owed.
In a positive development, the parties had agreed late Friday to name two mediators - Charles Byron Renfrew, a former federal judge and Chevron Oil executive, and John G. Bickerman, a Washington lawyer and professional mediator - to conduct nonbinding settlement negotiations.
It was the first time in nearly three years that the sides held talks and the first time they agreed to mediators.
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Brazil says its nuke program is peaceful

By STAN LEHMAN
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER
Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim talks to the media during a luncheon at the American Chamber of Commerce in Rio de Janeiro, Monday, April 5, 2004. In an apparent bid to defuse possible tensions over international inspections of Brazil's nuclear facilities, Amorim reaffirmed the country's commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the peaceful objectives of its nuclear program. (AP Photo/Renzo Gostoli)
SAO PAULO, Brazil -- Brazil's nuclear program is peaceful and the country remains committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said Monday, in an effort to defuse tensions over international inspections.
Amorim's comments came as the Science and Technology Ministry confirmed that U.N. nuclear inspectors were denied access in February and March to uranium-enrichment centrifuges at a facility that is being built in Resende, near Rio de Janeiro.
The report of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors' being denied access was first reported Sunday by the Washington Post.
Amorim said Brazil's nuclear program is exclusively aimed at the production of cheap energy and that the "country must have the right to protect its own technology."
"Brazil is complying with all its international obligations" pertaining to its nuclear program and reports indicating otherwise are "groundless," Amorim told reporters.
He said the world's nuclear powers should make a concerted effort toward nuclear disarmament instead of focusing their attention on countries like Brazil that do not have nuclear weapons.
Science and Technology Minister Eduardo Campos said the inspectors had access to uranium that would be sent to Canada for enrichment "but we are not obliged to show the technology that took us years to develop."
Campos told the O Globo newspaper that Brazil had already invested close to $1 billion and years of research to develop its own technology to enrich uranium to be used in power plants.
Repeated calls to the IAEA in Vienna were not returned Monday.
Brazil has the world's sixth largest uranium reserve. The country has had the capacity to enrich uranium since the 1980s, but has so far only done so for research purposes. The country signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1997.
Brazil's ambassador of the United States, Roberto Abdenur, also defended the decision to deny inspectors access.
"Brazil has legitimate industrial and technological reasons for not allowing the inspectors to see the centrifuges," Abdenur told the O Estado de Sao Paulo newspaper.
One of Brazil's top nuclear scientists, however, accused government officials of "abusing the concept of national sovereignty."
"Centrifuges are being used by many countries around the world and even if Brazil's has some kind of new technology, I am sure that technology is not earthshaking enough to hide," Jose Goldemberg told The Associated Press.
Refusing access to IAEA inspectors could lead to "suspicions that it indeed has something to hide and thus create a certain tension or impasse with the agency and the United States," Goldemberg said.
Uranium mined from the ground is run through centrifuges where it is enriched for use in either in nuclear power plants for electricity generation or in atomic weapons.
Brazilian officials hope to be enriching enough uranium by 2014 to run its only two nuclear power plants - called Angra 1 and Angra - plus a third that is expected to come on line that year. The country also expects to have a surplus of enriched uranium by then, which could be exported.
Brazil has also refused to sign on to another clause in the nuclear treaty, which would allow the IAEA to conduct spot inspections of Brasilia nuclear facilities.
Abdenur reiterated Brazil's long-held view against signing the additional protocol, saying some industrial countries, especially the United States, have unfairly made signing it a condition for obtaining new nuclear technology.

Associated Press writer Harold Olmos contributed to this report from Rio de Janeiro.

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>> STATES OF CONCERN - REGRESSION WATCH...

DEVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN:
REFORM OR REGRESSION?
22 March 2004
ICG Asia Report N?77
Islamabad/Brussels

ICG Asia Report N?77 22 March 2004
DEVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN: REFORM OR REGRESSION? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pakistan's military government launched a campaign for political devolution in 2000 that it said was aimed at transferring administrative and financial power to local governments. The scheme was to strengthen local control and accountability and, according to President Pervez Musharraf, "empower the impoverished". In practice, however, it has undercut established political parties and drained power away from the provinces while doing little to minimise corruption or establish clear accountability at a local level. The reforms, far from enhancing democracy, have strengthened military rule and may actually raise the risks of internal conflict. Under the Devolution of Power Plan announced in August 2000, local governments were to be elected on a non-party basis in phased voting between December 2000 and July 2001. District and sub-district governments have since been installed in 101 districts, including four cities. Operating under its respective provincial Local Government Ordinance 2001, each has its Nazim and Naib Nazim (mayor and deputy mayor), elected council and administration. Like previous local government plans, Musharraf's called for re-establishing elected local councils at district and sub-district levels. It promised substantial autonomy for elected local officials and, most notably, placed an elected official as overall head of district administration, management and development, reversing a century-old system that subordinated elected politicians to bureaucrats. Musharraf's scheme ostensibly aimed at establishing the foundations of genuine local democracy. However, the main rationale for devolution was and remains regime legitimacy and survival. Aside from the widespread allegations of rigging and manipulation that have shadowed them, the nonpartisan nature of the local elections has exacerbated ethnic, caste and tribal divisions and undermined the organisational coherence of political parties. Devolution, in fact, has proved little more than a cover for further centralised control over the lower levels of government. Despite the rhetoric from Islamabad of empowerment, local governments have only nominal powers. Devolution from the centre directly to the local levels, moreover, negates the normal concept of decentralisation since Pakistan's principal federal units, its four provinces, have been bypassed. The misuse of local government officials during the April 2002 presidential referendum and the October 2002 general elections has left little doubt that these governments were primarily instituted to create a pliant political elite that could help root the military's power in local politics and displace its traditional civilian adversaries. Friction is growing between various levels of government, especially since the military transferred power, at least formally, to the central and provincial governments that were formed after the 2002 elections. These tensions are partly the result of the manner in which the devolution plan was devised and implemented in the absence of elected officials and against the strong opposition of the major political parties, civil society and media. Despite its lack of domestic legitimacy, the devolution plan has considerable support from donors, who mistakenly believe it is advancing democracy and building down military rule. For now, the military's backing as well as this external support works in its favour. But low domestic acceptance undermines its long-term prospects, and the military's political engineering that accompanies it is widening divisions at the local and provincial levels. Some of these could well lead to greater domestic violence and instability.
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?
ICG Asia Report N?77, 22 March 2004 Page ii
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Pakistan:
1. Demonstrate a commitment to real political
devolution by:
(a) placing the Local Government Ordinance (LGO) before each provincial government for review to create the necessary political acceptance of the scheme;
(b) holding local government elections on a party basis, with direct polls for district officials; and
(c) refraining from imposing political discipline on local officials and misusing them for political ends such as partisan electioneering.
2. Take steps toward decentralisation from federal to provincial levels by:
(a) reducing the number of federal ministries involved in and hence capable of exercising control over local government; and
(b) allowing the representation and participation of provincial and national assembly legislators in key local government bodies such as the district development advisory committees.
3. Devolve administrative and fiscal powers to local units, in particular by:
(a) giving district governments greater control over budgetary resources and increasing allocations for development, especially in poorer districts; and
(b) linking provincial population-based fiscal transfers to each district's level of poverty, fiscal and development needs.
4. Improve the delivery of justice in local government through security sector reform, notably by:
(a) expediting the formation and operationalisation of district, provincial and national safety commissions and police complaints authorities; and
(b) allocating more resources and staff to the
district police. To UNDP, the international financial institutions and key donor governments, including the U.S.:
5. Encourage the Pakistan government strongly to devolve political, administrative and financial responsibilities to the provinces.
6. Re-evaluate and reorder devolution program assistance in order to emphasise sustained help for wider institutional reforms that address the longstanding problems of poverty, economic growth, public sector corruption and inefficiency.
7. Link support for devolution to progress on police reforms and provide budgetary support and other assistance to improve service incentives and conditions and build capacity for investigation and prosecution functions.
Islamabad/Brussels, 22 March 2004
ICG Asia Report N?77 22 March 2004
DEVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN: REFORM OR REGRESSION?
I. INTRODUCTION
On 14 August 2000, President Musharraf unveiled his government's Local Government Plan, intended to build genuine democratic institutions and empower the people at the grassroots.1 The main stated objectives are political devolution, administrative decentralisation, and the redistribution of resources to local governments. In his words: The basic issue is to empower the impoverished and make the people the master of their own destiny. We want to introduce essence of democracy and not sham democracy, which promotes the privileged. Devolution will bring far-reaching consequences and will change [the] fate of the country.2 In reviving local governments,3 Musharraf was following in the footsteps of his predecessors. Successive military rulers have typically instituted lower tiers of government as a substitute for democratisation at the provincial and national levels.
1 The Local Government Plan was approved in a joint meeting of the National Security Council and the Federal Cabinet on 5 August 2000. Bureau Report, "NSC, Cabinet Approve Devolution Plan", Dawn, 6 August 2000.
2 M. Ziauddin, "Musharraf Announces Partyless Local Bodies Polls", Dawn, 16 August 2000.
3 Pakistan has four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). There are three levels of local government: district, tehsil and union, each with a nazim and naib nazim, elected bodies (zila tehsil and union councils) and administrative structures (district, tehsil/town municipal and union). There are 92 districts, of which 33 are in Punjab, fifteen in Sindh, 21 in Baluchistan, and 23 in NWFP. Each province has one city district. There are 307 tehsils, of which 116 are in Punjab, 86 in Sindh, 71 in Baluchistan, and 34 in NWFP. There are 30 city/towns, of which six are in Punjab, eighteen in Sindh, two in Baluchistan, and four in NWFP. Source: Aazar Ayaz, "Decentralisation in Pakistan: An Approach to Poverty Reduction and Protection of Human Rights", The Researchers, Islamabad, October 2003. Local governments have mainly been used to: (1) depoliticise governance; (2) create a new political elite to challenge and undermine the political opposition; (3) demonstrate the democratic credentials of a regime to domestic and external audiences; and (4) undermine federalism by circumventing constitutional provisions for provincial political, administrative, and fiscal autonomy. Like his predecessors, Musharraf quickly seized upon local government. Within a month of his coup, he set up a National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) under a retired general to develop a scheme for devolution. Drafted with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the "Local Government Plan 2000" (LG Plan 2000) called for reestablishment of elected councils at the sub-district and district levels just like President and Field Marshal Ayub's Basic Democracy and President and General Zia-ul-Haq's local bodies. But unlike previous systems, Musharraf's plan promised to vest extensive political and administrative authority in district and subdistrict governments by providing for matching federal and provincial grants to help them fulfil their new responsibilities.
Each level was to have an elected nazim and naib nazim (mayor and deputy mayor), elected councils and administration. For the first time in Pakistan's history, elected officials were to be placed at the apex of district government, with executive powers and responsibilities for law and order to "ensure the supremacy of the political leadership over the administration".4 While the ostensible aim of Musharraf's devolution scheme may be the transfer of administrative, political and financial authority to the lower tiers of 4 "Local Government (Proposed Plan): Devolution of Power and Responsibility Establishing the Foundations for Genuine Democracy" [hereafter LGP], Government of Pakistan, National Reconstruction Bureau, Islamabad, May 2000, p. 36.
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?
ICG Asia Report N?77, 22 March 2004 Page 2
government, the reality is starkly different. Local governments in fact exercise only nominal autonomy with respect to administrative and financial matters in their respective jurisdictions. Sweeping as it looks, the new system's telltale mandate is in the requirement that all local elections must be partyless.5 Local governments have proved to be key instruments in the military's manipulation of the Pakistani polity to ensure regime survival. District nazims (mayors) used public funds and other state resources to stage pro-Musharraf rallies during the April 2002 presidential referendum and to support the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) (PMLQ)' s parliamentary candidates in the 2002 national polls. Local governments have also had significant utility for the military's divide-and rule tactics. By juxtaposing more than 100 new local governments between it and the provinces, the centre, where the military continues to maintain its grip on the levers of state power, has been strengthened at the cost of Pakistan's four federating units.
If Pakistan's chequered political history is any barometer, the question of devolution cannot be addressed in isolation from the larger issue of provincial autonomy. Devolution of power, authority and resources is central to the viability of any multiethnic, multi-regional state. Although the federal principle is enshrined in the 1973 constitution, Pakistan's civil-military ruling elite has been averse to devolving powers to the provincial level. Instead, it has often used the administrative and coercive powers at its disposal to extend the centre's control over the provinces. Since military-inspired devolution is directed to local levels, it enhances tensions between the centre and the provinces. Such schemes undermine the very concept of federalism and increase ethno-regional rifts.
This centralisation of power and authority led to Pakistan's break-up in 1971, when the East wing rebelled against the centre's political control and fiscal exploitation. In present-day Pakistan, ethnic tensions, fuelled by bitter resentment against a Punjabi-dominated military, are rising in the smaller 5 There are many circumstances and contexts in which nonpartisan local elections operate as an effective part of the democratic process, of course. The criticism of the concept in this report relates to the specific circumstances of today's Pakistan in which the concept has been used to help bypass political parties and thereby strengthen an undemocratic military government.
federal units of Sindh, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). In the Punjab itself, Pakistan's largest province, the military has bargained opportunistically along biradari (caste, tribal, subregional) lines and unleashed equally divisive forces by deliberately suppressing party politics. This report examines President Musharraf's devolution scheme in relation to its stated political, administrative, financial, and law enforcement objectives and assesses the impact on political stability, federal-provincial relations, and ethnoregional relations.
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?
ICG Asia Report N?77, 22 March 2004 Page 3
II. BACKGROUND A. GENERAL AYUB KHAN'S BASIC DEMOCRACY While rudimentary forms had existed in parts of British India, the colonial state's need for centralised, authoritarian rule mitigated against the development of any real elected system of local government. Pakistan inherited the British system in which the deputy commissioner (DC) (administrative head of the district) virtually controlled all facets of district government: administration, development, revenue and criminal justice. Upon assuming power in 1958, Pakistan's first military ruler, General Ayub Khan, opted for an elaborate, though nominally empowered, local bodies scheme. Having suspended the constitution, the regime needed for its survival to create at least a semblance of democratic representation at some level. In 1959, Ayub formally introduced his "Basic Democracy" (BD) plan, declaring that the nation was not yet ready for full democracy. "The scheme of Basic Democracies", he said, "has been evolved after a careful study of the experience of other countries and of the special conditions prevailing in our land".6 Under Basic Democracy, the country was divided into 80,000 wards (single member constituencies of 1,000 to 1,200 people each) to elect a "Basic Democrat" on a non-party basis. Local councils were created at the district and sub-district levels of union, tehsil (West Pakistan) and thana (East Pakistan). Roughly half the members of local councils were officially nominated, not directly elected.7 While these councils received state funds to perform municipal and civic functions, the district administrative bureaucracy retained virtually total authority over them, including the powers to overrule council decisions and suspend the execution of their orders.
Besides serving on the local councils, Basic Democrats constituted the Electoral College that selected the president. In 1960, Ayub used this new institution to have himself confirmed as president for five years through a referendum that gave him a 95.6
6 Ayub's Speech of 2 September 1959 on Basic Democracies,
cited in Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Karachi, 2001), p. 219.
7 The process of nomination was later abandoned. per cent vote. Having abrogated the 1956 constitution, Ayub promulgated a new one in March 1962. Federal in principle, it established a unitary, presidential government.
As president, Ayub arrogated to himself unchallenged executive powers and the authority to dismiss the national and provincial legislatures. Provincial autonomy was circumscribed further through the appointment of governors, answerable to the centre. Basic Democrats were retained as the Electoral College for both the President and members of the National Assembly and provincial legislatures. In creating these local bodies, Ayub's intent was not to decentralise or democratise authority but to extend centralised control over the federal units through a new grass roots political base. The scheme was remarkably well orchestrated for extending direct patronage to, and manipulation of local power structures. Controlling access to the state's resources, the district bureaucracy was able to penetrate and manipulate local politics by dealing directly with the new elite, bypassing politicians and political parties and thus isolating them from the general electorate. In this way, governance was depoliticised and localised under the control of centrally appointed bureaucrats.8
At the end of his presidential tenure in 1965, Ayub sought re-election in a contested poll. While he defeated his principal civilian opponent, Fatima Jinnah, allegations of electoral rigging and manipulation from the opposition further weakened the declining credibility of his local government system.
The denial of provincial autonomy and systematic suppression of political views fuelled domestic dissent and, combined with skewed economic policies that mostly benefited a small industrial elite, exacerbated polarisation along regional, class and ethnic lines. In East Pakistan, resentment over denial of economic and political autonomy by a Punjabi-dominated civil-military establishment galvanised a popular movement for provincial autonomy under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's Awami League. In the western wing, lack of opportunity for political participation and coercive authoritarian rule bred alienation and frustration among ethno-regional groups, urban intelligentsia, students and labour unions.
8 See Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad, 1994).
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?
ICG Asia Report N?77, 22 March 2004 Page 4
By 1969, violent protests and countrywide strikes crippled Ayub's authority. As it declined, the military high command withdrew its support and handed power to his army chief, General Yahya Khan. One of Yahya's first steps was to scrap "Basic Democracy". Lacking legitimacy and public sanction, Ayub's discredited system did not survive its creator. But Ayub's political engineering, aimed at legitimising the military's control over politics at every level, undermined federalism, exacerbated regional frictions and culminated in civil war and dismemberment of the Pakistani state.
B. GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM In July 1977, the army under General Zia-ul-Haq deposed the elected Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ironically, local government had remained defunct during the brief democratic interlude from 1972 to 1977. Although the PPP government promulgated a People's Local Government Ordinance in 1975, the elections were never held.9 Like Ayub, Zia saw merit in instituting local bodies in order to cloak a highly centralised, authoritarian system of government under the garb of decentralisation. In September 1979, he revived local governments through provincial ordinances.10 Unlike with Ayub's BDs, some functions of provincial governments were delegated to local bodies but they were to operate under provincial control. Zia established three tiers of local government in rural areas: union councils (consisting of villages), tehsil (sub-district) committees and zila (district) councils. In urban areas, town committees were established for towns with populations between 5,000 and 30,000; municipal committees for towns with a population up to 250,000, and municipal/metropolitan corporations for major cities (Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi) with populations in excess of 250,000.
9 Akbar Zaidi, "Pakistan: Country Paper", in Local Government in Asia and the Pacific: A Comparative Study, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for the Asia Pacific (UNESCAP), at www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/ country/pakistan/ pakistan.html.
10 Baluchistan's Local Government Ordinance was promulgated in 1980.
Elections to union councils/town committees were held in 1979, 1983, and 1987 on a non-party basis,11 with 80 per cent of members elected by universal adult suffrage and 20 per cent reserved for peasants, workers, tenants, and women. Councillors served as the electoral college for choosing the heads (chairmen and vice chairmen) of zila and tehsil councils.12
The main responsibility of the local councils was to manage small-scale public welfare and development activities (water supply, sanitation, maintenance and management of hospitals and schools) in their jurisdictions. The list of council functions was extensive but the revenue base was limited despite the delegation of some taxation powers by provincial governments.13 The bulk of their funds came as federal transfers and to a lesser extent allocations from provincial Annual Development Programs (ADP).
Similar to the BD scheme, Zia's local councils were not entrusted with general administration, law and order or policing, which were retained by civil bureaucrats (commissioners and deputy commissioners) who also served as ex officio, nonvoting, members of these councils. Unlike the BD system, Zia's local government officials did not form an electoral college for provincial or national assemblies or the presidency. In the first local bodies elections, in September 1979, the Awam Dost (Friends of the People) group, a cover name for the Pakistan People's Party, secured significant representation. Their success was a rude shock to the military government. To forestall their victory, Zia postponed indefinitely national elections scheduled for 17 and 20 November 1979.
The primary motivations for Zia to create local bodies was to legitimise the military government, broaden its support base beyond the military, and use the newly created and pliable local elite to undermine its political opponents. In essence, the local bodies provided the "civilian base of his
11 Zaidi, op.cit.
12 Ibid.
13 These included tax (octroi) on the import of goods and animals, tax on the annual rental value of buildings and roads, and tax on the transfer of immovable property. The main revenue source - over 50 per cent - for urban councils was octroi.
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military government, supporting it in return for economic and political benefits".14 Gradually, these local governments became a vast mechanism for extending state patronage to promilitary politicians, providing the military government with ample scope for staging favourable, non-partisan elections. In due course, the new local elites formed the core of Zia's rubber stamp parliament, elected in non-party national elections in 1985. But these local bodies could not assuage popular demands for participation or bestow any lasting legitimacy on the military government. Eventually, a revolt within the parliament triggered by the military's refusal to share any meaningful authority with elected politicians led to dissolution of the democratic fa?ade it had so assiduously manufactured. 15
Tainted by its association with a military dictator, Zia's local government scheme was allowed to decay under elected governments in the 1990s. Local bodies were dissolved in the NWFP in 1991, in Sindh in 1992 and a year later in the Punjab province.16 While corruption and mismanagement were often cited, the primary reason for scrapping these local bodies was almost always political. Wary of the electoral influence of local officials, elected governments preferred to run local councils through appointed administrators, regular federal and/orprovincially appointed civil servants. "Unfortunately, elected governments were at loggerheads with local bodies", says a senior PPP politician, "because they wanted to keep local politics under control for fear of losing out to their rivals". 17
14 ICG Asia Report N?40, Pakistan: Transition to Democracy,
3 October 2002, p. 7.
15 Ibid, p. 15
16 Local bodies were later restored in the NWFP and Punjab.
17 ICG interview, Karachi, June 2003.
III. THE MUSHARRAF DEVOLUTION
A. DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL IMPERATIVES
On 12 October 1999, Pakistan's military deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's elected government. Accusing Sharif of destabilising the army and creating dissension within its ranks, Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf claimed that the armed forces had "no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in the country".18 Primarily driven by the need to legitimise the coup, Musharraf quickly announced a seven- point democratic reform agenda to address Pakistan's institutional decay. This included rebuilding national confidence and morale; strengthening the federation while removing inter-provincial disharmony; reviving and restoring investor confidence; ensuring law and order and dispensing speedy justice; reconstructing and depoliticising state institutions; ensuring swift across-the-board accountability; and devolving power to the grass roots level.
Like his military predecessors Musharraf quickly seized upon the idea of using local government to advance regime survival and consolidation. Creating a National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) under retired General Tanvir Naqvi in November 1999, he made devolution and diffusion of power a main policy priority of his military government. While the NRB had a broad national reconstruction agenda, Naqvi and his team of mainly donorfinanced consultants concentrated on this. The Bureau produced a broad local government blue print that Musharraf announced on 23 March 2000.19 He claimed devolution was "the beginning of a constructive, democratic, dynamic revolution whose sole objective is to place in [the] hands of the people the power to shape their own destiny....an unprecedented transfer of power will take place from the elites to the vast majority".20 In "devolving
18 General Musharraf's televised address to the nation, BBC News Online, 17 October 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/477358.stm.
19 23 March is celebrated every year to commemorate the passing of the Pakistan Resolution by the All India Muslim League in 1940.
20 "CE Announces Holding of Local Government Elections", Associated Press of Pakistan, 24 March 2000.
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powers", Musharraf was actually replicating the attempts of his predecessors to circumvent popular aspirations for representative rule. He and his fellow generals faced special constraints, however, in the context of the October 1999 coup.
Pakistan's military rulers have traditionally relied on U.S. diplomatic and economic support to prolong and consolidate their power but both Ayub and Zia had taken over when external conditions were conducive to military rule. Having deposed an elected government in a post cold-war environment where electoral democracy has emerged as the preferred form of government, Musharraf's need to dispel international apprehensions was far more acute. Says an analyst, "the military's decision to devolve substantial powers to local levels was informed in no small part by the need to assuage international concerns about political democracy, which could no longer be satisfied merely by creating nominal local bodies".21 Despite reservations over misrule and corruption, the international community had opposed the October 1999 military takeover, and the U.S., EU and Japan imposed trade and economic sanctions. Keen to end its isolation, the military government's strategies included the ostensible devolution of power to civilians at the local level even as it maintained control of the real levers of state power, those at provincial and national levels. Local governments were intended to establish the military's democratic credentials and confirm its intent eventually to restore civilian rule. Announcing his local bodies plan on the eve of U.S. President Clinton's visit, Musharraf declared, "Democracy starts here at the district and local governments, from here we will move up step by step to provincial and federal (elections) in due course".22 The devolution decision was also aimed at coopting domestic and external constituencies that favour decentralisation and local empowerment. Since donors as well as influential sections of civil society such as the media and NGOs have long blamed bureaucratic corruption and centralisation for Pakistan's political and administrative malaise, Musharraf distanced his government from the discredited machinery.23 In his 23 March speech, he
21 ICG interview, Islamabad, May 2003.
22 "Clinton Tours Indian Village, Pakistan Announces Local Elections", CNN online, 24 March 2000.
23 ICG interview, May 2003.
stressed that "the entire administration system has been distorted, and interference by the Federal Government in local affairs has been extreme".24 Another key motivation was to create new elites so as to undermine and marginalise political adversaries. Ruling through non-partisan local bodies is a time-tested strategy employed by Pakistan's military rulers. Echoing the military's traditional distrust of party politics, Musharraf made it clear in August 2000 that local elections would be non-partisan, ostensibly to discourage petty political rivalries at district level.25 A multitude of scattered local power centres dependent on patronage are easier for the military to deal with than four, relatively more cohesive provincial governments. By creating a democratic fa?ade at local levels, Musharraf hoped to circumvent constitutional provisions for provincial political, administrative, and fiscal autonomy. Under the 1973 constitution, Pakistan is a federation, and local government is a provincial responsibility. The leaders of Pakistan's mainstream parties, including the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), say Musharraf, like others before him, has employed devolution merely to extend military control over the provinces. "Real devolution", a PPP leader said, "would entail transfer of powers from the centre to the provinces, resulting in substantive provincial autonomy".26 PML-N's Ahsan Iqbal, former head of the Federal Planning Commission, agreed: "The provinces are already weak with the centre usurping many of their powers under the concurrent legislative list, and local governments will be one more step in this direction".27
B. THE BLUEPRINT
The NRB presented its full draft Devolution of Power Plan in May 2000.28 The plan revived Zia's three-tiered system of local governance at the union, tehsil and zila levels, but envisaged unprecedented
24 "CE Announces Holding of Local Bodies Elections", Associated Press of Pakistan, 24 March 2000.
25 Zaffar Abbas, "Musharraf Unveils Local Election Plan", BBC News Online, 14 August 2000.
26 ICG interview, Karachi, June 2003.
27 ICG interview, Islamabad, April 2003.
28 LGP, op. cit.
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administrative and developmental functions for elected officials. One of the most radical measures was subordination of the district administration and police to the elected chief mayor.29 District governments were also to be vested with significant financial resources through federal and provincial grants and tax powers.
The plan envisaged a district assembly comprising chairmen of all union councils in a district.30 The assembly was made responsible for approving bylaws, taxes, annual development plans and budgets. To improve service delivery and monitor citizen rights, it would oversee governmental departments through its monitoring committees. A tehsil council, comprising union councillors from the tehsil, would perform functions at its level.31 The lowest tier, the union council, would have its own chairman and 26 councillors.32 Members of the union council were to be elected directly by adult franchise and would also act as the electoral college for reserved seats. The main function of the union councils was to undertake local development projects and monitor "citizens' rights, security and services".33 The plan expanded the franchise by reducing the voting age from 21 to eighteen, while 50 per cent of the seats in union councils were reserved for women. Joint electorates were proposed for minorities in order to address long-standing demands from women and minority rights' groups.
1. Administrative Decentralisation
The plan proposed to abolish the posts of deputy commissioner and assistant commissioner, who traditionally controlled executive, judicial and revenue functions in a district, and establish a new administrative structure led by a district coordination officer (DCO). Magisterial and legal powers were transferred to the district and sessions judge and police oversight powers to the nazim. The divisional tier of administration headed by the commissioner was abolished, and the nazim received the power to
29 The designations for chief mayor and deputy chief mayor were later changed to "nazim" and "naib nazim".
30 The district assembly was renamed "zila council".
31 Union naib nazims are now ex-officio members of the tehsil council.
32 The seats on the union council were allocated as follows: sixteen general seats, eight seats for peasants/workers, and two for minority communities. Half the seats in each of the three categories were reserved for women.
33 LGP, op. cit., p. 32.
appoint and remove the DCO, albeit with the approval of the district assembly. Justifying this restructuring, the NRB claimed that concentration of authority, particularly in the office of the deputy commissioner, creates the potential for "arbitrariness, incessant delays, management and corruption in government operations".34 But critics say its most significant change was designed to weaken the civil service's elite district management group (DMG), which had virtually controlled district administration, as well as top tier posts in the provincial and federal governments. The military's decision to dilute its authority also resulted partly from strong opposition to the DMG among senior police and income tax officials, who occupied key posts in Musharraf's secretariat. Targeting the DMG was also an attempt to capitalise on divisions within the civilian bureaucracy in order to expand direct military control over administration.35 This was reflected in an NRB document:
The civil service is effectively controlled by the DMG. The group has close relations with international donors...Other groups in the public administration chafe under the control of one group and would welcome a democratisation of civil service structure as a basic element of civil service reform. The end of the domination of the bureaucracy by one group is a necessary pre-condition for the attainment of administrative power by the Army and the creation of conditions for national reconstruction (emphasis added).36 The restructuring included devolution of provincial line departments to district level and creation of new departments of law, literacy and information technology. Each district department was placed under a district officer, assisted by a deputy (DDO) at sub-district levels.37
34 LGP, op. cit., p. 27.
35 "An urgent task facing Musharraf was to swiftly consolidate the army's authority over the administrative and political structures of the state", said a retired army general. ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
36 "Structural Analysis of National Reconstruction", National Reconstruction Bureau, 27 May 2000.
37 Each district department is now headed by an executive district officer (EDO).
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The tehsil (sub-district) government was to have overall responsibility for basic municipal services. Under Zia's local bodies system, rural and urban areas were separate political entities, divided into union and zila councils for the former and town committees, municipal and metropolitan corporations for the urban areas. With the ostensible aim of mitigating this rural-urban divide, the devolution plan proposed that tehsils (towns in city districts) would include the rural as well as urban union councils. In the words of the plan, "the integrated tehsil government will mitigate the prevailing rural-urban frictions by providing opportunities for representation in proportion to the population and taxation in proportion to the services".38 To involve people in community development, the plan also called for creation of citizen community boards (CCBs) in both urban and rural areas.39 Also planned were village (and neighbourhood) Councils for changing popular attitudes from a "reactive to a proactive mindset".40 A zila mohtasib (district ombudsman) was to give the public an independent mechanism for addressing complaints against local government officials.
Acknowledging in principle the different administrative, policing and municipal needs of large cities, the plan also envisaged creating city district governments.
2. Fiscal Decentralisation
Pakistan has a highly centralised fiscal system with the federal government raising some 90 per cent of tax revenues. Provincial governments rely overwhelmingly on federal transfers, which are some 80 per cent of their revenues. Under the proposed Local Government Plan, local governments would receive revenue through formula-based provincial transfers and the decentralisation of specified taxation powers.41
While the plan remained vague on the exact modalities of fiscal decentralisation, it proposed a provincial finance commission (PFC) for the transfers, and envisaged that district and tehsil
38 LGP, op. cit., p. 52.
39 Ibid, p. 34.
40 Ibid, p. 33.
41Ibid, p. 60.
Councils would have legislative authority to levy specific taxes.
3. Law Enforcement
Under the Police Act of 1861, the district superintendent of police was subject to the operational control of the deputy commissioner in addition to the provincial police hierarchy.42 With the proposed abolition of the office of deputy commissioner, the district police chief was made responsible to the elected chief mayor. While the province remained the designated level for "raising, training and equipping" police, the plan called for revising law enforcement functions. District (and provincial/national) safety commissions were proposed to monitor police performance and redress public grievances. Watch and ward functions were separated from investigation. An independent prosecution service and a provincial police complaints authority were also envisaged.
C. MILITARY EXCEPTIONS
Following the 1999 coup, the military swiftly put its own people into key civil service institutions in the name of reducing corruption, introducing accountability, and monitoring government.43 This insertion of 3,500 military people into civilian bodies at the national, provincial, divisional and district levels as "army monitoring teams" promoted official abuse and belied the official rhetoric of citizen empowerment and devolution of power.44 The spirit of devolution was also negated in a far more significant way. The local government plan was to be applied to the four provinces, but not to
42 Under paragraph 2, section 4 of the act, "the administration of the police throughout the local jurisdiction of the magistrate of the district shall, under the general control and direction of such magistrate, be vested in a district superintendent and such assistant district superintendents as the Provincial Government shall consider necessary".
43 The system of appointing serving and retired military personnel to civil service posts, institutionalised under General Zia, was greatly expanded under Musharraf in violation of rules and quotas.
44 Annex III: Monitoring Teams, "Report on the Work of the Government: 12 October 1999 to January 2000", Directorate General Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, 2000. "Reform or Repression: Post-Coup Abuses in Pakistan", Human Rights Watch, October 2000.
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some 41 largely civilian populated cantonments (military garrisons) in towns and major cities, which would remain under the control of military station commanders.45 The issue of integrating cantonments with elected local governments was left to the future since "local government already exists in the cantonments in the form of cantonment boards".46 That is simply untrue. Cantonments are run under the Cantonment Act of 1924, which vests statutory control to the army. Under the act, the army station commander is, ex officio, President of the Cantonment Board, which has a nominal elected component but can be dismissed by the president.47 Dating back to colonial times, this act mainly concerns the orderly administration of military lands and garrisons. Says a former elected member of the Rawalpindi Cantonment Board, "the devolution plan only reinforces the non-elected nature of governance in cantonments where civilians have little or no voice or representation".48 Even freedom of movement is often severely restricted in cantonments by military checkpoints.
Official sources confirmed to ICG that the initial decision to include cantonments in the plan met with stiff resistance from army corps commanders, who justified their opposition on national security grounds.49 According to a federal official, "the army is loath to abdicate control over the cantonments, which contain lucrative army real estate and installations under its exclusive administrative control since independence".50 Exclusion of the cantonments meant that the station commander could continue to exercise colonialstyle control over civilian populations while the entire district administrative structure was being abolished, ostensibly to empower citizens.51 The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was also not included in the devolution system, although this was left open for future review. Opposition from tribal leaders was cited as the main reason but critics say the federal government's traditional aversion to public participation in the
45 Cantonments exist in large cities like Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar, large garrisons like Kharian and Gujranwala, and small garrisons like Bannu and Kohat.
46 LGP, op. cit.
47 Cantonment Act 1924.
48 ICG interview, Rawalpindi, June 2003.
49 ICG interview, June 2003.
50 ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
51 ICG countrywide interviews, June 2003.
strategic border region played a part. The Federal Capital Territory (Islamabad) was likewise left out.52
D. DOMESTIC REACTION
Major political parties, independent human rights groups, the media and analysts opposed the draft devolution plan. Most political parties believed the military's scheme was little more than a ploy to ensure regime survival. Another aim, according to the opposition, was to deflect international attention from the need to restore democracy even as the centre extended its direct control over local politics and administration. Said an opposition politician, "with generals controlling state authority from the top, the devolution plan is an attempt to cover up and postpone the main issue of transferring power to elected representatives".53
Party leaders from across the political divide shared this view. "The federal government encroaches on a number of provincial subjects which it controls through central ministries", said the PML-N's Ahsan Iqbal. "Devolution from the centre to the district will further undermine the principles of federalism and provincial autonomy".54 According to the PPP's Senator Raza Rabbani, "the NRB's devolution system completely bypasses provinces to create over 100 districts that could be directly controlled and manipulated from Islamabad. Provinces have been made redundant".55 The fiercest opposition came from ethno-regional groups in Baluchistan, Sindh and the NWFP, who have traditionally demanded the provincial autonomy guaranteed to Pakistan's federal units by the 1973 constitution.56 In Baluchistan, where the centre's usurpation of provincial political and economic rights had resulted in an armed insurgency in the mid-1970s and opposition to the Punjabi-dominated military is strong, the plan was suspected to be a cover for army efforts to consolidate control over provincial affairs. "The already limited powers of the provinces are being forcefully transferred to the district. The real 52 The NRB has been unwilling or unable to hold elections though it has prepared a draft Islamabad Capital Territory
Local Government Ordinance 2002.
53 ICG interview, Lahore, May 2003.
54 ICG interview, Islamabad, May 2003.
55 ICG interview, Karachi, June 2003.
56 See "PONAM opposes District Government Plan", Dawn,
29 March 2000.
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aim is to undermine provinces, fragment political power and ensure direct control of the military over governance", warned Abdul Hayee Baloch of the Baluchistan National Movement (BNM).57 In the NWFP, where demands for political and fiscal autonomy have also been traditionally suppressed, the Pashtun-dominated Awami National Party (ANP) rejected the plan and compared it to earlier failed military experiments. "The fact that the federal government is taking the decision to hold local elections", said ANP leader Asfandyar Wali Khan, "is indicative of further centralisation of powers and negates the concept of local governance".58 These critiques remain relevant. In 1971, centralisation of power and authoritarian government resulted in bloody civil war and Pakistan's dismemberment. In 2004, the military's propensity to concentrate all power in its hands and its aversion to democratic governance are exacerbating regional divisions and promoting internal tensions. Instead of empowering citizens, the devolution scheme has exacerbated the Pakistan state's institutional crisis by rooting the military in local politics. The independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has rejected the military's devolution plan on the ground that its main aim is to "depoliticise governance and to earn a lease of life for the (military) government behind a sort of democratic facade".59 The Commission has also called upon the military-led government "to develop a consensus with political parties on a strategy for its own withdrawal and the country's return to democratic rule".60
57 ICG interview, Quetta, May 2003.
58 Marianna Babar, "ANP Rejects Government's Devolution Program", The News, 4 April 2000.
59 "HRCP Rejects Devolution Plan of CE", Dawn, 25 March 2000.
60 Ibid.
IV. FINE-TUNING THE PLAN
Some of the more radical reforms envisaged in the draft Local Government Plan were diluted in the final version released in August 2000. The nazim lost the crucial powers to appoint and remove the district coordinating officer, the district's most senior civil bureaucrat, for instance. While government sources cited "institutional stability" concerns for this, the military was clearly reluctant to forgo the option of using the civil bureaucracy to control elected officials,61 particularly potential opponents. "The military would have been left with no levers to control the districts in case of political surprises", says a senior government official privy to NRB policy meetings.62 NRB advisors recommended to Musharraf and his corps commanders that the centre control civil service transfers and postings, and thus retain power over local decisions. The initial scheme had also envisaged repeal of the separate electoral system for minorities63 but the final version retained it, with five per cent of seats reserved. It also reduced reserved seats for women from 50 per cent to 33 per cent. Both steps, analysts say, were to accommodate the religious right, traditional allies of the military.64 At the same time, academic qualifications of not less than a secondary school certificate or equivalent were made mandatory for all nazims and naib nazims, ostensibly to create a "more educated and well informed" elected leadership.65 The Final Local Government Plan 2000 also introduced a far-reaching change to the election method for the zila and tehsil nazims and naib nazims. The draft plan had recommended direct elections for both offices on a joint ticket. However, army corps commanders overruled the NRB, and the
61 Others believe that successful lobbying by the bureaucracy was responsible for this change. ICG interviews, Islamabad and Lahore, May-June 2003.
62 ICG interview, Lahore, July 2003.
63 "EC suggests joint electorate to ensure proper representation", Associated Press of Pakistan, 3 March 2000. Widely seen as an attempt to marginalise non-Muslim minorities, the separate electoral system introduced by General Zia reserved a limited number of parliamentary seats for each minority community and restricted the franchise of non-Muslim voters to these seats.
64 ICG countrywide interviews, June 2003.
65 ICG interview, Islamabad, May 2003. Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression? ICG Asia Report N?77, 22 March 2004 Page 11 final plan replaced this with indirect elections whereby directly elected union councillors would choose the nazim and naib nazim.66 The official justification given was that as the district in many cases was much larger than a National Assembly constituency, direct elections could produce complications when national elections were held.67 Otherwise, the crux of the reforms remained more or less intact. The district administration remained answerable to the nazim; provincial line departments were devolved to districts (including education and health); and the divisional tier of administration was abolished. As a result of the new delimitation of administrative boundaries, 97 districts and four city districts, one in each provincial capital, were created.
A. LOCAL ELECTIONS
The government's actual motivation for indirect elections was soon revealed by the local government elections. Indirect choices lend themselves better to rigging. Simply put, it was far easier for the military government to manipulate a constituency of a few hundred union councillors than face the unpredictable vote of over 1 million voters (the mean number in a district).
Political parties were formally banned from the elections. However, most fielded candidates unofficially to take advantage of the partial electoral opening68 and retain a degree of leverage through the nazims in case the military decided to use them as an electoral college for the national presidency.69 Army corps commanders knew full well the risks of a direct election in light of the PPP's largely intact strength. In fact, the direct elections for union nazims
66 ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
67 ICG interview with an NRB official, Islamabad, June 2003.
68 Unlike most parties, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which represents Urdu-speaking migrants and their descendents in urban Sindh, boycotted the local elections, calling them a "legal cover to an unconstitutional government". The MQM opposed the re-demarcation of electoral constituencies and the division of Karachi into eighteen town councils under the devolution plan, which it saw as an attempt by the military government to undermine its voter base. According to Dr. Farooq Sattar of the MQM, "we refuse to be part of a process that usurps the rights of the smaller provinces and divides Karachi along ethnic and linguistic lines". Interview in Herald, June 2001.
69 ICG countrywide interviews with PML-N, PPP and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) leaders, May-June 2003. and councillors, held from December 2000 to July 2001, proved their worst fears. PPP-backed candidates were returned in large numbers to union and tehsil councils across the Punjab and Sindh and even the NWFP. According to a former NRB consultant, "Opting for indirect polls was a calculated move to prevent the PPP (and PML-N) sweeping the district nazim polls in their traditional strongholds".70 The local elections were held in five phases, over almost nine months. This allowed careful monitoring of each phase so that "surprises" could be managed accordingly.71
Opposition parties say the indirect elections were selectively rigged to install pro-military nazims, especially in the Punjab. Rigging took both direct and indirect forms. First, the military manipulated official electoral mechanisms. Since local government is a provincial responsibility under the 1973 constitution, provincial authorities traditionally conduct local bodies elections. However, the Local Government Elections Order 2000 bypassed the provinces, entrusting the task to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), which operates, for practical purposes, under federal control. On the eve of the elections, it threatened to disqualify candidates with party affiliations in what was widely seen as a politically motivated move to strengthen militarybacked candidates.72
The military also used coercion and cooption. On 6 July 2001, for example, senior leaders of the promilitary PML-Q were reportedly summoned to the Presidency to help identify suitable zila nazim candidates for key Punjab districts. Instructions were then issued to corps commanders and heads of military and civil intelligence agencies to ensure their victories.73
In Rawalpindi, home to Army Headquarters, pro-PPP or PML-N candidates for district and tehsil nazim were pressured to withdraw and support military-backed candidates. Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, then a PML-N leader and now Federal Information Minister in the PML-Q cabinet, withdrew citing his inability to win under the "circumstances".74 In
70 Ibid.
71 ICG interview, Islamabad, May 2003.
72 ICG countrywide interviews, May-June 2003.
73 Mubashir Zaidi and Ali Hasan, "Old Habits Die Hard", Herald, August 2001.
74 Ibid.
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Jhelum district, the elected nazim was "motivated" to switch to the PML-Q. In Gujarat district, the brother of Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, now PML-Q parliamentary leader, was chosen nazim despite a clear PPP majority among the elected union councillors. In Lahore, Punjab's provincial capital, pro-PML-Q candidates openly solicited votes on the basis of support from the military. District administration officers were changed to influence the outcome in PPP Punjabi strongholds. Deputy commissioners and police superintendents were instructed to "encourage" union councillors "to vote for the party committed to General Musharraf's agenda of national reconstruction", a clear euphemism for the PML-Q.75 Similar tactics were deployed in Sindh, the NWFP and Baluchistan. As a consequence, rather than creating the conditions conducive for electing a credible local leadership, the military made further incursions into civil society and undermined the rule of law. Its bid to sideline party politics through non-partisan elections also encouraged the politics of patronage based on tribal, ethnic and sectarian affiliations or even just monetary considerations.
An official reports that, "a curious process of political realignment took place at the district level with party loyalties subordinated to the goal of winning the elections".76 According to Ahmed Rashid, "the nonpartisan nature of the elections and the military's manipulation of the process has exacerbated caste and biradari divisions, further undermining already weak political parties and their representation at the lower levels".77 Since these elections bypassed political parties and weakened party loyalties, electoral competition took place along caste lines. With caste-based candidates pitted against each other, the elections reinforced traditional hostilities at the local level.
Another political commentator said, "the non-party elections for district councils have destroyed the organisational credibility and institutional ethos of political parties. Compromised candidates of expedient multi-party alliances will neither represent
75 ICG countrywide interviews, May-June 2003.
76 ICG interview with a senior field officer, Lahore, June 2003.
77 ICG interview, Khushab, May 2003.
policies nor issues nor ideologies".78 "The flawed local electoral process", according to Nasim Ahir, PPP politician and former federal Interior Minister, "has created new divisions in Pakistani society. The military had left no doubt in anyone's mind that only abiding loyalty to the establishment can pay off politically".79
President Musharraf's oft-repeated pledge to create a new, more credible leadership notwithstanding, his government relied on established but pro-military politicians to win the district nazim elections. A vast majority of the district and tehsil/town nazims elected in the Punjab and Sindh were party activists or belonged to well-known political families.80 Once the military government created the PML-Q as an alternative to the PPP and PML-N, local elections became merely "a spring board for creating an avowedly party-less elite that could be politicised as and when the military needed its support".81
78 Mohammad Waseem, "Elections without a Mandate", Dawn, 5 August 2001.
79 ICG interview, May 2003.
80 Azmat Abbass, "A Punjabi Risotto", Herald, August 2001, pp. 38-40. See also Ali Hassan, "Waderas Take All", ibid, February 2001, pp. 49-51.
81 ICG interview with Adnan Adil, BBC Urdu analyst and correspondent, Lahore, April 2003.
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V. IMPLEMENTING DEVOLUTION
A. THE POLITICS OF DEVOLUTION
On 13 August 2001, all four provincial governments issued local government ordinances to operationalise the devolution plan. The irony was not lost on critics of the plan that the "Local Government Ordinance 2001 was prepared by the federal government but each province was directed to notify it as its own law".82
On 14 August, Pakistan's independence day, elected local governments were formed in 97 provincial districts and the four city districts of Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta. Its internal contradictions leave Local Government Ordinance 2001 (LGO) open to varying interpretations and make its implementation difficult. No clear lines of authority delineate the relationship between the nazim and the bureaucratic head of a district, the DCO, who represents the centre. The LGO designates the zila nazim as the head of the district government to be assisted by the DCO83 but many zila nazims complained to ICG that DCOs often ignore them in administrative matters since there is no provision in the LGO to ensure their compliance with local government directives.84 Section 20 makes nazims personally responsible for financial losses and unlawful expenditures.85 Several nazims complain this creates "responsibility without authority" and leaves them vulnerable.86 The manner of implementation suggests that the military government is far more interested in political manipulation than political devolution. The political use of the scheme is best demonstrated by the April 2002 referendum that extended President Musharraf's term by five years with 97.5 per cent approval. The military used the newly installed nazims to help ensure a favourable outcome. They were persuaded or coerced to mobilise their constituents for a pro- Musharraf vote. Many organised and funded rallies in return for economic and political rewards.
82 Kunwar Idris, "From Politicians to the People", Dawn, 3 August 2003.
83 SBNP Local Government Ordinance 2001.
84 ICG countrywide interviews with nazims, May-June 2003.
85 SBNP, Local Government Ordinance 2001.
86 ICG countrywide interviews with nazims, May-June 2003.
According to some reports, union councillors were funded by local governments to campaign on Musharraf's behalf.87 Others were warned of the withdrawal of government support and termination of development projects in their areas if they did not cooperate. Those who refused were also threatened with prosecution for corruption.88 Shah Mehmood Qureshi, then Multan District nazim and a PPP leader, said: "The provincial government wanted me to release money from the district budget for Musharraf's referendum. I refused since I could not transgress my authority".89 This resulted in the provincial government prosecuting him for misuse of public resources.90 Nafisa Shah, nazim of Khairpur district in upper Sindh, refused to attend Musharraf's referendum rally, branding it a political gimmick.91 Since then, district officials are transferred without her knowledge, and development funds are frequently withheld.92 From the start, the military has carefully controlled the pace and direction of devolution. Military personnel have remained intimately involved in the day-to-day affairs of local bodies. District transition teams, formed to facilitate the start of the new structures, were headed by military officers who called the administrative and financial shots. With the structures in place, the military has continued to oversee administration as well as the disbursement of development funds. Several nazims in the Punjab say they have received direct orders from senior officers to undertake certain "visible development projects that could later be cited as achievements of the military government".93
Field officers, as well as union council nazims
interviewed by ICG, say that the elected local
87 Massoud Ansari, "How the Referendum Was Won", Newsline, May 2003.
88 ICG countrywide interviews, May-June 2003.
89 ICG interview, Islamabad, April 2003.
90 The charges were later dropped. Ibid.
91 ICG interview, Khairpur, June 2003.
92 In January 2004, a charge of water-theft was filed against Nafisa Shah. In her statement before the Sindh High Court, she said that pro-PPP nazims, naib nazims and councillors were being pressured to change their political loyalties by threats of false charges would be brought against them. The court directed the Khairpur district police officer to discontinue the practice. "SHC asks DPO not to book councillors in fake cases", The News, 10 December 2003; "Khairpur court grants bail to three Nazims", The News, 16 January 2004.
93 ICG interviews, May-June 2003.
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governments have been empowered only in name and do not enjoy any meaningful administrative or financial autonomy. Of special concern is the imbalance of powers between the directly elected union councillors and the indirectly elected zila nazims. "The actual intent was to consolidate the military's power at the district level through zila nazims", says a union councillor from Quetta. "Below that level, we mostly do what previous councils did: register marriages, deaths and births".94 It was with this primary objective in mind, critics say, that the military's devolution plan has tilted power in local structures in favour of district and tehsil nazims. Elected councils retain only residual functions. "Devolution has stopped at the level of the district nazim", says a Baluchistan district naib nazim. "The [directly elected] district council is a rubber stamp".95
Given the indirect nature of their elections, district nazims are answerable to a narrow "electoral college" of union councillors. "Under the new local government scheme", says one in the Punjab, "the allocation of limited development funds is the central pivot around which political loyalties revolve".96 In several districts ICG visited, councillors claimed that their union councils are neglected in development projects because of their opposition to the nazim.97 The nazim's need to reward supporters "has resulted in a lopsided situation where some union councils are richer and more developed than others".98 Hence the local government scheme has created its own promilitary elite, with strong political and financial stakes in the military-created system. As a zila nazim from the Punjab told ICG, "our loyalties should lie not with a political party or government but with General Musharraf who has really empowered the people at the grassroots".99 Contrary to official claims that the devolution scheme has successfully increased representation of women in government, it has done little to guarantee legal, administrative or financial responsibility for them other than the reservation of 33 per cent of local council seats. "When the local councils are powerless as a whole", asks a woman councillor
94 ICG interview, Quetta, May 2003.
95 ICG interview, Quetta, May 2003.
96 ICG interview, May 2003.
97 ICG countrywide interviews, June 2003.
98 ICG interview with an official in the ministry of local government, Punjab, Lahore, June 2003.
99 ICG interview, Lahore, June 2003.
from Baluchistan, "Can you imagine the extent of our influence on local affairs"?100 Most women councillors interviewed agree. Says one from the NWFP, "We don't get anything. We have no vote. We have no voice".101 Says another from Sindh, "we are mere rubber stamps. The zila council approves schemes and we are asked to vote for them".102 The facts speak for themselves. In the 101 districts, only two nazims are women and both come from traditionally dominant political families in Sindh. Male councillors say that since they have nominated women councillors, these are "unequal".103 "If the military government was really serious about giving women powers rather than appeasing donors", says a woman councillor, "it would have reserved a share of nazim slots at the district and tehsil levels".104 Women councillors complain that the government and NGOs raised their hopes unrealistically. Most say they have received no special training to familiarise them with the provisions of the LGO or the functioning of the local government system. Their participation in Council meetings is made even more difficult in the absence of adequate pay, though male counterparts frequently cite this problem also.105
B. ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT
1. Restructuring Administration
With the promulgation of the four provincial LGOs, the previous system of administration ceased to exist. But while elected governments took the oath of office on 14 August 2001, decentralisation of the administration took far longer. The entire divisional tier that acted both as a coordination link between the district and the province, as well as the appellate authority in the district system, was abolished.106 A new bureaucratic structure, with the district coordination officer (DCO) at the top and executive district officers (EDOs) heading each district department, was put in place. The administrative,
financial and appellate powers of divisional officers
100 ICG interview, Quetta, June 2003.
101 ICG interview, Kohat, March 2003.
102 ICG interview, Sukkur, March 2003.
103 ICG interviews in NWFP and Sindh, March-May 2003.
104 ICG interview, Islamabad, May 2003.
105 ICG country-wide interviews, May-June 2003.
106 The closure of the divisional, regional and zonal offices
commenced on 14 August 2001, with the provision that such
offices would cease to exist by 31 December 2001.
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were devolved to this restructured district administration. Staff from older local councils and municipal bodies was transferred to the district and tehsil levels. Provincial line departments such as education, health, and works were devolved to those levels and new departments, including information technology, law, and literacy, were created. The new system was flawed since it was installed in haste, reflecting the military government's need to meet its own arbitrary independence day target.107 Not enough preparation was devoted to implementation details. The perception within the NRB was that once the system was in place, the military's backing would ensure smooth operation. While transition modalities were worked out on paper and provincial transition mechanisms put in place, little attention was given to the actual dynamics of replacing a well-entrenched system with an unfamiliar, untested one. Even less was paid to the weak administrative capacity at local levels.
Not unsurprisingly, the initial weeks were marked by confusion within the official machinery and among the public. While teething problems were gradually removed, structural problems remain. Many administrative powers previously exercised by the district commissioner remained unspecified in the new system. Poorly defined enforcement mechanisms are another problem. While the tehsil administration enjoys quasi-judicial powers such as imposing fines, its officials find it nearly impossible to enforce their writ without the enforcement powers previously exercised by executive magistrates backed by the police. According to a Baluchistan minister, "in the previous system, the DC had executive magistrates at his disposal who could effectively check prices, food quality and encroachments. There is a vacuum now, and the writ of the state has been weakened".108 The NRB is critical of the "the absence of horizontal integration and the consequent inadequacy of functional co-ordination between the line departments at the division, district, and tehsil levels which lead to inefficiency and corruption, and are the root causes of the crisis of governance at the grass root level".109 Coordination has grown worse. There are no hierarchical linkages between the various levels of local government, and each practically operates in isolation. "Lack of vertical linkages and
107 ICG countrywide interviews, May-June 2001.
108 ICG interview, Quetta, June 2003.
109 LGP, op.cit.
coordination between tehsil and district often lead to jurisdictional conflicts", says Ahmed Wassan, a Lahore town nazim.110 A former Karachi DCO adds, "intra-local government coordination is zero", thus reducing the NRB's "goals of coordinated planning and coherent administration to a practical joke".111 The stand-alone nature of administrative changes at district level is another shortcoming.112 Absent wider civil service reforms at provincial and national levels that address the broader problems of poor skills, low incentives, weak capacity and widespread corruption, the ambitious changes sought by the plan have little chance.
Officers of the District Management Group, who continue to run district and tehsil-level administrations, feel unfairly targeted, not least because they were completely ignored during the process that led to adoption of the devolution plan. And despite NRB claims,113 the district coordination officer and his deputies enjoy wider administrative and financial powers than the former DC, however reduced the new administration's law enforcement and judicial authority may be.
In addition, the current form of administrative decentralisation cannot address the issue of corruption and misuse of office unless there are corresponding changes in the lower structures of land revenue management, that is, at the level of the tehsildar/patwari (pre-independence revenue officials). Says a former federal secretary, "merely re-orienting the upper links in the chain of
exploitation and corruption will only bring cosmetic
changes...the common man still has to deal with the
110 ICG interview, Lahore, June 2003.
111 ICG interview, Karachi, June 2003. The only coordinating mechanism between district and tehsil levels is the Mushawrat (consultation) Committee comprising zila nazims, naib nazims and tehsil nazims. Under the LGO, it can "co-ordinate inter-tehsil development plans and resolve intradistrict disputes". However, it is largely dysfunctional since it is hostage to the political relationship between district and tehsil nazims.
112 "Devolution in Pakistan: Preparing for Service Delivery Improvement", Asian Development Bank, June 2003, at http://www.adb.org/Documents/PRM/Working_Papers/w02.pdf.
113 In the proposed LGP, the NRB had planned to induct personnel from other civil service occupational groups and even the private sector.
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horrifying reality of bribing the patwari or the local policeman to get things done".114 Provincial line departments were to be devolved and new ones created at the district level. Aided by a bureaucracy unaccustomed to change, however, provincial governments adopted a go-slow approach in devolving line ministries and relinquishing administrative controls over their staff in the districts. In some districts, several departments remained under provincial control for over a year. "There is need for the real devolution of departments of the provincial government such as health and education", says Malik Asad, district nazim of Kohat in the NWFP. "So long as the provincial government retains control, there will only be surface devolution".115 The precarious position of the city district government of Karachi is a case in point. Under section 182 (3) (a) of the LGO, "the control of the development authorities, water and sanitation agencies and solid waste management bodies was to be vested in a city district government".116 Nevertheless, citizens continue to face serious water and sanitation problems, and the Karachi Sewerage and Water Supply Board (KSWSB), the civic agency delivering water and sanitation services, remains outside the operational control of district authorities. In several poor localities of the city, water shortages have led angry residents to demonstrate outside town council offices.117 Elected officials fear water riots if problems persist. Says Muslim Pervez, a senior presiding officer of the city district council, "people bring their complaints to us, and we have no powers over the water board. I am afraid things could easily spiral out of control". 118 District authorities in Gwadar, a remote coastal district in Baluchistan, face similar problems. The provincial chief minister heads the governing body that controls the Gwadar Development Authority, and a provincially appointed director general acts as head of administration.119 The provincial government also retains control over the works and services department while staff salaries are deducted from the
114 ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
115 ICG interview, Kohat, March 2003.
116 SBNP, Local Government Ordinance of 13 August 2001, Government of Pakistan.
117 "Water Shortage May Cause Riots in Orangi", Dawn, 28 March 2003.
118 ICG interview, Karachi, 23 May 2003.
119 Amanullah Kasi, "Gwadar Development Authority Bill Passed", Dawn, 29 July 2003.
account of the district government. Says Babu Gulab, a zila nazim, "for the last two years, I have felt powerless in the face of the continued provincial control over the district's affairs".120
2. Devolving Corruption?
Another key problem with the devolution scheme is the lack of checks and balances between and across the various levels of district government. There is a virtual absence of accountability of district nazims. The provincial Local Government Commission can initiate special audits and inspections of district governments121 but these can be at best sporadic and are not a viable substitute to permanent, institutionalised checks and balances at district level. Technically, the zila council can be an effective check on the nazim, and through its monitoring committees on the district government as a whole. By law, the council approves by-laws, taxation proposals, annual development plans and the district budget. The extensive range of financial controls and their effective exercise, however, remain contingent on the political relationship between nazims and the council headed by the naib nazim. Since the nazim and naib nazim are elected on a joint ticket, the former can wield enormous influence over the council without enduring corresponding legislative checks on his authority.122
The joint ticket was conceived with the ostensible goal that the naib nazim would be the link between the nazim and the council. But this interface is under severe strain because of the gross imbalance of powers between the two offices. "The naib nazim is a show piece who can't even sign a legal document", says one of those officials.123 In districts where the relationship is antagonistic, the naib nazim can simply refuse to summon the council when required by the nazim. In such cases, the nazim, as executive head of the district, often runs the government without consulting the council, which can at best censure his actions through non-binding resolutions. Under the LGO, the district coordination officer is the principal accounting officer of the district
120 ICG interview, Gwadar, May 2003.
121 The commission is headed by the provincial minister for local government and can initiate annual and special inspections and audits of local governments.
122 ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
123 ICG interview with a naib nazim, Lahore, July 2003.
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government. He is, however, responsible to the public accounts committee of the provincial assembly in financial matters, not to the nazim or the zila council. He also heads the district development committee (DDC),124 which can approve development schemes up to Rs.5 million (U.S.$90,000) "The new DCO is the financial kingpin of the district", says a provincial minister in the Punjab, "with access to a larger financial pie than the former district commissioner but without any substantial changes in contracting or other financial procedures".125 Consequently, corruption opportunities have increased. "The checks and balances system envisaged under devolution is practically absent or operationally ineffective", says an EDO (Finance), in the Punjab. "This has increased the already rampant and unchecked corruption" in the province.126
Under the LGO, elected monitoring committees of zila, tehsil and union councils are responsible for reporting administrative malpractice and corruption in local governments to the nazim for appropriate action. But these committees exist mostly on paper. While many have been elected, there are no financial or administration provisions for their functioning. The head of a district education monitoring committee in Punjab's Khushab district told ICG, "We have no resources or capacity to monitor governmental functions. Besides, there are no official rules of business that govern our operations". Elected councillors interviewed in Baluchistan, the NWFP and Sindh cited bureaucratic resistance as a key stumbling block: "Executive district officers who are supposed to furnish us with information rarely respond to our queries since they know we have no powers over them".127
The tehsil is the designated level at which most local municipal services such as water, sanitation, and sewerage are delivered. The tehsil municipal administration (TMA) is also responsible for awarding contracts for signboards and advertisements, an area prone to opportunities for rent seeking. Since there are virtually no financial checks on the tehsil administration, and it can assign or contract out any of its functions to private and public sector
124 In the NWFP, district development committees were initially headed by nazims but are now under district coordination officers.
125 ICG interview, Lahore, June 2003.
126 ICG interview, Lahore, June 2003.
127 ICG interview with a zila council member, Peshawar, May 2003.
organisations, allegations of corruption in contracts are rife. In theory, the zila nazim can initiate inspections of tehsil and municipal administrations but in practice, they have neither the time nor the enforcement machinery. According to a senior official in the Sindh Ministry of Local Government, "corruption is up with a new mafia of nazims, tehsil officers and contractors emerging under the devolution plan that works in unchecked collusion with respect to awards of public contracts".128 Access to information can enhance transparency and accountability by creating pressure on the government to take into account citizen preferences when reaching decisions. While the devolution plan claimed commitment to "information empowerment", public and media access to information about the actions and performance of government is still subject to tight controls exercised by government. "Devolution will remain meaningless without an effective Freedom of Information Act", says a newspaper editor in Baluchistan. "The presence of legal obstructions like the Official Secrets Act practically preclude the possibility of access to any information unless explicitly declared public by the government of the day".129 The LGO envisages "transparent, automated information systems at all levels in each district", but little provision has been made for the lack of local information technology capacity, infrastructure and resources.
3. Development and Service Delivery
The devolution plan emphasised community involvement in development through creation of citizen community boards (CCBs). Nevertheless, the NRB took almost two years to frame by-laws. While many districts in the Punjab and some in Sindh have registered many CCBs, they can receive project-based cost sharing support from local governments only up to 80 per cent. "In rural districts," says a zila nazim from Punjab, "it is impossible to generate the remaining 20 per cent funds from communities who can barely make ends meet".130
The cost sharing provision, many officials and analysts believe, effectively works against the official LGO policy of "energizing the local communities through voluntary, proactive and self-help
128 ICG interview, Karachi, May 2003.
129 ICG interview, Quetta, May 2003.
130 ICG interview, May 2003.
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initiatives".131 An observer says that, "it seems that the concept of CCBs is more a function of the flowery rhetoric of the writers of the devolution plan aimed mostly at international donor agencies and the domestic NGO community than ground realities or real intent".132
Most nazims interviewed by ICG, however, argue that elected local councils have improved public access to official business. Devolution has certainly reduced the gap between state and citizen since local councillors and elected nazims are easily accessible, unlike a district commissioner. This could facilitate the local solution of day-to-day problems that were previously managed by bureaucrats in provincial capitals. In addition, budgets, prepared at district level, can reflect local priorities. Development schemes (roads, sanitation, water supply) can be locally planned and executed, thus eliminating delays involved in getting approvals from provincial or federal authorities.
Yet, many senior federal and provincial as well as local government officials told ICG that the system is not working, citing as evidence the steady deterioration in delivery of basic social services like education and health. According to one federal health official, "nazims tend to focus on quick impact projects like sanitation and sewerage rather than longer term investments in education or health". 133 Says a critic:
the plan may have facilitated the creation of new facilities and infrastructure but so did Ayub's Basic Democracy system. The real test is visible improvements in the basic living standards and services of the people. There is no evidence of that happening anytime soon.134 Others point out that municipal infrastructure, especially in urban areas, has come under enormous pressure as tehsil administrations try to cope with the expansion of their functions to rural areas. "Mitigating the rural-urban divide is a good idea in the long run. But at the moment, it has undermined service delivery", believes a tehsil nazim in Sindh province. Many nazims typically blame the shortage
131 ICG countrywide interviews, May-June 2003.
132 ICG interview, Karachi, June 2003. Both the devolution plan and the LGO also envisage village and neighborhood councils that are yet to be defined or created.
133 ICG interview, Islamabad, July 2003.
134 ICG interview, Karachi, June 2003.
of development funds and the lack of staff capacity. "Whatever development funds we get", says Amjad Noon, zila nazim of Sargodha in the Punjab, "flow mostly through federally or provincially funded schemes, leaving districts little leeway over the planning, implementation and budgeting".135 Shortage of funds is a serious problem with many district and tehsil administrations struggling to pay the monthly salaries of employees. In the absence of any reliable national data, it is hard to reach definitive conclusions on the impact of devolution on service delivery but the widespread perception remains that it has done no better, if not worse, than the system it replaced.136
C. FISCAL DECENTRALISATION
The bulk of local government resources come as fiscal transfers from provincially appointed provincial finance commissions (PFC) -- 98 per cent in some cases. Provinces transfer some 40 per cent of their total receipts to local governments, fuelling already widespread perceptions of encroachment on provincial autonomy.
District governments, however, have limited discretion over their budgetary resources. Over 80 per cent of the money transferred is for salaries and cannot be used for any other purposes. Except in Punjab, salaries are still paid from provincial accounts.137 Only the non-salary component (utilities and other recurring costs), a fraction of the total expenditure, is transferred to district-controlled accounts. 138
By and large, transfers are population rather than needs-based.139 Population estimates remain problematic in light of the controversial nature of the census the army conducted in 1998. In Baluchistan, for instance, the Pashtun Khwa Milli Awami Party called for a boycott of the census. Rahim Kakar, the
135 ICG interview, Sargodha, May 2003.
136 ICG countrywide interviews, May-June 2003.
137 Nick Manning et al., "Devolution in Pakistan: Preparing for Service Delivery Improvements", draft working paper prepared for the Forum on Inter-governmental Relations in Pakistan, 27-29 June 2003, p. 33.
138 Ibid.
139 In Sindh, 40 per cent of the transfers in 2002 were based
on a backwardness index that factored in population, underdevelopment,
fiscal effort, revenue generation capacity, and
expenditure requirements.
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Quetta City district nazim, said, "this resulted in an unfair PFC award for Quetta since the census grossly underestimated the city's actual population".140 Under the LGO, local governments can raise additional revenues through specified taxes. Previously the main source of taxation revenue for local councils was the octroi (urban) and zila tax (in rural areas) on the movement of goods in and out of the territorial jurisdiction of the council. Under IMF directives, the federal government abolished this in 1998 to remove tax distortions. To make up for the revenue loss, 2.5 per cent of the revenue generated by the centre from the new general sales tax is now allocated to provinces. Provinces transfer this directly to the tehsil administrations. Without an octroi tax, however, the taxation base of local governments (especially urban councils) is severely circumscribed. Says an economist in the Federal Planning Commission, "The LGO does not significantly increase the tax base of the district governments, without which meaningful devolution will remain elusive".141 The tehsil administration can collect the more lucrative urban immovable property tax (UIPT) and transfer of property tax.142 Any proposal for new taxation, however, requires approval of the relevant provincial authority.143 "Previous councils were more financially autonomous as they could raise substantive taxes", says a former chairman of the zila council and now a town nazim in the Punjab. "This is devolution with a centralised financial system".144 Financially starved, many districts are centralising taxation powers. In Karachi, for instance, the city district government collects the fee on advertisement billboards and posters, otherwise a tehsil fee.
D. LAW ENFORCEMENT
In August 2002, President Musharraf promulgated Police Order 2002,145 under which the district police officer (DPO) is responsible to the zila nazim for
140 ICG interview, Quetta, May 2203
141 ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
142 The UIPT is collected by the district government on behalf of the tehsil for a 10 per cent fee.
143 In the Punjab, this provincial check was introduced after a plethora of overlapping toll fees and user charges were imposed by union and tehsil administrations.
144 ICG interview, Lahore, June 2003.
145 Interim changes in the district police set up as envisaged in LGP 2000 were implemented through the Police (Amendment) Order 2001 of 14 August 2001.
police functions "other than administration of the district police, investigation of criminal cases and police functions relating to prosecution".146 The nazim writes an annual performance report on the DPO. Emulating the Japanese National Safety Commission system, the Police Order calls for establishment of oversight bodies with both elected and appointed members at district, provincial and national levels. It also creates an independent prosecution service to act as an additional check and balance on the police, who have investigation as a separate responsibility. But the Japanese police system has been implanted in Pakistan without account being taken of the political and administrative differences between the countries. The Japanese system is predicated on institutional mechanisms that shield the police from political pressure and ensure civilian control. In Pakistan, the police are highly politicised, inefficient and corrupt. Despite provisions for police autonomy on assignments, these remain centrally or provincially controlled. Law and order is a provincial responsibility, and the new federally enacted police order has understandably engendered apprehension and resistance among provincial authorities. More importantly, since assuming power in October 1999, the Musharraf government has given no practical indication that it intends to reform the police. On the contrary, like its military predecessors, it has deployed police for regime ends. This includes using law-enforcement agencies to obtain favourable results in local elections and the presidential referendum as well as to harass political opponents. The military's failure to implement police reforms is evidence of its unwillingness to hand over law enforcement to public representatives. According to a police official, "while much was made of the purportedly historic nature of police reforms, there appears to be no enthusiasm within the senior military echelons to back police reforms in substance".147 Provincial reservations were cited as reasons for delay in implementation of reforms but the military has conveniently transferred responsibility for enacting those reforms to a powerless elected government. Sections of Police Order 2002 that grant powers to the police have indeed been enforced but areas that
146 Police Order 2002.
147 ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2002.
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prescribe accountability remain poorly implemented. While the district commissioner's lateral control has been removed, the district police officer remains only tangentially responsible to the nazim for law and order. Previously, the DC had been positioned to intervene on behalf of the public to redress grievances. "Though the DC's operational check on the police had been diluted over the years", says a former police official, "periodic visits to the police station did bring relief for those in unlawful detention".148
Technically, the district nazim can inspect police stations to check illegal detentions but except for districts in which individual police officers have personally established a good working relationship with the nazim, district police authorities are widely accused of running a parallel government. Says Khairpur nazim Nafisa Shah, "I have no information about the activities of the police. Unless a cooperative police officer comes along, I fear the police will continue to operate without any check or accountability".149
The viability of police reforms depends largely on how the planned safety commission system evolves. Initial signs are discouraging. While provincial governments have notified the creation of district safety commissions,150 few are properly constituted, fewer still operational.151 These latter, including the one in Quetta, owe their success mainly to the personal involvement of individual police officers.152 Provincial safety commissions and the police complaints authorities are yet to be created. Since the promulgation of the Police Order, a corrupt and violence-prone force has been allowed a free hand without external accountability. In fact, selective implementation of the order in an overall environment of the absence of rule of law has
148 ICG interview, Lahore, July 2003.
149 ICG interview, Khairpur, May 2003.
150 According to the Police Order 2002, the provincial government is to establish a public safety commission in each district with eight, ten or twelve members depending upon size and population. The zila council is to elect half the members. The other half (independent members) are to be appointed by the governor from a list recommended by the district selection panel. One third of both elected and appointed members are to be women.
151 ICG interviews, Hyderabad and Hala, January 2004.
152 Shoaib Suddle, the current chief of police in Baluchistan, was a leading member of both the federal interior ministry's focus group on police reforms and the NRB's police reforms think tank.
resulted in a sharp rise in reported police excesses, crimes, and deteriorating law and order.153 Even if the safety commissions were constituted as envisaged, questions would remain about their effectiveness. The Police Order gives the commissions vague powers to approve policing plans and encourage public-police cooperation. A commission can only ask the district police officer "in writing" to remedy of public complaints. It has no independent enforcement mechanisms or powers of inspection.154 The federally appointed provincial governor selects half the commission's members. More importantly, the governor can remove members "on his own volition" on several grounds, including "involvement in activities prejudicial to the ideology, interest, security, unity, solidarity, peace and integrity of Pakistan", a euphemism for arbitrary removal. Police officers as well as many district nazims interviewed by ICG still support the new reforms. Nazims pointed out that nazim-police coordination helped keep relative calm in the wake of countrywide protests against the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan. "During the violenceprone month of Muharram when Sunni-Shia tensions are running high", said Amjad Noon, nazim of Sargodha district in Punjab "the police and district government worked hand in hand to avert any untoward incidents".155
Police officials say that DMG officers who remain unwilling to shed their colonial powers are maligning the Police Order. There is no doubt that the previous system was outdated and contrary to all principles of 153 Noting that torture was widespread, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan documented several cases in 2003 and added that, to its knowledge, no police official was punished. http://www.hrcp-web.org/police_torture.cfm. In a written statement submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the South Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre claimed that citizens were arbitrarily arrested and detained; torture and harassment in custody were common, and at least 100 persons died from police torture annually. http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf./(Symbol)/E.CN.4.2003.NGO.162.En? Ope23/02/2004.
154 The commission can direct the district police officer in writing to ensure registration of a first information report on receiving complaint of any unjustified delay by the head of a police station and report in 48 hours on the action taken by him. On receiving a public complaint against a police officer, it can ask the district officer to act within a specified time. It can also form a team to ascertain the facts and recommend action to the district police officer.
155 ICG interview, Sargodha, May 2003.
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modern policing. "The Police Order has removed the colonial system of administrative controls over the police", said the senior superintendent of police in Quetta. "Investigation has been separated; we can now work more efficiently if given the resources and political backing".156 There is, in fact, a consensus among senior law enforcement officials interviewed by ICG on the need to see the Police Order implemented in letter and spirit. At the same time, they express doubts about its legitimacy and viability given its association with a military regime. According to a former police service interior secretary, "for the police to function effectively, the society has to ensure that the Constitution is honoured by all. With the military in control, the government is no longer accountable to the people. This creates a precarious situation, particularly for the agency which is responsible for law enforcement".157
156 ICG interview, Quetta, May 2003.
157 I.M. Mohsin, "Police Reforms Delayed", Daily Times, 31 March 2003.
VI. DONORS AND DEVOLUTION
When the military took power on 12 October 1999, Pakistan was nearly bankrupt. The U.S. had imposed military and economic sanctions as a result of Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons. After a series of nuclear tests in May 1998, new loans from the IMF and World Bank were suspended, and Japan, its largest bilateral donor, also froze aid and made resumption contingent on accession to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The coup itself triggered further "democracy sanctions".158 Confirming that the UK had frozen all direct development assistance, Secretary for International Development Clare Short said:
Pakistan needs a democratic government, which is transparent and accountable....obviously, we cannot provide development assistance to the military authorities in Pakistan. No new funds for programs linked to governmental institutions will be made available, and all our specialists who have been advising the Government have stopped work.159
The military required urgent and immediate access to the international financial system for its overall corporate interests and regime survival. As international pressure for return to civilian rule mounted, the Musharraf government pledged a series of devolution reforms both to "distract the international community from its coercive actions and to appease donor agencies that favour decentralisation".160
Well aware of the hostile international environment, the military government appropriated the donorfriendly lexicon of "good governance", "devolution", "grassroots empowerment", and "bottom-up reforms". In this it had the support of a politically vocal coalition of local NGO leaders. It was also more than coincidental that the modes, methods and
158 U.S. nuclear proliferation sanctions were imposed under the Pressler and Glenn Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, 1961. U.S. democracy sanctions were imposed under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, Section 508, which bars Washington from providing militaryor economic assistance to non-elected governments.
159 BBC, "UK Halts Aid to Pakistan," 15 October 1999 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ukpolitics/476091.stm.
160 James Manor, "The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralisation", Washington, D.C, The World Bank, 1999, p. 39.
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rhetoric of the Musharraf devolution plan closely resembled decentralisation reforms advocated by some donor agencies.161
Long before the 1999 coup, donors had led the debate on the need for decentralisation.162 The World Bank's "Framework for Civil Service Reforms in Pakistan" had strongly recommended "devolution of substantive authority" to lower tiers of government. The Bank had also strongly emphasised the need for "re-examining the roles of District Commissioners and their Deputies" and for "safeguards to prevent their encroachment on local governments and intervention in their affairs".163
In February 1998, the Planning Commission's good governance group (G3) had conducted four provincial seminars on local government with UNDP assistance. Legislators, civil servants, NGO leaders and aid officials held extensive discussions. The World Bank urged the government to draw on this "consensus building process" and another of its reports, "Supporting Fiscal Decentralisation in Pakistan", to "make early strategic decisions on devolution".164 Soon after the 1999 coup, the UNDP, sensing an opportunity, approached the military government with generous offers of technical assistance.165 Donor officials based in Pakistan sought to redirect their pre-coup earmarked funds to Musharrraf's "democratic reforms" agenda. With little else on which to base its external legitimacy and anxious to co-opt donors, the military government made calculated overtures to enlist support for its "bottom up" reconstruction of Pakistan.
161 Indeed, the NRB devolution plan virtually mirrored the latest development policy discourse in calling for "devolution of political power, decentralisation of administrative authority, de-concentration of functions, redistribution of resources and enhanced representation". LGP, op. cit.
162 The new consensus in donor policy on good governance includes decentralisation as a key component. It is seen as a means of shifting power and authority from the centralised state to local levels and civil society, increasing governmental transparency and accountability, and making delivery of social services more efficient. Manor, op cit.
163 World Bank, "Framework for Civil Service Reforms in Pakistan", 1998, p. 54.
164 Ibid., p. 53.
165 Aid officials ICG interviewed in Islamabad made no effort to hide their frustration with Pakistan's elected government in the 1990s, which they saw as corrupt and inefficient.
166 Other short-term international consultants, and inputs, including information and communication technology support, were also provided, 15 April 2003.athttp://undp.un.org.pk.
At a crucial meeting held soon after the coup, in November 1999, the National Reconstruction Bureau chairman, Lt. General Tanvir Naqvi, requested UNDP to coordinate support to the government's "national reconstruction reform process" from other UN programs, as well as multilateral and bilateral partners. Thereafter the military government relocated the G3 group to the NRB and made it the focal point for external assistance to the devolution plan. UNDP re-activated its U.S.$1.89 million support to the G3 project, providing national consultants as well as a senior international governance advisor for NRB's devolution think tank.166 UNDP advisors were given unprecedented access to high-powered NRB policy planning meetings. They drafted background papers, policy briefs and substantial parts of the original devolution plan. Through the Institutional Development Task Force, an inter-aid agency body on governance issues (renamed the Governance Group), UNDP also provided the main platform for donor coordination and discussion on the devolution plan.167
As General Musharraf consolidated his grip on the state, initial scepticism in some aid agencies over support to a military government gave way to heightened enthusiasm over the opportunity to reshape and redefine Pakistani governmental structures. Donors like the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) committed their "democratic governance programs" to the military's devolution project.168 In due course, multilateral financial institutions like the Asian Development Bank dedicated substantial resources for "the government's far-reaching Political Devolution and Administrative
167 In addition to support from its regular country programs, UNDP has spearheaded an inter-donor advocacy campaign to establish a U.S.$300 million Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment to "activate the community participation elements of devolution".
168 For instance, CIDA's Democratic Governance Program supports almost exclusively "the devolution of power, the decentralisation of administration, and the participation of citizens in local governance", which is expected to lead to "improved local governance policies and policy implementation, effective local democratic institutions and practices, and effective citizens' voice in setting local priorities and delivering social services". Canadian International Development Agency website, at www.acdi-cida.gc.ca.
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Decentralisation Plan, among the boldest governance reforms ever undertaken by a developing country".169 As these and other donors re-routed their governance resources to build Pakistani democracy from below, the military government was dismantling it from the top. With General Musharraf simultaneously occupying the offices of chief executive (and later president), chief of army staff, chairman joint chiefs of staff and defence minister, military officers were appointed to top civilian posts in the federal and provincial governments. Political rallies were banned; parliament remained dissolved, and the constitution was put in abeyance. On 26 January 2000, the chief justice and half the bench of the Supreme Court were arbitrarily removed when they refused to take an oath under the military government's provisional constitution.
This destruction of the independence of the courts and the separation of powers did not change donor policy. In fact, donors continued to support Musharraf's devolution of power scheme even after the military resorted to coercive tactics in the elections for nazims. After 11 September 2001, even the international community's rhetorical emphasis on a return to democracy in Pakistan was put on the back burner as the Musharraf government joined the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Emboldened by his international acceptance, Musharraf used the newly created local governments to manipulate the run up to the national elections of October 2002.
Despite extensive "pre-poll rigging" that led international observers to censure the 2002 electoral process as "seriously flawed",170 UNDP, DFID,CIDA and the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), continued to back a U.S.$5 million umbrella project on "Supporting Democratic Electoral Processes in Pakistan (SDEPP)" to provide "the basis for coordinated international donor
169 Asian Development Bank, Press Release. "Helping Pakistan's Devolution Program Improve Delivery of Social Services", Manila, 21 November 2002, at www.adb.org. The ADB funds a U.S.$300 million "Support to Devolution Program" that mainly provides budgetary support to the Pakistan government.
170 See the report of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) at http://www.eueom.org.pk/finalreport.asp.
community support for the preparation of truly democratic elections".171
Donor agencies such as UNDP also supported the NRB's proposed constitutional amendments to "provide constitutional coverage to and ensure stability of the devolution initiatives".172 Actually, only a small fraction of the constitutional amendments package, the August 2002 Legal Framework Order (LFO), relates to devolution. Many features of that package, now enshrined in the constitution through the 17th amendment, are widely seen as an attempt to retain direct military rule. Donors have not been ignorant of the military's intentions. A senior governance advisor of a multilateral bank says, "we knew that regime security was primary to devolution; it was obvious to us that the military was circumventing provinces to create new constituencies for local support while reaping the added benefit of donor support".173 Another aid official says, "we did and still have serious reservations about the local government plan but we could either equivocate and risk reform failure, or put our money behind [the military government] to gain a voice".174
Many other donors gave their support apparently more enthusiastically and are much more sanguine about the military's reformist zeal. According to a senior DFID official, "mass empowerment was the real motivation behind devolution. Colonialism and centralisation, twin evils of Pakistan's bureaucratic institutions, can't be abolished overnight -- 101 elected districts are the answer".175 This unquestioning acceptance by some donors of Musharraf's "readiness to confront issues that eluded the country since independence",176 has led many to violate even their own declared goals of "local ownership" and "stakeholder consultations". While the overall objective of the UNDP Governance Program in Pakistan, for instance, is "to create an enabling environment within which the people of Pakistan can influence the direction and conduct of
171 For a project synopsis see http://undp.un.org.pk.
172 UNDP "Governance and Gender Unit Quarterly Progress
Report: April -June 2002", at http://undp.un.org.pk, 2 April
2003.
173 ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
174 ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
175 ICG Interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
176 Asian Development Bank, " Pakistan: Country Strategy
and Program 2002-2006", at www.adb.org.
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their governing institutions",177 political parties, civil society organisations, professional associations, and even the civilian bureaucracy were largely bypassed in the policy planning process that eventually led to adoption of the devolution plan.178 Throughout the formulation, design, dissemination and implementation of that plan, UNDP even overlooked existing institutional arrangements, including the ministry of local government, opting instead to support the NRB.179
This experience is a cautionary tale that in extreme situations, reforms carried out according to donor specifications can reinforce authoritarian regimes and undermine democracy.180 In the specific example of Musharraf's devolution, donor acceptance of the official rhetoric of good governance has, as a practical matter, undermined the democratic transition.
Although criticised by most Pakistani political parties and independent human rights groups, donor acceptance and ownership of the devolution plan has certainly endowed the military's local government system with its own momentum and an otherwise missing semblance of legitimacy. With low levels of internal accountability, donor funding not only contradicts declared objectives of supporting democratic governance but also wastes scarce resources. The lack of domestic legitimacy means there are high risks of failure and adverse political impact. No matter how unintended, by supporting the regime's devolution plan, donors have reinforced the military's hold on power.
177 UNDP Governance Unit, at http://undp.un.org.pk.
178 Funded by the Asia Foundation, the only visible attempt to solicit public views was a series of "People's Assemblies" held under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.
179 UNDP continues to support the devolution concept: "The devolution project is one of the fundamental projects in Pakistan in alleviating poverty. The UNDP stands behind it 100 per cent and will continue to support the initiative". ICG interview, Farhan Sabi, head of the UNDP governance unit in Islamabad, 22 March 2004.
180 Carrie Meyer, "The Irony of Donor Efforts to Build Institutions: A Case Study From the Dominican Republic", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, No. 148, 1992, pp.628-44.
VII. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. PREPARING THE GROUND
To protect the devolution scheme from interference by elected governments, Musharraf's LFO placed the four provincial Local Government Ordinances in that part of the 1973 constitution (the Sixth Schedule) that can only be amended with consent of the president.181 It was also required that provincial governments "shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected local representatives".182 This provision creates the false impression that devolution remains within a provincial framework but its protected constitutional status effectively precludes provinces from amending the LGO.
With this constitutional cover, the military government could rely on its local clients ensure a favourable outcome in the October 2002 national elections. In the Punjab, where a majority of district and tehsil nazims could be counted on to support military-backed candidates for the national and provincial assemblies, they were encouraged to mobilise support openly for the pro-Musharraf PML-Q in return for generous developmental funds. Elsewhere, nazims were threatened and intimidated to support PML-Q candidates. In parts of Sindh and Baluchistan, wholesale transfers of district officers were ordered to blunt the authority of "hostile" nazims.183 Local governments proved instrumental in the military government's manipulation of these general elections, which international human rights and election observer groups termed "seriously flawed".184 With the military's backing, the PML-Q obtained the most seats in the National Assembly and the Punjab Provincial Assembly. "The blatant political use of
181 Under Article 268 (2) of the 1973 Constitution, the laws specified in the sixth schedule may not be altered, repealed or amended without the previous sanction of the president.
182 Legal Framework Order 2002, Chief Executive's Secretariat, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, August 2002.
183 ICG interviews, May-June 2002.
184 See the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) to Pakistan, at http://www.eueom.org.pk/finalreport.asp. Also see Human Rights Watch Background Briefing, "Pakistan: Entire
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elected councils in the general elections has proved beyond any doubt that the local bodies had been primarily created for that very purpose", said Afrasiab Khattak, then Chairman of the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.185
B. THE POLITICS OF DEVOLUTION
With the transfer of power to the elected national and provincial governments in November 2002, there are growing frictions between elected officials and local governments, which are perceived as tainted by their association with the military government and its political machinations. Elected politicians see in local bodies an alternative power structure that undercuts their authority. They have just cause since the power dynamics have been radically altered by the military's politically motivated delimitation of both provincial and national electoral constituencies (especially in the Punjab) and the installation of nazims. In Lahore, for instance, the area under the control of one town nazim includes several provincial and national electoral districts. Members of provincial assemblies (MPAs) and the National Assembly (MNAs) also feel that nazims have usurped their legitimate right to oversee development projects in their constituencies.186 In interviews with ICG, many legislators stress that their access to development projects is essential because Pakistani voters expect their representatives to deliver patronage and resolve their day-to-day problems. According to a pro-military PML-Q MNA from the NWFP, "If I tell my constituents that sanitation, water supply or police matters are now the responsibility of local governments, they turn around and say: we voted for you, not the nazim".187 An MNA of the same party and from a northern Punjab district asks, "if I don't deliver on public demands, what is my political future?"188
185 ICG telephone interview, November 2002.
186 The involvement of legislators in local development schemes dates back to General Zia's time, when state funds were disbursed to loyal "non-partisan" parliamentarians to create a political clientele for the military ruler. Systematic suppression of partisan loyalties and state patronage of corruption under authoritarian rule have gradually replaced issue-based political competition with easier to manage, personality-based patronage politics.
187 ICG interview, June 2003.
188 ICG interview, July 2003.
Opposition legislators from the PPP and PML-N agree, adding that President Musharraf had reserved many public policy areas such devolution under the LFO. The President retains his control over the devolution scheme after its inclusion in the Sixth schedule of the constitution. This seriously limits the policy making options of politicians and encourages them to focus on local as opposed to regional or national issues.
To assuage their demands for participation in local development schemes, the PML-Q central government decided in late November 2002 to allocate special funds to provincial and national legislators that would enable them to undertake development projects in their own constituencies. This reinforced the public perception that legislators remain the appropriate address for resolving local problems, not nazims. While they can only identify electrification, gas and telecommunication projects, the official reintroduction of their developmental role has spurred local authorities to match them project for project.189 In many districts where the political relationship between nazims and legislators is less than friendly, energies are consumed by the need to build independent political capital, often through parallel and hence wasteful developmental schemes. In the Punjab, Sindh and NWFP, rivalries between nazims and legislators often cut across party lines. In many districts of the Punjab, for instance, even nazims and provincial or national legislators from the ruling and pro-Musharraf PML-Q are at loggerheads since the military either deliberately supported, or at least acquiesced in, the victories of mutually hostile candidates at the different tiers of government. According to a PML-Q national legislator, "I sense a deliberate strategy on the part of the federal government to keep MNAs embroiled in a competition with the nazim, lest they begin to challenge the military's role at the centre".190 An analyst agrees: "Since divide-and-rule tactics are a favourite with the military, creating the district government as a rival power centre was part of a deliberate strategy to keep politicians and nazims at each other's throats and thus take pressures off the centre where the generals rule".191
Wary of these growing tensions, Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali instructed the NRB in
189 ICG interviews, June 2003.
190 ICG interview, Islamabad, July 2003.
191 ICG interview, July 2003.
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February 2003 to work out a mutually acceptable mechanism for coordination between elected members of the local governments and parliamentarians. Several proposals are on the table (including participation of elected members in district development committee meetings), but the tussle between different tiers of government shows no signs of abating in the absence of any effective mechanisms for dispute resolution.192
C. PROVINCIAL DISCONTENT
Provincial and local governments were on collision course from the start. Most opposition politicians see devolution as Islamabad's infringement on an already reduced sphere of provincial autonomy. "Devolution was bulldozed over the provinces by a military regime without taking political parties into confidence", says Shah Mehmood Qureshi of the largest opposition party, the PPP. "It was only a matter of time before the various tiers of government locked horns with each other".193 Most elected provincial governments, including those controlled by the ruling PML-Q, also view devolution with varying degrees of suspicion.
Provincial demands range from amendments to abolition of the Local Government Ordinance. "The LGO is silent on many issues and requires adjustments", notes Raja Basharat, Punjab Minister for Local Government."194 A minister in Baluchistan from the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA, the sixparty religious alliance) says, "Islamabad has usurped the administrative, legislative and financial powers of the provinces in the name of devolution which should be abolished".195
Above all, there is consensus across the political spectrum that the local government scheme cannot work without adjusting it to Pakistan's federal parliamentary system. Even in the Punjab where a majority of district nazims remain loyal to the ruling PML-Q, Chief Minister Pervez Elahi concedes that "certain changes would have be made in the local government law to create linkages between the
provincial and the district governments".196 In
192 ICG interviews, Hyderabad, January 2004.
193 ICG interview, Islamabad, April 2003.
194 ICG interview, Lahore, June 2003.
195 ICG interview, Quetta, June 2003.
196 "Devolution plan to be strengthened: Pervez", Dawn, 17
December 2002.
February 2003, the Punjab government created a devolution committee to address these problems and suggest reforms. Headed by the provincial minister for local government, the body includes provincial legislators and nazims.
Such ad hoc measures can hardly rectify the distortions that have resulted from the military's manipulation of the political process. By purportedly depoliticising governance, for instance, the military has reinforced loyalties along the lines of biradari (caste, tribe, sub-region), thus actually aggravating social and political divisions in society. Centralised control, the absence of the rule of law, and patronage-based politics are promoting corruption and have increased the potential for confrontation and conflict between the federal units and the centre and within the provinces.
In provinces where nazims and elected governments come from different political parties, the problems are predictably more severe. Notes an analyst, "no sooner had elected governments assumed office than political rivalries, forced underground by authoritarian manipulation, resurfaced with a vengeance".197 In the NWFP, the MMA government is dominated by the Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI), which had boycotted the local government elections. Ever since, zila nazims say, the MMA government has attempted to reassert control over local bodies by gradually usurping their already limited powers. "Release of development funds has been stalled and district nazims are ignored in almost all the important administrative matters".198
While tensions had been brewing for some time, they came to a head in late May 2003 when the MMA government introduced resolutions in the provincial assembly to remove the district nazims of Kohistan and Bannu for misuse of power and corruption. The assembly speaker formed a special committee to deal with the cases. The threat of prosecution prompted all 24 NWFP district nazims to tender their resignations, citing "undue interference" from the provincial government. The resignations came against the backdrop of the military's stalled negotiations with the MMA to gain its support in the national parliament for Musharraf's Legal Framework Order.199 Analysts believe they were meant to
197 ICG interview, Lahore, June 2003.
198 ICG interview, August 2003.
199 Relations between the centre and the NWFP government also deteriorated when the MMA tabled a bill on shari'a
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pressure the MMA to support the LFO. The signal to the MMA government was "fall in line or face the consequences".200
According to federal government sources, it was not surprising that the nazims, whether sensing a favourable political climate or heeding Islamabad's directive, deliberately bypassed provincial authorities and tendered their resignations directly to President Musharraf.201 A district nazim who spearheaded the revolt against the provincial government confirmed to ICG, "while most nazims had legitimate grievances against the MMA government, we had been bypassed since 14 August 2001, so this was a golden opportunity to make our voices heard".202 Demonstrating an indifference to provincial autonomy, President Musharraf intervened, refusing the resignations and directing the MMA government to restore powers delegated to the nazims under the LGO within ten days.203 The NRB subsequently drafted new rules in consultation with the provincial government and the nazims but little has changed on the ground. The tussle between nazims and provincial governments is far from over. The military's political use of its devolution scheme is further illustrated by President Musharraf's benign neglect of -- some say blessing for -- the Punjab government's plans to pressure and remove nazims with links to opposition parties.204 In Lahore city, for instance, it reportedly colluded in ousting Ahmed Hassan, the pro PML-N nazim of Data Gunj Bakhsh Town, through a no-confidence motion. 205 "I have been a victim of a conspiracy hatched by the (Islamic) law in late May 2003, causing much embarrassment to President Musharraf on the eve of his trip to the U.S., France, Germany and the UK. Vigilante action by the youth wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami, a key member of the MMA, which included the defacing of billboards across the provincial capital, Peshawar, prompted Islamabad to threaten administrative action. "Shariat Bill tabled in NWFP's provincial assembly", Dawn, 28 May 2003.
200 ICG interview, Islamabad, July 2003.
201 "District Nazims in NWFP Resign", Dawn, 2 June 2003.
202 ICG interview, August 2003.
203 Senior officials in the MMA government say that Musharraf had given them a green light for action against corrupt nazims. Quoted in Mubashir Zaidi and Ali Hasan, op.cit.
204 ICG Punjab-wide interviews, June 2003.
205 Ali Lahori, "Councillors on Sale in Lahore", The Independent, 4-10 September 2003, p. 4.
Councillors were reportedly bribed to vote against Hassan. provincial PML-Q authorities", he claimed.206 Several PPP and PML-N tehsil and district nazims told ICG they are under intense official pressure to join the PML-Q.207
In provinces where the ruling PML-Q has formed coalition governments, the devolution scheme has fared no better. In Baluchistan, nazims have appealed to the courts to stop provincial interference in district affairs. Rahim Kakar, the district nazim of Quetta City, says, "I have had to approach the High Court to stop provincial intrusions in the affairs of the city district government".208 The roots of local opposition to devolution run much deeper in this province than battles over political turf. The scheme is widely seen by the Baluch as yet another attempt by a Punjabi-dominated military to usurp their political and economic rights. While they accept decentralisation to district levels in principle, Baluch leaders and academics are quick to point out that the administrative and financial autonomy guaranteed to the federal units in the 1973 constitution has been undermined by continued military rule. History warns that central intrusions into provincial affairs can seriously exacerbate ethno-regional tensions. In the 1970s, the dismissal of the provincial National Awami Party-JUI government in Baluchistan culminated in a bloody insurgency against the central government. Several thousand Baluch were killed in the military's counter-insurgency operations. Worryingly, the deepening sense of Baluch alienation from centralised military rule is already manifesting itself in periodic attacks on oil and gas installations. In Sindh, local rivalries aggravated by the military's political manipulation mar provincial-local government relations. The military's decision to cobble together a fractious coalition that includes the PML-Q, the MQM and the Sindh Democratic Alliance rather than allow the PPP, which has the most seats in the assembly, to form the provincial government is largely responsible for heightened ethnic, regional and factional infighting. As pro-PPP district nazims pay the price for their political affiliation, Sindhi resentment against the Punjabi-dominated military is on the rise. With memories of the execution of a Sindhi Prime
206 ICG telephone interview, September 2003. Hassan has appealed to the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
207 ICG interviews, Punjab, May-June 2003.
208 ICG interview, Quetta, June 2003.
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Minister by a military ruler still fresh, the Sindhis have little faith in the legitimacy of the state and its institutions, least of all in the local government scheme.209
In the Muhajir-dominated urban centres of Sindh, which have repeatedly witnessed violent ethnic conflict, local rivalries are already assuming a dangerous shape. The MQM, which boycotted local elections, opposes control of the city district and several town governments by its archrival, the Jamaat-i-Islami. Senior MQM leaders, who hold important posts in the provincial government, including that of governor, say it is only a matter of time before they bring no-confidence motions against JI nazims. According to JI city district council members, "the provincial governor and the local government minister have left no stone unturned to undermine the city nazim by blocking the devolution of municipal bodies, slashing budgets and transferring officials".210
While the federal government has acted to ease tensions by removing the local government minister, informed observers fear that the JI-MQM dispute could intensify to engulf Karachi in yet another cycle of violence and instability.211 Armed clashes between activists have already claimed several lives. Growing tensions between the centre and the smaller provinces are also prominent in the increasingly strident criticism of the devolution scheme by Baluch, Sindhi and Pashtun ethno-regional parties. Rejecting the military's involvement in politics in general, and demanding more independence for the federal units, parties such as the NWFP-basedAwami National Party, the Pashtun-dominated Pakhtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party, the Baluchistan National Party and Baluchistan National Movement, the Sindhi Taraqi Pasand Party and the Jeay Sindh Mahaz, among others, believe that the devolution scheme is yet another means for the Punjabi-
209 Criticising the Punjabi-dominated military for usurping power at the cost of the smaller federal units, a Sindhi political activist said, "We might not be capable of fighting the military but we will never accept military rule". ICG interview, Hyderabad, January 2004. Former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was removed from office in 1978 by General Zia's military government and executed the following year.
210 ICG interview, Karachi, June 2003.
211 "MQM Minister Replaced", Dawn, 24 August 2003. dominated military to undermine provincial rights.
212 This growing resentment might not translate into armed conflict, given the military's power. If left to fester, however, it could, as in the past, still turn violent.213 Resentment of the devolution plan might well prove the catalyst.
212 On 23 February 2004, the police booked 25 leaders of PONM parties, including members of both houses of parliament, in Islamabad for preaching provincial and ethnic prejudice after they held a seminar on the 17th amendment and its infringement of provincial rights.
213 Commenting on the government's action against the PONM leaders, The News editorialised that, "the issue of provincial autonomy" requires "immediate attention if the country's unity is to be strengthened. The example of East Pakistan inevitably emerges as a nightmare of what can happen if again those same errors are committed". "Hear these voices", The News, 24 February 2004.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
While the NRB claims it is too early to know whether the new administrative arrangements are working, most officials in the field and nazims told ICG that law enforcement has emerged as a particularly serious problem. According to an official of the federal ministry of interior, "the poor performance of the local governments in relation to the enforcement of rule of law could force all four provincial governments to reconsider the whole devolution scheme".214 In Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP, provincial authorities complain that nazims are constrained by political affiliations in controlling law and order. In February 2003, the Punjab government gave district revenue officers power to try offences under the local and special laws for three months.215 This partial return of magisterial powers to executive officers is a serious blow to the devolution plan and has fuelled speculation that it will not last long.216
Although President Musharraf and Prime Minister Jamali have ordered the provinces to implement Police Order 2002 by 14 August 2004, it is unlikely they will comply.217 And with demands for restructuring of the LGO echoing in provincial and central legislatures by government ministers and opposition politicians alike, doubts about its survival continue to grow.
For those with stakes in the system, including the nazims, President Musharraf's backing remains the mainstay of their hopes for political survival. The
214 ICG interview, Islamabad, June 2003.
215 ICG interviews, Lahore, June 2003. Section 144 allows the government to take preventive measures if it perceives danger to public order. These can include a ban on meetings and processions of five or more persons, carrying of firearms, and preventive detention of any person likely to disturb public order. A senior local government ministry official said, "the provincial government was facing serious difficulties in implementing its policies which compelled us to confer magisterial powers on the executive magistrates". ICG interview, Lahore, 2003.
216 According to an NRB official, "the return of the magistracy puts a question mark on the Bureau's main objective of de-concentrating the executive and judicial powers of the DMG". ICG interview, Islamabad, May 2003. The DMG group in the federal bureaucracy, which had previously exercised magisterial powers, still controls strategic positions at provincial and federal levels.
217 "Police Order that no one wants", Daily Times, 29 January 2004.
devolution scheme is also still backed by a number of donors in the belief that "new pro-devolution constituencies" will ensure the viability of the system.218 This optimism, however, is not widely shared.
"Lacking internal legitimacy", says Ahmed Rashid, "the devolution plan faces the political and legal ambiguities common to projects in which authoritarian means are deployed to achieve democratic goals".219
Since key stakeholders were bypassed in the process, it is not surprising that devolution remains controversial with political parties, provincial governments and the bureaucracy. Without their support, it is vulnerable, especially because of its association with the military.
A Sindh nazim says, "you can't legitimise a system of government by putting it in a glass case. Legislators and parties will have to be taken into confidence if the system is to last".220 According to Senator Sanaullah Baluch of the Baluchistan National Party, "A system devoid of legitimacy and propped on military crutches can hardly be expected to outlive its creator".221
There is indeed pressing need for the devolution of political, administrative and economic power in Pakistan but any scheme has to take into account the legitimate concerns of elected politicians and provincial governments.
Party-based, direct elections for posts in any local government scheme are crucial if there is to be electoral accountability of local officials and the divisive impact of non-partisan elections on political affiliations is to be curtailed. Provincial grievances will have to be addressed through meaningful step towards decentralisation of administrative and financial powers. Provinces must also be consulted and involved in the timely implementation of police reforms.
To make devolution viable, the financial autonomy of local units of government will have to be enhanced with provisions for raising additional revenue through
218 ICG interview, Islamabad, July 2003.
219 ICG interview, Khushab, May 2003.
220 ICG interview, Karachi, June 2003.
221 ICG interview, Islamabad, July 2003.
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?
ICG Asia Report N?77, 22 March 2004 Page 30
taxation. And provincial transfers to local tiers of government must be adjusted to reflect local fiscal needs, underdevelopment and poverty levels. Given the paucity of local resources, international assistance is also essential to successful devolution. However, the international community should link financial and technical assistance to time-bound progress on federal-provincial devolution, fiscal decentralisation and police reforms. In its present form, the Musharraf local government scheme has failed to give any lasting legitimacy to military rule. But the political engineering that accompanies it has strained a fragile polity by exacerbating sub-national divisions and fanning provincial grievances over reduced financial and administrative autonomy.222
Now that the military and MMA have reached a deal on the LFO, there is speculation that Musharraf could choose to reshape the devolution scheme in the NWFP and Baluchistan to assuage the concerns of the religious alliance.223 In Punjab, devolution is likely to be retained with no more than minor adjustments. In Sindh, political rivalries between nazims and provincial ministers (especially in Karachi) will continue to mar the prospects of any meaningful devolution and increase the potential for conflict, particularly in the provincial capital. For now, the coercive powers at the military's disposal, combined with international support, favour the present devolution scheme. But centralisation of powers, denial of provincial autonomy and the absence of any meaningful public participation in government will almost inevitably cause it to unravel. In the final analysis, the fate of President Musharraf's devolution plan remains linked to his own.
Islamabad/Brussels 22 March 2004
222 ICG interview, Islamabad, May 2003.
223 ICG countrywide interviews, July-August 2003.
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?
ICG Asia Report N?77, 22 March 2004 Page 31
APPENDIX A
MAP OF PAKISTAN
Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?
ICG Asia Report N?77, 22 March 2004 Page 32
APPENDIX B


Further information about ICG can be obtained from our website: www.crisisweb.org
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?
ICG Asia Report N?77, 22 March 2004

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The Intelligence Mess: How It Happened, What to Do About It

Andrew C. McCarthy
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article.asp?aid=11704013_1

Intelligence-gathering is something of a square peg in the round hole of contemporary political morality. It is about unearthing that which is willfully concealed, an enterprise that necessarily calls for invading privacy and inducing betrayal--discomfiting acts in an age that exalts the individual and his liberties above community and country. It is about assuming and preparing for the worst in an era that sees "bad" as an outmoded adjective for "different," another dash of enlivening spice in a rich social stew. Intelligence is gimlet eyes in a world of rose-colored glasses.

Now, however, that foreign pathologies long denied have visited their excesses upon us, many among the benignly tolerant have turned overnight into the equivalent of ambulance-chasers. In particular, they have confidently laid at the door of America's intelligence apparatus the success of America's enemies on September 11, 2001. Even as investigators in the CIA and FBI were unable to "connect the dots," it is said, nineteen al-Qaeda hijackers cavorted for months in this country before carrying out the atrocities of that day. Nor was this catastrophe--"by definition, the worst intelligence failure in our country's history," in the words of the Reagan-era intelligence expert Herbert Meyer--a singular phenomenon. Less than a year earlier, a billion-dollar battle ship, the U.S.S. Cole, had been bombed and nearly sunk, causing the deaths of seventeen servicemen, because we unwittingly berthed it in the al-Qaeda-infested port of Aden, Yemen. This, after our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were turned to rubble in August 1998 by the very same al Qaeda, which had already attacked numerous times previously, and which no less often had expressly declared war on the United States.

Nor is that all. Thanks to our failed intelligence services (the indictment continues), the Bush administration grossly overestimated the stockpiles and production capacity of chemical, bacteriological, radiological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. In the meantime, in North Korea, construction of nuclear weapons seems to have ensued for years right under our noses. And Pyongyang's mischief marked only a single strand in a web of proliferation woven by our ally Pakistan, a web that may have spread into as many as seven nations, including Iran, where the mullahs now harbor the remnants of al Qaeda's leadership.

How did this wide wreckage in our intelligence capacities come about? One incisive answer has been given by Mark Riebling in his gripping history, Wedge: How the Secret War between the FBI and CIA Has Endangered National Security (1994, re-issued in 2002 with a new epilogue). Riebling's thesis is that the problem is longstanding, that it has a single "root cause," and that this root cause is institutional. In his telling, a full half-century's worth of national disasters--from Pearl Harbor through the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy assassination, Watergate, Iran-Contra, and 9/11--can be traced directly to intelligence failures, and those failures were proximately caused by turf-battling between our two great rival agencies.

This has now become conventional wisdom, accepted on all sides. And one can see the apparent sense in it. A ramified system of multiple agencies having similar missions and chasing the same budget dollars will inevitably produce rivalry; rivalry begets pettiness, and pettiness begets failure. Such, indeed, is the reasoning behind virtually all of the proposals now under consideration by no fewer than seven assorted congressional committees, internal evaluators, and blue-ribbon panels charged with remedying the situation.

One proposed fix, supported by, among others, Senator John Edwards and James B. Steinberg, a deputy national security adviser in the Clinton administration, would create a new entity, analogous to Britain's MI-5, to assume the FBI's domestic-intelligence mission. Decoupling that agency's information-gathering from its law-enforcement duties would allegedly result in a specialist agency that would more resemble, and be less likely to rumble with, its foreign-intelligence counterpart, the CIA. These hoped-for efficiencies would, it is (naively) supposed, compensate for the loss of the FBI's critical power to leverage intelligence-gathering with the ready hammer of prosecution.

Steinberg and Senator Dianne Feinstein are also among those who would solve the pitfalls of conflicting bureaucracies by . . . adding another bureaucracy. This new National Intelligence Directorate would oversee the full spectrum of relevant entities, compelling the likes of the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the State Department's intelligence branch to play nice with each other. Presumably it would also render obsolete the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, another new entity (under CIA direction) created by President Bush a year ago to promote harmony.



II

But is it true that inter-agency rivalry is the problem everyone claims it is?

That rivalry exists is indisputable; likewise, that its effects can be pernicious. One of my first encounters with the CIA a decade ago occurred when I and other prosecutors preparing the conspiracy case against the organization responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombing asked the agency for a much-needed briefing. The CIA was perfectly willing to come to New York for that purpose--but not if our FBI case agents were going to be in the same room.

Nevertheless, like many facts that appall at first blush, internecine warfare is only, at best, half the story. For one thing, intelligence professionals are correct (if occasionally disingenuous) when they complain that the public has a skewed perception of their operations: while catastrophic lapses are always notorious, intelligence successes are more numerous. These, however, must typically be kept secret in order to preserve sources of information and methods of gathering it. The unfortunate result is a portrait of ceaseless "failure" that, aside from giving intelligence-gathering an undeserved bad name, also obscures other verities.

First, day-to-day cooperation among agencies, and particularly between the FBI and CIA, is actually far better than people have been led to believe. In terrorism cases, in the decade after the 1993 WTC bombing, teamwork improved in leaps and bounds. To be sure, there are occasional breakdowns, usually due to personality conflicts. But this is an unavoidable function of the human condition--which no legislation on earth can repeal--and it is just as frequently a factor in intra-agency disputes as in those between agencies. Today, agents who fail to compare notes are generally acting in violation of information-sharing protocols; it is hard to imagine additional directives improving the situation.

Second, intelligence-gathering is not monolithic. Domestic intelligence is radically different from the foreign variety, and both differ critically from the needs of the military. So polysemous an imperative requires a variety of skills to meet widely divergent situations and assumptions. As both a practical and a political matter, it is inconceivable that the task could be accomplished by a single agency, and proposals that suggest otherwise are certain only to reshuffle, rather than eradicate, natural rivalries while damaging the quality and quantity of information collection.

Third, and most misunderstood, rivalry--overall--is a virtue. In the government's vast monopoly, it is essential. Naturally, the seamy side of competition being a perennial best-seller, the public record is replete with hair-raising anecdotes of sharp-elbowed investigators pursuing the same quarry to the benefit of criminals, enemies, and traitors. On a macro level, however, the throat-cutting is statistically insignificant. As a rule, competition impels agents to test their premises and press for better information; it results in the generation of more leads and the collection and refinement of more intelligence. In a world where the Supreme Court cannot decide a case without amicus briefs from innumerable interested observers, where Congress declines to pass legislation without the input of scores of experts, do we really want the President, in matters of national security, reduced to a single stream of intelligence-collection and analysis?

If turf-battling is not an enormous obstacle, does that mean there are no obstacles? Hardly. The real problems, though, are not bureaucratic but structural and philosophical. They have taken over 40 years to metastasize, and they would take a lot more than cosmetic surgery to reverse, even assuming the national will to do it.



III


As with much else in our national life, the bacillus now grown to plague America's intelligence apparatus took root in the unrest of Vietnam and the upheaval of Watergate. The perception of national security became intertwined in those years with an increasingly unpopular war that ended badly. For a generation of activists soon to take up positions of influence in politics, academia, and the media, the antiwar movement inculcated a lasting aversion not only to the exercise of American military power but to the agencies tasked with assessing threats to our national security, not to mention the real-world grunt work of intelligence.

Watergate deepened the aversion. For one thing, the burglars included former intelligence officers. For another, President Richard Nixon enlisted the CIA to obstruct the FBI's investigation of the break-in. For a third, his White House "enemies" operation featured spying against domestic political adversaries. Hot on the heels of these misdeeds, the CIA became enmeshed in other domestic spying scandals that were subjected to high-profile probes, first by a commission appointed by President Ford and, in 1976, by the celebrated Senate Select Committee chaired by Frank Church.

Perhaps the first consequence of this chain of events was a long-term decline in the authority of the executive branch of government. The decline stemmed from an illogic that often bedevils the aftermath of scandal: the tendency to confound the sins of a corrupt actor (in this case, Nixon) with a structural weakness in the system itself. In the mid-1970, the new operating premise was that, since robust presidential power was likely to be corrupted, it must therefore be scrutinized and shackled in every respect.

From this there followed a second consequence: a shift of national-security functions, prominently including intelligence-gathering, from the ambit of broad executive discretion to the area where executive action is regulated by Congress and the federal courts. Compared with the "intelligence failures" decried by journalists and politicians today, this shift engendered a continuing calamity.

In the constitutional license given to executive action, a gaping chasm exists between the realms of law enforcement and national security. In law enforcement, as former U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr explained in congressional testimony last October, government seeks to discipline an errant member of the body politic who has allegedly violated its rules. That member, who may be a citizen, an immigrant with lawful status, or even, in certain situations, an illegal alien, is vested with rights and protections under the U.S. Constitution. Courts are imposed as a bulwark against suspect executive action; presumptions exist in favor of privacy and innocence; and defendants and other subjects of investigation enjoy the assistance of counsel, whose basic job is to thwart government efforts to obtain information. The line drawn here is that it is preferable for the government to fail than for an innocent person to be wrongly convicted or otherwise deprived of his rights.

Not so the realm of national security, where government confronts a host of sovereign states and sub-national entities (particularly terrorist organizations) claiming the right to use force. Here the executive is not enforcing American law against a suspected criminal but exercising national-defense powers to protect against external threats. Foreign hostile operatives acting from without and within are not vested with rights under the American Constitution. The galvanizing national concern in this realm is to defeat the enemy, and as Barr puts it, "preserve the very foundation of all our civil liberties." The line drawn here is that government cannot be permitted to fail.

For these reasons, prior to the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate revolution, executive-branch authority in matters of national security had been almost plenary. The constitutional checks held by Congress were largely trifles. The power to declare war was already nearly an anachronism--during the Civil War, the Supreme Court had ruled that, regardless of whether Congress acts, Article II of the Constitution actually obliges the President to respond with all necessary force to put down attacks against the United States. Even Congress's power of the purse lacked much practical muscle, given the inherent political risk for a legislator who dared to withhold funds the President said were vital to national security.

In line with this, the executive branch had wide latitude to gather intelligence against potential threats. True, the CIA's charter did not permit it to conduct domestic intelligence-gathering--that task being left to the FBI--but this affected only which arms of the executive branch could spy on our enemies in which venues. It did not, at least in theory, affect the substance of the information to be gathered.



IV


But cataclysmic changes were ahead, and their harbinger was President Jimmy Carter's acquiescence in the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Here, for the first time, Congress and the courts undertook to regulate the gathering of national intelligence, particularly by electronic eavesdropping, against agents of hostile foreign powers. In the Nixonian afterclap, it was adjudged that the executive could not be trusted unilaterally to wield this power, which might secretly be used against political opponents.

Of course, such wiretapping was already illegal, and the Nixon experience had amply demonstrated the political price to be paid for engaging in it. No matter. Henceforth, the executive branch would not be allowed to use whatever tactics it, as the branch with the most expertise and information, determined were necessary to protect the nation. Rather, it would be compelled to go to a federal FISA court newly created for the purpose, and, as with the procedure for criminal wiretaps, it would need to establish probable cause that the target was an agent of a foreign power. Electronic surveillance would be permitted only if the judges approved.

The impact on intelligence collection was serious. Previously, it would have been laughable to suggest that foreign enemy operatives had a right to conduct their perfidies in privacy--the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches, and there is nothing unreasonable about searching or recording people who threaten national security. (The federal courts have often recognized that the Constitution is not a suicide pact.) Now, such operatives became the beneficiaries of precisely such protection. Placing so severe a roadblock in the way of a crucial investigative technique necessarily meant both that the technique would be used less frequently (thereby reducing the quantity and quality of valuable intelligence) and that investigative resources would have to be diverted from intelligence-collection to the rigors of compliance with judicial procedures (which are cumbersome).

This was only the start of the debacle. Courts and the organized defense bar soon began to ply the FISA statute with hypothetical governmental abuses. What if, they worried, a national-security wiretap yielded evidence of an ordinary crime--not an unlikely event, given that terrorists tend to commit lots of ordinary crimes, including money laundering, identity fraud, etc. This was no problem under FISA as written: intelligence agents could simply pass the information to agents of the criminal law, who could then use the damning conversations in court. But what if such law-enforcement agents, for their part, were to try to use FISA as a pretext to investigate crimes for which they themselves lacked probable cause to secure a regular criminal wiretap?

In one sense, the suggestion was not out of line--wiretap conversations are devastating evidence, and defense lawyers routinely strain to have them suppressed. But the notion was logically absurd. If a criminal investigator was going to act corruptly, it would be far easier for him to fabricate evidence showing probable cause for a regular wiretap (by pretending, for example, to have an anonymous source who had bought illegal drugs from the target) than to trump up a national-security angle necessitating an additional set of internal approvals. Nor was there any indication that such chicanery was actually afoot. But reality is rarely an obstacle for those who see life as an ongoing law-school seminar. Gradually, courts rewrote FISA, grafting onto it a so-called "primary purpose" test requiring the government to establish not only probable cause that it was targeting operatives of a foreign power but also that its real reason for seeking surveillance was counterintelligence, not criminal prosecution.

As one would expect, this created among many prosecutors a grave apprehension about "the appearance of impropriety"--a hidebound concept governing lawyer ethics that is perfectly nonsensical in the life-and-death context of national security. Even as militant Islam began its terrorist war against the United States with the 1993 WTC bombing and the 1994-95 "Bojenka" plot to blow a dozen American airliners out of the sky over the Pacific, the Justice Department was worrying that agents and prosecutors might be perceived to be using intelligence-gathering authority to build criminal prosecutions. Often, the result was weeks or more of delay, during which identified terrorists who happened also to be committing quotidian crimes went unmonitored while the government dithered over whether to employ FISA or the criminal wiretap law. The insanity reached its apex in 1995 with the "primary purpose" guidelines drafted by the Clinton administration: henceforth, a firewall would be placed between criminal and national-security agents, generally barring them even from communicating with one another.

The damage from the firewall and the impediments to FISA has been incalculable. It took ten years to make the racketeering case against Sami al-Arian, the professor accused of helping run the murderous Palestinian Islamic Jihad from the campus of South Florida University, because the wealth of information collected by intelligence agents was withheld from their criminal counterparts. And that was a pittance compared with what happened in the waning weeks before the September 11 attacks. Zacarias Moussaoui, who had paid cash for pilot training (and was reported to authorities when his bizarre behavior--including intense interest in how cabin and cockpit doors worked--could no longer be ignored), was detained by the immigration service. Worried FBI intelligence agents were desperate to search his computer, but were turned down by supervisors who decided there was insufficient evidence to go to the FISA court. His al-Qaeda membership and numerous connections to the hijackers were not uncovered until after the attacks.

And the Moussaoui travesty itself pales in comparison to the story of Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, excruciatingly recounted in Slate by Stewart Baker, general counsel of the National Security Agency during the early Clinton administration. The pair, who had trained to pilot planes, lived in California. In August 2001, an astute FBI intelligence agent was trying to find them, and asked the criminal division for help. But FBI headquarters stepped in and insisted that the firewall not be breached: criminal agents were to stay out of the intelligence effort. A few weeks later, al-Midhar and al-Hazmi plunged Flight 77 into the Pentagon, their manifold ties to Mohammed Atta and the other hijackers kept safely under wraps.



V

In attempting to "connect the dots" on how branches of our government erected barricades against efficient information-sharing, one cannot avoid addressing the most basic blunder of all. In the years after World War II, the designers of the CIA conceived of it as, in one sense, an analogue to the American military. Just as the armed forces are generally precluded by law from domestic policing (which is left to the FBI and other federal, state, and local agencies), so the CIA could not conduct its operations within U.S. territory.

The CIA, then, is confined to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. When leads cross into U.S. territory, the FBI takes over--mainly through its foreign-counterintelligence division, which is separate from its law-enforcement side. This division of labor, and not simple rivalry, is the salient reason for the inter-agency warfare of the last half-century.

Turf aside, however, the structure is not analogous to the military doctrine of posse comitatus, which bars the armed forces from domestic policing. For if the United States were invaded by a foreign army, our military would respond; that would be a national-defense function, not policing. Similarly, hostile foreign operatives within the U.S.--plotting, recruiting, providing funding and material support to their principals--fit the mold of an invading foreign army far better than that of a criminal collaborator.

Yet U.S. law and tradition (strenuously supported by many of the same politicians who today bluster about the CIA's lack of dot-connecting skills) rig intelligence as if it were Russian roulette: the agency whose raison d'?tre is to counter foreign threats to our national security is precluded from participating in investigations once they cross into our nation, while the agency that is expected to pick up the ball and run with it from there does so without the CIA's depth of knowledge and expertise.

The ill-conception of this arrangement has become increasingly patent. With the info-tech revolution, al-Qaeda operatives seamlessly share information across borders with the click of a mouse, enabling them instantly to construct a complete picture of their prey. By contrast, the forces charged with keeping us safe from them are expected to complete awkward hand-offs as persons and information roam in and out of the country. The windfall beneficiary is, ironically, the terrorist operative who happens also to be an American citizen. Such an operative is not only protected by the full panoply of constitutional rights wherever in the world he travels but is radioactive to the CIA, which is no less fearful of the perception that it is spying on Americans than the Justice Department was about the appearance of misusing FISA.



VI

It is bad enough that, prior to 9/11, terrorists could easily survive in the lacunae of our domestic intelligence apparatus. Worse, they positively thrived on the way it operated.

Throughout the eight years of the Clinton administration, as militant Islam's jihad against America escalated, the federal courts became the linchpin of counterterror strategy. This began understandably enough. The 1993 WTC bombing was viewed as a domestic crime. Although, years later, investigators and journalists would link the bombing to al Qaeda, and al Qaeda in turn to prior terrorist acts against the U.S., at the time not much was known about Osama bin Laden, his network, and his national support systems in Afghanistan and Sudan. No one credibly could fault President Clinton for handling the matter as a court case or for not responding militarily. As the murder and mayhem grew, however, and as it became clearer that indictments were a pusillanimous response to suicide bombers geared to obliterate American embassies and naval destroyers, Clinton stayed the self-defeating course.

As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has observed, weakness is provocative. The fecklessness of meeting terrorist attacks with court proceedings--trials that take years to prepare and months to present, and that, even when successful, neutralize only an infinitesimal percentage of the actual terrorist population--emboldened bin Laden. But just as hurtful was the government's promotion of terrorism trials in the first place. They were a useful vehicle if the strategic object was to orchestrate an appearance of justice being done. As a national-security strategy, they were suicidal, providing terrorists with a banquet of information they could never have dreamed of acquiring on their own.

Under discovery rules that apply to American criminal proceedings, the government is required to provide to accused persons any information in its possession that can be deemed "material to the preparation of the defense" or that is even arguably exculpatory. The more broadly indictments are drawn (and terrorism indictments tend to be among the broadest), the greater the trove of revelation. In addition, the government must disclose all prior statements made by witnesses it calls (and, often, witnesses it does not call).

This is a staggering quantum of information, certain to illuminate not only what the government knows about terrorist organizations but the intelligence agencies' methods and sources for obtaining that information. When, moreover, there is any dispute about whether a sensitive piece of information needs to be disclosed, the decision ends up being made by a judge on the basis of what a fair trial dictates, rather than by the executive branch on the basis of what public safety demands.

It is true that this mountain of intelligence is routinely surrendered along with appropriate judicial warnings: defendants may use it only in preparing for trial, and may not disseminate it for other purposes. Unfortunately, people who commit mass murder tend not to be terribly concerned about violating court orders (or, for that matter, about being hauled into court at all).

In 1995, just before trying the blind sheik (Omar Abdel Rahman) and eleven others, I duly complied with discovery law by writing a letter to the defense counsel listing 200 names of people who might be alleged as unindicted co-conspirators--i.e., people who were on the government's radar screen but whom there was insufficient evidence to charge. Six years later, my letter turned up as evidence in the trial of those who bombed our embassies in Africa. It seems that, within days of my having sent it, the letter had found its way to Sudan and was in the hands of bin Laden (who was on the list), having been fetched for him by an al-Qaeda operative who had gotten it from one of his associates.

Intelligence is dynamic. Over time, foreign terrorists and spies inevitably learn our tactics and adapt: consequently, we must refine and change those tactics. When we purposely tell them what we know--for what is blithely assumed to be the greater good of ensuring they get the same kind of fair trials as insider traders and tax cheats--we enable them not only to close the knowledge gap but to gain immense insight into our technological capacities, how our agencies think, and what our future moves are likely to be.

In considering the asserted "intelligence failures" of September 11 and beyond, it is worth bearing in mind this information bounty, which our government consciously decided to provide from 1993 through 2001 even as it was increasingly manifest that the enemy was growing more proficient, its attacks more deadly.



VII

Although I have thus far been concentrating on the collection and analysis of intelligence here at home, a similar and complementary history can be constructed for what happened to our capabilities overseas. There, too, our intelligence apparatus was thoroughly compromised.

In particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's dovetailed with a severe economic recession that ultimately cost George H. W. Bush his presidency. For the CIA, this constellation of circumstances had two major, detrimental consequences.

First, desperate to cut spending wherever politically palatable, the federal government declared a "peace dividend." This was a fantasy. Although the fall of Soviet tyranny was an enormous blessing, it also presaged a more challenging international environment, filled with threats diffuse, unconventional, and less predictable. Nevertheless, at the urging of many of the same elected officials now complaining about failure, including Senator John F. Kerry, intelligence spending was repeatedly slashed.

The second nightmare for the CIA was President Clinton. For the first President Bush, himself a former CIA director, intelligence had been a priority. For Clinton, it was a nettlesome chore--and one he largely avoided. Clinton had no time even for James Woolsey, his own chosen director of Central Intelligence, declining to hold a single one-on-one meeting during Woolsey's maddening two-year tenure. This freeze-out had the predictable effects: agency morale plummeted, officers abandoned ship, and Congress's funding door slammed shut.

Human intelligence also fell into disrepair, having already fallen into disrepute. It is worth considering that almost all the terrorism prosecutions of the 1990's took place after successful attacks. We managed to stop exactly two such attacks: the 1994 Bojenka plot against the airliners, and a 1993 conspiracy to bomb New York City landmarks. The former success was due to sheer luck (a fire, started by inept chemical mixing on the part of two terrorists, was detected by an alert Manila police officer), combined with a Pakistani informant who was induced to turn in the ringleader. The latter happened because an informant penetrated the blind sheik's terror organization, recorded scores of conspiratorial conversations, and permitted agents to catch the plotters in flagrante delicto, stirring explosives. Sadly, that informant had actually infiltrated the group in 1991 but had been deactivated seven months before the 1993 WTC bombing (after which he was reinstated).

One cannot develop the necessary global network of intelligence informants without CIA case officers. As George Tenet, the current director, attested in a recent speech, by the time he took the helm in the fifth year of the Clinton administration the graduating class of case officers was at a historic nadir. As for the agency's clandestine-services program, Tenet elaborated, that was in such a shambles that it will take until 2009 before it is functioning at an acceptable level.

Meanwhile, abjuring clandestine operatives, Clinton-era intelligence went hi-tech, making extensive use of satellite surveillance and other advances in remote eavesdropping. But with fewer agents to translate and analyze what was gathered, or to follow leads, the effort was ineffectual. Consider: the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, carried out by an organization we had been focusing on for five years, took several months to plan; ditto the 2000 strike on the U.S.S. Cole (which would have happened eight months earlier, to the U.S.S. The Sullivans, had not the terrorists' attack boat sunk from the heft of explosives). The attacks of September 11, 2001 were plotted on four continents for well over a year. We did not sniff out any of them.

As the CIA stumbled, the FBI was ascendant, opening a host of new legal-attach? offices around the world. Generally speaking, this was a positive development: just as the terrorist threat was exploding, so too was the spread and sophistication of criminal syndicates, making it imperative for law-enforcement agencies to cooperate internationally. But timing is everything. The FBI was spreading its wings just as its most significant cases involved not ordinary crimes but national security.

Some of our best information is obtained from foreign intelligence services. Naturally, those services are much less forthcoming if they think that what they tell us will have to be revealed in court because of U.S. legal rules. Historically, that was not much of a problem when dealing with the CIA; it is, however, always a concern for a country weighing whether to share some sensitive or potentially embarrassing information with the FBI. The Saudis' infamous obstruction of the FBI's efforts to investigate the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing is an exquisite example.

In the Clinton years, no matter how many times we were attacked, all the world knew that our approach was to have the FBI build criminal cases. Indeed, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, issued in June 1995, announced that prosecuting terrorists and extraditing indicted terrorists held overseas were signature priorities of the administration. Nearly three years later, after several other attacks and public declarations of war by bin Laden, Clinton issued a press release that both trumpeted as a ringing success his strategy of having terrorists "apprehended, tried, and given severe prison sentences" and announced a new directive, PDD 62. This purported to "reinforce the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism,"including by means of the "apprehension and prosecution of terrorists." The embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed less than three months later.




VIII

The mantra that "9/11 changed everything" is omnipresent. But is it true? It is certainly true in one crucial sense: our national anti-terrorism strategy is no longer to fight bombs and militias with indictments and press releases. The military has reemerged as the spearhead, with law enforcement in an important but subordinate role. The ramifications have already been positive: simply by responding with force to our enemies, we have not just eliminated thousands of terrorists but accumulated volumes of vital intelligence.

But much still needs to change, and the prognosis is not hopeful. For one thing, we speak of intelligence "failures" as if they were current lapses, to be laid at the feet of the poor saps left without a chair just as the music stopped. And we speak about "fixes" without coming to terms with the nature of the problem; until we do, any such fixes will at best be palliatives, and will more likely make things worse.

Take Iraq's missing weapons of mass destruction. It may yet turn out that these will be found in Iraq itself, or that they were moved or hidden outside the country in the many months between when we first told Saddam Hussein we were coming and when at last we arrived to depose him. Still, for the moment the stubborn fact remains that the government said the WMD were there and they have not been located. Whose intelligence failure is that? Did our intelligence agencies "fail" in 2003, when, according to David Kay, even Saddam's Republican Guard believed Iraq possessed the weapons? Or did they "fail" in the 1990's when the government of the United States regarded the CIA, and spying, and human intelligence, and Iraq as one big pain that should just go away?

Hizballah killed well over 200 servicemen in the two Lebanon attacks of 1983. The blind sheik, and bin Laden after him, promised their adherents that a reprise or two of such "operations" would surely induce the Americans to cut and run from the Persian Gulf. Although we did not cut and run, we did stand by as Saddam Hussein put down a revolt we had incited with the materiel we let him keep. When Saddam tried to assassinate the first President Bush and when he expelled the UN inspectors, we lobbed a few missiles at useless targets--just as we did when bin Laden obliterated our embassies in Africa. In response to the Cole bombing, we did nothing.

Bin Laden struck us repeatedly in the eight years leading up to September 11. From the thousands in al Qaeda's swelling international ranks, we plucked about 40 and indicted them, bathing them in all the rights of American defendants, and arming them with information from our intelligence files to prepare their defenses. One of these, Mohammed Daoud al-`Owhali, had killed nearly 250 people by helping to drive a car bomb to the entrance of our embassy in Nairobi, and later confessed. Al-`Owhali was a soldier in a war on America, probably among the most effective ever. He was held not as a prisoner of war but as a criminal defendant, questioned not by the CIA but by FBI agents, who actually tried to give him Miranda warnings. When he was given a civilian trial, a U.S. judge initially ordered his confession suppressed--which would nearly have guaranteed his acquittal--because he had not been advised of his right to have an American defense lawyer present: a right that, since he was in the custody of Kenya, he did not have. The judge later relented, but only after issuing an opinion holding that foreign terrorists who attack America overseas should be accorded the benefits of the constitutional system it is their mission to destroy.

Was September 11 the worst intelligence failure in our country's history? Or was it, rather, a national failure, the failure of a country that allowed its sense of decency to overwhelm its instinct for survival and that effectively convinced its enemies that they could strike with impunity?

The problem with our intelligence apparatus, to repeat, is that we went on a national nap for over two decades. If an entity is systematically warped and mismanaged for 20 or 30 years--not by a single agency director or American President, but by a philosophy--it cannot be fixed overnight. You cannot wake up on Monday and say, "We need more informants," and expect to have them embedded and reporting by the close of the business day. If those lobbying for quick fixes to the intelligence mess do not appear to understand this, might it be because they do not want anyone to start probing whose mess it actually is?



IX

This is not to say that the U.S. intelligence apparatus needs fundamental restructuring. In my opinion, it does not. Instead, its primary needs are, first, time to reverse a quarter-century of sloth, and, second, adequate resources to build a new human-intelligence network. Beyond that, a few other things need to happen, but it is here especially that pessimism sets in.

Although there is no need to restructure the CIA and FBI, the division of labor between them must take account of new realities. Without losing the benefits of rivalry, it is imperative to eliminate the structural barriers that, assuming they ever made sense, make none now. In particular, in a national-security investigation, the overriding assumption must be that we are dealing not with potential criminals presumed innocent but with foreign enemies who must be brought to heel. This means that the CIA must be able to follow the trail of its intelligence into the U.S.

In short, I am proposing that the CIA be permitted to work in the United States against those who have been colorably associated with foreign powers, including terrorist groups. A number of safeguards can be put in place to assure Americans that we have not authorized Big Brother to run amok. In addition to requiring that the FBI be given notice and periodic updates, we could mandate that the CIA obtain authorization within 72 hours of the start of domestic surveillance.

My own preference is that this approval come from a responsible executive-branch official rather than from the courts. The FISA model, in my view, violates the principle of separation of powers, gets courts (which have no institutional expertise in, or ready access to, intelligence) into the business of micro-managing national security, discourages agents from pursuing investigations essential to public welfare, and confers upon enemy operatives benefits they should not have. Still, given that FISA is not going away, I would rather have a requirement to obtain FISA court authorization than a continuation of the outdated system in which, while al Qaeda can freely cruise from Peshawar to Peoria, the CIA gets turned away at the border.

Complementing this change, the FBI and the CIA should continue their increasingly effective cooperation outside the United States, with two caveats. The first is that the CIA (and the Defense Department) should be in the lead, the FBI in a secondary role except when the executive branch determines it is in our national interest to extradite to our criminal-justice system a terrorist held by a foreign sovereign. The second is that, the targets in this war being enemy combatants and not criminal suspects, they should not get Miranda warnings, American constitutional protections (except minimal due process, which our government must always accord), or lavish access to our sensitive files. Instead, they should be captured, held for however long active hostilities last, squeezed (humanely) for information, and, if they have violated the laws of war, given military tribunals.

Other commonsense steps to promote competent intelligence-collection were incorporated in the Patriot Act, enacted six weeks after the September 11 attacks. This act, however, has come under blistering assault; so vicious has the campaign been that sensible Democrats like Senator Feinstein and Senator Joseph Biden have been moved to join their voices to those of President Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft in the act's defense. But it may be too little, too late: there are now more than a half-dozen proposals making their way through Congress seeking rollbacks or repeal.

The Patriot Act's intelligence improvements were vital, and nowhere more so than in the area of information-sharing. It dismantled the pernicious FISA firewall that prevented agents from pooling information. It authorized intelligence agents who were conducting FISA surveillance to "consult with federal law-enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against" terrorism and other hostile acts. In addition, the act made it easier to obtain surveillance authorization, scotching the requirement that agents show that foreign counterintelligence was the "primary purpose" for their application in favor of the less burdensome certification that it was a "significant purpose."

But it is these crucial improvements that have come under greatest fire. First, in 2002, the FISA court itself took umbrage at Congress's demolition of the firewall and the (judicially invented) "primary purpose" test. Fortunately, the court's attempt to reestablish the suicidal status quo ante was blocked. Next, however, an amalgam of libertarian Republicans and anti-Bush Democrats has promised to limit the term of the bill's crucial provisions to December 31, 2005, when they are currently scheduled to "sunset" unless extended or made permanent by new legislation.

This bipartisan Senate cabal (led by Democrats Patrick Leahy, Richard Durbin, and Harry Reid and Republicans Larry Craig and John Sununu) wants not only to terminate the FISA sharing provisions but to end the sharing of grand-jury information; to restrict the information that intelligence agencies may obtain from communications-service providers (the same kind of information long available to criminal investigators probing health-care fraud and gambling); and effectively to destroy the valuable "sneak-and-peak" search warrant (another longstanding tool in ordinary criminal investigations) that allows agents, with court approval, to search a location for intelligence purposes but not to seize anything, thus keeping the targets unaware. No doubt, the next time something goes boom, these Senators and their myriad sympathizers will be among the first to wail about unconnected dots.

A political class that appreciated the stakes involved would not indulge in this sort of recklessness. It would not hasten to dub every episodic setback an intelligence failure without asking searchingly whether we have set our agencies up to fail. It would have the necessary perseverance, through the inevitable torrent of catcalling, to retrace a quarter-century of missteps. And it would construct its remedies on the basis of a correct diagnosis of the disease. Right now, when we need it most, this is not the political class we have.

Andrew C. McCarthy, a former chief assistant U.S. attorney in New York, led the 1995 terrorism prosecution of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in connection with the first World Trade Center bombing. His reviews and essays have appeared in COMMENTARY, National Review Online, and other publications.


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Reform Overdue for Central Intelligence
Posted April 5, 2004
By Jamie Dettmer


George Tenet remains a stout defender of his CIA, but there is a growing consensus in Washington that far-reaching reforms are necessary.


George Tenet has been on the offensive all winter, defending the CIA's recent record as more details emerge of his agency's failures from overstating Saddam Hussein's weapons-of-mass-destruction programs to not fully appreciating the extent of the work undertaken by Libya and Iran to develop nuclear weapons. In speeches and in congressional testimony, the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has sought cautiously to shift blame elsewhere, suggesting that high administration officials may have ignored equivocations in intelligence reports concerning Iraq and elected to highlight worst-case scenarios. The New York Times' interpretation of Tenet's testimony, quickly denied in official circles, is that at least three times he had to advise Vice President Dick Cheney to restrain himself when making the public case for war against Saddam and urged him to soften his claims about the immediacy of an Iraqi threat.

Tenet hardly has shifted his ground since the terror attacks struck New York City and Washington on 9/11. In the wake of the attacks he insisted, "Failure means no focus, no attention, no discipline - and those were not present in what either we or the FBI did here and around the world." Subsequently, he has admitted to a mistake here or there, and he has acknowledged that CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., needs to improve its skills when "connecting the dots." But he still won't concede that Sept. 11 represented a massive failure on the part of the agency he heads.

Despite Tenet's spirited defense, grave questions remain about the CIA, its recent performance and what is to be done to improve it. A report due soon by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 9/11 intelligence failures, currently undergoing a final edit, reportedly delivers a devastating verdict on the CIA performance. Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan said of the report: "It's shocking," and added, "There has to be accountability."

The report is bound to fuel calls for reform and to intensify the Washington debate about reform. For critics outside Langley it is difficult to get a full picture of the CIA, as intelligence successes have to remain cloaked, whereas dramatic failures stumble into the public light, often as a result of efforts by the stumblers to avoid blame. Even so, while Tenet remains a stout defender of his agency, there is a growing consensus in Washington that reform is necessary, although there is often little agreement about what reforms are needed or the scale of the change that may be required.

Most lawmakers and intelligence insiders accept that the CIA has to do a better job of collecting intelligence and analyzing the information that is gathered. But many larger institutional questions remain unresolved, such as how to achieve greater coordination between U.S. intelligence agencies and whether there should be a unification of national-level collection and analytic agencies under the CIA director to give him maximum control of the whole intelligence apparatus - a move that would be fought tooth-and-nail by the Pentagon, which commands the lion's share of the intelligence budget.

And it isn't clear that Congress is capable of biting the reform bullet. Though there have been angry exchanges in recent months between the congressional panels - most notably last September over a report by the chief investigator for the House and Senate Joint Inquiry Committee on the Sept. 11 attacks accusing agency officials of withholding vital information from committee staff - the panels are reluctant to take on the intelligence community. Former and current CIA officials say that, on the whole, the panels traditionally are supine, don't ask enough questions about ongoing everyday matters and give the agency the benefit of the doubt.

And the panels are fearful of rocking the boat when it comes to major reform. Many lawmakers who serve on the oversight panels enjoy a cozy relationship with the community and are loath to risk endangering their good ties. "That has become more obvious with the current intelligence committees," says an intelligence source with experience on Capitol Hill. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence saw Republican Sen. Pat Roberts of Kansas replace Democratic Sen. Bob Graham of Florida as chairman, and congressional insiders say that has helped Tenet mount his arguments for the status quo. Roberts is a strong defender of Tenet, unlike Graham, who was critical.

The panel also lost the CIA director's most uncompromising critic, Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala.), who had to leave because of an eight-year time limit for service on the committee. Shelby placed many of the problems at the CIA firmly at Tenet's door, claiming that the DCI's leadership was weak. On the House side, the intelligence chairman, Rep. Porter Goss (R-Fla.), is a former CIA officer. As an intelligence insider, Capitol Hill aides claim, he tends to pull his punches.

Reform has been held back in the past and congressional oversight blunted because of the CIA's tendency to co-opt lawmakers and Hill aides and to turn them in effect into agents of influence in Congress for the agency. In the mid-1990s, Republican Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania rebuked the CIA for doing this, saying, "The CIA's Directorate of Operations would be better advised to improve its reputation and standing by real performance, instead of attempting to rely on factors like personal, school or family ties."

But if there were real impetus behind reform, what changes should be made? Former and current intelligence agents say that Tenet has made one post-9/11 change that will pay dividends. Recently, the Directorate of Operations (DO) was instructed to inform analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence of the identities and track records of sources for raw reports, thereby allowing analysts a better chance of evaluating the information being provided. Previously, analysts were not told about DO sources and assets and therefore often were unable to distinguish the value of the information they received in DO reports. Some of the inaccuracies in the agency's assessments of the weapons programs in Iraq were the result of analysts' lack of knowledge about sources, say CIA insiders.

That reform doesn't satisfy Tenet critics such as Shelby; he believes change requires a much bigger shake-up. He sees Sept. 11 as "part of a pattern of intelligence failures" that resulted in the bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa and the successful attack on the USS Cole. Shelby also questions whether Tenet has the determination or ability to reform the CIA and to bring order to the Byzantine organization of America's $30 billion intelligence community.

Former senior Reagan Pentagon official Frank Gaffney, now president of the Center for Security Policy, agrees with the Shelby line, arguing that "A man who does not understand what is wrong with his organization is unlikely to be able to fix it." As he wrote recently: "Tenet has insisted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that there was no failure of intelligence. Such a stance has become increasingly untenable, as more and more evidence emerges that neither the CIA nor the FBI properly handled information about threats of deadly aircraft-delivered attacks by Islamist operatives against U.S. government facilities and/or other prominent sites."

Failure in leadership has been a common complaint of assorted intelligence aides covering their own failures stretching back decades. In the early 1990s, former veteran analyst John Gentry argued in a long and detailed reform paper that the culture of the agency needed to be altered, with the agency ridding itself of deadwood and bringing in agents of change. "The president [Bill Clinton] and Congress must understand the culture - the disease - before they can prescribe remedial medicine," he wrote. "Reorganizational Band-Aids will only briefly ameliorate symptoms. They must also understand the disease-causing agents - the senior responsible executives - and remove them from the organs of intelligence agencies to prevent reinfection." Several former CIA directors when taking up their posts at Langley noted the need for a cultural change but failed to bring it about. John Deutch noted the importance of changing the culture in his confirmation hearing but failed to unleash the bloodletting that was needed to do that.

Aside from cultural problems, Gaffney believes a root cause for recent intelligence mishaps rests with the agency's "failure to invest adequately in the traditional espionage techniques known as human intelligence, or 'HUMINT.'" He says this "problem has its roots in the deliberate emasculation of the agency's HUMINT assets and capabilities when Jimmy Carter turned the CIA over to Adm. Stansfield Turner. But it has persisted and metastasized during the years since - especially during the Clinton presidency." The CIA needs to stop being overreliant on electronic means of intelligence collection, he argues.

Former and current CIA officials concur with Gaffney. They add that the agency also needs to widen the type of operatives and assets it hires, and former State Department and CIA counterterrorism official Larry Johnson cites the lack of ability of the agency to hire foreign nationalities. "We need to be like Russia - hire the nationalities that can blend in and don't worry about getting soiled by hiring thugs if that's what it takes," he told United Press International, Insight's sister wire service. "Either you are willing to soil your hands a bit for the sake of the information, or you're going to think well of yourself and get blindsided the way we did on Sept. 11."

The CIA's analytical setup is the focus of many of the reform calls. Former and current intelligence officials argue that the system is cumbersome and is top heavy with managers. Reports, they say, are overedited and there is little communication between analysts and the higher reaches of the agency. Further, analysts often are inexperienced and assignment transfers are frequent, preventing analysts from developing real expertise. The average assignment is about two years. Veterans say transfers should be kept to a minimum and the average length of assignment should be at least five years and maybe longer.

Analysts' morale is low. Many feel they are at the bottom of the pile and that their promotion opportunities to management levels are few. Fast-track promotion opportunities should be instituted and those with analyst backgrounds should be welcome in the higher echelons of the agency, say some intelligence insiders.

Critics also worry that the DI welcomes and rewards those who subscribe to prevailing orthodoxies and punishes analysts who buck conventional wisdom and think out of the box. "Loyalty to individual bosses has assumed a great role within the directorate," complains a current CIA analyst. "Your career can be ruined if you take on the prevailing opinion of senior managers." Again, this is an old problem, and Gentry in the 1990s was lamenting it, claiming analysis was "tailored to gain personal and institutional kudos - one that DCIs [William] Casey, [William] Webster, [Robert] Gates and [James] Woolsey showed no inclination to alter."

Gentry also urged major bloodletting in the DI, arguing that "The CIA's problem managers have prospered for so long that they are ubiquitous in senior executive suites and common throughout middle management as well." He called for widespread sackings. "The upheaval would be considerable, but it would be relatively short-lived. Some temporary disruption is far preferable to the ongoing malaise that has plagued the DI for a decade." That malaise could continue if Congress doesn't insist something be done.

Away from change at the CIA, many reformers maintain that the role and power of the DCI need to be strengthened. Writing several years ago, Victor Marchetti noted that Richard Helms frequently would rage at his limited powers when it came to trying to coordinate the intelligence community as a whole, observing "to his staff that while he, the DCI, was theoretically responsible for 100 percent of the nation's intelligence activities, he in fact controlled less than 15 percent of the community's assets - and most of the other 85 percent belonged to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Without a central figure knocking the heads of the myriad agencies that go to make up the U.S. intelligence community, interagency rivalry has been allowed to thrive. There is tremendous duplication, and confusion is sown among consumers of the intelligence product. Some reformers maintain that larger chunks of the intelligence community should come directly under the sway of the DCI and that he should have control of more of the budget. Such a move, though, would trigger a major turf war between Langley and the Pentagon, and any efforts to bring the National Security Agency under the CIA's control likely would bring the reform process to a shuddering halt with a lobbying fight being waged on Capitol Hill, insiders say.

Still, to overcome the ravages of poor leadership in the past and the dysfunction among the different parts of the intelligence community today will require tough remedial action and upheaval, but without boldness there can be no major improvement. The question is whether Congress and the White House are ready to grasp the nettle.

Jamie Dettmer is a senior editor for Insight.


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Hamas invested in U.S. real estate with Gulf money
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, April 5, 2004
Hamas has invested up to $25 million in housing projects throughout the United States.
U.S. officials said the investment was believed to have stemmed from Saudi and other Gulf Arab sources as part of an effort to finance Hamas insurgency operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They said the funding pointed to the close links between Hamas and Gulf Arab supporters.
[In Nablus, Israeli special operations forces arrested 26 senior Hamas insurgents, Middle East Newsline reported. Israeli officials said this comprised the Hamas military command in the northern West Bank city.]
Hamas investments in the United States began in the early 1990s through Mussa Abu Marzouk, a member of Hamas's political bureau, officials said. The investments were handled mostly through a firm founded by an Egyptian national sentenced in January 2004 to one year in prison for relaying millions of dollars to Al Qaida as well as other Islamic insurgency groups.
In February, a U.S. federal court in Rhode Island ruled that Hamas must pay $116 million to the parents and children of an Israeli couple killed in a Palestinian attack in 1996. On Thursday, the same court ruled that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority must also each pay similar damages to the plaintiffs.
FBI officials have provided evidence of Hamas investments during the investigation of Soliman Biheiri, alleged to have been a key conduit of Saudi and Gulf funding to Al Qaida and Hamas. The investigation of Biheiri, sentenced to one year in jail, was conducted by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and included numerous Saudi-sponsored groups in the Washington D.C. area.
Hamas invested in the construction of hundreds of apartment units, many of them in the suburban Washington area, officials said. In Prince George County, Md., Hamas was said to have financed the construction of 57 homes in a project called Oxon Hill, which contains numerous Muslim immigrants.
Abu Marzouk, expelled by the United States in the late 1990s, was a principal investor in Oxon Hill. He was also cited as a principal of a Biheiri company, BMI, a subsidiary of which financed a development called Barnaby Knolls in Maryland.
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The investigation into Hamas investments stemmed from a federal raid of 14 Saudi-aligned businesses in Virginia in 2002 meant to uncover the ties between BMI and a Herndon, Va. corporation, Sana-Bell Inc. Sana-Bell was alleged to have laundered millions of dollars for the Saudi-sponsored International Islamic Relief Organization, believed connected to Hamas and the Egyptian Gamiat Islamiya.
A declaration of sentencing of Biheiri released by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] detailed the Hamas investments. In the declaration, ICE senior agent David Kane said BMI employed investment schemes to launder large amounts of money to and from Hamas organizations and businesses. Kane said these organizations included 100 bogus charities, most of which operated in Virginia.
The declaration also traced the flow of money to Hamas for investment in the United States. It said money was flowing from Hamas charities through banks in Virginia and New Jersey to the port of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. The ICE said a significant amount of revenues that stemmed from Hamas investments were employed "in furtherance of Hamas terrorist operations."
The key investor in BMI was identified as a Saudi national, Yasin Qadi. Qadi has been placed on a U.S. Treasury Department list of financiers of Al Qaida.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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Saudis agree to detain transferred Guantanamo inmates
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, April 5, 2004
Saudi Arabia has agreed to detain several Al Qaida insurgents transferred by the United States.
U.S. officials said the Saudi detention was a condition for the release of several Saudi nationals in U.S. custody since early 2002. The nationals had been held for nearly two years at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Officials said many of the Guantanamo detainees managed to conceal their activities in Taliban and Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan. They said that in the past, at least one instance a freed Guantanamo detainee rejoined Al Qaida and its war against the West.
The Saudi nationals were identified as low-level operatives of Al Qaida, Middle East Newsline reported. Officials said four Saudis had been transferred to Riyad for continued detention.
The Defense Department has begun releasing or transferring detainees from Guantanamo. So far, 146 detainees left the facility, most of them for freedom. About 30 others were transferred for continued detention in their native countries.
Currently, there are 595 detainees at Guantanamo. On Friday, the Pentagon said it transferred for release 15 detainees, including those from Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen.
"The decision to transfer or release a detainee is based on many factors, including whether the detainee is of further intelligence value to the United States and whether he is believed to pose a threat to the United States," a Pentagon statement said.
The Al Qaida detainees transferred to Jordan arrived as the kingdom seized a truck filled with explosives and searched for two other vehicles believed sent by Al Qaida. The official A-Rai daily reported on Friday that authorities have been questioning suspects under the command of Abu Mussib Al Zarqawi, regarded as the most lethal Islamic insurgent in Iraq.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc
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>> HIGHER ED WATCH...

The Saudi Fifth Column On Our Nation's Campuses

By Lee Kaplan
FrontPageMagazine.com | April 5, 2004

From Riyadh to Ramallah to the Ivy League, the Saudi Wahhabi lobby and money machine is funding the goals of radical Islam and undermining America's efforts to prosecute the War On Terror.

The press recently reported new closures by the Department of Justice of Saudi "charitable" fronts like the Muslim World League, the Al-Haramain Foundation, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and others which raised money for Al Qaeda, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.[1] But the government has so far ignored an even larger network of Saudi front groups working toward parallel ends.



This network is embedded deep within our system of higher education, including many of our most prestigious universities. The Saudis have steadily infiltrated American educational institutions, using vast infusions of money to turn the American educational system against US support for Israel and in favor of the Saudi vision of a global Muslim state in which not only Jews but Christians and all infidels will have subordinate status to the followers of the "true faith." At the same time they look to affect American policy in the Middle East and public opinion in the US in a way to aid their Wahhabist goals.[3]


Saudi Wahhabism fuels a particular hatred for the West and its liberalism regarding religious tolerance and human rights. It views attempts by the West to promote democratic reforms in the medieval Arab monarchy of the Saudi royal family as an affront to Islam. In other words, it shares the religious and political views of its wayward-but not forgotten- son, Osama Bin Laden.


Accordingly, the Saudi royal family has been waging its own quiet jihad of ideas and disinformation to advance its goals. It has also financed terrorist activities of Al Qaeda and Palestinian radicals. The US Senate Judiciary Committee recently heard testimony from fellow senators and terrorism experts that the Bush administration has failed to recognize the dangers of Saudi influence, having left the Kingdom in control of most of the Muslim organizations in the United States. For instance, 80% of the mortgages on mosques in the US are paid for by the Wahhabist Saudis.


Over the last 30 years the Saudi Royal Family has contributed upwards of 70 billion US dollars to infiltrate worldwide institutions with propaganda against the West and Israel. This sum, it has been observed, makes the one billion dollars per annum spent by the Soviet Union during the Cold War for Communist propaganda pale by comparison. [4] The Saudis see donations to our universities as a way of promoting their political and religious propaganda. To quote their English language daily, Ain Al Yaqueen: "The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz has positively shouldered responsibility and played a promising role in order to raise the banner of Islam all over the globe and raise the Islamic call either inside or outside the kingdom."[5]


The new head of Middle East Studies at UC Santa Barbara, Stephen Humphreys, holds a chair named after Aziz himself. The head of the Muslim American Society , W. Deen Muhammed, has stated that Saudi gifts require the receiver to prefer the Saudi "school of thought." While Humphreys denies there are strings attached, one wonders how likely a thesis on Saudi misogyny or their educational system teaching hatred of Americans, Jews and Christians would go over in Saudi funded departments if someone hoped to advance or be tenured.[6]


One wonders why a theocratic totalitarian regime where 30% of the population is illiterate and where PhDs teach that Jews use the blood of gentile children to make matzoh[8] would take such interest in the American educational system instead of their own.[9]Yet the money the Saudis are pouring into our universities and colleges as gifts and endowments is alarming: King Fahd donated $20 million dollars to set up a Middle East Studies Center at the University of Arkansas; $5 million was donated to UC Berkeley's Center For Mideast Studies from two Saudi sheiks linked to funding Al Qaeda; [10] $2.5 million dollars to Harvard; $8.1 million dollars to Georgetown including a $500,000 scholarship in the name of President Bush; $11 million dollars to Cornell; $1.5 million dollars to Texas A&M; $5 million dollars to MIT; $1 million dollars to Princeton; Rutgers received $5 million dollars to endow a chair as did Columbia which tried to hide where the money came from.[11] Saudi largesse included UC Santa Barbara; Johns Hopkins; Rice University; American University in Washington, D.C.; University of Chicago; Syracuse University; USC; UCLA; Duke University; and Howard University among many others.[12]


Saudi infiltration works on several levels. By creating new Middle East Studies Centers and such endowed chairs on campuses across the US, the Saudis are able to influence the curriculum taught to the next generation of American students about the Middle East situation as taught at Saudi-funded madrassas both here and abroad. That curriculum is decidedly anti-Western and full of incitement against Christians and Jews.[13] Based not on truth as much as the agenda of the totalitarian regime in power, it "molds" the next generation to hate Israel and to hate America as an "imperialist" or "racist" nation.[14]


For example, according to Middle East historian Martin Kramer, Columbia University has become the "Bir Zeit (University) on -the- Hudson"[15]. Bir Zeit is a university built for the Palestinians by Israel in the West Bank. Instead of its being a source for educational prosperity and peace, it is a breeding ground for totalitarian terrorist ideologues and their ilk. Faculty write scholarly works about Middle East history against the US and Israel as a matter of course. At Columbia, Palestinians dominate the teaching of the modern Middle East and do not encourage a diversity of approaches in doing so. [16] When a chair is endowed by Saudi money it is filled by academics known for their Palestinian or Saudi activism less than for their scholarship.

Thus Columbia's new chair was given to Rashid Khalidi, a University of Chicago historian and Palestinian activist. Khalidi took over the "Edward Said Chair Of Arab Studies." Said, who died recently, and who was raised in Egypt, was a member of the Palestine National Council and anti-Israel activitist thought the Oslo peace process was a "sellout." [17] He was an English literature professor, whose expertise was Jane Austen, yet his anti-American and anti-Israel writings dominate the perspectives of Middle East Studies departments across the nation.


Khalidi is on record defending the killing of Israeli soldiers: "Killing civilians is a war crime, whoever does it, but resistance to occupation is legitimate in international law". [18] Khalidi is an obsessive Israel basher and has stated Americans are "brainwashed" by the Middle East's only democracy. He also considered US popular support for overthrowing Saddam Hussein an "idiots' consensus". [19]


Another Palestinian professor in Columbia's Middle East Studies program is Joseph Massad, who also rails against the US and Israel. Massad likes to denigrate American democracy by alluding to early 19th century history when slavery was a worldwide institution, and accuses America of nuclear genocide for using the atomic bomb to end World WarII. He has also characterized Israel as an "imperialist" and "colonial" concoction of the Europeans. [20]


With Khalidi's appointment as chair and Massad as the main teacher of politics and history of the Middle East at Columbia, what students will be exposed to with no alternative views isn't hard to imagine. Even Lisa Anderson, head of International Studies at Columbia has conceded publicly that Middle East Studies at Columbia are not balanced, nor are they at other Middle East Studies centers nationwide.[21] What is more telling is that Columbia tried to conceal where the money came from to fund Khalidi's chair until pressure from outside academics and even the state of New York required it.[22] Daniel Pipes has remarked that choosing Khalidi for the Columbia chair is "particularly egregious because he is one of a team of Palestinian falsifiers who are all giving us this propagandist, non-scholarly interpretation of the Middle East" and that Columbia's cover-up of the donors "doesn't smell right". Steve Emerson, who reports to Congress frequently on terrorism issues, has stated publicly that "Khalidi's statements raise serious questions about his attitudes on violence" [23]


But Columbia is not alone. Such departments and professors are now found in Middle East Studies programs nationwide.



UC Berkeley's Center For Middle East Studies website boasts of receiving a $5 million dollar grant courtesy of Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud and Sheikh Salahudin Yusef Hamza Abdeljawad, another major donor. Both are linked to Islamic charities which the US government says are front groups for funding Al Qaeda and both are now part of a $1 trillion dollar lawsuit by the families of the victims of 9/11.


Their contributions link through a labyrinth of front banks and charitable institutions which ultimately finance terrorism against the West. Al-Saud gives generously to the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, the Muslim League and World Assembly of Muslim Youth--all established fronts for terrorist funding named by the US State Department. And Abdeljawad is linked to the Saudi Dar-Al_Maal-Islami Bank founded by Osama Bin Laden and managed by Osama Bin Laden's brother that is known by the State Department to also fund terrorism as well. Did the Sultan Al-Saud give money knowingly to charity that made its way to Bin Laden? [24]


A visit to the Sultan's foundation website in Saudi Arabia tells much more. It lists a "Higher Council" or board of directors which includes one Abdulrahman bin Ali Jeraisy who has been openly funding Al Qaeda according to a report to Congress.[25] UC Berkeley's Saudi funded academics have more than satisfied Saudi goals of using US campuses to teach hate for America and Israel. The Israel divestment petition was begun at UC Berkeley and has been promoted by faculty there. [26] A Jewish student who complained to her Arabic instructor about the anti-semitic Protocols Of the Elders Zion was told that the ficitious "protocols" were indeed written by Jews. She was then attacked by the instructor's supervisor, who openly called her a liar and threatened her with a libel suit. He even lied to the press claiming an investigation had been conducted of the student's claims when the student was never interviewed. The instructor held so firm to his comment about Jews being authors of the forgeries that the campus newspaper believed afterward that the "protocols: were actually written by Jews. [27]


Saudi endowed chairs and departments have produced faculty at the college level in America who spout the propaganda provided to 8th graders in Saudi Arabian schools, where textbooks claim that Jews "are people of treachery and betrayal." At Connecticut State University, Norton Mezvinsky, has declared Judaism a religion of "racism" whose followers believe that "the blood of non-Jews has no intrinsic value" and that the killing of non-Jews does "not constitute murder according to the Jewish religion" and that Judaism teaches "the killing of innocent Arabs for revenge is a Jewish virtue." While textbooks in Saudi Arabia claim "the Zionist Jews are the enemies of Islam and supporters of the modern Crusaders" Joel Beinin, Middle East Studies professor at Stanford and former head of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), rails against America's "Zionist lobby" that controls the US government by blocking democracy and economic development in the Arab world" and uses power "to make and unmake regimes". [29]


The University of Arkansas Middle East Studies department, set up under King Fahd, offers an Arabic language program. A sample newsletter published by the department contains a full-page poem translated by some of the studnet body's Arabic language students entitled "A Letter To A Faraway Friend (from inside the occupied territory)". The poem subtly demeans Israel and praises martyrdom and death. [30] The sole guest lecturer to the department mentioned on its site is Joel Beinin.[31]


Examples abound on campuses all over the country. Harvard received a $2 million dollar grant from Sheik Khalid Al Turki. For its graduation ceremony it chose a student, Zayed Yasin, for commencement speaker. His speech? "My American Jihad." Yasin has voiced his support for Hamas and says suicide bombers should be paid. He also has raised money for the Holy Land Foundation, one of the Islamic charities shut down by the Bush administration as a front for Al-Qaeda.[32] Prince Alaweed Bin Talal recently donated $500,000 to Georgetown University for a scholarship program in President Bush's name. Alaweed also recently donated $27 million dollars to Hamas. Martin Kramer's book "Ivory Towers On Sand: The Failure Of Middle East Studies" illustrates many other similar situations on US campuses to show how pervasive this has become. [33]


Saudi money sets up these academic departments with anti-American and anti-Israel agendas, but U.S. taxpayers underwrite the programs themselves. This is done through Title VI funding mandated by Congress. Originated in the late 1950's during the Cold War, Title VI received an additional $86 million dollars after 9/11 as part of the Education Act. This allowed the creation of 118 Middle East Resource Centers at US colleges and universities where Arabic would be taught and security analysis developed in the War On Terror. Yet the program has been seriously abused. The idea was that the universities would provide an understanding of the Middle East and Arab language experts for the military and intelligence services. But most Middle East Studies departments let their students slide by with minimal Arabic instruction. The focus is on research articles which serve the worldwide cause of jihad when they have any contemporary relevance.[34] It goes also for "outreach" programs to secondary schools which are little more than propaganda efforts against Israel and the United States.


At Georgetown University such an outreach program is provided for teachers from kindergarten level through the 12th grade. Seminars are packed with Arab anti-war activists opposed to the removal of Saddam Hussein by the US military. One of these "academics" was in fact once a public relations consultant for Saddam Hussein and blamed the oppression of Iraq's people by Saddam Hussein on the United States. No opposing views were presented.[35]


Once the Saudi endowments are complete, matching funds are then provided by the US taxpayer, who refreshes the Saudi investment with matching funds through Title VI. One "scholar" who lobbied for the continuation of such funding to the State Department recently was Hussein Ibish, a non-academic and leader of the radical American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. [36]


Besides paying the salaries of academics who advance the Saudi "point of view", Title VI money goes to what could be considered the Saudis' "foot soldiers" on campus, activists who will spread the word beyond the scholarly community. Co-mingled funding for Middle East centers goes into stipends, scholarships and fellowships for Arab students to support them in their work as activists spearheading Muslim and Palestinian groups on campus. While handpicked Arab professors and sympathizers "reeducate" the student body to the proper "point of view," these student activist groups carry it forward, creating an atmosphere that permeates campuses with anti-American and anti-Israeli propaganda. A tour of any major campus will reveal the prevalance of professionally produced flyers posted against Israel and "Zionists" (the new euphemism for Jews) or against American policy in Iraq, and "film festivals" and lectures devoted to crude attacks on alleged Israeli "massacres" and other alleged atrocities.

All this is made possible by the Title VI funding of stipends to Middle East Studies students. Arab students may train overseas during the summer in "activism" then return to campus to ply their skills. As a result, anti-Semitic attacks are on the increase on our college campuses. Not long ago Jewish students at San Francisco State needed to be escorted to safety by off-campus city police during a pro-Israel rally, causing one professor to remark it was like Germany in the 1930's. At Concordia University, 1,500 "students" showed up to create a riot and prevent former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu from speaking about terrorism on that campus and ticket holders needed a police escort off campus as well.

This tide of abuse needs to be addressed. Academic departments with political agendas is a new phenomenon on American campuses and directly violates the principles of Academic Freedom established by the American Association of University Professors and long recognized by accrediting institutions. Congress has recently taken a needed step to oversee the way it provides Title VI needs to take a hard look at the way it provides money to underwrite these programs. University trustees and administrators need to do likewise.

ENDNOTES


[1] www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.asp?ref=/mowbray/mowbray122002.asp

[2] www.ropma.net/saudi-education.htm#edn1

[3] http://216.26.163.62./2003/ss_terror_06_27.html

[4] http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=static&page=alexievtestimony


[5] http://216.26.163.62/2003/ss_terror_06_27.html

[6] http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=static&page=alexievtestimony

[8] http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP35402

[9] http://biz.bahrainedb.com/NewsIn.asp?Article=1605&Sn=6

[10] http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/675

[11] http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/794

[12] Source: US Dept. of Education (figures may be higher due to more current donations).

[13] http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-stalinsky020703.asp

[14] http://www.meforum.org/article/538

[15] http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/2003_09_08.htm

[16] http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/663

[17] http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=1157

[18] http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/756

[19] http://www.campus-watch.org/about.php

[20] http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article1825.shtml

[21] http://www.dafka.org/NewsGen.asp?S=4&PageID=57

[22] http://www.senatorlavalle.com/press_archive_story.asp?id=199

[23] www.campus-watch.org/article/id/756

[24] www.campus-watch.org/article/id/627 also: http://www.sultanfoundation.org/english/advisory.htm

[25] http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031103me.pdf

[26] http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=3804

[27] http://www.littlegreenfootballs.com/weblog/?entry=7785

[28] http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=2783

[29] http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.asp?ref=/comment/comment-harris061903.asp

[30] http://www.uark.edu/depts/mesp/newsletter/fall03.pdf

[31] http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/398

[32] http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/22 also: http://www.academia.org/news/struggle.html

[33] http://www.ivorytowers.org/pages/832317/index.htm

[34] http://www.meforum.org/article/208/

[35] http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/740

[36] www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=5101 also: www.wrmea.com/backissues/1188/8811050.htm (note discussion of American-Arab Anti-discrimination Committee touring Saudi information minister) also: http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/091003_epstein.pdf also: www.us-israel.org/jsource/US-Israel/lobby.html

[37] http://www.sultanfoundation.org/english/studies.htm

[38] http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz061603.asp

[39] http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz061603.asp

[40] http://www.ropma.net/saudi-education.htm#-edn1


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Lee Kaplan is a contributing editor to Frontpagemag.com.
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>> NYU WATCH...

Boycotting Israel at NYU?

By Martin Kramer
MartinKramer.org | April 5, 2004

The habitual academic petition-signers against Israel are out in force, in a letter to Hebrew University president Menachem Magidor. They charge that Israel "makes it difficult or impossible for Palestinian teachers and students to reach their universities," and that Israeli troops are responsible for "harassment, arrests, random shootings and assaults" on Palestinian campuses. The occupation itself, they write, "disrupts the necessary framework for any successful educational structure." The signatories of the letter call themselves "defenders of Palestinian academic freedom and supporters of the academic boycott against Israel." And they ask "the Israeli academic leadership where it stands on the issue of current Israeli policy, and to share with us what Israeli academic institutions are doing to challenge the behavior of your government." (For more, see this article in the Chronicle of Higher Education.)

Now I don't speak for anyone else, but I know where I would lay the blame for the plight of Palestinian academic institutions. (By the way, there wasn't even one such institution in the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, and every one of them was established under the Israeli occupation.) I would lay the blame on the Palestinian Authority for choosing war, and on the violent militias that use campuses as recruitment stations for terrorists.

Nevertheless, Israeli academics have never boycotted Palestinian professors, even in the worst days of terror. To the contrary: if you're organizing a conference in Israel, it's almost obligatory to have a Palestinian professor on the podium. Free exchange is what academic freedom means, and Israeli universities have done an admirable job of upholding it in trying times. In contrast, the academic boycott against Israel is itself a gross violation of academic freedom, because it explicitly imposes a political litmus test on Israeli scholars. It's radical-style McCarthyism.

Among the American signatories, there are a handful of Middle East academics. Only one stands out: Professor Zachary Lockman, who identifies himself as director of the Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies at New York University. He stands out because he's the only signatory with any academic clout. In fact, not only did he become director of NYU's Middle East center last fall. His center simultaneously became a self-standing Title VI National Resource Center for the Middle East. Its activities enjoy a federal subsidy of around $400,000 a year.

Now that Lockman has announced himself as a "supporter of the academic boycott against Israel," the question for New York University and the U.S. Department of Education is a simple one. Is it Lockman's intention to implement the boycott that he supports, in the National Resource Center that he administers? If the answer is yes, then New York University's provost should insist he step down. It's unthinkable that a comprehensive center for Middle Eastern studies would boycott Israeli academics. (Tell the provost yourself if you agree.) And it's unthinkable that the U.S. government would subsidize such a center. If Lockman is going to walk the boycott walk at the Kevorkian Center, its federal subsidy should be revoked immediately.

Now it may be that Lockman supports the boycott only in principle, and has no intention of acting on his principle. But having signed the petition as the director of the Kevorkian Center, and not simply as an NYU professor (which would have sufficed for identification purposes), he has to clarify that point. Specifically, he must reassure New York University and the U.S. Department of Education that no boycott, in any form whatsoever, open or tacit, will be implemented at the Kevorkian Center. Anything less than an explicit reassurance will leave a cloud of suspicion hanging over the place.

When I was a center director, in the 1990s, I was careful to stay clear of political controversy, so as not to drag my colleagues down my own alley. Professor Lockman seems to feel no comparable obligation. His colleagues might ask themselves whether they can afford this sort of academic "leadership." They should affirm that Lockman doesn't speak for them or the Kevorkian Center, whose name he has deliberately put on a political statement. If they feel otherwise, they should announce that as well. (Professor Timothy Mitchell, previous director, also signed the boycott letter.) So Lockman wants to know where every academic in Israel stands? Let's first find out where every member and affiliate of the Kevorkian Center stands.

Update: I'm pleased to report that Professor Lockman has clarified his position to the provost of NYU, repudiating the boycott. "Neither I nor NYU's Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies, which I direct, advocate or implement such a boycott," Lockman writes in a letter dated April 2. And he adds:

I signed the letter as a supporter of academic freedom for Palestinian scholars and academic institutions, not as a supporter of a boycott against Israel. However, the wording of the letter was such that it could have led people to construe my support for the defense of the academic freedom of Palestinians as an endorsement of a boycott of Israeli scholars and academic institutions, which is not the case. In reality, neither the Kevorkian Center, nor I as an individual, advocates or practices a boycott of Israeli scholars or academic institutions. In fact, the Center regularly hosts visiting scholars and professors from Israel and maintains ongoing relations with Israeli academic institutions, and issues related to Israel are part of the Center's program.
NYU provost David McLaughlin has accepted Lockman's assurances. The boycott letter that Lockman signed, McLaughlin adds, "was poorly constructed, its wording inadequately precise, and so his signing of it unclear as to his intentions." Actually, I thought it was pretty straightforward. And as Lockman says he signed the letter via the Internet, I wonder how he failed to notice that the web address of the letter is www.academicboycott.org, and the title of the webpage is "Boycott Israeli Academic and Research Institutions: Open Letter." That's not exactly subtle. Even so, I will not dispute the assurances he's now given.

The main thing, however, is that the provost has added his own assurances:

The University's position on calls for a boycott is clear. It stands firm against any such boycott, which by its very nature runs counter to the essence of the University, and to the values to which New York University in particular is committed. Our view is that the University is a space that encourages open, free and continuous dialogue free from fear of recrimination.
That's an important statement by the university's leading academic official, it binds the entire university, and I'm delighted to have elicited it.

If there is a lesson here, it is that academics, who make their livelihood by the crafting of written and spoken words, should be discriminating in what they sign. I'll continue to keep a sharp eye on the doings of the Kevorkian Center and its director. But from my point of view, Lockman has done the right thing. I hope the other signatories will follow suit.


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George Galloway: It's not easy being Gorgeous
George Galloway is embroiled in the mother of all libel battles. But the cigar-chomping rebel MP laughs in the face of disaster. Deborah Ross takes a ride in his Mercedes to hear why
05 April 2004


I meet George Galloway - also known as Gorgeous George, of course, as well as Britain's biggest champion of the Arab world - at his office in the House of Commons. I'm not sure why, but by the time I arrive, which is mid-afternoon-ish, George and the photographer are engaged in a conversation about beards not being fashionable any more. "A hundred years ago every MP had one," George is saying. David Blunkett still has one, I say. "Yes, but he probably doesn't know he has one," George says.

George does not have a beard, but he does have a little silver moustache. "Emma Nicholson once told me," he says, "that kissing a man without a moustache is like eating an egg without salt." Everyone else in the room - myself, the photographer, two of Galloway's staff, Yasmin and Rima - freezes in horror, largely because, I think, we had always hoped to get though life without ever having to hear "egg" and "moustache" in the same sentence. Who hasn't?

George isn't fazed, though. I don't think much ever fazes George. "I thought it might have been a come-on," he continues, "so I beat a hasty retreat." He'd quite like to be thought of as a bit of a sexy beast, I think. His favourite actor, it turns out, is Jack Nicholson, and there is this sense that he might model himself on Jack, a little.

Certainly, he chomps on his fat cigars in a very Hollywood sort of way. He is chomping on one now, but while this cigar, he says, is all very well, it's not as juicily fat as his favourite, "the Montecristo No 2; they're like torpedoes". But he's suspended his Montecristo habit for the time being. They're expensive, he says, and what with his upcoming libel battle against The Daily Telegraph, "I have to put money into my legal pot. My bill is already a quarter of a million pounds. Luckily, my lawyers have faith in me. They're not asking for it up front."

We're off to Walsall, where George is due to speak at 7.30pm at a meeting of Respect, the new lefty anti-war party he founded to contest the European elections. Rima - thirty-ish, Manchester-born, of Lebanese/ Syrian descent - is coming too. She's a rubbish map-reader, it turns out, but is very beautiful with glossy black corkscrew curls. "You should meet her mother," says George later. "Wow, what a looker!"

We walk down the corridor. Mike Gapes, the pro-Israel MP, is a near neighbour. Do they pass the time of day? "No," George replies. I try to work out who his mates are in the anti-war lot. Glenda Jackson? "A cold fish," he says, shiveringly. "To me, her finest role was in A Touch of Class. She was very loveable in that." So if she can act loveable, she should be able to act warm? "Exactly. I do admire her Joan of Arc-like integrity, though." Ken Livingstone? "I admire and respect him, but he's not an easy person to like." Robin Cook? "Of course, while we must welcome any sinner that repents, he prepared the ground for all that happened."

His best friends include Alan Milburn, Barbara Roche, John Reid and Margaret Hodge. OK, maybe not. "I used to regard them as Trots! Margaret was always known as Enver Hoxha, after the Albanian dictator: now she's like a member of the Royal Family, lecturing patronisingly all over the place." I suppose that, whatever you might think about George, you do have to admire him for not shifting when the wind did. However, he did once have ministerial ambitions: "I would have loved to have been Foreign Secretary." So maybe there is some frustration and bitterness here. Perhaps, even, it's not so much that he loves Iraq, or found good in Saddam - more that he hates New Labour so much that any enemy of theirs has to be a friend of his.

Out to his car, now, which is parked in the forecourt. It's a big navy Mercedes. But it's not new, he stresses, and "I've done 108,000 miles in it since September 11". So many speaking engagements, he's had time for little else. Not even Sex and the City. "My staff encouraged me to watch and I did begin to feel I knew the characters." Who did he fancy most? "Well, you'd want to marry Charlotte and you'd want to sleep with Samantha, wouldn't you?"

In your dreams, pal, I want to say, but of course I'm much too polite. "Nice car," I do say. "I always pay for my own petrol," he says. His combined salary as an MP and columnist for the Scottish edition of The Mail on Sunday amounts to ?150,000 a year. He once, famously, interviewed Saddam for The Mail on Sunday. Saddam offered him a Quality Street, which he did not accept. "I'm not really a chocolate man. I'm more cakes and puddings. I like banoffee pie."

His other cars, by the way, include a Range Rover in Portugal, where he has a second home, and "a soft-top vintage Mercedes, which I bought with my libel winnings from Robert Maxwell. All my cars are third-hand. The only new car I've ever owned was a Lada. It was good. Never broke down once. Soviet engineering!"

Rima offers to drive, but George won't hear of it. "I don't feel as manly, somehow, being driven." George, 50, is not a big man. He's surprisingly small, in fact, but stockily powerful with stockily powerful thighs, now splayed on the driving seat. (That's another image you didn't want, I bet.) His jeans strain at the seams. They used to be black but are so old they're that strange green that old black things go. His jacket is positively shiny with age. I'm shocked. What happened to Gorgeous George of the chi-chi Kenzo suits? "I used to be much better dressed because I used to have more time to shop," he says. "I like Selfridges. I used to go there a couple of times a year, but for the last couple of years, with the war and the run-up to the war, I really haven't had time." Rima offers George a small white pillow. "Piles?" I ask, sympathetically. "My back," he replies, firmly.

The car comes to life with a soft purr. We move off, past the Houses of Parliament. "I like the House of Commons. I like it late at night. It's got a certain majesty about it. But at the same time I could turn my back on it easily enough." George was expelled from the Labour Party (he is now the independent MP for Glasgow Kelvin) last October for his extreme anti-war rhetoric.

Would he return, if invited? No, he says. "If the Labour Party were to undergo some convulsive change, then obviously I'd have to think about that. But just swapping Blair for Brown wouldn't be a convulsive change." How did it feel, I ask, to be expelled? "I wasn't surprised, but I was shocked. When they said the words, I did feel a stab. But I'm over it." Does anything ever faze him? "Calamity has hardened me and turned my mind to steel," he says. Poetic, I say. "Ho Chi Minh," he says.

George and calamity. Everywhere George goes, trouble follows, as sure as eggs are eggs (which is fine; just don't bring moustaches into it). The classic case was at War on Want, which he raised from an unknown outfit to a major charity. At the same time, he was accused of fiddling his expenses and philandering. While an independent auditor cleared him of dishonesty, he admitted to coming away from a business trip to Greece with "carnal knowledge" of another woman, despite being married at the time. Not a happy marriage, then? "I wouldn't have been having an affair if it had been a happy marriage." Pause. "Rima, are we taking the M6?"

He is always being libelled, too. "I've won - if that's the word - a quarter of a million pounds in libel damages over the years, but I can honestly tell you I'd rather the libels hadn't happened. I hate being hated, lashed, traduced." Why are you libelled so often? "That's what my lawyers would like to know." Most recently, he won ?30,000 from The Times (for a Julie Burchill column that confused him with another MP altogether) and substantial undisclosed damages from the The Christian Science Monitor over a claim, based on what turned out to be forged documents, that he was paid ?10m by Saddam to oppose the conflict in Iraq.

The forgeries, he says, are evidence of a dirty-tricks campaign. "If you'd been at any of the anti-war demonstrations you'd know that I'm the main speaker, am always the final speaker and always get the best response." That's modest of you, George. "Those are facts." His libel case against the Telegraph involving another set of documents - this time purporting to show that he had been receiving ?375,000 a year from the Iraqi government - is due in court in November. He is impenetrably confident - but what, I ask, if it does go against him? He'll be finished, politically and financially. "If the worst comes to the worst," he says, "I'll go up a hill and read a book. I know I've done nothing to be ashamed of."

We're purring up the Edgware Road now... Born and brought up in Dundee, his father worked in an engineering factory. I ask if he still feels working-class, with his Merc and his salary and his houses - which he now shares with his second wife, a Palestinian scientist. "I'm absolutely working-class. It's how you relate to other people, how awkward you feel when you kiss them... do you kiss them on one cheek or two? Are you absolutely confident about what to do with all that cutlery? Do you switch over when the opera comes on? Have you ever been to ballet?"

I say that a good test is having a cleaner. Middle-class people are good at underpaying and bossing them, but working-class people aren't, no matter how wealthy they might have become. He agrees: "I can't bear the thought of somebody being given orders to clean things in my house." Yes, he does have a cleaner, but he also has a solution. "I try to be out when she comes."

I ask George to describe his politics in one word. "Socialist. Although I'm not as left wing as you think." Surprise me, George. "I'm strongly against abortion. I believe life begins at conception, and therefore unborn babies have rights. I think abortion is immoral." You can't be pro-choice? "Who is choosing for the child?"

Well, I say, better the unborn unwanted child than the born unwanted one. "I can't accept that, because I believe in God. I have to believe that the collection of cells has a soul." No, he says, his faith in God cannot be shaken, and, yes, he hopes to go to Heaven. "I believe the souls of the departed will be there, and that I will see the good people I have known again." What would Hell be? A two-up, two-down shared with Tony Blair, Charles Moore, Julie Burchill and a cleaner who demands a lot of direction? "That would be hell," he confirms.

We stop at a motorway services. Cheese toasties all round. George's treat. I have to say, if he did ever earn ?375,000 a year from the Hussein regime, he's not spending it on snacks. Then it's back on the road, arriving in Walsall at seven-ish, but then, alas, Rima's map-reading skills being what they are, we drive round and round the same one-way system 78 times. George tries not to lose it. "The air in this car would be very blue if you weren't in it," he tells me.

Eventually, we do make the venue. "Anywhere to park, brother?" George asks the chap outside. "No, brother, but if you drive up to the roundabout and take the first left..." George passes the keys to Rima. "She'll do it," he says. He does not add: "Would you mind, sister?" He might be quite good at bossing staff about, after all.

George is the last speaker and, yes, the best. Then it's home on the last train to London. The day hasn't been so bad. I've quite enjoyed it, actually. I like George. I've no idea if the Telegraph's allegations against him are true or not. But I do hope not. Then, maybe I'm just assuming that any enemy of New Labour has to be a friend of mine. It may take me a while to forgive the egg-and-moustache thing, though. Obviously.
5 April 2004 22:46

? 2004 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd



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U.S. sanctions Gulf firm for helping Iran's missile program

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, April 5, 2004
The United States has sanctioned a firm from the United Arab Emirates for providing help to Iran's cruise missile program.

It was the first time the United States has sanctioned a company from the UAE, regarded as an ally of Washington. Previously, U.S. sanctions regarding missile assistance to Iran included China, North Korea, Russia and former East Bloc states.

Officials did not immediately identify the UAE firm, Middle East Newsline reported. But they said the Bush administration has discussed with the UAE the need to tighten export controls to prevent the transfer of components and technology for missile and weapons of mass destruction programs.

On Friday, the State Department announced sanctions on 13 companies that provided missile components to Iran. The companies included five Chinese firms, two from Macedonia, two from Russia, one from Belarus, North Korea, Taiwan and the UAE.
State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli said the sanctions were in accordance to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Ereli said sanctions were not imposed on any of the countries where the companies were based.
"The penalties were imposed pursuant to the Act," Ereli said, "because there was credible information indicating that these companies had transferred to Iran, since Jan. 1, 1999, either equipment and technology on the export -- multilateral export control lists or items such as those on the list but falling below control list parameters or other items with the potential of making a material contribution to proscribed programs."
So far, 23 entities have come under U.S. sanctions since the legislation, which bans any dealings by the U.S. government with these companies. In 2003, four entities were sanctioned.
On March 23, the State Department lifted sanctions from six Russian entities. Officials said the six were found to have no longer supplied missile assistance to Iran.
On Sunday, UAE officials disclosed that the Central Bank has frozen $3.1 million in funds linked to what they termed terrorist groups as well as SMB Computers, the Dubai-based company employed by the Pakistani nuclear network of scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Officials said Dubai authorities were briefed by U.S. officials on SMB's role in processing and shipping nuclear weapons components to Iran and Libya. In mid-March, they said, SMB was shut down.
"The UAE Central Bank has frozen all accounts related to SMB Computer Co. as part of the investigation," Central Bank governor Sultan Bin Nasser Al Suwaidi said. "The investigating committee has made significant progress.
The Dubai public prosecutor will soon announce the results of the probe."
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc
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Kharrazi to visit Moscow Monday
Friday, April 02, 2004 - ?2004 IranMania.com
Tehran, April 2 (IranMania) -- According to Iran's State News Agency (IRNA) Iran's Foreign Minister Dr Kamal Kharrazi is to arrive in Moscow on Monday to take part in a meeting of foreign ministers of the Caspian Sea littoral states.
The meeting, to open Tuesday, will be attended by Foreign Ministers of the sea`s five littoral states--Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.
According to the Russian president`s special envoy for Caspian Sea affairs, Viktor Kalyuzni, the foreign ministers will tackle issues such as the military activities of states in the sea, an equitable manner of dividing the sea and determination of fishing areas.
The meeting will also make preliminary arrangements for a meeting of heads of the sea`s littoral countries to be held in Tehran this year.

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>> BUSINESS OF WAR...

BY JAMES TARANTO
Monday, April 5, 2004 1:53 p.m. EDT

Soldiers as Victims

Our item Friday on blogger Markos Zuniga's post about the four Blackwater Security Consulting contractors murdered in Fallujah, Iraq, last week--"They are there to wage war for profit. Screw them," Zuniga said--brought this response from reader Josh Waxman:
It would be "fair and balanced" if you also mentioned that Markos explained that the reason he was angry was because the deaths of American soldiers in Iraq got second billing to the deaths of these individuals.
But that might not please your master, would it? It's really nice when facts are things you can use as you wish, and discard when they're inconvenient.
We don't want to get into any trouble, so if you see our master, please don't tell him we published Waxman's letter. Anyway, we're not sure how Zuniga's professed sympathy for soldiers is a mitigating factor. "Screw them," he said of four men who had been lynched. Is such an attitude less despicable because there are other people whose lynching Zuniga would object to?
The distinction between soldiers and civilian contractors seems like mere hairsplitting when you consider that all four of the Fallujah dead were retired U.S. military special forces officers. Reader Ray Gardner puts things in perspective:
Blackwater and security firms like them are a place where former Marines, special forces soldiers and other high-speed types from the U.S. military go upon leaving active duty.
Going back in the Marines myself is just not feasible at my age but I have considered going to work for such a security firm since 9/11. Such employment for me would be the next best thing to going back to active duty.
Others go into such work for a variety of reasons, but one thing is common among them; they are hardworking Americans, mostly military veterans, who have given their lives to defending this country.
To speak out against Blackwater's employees is to speak against veterans one and all. When they were active duty, these guys were the 5% that did all of the dirty work.
Zuniga's rationalization is interesting, though, for what it tells us about the way the left views the U.S. military. Back in the Vietnam era, the antiwar movement vilified American servicemen; as we noted in February, when John Kerry testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971, he charged his fellow veterans with all manner of war crimes.
Somewhere along the line, it became politically incorrect on the liberal left (as distinct from the radical left) to disparage members of the military. The operative principle became: We support the troops, though we oppose their mission. Members of the military thereby achieved the status of accredited victims, entitled to liberal "compassion." And in a February interview with CNN's Judy Woodruff, Kerry reinterpreted his 1971 views to absolve soldiers of any guilt: "I was accusing American leaders of abandoning the troops. . . . It's the leaders who are responsible, not the soldiers. . . . I've always fought for the soldiers."
The San Francisco Chronicle has a revealing profile of Susan Galleymore, a 48-year-old Alameda, Calif., antiwar activist whose son, Nick, is an Army Ranger serving in Iraq. Galleymore doesn't approve of Nick's chosen career, and she's written about it:
In one essay, Galleymore asked for others to appreciate that the soldiers are in a dilemma, "caught in a military culture that encourages the numbing of most emotions but anger. Whip up enough anger in young men emotionally isolated, denied friends, family, lovers, even civilians [sic] clothes, physically exhaust them, nourish them inadequately, expose them to extreme temperatures and violent behavior, confine them to base and portray everyone else as murderous and you create impossible stress."
Nick told his mother that wasn't his experience.
Indeed. The idea of soldier-as-victim might have made some sense in 1971, when the draft was on and some soldiers were in Vietnam against their will. But today's military has not a single conscript; everyone fighting in Iraq and elsewhere is a professional who has voluntarily chosen a hazardous line of work. They deserve our gratitude and respect, not our pity.
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Very Awkward Facts
Richard Clarke's denials of Iraq's terror ties don't ring true.

BY LAURIE MYLROIE
Saturday, April 3, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST

The credibility of Clinton counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke has come under withering fire. He has been caught in error after error, omission after omission. I can attest to one error more: a highly revealing error that tells us a great deal about who Richard Clarke really is.
Mr. Clarke singles me out for special criticism in his book, "Against All Enemies." This is not surprising. He believes that Islamic terrorism is the work of a few individual criminals, many of them relatives. I have for years gathered the evidence that shows that terrorism is something more than a mom-and-pop operation: that it is supported by powerful states, very much including Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
Mr. Clarke is a man famously intolerant of those who disagree with him. When he cannot win the argument, he cheats. And that is what he has done again in the pages of his book. In order to explain why he opposed the war with Iraq, Mr. Clarke mischaracterizes the arguments of those of us who favored it. The key mischaracterization turns on an important intelligence debate about the identity of the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This mastermind goes by the name of "Ramzi Yousef." But who was "Ramzi Yousef"?
The evidence suggests that "Ramzi Yousef" had close connections to the Iraqi security services. This evidence has impressed, among others, former CIA chief James Woolsey, and Richard Perle, former head of the Defense Policy Board. Mr. Clarke calls the Yousef-Saddam connection an "utterly discredited" theory, unworthy of serious debate. He likes the phrase so much, he even uses it on the dust jacket of his book. But let's review the facts:
* Fact No. 1: "Ramzi Yousef" entered the U.S. in September 1992 on an Iraqi passport, with stamps showing a journey beginning in Baghdad. This fact is attested by the inspector who admitted Yousef into the U.S. Yet Mr. Clarke contends that Yousef entered the U.S. without a passport.

* Fact No. 2: The sole remaining fugitive from the 1993 bombing, Abdul Rahman Yasin, is an Iraqi. After the attack, Yasin fled to Iraq. The Iraqi regime rewarded Yasin with a house and monthly stipend. Yet Mr. Clarke claims, incredibly, that the Iraqis jailed Yasin.

* Fact No. 3: Seven men were indicted in the 1993 attack. Two of the seven, Yousef and Yasin, have Iraqi connections. Yet Mr. Clarke inflates the number of participants to 12, so as to create the impression that the presence of one or two men with Iraqi connections was no big deal.

* Fact No. 4: The truth is, we don't really know much about the prisoner bearing the name "Ramzi Yousef." Judge Kevin Duffy, who presided over Yousef's two trials, observed at sentencing: "We don't even know what your real name is." Yet Mr. Clarke claims to know what the judge did not: Yousef, he writes, "was born Abdul Basit in Pakistan and grew up in Kuwait where his father worked."
To reach this conclusion, Mr. Clarke has to ignore a forest of awkward facts. In late 1992, according to court documents, Yousef went to the Pakistani consulate in New York with photocopies of the 1984 and 1988 passports of Abdul Basit Karim (those documents have Karim born in Kuwait). Yousef claimed to be Karim, saying he had lost his passport and needed a new one to return home. He received a temporary passport, in the name of Abdul Basit Karim, which he used to flee New York the night of the Trade Center bombing.
Karim was, indeed, a real person, a Pakistani reared in Kuwait. After completing high school in Kuwait, Karim studied for three years in Britain. He graduated from the Swansea Institute in June 1989 and returned home, where he got a job in Kuwait's Planning Ministry. He was there a year later, when Iraq invaded.
Kuwait maintained an alien resident file on Karim. That file appears to have been altered to create a false identity or "legend" for the terrorist Yousef. Above all, the file contains a fingerprint card bearing Yousef's prints. But Yousef is not Karim--as Judge Duffy implied--for many reasons, including the fact that Yousef is 6 feet tall, while Karim was significantly shorter, according to his teachers at Swansea. They do not believe their student is the terrorist mastermind. Indeed, according to Britain's Guardian newspaper, latent fingerprints lifted from material Mr. Karim left at Swansea bear "no resemblance" to Yousef's prints. They are two different people.
The fingerprint card in Mr. Karim's file had to have been switched. The original card bearing his prints was replaced with one bearing Yousef's. The only party that reasonably could have done so is Iraq, while it occupied Kuwait, for the evident purpose of creating a "legend" for one of its terrorist agents.
The debate over Yousef's identity has enormous implications for the 9/11 strikes. U.S. authorities now understand that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed masterminded those attacks. But Mohammed's identity, too, is based on Kuwaiti documents that predate Kuwait's liberation from Iraq. According to these documents, Mohammed is Ramzi Yousef's "uncle," and two other al Qaeda masterminds are Yousef's "brothers."
A former deputy chief of Israeli Military Intelligence, Amos Gilboa, has observed that "it's obvious" that these identities are fabricated. A family is not at the core of the most ambitious, most lethal series of terrorist assaults in U.S. history. These are Iraqi agents, given "legends," on the basis of Kuwait's files, while Iraq occupied the country.
When Mr. Clarke reported, six days after the 9/11 strikes, that no evidence existed linking them to Iraq, or Iraq to al Qaeda, he was reiterating the position he and others had taken throughout the Clinton years. They systematically turned a blind eye to such evidence and failed to pursue leads that might result in a conclusion of Iraqi culpability. These officials were charged with defending us "against all enemies." Their own prejudices blinded them to at least one of our enemies and left the nation vulnerable.
Ms. Mylroie, an advisor on Iraq to the 1992 Clinton campaign, is author of "The War Against America" (HarperCollins, 2001).

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>> HOLY? HOTHEAD...


Media-savvy saviour of Iraqis or a defiant, dangerous hothead
By Anne Penketh, Diplomatic Editor
06 April 2004
For Paul Bremer, the American proconsul in Iraq, and for many Shia, the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is a dangerous hothead.
But to his young, radical followers, the 30-year old Shia firebrand is an inspired leader who has dared to challenge the American occupation.
Mr Sadr is the only surviving son of the Muslim cleric, Ayatollah Mohamed Sadeq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by Saddam's agents in 1999 along with two sons for his defiant stand against the regime.
Baghdad's Shia district, Saddam City, was renamed Sadr City after the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator. The slum in northeastern Baghdad has become Mr Sadr's power base, patrolled by his militia, the Mehdi army.
Sadr junior, who was last night under threat of arrest by the US military and branded an outlaw, took up a bellicose position from the moment the American occupation began.
In his Friday sermons in Kufa, he dons a white shroud as a symbol of mourning. In every sermon, participants repeat after him: "No, No to Israel, No, No to America, No, No to terrorism."
The media-savvy leader is aware of the benefits of his father's image, which is brandished at every protest rally. His positions were given wider currency through his ownership of the weekly newspaper al-Hawza al-Natiqa, which recently accused Mr Bremer of following Saddam by persecuting the Shia majority.
But Mr Sadr's views in his paper were not representative of the Shia community. The most influential cleric is the elderly Grand Ayatollah Sistani, a cautious leader of the conservative mainstream, and whose low political profile has angered radicals.
Mr Sadr's supporters were accused of mounting a siege of Ayatollah Sistani's home in Najaf, only days after the killing of a moderate Shia leader, Ayatollah Abdel-Majid al-Khoei, who had just returned from exile in Britain in April last year. The cleric was hacked to death at a meeting with Sistani on whether to co-operate with the invaders.
Mr Bremer may have unwittingly played into Mr Sadr's hands last week, by ordering his newspaper to be temporarily closed, on the grounds that it was inciting violence against coalition forces.
The protests by Mr Sadr's supporters turned violent at the weekend, and left 52 people dead.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> HOLY? HOTHEAD 2...DEATH CULT WATCH...

Face to face with mastermind of Jerusalem suicide bombs
Abdul Rahman Makdad planned attacks this year on two Israeli buses. Nineteen were killed. He tells Donald Macintyre why he prefers civilian targets - and why he did not carry out the operations himself
06 April 2004


He sat in the middle of the room, a few feet away from the Shin Bet interrogator he had got to know so well since he was arrested just under a month ago. With his well-kept beard, and dressed in a beige zip-up jacket over a white T-shirt, dark trousers, his feet sockless under brown lace-up shoes without laces, Abdul Rahman Makdad looked relaxed, perhaps even a little truculent.

As he began to speak, in a clear, unhesitant voice, it required effort, here in the heart of the Russian Compound prison, to conjure the full enormity of the mission Makdad was describing in such calm, matter-of-fact terms. On Saturday 21 February, just six weeks ago, he had sent his wife and infant son away to his parents-in-law, leaving him free to concentrate on the work ahead.

At 4pm Mohammed Za'ul, at 23 five years younger than Makdad, arrived at Makdad's home in Bethlehem so that the older man could give the younger one final instructions and spend the night meticulously preparing the explosives before packing them into the blue rucksack Za'ul would be wearing when he boarded the number 14 bus in Jewish West Jerusalem the following morning.

Neither man had slept that night; Makdad took the customary video of Za'ul's last testament as a man who had volunteered for martydom. Makdad saw to it that Za'ul was wearing clothes suitable for the Jerusalem weather that morning - jeans, jacket and a nondescript hat. The object, he explained, was to make Za'ul as unobtrusive - and as Jewish looking - as possible. "In general he wasn't frightened," said Makdad. "But I told him not to look at any police and security people and not to be frightened." Za'ul did not speak any Hebrew; so he had been under a standing instruction to detonate the bomb if he was spoken to by the bus driver. "But this is a rare situation."

Although only religious, by his own account, "in a general way, not an extreme one", Makdad had joined Za'ul in his last prayers. The two men ate breakfast together before Za'ul left at 6pm, to be guided by a construction worker carefully chosen for his local knowledge through the security cordon dividing Bethlehem from Jerusalem and on to the centre of the city. It was after 8.30am that Makdad got the news that the bomb had detonated as a bus headed north along Kind David Street in rush hour, killing eight Israeli civilians and wounding more than 60. "I heard it on the radio," he said. "And I was happy."

If Makdad had somehow been broken by his interrogation he showed no sign of it. Asked early on in this rare hour-long interview whether he accepted the principal Israeli accusation that he had organised the February bomb on the number 14 bus and the one just a month earlier which had killed 11 people on a number 19 Jerusalem bus, he answered coolly: "I was responsible for the last two operations. I don't recall the numbers of the buses."

He showed impatience - turning to his unnamed Shin Bet interrogator, an Arabic speaker in his 30s dressed in jeans and a check shirt, to enjoy a joke with him at the expense of the sheer "Westernness" of our questions - when he was asked repeatedly exactly how the two men had spent the last 14 hours before Za'ul left on his mission. What had they eaten for breakfast? Did it matter? Maybe a little humus; he couldn't really remember. Why were we so obsessed with food? Were we hungry?

What had they spoken about when Makdad wasn't working on the explosives? "Ordinary conversation. There was no need at all to convince this man to carry out the operation. He himself chose to be a martyr." Indeed "the easiest thing [about such operations] is to find a martyr. In our nation we have thousands of people who want to be martyrs."

Makdad's journey to the leadership of a cell of four men, according to Makdad - which was part of a larger, interlocking, 20-strong Bethlehem-based cell according to the Israelis - had been a relatively long one. He was born in Egypt. His family had fled there as refugees after 1948 from near Ashkelon. Makdad lived there until he was 14, moving on to Libya, where he joined Fatah's Palestinian Liberation Army and took a commando course.

But with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the wake of the Oslo accords he came to Gaza and then to Jenin, where he served in the Palestinian Security Services. At this point, he said: "I believed in peace. I served with the police force." But then, as he put it: "I noticed that Israel didn't want peace."

The manifestations of the occupation remained in place - including what Makdad described as "Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people." He was transferred to Bethlehem, where he became a bodyguard to the PA governor, Mohammed Madami, and then to the man who took over the governate from Madami five months ago, Zuhair Manasra. He was in that job until he was arrested; indeed, as Makdad confirmed, his family continue to receive his salary now he is in detention. To Makdad this is entirely natural, despite the Authority's stated opposition to suicide bombings. "They treat me as a political prisoner not as a criminal. If I had been found out as a collaborator, they would have stopped my salary."

The Israeli charge sheet against Makdad is lengthy, going back to shooting attacks in 2001. In 2003, the Israelis say, he took instructions from Ahmed Mugrabi, whom Makdad had first met in Libya. Makdad managed to stay in contact with Mugrabi after his detention for his part in a 2002 suicide bombing in Beit Yisrael.

As late as last month, just a week after dispatching the second bus bomber to Jerusalem, Makdad is accused of planning a spectacular but foiled hijacking of an Israeli bus. Two suicide bombers would have driven the bus to Bethlehem, forcing it and its passengers into the Church of the Nativity to negotiate the release of Palestinian prisoners in return for the passengers' lives. If anything had gone wrong, the bombers would have blown up the bus.

So why had he agreed to talk to us, five reporters from European and American newspapers, invited to the Russian Compound by his Israeli enemies? "The main purpose of this meeting is to give a clear picture of our strategy, which is reacting to killing by killing." He used this last phrase several times, justifying the killing of innocent civilians as a response to the deaths caused by Israeli targeted assassinations and incursions into the occupied territories. Makdad told us: "We prefer to do the explosions in a bus. Sometimes it has to be in Jerusalem in a crowded area. But the main thing is to create more casualties."

What had the tactic, internationally reviled as it was, achieved for the Palestinian cause? If the Israelis continued to kill Palestinians, this would eventually help to achieve the Palestinian goals "in the long term and in the future".

If we had asked about his interrogation, the Israeli officials supervising the interview would have ended it immediately. Although officials admit privately that prisoners like Makdad sometimes give information because they are allowed to believe falsely that their wife and children are under threat of detention, this prohibition was not, they insisted, because he might reveal maltreatment at the hands of his captors. Five years ago, after repeated and well-documented accusations that the Israelis had regularly tortured prisoners, the Supreme Court ruled against any physical abuse of prisoners.

But in any case, what had been the gain in this, at times surreal, meeting for the Israeli authorities themselves? Occasionally, perhaps, a prisoner may give information in such circumstances that he will withhold from his interrogators. Explaining that his cell was a freelance one, beholden to none of the well-known armed factions, Makdad disclosed, apparently for the first time, that the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade had been allowed to claim responsibility for the bombing in return for providing 3,000 shekels (?400) through Makdad's brother, Maher. The "credit" for the operation had, in effect, been sold.

But the other, more potent factor may well have been Makdad's role as an employee of the PA, particularly in Bethlehem where from 2002 until two months ago the Authority was in theory left in charge of security. According to the Israelis, this allowed the militant factions to establish themselves in the town.

Makdad himself insisted that if the PA - or the Bethlehem Governor - had known about his activities he would have been arrested. Seven miles away in his office in Bethlehem, Governor Manasra indeed said he had been "astonished" at Makdad's arrest and subsequent confession. "All I ask of my bodyguards is that they are polite to people and balanced in their behaviour. He was both these things." But while adamant that he opposed attacks on innocent civilians he warned that incursions, checkpoints and seizure of land to accommodate the route of the security barrier which were stopping "patients getting to their doctors, children to their schools, students to their universities" and devastating the local economy created a feeling of hopelessness among Palestinian youth. "Give me one day in 2003 or 2004 in which the Israelis did not kill a Palestinian," he added. "What the Israelis do is going to make more and more Palestinians radical and violent. They leave no way for a reasonable or pragmatic way of doing things."

He claimed that even though the Israelis had not backed a security plan to transfer known militants to Jericho, the PA was "every day stopping actions [by militants] because we think that to kill civilians is to escalate the conflict". He had been obliged in January to release a dozen prisoners held in Bethlehem only when the Israeli Army had raided the city and demanded they be handed over to them.

Back in Jerusalem, awaiting what is likely to be life sentence, an unrepentant Makdad insisted he "had no regrets. I have done nothing wrong" Two more questions. Why, if he was strong believer in martyrdom, had he not carried out of the bombings himself? If he went on such a mission, he would no longer be able to organise others to do so. But he had been ready to do the February bombing himself if it had been necessary because no martyr could be found. And was his career of organising attacks on Israelis over? Well, prisoner swaps are a feature of the conflict. "No I don't think it is over."
5 April 2004 22:50


? 2004 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd

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U.S. may move vs. Pakistan terror areas
By SIOBHAN MCDONOUGH
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER
Pakistani tribal elders leave Governor House after their meeting with officials, Monday, April 5, 2004 in Peshawar, Pakistan. Senior government official warned more than 100 elders from two tribal regions that have been the focus of a recent hunt for al-Qaida suspects that they face punitive action if they fail to evict or hand over foreign terrorist in their areas. (AP Photo/M. Sajjad)
WASHINGTON -- Pakistan must eliminate terrorist sanctuaries or this country will step in and do its part in obliterating them, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad said Monday.
Unless the issue of sanctuaries is solved, it will be difficult to fully abolish security problems in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, he said.
"We cannot allow this problem to fester indefinitely," Khalilzad told about 100 people at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.
"We have told the Pakistani leadership that either they must solve this problem or we will have to do it for ourselves."
About 2 1/2 years after the Taliban-led government was toppled in a U.S.-led bombing campaign, Khalilzad gave a status report. He said "Afghanistan is succeeding."
However, he cautioned, "to consolidate the victory over extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan will take a sustained commitment of at least five years by the United States and its partners."
One of the greatest worries remains over the Taliban and other hostile groups that continue to be able to base, train and operate from Pakistani territory, he said.
The U.S. military has stepped up patrols along the rugged Pakistani border in an attempt to crush militants linked to the Taliban, al-Qaida or Afghan anti-government guerrilla leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Khalilzad said the United States prefers that Pakistan take responsibility and the Pakistani government agrees.
"We are prepared to help President (Gen. Pervez) Musharraf. However, one way or the other, this problem will have to be dealt with."
Progress is evident in rebuffing the Taliban and other terrorists who aim to destabilize Afghanistan, the ambassador said.
The number of security incidents has remained roughly constant during the past year; the attacks consist of terrorist actions or small, uncoordinated military activities.
"They are too weak to threaten the new government and the coalition," Khalilzad said.
He said the most immediate challenge are presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled for September. The challenge is logistical and operational, not security-related, he said.
The United Nations, which has lead responsibility for the elections, has registered 1.5 million of the estimated 10 million Afghans eligible to vote, Khalilzad said.
The Afghan National Army consists of about 8,000 troops. It will reach about 20,000 by the end of the year, he said, and roughly 30,000 police officers will have been trained and equipped by then.
Khalilzad is a U.S.-educated member of Afghanistan's ethnic Pashtun group, now representing America in the country of his birth.

Reliable Source
White-House officials may have known much more than they're letting on. An FBI staffer tells what really happened before 9/11.
By Michael Tomasky
Web Exclusive: 04.04.04
http://www.prospect.org/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=7562


I remember hearing the warnings in December 1999 about the imminent possibility of millennial terrorist attacks on American soil. And I remember, as most Americans who think back probably would, giving the warnings about eight seconds' thought.

Fortunately for all of us, I wasn't one of the people being paid to think about such things. And, fortunately, the people who were being paid to think about such things were thinking about them pretty obsessively. It's interesting today to read back over the coverage that December of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam, the Algerian national who was arrested by U.S. border guards as he tried to enter Washington state from Canada with a trunkful of explosives.

The press took the matter seriously -- The New York Times ran more than two dozen stories in December about Ressam's arrest and the potential for attacks. And so did the Clinton administration. As Richard Clarke tells the tale in Against All Enemies, Ressam's arrest was a pivotal moment in the administration's successful thwarting of at least one and possibly several planned terrorist attacks for New Year's Eve. The State Department issued two separate warnings.

Jordan arrested 13 men who might have been involved in planning potential attacks. And most of all, as we know from Clarke, once the warnings from intelligence sources became more frequent and more ominous, the administration's highest-level Cabinet and counter-terrorism officials met on a daily basis, which meant that every day, they had to show up in front of Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, and report on what new steps they'd taken in the past 24 hours.

All of which is to say: The government acted. The scope of what it prevented, we may not know for a long time, until the day that related documents are leaked or declassified. It must have been painful to Clinton at the time as it would have been to any pol, knowing that his administration had quite possibly averted a national tragedy but aware that he couldn't brag about it for security reasons. But all those who spent years whining about how Clinton put p.r. ahead of substance should note that his administration did its job.

December 1999 is starkly relevant as Condoleezza Rice gets set to testify to the 9-11 panel this week. Because the central question she needs to be asked is this: When the Bush administration started hearing more intelligence noises in June and July of 2001, why didn't it -- and Rice specifically, since this was her bailiwick -- convene the same kind of daily meetings the Clinton administration had when it heard similar noise? The obvious answer, whatever she chooses to say Thursday, is that it wasn't a high priority and that facts could not make it so. And a model existed, then not even two years old, for how to avert catastrophe.

A quick data-retrieval search helps prove the point. Clarke and others have asserted that the administration was far more consumed with missile defense than with counter-terrorism. Type in "Condoleezza Rice" and "missile defense," and you'll find 56 citations in The New York Times for stories containing those two phrases between January 20 and September 11 of 2001. Do the same for "Condoleezza Rice" and "terrorism" and you'll turn up 14 Times citations. Seven of those are about the Israelis and the Palestinians, a couple others about India and Pakistan, and one about Moammar Qadafi. Since newspapers (especially the newspaper of record) tend to write about what a sitting administration is talking about, this is pretty fair indication of where the Bush administration ranked al-Qaeda as a priority.

Then there are Rice's own inconsistencies in her public statements, the transcripts of which are a gold mine of contradiction and pettifoggery. Did Clarke give the administration a counter-terrorism plan in January or not? One Condi says yes, the other says no. Did that plan include military options? Again, yes and no. Was the plan the administration finally drafted substantially different from what Clarke recommended, or about the same? On all these questions, Rice has contradicted either herself or explanations given by other administration officials. Whether Rice is asked to explain these inconsistencies, and to account for why the administration didn't kick into gear as their Clinton predecessors had done, will depend largely on 9-11 commission members Tim Roemer and Richard Ben-Veniste, who thus far have been the toughest Democratic questioners. Rice is usually a cool cucumber, and such are the ways of Washington that she'll probably receive more deference than she deserves.

The very definition of the commission's mandate is at issue here. Bush people always signal through their rhetoric that the commission's job is to see what we can do to make sure such attacks don't happen again. That should be the main thrust. But if the people we voted into -- I mean, if the people who held office at the time of the attacks were uniquely negligent, I'd think most Americans would want to know that in a big way.

Meanwhile, remember two words: Sibel Edmonds. On March 30, Salon's excellent Eric Boehlert interviewed this former FBI translator, who told him that she had told the 9-11 commission in closed testimony that clear warnings were received throughout the spring and summer of 2001 (Bush's watch, not Clinton's) that a terrorist attack involving airplanes was being plotted. Her name has not yet crept its way into the major American newspapers (with the interesting exception of The Washington Times). But there are many mentions in the international press, so the Washington bureaus should wake up eventually.

If Edmonds's testimony is credible -- and Republican Senator Charles Grassley has described her with exactly that word -- it's one more piece of a puzzle that Richard Clarke began to solve for us two weeks ago. Somehow, his story just keeps being corroborated. Funny thing.

Michael Tomasky is the Prospect's executive editor. His column about politics appears each week in the Prospect's online edition.

Copyright ? 2004 by The American Prospect, Inc. Preferred Citation: Michael Tomasky, "Reliable Source", The American Prospect Online, Apr 4, 2004. This article may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from the author. Direct questions about permissions to permissions@prospect.org.

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>> AHEM...

So Much for Spinning the Positive
By Al Kamen

Monday, April 5, 2004; Page A15


The Bush administration has been fuming for many months that the media keep getting things wrong about Iraq, that reporters just refuse to cover the really great things going on over there. So back in the fall, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld asked his Cabinet pals to help out.

There is all sorts of progress in Iraq, he wrote, thanks to many people, "including some of your staff members. . . . Unfortunately, the American people don't know much about the progress being made -- because the media has focused on the difficulty and challenges, not the successes."

He enclosed a six-page memo with suggestions for each Cabinet member who would be "taking along their respective press corps, who may be less jaded, and more open to good news, than those who regularly cover Iraq."

For Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, we find:

"MESSAGE: Crime is down in Baghdad and other cities. . . . Iraqi courts are operating again. . . . More than 30,000 Iraqi police are trained, armed and are conducting joint patrols with Coalition forces.

"EVENTS:

* Watch a police training session. . . .

* Go on a joint patrol (in a permissive neighborhood) with Iraqi police. . . .

"PRESS CORPS INVITED: Justice/legal correspondents of major news organizations."

And so it went for each agency. A LexisNexis search by our colleague Lucy Shackelford shows that since late September, five of the 12 members invited have been to Iraq: Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans, Labor Secretary Elaine L. Chao, Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman, Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta and Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson.

It is not clear whether they took their own press corps. Some, such as Mineta, did not get much coverage. Others, such as Veneman and Chao, received excellent press. Sometimes the coverage was a mix of good news and bad news.

For example, Evans told reporters on a visit to Iraq Oct. 14 that his own presence showed Iraq is safe. "But just moments before," the Associated Press reported, "U.S. soldiers delivered the bad news: They'd found a roadside bomb on the route. The bus would be diverted."

Some Cabinet types could improve their skill in staying on message. For example, Thompson, who has demonstrated a willingness to travel overseas regularly if that is what it takes to improve the health of all Americans, visited in February.

He toured a Baghdad hospital, as Rumsfeld's missive suggested, but it was filthy. "If they just washed their hands and cleaned the crap off the walls," Associated Press reporter Mark Sherman quoted him as saying, things would improve.

"No one bothered to mop up a puddle near one girl's bed when Thompson walked through the cancer ward Sunday," the story continued. "Two decades of war and international sanctions have rendered Iraqi hospitals decrepit and doctors woefully behind the times in terms of training. Looting after the U.S.-led invasion stripped many hospitals and clinics bare."

Oh, well.

No Skimpy Trip

Speaking of Thompson, his one-week AIDS delegation to five African nations in December cost about a half-million dollars, according to documents obtained by Science magazine. It would have been a lot more, but several dozen folks, including those from faith-based groups and industry leaders, who were hit up to contribute to anti-AIDS programs, paid their own way, ponying up nearly $100,000.

The $477,000 figure uncovered by Science magazine (after a little recalculation) includes $11,000 for cell phone charges, $10,000 for a PR firm and nearly $400,000 for a chartered plane. It does not include the cost of flying everyone to Frankfurt, Germany, where the trip started.

Asked about the cell phones, Health and Human Services spokesman Tony Jewell said international cell phone charges were expensive as staff put together a "logistically challenging trip. They weren't offering free nights and weekends to everyone."

In all, Thompson's trip included three dozen government employees, or about $14,000 per employee.

Your Shipping Papers, Please

The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection office in Norfolk was concerned last fall that shipments of goods to China from various ports were being permitted without the requisite paperwork. So the port director issued "Information Bulletin #1295" to ensure "uniformity among the ports" when shipments are to go to certain "proscribed countries." Shippers sending goods to such countries, deemed to be bad guys, need to have detailed cargo information cleared and fulfill other requirements.

"The proscribed countries" listed include hardy perennials such as Cuba, Libya, North Korea and Iran. They also include new NATO allies Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Rumania, and other NATO allies and members of the Coalition of the Willing, Poland and Hungary. And then we have the nonexistent U.S.S.R and the German Democratic Republic. (There won't be any shipments to those places.) Ditto the "Soviet Zone sector of Berlin."

Shortlist for Iraq Ambassador

Speaking of Iraq, White House officials last week were said to have narrowed the search for a new ambassador to Iraq to a shortlist, said to include National Security Council Iraq troubleshooter and former ambassador to India Robert D. Blackwill and U.N. ambassador and veteran diplomat John D. Negroponte. An announcement is expected this week, possibly as early as today.

? 2004 The Washington Post Company
-----------------------------------------------

Corruption charges threaten valuable U.N. role in Iraq
Mon Apr 5, 6:38 AM ET USATODAY.com

For all of Iraq (news - web sites)'s current problems, at least the oil-rich country now can trade with the outside world. That wasn't the case in the mid-1990s. In fact, after the 1991 Gulf War (news - web sites), Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s refusal to prove he had rid his country of weapons of mass destruction was punished with United Nations (news - web sites) sanctions that barred other countries from doing business with Iraq. But ordinary Iraqis would have suffered even more without a U.N. program that, starting in 1996, let Iraq sell $65 billion of oil for food and other essentials.

Today, evidence suggests U.N. officials abused the program, enriching themselves, Saddam and favored foreign companies. The Iraqi Governing Council has hired accountants and lawyers to investigate Iraqi documents it says provide proof of corruption and fraud in the oil-for-food program.

Iraq's media have cited at least 270 suspects, including French and Russian firms, a senior U.N. official and a company linked to the son of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan (news - web sites). Last month, a U.S. congressional investigation estimated that Saddam siphoned $10 billion or more from the program in kickbacks and bribes.

The charges could be shrugged off as the unfortunate but all-too-typical type of corruption that defines both dictators and international aid programs, except for one thing: The scandal tars an organization that could play a crucial supporting role in U.S. efforts to turn Iraq into a stable democracy.

The oil-for-food corruption scandal raises serious questions about how the U.N. would handle that daunting job. And it focuses attention on the potential for abuse in any massive government reconstruction program. Indeed, charges have surfaced in Iraq that some members of the governing council are profiting from rebuilding contracts.

As the U.S. considers ways it can rely on the U.N. to help Iraq after it gains self-rule June 30, the fraud alleged in the oil-for-food program provides a microcosm of the problems that also could plague Iraq's rebuilding:

Lax accounting. Proper oversight could have caught abuses in the oil-for-food program. The Iraqi Governing Council's investigation shows the way to prevent future problems: Hire credible auditors to monitor the U.N. as they would private businesses.

Bloated bureaucracy. The oil-for-food program - involving nine separate agencies, projects and funds - was a classic example of the bureaucratic jumble that has been a U.N. hallmark. Two rounds of U.S.-pushed reforms in 1997 and 2002 to streamline the U.N. have made limited progress.

Poor policing. Saddam was allowed to choose the companies and countries the oil-for-food program did business with - a clear invitation to pick those open to bribery. Yet a U.N. spokesman said the organization had no responsibility to investigate allegations of corruption. In fact, though charges swirled for more than a year, the U.N. started a credible investigation only after the Iraqi Governing Council recently began its probe.

U.N. officials say they are determined to get to the bottom of the scandal that overshadows the success of a program responsible for feeding 60% of Iraq's 27 million people for seven years. Even if they do, unmasking corrupt players falls short of the need to address the systemic U.N. failures that allowed it to happen in the first place.

As the U.N. considers taking on a bigger job in Iraq, its success depends on learning from this embarrassing episode.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

Saudis Say They Killed Wanted Militant

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia - Saudi Arabian police killed a wanted militant and injured a second in a shootout Monday in a suburb of the capital, Riyadh, security officials said.

The officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said police patrolling the affluent suburb of Roda, east of Riyadh, fired at a car that refused their order to stop.

The officials told The Associated Press that police fired at two "wanted militants" who were in the car, killing one and wounding a second.

Eyewitnesses said the militants fired first. Officials said the ensuing gun battle injured three other people, but it was not immediately clear if they were police or bystanders.

Police have cornered the wounded militant inside a villa in the area, which has been cordoned off and surrounded by security forces and several armored vehicles. Ambulances have arrived.

It was not immediately clear what the militants were wanted for, but Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden (news - web sites), has been on high alert since terrorists carried out several attacks aimed at destabilizing the U.S.-allied Gulf state and home to Islam's two holiest shrines.

Saudi authorities released a list of 26 most wanted terrorists after a series of bombings in Riyadh on May 12, 2003, that killed 26 people. On Nov. 8, another suicide attack on a Riyadh housing compound killed 17 people.

Three of Saudi's most wanted list are dead and hundreds of suspected extremists have been rounded up in raids to seize weapons and Islamic militants.

---------------------------------------------------------------
Paper: Arafat OK With Hamas in New Group
Mon Apr 5,12:13 PM ET

RAMALLAH, West Bank - Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (news - web sites) is prepared to include the militant Hamas group in a new Palestinian leadership organization that would function alongside the Palestinian Authority (news - web sites), a Palestinian newspaper reported Monday.

The Al Ayyam daily, which is close to Arafat's Fatah (news - web sites) faction, said Arafat was willing to include Hamas and Islamic Jihad, another militant organization, in a unified leadership group, though it did not specify what the group's function would be.

In the past Palestinian Authority officials have said they would be willing to cooperate with Hamas if it recognized the authority's leadership. Hamas has so far not responded to the proposals.

Al Ayyam quoted Fatah Central Committee member Hani al-Hassan as saying the new leadership group could easily coexist alongside the existing leadership structure.

"Forming a unified Palestinian leadership does not contradict the Palestinian Authority as it is an internal Palestinian factional issue," it quoted him as saying.

Arafat's critics have accused him of being an autocratic leader, unwilling to share power with his prime minister and refusing to groom a successor.

Over the past several days, the Palestinian Authority has been holding meetings with Palestinian militant groups on how to run the Gaza Strip (news - web sites) after a possible Israeli withdrawal. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (news - web sites)'s Likud Party says he is committed to a complete withdrawal.

Hamas has so far not agreed to cooperate with the Palestinian Authority in running Gaza.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

UAE Working on Terror Financing Law
Mon Apr 5, 7:24 AM ET

By RAWYA RAGEH, Associated Press Writer

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates - A new law to combat terror financing is in the works, the Central Bank governor said Monday, a day after announcing the freezing of assets of a Sri Lankan businessman accused by Washington of brokering black-market deals for nuclear technology.

Sultan bin Nasser al-Suweidi said a draft law is in the final stages of review by the legislative committee in the Cabinet and is expected to be passed soon. He did not elaborate.

U.S. and Western investigators have warned Dubai's banking, trade and visa regulations could be easily abused for money laundering and illicit trade. About half the $250,000 spent on the Sept. 11 attacks was wired to al-Qaida terrorists in the United States from Dubai banks. Al-Qaida money in Dubai banks also has been linked to the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

Al-Suweidi announced Sunday that authorities have frozen the accounts of SMB Computers, a company founded by Sri Lankan businessman Buhary Abu Syed Tahir. He said an investigation is under way involving the Central Bank, the Dubai Prosecutor General's office and other agencies.

"The UAE Central Bank has frozen all accounts related to SMB Computers Co. as part of the investigation," he told reporters on the sidelines of a conference held in the capital, Abu Dhabi, to regulate an informal system of money transfer known as hawala.

SMB is a Dubai-based company established by Tahir and his brother, Syed Ibrahim Buhary, that President Bush (news - web sites) alleged Tahir used as a front for clandestine movement of parts for nuclear centrifuges. The company is part of a small-business empire with interests in Pakistan, Iran and Libya, key countries linked to the clandestine nuclear weapons network.

Al-Suweidi said results of the investigation will be revealed soon. Authorities also shut down the company's operations in Dubai, The Gulf News daily reported Monday.

Dubai's public prosecutor would not comment on the investigation.

Tahir, who is married to a Malaysian, is believed to be living in Malaysia, where he has been questioned by police and kept under surveillance, but is not in custody.

Al-Suweidi said earlier that authorities also have confiscated $3 million in terror-related funds and frozen 14 accounts of companies and individuals named on lists by the United Nations (news - web sites) and the United States.

On Monday, he told The Associated Press that among the frozen accounts were ones belonging to Al-Hisawi Co., owned by Saudi native Mustafa Ahmed al-Hisawi, a suspected financier of the Sept. 11 hijackers; and al-Barakat Group, a Somali company allegedly linked to al-Qaida.

--------------------------------------------------------------
Researcher Is Found Guilty of Espionage
46 minutes ago

By JIM HEINTZ, Associated Press Writer

MOSCOW - Researcher Igor Sutyagin was found guilty of espionage Monday, Russian news agencies reported, in a case that raised fears of a resurgence of Soviet-style tactics and alarmed the scientific community.

Sutyagin, a scholar at Moscow's respected USA and Canada Institute, was jailed in October 1999 on charges he sold information on nuclear submarines and missile warning systems to a British company that Russian investigators claim was a CIA (news - web sites) cover.

Sutyagin maintained the analyses he wrote were based on open sources and that he had no reason to believe the British company was an intelligence cover.

He faces up to 20 years on the conviction, but a sentence was not immediately announced and officials at the Moscow City Court could not be reached for comment

The Interfax news agency quoted Sutyagin's lawyer, Boris Kuznetsov, as saying only four of the 12 jury members recommended mercy when the judge determines the sentence.

Kuznetsov said he would appeal and that the judge gave the jury incorrect instructions by asking them to determine whether Sutyagin had passed along the information -- which the defendant did not deny -- rather than whether he had passed state secrets.

The judge "was manipulating the jury's opinion and the main manipulation was that the questions raised by her did not reflect the essence of the charge," he said in comments shown on the NTV television channel.

Human rights advocates say the Federal Security Service, or FSB, the KGB's main successor, is deeply suspicious of Russian scientists' contacts with foreigners. They say that its agents have been emboldened by the rise of ex-KGB agent and FSB director Vladimir Putin (news - web sites) to the presidency.

In only a few cases have courts challenged such cases. In December, a jury acquitted Valentin Danilov, a professor at Krasnoyarsk Technical University in Siberia, who had been charged with selling classified information on space technology to China and misappropriating university funds.

Russia's constitution provides for jury trials, but until recently they existed only on an experimental basis.

A court had been expected to deliver a verdict in the case in 2001, but instead instructed prosecutors to continue investigating and left Sutyagin in jail. Russian courts, including the Supreme Court, have repeatedly denied his request to await trial out of jail.

Other high-profile spying cases involving open sources in recent years included the arrest of former navy Capt. Alexander Nikitin, charged with divulging state secrets after co-authoring a report on environmental dangers posed by Russia's northern submarine fleet. He said the information he used had been published before, but spent 11 months in jail. He was later acquitted.

In 2000, U.S. businessman Edmund Pope was convicted of espionage for trying to purchase plans for an underwater propulsion system, which his supporters said had already been sold openly. He was later pardoned by Putin.

The 2001 arrest and conviction of U.S. Fulbright Scholar John Tobin on marijuana charges attracted wide attention after officials alleged he was a spy in training. He was later released.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Six Held for Taking Ukraine Nuke Equipment
Mon Apr 5, 9:27 AM ET

KIEV, Ukraine - Authorities detained six men on suspicion of stealing equipment from the Rivne nuclear plant in western Ukraine to sell as scrap metal, a prosecutor said Monday.

Police arrested the plant's security officer and five workers on suspicion of stealing the reactor's evaporator heating chamber, said Mykola Tomylovich, a local deputy prosecutor, according to the Interfax news agency.

The piece of equipment was from a batch of unused spare parts and was not radioactive, a spokesman for the state-run Energoatom told The Associated Press, speaking on condition of anonymity. He said the nuclear plant was not affected and was operating normally.

The suspects apparently tried to sell the equipment, worth more than $150,000, to scrap metal dealers for $280, Tomylovich said.

Ukraine was the site of the world's worst nuclear disaster in April 1986, with an explosion and fire at a reactor in the Chernobyl nuclear plant. Chernobyl was closed in 2000.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

In a First, Chirac Visits Top-Secret Titov Center

Combined Reports
Alexander Zemlianichenko / AP

Chirac speaking at a news conference at the Titov space control center Saturday.

French President Jacques Chirac became the first Western leader to visit the top-secret Titov space control center, touring the site Saturday as part of Russian efforts to court the lucrative European satellite-launching business.

The center, which operates under tight security, is the control point for all of Russia's satellites, including its military satellites.

After greeting Chirac, President Vladimir Putin handed over the floor to the center's chief, Lieutenant General Nikolai Kolesnikov, to outline its work and future plans.

The space center, located in the city of Krasnoznamensk outside Moscow, also is involved in launches of Russia's intercontinental ballistic missiles and is working on a plan that would improve the use of space satellites for defensive early warning systems.

"All our efforts to ensure our security are not aggressive and are not targeted against anyone," Putin said after talks with Chirac.

He said his decision to invite Chirac to the site should "point to Russia's transparency and openness in security matters."

There was also a clear commercial desire, with Putin emphasizing Russia's "vast space exploration potential."

Russia's space program has worked closely with the European Space Agency in recent years, launching ESA satellites and carrying ESA astronauts on research missions to the international space station.

In February, the ESA reached an agreement with Russia to launch Russian Soyuz rockets from France's Kourou launch pad in French Guyana. The launches are expected to begin in about three years.

France-based aircraft maker Airbus also signed a deal last year with Russia's Sokol, which will produce fuselage parts for Airbus A320 planes, Interfax reported.

Later, the fight against terrorism topped the agenda of one-on-one talks between the two leaders. Putin called on the international community to develop a joint system for eliminating terrorism, Interfax reported. Chirac called for efforts to remove "the fertile ground in which terrorism develops. This includes unresolved conflicts, misery, famine, poverty and the humiliation which people are justified in feeling."

Other topics on the agenda included the situation in Iraq, the continuing violence in the Middle East, Kosovo, and the European Union's expansion next month. "France views relations between the European Union and Russia as an essential element, essential for Russia, essential for Europe and even more importantly, essential for the balance and stability of tomorrow's world," Chirac said.

Meanwhile, Chirac said Putin accepted his invitation to participate in this year's 60th anniversary commemorations of the D-Day invasion in France.

"This invitation is completely logical as the very turning points in World War Two took place in Moscow, Kursk and Stalingrad," Chirac said.

(AP, Reuters)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saudis Eye Asian Price War With Russia

By Nesa Subrahmaniyan
Bloomberg

Ronald Zak / AP

Al-Naimi, center, talking with other delegates at last week's OPEC meeting in Vienna.

SINGAPORE -- Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al- Naimi, who oversees the world's biggest oil reserves, may offer to cut prices to buyers in China, South Korea and Japan in the face of growing competition from Russia, traders said Friday.

Al-Naimi, who travels to Seoul and Tokyo from Beijing this week, may discount prices for Asian buyers, traders said.

Russian plans to build more than $20 billion of oil and gas pipelines supplying China, South Korea and Japan may help Asian refiners cut oil bills that are as much as $10 billion a year more than they would pay in Europe or the U.S.

"They may look into giving price concessions," said Dennis Ang, president of Statoil Asia Pacific, a unit of Norway's biggest oil producer. "The Russian pipeline offers a challenge and they have to accept diversification of sources. They at least want to maintain market share or even grow it."

Russia is vying with Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer, to supply to China and Japan, the world's No.2 and No.3 consumers. Russian output grew 12 percent in the first two months of this year to 8.9 million barrels a day against the Saudis' 8.4 million. Saudi Arabia can produce as much as 10 million barrels a day, with more than 40 percent of output going to Asian buyers.

China, South Korea and Japan, which import four-fifths of their oil from the Middle East, want to diversify sources of oil.

Al-Naimi "will try to persuade Japan to continue buying Saudi's oil," said Hiro Katsumata, a post-doctoral fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore. "Over the last decade, Japan has diversified its source of energy -- in relative terms. One thing is that it has become relatively easier for any country to purchase oil in the international market."

Russia and other non-OPEC producers such as Kazakhstan have been taking market share from members of the oil group as it cuts output. Kazakhstan's oil production has risen 10 percent to 965,000 barrels a day.

Japan is competing with China, Asia's fastest-growing economy, to secure oil and gas supplies from Russia. Both are vying for supply from Russia's far eastern fields. PetroChina, China's largest oil producer, and Yukos proposed a $2.8 billion pipeline to transport Siberian oil to Daqing in northeast China.

Japan has offered to help pay the $5.8 billion cost of an alternative line to Russia's Pacific coast port of Nakhodka so that the oil can be exported to Japan.

Russia has yet to decide which plan to support.

"Saudi Arabia is feeling threatened by the Russian oil pipeline project," said Jang Ji Hak, a crude oil trader at Hyundai Oilbank, South Korea's fourth-biggest refiner. "South Korean companies will be better positioned to negotiate prices and in efforts to settle the issue of Asian premiums."

Hyundai Oilbank said in December it would stop buying crude oil from Saudi Arabia from this year, increasing supplies from Iran. Hyundai Oilbank dropped a contract with Saudi Aramco, the world's biggest oil company, for 20,000 barrels per day and increase purchases from National Iranian Oil Co.

Saudi Aramco's crude oil prices are determined by destination, with prices for its Asian customers expressed as a differential against the average of Oman and Dubai grades, the two Arabian Gulf benchmarks used by Asian oil traders.

China, which last year overtook Japan as an oil consumer, may boost crude imports by more than 9.8 percent this year to ease domestic fuel shortages, the government said on March 24.


? Copyright 2002, The Moscow Times. All Rights Reserved.
-----------------------------------------------------------------

>> REALLY...?
http://www.campaignmoney.org/


BUSH'S MONEY LAUNDRY-ING
By David Donnelly, Director, Campaign Money Watch

Special Interest Spotlight 2.5
March 24, 2004

Six weeks after Cintas Corp. Chairman Richard T. Farmer co-hosted a $1.7 million fundraiser for George W. Bush in Cincinnati, Bush's Environmental Protection Agency proposed exempting industrial laundries like Cintas from rules that protect workers from handling poisonous materials. The EPA says the rules could "save affected facilities over $30 million per year."

On November 20, 2003, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released new draft regulations that, if adopted, will weaken federal safeguards for employees who handle poison-soaked "shop" towels. The new rule would exempt industrial laundries like Cintas "from federal hazardous and solid waste requirements for shop towels contaminated with toxic chemicals." [1]

It is not a small exemption. Each year, 3.8 billion industrial shop towels, which are used to clean up toxic materials or spills in the work place, or to `wipe-down' machinery, are sent to be cleaned.[2]

Cintas has been found to have repeatedly violated worker safety and environmental protection standards. "We were never told about all the chemicals we were forced to handle, and never really warned about the toxic dangers from these chemicals. The towels were often in plastic bags dripping with solvent. Our supervisors knew all about this," said Mark Fragola, of New Haven, CT, a former driver for Cintas Corp.[3]

The EPA predicts "this proposal would... save affected facilities over $30 million per year."[4]

For the record, Cintas and Farmer are already doing quite well. Cintas made $249.3 million in profits in fiscal year 2003 and Farmer is ranked by Forbes as the 140th wealthiest man in America with a net worth of $1.5 billion.[5]

Farmer: "All I want is decent government."

The EPA proposal was released just weeks after Farmer co-hosted a $1.7 million fundraiser for President Bush on September 30, 2003.[6]

Farmer is a "Ranger," meaning that he has personally raised more than $200,000 for the President's re-election campaign.[7] In addition, Farmer was instrumental George W. Bush's 2000 campaign. Not only was he was a "Pioneer" in 2000 (having pledged to raise $100,000),[8] Farmer and his wife gave the second most of any family to the Republican Party in 2000.[9]

Since the 2000 election cycle, Cintas and its employees have given almost $2.2 million to federal candidates and parties, with 100 percent of that money going to Republicans. So far this election cycle, in addition to Farmer, 15 Cintas executives have contributed to Bush, with eight of them giving the maximum $2,000 contribution.[10]

Of course, Farmer sees nothing wrong. He told the Cincinnati Enquirer in 1997, "I don't expect any special treatment when I give my money. All I want is decent government."[11]

Bush Administration Gives Cintas "Decent Government"

Read more or take action.
The EPA is receiving public comments on the draft rule that will benefit Cintas and hurt workers through April 9. Click here for more info.
From Cintas Corp.'s point of view, decent government is one that rewrites environmental law to increase their profits, and one that gives them big government contracts. In addition to the EPA draft regulation, Cintas, as the nation's largest launderer, would likely to have been in line to receive a contract for laundry services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, if the VA had proceeded with plans to privatize laundry services at facilities around the U.S. But the American Federation of Government Employees, which represents 600,000 federal workers, sent a `cease and desist' letter telling the VA that contracting out the services would be in violation of federal law.[12]

Farmer wasn't an innocent by-stander. He served on Bush's Veterans Affairs transition team.

Will Cintas get its way? The have a long history of bullying and silencing their opponents. They have sued UNITE, a labor union, for defamation,[13] and sued a shareholder activist to silence his efforts to bring forth shareholder resolutions about Cintas' labor conditions.[14]

This Special Interest Spotlight is the third in a series of short reports on President Bush's fundraising in Ohio. The state has become one of the President's most reliable sources of campaign contributions.

ABOUT THE SPECIAL INTEREST SPOTLIGHT

The Special Interest Spotlight is a regular report on money in politics. It is published by Campaign Money Watch, a nonprofit campaign finance reform group that holds candidates accountable for the special favors they do for their contributors and for opposing comprehensive reform.

Please pass this along to other interested people. If you have received this, and haven't already signed up for regular updates, and you want to, sign up by clicking here.


Footnotes

[1] UNITE and Sierra Club joint press release, March 9, 2004
[2] Sierra Club website
[3] UNITE and Sierra Club joint press release, March 9, 2004
[4] Joseph Straw, "DeLauro, union dueling with Cintas over shop rags," New Haven Register, March 15, 2004.
[5] Forbes magazine website
[6] WhiteHouseForSale.org website
[7] Bush/Cheney 04 Inc. website
[8] WhiteHouseForSale.org website
[9] Center for Responsive Politics website
[10] Ibid.
[11] Mother Jones, MoJo 400, March 5, 2001
[12] Letter from Bobby Harnage, president of AFGE, to Anthony Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, July 30, 2003.
[13] Cintas Corp. press release, February 24, 2004
[14] Socialfunds.org press release, February 11, 2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> REALLY 2...

Taking Care of His Own?

Bush, FirstEnergy, Hundreds of Millions in Fines,
& Kids With Asthma

FULL REPORT: FACTS AND SOURCES
OCTOBER 2003

FirstEnergy Corporation and other big utilities lobbied the Bush Administration to rewrite and weaken the Clean Air Act.

Lobbyists from the oil, coal, and electric utility industries used the Vice President's energy task force as a way to revisit pending enforcement actions against polluters, in effect getting the White House to do something they couldn't get Congress to do. The enforcement actions were against polluters who upgraded dirty power plants without installing new pollution control equipment. This prompted one environmental organization to ask President Bush for relief:
"Industry lobbyists sought legislative relief from these enforcement cases in 1999, which Congress appropriately rejected; now they are turning to officials in your White House to help block the government's attempt to enforce the law." Letter from NRDC President John H. Adams, May 7, 2001 to President George W. Bush, http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/pbushcaa.asp.

Individuals and their companies that were listed as taking part in the Cheney's energy task force secret meetings had contributed significantly to politicians and political parties. In total, these corporations and organizations, their employees and their employees' spouses, and their PACs gave $85.7 million in contributions to federal candidates and political parties from 1999 to 2002. Of that, 65% when to Republicans and 35% went to Democrats. See http://www.opensecrets.org/news/energy_task_force/nrdcmasterlist_9902
partysplit.asp
Bush's "Clear Skies" initiative will cause more air pollution emitted by utilities like FirstEnergy's coal-burning plants, which will lead to more asthma attacks in children.

According to public health groups, Ohio children will be harmed by the new policy:
There are 27 power plants in Ohio, and another 46 within 30 miles of the state border, that will be allowed to pollute the air more under Bush's new policy.

There are 2,487,909 children in Ohio that live within 30 miles of these plants.

There are 176,271 children with asthma in Ohio.

There are 7,017 schools in Ohio within 30 miles of one of these plants.

See "Children at Risk," a joint report by Clear the Air, and Physicians for Social Responsibility, which can be found at http://www.enviroealthaction.org/upload_files/ChildrenatRisk.pdf.

John L. Kirkwood, the President and CEO of the American Lung Association, made the impact of the Bush policy very clear:
"The Bush administration's air pollution legislation, inaccurately known as `Clear Skies,' will gut the landmark Clean Air Act and severely weaken U.S. efforts to curb dirty air. The administration plan would hurt public health and help big polluters by delaying and diluting cuts in power plant emissions of sulfur, nitrogen and mercury. ...

"Meanwhile, millions of Americans - including children with lung diseases like asthma and seniors with chronic lung and heart problems - continue to breathe dirty air, especially on the high pollution days we see during the summer months.

" The administration's approach to the problem will not clear the skies. It will not move us forward and it fails to protect public health."
See http://www.lungusa.org/press/envir/air_092303jlk.html.

The Natural Resources Defense Council also provides an analysis of the new policy, finding that it will "delay deadlines for meeting public health standards, allowing violations of soot and smog health standards to continue until 2015 or later." See http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/fclearsk.asp.
The new rules would exempt roughly 17,000 older power plants, oil refineries and factories across the country from having to install pollution controls when they replace equipment - even if the upgrade increases pollution. See http://www.nrdc.org/bushrecord/airenergy_powerplants.asp#1409.
Before Bush was elected, the EPA and the Department of Justice sued the corporate owners of 51 power plants for alleged violations of the Clean Air Act, including FirstEnergy Corp.-owned Sammis plant in Akron, and several others in Ohio.

For a Department of Justice press release on November 3, 1999, announcing the legal actions, see http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/November/524enr.htm.
For the court documents on the FirstEnergy, see http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/first.pdf, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/firstenergy
complaint.pdf, and http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/ohioamend.pdf
Other coal-fired plants facing legal action include an American Electric Power-owned facility in Columbus and a Cinergy-owned plant in Cincinnati. For the entire list, see http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/ppsl.html.
Anthony Alexander, FirstEnergy's president, and H. Peter Burg, its chief executive and chairman, are both major fundraisers for Bush.

The Bush/Cheney '04 Inc. committee raised $600,000 at an Akron, Ohio fundraising event on June 30th, according to news reports. The event was co-hosted by Alexander and Burg. See "Cheney raises $40,000 a minute during speech in NE Ohio," Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), 7/1/03, and "Cheney Cashes in for GOP at Fund-Raiser," Beacon Journal (Akron, Ohio), 7/1/03. See also http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/dashforcash/page.cfm?pageid=
49#akro06302003.
Anthony Alexander was a Bush "Pioneer" in 2000, meaning that he raised more than $100,000 for the president's campaign. See http://www.tpj.org/docs/pioneers//pioneers_view.jsp?id=189.
According to Bush/Cheney '04 Inc., Alexander has already raised at least $100,000 for the Bush campaign this year. See http://www.georgewbush.com/Donors/Rangers.aspx.
Electric utilities that would benefit from these regulatory changes had given $4.8 million in 2000, including more than $2.2 million from electric utilities that faced E.P.A. enforcement.

Utility companies, utilities' employees and their spouses, and utilities' political action committees gave more than $4.8 million in the 2000 and 2002 election cycles to President George W. Bush's campaign efforts and to Republican party committees, according to a February 2003 Campaign Money Watch analysis of data downloaded from the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org)
Of the $4.8 million, $1.85 million came from the four electric utilities facing the biggest lawsuits, as well as the leading industry trade association. Five other electric utilities facing legal action gave $424,700. See http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/understand/page.cfm?pageid=211.
The nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics reports that Bush has already raised $1.7 million from the energy sector this election cycle. See http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/sector.asp?id=N00008072&cycle=2004.
Just weeks after a federal judge determined that FirstEnergy had violated the Clean Air Act 11 times, the E.P.A. rewrote the Clean Air Act and threw the future of all the legal actions against utilities into question.

The E.P.A. published its much-awaited rollbacks on August 26th. See http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/26/tech/main570182.shtml for a news story on the issue. See http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ for the actual rule change.
The new guidelines were accompanied by a General Accounting Office report that the rules were written with only "anecdotal evidence" provided by industry insiders, rather than hard science, according to a August 26, 2003 Associated Press report. The GAO report stated, "Because it lacked comprehensive data, EPA relied on anecdotes from the four industries it believes are most affected." See http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/22/health/main569674.shtml.
For the finding that FirstEnergy had violated the Clean Air Act, see the decision of Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, August 7, 2003, at http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/opinions/c_2_99_1181_3.pdf.
"Environmental groups said the decision may be a short-lived victory because the White House aims to weaken pollution laws. `The Bush administration is rewriting Clean Air Act rules in a way that will allow companies to avoid cleaning up their pollution,' said David McIntosh, an attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council. `If the Bush administration gets its way, the pollution that the court found illegal today would be legal tomorrow.'" See http://www.forbes.com/business/energy/newswire/2003/08/07/rtr1052640.html.
This was predicted by former E.P.A. Administrator Christie Whitman. In May 2001, Whitman wrote an internal memo to Vice President Dick Cheney in which she argued that proposing changes to the rules regarding installing mandatory pollution controls would lead to "settlements [of lawsuits against utility corporations] will likely slow down or stop." Moreover, Whitman wrote, "It will be hard to refute the charge that we are deciding not to enforce the Clean Air Act." See "Committee Approves E.P.A. Nominee, Setting Up Floor Fight," New York Times, 10/16/03.
The judge in the FirstEnergy case had already "condemned" the E.P.A. for being "unwilling to enforce a clear statutory mandate set for in an act of Congress."

Judge Sargus wrote: "It is also evident from the record in this case that various electric utilities and industry organizations have sought within legal bounds to influence the conduct of the EPA. What should be unexpected and condemned, however, is an agency unwilling to enforce a clear statutory mandate set forth in an act of Congress." See the decision at http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/opinions/c_2_99_1181_3.pdf.
See also Forbes.com story, "FirstEnergy plant violated Clean Air Act-judge," August 7, 2003, at http://www.forbes.com/business/energy/newswire/2003/08/07
/rtr1052640.html
Reports also point to E.P.A. officials misleading Congress on the impact of the new regulations, specifically on whether the new rules hurt the pending legal cases against polluting corporations.

Jeffrey Holmstead, E.P.A.'s assistant administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation, testified to the a joint hearing of U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and U.S. Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, on July 16, 2002, that the E.P.A. did "not believe that these [regulations] will have a negative impact on the enforcement cases," even as internal debate at the E.P.A. was unclear as to that statements truth. See http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/documents/NSR_final.pdf.
"The new NSR rule impairs the ability of the government to obtain favorable settlements or judgments against companies that have violated the rules in the past. Already, the new rule has been cited by electric utilities defending themselves in lawsuits in Ohio and Indiana. And Acting EPA Administrator Marianne Horinko has said the government is unlikely to bring new compliance suits based on violations of the previous NSR rule." Emphasis added. See http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/understand/page.cfm?pageid=211.
In addition, according to a October 13, 2003 press release from Public Citizen, "the Department of Justice filed a September 2003 brief in an Illinois case in which it abandoned its previous argument that the court must apply a narrow interpretation of the New Source Review language in the Clean Air Act; experts say this kind of concession could jeopardize New Source Review lawsuits."
The size of the fines for all the enforcement actions is described as in the "multi-billions."

U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, in the hearing mentioned above with E.P.A. assistant administrator Jeffrey Holmstead, asked "On these multi-billion cases that have been filed, your understanding from [Department of Justice] is that [the new regulations] would not have any effect?" See http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/documents/nsr_sources.pdf.
Settlements have been above $1 billion for several utility companies that wanted to avoid the courtroom. See http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/documents/enforce_threats.pdf.
Still, estimates are hard to determine for these potential fines. The statute calls for a maximum fine of $25,000 per day per violation of the Clean Air Act for every day leading up to January 30, 1997, and $27,500 per day per violation after January 30, 1997. Should these 51 plants all be found to have one violation starting from the time the legal actions commenced (November 3, 1999), the fines could easily total more than $2 billion. Many of these plants have more than one alleged violation stemming from upgrades dating back into the mid-1980s. On the size of the penalty, see complaint filed on FirstEnergy at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/first.pdf.
In the one case that has gone through trial - the FirstEnergy Sammis plant in Akron - the judge has set the penalty phase of the case for March 2004. FirstEnergy was found to have eleven violations, dating back to as early at 1988. The potential fine is at least in hundreds of millions of dollars. See decision at http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/opinions/c_2_99_1181_3.pdf

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The September 11th Sourcebooks
Volume VII: The Taliban File

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 97

Edited by Sajit Gandhi


September 11, 2003
Washington, D.C., September 11, 2003 - Marking the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the National Security Archive at George Washington University today posted on the Web a new collection of recently declassified U.S. documents covering the controversial rise to power of Osama bin Laden's former hosts in Afghanistan, the Taliban. This murky history has particular relevance today, as the Taliban fighters regroup in Afghanistan, and key Taliban leaders remain at large.

Today's posting, "The Taliban File," is the seventh volume in the Archive's September 11th Sourcebook series, recognized by the National Journal in December 2001 as one of the top five sites on the Web for terrorism information. The collection of 32 documents obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act by Archive research associate Sajit Gandhi details the rise of the Taliban from its meager start in Kandahar to a full fledged military force and ultimate control of the country. The documents discuss Pakistan's support for the Taliban, U.S. dealings with the Taliban, post 9/11 thinking on military strategy in the War on Terror, and the relationship between the assassination of the Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud and the terrorist attacks of September 11.

Highlights of the Briefing Book include:

A November 1994 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad which mentions one of the first kidnappings conducted by Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the self-confessed mastermind of the kidnapping of slain American reporter Daniel Pearl. Sheikh, who in 1994 went by the moniker Rohit Sharma, kidnapped one American-Bella Josef Nuss--and three British citizens. The document indicates that Sheikh (Sharma), "holds a British Passport, attended the London School of Economics, and spent time in Bosnia where the abuse of Muslim women apparently radicalized his views." In January of 2002, eight years after the 1994 kidnapping, the Bush administration finally asked Pakistan to arrest Saeed Sheikh[2].
A February 1995 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad which offers a detailed biographic sketch of the secretive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the faithful), from his origins in the Mujahideen to his rise as the leader of the Taliban. [8]
A December 1997 Department of State cable summarizing a meeting between Taliban officials in the US as part of a Unocal delegation and Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl Inderfurth. When the Taliban are questioned by Inderfurth over their allowing Osama Bin Laden refuge, a Taliban representative responds by saying that if they expelled Bin Laden he would go to Iran and cause more trouble. Another representative notes that the Taliban did not invite Bin Laden into Afghanistan, but that he was already inside Afghanistan, "as a guest of the previous regime when they took over." The Taliban representative claims that they had stopped allowing Bin Laden to give public interviews, and "had frustrated Iranian and Iraqi attempts to get in contact with him." [24]
DIA cables from October 2001 which discuss the role of Pakistan in the rise of the Taliban and questions about Pakistan's and the ISI's connection with Bin Laden. "Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network was able to expand under the safe sanctuary extended by Taliban following Pakistan Directives." [Documents 28 and 29]
A November 2001 DIA cable that discusses the relationship between the assassination of Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud and the terrorist attacks of September 11. The cable indicates that Masoud had gained limited knowledge "regarding the intentions of the Saudi millionaire Usama (bin Ladin) (UBL), and his terrorist organization, al-Qaida, to perform a terrorist act against the U.S. on a scale larger than the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania." Could Masood's knowledge of an attack, and subsequent warning to the US government have led to his assassination? [31]
Formed in 1994, the Taliban began with only a few followers, mostly religious students who fought with the Mujahideen in the war against the Soviets and who were schooled in Islamic seminaries (madrasahs) in Pakistan. These students, or seekers, as they are referred to in the documents, wanted to rid Afghanistan of the instability, violence, and warlordism that had been plaguing the country since the defeat and withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989.

The departure of the Soviets, while welcomed by Afghans and the United States, left a political vacuum in Afghanistan. The resulting chaos and civil war led to the involvement of the United Nations which tried unsuccessfully to bring about political transition through the mission led by Special Representative Mahmoud Mestiri. Despite the UN's efforts, and those of the international community, the various factions, as well as the Kabul government led by Barnahuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masoud, in addition to other outside parties, made a definitive peaceful or military solution difficult.

As a result, the civil war continued with Rabbani and Masoud attempting to fill the government role, while the other warlord remnants of the Afghan resistance, such as the Uzbek commander Abdul Rashid Dostum, Pakistani-backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Ismail Khan, remained unwilling to cede any power or make concessions that could have resulted in a peaceful solution.

Consequently, outside forces saw instability in Afghanistan as an opportunity to press their own security and political agendas. Among them were terrorist groups such as Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network and states such as Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and India. Pakistan, for example, saw an unstable Afghanistan as a boon for its internal security, allowing it a strategic depth against India. Initially, [See document 25] the Pakistanis supported the Pashtun-Islamicist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an incompetent commander from the Mujahideen days, in order to have influence over the Afghan political landscape. When Hekmatyar failed to deliver for Pakistan, the administration began to support a new movement of religious students known as the Taliban.

The first document dates from November 1994, one month after the Taliban took the strategic post of Spin Boldak on the Afghan-Pakistan border, allegedly with cover fire provided by Pakistani Frontier Corps (see document 5). With that victory, the Taliban, who were being championed by a fellow Pashtun, Pakistani Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar (see document 4), began to make a name for themselves, and also gained a significant amount of military supplies. Pakistan supported the Taliban, not just to restore order to Afghan roads, which would open the way for a possible Trans-Afghan gas pipeline (TAP), but because they also saw the Taliban as a faction that they might have considerable influence over, and who might provide in Afghanistan, a strategic lever for Pakistan against India.

As the documents and history show, Pakistani authorities discovered they had made a blunder. The Taliban were not only uncontrollable, but unpredictable as well. In certain instances the Taliban would declare their desire for peace, willingness to work with the UN, and desire for a non-military solution for Afghanistan, then state that "anyone who gets in our way will be crushed."

The documents also show that the U.S. made tremendous efforts to obtain a political solution for Afghanistan, not just because of the desire for American companies to take advantage of business opportunities (see document 16) with the TAP, but also due to other key concerns: human rights, narcotics, and terrorism (see document 17). In many instances, American officials pressed the Taliban on their counternarcotics strategy, their treatment of women, and on allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for terrorist operations and home for Osama Bin Laden.

The cable traffic shows the difficulty the U.S. had negotiating with Taliban representatives in all these areas. Cultural and political miscommunication was rampant (see document 18). In one meeting, Ambassador Thomas W. Simons Jr., the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan -who also had responsibility for Afghanistan- attempted to find common ground with Taliban Foreign Minister Mullah Ghaus, explaining that "Americans are the most religious people in the Western world."

It soon became clear that Taliban rule was detrimental to Afghan and international security, as evidenced by their sanctioning of continuing narcotics production -despite its un-Islamic quality- and shelter for al-Qaeda and other terrorists. Acting Secretary Strobe Talbott described the danger of the Taliban in a February 1996 meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Assef Ali when he drew an analogy between Pakistani support for the Taliban in Afghanistan and the militants in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Talbott stated that while such support was undertaken to serve Pakistani interests, there were unintended consequences contrary to Pakistan's and the region's larger interests. These consequences became shockingly clear two years ago, on September 11, 2001.




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Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1
U.S. Consulate (Peshawar) Cable, "New Fighting and New Forces in Kandahar," November 3, 1994, Confidential, 13 pp. Excised.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

While Consular officials inform Washington of a stranded Pakistani convoy delivering aid supplies to Afghanistan and the Newly Independent States (NIS), they report that fighting has broken out between Afghan factions in Kandahar province. One of the parties involved was a new movement known as "The Taliban ("Seekers")," which had recently taken over the Afghan border town of Spin Boldak, and hailed from the Madrasas (religious schools) of Quetta and Peshawar. Speculation is rife about who the Mullah Mohammed Omar-led Taliban actually support and where their support comes from, but suggests that the Taliban may represent a new phenomenon independent from the party politics and violence plaguing Afghanistan since the end of the war against the Soviets. The document displays the contrasting information available on the Taliban movement as the label suggests the Taliban was anti-Wahhabi, while simultaneously being Pakistani tools and anti-Pakistan.
Document 2
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Weekly South Asia Activity Report," November 4, 1994, Confidential, 13 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This activity report discusses various developments occurring in South Asia including the rising tide of Afghan refugees fleeing Kabul for outerlying areas, progress of the UN (Mestiri) Commission in Afghanistan, the battle for the stranded Pakistan convoy headed towards Central Asia, and most interestingly, mentions the debriefing of British kidnapping victims who identified their captor as "Rohit Sharma." Mr. Sharma, the note states, holds a British passport, attended the London School of Economics, and spent time in Bosnia where the abuse of Muslim women radicalized his views. This 1994 document is significant because Rohit Sharma is also known as Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the self-confessed mastermind of the kidnapping of slain American reporter, Daniel Pearl. In January of 2002, eight years after the kidnapping, the Bush administration finally asked Pakistan to arrest Omar Saeed Sheikh in connection with the 1994 incident discussed above.
Document 3
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "The Taliban - Who Knows What the Movement Means?" November 28, 1994, Confidential, 14 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This cable discusses the suspected origins, goals, and sponsors of the Taliban movement, a group that at this point, controls most of Kandahar province. Delving into the various deals that the Taliban was conducting to get into power, it indicates that the Afghan government, led by President Barnahuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masoud, is worried by the rapid growth and popularity of the Taliban. The Taliban hold "out hope for war-weary Afghans disgusted with the failure of national-level leaders to compromise and the failure of local commanders to establish local security."
Document 4
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, "Developments in Afghanistan," December 5, 1994, Classification Unknown, 1 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This memo to the State Department's Afghanistan Desk shows concern over the Government of Pakistan's now-notorious Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate's (ISI) involvement in the Taliban's recent takeover of Kandahar. At the bottom of the memo, a handwritten note states, "This AM I've heard that General Babar is running this Taliban op." General Nasrullah Babar was the Pakistani Interior Minister, and also a Pashtun.
Document 5
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "[Excised]Believe Pakistan is Backing Taliban," December 6, 1994, Secret, 3pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This cable conveys the observations of a source who believes that the Taliban are being directly supported by Pakistan, the principal patron being none other than General Babar. According to this source, Pakistani frontier corps provided artillery cover for the Taliban's September seizure of the Spin Boldak arms dump.
Document 6
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "The Taliban: What We've Heard," January 26, 1995, Secret, 10 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

Relaying the observations of recent visitors to Kandahar, this cable suggests that the Taliban are well armed, militarily proficient, and eager to expand their influence in order to end the banditry of small militias and to invoke Sharia law. According to the cable, this Taliban influence has resulted in women being ordered to stay in the home, and prohibiting male doctors from treating female patients.
Document 7
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Meeting with the Taliban in Kandahar: More Questions than Answers," February 15, 1995, Confidential, 7 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad reports on the Taliban's plan for the future. They want to take over Kabul, disarm rival commanders, and install one government across Afghanistan. This document also shows the beginnings of the Taliban double-talk with Western governments. In one instance, the Taliban indicate their desire to bring peace back to Afghanistan, but also say that "anyone who gets in our way will be crushed." Financial support to the Taliban and drug policy are also discussed.
Document 8
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Finally, A Talkative Talib: Origins and Membership of the Religious Students' Movement," February 20, 1995, Confidential, 15 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This cable, relying on a Talib source, offers an in-depth sketch of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Taliban, as well as the creation and organization of the Taliban. The source attempts to dispel the notion that the Taliban is backed by a foreign patron, interestingly noting that the "movement sought good relations with the Islamic countries, but did not like Saudi Arabia's efforts to interfere in Afghan religious matters. Similarly, the Pakistan Government's desire to interfere in internal affairs, and the efforts of ISI to treat Afghanistan like another province are not appreciated." The source noted at the close of the conversation that, "like the lease of Hong Kong," the Durand Accord is about to expire amid renewed calls for an independent Pashtunistan.
Document 9
U.S. Embassy (Dushanbe), Cable, "Rabbani Emissary States Rabbani Will Not Surrender Power to Interim Council Until Taliban Join," February 21, 1995, Confidential, 9 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

During a meeting between Embassy officials and Afghan President Rabbani's Economic Advisor, Ashraf Shah, the latter summarizes events in Afghanistan, including the Taliban's taking-over of Charasiab, Maydan Shahr, and Chowk-i-Wardak, as well as the Ghazni-Kabul Road. Shah wanted U.S. advice but stated that the Government would probably not surrender power to an Interim Council until the Taliban agreed to join the council.
Document 10
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban Take Shindand Air Base; Herat Threatened - Will Iran Intervene," September 4, 1995, Confidential, 6 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan closely monitored development in the continuing Afghan civil war. The cable reports that the Taliban have seized the strategic Shindand Air Base, previously controlled by Ismail Khan, and are now moving towards the city of Herat. It also discusses possible Iranian reactions to the Taliban threat.
Document 11
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Heavy fighting Rages West of Kabul; Herat Calm After Taliban Take-Over," September 6, 1995, Confidential, 6 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This document captures the Taliban's drive to victory as well as sentiments about their impending rule. The Taliban have taken over Herat forcing Ismail Khan along with 300-600 of his followers into Iran. Hekmatyar's forces are continuing to be attacked by Masoud and government troops. The cable also alerts Washington to news that an angry crowd of demonstrators has recently converged upon and set fire to the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul, allegedly in response to Pakistan's support for the Taliban and its role in the fall of Herat.
Document 12
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Eyewitness to the Fall of Herat Says Taliban are Winning Hearts and Minds - For Now," February 18, 1995, Confidential, 11 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This document describes the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan through the observations of an American citizen who witnessed the fall of Herat. The American, while faulting Ismail Khan for his political and military ineptitude, states that "the Taliban, in contrast, were extremely well organized, well-financed, and exhibited strong discipline."
Document 13
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Senator Brown and Congressman Wilson Discuss Afghanistan with Pakistani Officials," February 18, 1995, Confidential, 4 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

On February 18, 1995, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto met with Senator Hank Brown (R-CO) and Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-TX). Bhutto stressed the need for the Trans-Afghan gas pipeline in order to meet the "growing Pakistani demand for oil/gas, provide an outlet for the Central Asian Republics (CAR) other than via Iran and Russia, and encourage efforts towards [Afghan] national reconciliation." She also takes this opportunity to tell the Americans that the perception that "her government was backing the Taliban was simply untrue."



Document 14
"U.S. Department of State, Cable, Pak Foreign Minister Asks U.S. Cooperation on Afghanistan," February 21, 1996, Confidential, 6 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

During meetings with Pakistani Foreign Minister Assef Ali, Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott argues that Pakistani support for the "Islamicist Taliban movement" is forcing Moscow and Tehran to continue providing aid to Rabbani and Masoud. While sharing concern over increased outside interference, Afghan instability, drugs, and export of terrorism, Talbott suggests that Pakistan reestablish a more visible policy of neutrality before the two governments can act together in Afghanistan.

In a significant closing, Talbott "drew an analogy between Pakistani support for the Taliban in Afghanistan and the militants in Indian controlled Kashmir. While such support was undertaken to serve Pakistani interests, there were unintended consequences contrary to Pakistan's and the region's larger interests. Ultimately such groups could not be controlled and indulged in actions such as the kidnapping of foreigners in Kashmir."

Document 15
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "A/S Raphel Discusses Afghanistan," April 22, 1996 Confidential, 7 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel travels to the region for discussions with representatives of the Government of Pakistan, the Kabul government, and Taliban officials.

The record of one meeting suggests that the top Pakistani leadership recognizes that its support for the Taliban has backfired. Pakistani General Jehangir Karamat refers to the Taliban as "A millstone around our necks," while Prime Minister Bhutto emphasizes that Pakistan is not providing military support to the Taliban and insisted that only minimal, non-lethal aid was being provided. Raphel's meetings with Kabul officials emphasized Rabbani and Masood's perception of themselves as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. They blame Pakistan and the Taliban for all of their problems, and Masoud goes as far as to say that, "Pakistan is as much to blame for the destruction of Afghanistan as the Soviets." Taliban officials take a soft approach, asking Raphel to help improve their image on human rights, while indicating their desire for the UN process to work stating that, "If the U.N. fails, then we have failed." The cable closes with commentary suggesting that growing insecurity within the Taliban and the Kabul regime, complemented by Pakistan's apparent willingness to engage more positively, has created an opportunity for a reinvigorated U.N. mission to move toward Afghan reconciliation

Document 16
U.S. Embassy (Moscow), Cable, "A/S Raphel Consultations with Deputy FM Chernyshev," May 13, 1996, Confidential, 6 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This cable describes Raphel's meets with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev which are devoted mostly to Afghanistan. Raphel indicates a growing desire in Washington to resolve the Afghan conflict. "In addition to our traditional concerns - restoring regional political stability, interdicting narcotics, and relieving human suffering -- the USG now hopes that peace in the region will facilitate U.S. business interests like the proposed Unocal Gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan." Raphel proposes an arms embargo to Afghanistan, and the Russians, while emphasizing their continued support for the Mestiri (U.N.) Mission, deny they are giving arms to any faction.

Document 17
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Dealing with the Taliban in Kabul," September 28, 1996, Confidential, 6 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

Following the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban, the State Department instructed the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan to gather information on the Taliban as well as send messages to the organization. This cable indicates that the U.S. wishes to "engage the new Taliban interim government at an early stage to: Demonstrate USG willingness to deal with them as the new authorities in Kabul, seek information about their plans, programs and policies, and express USG views on areas of key concern to US stability, human rights, narcotics, and terrorism." Some of these talking points show the desire of the U.S to locate "ex-Saudi financier and radical Islamist Osama Bin Laden."

Document 18
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban Official Says that Relations with Russia and Iran "Tense," September 29, 1997, Confidential, 10 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.



Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul, Mullah Abdul Jalil indicates in a conversation with a U.S. Embassy political officer that relations with Russia and Iran are tense. Jalil also indicates that the Taliban have no idea of the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden, or any other "Arabs" flushed from terrorist training camps during the Taliban takeover, but that they are seeking Commander Masoud.

Document 19
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Ambassador Meets Taliban: We are the People," November 12, 1996, Confidential, 17 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This cable describes a meeting between U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Thomas W. Simons Jr. and the Taliban's "Acting Foreign Minister," Mullah Ghaus, on 11 November. Their discussions of the Afghan conflict began with Mullah Ghaus stating that "Thanks to God and help from its friends -including the United States-the Afghan resistance was able to defeat the Soviet Union and its allies." Ghaus continued by stating that peace that was to occur after the removal of the Soviets never arrived because of a "conspiracy of the communists, selfishness of resistance leaders, and foreign interference," blaming "interference by Russia, Iran, and India" in the affairs of Afghanistan as the main cause of the ongoing war. Ambassador Simons, in efforts to stop the tide of miscommunication and start on an equal footing with the pious Talib, attempted to explain American religiosity by stating that Americans are "the most religious people in the western world," and at the same time "have learned that it is very hard to discern the will of God." While the two men agree that a negotiated settlement is best, this document reveals some of difficultites in communication that existed between the USG and the Taliban.
Document 20
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban Rep Won't Seek UN Seat For Now," December 13, 1996, Confidential, 6 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

American officials met with a Taliban representative who suggested that the Taliban and Afghanistan want USG influence and encouragement, instead of the Iranian, Pakistani, or Russian influence and money that is being pressed upon them. One of the U.S. officials responds that the US has "neither funds nor the inclination to back any group," and that it does not want to distort the political process. According to the source, the Taliban were divided internally into three groups, "Pashtun chauvinists," "religious ones who believe that Allah will deliver the entire country to them," and "the moderates who understand the Taliban needs to reach out to the other ethnic/religious groups." The source also indicated that Pakistani support for the Taliban was extensive, coming mainly from the ISI, and included cash, supplies, on the ground military/intelligence advisers, and even the drafting of letters for the Taliban.

Document 21
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Scenesetter for Your Visit to Islamabad: Afghan Angle," January 16, 1997, Confidential, 6 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

Ambassador Simons assessed the situation in Afghanistan for Assistant Secretary Raphel, prior to her visit to the region. He praised the Taliban for their ability to restore order to Kandahar, where the Taliban are almost revered, but tells Raphel that the Taliban are viewed as occupiers in Herat and Kabul. Simons tells Raphel that the Taliban feel slighted by the U.N. and International NGO's and also that Pakistani assistance for the Taliban is pushing Iran, and probably Russia and India are aiding Masoud and Rabbani. The Scenesetter ends with bullet points outlining U.S. policy interests ranging from a peace process, counterterrorism including the request to "give up or expel Usama Bin Ladin," counternarcotics, humanitarian issues, and gas and oil pipelines.
Document 22
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: GOP denies Pakistani Involvement in Fighting; Taliban Reportedly Enlisting Supporters in Frontier Areas," June 4, 1997, Confidential, 4 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This cable summarizes a conversation between an American political officer in Islamabad and Pakistani Afghan Desk Officer Naeem Khan, and another conversation wtih Abdul Wahab, the First Secretary at the Taliban-controlled Afghan Embassy in Islamabad. During their conversation, Khan insisted that Pakistan does not militarily aid the Taliban, while admitting to giving the Taliban only diplomatic support. Wahab too denied official Pakistani support, yet admitted that the Taliban does receive support (manpower) from the tribal areas in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.
Document 23
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Observers Report Uptick in Support for Anti-Taliban Factions by Iran," July 7, 1997, Confidential, 10 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This cable relays information about Iranian military and political support for anti-Taliban factions. State Department source believes Iran's moves are a strategic reaction to the Taliban's efforts to gain control of the north, while Pakistani representatives see Iran's moves as purely aggressive.

Document 24
Department of State, Cable, "Afghanistan: Meeting with the Taliban," December 11, 1997, Confidential, 13 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

On December 8, 1997 Taliban officials, who were in the US under the auspices of Unocal, met with Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl Inderfurth in Washington D.C. The Taliban officials seek improved relations and American assistance to fund crop substitution programs. Inderfurth welcomes cooperation in this area and also queries the Taliban on their gender policies and terrorism. Taliban officials replied that their gender policies reflect Afghan tradition, and pledged to prevent terrorists from using Afghanistan to launch attacks on others. While arguing that the Taliban did not invite Bin Laden into Afghanistan, Taliban officials claim they stopped allowing him to give public interviews and "frustrated Iranian and Iraqi attempts to get in contact with him."
Document 25
U.S. Consulate (Peshawar), Cable, "Afghanistan: A Report of Pakistani Military Assistance to the Taliban," March 24, 1998, Confidential, 3pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This cable relays a recent incident of alleged Pakistani military assistance to the Taliban. The incident, while not confirmed, involved 25 large Mercedes Benz trucks full of Pakistani fighters being delivered to Kabul airport for transport to Kunduz in order to assist the Taliban.
Document 26
Department of State (Washington), Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban Convene Ulema, Iran and Bin Ladin on the Agenda," September 25, 1998, Confidential, 5 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

According to State Department information, the upcoming Ulema, or meeting of religious scholars, to be conducted by the Taliban will discuss Iran and Osama Bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan. The Department's source sees a divide in Taliban ranks over Bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan, but also suggests the Ulema will only reiterate what Mullah Omar has already said on Bin Laden, that he is a guest of the Taliban, and that he has not been proved to be involved in any bombings.
Document 27
Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Assessment, "Usama Bin Ladin/ Al-Qaida Information Operations," September 1999, Top Secret, 15 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This heavily excised Intelligence Assessment shows small portions of a document that will hopefully one day be released in full. The released portions discuss among other things, callback services for people residing in a foreign country, the INMARSAT-M Telephone, the Taliban website, the Islamic Gateway Organization, and a Bin Laden chronology.

Document 28
Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, "IIR [Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveler's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses," October 2, 2001, Secret, 10 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This DIA report discusses the current status of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and strategy for the impending American-led war against them. The source believes that forces must learn to think outside of the box, rid themselves of the Western mindset, and focus on human intelligence. The cable elucidates the ISI's connection with Bin Laden by noting that "Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network was able to expand under the safe sanctuary extended by Taliban following Pakistan Directives."
Document 29
Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, "IIR [Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveler's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Military, Political and Cultural Landscape and its Weaknesses," October 2, 2001, Secret, 7 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This summary details recent events in Afghanistan and the role of Pakistan in supporting the Taliban movement. It describes how Pakistan preferred to groom incompetent commanders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar for leadership positions in Afghanistan who would then be reliant upon Pakistan. The failure of supporting Hekmatyar, which "effectively saw the lebanonization of Afghanistan," caused the Pakistanis to introduce the Taliban. The account notes that "Pakistan has lost every war it has ever fought." The cable also notes that "it must be a deeply troubling period for General (Musharraf) in Pakistan, who is asked to help hunt down the culprits that he helped to establish," and ends with a summary of the al-Qaeda agenda, the Pakistani agenda, and the death of Ahmad Shah Masoud in the context of the downing of the twin towers.
Document 30
Department of Defense, Cable, [Title Excised,] October 4, 2001, Confidential, 5 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

Reflecting the change in Pakistan's policy after 9/11, a DIA source discusses Pakistan and Musharraf's support for the international fight against terrorism. The source suggests that assisting the U.S. "serves Pakistan's self interests," and that Pakistan would like to be recognized and assisted by the U.S. and the rest of the international community for its commitment to the struggle.
Document 31
Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, "IIR [Excised]/The Assassination of Massoud Related to 11 September 2001 Attack," November 21, 2001, Secret, 5 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

DIA asseses the relationship between the assassination of Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud and the terrorist attacks of September 11. Apparently Masoud had gained limited knowledge "regarding the intentions of the Saudi millionaire Usama (bin Ladin) (UBL), and his terrorist organization, al-Qaida, to perform a terrorist act against the U.S., on a scale larger than the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania."
Document 32
Defense Intelligence Agency, Cable, "IIR [Excised] Pakistani Political, Military Situation, and Terrorism Issues," January 9, 2002, Secret, 5 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National Security Archive.

This cable discusses the political and military situation in Pakistan, including government stability, armed forces capabilities, and terrorism issues in light of the post-September 11 climate.

New Document: State Department Report, "U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama Bin Laden," Secret, Circa July 16, 2001, 9 pp.



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Notes
For useful background on terrorism and the Taliban see:

Byrne, Malcolm and Jeffrey Richelson eds. "Terrorism and U.S. Policy, 1968-2002: From the Dawn of Modern Terrorism to the Hunt for Bin Laden " Chadwyck-Healey/Proquest, 2002.

Cogan, Charles. "Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979." World Policy Journal. Summer 1993.

Kux, Dennis. "The United States and Pakistan: Disenchanted Allies," Woodrow Wilson Press, Washington D.C., 2000.

Maley, William ed. "Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban." New York University Press: New York,1998.

Rashid, Ahmed. "Taliban: Militant Oil, Islam, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.". Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 2000.

Stern, Jessica. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture." Foreign Affairs. November/December 2000.

Weinbaum, Marvin. "Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction." Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1994.

First Terrorist Bomb-Belts Reach Europe

DEBKAfile Special Report

4 April:
Serhane ben Abdelmajid Farkhet, 35, alias "The Tunisian", suspected ringleader of the Madrid train bombings, was one of the terrorists who blew themselves up Saturday night in the southwestern Madrid suburb of Leganes when Spanish police closed in on their hideout. Spanish interior minister Angel Acebes said it is impossible to establish how many al Qaeda suspects were holed up in the building. They began shooting from a window at police approaching the apartment building. Special police agents prepared to storm the building when the terrorists set off a powerful explosion with several bomb belts shouting God is great in Arabic. One policeman was killed and 15 injured. Some of the suspects may have escaped under cover of the blast or before the police closed the net around the building.
Also found in the damaged apartment building were additional explosive devices and 200 detonators.
Forty apartments were evacuated and the area sealed off. Three of the terror suspects who committed suicide have been identified, but the possibility of more having taken part in the group suicide has not been ruled out. Spanish radio reported Jamal Ahmidan, 33, was among the dead. He was named in one of the six arrest warrants issued in the March 11 train bombings investigation.
This was the first time terrorists are known to have used bomb belts in Europe, also the first battle with al Qaeda to take place on the continent.
Spanish police are already holding 15 suspects in connection with the attack on the commuter trains last month. Six have been charged with mass murder and nine with collaborating with a terrorist organization. Eleven are members of the al Qaeda-linked Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.
Friday, April 2, Spain went on terror alert after a bomb was found on the Madrid-Seville high speed rail track near Toledo 10 km south of capital. The device was connected to a detonator with a 130 m cable. The Spanish army and helicopters are now guarding Spanish railway lines.
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1,500-Mile Oil Pipeline Fading Fast For China
Japan Offers Russia An Alternate Route
By Peter S. Goodman
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, April 5, 2004; Page A01
BEIJING -- Last May, China's president, Hu Jintao, flew to Moscow to sign what was billed as a historic declaration of cooperation with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. A day later came what seemed a tangible outgrowth of the new relationship -- the inking of a $150 billion deal that was to see the two neighbors jointly erect a 1,500-mile-long pipeline to carry crude oil from Siberia to China.
The pipeline deal was key to China's increasingly desperate need for energy to fuel its torrid industrial expansion. It underscored how the Communist Party government, once isolated and obsessed with self-sufficiency, is now increasingly engaged with the outside world, refashioning relations with previously bitter enemies in pursuit of its economic needs.
Yet since the signing ceremony, almost nothing has gone according to the Chinese plan. The Russian signatory to the deal, Yukos Oil Co., has fallen into disarray following the jailing of its chief shareholder on fraud charges. Japan, with its own need for oil, has pressed a competing proposal for a pipeline that would bypass China. Japan has extended as much as $6 billion to finance its construction, and billions of dollars more via private companies for oil exploration in eastern Siberia, according to senior government officials in Tokyo who have participated in talks with the Russian side.
Japan's largesse now appears to have captured the project, according to officials in Beijing, Tokyo and Moscow.
For China, the Siberian pipeline has disintegrated from a model of Beijing's new internationalism to a painful lesson in the complexities of the global oil market. It has reinforced how energy remains a zero-sum game: For China and Japan, whose historic enmity has lately been muted by growing trade links, the scramble for oil has sharpened a natural rivalry for resources.
In a recent interview in Beijing, Zhai Guangming, a top official at China National Petroleum Co., which signed the deal with Yukos, acknowledged that the Siberian pipeline was a fading dream.
"The plan is not happening now," he said. "The Japanese are more practical and business-oriented. That's why they can use more money to grab gas and oil. But for China, we just started the market system. It's hard for China to jump out and say we're going to pay such an enormous sum of money."
Japan's government continues to assess Russian claims about Siberian reserves, and officials stress they have yet to irrevocably commit to anything. Russia continues to study proposed routes for the pipeline and has yet to render a final decision. But several officials said Moscow has agreed in principle to build a pipeline from oilfields in eastern Siberia to the Russian port of Nakhodka, on the Sea of Japan, and not, at least not anytime soon, to the Chinese city of Daqing, as Yukos promised.
"Russia is determined to set up a pipeline route to the Asian market, and their preference seems to be clear: the Nakhodka route," said a senior Japanese official who has participated in talks with Russia.
"We are going to do something with the Russians," said Kuninori Matsuda, director of the Russian Division of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "We have told them we are ready to cooperate, including financial and technical."
In an interview with several journalists in Moscow in February, then-energy minister Igor Yusufov called the Nakhodka route "of greater strategic importance for us," adding that the proposed line to China "didn't address the problems of resource development in eastern Siberia."
Zhai, who recently briefed Premier Wen Jiabao on China's long-term energy security, said Beijing was now focused on tapping oil and gas fields in neighboring Kazakhstan to compensate for the likely loss of the Siberian crude.
The pipeline to Siberia was to have been a crucial infusion of oil -- 20 million tons of crude a year by 2010 -- at a time when China's burgeoning factories and cars are straining the supply. It would have run from Siberian fields near Angarsk, traversing country south of the giant Lake Baikal, and on to Daqing, an industrial city in northeastern China that was the birthplace of the modern Chinese oil industry. Only a decade ago, China was an oil exporter. Now, it is the third-largest importer after the United States and Japan. Beijing reckons it will need to import up to 600 million tons of oil a year by 2020, more than triple its anticipated domestic production.
The Siberian link was aimed at diminishing China's dependence on oil from the volatile Middle East, the source of more than half the country's imports. China has become uneasy that the lifeblood of its economy is increasingly tied to the policing of international shipping lanes by the United States.
The Siberian pipeline idea was laden with history: Back when Beijing's relations with Moscow were defined by Communist solidarity, Moscow dispatched engineers to help develop China's oil industry. But when the two powers broke off relations in the mid-1950s, the Soviet engineers abandoned Daqing and derided the Chinese on the way out, telling them they would never manage alone. Chairman Mao Tse-tung then made the success of the project a kind of national crusade. When the work went on and the oil flowed, Daqing became a monument to China's resilience and an oft-touted source of Communist Party pride, along with a cautionary tale about reliance on its neighbor to the north.
The deal with Yukos was supposed to bury this unpleasant history. As the world's biggest oil producer, Russia has a natural interest in finding buyers nearby. Russia and China have mutual interest in improved relations to diminish the need for substantial military presence along their shared border.
But long before the Yukos deal's signing, the pipeline was plagued by fundamental problems that were apparently not fully evident to the Chinese side. Under the aggressive leadership of chief shareholder Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Yukos became for a time Russia's largest producer and tested the limits of Moscow's authority. In Russia, only the state-owned Transneft has the authority to build pipelines, and its patrons in government resented Yukos trying to usurp that monopoly. Yukos executives long regarded China as a lucrative market for its eastern Siberian oil fields and hoped to spur the government to follow their company's lead.
In Moscow, the pipeline deal with China cemented the sense that Yukos was effectively conducting its own foreign policy. Perhaps more important, Russian government officials had misgivings about the Yukos proposal because it effectively tied sales of Siberian oil to a single buyer, China, giving Beijing excessive leverage over price. If a pipeline could instead reach the Pacific, running about 2,500 miles, it would allow Russia to sell crude to Japan as well as South Korea, China and perhaps refineries on the West Coast of the United States.
With this vision in mind, Russian officials had already opened a channel with Japan to discuss a pipeline to Nakhodka, an ice-free deep-water port. In February 2002, at a Tokyo conference, an official from Transneft made a speech in which he proposed such a link.
Japan, which imports virtually all its oil, was warm to the idea. Japan figured it could ship oil from Nakhodka to refineries on the Sea of Japan for less than a third of the $1.50 per barrel it costs to ship oil from the Middle East, the source of 90 percent of its present supply.
A joint Russian-Japanese pipeline project could also fulfill a broader objective for the two countries: More than a half-century after the end of World War II, Japan and Russia have yet to sign a peace treaty formally ending hostilities. They continue to squabble over competing claims to a chain of islands, the Kurils. A multibillion-dollar commercial tie-up could be used as a pretext to settle longstanding issues.
Japan's Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry began studying the project. In May 2002, Igor Yusufov, Russia's energy minister at the time, met Takeo Hiranuma, Japan's then-minister for economy and trade, at an energy conclave in Detroit and discussed the outlines of a pipeline project. That October, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi traveled to Russia and declared Japan's willingness to participate.
The landmark came in January 2003, when at a Moscow summit Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi officially agreed that the pipeline "would greatly contribute to regional development, the stabilization of the international energy markets, and enhancement of energy security in the Asia-Pacific region." Sources said Koizumi offered no financial commitments, but signaled a willingness to make capital available.
The details emerged as a series of high-level Japanese delegations traveled to Moscow: The government-led Japan Bank for International Cooperation would supply low-interest loans for the pipeline. Japanese firms influenced heavily by the government could be relied upon to explore untapped areas of eastern Siberia, key to Russia's future development plans.
China responded to the competition from Japan by emphasizing the shorter route to Daqing. But on May 30, 2003, just two days after Yukos signed the deal with CNPC to build the Daqing pipeline, President Putin shot down that argument. "Some people say that a China route would be built more quickly and cheaply," Putin said. "But it is important to develop untapped resources in Siberia."
Environmental concerns surrounding the vast Lake Baikal also argued against the route to China, Russian sources said.
Last August, Japan and Russia convened the first of five meetings in Moscow of a working group designed to finalize plans for the project. The group is composed of officials from Japan's ministries of economy and foreign affairs and their Russian counterparts, as well as representatives from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and Japanese oil companies.
For Japan, the key remaining issue is establishing that Siberia holds sufficient reserves to justify the pipeline. Japan seeks 1 million barrels of crude a day delivered to Nakhodka. Russia has said that eastern Siberia now holds proven reserves sufficient to satisfy about 80 percent of that. "Before we decide to make an investment, we have to be confident," said a Japanese official involved in the talks.
Throughout the jockeying for the pipeline, Japan has sought to play down the notion that its gain is China's loss, stressing that oil will be sold at the market price to any buyer in Nakhodka. "Of course, we expect a substantial proportion of the crude reaching Nakhodka will reach Japan, but we do not intend to monopolize it," the official said.
Yukos recently agreed to increase shipments of crude to Daqing by rail. Japanese officials say Russia is still officially studying whether it could build a spur to Daqing off the main pipeline. But officials and analysts doubt enough oil could be pumped in eastern Siberia to make such a scenario feasible. "The explored deposits are not large enough," former energy minister Yusufov said. Even if it were possible, it would not happen anytime soon, leaving China where it began -- scouring the globe for alternatives.
"It could take 10 years to produce enough oil to fill the other pipeline," said Kaname Nakano, deputy director general of Energy and Natural Resources Finance Department at the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. "That is why it is such a delicate matter."
Staff writer Peter Baker contributed to this report from Moscow. Special correspondent Akiko Kashiwagi contributed from Tokyo.



? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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>> WHY ASK WHY?

Some Bush Initiatives Languish In Congress
Follow-Up Missing, Lawmakers Say

By Charles Babington
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, April 5, 2004; Page A01
Some of President Bush's splashiest proposals are languishing in Congress even though his party controls both chambers. The main reason is not Democratic obstruction but a lack of vigorous follow-through by the administration once the initial hoopla died down, according to some Republican and Democratic lawmakers.
Proposals to bar gay marriage, rewrite immigration laws, protect Americans from anthrax bacteria and send astronauts to the moon and Mars are progressing slowly -- or not at all -- even though Bush initially endorsed them at high-visibility events.
The administration's low-energy approach to these issues contrasts sharply with its promotion of unquestioned priorities such as tax cuts and educational accountability, for which the president and his staff relentlessly marshaled public and congressional support to overcome opposition.
A White House spokesman and some Republicans defended the administration's approach, saying the president is waiting for the appropriate time to press for action on some of his initiatives, while recognizing that others may have to wait for a second term.
Bush endorsed a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage, said White House spokesman Trent Duffy, and now it is time to "let the American people, through their elected officials, decide."
"This president has a very impressive record of accomplishments," Duffy added.
Democrats say the president wants to score political points on matters he knows even a Republican-controlled Congress won't pass. Republicans say that's not the White House's motive, but even some GOP senators recently chastised the administration for providing virtually no legislative follow-up to its big immigration proposal. House Republicans agree that the immigration plan, along with some other major Bush initiatives, faces heavy odds.
Immigration reform "is considered by all a divisive issue," and "it's not going to pass this year," said Rep. Thomas M. Davis III (R-Va.). As for Bush's motives in proposing to overhaul immigration rules in January, Davis said, "I don't know what he thought."
Regarding Bush's proposed constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage, which faces stiff resistance in Congress, Davis said, "The president doesn't vote on constitutional amendments. . . . He's entitled to his opinion, and some people are scratching their heads over why he did it."
Davis added, however, that some of the stalled issues "may well be second-term items" if Bush wins reelection this fall.
Some independent analysts warn that proposing big programs, but not truly fighting for their enactment, can cut both ways politically.
"Some of these are transparently political things that the president states and doesn't follow through on," said James Thurber, director of American University's Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies. Although Bush may score initial points with targeted groups, the strategy "has the potential to backfire" if voters believe there is not a sincere effort to deliver, Thurber said.
Whatever the White House's calculations, some GOP and Democratic lawmakers express puzzlement at what they consider half-hearted efforts to advance certain initiatives. Several senators, for example, chided the administration at a March 23 Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Bush's ambitious but not yet detailed plan to make 8 million undocumented immigrants eligible for temporary legal status, for at least six years, as long as they are employed.
"It is going to require intense presidential leadership," Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) told an administration representative. "And so my question would be, what is the administration doing? . . . I'm at a loss to see where your intensity of debate is up here."
Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) praised Bush for raising the issue of immigration reform but added, "Frankly, the president's proposal was met with all sorts of criticism from all over the political spectrum for its inadequacy or its lack of focus on one factor or another to the point that I would now say the president fell back."
"I've been around long enough to know . . . when the administration really wants something, any administration, and when they're kind of lukewarm," said Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.). "I'm being polite by calling it lukewarm at this point. I don't get any sense at all about real energy behind this."
Eduardo Aguirre, immigration services director at the Department of Homeland Security, told the senators: "I think the president's serious about the issue and I think the president is looking to the Congress to frame the legislation that can be brought to the administration. . . . Whether or not it's going to pass the Senate and the House, I'll leave it to you." Aguirre said the president has spoken publicly about the immigration initiative a dozen times since it was first announced, but some lawmakers and aides say Bush hasn't done enough to get the plan moving.
Bush announced his immigration plan on Jan. 7 in a White House speech before 200 Latino supporters. Although some business groups and Latino advocates hailed the initiative, a number of conservatives said it would reward those who break the law by entering the United States illegally.
Seven weeks after his immigration speech, Bush embraced an even more contentious proposal, long sought by many social conservatives: amending the constitution to bar same-sex marriages.
But the daunting campaign to achieve the amendment -- which requires a two-thirds majority in the House and Senate, then ratification by 38 states -- shows little evidence of White House involvement. Republicans and Democrats in both houses have said they see virtually no chance of passage, yet the administration has made no overt move to jump-start the effort.
Duffy said in an interview Friday, "Congress is holding hearings, and it's moving forward." Some advocates of the constitutional amendment are giving the administration a pass for now, but are serving notice that Bush can't stay on the sidelines indefinitely. "As we get closer to a vote" in Congress, possibly by late summer, "we are hoping and expecting the president to use his persuasive abilities to get it passed," said Gary Bauer, president of the group American Values.
Another White House initiative, Project BioShield, has languished for 14 months, since Bush proposed it in his 2003 State of the Union address.
The 10-year, $6 billion program is supposed to develop vaccines and medicines to help Americans survive a bioterror attack involving agents such as anthrax bacteria.
The House overwhelmingly approved the plan, but it bogged down in the Senate, to the frustration of companies developing drugs they say show promise. A few senators have objected to various provisions, including expedited federal contracting procedures and disclosure guidelines for military personnel being vaccinated. Most of the objections have been resolved, however, and the remaining ones are minor, say Senate staffers.
Although Bush urged movement on Project BioShield in speeches in June and last month, some of its advocates question why it hasn't been enacted by a party that controls the House, Senate and White House.
The chief need is for the government to agree to buy stockpiles of an anti-anthrax drug, which is the only way to justify the cost of continuing to test and develop, said Asha M. George, managing director of the Anser Institute for Homeland Security, an Arlington think tank.
"If the administration really wants to do this, then the administration is going to have to agree to buy it," she said. Rockville-based Human Genome Sciences Inc. has tested a promising anti-anthrax drug called Abthrax but repeatedly has implored Congress or the administration to fund Project BioShield or some other plan to make the drug's development feasible.
White House spokeswoman Erin Healy said, "We're still very committed" to the project.
Another Bush initiative that drew big headlines -- his Jan. 14 call for manned missions to the moon and Mars -- fell quiet so quickly that many were left wondering how plausible it might be. Six days after the announcement, Bush delivered his 2004 State of the Union address, in which he did not mention the moon-Mars proposal.
Healy said there was no need to cite the plan in the State of the Union talk because Bush "had just given a major policy speech on it." Some Democrats see a more partisan explanation.
"There are a lot of instances where they make a political point when they don't want to push it legislatively," said House Minority Whip Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.). For example, he said, Bush looks "compassionate" by calling for extending unemployment benefits, but he doesn't press Congress to actually authorize the funding for it, so he can claim a "conservative" budget.

Staff researcher Lucy Shackelford contributed to this report.

? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Pyongyang Willing to Abandon Nuclear Program
A possible change in North Korea's stance has been detected as Pyongyang says it is willing to give up all of its nuclear facilities including those for peaceful purposes. North Korea is willing to abandon its peaceful nuclear programs to produce energy if it is offered "appropriate corresponding measures" at six-party nuclear talks. Officials in Seoul say this change in stance was reportedly disclosed by North Korea during a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in Pyongyang late last month.
In previous negotiations with South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, North Korea had said it would only consider scrapping its nuclear weapons ambitions. Earlier this week, South Korean foreign minister Ban Ki-moon back from a trip to Beijing had said North Korean officials had indicated their intention to resolve the nuclear standoff and expressed interest in compensation measures and a security guarantee for its regime.

Ban also said Pyongyang had agreed to participate in working-level discussions and another round of six-party negotiations on the nuclear issue. According to officials here, South Korea and China are working to put together a working group meeting as soon as possible but are at the same time concerned that the talks may not happen within this month as Washington has yet to show any response to this latest development.

Arirang TV
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Arms Control Today April 2004

Seven Lessons for Dealing With Today's North Korea Nuclear Crisis
Excerpted from Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci

As the United States and North Korea prepare for a fourth round of talks to resolve an 18-month old crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs, the two countries find themselves fighting over many of the same issues they fought over during the last nuclear crisis in 1993 and 1994. During that showdown, North Korea similarly announced its withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and threatened to take steps (including the production of plutonium) toward building nuclear weapons. The crisis ended with an agreement by North Korea to freeze its nuclear program and provide a full accounting of its past actions in return for a U.S. commitment to meet Pyongyang's energy needs and begin the process of normalizing bilateral relations. In the following excerpts , U.S. negotiators Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci argue that the previous set of talks hold important lessons for their counterparts today in the Bush administration. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis is to be released by Brookings Institution Press later this month.


What lessons do the crises of 1993 and 1994 hold for the impasse of today? Now, as then, the critical issue is North Korean access to bomb material, this time highly enriched uranium as well as plutonium. Now, as then, the consequences of failure would be grave: an untethered North Korea would be able to churn out bomb-making material each year for use in threatening its neighbors--or for export to terrorists or others. (The fastest route to Al Qaeda would seem to run through Pakistan, North Korea's active trading partner in illicit arms and the likely source of the technology North Korea used to enrich uranium.) Now, as then, a difficult relationship with a newly elected South Korean president further complicates an already daunting diplomatic mission. Now, as then, the other regional powers--South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia--have important roles to play in resolving the crisis.
Mark Twain once observed that by sitting on a hot stove, his cat learned not to sit on a hot stove again. But the cat also learned not to sit on a cold stove. Even if one considered the Agreed Framework a hot stove, the question is whether the government could design a cold stove that could support a lasting and effective diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear challenge. To do so, it would have to consider what kind of agreement would advance U.S. interests and how the United States should go about negotiating such an arrangement. The 1994 crisis has relevance for today on both counts.
Lesson 1. Set strategic priorities, then stick to them. It may seem too obvious to dwell on this lesson, but setting and maintaining priorities is easier said than done. During the first North Korean crisis, the Clinton administration placed the highest strategic priority on blocking North Korean access to additional stocks of separated plutonium. Clarity on that point enabled decision-makers to resist pressures inside the administration to press other (admittedly important) objectives--curbing Pyongyang's ballistic missile program and its threatening conventional force posture--to the point where they would jeopardize the resolution of the nuclear crisis.
Failure to set priorities quickly leads to stalemate. For example, the Bush administration proposed a comprehensive approach in dealing with North Korea, a "bold initiative" that would offer energy and other carrots if North Korea verifiably dismantled its nuclear program and satisfied other U.S. security concerns.31 Such an approach runs the risk of failure because it seeks full North Korean performance on all U.S. demands before offering significant U.S. performance on any North Korean demands. There was never any chance North Korea would accede to such a position, especially since time played in Pyongyang's favor as each passing day it enhanced its own nuclear capabilities. Since the president has made clear that the United States seeks a diplomatic resolution to the current crisis, some parallelism in performance will need to be negotiated if the parties are to achieve agreement on the core issues.
Lesson 2. Integrate carrots and sticks into a strategy of coercive diplomacy. If offered only carrots, the North Koreans will conclude that the other side is more desperate for a deal than they are and will likely continue on a path of defiance and increasing negotiating demands. Offering only sticks will tell the North Koreans that there is no benefit from complying with international demands, except avoidance of pain. They might as well continue down a dangerous path of defiance until their acts become so threatening that the international community will have to respond, by which time Pyongyang may have substantially strengthened its bargaining leverage. That is essentially what occurred after Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly challenged the North Koreans in October 2002 regarding their secret enrichment program.
The Clinton administration relied on both carrots and sticks to try to resolve the 1994 crisis, integrating them into a negotiating position that presented a clear choice.32 If Pyongyang returned to full compliance with international nonproliferation norms, then the international community would respond favorably, reassuring North Korea that compliance would enhance its national security, and even prosperity. It was easier to define the acceptable end-state than to define a viable diplomatic path to reach it. Once the North Koreans were prepared to back down and comply with their nonproliferation obligations, they still sought a face-saving way to do so. This was the "escape valve" that President Clinton kept prodding his advisers to embed into the U.S. negotiating position and, deus ex machina, finally appeared in the form of Jimmy Carter.
At the same time, Pyongyang had to know that if it passed up the face-saving exit and continued to defy the international community, it would experience increasing isolation and hardship. In 1994 this coercive side of diplomacy came to the fore through a gradual military buildup on the peninsula and efforts to seek global support for economic sanctions. Ominous signals from Beijing at the time must have undermined the North Koreans' confidence that China would intervene to insulate North Korea from the effect of UN Security Council sanctions. These efforts put pressure on North Korea to back down when the crisis crested in June 1994. Arriving in Pyongyang at the critical moment, former President Jimmy Carter gave the North Koreans a face-saving way out. They took it.
Lesson 3. Use multilateral institutions and forums to reinforce U.S. diplomacy. Each of North Korea's neighbors has unique equities and assets that must be brought into the settlement. South Korea is the most directly affected, sharing the peninsula and innumerable ties of blood, culture, and history. The United States--a neighbor by virtue of the 37,000 American troops deployed across the Demilitarized Zone--has an unshakable security commitment to South Korea and broader political and economic interests in the region. Japan shares a complex history with Korea--including its occupation of the peninsula ending with Tokyo's defeat in World War II, the painful issues of Japanese abducted by the North Korean regime, and ties between ethnic Koreans living in Japan and their relatives in the North. It also has the economic resources likely to be an essential part of any settlement with North Korea.
China--traditionally as close to North Korea as "lips and teeth"--has loosened its ties but remains more closely involved with Pyongyang than any other regional player. It also retains the most leverage of any outsider, as the provider of the majority of North Korea's fuel and food, without which Pyongyang's economy could not survive. While Russia does not approximate that degree of influence, it is bound to the North by treaty and historical ties dating back to Josef Stalin. It can still contribute significantly to a diplomatic settlement of North Korea's differences with the world.
The Clinton administration worked closely with all of the other regional players in the quest for a solution to the nuclear crisis. It also made full use of all available multilateral institutions to bring pressure to bear upon North Korea in the effort to persuade it to comply with international nonproliferation norms. When the Clinton administration engaged in bilateral discussions with North Korea, it did so with multilateral backing--encouraged initially by South Korea and China, authorized by the UN Security Council. These bilateral talks in no way detracted from the administration effort to secure broad multilateral support for a negotiated solution if possible, and for the use of coercive measures if necessary. To the contrary, the showing of its good-faith bilateral efforts helped the United States make its case in multilateral forums.
Lesson 4. Use bilateral talks to probe diplomatic alternatives. While multilateral diplomacy is indispensable, involving more governments--with varying motives, interests, and objectives--at best complicates and at worst dilutes or even undermines U.S. efforts. The United States should therefore use multilateral diplomacy but not be locked into it exclusively. As a sovereign nation, the United States must be free to use any mechanism--including bilateral talks--to advance its unique interests and objectives. In that sense, bilateral talks are not merely a "gift" to be conferred on other governments, but a vector to convey U.S. perspectives unalloyed and undiluted by multilateral involvement.
American negotiators sometimes envisaged outcomes that would satisfy its multilateral partners' needs, even if the partners were unwilling or unable (because of their negotiating constraints or domestic political factors) to approve certain negotiating positions in advance. Of course, the trade-off is that although reducing the number of parties in direct negotiations can facilitate reaching a deal, it can complicate implementation to the degree that the arrangement does not adequately address the concerns of the governments whose cooperation is essential to success.
Today the Bush administration faces the same dilemma. It has relied almost entirely on multilateral talks, rejecting any but fleeting bilateral contacts with Pyongyang. This approach may give the key governments a greater stake in ensuring that an agreement is fully implemented, create greater pressure on Pyongyang by presenting a unified front, and provide an avenue for others to bring carrots or sticks to bear in the service of the collective diplomatic effort. The disadvantages include an inevitable muffling of U.S. positions in relation to Pyongyang, while also subjecting Washington to greater pressure to modify its own positions.
Most important, placing so much weight on the multilateral format of the discussions with North Korea allows Pyongyang to dictate the pace of the crisis. Pyongyang already makes the decisions on its own nuclear activities. Letting it off the hook of "confronting its accusers" also gives it the upper hand in deciding the pace of the diplomatic effort. Rigid insistence on specific formats or conditions (as opposed to an "anytime, anywhere" offer for talks) permits the North Koreans--now liberated from the cameras, seals, and inspectors of the [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] that they ejected in 2002--to continue their pursuit of nuclear weapons while sidestepping international pressure. Since time is on North Korea's side, the United States and its allies should seek to force the issue by reasserting control over the pacing of the crisis.
In the Civil War, it was not enough for Abraham Lincoln to refuse to recognize the Confederate States of America. He had to take affirmative action to interfere with the Confederacy, which would have realized its strategic aims simply by carrying on its activities independently from--and unmolested by--the Union. Similarly, North Korea can realize its strategic objectives simply by continuing its current path until someone stops it. The longer real negotiations are delayed, the greater the nuclear capability--and bargaining leverage--the North will have accumulated. So whether a particular round of talks with North Korea is bilateral or multilateral is less important than that they occur sooner rather than later. (This is where setting priorities correctly comes into play.)
Lesson 5. South Korean support is crucial to any lasting solution of the North Korean nuclear problem. The role of South Korea is as complex as it is central to resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. Seoul's support is critical, since any action or solution, whatever form it takes, will be on its peninsula. To that end, in 1993 and 1994 the United States and South Korea spent enormous amounts of time and energy working together to forge a common strategy. Contrary to popular belief in South Korea, time after time Washington deferred to Seoul or explicitly took its views into account. The record shows that South Korea had a remarkable degree of influence, even though its positions frequently changed.
Some South Koreans have complained about being harnessed to an ally ready to sacrifice their interests on the altar of nuclear nonproliferation. The most notable example is President Kim's recent claim that he stopped President Clinton from starting a second Korean War.34 In fact, there were no eleventh-hour phone calls to the White House. President Kim was solidly behind the American drive for sanctions, and his government was well informed about the gradual military buildup on the peninsula as well as the more extensive deployments that were about to be considered. Seoul did not know about American consideration of a preemptive strike against Yongbyon, but it is clear from the record of the Principals Committee meetings that Washington would never have authorized an attack without prior consultation with Seoul. That consultation never became necessary after the June breakthrough that returned the nuclear issue to the negotiating table.
In important respects, the challenge of maintaining U.S.-South Korean solidarity is more difficult today than it was a decade ago. Then the majority of South Koreans, and their government, had personal memories of the Korean War and its aftermath as well as serious doubts about Pyongyang's intentions. Now a younger generation has taken the reins of power, after years of a Sunshine Policy that has left many South Koreans feeling greater sympathy toward their brethren in the North and greater concern that their peace is more likely to be disturbed by Americans than North Koreans. For Americans, the deference once accorded to Seoul as facing the more imminent threat from the North has since September 11 been displaced by its own sense of vulnerability to the export of nuclear technology to adversaries and, to some, the prospect of North Korean ballistic missiles ranging the continental United States.
Lesson 6. Take full advantage of China's continuing sway over North Korea. As the driving force behind the six-party talks in 2003, China assumed a much higher profile as a diplomatic player on the world stage. Its importance in addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis was already apparent in 1994. The first crisis broke during China's transition from unalloyed dedication to its alliance with Pyongyang to a more evenhanded relationship between the two Koreas. That timing left China more open to work cooperatively with Seoul, while giving Pyongyang greater reason to fear abandonment by its prime benefactor. Beijing understood both its own leverage as well as the grave consequences of a North Korean nuclear program and repeatedly, but quietly, nudged Pyongyang toward compliance with its nonproliferation commitments. Beijing's most important effort unfolded in the spring of 1994, when it tried its hand at mediation after North Korea's unloading of the fuel rods from the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon and appeared to signal that Pyongyang could not count on China blocking the imposition of UN sanctions against North Korea.
Although Chinese officials have traditionally sought to downplay their influence in Pyongyang, they clearly retain greater leverage over the Kim Jong Il regime than any other player. Fortunately, China and the United States agree on two key objectives: (1) the Korean Peninsula should remain stable and secure, and (2) it should be free of nuclear weapons.
But this convergence of views between Washington and Beijing has limits. Specifically, China has a strong interest in avoiding political disruption in North Korea, which argues in favor of seeking a negotiated solution to the nuclear challenge and against taking steps that could induce regime change in North Korea. By 2003, however, some U.S. officials had apparently concluded that the North Koreans were inveterate cheaters with whom no agreement could be reached that would protect American interests. Under this view, agreements should therefore be eschewed in favor of the only practical way to head off North Korean possession of a growing nuclear weapon stockpile: regime change. Whether this would occur by force or by inducing a social collapse through encouraging massive refugee flows out of the North, the bottom line is that pursuit of this objective would drive a wedge between China and the United States.
Lesson 7. Negotiated arrangements can advance U.S. interests even if the other party engages in cheating. Of course, it is possible to construct a deal that would leave the United States in a worse position if the other side cheated. An example would be an agreement that left the other side well positioned to break out of a treaty in a manner that would put the United States at an instant military disadvantage. Nazi Germany's rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty, combined with Europe's failure to respond, comes to mind. But it is also possible to construct a treaty that leaves the United States better off every day that the other party is compliant, and not significantly disadvantaged if the other party cheats.
U.S. negotiators will always need to make hard choices. It would be desirable if any new deal includes comprehensive limits on North Korea's nuclear program, extending beyond known plutonium production facilities to encompass not only uranium-enrichment activities but also any nuclear weapons Pyongyang may have already built or obtained, as well as its research and development efforts. Such a commitment would be impossible to verify with confidence, even with "anytime, anywhere" inspections in North Korea. It is just too easy to cheat.
Should U.S. negotiators pass up stronger commitments if they cannot be confidently verified? What if a new deal imposes greater restrictions on Pyongyang with more extensive inspections than the 1994 accord but still leaves uncertainties? Would such a deal serve U.S. interests? Similar questions confronted the United States in 1994, when the president had to decide whether to seek more immediate limits on North Korea's threatening plutonium production program in lieu of immediate special inspections.
One way to try to avoid falling into a situation in which the president faces only extreme options is to set "red lines" for North Korea. Initially, the Bush administration seemed leery to do that on the assumption that "if you draw it, they will cross it." There is always a danger that Pyongyang will cross these lines, either deliberately or through miscalculation. In the spring of 1994, North Korea did cross a red line by unloading the 5-megawatt reactor and destroying important historical information contained in the spent fuel rods, triggering the march toward confrontation. But one month later, Pyongyang did not expel the IAEA inspectors monitoring the Yongbyon facility, perhaps in part because of Jimmy Carter's trip but also because it knew that could trigger an American preemptive attack. In short, picking a clear boundary for acceptable behavior can prove a successful deterrent, but only if it is backed by the credible threat of force. The United States should not be bluffing, and it must be clear that it is not.
For four decades, the greatest threat of nuclear conflict emerged from the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall set events in train that ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The first major nuclear proliferation threat--of seeing four nuclear-weapon states emerge full-blown at the end of the Cold War--was averted when U.S. negotiators persuaded the newly formed nations of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to relinquish all of their nuclear weapons to Russia. The second threat--that Russia would become a source of nuclear weapons proliferation from the diversion of weapon scientists and fissile materials to hostile forces--spawned a series of U.S. initiatives under the seminal Nunn-Lugar legislation aimed at promoting the safe and secure dismantlement of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal.
North Korea posed the third great nuclear threat. Addressing that threat as a matter of national urgency led to the concerted effort described in these pages. The urgency was dictated not only by the dire consequences that unbounded North Korean plutonium production could have produced but also by the impending review and extension conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], the cornerstone of global efforts to combat the spread of nuclear weapons. Had the United States failed to contain the North Korean threat in time, it would have torn a hole in the regime just at the moment when the nations of the world were gathering in New York to decide whether to extend the treaty indefinitely, or to let it lapse.
The Agreed Framework permitted the NPT conference to proceed with a North Korea that had reaffirmed its commitment to the treaty, accepted IAEA monitoring to ensure the continuation of the nuclear freeze, and promised ultimate North Korean acceptance of inspections to clarify remaining questions about its past nuclear activities. The accord earned the support of the IAEA, and the NPT was successfully extended indefinitely and without condition, by consensus, in May 1995.35
The response of the United States to the North Korean nuclear challenge was pragmatic, guided by the overarching objective to stop Pyongyang's access to more separated plutonium. It was principled, gaining support of the world community through the UN Security Council, the IAEA, and other forums to support U.S. efforts to persuade Pyongyang to curtail and accept international limits on its nuclear activities. It was complex, involving constant scrutiny of U.S. interests and the effects of shifting events, continual consultations with friends and allies, and a difficult and protracted negotiation with the North Koreans.
Above all, the U.S. response was guided by a determination to prevent the nightmare of nuclear destruction threatened by the North Korean program. The U.S. officials involved in negotiating the Agreed Framework shared a fundamental commitment to advancing the nation's security. None would have advocated support for any accord that did not meet a simple test: would Americans be safer with the Agreed Framework than without it? As public servants, a decade ago we answered that question in favor of the Agreed Framework. As authors today, we reach the same conclusion.
That the same question--will Americans be safer or not?--should guide the evaluation of any proposed U.S. response to the renewed nuclear threat in Korea. If grounded in a policy that forces North Korea to choose between a path of compliance with--or defiance of--the global norm against nuclear weapons proliferation, that question can bring the world to a safer future. North Korea will only be forced to make that choice if the path of defiance inexorably brings pressure that threatens the continued viability of the Kim Jong Il regime, while the path of compliance offers the regime the security assurances and improved relations with the international community that it seeks. We wish those entrusted with our national security well as they make the fateful choices that will shape the outcome of the current crisis. The stakes could not be higher.


Joel S. Wit, a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as the State Department coordinator for the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. Daniel Poneman, a principal at the Scowcroft Group, was a member of the National Security Council from 1990-1996, including three years (1993-1996) as senior director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls. Robert Gallucci, currently dean of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, was the lead U.S. negotiator with North Korea in 1993 and 1994. From 1998-2001, Ambassador Gallucci held the position of special envoy to deal with the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

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U.S. Mulled Nuclear Strikes On NK Army in 1978
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Nautilus Institute in California reported Friday that in March 1978, during the Carter administration, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), an affiliated organization of the U.S. National Defense Ministry, was examining how to use tactical nuclear weapons to coerce North Korea on the battlefield.
The institute announced a study by Science Applications Inc. concluding that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be most effective against DPRK armored units attacking south of the DMZ.

The study suggested that at least 30 airburst nuclear weapons would be used in an area only nine miles from Seoul and some 15 miles south of the DMZ. The Nautilus Institute indicated that around the time the DNA was looking into the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the Carter administration was struggling with its withdrawal policy for U.S. forces in Korea.

(Joo Yong-jung, midway@chosun.com )



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Closing Pandora's Box: Pakistan's Role in Nuclear Proliferation

Sharon Squassoni

On February 4, 2004, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, self-styled father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, appeared on Pakistani television to apologize to his nation. Revealing few details, Khan stated that a government investigation, which followed "disturbing disclosures and evidence by some countries to international agencies" (read "Iran and Libya to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]"), confirmed "alleged proliferation activities by certain Pakistanis and foreigners over the last two decades." Khan admitted the allegations were true and said "there was never ever any kind of authorization for these activities by any government official." Pakistani officials a few days earlier claimed that Khan provided technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.[1]

On February 5, Khan was pardoned by Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, with no mention of confiscating the millions of dollars he had acquired in more than 20 years of nuclear moonlighting. When asked about Khan's pardon, U.S. Department of State spokesperson Richard Boucher replied, "I don't think it's a matter for the United States to sit in judgment on."

In fact, it is critically important for the United States to judge whether Pakistan has adequately addressed Khan's proliferation behavior. The administration's failure to do so may be symptomatic of a deeper problem in its nonproliferation strategy. By focusing on "hostile states and terrorists"[2] as the main proliferation threat, the Bush strategy ignores friendly countries, such as Pakistan, that host terrorists, place insufficient controls on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and are threatened with political destabilization. Ironically, the threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction is probably greater in Pakistan than in Iraq, Libya, North Korea, or Iran--all targets of Bush counterproliferation policy. Even more, Pakistan has remained locked in a nuclear confrontation with India, which has several times escalated to the point of all-out war.

The Khan case illustrates a practical reality: separating "good guys" and "bad guys" in this fashion will not work over the long term. The reason is the phenomenon of secondary proliferation. Whereas 20 years ago we worried about single states acquiring the bomb, Khan has raised the stakes. Although some may argue that Khan acted independently and that his role is unlikely ever to be replicated, Pakistan's continuing struggle with Islamic fundamentalism makes the prospect of rogue nuclear-weapon scientists even more problematic than government-directed proliferation. If Khan is not unique, how effective is the Bush administration's targeted counterproliferation policy? Can tweaking supplier controls, as President George W. Bush recently suggested, stop this kind of proliferation? What practical routes are left for slowing nuclear proliferation?

Is Khan's Role Unique?

The press has focused on the sexier aspects of Khan's story: money launderers in Dubai, Swiss and British intermediaries, plants in Kuala Lumpur, and shipments intercepted in Mediterranean ports. Yet, nuclear proliferation is no stranger to intrigue, spies, and foreign travel. What may be most shocking about the unfolding tale of Khan's nuclear weapons marketing is how utterly familiar it sounds. To be sure, leaks of high technology used to emanate mostly from North America, Europe, and Russia.[3] Sources now have expanded to Asia and Eurasia, despite attempts to strengthen supplier controls and nuclear safeguards in the wake of Iraq's embarrassing nuclear shopping spree before the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

If the modes of covert nuclear commerce appear to have changed little, what is particularly egregious about the Khan case? One answer may lie in Khan and his associates' apparent ability to provide "one-stop shopping."[4] Khan sold blueprints; components; full centrifuge assemblies; uranium hexafluoride feedstock; and, from some accounts, a nuclear-weapon design.[5] If he had desired, Khan also could have provided some missile technology because Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) developed missiles in collaboration with North Korea.[6] Was Khan able to provide this one-stop shopping because of his unique position within the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and heroic popular image or because the Pakistani government helped?

Khan's assistance to Iran in centrifuge uranium-enrichment apparently began in the late 1980s and continued at least until the mid-1990s.[7] Assistance to Libya began in the early 1990s and may have continued into 2002. Beyond blueprints, components, full assemblies of centrifuges, and low-enriched uranium, Libya also received--startlingly--a nuclear weapons design.[8] In both cases, it is clear that Khan provided technology for an advanced centrifuge design (the P-2).[9] There is no confirmation that the nuclear-weapon design Libya received in 2001 or 2002 is from Pakistan, but some sources have reported that the design contained Chinese text and step-by-step instructions for assembling a vintage 1960s, highly enriched uranium (HEU) implosion device, which could indicate that Khan passed on a design that Pakistan is long rumored to have received from China.[10]

Whether Khan gave North Korea nuclear-weapon-related technology or equipment is still disputed. U.S. officials and sources close to Khan have said he did; the Pakistani and North Korean governments have denied any technology transfers.[11] One popular theory is that Pakistan bartered uranium-enrichment technology for missile technology from North Korea, but Musharraf has stated that "whatever we bought from North Korea is with money."[12] A Pakistani official involved in Khan's investigation reportedly said North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997 to 2000.[13] Separately, other evidence points to Pakistani nuclear assistance. As far back as 1991, a German intelligence investigation concluded that Iraq, and possibly Iran and North Korea, obtained uranium-melting information from Pakistan in the late 1980s.[14]

Investigating Khan

The Pakistani government began to investigate allegations of nuclear transfers in 2000.[15] The Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) raided a plane chartered by Khan bound for North Korea but found nothing. Further, although Musharraf admitted that he "forcibly retired" Khan from the KRL in 2001 to prevent him from transferring more nuclear secrets, Khan ultimately was undone not by his government, but by his clients. Forced to prove to the IAEA that it had not enriched uranium to HEU levels, Iran revealed the existence of foreign suppliers in October 2003. Iran had held back information on the procurement network for months. Apparently, Khan had written letters to Iranian clients, urging them to destroy some of their facilities and tell the IAEA that their Pakistani contacts were dead.[16] Libya's decision to give up its WMD programs voluntarily, however, unleashed a torrent of information about Pakistani assistance, forcing the Pakistani government to conduct a two-month investigation.

The Pakistani government has been slow to admit that there were nuclear transfers and quick to deny any official complicity. Initially, official Pakistani responses ranged from "our nuclear weapons are secure" to "there is no smoking gun."[17] In December 2003, the Foreign Ministry spokesman claimed that Pakistan never authorized transfers but that individuals may have been involved in transfers to Iran. On January 6, 2004, when asked about transfers to Libya, Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed said "This is total madness." An interview in February 2004 with Musharraf noted that Pakistan's investigation had not uncovered evidence of transfers to countries other than Iran and Libya."[18]

The structure of the nuclear establishment in Pakistan and the key role of the military, as well as long-standing ties between Pakistan and all three countries, raise doubts that Khan acted completely without government knowledge. Pakistan's military is widely believed to control the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Musharraf has taken pains to clarify that Pakistan established civilian control of the nuclear weapons program (embodied in himself) under the National Command Authority, but until Musharraf steps down as army chief of staff, this distinction may be irrelevant. Moreover, a key feature of Pakistan's export control regulations allows for an explicit exemption for Ministry of Defense agencies, which suggests that weapons programs under military leadership could skirt domestic export control laws.[19]

Khan has alleged that military officials, including former Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS), knew of the transfers. One account claims that equipment to Iran was transferred at the request of the late General Imtiaz Ali between 1988 and 1990.[20] Another states that Musharraf was aware of aid to North Korea, that General Mirzla Aslam Beg knew about aid to Iran, and that two other COAS (Generals Jehangir Karamat and Abdul Waheed) knew of aid to North Korea.[21] General Beg long has had a reputation for being an Islamist and an admirer of the Iranian revolution. Beg officially denied knowledge of aid to Iran, although former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said she was approached several times from 1988 to 1990 (the period when Beg was COAS) by military officials and scientists who wanted to export nuclear technology. According to Bhutto, "it certainly was their (scientists') belief that they could earn tons of money if they did this." But Bhutto had established a policy in December 1988 not to export nuclear technology.[22] Bhutto also said that "no Pakistani thought Mr. Khan was acting alone."[23]

Reports of extensive official cooperation between Pakistan and the three countries lend credence to claims that Pakistan's government might have known of transfers. Pakistan reportedly signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran in 1986, although the terms of that agreement are unknown, and Iranian scientists received training in Pakistan in 1988. Libyan funding of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program in the early years long has been alleged.[24] Pakistan's well-documented missile cooperation with North Korea beginning in the early 1990s may have provided either a convenient excuse for rogue nuclear scientists to ply their trade or sparked the plan for a barter arrangement as Pakistani foreign currency reserves fell dangerously low in 1996.[25]

Khan reportedly made more than $100 million from selling nuclear technology to Libya alone.[26] Musharraf has stressed the role of greed, but Khan reportedly told investigators he hoped to deflect attention from Pakistan's nuclear program and support other Muslim countries (i.e., Iran and Libya) by providing nuclear assistance.[27] In the late 1980s, when cooperation with Iran allegedly began, the argument for deflecting attention from Pakistan could have been plausible, particularly as pressure from the United States grew with each new revelation of Pakistan's nuclear progress.

U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan

For 30 years, the U.S. government has tried to restrain Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons using such tools as diplomacy, aid, and interdiction. When those failed, sanctions were developed specifically against Pakistan to slow its nuclear program (see sidebar). U.S. policy implementation, however, has been inconsistent, particularly when other U.S. national security interests at times have taken precedence. Less than six months after cutting off aid in 1979 to Pakistan for its uranium-enrichment activities, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and negotiations to resume aid to Islamabad began. In 1990, after the Soviets pulled out, President George H.W. Bush determined he could not certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device, and so aid was cut off again, this time for several years. In 1998, aid was cut off following Pakistan's nuclear tests, but this lasted less than a year. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed legislation allowing Pakistan to circumvent the remaining restrictions on aid (related then to its foreign debt arrears and 1999 military coup).

Over time, the U.S. threshold of proliferation tolerance has risen from Pakistan's acquisition of technology to its possession of a nuclear device and then to nuclear testing (in 1998). Has the threshold now risen to the point where the United States is seeking to sidestep laws aimed at penalizing states that supply nuclear technologies, rather than those that receive such aid? This could explain why the United States has not strenuously pursued the question of potential Pakistani government cooperation in Khan's activities. The State Department concluded in a letter to key members of Congress on March 12, 2003, that "the administration carefully reviewed the facts relating to the possible transfer of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea, and decided that they do not warrant the imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws." Given administration statements alleging such nuclear transfers, the United States appears to have accepted Islamabad's explanation that it had no role.

Pinning the blame on individuals is a time-tested and obvious circumvention (? la the 1996 provision of Chinese ring magnets to Pakistan, which was not deemed a sanctionable offense). Although individuals engaging in proliferation are barred under U.S. law from receiving U.S. government contracts, there are few other ways for the United States to punish them. Nonetheless, a determination that Libya and Iran received such equipment, even from an individual, might not relieve Bush of an obligation to make a determination and then perhaps waive sanctions. In particular, receiving a nuclear weapons design is a trigger for cutting off aid under Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act. In the case of both Libya and Iran, new sanctions would add little to the broader burden already imposed on them by virtue of their status as a state sponsors of terrorism. With respect to Pakistan, draft Senate authorizing legislation on the foreign affairs budget (S. 2144) currently contains a waiver of sanctions (including those for proliferation) previously in force.

The line in the sand appears to be drawn now at the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to terrorists. Unfortunately, such activities are incredibly difficult to deter, detect, identify, and stop. The 2002 U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction identifies this problem as "one of the most difficult challenges we face." Whether the threat of terrorists acquiring and using nuclear weapons is greater now than before is unclear, but the ability to influence terrorists in this regard, in contrast to states, remains extremely limited.

U.S. officials have intimated they knew about Khan's network for several years, and the U.S. government seems to have been quietly working with the Pakistani government to limit the damage from Khan's nuclear network.[28] Shortly after Khan's dismissal in 2001, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage reportedly stated that "people who were employed by the nuclear agency and have retired" could be spreading nuclear technology to other states, including North Korea.[29] Nonetheless, after U.S. intelligence officials leaked the news in 2002 that Pakistani enrichment technology was transferred to North Korea, Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that "President Musharraf gave me his assurance, as he has previously, that Pakistan is not doing anything of that nature....The past is the past."[30] But Powell put Musharraf on notice: "I have made clear to him that any, any sort of contact between Pakistan and North Korea we believe would be improper, inappropriate, and would have consequences."[31]

Clearly, another key factor here is the priority of counterterrorism over counterproliferation policy in the Bush administration. In 2002, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer was asked whether countries that provided assistance to North Korea on the enrichment program would risk being cut off from U.S. assistance and he responded that "September 11th changed the world." Two months later, the United States decided to impose sanctions on North Korea for sending Scud missiles to Yemen, yet waived sanctions against Yemen for receiving them. The reason: According to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, "because of the commitments that they [Yemen] had made and in consideration of their support for the war on terrorism."

Missiles to Yemen may be one thing, but tacitly condoning past nuclear weapons cooperation with three state sponsors of terrorism is counterproductive. Secretary of State Powell's announcement on March 18th that Pakistan would be designated a "major non-NATO ally," a step that facilitates military cooperation and assistance, reinforces the impression that for the Bush administration, counterterrorism trumps counterproliferation cooperation.

Next Steps

There is no telling how much information Khan's 12-page confession contains, whether it is accurate or complete, or how much will be revealed either to the IAEA or other states. So far, Musharraf has denied the need for an international investigation or any international inspections of Pakistani nuclear facilities.[32] He has said he will share some information with the IAEA, and U.S. officials apparently are content with that approach.[33]

The main U.S. response so far has been to focus on closing down Khan's covert nuclear network. On February 11, 2004, Bush unveiled new efforts aimed partly to accomplish this.[34] Briefly, Bush proposes to expand interdiction efforts (under the Proliferation Security Initiative) to "shut down labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets;" criminalize proliferation through a new U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution; expand cooperative threat reduction measures to states such as Libya; ban enrichment and reprocessing capabilities beyond those states that already have them; make the Additional Protocol (to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]) a prerequisite for nuclear-related imports; and create a special committee at the IAEA to investigate compliance.

Strengthening export controls is laudable and necessary, but these measures, even taken together, are unlikely to prevent another Khan affair. Above all, supplier controls rely on the fundamental premise that slowing the leakage of technology (which itself is inevitable) buys time for the world community to persuade states not to acquire nuclear weapons. This premise is undone by the emergence of a supplier who can supply it all. In one sense, Khan's success is the natural result of a well-known NPT loophole: states outside the treaty that have acquired nuclear weapons. Pakistan, India, Israel, and possibly North Korea are likely to remain outside the NPT and therefore are not bound by the treaty's prohibitions on sharing nuclear weapons technology.

Despite this, the United States and other supplier countries have their own means to impose penalties for actions that undermine the NPT (see sidebar), as well as ample carrots to offer Pakistan. The Bush administration has proposed a $3 billion aid package to Pakistan over the next five years. At a minimum, the United States should condition this aid on requiring Pakistan to give the United States full access to Khan, as well as to improve transparency, export controls, and personnel reliability in its nuclear program.

Conclusion

By treating Libya, the "axis of evil" countries, and Pakistan as separate and distinct problems, the United States is missing an opportunity to develop a common and consistent nuclear nonproliferation policy.

Events in Iraq, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and North Korea all point to the lesson that nothing can substitute for on-site inspection of suspicious activities. Inspections in Iraq failed to come up with evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program, whether conducted by the IAEA and the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) or the Iraq Survey Group. Inspections in Iran have slowly revealed capabilities Iran had been loathe to admit and which were not revealed by overhead imagery alone. Inspections in Libya surprised some with revelations of centrifuge and weapons design procurement but basically confirmed long-held views that Libya's nuclear weapons program did not amount to much. Finally, the lack of inspections in North Korea has left the United States guessing about North Korean enrichment capabilities.

Although Pakistan has rejected the NPT and any kind of international inspections into Khan's activities, there may be ways of introducing more transparency into its nuclear program. Serious discussions with Pakistan on export control only began in 2003 and the Bush administration has asked for just $1 million in the FY05 State Department budget for export control assistance, a tiny fraction of the $700 million in assistance to Pakistan for next year. U.S. export control assistance should be expanded, with a particular focus on eliminating exemptions for Pakistani defense agencies and assisting Pakistan to adhere to Nuclear Suppliers' Group guidelines. The United States could also offer specific assistance in physical protection of nuclear material and personnel security under the auspices of a cooperative threat reduction program. Nonetheless, even if Pakistan accepted this offer, this may not produce adequate transparency. [35]

Ultimately, it would be far better to get international inspections at Pakistani facilities and to draw Pakistan into a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). U.S. policy has supported such a treaty since 1993, but little diplomatic capital has been expended on it. Pakistan has said it will support an FMCT. At a minimum, a cutoff agreement would place all enrichment and reprocessing worldwide (given universal adherence) under inspection. In this way, it would require inspections at facilities that have operated covertly for many years, opening them up to international scrutiny and making it more difficult for covert supplier networks to flourish. A treaty also could go further and close down unneeded production capacity or incorporate international management or control of fissile material.

Finally, although Pakistan's current importance to the war on terrorism makes U.S. sanctions unlikely, the United States needs to make clear that there will be severe consequences for further transgressions, regardless of the counterterrorism issue. U.S. policymakers also need to reevaluate their tepid support for multilateral nonproliferation approaches. If anything, the globalization of the black nuclear market should provide a warning that one country cannot halt this problem alone.

Retracing Khan's Path

Abdul Qadeer Khan's unlikely route to nuclear stardom began in 1972. As a trained metallurgist subcontracted to the fledgling URENCO consortium, he was asked to translate classified documents on centrifuge technology from their original German into Dutch. Khan's access, as well as overt Pakistani procurement attempts, began to attract notice from Dutch authorities in late 1975. Transferred to a less sensitive position, Khan fled Holland for his native Pakistan in December 1975. His intimate knowledge of suppliers and a weak international export control regime allowed him to build a centrifuge enrichment plant at Sihala in just a few years.[1] The construction and operation of the Kahuta enrichment facility, known then as the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL), followed. Khan's hard work was rewarded in 1981 when President Muhammed Zia ul-Haq renamed the ERL as the Khan Research Laboratory (KRL).[2] According to some reports, a competition was encouraged between the KRL and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) to develop two routes to the bomb--HEU and plutonium. Khan himself has described his activities as supporting the PAEC's reactor development program, enriching uranium to use as fuel in the Chasma nuclear reactor.

By many accounts, the KRL and Khan were given remarkable autonomy. This independence only grew after the uranium-enrichment program, once thought of as a fallback in case the French reprocessing plant at Chasma fell through (which it did in 1978 under strong U.S. pressure), became the cornerstone of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.[3] One aide close to President Gen. Pervez Musharraf stated, "Khan had a complete blank check. He could do anything. He could go anywhere. He could buy anything at any price."[4] Musharraf himself has noted that "there was a covert program for maybe 30 years, and there was a lot of autonomy given to the organization and individuals running the program. There was a lot of chance for leakages."[5]

A critical question is why the Pakistani government permitted this autonomy. Politics likely played a key role. After taking power in 1999, Musharraf began to receive reports of corruption (skimming government contracts and nepotism) at Kahuta.[6] Khan's lavish lifestyle, despite his modest salary, was "the worst-kept secret in town," said one Pakistani official.[7] Still, Musharraf did not remove him as KRL head until 2001, allegedly under considerable pressure from the United States. Even then, he was appointed special adviser to Musharraf. After Khan's confession, Musharraf called him a personal hero and a hero to the nation.[8] Musharraf declared that, "since [Khan] had acquired a larger-than-life figure for himself, one had to pardon him to satisfy the public."[9]

Khan further cemented his importance to the entire nuclear weapons program through KRL development of missiles in the 1980s. Reportedly, a competition was encouraged between the plutonium team (PAEC), working toward Chinese-derived nuclear-capable missiles, and the HEU team (KRL), collaborating with North Korea on a Scud derivative.[10] Khan's frequent trips abroad for "legitimate" missile cooperation with North Korea might have provided cover for his nuclear deals.

The nuclear program prior to 1998, according to Pakistani officials, was handled by just a few people at the top.[11] Despite Pakistan's claims to have tightened controls by creating the National Command Authority (NCA) in February 2000, high-level officials still seem to be exempt. Reportedly, key people in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program are screened every two years (since 2000) by the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), Military Intelligence, the Intelligence Bureau, and the Strategic Plan Division of the NCA. However, "top-level people (including scientists) are controlled by their organizations and not psychologically screened."[12] Musharraf has suggested in interviews that it is virtually impossible to stop security breaches by institution leaders. Referring to himself, he stated, "If there was a security problem here and if I myself am involved in the breach, do you think anyone is going to check me?"[13] This analogy might reflect the unique status of Khan, a fundamental flaw in Pakistani nuclear security procedures, or both. Moreover, it is yet to be established that some or all of these exchanges were not matters of national policy.

NOTES

1. For an excellent account, see Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books, 1981).

2. Simon Henderson, "We Can Do It Ourselves," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (September 1993), p. 27.

3. The KRL began to produce enriched uranium in 1984 and, by some estimates, HEU by 1986, whereas plutonium for weapons did not become available until after the 1998 nuclear tests. See Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1988), p. 143.

4. "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network," The New York Times, February 12, 2004.

5. "Q&A: Pervez Musharraf; Confronting the Nuclear Underworld," The Washington Post, January 25, 2004.

6. "Delicate Dance for Musharraf in Nuclear Case," The New York Times, February 8, 2004.

7. "Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe," The Washington Post, February 3, 2004.

8. "General Defiant in Face of Scandal Over Scientist's Nuclear Secrets," Financial Times, February 18, 2004.

9. "Pakistani Leader Suspected Moves by Atomic Expert," The New York Times, February 10, 2004.

10. Simon Henderson, "Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. Policy," PolicyWatch, no. 826, January 12, 2004.

11. See report from a visit to Pakistan by Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini in 2001, "Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy in Pakistan: A concise report of a visit by Landau Network-Centro Volta."

12. Ibid.

13. General Defiant in Face of Scandal Over Scientist's Nuclear Secrets," Financial Times, February 18, 2004.


Retracing Khan's Path


During the past three decades, the United States has imposed and lifted sanctions on Pakistan many times. The changes have reflected modifications in U.S. foreign policy priorities as much as shifts in Pakistan's nonproliferation behavior.


1976 Congress amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) to bar aid to countries that transfer uranium-enrichment or reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology in violation of specified conditions (Symington amendment, Sec. 669, FAA).

1977 Congress amends FAA to bar aid for countries that detonate a nuclear explosive (Glenn amendment, Sec. 670, FAA, which also covers reprocessing transfers). Aid suspended in September

1977 because Pakistan is found to be seeking reprocessing technology from French companies.

1978 Aid resumed in October 1978 after France cancels reprocessing deal.

1979 Aid cut off in April 1979 because of Pakistan's enrichment activities (Symington invoked).

1980 Negotiations to resume aid begin after Soviets invade Afghanistan.

1981 Aid resumed (Symington waived by Congress (Sec. 620E, FAA) of Sec. 669) for Pakistan but restrictions added for transfers of nuclear weapons and design information.

1985 Solarz amendment (amends Sec. 670, FAA) bars aid for illegal export from the United States of any material, equipment, or technology that would contribute significantly to the ability of a country to build a nuclear explosive device. Pressler amendment (Sec. 620E(e), FAA) prohibits the transfer of military equipment or technology to Pakistan specifically unless the president certifies to the Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed U.S. aid program would reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess such a device.

1987 Symington waiver expires; renewed for 30 months.

1990 Aid suspended under Pressler amendment. Symington waiver expires.

1995 Brown amendment relaxes cut-off so that only military aid and transfers barred.

1998 May: aid suspended after nuclear tests. July: Congress provides waiver for wheat purchases. Aid resumes for one year, except military assistance, dual-use exports, and military sales (India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (Brownback I).

1999 Aid resumes permanently (Brownback II gives president permanent waiver authority for proliferation sanctions). However, foreign debt arrears and military coup bar aid to Pakistan.

2001 Presidential executive order lifts remaining restrictions.


NOTES

1. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, "Key Pakistani Is Said to Admit Atom Transfers," The New York Times, February 2, 2004.

2. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002), p. 1.

3. A 1982 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of India, Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan, concluded that from 1978 to 1981 India acquired technology from France, the United States, and the United Kingdom; Iraq from Brazil, Germany, France, Italy, Niger, Norway, Portugal and Russia; Libya from Argentina, Finland, India, Niger, the United States, and Russia; and Pakistan from Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia. By the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland were also found to have supplied Iraq with nuclear technologies. See "Who Armed Iraq?" The New York Times, July 18, 1993.

4. Pakistan's investigation also included Mohammed Farooq, who supervised the KRL's contacts with foreign suppliers; Yasin Chohan, a KRL metallurgist; Major Islam ul-Haq, a personal staff officer; Nazeer Ahmed, a KRL director; and Saeed Ahmed, head of centrifuge design. Between 11 and 25 KRL employees were questioned, as well as the generals in charge of KRL security, Generals Beg and Karamat. Simon Henderson, "Link Leaks," National Review Online, January 19, 2004.

5. See Karen Yourish and Delano D'Souza, "Father of Pakistani Bomb Sold Nuclear Secrets," Arms Control Today, March 2004, p. 22.

6. In fact, U.S. sanctions were imposed in early 2003 on the KRL for receiving MTCR Category I missiles from North Korea.

7. Iran told the IAEA its centrifuge enrichment program began in 1987; Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, who briefed journalists on February 1, 2004, on Khan's confession, reportedly stated that cooperation began in 1989 and Khan transferred technology from 1989 to 1991. "Key Pakistani Is Said to Admit Atom Transfers," The New York Times, February 2, 2004. An IAEA report states that Iran received P-2 drawings from "foreign sources" in 1994. IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," GOV/2004/11, February 24, 2004, p. 8 (hereinafter GOV/2004/11 report).

8. An IAEA report states that in 1997 foreign manufacturers provided 20 pre-assembled L-1 (equivalent to P-1) centrifuges and components for an additional 200 L-1 centrifuges, including process gas feeding and withdrawal systems, UF6 cylinders, and frequency converters. IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," GOV/2004/12, February 20, 2004 (hereinafter GOV/2004/12 report).

9. Libya received two of the P-2-type centrifuges in 2000 and placed an order for 10,000 more. Iran has claimed that it received P-2 plans, but no centrifuge components, and tried to develop a carbon-composite rotor on its own, with no success. GOV/2004/11 report and GOV/2004/12 report.

10. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan Figure," The New York Times, February 4, 2004; Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, "Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China," The Washington Post, February 15, 2004.

11. Asked by Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) what the United States knows about Pakistan's involvement in helping North Korea, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage replied that "[w]e know it's both ways and we know a good bit about a North Korean-Pakistan relationship." Richard Armitage, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 4, 2003.

12. Farhan Bokhari, Steven Fidler, and Edward Luce, "Pakistan Rejects Nuclear Inspection," Financial Times, February 18, 2004. For additional evidence related to a barter arrangement, see Sharon Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan," CRS Report for Congress, RL 31900, March 11, 2004.

13. Mubashir Zaidi, "Scientist Claimed Nuclear Equipment Was Old, Official Says," The Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2004.

14. Mark Hibbs, "Agencies Trace Some Iraqi URENCO Know-How to Pakistan Re-Export," Nucleonics Week, November 28, 1991, pp. 1, 7-8. See also Mark Hibbs, "CIA Assessment on DPRK Presumes Massive Outside Help on Centrifuges," Nuclear Fuel, November 25, 2002.

15. "Pakistan Informed U.S. of `Personal' Nuclear Technology Transfer: Report," Agence France-Presse, December 25, 2003. According to this report, the United States asked the Pakistani government to look into alleged nuclear transfers to North Korea, and Pakistani officials concluded from the deposit of large sums of money in Kahuta scientists' bank accounts that nuclear technology had indeed been transferred on an individual basis.

16. Ibid.

17. Glenn Kessler, "Pakistan's N. Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny; Aid to Nuclear Arms Bid May Be Recent," The Washington Post, November 13, 2002. Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, reportedly stated that "[n]o material, no technology ever has been exported to North Korea "and "[n]obody can tell us if there is evidence, no one is challenging our word. There is no smoking gun."

18. Bokhari, Fidler, and Luce, "Pakistan Rejects Nuclear Inspection," Financial Times, February 18, 2004.

19. Anupam Srivastava and Seema Gahlaut, "Curbing Proliferation from Emerging Suppliers: Export Controls in India and Pakistan," Arms Control Today, September 2003, pp. 12-16.

20. "Nuke Leak May Cost Pak $3b," The Times of India Online, February 5, 2004.

21. John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe," The Washington Post, February 3, 2004.

22. See David Rohde, "General Denies Letting Secrets of A-Bomb Out of Pakistan," The New York Times, January 27, 2004; Steven Fidler, "Bhutto `Rejected Request to Sell N-Technology,'" Financial Times, February 24, 2004.

23. On the other hand, Bhutto stated she did not think it probable that centrifuge parts were exported from Pakistan to Iran from 1994 to 1995 (while she was prime minister), despite revelations of exactly that in a Malaysian police report connected to the Iran investigation.

24. Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books, 1981).

25. Daniel A. Pinkston, "When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin?" http://cns.mis.edu.

26. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Pakistani's Nuclear Earnings: $100 Million," The New York Times, March 16, 2004.

27. John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe," The Washington Post, February 3, 2004.

28. CIA director George Tenet stated that U.S. intelligence had penetrated Khan's network, including its subsidiaries, scientists, front companies, agents, finances, and manufacturing plants, in a February 5, 2004, speech he gave at Georgetown University, available at www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/index.html.

29. Steven Fidler and Edward Luce "U.S. Fears North Korea Could Gain Nuclear Capability through Pakistan," Financial Times, June 1, 2001.

30. Carla Anne Robbins, "North Korea Got a Little Help from Neighbors--Secret Nuclear Program Tapped Russian Suppliers and Pakistani Know-How," Wall Street Journal Europe, October 21, 2002; ABC's This Week, October 20, 2002 (transcript).

31. Ahmed Rashid, "US Grows Unhappier with Pakistan--Despite Official Friendship, Three Areas of Contention Are Straining the Alliance," The Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2002.

32. Bokhari, Fidler, and Luce, "Pakistan Rejects Nuclear Inspection," Financial Times, February 18, 2004.

33. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated in the daily press briefing on February 17, 2004, that "we look forward to hearing from the Pakistani government about the facts as they have developed them during the course of their investigation."

34. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html. See also Wade Boese, "Bush Outlines Proposals to Stem Proliferation," Arms Control Today, March 2004, pp. 24-25.

35. For specific impediments to providing cooperative threat reduction assistance to Pakistan and India, see Sharon Squassoni, "Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan," CRS Report for Congress, RL 31589.

Sharon Squassoni is a specialist in national defense issues with the Congressional Research Service. The views presented here are the author's own and do not reflect those of the Congressional Research Service or the Library of Congress.

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US prods UN for a nuclear export rule
Measure sought to halt the spread of weapons data
By Farah Stockman, Globe Staff, 4/4/2004

WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration is pressing for a UN resolution demanding that all countries pass strict laws on nuclear exports, according to a draft of the resolution being circulated to the Security Council.

The initiative is taking shape as US officials acknowledge that no members of an international nuclear-smuggling network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist, have been brought to justice. Some members, the officials said, are free to continue operating their businesses months after being exposed. In many cases, inadequate laws do not even make their activities illegal.

At least four of nine suspects identified as part of Khan's network had prior connections to illicit sales, but none are facing prosecution, according to interviews with authorities and information from documents around the world. Some details came from a Malaysian police report that identifies business executives who worked with Khan on Libya's nuclear weapons program.

Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, confessed in February to selling nuclear secrets to Libya, North Korea, and Iran. He was pardoned by Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf.

In Washington, US officials touting the proposed UN resolution say outdated domestic laws and lax attitudes toward proliferation in parts of Asia and Europe have frustrated efforts to bring Khan's network to justice.

They say the passage of the UN resolution would close a loophole in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which addresses the actions of states, not of individuals.

US officials began working on the resolution in September, as President Bush made a speech at the United Nations calling for stricter nuclear export laws. At the time, Khan's network was not publicly known, but it was known to the president and it bolstered his decision to push the resolution, according to a Washington-based administration official who said it was his office's policy to request that his name be withheld.

Another Washington-based US official, who also asked not to be identified, said the resolution was part of a push to persuade countries to tighten export laws in part because of what had been learned in the Khan case.

"There are a number of countries that recognize that laws that might have been appropriate a decade or two decades ago aren't going to work in the 21st century," the official said.

The resolution, which directs countries to pass domestic laws criminalizing the export and manufacture of nuclear components and other weapons of mass destruction, could have considerable teeth: The draft cites Chapter VII of the UN charter, which gives the power to invoke sanctions and the use of force to require countries to comply, although such measures are not stated explicitly.

Security Council diplomats said they expected the resolution to pass, perhaps with modifications that might weaken it.

Specialists said the move did not tackle the most abused loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- that countries are given access to nuclear technology if they promise to use it for peaceful purposes. But some said the resolution was unexpectedly sweeping.

"Strange as it may seem, there is no international prohibition today against having a group of terrorists move into a country and set up shop to make nuclear bombs, nor is there a prohibition against a group of entrepreneurs doing the same thing to make money," said Arthur Shulman, a research associate at the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

A look at the evidence against the businessmen who allegedly worked with Khan reflects the uphill battle that investigators face.

Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman whom Bush identified as Khan's "chief financial officer and money launderer" set up a factory in Malaysia to produce components for nuclear centrifuges to be shipped to Libya.

When US and British intelligence officials brought the case to the Malaysian special branch in November, Tahir was questioned by Malaysian police, who compiled an extensive report.

But police released him, concluding that his actions did not violate Malaysian law.

Malaysia is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which regulates the government's activities in the nuclear field. But the country's export laws do not regulate a private individual's manufacture of technology such as the nuclear centrifuge components that Tahir was selling, according to the report, which Malaysian authorities released.

Tahir, who became friends with Khan in the 1980s while selling air-conditioning parts to Khan's laboratory in Pakistan, had been suspected in 1999 for involvement in the sale of nuclear technology to Khan. He was never arrested.

Urs Tinner, a Swiss consultant, was also identified by the Malaysian police report, which indicates that Tinner allegedly set up the factory in Malaysia and outfitted it with imported machine tools. Tinner is being investigated by Swiss authorities for possible violations of a 1998 law that prevents Swiss citizens from aiding in the production of a nuclear weapon, according to Othmar Wyss, head of export control at the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs.

Tinner will not be prosecuted unless Swiss authorities can prove he knew what was being produced at the factory. He has denied knowing anything.

"It is very difficult for us to prove that he knew," Wyss said in a telephone interview.

Tinner was investigated in 1991 when valves he sent to Singapore were routed to Iraq, but Swiss authorities could not prove he knew their final destination, Wyss said.

In an interview with The Wall Street Journal Europe, Tinner said he did not know that the factory he helped set up was meant to make centrifuge parts for Libya's nuclear weapons program. "I had no idea what was going on," he was quoted as saying. "If I had been working in the final production, where one could see the final product, then I would be guilty. But I didn't know what we were making."

Gotthard Lerch, a German man identified in the police report as having tried to supply pipes to the Libyan nuclear program, had served time for proliferation, according to an official at the German Embassy. It was unclear if Lerch's jail sentence was a result of the activities mentioned in the Malaysian report. No telephone number for Lerch could be found.

Two Turkish nationals who also allegedly supplied Libya's nuclear program are being scrutinized by investigators, but have not been arrested, according to Tolga Ucak, an attache at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey.

Peter Griffin, a British businessman, allegedly supplied a furnace and a floor plan to Libya's nuclear weapons program, according to the police report. It said he was active as late as 2001, supplying a lathe machine and arranging for Libyan technicians to travel to Spain to learn how to use it.

Griffin, former owner of Gulf Technical Industries in Dubai, has not been arrested, according to a British official in Washington, D. C., who declined to comment further on his case. Attempts to reach him at the business were unsuccessful. Griffin's son, Paul, who took over the company, told the newspaper The Guardian, "We have been framed."

But Shulman, a research associate at the Wisconsin Project, which tracks more than 3,700 companies and individuals suspected of involvement in proliferation, said Griffin was exposed in the 1980s, so long ago that the group stopped sending out warnings about him, thinking he had been forced into retirement.

"Our impression was that known people like Griffin would have been put out of commission a long time ago," Shulman said. "We certainly didn't think that they were still out there doing this. If they are still involved, it's alarming, and it should a wake-up call to these governments."

Farah Stockman can be reached at fstockman@globe.com

? Copyright 2004 Globe Newspaper Company.
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Nuclear Necessity in Putin's Russia





Rose Gottemoeller

What purpose do nuclear weapons serve in today's Russia? More than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians still deploy more than 5,000 warheads on strategic nuclear-weapon systems. Additionally, they might deploy more than 3,000 nonstrategic warheads, and there are as many as 18,000 warheads either in reserve or in a queue awaiting dismantlement.[1] This enormous capability is available to Kremlin leaders, but it is a very good question what they can do with it.

Clearly, Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to see some political and diplomatic benefit to the weapons. It was no accident that in February--only one month before Putin successfully won re-election--the Russian military staged an all-out nuclear exercise that harkened back to the Cold War. Much of the short-term political payoff was lost, of course, when, with Putin in ceremonial attendance and cameras rolling, the navy twice failed to launch ballistic missiles from its strategic strike submarine. Still, the Russian president also announced plans for a new strategic weapon system, one that, from the evidence of media reports, involves maneuvering warheads that were first developed in response to President Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" missile defense system in the 1980s.

By overseeing the exercise, Putin was able to look presidential, recalling the days of Soviet power for at least the portion of his electorate nostalgic for it. Also, he was able to say to the U.S. administration recently critical of him, "You cannot ignore Russia." Finally, he was able to highlight for the Russian armed forces that he was paying attention, celebrating their stature as a national institution. Even with the missteps, the exercise thus was a political boon to Putin--not that he needed it in his landslide election victory. Still, Russia's dilemmas about its nuclear arsenal extend well beyond the ramifications of these election-year events.

During much of his first term, Putin and his military and foreign policy advisers struggled with what to make of the Cold War-sized nuclear arsenal they inherited. Like Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, they pondered whether this arsenal could offer security benefits in a world where the Kremlin's most likely adversaries were no longer another nuclear weapons superpower, but terrorists and separatists. They tested whether Moscow could leverage these weapons to diplomatic advantage and "throw its nuclear weight around." They probed whether it was possible to redirect the resources of the nuclear arsenal to other purposes.

As Putin begins his second term, however, many of these questions appear to have been at least partially answered. A combination of military necessity and domestic political benefits have combined with the demise of certain constraints, specifically START II, to convince Putin and his top aides that Russia should continue to depend on nuclear weapons. In fact, the Kremlin has drawn this conclusion even though Russian officials implicitly acknowledge such weaponry will do little to counter the main threats to their security.

To illustrate this point: the recent exercise mimicked one last seen in 1982, when the Soviet Union was at the height of its efforts to achieve nuclear war-fighting prowess and bolster its deterrent against the United States. Russia's official comment, however, placed the 2004 exercise in a context quite different from Cold War deterrence. According to official sources, the exercises were planned to counter the threat of terrorism.[2]

Given the massive display of nuclear capability and the evident focus on the United States, this explanation at best seemed far-fetched: would the United States somehow be involved in a terrorist attack and have to be punished for pursuing that course? More likely, the Russian military was simply reaching for its default option, a well-known threat scenario and, at least in the old days, a well-practiced response.

A Missed Opportunity

It did not have to turn out this way. Beginning in the late 1990s, the role of strategic nuclear weapons in Russian national security was at the center of a bureaucratic battle over post-Cold War military reforms--a debate that could have turned out very differently. The battle featured two key players, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, a former commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) who was named minister of defense in May 1997, and Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, putatively his senior deputy. Sergeyev favored a strong role for strategic nuclear weapons in Russia's military policy. Kvashnin wanted the Kremlin to put its emphasis on strengthening the conventional armed forces for regional conflicts such as the war in Chechnya.

Under Yelstin, Sergeyev got his way, seeking and gaining approval from the Security Council to create a Strategic Deterrence Force. This force would combine the strategic nuclear capabilities in the SRF with those of the navy and air force, together with certain other early warning and command and control assets, including Russian reconnaissance satellites in space.[3] In this way, it would form an integrated strategic command similar to the Strategic Command being formed during a similar period in the United States.

This "victory" for the strategic forces was short-lived. By April 2000, the fierce debate between Sergeyev and Kvashnin had broken into the open. Kvashnin apparently went around Sergeyev to suggest to Putin, who had only recently ascended to the presidency, that the SRF should be downgraded as a separate service and folded into the air force. Sergeyev responded sharply and openly to this proposal, angrily insisting that it be withdrawn.[4] Only three months after being sworn in, Putin was faced with the unprecedented task of rebuking his two top military men for their public disagreement.

By August, however, Putin seemed to be deciding in Kvashnin's favor. Through the summer, he fired several generals who were seen as allies of Sergeyev. Then, at a Security Council meeting in August, he gave lip service to the continued need for strong nuclear forces but otherwise placed emphasis squarely on strengthening the conventional forces. The notion of a Strategic Deterrence Force was officially dead; indeed the SRF were to be subordinated to the air force.

This outcome to the debate seemed to foretell a permanent victory for Kvashnin. Russian military policy seemed to be heading in the direction of a profound and unprecedented "denuclearization." A keystone of Kvashnin's concept was that the Russian Federation no longer needed to maintain nuclear parity with the United States but could succeed at deterring U.S. aggression with a minimal nuclear force. Kvashnin proposed, for example, to move from 756 land-based ICBMs to 150 by 2003.[5] Although Western analysts called this idea "strategic decoupling," Russian experts such as Vladimir Dvorkin, a retired SRF general and eminent modeler of the strategic forces, called it "a gross strategic mistake."[6]

Repercussions of U.S. Policy

Within two years, a U.S. policy decision helped restore the status of the strategic nuclear forces. In December 2001, the United States announced its intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Russian Federation responded with restraint, officially calling the withdrawal a "mistake" but not reacting with immediate political or military countermoves. The Kremlin did, however, what it had long warned it would do: it stated that it would not implement the START II treaty cutting the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. By doing so, Russian officials said they would have the flexibility to counter future U.S. missile defenses that might impact the effectiveness of their strategic arsenal.


In deciding not to implement START II, which had never concluded its ratification process and had not entered into force, Russian officials were able to opt out of that treaty's ban on multiple-warhead land-based missiles (so-called MIRVed ICBMs). Instead of retiring such missiles, the Kremlin decided that it would continue deploying them for at least a decade.[7]

In this new strategic landscape, Russian experts began talking increasingly about strategic modernization "on the cheap," looking for ways to sustain a modern strategic nuclear force and still accomplish urgently needed improvements to the conventional forces. Dvorkin, for example, spoke about putting multiple warheads on the Topol-M, the new Russian ICBM that had been designed with a single warhead to conform with START II.[8] Yet even without such measures, the failure of START II meant that the Kremlin no longer had an urgent requirement to modernize their strategic forces, because they could maintain the deployment of earlier generations of multiple warhead missiles. The Russian nuclear arsenal was very far indeed from Kvashnin's stated goal of 150 land-based ICBMs by 2003--Sergeyev seemed to have been vindicated.

Putin and his top advisers made the shift plain in October 2003. At a meeting with top-ranking military leaders, Putin seemed to be saying that the time for upheaval was over when he announced, "We are moving from radical reforms to deliberate, future-oriented development of the armed forces."[9] Sergei Ivanov, a Putin ally and civilian who had been sworn in as defense minister in April 2001, also seemed to call a halt to the roller-coaster debate over defense reform, asserting that the Russian army had already adapted to new realities. No longer, Ivanov said, would the Russian army have to consider global nuclear war or a large-scale conventional war as the most likely contingencies. Therefore, nuclear and conventional forces had already been trimmed substantially.[10]

Accompanying these statements was a reconfirmation that Russia was taking steps to maintain the capability of its strategic nuclear arsenal. Ivanov underscored the fact that the strategic nuclear forces would retain essentially the same composition as they had had during the Cold War years. "Russia retains a significant number of land-based strategic missiles....I am speaking here about the most menacing missiles, of which we have dozens, with hundreds of warheads," he said.[11]

Whether October 2003 represented an accurate time to declare the reform of the Russian armed forces complete seems doubtful. Even by the evidence that Putin and Ivanov presented in their public comments, reform still was a work in progress. Nevertheless, it is possible to point to a "settling out" of the relationship between the nuclear forces and the conventional forces. Neither Kvashnin, in his insistence on a "denuclearization" of the Russian armed forces, nor Sergeyev, with his emphasis on strong strategic nuclear forces and investment to match, had been precisely right. Each, however, had been to some measure correct.

The compromise path, as noted above, was engineered through the demise of START II. Relieved of START II constraints, the Russian Federation found a way to retain strategic nuclear weapons "on the cheap," thus freeing up funding for conventional force modernization. With the competition resolved, perhaps progress on reforming conventional forces could accelerate.

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

This resolution, at least for the time being, of the debate about the relationship and primacy of strategic nuclear and conventional forces does not address the place of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine. One of the oddest aspects of the Sergeyev-Kvashnin debate was that both of those military leaders as well as other Russian military experts shared and continue to share a theoretical consensus on the utility of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to counter Russian conventional weakness.

In April 2000, a new version of Russian military doctrine was issued, consistent with earlier versions except in its emphasis on the importance of using nuclear weapons to deter and counter attacks on Russian territory. This doctrine had been preceded, in January 2000, by a new National Security Concept that emphasized the same point. In describing the concept, Ivanov, who was then secretary of the Security Council, spoke about the nuclear issue: "Russia never said and is not saying now that it will be the first to use nuclear weapons, but at the same time, Russia is not saying that it will not use nuclear weapons if it is exposed to a full-scale aggression which leads to an immediate threat of a break-up and [to] Russia's existence in general."[12]

The doctrine stressed that even a conventional attack on targets that the Russians considered of strategic importance on their own territory could bring forth a nuclear counterattack anywhere in the theater of military operations. The exercise Zapad-99 showed exactly the type of scenario that underpinned this doctrine. Enemy forces (and NATO was heavily implied, in alliance with regional opponents of Russia) were beginning to overrun Russian territory. At the same time, they were using high-precision conventional weapons to attack strategic targets, such as nuclear power plants, on Russian territory. In response, Russia launched bombers armed with nuclear air-launched cruise missiles against enemy territory.

The greatest innovation of the January 2000 National Security Concept was the suggestion that nonstrategic nuclear weapons might be used in a limited way to counter a conventional attack, without spurring a major escalation to all-out nuclear use. The concept essentially restated long-standing policy, renewing the mission of the nuclear forces to deter any attack--nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional--against the territory of the Russian Federation.[13]

The notion that a limited nuclear response could be used to de-escalate conflict was a departure from long-standing Soviet era doctrine, which tended to stress the inevitability of rapid escalation as a counter to the U.S. position. During that era, the United States stated that it might have to use nuclear weapons in a limited way to counter an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. The arrival of this idea in Russian nuclear policy seems to indicate that the shoe was now on the other foot: it was now Russia that might have to contemplate the limited use of nuclear weapons to compensate for its weakness against a determined and overwhelming regional aggressor.

Thus, a major new trend was emerging in Russian nuclear security policy: Nuclear weapons would not only be used in a large-scale coalition war involving exchanges with a major power such as the United States. They might also be used in conflicts on Russia's periphery if the Russians decided that they had no other option to counter a weapon of mass destruction attack involving chemical or biological weapons. They might also be used to counter attacks by small-scale but capable conventional forces impacting targets that Russia considers to be of strategic importance.

This latter use, it is worth stressing, had earlier antecedents. As early as the mid-1980s, the Soviets were becoming concerned about what they termed "strategic conventional attacks" against Soviet territory. In that era, they worried about the new U.S. long-range land-attack cruise missiles that were capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads. The Soviets complained at the time that they would not be able to distinguish between a nuclear and conventional attack and would therefore either have to treat the attack as nuclear or lose their opportunity to launch on tactical warning. In this way, "strategic" conventional weapons might deprive them of their options to limit damage from a nuclear attack.[14]

At the time, the Soviets were not stressing the "de-escalatory" nature of limited nuclear response options. In fact, they tended to threaten that a cruise missile attack on Soviet territory, even if it turned out to be conventional, could lead to all-out nuclear war. They did claim, however, that such response options would be consistent with Soviet no-first-use policy because they would be responding on warning of what appeared to be a nuclear attack; once their opponent had launched such an attack, they were justified to respond. Even if the cruise missile turned out to be conventionally armed, they would have been responding to "nuclear" warning.

Thus, when the Russians talk about using their nuclear forces against "terrorists," they are falling back on some established traditions but also on the military reality that their conventional forces are not yet ready to confront new threats to the Russian Federation. Yet, it not likely that terrorist decision-makers will be deterred by nuclear weapons.[15] Rather than bolstering Russian defenses against terrorism, the ineffectual nature of nuclear forces for this mission only highlights the continued weakness of the Russian armed forces overall.

Future Directions

The Russians seem to be drawing a measure of security from their nuclear capability and are doing it "on the cheap." One problem will arise if that security becomes synonymous with the current high numbers of nuclear weapons and the Russian government decides it will no longer work to reduce its vast holdings of nuclear weapons and materials. At the moment, Russia seems to be taking seriously its commitments under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) to reduce operational deployments of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by 2012. For example, despite their decision to maintain some older systems, they are eliminating SS-18s at the rate of two to three regiments a year, blowing up silos so that the reductions are irreversible. As long as the Russians remain committed to reductions, their continuing dependence on nuclear forces is not a problem.

A problem will arise if the Russians decide that they must begin to modernize their nuclear capability, developing and building new nuclear warheads and possibly testing them. This direction looked possible in 2003 as high-level officials made obscure references to the need for new "strategic weapons." Putin, for example, remarked approvingly about new strategic capabilities in his "State of the Union" address in May, but it was unclear whether he was talking about new advanced conventional weapons or new nuclear weapons.[16]

U.S. policy may have had some impact on these decisions. For example, Putin announced a new strategic system in February 2004, the resurrection of a Soviet-era maneuvering warhead project that had been originally designed to counter the U.S. Star Wars program. With the United States moving toward deployment of a national missile defense system, Putin perhaps wanted to reassure his military that important technological countermeasures were "in the works."

Yet, U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses, and research and potentially deploy new nuclear weapons, have also prompted assertions from some Russian officials that they will not seek to match U.S. efforts. Russian officials have stated clearly, "We will not chase after you." They seem to believe that existing Russian nuclear deployments could counter any new U.S. capabilities, offensive or defensive, for the foreseeable future. No need for panic, they convey, we will not be surprised or overwhelmed by new developments in the United States.[17]

Thus, Russian nuclear policy looking into the future is an interesting admixture. It combines military necessity--an insurance policy against conventional weakness--with a political expression of national pride. The celebration of the nuclear forces has also served a reassurance function, conveying that the leadership, and particularly Putin, value the military's contribution to Russia's future.

A key question for the international community, and indeed for the United States, is whether Russia's nuclear capabilities and emotional investment in such weapons might be tapped for larger purposes than Russian domestic politics. It is often said that nuclear weapons give Russia a seat at the diplomatic table. Indeed, Russia's status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council is linked to its status as a nuclear-weapon state under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

To be sure, Russia's nuclear weapons give it a stronger role on the world stage than its economy or political heft would otherwise warrant, and Russia's pride in this role should be harnessed to accomplish larger international goals. For example, the Russians might be asked to use their nuclear expertise more fully in the fight against proliferation. Recently, they have shown a willingness to take a firmer hand with Iran over the supply of fuel to the Bushehr reactor project. Can such firmness be extended both with Iran and to other proliferation tough cases? Can Russia in fact become a full partner to the United States in the fight against proliferation?[18]

Consider the example of North Korea. Having provided nuclear research reactors and power technology to North Korea in the first place, Russia has significant first-hand knowledge of the foundations of the North Korean program. Moreover, Russia has indicated an interest in serving as an international repository for spent nuclear fuel. If North Korea has not reprocessed all of its 8,000 nuclear fuel rods, it might be convinced to hand them over for storage at an international site, along with whatever plutonium has been produced. Because of its involvement with the North Korean program and its geographic proximity, Russia could provide the site for these materials.

The Russians, with the help of the United States, could also lead by example. For example, the Russian Federation could accelerate reductions in its nuclear arsenal and the nuclear materials that underpin it. Although the current U.S. administration does not seem interested in reductions beyond those enshrined in the SORT, there are good reasons to pursue them. In particular, controlling and eliminating nuclear assets is the best way to keep them out of the hands of terrorists and regimes inimical to the international order. This goal is particularly relevant to nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons. Up to this point, such weapons have not been subject to formal arms control agreements, but they are likely to be among the nuclear assets most attractive and accessible to terrorists.

Even if the United States and Russia do not immediately turn their attention to new nuclear arms reductions, they could reinvigorate joint efforts to protect, control, and account for nuclear materials. An early joint effort, called the Trilateral Initiative because of the involvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency along with the United States and Russia, made some progress on joint nuclear material protection in the 1990s but then stalled over implementation costs and related issues. Russia and the United States could quickly reinvigorate this initiative, thus providing some important impetus to international efforts to control nuclear materials.

Likewise, the United States and Russia promised each other, at the time the SORT was signed in May 2002, that they would examine new measures of transparency that would facilitate implementation of the treaty. Some of the most important of such measures could relate to monitoring warheads in storage. Both Russian and U.S. experts have spent considerable time jointly developing the technologies and procedures that would be necessary to monitor warhead storage, and this agenda could quickly be developed. These steps could apply equally to strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads if the two countries should decide to pursue joint measures that would control and account for both types.

The United States will have to make some effort to allow Russia to assume the role of a more equal partner on nonproliferation policy. Washington is accustomed, for example, to thinking of Russia more as a proliferation problem than part of the solution. Indeed, Russia's insistence on selling nuclear reactors to unpalatable customers such as Iran and Libya has meant that it has been continually under suspicion as a proliferator itself. Nevertheless, the center of the proliferation sales network seems to have been in Pakistan rather than Russia. Thus, if the United States is willing to continue the difficult work of improving Russian export control laws and other regulations, Russia could develop into a reliable nonproliferation partner.

Likewise, on the arms control front, Russian weakness and distraction have often meant that the United States has taken the lead in advancing new initiatives. The SORT, for example, was based on a U.S. concept, although the Kremlin insisted that it be signed as a legally binding treaty rather than a political commitment. In the future, Washington may find itself as the only partner volunteering new ideas, such as further reductions in strategic nuclear forces or a withdrawal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons from NATO Europe. Even if such initiatives are advanced on a voluntary basis rather than in the context of a negotiation, they can be designed to draw forth a positive response from the Russian side.

The United States and Russian Federation have a long history of working together to solve nuclear problems, particularly in the realm of nuclear arms reductions. For the time being, Russian nuclear weapons must compensate in part for its weakness. However, Russia's nuclear capabilities also mean that it can be somewhat self-confident in the international arena, turning its knowledge, expertise, and resources to serve the country's larger goals. With sufficient U.S. cooperation and encouragement, Putin might be able to provide a new and positive answer to the question of what purpose nuclear weapons serve in today's Russia.

NOTES

1. According to information published by the Arms Control Association, as of July 31, 2003, strategic nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union totaled 5,286 nuclear warheads (2,922 ICBMs, 1,732 SLBMs, and 632 bombers). This information is based on the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Russian Federation of July 31, 2003. Arms Control Association, "Current Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Former Soviet Union," February 2004, available at www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sovforces.asp. See also Natural Resources Defense Council, "Table of USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads," November 25, 2002, www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab10.asp.

2. Ivan Safronov, "Russia Will Play Out a Nuclear Game With Itself," Kommersant, January 30, 2004.

3. The inception of the Strategic Deterrence Forces is described in Jacob W. Kipp, "Russia's Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons," Military Review, May-June 2001, available at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/russias_nukes/russias_nukes.htm.

4. David Hoffmann, "Putin Tries to Stop Feuding in the Military," The Washington Post, July 15, 2000, p. 14. A good summation of Russian commentary on the debate is contained in Nikolai Sokov, "`Denuclearization' of Russia's Defense Policy?" July 17, 2000, available at www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke.htm. Another good precis of the debate is Philipp C. Bleek, "Russia Ready to Reduce to 1,500 Warheads, Addressing Dispute Over Strategic Forces' Fate," Arms Control Today, September 2000.

5. For a good review of Russian sources on this point, see Sokov, "'Denuclearization' of Russia's Defense Policy?"

6. Vladimir Dvorkin, "Russia Needs a Transparent Development Programme for Its Strategic Nuclear Forces," Vremya Novostei, No. 1, January 2003, translated in the CDI Russia Weekly, No. 240, Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC.

7. According to some analysts, SS-18s and SS-19s could be refurbished and maintained well beyond their guaranteed life span, perhaps until 2020 or even beyond. General Yury Kirillov, chief of the SRF Military Academy, said that, "[c]onsidering Russia's economic capabilities, the preservation of Russia's nuclear potential requires a maximum possible extension of the service life of the RS-20 and RS-18 MIRVed missile complexes." (The NATO designators for these missiles are the SS-18 and SS-19.) Interview with Colonel General Yury Kirillov, "Possibly It's Time to Advance the Idea of a Nuclear Deterrence Safeguards Treaty," Yadernyy Kontrol, November-December 2002, translated in FBIS-SOV-2003-0114, October 5, 2002.

8. Discussion among Aleksandr Golts, Sergey Parkhomenko, and Vladimir Dvorkin, Ekho Moskvy Radio, May 21, 2002, available at www.echo.msk.ru/interview/8529.html.

9. Lenta.RU, available at http://vip.lenta.ru/fullstory/2003/10/02/doctrine/index.htm.

10. Viktor Litovkin, "Security is Best Achieved Through Coalition: Russia's New Military Doctrine Highlights Community of Goals with the World," www.cdi.org/russia/276-6.cfm.

11. Simon Saradzhyan, "Putin Beefs Up ICBM Capacity," The Moscow Times, October 3, 2003. See also Jeremy Bransten, "Russia: Putin Talks Up Power of Nuclear Arsenal," RFE/RL, available at www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/10/03102003170748.asp.

12. "Security Council Chief Says New Concept `Unique,'" ITAR-TASS, February 24, 2000, in FBIS-SOV-2000-0224. The doctrine may be found at "Voyennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 22, 2000, available at http://ng.ru/printed/politics/2000-04-22/5_doktrina.html.

13. For a useful commentary on the link between Zapad-99 and the Security Concept, see Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's New National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle," CNS Reports, January 19, 2000, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sokov2.htm.

14. For a discussion of this period in Soviet doctrine, see Rose Gottemoeller, "Land-Attack Cruise Missiles," Adelphi Paper, No. 226 (Winter 1987/88): 18-19.

15 It should be noted that, when the Russian government refers to "terrorists," it often is describing separatists from the breakaway republic of Chechnya, who may or may not be engaging in nonstate terrorist activities. To the extent that Chechen politicians ascribe to the responsibilities of government leadership, they might be subject to some aspects of deterrence, especially of a nuclear kind.

16. President Vladimir Putin's Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, May 16, 2003. Then-Deputy Prime Minister Alyoshin asserted after the president's speech that Putin was talking about a new strategic command and control system to allow "the use of in-depth space, air and earth systems," not new nuclear weapons. See Natalia Slavina, "Deputy Premier Says Russia Government to Pursue Tasks of Putin's Address," ITAR-TASS, May 16, 2003, transcribed in FBIS-SOV-2003-0516. See also "Russian Deputy Premier Calls for Developing IT-Intensive Weapon Systems," Moscow Interfax, May 16, 2003, in FBIS-SOV-2003-0516.

17. Conversations with author, Moscow, January 2004.

18. This idea was advanced by Russian participants in a joint project of the U.S. National Academy of Scientists and the Russian Academy of Sciences on the future of nonproliferation coo=peration. See National Research Council of the National Academies, "Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Report of a Workshop," February 2004, pp. 1-10.

Rose Gottemoeller is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where she holds a joint appointment with the Russian and Eurasian Program and the Global Policy Program. Before joining Carnegie in October 2000, Gottemoeller was deputy undersecretary for defense nuclear nonproliferation in the Department of Energy.

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RUSSIE Le pr?sident fran?ais a salu? la brillante r??lection de son homologue et le progr?s des r?formes
Chirac, partenaire inconditionnel de Poutine
Le pr?sident Jacques Chirac a annonc? que le pr?sident russe avait confirm? sa pr?sence en Normandie lors des c?r?monies marquant le 60e anniversaire du d?barquement alli? en France.
Krasnoznamensk : de notre envoy?e sp?ciale Laure Mandeville
[05 avril 2004]

L'arriv?e hier de Jacques Chirac et de quelques minibus remplis de journalistes dans la ville ferm?e de Krasnoznamensk, lieu d'une base militaire et spatiale russe qui ne figura longtemps sur aucune carte d'URSS, n'a pas sembl? susciter d'?motion particuli?re de la part des 25 000 habitants qui y vivent toujours en vase clos, ? 45 kilom?tres de Moscou.


On aurait pu se croire ?back in the USSR? dans ce d?cor tr?s sovi?tique de barres d'immeubles d?cr?pis d?pendant du minist?re de la D?fense. A l'entr?e de la ville secr?te, d?limit?e par de hautes grilles et un poste de contr?le, un L?nine de bronze, le bras lev?, regardait vers l'horizon, tandis que des ?babouchkas? faisaient tranquillement leurs courses.


C'?tait pourtant la premi?re fois qu'un chef d'Etat ?tranger p?n?trait dans le principal centre de commande des satellites militaires russes. Une symbolique destin?e ? donner un lustre tout particulier ? la visite de quelques heures de Jacques Chirac ; et ? montrer l'importance que la Russie accorde ? la relation avec la France. ?Ce geste r?v?le le niveau de transparence et de confiance auquel nous sommes arriv?s?, a d'ailleurs soulign? le pr?sident Poutine, qui s'est r?joui ?des perspectives de coop?ration ouvertes par Paris et Moscou? dans le domaine du spatial et de l'a?ronautique.


Le pr?sident Jacques Chirac affichant, malgr? une mine soucieuse, des dispositions d'esprit tout aussi excellentes que son partenaire russe, la journ?e a ?t? l'occasion d'un festival de congratulations mutuelles. ?Je suis tr?s heureux de pouvoir f?liciter le pr?sident Poutine pour sa brillante r??lection ? la t?te de la Russie?, a lanc? le pr?sident fran?ais ? son h?te, sans ?mettre de r?serve sur le verrouillage m?diatique et politique spectaculaire qui a pr?sid? ? la victoire du pr?sident russe. ?Il y a un lien spontan? et naturel entre nos deux pays, a-t-il poursuivi, d'autant que la Russie s'est engag?e avec beaucoup de succ?s sur la voie des r?formes et de la d?mocratie.?


A l'int?rieur d'un b?timent fleurant bon le neuf, le chef de l'Etat fran?ais venait d'assister ? une sorte de d?monstration du travail qu'effectue le centre de commande de Krasnoznamensk, pour contr?ler la bonne marche des satellites russes et des missiles intercontinentaux. Dans une grande salle aux allures de Futuroscope, il avait pu regarder un grand tableau de bord surmont? d'une carte de Russie, o? s'affichaient les caract?ristiques des satellites en orbite, tandis que le nouveau commandant des forces spatiales russes, tout juste nomm?, commentait un diaporama anim?.


Si l'Irak, le Moyen-Orient, l'Otan et le Kosovo ont ?t? ?voqu?s lors des entretiens r?v?lant ?une totale convergence de vue?, c'est ?? 80%? sur le bilat?ral que se sont concentr?s les deux hommes. ?Nous avons augment? nos ?changes ?conomiques de 25% en un an, un joli succ?s, a lanc? Poutine, rappelant que la relation commerciale et le dialogue ?nerg?tique avec la Russie pourraient avoir des retomb?es ?tr?s concr?tes? pour les Fran?ais, ?en termes de cr?ation d'emplois ou de baisse du prix de l'essence?.


Les deux hommes ont discut? des cons?quences de l'?largissement de l'Union europ?enne pour la Russie, un sujet qui a provoqu? de fortes tensions r?cemment entre Bruxelles et Moscou, qui s'estime l?s? par l'extension des r?gles communautaires ? ses anciens partenaires du Comecon.


Le pr?sident Chirac a rappel? que ?la relation entre l'UE et la Russie est essentielle ? l'?quilibre et la stabilit? du monde de demain? et annonc? des propositions fran?aises et allemandes sur ce th?me pour le prochain sommet Russie-UE, dans un mois ? Moscou. Lors d'un r?cent voyage ? Budapest, Jacques Chirac avait appel? les nouveaux adh?rents de l'Est ? faire preuve de ?compr?hension vis-?-vis de la Russie?. Ces pays, inquiets des d?rives n?o-imp?riales qui s'affirment ? Moscou sont persuad?s que Paris, aveugl? par une vision ?romantique? de la Russie, ne condamne pas avec assez de vigueur les ?carts russes.

Il est vrai que le pr?sident Chirac ne s'est pas ?tendu sur les sujets qui f?chaient, ne mentionnant la guerre de Tch?tch?nie qu'? la demande d'une journaliste, et associant ce conflit directement ? la ?lutte contre le terrorisme?, comme le font syst?matiquement les Russes.


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THE OTHER WAR
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Why Bush's Afghanistan problem won't go away.
Issue of 2004-04-12
Posted 2004-04-05
In December, 2002, a year after the Taliban had been driven from power in Afghanistan, Donald Rumsfeld gave an upbeat assessment of the country's future to CNN's Larry King. "They have elected a government. . . . The Taliban are gone. The Al Qaeda are gone. The country is not a perfectly stable place, and it needs a great deal of reconstruction funds," Rumsfeld said. "There are people who are throwing hand grenades and shooting off rockets and trying to kill people, but there are people who are trying to kill people in New York or San Francisco. So it's not going to be a perfectly tidy place." Nonetheless, he said, "I'm hopeful, I'm encouraged." And he added, "I wish them well."

A year and a half later, the Taliban are still a force in many parts of Afghanistan, and the country continues to provide safe haven for members of Al Qaeda. American troops, more than ten thousand of whom remain, are heavily deployed in the mountainous areas near Pakistan, still hunting for Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader. Hamid Karzai, the U.S.-backed President, exercises little political control outside Kabul and is struggling to undercut the authority of local warlords, who effectively control the provinces. Heroin production is soaring, and, outside of Kabul and a few other cities, people are terrorized by violence and crime. A new report by the United Nations Development Program, made public on the eve of last week's international conference, in Berlin, on aid to Afghanistan, stated that the nation is in danger of once again becoming a "terrorist breeding ground" unless there is a significant increase in development aid.

The turmoil in Afghanistan has become a political issue for the Bush Administration, whose general conduct of the war on terrorism is being publicly challenged by Richard A. Clarke, the former National Security Council terrorism adviser, in a memoir, "Against All Enemies," and in contentious hearings before the September 11th Commission. The Bush Administration has consistently invoked Afghanistan as a success story--an example of the President's determination. However, it is making this claim in the face of renewed warnings, from international organizations, from allies, and from within its own military--notably a Pentagon-commissioned report that was left in bureaucratic limbo when its conclusions proved negative--that the situation there is deteriorating rapidly.

In his book, Clarke depicts the victory in Afghanistan as far less decisive than the Administration has portrayed it, and he sharply criticizes the Pentagon's tactics, especially the decision to rely on airpower, and not U.S. troops on the ground, in the early weeks. The war began on October 7, 2001, but, he wrote, not until seven weeks later did the United States "insert a ground force unit (Marines) to take and hold a former al Qaeda and Taliban facility. . . . The late-November operation did not include any effort by U.S. forces to seal the border with Pakistan, snatch the al Qaeda leadership, or cut off the al Qaeda escape."

Clarke told me in an interview last week that the Administration viewed Afghanistan as a military and political backwater--a detour along the road to Iraq, the war that mattered most to the President. Clarke and some of his colleagues, he said, had repeatedly warned the national-security leadership that, as he put it, "you can't win the war in Afghanistan with such a small effort." Clarke continued, "There were more cops in New York City than soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan. We had to have a security presence coupled with a development program in every region and stay there for several months."

In retrospect, Clarke said, he believes that the President and his men did not respond for three reasons: "One, they did not want to get involved in Afghanistan like Russia did. Two, they were saving forces for the war in Iraq. And, three, Rumsfeld wanted to have a laboratory to prove his theory about the ability of small numbers of ground troops, coupled with airpower, to win decisive battles." As of today, Clarke said, "the U.S. has succeeded in stabilizing only two or three cities. The President of Afghanistan is just the mayor of Kabul."

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Collins, a Pentagon expert on Afghanistan, acknowledged that it was only in the past several months that "significant money began to flow" into Afghanistan for reconstruction and security. "We found in the security area we were doing the right thing, but not fast enough," he told me. The resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Collins said, did not begin until early last year. "They began to realize at the end of 2003 that the key is not to fight our soldiers but U.N. officials and aid workers." In the long run, Collins added, "these tactics are self-defeating--in Afghanistan and in Iraq."

Clarke's view of what went wrong was buttressed by an internal military analysis of the Afghanistan war that was completed last winter. In late 2002, the Defense Department's office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (solic) asked retired Army Colonel Hy Rothstein, a leading military expert in unconventional warfare, to examine the planning and execution of the war in Afghanistan, with an understanding that he would focus on Special Forces. As part of his research, Rothstein travelled to Afghanistan and interviewed many senior military officers, in both Special Forces and regular units. He also talked to dozens of junior Special Forces officers and enlisted men who fought there. His report was a devastating critique of the Administration's strategy. He wrote that the bombing campaign was not the best way to hunt down Osama bin Laden and the rest of the Al Qaeda leadership, and that there was a failure to translate early tactical successes into strategic victory. In fact, he wrote, the victory in Afghanistan was not, in the long run, a victory at all.

Last month, I visited Rothstein in his office at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, where he is a senior lecturer in defense analysis. A fit, broad-shouldered man in his early fifties, he served more than twenty years in the Army Special Forces, including three years as the director of plans and exercises for the Joint Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, before retiring, in 1999. His associates depicted him as anything but a dissident. "He puts boots on the ground," Robert Andrews, a former head of solic, told me, referring to Rothstein's missions in Central America, for which he earned a decoration for valor, and in the former Yugoslavia. Rothstein agreed to speak to me, with some reluctance, only after I had obtained his report independently, and he would not go into details about his research. "They asked me to do this," he said of the Pentagon, "and my purpose was to make some things better. All I want people to do is to look at the paper and not at me. I'll tell you the good and the bad."

The report describes a wide gap between how Donald Rumsfeld represented the war and what was actually taking place. Rumsfeld had told reporters at the start of the Afghanistan bombing campaign, Rothstein wrote, that "you don't fight terrorists with conventional capabilities. You do it with unconventional capabilities." In December, the Taliban and Al Qaeda retreated into the countryside as the armies of the Northern Alliance, supported by American airpower and Special Forces troops, moved into the capital. There were many press accounts of America's new way of waging war, including well-publicized reports of American Special Forces on horseback and of new technologies, like the Predator drones. Nonetheless, Rothstein wrote, the United States continued to emphasize bombing and conventional warfare while "the war became increasingly unconventional," with Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters "operating in small cells, emerging only to lay land mines and launch nighttime rocket attacks before disappearing once again." Rothstein added:

What was needed after December 2001 was a greater emphasis on U.S. special operations troops, supported by light infantry, conducting counterinsurgency operations. Aerial bombardment should have become a rare thing. . . . The failure to adjust U.S. operations in line with the post-Taliban change in theater conditions cost the United States some of the fruits of victory and imposed additional, avoidable humanitarian and stability costs on Afghanistan. . . . Indeed, the war's inadvertent effects may be more significant than we think.

By the end of 2001, the Afghan war had essentially become a counterinsurgency. At this point, it was important to turn to a specific kind of unconventional warfare: "The Special Forces were created to deal with precisely this kind of enemy," Rothstein wrote. "Unorthodox thinking, drawing on a thorough understanding of war, demography, human nature, culture and technology are part of this mental approach. . . . Unconventional warfare prescribes that Special Forces soldiers must be diplomats, doctors, spies, cultural anthropologists, and good friends--all before their primary work comes into play."

Instead, Rothstein said, "the command arrangement evolved into a large and complex structure that could not (or would not) respond to the new unconventional setting." The result has been "a campaign in Afghanistan that effectively destroyed the Taliban but has been significantly less successful at being able to achieve the primary policy goal of ensuring that al Qaeda could no longer operate in Afghanistan."

Rothstein wrote that Rumsfeld routinely responded to criticism about civilian casualties by stating that "some amount" of collateral damage "is inevitable in war." It is estimated that more than a thousand Afghan civilians were killed by bombing and other means in the early stages of the war. Rothstein suggested that these numbers could have been lower, and that further incidents might have been avoided if Special Forces had been allowed to wage a truly unconventional war that reduced the reliance on massive firepower.

The Administration's decision to treat the Taliban as though all its members identified with, and would fight for, Al Qaeda was also a crucial early mistake. "There were deep divisions within the Taliban that could have been exploited through a political-military effort which is the essence of unconventional warfare," Rothstein said. "A few months of intensive diplomatic, intelligence and military preparations between Special Forces and anti-Taliban forces would have made a significant difference."

Instead, Rothstein wrote, the American military campaign left a power vacuum. The conditions under which the post-Taliban government came to power gave "warlordism, banditry and opium production a new lease on life." He concluded, "Defeating an enemy on the battlefield and winning a war are rarely synonymous. Winning a war calls for more than defeating one's enemy in battle." He recalled that, in 1975, when Harry G. Summers, an Army colonel who later wrote a history of the Vietnam War, told a North Vietnamese colonel, "You never defeated us on the battlefield," the colonel replied, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."

Rothstein delivered his report in January. It was returned to him, with the message that he had to cut it drastically and soften his conclusions. He has heard nothing further. "It's a threatening paper," one military consultant told me. The Pentagon, asked for comment, confirmed that Rothstein was told "we did not support all of his conclusions," and said that he would soon be sent notes. In addition, Joseph Collins told me, "There may be a kernel of truth in there, but our experts found the study rambling and not terribly informative." In interviews, however, a number of past and present Bush Administration officials have endorsed Rothstein's key assertions. "It wasn't like he made it up," a former senior intelligence officer said. "The reason they're petrified is that it's true, and they didn't want to see it in writing."

The high point of the American involvement in Afghanistan came in December of 2001, at a conference of various Afghan factions held in Bonn, when the Administration's candidate, Hamid Karzai, was named chairman of the interim government. (His appointment as President was confirmed six months later at a carefully orchestrated Afghan tribal council, known as a Loya Jirga.) It was a significant achievement, but there were major flaws in the broader accord. There was no agreement on establishing an international police force, no procedures for collecting taxes, no strategy for disarming either the many militias or individual Afghans, and no resolution with the Taliban.

Then came Iraq. In interviews with academics, aid workers, and non-governmental-organization officials, I was repeatedly told that, within a few months of the Bonn conference, as the United States began its buildup in the Gulf, security and political conditions throughout Afghanistan eroded. In the early summer of 2002, a military consultant, reflecting the views of several American Special Forces commanders in the field, provided the Pentagon with a briefing warning that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were adapting quickly to American tactics. "His decision loop has tightened, ours has widened," the briefing said, referring to the Taliban. "He can see us, but increasingly we no longer see him." Only a very few high-level generals listened, and the briefing, like Rothstein's report, changed nothing. By then, some of the most highly skilled Americans were being diverted from Afghanistan. Richard Clarke noted in his memoir, "The U.S. Special Forces who were trained to speak Arabic, the language of al Qaeda, had been pulled out of Afghanistan and sent to Iraq." Some C.I.A. paramilitary teams were also transferred to Iraq.

Meanwhile, the United States continued to pay off and work closely with local warlords, many of whom were involved in heroin and opium trafficking. Their loyalty was not for sale but for rent. Warlords like Hazrat Ali in eastern Afghanistan, near the Pakistan border, and Mohammed Fahim had been essential to America's initial military success, and, at first, they had promised to accept Karzai. Hazrat Ali would be one of several commanders later accused of double-crossing American troops in an early, unsuccessful sweep for Al Qaeda, in 2002. Fahim, now the defense minister, is deeply involved in a number of illicit enterprises.

The Bush Administration, facing a major war in Iraq, seemed eager to put the war in Afghanistan behind it. In January of 2003, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, made a fifteen-hour visit to Kabul and announced, "We're clearly moving into a different phase, where our priority in Afghanistan is increasingly going to be stability and reconstruction. There's no way to go too fast. Faster is better." There was talk of improving security and rebuilding the Afghan National Army in time for Presidential and parliamentary elections, but little effort to provide the military and economic resources. "I don't think the Administration understood about winning hearts and minds," a former Administration official told me.

The results of the postwar neglect are stark. A leading scholar on Afghanistan, Barnett R. Rubin, wrote, in this month's Current History, that Afghanistan today "does not have functioning state institutions. It has no genuine army or effective police. Its ramshackle provincial administration is barely in contact with, let alone obedient to, the central government. Most of the country's meager tax revenue has been illegally taken over by local officials who are little more than warlords with official titles." The goal of American policy in Afghanistan "was not to set up a better regime for the Afghan people," Rubin wrote. "The goal instead was to get rid of the terrorist threat against America." The United States enlisted the warlords in its war against terrorism, and "the result was an Afghan government created at Bonn that rested on a power base of warlords."

One military consultant with extensive experience in Afghanistan told me last year, "The real action is at the village level, but we're not there. And we need to be there 24/7. Now we are effectively operating above the conflict. It's the same old story as in Vietnam. We can't hit what we can't see." He added, "From January, 2002, on, we were in the process of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory."

Last summer, a coalition of seventy-nine human-rights and relief organizations wrote an open letter to the international community calling for better security in Afghanistan and warning that the Presidential elections there, now scheduled for September, were imperilled. The letter noted, "For the majority of the Afghan people, security is precarious and controlled by regional warlords, drug traffickers or groups with terrorist associations. The situation is getting worse, and there is no comprehensive plan in place to halt the spiral of violence." Statistics compiled by care International showed that eleven aid workers were murdered in four incidents during a three-week period ending early last month, and the rate of physical assaults on aid workers in Afghanistan more than doubled in January and February compared with the same period in the previous year. Such attacks, a care policy statement suggested, inevitably led to cutbacks in Afghan humanitarian and reconstruction programs. In early 2003, for example, according to the Chicago Tribune, there were twenty-six humanitarian agencies at work in Kandahar, the main Afghan city in the south. By early this year, there were fewer than five.

Even one of the most publicized achievements of the post-Taliban government, the improvements in the lives of women, has been called into question. Judy Benjamin, who served as the gender adviser to the U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Kabul in 2002 and 2003, told me, "The legal opportunities have improved, but the day-to-day life for women, even in Kabul, isn't any better. Girls are now legally permitted to go to school and work, but when it comes to the actual family practice, people are afraid to let them go out without burkas." Conditions outside Kabul are far worse, she said. "Families do not allow females to travel--to go to jobs or to school. You cannot go on many roads without being held up by bandits. People are saying they were safer under the Taliban system, which is why the Taliban are getting more support--the lack of safety."

Nancy Lindborg, the executive vice-president of Mercy Corps, one of the major N.G.O.s at work in Afghanistan, had a similar view. Outside of Kabul, she said, "everywhere I go, from Kunduz to Kandahar, I see no change for most women, and security for everybody has fallen apart since November of 2002." The Pentagon's announcements of increased commitments to security and reconstruction were increasingly seen "as a big charade," Lindborg said. "The United States has left Afghanistan to fester for two years."

The humanitarian community is not alone in its concern. In February, Vice-Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, acknowledged during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing that the growing Taliban insurgency was targeting humanitarian and reconstruction organizations. Over all, he said, Taliban attacks had "reached their highest levels since the collapse of the Taliban government."

Heroin is among the most immediate--and the most intractable--social, economic, and political problems. "The problem is too huge for us to be able to face alone," Hamid Karzai declared last week in Berlin, as he appealed for more aid. "Drugs in Afghanistan are threatening the very existence of the Afghan state." Drug dealing and associated criminal activity produced about $2.3 billion in revenue last year, according to an annual survey by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, a sum that was equivalent to half of Afghanistan's legitimate gross domestic product. "Terrorists take a cut as well," the U.N. report noted, adding that "the longer this happens, the greater the threat to security within the country."

The U.N. report, published last fall, found that opium production, which, following a ban imposed by the Taliban, had fallen to a hundred and eighty-five metric tons in 2001, soared last year to three thousand six hundred tons--a twentyfold increase. The report declared the nation to be "at a crossroads: either (i) energetic interdiction measures are taken now . . . or (ii) the drug cancer in Afghanistan will keep spreading and metastasise into corruption, violence and terrorism--within and beyond the country's borders." Afghanistan was once again, the U.N. said, producing three-quarters of the world's illicit opium, with no evidence of a cutback in sight, even though there has been a steady stream of reports from Washington about drug interdictions. The report said that poppy cultivation had continued to spread, and was now reported in twenty-eight of the nation's thirty-two provinces.

Most alarmingly, according to a U.N. survey, nearly seventy per cent of farmers intend to increase their poppy crops in 2004, most of them by more than half. Only a small percentage of farmers were planning any reduction, despite years of international pressure. Many of the areas that the U.N. report identified as likely to see increased production are in regions where the United States has a major military presence.

Despite such statistics, the American military has, for the most part, looked the other way, essentially because of the belief that the warlords can deliver the Taliban and Al Qaeda. One senior N.G.O. official told me, "Everybody knows that the U.S. military has the drug lords on the payroll. We've put them back in power. It's gone so terribly wrong." (The Pentagon's Joseph Collins told me, "Counter-narcotics in Afghanistan has been a failure." Collins said that this year's crop was estimated to be the second largest on record. He added, however, that the Afghan government is planning to "redouble" its efforts on narcotics control, and that the Pentagon is "now putting more money into it for the first time"--seventy-three million dollars.)

The easy availability of heroin also represents a threat to the well-being of American troops. Since the fall of 2002, a number of active-duty and retired military and C.I.A. officials have told me about increasing reports of heroin use by American military personnel in Afghanistan, many of whom have been there for months, with few distractions. A former high-level intelligence officer told me that the problem wasn't the Special Forces or Army combat units who were active in the field but "the logistical guys"--the truck drivers and the food and maintenance workers who are stationed at the military's large base at Bagram, near Kabul. However, I was also told that there were concerns about heroin use within the Marines. The G.I.s assigned to Bagram are nominally confined to the base, for security reasons, but the drugs, the former intelligence officer said, were relayed to the users by local Afghans hired to handle menial duties. The Pentagon's senior leadership has a "head-in-the-sand attitude," he said. "There's no desire to expose it and get enforcement involved. This is hard shit," he added, speaking of heroin. The Pentagon, asked for comment, denied that there was concern about drug use at Bagram, but went on to acknowledge that "disciplinary proceedings were initiated against some U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan for suspected drug use." Asked separately about the allegations against marines, the Pentagon said that some marines had been removed from Afghanistan to face disciplinary proceedings, but blamed alcohol and marijuana rather than heroin.

The drug lords traditionally processed only hashish inside the Afghan borders, and shipped poppies to heroin-production plants in northern Pakistan and elsewhere. A senior U.N. narcotics official told me that in the past two years "most of the heroin has been processed in Afghanistan, as part of a plan to keep profits in-country." Only a fraction of what is produced in Afghanistan is used there, the officer said. Nonetheless, a U.S. government-relief official told me, the "biggest worry" is that the growth in local production will increase the risk of addiction among G.I.s. A former C.I.A. officer who served in Afghanistan also said that the agency's narcotics officials have been independently investigating military drug use.

Afghanistan is regaining the Bush Administration's attention, in part because the worsening situation in Iraq has increased the need for a foreign-policy success. State Department and intelligence officials who have worked in Kabul said that it is widely understood that Afghanistan's Presidential and parliamentary elections, which had already been rescheduled, must be held before the American Presidential elections, on November 2nd. The upside to the political timetable has been a new commitment of American reconstruction funds--more than two billion dollars, a fourfold increase over the previous year--for schools, clinics, and road construction in Afghanistan. Richard Clarke wrote in his memoir that initially the aid funds were "inadequate and slowly delivered," and far below the thirteen hundred and ninety dollars per capita that was spent in the first years of the rebuilding effort in Bosnia and the nearly twenty billion dollars now earmarked for Iraq. At one point in 2002, American aid funds for Afghanistan came to only fifty-two dollars per person. "Why are we getting aid money now?" the U.S. government-relief official said to me, with a laugh. "We've been asking for two years and no one in their right mind thought about getting all this."

In insisting on holding elections by the fall, the Administration is overriding the advice of many of its allies and continuing to bank heavily on Hamid Karzai. (As of this spring, an estimated ten per cent of eligible voters were registered.) Last week, the international conference in Berlin bolstered Karzai's regime, and his election prospects, by promising to provide more than four billion dollars in aid and low-cost loans in the next year--although that figure includes more than a billion dollars previously pledged. Half of the contributions came from the Bush Administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell praised Karzai for having turned Afghanistan from "a failed state, ruled by extremists and terrorists, to a free country with a growing economy and emerging democracy."

Nonetheless, in interviews for this article, Hamid Karzai was consistently depicted by others as unsure of himself and totally dependent on the United States for security and finances. One of Karzai's many antagonists is his own defense minister, Mohammed Fahim. Last year, the Bush Administration was privately given a memorandum by an Afghan official and American ally, warning that Fahim was working to undermine Karzai and would use his control over money from illegal businesses and customs revenue to do so. Fahim was also said to have recruited at least eighty thousand men into new militias.

The United States' continuing toleration of warlords such as Fahim and General Abdul Rashid Dostum--an alleged war criminal and gunrunner who, after being offered millions of dollars by Washington, helped defeat the Taliban in the fall of 2001--mystifies many who have long experience in Afghanistan. "Fahim and Dostum are part of the problem, and not the solution," said Milt Bearden, who ran the C.I.A.'s Afghan operations during the war with the Soviet Union. "These people have the clever gene and they can get us to do their fighting for them. They just lead us down the path," Bearden said. "How wonderful for them to have us knock off their opposition with American airplanes and Special Forces."

The wild card in the election planning may be the Taliban. The former Taliban foreign minister, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, who spent months in American custody, has repeatedly offered to open a channel to the Taliban leadership for extended talks. "But the Administration only wants to get help in finding Osama bin Laden," a Democratic Senate aide said. "Its only concern is tactical information." Meanwhile, the Taliban's influence has grown throughout the south and east of Afghanistan, in defiance of--or, perhaps, because of--continued American air and ground assaults, which inevitably result in civilian casualties.

In an effort to strengthen Karzai, the American military command has tried to reduce its own reliance on some regional warlords. The most recent target was Ismail Khan, the popular independent governor of Herat, a large province in western Afghanistan, adjacent to Iran. Khan, a bitter enemy of the Taliban, supported the initial American invasion of Afghanistan after September 11th. He has since defied the central government and refuses to hand over to Kabul most of the tax and customs revenue. (Herat is an ancient trade center.) Kahn personifies how difficult it is for the U.S. to separate its enemies from its allies in Afghanistan. "If Mohammed Fahim is a government minister and Ismail Khan is a warlord," one American official told me, "you're abusing the language." The official's point was that Khan has provided better security and more stability for the local population than is found in other Afghan provinces, and international observers believe that he would probably win a provincial election. But he treats Herat as a private fiefdom, and has alarmed many in the Bush Administration with his vocal support of Iran; last fall, he was quoted as calling it "the best model of an Islamic country in the world."

One regional expert told me that Karzai--who was always apprehensive about Ismail Khan--raised the question of how to remove him last spring, during a brief visit by Donald Rumsfeld to Kabul. "He asked Rumsfeld for his support," the expert recalled. "Rumsfeld wished him good luck but said the United States could not get involved. So Karzai got cold feet." The issue was revisited again in February, a former C.I.A. consultant told me, by the American military command at Bagram. Sometime that month, the American command put out a request to its intelligence components for a new operational plan for Khan. The former C.I.A. consultant learned from within the intelligence community that there was agreement that Khan had to be neutralized. Asked what that meant, he said that he was told "Khan had to be eliminated--we've got to end his influence." (The Pentagon denied that there was such a plan.)

On March 21st, an armed conflict erupted in Herat between Khan's forces and those loyal to the central government. Accounts of what happened vary widely; it was not immediately clear who started what. According to an account by U.N. workers in Afghanistan, filed to headquarters in New York, tensions had been mounting between Khan and one of his bitter rivals, General Abdul Zaher Naibzadah, over control of the Afghan military's Herat garrison. Khan's son heard reports that there had been an assassination attempt on his father, and drove to the General's house, where Naibzadah's bodyguards gunned him down, along with others. According to the U.N. dispatch, Ismail Khan took violent revenge on his attackers, burning down the local headquarters of the Afghan militia and killing scores. Some press accounts put the death toll of the subsequent daylong battle at a hundred or more; other accounts, emanating from Kabul, said that fewer than two dozen were killed. The U.N. account included reports that a personal phone call from Karzai to Khan was necessary to defuse the situation. In the next days, a division of the Afghan National Army, sent by the central government, moved into Herat to restore order.

There is no evidence that the American commanders were involved in any attempt on Khan's life, the former C.I.A. consultant told me. But, according to some officials, Americans were attached to Afghan military units that were present in Herat. "We clearly had embedded American trainers and advisers with the Afghan troops," the consultant said. "They knew what was going on." The result, the U.N. reported, was that Khan "may become even more intractable in his dealing with the central government." The American-endorsed plan to challenge Khan's leadership and strengthen Karzai's national standing inside Afghanistan, it seemed, had served to make Khan a more determined enemy.

The U.S. government-relief official told me of spending weeks last year travelling through Afghanistan--including the south and the east, areas with few ties to the central government in Kabul. "They'd say, `We don't like the Taliban, but they did bring us security you haven't been able to give us,'" the official said. "They perceived that we were allied with the bad guys--the warlords--because of our war on terrorism." The official recalled being asked constantly about the American war in Iraq. "They were concerned about Iraq, and wanted to know, `Are you going to stay?' They remembered how we left"--after the American-sponsored defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. "They'd say, `You guys are going to leave us, like you did in 1992. If we had confidence in the staying power of America, we'd deal with you.'" The official concluded, "Iraq, in their mind, meant that America had bigger priorities."

One U.N. worker who is helping to prepare for elections in Afghanistan told me that American aid funds now headed into Afghanistan, whatever the Administration's motives, are essential for the country's future. "We've got a golden window of opportunity that will close on November 2nd." It's a cynical process, he added. "A key factor in holding the election will be the non-interference of the various drug-dealing warlords around the nation, and stemming the drug trade will not be a priority." The message he's getting from the warlords, the U.N. worker said, was that if the U.S. attempted a "hard and heavy" poppy-eradication program, the warlords would disrupt the elections.

The U.N. worker said that President Karzai was perceived as "a weak leader with very little street credibility." He told me that, again and again, when he met with village elders, as part of his work, "the old people say, `Hamid is a good man. He doesn't kill people. He doesn't steal things. He doesn't sell drugs. How could you possibly think he could be a leader of Afghanistan?'"

Inquiry at Bank Looks at Accounts of Diplomats
By TIMOTHY L. O'BRIEN
As the F.B.I., banking regulators and a Congressional committee look more deeply into Saudi Arabian transactions at a Washington bank used widely by diplomats, a host of accounts controlled by representatives of several Mideast countries have also come under scrutiny, according to a person briefed on the investigations.
Investigators have been examining cash transactions in foreign accounts at the bank, Riggs National, especially those for Saudi Arabia, for possible connections to terrorist groups or money-laundering activities. Accounts controlled by diplomats from Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Oman have been included in the inquiry as well, this person said. Saudi representatives said that investigators had told them that their Riggs accounts were not tainted.
In addition to the Middle Eastern accounts, a corporate account controlled by the president of the West African nation of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasago, is also being examined. Millions of dollars in money that regulators and the bank have identified as questionable have flowed through that account. It was opened under the name of a corporation called Otong, and money began moving through it as early as 1999, according to a regulatory report dated Jan. 30 that Riggs filed with federal regulators.
Although Riggs closed all of its Equatorial Guinean accounts in February, activity in accounts before then has drawn attention because Exxon Mobil, the oil giant, deposited about $300 million into Mr. Mbasago's personal Riggs accounts. Although Equatorial Guinea has struggled with poverty, its economy has grown sharply in recent years because of the discovery of large oil reserves there. Exxon Mobil is one of the country's biggest oil producers.
It is not clear whether money from Exxon Mobil found its way into the Otong account. Exxon Mobil and Equatorial Guinean officials could not be reached for comment.
Seven transactions in the Otong account from September 1999 to April 2002 that totaled about $11.5 million have drawn special scrutiny. A Riggs compliance officer told Riggs's own investigators last September that money in the Otong account came from overseas accounts that Mr. Mbasago had closed - an explanation that federal investigators have found unsatisfactory. Federal officials are looking into the possibility that money in the Otong account was used to bribe employees of American companies or involved the proceeds of political graft, according to an individual with direct knowledge of the investigation.
The role played by Equatorial Guinea's ambassador to the United States, Teodoro Biyogo Nsue, in the transfers is also being investigated.
Riggs has been cooperating with the F.B.I. investigation and regulatory examinations since the fall of 2002 and said it had not "willfully" violated any laws. "Riggs always cooperates with regulators and law enforcement officials, but Riggs has no indication that we are or ever were the target of an F.B.I. investigation," Adam Weiner, a spokesman for the bank, said.
The investigation was touched off by an examination of transactions at Riggs by Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, and his wife, Princess Haifa, in 2002. At the time, F.B.I. officials were investigating whether money from the princess's accounts wound up in the pockets of two of the people involved in the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. The New York Times reported in late 2002 that the F.B.I. found no evidence that the money went to the hijackers. F.B.I. officials could not be reached for comment last night.
Saudi Arabia's possible financial sponsorship of terrorist groups has drawn close attention from law enforcement officials since the Sept. 11 attacks and the Riggs accounts initially drew attention as part of that inquiry, according to one federal investigator briefed on the inquiry.
A spokesman for the Saudi Arabian Embassy said that the "F.B.I. has repeatedly and as recently as a week ago informed the embassy that there were no concerns" now that the Saudi accounts at Riggs involved terrorist funds or the proceeds of money laundering.
Riggs closed all of its Saudi accounts in early March after it became concerned that the Saudis were not complying with tighter supervisory guidelines the bank imposed on all of its diplomatic accounts a year ago. A person briefed on the matter said that although activity in the accounts had quieted down last summer and fall, largely because Prince Bandar was in Saudi Arabia and Britain most of that time, unusual spikes in banking transactions began occurring again last winter, prompting the bank's action.
The Wall Street Journal reported yesterday that regulators were examining $50 million in Saudi withdrawals from Riggs accounts, some in increments exceeding $1 million.
In addition to the F.B.I. investigation, Riggs is also being investigated by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs and by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the banking regulator for the Treasury Department.
In March of last year, the comptroller's office identified several areas where Riggs had fallen short in terms of complying with federal guidelines to combat money laundering. Its examiners were in the bank almost daily from last March until July. During that time, and since, the bank began instituting what it considered to be more stringent controls to combat money laundering at the bank, including the hiring of extra employees and specialists in fraud supervision, according to a long list of measures provided by Riggs.
Last July, the comptroller's office took the unusual step of imposing a strongly worded "consent order" on Riggs. The order, a public document, outlined the steps the bank needed to take to comply more fully with standards on laundering. But the comptroller's office continued to be disappointed by the steps Riggs was taking to tighten standards.
In March, the comptroller's office told the bank that it planned to designate it as a "troubled" institution, according to Securities and Exchange Commission documents Riggs filed about two weeks ago. The bank may also face substantial fines. Designation as a troubled institution means that Riggs, a midsize concern with about $7 billion in assets, would no longer be able to appoint senior officials to manage its affairs without first securing regulatory approval.
Though there has been speculation on Wall Street that Riggs's woes may result in a forced sale of the bank, it is unlikely that regulators would push for such a sale. Regulators force the sale of a bank only when it is insolvent, has serious liquidity problems, or is designated as a criminal enterprise - conditions that do not apply to Riggs at this point.

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
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Not A Diversion
From the April 12 / April 19, 2004 issue: The war in Iraq has advanced the campaign against bin Ladenism.
by Reuel Marc Gerecht
04/12/2004, Volume 009, Issue 30
"I DON'T FAULT George Bush for doing too much in the war on terror, as some do. I believe that he's done too little and done some things that he didn't have to. When the focus of the war on terror was appropriately in Afghanistan and on breaking al Qaeda, President Bush shifted his focus to Iraq and to Saddam Hussein. He pushed away our allies at a time when we needed them the most. He hasn't pursued a strategy to win the hearts and minds of people around the world, and win the war of ideas against the radical ideology of Osama bin Laden."
So spoke Senator John Kerry on March 15. This could, of course, have been Richard Clarke, the former counterterrorism chief, or Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, the former national security advisers who often do tandem "realist" critiques. Or it could have been Al Franken, the liberal comedian-turned-less-witty-broadcaster, or Patrick Buchanan, the standard-bearer of conservative blue-collar America. From the far left to the far right, a common theme has developed among those who opposed the Iraq war: The campaign against Saddam Hussein diverted us from the battle against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and beyond. Indeed, the invasion and occupation of Iraq has made, to quote Clarke, "America less secure and strengthen[ed] the broader radical Islamic-terrorist movement."
Of course, this view did not occur to all of the above before March 2003--if John Kerry actually believed back then that the war would imperil America's national security, then his vote for it was inexcusably reckless (Howard Dean's logic was at least impeccable). But retrospective clairvoyance, fortified by a good sense for the jugular, has won the day. If you can collapse the central pillar of the Bush war presidency, the odds are good that you can win in November. Politics aside, do these folks have a point? There are always unintended, adverse consequences to any military action. Could those from the Iraq war be the very ones that Clarke, the "realists," and the antiwar Democrats envision?
Not likely. Point by point, their case actually inverts the reality, often the history, of what has happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the rest of the Muslim Middle East. Let us start with the war in Afghanistan, before we get diverted by President Bush's preemptive campaign against Saddam Hussein.
THERE ARE CERTAINLY LEGITIMATE CRITICISMS of the way the administration fought the war in Afghanistan. This magazine made a few, with which the White House took issue. It shouldn't be that hard to see now--it really wasn't that hard to see then--that the Pentagon moved too slowly south, that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's fascination with "new-age" warfare, where very small deployments of special forces, reinforced with awesome air power and what the British used to call "tribal levies," slowed the campaign at critical points. The real issue was never whether the United States was going to get bogged down in an Afghan quagmire, as did the Soviets in the 1980s and the British (briefly) in 1842. Victory for America, once President Bush made the decision to invade and destroy the Taliban state, was never in doubt. The issue was whether we would rapidly fracture Taliban power in Kandahar and possibly catch al Qaeda in disarray. The military brass chose not to throw much manpower at southeastern Afghanistan, the area bin Laden knew best, and to which, it strongly appears, he withdrew. Doing so surely would have cost many U.S. soldiers their lives, but it probably would have increased the odds of catching Osama bin Laden, his number two, Ayman al Zawahiri, and their inner circle and families. It is impossible to say, however, by how much the odds would have improved. With the possible exception of the deep jungles of the Amazon, the southeastern border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the worst area imaginable to play a lethal version of hide and seek. You could pour tens of thousands of troops into that terrain and only marginally improve the chances of finding your target.
Which brings us to Iraq. The tactics used in Afghanistan were not predicated on an ensuing war in Mesopotamia. Rightly or wrongly, Rumsfeld likes "new-age" warfare, regardless of the locale. There simply is no serious argument that the actions of the first campaign were diminished by the planning, logistics, and execution of the second a year later.
There is a pretty good case to be made that in 2001-02 the Bush administration didn't seriously pressure Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to understand the urgent need to move aggressively against the unpatrolled tribal regions bordering Afghanistan. But again, that had nothing to do with Iraq, and everything to do with internal Pakistani politics. And America's second Gulf War certainly did not discourage Musharraf from becoming more aggressive against domestic and foreign holy warriors in 2003-04. It beggars the imagination to believe that al Qaeda's foreign holy warriors and their Pakistani sympathizers want to kill Musharraf for the war in Iraq more than they want to kill him for the war in Afghanistan and his current efforts to extinguish them and their Pakistani base of operations.
It is certainly true, as Clarke and others have charged, that the Bush administration should have done, and still should do, a lot more in reconstructing Afghanistan and in aiding those who want to reform, and eventually end, the warlord system that prevails outside of the capital, Kabul. The holy-warrior camps in Afghanistan that General Musharraf and his predecessors developed for the battle against India in Kashmir--the camps that starting in 1996 came under the control of bin Laden--could come back, particularly if there were a change of heart in Islamabad. If the Bush administration allowed this to develop--and this scenario remains hypothetical--then it would deserve to be damned for shortsightedness and gross negligence. But in the Pentagon, at the State Department, and in the National Security Council, they are well aware of the dangers. It is very hard to see this administration, any administration after 9/11, not doing the minimum necessary to keep Afghanistan from experiencing a Taliban renaissance where jihadist camps could operate.
Let's be honest: It was perfectly clear that the Bush administration was not going to invest massively in Afghanistan way before the White House made the decision to fight in Iraq (it strongly appears that former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill actually doesn't know anybody at Defense, for if he did, he would know, as we did, that the decision to fight in Iraq was neither quick nor easy nor foreordained). As Olivier Roy, the renowned French scholar of Afghanistan and Islamic militancy, has pointed out, the average Afghan certainly wanted us to play the khan, the overlord who takes care of the family. But this runs against the American grain, be it liberal or conservative. Wipe the Iraq war from history, and it remains hard to imagine Secretary Rumsfeld, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State Colin Powell, or President Al Gore if he were in power, putting tens of thousands of troops and tens of billions of dollars into a country that is, in virtually every way, nondeveloped. It is easy, and maybe wise, to throw large amounts of money and manpower at a developed or even developing country after it's been blown to bits by years of war and civil strife. It is much more difficult, and far less wise, to invest too quickly and too massively in a place like Afghanistan.
Baseline point: The Americans aren't going to run away from Afghanistan--odds are we will be in that country for far longer than we will be, in any force, in Iraq. With a little luck, a bit more money and manpower, and a willingness to play hardball with Pakistan in case it returns to its former ways, Afghanistan will muddle through. Certainly, we won't want to use it as an ideal case study at a Harvard seminar on American-led postwar reconstruction in the third world. But it will do. And by the time we leave, it will be perfectly clear to both Democrats and Republicans that neither the time nor the money the United States spent in Afghanistan had much to do at all with George Bush's decision to invade and occupy Iraq.
NEXT CRITICISM: What about our allies, the ones critical to our war on terror, whom we've angered and dissed? Have we not, as General Scowcroft predicted in August 2002 and as Senator Kerry regularly reminds us from the stump, just shot to hell the international system? As Scowcroft wrote in the Wall Street Journal, "And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war [against bin Laden] without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence." According to the Washington Post, Rand Beers, who was President Bush's senior director for counterterrorism, resigned just before the Iraq war because he thought the president's decision to invade had, among other things, "created fissures in the United States' counterterrorism alliances."
Okay, name an important intelligence service in the Middle East that doesn't have a stronger liaison relationship with the United States today than it had on, say, the day after Kandahar fell? Though the Central Intelligence Agency likes to think of itself as an airtight shop, we all know, given what's happened since the end of the Iraq war, that unhappy employees who don't get the foreign policies they prefer leak. And the senior grades of the Clandestine Service in particular love to leak, especially via their retired friends, when they are upset. Can anybody recall, even in the vaguest way, a planted story about anti-al Qaeda operations getting aborted because an Arab service didn't want to touch us?
Anybody hear about the French DST (internal security) or the DGSE (foreign intelligence) turning off a spigot of information about Islamic extremists? According to a senior French intelligence officer, the first and principal exchange point for the United States and continental European security services is Paris. Does this sound like the French elite (which really would like to see George Bush get demolished in Iraq and John Kerry elected) has a problem with intelligence cooperation? Anybody heard of any problems with the Spanish, who just got scorched, so the theory goes, because of their alliance with us in Iraq? How about the Russians, Pakistanis, Uzbeks, or Chinese?
A pretty good argument could be made that we would be better off if the CIA didn't have such friendly relationships with its counterparts in Tashkent, Cairo, Islamabad, or Algiers; that the short-term gain from these relationships, though undoubtedly vital at times of great urgency, fundamentally compromises us in the long-term and ultimately more important task of opening up these societies so that domestically generated Islamic extremism doesn't attack us. In any case, our intelligence and security liaison relationships have never been better. For our Middle Eastern "allies" in particular, it's as if they'd died and gone to heaven. The CIA, often more accurately addressed as Sugar Daddy, has never before come calling with so many gifts. Egypt's president-for-life Hosni Mubarak, who would strongly prefer that the United States not create a functioning democracy in Iraq, knows that his intelligence-liaison relationship with the United States is an ace in the hole. That fraternal tie will certainly stay warm as long as Mubarak thinks there's a chance that President Bush might be serious about transforming the dictatorial politics of the Middle East.
NEXT CRITICISM: George Bush's war in Iraq has inflamed Islamic opinion, radicalized more Muslim youth, and created a new legion of anti-American holy warriors. This is probably the most damning, if the most ethereal, of the charges against President Bush. Odds are, this will be the charge that Senator Kerry and his minions hurl most often at the president (the possible exception being the gravamen that George W. has neglected homeland defense).
Now, the first thing that ought to be said is that we really don't know how many jihadists got born during the first Bush presidency and the eight years of Bill Clinton. Al Qaeda slowly evolved from the Maktab al-Khadamat ("The Office of Services"), an organization started during the Soviet-Afghan War to transport Muslims, primarily Arabs, to Pakistan to join the battle against the Red Army. We really don't know how many Muslims went. If one tracks down the figures for the Maktab, all one can say for sure is that the sources on the numbers are all Pakistani and that Pakistani sources are notoriously unreliable. We have no firm idea how many of the Muslims who did go actually ever crossed into Afghanistan and fought, or how many of them stayed in Pakistan, living lives often more comfortable than those they'd had at home. (This was particularly true when it came to having wives. The cult of the Afghan woman--and there were hundreds of thousands of Afghan women in distress in Pakistan during the war--was very popular among the "jihadists.") And it is difficult to say precisely when al Qaeda became an independent, self-conscious organization developing anti-American holy warriors. This may have happened as early as 1989, or it could have been only two or three years later that a real organization developed with a clear raison d'?tre and a full-time staff.
The afterword of Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon's The Age of Sacred Terror, which is easily the best book about the rise of bin Ladenism and the Clinton administration's response to it, tells us the following: "U.S. officials have spoken of 'tens of thousands' of individuals who were trained in the camps of Afghanistan, and Germany's intelligence chief put the number at seventy thousand, though many were trained as soldiers to fight alongside the Taliban, not as terrorists. Still the number of operatives at large is probably multiples greater than that on any other terrorist group in memory."
Benjamin and Simon were once the director and senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton administration's National Security Council, and they, too, are highly critical of the Bush administration. I strongly suspect the numbers above are grossly exaggerated. When I visited Ahmed Shah Massoud, the legendary Tajik leader of the Northern Alliance, in the fall of 1999, he told me that he was then facing around 700 Arab Afghans. This figure fluctuated a bit, perhaps, but the Taliban never deployed more than 1,000 Arab Afghans against him.
But, for the sake of argument, let's accept the numbers suggested by Benjamin and Simon. In other words, during the eight years of Bill Clinton's presidency, when the United States studiously avoided invading Iraq, the number of Islamic holy warriors fully formed in the Afghan training camps skyrocketed. Let us recall these were the glory years of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, when the president often worked night and day to bring conciliation and settlement to the two sides. These were the years, too, when the Americans went to the rescue of the Bosnian Muslims. And these were the times when President Clinton tried to make nice-nice with President Mohammad Khatami of Iran (of course, Sunni Muslim holy warriors might not care for this too much; but since bin Laden knew he hadn't blown up the American barracks at Khobar Towers in 1996, and since his contacts inside the Saudi royal family were pretty good, he might have drawn the right conclusion when the Clinton administration didn't retaliate against the real perpetrator of the Khobar bombing, the regime in Tehran--to wit, Clinton wasn't tough).
So, during the best of years--or at least, according to Clarke and Kerry, vastly better years than what followed--al Qaeda grew from scratch to an umbrella organization, drawing into its apocalyptic designs holy warriors from the Middle East, America, Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Orient. These were the years when bin Laden promised the faithful that they, not the Americans, were the "stronger horse."
And now, according to the "realists" and antiwar Democrats, the Bush administration has made things worse. It's theoretically possible, of course. It's possible the Clinton years were less energizing to the enemy than the Bush years, when the Taliban were destroyed, bin Laden was put to chase, and al Qaeda as an organization was badly battered. It is possible that America's invasion and (temporary) occupation of Iraq will galvanize holy warriors as did the first Gulf War for an earlier generation. Professor Bernard Lewis's textual analysis showing that bin Laden used the first Gulf War as a clarion call for holy war is undeniable. (And was not the first Gulf War worth angering Islamic militants?)
But we should be enormously cautious in suggesting, as Bush's critics eagerly do, that apocalyptic holy warriors come into being primarily because of specific American actions. We know this is certainly not true for the deadliest of the Wahhabi jihadists--the highly Westernized ones reared or educated in Western Europe. These men are born from their troubled assimilation into Europe's secularized societies. And killer Sunni fundamentalism predates the first Gulf War by decades. Its evolution is attached to no specific Western event--certainly not to the creation of Israel, which in fundamentalist literature is just one more proof, a particularly painful proof since Jews are among the weakest of people in Islamic history, that civilization has gone to hell. But the primary culprits for this fall are not Europeans or Americans--"Christendom," to the fundamentalists. Christendom has been there, in one shape or another, since the beginning of the Islamic era. The real villains, according to the first few generations of fundamentalists, are the Muslims who ape Western ways. The new breed of Muslim activists, the killer elite of bin Laden's deracinated young men who know not love of country or father, have elevated the old disgust at the despotic Westernizing rulers of the Middle East--the men many "realists" still see as our friends--into a global hatred of the West and its cutting edge, the United States. These young men were coming for us, regardless of whether the Bush administration invaded Iraq. Or whether the Clinton administration quarantined and bombed Iraq for eight years. They live to kill. The most devout live to die. It is not surprising at all that Americans, particularly those who work in Washington, who are mostly good secular sorts, view so mundanely the causes of holy war.
On the biggest of issues, Benjamin and Simon are definitely right: "Democratization, however hazardous and unpredictable the process may be, is the key to eliminating sacred terror over the long term." Which is why, of course, the war in Iraq--the attempt to build a democracy on the ruins of the Middle East's most despicable regime--has been worth the blood and treasure. There were many reasons to go to war; as Robert Kagan and William Kristol recently pointed out in these pages, President Clinton and his national security adviser Sandy Berger did a very convincing job of enumerating them in their finest speeches. But a compelling reason, even if it is not one that many in the Bush administration fully understand, was bin Ladenism itself and the need to strike boldly to give us, and Muslims in the Middle East, a way out.
We should be skeptical of those voices who tell us that success in Iraq won't have serious repercussions for the rest of the Middle East (the same voices that are usually quick to point out the adverse effects of failure). The trial of Saddam Hussein, in whom many Muslims of the Middle East will see the image of their own rulers, will make gripping television, even on the anti-American Al Jazeera satellite channel. Iraq's coming great debates, for all the country's enormous problems and attendant violence, will echo through the region on television and radio. The Sunni Arabs of the region will watch Shiite Arabs, long cursed creatures, moving forward, however fitfully and slowly, toward more democracy than they themselves have ever imagined. The shame could be unbearably provocative. The now famous letter to al Qaeda from Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian holy warrior operating in Iraq, tells, we can hope, the future of the entire region. Jihadism cannot survive people power. When the common Muslim man is responsible for his own fate, human decency and civility will win out.
The liberal Washington Post columnist Jackson Diehl, who writes often on the Arab world, recently provided the most honest description of what George W. Bush has wrought in the Middle East:
The most underreported and encouraging story in the Middle East in the past year has been the emergence in public of homegrown civic movements demanding political change. Two years ago they were nonexistent or in jail. Now they are out in the open even in the most politically backward places in the region: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. They are made up not only of intellectuals but of businessmen, women, students, teachers, and journalists. Unlike their governments--and the old school of U.S. and European Arabists--they don't believe that change should be gradual, and they reject the dictators' claim that democracy would only empower Islamic extremists. It is the delay of change, they say, that is increasingly dangerous.
These people weren't created by George W. Bush. They are the homegrown answer to a decadent political order, and they ride a powerful historical current. But they will tell you frankly: The new U.S. democratization policy, far from being an unwanted imposition, has given them a voice, an audience and at least a partial shield against repression--three things they didn't have one year ago.
These words are the best retort to Richard Clarke and John Kerry. But we have no time to waste. Under any circumstances, building democracy in the Muslim Middle East will be slow. And bin Ladenism is a resilient, captivating disease. We should pray, however, that it will not take generations. It certainly won't happen at all if the Bush administration pulls back from its "forward strategy of freedom." Voluntary change in the Middle East is no change at all. But we are off to a good beginning. The war on terror had, thank God, a second act. We will all have to wait until after November to see if there will be a third. Everyone in the Middle East, but especially the holy warriors, will be watching.
Reuel Marc Gerecht is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard.

? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
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No Longer a 'Problem'
Clarke, Condi and the wars of September 11.
BY DANIEL HENNINGER
Friday, April 2, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST
From the moment the September 11 commission was authorized, the only important question was when it would propitiate the media gods. That moment has arrived. We have finally reduced the entire story of September 11, as always, to heroes and villains, winners and losers.
Richard Clarke divined how our system elevates its heroes. He extruded his long, honorable career through layers of major media--Simon & Schuster, CBS and then the Barnum & Bailey big-top of televised hearings. For a week, he became the man of the moment.
Now in another propitiation, Condoleezza Rice will go before the commission in the role the gods have ordained: Prove in public that neither she nor her colleagues in the Bush presidency are knaves who make policy in cynical disregard of truth or evidence. When this exercise is over, we will know very little important about September 11 that we didn't know on September 12.
Recall the famous phrase, "September 11 changed everything." What that meant is that September 11 changed the American mind about terror. That day, though awful, was of a piece with the radicalized Arab policy of annihilating civilians that began at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Across three decades, the West has "lived with" terror. Every now and then, some people died. However willing old Europe was to endure this occasional cost, Americans as of September 2001 were not. After September 11 the president of the United States declared war on terror. He then established the fact of war, not merely the sentiment of war, by defeating the Taliban and Saddam Hussein with armies.
What we had before September 11 was not a war. It was a problem. Wars have common goals and many offensive acts. Problems are open to constant debate, reducing acts. This distinction is crucial to understanding what many think is the September 11 commission's stated mandate: Why did the nation's security bureaucracies "fail" to prevent the attack?
All of the agencies under the commission's microscope--the CIA, the FBI, Defense, State Department and the NSC--are, no matter how elevated their titles, public bureaucracies. If you read the commission's already published papers--on diplomacy, the military, intelligence policy and national policy coordination--the shape of what happened becomes clear.
These are smart fiefdoms. They have their own opinions, all the time, about a host of factors--legal, political, operational--bearing on their work. It is always difficult outside the context of a war to sustain on-point bureaucratic compliance with a goal. The problem is not that these bureaucracies are incompetent. They are unfocused because they answer to several authorities--the president, Congress, their budget, the bureaucracy itself, their boss down the hall.
Read the commission's paper on national security coordination and the Clinton team's anti-terror planning that was led by Richard Clarke. It sounds well-intended and aware of the threat from al Qaeda. But consider just the authors' description of the hierarchy of advisory bodies to the NSC.
There is the National Security Council, "the formal statutory body," chaired by the president. Then "the Principals Committee, with cabinet-level representatives from agencies. . . . Next is the Deputies Committee, where the deputy agency heads meet under the chairmanship of the deputy national security advisor. Lower ranking officials meet in many other working groups or coordinating committees, reporting to the deputies, and, through them, to the principals."
The staff documents are replete with examples of bureaucratic concern and argument. There is nothing insidious in this. It is the nature of large, modern organizations. Agencies execute policy subject to myriad constraints imposed on any public bureaucracy. Amid the rubble and death of a September 11, it is everyone's instinct to say these agencies should have been focused on the problem laserlike and 24/7. That has never been and never will be--short of war.
Richard Clarke, for all his reputation as a bull in the bureaucracy's china shop, clearly thinks Mr. Bush's declared war was a mistake. He and others would let the world's security bureaucracies "work the problem." But over 30 years, an entire industry had grown up to work the terrorism problem. Abu Nidal and Carlos the Jackal were household names. And still the destruction of embassies, hotels, ships and finally skyscrapers continued.
After Mr. Bush's September declaration of war, the bureaucracies focused and functioned magnificently from Afghanistan to Baghdad. Policy moved out of the agency mists, Mr. Clarke's world, and was now in the realm of public and political consensus. It had the backing of the American people. Even bureaucracies understand esprit.
But that run from Kabul to Baghdad was a brief, shining moment. The future is less clear. Successful wars require national unity, in part to energize and focus the bureaucracies. The U.S., however, is at a point in its history when no subject--nothing--is immune to partisan disunity. What existed after September 11 is broken.
Unbending partisanship may be an American entitlement now, and Howard Dean exercised it this week in the wake of Fallujah and U.S. casualties in Iraq. "That is the legacy of this president," Mr. Dean told a dinner for the hopefully named 21st Century Democrats, "who did not tell the truth to the American people." But if we are as concerned as we say about preventing another September 11, we should understand the price of our indulgences. In a world in which the know-how to produce missile delivery systems and nuclear and biological weapons will soon be commoditized, you should want your bureaucratic warriors to be on a war-like footing. Assuming that they always are is foolish. Like the Supreme Court, bureaucracies follow the election returns. Their attention can revert to the norm.
This is not an argument against dissent and disagreement. It is an argument that George Bush's declaration of war on terror, including Iraq, is more right than it is wrong. The more we step down from that war, the closer we and our bureaucracies will return to the vulnerabilities that led to September 11.
Mr. Henninger is deputy editor of The Wall Street Journal's editorial page. His column appears Fridays in the Journal and on OpinionJournal.com.
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GOP TERROR MYOPIA

By PETER BEINART
April 3, 2004 -- WE sometimes assume 9/11 inaugurated a brand new foreign- policy debate. If we see any precedents at all, we find them in the Cold War, the last time the United States faced a mortal threat and national security defined the two parties. The 1990s, by contrast, seem like a lull between two storms, an interlude whose relatively trivial foreign policy concerns were rendered obsolete when the World Trade Center fell.
But this isn't really true. In the '90s, both parties crafted visions of the world that 9/11 ratified. In many ways, Democrats and Republicans are engaged in the same debate today as they were a decade ago. All that has changed are the stakes.
When the Cold War ended, some Republicans decided the United States should turn inward. But isolationism, while prevalent at the GOP grassroots, never captured the party leadership. Pat Buchanan challenged George H.W. Bush in 1992 and Bob Dole in 1996, but control of the party remained in the hands of relative internationalists like Dole, Newt Gingrich, Trent Lott and, ultimately, George W. Bush.
These men believed the job of U.S. foreign policy was to figure out which states would threaten the United States in the future and to head them off - a job from which Bill Clinton's humanitarian adventures distracted. Sometimes GOP leaders imagined China as the new threat; sometimes they imagined "rogue" states like Iran, Iraq, Syria and North Korea. In either case, the Cold War was the template - America's relationship with hostile regimes would define the new era.
As a result, when Islamic terrorists began striking the United States in the '90s, Republicans talked about them not as an independent force, but as the outgrowth of hostile regimes. "Terrorist states have made a comeback during Bill Clinton's administration," claimed the 1996 GOP platform.
In January 2000, when Condoleezza Rice outlined the Bush campaign's international agenda for Foreign Affairs, she mentioned "the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism." In "Against All Enemies," Richard Clarke recounts telling Rice and her deputy, Steve Hadley, that his anti- terrorism office dealt with "post-Cold War security, not focused just on nation-state threats." It was a portfolio, he remembers, that they seemed to consider "strange."
In the Democratic Party, however, the '90s brought a different perspective. If "the economy, stupid" began as a statement about domestic policy, it gradually became a prism for international affairs.
Clinton identified globalization-the increased economic, technological, and cultural integration of the world - as his administration's central challenge. And, as he knew from his struggles to please the international bond market, globalization made governments weaker than ever before.
When terrorism hit the United States in the '90s, it became the foremost example of globalization's "dark side." In a 1999 interview with The New York Times, Clinton argued that terrorism was a threat not only distinct from rogue states, but greater than them.
In the Democratic rejoinder to Rice, in the March 2000 issue of Foreign Affairs, former Clinton officials W. Bowman Cutter, Joan Spero and Laura D'Andrea Tyson argued that "traditional security threats" were giving way to "nonterritorial" problems "like international terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and environmental degradation." For his part, John Kerry in 1997 authored "The New War," in which he argued the United States should "lead the world in the fight against 'private' criminal enterprises just as we led the world in the fight against 'public' criminal governments."
By 9/11, in other words, both parties had already assimilated terrorism into a broader view of the world. Two weeks after the attacks, conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote that "the overriding aim of the war on terrorism is changing regimes."
In his first post-9/11 State of the Union, in a clear echo of Ronald Reagan's reference to the "evil empire," Bush spoke of an "axis of evil" comprising Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
Democrats saw things differently. They supported the war in Afghanistan. But they considered it a war against a terrorist organization that had hijacked a state, not against a government using terrorism as a means of state power. And, in their broader statements, party leaders made it clear they still regarded terrorism as largely independent of governments, not the expression of them - which predisposed them to see Iraq as a diversion. As Kerry put it in February, "The agents of terrorism work and lurk in the shadows of sixty nations."
Republicans say the difference between the two parties is that the GOP wants to wage a war, while Democrats simply want to run police operations. But that's not quite right. Kerry, and many other Democrats, urged the Bush administration to use force more aggressively to destroy al Qaeda remnants in the final days of the Afghan war.
The Bush team, by contrast, seemed to grow militarily complacent after the Taliban was overthrown. Relieved that Afghanistan was no longer a rogue state, the Bushies seemed relatively untroubled that it was no longer much of a state at all.
The distinction between the two parties isn't over military force per se; it's over whether to use military force - and every other tool of U.S. power - primarily against terrorist-supporting states or against terrorists operating independently of states.
For the GOP, the war on terrorism will be won - in an echo of 1989 - by toppling regimes. Not all the regimes will fall to U.S. tanks, but the Iraqi demonstration effect, combined with moral clarity and political pressure, will eventually bring the dominoes down.
I hope they're right. But, even if they are, their model won't win the war on terrorism. As we're learning in Iraq (and, for that matter, in parts of the former Soviet Union like Uzbekistan and Chechnya), toppling dictatorships doesn't necessarily usher in democracy and, thus, doesn't necessarily stop terrorism.
Ironically, the more success Republicans have in overthrowing rogue regimes, the more terrorism will become the nongovernmental force Democrats say it is. And the more the United States will have to focus on globalization's "dark side": anarchic states plagued by ethnic conflict, economic dysfunction, loose weapons and al Qaeda - in other words, pretty much what we're facing in Iraq.
Far from being irrelevant, the '90s are likely to be with us for a very long time.
Peter Beinart is editor of The New Republic. From the April 12 & 19 double issue


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Al Qaeda-Hizballah Bomb Team on Amman Revenge Mission for Hamas
DEBKAfile Special Report
April 2, 2004, 6:31 PM (GMT+02:00)
Meridien-Amman - targeted for terror
The building in the picture, the five-star Le Meridien Hotel, in the Shmeisani district of Amman, walking distance from the Hussein sports center and the Palace of Culture, was projected for reduction to charred rubble Friday, April 2 by a joint Hizballah-al Qaeda bomb team. This is revealed by DEBKAfile's exclusive counter-terror sources. But part of that team was captured by Jordanian forces as it entered the kingdom from Syria at the Rahmtha crossing Wednesday, March 31, driving a suspicious looking pickup truck found on examination to be loaded with hundreds of kilos of explosives. The four detainees, questioned at Jordanian army security headquarters in Amman, soon gave them game away. They also disclosed that another one or two explosives-laden trucks with the rest of the terror team had managed to slip into Jordan before them and was at large - whereupon the royal security forces shot into pursuit mode and placed armed guards on the palaces, the US and Israeli embassies and strategic sites.
Amid the hue and cry, King Abdullah put in calls to the United States and Israel to report the captured terrorists had also divulged they were on their way to carry out a mega-strike against at least two hotels and a large Amman shopping mall to avenge Israel's killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in the Gaza Strip on March 22.
The al Qaeda-Hizballah terrorist plot would have left several hundreds of people dead in Amman - a catastrophe several times greater than the Madrid train bombings. According to our Jordanian sources, the captured terrorists claimed that because the Hamas, Hizballah and al Qaeda were prevented thus far from carrying out a mass-casualty attack in any Israeli city by its heavy security build-up, they opted from the Jordanian capital as target. Initial input from the Jordanian inquiry has been relayed to Washington and Jerusalem.
The terrorists driving the missing truck or trucks were to have rendezvoused at an unknown location with a second team of fellow al Qaeda operatives who were to have collected the explosives and used them for suicide car bombings inside Amman. The truck seized at the border was to have blown up Le Meridien.
DEBKAfile's military sources add: the Jordanian army, police and security services have been on high alert for three days, special units reinforcing security at the royal palaces and for heads of government and economy. Royal Air Force craft are swooping up and down the kingdom hoping to spot the missing bomb vehicles and terrorists before they gain access to any Jordanian town. First thing Thursday, April 1, when they had still not been located, the king telephoned Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in Riyadh and Hosni Mubarak in Sharm el Sheikh with bitter recriminations against Syrian President Bashar Assad for failing to avert the attempted assault on his capital city. He said the trucks could not have been packed with explosives on the outskirts of Damascus and then set off for the Jordanian frontier without the knowledge of Syrian military intelligence. Indeed, the captured terrorists admitted they had been assured they would not be bothered at the Syrian border crossing because the border guards had been told not to search the trucks.
Then and there, to avoid the embarrassment of shaking hands with the accused Syrian leader, the Egyptian president ordered their meeting later that morning to be cancelled. In case Assad turned up anyway, Mubarak took to the air and flew out of the Sinai resort to Cairo.
Had the Le Meridien Hotel hit been achieved on behalf of Hamas, DEBKAfile's counter-terror sources sketch the resulting scenario:

1. Hamas would have claimed its vow to avenge its dead leader vindicated with the help of forces outside the country.

2. The pick-up truck or trucks still loose might still strike an Israeli target such as the Israeli embassy in Amman or an Israeli-Jordanian factory in the kingdom.

3. Jordan would carry the brand of the most loyal ally of America and Israel in the Middle East.

4. Even though the Hamas had no direct role in the operation, its leaders would claim that its reach had crossed national Palestinian borders and the movement was now part of the al Qaeda-Hizballah terrorist network in the Middle East and beyond.

Jordanian media named the notorious al Qaeda operative Musab Zarqawi as the suspected mastermind of the attempted al Qaeda-Hizballah Hamas mega-strike in Amman. DEBKAfile's terror experts note that the familiar al Qaeda names bandied about after every terrorist action belong to the fundamentalist network's command level current until the end of 2002. They are yesterday's men. A new generation has meanwhile risen from the middle ranks whose names are unknown. Their anonymity has become the biggest obstacle facing Western intelligence in fighting or predicting al Qaeda actions. Zarqawi is a Jordanian himself and still active, but it is hardly credible that one man is capable of wreaking devastation over a short period in Baghdad, Karbala, Irbil, Madrid, Amman, Istanbul and every other world site targeted for terror.

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http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040419&s=klein


lookout by Naomi Klein

Let's Make Enemies
[from the April 19, 2004 issue]
Baghdad

QUOT-Do you have any rooms?" we ask the hotelier.

She looks us over, dwelling on my travel partner's bald, white head.

"No," she replies.

We try not to notice that there are sixty room keys in pigeonholes behind her desk--the place is empty.

"Will you have a room soon? Maybe next week?"

She hesitates. "Ahh... No."

We return to our current hotel--the one we want to leave because there are bets on when it is going to get hit--and flick on the TV: The BBC is showing footage of Richard Clarke's testimony before the September 11 Commission, and a couple of pundits are arguing about whether invading Iraq has made America safer.
They should try finding a hotel room in this city, where the US occupation has unleashed a wave of anti-American rage so intense that it now extends not only to US troops, occupation officials and their contractors but also to foreign journalists, aid workers, their translators and pretty much anyone else associated with the Americans. Which is why we couldn't begrudge the hotelier her decision: If you want to survive in Iraq, it's wise to stay the hell away from people who look like us. (We thought about explaining that we were Canadians, but all the American reporters are sporting the maple leaf--that is, when they aren't trying to disappear behind their newly purchased headscarves.)
US occupation chief Paul Bremer hasn't started wearing a hijab yet, and is instead tackling the rise of anti-Americanism with his usual foresight. Baghdad is blanketed with inept psy-ops organs like Baghdad Now, filled with fawning articles about how Americans are teaching Iraqis about press freedom. "I never thought before that the Coalition could do a great thing for the Iraqi people," one trainee is quoted saying. "Now I can see it on my eyes what they are doing good things for my country and the accomplishment they made. I wish my people can see that, the way I see it."
Unfortunately, the Iraqi people recently saw another version of press freedom when Bremer ordered US troops to shut down a newspaper run by supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr. The militant Shiite cleric has been preaching that Americans are behind the attacks on Iraqi civilians and condemning the interim constitution as a "terrorist law." So far, al-Sadr has refrained from calling on his supporters to join the armed resistance, but many here are predicting that the closing down of the newspaper--a nonviolent means of resisting the occupation--was just the push he needed. But then, recruiting for the resistance has always been a specialty of the Presidential Envoy to Iraq: Bremer's first act after being tapped by Bush was to fire 400,000 Iraqi soldiers, refuse to give them their rightful pensions but allow them to hold on to their weapons--in case they needed them later.
While US soldiers were padlocking the door of the newspaper's office, I found myself at what I thought would be an oasis of pro-Americanism, the Baghdad Soft Drinks Company. On May 1 this bottling plant will start producing one of the most powerful icons of American culture: Pepsi-Cola. I figured that if there was anyone left in Baghdad willing to defend the Americans, it would be Hamid Jassim Khamis, the Baghdad Soft Drinks Company's managing director. I was wrong.
"All the trouble in Iraq is because of Bremer," Khamis told me, flanked by a line-up of thirty Pepsi and 7-Up bottles. "He didn't listen to Iraqis. He doesn't know anything about Iraq. He destroyed the country and tried to rebuild it again, and now we are in chaos."
These are words you would expect to hear from religious extremists or Saddam loyalists, but hardly from the likes of Khamis. It's not just that his Pepsi deal is the highest-profile investment by a US multinational in Iraq's new "free market." It's also that few Iraqis supported the war more staunchly than Khamis. And no wonder: Saddam executed both of his brothers and Khamis was forced to resign as managing director of the bottling plant in 1999 after Saddam's son Uday threatened his life. When the Americans overthrew Saddam, "You can't imagine how much relief we felt," he says.
After the Baathist plant manager was forced out, Khamis returned to his old job. "There is a risk doing business with the Americans," he says. Several months ago, two detonators were discovered in front of the factory gates. And Khamis is still shaken from an attempted assassination three weeks ago. He was on his way to work when he was carjacked and shot at, and there was no doubt that this was a targeted attack; one of the assailants was heard asking another, "Did you kill the manager?"
Khamis used to be happy to defend his pro-US position, even if it meant arguing with friends. But one year after the invasion, many of his neighbors in the industrial park have gone out of business. "I don't know what to say to my friends anymore," he says. "It's chaos."
His list of grievances against the occupation is long: corruption in the awarding of reconstruction contracts, the failure to stop the looting, the failure to secure Iraq's borders--both from foreign terrorists and from unregulated foreign imports. Iraqi companies, still suffering from the sanctions and the looting, have been unable to compete.
Most of all, Khamis is worried about how these policies have fed the country's unemployment crisis, creating far too many desperate people. He also notes that Iraqi police officers are paid less than half what he pays his assembly line workers, "which is not enough to survive." The normally soft-spoken Khamis becomes enraged when talking about the man in charge of "rebuilding" Iraq. "Paul Bremer has caused more damage than the war, because the bombs can damage a building but if you damage people there is no hope."
I have gone to the mosques and street demonstrations and listened to Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters shout "Death to America, Death to the Jews," and it is indeed chilling. But it is the profound sense of betrayal expressed by a pro-US businessman running a Pepsi plant that attests to the depths of the US-created disaster here. "I'm disappointed, not because I hate the Americans," Khamis tells me, "but because I like them. And when you love someone and they hurt you, it hurts even more."
When we leave the bottling plant in late afternoon, the streets of US-occupied Baghdad are filled with al-Sadr supporters vowing bloody revenge for the attack on their newspaper. A spokesperson for Bremer is defending the decision on the grounds that the paper "was making people think we were out to get them."
A growing number of Iraqis are certainly under that impression, but it has far less to do with an inflammatory newspaper than with the inflammatory actions of the US occupation authority. As the June 30 "handover" approaches, Paul Bremer has unveiled a slew of new tricks to hold on to power long after "sovereignty" has been declared.
Some recent highlights: At the end of March, building on his Order 39 of last September, Bremer passed yet another law further opening up Iraq's economy to foreign ownership, a law that Iraq's next government is prohibited from changing under the terms of the interim constitution. Bremer also announced the establishment of several independent regulators, which will drastically reduce the power of Iraqi government ministries. For instance, the Financial Times reports that "officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority said the regulator would prevent communications minister Haider al-Abadi, a thorn in the side of the coalition, from carrying out his threat to cancel licenses the coalition awarded to foreign-managed consortia to operate three mobile networks and the national broadcaster."
The CPA has also confirmed that after June 30, the $18.4 billion the US government is spending on reconstruction will be administered by the US Embassy in Iraq. The money will be spent over five years and will fundamentally redesign Iraq's most basic infrastructure, including its electricity, water, oil and communications sectors, as well as its courts and police. Iraq's future governments will have no say in the construction of these core sectors of Iraqi society. Retired Rear Adm. David Nash, who heads the Project Management Office, which administers the funds, describes the $18.4 billion as "a gift from the American people to the people of Iraq." He appears to have forgotten the part about gifts being something you actually give up. And in the same eventful week, US engineers began construction on fourteen "enduring bases" in Iraq, capable of housing the 110,000 soldiers who will be posted here for at least two more years. Even though the bases are being built with no mandate from an Iraqi government, Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy chief of operations in Iraq, called them "a blueprint for how we could operate in the Middle East."
The US occupation authority has also found a sneaky way to maintain control over Iraq's armed forces. Bremer has issued an executive order stating that even after the interim Iraqi government has been established, the Iraqi army will answer to US commander Lieut. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez. In order to pull this off, Washington is relying on a legalistic reading of a clause in UN Security Council Resolution 1511, which puts US forces in charge of Iraq's security until "the completion of the political process" in Iraq. Since the "political process" in Iraq is never-ending, so, it seems, is US military control.
In the same flurry of activity, the CPA announced that it would put further constraints on the Iraqi military by appointing a national security adviser for Iraq. This US appointee would have powers equivalent to those held by Condoleezza Rice and will stay in office for a five-year term, long after Iraq is scheduled to have made the transition to a democratically elected government.
There is one piece of this country, though, that the US government is happy to cede to the people of Iraq: the hospitals. On March 27 Bremer announced that he had withdrawn the senior US advisers from Iraq's Health Ministry, making it the first sector to achieve "full authority" in the US occupation.
Taken together, these latest measures paint a telling picture of what a "free Iraq" will look like: The United States will maintain its military and corporate presence through fourteen enduring military bases and the largest US Embassy in the world. It will hold on to authority over Iraq's armed forces, its security and economic policy and the design of its core infrastructure--but the Iraqis can deal with their decrepit hospitals all by themselves, complete with their chronic drug shortages and lack of the most basic sanitation capacity. (US Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson revealed just how low a priority this was when he commented that Iraq's hospitals would be fixed if the Iraqis "just washed their hands and cleaned the crap off the walls.")
On nights when there are no nearby explosions, we hang out at the hotel, jumping at the sound of car doors slamming. Sometimes we flick on the news and eavesdrop on a faraway debate about whether invading Iraq has made Americans safer. Few seem interested in the question of whether the invasion has made Iraqis feel safer, which is too bad because the questions are intimately related. As Khamis says, "It's not the war that caused the hatred. It's what they did after. What they are doing now."
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Petraeus to Get Key Job in Iraq
101st Airborne Chief to Take Charge of Developing Iraqi Military
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 3, 2004; Page A20
Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, who spent most of the past year in Iraq as commander of the 101st Airborne Division, is being sent back to that country to oversee the organization and training of all Iraqi military and security forces, Pentagon insiders said yesterday.
The selection of Petraeus, which has not yet been announced, is "all part of the thinking about the transition" to Iraqi sovereignty in 90 days, said a spokesman for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld who confirmed the choice but declined to be identified.
Essentially, Petraeus is being given charge of a major component of the U.S. exit strategy for Iraq -- developing Iraqi forces strong enough to maintain security and thereby permit the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
Despite the behind-the-scenes moves being made to prepare for the transition of power, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz sought yesterday to play down the military significance of the changeover.
"There's not going to be any difference in our military posture on July 1st from what it is on June 30th, except that we will be there then at the invitation of a sovereign Iraqi government, which I am quite sure will want us to stay there until killers like the ones who perpetrated these atrocities in Fallujah are brought under control," he told reporters on Capitol Hill after he briefed members of Congress on the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As chief of an expanded Office of Military Cooperation, Petraeus is expected to take over many of the internal security functions currently overseen by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority. Petraeus, whose command of the 101st during last spring's war in Iraq was recently the subject of a two-part series in The Washington Post, almost certainly will be nominated by Rumsfeld for a third star as part of the assignment, the Pentagon insiders said.
Petraeus's new position will be especially sensitive in the coming months because it will make him the point man for integrating various Kurdish and Shiite Muslim militias into the Iraqi security structure, or for eliminating them somehow. His experience over the past year in northern Iraq has allowed him to develop close relationships with several Kurdish leaders, whose pesh merga has 50,000 members, making the militia larger than many nations' armies.
Senior U.S. officials in Iraq say that breaking up the armed groups there is essential to the country's transition to democracy, and that the demobilization of the Kurdish and Shiite militias is the first step toward that goal.
Even so, having Petraeus in a top slot in Baghdad overseeing the distribution of weapons to Iraqi forces would be good news for the Kurds. It would likely be more problematic for the Shiite militias, especially the Mahdi Army, a force organized last year by Moqtada Sadr, a militant young Shiite cleric.
Petraeus is believed to favor a hard line against insurgents in the Sunni Triangle, north and west of Baghdad. He is said to favor a strategy of flooding especially hostile enclaves, such as Fallujah, with forces and slugging it out, accompanied by a policy of engagement that turns on heavy spending to boost local employment.
Petraeus is close to Army Gen. John Abizaid, chief of the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. military headquarters for the Middle East. Abizaid is said to have specifically asked the Army for Petraeus.
The Army said he will be succeeded as commander of the 101st Airborne, which is based in Fort Campbell, Ky., by Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Turner II, who currently commands the Army's Italy-based Southern European Task Force.

? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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After Falluja
From the April 12 / April 19, 2004 issue: We cannot permit the outrages in Mogadishu and Falluja to have similar effects.
by William Kristol
04/12/2004, Volume 009, Issue 30
THE SIMILARITY struck everyone right away: Mogadishu, October 3, 1993--Falluja, March 31, 2004. But we cannot permit these two outrages to be similar in their effect. At this key moment, the Bush administration has to ensure that the reactions to Falluja and Mogadishu go down in the history books as studies in contrast, not in similarity.
Mogadishu triggered, in a few months, the withdrawal of American troops from Somalia, and victory for those who killed our soldiers. Slaughter in Rwanda followed in a few months--a slaughter the Economist this week (on the 10th anniversary) called "the purest genocide since 1945, and perhaps the single greatest act of evil since Pol Pot turned Cambodia into a killing field." The Economist further noted that the "West's reluctance to get involved was largely a consequence of America's shambolic intervention in Somalia the previous year." Or more precisely: a consequence of America's humiliating retreat from Somalia.
Mogadishu encouraged Osama bin Laden in his judgment that America was a "weak horse," a nation that could not take casualties. Mogadishu therefore deserves a place of dishonor at the head of a decade of failures to respond seriously to attacks against our soldiers, diplomats, and citizens. From Mogadishu to the Khobar Towers, the African embassies, and the USS Cole, American passivity helped Osama bin Laden make the case to prospective jihadists that their cause would prevail. Then came 9/11, and a decisive response.
And now Falluja. The New York Times last week warned, to its credit, against "a panicky, casualty-driven withdrawal" from Iraq. But then, to its discredit, it lapsed into worry that the "emotions" generated by "pictures of burned Americans hanging from a bridge" in Falluja might lead to "overwhelming reprisals." If only.
It would be unfair to dwell on the lame comment by one American commander on the day of the atrocity: "Should we have sent in a tank so we could have gotten, with all due respect, four dead bodies back? What good would that have done? A mob is a mob. We would have just provoked them. The smart play was to let this thing fade out." Really? Unprovoked by the sight of a tank, terrorists in the Falluja area continued in the following days their assaults against U.S. troops and Iraqis working with Americans. In any case, the alternative to inaction on March 31 did not have to be a single tank. We could have sent many tanks, along with air support, to disperse the mob, kill those who didn't disperse, intimidate onlookers, and recover the bodies of the dead Americans. And we could immediately have put a price on the head of the killers and those who desecrated the bodies.
Still, since that first day, the responses of the Bush administration and of American commanders have been commendable: assurances that we will not cut and run, and commitments to punish those involved, and to reenter and "pacify" Falluja. We expect a strong--even "overwhelming"--military response along those lines in the coming days.
It has been the great achievement of President Bush, since September 11, to break the bad habits of the 1990s. The president's critics now claim that any president would have done the same after the attacks on New York and Washington. This is by no means clear. The pattern of passivity ran deep. The temptations of accommodation and wishful thinking are still strong. Indeed, they are so strong that the administration arguably hasn't broken as sharply with the failed policies of the past decade as it should have. The size of the military has not been increased; there was a reluctance to send ground troops into Afghanistan in November-December 2001 and to commit enough ground troops to Iraq; there seems to be an unwillingness to hold Iran accountable for sheltering al Qaeda leaders; there is an aversion to pressuring Saudi Arabia.
Still, the Bush administration has shown real strength and impressive decisiveness in taking on terrorist groups and states. We trust that U.S. troops will soon move to uproot what seems to have become a kind of terrorist sanctuary in Falluja, and to ensure that those who seek to drive us from Iraq are thwarted and indeed routed. If the atrocities in Falluja lead to a deepening of the U.S. commitment to victory in Iraq, and to a sharpening of the Bush administration's sword in the war on terror, then we will have properly honored the sacrifice of those who died March 31 in Falluja--and a decade earlier in Mogadishu as well.

--William Kristol


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Brazil Shielding Uranium Facility
Nation Seeks to Keep Its Proprietary Data From U.N. Inspectors

By Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, April 4, 2004; Page A01
The Brazilian government has refused to allow U.N. nuclear inspectors to examine a facility for enriching uranium under construction near Rio de Janeiro, according to Brazilian officials and diplomats in Vienna, home of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The IAEA and Brazil are at an impasse over the inspections, the diplomats said. Brazil maintains that the facility will produce low-enriched uranium for use in power plants, not the highly enriched material used in nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, Brazil refuses to let IAEA inspectors see equipment in the plant, citing a need to protect proprietary information.
The diplomatic standoff plays into fears that a new type of nuclear race is underway, marked not by the bold pursuit of atomic weapons but by the quiet and lawful development of sophisticated technology for nuclear energy production, which can be quickly converted into a weapons program.
Brazil's project also poses a conundrum for President Bush, who has called for tighter restrictions on enrichment of uranium, even for nuclear power, as part of a new strategy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Nonproliferation specialists also say that if the United States and the United Nations do not act to curtail Brazil's program, or at least insist on inspections, it could undermine White House calls for Iran and North Korea to halt their efforts to enrich uranium.
"If we don't want these kinds of facilities in Iran or North Korea, we shouldn't want them in Brazil," said former U.S. nuclear negotiator James E. Goodby. "You have to apply the same rules to adversaries as you do to friends. I do not see that happening in Brazil."
Brazil's shrouded technology at the plant in Resende belongs to a program considered legal under international treaties, but it remains subject to U.N. inspections, aimed at making sure it is not used for producing weapons-grade material for itself or customers.
The IAEA has dispatched inspectors to Resende in recent months, only to find significant portions of the facility and its contents shielded from view, diplomats said. Walls have been built and coverings are draped over the equipment, according to reports from specialists who have visited the plant, which is in the early stages of construction.
Brazilian officials maintain that the facility falls within rules allowing countries to develop the nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful uses. They say intrusive IAEA inspections are unnecessary because Brazil, which formally forswore nuclear weapons in the 1990s, is seeking a secure and inexpensive source of nuclear power, and has no lingering atomic weapons ambitions.
"We feel deeply bothered, almost offended, when suspicions are raised about Brazil," a senior Brazilian diplomat said.
The Brazilian official acknowledged that inspectors are not permitted to see all the equipment at the Resende plant, but he said the IAEA is free to conduct sensitive tests on the surroundings, as well as uranium fed into the centrifuges and exiting the other end.
The coverings are "necessary to protect our technological breakthroughs," said the diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. He said the IAEA is "politically motivated to insist on visual access. We say that visual access is not indispensable.
"This is a natural process of negotiation," the official added, "which ought not to be the object of any fuss."
There has been no suggestion that the White House plans to prevent Brazil from perfecting its enrichment facility, although U.S. emissaries expect to push this month in Brasilia for better cooperation with the IAEA inspectors.
"We hope that Brazil will be part of the solution. We're not trying to describe them as part of the problem," said a senior State Department official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "We understand they're going to establish an enrichment capability [for nuclear energy]. It will be safeguarded."
A series of Brazilian statements about nuclear matters raised worries in Washington and Vienna about Brazil's intentions, however. During his winning campaign, leftist Workers' Party presidential candidate Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva criticized the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty as unfair. "If someone asks me to disarm and keep a slingshot while he comes at me with a cannon, what good does that do?" da Silva asked in a speech. He later said Brazil has no intention to develop nuclear arms.
Suspicions rose anew after da Silva's science and technology minister, Roberto Amaral, said Brazil would not renounce its knowledge of nuclear fission, the principle behind the atomic bomb. Brazilian officials quickly said Amaral was out of line, and he later resigned.
The da Silva government announced it will expand its uranium enrichment capability not only for its own power plants but also to sell low-enriched uranium for use in energy production in other countries. The program is to begin this year. Only half a dozen countries now have such a capability.
Enrichment technology is not new to Brazil. The government, working with West Germany, developed a rudimentary ability to enrich uranium in the 1970s as part of an ambitious strategy to supplement hydroelectric power and natural gas. Two nuclear reactors, Angra-1 and Angra-2, now operate in the country's industrial belt.
Brazilian officials, who oversee one of the largest uranium deposits in the world, currently pay to ship the raw metal to Canada and on to Britain, where it is enriched for use in the power plants. If Brazil mastered the complete fuel cycle, it would save $10 million to $12 million per year, the government estimates, while laying the groundwork to sell to others.
"It is a very rich market that runs into the billions each year," the Brazilian diplomat said.
IAEA inspectors want to inspect for two reasons: to make sure Brazil is not making weapons-grade material; and as part of their investigation of global nuclear supply networks, including the one established by Pakistani scientist Adbul Qadeer Khan. Diplomats and nuclear experts said IAEA wants to learn more about the origin of the program in Brazil and its sources of supply.
"If you have an enrichment facility, you want to make sure that the material isn't being enriched to a level that would cause concern," a Vienna-based diplomat said. "There are just a lot of questions at this moment which are unresolved. There's an impasse."
The IAEA is expected to report in June on Brazil's performance. Agency officials working on the Brazil project declined to comment for this story.
A separate issue facing Bush is where to draw the line on Brazil and other countries seeking a uranium enrichment capability. Such projects are permitted under the Non-Proliferation Treaty when the purposes are peaceful, but Bush has proposed a change.
Under his plan, announced in a Feb. 11 speech, countries that do not already produce uranium would not be allowed to do so. Rather, they would be provided nuclear fuel at a reasonable cost -- and only if they also agreed to rigorous IAEA inspections.
For governments that already considered the treaty unfair, Bush's proposal seemed only to reaffirm the bias in favor of countries that already possessed atomic technology when the treaty was crafted in the 1960s. Three countries that later built nuclear weapons -- India, Pakistan and Israel -- did not sign.
"We don't like treaties that are discriminatory in their intent," said the Brazilian official, who described Bush's nuclear fuel proposal as "unacceptable to Brazil, precisely because we see ourselves as so strictly committed to nonproliferation, to disarmament, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."
Iran has made similar statements, as has North Korea, which U.S. intelligence experts believe has built one or two nuclear weapons. Iran and North Korea had secret enrichment programs, with Iran's hidden for 18 years. North Korea evicted U.N. inspectors and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In Brazil, by contrast, one U.S. official said that "we don't have any reason to think there are problems." A diplomat in Vienna said, "It's not Iran, it's just not."
Yet permitting Brazil to proceed with the kind of enrichment program that Bush wants to limit, several analysts said, threatens to weaken efforts to make common rules. Lawrence Scheinman of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies said, "Brazil going forward could give cause to countries like Iran to do the same."
"It makes mincemeat of the president's speech," said Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington think tank. He noted that Bush said countries must agree to rigorous IAEA inspection to get international help. "It sets a hell of a precedent if they go through with an enrichment facility."

? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Papers on 1964 Brazil Coup Declassified
Sat Apr 3, 4:44 AM ET

By TOM MURPHY, Associated Press Writer
SAO PAULO, Brazil - Newly declassified U.S. documents show the extent of American willingness to provide aid to Brazil's generals during the 1964 coup that ushered in 21 years of often bloody military rule.
* 40th Anniversary of Brazil Military Coup (Nat'l Security Archive)
The National Security Archive, a non-governmental Washington-based research group, posted the documents on its Web site this week to coincide with Wednesday's 40th anniversary of the coup.
Figuring prominently in the records is Lincoln Gordon, the U.S. ambassador to Brazil at the time and now a resident expert in Latin American affairs at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
"We were working at a frenzied pace in those days to get Washington ready for whatever might happen," Gordon, 90, said in a telephone interview with The Associated Press. "It was the height of the Cold War and Brazil was a major country in Latin America."
The documents show members of Lyndon B. Johnson's administration actively preparing to aid the coup plotters.
In a March 27, 1964, cable to the State Department, Gordon requested a naval task force and deliveries of fuel and arms to the coup plotters "to help avert a major disaster here."
Gordon said in the cable that Brazil could fall under the spell of a communist-style regime led by President Joao Goulart, "which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s." Mainland China turned communist in 1949 under Mao Zedong.
The documents also reveal what some experts say was a major miscalculation by the CIA (news - web sites).
A CIA cable from Brazil, dated March 30, predicted a military coup "within the next few days." It added, "The revolution will not be resolved quickly and will be bloody."
In fact, the coup was put in motion the next day, March 31, and was over by April 4, when Goulart fled to exile in Uruguay. The entire episode was bloodless.
"The CIA was probably harking back to events in 1961, when the military was deeply divided over the issue of Goulart assuming power," said American political scientist David Fleischer, who teaches at the University of Brasilia. "But, just as there was no violence in 1961, there was none in 1964. It was a CIA miscalculation, not for the first time and not for the last."
A Brazilian historian, Gaudenico Torquato of the University of Sao Paulo, said, "They (the CIA) got it wrong. At that time, the U.S. was involved in the feverish competition against communism known as the Cold War. That colored their judgment."
In a March 31 reply to Gordon, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said the administration had decided to "immediately mobilize" a naval task force. He also promised fuel, ammunition and tear gas shipments to the Brazilian military.
"These new documents serve to reinforce what is now a well-known tale," said Fleischer. "The U.S. organized its support for the coup in an operation called Brother Sam. The task force ended up steaming toward the South Atlantic, but the aid was never needed. The coup ended quickly and without bloodshed."
Gordon said Rusk made it clear that the U.S. would only intervene under certain circumstances. "He wanted to make sure there was broad political support in Brazil for the military before advising any intervention."
The documents show President Johnson was keenly following events in Brazil. In one instance, Johnson instructs aides "to take every step that we can" to aid Brazilian military forces opposed to Goulart.
The audiotape presents a briefing between Johnson and national security aides. In it, Johnson says, "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little."
But Gordon said: "People like Rusk were cautious. I think they were influenced by the Bay of Pigs and didn't want a repeat of that experience."
In 1961, anti-Castro rebels, supported and armed by the U.S., were defeated by Castro when they attempted to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.
From 1964 to 1985, Brazil was ruled by a string of five colorless military presidents chosen by their fellow officers. The dictatorship ended in 1985 when a democracy movement swept the country.
On the Net:
National Security Archive: http://www.nsarchive.org

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Probe eyes key concept of physics
By Beth Daley, Globe Staff, 4/3/2004

It took more than 44 years to build, was canceled seven times, and is considered by some scientists to be the most technically difficult mission NASA has ever undertaken.
Yesterday, the space agency announced that Gravity Probe B is finally ready for launch on April 17. Its goal is to help prove one of the most confounding concepts in physics: the strange twist in space-time predicted by Einstein's theory of general relativity.
Despite the modest name, Gravity Probe B carries a payload of superlatives. It has taken longer to finish than any other project at NASA. It is armed with some of the most precise instruments ever built. And in a space agency known for its delays and cost overruns, the $700 million project remains singular in its ballooning schedule and budget, some observers say.
"Gravity Probe B has been 5 years away from launch for the 25 years I've been involved in space programs," said Keith Cowing, editor of Nasawatch.com, a group that monitors NASA.
Since the project was conceived by three scientists after a naked midday swim at Stanford University's pool, more than 1,000 people have worked on the satellite. Two of its founders are dead. More than 90 people have earned their doctorates working on the project. Gravity Probe B has been on the chopping block so many times that its bespectacled lead scientist has become a fixture on Capitol Hill for his successful lobbying to keep it funded.
Inside the satellite are four gyroscopes whose movement could confirm the theoretical underpinnings of modern physics -- or turn them on their head.
"The expectation is we are going to see [the movement]," said Robert Reasenberg, associate director of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, in Cambridge, which is helping calculate key astronomical measurements for the project. "If we don't see it, it is an astounding result. It will turn physics upside down."
In 1916, Einstein shocked the world of physics by introducing a new description of gravity, one that is caused by massive objects curving the fabric of space and time. Large objects like the earth can "warp" space-time, the way a basketball placed on a taut rubber sheet warps the sheet and causes other nearby objects to roll toward it. At the same time, if the basketball is turning, its motion will twist the sheet slightly -- a phenomenon known as "frame dragging."
Ever since it was proposed, scientists have wanted to test Einstein's general relativity theory using the earth itself. But the earth's "warping" effect on space and time is tiny -- more of a marble than a bowling ball -- and no precise measuring tools were available.
Now, the scientific supporters of Gravity Probe B say the extraordinary predictions made by general relativity can finally be tested. Thanks to dramatic, and expensive, advances by the project team, the probe will be able to measure once-undetectable changes in the gyroscope's spin related to a distant star.
The project has been hailed as a marvel for its work with cryogenics and engineering. The gyroscopes' four spherical rotors, each the size of a ping-pong ball, are considered the roundest manmade objects in the world. Scientists can also detect a change of angle equal to the width of a human hair as seen from 10 miles away. To ensure the experiment's success, scientists had to create almost unheard-of conditions inside the satellite, where the instruments will be kept chilled at minus 455 degrees Fahrenheit with liquid helium.
The probe can even boast its own spinoff technologies. Graduate students who worked on the project helped develop better GPS systems that are now used in aircraft landings. They also created a type of superglue that can stand up to the pressures of space.
Still, the project is not without its critics, who complain that its rising costs have sucked money from more worthy missions. Others say that the project has lost much of its value since it was first planned, because other experiments have been conducted that appear to prove Einstein's theory.
"When it was first conceived it would have taught us something new about gravity theory . . . but not now," said Kenneth Nordtvedt, a gravity specialist and retired physics professor at Montana State University.
The project's scientists, however, say the probe will provide the most accurate test yet -- and will be the first experiment to test the frame dragging effect.
They note that every time the project has been on the budgetary chopping block, it has been upheld by a review panel of researchers or by Congress.
"The thing that drives Gravity Probe B is the measurement accuracy," said Rex Geveden, program manager.
Now, as the launch date approaches at California's Vandenberg Air Force Base, invitations have been sent out to the scientists, engineers, and students that have in some way helped create it.
Few are as excited as Robert H. Cannon Jr., the lone surviving scientist who started the project and went on to be the Air Force's chief scientist and a US assistant secretary of transportation. When he first imagined the project with the physicists Leonard Schiff and William Fairbanks, the latter physicist said it might take 10 years to test. Cannon thought it would be more like 20 years.
That was 1959.
"It's been a long wait," Cannon said this week. "Bill Fairbanks was off by four and I was off by two. But I'll be there [at the launch]. My whole family will be there."
Beth Daley can be reached at bdaley@globe.com.

? Copyright 2004 Globe Newspaper Company.

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Odd Sound Startles Space Station Crew Again

Associated Press
Sa