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BULLETIN
Tuesday, 20 April 2004

>> ANOTHER UN FRAUD?

The UN's Fraudulent War on Terror

By Arnold Beichman
Washington Times | April 20, 2004

I simply cannot understand why President Bush keeps appealing to United Nations for its help and cooperation when that institution has proven itself to be incapable of doing anything significant in the field of human rights let alone international terrorism. Nor can I understand why Secretary of State Colin Powell has called the U.N. a "Coalition partner" when it is at best a sneering onlooker.

I base this judgment on a long dead-letter U.N. resolution dated Dec. 9, 1994, passed by the General Assembly almost a decade ago, about which little is heard. In fact, few people even know it exists. And why should they, since the resolution died the day it passed?

To discuss this resolution is to prove beyond a shadow of doubt the U.N. is a fraud, a betrayer of our hopes to establish a rule of law among nations. This 10-year-old resolution, titled "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," passed with no opposition. And a fat lot of good it did.

The 1994 resolution text begins with this laudable preamble:

"Having considered in depth the question of measures to eliminate international terrorism, [and] convinced that the adoption of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism should contribute to the enhancement of the struggle against international terrorism.... "

Were such a resolution presented once again to the U.N. Sixth Committee, I doubt it would ever be considered. The rot is deep in the U.N. General Assembly. How deep? Mark these words of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan as late as Feb. 24, 1998: "Can I trust Saddam Hussein? I think I can do business with him." Mr. Annan was bestowing his confidence on a dictator whose genocidal practices were well-known, a dictator who poison-gassed 5,000 Iraqis in Halabja in 1991.

The 1994 U.N. resolution demands that member states "take all appropriate measures at the national and international levels to eliminate terrorism." Appended to the resolution is the "Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism."

Congress ought to appoint a special committee to find out why the U.N. has ignored its own resolution and why it has failed to fulfill what its own General Assembly demanded of the Secretariat.

The U.N. resolution said the General Assembly was "deeply disturbed by the worldwide persistence of acts of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations ... which endanger or take innocent lives." The GA, it said, was "firmly determined to eliminate international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations [and] that those responsible for acts of international terrorism must be brought to justice."

Mark those words: There is no justification, said the U.N., for international terrorism -- that is taking the lives of innocent people as at the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, or in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Terrorism is terrorism regardless of political slogans or issues, said yesterday's United Nations.

If Kofi Annan and the U.N. Security Council are serious about combating terrorism, they should immediately call a special General Assembly session to renew the General Assembly Declaration of 1994. Were this resolution in effect today, the Coalition forces in Iraq would have the legitimating support of the U.N. just as the United States had in 1950 when it almost single-handed rescued South Korea from being swallowed up by the military dictatorship of North Korea's Kim Il-sung.



>> UN OIL SCANDAL -


Insight on the News - World
Issue: 4/27/04

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Investigative Report
Documents Prove U.N. Oil Corruption
By Kenneth R. Timmerman

A team of international forensic investigators is preparing to blow the lid off the much-disputed U.N. oil-for-food program in Iraq and will present new evidence of corruption at an upcoming congressional hearing that directly will implicate world leaders and top U.N. officials, Insight has learned.

Investigators, led by Claude Hankes-Drielsma and the KPMG accounting firm, currently are in Baghdad sifting through mountains of Saddam Hussein-era records seized from his Oil Ministry and the State Oil Marketing Organization that detail payments by Saddam to his legions of foreign friends and political supporters. An Iraqi newspaper, Al-Mada, published the list of 270 recipients of special "allocations" (also known as vouchers) in January. But as Insight goes to press, the testimony of Hankes-Drielsma on April 22 before the House International Relations Committee is expected to provide new evidence of widespread international corruption.

In a scathing letter sent to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on March 3, which he made available to Insight, Hankes-Drielsma called the U.N. program "one of the world's most disgraceful scams," and said that "based on the facts as I know them at the present time, the U.N. failed in its responsibility to the Iraqi people and the international community at large."

In an earlier letter to Annan, to which he received no reply, Hankes-Drielsma noted that allocations of "very significant supplies of crude oil [were] made to ... individuals with political influence in many countries, including France and Jordan," both of which supported Saddam and his regime to the bitter end.

Under the U.N. program, the Dutch company Saybolt International BV was paid hefty fees to inspect oil tankers loading Iraqi crude in Basra, to make sure no cheating took place. "Now it turns out that the inspecting company was paid off," one investigator said, "while on the ground, individual inspectors were getting cash bribes." Saybolt denies it received an oil allocation, although the Iraqi documents show it was down for 3 million barrels.

Saybolt spokesman Peter Box tells Insight that the company's own investigation of two known incidents of "topping off" involving the oil tanker Essex in 2001 "found no involvement of our staff at that particular time." Saybolt continues to operate in Iraq today, although it now has an "entirely new group of people," Box adds.

Among the revelations at the April 22 hearings, Insight has learned from investigators directly working on the case, will be new details of oil vouchers allegedly granted to Patrick Maugein, a prominent crony of French President Jacques Chirac, said to total 72.2 million barrels.

Maugein's involvement in the U.N.-approved oil deals is significant, investigators say, because he is believed to be a conduit for backdoor payments to Chirac and his family. It was Chirac who spearheaded a worldwide coalition last year that opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and tried desperately to keep Saddam in power.

When the allegations of backdoor payments first surfaced in a Paris courtroom in 1998, Maugein swept them aside as "pure fantasy." And in a statement provided to Insight, he denies having raised funds for Chirac, his family or his political campaigns. But as more evidence begins to leak from the archives of Saddam's former oil ministry, such denials may become harder to sustain.

The vouchers were assigned to two trading companies, identified in the Iraqi documents as Trafigura and Ibex, both of which were involved in the Essex incident. Investigators say they believe both companies are tied to Maugein, either through beneficial ownership or contractual arrangement. Vouchers for an additional 11 million barrels were granted to Maugein business partner Cabecadas Rul de Soussa, according to the original Al-Mada list. The ties between de Soussa and Maugein were first revealed by Therese Raphael of the Wall Street Journal Europe.

Asked about the allegations by Insight, Maugein denied he was involved with either company, although he did acknowledge knowing their principals, with whom he had worked as an oil trader with Marc Rich in Switzerland. He insisted that all his dealings with Iraq were legal and conducted through the oil-for-food program. "Patrick Maugein bought oil for his refinery in Mantua, Italy," a spokesman said. "All the oil deals were run by the U.N. They were paid through the U.N. and monitored by the U.N."

But those denials might not withstand the onslaught of the documents about to be released, investigators say. "Already we've got details of all the accounts held in the names of individuals," one investigator tells Insight in an exclusive interview. "On these records are exact details of which accounts were held by whom," including the foreign proxies and their ultimate beneficiaries - in Iraq and overseas.

The Iraqi documents specifically tie Maugein to the 25 million barrels allocated to Trafigura Beheer BV, a company Maugein claims was a competitor of his own London-based SOCO International. Investigators say other information they have developed shows that Maugein could be a "beneficial owner" of Ibex Energy, a holding company registered in Bermuda that was awarded vouchers for 47.2 million barrels. "That is a very high allocation," an investigator tells this magazine. "If a Cabinet minister gets 12 million barrels, why would Ibex get 47 million barrels unless something much bigger was at stake?"

Other French recipients named in the Iraqi documents include former Interior minister Charles Pasqua (12 million barrels), former French U.N. ambassador Jean-Bernard Merimee (8 million barrels) and Lebanese-French middleman Elias Firzli (14.6 million barrels).

Firzli acknowledged in a lengthy interview with Insight in Paris that the Iraqis were desperate to meet with Chirac and were willing to pay a high price for access. Shortly before the war broke out in March 2003, Firzli says he introduced Iraqi diplomat Nizar Hamdoon - sent as an emissary from Saddam - to senior French government officials in Paris. But Firzli scoffed at the oil vouchers, calling them "small stuff compared to the billions of dollars people made in the 1980s."

Published reports to date have focused on oil vouchers granted to the head of the United Nation's oil-for-food program, Benan Sevan, who has been on an extended vacation since the allegations first surfaced at the end of January. He denied the charges through a U.N. spokesman. And Insight has learned that as investigators pursue the document trail, they believe they are getting closer to world leaders, including Chirac.

But can it be proved? "The Iraqi civil service, even under Saddam, was quite excellent. They kept meticulous records. Every order was cross-referenced, initialed and counterinitialed, so nobody could be accused of taking anything for himself," an investigator who recently returned from Baghdad tells Insight.

Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), chairman of the House International Relations Committee, sent a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Annan on April 1, which committee staffers tell this magazine was intended to "lay down a marker." It called the scandal "without precedent in U.N. history" and urged Annan to make his response "equally unprecedented." Annan has announced that he will name an independent panel to investigate.

Fears of a U.N. whitewash run high on Capitol Hill. Hyde urged Annan to take steps to ensure that all documents relating to the oil-for-food program "be preserved and secured," and asked that special measures be taken to protect potential whistle-blowers who could provide testimony on the illicit deals. The United States General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, told Hyde's committee recently that $10.1 billion of the estimated $60 billion handled by the United Nations under the program was paid in kickbacks, bribes and set-asides to Saddam and his cronies.

The KPMG forensic-accounting investigators were brought to Baghdad by the Iraqi Governing Council to get to the bottom of the scandal. But Insight has learned that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by J. Paul Bremer, recently took over the investigation, just as the accountants were stumbling over evidence of corruption by Americans working for the CPA. "We were hearing stories of contractors passing envelopes with huge amounts of cash to CPA officials," an investigator says. "As much as $300,000 in cash passed hands."

Speaking from Baghdad, an Iraqi official confirmed to this magazine that the CPA was now in charge of these matters, although the Iraqi Governing Council was footing the bill. "We no longer have control over the documents or the investigation," the official said.

In Washington, the State Department's Bureau of International Organizations is in charge of relations with the United Nations. In preparation for the April 22 hearing, Chairman Hyde has sent two letters to Assistant Secretary of State Kim Holmes requesting that State provide full documentation of the oil-for-food program, including commercial contracts. Since the United States is a permanent member of the Security Council and a leading member of the U.N. Sanctions Committee, State has access to the full United Nations record but has been unwilling to make incriminating information public until now for fear of angering U.S. allies. France accounted for approximately 25 percent of all U.N.-approved trade with Iraq, according to an estimate by the CIA.

"Give France a break," says French ambassador to the United States Jean-David Levitte, writing in the Los Angeles Times. He said allegations that France condoned kickbacks or took bribes "are completely false and can only have been an effort to discredit France, a longtime friend and ally of the U.S."

Kenneth R. Timmerman is a senior writer for Insight and author of The French Betrayal of America, just released from Crown Forum.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



>> WHERE IS DOV?


Treasury Checks and Unbalances
Posted April 14, 2004
By Kelly Patricia O Meara


Treasury Secretary John W. Snow.


It's that time of year again when Congress and the rest of us get the opportunity to pore over the government's financial statements and decide how well federal bureaucrats spent, and accounted for, the taxpayer dollars with which they were entrusted. The good news is that most of the federal agencies and departments are making progress. The bad news is that the federal government still cannot balance its checkbook.

The most interesting development concerning the 2003 financial statements may be that Treasury Secretary John Snow apparently caught the May 2002 edition of Insight in which this reporter questioned why the word money is never used in these financial reports. Rather than refer directly to the wholesale spending of your tax money, bloodless euphemisms have been concocted to refer to it as assets, transactions, unsupported entries, material-control weaknesses, adjusted records, unmatched disbursements and even abnormal balances.

But this year, on page 22 of the summary of the 2003 Financial Report of the United States Government, Secretary Snow, the top money man to whom all agencies and departments must report, explains: "A clean audit opinion provides assurance that agencies are responsibly accounting for the people's money." There it is. Undeniably there. Although the word money appears only once in the Treasury's 27-page report, critics say, admitting that what is being spent is actually money is the first step toward balancing the federal checkbook. Nonetheless, issuance of the 2003 financial statements marks the seventh year in a row that the federal government could not audit, let alone balance, its books.
-------------------------------------------

Treasury Secretary, Year and Audit Opinion


Robert E. Rubin, 1997, Unauditable
"We believe that the publication of these audited statements is an important step in providing American citizens with more information about the operations of their government."

Robert E. Rubin, 1998, Unauditable
"We believe that the publication of this financial report is an important
step in providing the American public with useful information about their government's assets, liabilities and operations."

Lawrence H. Summers, 1999, Unauditable
"We are committed to producing and reporting financial information that meets the highest standards of integrity and to provide to the American people the accountability and professionalism they expect from their government."

Paul H. O'Neill, 2000, Unauditable
"I am committed to producing and reporting financial information that meets the highest standards of integrity and to provide the American people the accountability and professionalism that they expect from the government."

Paul H. O'Neill, 2001, Unauditable
"I believe that the American people deserve the highest standards of accountability and professionalism from their government, and I will not rest until we achieve them."

John W. Snow, 2002, Unauditable
"I intend to continue the commitment to producing and reporting financial information that meets the highest standards of integrity and to provide to the American people the accountability and professionalism that they expect from their government."
-------------------------------------------------

This also was the case under Treasury secretaries Robert Rubin, Lawrence Summers and Paul O'Neill, so Snow is eager to note that "The federal government has come a long way since the first governmentwide report subject to audit issued in March of 1998 for fiscal year 1997," and "at that time only 8 of the 24 agencies received clean opinions." Today 20 of 24 federal agencies received clean audit opinions and the agency statements were for the first time produced before the end of the calendar year.

It is the job of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to audit the federal government's financial statements, and this year, as in all previous years in which the auditing requirement was in force, "certain material weaknesses in internal control and in selected accounting and reporting practices resulted in conditions that continued to prevent us from being able to provide Congress and American citizens an opinion as to whether the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government are fairly stated." Indeed, the GAO further reports, "As a result of material deficiencies in the federal government's systems, record-keeping, documentation and financial reporting, readers are cautioned that amounts reported in the consolidated financial statements and related notes may not be reliable."

So the books can't be audited and what information is made available "may not be reliable."

And why was the GAO unable to "provide an opinion"? According to David Walker, the comptroller general of the United States, "there are three primary reasons" why the consolidated financial statements remained unauditable for fiscal year 2003: (1) serious financial-management problems at the Department of Defense (DoD); (2) the federal government's inability to account for billions of dollars of transactions between federal entities; and (3) the federal government's ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements.

Walker explains in his report of the government's financial statements that "We designated the serious financial-management problems at DoD as high risk since 1995. Overhauling DoD's financial-management operations represents a challenge that goes far beyond financial accounting to the very fiber of DoD's range of business operations, management-information systems and culture. DoD's financial-management problems are pervasive, complex, long-standing and deeply rooted in virtually all business operations throughout the department. To date, none of the military services or major DoD components has passed the test of an independent financial audit because of pervasive weaknesses in financial-management systems, operations and controls."

Of course, the nation is at war, but not one military service or major component of DoD was able to pass an audit even as the department had the largest 2003 cost increase in the whole of the federal government - up more than 35 percent from the previous year to $143.4 billion. And, according to Snow, in 2003 more than $50 billion in additional funding was appropriated to DoD to fight the war on terrorism. Given the fact that systemic financial management at DoD is so bad institutionally that it cannot audit its books, even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cannot say whether that additional money was appropriately or effectively spent.

And why can't the DoD account for its money? During testimony last month before the House Government Reform subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, Walker reiterated what everyone knows, especially Rumsfeld - that "DoD's financial-management problems are pervasive, complex, long-standing and deeply rooted in virtually all business operations throughout the department." In other words, despite Rumsfeld's blistering insistence that the problem be solved, the financial-management systems still do not communicate with one another. In his testimony Walker does not provide information about the corporate contractors who have been paid hundreds of millions of dollars to correct what he calls "pervasive weaknesses in financial-management systems."

Rep. Todd Platts (R-Pa.), chairman of the subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, tells Insight that his subcommittee has been focused on trying to learn "what financial systems are working and those that aren't, and what is being done to fix the problems. The biggest challenge to getting a clean audit is DoD, and its biggest problem is its financial-management systems. The GAO has said that the challenge there is long-running institutionalized practices - they've identified several thousand different financial-accountability processes used there and they're trying to get those thousands of systems to be uniform and combined as one efficient system."

"Who the contractors are," the subcommittee chairman says, "isn't as important as what is being done. My focus is twofold: Is the work being done, and are the taxpayers being well served regardless of whether it's contractor X, Y or Z? Do the departments and agencies have a long way to go? Absolutely. Are they making strides in the right direction? Yes."

Even so, and despite the warning by Comptroller General Walker that the information in the financial statements may not be reliable, Platts says he believes "The big picture is that Congress has information available that tells us which departments and agencies are doing a good job in accounting for taxpayer funds and which are not. ... The consolidated financials tell us where to target our focus."

Meanwhile, critics say, the problem continues. In the Pentagon, for instance, institutionalized bureaucracies, military careerists and Pentagon procurement colonels continue to resist some of the world's best professional managers brought in to put the financial house in order. This has produced some very odd dual messaging. For instance, the DoD recently added to its Website a slide show that begins with "We are America's Oldest Company, Largest Company, Busiest Company and Most Successful Company." The accompanying slides describe the DoD as a corporation by explaining that it is bigger than Wal-Mart, Exxon-Mobil, GM and Ford and refers to President George W. Bush as the chief executive officer and Congress as the board of directors, with the American people being the "stockholders."

Critics point out that DoD has been the biggest impediment to getting the federal government's books balanced, that under Bill Clinton in fiscal 2000 the department could not account for $1.1 trillion (and still hasn't), and that for seven years it has been unable to audit its books. Rumsfeld has turned the air blue trying to impress both the Pentagon establishment and the entrenched and congressionally protected civil-service bureaucracy with the need to correct these problems. He is fully aware that if DoD were indeed a corporation the bankruptcy courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission long ago would have shut down this "corporation" on which the nation relies for its defense.

Kelly Patricia O'Meara is an investigative reporter for Insight magazine.



-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hu, Kim discuss nuclear program
By Stephanie Hoo
ASSOCIATED PRESS
BEIJING -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Il reportedly discussed his country's nuclear program with China's president at a meeting yesterday, just days after Vice President Dick Cheney urged Beijing to do more to defuse a growing threat from Pyongyang.
Mr. Kim told China's leader that he was ready to give up his country's nuclear programs if the United States changed its "hostile attitude," a South Korean newspaper reported, according to Reuters news agency.

"Kim reportedly explained the reasons behind the nuclear weapons to Hu and added that North Korea is willing to give up nuclear developments if the United States changes its hostile attitude," South Korea's most widely read daily, Chosun Ilbo, said, quoting a Chinese source.
Mr. Kim's visit was reported by South Korean media but not confirmed by China's Foreign Ministry, which in the past has released information about the secretive leader's visits only after he returns home.
Early yesterday, a convoy of armored cars with tinted windows was seen carrying a delegation from the main Beijing train station to a government guesthouse where Chinese leaders usually receive visiting leaders. Mr. Kim reportedly traveled to China by train.
The reports said Mr. Kim talked with President Hu Jintao over lunch about North Korea's nuclear-weapons program and asked for economic aid. They said the visit would last four days.
Mr. Cheney, who met with Mr. Hu last week, prodded China to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, citing new evidence that the North has atomic weapons.
"Time is not on our side," a senior U.S. official quoted Mr. Cheney as telling Chinese leaders.
Washington wants China to use its leverage as the North's last major ally and the leading supplier of food and energy for its ailing economy.
The U.S. official said Mr. Cheney gave Chinese leaders information from a top Pakistani nuclear scientist suggesting that North Korea had at least three nuclear devices and is capable of making more from both plutonium and enriched uranium.
China says it wants a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons and has hosted two rounds of talks on the issue with the two Koreas, the United States, Japan and Russia. Beijing is trying to organize a third round within the next few months.
China's Foreign Ministry said it had "no information" on Mr. Kim's meeting with the Chinese leader, which would be the first since Mr. Hu became president last year. When Mr. Kim visited China in 2000 and 2001, neither side announced the trips in advance.
A special train carrying Mr. Kim and his entourage of about 40 senior party and government officials arrived in Beijing yesterday morning, South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported.
---------------------------------------------------------------

>> FOOD FIGHT...

Heinz Co. Is Campaign Weapon for Bush

By LOLITA C. BALDOR
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Though John Kerry's wife is an heir to the H.J. Heinz Co. fortune, the food company and its executives are providing President Bush with money and a campaign issue - jobs flowing overseas - in this year's election.

Members of the board of the Fortune 500 company and its corporate political action committee have donated thousands of dollars to Republicans in recent years, including contributions to the Bush campaign. The corporate PAC has given nothing to Kerry.

The Republicans are accepting the cash even as they criticize the Pittsburgh-based company's job cuts and overseas moves - part of an effort to taint the presumptive Democratic nominee with the conglomerate's business practices.

While Teresa Heinz Kerry gained much of her $500 million portfolio through her Heinz inheritance, she does not serve on the board and is not involved with the management of the company. Even her late husband, Sen. H. John Heinz III, R-Pa., did not serve on the board.

No Heinz family member has been employed by the company or served on its board since H.J. "Jack" Heinz II, its chairman, died in 1987.

Heinz Kerry, who heads the separate Heinz Family Foundation and the Howard Heinz Endowment, owns less than 4 percent of the company's stock. Major Heinz stockholders include the company's top executives, led by Chairman William R. Johnson, as well as beer magnate Peter Coors and former Pittsburgh Steelers wide receiver and pro football Hall of Famer Lynn Swann.

During the campaign, Kerry has criticized companies that move jobs overseas or shift their tax status abroad to avoid federal taxes, calling them "Benedict Arnold" businesses. He has faulted the Bush administration for embracing a tax policy that rewards them.

Republicans, in response, have pointed to the Kerrys' ties to Heinz, calling the four-term Massachusetts senator a hypocrite for slamming policies that have poured millions into his wife's bank account.

Stuck in what it fears is a food fight is the Heinz Co., which is trying desperately to keep the campaign out of its ketchup sales. In the last few months, the company - which gets about 5,000 phone calls a month - has fielded 800 calls from consumers with questions or complaints about the company's connections to Kerry, his wife and the campaign, said spokeswoman Debbie Foster.

A look at the company's campaign donations shows a preference for Republicans. In the past six years, the Heinz company's political action committee gave more than $64,000 to GOP candidates, nearly three times the amount given to Democrats. It contributed $5,000 to Bush's campaign. It has shunned the Kerry campaign, but the PAC gave $5,000 to the Massachusetts Democratic Party.

Johnson also put his money on the GOP, giving more than $20,000 to Republican congressional committees and candidates since 1999. Other board members have also contributed to Republicans, giving money to Bush's campaign and Pennsylvania's two Republican senators, Arlen Specter and Rick Santorum.

Company spokesman Jack Kennedy said Heinz is nonpartisan and the PAC gives money to both parties. The heavy Republican totals, he said, may just be an indication of where corporate facilities are located.

Determined to make clear that it is not connected to the Kerry campaign, the Heinz company has issued statements about the relationship. "We want to make sure people buy our products on their merit. We're an equal-opportunity condiment," Kennedy said.

According to Kerry's financial disclosure report filed last May, Heinz Kerry owns more than $4 million worth of company stock. Heinz Kerry sold more than $14.8 million worth of Heinz stock in 2002.

"No, they don't run the company, but they still own a lot of stock. And Teresa has had a long relationship with the company," said James Glassman, a columnist and economic analyst at the conservative-leaning American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. "I think it's absolutely legitimate to point to Heinz and say here's a company with a close association with Kerry that is doing exactly the thing Kerry is condemning."

Republican National Committee spokeswoman Christine Iverson said the GOP is not going after the Heinz Co. but "will continue to point out John Kerry's hypocrisy when his record on the issues does not match his rhetoric."

Last month, the RNC issued a lengthy critique of the Heinz company, detailing hundreds of layoffs and plant closings in five states over the past nine years and pointing out jobs it created in other countries.

The multibillion-dollar Heinz Co. has about 38,900 workers worldwide, with 30 percent located in 27 factories scattered across 17 states. The other 70 percent work in facilities overseas.

About 60 percent of the company's sales are outside America, and the products sold in other countries are often made and marketed locally and in some cases are unique to that region. Tomatoes for ketchup sold in the United States are grown largely in the regions surrounding the major processing plants in Ohio, Iowa and California.

Besides its name brands, Heinz also makes and markets OreIda potatoes, Smart Ones frozen foods and Classico sauces. The company has 50 affiliates operating in 200 countries.

---

On the Net:

www.hjheinz.com
www.opensecrets.org
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>> SAUL FILES - TALLEST "HEBREW"? OR KERRY WATCH...

Purple Hearts: Three and Out
Posted April 12, 2004
By Stephen Crump
Kerry glows with pride while wearing one of the Purple Hearts he desperately sought.
Democratic presidential nominee in waiting Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) frequently speaks of courage, brotherhood and responsibility when he mentions his brief service in Vietnam. He took Super-8 home movies there in which he staged heroics in full-battle dress, so that later he might use them for campaign ads. Kerry has made so much of his Vietnam medals which he once pretended to throw away that critics have begun to wonder why he has been so cagey about the dubious circumstances surrounding the Purple Hearts that got him out of Vietnam after only four months of combat service. Under the rules, a serviceman had to be awarded three Purple Hearts to apply to go home. Not one or two, but three. And, say critics, there's the rub.
Kerry, who piloted Patrol Crafts Fast (PCFs) as a young Lt.(jg) in the Vietnam War, has always made much of those Purple Hearts. An award often pinned on the pillow of a combat warrior so badly wounded that he cannot sit up to receive it, the Purple Heart recognizes the sacrifices of combat when a soldier or officer has sustained a wound "from an outside force or agent" and received treatment from a medical officer. The records for such treatment "must have been made a matter of official record," according to the military definition of the award.
According to Kerry's own description in Douglas Brinkley's Tour of Duty, the Dec. 2, 1968, mission behind what he has claimed to be his first Purple Heart was "a half-assed action that hardly qualified as combat." Indeed. Kerry was stationed with Coastal Division 14 at Cam Ranh Bay. At that time he piloted a small foam-filled boat, known as a Boston Whaler, with two enlisted men in the darkness of early morning. The intent, apparently, was to patrol an area that was known for contraband trafficking, but it was an undocumented mission. Upon approaching the objective point, the crew noticed a sampan crossing the river. As it pulled to shore, Kerry and his little team opened fire, destroying the boat and whatever its cargo might have been.
In the confusion, Kerry claims to have received a "stinging piece of heat" in the arm, the result of a tiny piece of shrapnel. He was not incapacitated and continued with regular swiftboat-patrol duty. William Shachte, who oversaw this ad hoc mission, was quoted by the Boston Globe as saying Kerry's injury, from whatever source, "was not a serious wound at all."
But Kerry met with his immediate superior officer, Lt.Cmdr. Grant Hibbard, the next morning and requested a Purple Heart for his wound. Hibbard recalls that Kerry had a "minor scratch" on his arm and was holding in his hand what appeared to be a fragment of a U.S. M-79 grenade, the shrapnel that had caused the wound. "They didn't receive enemy fire," Hibbard tells Insight. Since this was an essential requirement for the award, the commander rejected Kerry's request. Hibbard does not remember that Kerry received medical attention of any kind and confirms that no one else on the mission suffered any injuries.
Shortly thereafter, Kerry was transferred to Coastal Division 11 at An Thoi. Apparently, Kerry petitioned to have his Purple Heart request reconsidered. Hibbard remembers getting correspondence from Kerry's new division, asking for his approval. In the hurried process of moving to a new command himself, Hibbard thinks he might have signed off on the award. If so, "it was to my chagrin," Hibbard remembers. Kerry's second commander, Lt.Cmdr. G.M. Elliott, says he has no recollection of such an event ever occurring.
There are no written records of Kerry's magical first Purple Heart on file at the Naval Historical Center in Washington, the nation's primary repository for such documentation. A Purple Heart normally is not requested but is awarded de facto for a wound inflicted by the enemy - a wound serious enough to require medical attention. The Naval Historical Center keeps all documents connected to such awards to U.S. Navy and Marine personnel. These typewritten "casualty cards" list the date, location and prognosis of the wound for which the Purple Heart is given, and they are produced by the medical facility that provides treatment for the combat wound at the hands of the enemy. There are two such cards for Kerry - for his slight wounds on Feb. 20 and March 13, 1969, but none for his December 1968 claim.
After receiving a Purple Heart for the March 13 scratch and bruise, Kerry sought an early pass out of combat duty, invoking the informal Navy "instruction" known as 1300.39. According to the Boston Globe, 1300.39 meant an officer could request a reassignment from his superior officer after receiving three Purple Hearts. The instruction states that, rather than being automatic, the reassignment would "be determined after consideration of his physical classification for duty and on an individual basis." Of the 138 servicemen and officers in Kerry's unit who received Purple Hearts during the time he was there, records indicate only two received more than two. These were Lt.(jg) Jim Galvin and a boatswain's mate named Stevens. When Insight reached Galvin he said all three of his Purple Hearts were the result of shrapnel or glass shards. Such minor injuries were common on PCF boats with their glass windows and thin metal hulls, and, like Kerry's, Galvin's injuries were not serious enough to take him out of combat for more than a few days.
Unlike Kerry, Galvin elected to stay with his men. Indeed, though a professional Navy officer, he never had heard of instruction 1300.39. It was not until early April of 1969, when Galvin noticed that Kerry was preparing to leave the officers' barracks at An Thoi that he learned about "three Purple Hearts and you're out." According to Galvin, it was Kerry who told him, "There's a rule that gets you out of here and I'm getting out. You ought to do the same." Galvin remembers, "He seemed to take care of everything pretty quickly," because that was the last time Galvin saw Kerry in Vietnam.
The three-times wounded Galvin stayed with his men, transferred to Cam Ranh Bay to get them a respite from the dicey Mekong Delta, and eventually left the swiftboats for destroyer school.
Insight: contacted many men who served in Coastal Division at the same time Kerry did to ask if any of them had heard of anyone leaving the combat zone by invoking three minor wounds. Of the 12 who replied, none had heard of anyone doing so but John Kerry."
Less than a month after having claimed three wounds for which he lost no more than a total of two days of duty, Kerry reported as an aide to a navy yard admiral in Brooklyn, New York, leaving his crew in Vietnam. Two years later, preparing for a congressional race in a left-wing Massachusetts district - where the seat eventually was won by the even more radical Rev. Robert Drinan - Kerry was working with Maoists and other radicals in Vietnam Veterans Against the War, saying of those he left behind who were being killed and wounded for real that they were committing crimes "on a day-to-day basis with the full awareness of officers at all levels."
Indeed, Kerry said, he knew men who in Vietnam "had personally raped, cut off ears, cut off heads, razed villages in fashion reminiscent of Genghis Khan, shot cattle and dogs for fun, poisoned food stocks and generally ravaged the countryside." Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 22, 1971, about these and other alleged war crimes, he called on the United States to pay "extensive reparations."

Stephen Crump is an associate reporter for Insight magazine.

>> 2...

John Kerry's first Purple Heart
With questions lingering over President Bush's service in the Guard, conservatives hope to diminish Kerry's Vietnam heroics -- but they can't erase his real battle record.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
By Douglas Brinkley

April 17, 2004 | It was Dec. 2, 1968, and Lt. j.g. John Kerry was on a special nighttime covert mission in Vietnam. He had been ordered into a Viet Cong-infested peninsula north of Cam Ranh Bay to disrupt a smuggling operation. His vessel was a Boston Whaler, a boat that could float after taking 1,000 rounds of automatic weapons fire. Much of the evening was spent apprehending fishermen in a curfew zone. At approximately 2 a.m., however, they proceeded up an inlet with wild jungle on both sides of the boat. As they approached a bay, Kerry's whaler fired flares into the air. To their horror, not far from them, were a startled group of Viet Cong smugglers trafficking in contraband.
"We opened fire," Kerry told me in a Jan. 30, 2003, interview. "The light from the flares started to fade, the air was full of explosions. My M-16 jammed, and as I bent down to grab another gun, a stinging piece of heat socked into my arm and just seemed to burn like hell. By this time one of the sailors had started the engine and we ran by the beach strafing it. Then it was quiet."
- - - - - - - - - - - -

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http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/04/17/kerry_purple/index_np.html

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>> FOOD FIGHT 2...

Bush Spends Nearly $50 Million in March
By SHARON THEIMER
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- President Bush and John Kerry each added to their presidential fund-raising firsts last month: Bush in part by hitting $185 million and spending nearly a third of it and Kerry by raising nearly $55 million in one quarter.
Kerry's $54.8 million fund-raising total for January through March tops the $52.9 million Bush raised during the period. It also beats the previous presidential quarterly record of $50 million, set by Bush last summer.
The Democratic nominee-to-be has a long way to go to catch up with Bush's record overall fund raising, however. Kerry raised about $84 million from January 2003 through last month.
Bush and Kerry are now setting records with every dollar collected. That is in part because this is the first time both major-party nominees have skipped public financing for the primary season, freeing them from the program's $45 million spending limit.
Bush's spending in March, about $50 million, is the most ever in one month by a presidential campaign. Most of the money paid for the Republican's first wave of ads, timed to begin just after Kerry emerged from the Democratic primaries.
Nearly all of Bush's ad spending - about $40.8 million - went to Maverick Media, an admaking firm run by Bush media adviser Mark McKinnon, a campaign finance report Bush filed Tuesday with the Federal Election Commission shows.
In all, Bush has spent at least $99 million since officially starting his re-election effort last May, much of that reaching out to prospective voters and donors. In addition to ad spending, Bush has devoted at least $19 million to mailings, voter lists and related costs and at least $800,000 to "message" phone calls.
One campaign mailing sent to homes around the country this year includes a color photo of Bush and first lady Laura Bush with their signatures and the message "Grassroots leaders like you are the key to building a winning team."
Bush began April with millions of dollars on hand despite his spending spree. He raised $26.2 million last month and started April with $86.6 million on hand.
Kerry, who loaned his campaign about $6 million late last year to keep it afloat, surfaced from the primaries nearly broke but since has rebuilt his finances.
Kerry raised $42.8 million in March alone, thanks in part to a flood of small-dollar donations over the Internet as well as $1,000 and $2,000 checks from Democrats who delayed giving until after the primaries, or previously gave to his Democratic rivals.
Kerry started April with $31 million in the bank. He has spent about $69 million since starting his campaign, including roughly $30 million last month.
Bush's overall fund-raising advantage has shown on the airwaves in recent weeks. Bush has dedicated at least $50 million to ads over March and April, compared to about $12 million in ad spending by Kerry over that period.
But Kerry has benefited from at least $28 million in ad spending by outside groups that oppose Bush, including the Media Fund, MoveOn.org and the AFL-CIO. That has prompted complaints by the Bush campaign accusing some anti-Bush groups of illegally using unlimited donations known as "soft money" in the election; the groups say their activities are legal.
The two candidates remain virtually neck-and-neck in national voter polls.
Kerry is expected to increase his ad spending in coming weeks as his campaign fund grows.
The Massachusetts senator hopes to have reached $105 million in contributions by the party's nominating convention in late July. He is in the middle of a national tour to raise millions of dollars for his campaign and the Democratic National Committee.
His campaign sent an e-mail Tuesday thanking donors for giving $2.5 million online in the past week and asking them to give more. "We cannot slow down now. John Kerry can win this election but he needs your help," campaign manager Mary Beth Cahill wrote.

---

On the Net:

Federal Election Commission: http://www.fec.gov/

Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
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GOP Hoping to Push Through Asbestos Fund

By JESSE J. HOLLAND
Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Legislation to speed money to asbestos-disease sufferers could increase the federal deficit by $13 billion over the next decade, congressional budget officials said Tuesday in an estimate that could sour some of the bill's conservative support in the Senate.
This came as Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist prepared for a Thursday showdown in the Senate on whether to swap permanent business immunity from asbestos lawsuits for a $124 billion trust fund intended to speed money to sick litigants.
Democrats say they have enough votes to stop majority Republicans from pushing through their plan, saying it does not provide enough money to the victims for giving up their right to sue companies.
The Congressional Budget Office also said the fund would not have enough money.
"Including outlays for administrative costs and investment transactions of the Asbestos Fund, CBO estimates that operations of the fund would increase budget deficits by $13 billion," Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin said in a letter Tuesday to Senate Budget Chairman Don Nickles.
But Frist spokeswoman Amy Call said, "Those additional expenditures would be handled by the legal system and would not be a cost to the federal government."
Nickles' Budget Committee has said it's uneasy about the cost of the asbestos fund. In a March release, the Budget Committee said it worried that creating "a new uncapped government entitlement during a period requiring austere budget discipline, would be imprudent and inconsistent with financial responsibility."
Nickles is "still in favor of asbestos reform, but has always had reservations about the trust fund approach," Nickles spokeswoman Rachel Oliphant said. Nickles will support Frist's call for a Thursday debate, she said.
Frist is expected to try and force the Senate to debate the bill Thursday. It would take 60 votes to force a debate in the Senate, which is split with 51 Republicans, 48 Democrats and one independent senator, Jim Jeffords of Vermont. Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota said Tuesday he has enough votes to block the bill.
Under a bill promoted by Frist, R-Tenn., and Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, the Judiciary Committee chairman, the government would set up a trust fund that could reach as much as $124 billion. The fund, financed by businesses and insurance companies, would speed money to people with asbestos-related diseases.
Democrats say people who have sued companies over asbestos illnesses should not have their cases thrown out of court and be forced to participate in the fund.
They want assurances that all victims can be compensated.
Republicans argue the plan would get money to people who really need it.
Suing companies over asbestos is "almost like a lottery-like system where few claimants ... get very large awards, but many, many get little often based on simply where, for example, the claim was filed," Frist said. "The big winner is always the trial lawyers, who have taken billions of dollars out of the system, money that really should be going to those sick victims."
Democrats contend Republicans are pushing the bill to please businesses and insurers and are not working on a bipartisan solution.
"There are many on both sides of the aisle who truly and deeply want a resolution," Daschle said.
Republicans say the plan also will help the economy by removing the threat of bankruptcy for companies facing potential suits. They also say the bill is the only option the Senate will get.
"If we want to get something done, we are going to have to work with this bill," Hatch said.

---

On the Net:

Information on the original bill, S. 1125, and the revised one, S. 2290, is available at http://thomas.loc.gov

Centers for Disease Control background on asbestos: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/asbestos/

Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
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>> OUR FRIENDS IN JORDAN...

Security forces kill 4 terror suspects in shoot-out
By Rana Husseini
Anti-terrorist forces prepare on Tuesday to storm a Hashmi Shamali (northern) building, in which they killed in a shoot-out four suspected terrorists planning attacks against Jordan (Photo by Nader Daoud)
AMMAN -- Security forces on Tuesday killed four suspected terrorists in a Hashmi Shamali (northern) shoot-out, during which several officers were injured, a senior official said on Tuesday.
Minister of State and Government Spokesperson Asma Khader said anti-terrorist forces surrounded a building in the neighbourhood after receiving a tip that a group of armed men planning terrorist attacks were hiding in the area.
"The gunmen were ordered to surrender, but they fired on [security] forces, who returned fire, stormed the building and killed three suspects," Khader told reporters after a Cabinet session last night.
Few hours later, she added, the fourth gunman, who was hiding in a tunnel inside the same building, was killed after he opened fire on the security forces.
One of the four men was Jordanian, according to the spokesperson.
"Apparently, they were linked to a terrorist group, but investigations are still under way," Khader said. She did not elaborate.
Wednesday, April 21, 2004


Jordanian police kill three ''terror'' suspects in Amman shootout
In a rare incident, Jordanian police shot dead three "terror" suspects Tuesday in a shootout in the Jordanian capital, the authorities said.
Working on a tip, police stormed a hideout in east Amman where the suspects had been hiding, the police said in a statement carried by the official Petra news agency.
Police had called for the suspects to surrender, but they responded with gunfire, the statement said. The incident took place at 2:20 p.m. in downtown Amman at the district of Hashemi, the statement said.
"Information made available to security authorities pointed to the presence of an armed group which had plotted to carry out terror attacks," the statement added.
Two of the three men killed were foreigners, according to police.
Last week, Jordanian officials said an al-Qaeda-linked cell, recently dismantled in the kingdom, was plotting to detonate a chemical bomb capable of killing up to 20,000 people and to attack the U.S. Embassy and prime minister's office with poison gas. (Albawaba.com)




Report: Jordan foils huge chemical attack on inelligence HQ
The cell that was apprehended last week in Jordan planned to carry out a large-scale chemical attack, Jordanian officials told the London-based al-Hayat daily. According to the Friday's report, the prevention of the attack may have saved thousands of lives.
It added that the "majority of the members" were arrested. Jordanian officials said the plan was to detonate a powerful car bomb, which included chemical materials, at the Jordanian Military Intelligence headquarters. The cell also intended to use poison gas during attacks on the US embassy in Amman and a government building in the kingdom.
The officials said that following the interrogation of the cell members, it was revealed they were connected to senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who is high up on the US most wanted list in Iraq.
Two detained men identified as Suleiman Khaled Darwish and Ali Adwan "established the cell, which was funded by al-Zarqawi from Iraq and Iran," Jordanian sources told al Hayat.
With the help of a third man, Azmi Abd al Fattah al Jayousi, they managed to smuggle three cars packed with explosives. In one of the cars, security forces found the chemical charge. The Jordanian authorities are still looking for al Jayousi.
The Jordanian officials were quoted as saying, "The bomb, had it been detonated, could have affected people in a one kilometer radius and cause the deaths of more 20,000 people, according to estimates by bomb experts".
King of Jordan Abdullah II on Wednesday sent a letter of appreciation to the Kingdom's security forces who managed to foil the plot. "Thank God, the plans of these criminals were foiled and thousands of souls were saved from a crime this country has never known". (Albawaba.com)




Kosovo: Jordanian policeman kills two American officers in jail shootout
A Jordanian policeman opened fire on a group of international UN police in Kosovo on Saturday, killing two Americans before he was killed when officers returned fire. 10 US officers and an Austrian were injured.
The motive was not exactly clear, however Reuters reported emotions over the situation in Iraq apparently prompted the gunbattle between members of the UN law enforcement mission.
The shootout broke out when a group of correctional officers - 21 Americans, two Turks and an Austrian - were leaving the detention center after a day of training. They came under fire from at least one of a group of Jordanians on guard at the prison, said Neeraj Singh, a United Nations spokesman.
The officers shot back in a gunbattle that lasted about 10 minutes. It was not immediately clear what prompted the Jordanian to shoot.
"As far as we know, there was no communication between the officer who fired and the group of victims," Singh said, adding that investigators probing the incident were questioning four Jordanian officers.
Meanwhile, the Jordanian government expressed regret for the incident in a statement and said it also was investigating the shooting, according to Petra news agency. The statement identified the Jordanian officer as Ahmed Mustafa Ibrahim Ali.
UN and local police officers sealed off the yard of the detention center, took pictures and marked the bullet cartridges with numbers. The body of a police officer, covered with what looked like a dark blue jacket, lay for hours in the yard of the prison compound.
A doctor at the hospital in Kosovska Mitrovica, told The AP that five American officers and one Austrian officer were being treated. It was not immediately clear where the other wounded were being treated, or what their nationalities were.
Kosovska Mitrovica has long been the scene of violence between Serbs and ethnic Albanians, including riots that broke out a month ago, killing 19 and injuring 900. (Albawaba.com)

Major terror attack thwarted: King Abdullah II

SAN FRANCISCO: Jordan's King Abdullah II said in an interview published yesterday that Jordanian security services thwarted a major terrorist attack aimed at toppling his government.
Jordanian police seized five trucks loaded with 17.5 tonnes of high explosives, the king told the San Francisco Chronicle.
"It was a major, major operation," Abdullah said. "It would have decapitated the government."
Casualties would have been "in the thousands," he added. "It couldn't have been more sinister."
King Abdullah is currently visiting California and spoke in San Francisco on Friday. He is scheduled to meet President George W. Bush in Washington on Wednesday.
The explosives were apparently intended for an attack on the Jordanian prime minister's office and the intelligence ministry, King Abdullah said, adding that it was uncovered after two suspected terrorists were arrested two weeks ago.
King Abdullah said that, although the trucks came from Syria, he was "completely confident that (Syrian President) Bashir (Assad) did not know about it."
The king told the Chronicle that European anti-terrorism experts were aiding the Jordanian police investigation, but gave few details.
Turning to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terror network, King Abdullah said it "has been very badly hurt, but ... that doesn't mean it can't hurt you, as we saw in Madrid."
He referred to the terrorist attacks in Spain last month. "They're still very, very effective."
The king avoided any direct comments on Bush's recent dramatic policy shift toward Israel, but did say that he had not been given any advance notice of the change.
"There were discussions beforehand with members of the administration, but what came out in Washington was different," King Abdullah told the Chronicle. "We really are at a loss for information. ... Washington has taken us a bit by surprise.
"Honestly, we don't know what the implications are," he added.
Jordan said yesterday it wanted American guarantees on the final status of Palestinian occupied territories, four days ahead of a White House meeting between King Abdullah and Bush.
"The meeting will enable Jordan's position to be reiterated on the Palestinian question and we want guarantees from the American administration on the final status," Foreign Minister Marwan Moasher said.
"We have heard the American administration stress in the past, and again on Friday, that the final status must not be decided in advance but during negotiations," said the minister, who heads for the United States today to join the king.
During a Washington Press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush said all questions linked to the final status must be negotiated between the parties. - AFP
Last update on: 18-4-2004

Posted by maximpost at 11:24 PM EDT
Permalink

Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan
Updated March 11, 2004
Sharon A. Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan
Summary
In October 2002, the United States confronted North Korea about its alleged
clandestine uranium enrichment program. Soon after, the Agreed Framework
collapsed, North Korea expelled international inspectors, and withdrew from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). U.S. intelligence officials claimed Pakistan
was a key supplier of uranium enrichment technology to North Korea, and some
media reports suggested that Pakistan had exchanged centrifuge enrichment
technology for North Korean help in developing longer range missiles.
U.S. official statements leave little doubt that cooperation occurred, but there
are significant details missing on the scope of cooperation and the role of Pakistan's
government. Further, both North Korea and Pakistan have denied that nuclear
technology was provided to North Korea. This report describes the nature and
evidence of the cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan in missiles and
nuclear weapons, the impact of cooperation on their weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs and on the international nonproliferation regime. It will be updated
as events warrant.
The roots of cooperation are deep. North Korea and Pakistan have been
engaged in conventional arms trade for over thirty years. In the 1980s, as North
Korea began successfully exporting ballistic missiles and technology, Pakistan began
producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratory. Benazir
Bhutto's 1993 visit to Pyongyang seems to have kicked off serious missile
cooperation, but it is harder to pinpoint the genesis of Pakistan's nuclear cooperation
with North Korea. By the time Pakistan probably needed to pay North Korea for its
purchases of medium-range No Dong missiles in the mid-1990s (upon which its
Ghauri missiles are based), Pakistan's cash reserves were low. Pakistan could offer
North Korea a route to nuclear weapons using HEU that could circumvent the
plutonium-focused 1994 Agreed Framework and be difficult to detect.
WMD trade between North Korea and Pakistan raises significant issues for
congressional oversight. Are there sources of leverage over proliferators outside the
nonproliferation regime? Do sanctions, interdiction, and intelligence as
nonproliferation tools need to be strengthened? How is the threat of proliferation
interpreted within the nexus of terrorism and WMD? Further, has counterterrorism
cooperation taken precedence over nonproliferation cooperation? If so, are there
approaches that would make both policies mutually supportive?
See also CRS Issue Brief IB91141 North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,
and CRS Report RS21391, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Rogue State Symbiosis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
North Korean Enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Pakistani Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Technical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Pakistan's Missile Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
North Korean Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Technical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Pakistan's Nuclear Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Government Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1 Several countries have made political decisions to stop WMD programs, sometimes
coinciding with regime changes, e.g., Argentina and Brazil halted their nuclear weapons
programs and South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons in the 1990s. The U.S. stopped
its biological weapons program in advance of the Biological Weapons Convention and
Libya decided in December 2003 to renounce all its WMD programs.
2 China has only belatedly joined supplier restraint groups. A member of the Zangger
Committee, but not the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, China joined the NPT in 1992 and has
agreed to adhere to MTCR guidelines. China has also given assurances that it will not
export nuclear-related items to unsafeguarded facilities. However, China continues to
supply technical assistance to Pakistan's missile program.
3 See CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation
Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade
Between North Korea and Pakistan
Introduction
More than thirty years ago, states agreed to control trade related to weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to complement the agreements comprising the
nonproliferation regime. Supplier controls are not foolproof, but many observers
believe that national and multilateral export controls can slow, deter, and make
WMD acquisition more difficult or costly for the determined proliferator until
political change makes the weapons irrelevant or no longer desirable.1
A recurrent problem in controlling technology transfers is that key states do not
participate in the regimes. Although they are still targets of supply-side restrictions,
some proliferating states now are able to reproduce WMD technologies and systems
and sell them abroad without formal restraints on trade. North Korea, Pakistan, and
India are three such examples in the case of nuclear weapons and missile technology.2
When export controls and interdiction fail, some U.S. laws impose penalties on
countries, entities, or persons for proliferation activities. The provisions are varied
and extend across the range of foreign assistance (aid, financing, government
contracts, military sales).3 Penalties for engaging in enrichment or reprocessing
trade were strengthened by the 1976 and 1977 Symington and Glenn amendments to
the Foreign Assistance Act (now Sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control
Act). Later penalties were added for nuclear detonations, and other provisions
established penalties for individuals. Missile proliferation-related sanctions were
established in the Missile Technology Control Act 1990, which added Chapter VII
to the Arms Export Control Act and similar language at Section 11B of the Export
Administration Act of 1979. In addition to legislated penalties, the U.S. government
also imposes sanctions through executive orders.
CRS-2
4 "A Nuclear North Korea: Intelligence; U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North
Korea," New York Times, October 18, 2002.
5 See "Pakistan's Benazir Oversaw Korea Nuclear Deal - sources," Reuters News, November
20, 2002.
6 Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 63, April 2, 2003, pp. 16113-16114. The U.S. imposed
sanctions on Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1993 for receipt of M-11 missiles from
China; in 1998 for missile-related cooperation with Changgwang Sinyong Corporation and
again in 2003.
7 "Pakistan Rejects Nuclear Inspection," London Financial Times, February 18, 2004.
8 "President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD," Remarks by the
President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair, National
Defense University, Washington, D.C.
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html]
In October 2002, the Bush Administration announced that North Korea had been
pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program; U.S. intelligence officials
leaked to the press a few days later that Pakistan, among other countries, was
implicated.4 The outlines of a missiles-for-nuclear technology trade were reported
in the press.5 Pakistani government officials denied such trade. The State
Department offered assurances that cooperation between the two was a thing of the
past. In March 2003, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on North Korean
and Pakistani entities for cooperation in missiles.6 In a letter to Congress, the State
Department explained that "the facts relating to the possible transfer of nuclear
technology from Pakistan to North Korea...do not warrant the imposition of sanctions
under applicable U.S. laws."
In late 2003, a convoluted turn of events involving nuclear safeguards
inspections in Iran and a decision by Libya in December to renounce its WMD
programs provided evidence that Pakistani scientists had supplied nuclear
technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Pakistani officials denied any
government knowledge of such cooperation and at first, denied that A.Q. Khan
(former head of Khan Research Laboratories) and his associates had assisted Libya
or North Korea. Khan confessed to his proliferation misdeeds in early February 2004
and was pardoned by President Musharraf immediately. Interviewed on February 17,
2004, Musharraf noted that Pakistan's investigation had not uncovered evidence of
transfers to other countries other than Iran and Libya."7
Nonetheless, President Bush, in a speech that focused on proliferation at the
National Defense University on February 11, 2004, stated that Khan and others sold
"nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from North Africa
to the Korean Peninsula." Bush further stated that "Khan and his associates provided
Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well
as designs for more advanced and efficient models."8
Both North Korea and Pakistan have been subject to sanctions in the past for
WMD trade. North Korea has been under one form or another of sanctions for close
to fifty years; Pakistan has been sanctioned in what some observers deem an "on
again, off again" fashion, mostly for importing WMD technology, and also for testing
CRS-3
9 See CRS Report, RS20995, India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack, for a discussion of sanctions on Pakistan.
10 Unpublished paper by Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "DPRK-Pakistan Ghauri Missile
Cooperation," 1996.
11 See CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry
Niksch. North Korea also tried to withdraw from the NPT in 1994,but suspended its
withdrawal.
12 See CRS Report RS21391, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?.
(Updated periodically.)
a nuclear device.9 The sanctions on the North Korean entity, Changgwang Sinyong
Corporation, were imposed pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the Export
Administration Act on the basis of knowing involvement in the transfer of Category
I (under the Missile Technology Control Regime) missiles or components. The
sanctions on the Pakistani entity, Khan Research Laboratories, were imposed
pursuant to Executive Order 12938, reportedly for making a material contribution to
Pakistan's missile program. Both of these entities have been sanctioned repeatedly
in the past for missile trade. On the nuclear side, all sanctions were waived following
September 11, 2001, and it is unlikely that such sanctions will be imposed again,
absent significant evidence of the Pakistani government's involvement in nuclear
trade.
Rogue State Symbiosis?
At first glance, North Korea and Pakistan do not seem the likeliest of
proliferation bedfellows. However, they have traded in conventional armaments for
over thirty years and forged a firm relationship during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988),
during which both provided assistance to Iran. North Korea's sale of Scuds and
production capabilities proved particularly important to Iran.10
Neither state lies completely outside the nonproliferation regimes. Despite its
extreme isolation, North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in
1985 under pressure from the Soviet Union, and is a party to the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC). However, North Korea never lived up to its NPT obligations
and formally withdrew from the treaty, effective April 10, 2003.11 Most observers
believe North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons (or at least the plutonium for
them) and may now be able to add five or six weapons to its arsenal, given successful
reprocessing of the spent fuel at Yongbyon. (North Korea announced in April 2003
that it was successfully reprocessing plutonium, and told an unofficial U.S.
delegation in January 2004 that the reprocessing campaign began in mid-January
2003 and ended at the end of June 2003. The unofficial delegation, including former
head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Sig Hecker, was shown an empty spent
fuel pond, but little else to prove North Korean claims).12 Most observers believe
North Korea probably has biological weapons. North Korea does not participate in
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), nor is it a party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). After successfully reverse-engineering Soviet-origin
Scud missiles, North Korea became a leading exporter of ballistic missiles beginning
in the 1980s. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), North Korea
CRS-4
13 See [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2003.htm]
14 Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001.
15 "Agencies Trace Some Iraqi URENCO Know-How to Pakistan Re-Export," Nucleonics
Week, November 28, 1991, pp. 1, 7-8.
attaches high priority to exporting ballistic missiles, which is a major source of hard
currency.13
Pakistan, on the other hand, has never been as isolated as North Korea. It has
relied significantly on outside sources of technology for its weapons programs but
has not been thought of as a major exporter of WMD-related items. It remains to be
seen whether the Pakistani military and/or government was involved at all with
Khan's nuclear deals. Pakistan has long rejected the NPT and tested nuclear
weapons in 1998, but is a party to the BWC and the CWC. Nonetheless, the U.S.
Department of Defense believes Pakistan has "the resources and capabilities to
support a limited BW research and development effort," and likely has a chemical
weapons capability.14 Pakistan has sought technical assistance in its ballistic missile
programs from North Korea and China for over a decade.
To some, proliferation by states that have newly acquired WMD is inevitable,
resulting from diffusion of technology, insufficient political will to enforce controls,
or demand fueled by perceived threats or the continuing prestige of WMD. In the
past, however, technology transfers between countries outside of the control regimes
seemed limited by the lack of technical skill and technology or hard currency. By the
mid-1990s, however, North Korea had a proven track record in ballistic missiles, and
Pakistan had demonstrated its uranium enrichment capabilities. Although Pakistan
apparently was hampered by a lack of hard currency, it could provide North Korea
with a route to nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium (HEU). This route
would not only circumvent North Korea's Agreed Framework with the United States,
but would also be difficult to detect using satellite imagery.
North Korean Enrichment
At the time the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea was negotiated, there
was concern about, but scant evidence of, North Korean interest in uranium
enrichment. Reports relating to North Korea's procurement of enrichment-related
equipment date as far back as the mid-1980s, a time when North Korea was
progressing rapidly in its plutonium production program. For example, in 1987,
North Korea reportedly received a small annealing furnace from the West German
company Leybold AG. Although they have many other uses, annealing furnaces can
be used in production of centrifuge rotors for uranium enrichment. A five-year-long
German intelligence investigation conducted from 1985 to 1990 concluded that Iraq,
and possibly Iran and North Korea obtained uranium melting information from
Pakistan in the late 1980s.15 U.S. intelligence sources also believed that technicians
employed by Leybold AG were involved in transferring equipment and information
to North Korea. One or two such technicians were in North Korea in 1989 and
another Leybold employee reportedly was seen there in 1990. Subsidiaries of
CRS-5
16 "Iraq's Bomb, Chip by Chip," New York Times, April 24, 1992.
17 Under North Korea's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), North Korea would only have to declare such facilities when safeguarded material
was introduced into the facility.
18 Testimony of Dr. Sigfried Hecker before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
"Update on the North Korean Nuclear Issue," January 21, 2004.
19 Untitled working paper on North Korea's nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment
distributed by CIA to Congressional staff on November 19, 2002.
Leybold AG were also involved in exporting centrifuge-related welding equipment
to Iraq in the late 1980s.16
Negotiators of the Agreed Framework were aware that North Korea's NPT
obligations did not prohibit uranium enrichment, and that the Agreed Framework did
not directly address uranium enrichment.17 North Korea was bound not to possess
plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities by virtue of the 1992 Joint
Declaration of a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula -- a bilateral agreement with South
Korea that called for subsequent meetings. The U.S.-North Korean Agreed
Framework required North Korea to make progress in implementing the joint
declaration, but the process languished. Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. government
continued to look for signs of enrichment and in 1998, the United States sent a team
to Kumchang-ni to look for undeclared nuclear activities, including uranium
enrichment. The team concluded that the site was not nuclear-related. By 1999,
according to one former official, however, there were clear signs of active North
Korean interest in uranium enrichment.
Current Status
North Korea has continued to deny it has an enrichment program. Vice Minister
Kim Gye Gwan told an unofficial U.S. delegation to Pyongyang in January 2004 that,
"We do not have a highly enriched uranium program, and furthermore we never
admitted to one."18 In addition, North Korea has not admitted that it has an
enrichment program in the course of the six-party talks, a negotiating position which
could bring talks to a standstill, at least from a U.S. perspective.
On February 24, 2004, CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that "We ...believe Pyongyang is pursuing a productionscale
uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by AQ Khan,
which would give North Korea an alternative route to nuclear weapons." This
estimate indicates either that North Korea has made progress since the CIA
distributed a one-page, unclassified white paper to Congress on North Korean
enrichment capabilities in November 2002, or that the CIA has new information on
North Korean capabilities. The November 2002 paper noted that the United States
had "been suspicious that North Korea has been working on uranium enrichment for
several years," and that it obtained clear evidence "recently" that North Korea had
begun constructing a centrifuge facility.19 The CIA concluded that North Korea
began a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program in 2000. Further, the paper
noted that, in 2001, North Korea "began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large
CRS-6
20 "N. Korea Keeps U.S. Intelligence Guessing," USA Today, March 11, 2003.
21 Ibid.
quantities. It also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and
withdrawal systems." The CIA "learned that the North is constructing a plant that
could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per
year when fully operational -- which could be as soon as mid-decade."
Media reports suggested that the CIA had evidence of construction and of
procurement. "Clear evidence" of construction of a centrifuge facility could mean
photographs of construction sites, but the phrasing that the CIA "learned that the
North has begun constructing a plant" is ambiguous enough to suggest the possibility
that such information comes from a defector. According to former U.S. ambassador
Donald Gregg, who became ambassador to South Korea in 1989 after retiring from
the CIA, North Korea is "an extraordinarily difficult target to go after."20 The
unclassified one-page paper distinguishes between North Korea seeking materials
and actually obtaining equipment.
According to U.S. intelligence officials, the CIA does not know where North
Korea is enriching uranium.21 According to a State Department official, the
Administration has narrowed possible uranium enrichment sites down to three.
Outside observers have suggested that Yongjo-ri, Hagap, Taechon, Pyongyang, and
Ch'onma-san might all be potential sites for enrichment. One defector, who was
debriefed by Chinese officials in 1999 (he later returned to North Korea, where, it is
assumed, he was killed), claimed that North Korea was operating a secret uranium
processing site under Mt. Chun-Ma. Commercial satellite photos of Hagap show
tunnel entrances but little else.
Detecting clandestine uranium enrichment is generally considered to be more
difficult than detecting clandestine plutonium production for several reasons. First,
satellite imagery is most useful when changes can be detected at known facilities, or
in detecting new facilities. Reactors and reprocessing facilities used in plutonium
production often have telltale signatures (shape, size, features like no windows in a
reprocessing plant, connection to a water source, power plants or connection to an
electricity grid, environmental releases), which facilitate remote detection. Uranium
enrichment plants often do not, although this varies among the techniques used. For
example, gaseous diffusion enrichment plants often are very large and require
tremendous amounts of electricity, offering some distinguishable features. In
contrast, centrifuge plants can be small, emit few environmental signatures, and do
not require significant amounts of energy to operate.
Pakistani Assistance
There is currently no detailed, unclassified information on the assistance
Pakistan might have offered. One media report, citing Western officials, said the aid
included a complete design package for a centrifuge rotor assembly, while a Japanese
report stated that Pakistan had exported actual centrifuge rotors (2,000-3,000) to
CRS-7
22 "CIA Assessment on DPRK Presumes Massive Outside Help on Centrifuges," Nuclear
Fuel, November 25, 2002.
23 "U.S. Followed the Aluminum; Pyongyang's Effort to Buy Metal was Tip to Plans,"
Washington Post, October 18, 2002.
24 "Scientist Claimed Nuclear Equipment Was Old, Official Says," Los Angeles Times,
February 10, 2004.
25 Untitled working paper on North Korea's nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment
distributed by CIA to Congressional staff on November 19, 2002.
26 The P-1 centrifuge design uses aluminum and is modified from a 1970s URENCO design,
which AQ Khan reportedly stole. The Pakistani program apparently now uses a P-2
centrifuge design, which is a more advanced design, with greater efficiency, using maraging
steel.
North Korea.22 The Washington Post reported that North Korean efforts to procure
high strength aluminum and significant construction activity tipped off the United
States.23 Apparently, North Korea attempted to obtain materials from China, Japan,
Pakistan, Russia, and Europe, but Pakistan provided most of the assistance related
to the rotors. A Pakistani official involved in Khan's investigation reportedly said
North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997 to 2000.24 The scope of
Pakistan's cooperation with Libya and Iran (including P-1 and P-2 designs, a nuclear
weapon design for Libya, and some complete rotor assemblies) raises significant
questions about how much other help Khan might have given to the North Koreans.
Technical Implications
If North Korea may already have plutonium-based nuclear weapons, what is the
technical significance of acquiring a uranium enrichment capability? On the one
hand, acquiring fissile material is, to many observers, the most difficult part of
nuclear weapons acquisition. On the other hand, North Korea's plutonium production
program is no longer bound by the Agreed Framework. North Korea began operating
its 5MW reactor and has claimed to have completed reprocessing the spent fuel in
storage (although the U.S. has not confirmed this). North Korea therefore now may
be able to augment its current stockpile of 1-2 weapons' worth of plutonium with
additional plutonium for about 5 to 6 weapons.
Currently, most accounts suggest that North Korea does not have a completed
enrichment plant. In order to produce enough HEU for 1 to 2 weapons (about 50kg),
North Korea would require cascades of thousands of centrifuges. If North Korea has
the capability to produce its own centrifuge rotors, or has completed assemblies
already, producing HEU might be considered easier that its other fissile material
production options. The unofficial U.S. delegation that visited North Korea in
January reported that the larger reactor under construction at Yongbyon was clearly
in disrepair. The unclassified CIA 2002 paper estimated that North Korea could
produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year
when the enrichment plant is fully operational.25 It is not clear how this estimate was
arrived at, and whether evidence that Pakistan provided P-1 or even P-2 centrifuge
technology was available at that time.26
CRS-8
27 The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) report, GOV/2004/12,
"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya," February 20, 2004 states Libya received "documentation related to a nuclear
weapon design and fabrication from a foreign source" p. 6.
28 "Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan Figure," New York Times, February
4, 2004; and "Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China," Washington Post, February 15,
2004. The implicit assumption is that Pakistan provided a nuclear weapon design it received
from China in the 1980s to Libya.
29 There are some reports that North Korean scientists were present at Pakistan's 1998
nuclear tests and some speculation that Pakistan tested a North Korean plutonium device
during those tests, but there is little public evidence to support this latter claim. See
"Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test," New York Times, February 27, 2004.
Revelations that Libya received a nuclear weapons design from a foreign source
raise concerns about whether North Korea also received such a nuclear weapons
design.27 According to media reports, the packet of information that Libya received
on the nuclear weapon included Chinese text and step-by-step instructions for
assembling a vintage-1960s HEU implosion device.28 The Chinese markings are
significant because of long-standing rumors that China provided Pakistan with a
nuclear weapons design. For North Korea, receiving a proven design for an HEU
implosion device would be a significant advantage for its nuclear weapons program,
since it has not overtly tested a nuclear device.29
Quite possibly, the main benefit of a centrifuge enrichment program -- the
ability to produce fissile material clandestinely -- may no longer be of great
importance to North Korea since it left the NPT in 2003. Nonetheless, such a
program may make the North Korean arsenal less vulnerable to possible military
strikes because centrifuge enrichment facilities are hard to detect. In addition, the
production of highly enriched uranium, together with plutonium production, could
give the North Koreans the option of producing more sophisticated nuclear weapons,
for example, using composite pits or boosted fission techniques (although there are
no indications that they have the technical skill to do so).
Pakistan's Missile Development
Pakistan, according to many observers, has two clearly distinct missile
development programs. The first program is run by the Pakistan National
Development Complex (PNDC) in collaboration with the Pakistan Space and Upper
Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) and has focused since the early 1980s on solid-fueled ballistic
missiles. Pakistan currently fields about 80 of the first variant, the Hatf 1. The Hatf
1 is a short-range, solid propellant, unguided missile considered by some to be too
small for a nuclear warhead, which was flight-tested in 1989 and fielded in 1992.
The 80km-range was extended to 300km in the Hatf 2a, and to 800km in the Hatf 3.
Despite claims of indigenous development, there are many indications that the Hatf
1, 2, and 3 benefitted from Chinese and European assistance. Some believe that
Pakistan renamed some imported Chinese M-11 missiles as Hatf 2a missiles in the
early 1990s; many believe that the Hatf 3 are variants of Chinese M-9 missiles, and
CRS-9
30 Simon Henderson, "Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. Policy," Policy Watch, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 12, 2004.
31 Duncan Lennox, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Thirty-Six, January 2002, p.
125.
32 ibid, p. 126
33 See Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,"
Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 2, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, 1999, pp. 23-24.
34 Daniel A. Pinkston, "When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin?"
[http://cns.mis.edu]
35 Duncan Lennox, editor, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue 36, January 2002, p. 125.
36 "Pakistan's Missile `Was a Nodong'," Jane's Missile and Rockets, Volume 2, Number 5,
May 1998, pp. 1-2.
there are those who believe that the Hatf 4 (Shaheen 1) may be based on Chinese M-
11s. Pakistan tested its Hatf 6 missile (Shaheen 2), which reportedly has a 2000-km
range, in early March 2004 for the first time.
The second development program has been headed by Khan Research
Laboratories. One report has suggested that these competing ballistic missile
development efforts were aligned with competing nuclear warhead efforts -- that is,
the team developing a plutonium warhead for Pakistan's bomb, the PAEC, worked
towards developing Chinese-derived nuclear-capable missiles, while the HEU team
(KRL), collaborated with North Korea on liquid-fueled missiles derived from
Scuds.30 In any event, it is clear that KRL cooperated with North Korea in
developing the Ghauri (Hatf 5), reportedly beginning around 1993.31 The Ghauri 1
is a liquid-propellant, nuclear-capable, 1500km-range ballistic missile, which was
successfully flight-tested in April 1998. Pakistan now fields approximately 5 to 10
of these missiles and is developing longer-range variants.
North Korean Assistance
Pakistani ballistic missile engineers developed working relationships with North
Korean engineers in the mid-1980s when they both assisted Iran during the Iran-Iraq
war. In fact, the close resemblance of Iran's Shahab missile and the Ghauri 1 has led
many to conclude that the development of the missiles was coordinated between
Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea around 1993.32 In 1992, Pakistani officials visited
North Korea to view a No Dong prototype, and again in 1993 for a No Dong flight
test.33 There are reports that then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Pyongyang
for one day in December 1993 and many analysts believe missile sales were on the
agenda of her visit, despite her public denial.34 According to one report, North Korea
sent 5 to 12 No Dong missile assembly sets to Pakistan between 1994 and 1997;
North Korea denies the allegation.35 At the end of 1997, intelligence agencies
observed regular flights from North Korea to Pakistan, accelerating in the beginning
of 1998 when there were about 9 flights per month. These flights reportedly
followed the visit of high-level North Korean officials to Pakistan.36 A.Q. Khan
CRS-10
37 Seymour Hersh, "The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew About Pakistan and the
North Korean Nuclear Program," New Yorker, January 27, 2003. "So Far U.S. Skirting
Sanctions Issue on Pakistan's Centrifuge Aid to DPRK," Nuclear Fuel, December 9, 2002,
quotes a Western source that A.Q. Khan was in the DPRK when the two countries'
representatives closed a deal to cooperate on ballistic missiles and uranium enrichment.
"The Evil Behind the Axis?" Los Angeles Times, January 5, 2003, quotes U.S. officials that
Khan initiated talks with the North Koreans in 1992 for No Dong missiles.
38 Duncan Lennox, editor, Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue 36, January 2002, p. 126.
apparently made 13 visits to North Korea, beginning in the 1990s.37 Many observers
believe Pakistan accepted between 12 and 25 complete No Dong missiles in the late
1990s.
Some observers believe that cooperation has gone both ways -- that Pakistan
assisted North Korea in developing solid propellant technology. The Taepo Dong 1,
which was flight-tested in August 1998, reportedly had a third, solid-propellant stage.
Both Iranian and Pakistani personnel apparently were present for the flight test in
1998, and both Iran and Pakistan have expressed interest in space launch vehicles.
North Korean missiles have overwhelmingly used liquid propellants. If Pakistan
provided such cooperation, it likely would have come from PAEC and not KRL.
Technical Implications
In missile development, some important milestones include extending range and
payload, improving accuracy, and enhancing deployability (for example, through
stable propellants and mobile launchers). The medium-range Ghauri 1 missiles
significantly increase Pakistan's ability to target India and improve Pakistan's ability
to deploy nuclear warheads by increasing the payload. With a payload of 1200kg and
and a range of 1500km, the Ghauri well exceeds the MTCR standard for a Category
I, or nuclear-weapons capable, missile (500kg/300km). By contrast, the Hatf 1
missiles have a range and payload of 80km and 500kg. A.Q. Khan has stated that the
Ghauri is Pakistan's only nuclear capable missile. The Ghauri 2, still in
development, will have a range of between 1800 and 3000km. Both could reach
major Indian cities with large payloads.
The Ghauri missiles, because they use liquid propellant, are not as easily
deployed as the Shaheen 1 and 2 missiles (Hatf 4 and 6). These solid-fueled,
medium-range missiles apparently are based on Chinese M-11s. The Shaheens are
easier to prepare, require fewer support vehicles and personnel, and are far more
accurate than the Ghauris.38 There have been unconfirmed reports that the Ghauri
missiles will be shelved in favor of the Shaheens. On the other hand, the Shaheen
1 has a range of just 600km, while the Shaheen 2 has a range, reportedly, of 2000km.
North Korea has not flight-tested ballistic missiles since it pledged a moratorium
in September 1999. However, U.S. intelligence officials believe that it has continued
other kinds of testing. North Korea threatened to end the moratorium in November
2002 if normalization with Japan did not progress, and then in January 2003, after
North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT. Some officials believe it is only
CRS-11
39 "North Korea Prepares New Test of Missile," Washington Times, March 12, 2003.
40 "Agencies Trace Iraqi Urenco Know-how to Pakistan Re-Export," Nucleonics Week,
November 28, 1991.
41 B. Raman, "The Pakistan-North Korea Nexus," [http://www.rediff.com], March 10, 2004.
42 "Scientist Claimed Nuclear Equipment Was Old, Official Says," Los Angeles Times,
February 10, 2004.
a matter of time until North Korea breaks the moratorium.39 The implications of
ballistic missile testing for North Korean-Pakistani missile cooperation are not clear
because objectives of North Korean testing and future directions of the Pakistani
program are not known. However, Pakistan probably would be interested in
increasing the payload and improving the accuracy and mobility of its missiles, which
could indicate more interest in Chinese than North Korean assistance.
Pakistan's Nuclear Sales
The genesis of Pakistan's nuclear cooperation with North Korea is murky.
There are a few reports in trade journals of equipment passing through Pakistan on
the way to North Korea, but it is difficult to pinpoint when cooperation began. In
1986, Swiss officials seized equipment (autoclaves and desublimers) en route to
Pakistan that is typically used in uranium enrichment. Special steel containers were
also seized. One source reports that uranium enrichment information may have been
diverted from the German partner in URENCO, Uranit GmbH, to Pakistan via
Switzerland and then reexported to North Korea.40
Whether provided solely at the behest of Khan, or with the government's
blessing, it is clear that nuclear cooperation accelerated in the 1990s. One report
says that cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea expanded into the nuclear
and missile areas in Benazir Bhutto's second term (1993 to 1996) to include
exchanges of scientists and engineers.41 If Khan piggybacked his nuclear deals onto
missile cooperation, then he certainly would have had many more opportunities in
the mid- and late-1990s than before. As noted earlier, a Pakistani official involved
in Khan's investigation reportedly said North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge
components from 1997 to 2000.42
It is clear that the Pakistan government sought to reorganize some of its nuclear
programs and structure following the May 1998 tests, reportedly because it was now
a "declared" nuclear weapons state. Part of this restructuring apparently included
issuing regulations for controlling nuclear exports. In June 2000, the Pakistani
government published an advertisement announcing procedures for commercial
exports of nuclear material. Prospective exporters would need a "no objection
certificate" from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, which would also have
the authority to verify and inspect all prospective nuclear exports. According to an
article in the Pakistan daily, Dawn:
The items listed in the advertisement can be in the form of metal alloys, chemical
compounds, or other materials containing any of the following: 1. Natural,
CRS-12
43 "Government Regulates Export of Nuclear Materials," Dawn, July 24, 2000.
44 "Pakistan Clarifies Nuclear Export Control Guidelines, Arms Control Today, September
2000.
45 Srivastava, Anupam and Gahlaut, Seema, "Curbing Proliferation from Emerging
Suppliers: Export Controls in India and Pakistan," Arms Control Today, September 2003.
depleted, or enriched uranium; 2. Thorium, plutonium, or zirconium; 3. Heavy
water, tritium, or beryllium; 4. Natural or artificial radioactive materials with
more than 0.002 microcuries per gram; 5. Nuclear-grade graphite with a boron
equivalent content of less than five parts per million and density greater than
1.5g/cubic centimeter. 43
Many of those items would be useful in a nuclear weapons program. The
advertisement also listed equipment "for production, use or application of nuclear
energy and generation of electricity" including:
! Nuclear power and research reactors
! Reactor pressure vessels and reactor fuel charging and discharging
machines
! Primary coolant pumps
! Reactor control systems and items attached to the reactor vessels to
control core power levels or the primary coolant inventory of the
reactor core
! Neutron flux measuring equipment
! Welding machines for end caps for fuel element fabrication
! Gas centrifuges and magnet baffles for the separation of uranium
isotopes (emphasis added)
! UF6 mass spectrometers and frequency changers
! Exchange towers, neutron generator systems, and industrial gamma
irradiators
These guidelines, which implied that fissile material could be exported,
apparently conflicted with earlier regulations. Several days later, Pakistan's Ministry
of Commerce retracted the notice, saying that procedures were still under
consideration.44 The U.S. State Department reportedly responded by suggesting that
the regulations did not authorize such exports, but seemed to be drawn from
international control lists. U.S. and Pakistani officials apparently have been
discussing export control measures since at least 2000. A key feature of Pakistan's
regulations, however, is the explicit exemption of Ministry of Defense agencies from
controls, which suggests that weapons programs under military leadership could skirt
domestic export control laws.45
U.S. Government Responses
U.S. officials reportedly raised with Islamabad suspicions of nuclear technology
transfers between Pakistan and North Korea in 2000, prompting an investigation that
revealed that KRL scientists had large deposits of money in their personal bank
accounts. Pakistani officials reportedly informed the United States that the
CRS-13
46 "Pakistan Informed US of `Personal' Nuclear Technology Transfer: Report" December
25, 2002, Agence France-Presse.
47 "US Fears North Korea Could Gain Nuclear Capability through Pakistan," Financial
Times, June 1, 2001.
48 "North Korea Got a Little Help from Neighbors -- Secret Nuclear Program Tapped
Russian Suppliers and Pakistani Know-How," Wall Street Journal Europe, October 21,
2002; "North Korean-Pakistan Collusion Said Limited to KRL and Missiles," Nuclear Fuel,
June 25, 2001.
49 "Pakistan's N. Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny; Aid to Nuclear Arms Bid May Be Recent,"
Washington Post, November 13, 2002.
50 Reported in "North Korea Got a Little Help from Neighbors -- Secret Nuclear Program
Tapped Russian Suppliers and Pakistani Know-How," Wall Street Journal Europe, October
21, 2002. Transcript of ABC This Week from October 20, 2002.
51 Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2002.
52 "Musharraf Named In Nuclear Probe," Washington Post, February 3, 2004.
cooperation was conducted by individuals 46 In March 2001, reportedly at U.S.
insistence, AQ Khan was removed from his position as head of KRL, but retained the
post of presidential adviser until early 2004. Shortly after Khan's dismissal, Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage was quoted by the Financial Times as saying that
"people who were employed by the nuclear agency and have retired" could be
spreading nuclear technology to other states, including North Korea.47 A senior U.S.
nonproliferation official explained weeks later that Armitage's statement led to
confusion about the cooperation; that it was really limited to missile cooperation.48
Since the allegations of October 2002, Pakistani officials consistently have
denied any involvement with North Korea's nuclear program. Pakistan's ambassador
to the United States, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, told the Washington Post that "No
material, no technology ever has been exported to North Korea," adding that while
"Pakistan has engaged in trade with North Korea, nobody can tell us if there is
evidence, no one is challenging our word. There is no smoking gun."49 Nonetheless,
Secretary of State Powell told ABC's This Week that "President Musharraf gave me
his assurance, as he has previously, that Pakistan is not doing anything of that
nature...The past is that past. I am more concerned about what is going on now. We
have a new relationship with Pakistan."50 Powell stressed that he has put President
Musharraf on notice: "In my conversations with President Musharraf, I have made
clear to him that any, any sort of contact between Pakistan and North Korea we
believe would be improper, inappropriate, and would have consequences."51
Khan's confession in 2004 raises an important question of whether the Pakistani
government knew of, aided, or abetted his nuclear assistance to North Korea. Khan
has alleged that military officials knew of the transfers, but few details have emerged.
One account states that Generals Musharraf, Karamat and Waheed knew of aid to
North Korea when they were chiefs of the Army staff.52 Pakistani officials have
consistently averred that any nuclear technology was transferred on a personal basis,
CRS-14
53 "Pakistan informed US of `personal' nuclear technology transfer," Agence France-Presse,
December 25, 2002 (based on report from Jiji Press news agency). According to this and
other reports, the apparent tip-off was tens of thousands of dollars deposited into the
personal bank accounts of Pakistani scientists at Kahuta (Khan Research Laboratories).
54 "Pakistan Rejects Nuclear Inspection," London Financial Times, February 18, 2004.
55 Daniel A. Pinkston, "When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin?"
[http:/www./cns.mis.edu]
56 "Emerging Market ADRs -2: Pakistan Currency Reserves Low," Dow Jones News Service,
February 4, 1997.
57 Currently they stand at about $10 billion.
without the acquiescence or knowledge of the Pakistani government.53 This could
explain why the Bush Administration thus far, has not sought sanctions against
Pakistan. In a letter to key senators and members of Congress on March 12, 2003,
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Paul Kelly wrote that "the
Administration carefully reviewed the facts relating to the possible transfer of nuclear
technology from Pakistan to North Korea, and decided that they do not warrant the
imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws."
Both the Pakistani and North Korean governments thus far have denied that any
nuclear transfers took place at all. In particular, President Musharraf has sought to
dampen rumors that Pakistan traded nuclear secrets for missile help, by stating that
"whatever we bought from North Korea is with money."54 Evidence of such a barter
would clearly implicate the Pakistani military and government, which could
complicate U.S. decisions on aid to Pakistan and possibly trigger U.S. sanctions.
One analyst has suggested that Pakistan's foreign currency reserve crisis in 1996
might have made a barter arrangement attractive.55 In that year, the government was
able to avoid defaulting on external debt with help from the International Monetary
Fund and borrowed $500M from domestic banks.56 The reserves at that time were
$773 million, the equivalent of about three weeks of imports.57 The next year, visits
of North Korean and Pakistani officials accelerated, although this could be attributed
solely to missile cooperation.
Issues for Congress
North Korea's actions alone raise significant policy questions for Congress,
specifically, on how to roll back a capability that North Korea refuses to admit it has.
However, WMD trade between two proliferators raises a host of other issues that
may be pertinent to Congress' oversight of nonproliferation programs and strategy
and counterterrorism. First, leverage is needed from outside the traditional
nonproliferation framework, since neither North Korea nor Pakistan is a member of
the missile or nuclear control regimes. China is an obvious source of leverage
because of its longstanding diplomatic, military, and economic ties to both countries,
but the development of a new relationship between the United States and Pakistan
based on counterterrorism cooperation may also be a source of leverage.
CRS-15
58 Martin Indyk, "The Iraq War Did Not Force Gadaffi's Hand," London Financial Times,
March 9, 2004. Indyk reveals that Libya approached the United States in 1999 to discuss
eliminating its WMD.
59 Remarks by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage to Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing on North Korea, February 4, 2003.
Second, this example of secondary proliferation highlights the critical roles of
sanctions, interdiction, and intelligence. Nonproliferation sanctions appear to have
had little effect on North Korea and Pakistan, while comprehensive sanctions against
Libya, over thirty years, appear to have helped Libya decide to renounce its WMD.58
Although intelligence information was used to help alert Pakistani officials to Khan's
technology trade, interdiction appeared to play a secondary role. It is not yet clear
whether Khan's forced retirement in 2001 cut off trade (in which case intelligence
would have played a leading role) or whether it continued beyond that, until
inspections in Iraq and Libya's confessions made Khan's position untenable.
Further, intelligence information has not been able to locate uranium enrichment
facilities in North Korea. Congress may wish to explore, in the context of the
President's nonproliferation initiatives outlined on February 11, 2004, how to
improve these capabilities.
The example of WMD trade between North Korea and Pakistan raises particular
questions about how to interpret proliferation threats within the nexus of terrorism
and WMD. Do these developments compromise the security of the United States and
its allies because Pakistan and North Korea are developing new capabilities, or
because sales of sensitive technologies continue unabated and could expand to
terrorists? Since September 2001, the nexus of proliferation of WMD and terrorism
has been deemed one of the greatest threats to U.S. security. Although North Korea
is one of the seven state sponsors of terrorism, some in the administration believe that
the nexus of terrorism and WMD is not as pronounced in North Korea as it has been
elsewhere, for example, in Iraq.59 Others believe, however, that there is a danger of
North Korea proliferating its nuclear technology. Pakistan, while not a state sponsor
of terrorism, clearly has terrorist activities on its soil, and potential terrorist access
to its nuclear weapons has been a particular concern since September 11, 2001. At
that time, nonproliferation concerns about Pakistan centered on the security of the
Pakistani nuclear arsenal from terrorists and the activities of Pakistani nuclear
scientists providing assistance to terrorists or other states. The inadvertent leakage
of nuclear know-how appeared to be a serious threat. Although the Pakistani
government repeatedly has assured the world that its nuclear program is safe, there
are those who believe this may not be true. In the case of trade with North Korea, it
is unclear whether alleged nuclear transfers occurred with the blessing of the
Pakistani government or on the personal initiative of scientists. Some have
maintained that Pakistan should be able to provide evidence that it provided cash --
rather than nuclear technology -- in return for North Korean missiles and
components that apparently were loaded onto government-owned C-130 aircraft.
Others maintain the United States should press harder for direct access to Khan to
learn the scope of his activities.
A broader question is whether the Bush Administration has given higher
priority, since September 2001, to cooperation on counterterrorism than to
CRS-16
60 When asked at the daily press briefing on December 11, 2002 about waiving sanctions
against Yemen for its receipt of Scuds from North Korea, State Department Richard
Boucher said, "We decided to waive it because of the commitments that they [Yemen] had
made and in consideration of their support for the war on terrorism." He later elaborated
that: "We have done a lot of cooperation, training, exchange of information, law
enforcement cooperation with the Government of Yemen and we want to continue to do
that."
61 Transcript, White House press briefing, October 18, 2002.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

RL32336 -- FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress


April 6, 2004


Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division

Todd Masse
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Domestic Social Policy Division




CONTENTS
Summary
Introduction
FBI Intelligence Reforms
Business Process Changes
The Intelligence Cycle
Centralized Headquarters Authority
Organizational Changes
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence
New Field Office Intelligence Groups
New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s)
Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services
Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors
More Intelligence Analysts
Revamped Intelligence Training
Improved Technology
More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI
Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and State and Local Officials
Issues for Congress
The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening FBI Intelligence
Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI's Intelligence Program
Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program
Skeptics Believe FBI's Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Can Overcome FBI's Lack of Intelligence Experience
Implementation Challenges
Technology
FBI Field Leadership
Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics
Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform
Changes in The Intelligence Cycle
Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce Desired Results?
Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate?
Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient?
Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate?
Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements
Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and With Other Agencies, Is Improving For Additional Reasons
Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling Signs on Sharing
Some State and Local Officials Also Remain Dissatisfied With Level of Sharing
Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing Procedures
Congressional Oversight Issues
Oversight Effectiveness
Eliminating Committee Term Limits
Consolidating Oversight Under the Intelligence Committees
Options
Option 1: Status Quo
Option 2: Creation of a National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI
Option 3: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to Department of Homeland Security
Option 4: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to the DCI
Option 5: Creation of a New Domestic Security Intelligence Service
Conclusion
Appendix 1: Definitions of Intelligence
Appendix 2: The FBI's Traditional Role in Intelligence
Appendix 3: The FBI's Intelligence Programs -- A Brief History
FBI Excesses
Oversight and Regulation: The Pendulum Swings
Appendix 4: The Case File as an Organizing Concept, and Implications for Prevention
Appendix 5: Past Efforts to Reform FBI Intelligence
Appendix 6: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
Appendix 7: Relevant Legal and Regulatory Changes
Footnotes




Summary
The Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has been criticized for failing to warn of the attacks of September 11, 2001. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism and September 11, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, singled out the FBI in a significant manner for failing to focus on the domestic terrorist threat; collect useful intelligence; analyze strategic intelligence; and to share intelligence internally and with other members of the Intelligence Community. The Joint Inquiry concluded that the FBI was seriously deficient in identifying, reporting on, and defending against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States.

The FBI is responding by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as crimes. The major component of this effort is restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements; and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence.


Reactions to these FBI reforms are mixed. Critics contend the reforms are too limited and have implementation problems. More fundamentally, they argue that the gulf between law enforcement and intelligence cultures is so wide, that the FBI's reforms, as proposed, are unlikely to succeed. They believe the FBI will remain essentially a reactive law enforcement agency, significantly constrained in its ability to collect and exploit effectively intelligence in preventing terrorist acts.

Supporters counter that the FBI can successfully address its deficiencies, particularly its intelligence shortcomings, and that the Director's intelligence reforms are appropriate for what needs to be done. They argue that the FBI is unique among federal agencies, because it supplies the critical ingredient to a successful war against terrorism in the U.S. -- unmatched law enforcement capabilities integrated with an improving intelligence program.

The congressional oversight role includes deciding on whether to accept, modify, or reject the FBI's intelligence reforms currently underway. Congress may consider several options, ranging from support of the FBI's current reforms, to establishing a stand-alone domestic intelligence service entirely independent of the FBI. Congress may also reevaluate how it conducts oversight of the FBI. Pending legislation on FBI intelligence reform includes, but is not limited to, S. 410, The Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003, and S. 1520, The 9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act.





Introduction (1)
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have been labeled as a major intelligence failure, similar in magnitude to that associated with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (2) In response to criticisms of its role in this failure, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has introduced a series of reforms to transform the Bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on criminal investigations into a more mobile, agile, flexible, intelligence-driven (3) agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.

FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III initiated changes that were sparked by congressional charges that the Intelligence Community (IC), (4) including the FBI, missed opportunities to prevent, or at least, disrupt the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism, the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, (5) (JIC) criticized the FBI for failing to focus on the terrorist threat domestically; collect useful intelligence; strategically analyze intelligence, (6) and to share intelligence internally, and with the rest of the IC. According to the congressional inquiry, the FBI was incapable of producing significant intelligence products, and was seriously handicapped in its efforts to identify, report on (7) and defend against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States. (8)


Observers believe successful FBI reform will depend in large measure on whether the FBI can strengthen what critics have characterized as its historically neglected and weak intelligence program, particularly in the area of strategic analysis. They contend the FBI must improve its ability to collect, analyze and disseminate domestic intelligence so that it can help federal, state and local officials stop terrorists before they strike. If the FBI is viewed as failing this fundamental litmus test, they argue, confidence in any beefed up intelligence program will quickly erode.

Critics contend the FBI's intelligence reforms are moving too slowly (9) and are too limited. (10) They argue that the FBI's deeply rooted law enforcement culture and its reactive practice of investigating crimes after the fact, (11) will undermine efforts to transform the FBI into a proactive agency able to develop and use intelligence to prevent terrorism (for a more detailed discussion of the FBI's reactive "case file" approach, see Appendix 4). While the British Security Service (MI-5) may or may not be an appropriate organizational model for U.S. domestic intelligence for myriad reasons, the primacy it accords to intelligence functions over law enforcement interests may be worthy of consideration. (12) In justifying their pessimism, critics cite two previous failed attempts by the FBI to reform its intelligence program (for a more detailed discussion, see Appendix 5).


Critics also question whether Director Mueller, who has an extensive background in criminal prosecution but lacks experience in the intelligence field, (13) sufficiently understands the role of intelligence to be able to lead an overhaul of the FBI's intelligence operation. (14)

Supporters counter that they believe the FBI can change, that its shortcomings are fixable, and that the Director's intelligence reforms are appropriate, focused and will produce the needed changes. (15) They also argue that a successful war against terrorism demands that law enforcement and intelligence are closely linked. And they maintain that the FBI is institutionally able to provide an integrated approach, because it already combines both law enforcement and intelligence functions. (16)

A major role for Congress is whether to accept, modify or reject the FBI's intelligence reforms. Whether lawmakers believe the FBI to be capable of meaningful reform, and the Director's reforms to be the correct ones, could determine whether they accept or modify his changes, or eliminate them altogether in favor of a new separate domestic intelligence agency entirely independent of the FBI, as some have advocated. (17)

This report examines the FBI's intelligence program and its reform. Specifically, the section covers a number of issues that Congress might explore as part of its oversight responsibilities, to develop and understanding of how well the FBI is progressing in its reform efforts. The following section outlines the advantages and disadvantages of several congressional options to make further changes to the FBI's intelligence program. (18) Finally, a number of appendices concerning contextual issues surrounding FBI intelligence reform are provided.


FBI Intelligence Reforms
The FBI is responding to the numerous shortcomings outlined by the JIC by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as criminal acts. The major component of this effort is the restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements; and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The FBI also has reallocated its resources in an effort to establish an effective and efficient intelligence program.

The reforms are intended to address the numerous perceived shortcomings, including those outlined by the JIC Inquiry, which concluded the FBI failed to


Focus on the domestic threat. "The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qaida and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States." (19)

Conduct all-source analysis. (20) "... The FBI's traditional reliance on an aggressive, case-oriented, law enforcement approach did not encourage the broader collection and analysis efforts that are critical to the intelligence mission. Lacking appropriate personnel, training, and information systems, the FBI primarily gathered intelligence to support specific investigations, not to conduct all-source analysis for dissemination to other intelligence agencies." (21)

Centralize a nationally-coordinated effort to gain intelligence on Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida. "... The FBI's 56 field offices enjoy a great deal of latitude in managing their work consistent with the dynamic and reactive nature of its traditional law enforcement mission. In counterterrorism efforts, however, that flexibility apparently served to dilute the FBI's national focus on Bin Laden and al-Qaida." (22)

Conduct counterterrorism strategic analysis. "Consistent with its traditional law enforcement mission, the FBI was, before September 11, a reactive, operationally-driven organization that did not value strategic analysis ... most (FBI consumers) viewed strategic analytical products as academic and of little use in ongoing operations." (23)

Develop effective information technology systems. The FBI relied upon "... outdated and insufficient technical systems...." (24)

Business Process Changes
In an attempt to transform and upgrade its intelligence program, the FBI is changing how it processes intelligence by formally embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a long-time practice followed by the rest of the IC. It also is centralizing control over its national security operations at FBI Headquarters.

The Intelligence Cycle. FBI is attempting to formalize and discipline its approach to intelligence by embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a process through which (1) intelligence collection priorities are identified by national level officials, (2) priorities are communicated to the collectors who collect this information through various human and national technical means, (3) the analysis and evaluation of this raw intelligence are converted into finished intelligence products,( 4) finished intelligence products are disseminated to consumers inside and outside the FBI and Department of Justice, and (5) a feedback mechanism is created to provide collectors, analysts and collection requirements officials with consumer assessment of intelligence value. (See Figure 1, below). To advance that effort, the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) has developed and issued nine so-called concepts of operations, which essentially constitute a strategic plan identifying those areas in which changes must be made. These changes are seen as necessary if the FBI is to successfully establish an effective intelligence program that is both internally coordinated and integrated with its Intelligence Community counterparts.

Source: http://www.fbi.gov/, as altered by the Congressional Research Service


The FBI also is trying to improve and upgrade its functional capabilities at each step along the cycle. Success may turn, in part, on the performance of the new Office of Intelligence, which has the responsibility to "... manage and satisfy needs for the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence" within the FBI and to ensure requirements "levied on the FBI by national, international, state and local agencies" are met. (25)
FBI officials say their objective is to better focus intelligence collection against terrorists operating in the U.S. through improved strategic analysis that can identify gaps in their knowledge. As will be addressed later in the "Issues for Congress" section, the FBI faces numerous challenges as it formalizes its activities in each element of the intelligence cycle.

Centralized Headquarters Authority. Following September 11, Director Mueller announced that henceforth, the FBI's top three priorities would be counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime, respectively. (26) He signaled his intention to improve the FBI's intelligence program by, among other measures, consolidating and centralizing control over fragmented intelligence capabilities, both at FBI Headquarters and in the FBI's historically autonomous field offices. (27) He restated that intelligence had always been one of the FBI's core competencies (28) and organic to the FBI's investigative mission, (29) and asserted that the organization's intelligence efforts had and would continue to be disciplined by the intelligence cycle of intelligence requirements, collection, analysis, and dissemination.


Organizational Changes
The FBI is restructuring to support an integrated intelligence program. The FBI director has also created new intelligence-related positions and entities at FBI Headquarters and across its 56 field offices to improve its intelligence capacity.

New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence. As part of his effort to centralize control, Director Mueller established a new position -- the EAD-I. (30) The EAD-I manages a single intelligence program across the FBI's four investigative/operational divisions -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber. Previously, each division controlled and managed its own intelligence program. To emphasize its new and enhanced priority, the Director also elevated intelligence from program support to full program status, and established a new Office of Intelligence (OI). The OI is responsible for implementing an integrated FBI-wide intelligence strategy, developing an intelligence analyst career path, and ensuring that intelligence is appropriately shared within the FBI as well as with other federal agencies. (31) The Office also is charged with improving strategic analysis, implementing an intelligence requirements and collection regime, and ensuring that the FBI's intelligence policies are implemented. Finally, the office oversees the FBI's participation in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). (32)

The OI, headed by an Assistant Director who reports to the EAD-I, is comprised of six units: (1) Career Intelligence (works to develop career paths for intelligence analysts), (2) Strategic Analysis (provides strategic analyses to senior level FBI executives), (3) Oversight (oversees field intelligence groups), (4) Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management (establishes and implements procedures to manage the FBI intelligence process), (5) Administrative Support, and (6) Executive Support. (33)

New Field Office Intelligence Groups. The FBI has established field intelligence groups in each of its 56 field offices to raise the priority of intelligence and ultimately to drive collection, analysis and dissemination at the local level. Each field intelligence group is responsible for managing, executing and coordinating their local intelligence resources in a manner which is consistent with national priorities. (34) A field intelligence group is comprised of intelligence analysts, (35) who conduct largely tactical analyses; special agents, who are responsible for intelligence collection; and reports officers, a newly created position. (36) Reports officers are expected to play a key role by sifting raw, unevaluated intelligence and determining to whom it should be disseminated within the FBI and other federal agencies for further processing.

With regard to counterintelligence, which is any intelligence about the capabilities, intent, and operations of foreign intelligence services, or those individuals or organizations operating on behalf of foreign powers, working against the U.S., the FBI has established six field demonstration projects led by experienced FBI retirees. These teams are responsible for assessing intelligence capabilities at six individual field offices and making recommendations to correct deficiencies. (37)

New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s). In July 2002, the FBI established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), which coordinates its nation-wide network of 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). (38) The NJTTF also coordinates closely with the FBI's newly established Counterterrorism Watch, a 24-hour operations center, which is responsible for tracking terrorist threats and disseminating information about them to the JTTFs, to the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Operations Center and, indirectly, to state and local law enforcement. CT Watch is located at the FBI's 24-hour Strategic Intelligence Operations Center (SIOC). (39) With respect to regional JTTFs, the Bureau has increased their number from 66 to 84, and the number of state and local participants has more than quadrupled -- from 534 to over 2,300, according to the FBI.

Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center. President Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union address announced the establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which is to issue threat assessments based on all-source intelligence analysis. (40) The TTIC is a joint venture comprised of a number of federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities, and is directed by a CIA-named official, and a deputy director named by the FBI.

The Center, formally established in May 2003, employs 150, eight of whom are FBI analysts. When fully operational, in May 2004, the Center anticipates employing 300 professionals, approximately 65 (22%) of whom will come from FBI ranks. Of 300 total staff, 56 are expected to be strategic analysts.

New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services. As will be discussed in more detail below, the FBI has been criticized for failing to effectively share information with numerous consumer sets, including other members of the Intelligence Community, and state and local law enforcement authorities. In order to address these concerns Director Mueller established the EAD for Law Enforcement Services and under this new position, created an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. Staffed by a former state police chief, the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, working with the Office of Intelligence, ensures that relevant information is shared, as appropriate, with state and local law enforcement.


Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
There are numerous changes the FBI has made or is in the process of making to realize its intelligence goals. With the support of Congress, the FBI's budget has increased almost 50% since September 11, from $3.1 billion in FY2000 to $4.6 billion in FY2004. (41) The recently proposed FBI budget for FY2005 is $5.1 billion, including an increase of at least $76 million for intelligence and intelligence-related items. (42) According to Maureen Baginski, EAD for Intelligence, this year the FBI plans to hire 900 intelligence analysts, mostly in FBI field offices. (43) With the existing infusion of resources, the FBI is beefing up its intelligence-related staff, as well as functions which are integral to intelligence -- such as intelligence training, language translation, information technology, and intelligence sharing.

More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors. The FBI has increased the number of field agents it is devoting to its three top priorities -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), (44) in FY2004 the FBI allocated 36% of its agent positions to support Director Mueller's top the three priorities -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime -- up from 25% in FY2002. This represents an increase of approximately 1,395 agent positions, 674 of which were permanently reprogrammed from existing FBI drug, white collar, and violent crime programs. (45) From a recruitment perspective, the FBI recently established "intelligence" as a "critical skill need" for special agent recruitment. (46)

More Intelligence Analysts. The FBI estimates that of the 1,156 analysts employed as of July 2003, 475 of them were dedicated to counterterrorism analysis. (47) Prior to September 11, the FBI employed 159 counterterrorism analysts. (48) The FBI requested and received an additional 214 analytical positions as part of its FY2004 funding. (49) As mentioned above, in calendar year 2004, the FBI intends to hire 900 analysts, many of whom will be stationed across its 56 field offices. In an effort to convey that the FBI is attaching greater importance to the role analysts play, the Office of Intelligence has signaled to the FBI that analysts have a valid and valuable role to play within the organization. (50) The FBI, for the first time, is also attempting to establish a dedicated career path for its intelligence analysts, and for the purposes of promotion is now viewing its three types of analysts (formerly the Intelligence Research Specialists and Intelligence Operations Specialists, with the addition of a new category of employee, Reports Officers) all as generic intelligence analysts. As will be discussed more in-depth below, theoretically, all intelligence analysts, whether assigned to Headquarters or to a field office, will have promotion potential to the grade of GS-15 (non-managerial). Until now, generally, at the non-managerial level, analysts assigned to Headquarters had a promotion potential to the GS-14 level, and those in the field were only allowed to reach the GS-12 level. New recruitment standards, including the elimination of a requirement for a bachelor's degree (51) and a new cognitive ability testing process, have been developed.

Revamped Intelligence Training. (52) The FBI is revamping its training to reflect the role of intelligence. The FBI has revised its new agent training, established a College of Analytical Studies to train both new and more experienced analysts and has plans to re-engineer its overall training program. (53)

Specifically, the FBI is providing more intelligence training for new special agents. New special agents undertake a 17 week, 680 hour training program when they enter the FBI. The amount of time agents devote to studying National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) topics (54) -- principally Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism (55) -- in new agent training has increased from 28 hours (4.1% of total training) to 80 hours (11.8% of total training). (56) As part of this updated 680 hour curriculum for new agents, the FBI has instituted a two-hour block of training devoted solely to intelligence. Notwithstanding these changes, FBI officials recognize they have made relatively little progress in integrating intelligence into all aspects of new agent training.

The new training is intended to expose new employees to the intelligence cycle -- requirements, collection, analysis, reporting and dissemination -- and to how intelligence advances national security goals. Agents also are taught how to use strategic and tactical analysis effectively. (57)

All new analysts, or those new to the analytical function, are required to take an introductory analytical training course when they assume analytical responsibilities at the FBI. Historically, the curriculum for this course -- recently renamed the Analytical Cadre Education Strategy-I (ACES) so as to be "... more descriptive and create a positive image for the training effort" (58) -- included a substantial amount of time dedicated to orienting the new analyst to the FBI. According to FBI officials, this course has recently been re-engineered to focus more directly on intelligence, asset vetting, reporting writing, the Intelligence Community, and various analytical methodologies. According to FBI officials, more advanced intelligence analysis courses -- ACES II -- are in development.

Finally, the FBI plans to enhance training standardization and efficiency by consolidating all training in the FBI's Training Division. Historically, the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program has developed and provided its own substantive intelligence training programs. FBI analysts are also encouraged to avail themselves of the many geographic and functional analytic courses taught by other elements of the Intelligence Community.

Improved Technology. The FBI says it recognizes the critical importance of improving its antiquated information technology system, (59) so that it can more effectively share information both internally and with the rest of the Intelligence Community, and Director Mueller has made it one of his top ten priorities. But the FBI's technological center-piece -- the three-stage Trilogy Project -- continues to suffer from delays and cost overruns. Although the FBI has installed new hardware and software, and established local and wide area communications networks, (60) Trilogy's third, and perhaps most important component -- the Virtual Case File system (intended to give analysts access to a new terrorism database containing 40 million documents, and generally an improved ease of information retrieval) -- remains behind schedule and over budget. (61)

More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI. In the wake of the 1960s domestic intelligence scandals (for further discussion, see Appendix 3) various protective "walls" were put in place to separate criminal and intelligence investigations. As a result of these walls, information sharing between the two sets of investigators was "sharply limited, overseen by legal mediators from the FBI and Justice Department, and subject to scrutiny by criminal courts and the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." (62) The FBI recently eliminated an internal barrier to communication by allowing its criminal and intelligence investigators to physically work together on the same squads. As part of a new so-called Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy (MCIS), all counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset like an intelligence or espionage investigation. (63)


Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and State and Local Officials. The FBI also has taken steps to improve its intelligence and information sharing with other federal agencies as well as with state and local officials. It has established an Executive Assistant for Law Enforcement Services, who is responsible for coordinating law enforcement with state and local officials through a new Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. The FBI also has increased dissemination of weekly intelligence bulletins to states and localities as part of an effort to educate and raise the general awareness of terrorism issues. And the FBI is increasing its use of the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System and the National Criminal Information Center databases to disseminate threat warnings and the identities of individuals the FBI has listed on its Terrorist Watch List. (64) Other information sharing enhancements -- each addressed earlier -- include increasing the number of JTTFs and establishing the new position of Reports Officer.


Issues for Congress
Assessing the effectiveness of the FBI's intelligence reforms raises several potential issues for Congress. These include


The FBI's new focus on centralized headquarters decision-making;

Implementation challenges, including those in each area of the Intelligence Cycle;

Adequacy of resources to support reforms; and

Congressional oversight.

The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening FBI Intelligence (65)
Some observers believe a major issue is whether the FBI's new centralized management structure will provide the organization with the requisite formal and informal authority to ensure that its intelligence priorities are implemented effectively and efficiently by FBI field offices. Historically, and particularly with respect to the FBI's law enforcement activities, field offices have had a relatively high degree of autonomy to pursue locally determined priorities. A related issue is whether FBI employees will embrace, or resist, FBI Headquarters' enhanced management role and its new emphasis on intelligence.

Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI's Intelligence Program. Supporters argue that a centralized management structure is an essential ingredient of a counterterrorism program, because it will enable the FBI to strengthen its intelligence program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve headquarters-field coordination.

According to proponents, FBI Director Mueller has centralized authority by making four principal structural changes. He has established (1) a new position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) created a new Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence program; (3) established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force; and (4) established intelligence units in each field office to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence to FBI Headquarters.

Supporters contend that by centralizing decision-making, the FBI will be able to address several critical weaknesses which the JIC Inquiry attributed to decentralized management. First, a central management structure will enable the FBI to more easily correlate intelligence, and thereby more accurately assess the presence of terrorists in the U.S. Second, the FBI will be able to strengthen its analysis capabilities, particularly with regard to strategic analysis, which is intended to provide a broader understanding of terrorist threats and terrorist organization. Third, FBI Headquarters will be able to more effectively fuse and share intelligence internally, and with other IC agencies. Finally, centralized decision-making will provide FBI Headquarters a means to enforce intelligence priorities in the field. Specifically, it provide a means for FBI Headquarters to ensure that field agents spend less time gathering information to support criminal prosecutions -- a legacy of the FBI's law enforcement culture -- and more time collecting and analyzing intelligence that will help prevent terrorist acts.

Supporters contend that employees are embracing centralized management and the FBI's new intelligence priorities, but caution it is premature to pronounce centralized management a success. Rather, they suggest that, "with careful planning, the commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, progress should be well along in three or four years," (66) but concede that, "we're a long way from getting there." (67)

Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program. Skeptics agree that if the FBI is to prevent terrorism, it must strengthen its intelligence program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve headquarters-field coordination. But they question whether centralizing decision-making at FBI Headquarters will enable the FBI to accomplish these goals, and they cite two principal factors which they suggest will undermine the impact of centralized decision making. They question whether any structural management changes can (1) change a vested and ingrained law enforcement culture, and (2) overcome the FBI's lack of intelligence experience and integration with the Intelligence Community.

Skeptics Believe FBI's Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making. Skeptics assert that the FBI's entrenched law enforcement culture will undermine its effort to establish an effective and efficient intelligence program by centralizing decision-making at FBI Headquarters. They point to the historical importance that the FBI has placed on convicting criminals -- including terrorists. But those convictions have come after the fact, and skeptics argue that the FBI will continue to encounter opposition within its ranks to adopting more subtle and somewhat unfamiliar intelligence methods designed to prevent terrorism. Former Attorney General Janet Reno, for example, reportedly "leaned toward closing down surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) if they hindered criminal cases." (68) As one observer said, "law enforcement and intelligence don't fit ... law enforcement always wins." (69)

Some observers speculate that one reason law enforcement priorities prevail over those of intelligence is because convictions that can disrupt terrorist planning in advance of an attack often are based on lesser charges, such as immigration violations. FBI field personnel therefore may conclude that they should focus more effort on prosecuting criminal cases that result in longer jail terms. (70) Observers also suggest that because of the importance attached to successful criminal prosecutions, to the extent intelligence is used, it will be used to support criminal investigations, rather than to learn more about potential counterterrorism targets. (71)

Skeptics are convinced that the FBI's law enforcement culture is too entrenched, and resistant to change, to be easily influenced by FBI Headquarters directives emphasizing the importance of intelligence in preventing terrorism. They cite the Gilmore Commission, which concluded:


... the Bureau's long-standing traditional organizational culture persuades us that, even with the best of intentions, the FBI cannot soon be made over into an organization dedicated to detecting and preventing attacks rather than one dedicated to punishing them. (72)
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Can Overcome FBI's Lack of Intelligence Experience. Skeptics assert that the FBI's inexperience in the intelligence area has caused it to misunderstand the role intelligence can play in preventing terrorism, and they question whether centralized decision-making can correct this deficiency.


Specifically, they contend the FBI does not understand how to collect intelligence about potential counterterrorism targets, and properly analyze it. Instead, skeptics argue that notwithstanding the FBI's current efforts to develop detailed collection requirements, FBI agents will likely continue to "gather" evidence to support criminal cases. Moreover, skeptics argue, the FBI will undoubtedly "run faster, and jump higher," in gathering even more information at the urging of FBI Headquarters to "improve" intelligence. (73) Missing, however, according to critics, is the ability to implement successfully a system in which intelligence is collected according to a strategically determined set of collection requirements that specifically target operational clandestine activity. These collection requirements in turn must be informed by strategic analysis that integrates a broader understanding of terrorist threats and known and (conceptually) unknown gaps in the FBI's intelligence base. Critics fear that FBI analysts, instead, will continue to spend the bulk of their time providing tactical analytic support to FBI operational units pursuing cases, rather than systematically and strategically analyzing all-source intelligence and FBI intelligence gaps.



Implementation Challenges
The FBI is likely to confront significant challenges in implementing its reforms. Its most fundamental challenge, some assert, will be to transform the FBI's deeply entrenched law enforcement culture, and its emphasis on criminal convictions, into a culture that emphasizes the importance that intelligence plays in counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Although observers believe that FBI Director Mueller is identifying and communicating his counterterrorism and intelligence priorities, they caution that effective reform implementation will be the ultimate determinant of success. The FBI, they say, must implement programs to recruit intelligence professionals with operational and analytical expertise; develop formal career development paths, including defined paths to promotion; and continue to improve information management and technology. These changes, they say, should be implemented in a timely fashion, as over two and a half years have passed since the attacks of September 11, 2001. They also contend the FBI must improve intelligence sharing within the FBI and with other IC agencies, and with federal, state and local agencies.

Technology. Inadequate information technology, in part, contributed to the FBI being unable to correlate the knowledge possessed by its components prior to September 11, according to the congressional joint inquiry. (74) GAO and the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports conclude that the FBI still lacks an enterprise architecture, a critical and necessary component, they argue, to successful IT modernization. (75) In addition to lacking an enterprise architecture plan, according to the GAO, the FBI has also not had sustained information technology leadership and management. To demonstrate this point, a recent GAO report found the FBI has had five Chief Information Officers in the last 2003-2004, and the current CIO is temporarily detailed to the FBI from the Department of Justice. (76)

One important manifestation of the FBI's historical problems with information management is the deleterious effects it has had on analysis. For numerous information technology reasons, it has historically been difficult for FBI analysts at Headquarters, whose primary responsibility is to integrate intelligence from open sources, FBI field offices and legal attaches, and other entities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, to retrieve in a timely manner intelligence which should be readily available to them. Among other factors, this is the result of lack of appropriate information management and technology tools and, to a lesser extent, the lack of uniform implementation of policies relating to information technology usage.

Technology alone is not, however, a panacea. Existing information technology tools must be uniformly used to be effective. One FBI official responsible for intelligence analysis stated before the Joint Inquiry that "... Information was sometimes not made available (to FBI Headquarters) because field offices, concerned about security or media leaks, did not upload their investigative results or restricted access to specific cases. This, of course, risks leaving the analysts not knowing what they did not know." (77)

As mentioned above, supporters say that Director Mueller recognizes the important role technology must play in his reforms, and that despite setbacks to the Trilogy technology upgrade, the Director is making important progress. (78) However, the third and arguably most important stage of the Trilogy technology update, the deployment of the aforementioned Virtual Case File system, did not meet its December 2003 deadline. Moreover, according to the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, as of January 2003, the FBI confirmed the Inspector General's assessment that an additional $138 million (over the then estimated requirement of $458 million) would be necessary to complete the Trilogy project. (79) This would bring the total cost of the Trilogy update to $596 million.


FBI Field Leadership. An important issue is whether the FBI's field leadership is able and willing to support Director Mueller's reforms. Critics argue that the lack of national security experience among the existing cadre of Special Agents-in-Charge (SACs) of the FBI's field offices represents a significant impediment to change. According to one former senior FBI official, "... over 90 percent of the SACs have very little national security experience ...." (80) He suggested that lack of understanding and experience would result in continued field emphasis on law enforcement rather than an intelligence approach to terrorism cases.

Supporters counter that Director Mueller has made it inalterably clear that his priorities are intelligence and terrorism prevention. Some SACs who have been uncomfortable with the new priorities have chosen to retire. But critics also contend that it will require a number of years of voluntary attrition before field leadership more attuned to the importance of intelligence is in place.

Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics. Another issue is whether the FBI is effectively implementing its reforms and has established appropriate benchmarks to measure progress. Critics assert that although the FBI developed various concepts of operations to improve its intelligence program, in many cases it lacks specific implementation plans and benchmarks. The Department of Justice Inspector General has recommended that "an implementation plan that includes a budget, along with a time schedule detailing each step and identifying the responsible FBI official" (81) be drafted for each concept of operations.

Supporters say that the FBI recognizes the need for specific implementation plans and is developing them. They cite as an example the implementation plan for intelligence collection management, almost half of which they estimate is in place. (82)

Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform. Prior to September 11, FBI analytic resources -- particularly in strategic analysis -- were severely limited. The FBI had assigned only one strategic analyst exclusively to Al-Qaeda prior to September 11. (83) Of its approximately 1,200 intelligence analysts, 66% were unqualified, according to the FBI's own assessment. (84) The FBI also lacked linguists competent in the languages and dialects spoken by radicals linked to Al-Qaeda. (85)

Some supporters argue that appropriate resources now are being allocated to reflect the FBI's new intelligence priorities. "Dollars and people are now flowing to the FBI's most critical needs ... This trend is clearly reflected in the FBI's requested resources for FY2004," (86) according to former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who said intelligence analytic support, particularly for counterterrorism, has improved substantially. (87) As mentioned above, the Department of Justice is requesting at least $76 million in support of intelligence and intelligence-related programs for FY2005.

Supporters of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform describe a "dramatic increase" in intelligence analysts, both at headquarters and in the field -- from 159 in 2001, to 347 planned in 2003, and that an initial cadre of about a dozen analysts is supporting TTIC . (88) Moreover, as mentioned above, the FBI intends to hire 900 intelligence analysts in 2004. Supporters also point to the Daily Presidential Threat Briefings the FBI drafts, and 30 longer-term analyses and a comprehensive national terrorist threat assessment that have been completed. (89) But even supporters caution that institutional change now underway at the FBI "does not occur overnight and involves major cultural change." (90) They estimate that with careful planning, the commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, the FBI's "transformation" will be well along in three to five years, though it will take longer to fully accomplish its goals. (91)

GAO presents a more mixed assessment. According to GAO: "The FBI has made substantial progress, as evidenced by the development of both a new strategic plan and a strategic human capital plan, as well as its realignment of staff to better address the new priorities." Notwithstanding this progress, however, the GAO concluded "...an overall transformation plan is more valuable..." than "cross walks" between various strategic plans. (92) GAO also reports that 70% of the FBI agents and 29 of the 34 FBI analysts who completed its questionnaire said the number of intelligence analysts was insufficient given the current workload and priorities. (93) As a result, many field agents said they have no choice but to conduct their own intelligence analysis. Despite a lack of analysts apparent before September 11, if not after, the FBI did not establish priority hiring goals for intelligence analysts until 2003. (94) According to GAO, the FBI was well on its way to meeting its target of 126 new analytic hires in 2003 -- having hired 115 or 91%. (95)

The mix of analytic hires also is critical. But, according to GAO, the FBI lacks a strategic human capital plan, making it difficult to determine whether the FBI is striking an effective balance in its analytic core. (96) It also is difficult to assess whether the FBI is providing sufficient institutional support, the appropriate tools, and incentive system for these resources to be harnessed effectively in pursuit of its priority national security missions-counterterrorism and counterintelligence.

Skeptics of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform argue -- and supporters concede -- that this is not the first time the FBI has singled out intelligence for additional resources. The FBI did so in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, only to allow those resources to revert to the FBI's traditional priorities -- violent and organized crime, drug trafficking, and infrastructure protection. Additional intelligence analysts also were hired, but they were viewed as poorly trained, limited in experience, and lacking in needed information technology tools. They also were easily diverted to support the FBI's traditional anti-crime operations, (97) even though efforts were made during the intervening years to protect resources intended to support the agency's national security efforts, including intelligence. (98)

Changes in The Intelligence Cycle. As the FBI attempts to formalize its intelligence cycle, it will likely face challenges in each element of the intelligence cycle. Incomplete or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from the overall system's effectiveness.

Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce Desired Results? The FBI's new Office of Intelligence is establishing an internal intelligence requirements mechanism that will be part of an integrated IC national requirements system. Supporters of establishing this mechanism maintain that the FBI has outlined a rational process for managing collection requirements. According to FBI officials, the FBI is developing for each of its investigative/operational programs a detailed set of priority intelligence collection requirements. These requirements will be disseminated to FBI field offices through a classified FBI Intranet.

Skeptics question whether the FBI can overcome its historic lack of experience with a disciplined foreign intelligence requirements process. The FBI, they argue, traditionally has viewed domestic collection of foreign intelligence as a low priority "collateral" function, unless it helped solve a criminal case. And dissemination of any domestically collected foreign intelligence tended to be ad hoc.

Skeptics point to four hurdles that the FBI may have trouble surmounting. First, given that traditional intelligence tasking from the Intelligence Community to the FBI has generally been vague and voluminous; the FBI, they say, must be able to strike a balance between directing its collectors to answer questions that are either too nebulous or too specific. Questions that are overly vague can go unanswered for lack of direction. On the other hand, collection requirements that are too specific risk reducing intelligence to a formulaic science, when most analysts would agree the intelligence discipline is more art than science. In the final analysis, while appropriately drafted intelligence collection requirements are an essential element in the intelligence cycle, there is no substitute for experienced intelligence professionals who are capable of successfully collecting intelligence in response to the requirements. Second, they say, the FBI will need to dedicate appropriate resources to managing a requirements process that could easily overwhelm Headquarters and field intelligence staff with overlapping and imprecise requests for intelligence collection. Third, they say, the FBI will have to significantly upgrade its cadre of strategic analysts, who will play a critical role in identifying intelligence gaps. Fourth, they say, the FBI will have to support its requirements process with incentives and disincentives for agent intelligence collectors so that requirements are fulfilled. Enhanced performance of the intelligence requirements process depends largely on the accumulated successes the FBI has in each of these areas. Incomplete or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from the overall system's effectiveness.

Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate? Both supporters and skeptics of the adequacy of FBI's reforms agree that collecting intelligence by penetrating terrorist cells is critical to disrupting and preventing terrorist acts. Supporters argue that the FBI has a long and successful history of such penetrations when it comes to organized crime groups, and suggest that it is capable of replicating its success against terrorist cells. They assert that the FBI has had almost a century of experience recruiting and managing undercover agents and informers, and that it long ago mastered collection techniques such as electronic surveillance and witness interviews. They also argue that the FBI can uniquely use both money and the threat of prosecution to induce cooperation in recruiting human source assets. (99) They also cite as evidence of the FBI's commitment to improving its human intelligence collection the organization's recent deployment of six teams to "...examine ways to expand the FBI's human intelligence base and to provide additional oversight." (100)

Skeptics are not so certain. They say recruiting organized crime penetrations differs dramatically from terrorist recruiting. As one former senior level intelligence official put it, "It's one thing to recruit Tony Soprano, yet quite another to recruit an al Qaeda operative." (101) This official was alluding to the fact that terrorist groups may have different motivations and support networks than organized crime groups. (102) Moreover, terrorist groups may be less willing than organized crime enterprises to accept as members or agents individuals who they have not known for years and are not members of the same ethnocentric groups, or whose bona fides are not directly supported by existing members of the group.

As alluded to above, skeptics also argue that while the FBI is good at gathering information, it has little experience collecting intelligence based on a policy driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements. (103) As one observer commented:


While the FBI correctly highlights its unmatched ability to gather evidence and with it information, there is nonetheless a National Security imperative which distinguishes intelligence collection from a similar, but different, function found in law enforcement. "Gathering" which is not driven [and] informed by specific, focused, National Security needs is not the same as "intelligence collection"... which means intelligence activities which are dictated by, and coupled to, a policy driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements. (104)
Critics assert that the FBI's criminal case approach to terrorism produces a vacuum cleaner approach to intelligence collection. The FBI, they say, continues to collect and disseminate interesting items from a river of intelligence when, instead, it should focus collection on those areas where intelligence indicates the greatest potential threat. (105) But critics contend that there are few evident signs that the FBI has adopted such an approach. "They are jumping higher, faster," but not collecting the intelligence they need, according to one critic. (106) As a result, critics maintain, the process turns on serendipity rather than on a focused, directed, analytically driven requirements process. Another observer put it this way:


Using the metaphor "finding the needle in the haystack," since September 11 government agencies have been basically adding more hay to the pile, not finding needles. Finding the needles requires that we undertake more focused, rigorous and thoughtful domestic intelligence collection and analysis not collect mountains of information on innocent civilians.
(107)
Skeptics also question whether the FBI is prepared to recruit the type of individual needed to effectively collect and analyze intelligence. The FBI's historic emphasis on law enforcement has encouraged and rewarded agents who gather as many facts as legally possible in their attempt make a criminal case. Because a successful case rests on rules of criminal procedure, the FBI draws largely from the top talent in state and local law enforcement agencies, and the military; in short, some say, those individuals who focus on discrete facts rather than on the connections between them. (108)

Perhaps as fundamental to the collection of more targeted human intelligence is the implementation of a formal asset vetting program to assess the validity and credibility of human sources, according to informed observers, who note that only three to four percent of the FBI's human assets are vetted. (109) They point out the failure to effectively vet its human assets has contributed to serious problems in the FBI's criminal and national foreign intelligence programs. (110)

Supporters contend that the FBI is currently implementing its national intelligence collections requirements concept of operations, and so it may be premature to assess effectiveness. Critics contend, however, that it remains unclear what specific performance metrics the FBI is employing to measure the effectiveness of its collection. They say that when asked to assess its performance in the war on terrorism, the FBI continues to cite arrests and convictions of suspected terrorists. (111) They further contend that the FBI rarely cites the number of human sources recruited who have provided information essential to counterterrorism or counterintelligence as a performance metric. (112)

Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient? Some observers contend that the FBI has made notable progress in professionalizing its analytical program since September 11, and, indeed, over the past two decades. During this period, they assert that the FBI's analytic cadre, particularly at Headquarters, has evolved from a disjointed group of less than qualified individuals into a group of professionals which understands the role analysis plays in advancing national security investigations and operations. The majority of intelligence analysts at Headquarters possesses advanced degrees and has expert knowledge in various functional and geographic areas. Over the last two decades, they also cite the FBI's progress in internally promoting analysts to analytic management positions.

Supporters of Director Mueller's reforms also point to the new Office of Intelligence, and maintain that it is implementing a number of initiatives focused on improving the quality of analysis. They include a new promotion plan that will provide analysts GS-15 promotion opportunities (they now are capped at GS-14); new career development plans; an increased flexibility to continue working in their areas of expertise or to rotate to other functional, geographic or management positions; improved mid-career training; and improved and more standardized recruitment practices. They assert that these efforts will improve retention rates, a chronic problem. (113)

Critics, however, remain largely unpersuaded and argue that analysis remains a serious FBI vulnerability in the war on terrorism. The Congressional Joint Inquiry on September 11 urged the FBI, among other steps, to


... significantly improve strategic analytical capabilities by assuring qualification, training, and independence of analysts coupled with sufficient access to necessary information and resources. (114)
Although they applaud the FBI's new focus on analysis, critics question its effectiveness and point to a number of trends. For example, they cite the continuing paucity of analysts in the FBI's senior national security ranks, even more than two years after the September 11 attacks. This, they say, reflects the FBI's continuing failure to treat analysis as a priority and more fundamentally to understand how to leverage analysis in the war on terror. (115) They also point to the FBI's own internal study that found 66 percent of its analytic corps unqualified and question whether the FBI's changes are sufficiently broad to address this legacy problem. (116)

Critics support the new GS-15 promotion plan, but contend that implementation is lacking and that it falls short of senior executive service promotion which they advocate. (117) According to an FBI official, there are currently no FBI intelligence analysts at the non-managerial GS-15 grade level. They also are concerned that the FBI has eliminated the requirement that all new intelligence analysts possess a minimum of a bachelor's degree, and substituted instead a less rigorous requirement, in their view, of one year of analytic experience, or military or law enforcement employment. They insist that a bachelor's degree provides more formal and necessary academic training in research methodologies, written and oral communication and critical thinking. Moreover, according to some critics, the collapsing of all functional and cross-disciplinary analysts into one intelligence analyst position encourages a "one size fits all" approach to analysis that may undermine a need for functional, geographic and target-specific expertise. (118)


Finally, critics are concerned that although the FBI says it is trying to strengthen strategic analysis, it is failing to commit adequate resources. The new Office of Intelligence has a Strategic Intelligence Unit, but more in name only, according to some observers. Few analysts have been assigned to the unit, and those who have are being forced to balance management and executive briefing responsibilities with actually conducting strategic analysis. Further complicating the situation is the fact that tactical and strategic analysts still physically located in each of the FBI's operational divisions are now "matrixed" to the Office of Intelligence. That is, they report both to their own divisions and to the Office of Intelligence. Therefore, they potentially confront competing priorities -- analysis largely composed of briefing materials to support FBI executives, and tactical analyses to support ongoing cases. (119)

Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate? The FBI continues to be criticized for not sharing information -- a failure that variously has been blamed on a variety of shortcomings, including culture, an absence of information sharing strategy, technological problems, and legal and policy constraints. Some of the legal and policy constraints were eliminated by the USA PATRIOT Act. (120) And more recently, by a decision to allow criminal and intelligence investigators to work side by side. (121)

FBI supporters give the FBI high marks since the September 11th attacks for sharing threat information, building information bridges to the intelligence agencies and state and local law enforcement, collaborating with foreign law enforcement components, and opening itself up to external reviewers. (122) But even supporters believe that maintaining this commendable record will be a continuing management challenge, one which will require constant reinforcement. (123) They emphasize that the traditional values of FBI agents as independent and determined must give way to include values of information sharing and cooperation. (124)

Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements. Supporters argue that perhaps the most significant change -- a sea change, according to some -- is a recent decision to tear down the organizational wall that has separated criminal and intelligence investigations since the spying scandals of the 1960s. (125) As a result, criminal and intelligence investigators will now physically work as part of the same squads on terrorism investigations. All counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset like intelligence or espionage investigations, allowing investigators to more easily use secret warrants and other methods that are overseen by the surveillance court and are unavailable in traditional criminal probes. The FBI was able to do so as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act, which allows counterterrorism intelligence and criminal information to be more easily shared within the FBI. (126)

Supporters blame Congress for creating the wall in the first place. They assert that in the wake of the 1960s spy scandals, Congress weakened the FBI's domestic intelligence capabilities by imposing stricter standards. The result, they argue, was a dangerous lack of intelligence sharing. (127) According to the FBI, the recent change has resulted in the disruption of at least four terrorist attacks overseas and the uncovering of a terrorist sleeper cell in the United States. (128)

Although these changes undoubtedly will improve intelligence sharing between FBI's criminal and intelligence components, the question remains whether the information will be shared with other agencies and state and local law officials. Some critics do not dispute that Director Mueller's decision will enhance intelligence sharing within the FBI. They agree it will. Rather, they are concerned that more innocent people will become the targets of clandestine surveillance. (129)

Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and With Other Agencies, Is Improving For Additional Reasons. Advocates assert intelligence sharing, both internally and with other agencies is improving for other reasons -- the FBI is better training its personnel and providing them with improved sharing processes. In addition, they point to the FBI's new concept of operations for intelligence dissemination that collapses a number of current and different production processes into a single one that will be imbedded throughout the FBI. (130) Supporters also point favorably to Director Mueller's decision to establish the position of "Reports Officers," whose responsibility will be to extract pertinent intelligence from FBI collection and analysis and disseminate it to the widest extent possible. Supporters who believe that sharing with state and local authorities has improved point out that since September 11, the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are the principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law enforcement officials, has increased from 66 in 2001 to 84 in 2003. The number of state and local participants has more than quadrupled from 534 to over 2,300, according to the FBI.

Supporters also finally embrace Director Mueller for correctly emphasizing technology that emphasizes horizontal, rather than vertical, flow of information to produce better results. Director Mueller asserts that, "Our move to change the technology in the next two or three years will have a dramatic impact on the way we do business -- eliminating a lot of the bureaucratic hang-ups, giving the agents the tools they need to be interactive, pass among themselves the best ways of doing things and we will free up the FBI in a substantial number of ways." (131)

Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling Signs on Sharing. The FBI concedes that although it "... has always been a great collector of information," its "sharing of information was primarily case oriented rather than part of an enterprise wide activity." (132) Critics point to a number of troubling signs that they claim indicate continuing problems. According to the Gilmore Commission, the Federal government is far from perfecting a system of sharing national security intelligence and other information. Moreover, the flow of information remains largely one way -- from the local and state levels to the FBI. The prevailing view, according to the Commission, continues to be that the Federal Government likes to receive information but is reluctant to share it completely. One local law enforcement official said the FBI's intelligence sharing practices remain essentially unchanged since September 11. This official suggested that the FBI shares a great volume of threat information, but little of real value that would help state and local officials prevent terrorist attacks. (133) Another state office said, "We don't get anything (of value) from the FBI." (134)

Some skeptics argue that technology problems notwithstanding, willingness to share intelligence, both within the FBI and with other Intelligence Community agencies, remains a continuing problem. According to a recent report issued by the Markle Foundation, there has been only marginal improvement in the past year in the sharing of terrorist-related information between relevant agencies, including the FBI. The report states that sharing remains haphazard and still overly dependent on the ad hoc network of personal relations among known colleagues. It is not the result of a carefully considered network architecture that optimizes the abilities of all of the players, according to the report. (135)

The Markle report argues that the existing system of counterterrorism information sharing remains too centralized, federal government-centric, and bound by increasingly tenuous distinctions in U.S. regulations and law regarding domestic and foreign intelligence. (136) In order to combat a decentralized terrorist threat more effectively, Markle recommends a model of information sharing which runs counter to the existing "hub and spoke" information sharing model the FBI is building. Advocates envision a decentralized "peer-to-peer" network in which the various federal, state, local and private sector entities systematically collecting information relevant to counterterrorism, and according to established guidelines protecting civil liberties and privacy, share that information directly with one another. (137)

The Department of Justice's Office of Inspector General, recently reported that despite progress in terrorism information sharing, the FBI faces considerable impediments in establishing an effective information and intelligence sharing program, including changes to information technology constraints, ongoing analytical weaknesses, agency origination control procedures, (138) and lack of "... established policies and procedures that delineate the appropriate processes to be used to share information and intelligence, either internally or externally." (139)

Some State and Local Officials Also Remain Dissatisfied With Level of Sharing. Some state and local law enforcement officials continue to criticize what they characterize as FBI's continuing unwillingness to share intelligence, while expecting state and local law officials to share their information with them. Nevertheless, some state and local law enforcement officials concede that there has been some improvement in the sharing relationship since September 11. And there also is a growing recognition among some state and local law enforcement officials that "... there may be a mis-perception that the FBI has more detailed accurate or confirmed information than it actually has." (140)

While acknowledging some improvement, these officials insist the exchange of information remains largely one-way. (141) And although that hasn't prevented them from participating in their local JTTFs, one official said he believed that the FBI did not consider him an intelligence consumer. (142) According to another, the FBI has shared information through the JTTF but made clear it was doing so because "...he has a right to know, but not a need to know," and that the FBI told him not to share the information with anyone else in law enforcement or state government, including the governor, who, he said, possesses a Top Secret clearance. (143)

Some state and local law enforcement officials complain that although JTTFs are intended to be joint enterprises, combining federal, state and local law enforcement resources, they characterize the relationship as more of one of "co-habitation" where the FBI clearly is in charge and non-federal representatives are viewed as second tier participants, despite often having greater knowledge of a particular case. (144)

With respect to the case-orientation and law enforcement bias so often mentioned as challenges for the FBI as it shifts to having a more preventative bias, state and local law enforcement officials stated that notwithstanding recognition by FBI leadership that the "intelligence is in the case," the FBI agent on the street still starts with a case and has a bias in the direction of law enforcement. Moreover, one senior state law enforcement official stated that FBI leadership is "... still being led by individuals who have a criminal law mindset." (145)

Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing Procedures. Some state and local law enforcement officials are sufficiently displeased with the current sharing relationship that they have proposed that the Department of Homeland Security establish regional intelligence centers through which classified raw and finished foreign intelligence on terrorism could be disseminated. (146) The centers would be staffed by a cadre of Top Secret-cleared personnel drawn principally from State Police and State DHS Offices and would serve as "... regional repository and clearinghouse for terrorist related information gathered at the federal level, consisting of trends, indicators, and warnings." (147) Through a pending arrangement with the DHS, Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), the goal would be to "... create a national pipeline for pattern and trend analysis of terrorism intelligence," (148) at the state level. DHS has not acted on the proposal. (149)


Congressional Oversight Issues
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives each established intelligence oversight committees in the 1970s. The catalyst for the creation of these committees was public revelations resulting from press coverage and congressional investigations that the Intelligence Community had conducted covert assassination attempts against foreign leaders, and collected information concerning the political activities of some U.S. citizens during the late 1960s and early 1970s. (150) Intelligence Committee Members are selected by the majority and minority leadership of each chamber of Congress, and serve terms of eight years on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and six years on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Terms limited were established so that a greater number of Members could become knowledgeable on intelligence matters over time. Membership rotation was also viewed as the best way to maintain a flow of new ideas. Committee membership was also structured so that Members serving on other committees with interests in intelligence issues -- the Appropriations, Armed Services, Judiciary, and Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate) and Committee on International Relations (House) -- would be represented. Finally, in the Senate, the majority was given a one-vote, rather than a proportional margin, to ensure bipartisanship. The House apportions its membership using the traditional proportional method.

One oversight issue is whether the current congressional structure is sufficiently focused to monitor effectively the FBI's intelligence reforms. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI has been criticized for failing to more effectively collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence. The congressional committees principally responsible for conducting FBI oversight -- the Intelligence, Judiciary and Appropriations Committees -- on the other hand, have been subject to little or no criticism. (151) Some critics argue that those responsible for conducting oversight should be held accountable as well. They have questioned the diligence of the committees and, in the case of the Intelligence Committees, the committees' structure. (152)

Ellen Laipson, former director of the National Intelligence Council (1997-2002) suggests while the balance between intelligence collection and analysis is unlikely to be corrected soon:


What are needed are more radical steps to dismantle the bloated bureaucratic behavior of the large agencies and retool most employees to contribute more directly to the intelligence mission. The fault lies both with Congress and with the intelligence community's bureaucrats. This is not an argument for less collection, but perhaps less collection management, less complicated requirements process, and more priority given to a workforce whose productivity is measured in terms of output, of more useful processing of data, and creation of more analytic product. It seems that even the best intentioned intelligence community leaders cannot effect this change alone; a serious push by the oversight process and the senior customers must take place.
(153)
At the same time, GAO recommends that continuous internal and independent external, monitoring and oversight are essential to help ensure that the implementation of FBI reforms stays on track and achieves its purpose. "It is important for Congress to actively oversee the proposed transformation." (154)

Oversight Effectiveness. According to Representative David Obey, congressional oversight, at times, has been "miserable."


I've been here 33 years and I have seen times when Congress exercised adequate oversight, with respect to [the FBI], and I've seen times when I thought Congress' actions in that regard were miserable ... I can recall times when members of the committee seemed to be more interested in getting the autographs of the FBI director than they were in doing their job asking tough questions. And I don't think the agency was served by that any more than the country was. And I hope that over the next 20 years we'll see a much more consistent and aggressive oversight of the agency, because your agency does have immense power. (155)
Some observers agree, and have singled out the oversight exercised by the two congressional intelligence committees for particular criticism. According to Loch Johnson, a former congressional staff member and intelligence specialist at the University of Georgia, "They [the intelligence committees] didn't press hard enough [with regard to 9/11]. There's all the authority they need. They didn't press hard enough [for change]." Another observer commented, "They should be held as accountable as the intelligence agencies." (156)

Some Members of Congress, however, contend that the congressional committees have their limits. "Our job is to see that the agencies are focused on the right problems as we think them to be and they have the capabilities to meet those mission requirements," former Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham is reported to have said. (157) One of Graham's predecessors seems to agree. "We can legislate, but there is little we can do to compel compliance," according to a press account of former Chairman Senator Richard Shelby, who said the committees face an unacceptable choice from a security standpoint when it comes to fencing spending in an effort to force change. (158)

"As you examine the record, you will discover numerous examples of complete disregard for congressional direction, not to mention the law." Shelby is reported to have said. But as one Senate aide pointed out, "When you're in the middle of a war on terror, holding money back from the Intelligence Community -- that's the problem." (159)

Eliminating Committee Term Limits. Some have suggested that the current eight-year cap on intelligence committee service be eliminated. Critics of the term limits argue that members often are just beginning to grasp the complexities of the Intelligence Community by the time their term ends. "I was at a peak of my knowledge and ability to carry out effective oversight," Graham, who already had received a two-year extension of his eight-year term when he had to leave the committee at the end of the 107th Congress in 2002 is quoted as saying. (160)

Critics also argue that term limits, although seen as a well-intentioned efforts to prevent to members from becoming co-opted by the Intelligence Community, have outlived whatever usefulness they may have had. The community, they assert, has become technically so complex that effective oversight requires members who are knowledgeable and well-versed in its intricacies. Term limits work against that goal by robbing the committee of institutional memory, knowledge and expertise. That outcome can only be avoided if members are permitted to serve on an open-ended basis; of all congressional committees, only the intelligence committees are term-limited.

Supporters of term limits argue that the eight-year cap still effectively prevents Members of Congress from becoming too close to the Intelligence Community -- including the FBI; and this remains an important objective given the sensitive role the Intelligence Community plays in a democracy. Term limits, supporters argue, also provide exposure to the arcane world of intelligence to a greater number of members. Finally, they argue, by ensuring a stream of new members with relatively little experience in intelligence, term limits bring more new ideas to the table.

Consolidating Oversight Under the Intelligence Committees. Some observers argue that Congress could more effectively oversee the FBI's intelligence operation if the joint jurisdiction now exercised by the intelligence and judiciary committees was eliminated, and the sole responsibility given to the intelligence committees. They concede, however, that such an outcome could result only if a stand-alone collection and analysis entity, was separate and became independent from the FBI, effectively removing the rationale for judiciary committee oversight. In recommending such an outcome, they at least imply that the intelligence committees would bring a more focused oversight expertise to judging the effectiveness of domestic intelligence analysis, collection and dissemination. They further suggest that putting the intelligence committees in charge would provide an even better mechanism for protecting civil liberties than do "current structure and processes." (161)

However, opponents of consolidation argue that the intelligence committees are ill-quipped to focus on questions of civil liberties in connection with a domestic intelligence agency. They also could argue that the sensitivity of such issues requires the transparency that comes with regular public hearings. The intelligence committees, by contrast, conduct the majority of their work behind closed doors.


Options
The debate over Congressional options on FBI reform centers on two fundamentally opposing views on how best to prevent terrorist acts and other clandestine foreign intelligence activities directed against the United State before they occur. Adherents to one school of thought believe there are important synergies to be gained from keeping intelligence and law enforcement functions combined as they are currently under the FBI. They argue that the two disciplines share the goal of terrorism prevention; that prevention within the U.S. will invariably require law enforcement to arrest and prosecute alleged terrorists; and, that the decentralized nature of terrorist cells is analogous to that of organized crime. (162)

A second school of thought counters that the chasm between the exigencies of the two disciplines, both cultural and practical, is simply too broad to effectively bridge, and, therefore, that the two should be bureaucratically separated.

These two opposing views raise several options for Congress, including the following:


Option 1: Support Director Mueller's reform package.

Option 2: Create a semi-autonomous National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI.

Option 3: Establish a separate domestic intelligence agency within the Department of Homeland Security.

Option 4: Establish a separate domestic intelligence agency under the authority of the DCI, but subject to oversight of the Attorney General.

Option 5: Create an entirely new stand-alone domestic intelligence service.

Option 1: Status Quo
Under this option Congress would continue to support Director Mueller's reforms with necessary funding. Proponents of this could argue that Director Mueller's reforms constitute the most effective way to address weaknesses and improve the FBI's intelligence program, and ultimately, to prevent terrorism in the U.S. They could also argue that the reforms accomplish three important and inter-related goals. First, the FBI would continue to benefit from the synergies that integrated intelligence-law enforcement provides in the war on terror. Second, by keeping the intelligence program within the FBI and under the watchful eye of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General would be better able to reassure the American people that the FBI's use of intelligence will not be allowed to infringe on their civil liberties. Third, the reforms would improve the FBI's intelligence capabilities, while minimizing the bureaucratic disruption, confusion and resource constraints that would result if the FBI's intelligence program were re-established in a new stand-alone entity separate from the FBI. More specifically, they could maintain that Director Mueller's changes are improving day-to-day collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.

Opponents to this option could counter that the reforms are necessary but insufficient. While applauding Director Mueller's new focus on the intelligence, some could contend that his reforms are too limited and that intelligence still and always will be, undermined by its arguably second-class status in an FBI that has long been proud of its law enforcement culture. They could cite past instances when additional resources were provided to the FBI's intelligence program, only later to be siphoned off to support criminal priorities. Or, they could also go further, arguing that the disciplines of intelligence and law enforcement are so different that they must be separated, and the FBI's intelligence program housed in and directed by a new agency.


Option 2: Creation of a National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI
Under this option, Congress could establish a semi-autonomous national security intelligence service (NSIS) within the FBI, and provide it with sufficient staff and protected resources. The service would have its own budget to ensure sustainable resources. The service's principal responsibility would be to develop and nurture an integrated intelligence program, and to establish well-defined career paths for special agents and analysts that would hold out realistic promise of advancement to the highest levels of the FBI and the Intelligence Community. (163) Current FBI employees who decide to join the service could be protected from mandatory transfers to the FBI's criminal programs. The service director, experienced in all-source domestic and foreign intelligence, would be presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed. Regional service squads could be established to focus intelligence resources in the field.

There are multiple ways such an organization could be structured. One such construct, however, would pull all (investigative, operational and analytical -- headquarters and field) of the FBI's international terrorism, foreign counterintelligence, JTTF, and security countermeasures resources into the NSIS. While the NSIS Director would report to the FBI Director and the Attorney General, and operate under the Attorney General Guidelines, the NSIS Director would also be tasked to ensure seamless coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence on issues for which the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence are increasingly blurred, such as terrorism. Analysts within the NSIS would have access to all the FBI's intelligence relevant to national security, including criminal intelligence. Moreover, formal analytical working groups could be established to ensure analytical integration across counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal programs. Finally, field intelligence groups could be fewer in number to ensure focus and deployment of experienced human resources, and could report to both the NSIS Deputy Director, and local Special Agent in Charge.

Proponents could argue this option would enhance the FBI's focus on intelligence without building any "walls" between the various types of intelligence the FBI collects, analyzes, and exploits. They could contend that the FBI could build a more effectively leveraged intelligence program on the foundation that the Director is currently putting in place. And that it could do so without severing the connection with law enforcement and the FBI's 56 field offices and 46 legal attaches (164) serving in U.S. embassies. Such an approach would also ease efforts to establish intelligence career paths and strengthen the role of intelligence. Some proponents of a "service within a service" also argue that it may serve as an interim or bridge solution to the eventual creation of an autonomous domestic intelligence agency (see option 5 below). (165)

Opponents could argue that this option is still too limited, and that intelligence and law enforcement should be separated. They could also contend such an effort could be bureaucratically confusing as the new service seeks to build its independence while the FBI continues to exert control. Opponents could also argue that this option would disrupt Director Mueller's current reforms at the very time they are taking hold.


Option 3: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to Department of Homeland Security
A third option could be to establish a separate domestic intelligence service and house it in the Department of Homeland Security. (166) The service would be a member of the Intelligence Community and its authorities would be limited to collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence inside the United States, including the plans, intentions and capabilities of international terrorist groups operating in the U.S. As envisioned, the agency, like Great Britain's MI5, (167) would not have arrest authority.

Proponents of this option could argue that folding the new entity into DHS, as opposed to creating a new stand-alone agency, would avoid creating more bureaucracy while also establishing an organization unencumbered by the FBI's law enforcement culture. They could argue that such an entity would be able to more sharply focus on intelligence while also better safeguarding the rights of citizens, provided new checks on its ability to collect intelligence against innocent people were put in place.

Opponents could counter that placing the new organization in DHS would undermine its ability to play the role of an honest broker that could produce intelligence products not only for DHS but for other federal agencies, as well as for state and local authorities. They could also argue that placing the new entity within DHS would force it to compete with other DHS offices for scarce resources. (168) They also could oppose the idea for the same reason they might oppose a new entity separate from the FBI -- that the essential synergistic relationship between intelligence and law enforcement would be severed. Finally, opponents could argue that establishing a separate agency is tantamount to creating an MI5-like agency, which may be unworkable in the U.S. context for political, cultural and legal reasons despite any efforts to mold it to conform to American experience. (169)


Option 4: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to the DCI
A fourth option could be to establish a domestic intelligence service under the direction of the Director Central Intelligence, either as a separate entity reporting directly to the DCI in that capacity, (170) or incorporated into the CIA. The Attorney General would retain the authority to establish and enforce rules to assure that the rights of Americans would be preserved.

Supporters of this option could contend that providing the DCI additional operational capability would improve the integration of analysis and collection and would ensure that security rather than criminal concerns would be emphasized. (171) Opponents could argue that legal, policy perception, and cultural concerns militate against expanding DCI control over domestic intelligence collection and analysis. They could assert that there is a risk that the IC could misuse information it collected on American citizens. (172) They could also argue that as a practical matter if a decision was made to incorporate this entity into the CIA, it, like the FBI, simply may not up to the task of reorienting its efforts quickly enough to take on this added responsibility. (173)


Option 5: Creation of a New Domestic Security Intelligence Service
A fifth option could be to create an entirely new agency within the IC -- but, one which is independent of the FBI, CIA and DHS. The new agency would fuse all intelligence -- from all sources, domestic and foreign -- on potential terrorist attacks within the United States and disseminate it to appropriately cleared federal, state, local and private sector customers. (174) This stand-alone entity also would include a separate but collocated collection units, which would be authorized to collect domestic intelligence on international terrorism threats within the United States. The new organization would be prohibited from collecting intelligence un-related to international terrorism. Counterterrorism intelligence collection outside the United States would continue to fall under the purview of the CIA, NSA, and other foreign IC components. (175) It also would lack arrest authorities, but would provide "actionable" intelligence to those entities, such as the FBI, with authority to take action. The new entity would have authority to task the IC for collection. It would be overseen by a policy and steering committee comprised of the new agency's director, the DCI, the Attorney General and the DHS Secretary. The steering committee would ensure that the new entity adheres to all relevant constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements.

Proponents of this option could argue that because of its law enforcement culture, the FBI is incapable of transforming itself into an agency capable of preventing terrorist attacks. (176) And even if it could, proponents could argue that failing to separate intelligence collection from law enforcement could give rise to the fear that the U.S. was establishing a secret police. (177) Proponents also could assert that the federal government artificially distinguishes between foreign and domestic terrorist threats, when those distinctions increasingly are blurred. And they could contend, given the historical record, that the FBI and CIA are incapable of changing direction quickly enough to work together effectively to bridge that divide. (178)

Opponents could counter that establishing another agency will simply create more bureaucracy. They could argue that it would take years for a new organization to be fully staffed, and become effective in the fight against terrorism, and that pushing for better CIA-FBI cooperation is a more practical approach. (179) They also could argue that establishing a separate domestic intelligence service (like MI-5) is impractical in the U.S. context (180) and would move the country in the wrong direction by creating a more stove-piped bureaucracy that would undermine the country's ability to wage an integrated war on terrorism. (181) And they could argue that the FBI has never been solely a law enforcement agency but rather an investigative and domestic security agency that is well prepared to collect and analyze intelligence, and they could cite the FBI's successes against organized crime as proof. (182)

Opponents could also counter that the FBI in the past has effectively collected intelligence, but, that its ability to do so over time has been eroded. Former U.S. Attorney General Barr and others argue that historically the FBI has been effective in the collection of domestic intelligence, but that it was undermined by policymakers, such as Congress and the courts, through the placement of legal constraints on the FBI over the past 30 years. (183) Finally, opponents could argue that Britain's MI-5 has a mixed record of effectiveness. (184)


Conclusion
Congressional policymakers face FBI intelligence reform options in a dynamic context. The FBI has made or is in the process of making substantial organizational, business process, and resource allocation changes to enhance its ability to deter, detect, neutralize and prevent acts of terrorism or espionage directed against the United States. Some experts believe that the remedial measures currently being taken by the FBI, to include a centralization of national security-related cases, enhanced intelligence training for agents and analysts, increased recruitment of intelligence analysts, and the development of a formal and integrated intelligence cycle are all appropriate and achievable. Other experts are more critical of the current intelligence reforms believing that the culture of the FBI, including its law enforcement-oriented approach to intelligence, may prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to necessary intelligence reforms. Some argue that the pace and scope of reform may be too slow and not radical enough.

One of the central points of distinction between supporters and critics of the current FBI intelligence reforms is the extent to which they believe that the two disciplines of law enforcement and intelligence are synergistic, that is that the commonalities among them would benefit from continued integration. In general, those believing that law enforcement and intelligence should be integrated argue for the status quo. However, other experts believe that given the conceptual and operational differences between law enforcement and intelligence, the national interest would be best served by having them located in separate organizations with systematic and formal mechanisms in place to share information and protect civil liberties. Should the Congress choose to influence the direction and/or outcome of the FBI's intelligence reform, numerous options, from support of the status quo to the establishment of an autonomous domestic security intelligence service, are available for consideration.


Appendix 1: Definitions of Intelligence
Three formal categories of intelligence are defined under statute or regulation:


Foreign Intelligence. Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons. (185)

Counterintelligence. Information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (186)

Criminal Intelligence. Data which has been evaluated to determine that it is relevant to the identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by an individual who or organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity. [Certain criminal activities including but not limited to loan sharking, drug trafficking, trafficking in stolen property, gambling, extortion, smuggling, bribery, and corruption of public officials often involve some degree of regular coordination and permanent organization involving a large number of participants over a broad geographical area]. (187)

Appendix 2: The FBI's Traditional Role in Intelligence
According to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, signed December 4, 1981, and the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S. Code ?401), the FBI is a statutory member of the United States Intelligence Community. Specifically, and in accordance with section 1.14 of Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, the intelligence roles of the FBI are outlined as follows:

Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:


(a) Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coordinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community. When a counterintelligence activity of the military involves military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with the Department of Defense;

(b) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;

(c) Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the Intelligence Community, or, when requested by the Director of the National Security Agency, to support the communications security activities of the United States Government;

(d) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; and

(e) Carry out or contract for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.

Appendix 3: The FBI's Intelligence Programs -- A Brief History
The FBI's is responsible for deterring, detecting and preventing domestic activities that may threaten the national security, and, at the same time, respecting constitutional safeguards. (188) The FBI, a statutory member of the IC, is able to collect foreign intelligence within the U.S. when authorized by IC officials.

The FBI and its predecessor, the Bureau of Intelligence, have collected intelligence -- foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and criminal intelligence -- in the U.S. since 1908, (189) and, at times, effectively. (190) During the Cold War, the FBI successfully penetrated the Soviet leadership through a recruited U.S. Communist Party asset. The FBI also battled the Kremlin on the counterintelligence front. (191) In 1985 -- dubbed the Year of the Spy, the FBI arrested 11 U.S. citizens for espionage, -- including former U.S. warrant officer John Walker, who provided the Soviets highly classified cryptography codes during a spying career that began in the 1960s. The FBI also arrested Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA employee, a spy for the People's Republic of China; Jonathan Pollard, a Naval Investigative Service intelligence analyst who stole secrets for Israel; and Ronald Pelton, a former National Security Agency communications specialist who provided the Soviet Union classified material. (192) More recently convicted spies include FBI Special Agent Robert P. Hanssen, who spied on behalf of Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, and pleaded guilty to 15 espionage-related charges in 2001; and former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Ana Belen Montes, arrested in 2001 and subsequently convicted for spying for Cuba.


FBI Excesses
The FBI has been applauded for its historical successes, but also criticized for overstepping constitutional bounds by targeting U.S. citizens who were found to be exercising their constitutional rights. (193) For example, during the 1919-1920 "Palmer Raids," the FBI's so-called Radical Division (later renamed the General Intelligence Division) arrested individuals allegedly working to overthrow the U.S. government, but who were later judged to be innocent. (194)

Between 1956 and 1970, the FBI investigated individuals it believed were engaging in "subversive" activities as part of the FBI's so-called COINTELPRO Program. (195) In the mid-1960s, the FBI surveilled such prominent Americans as Martin Luther King, Jr., collecting "racial intelligence." (196) And in the 1980s, the FBI was found to have violated the constitutional rights of members of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) who the FBI believed violated the Foreign Agent Registration Act. (197) Although congressional investigators concluded that the FBI's investigation did not reflect "significant FBI political or ideological bias ...," its activities "resulted in the investigation of domestic political activities protected by the First Amendment that should not have come under governmental scrutiny." (198)


Oversight and Regulation: The Pendulum Swings
In response to these FBI abuses, the Department of Justice imposed domestic intelligence collection standards on the IC, including the FBI. For example, in 1976, Attorney General Edward H. Levi issued specific guidelines governing FBI domestic security investigations. Congress also established House and Senate intelligence oversight committees to monitor the IC. And President Carter signed into law the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which established legal procedures and standards governing the use of electronic surveillance within the U.S.

Critics argue that until Congress approved the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act granting the FBI additional authority to investigate suspected terrorists, increased oversight and over-regulation had seriously weakened the FBI's intelligence capabilities. Some thought that not only had regulations curtailed the FBI's surveillance authorities, but that they had undermined the risk-taking culture thought to be essential to successful intelligence work. (199) The Levi Guidelines (200) were singled out as being particularly onerous. (201)


Some observers blamed the restrictions for discouraging domestic intelligence collection unless the FBI could clearly show that its collection was tied to a specific alleged crime. They also said the restrictions led the FBI to transfer responsibility for parts of its counterterrorism program from the FBI's former Intelligence Division to its Criminal Division. The result, they contend, was an anemic intelligence program that contributed to the failure to prevent the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. (202)


Appendix 4: The Case File as an Organizing Concept, and Implications for Prevention
The FBI uses a case approach to categorize each of its investigations. Each case receives an alphanumeric indicator signifying the target country, or issue, and the level of priority. Some observers have criticized this approach as reactive; a case is opened only after a crime has been committed. Traditionally, ex post investigation is the FBI's greatest investigative strength. It can deploy thousands of agents, as it did after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to track domestic and international leads, conduct witness interviews and develop a "story board" about how the act and the events surrounding it took place. Although well suited for assembling a criminal case, this operational approach is ill-suited for terrorism prevention.

While the FBI reacts to crimes after the fact, it adopts a proactive approach in some counterintelligence cases, For example, FBI counterintelligence agents, working with their IC counterparts, may open a "case" to recruit a human asset, usually a foreign national, who may have access to information which would fulfill an existing intelligence gap.

The FBI says it is attempting to adopt a proactive approach to counterterrorism. FBI Director Mueller says that the new USA PATRIOT Act has helped. According to FBI Director Mueller, the FBI can now, "... move from thinking about 'intelligence as a case' to finding 'intelligence in the case'...." (203) While the reactive opening a criminal case, such as those against cigarette smugglers, may yield intelligence relevant to counterterrorism, it is generally a serendipitous occurrence. Extracting preventative and predictive intelligence from a case arguably presupposes first, that the case was opened pro-actively, and not necessarily in response to some adverse event. Second, in order to extract intelligence from any case, well-trained and experienced reports officers and intelligence analysts must be integrated into the flow of intelligence resulting from investigations, and be able to sift the "signal" from the "noise" in the sea of raw intelligence to which they have access. According to one local law enforcement official, the FBI is unable to strip the intelligence from their own cases, much less share that intelligence with state and local law enforcement officials. (204) Finally, for the FBI to succeed in using this new approach, it will likely have to implement successfully all the complex and inter-related elements of the intelligence cycle.


Appendix 5: Past Efforts to Reform FBI Intelligence
The FBI's current intelligence reform is not its first. Twice before -- in 1998, and then again in 1999 -- the FBI embarked on almost identical efforts to establish intelligence as a priority, and to strengthen its intelligence program. Both attempts are considered by some to have been failures. (205)

Both previous attempts were driven by concerns that FBI's intelligence effectiveness was being undercut by the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence program. The FBI's three operational divisions, at the time -- criminal, counterterrorism and counterintelligence -- each controlled its own intelligence program. (206) As a result, the FBI had trouble integrating its intelligence effort horizontally between its divisions. In intelligence world parlance, the programs were "stove-piped."


In 1998, the FBI attempted to address the stove pipe problem by consolidating control over intelligence under the authority of a newly established Office of Intelligence. It also took steps to improve the quality of its intelligence analysis, particularly in the criminal area, which was viewed as particularly weak.

Dissatisfied with the results, the FBI launched a second round of reforms the following year aimed at more thoroughly integrating FBI intelligence analysis in support of investigations. A new Investigative Services Division (ISD) was established to replace the Office of Intelligence, and to house in one location all FBI analysts that until then had been "owned" by FBI's operational divisions. Although the ISD was intended to provide each of the divisions "one-stop shopping" for their intelligence needs, it was never accepted by the operational divisions, which wanted to control their own intelligence analysis programs. In the wake of September 11, the FBI concluded that analysts would be more effective if they were controlled by the operational divisions. ISD was abolished, and analysts were dispersed back to the divisions in which they originally served.

Although observers blame the failure of both prior reform efforts on several complex factors, they put the FBI's deeply-ingrained law enforcement mentality at the top of the list. As one observer described it, efforts to integrate intelligence at the FBI were substantially hampered because resources dedicated to intelligence were gradually siphoned back to the FBI's traditional counter crime programs. Moreover, there was also little sustained senior level support for an intelligence function that was integrated with the Intelligence Community. (207)


Appendix 6: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence (208)
The FBI's two principal national foreign intelligence program responsibilities are counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Some observers of FBI intelligence reform have suggested that these two disciplines be integrated, but not necessarily under the control of the FBI. (209) Numerous interviewees indicated their belief that of the FBI's NFIP responsibilities, the counterintelligence program was most closely integrated into the Intelligence Community.

Historically, the FBI has shifted its organization to counter both terrorist and clandestine foreign intelligence activity directed against the United States. Although the FBI in the past has integrated both missions as part of the same division, currently the FBI has separate counterterrorism and counterintelligence divisions. The Assistant Directors for each division report to an Executive Assistant Director having responsibility for both functions. In a debate that mirrors the ongoing discussion about the appropriate relationship between law enforcement and intelligence, some observers believe counterterrorism and counterintelligence should be reintegrated. (210) They make the following arguments:


Commonality of Adversary Methods of Operation. No matter whether the threat the United States is confronting is that of a loosely affiliated foreign terrorist group, or a centrally controlled foreign intelligence service, the method of operation is consistent -- a covertly organized set of activities designed to undermine U.S. national security. As such, the countermeasures are similar -- primarily the penetration and surveillance of the inimical activity, up to, and until, the point at which action may be taken against the United States.

Linkages between Foreign Intelligence Services and Terrorist Groups. Some argue that there are linkages between foreign intelligence services and terrorist groups. (211) Information documenting these links, should they exist, are likely to be classified.
Supporters of the status quo argue the following:


Similar Disciplines -- Different Time Lines and Pressures. While the damage that can result from a successful espionage operation directed against the United States by a foreign power can be just as damaging to national security as the terrorist attacks of September 11, counterintelligence moves at a different pace than counterterrorism. Building counter-espionage cases can sometimes consume months, if not years, of monitoring actions of those suspected of passing national defense information to an unauthorized third party, or committing economic espionage. In the case of a potential terrorist act, there is pressure to collect actionable intelligence, and to act quickly to prevent terrorists from striking.

Diminution of Resources/Organizational Focus on Counterintelligence. Of the FBI's two principal National Foreign Intelligence Program priorities, the counterintelligence program, arguably, has been accorded a lower priority in the wake of the Cold War. Counterterrorism has become the FBI's first priority. Reintegrating the two could lead to situations in which, particularly from an FBI human resources perspective, counterintelligence personnel serve as a reserve pool of educated labor for counterterrorism. Such an occurrence may result in a diminished strategic focus on counterintelligence, a function which requires a long-term outlook and commitment.

The Law Enforcement Nexus with Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence. Given the decentralized nature of the terrorist threat, and criminal activities engaged in to provide financial support for such activities, there is a close relationship between the FBI's criminal programs and its counterterrorism program. While there is also a nexus between the FBI's counterintelligence activities and its criminal programs, arguably, given that very few counterintelligence cases ever go to trial for espionage or economic espionage prosecution, the nexus is weaker.

Appendix 7: Relevant Legal and Regulatory Changes
Intelligence Community operations, including domestic intelligence collection, and collection of intelligence on U.S. persons, (212) are governed by a body of laws, regulations and guidelines. (213) With regard to the domestic intelligence collection, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice has promulgated seven successive sets of guidelines (214) governing these efforts since 1976.

Following September 11, Congress also approved the USA PATRIOT Act, which makes it easier for the FBI to share intelligence with IC agencies, and to conduct electronic surveillance. (215) For example, with respect to electronic surveillance, a substantially broader legal standard authorized in the USA PATRIOT Act allows for electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as long as, among other requirements, the application includes a certification by an appropriate national security official that "a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information." (216) Among the other criteria which must be met for an application for electronic surveillance to be approved under FISA, a court must find that the surveillance "... is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." (217) Moreover, the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY2004 authorized the enhanced use of administrative subpoenas, also known as national security letters, by the FBI in order to gather information from financial institutions. (218)

The USA PATRIOT Act has had a substantial impact on FBI intelligence gathering and sharing. For example, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorizations for electronic surveillance increased 21.3% during the two-year period, 2000 to 2002. (219) According to FBI Director Mueller, the act has been "extraordinarily beneficial in the war on terrorism ... Our success in preventing another catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, without the Act." (220)


The USA PATRIOT Act also has provided a legal framework that makes it easier for the FBI's four investigative/operational divisions -- criminal, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber -- to integrate their intelligence efforts. As a result, the FBI has adopted a new strategy, known as the Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy, which permits the FBI to treat counterterrorism cases as intelligence cases from the outset, making it easier to initiate electronic surveillance. Special Agent John Pistole, FBI Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, stated, "We're still interested in the criminal violations that many people may be involved in. But, in many cases we are going to put that in the back seat and go down the road until we have all that we need." (221) If implemented and institutionalized, the new policy may significantly enhance the effectiveness of the FBI's intelligence program. The question becomes whether the FBI can implement the policy and stay within constitutional limits. Some civil libertarian advocates say they are concerned that by making it easier for the FBI to employ surveillance under FISA, the USA PATRIOT Act might lead the FBI to use such FISA surveillance to investigate criminal cases in a manner that may be inconsistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. (222)






Footnotes
1. (back)While the FBI initially provided the authors access to FBI officials and documents, it later declined to do so, despite numerous requests. Although this paper would have benefitted from continued cooperation, the authors note with gratitude that some FBI officials continued to share their insights into the current reforms. Numerous current and former employees of the FBI and Cental Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as state and local law enforcement entities, were interviewed for this report. Some sources wish to remain anonymous and, therefore, have not been identified by name in this report.

2. (back)William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 187.

3. (back)For purposes of this report, intelligence is defined to include foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and criminal intelligence. For a statutory definition of each see Appendix 1. For a brief summary of the FBI's traditional role in intelligence, see Appendix 2. Finally, Appendix 3 provides a brief history of FBI intelligence.

4. (back)The IC is comprised of 15 agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Treasury; the Department of Energy; the Coast Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; and; the Department of Homeland Security.

5. (back)See Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, a report of the U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S.Rept. 107-351; H.Rept. 107-792, Dec. 2002, pp. xv, xvi, 37-39, 337-338. (Hereafter cited as JIC Inquiry)

6. (back)An analyst conducts counterterrorism strategic intelligence analysis in order to develop a national and international understanding of terrorist threat trends and patterns, as well as common operational methods and practices. An analyst conducts tactical counterterrorism analysis in order to support specific criminal or national security-oriented cases and operations. While not mutually exclusive, each type of analysis requires a unique set of analytical methodologies and research skills.

7. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

8. (back)Ibid., p. 39.

9. (back)See "Statement of John MacGaffin to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," Dec. 8, 2003. MacGaffin testified, "In the domestic context, it is clear that the FBI needs to improve greatly its intelligence collection so that there are meaningful "dots" to connect and analyze. Some observers believe the FBI since 9/11 has made real progress in this direction. I and many others do not."

10. (back)A former senior FBI official stated in an Aug. 21, 2003 interview that if FBI Director Mueller was serious about achieving more than a limited reform, he would establish an intelligence career path. To date the Director has not implemented fully an intelligence career path for special agents.

11. (back)Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Implementing the National Strategy, Dec. 15, 2002, pp. 43-44. (Hereafter cited as Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress.) Organizational culture is a product of many factors, including, but not limited to, an organization's history, mission, self-image, client base and structure. According to William E. Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency, however, organizational culture is principally the product of structural conditions. See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, p. 3.

12. (back)For an analysis of the applicability of Great Britain's MI-5 model to the U.S., see CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

13. (back)Director Mueller has headed the Department of Justice Criminal Division, served as U.S. Attorney in San Francisco, and generally focused on criminal prosecution during his career.

14. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, with an extensive intelligence background, Aug. 21, 2003.

15. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, Former Attorney General of the United States, in U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.

16. (back)Ibid., pp. 16-17.

17. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. pp. 43-44.

18. (back)The Congressional Research Service has recently published a related report on the FBI. For a history of the FBI, see CRS Report RL32095(pdf), The FBI: Past, Present and Future, by Todd Masse and William Krouse.

19. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. xv.

20. (back)All-source intelligence analysis is that analysis which is based on all available collection sources.

21. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

22. (back)Ibid., pp. 38-39.

23. (back)Ibid., pp. 337-338.

24. (back)Ibid., p. xvi.

25. (back)See Concept of Operations, FBI Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Process, prepared jointly by FBI Headquarters divisions, reviewed by FBI field office representatives and coordinated by the FBI's Office of Intelligence, Aug. 2003. The Assistant Director, Office of Intelligence, reports to the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence.

26. (back)According to the FBI's 1998-2003 Strategic Plan, issued in May 1998, the FBI, prior to Sept. 11, had established three tiers of priorities: (1) National and Economic Security, aimed at preventing intelligence operations that threatened U.S. national security; preventing terrorist attacks; deterring criminal conspiracies; and deterring unlawful exploitation of emerging technologies by foreign powers, terrorists and criminal elements; (2) Criminal Enterprise and Public Integrity; and (3) Individuals and Property. Countering criminal activities was a prominent feature of each tier. See Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human Resource Allocation, Audit Division, Sept. 2003, pp. 03-37.

27. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.

28. (back)Core competencies are defined as a related group of activities central to the success, or failure, of an organization. In the private sector, core competencies are often the source of a company's competitive advantage. See C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, "The Core Competency of the Corporation," Harvard Business Review, Apr. 1, 2001.

29. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, July 23, 2003.

30. (back)The FBI established the position of EAD-I in early 2003, and the position was filled in April 2003, when Maureen Baginski, the former Director of Signals Intelligence, National Security Agency, was appointed. It was another four months before EAD-I Baginski began working in her new capacity, and an additional four months before Congress approved the reprogramming action formally establishing the EAD-I position. Some critics date whatever progress the FBI has made in upgrading intelligence to Baginski's arrival, but contend that because this critical position was left vacant for an extended period of time, the FBI made little, or no progress, between September 11 and Baginski's arrival almost one-and-a-half years later.

31. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Joint Inquiry, Oct. 17, 2002.

32. (back)The establishment of TTIC, and its mission, is addressed later in this section.

33. (back)The Office of Intelligence has had an uneven, albeit short, leadership history since its establishment. Although Director Mueller announced OI's established in Dec. 2001, the position of OI Assistant Director was vacant for one-and-a-half years, until Apr. 2003. The selected individual served four months before being appointed to another FBI position. The position then was vacant for almost five additional months before Michael Rolince, Special-Agent-in-Charge of the FBI's Washington Field Office, was appointed to lead the office on an acting basis in mid-Dec. 2003.

34. (back)See FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations, Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

35. (back)For the purposes of this report, intelligence analysts are defined as all-source analysts who conduct tactical and strategic analysis. Until recently, the FBI had two categories of analysts -- Intelligence Research Specialists, who were responsible for all-source analysis, and Intelligence Operations Specialists, who provided tactical analytic support for cases and operations. The FBI is merging these two positions with the newly created "Reports Officer" position, and re-titling the consolidated position as "intelligence analyst." The FBI says its purpose in doing so is to standardize and integrate intelligence support for the FBI's highest priorities. Within the intelligence analyst position, there are four "areas of interest" -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal; and three specific work "functions" -- all source, case support, and reports.

36. (back)The number of individuals in a field intelligence group varies, depending upon the size of the field office. See "FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations," Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

37. (back)Funding was authorized under the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-177). The legislation permits the FBI Director to "... enter into personal services contracts if the personal services to be provided under such contracts directly support the intelligence or counterintelligence missions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

38. (back)JTTFs are FBI-led and are comprised of other federal, state and local law enforcement officials. JTTFs serve as the primary mechanism through which intelligence derived from FBI investigations and operations is shared with non-FBI law enforcement officials. JTTFs also serve as the principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law enforcement officials.

39. (back)See statement of Larry A. Mefford, Executive Assistant Director -- Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, Research and Development; and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security of the U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Sept. 4, 2003.

40. (back)See CRS Report RS21283, Homeland Security: Intelligence Support, by Richard A. Best, Jr.

41. (back)See http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2003summary/html/FBIcharts.htm and Where the Money Goes: Fiscal 2004 Appropriations, -- House Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives (House Conf. Rept. 108-401).

42. (back)See U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, "2005 Budget and Performance Summary," winter 2004, pp.113-122. Elements of this request include 1) $35 million in non-personnel funding to support collocation of a portion of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division with the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and the interagency Terrorist Threat Integration Center; 2) $13.4 million to launch the Office of Intelligence; 3) $14.3 million to Counterterrorism FBI Headquarters program support, including intelligence analysis; and 4) $13 million to launch the National Virtual Translation Center. Some elements of the $46 million request for Counterterrorism Field Investigations and the $64 million request for various classified national security initiatives, also likely will be dedicated to intelligence.

43. (back)See Michelle Mittelstadt, "FBI Set to Add 900 Intelligence Analysts," The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 17, 2004. The near doubling of intelligence analysts in one year could present the FBI with a significant absorption challenge.

44. (back)The GAO has drafted two reports (GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003 and GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004) on the FBI reform efforts cited in this report. These GAO reports assess the FBI's transformation from a program management and results perspective, that is, the extent to which the FBI is expending its resources and dedicating its management in a manner consistent with its stated priorities. This CRS report focuses on the more policy-oriented question of FBI intelligence reform and related policy options, as well as the ability of the FBI to implement successfully its strategic plans related to intelligence.

45. (back)FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), periodically audits resource allocations, to determine if human resources are being committed in a manner consistent with stated priorities and strategies. In a recent report, the OIG found that since Sept. 11, the FBI "... continued to devote more of its time to terrorism-related work than any other single area," consistent with its post-Sept. 11 terrorism priority. To ensure that the FBI systematically and periodically analyzes its programs, the OIG recommended that the FBI Director "... regularly review resource utilization reports for the Bureau as a whole, as well as for individual investigative programs, and explore additional means of analyzing the Bureau's resource utilization among the various programs." See Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human Resource Allocation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 03-37), Sept. 2003. While the quantity of human resources must be adequate, appropriate quality is essential. One asset developed by an experienced, well-trained FBI special agent could have a significant effect on U.S. national security.

46. (back)As currently structured, the FBI special agent recruitment procedure has five entry programs, with numerous other areas defined as "critical skill needs." Agents must be hired under one of the five programs (law, accounting/finance, language, computer science/information technology and diversified); yet, the FBI will establish priorities for those having expertise in the critically needed skills. Unlike intelligence analysts, who are not required to possess a bachelor's degree, candidates for FBI special agent positions "must possess a four-year degree from an accredited college or university ...." See
https://www.fbijobs.com/jobdesc.asp?requisitionid=368.

47. (back)See Concept of Operations, Human Talent for Intelligence Production, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 2003.

48. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, June 18, 2003, p. 3.

49. (back)See Making Appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 2004, and For Other Purposes, U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report (H.Rept. 108-401).

50. (back)See "Human Talent for Intelligence Production," FBI Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

51. (back)In place of a bachelors degree, the FBI now allows a candidate for intelligence analyst to substitute a minimum of one year of related law enforcement or military experience.

52. (back)The authors were unable to compare training, before and after Sept. 11, because the FBI's Office of Congressional Affairs denied requests for a copy of the training curriculum.

53. (back)See statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 14.

54. (back)The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget includes a number of national-level intelligence programs, which are approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and submitted to the President and Congress as a single consolidated program. The NFIP budget funds those departments and agencies constituting the U.S. Intelligence Community. Historically, the FBI's NFIP has included the headquarters and field elements associated with the following programs: 1) international terrorism, 2) counterintelligence, 3) security countermeasures, and 4) dedicated technical activities.

55. (back)Some observers have suggested that as part of its intelligence reform, the FBI should consider re-integrating counterterrorism and counterintelligence. For an assessment of these arguments, see Appendix 6.

56. (back)Notwithstanding this increase in intelligence training, a new special agent collector, at least early in his career, still is at a disadvantage, compared to a foreign intelligence officer, or terrorist, who has likely received intensive clandestine operations training.

57. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 15, 2004.

58. (back)See "Human Talent for Intelligence Production," the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 2003.

59. (back)Numerous GAO studies, including the recent Information Technology: FBI Needs an Enterprise Architecture to Guide Its Modernization Activities (GAO Report 03-959, Sept. 25, 2003) have found substantial deficiencies in the FBI's formal procedures to implement recommended information technology changes. See also The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003).

60. (back)See "FBI Director Says Technology Investments Are Paying Off," Government Executive, Apr. 10, 2003.

61. (back)According to the Department of Justice Inspector General (IG), FBI officials originally estimated the cost of the Virtual Case File system to be $380 million. The current actual cost, according to the IG, exceeds $596 million. See also Wilson P. Dizard, "FBI's Trilogy Rollout Delayed; CSC Misses Deadline," Government Computer News, Nov. 4, 2003. Critics have attributed the FBI's chronic information management problems to, among other factors, deficient data mining capabilities, and the FBI's continuing inability to effectively upload information collected by field offices onto accessible FBI-wide databases.

62. (back)Dan Eggen, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Washington Post, Dec. 13, 2003, p. A1.

63. (back)In addition to easing constraints on intelligence sharing, this change will allow investigators to more easily employ secret warrants and other intelligence collection methods permitted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended. Those foreign intelligence gathering tools cannot be used in traditional criminal probes. The change stems from a Nov. 2002 intelligence appeals court ruling that upheld the USA PATRIOT Act provisions that provided more latitude for the sharing of foreign intelligence between criminal prosecutors and intelligence/national security personnel. See United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, In re: Sealed Case 02-001, Decided Nov. 18, 2002.

64. (back)For information on terrorist watch lists, see CRS Report RL31019, Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, by William Krouse and Raphael Perl.

65. (back)An organization's structure and business processes influence its performance. Large organizations with dispersed operations continually assess the appropriate balance between decentralized and centralized elements of their operations. Although the mission of National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) is unrelated to that of the FBI, it too has dispersed operations. In a review of the causes of the 1986 Columbia shuttle accident, the board investigating the accident found that "The ability to operate in a centralized manner when appropriate, and to operate in a decentralized manner when appropriate, is the hallmark of a high-reliability organization." See Columbia Accident Investigation Report, Volume I, Aug. 2003. http://www.caib.us/news/report/volume1/default.html

66. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 118, 2003, p. 3.

67. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

68. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

69. (back)Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

70. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

71. (back)See testimony of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003, p. 4.

72. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, pp. 43-44.

73. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

74. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 245.

75. (back)Statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 19. See also The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003), p. v.

76. (back)See "FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities," statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 13.

77. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 358.

78. (back)Statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.

79. (back)The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003), p. xiv.

80. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

81. (back)See The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.x.

82. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

83. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 337.

84. (back)Ibid., p. 340. The vast majority of FBI analysts are located in the FBI's 56 regional field offices.

85. (back)Ibid., p. 245.

86. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 3.

87. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

88. (back)Ibid., p. 4.

89. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

90. (back)Ibid., p. 3.

91. (back)Ibid.

92. (back)See "FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities," statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 33. A congressional requirement concerning resource management was levied on the FBI by P.L. 108-199. By Mar. 15, 2004, the FBI is to provide a report to the Committees on Appropriations a report which "...details the FBI's plan to succeed at its terrorist prevention and law enforcement responsibilities, including proposed agent and support personnel levels for each division."

93. (back)Ibid., p. 14.

94. (back)Ibid., p. 23.

95. (back)Ibid., p. 22.

96. (back)See "FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, But Major Challenges Continue," statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 8.

97. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 4.

98. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

99. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former Attorney General of the United States, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p.18.

100. (back)See "FBI Creates Structure to Support Intelligence Mission," U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, press release, Apr. 3, 2003. The results of these examinations remain classified.

101. (back)Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

102. (back)See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, 2003, (Yale University Press) p. 177.

103. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

104. (back)See statement of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003.

105. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

106. (back)Ibid.

107. (back)See statement of John J. Hamre before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003. Hamre is a former deputy secretary of defense.

108. (back)See Siobhan Gorman, Government Executive Magazine, FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart, Aug. 1, 2003. See also Frederick P. Hitz and Brian J. Weiss, "Helping the FBI and the CIA Connect the Dots in the War on Terror," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; volume 17, no. 1, Jan. 2004.

109. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

110. (back)Former FBI Special Agent John J. Connally, Jr., was recently convicted of racketeering and obstruction of justice for secretly aiding organized crime leaders in the Boston, Massachusetts area. See Fox Butterfield, "FBI Agent Linked to Mob is Guilty of Corruption," New York Times, May 29, 2002, p.14. Special Agent James J. Smith recently was indicted on one count of gross negligence in handling national defense information [Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 793(f)] and with four counts of filing false reports on an asset's reliability to FBI Headquarters [18 U.S. Code ??1343, 1346]. See http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/fbi/ussmith50703ind.pdf It is alleged that Smith and former Special Agent William Cleveland had sexual relationships with Katrina Leung, an FBI operational asset informing the FBI on the intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It is further alleged that Ms. Leung may have been a double agent for the PRC. Leung has been charged with unauthorized access and willful retention of documents relating to national defense [Title 18 U.S. Code, ?793(b)]. See http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/fbi/usleung403cmp.pdf James Smith has pleaded guilty and his trial has been set for February 2005. Katrina Leung's trial is scheduled for September. In addition to appointing an Inspector-in-Charge to investigate the integrity of the Chinese counterintelligence program in the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office (the last FBI Office of employment for Mr. Smith), the FBI has launched organizational and administrative reviews to determine why its established accountability system for the handling of intelligence assets apparently failed in this case. See FBI press release dated Apr. 9, 2003.

111. (back)See Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 11, 2003.

112. (back)For further information on how to assess performance of the FBI, and the U.S. Government in the war on terrorism, see Daniel Byman, "Measuring the War on Terrorism: A First Appraisal," in Current History, Dec. 2003.

113. (back)The FBI has never experienced problems in recruiting educated analysts, at least at FBI Headquarters. The FBI, however, has from suffered a retention problem.

114. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, Recommendations Section Errata, p. 7.

115. (back)See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, p. 298. (Random House).

116. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 340.

117. (back)Other IC agencies permit analysts to rise to the analytical equivalent of Senior Executive Service, or Senior Intelligence Service. One such program, the Senior Analytic Service (SAS), was established at the CIA in the late 1990s by CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin. The SAS track allows analysts to rise to the senior-most analytic level, without assuming managerial responsibilities.

118. (back)This approach is manifested in a recent intelligence analyst job announcement (04-FO-0515). While the FBI used to recruit intelligence analysts according to the functional or geographic area of need, it now asks potential candidates to identify one of four areas of interest, choosing from: counterintelligence, counterterrorism, criminal or cyber. According to the announcement, "... Applicants must identify the program area or interest, however, this does not guarantee placement in the particular program...." See

https://www.fbijobs.com/JobDesc.asp?src=001&requisitionid=1614&r=021811042620.

119. (back)Although these types of analyses are not mutually exclusive, they serve two different sets of consumers -- the executive who is supporting policymakers, and the special agent who is running an investigation or operation.

120. (back)For a policy-oriented discussion of relevant legal and regulatory changes, see Appendix 7.

121. (back)Dan Egan, The Washington Post, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Dec. 12, 2003, p. A-1. (Hereafter cited as Egan, FBI Applies New Rules.)

122. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Chairman, and Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, pp. 21-22.

123. (back)Ibid., p. 22.

124. (back)Ibid.

125. (back)See Dan Egan, "FBI Applies New Rules."

126. (back)Ibid.

127. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.

128. (back)Ibid.

129. (back)See Dan Egan,"FBI Applies New Rules."

130. (back)See statement of Steven C. McCraw, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, July 24, 2003.

131. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary June 21, 2002, transcript, p. 30.

132. (back)See Statement of Assistant Director Steven C. McCraw, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, July 24, 2003.

133. (back)Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

134. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Nov. 13, 2003.

135. (back)See "Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security," The Markle Foundation, Dec. 2, 2003, p. 2.

136. (back)See Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, Dec.2, 2003.

137. (back)The Markle Foundation has recommended the creation of a System-wide Homeland Analysis and Resources Exchange (SHARE) Network, in which the Department of Homeland Security would assume a central role in working with federal, state, local and private sector organizations to establish a strategy and implementing mechanisms and policies to share and analyze information in a decentralized manner. See Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, Exhibit A: "Action Plan for Federal Government Development of the SHARE Network," Dec. 2, 2003, p. 10.

138. (back)Originator control, or ORCON, is a process designed to protect categories of (generally) classified information from being sharing with unauthorized third parties. If an agency wishes to share ORCON information it received from another agency, it must first request ORCON release from the originating agency to share the information with a specific third party consumer. In terms of providing security clearances to state and local law enforcement officials with a "need to know," the FBI has established a streamlined security process that allows law enforcement officials to receive expedited "secret" clearances in about nine weeks. See Dan Eggen, "Bridging the Divide Between FBI and Police," The Washington Post, Feb. 16, 2004, p. A25.

139. (back)See The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.iv.

140. (back)See Gerard R. Murphy and Martha R. Plotkin, Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement (Volume 1 -- Local-Federal Partnerships), Police Executive Research Forum, as supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing, Mar. 2003.

141. (back)Many of the state and local law enforcement officials interviewed for this report also had substantial experience at the federal level, both in the IC and in law enforcement. They said they therefore well understand the inherent capabilities and limitations of intelligence and the roles foreign intelligence and criminal intelligence play in preventing terrorism.

142. (back)Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

143. (back)Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

144. (back)One local law enforcement official suggested that the JTTFs are where the investigative expertise lies, and should be retained. However, he suggested that in order to be more valuable in preventing terrorist acts domestically, the JTTFs should be reorganized around the concept of "joint ness," and cited the "Goldwater Nichols" Department of Defense Reorganization Act as a model. The "joint ness" envisioned by this official would have state and local law enforcement, federal law enforcement, and IC entities responsible for counterterrorism, operate in an integrated and seamless environment. As envisioned by this local law enforcement official, consistent with joint officers in the military, promotion to senior level positions at the parent agency would be contingent upon a successful rotation to the "Joint" Terrorism Task Forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433) integrated the operational capabilities of the military services. For further information on Goldwater-Nichols, see

http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html. H.R. 3439, the "JTTF Enhancement Act of 2003" proposes that 1) there be a greater degree of participation in the JTTFs from DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials; and 2) a program be established to detail state and local law enforcement officers to the CIA, or CIA personnel to state and local law enforcement organizations.

145. (back)Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

146. (back)See "Blue Spies for City," New York Post, June 29, 2003. The New York Police Department (NYPD), in what it describes as a substantial resource investment, has dedicated more than 100 officers to the New York JTTF. According to NYPD officials, there has been a steady improvement in the flow of information between the NY JTTF and the NYPD. But there also have been occasions when police officials have requested information from the FBI and the IC, but failed to receive a timely response. As result, the NYPD has stationed several of its officers overseas to better protect the city's security needs by collecting information regarding terrorist activities. As one New York City official commented, "We're not looking to supplant anything that is being done by the Federal government. We're looking to supplement. We're looking to get the New York question asked."

147. (back)See Northeast Regional Agreement Information Sharing Proposal, Sept. 22, 2003. The states engaged in this effort include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. These proposed "centers" are distinct from the existing Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). The HSIN uses the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) to foster communication among federal, state and local officials involved in counterterrorism information. Currently, the system contains only information categorized as "sensitive but unclassified." See "Homeland Security Information Network to Expand Collaboration, Connectivity for States and Major Cities," Department of Homeland Security, Press Release, Feb. 24, 2004.

148. (back)Ibid.

149. (back)Proponents contend that state and localities should have access to raw foreign intelligence, because the analysts they have been able to recruit are often superior to those the FBI employs in its field offices. Moreover, they argue that FBI analysts, unlike their local counterparts, are unfamiliar with local infrastructure needing protection, and provide inferior analysis. In asking for more intelligence sharing, state and local officials say they recognize and respect the FBI's authority to conduct terrorism investigations, but insist they need access to unfiltered foreign intelligence in order to protect state and local security needs.

150. (back)See Appendix 3 (page 48) for additional information.

151. (back)At the beginning of the 108th Congress, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security was established. Along with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, this new committee now shares FBI oversight responsibilities.

152. (back)See Cory Reiss, "Graham's security complaints might bite back," The Gainesville Sun, May 27, 2003.

153. (back)See Ellen Laipson, President and Chief Executive Officer, the Henry L. Stimson Center, "Foreign Intelligence Challenges post September-11," a paper delivered at the Lexington Institute's conference titled "Progress Towards Homeland Security: An Interim Report Card," Feb. 27, 2003. http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/homeland/Laipson.pdf.

154. (back)See statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Government Accounting Office, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, June 21, 2002, p. 18.

155. (back)See remarks of Congressman David Obey during a hearing in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Justice, State and Judiciary, June 21, 2002.

156. (back)See Cory Reiss, "Graham's Security Complaints Might Bite Back," The Gainesville Sun, May 27, 2003.

157. (back)Ibid.

158. (back)Ibid.

159. (back)Ibid.

160. (back)Ibid.

161. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. pp. 44-45.

162. (back)For a treatment of the evolution of the relationship between law enforcement and intelligence, see CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., by Richard A. Best Jr.

163. (back)The Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Analytic Service might serve as a possible model for elevating senior analysts to the non-managerial analytical equivalent of Senior Executive Service special agents.

164. (back)FBI legal attaches serve in overseas posts, and are declared to the host country. Legal attaches serve as the FBI's link to foreign law enforcement and security services. While legal attaches conduct overt liaison with foreign services, they do not engage in clandestine intelligence collection overseas.

165. (back)See Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, (Free Press, 2004), pp. 254-256.

166. (back)U.S. Senator John Edwards introduced S. 410, The Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003,which would establish a Homeland Intelligence Agency within DHS.

167. (back)See CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

168. (back)See Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. p. 42.

169. (back)See CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

170. (back)The Director of Central Intelligence serves as both the leader of the Central Intelligence Agency, and as Director of the broader U.S. Intelligence Community. The proposed 9/11 Intelligence Memorial Reform Act (S. 1520) would create a Director of National Intelligence. That individual would be precluded from simultaneous service as the Director of the CIA and Director of National Intelligence. Some have argued this proposal would undermine the DCI's power base. See Robert M. Gates, "How Not to Reform Intelligence," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 3, 2003. Finally, while the TTIC reports to the Director of Central Intelligence as leader of the Intelligence Community, the organization has been categorized as a "joint venture" of Intelligence Community participants.

171. (back)See statement by John Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Oct. 15, 2003, p. 5.

172. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

173. (back)See Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, p. 41.

174. (back)Ibid., pp. 41-47.

175. (back)Ibid., p. 44.

176. (back)Ibid., pp. 43-44.

177. (back)Ibid., p. 44.

178. (back)Ibid., p. 41.

179. (back)According to former House Intelligence Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton, "if the shortcomings leading up to Sept. 11 were systemic in nature, the solution lies in better system management, the handling and analysis of vast amounts of information, and the distribution in a timely manner of the key conclusions to the right people." See the JIC Inquiry, p. 350.

180. (back)Ibid, p. 351. According to former FBI Director William Webster, the MI-5 concept is inapplicable in the U.S. context. "We're not England," Webster said. "We're not 500 miles across our territory. We have thousands of miles to cover. Would you propose to create an organization that had people all over the United States, as the FBI does?" He instead supports training FBI personnel to be more responsive to terrorist threats. He further argues that, "More than any other kind of threat, there is an interrelationship between law enforcement and intelligence in dealing with the problem of terrorism...We need investigative capability and intelligence collection capability, as well as those who go through the bits and pieces and fill in the dots."

181. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 13.

182. (back)Ibid, p. 18. Former Attorney General Barr testified, "An idea making the rounds these days is the notion of severing "domestic intelligence" from the FBI and creating a new domestic spy agency akin to Britain's MI-5. I think this is preposterous and goes in exactly the wrong direction. Artificial stove-piping hurts our counterterrorism efforts. What we need to do now is meld intelligence and law enforcement more closely together, not tear them apart. We already have too many agencies and creating still another simply adds more bureaucracy, spawns intractable and debilitating turf wars, and creates further barriers to the kind of seamless integration that is needed in this area."

183. (back)Ibid., p. 14.

184. (back)See Center for Democracy, "Domestic Intelligence Agencies: The Mixed Record of the UK's MI5," Jan. 27, 2003.

185. (back)See National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S. Code, Chapter 15, 401(a) and Executive Order 12333, 3.4.

186. (back)Ibid.

187. (back)See Code of Federal Regulations, Part 23.

188. (back)For a more detailed description of the FBI's traditional intelligence role, see Appendix 2.

189. (back)For an official history of the FBI, see http://www.fbi.gov/fbihistory.htm. See also CRS Report RL32095(pdf), The FBI: Past, Present and Future, by William Krouse and Todd Masse.

190. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 3, 2003.

191. (back)The successful prosecution of an espionage case can be viewed as both a counterintelligence success, and failure. It is a success insofar as the activity is stopped, but is a failure insofar as the activity escaped the attention of appropriate authorities for any period of time.

192. (back)See CRS Report 93-531, Individuals Arrested on Charges of Espionage Against the United States Government: 1966-1993, by Suzanne Cavanagh (available from the authors of this report). For a compilation of espionage cases through 1999, see

http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage.

193. (back)See Tony Poveda, Lawlessness and Reform: The FBI in Transition, Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1990.

194. (back)See Edwin Hoyt Palmer, The Palmer Raids,1919-1921: An Attempt to Suppress Dissent, Seabury Press, 1969.

195. (back)For further information on the history of COINTELPRO, see S.Rept. 94-755, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports of Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, (Washington, Apr. 23, 1976); (Hereafter cited as the Church Committee Report).

196. (back)See Church Committee Report, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, p.71.

197. (back)The Foreign Agent Registration Act requires that persons acting as foreign agents (as defined by the act) register with the U.S. Department of Justice for, among other reasons, transparency. (see 22 U.S.C. Chap. 611)

198. (back)See "The FBI and CISPES," a report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. (S.Rept. 101-46, July 1989).

199. (back)See Bill Gertz, Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, 2002, pp. 83-125. (Regnery Publishing).

200. (back)According to the Levi guidelines, domestic security investigations were to be limited to gathering information on group or individual activities "... which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve a violation of federal law...."

201. (back)See Testimony of Francis J. McNamara, former Subversive Activities Control Board Director, before the National Committee to Restore Internal Security, May 20, 1986. Quoted in W. Raymond Wannall, "Undermining Counterintelligence Capability," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 15, winter 2002, pp. 321-329.

202. (back)Interviews with former senior FBI officials.

203. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress Senate Judiciary Committee, July 23, 2003.

204. (back)Interview with local law enforcement official, Apr. 5, 2004.

205. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

206. (back)A fourth division -- cyber crime -- was established in Apr. 2002. Until the appointment of the EAD-I, it, too, had its own intelligence component.

207. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

208. (back)According to Executive Order 12333, counterintelligence includes international terrorist activities. See Appendix 1.

209. (back)See "Spying," The Economist, July 10, 2003.

210. (back)Ibid.

211. (back)Ibid.

212. (back)United States persons means a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except in the case of a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government, or governments. See United States Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 12333, Dec. 4, 1981.

213. (back)Richard Betts, Member of the National Commission on Terrorism and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, contends that the balance between civil liberties and security is one in which a differentiation between two types of constraints on civil liberties (political censorship and compromises of individual privacy via enhanced surveillance) should be made. According to Betts, although the former (largely manifested through the suppression of free speech) will not measurably advance the war against terrorism, and should not be tolerated, greater acceptance of the latter, with appropriate measures for keeping secret irrelevant byproduct intelligence, may yield "...the biggest payoff for counterterrorism intelligence." See "Fixing Intelligence," Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2002.

214. (back)These policy guidelines include The Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Security Investigations (April 5, 1976 -- Attorney General Edward H. Levi), The Attorney General Guidelines on Criminal Investigations of Individuals and Organizations Dec. 2, 1980 -- Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security,/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 7, 1983 -- Attorney General William French Smith), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 21, 1989 -- Attorney General Richard Thornburgh), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General Jo Ann Harris to Attorney General Janet Reno recommending a change in the guidelines; approved by Attorney General Reno on April 19, 1994.), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (May 30, 2002 - Attorney General John Ashcroft), and The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (U) (Oct. 31, 2003 - Attorney General John Ashcroft). Other guidelines -- classified and unclassified - regulating the use of confidential informants, undercover operations, and procedures for lawful, warrant less monitoring of verbal conversations may also play a role in the gathering of domestic intelligence.

215. (back)See CRS Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions, Mar. 31, 2003, by Elizabeth B. Bazan. See also CRS Report RL31377, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, by Charles Doyle. See also CRS Report RL31200(pdf), Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act, by Charles Doyle. See Title II - Enhanced Surveillance Procedures (Section 203 "Authority to Share Criminal Investigative Information," altered rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure[2003 Edition] to permit the sharing of grand jury information with "federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security officials for official duties.") Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorized sharing of information gathered through electronic surveillance as part of a criminal investigation under 18 U.S.C. ?2517, as well as the sharing of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence gathered as part of a criminal investigation with any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist that official in performance of his official duties, 50 U.S.C. ? 403-5d. See also P.L. 107-56, Title V -- Removal of Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism, and Title IX -- Improved Intelligence.

216. (back)The requirement and standard was changed from "the purpose" to "a significant purpose." Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, codified at 50 U.S.C. ? 1804(a)(7)(B).

217. (back)50 U.S.C. ?1805(a)(3)(A). See numerous references to this standard in USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, Title II -- Enhanced Surveillance Procedures. Prohibitions against electronic surveillance or physical searches under FISA based solely on First Amendment protected activities pre-date the USA PATRIOT Act. However, the USA PATRIOT Act added similar language to the pen register and trap and trace devices part of FISA. See FISA, 50 U.S.C. ??1842 and 1843.

218. (back)The definition of financial institution as set out in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-177), adopts the language of Title 31, U.S. Code, ??(a) (2) and (c) (1), which includes any credit union, thrift institution, broker or dealer in equities or commodities, currency exchange, insurance company, pawn broker, travel agency, and/or operator of a credit card system, among others.

219. (back)See annual reports of the U.S. Justice Department to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, as required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (Title 50 U.S. Code, ?1807). Statistics and annual reports compiled by the Federation of American Scientists (see http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/). This increase is attributable, at least in part, to Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) which changed the legal standard concerning the purpose of the surveillance and its relationship to foreign intelligence information. According to the original language, "the purpose" of the surveillance had to be to obtain foreign intelligence information. The new language demands certification that foreign intelligence gathering is a "significant purpose" of the requested surveillance.

220. (back)See Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, July 23, 2003.

221. (back)See Dan Eggen, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Washington Post, Dec. 13, 2003, p. A1.

222. (back)Ibid.





Return to CONTENTS section of this Long Report.

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The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context
Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence
George J. Tenet
before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

24 February 2004

(as prepared for delivery)
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, last year I described a national security environment that was significantly more complex than at any time during my tenure as Director of Central Intelligence. The world I will discuss today is equally, if not more, complicated and fraught with dangers for United States interests, but one that also holds great opportunity for positive change.

TERRORISM
I'll begin today on terrorism, with a stark bottom-line:

The al-Qa`ida leadership structure we charted after September 11 is seriously damaged--but the group remains as committed as ever to attacking the US homeland.
But as we continue the battle against al-Qa`ida, we must overcome a movement--a global movement infected by al-Qa`ida's radical agenda.
In this battle we are moving forward in our knowledge of the enemy--his plans, capabilities, and intentions.
And what we've learned continues to validate my deepest concern: that this enemy remains intent on obtaining, and using, catastrophic weapons.
Now let me tell you about the war we've waged against the al-Qa`ida organization and its leadership.

Military and intelligence operations by the United States and its allies overseas have degraded the group. Local al-Qa`ida cells are forced to make their own decisions because of disarray in the central leadership.
Al-Qa`ida depends on leaders who not only direct terrorist attacks but who carry out the day-to-day tasks that support operations. Over the past 18 months, we have killed or captured key al-Qa`ida leaders in every significant operational area--logistics, planning, finance, training--and have eroded the key pillars of the organization, such as the leadership in Pakistani urban areas and operational cells in the al-Qa`ida heartland of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The list of al-Qa`ida leaders and associates who will never again threaten the American people includes:

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, al-Qa`ida's operations chief and the mastermind of the September 11 attacks.
Nashiri, the senior operational planner for the Arabian Gulf area.
Abu Zubayda, a senior logistics officer and plotter.
Hasan Ghul, a senior facilitator who was sent to case Iraq for an expanded al-Qa`ida presence there.
Harithi and al-Makki, the most senior plotters in Yemen, who were involved in the bombing of the USS Cole.
Hambali, the senior operational planner in Southeast Asia.
We are creating large and growing gaps in the al-Qa`ida hierarchy.

And, unquestionably, bringing these key operators to ground disrupted plots that would otherwise have killed Americans.

Meanwhile, al-Qa`ida central continues to lose operational safehavens, and Bin Ladin has gone deep underground. We are hunting him in some of the most unfriendly regions on earth. We follow every lead.

Al-Qa`ida's finances are also being squeezed. This is due in part to takedowns of key moneymen in the past year, particularly the Gulf, Southwest Asia, and even Iraq.

And we are receiving a broad array of help from our coalition partners, who have been central to our effort against al-Qa`ida.

Since the 12 May bombings, the Saudi government has shown an important commitment to fighting al-Qa`ida in the Kingdom, and Saudi officers have paid with their lives.
Elsewhere in the Arab world, we're receiving valuable cooperation from Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, the UAE, Oman, and many others.
President Musharraf of Pakistan remains a courageous and indispensable ally who has become the target of assassins for the help he's given us.
Partners in Southeast Asian have been instrumental in the roundup of key regional associates of al-Qa`ida.
Our European partners worked closely together to unravel and disrupt a continent-wide network of terrorists planning chemical, biological and conventional attacks in Europe.
So we have made notable strides. But do not misunderstand me. I am not suggesting al-Qa`ida is defeated. It is not. We are still at war. This is a learning organization that remains committed to attacking the United States, its friends and allies.

Successive blows to al-Qa`ida's central leadership have transformed the organization into a loose collection of regional networks that operate more autonomously. These regional components have demonstrated their operational prowess in the past year.

The sites of their attacks span the entire reach of al-Qa`ida--Morocco, Kenya, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia.
And al-Qa`ida seeks to influence the regional networks with operational training, consultations, and money. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad sent Hambali $50,000 for operations in Southeast Asia.
You should not take the fact that these attacks occurred abroad to mean the threat to the US homeland has waned. As al-Qa`ida and associated groups undertook these attacks overseas, detainees consistently talk about the importance the group still attaches to striking the main enemy: the United States. Across the operational spectrum--air, maritime, special weapons--we have time and again uncovered plots that are chilling.

On aircraft plots alone, we have uncovered new plans to recruit pilots and to evade new security measures in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of 11 September remain within al-Qa`ida's reach. Make no mistake: these plots are hatched abroad, but they target US soil or that of our allies.
So far, I have been talking only about al-Qa`ida. But al-Qa`ida is not the limit of terrorist threat worldwide. Al-Qa`ida has infected others with its ideology, which depicts the United States as Islam's greatest foe. Mr. Chairman, what I want to say to you now may be the most important thing I tell you today.

The steady growth of Usama bin Ladin's anti-US sentiment through the wider Sunni extremist movement and the broad dissemination of al-Qa`ida's destructive expertise ensure that a serious threat will remain for the foreseeable future--with or without al-Qa`ida in the picture.

A decade ago, bin Ladin had a vision of rousing Islamic terrorists worldwide to attack the United States. He created al-Qa`ida to indoctrinate a worldwide movement in global jihad, with America as the enemy--an enemy to be attacked with every means at hand.

In the minds of Bin Ladin and his cohorts, September 11 was the shining moment, their "shot heard `round the world," and they want to capitalize on it.
And so, even as al-Qa`ida reels from our blows, other extremist groups within the movement it influenced have become the next wave of the terrorist threat. Dozens of such groups exist. Let me offer a few thoughts on how to understand this challenge.

One of the most immediate threats is from smaller international Sunni extremist groups who have benefited from al-Qa`ida links. They include groups as diverse as the al-Zarqawi network, the Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
A second level of threat comes from small local groups, with limited domestic agendas, that work with international terrorist groups in their own countries. These include the Salifiya Jihadia, a Moroccan network that carried out the May 2003 Casablanca bombings, and similar groups throughout Africa and Asia.
These far-flung groups increasingly set the agenda, and are redefining the threat we face. They are not all creatures of Bin Ladin, and so their fate is not tied to his. They have autonomous leadership, they pick their own targets, they plan their own attacks.

Beyond these groups are the so-called "foreign jihadists"--individuals ready to fight anywhere they believe Muslim lands are under attack by what they see as "infidel invaders." They draw on broad support networks, have wide appeal, and enjoy a growing sense of support from Muslims are not necessarily supporters of terrorism. The foreign jihadists see Iraq as a golden opportunity.

Let me repeat: for the growing number of jihadists interested in attacking the United States, a spectacular attack on the US Homeland is the "brass ring" that many strive for--with or without encouragement by al-Qa`ida's central leadership.

To detect and ultimately defeat these forces, we will continually need to watch hotspots, present or potential battlegrounds, places where these terrorist networks converge. Iraq is of course one major locus of concern. Southeast Asia is another. But so are the backyards of our closest allies. Even Western Europe is an area where terrorists recruit, train, and target.

To get the global job done, foreign governments will need to improve bilateral and multilateral, and even inter-service cooperation, and strengthen domestic counterterrorist legislation and security practices.
Mr. Chairman, I have consistently warned this committee of al-Qa`ida's interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Acquiring these remains a "religious obligation" in Bin Ladin's eyes, and al-Qa`ida and more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN materials.

We particularly see a heightened risk of poison attacks. Contemplated delivery methods to date have been simple but this may change as non-Al-Qa`ida groups share information on more sophisticated methods and tactics.
Over the last year, we've also seen an increase in the threat of more sophisticated CBRN. For this reason we take very seriously the threat of a CBRN attack.

Extremists have widely disseminated assembly instructions for an improvised chemical weapon using common materials that could cause a large numbers of casualties in a crowded, enclosed area.
Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al-Qa`ida's program to produce anthrax as one of the most immediate terrorist CBRN threats we are likely to face.
Al-Qa`ida continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability. It remains interested in dirty bombs. Terrorist documents contain accurate views of how such weapons would be used.
I've focused, and rightly so, on al-Qa`ida and related groups. But other terrorist organizations also threaten US interests. Palestinian terrorist groups in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza remain a formidable threat and continue to use terrorism to undermine prospects for peace.

Last year Palestinian terrorist groups conducted more than 600 attacks, killing about 200 Israelis and foreigners, including Americans.
Lebanese Hizballah cooperates with these groups and appears to be increasing its support. It is also working with Iran and surrogate groups in Iraq and would likely react to an attack against it, Syria, or Iran with attacks against US and Israeli targets worldwide.

Iran and Syria continue to support terrorist groups, and their links into Iraq have become problematic to our efforts there.

Although Islamic extremists comprise the most pressing threat to US interests, we cannot ignore nominally leftist groups in Latin America and Europe. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia's second largest leftist insurgent group have shown a willingness to attack US targets. So has the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front--a Turkish group that has killed two US citizens and targeted US interests in Turkey.

Finally, cyber vulnerabilities are another of our concerns, with not only terrorists but foreign governments, hackers, crime groups, and industrial spies attempting to obtain information from our computer networks.

IRAQ
Mr. Chairman, we are making significant strides against the insurgency and terrorism, but former regime elements and foreign jihadists continue to pose a serious threat to Iraq's new institutions and to our own forces.

At the same time, sovereignty will be returned to an interim Iraqi government by 1 July, although the structure and mechanism for determining this remain unresolved.
The emerging Iraqi leadership will face many pressing issues, among them organizing national elections, integrating the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing Kurdish autonomy in a federal structure, and the determining the role of Islam in the Iraqi state.
Meanwhile, Mr. Chairman, the important work of the Iraqi Survey Group and the hunt for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction continues. We must explore every avenue in our quest to understand Iraq's programs out of concern for the possibility that materials, weapons, or expertise might fall into the hands of insurgents, foreign states, or terrorists. As you know, I'll talk about this at length next week.

Despite progress in Iraq, the overall security picture continues to concern me. Saddam is in prison, and the Coalition has killed or apprehended all but 10 of his 54 key cronies. And Iraqis are taking an increasing role in their own defense, with many now serving in the various new police, military, and security forces.

But the violence continues. The daily average number of attacks on US and Coalition military forces has dropped from its November peak but is similar to that of August.
And many other insurgent and terrorist attacks undermine stability by striking at, and seeking to intimidate, those Iraqis willing to work with the Coalition.
The insurgency we face in Iraq comprises multiple groups with different motivations but with the same goal: driving the US and our Coalition partners from Iraq. Saddam's capture was a psychological blow that took some of the less-committed Ba'thists out of the fight, but a hard core of former regime elements--Ba'th Party officials, military, intelligence, and security officers--are still organizing and carrying out attacks.

Intelligence has given us a good understanding of the insurgency at the local level, and this information is behind the host of successful raids you've read about in the papers.
US military and Intelligence Community efforts to round up former regime figures have disrupted some insurgent plans to carry out additional anti-Coalition attacks. But we know these Ba'thist cells are intentionally decentralized to avoid easy penetration and to prevent the roll-up of whole networks. Arms, funding, and military experience remain readily available.

Mr. Chairman, the situation as I've described it--both our victories and our challenges--indicates we have damaged, but not yet defeated, the insurgents.

The security situation is further complicated by the involvement of terrorists--including Ansar al-Islam (AI) and al-Zarqawi--and foreign jihadists coming to Iraq to wage jihad. Their goal is clear. They intend to inspire an Islamic extremist insurgency that would threaten Coalition forces and put a halt to the long-term process of building democratic institutions and governance in Iraq. They hope for a Taliban-like enclave in Iraq's Sunni heartland that could be a jihadist safehaven.

AI--an Iraqi Kurdish extremist group--is waging a terrorist campaign against the coalition presence and cooperative Iraqis in a bid to inspire jihad and create an Islamic state.
Some extremists go even further. In a recent letter, terrorist planner Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi outlined his strategy to foster sectarian civil war in Iraq, aimed at inciting the Shia.
Stopping the foreign extremists from turning Iraq into their most important jihad yet rests in part on preventing loosely connected extremists from coalescing into a cohesive terrorist organization.

We are having some success--the Coalition has arrested key jihadist leaders and facilitators in Iraq, including top leaders from Ansar al-Islam, the al-Zarqawi network, and other al-Qa`ida affiliates.
The October detention of AI's deputy leader set back the group's ambition to establish itself as an umbrella organization for jihadists in Iraq.
And we're also concerned that foreign jihadists and former regime elements might coalesce. This would link local knowledge and military training with jihadist fervor and lethal tactics. At this point, we've seen a few signs of such cooperation at the tactical or local level.

Ultimately, the Iraqi people themselves must provide the fundamental solutions. As you well know, the insurgents are incessantly and violently targeting Iraqi police and security forces precisely because they fear the prospect of Iraqis securing their own interests. Success depends on broadening the role of the local security forces.

This goes well beyond greater numbers. It means continuing work already under way--fixing equipment shortages, providing training, ensuring adequate pay--to build a force of increasing quality and confidence that will have the support of the Iraqi people.
It is hard to overestimate the importance of greater security for Iraqis particularly as we turn to the momentous political events slated for 2004.

The real test will begin soon after the transfer of sovereignty, when we'll see the extent to which the new Iraqi leaders embody concepts such as pluralism, compromise, and rule of law.
Iraqi Arabs--and many Iraqi Kurds--possess a strong Iraqi identity, forged over a tumultuous 80 year history and especially during the nearly decade-long war with Iran. Unfortunately, Saddam's divide and rule policy and his favored treatment of the Sunni minority aggravated tensions to the point where the key to governance in Iraq today is managing these competing sectional interests.

Here's a readout on where these groups stand:

The majority SHIA look forward to the end of Sunni control, which began with the British creation of Iraq. The Shia community nevertheless has internal tensions, between the moderate majority and a radical minority that wants a Shia-dominated theocracy.
The KURDS see many opportunities to advance long held goals: retaining the autonomy they enjoyed over the past twelve years and expanding their power and territory.
The minority SUNNI fear Shia and Kurdish ambitions. Such anxieties help animate Sunni support for the insurgents. The Sunni community is still at a very early state of establishing political structures to replace the defeated Ba'th party.
I should qualify what I've just said: no society, and surely not Iraq's complex tapestry, is so simple as to be captured in three or four categories. Kurds. Shia. Sunni. In reality, Iraqi society is filled with more cleavages, and more connections, than a simple typology can suggest. We seldom hear about the strong tribal alliances that have long existed between Sunni and Shia, or the religious commonalities between the Sunni Kurd and Arab communities, or the moderate secularism that spans Iraqi groups.

We tend to identify, and stress, the tensions that rend communities apart, but opportunities also exist for these group to work together for common ends.
The social and political interplay is further complicated by Iran, especially in the south, where Tehran pursues its own interests and hopes to maximize its influence among Iraqi Shia after 1 July. Organizations supported by Iran--Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its Badr Organization militia--have gained positions within the Iraqi police and control media outlets in Basrah that tout a pro-Iran viewpoint.

Tehran also runs humanitarian and outreach programs that have probably enhanced its reputation among Iraqi Shia, but many remain suspicious.
The most immediate political challenge for the Iraqis is to choose the transitional government that will rule their country while they write their permanent constitution. The Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Ali al-Sistani has made this selection process the centerpiece of his effort to ensure that Iraqis will decide their own future and choose the first sovereign post-Saddam government.

Sistani favors direct elections as the way to produce a legitimate, accountable government.
Sistani's religious pronouncements show that, above all, he wants Iraq to be independent of foreign powers. Moreover, his praise of free elections and his theology reflect, in our reading, a clearcut opposition to theocracy, Iran-style.
Once the issues involving the selection of an transitional government are settled, Iraq's permanent constitution will begin to take shape. Here the Iraqi government and the framers of the constitution will have to address three urgent concerns: integrating the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing Kurdish autonomy in a federal structure, and determining the role of Islam in the Iraqi state.

The Sunni. Sunnis are at least a fifth of the population, inhabit the country's strategic heartland, and comprise a sizable share of Iraq's professional and middle classes. The Sunni are disaffected as a deposed ruling minority, but some are beginning to recognize that boycotting the emerging political process will weaken their community. Their political isolation may be breaking down in parts of the Sunni triangle, where some Sunni Arabs have begun to engage the Coalition and assume local leadership roles. And in the past three months we have also seen the founding of national-level Sunni umbrella organizations to deal with the Coalition and the Governing Council on questions like Sunni participation in choosing the transitional government.

Federalism. The Transitional Administrative Law is just now being completed, and the way it deals with the relationship between the political center and Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious communities will frame the future constitutional debate. To make a federal arrangement stick, Kurdish and Arab Iraq leaders will need to explain convincingly that a federal structure benefits all Iraqis and not just the Kurds. And even so, a host of difficult issues--control over oil and security being perhaps the most significant--may provoke tension between Kurdish and central Iraqi authorities.

Islam. The current draft of the Transitional Administrative Law makes Islam Iraq's official creed but protects religious freedom. It also creates an Iraqi legal system that is a mix of traditions, including Islamic law--but as only one legal element among many. This compromise is already under fire by Sunni Islamists who want Islam to be the sole source of law.

I don't want to allow the important security and political stories to crowd out others we should also be telling, including the often neglected one about Iraq's sizable economic potential. It's true that rebuilding will go on for years--the Saddam regime left in its wake a devastated, antiquated, underfunded infrastructure. But reconstruction progress and Iraq's own considerable assets--its natural resources and its educated populace--should enable the Iraqis to see important improvement in 2004 in their infrastructure and their quality of life.

Over the next few years, they'll open more hospitals and build more roads than anyone born under Saddam has witnessed.
The recovery of Iraqi oil production will help. Production is on track to approach 3.0 million barrels per day by the end of this year. Iraq hasn't produced this much oil since before the 1991 Gulf war. By next year, revenues from oil exports should cover the cost of basic government operations and contribute several billion dollars toward reconstruction. It is essential, however, that the Iraq-Turkey pipeline be reopened and oil facilities be well protected from insurgent sabotage.

Much more needs to be done. Key public services such as water, sewage, and transportation will have difficulty reaching prewar levels by July and won't meet the higher target of total Iraqi demand.

Electric power capacity approaches prewar levels but still falls short of peak demand. Looting and sabotage may make supplies unreliable.
Finally, unemployment and underemployment, which afflicts about a half of the workforce, will remain a key problem and a potential breeding ground for popular discontent.
PROLIFERATION
Mr. Chairman, I'll turn now to worldwide trends in proliferation. This picture is changing before our eyes--changing at a rate I have not seen since the end of the Cold War. Some of it is good news--I'll talk about the Libya and AQ Khan breakthroughs, for example--and some of it is disturbing. Some of it shows our years of work paying off, and some of it shows the work ahead is harder.

We are watching countries of proliferation concern choose different paths as they calculate the risks versus gains of pursuing WMD.

Libya is taking steps toward strategic disarmament.
North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear program into at least a bargaining chip and also international legitimacy and influence.
And Iran is exposing some programs while trying to preserve others.
I'll start with LIBYA, which appears to be moving toward strategic disarmament. For years Qadhafi had been chafing under international pariah status. In March 2003, he made a strategic decision and reached out through British intelligence with an offer to abandon his pursuit of WMD.

That launched nine months of delicate negotiations where we moved the Libyans from a stated willingness to renounce WMD to an explicit and public commitment to expose and dismantle their WMD programs. The leverage was intelligence. Our picture of Libya's WMD programs allowed CIA officers and their British colleagues to press the Libyans on the right questions, to expose inconsistencies, and to convince them that holding back was counterproductive. We repeatedly surprised them with the depth of our knowledge.

For example, US and British intelligence officers secretly traveled to Libya and asked to inspect Libya's ballistic missile programs. Libyan officials at first failed to declare key facilities, but our intelligence convinced them to disclose several dozen facilities, including their deployed Scud B sites and their secret North Korean-assisted Scud C production line.
When we were tipped to the imminent shipment of centrifuge parts to Libya in October, we arranged to have the cargo seized, showing the Libyans that we had penetrated their most sensitive procurement network.
By the end of the December visit, the Libyans:

Admitted having a nuclear weapons program and having bought uranium hexafluoride feed material for gas centrifuge enrichment.
Admitted having nuclear weapon design documents.
Acknowledged having made about 25 tons of sulfur mustard CW agent, aerial bombs for the mustard, and small amounts of nerve agent.
Provided access to their deployed Scud B forces and revealed details of indigenous missile design work and of cooperation with North Korea on the 800-km range Scuds Cs.
From the very outset of negotiations, Qadhafi requested the participation of international organizations to help certify Libyan compliance. Tripoli has agreed to inspections by the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to abide by the range limitations of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). We have briefed information on Tripoli's programs to various international monitoring organizations. IAEA and OPCW officials have already followed up with visits to Libya. Some discrepancies remain, but we will continue to collect additional information and closely monitor Libya's adherence to the commitments it has made.

In contrast to Libya, NORTH KOREA is trying to leverage its nuclear programs into international legitimacy and bargaining power, announcing its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent.

Since December 2002, Pyongyang has announced its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and expelled IAEA inspectors. Last year Pyongyang claimed to have finished reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods that had been sealed by US and North Korean technicians and stored under IAEA monitoring since 1994.

The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. The 8000 rods the North claims to have processed into plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several more.
We also believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by AQ Khan, which would give North Korea an alternative route to nuclear weapons.

Of course, we are concerned about more than just North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea has longstanding CW and BW capabilities and is enhancing its BW potential as it builds its legitimate biotechnology infrastructure. Pyongyang is sending individuals abroad and is seeking dual-use expertise and technology.

North Korea also continues to advance its missile programs. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in ballistic missiles, and has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its extensive ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources. The North also has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that have enabled other states to acquire longer-range capabilities and a basis for domestic development efforts earlier than would otherwise have been possible.

North Korea has maintained a unilateral long-range missile launch moratorium since 1999, but could end that with little or no warning. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2--capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload--may be ready for flight-testing.
IRAN is taking yet a different path, acknowledging work on a covert nuclear fuel cycle while trying to preserve its WMD options. I'll start with the good news: Tehran acknowledged more than a decade of covert nuclear activity and agreed to open itself to an enhanced inspection regime. Iran for the first time acknowledged many of its nuclear fuel cycle development activities--including a large-scale gas centrifuge uranium enrichment effort. Iran claims its centrifuge program is designed to produce low-enriched uranium, to support Iran's civil nuclear power program. This is permitted under the Nonproliferation Treaty, but--and here's the downside--the same technology can be used to build a military program as well.

The difference between producing low-enriched uranium and weapons-capable high-enriched uranium is only a matter of time and intent, not technology. It would be a significant challenge for intelligence to confidently assess whether that red line had been crossed.
Finally, Iran's missile program is both a regional threat and a proliferation concern. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle Eastand includes the 1300-km range Shahab-3 MRBM as well as a few hundred SRBMs. Iran has announced production of the Shahab-3 and publicly acknowledged development of follow-on versions. During 2003, Iran continued R&D on its longer-range ballistic missile programs, and publicly reiterated its intention to develop space launch vehicles (SLVs)--and SLVs contain most of the key building blocks for an ICBM. Iran could begin flight-testing these systems in the mid- to latter-part of the decade.

Iran also appears willing to supply missile-related technology to countries of concern and publicly advertises its artillery rockets and related technologies, including guidance instruments and missile propellants.
Let me turn now to a different aspect of the evolving WMD threat. I want to focus on how countries and groups are increasingly trying to get the materials they need for WMD. I'll focus on two important stories:

The roll-up of AQ Khan and his network, one of the most significant counter-proliferation successes in years and one in which intelligence led the way.
The difficulty of uncovering both proliferators masquerading as legitimate businessmen and possible BW or CW plants appearing to be legitimate "dual-use" facilities.
As I pointed out last year, Mr. Chairman, WMD technologies are no longer the sole province of nation-states. They might also come about as a result of business decisions made by private entrepreneurs and firms.

As you now know, those comments were my way of referring to AQ Khan without mentioning his name in open session. Until recently, Khan, popularly known as the "father of the Pakistani bomb," was the most dangerous WMD entrepreneur. For 25 years Khan directed Pakistan's uranium enrichment program. He built an international network of suppliers to support uranium enrichment efforts in Pakistan that also supported similar efforts in other countries.

Khan and his network had been unique in being able to offer one-stop shopping for enrichment technology and weapons design information. With such assistance, a potentially wide range of countries could leapfrog the slow, incremental stages of other nuclear weapons development programs.
The actions taken against Khan's network--like the example of Libya I laid out earlier--were largely the result of intelligence.

Intelligence discovered, pieced together, tracked, and penetrated Khan's worldwide hidden network.
But every public success we enjoy can be used by people like Khan to adjust, adapt, and evade. Proliferators hiding among legitimate businesses, and countries hiding their WMD programs inside legitimate dual-use industries, combine to make private entrepreneurs dealing in lethal goods one of our most difficult intelligence challenges.

In support of these WMD programs, new procurement strategies continue to hamper our ability to assess and warn on covert WMD programs. Acquisitions for such programs aren't the work of secret criminal networks that skirt international law. They're done by businessmen, in the open, in what seems to be legal trade in high-technology.

The dual-use challenge is especially applicable to countries hiding biological and chemical warfare programs. With dual-use technology and civilian industrial infrastructure, countries can develop BW and CW capabilities. Biotechnology is especially dual-edged: Medical programs and technology could easily support a weapons program, because nearly every technology required for biological weapons also has a legitimate application.

Now I'll turn to a brief run-down of some significant missile programs apart from those I've already discussed.

China continues an aggressive missile modernization program that will improve its ability to conduct a wide range of military options against Taiwan supported by both cruise and ballistic missiles. Expected technical improvements will give Beijing a more accurate and lethal missile force. China is also moving on with its first generation of mobile strategic missiles.

Although Beijing has taken steps to improve ballistic missile related export controls, Chinese firms continue to be a leading source of relevant technology and continue to work with other countries on ballistic missile-related projects.
South Asian ballistic missile development continues apace. Both India and Pakistan are pressing ahead with development and testing of longer-range ballistic missiles and are inducting additional SRBMs into missile units. Both countries are testing missiles that will enable them to deliver nuclear warheads to greater distances.

Last year Syria continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant ballistic missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance, primarily from North Korean entities. Syria is developing longer-range missile programs, such as a Scud D and possibly other variants, with assistance from North Korea and Iran.

Many countries remain interested in developing or acquiring land-attack cruise missiles, which are almost always significantly more accurate than ballistic missiles and complicate missile defense systems. Unmanned aerial vehicles are also of growing concern.

To conclude my comments on proliferation, I'll briefly run through some WMD programs I have not yet discussed, beginning with Syria.

Syria is an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards and has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are closely monitoring Syrian nuclear intentions. Meanwhile, Damascus has an active CW development and testing program that relies on foreign suppliers for key controlled chemicals suitable for producing CW.

Finally, we remain alert to the vulnerability of Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion. We are also concerned by the continued eagerness of Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers--which makes Russian expertise an attractive target for countries and groups seeking WMD and missile-related assistance.

PIVOTAL STATES
I'm going to comment now on three countries we obviously pay a great deal of attention to: North Korea, China, and Russia.

The NORTH KOREAN regime continues to threaten a range of US, regional, and global security interests. As I've noted earlier, Pyongyang is pursuing its nuclear weapons program and nuclear-capable delivery systems. It continues to build its missile forces, which can now reach all of South Korea and Japan, and to develop longer-range missiles that could threaten the United States.

The North also exports complete ballistic missiles and production capabilities, along with related components and expertise. It continues to export narcotics and other contraband across the globe.

Moreover, the forward-deployed posture of North Korea's armed forces remains a near-term threat to South Korea and to the 37,000 US troops stationed there. Recall that early last year as tensions over the nuclear program were building, Pyongyang intercepted a US reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace.

Kim Chong-il continues to exert a tight grip on North Korea as supreme leader. The regime's militarized, Soviet-style command economy is failing to meet the population's food and economic needs. Indeed, the economy has faltered to the point that Kim has permitted some new economic initiatives, including more latitude for farmers' markets, but these changes are a far cry from the systemic economic reform needed to revitalize the economy. The accumulated effect of years of deprivation and repression places significant stresses on North Korean society.

The Kim regime rules largely through fear, intimidation, and indoctrination, using the country's large and pervasive security apparatus, its system of camps for political prisoners, and its unrelenting propaganda to maintain control.
Mr. Chairman, CHINA continues to emerge as a great power and expand its profile in regional and international politics--but Beijing has cooperated with Washington on some key strategic issues.

The Chinese have cooperated in the war on terrorism and have been willing to host and facilitate multilateral dialogue on the North Korean nuclear problem--in contrast to Beijing's more detached approach to that problem a decade ago.
Beijing is making progress in asserting its influence in East Asia. Its activist diplomacy in the neighborhood is paying off, fueled in large part by China's robust economy. China's growth continues to outpace all others in the region, and its imports of goods from other East Asian countries are soaring. As a result, Beijing is better positioned to sell its neighbors on the idea that what is good for the Chinese economy is good for Asia.

That said, China's neighbors still harbor suspicions about Beijing's long-term intentions. They generally favor a sustained US military presence in the region as insurance against potential Chinese aggression.
Our greatest concern remains China's military buildup, which continues to accelerate. Last year, Beijing reached new benchmarks in its production or acquisition from Russia of missiles, submarines, other naval combatants, and advanced fighter aircraft. China also is downsizing and restructuring its military forces with an eye toward enhancing its capabilities for the modern battlefield. All of these steps will over time make China a formidable challenger if Beijing perceived that its interests were being thwarted in the region.

We are closely monitoring the situation across the Taiwan Strait in the period surrounding Taiwan's presidential election next month.
Chinese leadership politics--especially the incomplete leadership transition--will influence how Beijing deals with the Taiwan issue this year and beyond. President and Communist Party leader Hu Jintao still shares power with his predecessor in those positions, Jiang Zemin, who retains the powerful chairmanship of the Party's Central Military Commission.

In RUSSIA, the trend I highlighted last year--President Putin's re-centralization of power in the Kremlin--has become more pronounced, especially over the past several months. We see this in the recent Duma elections and the lopsided United Russia party victory engineered by the Kremlin and in the Kremlin's domination of the Russian media.

Putin has nevertheless recorded some notable achievements. His economic record--even discounting the continuing strength of high world oil prices--is impressive, both in terms of GDP growth and progress on market reforms. He has brought a sense of stability to the Russian political scene after years of chaos, and he restored Russians' pride in their country's place in the world.

That said, Putin now dominates the Duma, and the strong showing of nationalist parties plus the shutout of liberal parties may bolster trends toward limits on civil society, state interference in big business, and greater assertiveness in the former Soviet Union. And the Kremlin's recent efforts to strengthen the state's role in the oil sector could discourage investors and hamper energy cooperation with the West.

He shows no signs of softening his tough stance on Russia's war in Chechnya. Russian counterinsurgency operations have had some success. Putin's prime innovation is the process of turning more authority over to the Chechen under the new government of Akhmad Kadyrov, and empowering his security forces to lead the counter-insurgency.

Although this strategy may succeed in lowering Russia's profile in Chechnya, it is unlikely to lead to resolution.
Moscow has already become more assertive in its approach to the neighboring states of the former Soviet Union, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Russian companies--primarily for commercial motives, but in line with the Kremlin's agenda--are increasing their stakes in neighboring countries, particularly in the energy sector.

The Kremlin's increasing assertiveness is partly grounded in a growing confidence in its military capabilities. Although still a fraction of their former capabilities, Russian military forces are beginning to rebound from the 1990s nadir. Training rates are up--including some high-profile exercises--along with defense spending.

Even so, we see Moscow's aims as limited. Russia is using primarily economic incentives and levers of "soft" power, like shared history and culture, to rebuild lost power and influence. And Putin has a stake in relative stability on Russia's borders--not least to maintain positive relations with the US and Europeans.

Russian relations with the US continue to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. On balance, they remain more cooperative than not, but the coming year will present serious challenges. For example, Russia remains supportive of US deployments in Central Asia for Afghanistan--but is also wary of US presence in what Russia considers to be its own back yard.

Let me turn now to AFGHANISTAN, where the Afghan people are on their way to having their first legitimate, democratically elected government in more than a generation.

The ratification of a new constitution at the Constitutional Loya Jirga in January is a significant milepost. It provides the legal framework and legitimacy for several initiatives, including elections, scheduled for later this year.

Within the next 12 months, the country could have, for the first time, a freely elected President and National Assembly that are broadly representative, multi-ethnic, and able to begin providing security and services at some level.
Even if the date of elections slips--the Bonn Agreement requires a June date--the central government is extending its writ and legitimate political processes are developing nationwide through other means. Regional "warlords" are disruptive but disunited--and appear to realize the Bonn process and elections are the only way to avoid relapsing into civil war.

Defense Minister Fahim Khan is cooperating with President Karzai and seems able to keep his large body of Panjshiri supporters in line in favor of Bonn and stability.
Meanwhile, the infusion of $2 billion in international aid has propelled Afghan economic performance. The IMF estimates GDP grew--from an admittedly low base--by 29 percent last year. The completion of the Kabul to Kandahar road in December was a success, but the international community will need to ensure that funds are channeled toward projects that make the most impact and are balanced among the regions and ethnic groups.

Building a National Army is another long-term international challenge. So far, almost 6,000 Afghan soldiers have been trained by US, British, and French trainers. It will take years to reach the goal of a 70,000-strong ethnically-balanced forcebut with continued Coalition and international community support and assistance over the next two years, Afghanistan need not become either a "security welfare state," or, again, a breeding ground for terrorists and extremism.
Last year's most worrisome events were the continued attacks by the Afghan Transitional Authority's enemies--particularly the Taliban, along with al-Qa`ida and followers of Afghan extremist Hikmatyar--who want to disrupt routine life and the reconstruction effort in the south and east. This is still a problem, because none of these groups has abandoned the ultimate goal of derailing the process by which legitimate democratic government and the rule of law will be established in Afghanistan.

I don't want to overstate the Taliban's strength. It is far from having sufficient political and military might to challenge the Karzai Government. It is, however, still able to interfere with the political, economic, and social reconstruction of the country by fomenting insecurity and thereby undermining public confidence in Kabul.

Like other extremists bent on restoring the terrorist-sponsored state that existed before the liberation of Afghanistan, Taliban remnants remain intent on using any available means to undermine President Karzai and his government, to drive international aid organizations and their workers from the areas that most need them, and to attack US and Coalition forces.
For this reason the security situation in the south and east is still tenuous and Kabul will need considerable assistance over at least the next year or two to stabilize the security environment there.
In IRAN, Mr. Chairman, I'll begin with a sobering bottom line:

With the victory of hardliners in elections last weekend, governmental led reform received a serious blow. Greater repression is a likely result.
With the waning of top-down reform efforts, reformers will probably turn to the grass roots--working with NGOs and labor groups--to rebuild popular support and keep the flame alive.
The strengthening of authoritarian rule will make breaking out of old foreign policy patterns more difficult at a time when Tehran faces a new geopolitical landscape in the Middle East.
The concerns I voiced last year are unabated. The recent defeats will have further alienated a youthful population anxious for change. Abroad, Tehran faces an altered regional landscape in the destruction of radical anti-Western regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq and growing international concern about nuclear proliferation.

And, as has so often happened in Iran's history, Iran's leaders appear likely to respond to these challenges in rigid and unimaginative ways.
The current setback is the latest in a series of contests in which authoritarian rule has prevailed over reformist challengers. The reformists--President Khatami in particular--are in no small part to blame. Their refusal to back bold promises with equally bold actions exhausted their initially enthusiastic popular support.

When the new Majles convenes in June, the Iranian government will be even more firmly controlled by the forces of authoritarianism. In the recent election, clerical authorities disqualified more than 2500 candidates, mostly reformists, and returned control of the legislature to hardliners. The new Majles will focus on economic reform, with little or no attention to political liberalization.

And with the Majles securely behind the hardliners, we expect to see many of the outlets for political dissent shut down by the clerical regime.
The prospect of internal violence remains. Hardliners may now resort to new heavy-handedness that produces public outrage and protest. At least eight people were killed and 30 injured in elected-related violence last weekend.
Although greater repression is likely to be the most immediate consequence, this will only further deepen the discontent with clerical rule, which is now discredited and publicly criticized as never before. In the past year several unprecedented open letters, including one signed by nearly half the parliament, were published calling for an end to the clergy's absolute rule.

Iran's recent history is studded with incidents of serious civil unrest that erupted in response to the arrogance of local officials--events like the 1999 student riots that broke out when security forces attacked a dormitory.
Even so, the Iranian public does not appear eager to take a challenge to the streets--in Tehran, apathy is the prevailing mood, and regime intimidation has cowed the populace. This mix keeps the regime secure for now.
The uncertainty surrounding Iran's internal politics comes as Tehran adjusts to the regional changes of a post-Saddam Iraq. Because Khamenei and his allies have kept close rein on foreign policy, we do not expect the defeat of the reformists to lead to a sudden change in Iranian policy. Tehran will continue to use multiple avenues--including media influence, humanitarian and reconstruction aid, diplomatic maneuvering, and clandestine activity--to advance its interests and counter US influence in Iraq.

We judge that Iran wants an Iraqi government that does not threaten Tehran, is not a US puppet, can maintain the country's territorial integrity, and has a strong Shia representation.
These interests have led Tehran to recognize the Iraqi Governing Council and work with other nascent Iraqi political, economic, and security institutions.
In INDONESIA, the world's most populous Muslim country, authorities have arrested more than 100 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) suspects linked to the terrorist attacks in Bali in October 2002 and the Jakarta Marriott Hotel last year. However, coming presidential and legislative elections appear to have blunted the government's efforts to root out JI.

Megawati remains the presidential frontrunner, but continuing criticism of her leadership and the growing prospect that her party will lose seats in the legislative election increase the likelihood of a wide-open race. The secular-nationalist Golkar--the former ruling party of Soeharto, now riding a wave of public nostalgia for his bygone era--could overtake Megawati's party to win the plurality of legislature seats. Most local polls suggest that the Islamic parties are unlikely to improve their percentage of the vote.

Vocal religious extremists, however, are challenging Indonesia's dominant moderate Muslim groups. A growing number of Indonesian Muslims now advocate the adoption of Islamic law, and dozens of provincial and district governments around the archipelago are taking advantage of the devolution of authority since 1998 to begin enforcing elements of Islamic civil law and customs.

Let me turn briefly to SOUTH ASIA. When I commented on the situation there last year, I warned that, despite a lessening of tensions between India and Pakistan, we remained concerned a dramatic provocation might spark another crisis.

This year I'm pleased to note that the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan has made steady progress. Building on Prime Minister Vajpayee's April 2003 "hand of friendship" initiative, the leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad have begun to lay a promising foundation for resolving their differences through peaceful dialogue.

Both countries have since made further progress in restoring diplomatic, economic, transportation, and communications links and--most importantly--both sides have agreed to proceed with a "composite" dialogue on a range of bilateral issues that include Kashmir.
Further progress will hinge largely on the extent to which each side judges that the other is sincere about improving India-Pakistan relations. For example, India is watching carefully to see whether the level of militant infiltration across the Line of Control (LOC) increases this spring after the snows melt in the mountain passes.

In this hemisphere, President Uribe of COLOMBIA is making great strides militarily and economically. Colombia's military is making steady progress against the illegal armed groups, particularly around Bogot?; last year the Army decimated several FARC military units. In the last two months, Colombian officials have apprehended the two most senior FARC leaders ever captured.

Foreign and domestic investors are taking note: last year, [2003] the growth rate of 3.5 percent was the highest in 5 years.
But some of Uribe's hardest work awaits him. The military has successfully cleared much of the insurgent-held territory, but the next stage of Uribe's "clear-and-hold" strategy is securing the gains thus far. That entails building the state presence--schools, police stations, medical clinics, roads, bridges, and social infrastructure--where it has scarcely existed before.

Finally, we should bear in mind that Uribe's opponents will adjust their strategies, as well. The FARC may increasingly seek to target US persons and interests in Colombia, particularly if key leaders are killed, captured, or extradited to the United States.

Drug gangs are also adapting, relocating coca cultivation and production areas and attacking aerial eradication missions. All of this translates into more money and more resources for traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary forces.
And in HAITI, the situation is, of course, extremely fluid at this moment. What continues to concern us is the possibility that the increasing violence will lead to a humanitarian disaster or mass migration. Forces opposed to the government control key cities in northern Haiti and they have identified Port-au-Prince as their next target. Those forces include armed gangs, former Haitian Army officers, and members of irregular forces who allegedly killed Aristide supporters during his exile.

Future battles could be bloody, as the armed opposition is arrayed against pro-government irregular forces equally disposed to violence. Moreover, food, fuel, and medical supplies already have been disrupted in parts of Haiti because of the fighting, making living conditions even worse for Haiti's many poor.
The government is looking for international help to restore order. Improving security will require the difficult tasks of disarming both pro- and anti-government irregulars and augmenting and retraining a national security force.
In SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, progress in continuing peace processes requires further careful Western cultivation and African regional cooperation.

In Liberia, UN peacekeepers and the transitional government face a daunting challenge to rein in armed factions, including remnants of Charles Taylor's militias.
Sudan's chances for lasting peace are its best in decades, with more advances possible in the short term, given outside guarantees and incentives.
A fragile peace process in Burundi and struggling transitional government in Congo (Kinshasa) have the potential to end conflicts that so far have claimed a combined total of over 3 million lives.
Tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their disputed border is jeopardizing the peace accord brokered by US officials in 2000.
THE OTHER TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
Let me conclude my comments this morning by briefly considering some important transnational concerns that touch on the war against terrorism.

We're used to thinking of that fight as a sustained worldwide effort to get the perpetrators and would-be perpetrator off the street. This is an important preoccupation, and we will never lose sight of it.

But places that combine desperate social and economic circumstances with a failure of government to police its own territory can often provide nurturing environments for terrorist groups, and for insurgents and criminals. The failure of governments to control their own territory creates potential power vacuums that open opportunities for those who hate.

We count approximately 50 countries that have such "stateless zones." In half of these, terrorist groups are thriving. Al-Qa`ida and extremists like the Taliban, operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, are well known examples.
As the war on terrorism progresses, terrorists will be driven from their safe havens to seek new hideouts where they can undertake training, planning, and staging without interference from government authorities. The prime candidates for new "no man's lands" are remote, rugged regions where central governments have no consistent reach and where socioeconomic problems are rife.

Many factors play into the struggle to eradicate stateless zones and dry up the wellsprings of disaffection.

Population trends. More than half of the Middle East's population is under the age of 22. "Youth bulges," or excessive numbers of unemployed young people, are historical markers for increased risk of political violence and recruitment into radical causes. The disproportionate rise of young age cohorts will be particularly pronounced in Iraq, followed by Syria, Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Infectious disease. The HIV/AIDS pandemic remains a global humanitarian crisis that also endangers social and political stability. Although Africa currently has the greatest number of HIV/AIDS cases--more than 29 million infected--the disease is spreading rapidly. Last year, I warned about rising infection rates in Russia, China, India, and the Caribbean. But the virus is also gaining a foothold in the Middle East and North Africa, where governments may be lulled into overconfidence by the protective effects of social and cultural conservatism.
Humanitarian need. Need will again outpace international pledges for assistance. Sub-Saharan Africa and such conflict-ravaged places like Chechnya, Tajikistan, and the Palestinian Occupied Territories will compete for aid against assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan. Only 40 percent of UN funding requirements for 2003 had been met for the five most needy countries in Africa.
Food insecurity. More than 840 million people are undernourished worldwide, a number that had fallen in the first half of the 1990s but in now on the increase. USDA estimates the food aid needed to meet annual recommended minimum nutrition levels at almost 18 million metric tons, far above the recent average of 11 million tons donated per annum.
And I'll take this opportunity to remind you, Mr. Chairman, of the continued threat the global narcotics industry poses to the United States.

As evident by the doubling of the Afghan opium crop in 2003, the narcotics industry is capable of moving quickly to take advantage of opportunities presented by the absence of effective government authority.
Although the linkages between the drug trade and terrorism are generally limited on a global basis, trafficking organizations in Afghanistan and Colombia pose significant threats to stability in these countries and constitute an important source of funding for terrorist activity by local groups.
This combination of flexibility and ability to undermine effective governmental institutions means that dealing with the narcotics challenge requires a truly global response.
And that, Mr. Chairman, concludes my formal remarks. I welcome any questions or comments you and the members may have for me.



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Source: CIA




RL32336 -- FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress


April 6, 2004


Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division

Todd Masse
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Domestic Social Policy Division




CONTENTS
Summary
Introduction
FBI Intelligence Reforms
Business Process Changes
The Intelligence Cycle
Centralized Headquarters Authority
Organizational Changes
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence
New Field Office Intelligence Groups
New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s)
Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services
Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors
More Intelligence Analysts
Revamped Intelligence Training
Improved Technology
More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI
Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and State and Local Officials
Issues for Congress
The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening FBI Intelligence
Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI's Intelligence Program
Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program
Skeptics Believe FBI's Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Can Overcome FBI's Lack of Intelligence Experience
Implementation Challenges
Technology
FBI Field Leadership
Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics
Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform
Changes in The Intelligence Cycle
Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce Desired Results?
Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate?
Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient?
Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate?
Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements
Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and With Other Agencies, Is Improving For Additional Reasons
Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling Signs on Sharing
Some State and Local Officials Also Remain Dissatisfied With Level of Sharing
Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing Procedures
Congressional Oversight Issues
Oversight Effectiveness
Eliminating Committee Term Limits
Consolidating Oversight Under the Intelligence Committees
Options
Option 1: Status Quo
Option 2: Creation of a National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI
Option 3: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to Department of Homeland Security
Option 4: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to the DCI
Option 5: Creation of a New Domestic Security Intelligence Service
Conclusion
Appendix 1: Definitions of Intelligence
Appendix 2: The FBI's Traditional Role in Intelligence
Appendix 3: The FBI's Intelligence Programs -- A Brief History
FBI Excesses
Oversight and Regulation: The Pendulum Swings
Appendix 4: The Case File as an Organizing Concept, and Implications for Prevention
Appendix 5: Past Efforts to Reform FBI Intelligence
Appendix 6: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
Appendix 7: Relevant Legal and Regulatory Changes
Footnotes




Summary
The Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has been criticized for failing to warn of the attacks of September 11, 2001. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism and September 11, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, singled out the FBI in a significant manner for failing to focus on the domestic terrorist threat; collect useful intelligence; analyze strategic intelligence; and to share intelligence internally and with other members of the Intelligence Community. The Joint Inquiry concluded that the FBI was seriously deficient in identifying, reporting on, and defending against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States.

The FBI is responding by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as crimes. The major component of this effort is restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements; and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence.


Reactions to these FBI reforms are mixed. Critics contend the reforms are too limited and have implementation problems. More fundamentally, they argue that the gulf between law enforcement and intelligence cultures is so wide, that the FBI's reforms, as proposed, are unlikely to succeed. They believe the FBI will remain essentially a reactive law enforcement agency, significantly constrained in its ability to collect and exploit effectively intelligence in preventing terrorist acts.

Supporters counter that the FBI can successfully address its deficiencies, particularly its intelligence shortcomings, and that the Director's intelligence reforms are appropriate for what needs to be done. They argue that the FBI is unique among federal agencies, because it supplies the critical ingredient to a successful war against terrorism in the U.S. -- unmatched law enforcement capabilities integrated with an improving intelligence program.

The congressional oversight role includes deciding on whether to accept, modify, or reject the FBI's intelligence reforms currently underway. Congress may consider several options, ranging from support of the FBI's current reforms, to establishing a stand-alone domestic intelligence service entirely independent of the FBI. Congress may also reevaluate how it conducts oversight of the FBI. Pending legislation on FBI intelligence reform includes, but is not limited to, S. 410, The Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003, and S. 1520, The 9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act.





Introduction (1)
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have been labeled as a major intelligence failure, similar in magnitude to that associated with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (2) In response to criticisms of its role in this failure, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has introduced a series of reforms to transform the Bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on criminal investigations into a more mobile, agile, flexible, intelligence-driven (3) agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.

FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III initiated changes that were sparked by congressional charges that the Intelligence Community (IC), (4) including the FBI, missed opportunities to prevent, or at least, disrupt the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism, the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, (5) (JIC) criticized the FBI for failing to focus on the terrorist threat domestically; collect useful intelligence; strategically analyze intelligence, (6) and to share intelligence internally, and with the rest of the IC. According to the congressional inquiry, the FBI was incapable of producing significant intelligence products, and was seriously handicapped in its efforts to identify, report on (7) and defend against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States. (8)


Observers believe successful FBI reform will depend in large measure on whether the FBI can strengthen what critics have characterized as its historically neglected and weak intelligence program, particularly in the area of strategic analysis. They contend the FBI must improve its ability to collect, analyze and disseminate domestic intelligence so that it can help federal, state and local officials stop terrorists before they strike. If the FBI is viewed as failing this fundamental litmus test, they argue, confidence in any beefed up intelligence program will quickly erode.

Critics contend the FBI's intelligence reforms are moving too slowly (9) and are too limited. (10) They argue that the FBI's deeply rooted law enforcement culture and its reactive practice of investigating crimes after the fact, (11) will undermine efforts to transform the FBI into a proactive agency able to develop and use intelligence to prevent terrorism (for a more detailed discussion of the FBI's reactive "case file" approach, see Appendix 4). While the British Security Service (MI-5) may or may not be an appropriate organizational model for U.S. domestic intelligence for myriad reasons, the primacy it accords to intelligence functions over law enforcement interests may be worthy of consideration. (12) In justifying their pessimism, critics cite two previous failed attempts by the FBI to reform its intelligence program (for a more detailed discussion, see Appendix 5).


Critics also question whether Director Mueller, who has an extensive background in criminal prosecution but lacks experience in the intelligence field, (13) sufficiently understands the role of intelligence to be able to lead an overhaul of the FBI's intelligence operation. (14)

Supporters counter that they believe the FBI can change, that its shortcomings are fixable, and that the Director's intelligence reforms are appropriate, focused and will produce the needed changes. (15) They also argue that a successful war against terrorism demands that law enforcement and intelligence are closely linked. And they maintain that the FBI is institutionally able to provide an integrated approach, because it already combines both law enforcement and intelligence functions. (16)

A major role for Congress is whether to accept, modify or reject the FBI's intelligence reforms. Whether lawmakers believe the FBI to be capable of meaningful reform, and the Director's reforms to be the correct ones, could determine whether they accept or modify his changes, or eliminate them altogether in favor of a new separate domestic intelligence agency entirely independent of the FBI, as some have advocated. (17)

This report examines the FBI's intelligence program and its reform. Specifically, the section covers a number of issues that Congress might explore as part of its oversight responsibilities, to develop and understanding of how well the FBI is progressing in its reform efforts. The following section outlines the advantages and disadvantages of several congressional options to make further changes to the FBI's intelligence program. (18) Finally, a number of appendices concerning contextual issues surrounding FBI intelligence reform are provided.


FBI Intelligence Reforms
The FBI is responding to the numerous shortcomings outlined by the JIC by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as criminal acts. The major component of this effort is the restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements; and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The FBI also has reallocated its resources in an effort to establish an effective and efficient intelligence program.

The reforms are intended to address the numerous perceived shortcomings, including those outlined by the JIC Inquiry, which concluded the FBI failed to


Focus on the domestic threat. "The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qaida and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States." (19)

Conduct all-source analysis. (20) "... The FBI's traditional reliance on an aggressive, case-oriented, law enforcement approach did not encourage the broader collection and analysis efforts that are critical to the intelligence mission. Lacking appropriate personnel, training, and information systems, the FBI primarily gathered intelligence to support specific investigations, not to conduct all-source analysis for dissemination to other intelligence agencies." (21)

Centralize a nationally-coordinated effort to gain intelligence on Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida. "... The FBI's 56 field offices enjoy a great deal of latitude in managing their work consistent with the dynamic and reactive nature of its traditional law enforcement mission. In counterterrorism efforts, however, that flexibility apparently served to dilute the FBI's national focus on Bin Laden and al-Qaida." (22)

Conduct counterterrorism strategic analysis. "Consistent with its traditional law enforcement mission, the FBI was, before September 11, a reactive, operationally-driven organization that did not value strategic analysis ... most (FBI consumers) viewed strategic analytical products as academic and of little use in ongoing operations." (23)

Develop effective information technology systems. The FBI relied upon "... outdated and insufficient technical systems...." (24)

Business Process Changes
In an attempt to transform and upgrade its intelligence program, the FBI is changing how it processes intelligence by formally embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a long-time practice followed by the rest of the IC. It also is centralizing control over its national security operations at FBI Headquarters.

The Intelligence Cycle. FBI is attempting to formalize and discipline its approach to intelligence by embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a process through which (1) intelligence collection priorities are identified by national level officials, (2) priorities are communicated to the collectors who collect this information through various human and national technical means, (3) the analysis and evaluation of this raw intelligence are converted into finished intelligence products,( 4) finished intelligence products are disseminated to consumers inside and outside the FBI and Department of Justice, and (5) a feedback mechanism is created to provide collectors, analysts and collection requirements officials with consumer assessment of intelligence value. (See Figure 1, below). To advance that effort, the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) has developed and issued nine so-called concepts of operations, which essentially constitute a strategic plan identifying those areas in which changes must be made. These changes are seen as necessary if the FBI is to successfully establish an effective intelligence program that is both internally coordinated and integrated with its Intelligence Community counterparts.

Source: http://www.fbi.gov/, as altered by the Congressional Research Service


The FBI also is trying to improve and upgrade its functional capabilities at each step along the cycle. Success may turn, in part, on the performance of the new Office of Intelligence, which has the responsibility to "... manage and satisfy needs for the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence" within the FBI and to ensure requirements "levied on the FBI by national, international, state and local agencies" are met. (25)
FBI officials say their objective is to better focus intelligence collection against terrorists operating in the U.S. through improved strategic analysis that can identify gaps in their knowledge. As will be addressed later in the "Issues for Congress" section, the FBI faces numerous challenges as it formalizes its activities in each element of the intelligence cycle.

Centralized Headquarters Authority. Following September 11, Director Mueller announced that henceforth, the FBI's top three priorities would be counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime, respectively. (26) He signaled his intention to improve the FBI's intelligence program by, among other measures, consolidating and centralizing control over fragmented intelligence capabilities, both at FBI Headquarters and in the FBI's historically autonomous field offices. (27) He restated that intelligence had always been one of the FBI's core competencies (28) and organic to the FBI's investigative mission, (29) and asserted that the organization's intelligence efforts had and would continue to be disciplined by the intelligence cycle of intelligence requirements, collection, analysis, and dissemination.


Organizational Changes
The FBI is restructuring to support an integrated intelligence program. The FBI director has also created new intelligence-related positions and entities at FBI Headquarters and across its 56 field offices to improve its intelligence capacity.

New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence. As part of his effort to centralize control, Director Mueller established a new position -- the EAD-I. (30) The EAD-I manages a single intelligence program across the FBI's four investigative/operational divisions -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber. Previously, each division controlled and managed its own intelligence program. To emphasize its new and enhanced priority, the Director also elevated intelligence from program support to full program status, and established a new Office of Intelligence (OI). The OI is responsible for implementing an integrated FBI-wide intelligence strategy, developing an intelligence analyst career path, and ensuring that intelligence is appropriately shared within the FBI as well as with other federal agencies. (31) The Office also is charged with improving strategic analysis, implementing an intelligence requirements and collection regime, and ensuring that the FBI's intelligence policies are implemented. Finally, the office oversees the FBI's participation in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). (32)

The OI, headed by an Assistant Director who reports to the EAD-I, is comprised of six units: (1) Career Intelligence (works to develop career paths for intelligence analysts), (2) Strategic Analysis (provides strategic analyses to senior level FBI executives), (3) Oversight (oversees field intelligence groups), (4) Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management (establishes and implements procedures to manage the FBI intelligence process), (5) Administrative Support, and (6) Executive Support. (33)

New Field Office Intelligence Groups. The FBI has established field intelligence groups in each of its 56 field offices to raise the priority of intelligence and ultimately to drive collection, analysis and dissemination at the local level. Each field intelligence group is responsible for managing, executing and coordinating their local intelligence resources in a manner which is consistent with national priorities. (34) A field intelligence group is comprised of intelligence analysts, (35) who conduct largely tactical analyses; special agents, who are responsible for intelligence collection; and reports officers, a newly created position. (36) Reports officers are expected to play a key role by sifting raw, unevaluated intelligence and determining to whom it should be disseminated within the FBI and other federal agencies for further processing.

With regard to counterintelligence, which is any intelligence about the capabilities, intent, and operations of foreign intelligence services, or those individuals or organizations operating on behalf of foreign powers, working against the U.S., the FBI has established six field demonstration projects led by experienced FBI retirees. These teams are responsible for assessing intelligence capabilities at six individual field offices and making recommendations to correct deficiencies. (37)

New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s). In July 2002, the FBI established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), which coordinates its nation-wide network of 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). (38) The NJTTF also coordinates closely with the FBI's newly established Counterterrorism Watch, a 24-hour operations center, which is responsible for tracking terrorist threats and disseminating information about them to the JTTFs, to the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Operations Center and, indirectly, to state and local law enforcement. CT Watch is located at the FBI's 24-hour Strategic Intelligence Operations Center (SIOC). (39) With respect to regional JTTFs, the Bureau has increased their number from 66 to 84, and the number of state and local participants has more than quadrupled -- from 534 to over 2,300, according to the FBI.

Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center. President Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union address announced the establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which is to issue threat assessments based on all-source intelligence analysis. (40) The TTIC is a joint venture comprised of a number of federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities, and is directed by a CIA-named official, and a deputy director named by the FBI.

The Center, formally established in May 2003, employs 150, eight of whom are FBI analysts. When fully operational, in May 2004, the Center anticipates employing 300 professionals, approximately 65 (22%) of whom will come from FBI ranks. Of 300 total staff, 56 are expected to be strategic analysts.

New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services. As will be discussed in more detail below, the FBI has been criticized for failing to effectively share information with numerous consumer sets, including other members of the Intelligence Community, and state and local law enforcement authorities. In order to address these concerns Director Mueller established the EAD for Law Enforcement Services and under this new position, created an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. Staffed by a former state police chief, the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, working with the Office of Intelligence, ensures that relevant information is shared, as appropriate, with state and local law enforcement.


Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
There are numerous changes the FBI has made or is in the process of making to realize its intelligence goals. With the support of Congress, the FBI's budget has increased almost 50% since September 11, from $3.1 billion in FY2000 to $4.6 billion in FY2004. (41) The recently proposed FBI budget for FY2005 is $5.1 billion, including an increase of at least $76 million for intelligence and intelligence-related items. (42) According to Maureen Baginski, EAD for Intelligence, this year the FBI plans to hire 900 intelligence analysts, mostly in FBI field offices. (43) With the existing infusion of resources, the FBI is beefing up its intelligence-related staff, as well as functions which are integral to intelligence -- such as intelligence training, language translation, information technology, and intelligence sharing.

More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors. The FBI has increased the number of field agents it is devoting to its three top priorities -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), (44) in FY2004 the FBI allocated 36% of its agent positions to support Director Mueller's top the three priorities -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime -- up from 25% in FY2002. This represents an increase of approximately 1,395 agent positions, 674 of which were permanently reprogrammed from existing FBI drug, white collar, and violent crime programs. (45) From a recruitment perspective, the FBI recently established "intelligence" as a "critical skill need" for special agent recruitment. (46)

More Intelligence Analysts. The FBI estimates that of the 1,156 analysts employed as of July 2003, 475 of them were dedicated to counterterrorism analysis. (47) Prior to September 11, the FBI employed 159 counterterrorism analysts. (48) The FBI requested and received an additional 214 analytical positions as part of its FY2004 funding. (49) As mentioned above, in calendar year 2004, the FBI intends to hire 900 analysts, many of whom will be stationed across its 56 field offices. In an effort to convey that the FBI is attaching greater importance to the role analysts play, the Office of Intelligence has signaled to the FBI that analysts have a valid and valuable role to play within the organization. (50) The FBI, for the first time, is also attempting to establish a dedicated career path for its intelligence analysts, and for the purposes of promotion is now viewing its three types of analysts (formerly the Intelligence Research Specialists and Intelligence Operations Specialists, with the addition of a new category of employee, Reports Officers) all as generic intelligence analysts. As will be discussed more in-depth below, theoretically, all intelligence analysts, whether assigned to Headquarters or to a field office, will have promotion potential to the grade of GS-15 (non-managerial). Until now, generally, at the non-managerial level, analysts assigned to Headquarters had a promotion potential to the GS-14 level, and those in the field were only allowed to reach the GS-12 level. New recruitment standards, including the elimination of a requirement for a bachelor's degree (51) and a new cognitive ability testing process, have been developed.

Revamped Intelligence Training. (52) The FBI is revamping its training to reflect the role of intelligence. The FBI has revised its new agent training, established a College of Analytical Studies to train both new and more experienced analysts and has plans to re-engineer its overall training program. (53)

Specifically, the FBI is providing more intelligence training for new special agents. New special agents undertake a 17 week, 680 hour training program when they enter the FBI. The amount of time agents devote to studying National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) topics (54) -- principally Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism (55) -- in new agent training has increased from 28 hours (4.1% of total training) to 80 hours (11.8% of total training). (56) As part of this updated 680 hour curriculum for new agents, the FBI has instituted a two-hour block of training devoted solely to intelligence. Notwithstanding these changes, FBI officials recognize they have made relatively little progress in integrating intelligence into all aspects of new agent training.

The new training is intended to expose new employees to the intelligence cycle -- requirements, collection, analysis, reporting and dissemination -- and to how intelligence advances national security goals. Agents also are taught how to use strategic and tactical analysis effectively. (57)

All new analysts, or those new to the analytical function, are required to take an introductory analytical training course when they assume analytical responsibilities at the FBI. Historically, the curriculum for this course -- recently renamed the Analytical Cadre Education Strategy-I (ACES) so as to be "... more descriptive and create a positive image for the training effort" (58) -- included a substantial amount of time dedicated to orienting the new analyst to the FBI. According to FBI officials, this course has recently been re-engineered to focus more directly on intelligence, asset vetting, reporting writing, the Intelligence Community, and various analytical methodologies. According to FBI officials, more advanced intelligence analysis courses -- ACES II -- are in development.

Finally, the FBI plans to enhance training standardization and efficiency by consolidating all training in the FBI's Training Division. Historically, the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program has developed and provided its own substantive intelligence training programs. FBI analysts are also encouraged to avail themselves of the many geographic and functional analytic courses taught by other elements of the Intelligence Community.

Improved Technology. The FBI says it recognizes the critical importance of improving its antiquated information technology system, (59) so that it can more effectively share information both internally and with the rest of the Intelligence Community, and Director Mueller has made it one of his top ten priorities. But the FBI's technological center-piece -- the three-stage Trilogy Project -- continues to suffer from delays and cost overruns. Although the FBI has installed new hardware and software, and established local and wide area communications networks, (60) Trilogy's third, and perhaps most important component -- the Virtual Case File system (intended to give analysts access to a new terrorism database containing 40 million documents, and generally an improved ease of information retrieval) -- remains behind schedule and over budget. (61)

More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI. In the wake of the 1960s domestic intelligence scandals (for further discussion, see Appendix 3) various protective "walls" were put in place to separate criminal and intelligence investigations. As a result of these walls, information sharing between the two sets of investigators was "sharply limited, overseen by legal mediators from the FBI and Justice Department, and subject to scrutiny by criminal courts and the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." (62) The FBI recently eliminated an internal barrier to communication by allowing its criminal and intelligence investigators to physically work together on the same squads. As part of a new so-called Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy (MCIS), all counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset like an intelligence or espionage investigation. (63)


Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and State and Local Officials. The FBI also has taken steps to improve its intelligence and information sharing with other federal agencies as well as with state and local officials. It has established an Executive Assistant for Law Enforcement Services, who is responsible for coordinating law enforcement with state and local officials through a new Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. The FBI also has increased dissemination of weekly intelligence bulletins to states and localities as part of an effort to educate and raise the general awareness of terrorism issues. And the FBI is increasing its use of the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System and the National Criminal Information Center databases to disseminate threat warnings and the identities of individuals the FBI has listed on its Terrorist Watch List. (64) Other information sharing enhancements -- each addressed earlier -- include increasing the number of JTTFs and establishing the new position of Reports Officer.


Issues for Congress
Assessing the effectiveness of the FBI's intelligence reforms raises several potential issues for Congress. These include


The FBI's new focus on centralized headquarters decision-making;

Implementation challenges, including those in each area of the Intelligence Cycle;

Adequacy of resources to support reforms; and

Congressional oversight.

The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening FBI Intelligence (65)
Some observers believe a major issue is whether the FBI's new centralized management structure will provide the organization with the requisite formal and informal authority to ensure that its intelligence priorities are implemented effectively and efficiently by FBI field offices. Historically, and particularly with respect to the FBI's law enforcement activities, field offices have had a relatively high degree of autonomy to pursue locally determined priorities. A related issue is whether FBI employees will embrace, or resist, FBI Headquarters' enhanced management role and its new emphasis on intelligence.

Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI's Intelligence Program. Supporters argue that a centralized management structure is an essential ingredient of a counterterrorism program, because it will enable the FBI to strengthen its intelligence program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve headquarters-field coordination.

According to proponents, FBI Director Mueller has centralized authority by making four principal structural changes. He has established (1) a new position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) created a new Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence program; (3) established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force; and (4) established intelligence units in each field office to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence to FBI Headquarters.

Supporters contend that by centralizing decision-making, the FBI will be able to address several critical weaknesses which the JIC Inquiry attributed to decentralized management. First, a central management structure will enable the FBI to more easily correlate intelligence, and thereby more accurately assess the presence of terrorists in the U.S. Second, the FBI will be able to strengthen its analysis capabilities, particularly with regard to strategic analysis, which is intended to provide a broader understanding of terrorist threats and terrorist organization. Third, FBI Headquarters will be able to more effectively fuse and share intelligence internally, and with other IC agencies. Finally, centralized decision-making will provide FBI Headquarters a means to enforce intelligence priorities in the field. Specifically, it provide a means for FBI Headquarters to ensure that field agents spend less time gathering information to support criminal prosecutions -- a legacy of the FBI's law enforcement culture -- and more time collecting and analyzing intelligence that will help prevent terrorist acts.

Supporters contend that employees are embracing centralized management and the FBI's new intelligence priorities, but caution it is premature to pronounce centralized management a success. Rather, they suggest that, "with careful planning, the commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, progress should be well along in three or four years," (66) but concede that, "we're a long way from getting there." (67)

Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program. Skeptics agree that if the FBI is to prevent terrorism, it must strengthen its intelligence program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve headquarters-field coordination. But they question whether centralizing decision-making at FBI Headquarters will enable the FBI to accomplish these goals, and they cite two principal factors which they suggest will undermine the impact of centralized decision making. They question whether any structural management changes can (1) change a vested and ingrained law enforcement culture, and (2) overcome the FBI's lack of intelligence experience and integration with the Intelligence Community.

Skeptics Believe FBI's Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making. Skeptics assert that the FBI's entrenched law enforcement culture will undermine its effort to establish an effective and efficient intelligence program by centralizing decision-making at FBI Headquarters. They point to the historical importance that the FBI has placed on convicting criminals -- including terrorists. But those convictions have come after the fact, and skeptics argue that the FBI will continue to encounter opposition within its ranks to adopting more subtle and somewhat unfamiliar intelligence methods designed to prevent terrorism. Former Attorney General Janet Reno, for example, reportedly "leaned toward closing down surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) if they hindered criminal cases." (68) As one observer said, "law enforcement and intelligence don't fit ... law enforcement always wins." (69)

Some observers speculate that one reason law enforcement priorities prevail over those of intelligence is because convictions that can disrupt terrorist planning in advance of an attack often are based on lesser charges, such as immigration violations. FBI field personnel therefore may conclude that they should focus more effort on prosecuting criminal cases that result in longer jail terms. (70) Observers also suggest that because of the importance attached to successful criminal prosecutions, to the extent intelligence is used, it will be used to support criminal investigations, rather than to learn more about potential counterterrorism targets. (71)

Skeptics are convinced that the FBI's law enforcement culture is too entrenched, and resistant to change, to be easily influenced by FBI Headquarters directives emphasizing the importance of intelligence in preventing terrorism. They cite the Gilmore Commission, which concluded:


... the Bureau's long-standing traditional organizational culture persuades us that, even with the best of intentions, the FBI cannot soon be made over into an organization dedicated to detecting and preventing attacks rather than one dedicated to punishing them. (72)
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Can Overcome FBI's Lack of Intelligence Experience. Skeptics assert that the FBI's inexperience in the intelligence area has caused it to misunderstand the role intelligence can play in preventing terrorism, and they question whether centralized decision-making can correct this deficiency.


Specifically, they contend the FBI does not understand how to collect intelligence about potential counterterrorism targets, and properly analyze it. Instead, skeptics argue that notwithstanding the FBI's current efforts to develop detailed collection requirements, FBI agents will likely continue to "gather" evidence to support criminal cases. Moreover, skeptics argue, the FBI will undoubtedly "run faster, and jump higher," in gathering even more information at the urging of FBI Headquarters to "improve" intelligence. (73) Missing, however, according to critics, is the ability to implement successfully a system in which intelligence is collected according to a strategically determined set of collection requirements that specifically target operational clandestine activity. These collection requirements in turn must be informed by strategic analysis that integrates a broader understanding of terrorist threats and known and (conceptually) unknown gaps in the FBI's intelligence base. Critics fear that FBI analysts, instead, will continue to spend the bulk of their time providing tactical analytic support to FBI operational units pursuing cases, rather than systematically and strategically analyzing all-source intelligence and FBI intelligence gaps.



Implementation Challenges
The FBI is likely to confront significant challenges in implementing its reforms. Its most fundamental challenge, some assert, will be to transform the FBI's deeply entrenched law enforcement culture, and its emphasis on criminal convictions, into a culture that emphasizes the importance that intelligence plays in counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Although observers believe that FBI Director Mueller is identifying and communicating his counterterrorism and intelligence priorities, they caution that effective reform implementation will be the ultimate determinant of success. The FBI, they say, must implement programs to recruit intelligence professionals with operational and analytical expertise; develop formal career development paths, including defined paths to promotion; and continue to improve information management and technology. These changes, they say, should be implemented in a timely fashion, as over two and a half years have passed since the attacks of September 11, 2001. They also contend the FBI must improve intelligence sharing within the FBI and with other IC agencies, and with federal, state and local agencies.

Technology. Inadequate information technology, in part, contributed to the FBI being unable to correlate the knowledge possessed by its components prior to September 11, according to the congressional joint inquiry. (74) GAO and the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports conclude that the FBI still lacks an enterprise architecture, a critical and necessary component, they argue, to successful IT modernization. (75) In addition to lacking an enterprise architecture plan, according to the GAO, the FBI has also not had sustained information technology leadership and management. To demonstrate this point, a recent GAO report found the FBI has had five Chief Information Officers in the last 2003-2004, and the current CIO is temporarily detailed to the FBI from the Department of Justice. (76)

One important manifestation of the FBI's historical problems with information management is the deleterious effects it has had on analysis. For numerous information technology reasons, it has historically been difficult for FBI analysts at Headquarters, whose primary responsibility is to integrate intelligence from open sources, FBI field offices and legal attaches, and other entities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, to retrieve in a timely manner intelligence which should be readily available to them. Among other factors, this is the result of lack of appropriate information management and technology tools and, to a lesser extent, the lack of uniform implementation of policies relating to information technology usage.

Technology alone is not, however, a panacea. Existing information technology tools must be uniformly used to be effective. One FBI official responsible for intelligence analysis stated before the Joint Inquiry that "... Information was sometimes not made available (to FBI Headquarters) because field offices, concerned about security or media leaks, did not upload their investigative results or restricted access to specific cases. This, of course, risks leaving the analysts not knowing what they did not know." (77)

As mentioned above, supporters say that Director Mueller recognizes the important role technology must play in his reforms, and that despite setbacks to the Trilogy technology upgrade, the Director is making important progress. (78) However, the third and arguably most important stage of the Trilogy technology update, the deployment of the aforementioned Virtual Case File system, did not meet its December 2003 deadline. Moreover, according to the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, as of January 2003, the FBI confirmed the Inspector General's assessment that an additional $138 million (over the then estimated requirement of $458 million) would be necessary to complete the Trilogy project. (79) This would bring the total cost of the Trilogy update to $596 million.


FBI Field Leadership. An important issue is whether the FBI's field leadership is able and willing to support Director Mueller's reforms. Critics argue that the lack of national security experience among the existing cadre of Special Agents-in-Charge (SACs) of the FBI's field offices represents a significant impediment to change. According to one former senior FBI official, "... over 90 percent of the SACs have very little national security experience ...." (80) He suggested that lack of understanding and experience would result in continued field emphasis on law enforcement rather than an intelligence approach to terrorism cases.

Supporters counter that Director Mueller has made it inalterably clear that his priorities are intelligence and terrorism prevention. Some SACs who have been uncomfortable with the new priorities have chosen to retire. But critics also contend that it will require a number of years of voluntary attrition before field leadership more attuned to the importance of intelligence is in place.

Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics. Another issue is whether the FBI is effectively implementing its reforms and has established appropriate benchmarks to measure progress. Critics assert that although the FBI developed various concepts of operations to improve its intelligence program, in many cases it lacks specific implementation plans and benchmarks. The Department of Justice Inspector General has recommended that "an implementation plan that includes a budget, along with a time schedule detailing each step and identifying the responsible FBI official" (81) be drafted for each concept of operations.

Supporters say that the FBI recognizes the need for specific implementation plans and is developing them. They cite as an example the implementation plan for intelligence collection management, almost half of which they estimate is in place. (82)

Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform. Prior to September 11, FBI analytic resources -- particularly in strategic analysis -- were severely limited. The FBI had assigned only one strategic analyst exclusively to Al-Qaeda prior to September 11. (83) Of its approximately 1,200 intelligence analysts, 66% were unqualified, according to the FBI's own assessment. (84) The FBI also lacked linguists competent in the languages and dialects spoken by radicals linked to Al-Qaeda. (85)

Some supporters argue that appropriate resources now are being allocated to reflect the FBI's new intelligence priorities. "Dollars and people are now flowing to the FBI's most critical needs ... This trend is clearly reflected in the FBI's requested resources for FY2004," (86) according to former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who said intelligence analytic support, particularly for counterterrorism, has improved substantially. (87) As mentioned above, the Department of Justice is requesting at least $76 million in support of intelligence and intelligence-related programs for FY2005.

Supporters of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform describe a "dramatic increase" in intelligence analysts, both at headquarters and in the field -- from 159 in 2001, to 347 planned in 2003, and that an initial cadre of about a dozen analysts is supporting TTIC . (88) Moreover, as mentioned above, the FBI intends to hire 900 intelligence analysts in 2004. Supporters also point to the Daily Presidential Threat Briefings the FBI drafts, and 30 longer-term analyses and a comprehensive national terrorist threat assessment that have been completed. (89) But even supporters caution that institutional change now underway at the FBI "does not occur overnight and involves major cultural change." (90) They estimate that with careful planning, the commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, the FBI's "transformation" will be well along in three to five years, though it will take longer to fully accomplish its goals. (91)

GAO presents a more mixed assessment. According to GAO: "The FBI has made substantial progress, as evidenced by the development of both a new strategic plan and a strategic human capital plan, as well as its realignment of staff to better address the new priorities." Notwithstanding this progress, however, the GAO concluded "...an overall transformation plan is more valuable..." than "cross walks" between various strategic plans. (92) GAO also reports that 70% of the FBI agents and 29 of the 34 FBI analysts who completed its questionnaire said the number of intelligence analysts was insufficient given the current workload and priorities. (93) As a result, many field agents said they have no choice but to conduct their own intelligence analysis. Despite a lack of analysts apparent before September 11, if not after, the FBI did not establish priority hiring goals for intelligence analysts until 2003. (94) According to GAO, the FBI was well on its way to meeting its target of 126 new analytic hires in 2003 -- having hired 115 or 91%. (95)

The mix of analytic hires also is critical. But, according to GAO, the FBI lacks a strategic human capital plan, making it difficult to determine whether the FBI is striking an effective balance in its analytic core. (96) It also is difficult to assess whether the FBI is providing sufficient institutional support, the appropriate tools, and incentive system for these resources to be harnessed effectively in pursuit of its priority national security missions-counterterrorism and counterintelligence.

Skeptics of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform argue -- and supporters concede -- that this is not the first time the FBI has singled out intelligence for additional resources. The FBI did so in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, only to allow those resources to revert to the FBI's traditional priorities -- violent and organized crime, drug trafficking, and infrastructure protection. Additional intelligence analysts also were hired, but they were viewed as poorly trained, limited in experience, and lacking in needed information technology tools. They also were easily diverted to support the FBI's traditional anti-crime operations, (97) even though efforts were made during the intervening years to protect resources intended to support the agency's national security efforts, including intelligence. (98)

Changes in The Intelligence Cycle. As the FBI attempts to formalize its intelligence cycle, it will likely face challenges in each element of the intelligence cycle. Incomplete or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from the overall system's effectiveness.

Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce Desired Results? The FBI's new Office of Intelligence is establishing an internal intelligence requirements mechanism that will be part of an integrated IC national requirements system. Supporters of establishing this mechanism maintain that the FBI has outlined a rational process for managing collection requirements. According to FBI officials, the FBI is developing for each of its investigative/operational programs a detailed set of priority intelligence collection requirements. These requirements will be disseminated to FBI field offices through a classified FBI Intranet.

Skeptics question whether the FBI can overcome its historic lack of experience with a disciplined foreign intelligence requirements process. The FBI, they argue, traditionally has viewed domestic collection of foreign intelligence as a low priority "collateral" function, unless it helped solve a criminal case. And dissemination of any domestically collected foreign intelligence tended to be ad hoc.

Skeptics point to four hurdles that the FBI may have trouble surmounting. First, given that traditional intelligence tasking from the Intelligence Community to the FBI has generally been vague and voluminous; the FBI, they say, must be able to strike a balance between directing its collectors to answer questions that are either too nebulous or too specific. Questions that are overly vague can go unanswered for lack of direction. On the other hand, collection requirements that are too specific risk reducing intelligence to a formulaic science, when most analysts would agree the intelligence discipline is more art than science. In the final analysis, while appropriately drafted intelligence collection requirements are an essential element in the intelligence cycle, there is no substitute for experienced intelligence professionals who are capable of successfully collecting intelligence in response to the requirements. Second, they say, the FBI will need to dedicate appropriate resources to managing a requirements process that could easily overwhelm Headquarters and field intelligence staff with overlapping and imprecise requests for intelligence collection. Third, they say, the FBI will have to significantly upgrade its cadre of strategic analysts, who will play a critical role in identifying intelligence gaps. Fourth, they say, the FBI will have to support its requirements process with incentives and disincentives for agent intelligence collectors so that requirements are fulfilled. Enhanced performance of the intelligence requirements process depends largely on the accumulated successes the FBI has in each of these areas. Incomplete or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from the overall system's effectiveness.

Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate? Both supporters and skeptics of the adequacy of FBI's reforms agree that collecting intelligence by penetrating terrorist cells is critical to disrupting and preventing terrorist acts. Supporters argue that the FBI has a long and successful history of such penetrations when it comes to organized crime groups, and suggest that it is capable of replicating its success against terrorist cells. They assert that the FBI has had almost a century of experience recruiting and managing undercover agents and informers, and that it long ago mastered collection techniques such as electronic surveillance and witness interviews. They also argue that the FBI can uniquely use both money and the threat of prosecution to induce cooperation in recruiting human source assets. (99) They also cite as evidence of the FBI's commitment to improving its human intelligence collection the organization's recent deployment of six teams to "...examine ways to expand the FBI's human intelligence base and to provide additional oversight." (100)

Skeptics are not so certain. They say recruiting organized crime penetrations differs dramatically from terrorist recruiting. As one former senior level intelligence official put it, "It's one thing to recruit Tony Soprano, yet quite another to recruit an al Qaeda operative." (101) This official was alluding to the fact that terrorist groups may have different motivations and support networks than organized crime groups. (102) Moreover, terrorist groups may be less willing than organized crime enterprises to accept as members or agents individuals who they have not known for years and are not members of the same ethnocentric groups, or whose bona fides are not directly supported by existing members of the group.

As alluded to above, skeptics also argue that while the FBI is good at gathering information, it has little experience collecting intelligence based on a policy driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements. (103) As one observer commented:


While the FBI correctly highlights its unmatched ability to gather evidence and with it information, there is nonetheless a National Security imperative which distinguishes intelligence collection from a similar, but different, function found in law enforcement. "Gathering" which is not driven [and] informed by specific, focused, National Security needs is not the same as "intelligence collection"... which means intelligence activities which are dictated by, and coupled to, a policy driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements. (104)
Critics assert that the FBI's criminal case approach to terrorism produces a vacuum cleaner approach to intelligence collection. The FBI, they say, continues to collect and disseminate interesting items from a river of intelligence when, instead, it should focus collection on those areas where intelligence indicates the greatest potential threat. (105) But critics contend that there are few evident signs that the FBI has adopted such an approach. "They are jumping higher, faster," but not collecting the intelligence they need, according to one critic. (106) As a result, critics maintain, the process turns on serendipity rather than on a focused, directed, analytically driven requirements process. Another observer put it this way:


Using the metaphor "finding the needle in the haystack," since September 11 government agencies have been basically adding more hay to the pile, not finding needles. Finding the needles requires that we undertake more focused, rigorous and thoughtful domestic intelligence collection and analysis not collect mountains of information on innocent civilians.
(107)
Skeptics also question whether the FBI is prepared to recruit the type of individual needed to effectively collect and analyze intelligence. The FBI's historic emphasis on law enforcement has encouraged and rewarded agents who gather as many facts as legally possible in their attempt make a criminal case. Because a successful case rests on rules of criminal procedure, the FBI draws largely from the top talent in state and local law enforcement agencies, and the military; in short, some say, those individuals who focus on discrete facts rather than on the connections between them. (108)

Perhaps as fundamental to the collection of more targeted human intelligence is the implementation of a formal asset vetting program to assess the validity and credibility of human sources, according to informed observers, who note that only three to four percent of the FBI's human assets are vetted. (109) They point out the failure to effectively vet its human assets has contributed to serious problems in the FBI's criminal and national foreign intelligence programs. (110)

Supporters contend that the FBI is currently implementing its national intelligence collections requirements concept of operations, and so it may be premature to assess effectiveness. Critics contend, however, that it remains unclear what specific performance metrics the FBI is employing to measure the effectiveness of its collection. They say that when asked to assess its performance in the war on terrorism, the FBI continues to cite arrests and convictions of suspected terrorists. (111) They further contend that the FBI rarely cites the number of human sources recruited who have provided information essential to counterterrorism or counterintelligence as a performance metric. (112)

Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient? Some observers contend that the FBI has made notable progress in professionalizing its analytical program since September 11, and, indeed, over the past two decades. During this period, they assert that the FBI's analytic cadre, particularly at Headquarters, has evolved from a disjointed group of less than qualified individuals into a group of professionals which understands the role analysis plays in advancing national security investigations and operations. The majority of intelligence analysts at Headquarters possesses advanced degrees and has expert knowledge in various functional and geographic areas. Over the last two decades, they also cite the FBI's progress in internally promoting analysts to analytic management positions.

Supporters of Director Mueller's reforms also point to the new Office of Intelligence, and maintain that it is implementing a number of initiatives focused on improving the quality of analysis. They include a new promotion plan that will provide analysts GS-15 promotion opportunities (they now are capped at GS-14); new career development plans; an increased flexibility to continue working in their areas of expertise or to rotate to other functional, geographic or management positions; improved mid-career training; and improved and more standardized recruitment practices. They assert that these efforts will improve retention rates, a chronic problem. (113)

Critics, however, remain largely unpersuaded and argue that analysis remains a serious FBI vulnerability in the war on terrorism. The Congressional Joint Inquiry on September 11 urged the FBI, among other steps, to


... significantly improve strategic analytical capabilities by assuring qualification, training, and independence of analysts coupled with sufficient access to necessary information and resources. (114)
Although they applaud the FBI's new focus on analysis, critics question its effectiveness and point to a number of trends. For example, they cite the continuing paucity of analysts in the FBI's senior national security ranks, even more than two years after the September 11 attacks. This, they say, reflects the FBI's continuing failure to treat analysis as a priority and more fundamentally to understand how to leverage analysis in the war on terror. (115) They also point to the FBI's own internal study that found 66 percent of its analytic corps unqualified and question whether the FBI's changes are sufficiently broad to address this legacy problem. (116)

Critics support the new GS-15 promotion plan, but contend that implementation is lacking and that it falls short of senior executive service promotion which they advocate. (117) According to an FBI official, there are currently no FBI intelligence analysts at the non-managerial GS-15 grade level. They also are concerned that the FBI has eliminated the requirement that all new intelligence analysts possess a minimum of a bachelor's degree, and substituted instead a less rigorous requirement, in their view, of one year of analytic experience, or military or law enforcement employment. They insist that a bachelor's degree provides more formal and necessary academic training in research methodologies, written and oral communication and critical thinking. Moreover, according to some critics, the collapsing of all functional and cross-disciplinary analysts into one intelligence analyst position encourages a "one size fits all" approach to analysis that may undermine a need for functional, geographic and target-specific expertise. (118)


Finally, critics are concerned that although the FBI says it is trying to strengthen strategic analysis, it is failing to commit adequate resources. The new Office of Intelligence has a Strategic Intelligence Unit, but more in name only, according to some observers. Few analysts have been assigned to the unit, and those who have are being forced to balance management and executive briefing responsibilities with actually conducting strategic analysis. Further complicating the situation is the fact that tactical and strategic analysts still physically located in each of the FBI's operational divisions are now "matrixed" to the Office of Intelligence. That is, they report both to their own divisions and to the Office of Intelligence. Therefore, they potentially confront competing priorities -- analysis largely composed of briefing materials to support FBI executives, and tactical analyses to support ongoing cases. (119)

Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate? The FBI continues to be criticized for not sharing information -- a failure that variously has been blamed on a variety of shortcomings, including culture, an absence of information sharing strategy, technological problems, and legal and policy constraints. Some of the legal and policy constraints were eliminated by the USA PATRIOT Act. (120) And more recently, by a decision to allow criminal and intelligence investigators to work side by side. (121)

FBI supporters give the FBI high marks since the September 11th attacks for sharing threat information, building information bridges to the intelligence agencies and state and local law enforcement, collaborating with foreign law enforcement components, and opening itself up to external reviewers. (122) But even supporters believe that maintaining this commendable record will be a continuing management challenge, one which will require constant reinforcement. (123) They emphasize that the traditional values of FBI agents as independent and determined must give way to include values of information sharing and cooperation. (124)

Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements. Supporters argue that perhaps the most significant change -- a sea change, according to some -- is a recent decision to tear down the organizational wall that has separated criminal and intelligence investigations since the spying scandals of the 1960s. (125) As a result, criminal and intelligence investigators will now physically work as part of the same squads on terrorism investigations. All counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset like intelligence or espionage investigations, allowing investigators to more easily use secret warrants and other methods that are overseen by the surveillance court and are unavailable in traditional criminal probes. The FBI was able to do so as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act, which allows counterterrorism intelligence and criminal information to be more easily shared within the FBI. (126)

Supporters blame Congress for creating the wall in the first place. They assert that in the wake of the 1960s spy scandals, Congress weakened the FBI's domestic intelligence capabilities by imposing stricter standards. The result, they argue, was a dangerous lack of intelligence sharing. (127) According to the FBI, the recent change has resulted in the disruption of at least four terrorist attacks overseas and the uncovering of a terrorist sleeper cell in the United States. (128)

Although these changes undoubtedly will improve intelligence sharing between FBI's criminal and intelligence components, the question remains whether the information will be shared with other agencies and state and local law officials. Some critics do not dispute that Director Mueller's decision will enhance intelligence sharing within the FBI. They agree it will. Rather, they are concerned that more innocent people will become the targets of clandestine surveillance. (129)

Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and With Other Agencies, Is Improving For Additional Reasons. Advocates assert intelligence sharing, both internally and with other agencies is improving for other reasons -- the FBI is better training its personnel and providing them with improved sharing processes. In addition, they point to the FBI's new concept of operations for intelligence dissemination that collapses a number of current and different production processes into a single one that will be imbedded throughout the FBI. (130) Supporters also point favorably to Director Mueller's decision to establish the position of "Reports Officers," whose responsibility will be to extract pertinent intelligence from FBI collection and analysis and disseminate it to the widest extent possible. Supporters who believe that sharing with state and local authorities has improved point out that since September 11, the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are the principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law enforcement officials, has increased from 66 in 2001 to 84 in 2003. The number of state and local participants has more than quadrupled from 534 to over 2,300, according to the FBI.

Supporters also finally embrace Director Mueller for correctly emphasizing technology that emphasizes horizontal, rather than vertical, flow of information to produce better results. Director Mueller asserts that, "Our move to change the technology in the next two or three years will have a dramatic impact on the way we do business -- eliminating a lot of the bureaucratic hang-ups, giving the agents the tools they need to be interactive, pass among themselves the best ways of doing things and we will free up the FBI in a substantial number of ways." (131)

Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling Signs on Sharing. The FBI concedes that although it "... has always been a great collector of information," its "sharing of information was primarily case oriented rather than part of an enterprise wide activity." (132) Critics point to a number of troubling signs that they claim indicate continuing problems. According to the Gilmore Commission, the Federal government is far from perfecting a system of sharing national security intelligence and other information. Moreover, the flow of information remains largely one way -- from the local and state levels to the FBI. The prevailing view, according to the Commission, continues to be that the Federal Government likes to receive information but is reluctant to share it completely. One local law enforcement official said the FBI's intelligence sharing practices remain essentially unchanged since September 11. This official suggested that the FBI shares a great volume of threat information, but little of real value that would help state and local officials prevent terrorist attacks. (133) Another state office said, "We don't get anything (of value) from the FBI." (134)

Some skeptics argue that technology problems notwithstanding, willingness to share intelligence, both within the FBI and with other Intelligence Community agencies, remains a continuing problem. According to a recent report issued by the Markle Foundation, there has been only marginal improvement in the past year in the sharing of terrorist-related information between relevant agencies, including the FBI. The report states that sharing remains haphazard and still overly dependent on the ad hoc network of personal relations among known colleagues. It is not the result of a carefully considered network architecture that optimizes the abilities of all of the players, according to the report. (135)

The Markle report argues that the existing system of counterterrorism information sharing remains too centralized, federal government-centric, and bound by increasingly tenuous distinctions in U.S. regulations and law regarding domestic and foreign intelligence. (136) In order to combat a decentralized terrorist threat more effectively, Markle recommends a model of information sharing which runs counter to the existing "hub and spoke" information sharing model the FBI is building. Advocates envision a decentralized "peer-to-peer" network in which the various federal, state, local and private sector entities systematically collecting information relevant to counterterrorism, and according to established guidelines protecting civil liberties and privacy, share that information directly with one another. (137)

The Department of Justice's Office of Inspector General, recently reported that despite progress in terrorism information sharing, the FBI faces considerable impediments in establishing an effective information and intelligence sharing program, including changes to information technology constraints, ongoing analytical weaknesses, agency origination control procedures, (138) and lack of "... established policies and procedures that delineate the appropriate processes to be used to share information and intelligence, either internally or externally." (139)

Some State and Local Officials Also Remain Dissatisfied With Level of Sharing. Some state and local law enforcement officials continue to criticize what they characterize as FBI's continuing unwillingness to share intelligence, while expecting state and local law officials to share their information with them. Nevertheless, some state and local law enforcement officials concede that there has been some improvement in the sharing relationship since September 11. And there also is a growing recognition among some state and local law enforcement officials that "... there may be a mis-perception that the FBI has more detailed accurate or confirmed information than it actually has." (140)

While acknowledging some improvement, these officials insist the exchange of information remains largely one-way. (141) And although that hasn't prevented them from participating in their local JTTFs, one official said he believed that the FBI did not consider him an intelligence consumer. (142) According to another, the FBI has shared information through the JTTF but made clear it was doing so because "...he has a right to know, but not a need to know," and that the FBI told him not to share the information with anyone else in law enforcement or state government, including the governor, who, he said, possesses a Top Secret clearance. (143)

Some state and local law enforcement officials complain that although JTTFs are intended to be joint enterprises, combining federal, state and local law enforcement resources, they characterize the relationship as more of one of "co-habitation" where the FBI clearly is in charge and non-federal representatives are viewed as second tier participants, despite often having greater knowledge of a particular case. (144)

With respect to the case-orientation and law enforcement bias so often mentioned as challenges for the FBI as it shifts to having a more preventative bias, state and local law enforcement officials stated that notwithstanding recognition by FBI leadership that the "intelligence is in the case," the FBI agent on the street still starts with a case and has a bias in the direction of law enforcement. Moreover, one senior state law enforcement official stated that FBI leadership is "... still being led by individuals who have a criminal law mindset." (145)

Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing Procedures. Some state and local law enforcement officials are sufficiently displeased with the current sharing relationship that they have proposed that the Department of Homeland Security establish regional intelligence centers through which classified raw and finished foreign intelligence on terrorism could be disseminated. (146) The centers would be staffed by a cadre of Top Secret-cleared personnel drawn principally from State Police and State DHS Offices and would serve as "... regional repository and clearinghouse for terrorist related information gathered at the federal level, consisting of trends, indicators, and warnings." (147) Through a pending arrangement with the DHS, Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), the goal would be to "... create a national pipeline for pattern and trend analysis of terrorism intelligence," (148) at the state level. DHS has not acted on the proposal. (149)


Congressional Oversight Issues
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives each established intelligence oversight committees in the 1970s. The catalyst for the creation of these committees was public revelations resulting from press coverage and congressional investigations that the Intelligence Community had conducted covert assassination attempts against foreign leaders, and collected information concerning the political activities of some U.S. citizens during the late 1960s and early 1970s. (150) Intelligence Committee Members are selected by the majority and minority leadership of each chamber of Congress, and serve terms of eight years on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and six years on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Terms limited were established so that a greater number of Members could become knowledgeable on intelligence matters over time. Membership rotation was also viewed as the best way to maintain a flow of new ideas. Committee membership was also structured so that Members serving on other committees with interests in intelligence issues -- the Appropriations, Armed Services, Judiciary, and Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate) and Committee on International Relations (House) -- would be represented. Finally, in the Senate, the majority was given a one-vote, rather than a proportional margin, to ensure bipartisanship. The House apportions its membership using the traditional proportional method.

One oversight issue is whether the current congressional structure is sufficiently focused to monitor effectively the FBI's intelligence reforms. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI has been criticized for failing to more effectively collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence. The congressional committees principally responsible for conducting FBI oversight -- the Intelligence, Judiciary and Appropriations Committees -- on the other hand, have been subject to little or no criticism. (151) Some critics argue that those responsible for conducting oversight should be held accountable as well. They have questioned the diligence of the committees and, in the case of the Intelligence Committees, the committees' structure. (152)

Ellen Laipson, former director of the National Intelligence Council (1997-2002) suggests while the balance between intelligence collection and analysis is unlikely to be corrected soon:


What are needed are more radical steps to dismantle the bloated bureaucratic behavior of the large agencies and retool most employees to contribute more directly to the intelligence mission. The fault lies both with Congress and with the intelligence community's bureaucrats. This is not an argument for less collection, but perhaps less collection management, less complicated requirements process, and more priority given to a workforce whose productivity is measured in terms of output, of more useful processing of data, and creation of more analytic product. It seems that even the best intentioned intelligence community leaders cannot effect this change alone; a serious push by the oversight process and the senior customers must take place.
(153)
At the same time, GAO recommends that continuous internal and independent external, monitoring and oversight are essential to help ensure that the implementation of FBI reforms stays on track and achieves its purpose. "It is important for Congress to actively oversee the proposed transformation." (154)

Oversight Effectiveness. According to Representative David Obey, congressional oversight, at times, has been "miserable."


I've been here 33 years and I have seen times when Congress exercised adequate oversight, with respect to [the FBI], and I've seen times when I thought Congress' actions in that regard were miserable ... I can recall times when members of the committee seemed to be more interested in getting the autographs of the FBI director than they were in doing their job asking tough questions. And I don't think the agency was served by that any more than the country was. And I hope that over the next 20 years we'll see a much more consistent and aggressive oversight of the agency, because your agency does have immense power. (155)
Some observers agree, and have singled out the oversight exercised by the two congressional intelligence committees for particular criticism. According to Loch Johnson, a former congressional staff member and intelligence specialist at the University of Georgia, "They [the intelligence committees] didn't press hard enough [with regard to 9/11]. There's all the authority they need. They didn't press hard enough [for change]." Another observer commented, "They should be held as accountable as the intelligence agencies." (156)

Some Members of Congress, however, contend that the congressional committees have their limits. "Our job is to see that the agencies are focused on the right problems as we think them to be and they have the capabilities to meet those mission requirements," former Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham is reported to have said. (157) One of Graham's predecessors seems to agree. "We can legislate, but there is little we can do to compel compliance," according to a press account of former Chairman Senator Richard Shelby, who said the committees face an unacceptable choice from a security standpoint when it comes to fencing spending in an effort to force change. (158)

"As you examine the record, you will discover numerous examples of complete disregard for congressional direction, not to mention the law." Shelby is reported to have said. But as one Senate aide pointed out, "When you're in the middle of a war on terror, holding money back from the Intelligence Community -- that's the problem." (159)

Eliminating Committee Term Limits. Some have suggested that the current eight-year cap on intelligence committee service be eliminated. Critics of the term limits argue that members often are just beginning to grasp the complexities of the Intelligence Community by the time their term ends. "I was at a peak of my knowledge and ability to carry out effective oversight," Graham, who already had received a two-year extension of his eight-year term when he had to leave the committee at the end of the 107th Congress in 2002 is quoted as saying. (160)

Critics also argue that term limits, although seen as a well-intentioned efforts to prevent to members from becoming co-opted by the Intelligence Community, have outlived whatever usefulness they may have had. The community, they assert, has become technically so complex that effective oversight requires members who are knowledgeable and well-versed in its intricacies. Term limits work against that goal by robbing the committee of institutional memory, knowledge and expertise. That outcome can only be avoided if members are permitted to serve on an open-ended basis; of all congressional committees, only the intelligence committees are term-limited.

Supporters of term limits argue that the eight-year cap still effectively prevents Members of Congress from becoming too close to the Intelligence Community -- including the FBI; and this remains an important objective given the sensitive role the Intelligence Community plays in a democracy. Term limits, supporters argue, also provide exposure to the arcane world of intelligence to a greater number of members. Finally, they argue, by ensuring a stream of new members with relatively little experience in intelligence, term limits bring more new ideas to the table.

Consolidating Oversight Under the Intelligence Committees. Some observers argue that Congress could more effectively oversee the FBI's intelligence operation if the joint jurisdiction now exercised by the intelligence and judiciary committees was eliminated, and the sole responsibility given to the intelligence committees. They concede, however, that such an outcome could result only if a stand-alone collection and analysis entity, was separate and became independent from the FBI, effectively removing the rationale for judiciary committee oversight. In recommending such an outcome, they at least imply that the intelligence committees would bring a more focused oversight expertise to judging the effectiveness of domestic intelligence analysis, collection and dissemination. They further suggest that putting the intelligence committees in charge would provide an even better mechanism for protecting civil liberties than do "current structure and processes." (161)

However, opponents of consolidation argue that the intelligence committees are ill-quipped to focus on questions of civil liberties in connection with a domestic intelligence agency. They also could argue that the sensitivity of such issues requires the transparency that comes with regular public hearings. The intelligence committees, by contrast, conduct the majority of their work behind closed doors.


Options
The debate over Congressional options on FBI reform centers on two fundamentally opposing views on how best to prevent terrorist acts and other clandestine foreign intelligence activities directed against the United State before they occur. Adherents to one school of thought believe there are important synergies to be gained from keeping intelligence and law enforcement functions combined as they are currently under the FBI. They argue that the two disciplines share the goal of terrorism prevention; that prevention within the U.S. will invariably require law enforcement to arrest and prosecute alleged terrorists; and, that the decentralized nature of terrorist cells is analogous to that of organized crime. (162)

A second school of thought counters that the chasm between the exigencies of the two disciplines, both cultural and practical, is simply too broad to effectively bridge, and, therefore, that the two should be bureaucratically separated.

These two opposing views raise several options for Congress, including the following:


Option 1: Support Director Mueller's reform package.

Option 2: Create a semi-autonomous National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI.

Option 3: Establish a separate domestic intelligence agency within the Department of Homeland Security.

Option 4: Establish a separate domestic intelligence agency under the authority of the DCI, but subject to oversight of the Attorney General.

Option 5: Create an entirely new stand-alone domestic intelligence service.

Option 1: Status Quo
Under this option Congress would continue to support Director Mueller's reforms with necessary funding. Proponents of this could argue that Director Mueller's reforms constitute the most effective way to address weaknesses and improve the FBI's intelligence program, and ultimately, to prevent terrorism in the U.S. They could also argue that the reforms accomplish three important and inter-related goals. First, the FBI would continue to benefit from the synergies that integrated intelligence-law enforcement provides in the war on terror. Second, by keeping the intelligence program within the FBI and under the watchful eye of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General would be better able to reassure the American people that the FBI's use of intelligence will not be allowed to infringe on their civil liberties. Third, the reforms would improve the FBI's intelligence capabilities, while minimizing the bureaucratic disruption, confusion and resource constraints that would result if the FBI's intelligence program were re-established in a new stand-alone entity separate from the FBI. More specifically, they could maintain that Director Mueller's changes are improving day-to-day collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.

Opponents to this option could counter that the reforms are necessary but insufficient. While applauding Director Mueller's new focus on the intelligence, some could contend that his reforms are too limited and that intelligence still and always will be, undermined by its arguably second-class status in an FBI that has long been proud of its law enforcement culture. They could cite past instances when additional resources were provided to the FBI's intelligence program, only later to be siphoned off to support criminal priorities. Or, they could also go further, arguing that the disciplines of intelligence and law enforcement are so different that they must be separated, and the FBI's intelligence program housed in and directed by a new agency.


Option 2: Creation of a National Security Intelligence Service within the FBI
Under this option, Congress could establish a semi-autonomous national security intelligence service (NSIS) within the FBI, and provide it with sufficient staff and protected resources. The service would have its own budget to ensure sustainable resources. The service's principal responsibility would be to develop and nurture an integrated intelligence program, and to establish well-defined career paths for special agents and analysts that would hold out realistic promise of advancement to the highest levels of the FBI and the Intelligence Community. (163) Current FBI employees who decide to join the service could be protected from mandatory transfers to the FBI's criminal programs. The service director, experienced in all-source domestic and foreign intelligence, would be presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed. Regional service squads could be established to focus intelligence resources in the field.

There are multiple ways such an organization could be structured. One such construct, however, would pull all (investigative, operational and analytical -- headquarters and field) of the FBI's international terrorism, foreign counterintelligence, JTTF, and security countermeasures resources into the NSIS. While the NSIS Director would report to the FBI Director and the Attorney General, and operate under the Attorney General Guidelines, the NSIS Director would also be tasked to ensure seamless coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence on issues for which the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence are increasingly blurred, such as terrorism. Analysts within the NSIS would have access to all the FBI's intelligence relevant to national security, including criminal intelligence. Moreover, formal analytical working groups could be established to ensure analytical integration across counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal programs. Finally, field intelligence groups could be fewer in number to ensure focus and deployment of experienced human resources, and could report to both the NSIS Deputy Director, and local Special Agent in Charge.

Proponents could argue this option would enhance the FBI's focus on intelligence without building any "walls" between the various types of intelligence the FBI collects, analyzes, and exploits. They could contend that the FBI could build a more effectively leveraged intelligence program on the foundation that the Director is currently putting in place. And that it could do so without severing the connection with law enforcement and the FBI's 56 field offices and 46 legal attaches (164) serving in U.S. embassies. Such an approach would also ease efforts to establish intelligence career paths and strengthen the role of intelligence. Some proponents of a "service within a service" also argue that it may serve as an interim or bridge solution to the eventual creation of an autonomous domestic intelligence agency (see option 5 below). (165)

Opponents could argue that this option is still too limited, and that intelligence and law enforcement should be separated. They could also contend such an effort could be bureaucratically confusing as the new service seeks to build its independence while the FBI continues to exert control. Opponents could also argue that this option would disrupt Director Mueller's current reforms at the very time they are taking hold.


Option 3: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to Department of Homeland Security
A third option could be to establish a separate domestic intelligence service and house it in the Department of Homeland Security. (166) The service would be a member of the Intelligence Community and its authorities would be limited to collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence inside the United States, including the plans, intentions and capabilities of international terrorist groups operating in the U.S. As envisioned, the agency, like Great Britain's MI5, (167) would not have arrest authority.

Proponents of this option could argue that folding the new entity into DHS, as opposed to creating a new stand-alone agency, would avoid creating more bureaucracy while also establishing an organization unencumbered by the FBI's law enforcement culture. They could argue that such an entity would be able to more sharply focus on intelligence while also better safeguarding the rights of citizens, provided new checks on its ability to collect intelligence against innocent people were put in place.

Opponents could counter that placing the new organization in DHS would undermine its ability to play the role of an honest broker that could produce intelligence products not only for DHS but for other federal agencies, as well as for state and local authorities. They could also argue that placing the new entity within DHS would force it to compete with other DHS offices for scarce resources. (168) They also could oppose the idea for the same reason they might oppose a new entity separate from the FBI -- that the essential synergistic relationship between intelligence and law enforcement would be severed. Finally, opponents could argue that establishing a separate agency is tantamount to creating an MI5-like agency, which may be unworkable in the U.S. context for political, cultural and legal reasons despite any efforts to mold it to conform to American experience. (169)


Option 4: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence Program Resources to the DCI
A fourth option could be to establish a domestic intelligence service under the direction of the Director Central Intelligence, either as a separate entity reporting directly to the DCI in that capacity, (170) or incorporated into the CIA. The Attorney General would retain the authority to establish and enforce rules to assure that the rights of Americans would be preserved.

Supporters of this option could contend that providing the DCI additional operational capability would improve the integration of analysis and collection and would ensure that security rather than criminal concerns would be emphasized. (171) Opponents could argue that legal, policy perception, and cultural concerns militate against expanding DCI control over domestic intelligence collection and analysis. They could assert that there is a risk that the IC could misuse information it collected on American citizens. (172) They could also argue that as a practical matter if a decision was made to incorporate this entity into the CIA, it, like the FBI, simply may not up to the task of reorienting its efforts quickly enough to take on this added responsibility. (173)


Option 5: Creation of a New Domestic Security Intelligence Service
A fifth option could be to create an entirely new agency within the IC -- but, one which is independent of the FBI, CIA and DHS. The new agency would fuse all intelligence -- from all sources, domestic and foreign -- on potential terrorist attacks within the United States and disseminate it to appropriately cleared federal, state, local and private sector customers. (174) This stand-alone entity also would include a separate but collocated collection units, which would be authorized to collect domestic intelligence on international terrorism threats within the United States. The new organization would be prohibited from collecting intelligence un-related to international terrorism. Counterterrorism intelligence collection outside the United States would continue to fall under the purview of the CIA, NSA, and other foreign IC components. (175) It also would lack arrest authorities, but would provide "actionable" intelligence to those entities, such as the FBI, with authority to take action. The new entity would have authority to task the IC for collection. It would be overseen by a policy and steering committee comprised of the new agency's director, the DCI, the Attorney General and the DHS Secretary. The steering committee would ensure that the new entity adheres to all relevant constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements.

Proponents of this option could argue that because of its law enforcement culture, the FBI is incapable of transforming itself into an agency capable of preventing terrorist attacks. (176) And even if it could, proponents could argue that failing to separate intelligence collection from law enforcement could give rise to the fear that the U.S. was establishing a secret police. (177) Proponents also could assert that the federal government artificially distinguishes between foreign and domestic terrorist threats, when those distinctions increasingly are blurred. And they could contend, given the historical record, that the FBI and CIA are incapable of changing direction quickly enough to work together effectively to bridge that divide. (178)

Opponents could counter that establishing another agency will simply create more bureaucracy. They could argue that it would take years for a new organization to be fully staffed, and become effective in the fight against terrorism, and that pushing for better CIA-FBI cooperation is a more practical approach. (179) They also could argue that establishing a separate domestic intelligence service (like MI-5) is impractical in the U.S. context (180) and would move the country in the wrong direction by creating a more stove-piped bureaucracy that would undermine the country's ability to wage an integrated war on terrorism. (181) And they could argue that the FBI has never been solely a law enforcement agency but rather an investigative and domestic security agency that is well prepared to collect and analyze intelligence, and they could cite the FBI's successes against organized crime as proof. (182)

Opponents could also counter that the FBI in the past has effectively collected intelligence, but, that its ability to do so over time has been eroded. Former U.S. Attorney General Barr and others argue that historically the FBI has been effective in the collection of domestic intelligence, but that it was undermined by policymakers, such as Congress and the courts, through the placement of legal constraints on the FBI over the past 30 years. (183) Finally, opponents could argue that Britain's MI-5 has a mixed record of effectiveness. (184)


Conclusion
Congressional policymakers face FBI intelligence reform options in a dynamic context. The FBI has made or is in the process of making substantial organizational, business process, and resource allocation changes to enhance its ability to deter, detect, neutralize and prevent acts of terrorism or espionage directed against the United States. Some experts believe that the remedial measures currently being taken by the FBI, to include a centralization of national security-related cases, enhanced intelligence training for agents and analysts, increased recruitment of intelligence analysts, and the development of a formal and integrated intelligence cycle are all appropriate and achievable. Other experts are more critical of the current intelligence reforms believing that the culture of the FBI, including its law enforcement-oriented approach to intelligence, may prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to necessary intelligence reforms. Some argue that the pace and scope of reform may be too slow and not radical enough.

One of the central points of distinction between supporters and critics of the current FBI intelligence reforms is the extent to which they believe that the two disciplines of law enforcement and intelligence are synergistic, that is that the commonalities among them would benefit from continued integration. In general, those believing that law enforcement and intelligence should be integrated argue for the status quo. However, other experts believe that given the conceptual and operational differences between law enforcement and intelligence, the national interest would be best served by having them located in separate organizations with systematic and formal mechanisms in place to share information and protect civil liberties. Should the Congress choose to influence the direction and/or outcome of the FBI's intelligence reform, numerous options, from support of the status quo to the establishment of an autonomous domestic security intelligence service, are available for consideration.


Appendix 1: Definitions of Intelligence
Three formal categories of intelligence are defined under statute or regulation:


Foreign Intelligence. Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons. (185)

Counterintelligence. Information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (186)

Criminal Intelligence. Data which has been evaluated to determine that it is relevant to the identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by an individual who or organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity. [Certain criminal activities including but not limited to loan sharking, drug trafficking, trafficking in stolen property, gambling, extortion, smuggling, bribery, and corruption of public officials often involve some degree of regular coordination and permanent organization involving a large number of participants over a broad geographical area]. (187)

Appendix 2: The FBI's Traditional Role in Intelligence
According to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, signed December 4, 1981, and the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S. Code ?401), the FBI is a statutory member of the United States Intelligence Community. Specifically, and in accordance with section 1.14 of Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, the intelligence roles of the FBI are outlined as follows:

Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:


(a) Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coordinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community. When a counterintelligence activity of the military involves military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with the Department of Defense;

(b) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;

(c) Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the Intelligence Community, or, when requested by the Director of the National Security Agency, to support the communications security activities of the United States Government;

(d) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; and

(e) Carry out or contract for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.

Appendix 3: The FBI's Intelligence Programs -- A Brief History
The FBI's is responsible for deterring, detecting and preventing domestic activities that may threaten the national security, and, at the same time, respecting constitutional safeguards. (188) The FBI, a statutory member of the IC, is able to collect foreign intelligence within the U.S. when authorized by IC officials.

The FBI and its predecessor, the Bureau of Intelligence, have collected intelligence -- foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and criminal intelligence -- in the U.S. since 1908, (189) and, at times, effectively. (190) During the Cold War, the FBI successfully penetrated the Soviet leadership through a recruited U.S. Communist Party asset. The FBI also battled the Kremlin on the counterintelligence front. (191) In 1985 -- dubbed the Year of the Spy, the FBI arrested 11 U.S. citizens for espionage, -- including former U.S. warrant officer John Walker, who provided the Soviets highly classified cryptography codes during a spying career that began in the 1960s. The FBI also arrested Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA employee, a spy for the People's Republic of China; Jonathan Pollard, a Naval Investigative Service intelligence analyst who stole secrets for Israel; and Ronald Pelton, a former National Security Agency communications specialist who provided the Soviet Union classified material. (192) More recently convicted spies include FBI Special Agent Robert P. Hanssen, who spied on behalf of Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, and pleaded guilty to 15 espionage-related charges in 2001; and former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Ana Belen Montes, arrested in 2001 and subsequently convicted for spying for Cuba.


FBI Excesses
The FBI has been applauded for its historical successes, but also criticized for overstepping constitutional bounds by targeting U.S. citizens who were found to be exercising their constitutional rights. (193) For example, during the 1919-1920 "Palmer Raids," the FBI's so-called Radical Division (later renamed the General Intelligence Division) arrested individuals allegedly working to overthrow the U.S. government, but who were later judged to be innocent. (194)

Between 1956 and 1970, the FBI investigated individuals it believed were engaging in "subversive" activities as part of the FBI's so-called COINTELPRO Program. (195) In the mid-1960s, the FBI surveilled such prominent Americans as Martin Luther King, Jr., collecting "racial intelligence." (196) And in the 1980s, the FBI was found to have violated the constitutional rights of members of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) who the FBI believed violated the Foreign Agent Registration Act. (197) Although congressional investigators concluded that the FBI's investigation did not reflect "significant FBI political or ideological bias ...," its activities "resulted in the investigation of domestic political activities protected by the First Amendment that should not have come under governmental scrutiny." (198)


Oversight and Regulation: The Pendulum Swings
In response to these FBI abuses, the Department of Justice imposed domestic intelligence collection standards on the IC, including the FBI. For example, in 1976, Attorney General Edward H. Levi issued specific guidelines governing FBI domestic security investigations. Congress also established House and Senate intelligence oversight committees to monitor the IC. And President Carter signed into law the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which established legal procedures and standards governing the use of electronic surveillance within the U.S.

Critics argue that until Congress approved the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act granting the FBI additional authority to investigate suspected terrorists, increased oversight and over-regulation had seriously weakened the FBI's intelligence capabilities. Some thought that not only had regulations curtailed the FBI's surveillance authorities, but that they had undermined the risk-taking culture thought to be essential to successful intelligence work. (199) The Levi Guidelines (200) were singled out as being particularly onerous. (201)


Some observers blamed the restrictions for discouraging domestic intelligence collection unless the FBI could clearly show that its collection was tied to a specific alleged crime. They also said the restrictions led the FBI to transfer responsibility for parts of its counterterrorism program from the FBI's former Intelligence Division to its Criminal Division. The result, they contend, was an anemic intelligence program that contributed to the failure to prevent the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. (202)


Appendix 4: The Case File as an Organizing Concept, and Implications for Prevention
The FBI uses a case approach to categorize each of its investigations. Each case receives an alphanumeric indicator signifying the target country, or issue, and the level of priority. Some observers have criticized this approach as reactive; a case is opened only after a crime has been committed. Traditionally, ex post investigation is the FBI's greatest investigative strength. It can deploy thousands of agents, as it did after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to track domestic and international leads, conduct witness interviews and develop a "story board" about how the act and the events surrounding it took place. Although well suited for assembling a criminal case, this operational approach is ill-suited for terrorism prevention.

While the FBI reacts to crimes after the fact, it adopts a proactive approach in some counterintelligence cases, For example, FBI counterintelligence agents, working with their IC counterparts, may open a "case" to recruit a human asset, usually a foreign national, who may have access to information which would fulfill an existing intelligence gap.

The FBI says it is attempting to adopt a proactive approach to counterterrorism. FBI Director Mueller says that the new USA PATRIOT Act has helped. According to FBI Director Mueller, the FBI can now, "... move from thinking about 'intelligence as a case' to finding 'intelligence in the case'...." (203) While the reactive opening a criminal case, such as those against cigarette smugglers, may yield intelligence relevant to counterterrorism, it is generally a serendipitous occurrence. Extracting preventative and predictive intelligence from a case arguably presupposes first, that the case was opened pro-actively, and not necessarily in response to some adverse event. Second, in order to extract intelligence from any case, well-trained and experienced reports officers and intelligence analysts must be integrated into the flow of intelligence resulting from investigations, and be able to sift the "signal" from the "noise" in the sea of raw intelligence to which they have access. According to one local law enforcement official, the FBI is unable to strip the intelligence from their own cases, much less share that intelligence with state and local law enforcement officials. (204) Finally, for the FBI to succeed in using this new approach, it will likely have to implement successfully all the complex and inter-related elements of the intelligence cycle.


Appendix 5: Past Efforts to Reform FBI Intelligence
The FBI's current intelligence reform is not its first. Twice before -- in 1998, and then again in 1999 -- the FBI embarked on almost identical efforts to establish intelligence as a priority, and to strengthen its intelligence program. Both attempts are considered by some to have been failures. (205)

Both previous attempts were driven by concerns that FBI's intelligence effectiveness was being undercut by the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence program. The FBI's three operational divisions, at the time -- criminal, counterterrorism and counterintelligence -- each controlled its own intelligence program. (206) As a result, the FBI had trouble integrating its intelligence effort horizontally between its divisions. In intelligence world parlance, the programs were "stove-piped."


In 1998, the FBI attempted to address the stove pipe problem by consolidating control over intelligence under the authority of a newly established Office of Intelligence. It also took steps to improve the quality of its intelligence analysis, particularly in the criminal area, which was viewed as particularly weak.

Dissatisfied with the results, the FBI launched a second round of reforms the following year aimed at more thoroughly integrating FBI intelligence analysis in support of investigations. A new Investigative Services Division (ISD) was established to replace the Office of Intelligence, and to house in one location all FBI analysts that until then had been "owned" by FBI's operational divisions. Although the ISD was intended to provide each of the divisions "one-stop shopping" for their intelligence needs, it was never accepted by the operational divisions, which wanted to control their own intelligence analysis programs. In the wake of September 11, the FBI concluded that analysts would be more effective if they were controlled by the operational divisions. ISD was abolished, and analysts were dispersed back to the divisions in which they originally served.

Although observers blame the failure of both prior reform efforts on several complex factors, they put the FBI's deeply-ingrained law enforcement mentality at the top of the list. As one observer described it, efforts to integrate intelligence at the FBI were substantially hampered because resources dedicated to intelligence were gradually siphoned back to the FBI's traditional counter crime programs. Moreover, there was also little sustained senior level support for an intelligence function that was integrated with the Intelligence Community. (207)


Appendix 6: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence (208)
The FBI's two principal national foreign intelligence program responsibilities are counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Some observers of FBI intelligence reform have suggested that these two disciplines be integrated, but not necessarily under the control of the FBI. (209) Numerous interviewees indicated their belief that of the FBI's NFIP responsibilities, the counterintelligence program was most closely integrated into the Intelligence Community.

Historically, the FBI has shifted its organization to counter both terrorist and clandestine foreign intelligence activity directed against the United States. Although the FBI in the past has integrated both missions as part of the same division, currently the FBI has separate counterterrorism and counterintelligence divisions. The Assistant Directors for each division report to an Executive Assistant Director having responsibility for both functions. In a debate that mirrors the ongoing discussion about the appropriate relationship between law enforcement and intelligence, some observers believe counterterrorism and counterintelligence should be reintegrated. (210) They make the following arguments:


Commonality of Adversary Methods of Operation. No matter whether the threat the United States is confronting is that of a loosely affiliated foreign terrorist group, or a centrally controlled foreign intelligence service, the method of operation is consistent -- a covertly organized set of activities designed to undermine U.S. national security. As such, the countermeasures are similar -- primarily the penetration and surveillance of the inimical activity, up to, and until, the point at which action may be taken against the United States.

Linkages between Foreign Intelligence Services and Terrorist Groups. Some argue that there are linkages between foreign intelligence services and terrorist groups. (211) Information documenting these links, should they exist, are likely to be classified.
Supporters of the status quo argue the following:


Similar Disciplines -- Different Time Lines and Pressures. While the damage that can result from a successful espionage operation directed against the United States by a foreign power can be just as damaging to national security as the terrorist attacks of September 11, counterintelligence moves at a different pace than counterterrorism. Building counter-espionage cases can sometimes consume months, if not years, of monitoring actions of those suspected of passing national defense information to an unauthorized third party, or committing economic espionage. In the case of a potential terrorist act, there is pressure to collect actionable intelligence, and to act quickly to prevent terrorists from striking.

Diminution of Resources/Organizational Focus on Counterintelligence. Of the FBI's two principal National Foreign Intelligence Program priorities, the counterintelligence program, arguably, has been accorded a lower priority in the wake of the Cold War. Counterterrorism has become the FBI's first priority. Reintegrating the two could lead to situations in which, particularly from an FBI human resources perspective, counterintelligence personnel serve as a reserve pool of educated labor for counterterrorism. Such an occurrence may result in a diminished strategic focus on counterintelligence, a function which requires a long-term outlook and commitment.

The Law Enforcement Nexus with Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence. Given the decentralized nature of the terrorist threat, and criminal activities engaged in to provide financial support for such activities, there is a close relationship between the FBI's criminal programs and its counterterrorism program. While there is also a nexus between the FBI's counterintelligence activities and its criminal programs, arguably, given that very few counterintelligence cases ever go to trial for espionage or economic espionage prosecution, the nexus is weaker.

Appendix 7: Relevant Legal and Regulatory Changes
Intelligence Community operations, including domestic intelligence collection, and collection of intelligence on U.S. persons, (212) are governed by a body of laws, regulations and guidelines. (213) With regard to the domestic intelligence collection, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice has promulgated seven successive sets of guidelines (214) governing these efforts since 1976.

Following September 11, Congress also approved the USA PATRIOT Act, which makes it easier for the FBI to share intelligence with IC agencies, and to conduct electronic surveillance. (215) For example, with respect to electronic surveillance, a substantially broader legal standard authorized in the USA PATRIOT Act allows for electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as long as, among other requirements, the application includes a certification by an appropriate national security official that "a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information." (216) Among the other criteria which must be met for an application for electronic surveillance to be approved under FISA, a court must find that the surveillance "... is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." (217) Moreover, the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY2004 authorized the enhanced use of administrative subpoenas, also known as national security letters, by the FBI in order to gather information from financial institutions. (218)

The USA PATRIOT Act has had a substantial impact on FBI intelligence gathering and sharing. For example, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorizations for electronic surveillance increased 21.3% during the two-year period, 2000 to 2002. (219) According to FBI Director Mueller, the act has been "extraordinarily beneficial in the war on terrorism ... Our success in preventing another catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, without the Act." (220)


The USA PATRIOT Act also has provided a legal framework that makes it easier for the FBI's four investigative/operational divisions -- criminal, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber -- to integrate their intelligence efforts. As a result, the FBI has adopted a new strategy, known as the Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy, which permits the FBI to treat counterterrorism cases as intelligence cases from the outset, making it easier to initiate electronic surveillance. Special Agent John Pistole, FBI Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, stated, "We're still interested in the criminal violations that many people may be involved in. But, in many cases we are going to put that in the back seat and go down the road until we have all that we need." (221) If implemented and institutionalized, the new policy may significantly enhance the effectiveness of the FBI's intelligence program. The question becomes whether the FBI can implement the policy and stay within constitutional limits. Some civil libertarian advocates say they are concerned that by making it easier for the FBI to employ surveillance under FISA, the USA PATRIOT Act might lead the FBI to use such FISA surveillance to investigate criminal cases in a manner that may be inconsistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. (222)






Footnotes
1. (back)While the FBI initially provided the authors access to FBI officials and documents, it later declined to do so, despite numerous requests. Although this paper would have benefitted from continued cooperation, the authors note with gratitude that some FBI officials continued to share their insights into the current reforms. Numerous current and former employees of the FBI and Cental Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as state and local law enforcement entities, were interviewed for this report. Some sources wish to remain anonymous and, therefore, have not been identified by name in this report.

2. (back)William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 187.

3. (back)For purposes of this report, intelligence is defined to include foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and criminal intelligence. For a statutory definition of each see Appendix 1. For a brief summary of the FBI's traditional role in intelligence, see Appendix 2. Finally, Appendix 3 provides a brief history of FBI intelligence.

4. (back)The IC is comprised of 15 agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Treasury; the Department of Energy; the Coast Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; and; the Department of Homeland Security.

5. (back)See Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, a report of the U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S.Rept. 107-351; H.Rept. 107-792, Dec. 2002, pp. xv, xvi, 37-39, 337-338. (Hereafter cited as JIC Inquiry)

6. (back)An analyst conducts counterterrorism strategic intelligence analysis in order to develop a national and international understanding of terrorist threat trends and patterns, as well as common operational methods and practices. An analyst conducts tactical counterterrorism analysis in order to support specific criminal or national security-oriented cases and operations. While not mutually exclusive, each type of analysis requires a unique set of analytical methodologies and research skills.

7. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

8. (back)Ibid., p. 39.

9. (back)See "Statement of John MacGaffin to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," Dec. 8, 2003. MacGaffin testified, "In the domestic context, it is clear that the FBI needs to improve greatly its intelligence collection so that there are meaningful "dots" to connect and analyze. Some observers believe the FBI since 9/11 has made real progress in this direction. I and many others do not."

10. (back)A former senior FBI official stated in an Aug. 21, 2003 interview that if FBI Director Mueller was serious about achieving more than a limited reform, he would establish an intelligence career path. To date the Director has not implemented fully an intelligence career path for special agents.

11. (back)Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Implementing the National Strategy, Dec. 15, 2002, pp. 43-44. (Hereafter cited as Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress.) Organizational culture is a product of many factors, including, but not limited to, an organization's history, mission, self-image, client base and structure. According to William E. Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency, however, organizational culture is principally the product of structural conditions. See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, p. 3.

12. (back)For an analysis of the applicability of Great Britain's MI-5 model to the U.S., see CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

13. (back)Director Mueller has headed the Department of Justice Criminal Division, served as U.S. Attorney in San Francisco, and generally focused on criminal prosecution during his career.

14. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, with an extensive intelligence background, Aug. 21, 2003.

15. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, Former Attorney General of the United States, in U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.

16. (back)Ibid., pp. 16-17.

17. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. pp. 43-44.

18. (back)The Congressional Research Service has recently published a related report on the FBI. For a history of the FBI, see CRS Report RL32095(pdf), The FBI: Past, Present and Future, by Todd Masse and William Krouse.

19. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. xv.

20. (back)All-source intelligence analysis is that analysis which is based on all available collection sources.

21. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

22. (back)Ibid., pp. 38-39.

23. (back)Ibid., pp. 337-338.

24. (back)Ibid., p. xvi.

25. (back)See Concept of Operations, FBI Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Process, prepared jointly by FBI Headquarters divisions, reviewed by FBI field office representatives and coordinated by the FBI's Office of Intelligence, Aug. 2003. The Assistant Director, Office of Intelligence, reports to the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence.

26. (back)According to the FBI's 1998-2003 Strategic Plan, issued in May 1998, the FBI, prior to Sept. 11, had established three tiers of priorities: (1) National and Economic Security, aimed at preventing intelligence operations that threatened U.S. national security; preventing terrorist attacks; deterring criminal conspiracies; and deterring unlawful exploitation of emerging technologies by foreign powers, terrorists and criminal elements; (2) Criminal Enterprise and Public Integrity; and (3) Individuals and Property. Countering criminal activities was a prominent feature of each tier. See Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human Resource Allocation, Audit Division, Sept. 2003, pp. 03-37.

27. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.

28. (back)Core competencies are defined as a related group of activities central to the success, or failure, of an organization. In the private sector, core competencies are often the source of a company's competitive advantage. See C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, "The Core Competency of the Corporation," Harvard Business Review, Apr. 1, 2001.

29. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, July 23, 2003.

30. (back)The FBI established the position of EAD-I in early 2003, and the position was filled in April 2003, when Maureen Baginski, the former Director of Signals Intelligence, National Security Agency, was appointed. It was another four months before EAD-I Baginski began working in her new capacity, and an additional four months before Congress approved the reprogramming action formally establishing the EAD-I position. Some critics date whatever progress the FBI has made in upgrading intelligence to Baginski's arrival, but contend that because this critical position was left vacant for an extended period of time, the FBI made little, or no progress, between September 11 and Baginski's arrival almost one-and-a-half years later.

31. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Joint Inquiry, Oct. 17, 2002.

32. (back)The establishment of TTIC, and its mission, is addressed later in this section.

33. (back)The Office of Intelligence has had an uneven, albeit short, leadership history since its establishment. Although Director Mueller announced OI's established in Dec. 2001, the position of OI Assistant Director was vacant for one-and-a-half years, until Apr. 2003. The selected individual served four months before being appointed to another FBI position. The position then was vacant for almost five additional months before Michael Rolince, Special-Agent-in-Charge of the FBI's Washington Field Office, was appointed to lead the office on an acting basis in mid-Dec. 2003.

34. (back)See FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations, Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

35. (back)For the purposes of this report, intelligence analysts are defined as all-source analysts who conduct tactical and strategic analysis. Until recently, the FBI had two categories of analysts -- Intelligence Research Specialists, who were responsible for all-source analysis, and Intelligence Operations Specialists, who provided tactical analytic support for cases and operations. The FBI is merging these two positions with the newly created "Reports Officer" position, and re-titling the consolidated position as "intelligence analyst." The FBI says its purpose in doing so is to standardize and integrate intelligence support for the FBI's highest priorities. Within the intelligence analyst position, there are four "areas of interest" -- counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal; and three specific work "functions" -- all source, case support, and reports.

36. (back)The number of individuals in a field intelligence group varies, depending upon the size of the field office. See "FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations," Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

37. (back)Funding was authorized under the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-177). The legislation permits the FBI Director to "... enter into personal services contracts if the personal services to be provided under such contracts directly support the intelligence or counterintelligence missions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

38. (back)JTTFs are FBI-led and are comprised of other federal, state and local law enforcement officials. JTTFs serve as the primary mechanism through which intelligence derived from FBI investigations and operations is shared with non-FBI law enforcement officials. JTTFs also serve as the principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law enforcement officials.

39. (back)See statement of Larry A. Mefford, Executive Assistant Director -- Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, Research and Development; and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security of the U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Sept. 4, 2003.

40. (back)See CRS Report RS21283, Homeland Security: Intelligence Support, by Richard A. Best, Jr.

41. (back)See http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2003summary/html/FBIcharts.htm and Where the Money Goes: Fiscal 2004 Appropriations, -- House Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives (House Conf. Rept. 108-401).

42. (back)See U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, "2005 Budget and Performance Summary," winter 2004, pp.113-122. Elements of this request include 1) $35 million in non-personnel funding to support collocation of a portion of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division with the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and the interagency Terrorist Threat Integration Center; 2) $13.4 million to launch the Office of Intelligence; 3) $14.3 million to Counterterrorism FBI Headquarters program support, including intelligence analysis; and 4) $13 million to launch the National Virtual Translation Center. Some elements of the $46 million request for Counterterrorism Field Investigations and the $64 million request for various classified national security initiatives, also likely will be dedicated to intelligence.

43. (back)See Michelle Mittelstadt, "FBI Set to Add 900 Intelligence Analysts," The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 17, 2004. The near doubling of intelligence analysts in one year could present the FBI with a significant absorption challenge.

44. (back)The GAO has drafted two reports (GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003 and GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004) on the FBI reform efforts cited in this report. These GAO reports assess the FBI's transformation from a program management and results perspective, that is, the extent to which the FBI is expending its resources and dedicating its management in a manner consistent with its stated priorities. This CRS report focuses on the more policy-oriented question of FBI intelligence reform and related policy options, as well as the ability of the FBI to implement successfully its strategic plans related to intelligence.

45. (back)FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), periodically audits resource allocations, to determine if human resources are being committed in a manner consistent with stated priorities and strategies. In a recent report, the OIG found that since Sept. 11, the FBI "... continued to devote more of its time to terrorism-related work than any other single area," consistent with its post-Sept. 11 terrorism priority. To ensure that the FBI systematically and periodically analyzes its programs, the OIG recommended that the FBI Director "... regularly review resource utilization reports for the Bureau as a whole, as well as for individual investigative programs, and explore additional means of analyzing the Bureau's resource utilization among the various programs." See Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human Resource Allocation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 03-37), Sept. 2003. While the quantity of human resources must be adequate, appropriate quality is essential. One asset developed by an experienced, well-trained FBI special agent could have a significant effect on U.S. national security.

46. (back)As currently structured, the FBI special agent recruitment procedure has five entry programs, with numerous other areas defined as "critical skill needs." Agents must be hired under one of the five programs (law, accounting/finance, language, computer science/information technology and diversified); yet, the FBI will establish priorities for those having expertise in the critically needed skills. Unlike intelligence analysts, who are not required to possess a bachelor's degree, candidates for FBI special agent positions "must possess a four-year degree from an accredited college or university ...." See
https://www.fbijobs.com/jobdesc.asp?requisitionid=368.

47. (back)See Concept of Operations, Human Talent for Intelligence Production, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 2003.

48. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, June 18, 2003, p. 3.

49. (back)See Making Appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 2004, and For Other Purposes, U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report (H.Rept. 108-401).

50. (back)See "Human Talent for Intelligence Production," FBI Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

51. (back)In place of a bachelors degree, the FBI now allows a candidate for intelligence analyst to substitute a minimum of one year of related law enforcement or military experience.

52. (back)The authors were unable to compare training, before and after Sept. 11, because the FBI's Office of Congressional Affairs denied requests for a copy of the training curriculum.

53. (back)See statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 14.

54. (back)The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget includes a number of national-level intelligence programs, which are approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and submitted to the President and Congress as a single consolidated program. The NFIP budget funds those departments and agencies constituting the U.S. Intelligence Community. Historically, the FBI's NFIP has included the headquarters and field elements associated with the following programs: 1) international terrorism, 2) counterintelligence, 3) security countermeasures, and 4) dedicated technical activities.

55. (back)Some observers have suggested that as part of its intelligence reform, the FBI should consider re-integrating counterterrorism and counterintelligence. For an assessment of these arguments, see Appendix 6.

56. (back)Notwithstanding this increase in intelligence training, a new special agent collector, at least early in his career, still is at a disadvantage, compared to a foreign intelligence officer, or terrorist, who has likely received intensive clandestine operations training.

57. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 15, 2004.

58. (back)See "Human Talent for Intelligence Production," the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 2003.

59. (back)Numerous GAO studies, including the recent Information Technology: FBI Needs an Enterprise Architecture to Guide Its Modernization Activities (GAO Report 03-959, Sept. 25, 2003) have found substantial deficiencies in the FBI's formal procedures to implement recommended information technology changes. See also The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003).

60. (back)See "FBI Director Says Technology Investments Are Paying Off," Government Executive, Apr. 10, 2003.

61. (back)According to the Department of Justice Inspector General (IG), FBI officials originally estimated the cost of the Virtual Case File system to be $380 million. The current actual cost, according to the IG, exceeds $596 million. See also Wilson P. Dizard, "FBI's Trilogy Rollout Delayed; CSC Misses Deadline," Government Computer News, Nov. 4, 2003. Critics have attributed the FBI's chronic information management problems to, among other factors, deficient data mining capabilities, and the FBI's continuing inability to effectively upload information collected by field offices onto accessible FBI-wide databases.

62. (back)Dan Eggen, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Washington Post, Dec. 13, 2003, p. A1.

63. (back)In addition to easing constraints on intelligence sharing, this change will allow investigators to more easily employ secret warrants and other intelligence collection methods permitted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended. Those foreign intelligence gathering tools cannot be used in traditional criminal probes. The change stems from a Nov. 2002 intelligence appeals court ruling that upheld the USA PATRIOT Act provisions that provided more latitude for the sharing of foreign intelligence between criminal prosecutors and intelligence/national security personnel. See United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, In re: Sealed Case 02-001, Decided Nov. 18, 2002.

64. (back)For information on terrorist watch lists, see CRS Report RL31019, Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, by William Krouse and Raphael Perl.

65. (back)An organization's structure and business processes influence its performance. Large organizations with dispersed operations continually assess the appropriate balance between decentralized and centralized elements of their operations. Although the mission of National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) is unrelated to that of the FBI, it too has dispersed operations. In a review of the causes of the 1986 Columbia shuttle accident, the board investigating the accident found that "The ability to operate in a centralized manner when appropriate, and to operate in a decentralized manner when appropriate, is the hallmark of a high-reliability organization." See Columbia Accident Investigation Report, Volume I, Aug. 2003. http://www.caib.us/news/report/volume1/default.html

66. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 118, 2003, p. 3.

67. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

68. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

69. (back)Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

70. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

71. (back)See testimony of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003, p. 4.

72. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, pp. 43-44.

73. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

74. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 245.

75. (back)Statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 19. See also The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003), p. v.

76. (back)See "FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities," statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 13.

77. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 358.

78. (back)Statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.

79. (back)The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003), p. xiv.

80. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

81. (back)See The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.x.

82. (back)Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

83. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 337.

84. (back)Ibid., p. 340. The vast majority of FBI analysts are located in the FBI's 56 regional field offices.

85. (back)Ibid., p. 245.

86. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 3.

87. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

88. (back)Ibid., p. 4.

89. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

90. (back)Ibid., p. 3.

91. (back)Ibid.

92. (back)See "FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities," statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 33. A congressional requirement concerning resource management was levied on the FBI by P.L. 108-199. By Mar. 15, 2004, the FBI is to provide a report to the Committees on Appropriations a report which "...details the FBI's plan to succeed at its terrorist prevention and law enforcement responsibilities, including proposed agent and support personnel levels for each division."

93. (back)Ibid., p. 14.

94. (back)Ibid., p. 23.

95. (back)Ibid., p. 22.

96. (back)See "FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, But Major Challenges Continue," statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 8.

97. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 4.

98. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

99. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former Attorney General of the United States, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p.18.

100. (back)See "FBI Creates Structure to Support Intelligence Mission," U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, press release, Apr. 3, 2003. The results of these examinations remain classified.

101. (back)Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

102. (back)See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, 2003, (Yale University Press) p. 177.

103. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

104. (back)See statement of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003.

105. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

106. (back)Ibid.

107. (back)See statement of John J. Hamre before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003. Hamre is a former deputy secretary of defense.

108. (back)See Siobhan Gorman, Government Executive Magazine, FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart, Aug. 1, 2003. See also Frederick P. Hitz and Brian J. Weiss, "Helping the FBI and the CIA Connect the Dots in the War on Terror," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; volume 17, no. 1, Jan. 2004.

109. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

110. (back)Former FBI Special Agent John J. Connally, Jr., was recently convicted of racketeering and obstruction of justice for secretly aiding organized crime leaders in the Boston, Massachusetts area. See Fox Butterfield, "FBI Agent Linked to Mob is Guilty of Corruption," New York Times, May 29, 2002, p.14. Special Agent James J. Smith recently was indicted on one count of gross negligence in handling national defense information [Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 793(f)] and with four counts of filing false reports on an asset's reliability to FBI Headquarters [18 U.S. Code ??1343, 1346]. See http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/fbi/ussmith50703ind.pdf It is alleged that Smith and former Special Agent William Cleveland had sexual relationships with Katrina Leung, an FBI operational asset informing the FBI on the intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It is further alleged that Ms. Leung may have been a double agent for the PRC. Leung has been charged with unauthorized access and willful retention of documents relating to national defense [Title 18 U.S. Code, ?793(b)]. See http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/fbi/usleung403cmp.pdf James Smith has pleaded guilty and his trial has been set for February 2005. Katrina Leung's trial is scheduled for September. In addition to appointing an Inspector-in-Charge to investigate the integrity of the Chinese counterintelligence program in the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office (the last FBI Office of employment for Mr. Smith), the FBI has launched organizational and administrative reviews to determine why its established accountability system for the handling of intelligence assets apparently failed in this case. See FBI press release dated Apr. 9, 2003.

111. (back)See Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 11, 2003.

112. (back)For further information on how to assess performance of the FBI, and the U.S. Government in the war on terrorism, see Daniel Byman, "Measuring the War on Terrorism: A First Appraisal," in Current History, Dec. 2003.

113. (back)The FBI has never experienced problems in recruiting educated analysts, at least at FBI Headquarters. The FBI, however, has from suffered a retention problem.

114. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, Recommendations Section Errata, p. 7.

115. (back)See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, p. 298. (Random House).

116. (back)See the JIC Inquiry, p. 340.

117. (back)Other IC agencies permit analysts to rise to the analytical equivalent of Senior Executive Service, or Senior Intelligence Service. One such program, the Senior Analytic Service (SAS), was established at the CIA in the late 1990s by CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin. The SAS track allows analysts to rise to the senior-most analytic level, without assuming managerial responsibilities.

118. (back)This approach is manifested in a recent intelligence analyst job announcement (04-FO-0515). While the FBI used to recruit intelligence analysts according to the functional or geographic area of need, it now asks potential candidates to identify one of four areas of interest, choosing from: counterintelligence, counterterrorism, criminal or cyber. According to the announcement, "... Applicants must identify the program area or interest, however, this does not guarantee placement in the particular program...." See

https://www.fbijobs.com/JobDesc.asp?src=001&requisitionid=1614&r=021811042620.

119. (back)Although these types of analyses are not mutually exclusive, they serve two different sets of consumers -- the executive who is supporting policymakers, and the special agent who is running an investigation or operation.

120. (back)For a policy-oriented discussion of relevant legal and regulatory changes, see Appendix 7.

121. (back)Dan Egan, The Washington Post, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Dec. 12, 2003, p. A-1. (Hereafter cited as Egan, FBI Applies New Rules.)

122. (back)See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Chairman, and Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, pp. 21-22.

123. (back)Ibid., p. 22.

124. (back)Ibid.

125. (back)See Dan Egan, "FBI Applies New Rules."

126. (back)Ibid.

127. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.

128. (back)Ibid.

129. (back)See Dan Egan,"FBI Applies New Rules."

130. (back)See statement of Steven C. McCraw, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, July 24, 2003.

131. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary June 21, 2002, transcript, p. 30.

132. (back)See Statement of Assistant Director Steven C. McCraw, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, July 24, 2003.

133. (back)Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

134. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Nov. 13, 2003.

135. (back)See "Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security," The Markle Foundation, Dec. 2, 2003, p. 2.

136. (back)See Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, Dec.2, 2003.

137. (back)The Markle Foundation has recommended the creation of a System-wide Homeland Analysis and Resources Exchange (SHARE) Network, in which the Department of Homeland Security would assume a central role in working with federal, state, local and private sector organizations to establish a strategy and implementing mechanisms and policies to share and analyze information in a decentralized manner. See Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, Exhibit A: "Action Plan for Federal Government Development of the SHARE Network," Dec. 2, 2003, p. 10.

138. (back)Originator control, or ORCON, is a process designed to protect categories of (generally) classified information from being sharing with unauthorized third parties. If an agency wishes to share ORCON information it received from another agency, it must first request ORCON release from the originating agency to share the information with a specific third party consumer. In terms of providing security clearances to state and local law enforcement officials with a "need to know," the FBI has established a streamlined security process that allows law enforcement officials to receive expedited "secret" clearances in about nine weeks. See Dan Eggen, "Bridging the Divide Between FBI and Police," The Washington Post, Feb. 16, 2004, p. A25.

139. (back)See The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.iv.

140. (back)See Gerard R. Murphy and Martha R. Plotkin, Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement (Volume 1 -- Local-Federal Partnerships), Police Executive Research Forum, as supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing, Mar. 2003.

141. (back)Many of the state and local law enforcement officials interviewed for this report also had substantial experience at the federal level, both in the IC and in law enforcement. They said they therefore well understand the inherent capabilities and limitations of intelligence and the roles foreign intelligence and criminal intelligence play in preventing terrorism.

142. (back)Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

143. (back)Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

144. (back)One local law enforcement official suggested that the JTTFs are where the investigative expertise lies, and should be retained. However, he suggested that in order to be more valuable in preventing terrorist acts domestically, the JTTFs should be reorganized around the concept of "joint ness," and cited the "Goldwater Nichols" Department of Defense Reorganization Act as a model. The "joint ness" envisioned by this official would have state and local law enforcement, federal law enforcement, and IC entities responsible for counterterrorism, operate in an integrated and seamless environment. As envisioned by this local law enforcement official, consistent with joint officers in the military, promotion to senior level positions at the parent agency would be contingent upon a successful rotation to the "Joint" Terrorism Task Forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433) integrated the operational capabilities of the military services. For further information on Goldwater-Nichols, see

http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html. H.R. 3439, the "JTTF Enhancement Act of 2003" proposes that 1) there be a greater degree of participation in the JTTFs from DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials; and 2) a program be established to detail state and local law enforcement officers to the CIA, or CIA personnel to state and local law enforcement organizations.

145. (back)Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

146. (back)See "Blue Spies for City," New York Post, June 29, 2003. The New York Police Department (NYPD), in what it describes as a substantial resource investment, has dedicated more than 100 officers to the New York JTTF. According to NYPD officials, there has been a steady improvement in the flow of information between the NY JTTF and the NYPD. But there also have been occasions when police officials have requested information from the FBI and the IC, but failed to receive a timely response. As result, the NYPD has stationed several of its officers overseas to better protect the city's security needs by collecting information regarding terrorist activities. As one New York City official commented, "We're not looking to supplant anything that is being done by the Federal government. We're looking to supplement. We're looking to get the New York question asked."

147. (back)See Northeast Regional Agreement Information Sharing Proposal, Sept. 22, 2003. The states engaged in this effort include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. These proposed "centers" are distinct from the existing Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). The HSIN uses the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) to foster communication among federal, state and local officials involved in counterterrorism information. Currently, the system contains only information categorized as "sensitive but unclassified." See "Homeland Security Information Network to Expand Collaboration, Connectivity for States and Major Cities," Department of Homeland Security, Press Release, Feb. 24, 2004.

148. (back)Ibid.

149. (back)Proponents contend that state and localities should have access to raw foreign intelligence, because the analysts they have been able to recruit are often superior to those the FBI employs in its field offices. Moreover, they argue that FBI analysts, unlike their local counterparts, are unfamiliar with local infrastructure needing protection, and provide inferior analysis. In asking for more intelligence sharing, state and local officials say they recognize and respect the FBI's authority to conduct terrorism investigations, but insist they need access to unfiltered foreign intelligence in order to protect state and local security needs.

150. (back)See Appendix 3 (page 48) for additional information.

151. (back)At the beginning of the 108th Congress, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security was established. Along with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, this new committee now shares FBI oversight responsibilities.

152. (back)See Cory Reiss, "Graham's security complaints might bite back," The Gainesville Sun, May 27, 2003.

153. (back)See Ellen Laipson, President and Chief Executive Officer, the Henry L. Stimson Center, "Foreign Intelligence Challenges post September-11," a paper delivered at the Lexington Institute's conference titled "Progress Towards Homeland Security: An Interim Report Card," Feb. 27, 2003. http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/homeland/Laipson.pdf.

154. (back)See statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Government Accounting Office, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, June 21, 2002, p. 18.

155. (back)See remarks of Congressman David Obey during a hearing in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Justice, State and Judiciary, June 21, 2002.

156. (back)See Cory Reiss, "Graham's Security Complaints Might Bite Back," The Gainesville Sun, May 27, 2003.

157. (back)Ibid.

158. (back)Ibid.

159. (back)Ibid.

160. (back)Ibid.

161. (back)See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. pp. 44-45.

162. (back)For a treatment of the evolution of the relationship between law enforcement and intelligence, see CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., by Richard A. Best Jr.

163. (back)The Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Analytic Service might serve as a possible model for elevating senior analysts to the non-managerial analytical equivalent of Senior Executive Service special agents.

164. (back)FBI legal attaches serve in overseas posts, and are declared to the host country. Legal attaches serve as the FBI's link to foreign law enforcement and security services. While legal attaches conduct overt liaison with foreign services, they do not engage in clandestine intelligence collection overseas.

165. (back)See Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, (Free Press, 2004), pp. 254-256.

166. (back)U.S. Senator John Edwards introduced S. 410, The Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003,which would establish a Homeland Intelligence Agency within DHS.

167. (back)See CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

168. (back)See Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress. p. 42.

169. (back)See CRS Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.

170. (back)The Director of Central Intelligence serves as both the leader of the Central Intelligence Agency, and as Director of the broader U.S. Intelligence Community. The proposed 9/11 Intelligence Memorial Reform Act (S. 1520) would create a Director of National Intelligence. That individual would be precluded from simultaneous service as the Director of the CIA and Director of National Intelligence. Some have argued this proposal would undermine the DCI's power base. See Robert M. Gates, "How Not to Reform Intelligence," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 3, 2003. Finally, while the TTIC reports to the Director of Central Intelligence as leader of the Intelligence Community, the organization has been categorized as a "joint venture" of Intelligence Community participants.

171. (back)See statement by John Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Oct. 15, 2003, p. 5.

172. (back)Ibid., p. 5.

173. (back)See Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, p. 41.

174. (back)Ibid., pp. 41-47.

175. (back)Ibid., p. 44.

176. (back)Ibid., pp. 43-44.

177. (back)Ibid., p. 44.

178. (back)Ibid., p. 41.

179. (back)According to former House Intelligence Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton, "if the shortcomings leading up to Sept. 11 were systemic in nature, the solution lies in better system management, the handling and analysis of vast amounts of information, and the distribution in a timely manner of the key conclusions to the right people." See the JIC Inquiry, p. 350.

180. (back)Ibid, p. 351. According to former FBI Director William Webster, the MI-5 concept is inapplicable in the U.S. context. "We're not England," Webster said. "We're not 500 miles across our territory. We have thousands of miles to cover. Would you propose to create an organization that had people all over the United States, as the FBI does?" He instead supports training FBI personnel to be more responsive to terrorist threats. He further argues that, "More than any other kind of threat, there is an interrelationship between law enforcement and intelligence in dealing with the problem of terrorism...We need investigative capability and intelligence collection capability, as well as those who go through the bits and pieces and fill in the dots."

181. (back)See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 13.

182. (back)Ibid, p. 18. Former Attorney General Barr testified, "An idea making the rounds these days is the notion of severing "domestic intelligence" from the FBI and creating a new domestic spy agency akin to Britain's MI-5. I think this is preposterous and goes in exactly the wrong direction. Artificial stove-piping hurts our counterterrorism efforts. What we need to do now is meld intelligence and law enforcement more closely together, not tear them apart. We already have too many agencies and creating still another simply adds more bureaucracy, spawns intractable and debilitating turf wars, and creates further barriers to the kind of seamless integration that is needed in this area."

183. (back)Ibid., p. 14.

184. (back)See Center for Democracy, "Domestic Intelligence Agencies: The Mixed Record of the UK's MI5," Jan. 27, 2003.

185. (back)See National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S. Code, Chapter 15, 401(a) and Executive Order 12333, 3.4.

186. (back)Ibid.

187. (back)See Code of Federal Regulations, Part 23.

188. (back)For a more detailed description of the FBI's traditional intelligence role, see Appendix 2.

189. (back)For an official history of the FBI, see http://www.fbi.gov/fbihistory.htm. See also CRS Report RL32095(pdf), The FBI: Past, Present and Future, by William Krouse and Todd Masse.

190. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 3, 2003.

191. (back)The successful prosecution of an espionage case can be viewed as both a counterintelligence success, and failure. It is a success insofar as the activity is stopped, but is a failure insofar as the activity escaped the attention of appropriate authorities for any period of time.

192. (back)See CRS Report 93-531, Individuals Arrested on Charges of Espionage Against the United States Government: 1966-1993, by Suzanne Cavanagh (available from the authors of this report). For a compilation of espionage cases through 1999, see

http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage.

193. (back)See Tony Poveda, Lawlessness and Reform: The FBI in Transition, Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1990.

194. (back)See Edwin Hoyt Palmer, The Palmer Raids,1919-1921: An Attempt to Suppress Dissent, Seabury Press, 1969.

195. (back)For further information on the history of COINTELPRO, see S.Rept. 94-755, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports of Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, (Washington, Apr. 23, 1976); (Hereafter cited as the Church Committee Report).

196. (back)See Church Committee Report, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, p.71.

197. (back)The Foreign Agent Registration Act requires that persons acting as foreign agents (as defined by the act) register with the U.S. Department of Justice for, among other reasons, transparency. (see 22 U.S.C. Chap. 611)

198. (back)See "The FBI and CISPES," a report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. (S.Rept. 101-46, July 1989).

199. (back)See Bill Gertz, Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, 2002, pp. 83-125. (Regnery Publishing).

200. (back)According to the Levi guidelines, domestic security investigations were to be limited to gathering information on group or individual activities "... which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve a violation of federal law...."

201. (back)See Testimony of Francis J. McNamara, former Subversive Activities Control Board Director, before the National Committee to Restore Internal Security, May 20, 1986. Quoted in W. Raymond Wannall, "Undermining Counterintelligence Capability," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 15, winter 2002, pp. 321-329.

202. (back)Interviews with former senior FBI officials.

203. (back)See statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S. Congress Senate Judiciary Committee, July 23, 2003.

204. (back)Interview with local law enforcement official, Apr. 5, 2004.

205. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

206. (back)A fourth division -- cyber crime -- was established in Apr. 2002. Until the appointment of the EAD-I, it, too, had its own intelligence component.

207. (back)Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

208. (back)According to Executive Order 12333, counterintelligence includes international terrorist activities. See Appendix 1.

209. (back)See "Spying," The Economist, July 10, 2003.

210. (back)Ibid.

211. (back)Ibid.

212. (back)United States persons means a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except in the case of a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government, or governments. See United States Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 12333, Dec. 4, 1981.

213. (back)Richard Betts, Member of the National Commission on Terrorism and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, contends that the balance between civil liberties and security is one in which a differentiation between two types of constraints on civil liberties (political censorship and compromises of individual privacy via enhanced surveillance) should be made. According to Betts, although the former (largely manifested through the suppression of free speech) will not measurably advance the war against terrorism, and should not be tolerated, greater acceptance of the latter, with appropriate measures for keeping secret irrelevant byproduct intelligence, may yield "...the biggest payoff for counterterrorism intelligence." See "Fixing Intelligence," Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2002.

214. (back)These policy guidelines include The Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Security Investigations (April 5, 1976 -- Attorney General Edward H. Levi), The Attorney General Guidelines on Criminal Investigations of Individuals and Organizations Dec. 2, 1980 -- Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security,/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 7, 1983 -- Attorney General William French Smith), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 21, 1989 -- Attorney General Richard Thornburgh), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General Jo Ann Harris to Attorney General Janet Reno recommending a change in the guidelines; approved by Attorney General Reno on April 19, 1994.), The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (May 30, 2002 - Attorney General John Ashcroft), and The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (U) (Oct. 31, 2003 - Attorney General John Ashcroft). Other guidelines -- classified and unclassified - regulating the use of confidential informants, undercover operations, and procedures for lawful, warrant less monitoring of verbal conversations may also play a role in the gathering of domestic intelligence.

215. (back)See CRS Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions, Mar. 31, 2003, by Elizabeth B. Bazan. See also CRS Report RL31377, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, by Charles Doyle. See also CRS Report RL31200(pdf), Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act, by Charles Doyle. See Title II - Enhanced Surveillance Procedures (Section 203 "Authority to Share Criminal Investigative Information," altered rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure[2003 Edition] to permit the sharing of grand jury information with "federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security officials for official duties.") Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorized sharing of information gathered through electronic surveillance as part of a criminal investigation under 18 U.S.C. ?2517, as well as the sharing of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence gathered as part of a criminal investigation with any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist that official in performance of his official duties, 50 U.S.C. ? 403-5d. See also P.L. 107-56, Title V -- Removal of Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism, and Title IX -- Improved Intelligence.

216. (back)The requirement and standard was changed from "the purpose" to "a significant purpose." Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, codified at 50 U.S.C. ? 1804(a)(7)(B).

217. (back)50 U.S.C. ?1805(a)(3)(A). See numerous references to this standard in USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, Title II -- Enhanced Surveillance Procedures. Prohibitions against electronic surveillance or physical searches under FISA based solely on First Amendment protected activities pre-date the USA PATRIOT Act. However, the USA PATRIOT Act added similar language to the pen register and trap and trace devices part of FISA. See FISA, 50 U.S.C. ??1842 and 1843.

218. (back)The definition of financial institution as set out in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-177), adopts the language of Title 31, U.S. Code, ??(a) (2) and (c) (1), which includes any credit union, thrift institution, broker or dealer in equities or commodities, currency exchange, insurance company, pawn broker, travel agency, and/or operator of a credit card system, among others.

219. (back)See annual reports of the U.S. Justice Department to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, as required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (Title 50 U.S. Code, ?1807). Statistics and annual reports compiled by the Federation of American Scientists (see http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/). This increase is attributable, at least in part, to Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) which changed the legal standard concerning the purpose of the surveillance and its relationship to foreign intelligence information. According to the original language, "the purpose" of the surveillance had to be to obtain foreign intelligence information. The new language demands certification that foreign intelligence gathering is a "significant purpose" of the requested surveillance.

220. (back)See Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, July 23, 2003.

221. (back)See Dan Eggen, "FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance," Washington Post, Dec. 13, 2003, p. A1.

222. (back)Ibid.





Return to CONTENTS section of this Long Report.




Attachment A
Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions,

1 January Through 30 June 2003

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Scope Note
Acquisition by Country:
Iran
Iraq
North Korea
Libya
Syria
Sudan


Key Suppliers:
Russia
North Korea
China
Other Countries


Emerging State and Non State Suppliers
Acrobat? PDF Version


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Scope Note
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:

"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."

At the DCI&'s request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of the Intelligence Community&'s assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.

Acquisition by Country
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 30 June 2003. We have excluded countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern.

Iran
Nuclear. The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in violation of its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, Iran sought technology that can support fissile material production for a nuclear weapons program.

Iran tried to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group disclosed that Iran was secretly building a heavy water production plant and a "nuclear fuel" plant. Press reports later in the year confirmed these two facilities using commercial imagery and clarified that the "fuel" plant was most likely a large uranium centrifuge enrichment facility located at Natanz. Commercial imagery showed that Iran was burying the enrichment facility presumably to hide it and harden it against military attack. Following the press disclosures, Iran announced at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) September 2002 General Conference that it had "ambitious" nuclear fuel cycle plans and intended to develop all aspects of the entire fuel cycle. By the end of 2002, the IAEA had requested access to the enrichment facility at Natanz, and the IAEA Director General (DG) for the first time visited the facility in February 2003. The IAEA is investigating the newly disclosed facilities, and previously undisclosed nuclear material imports to determine whether Iran has violated its NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement in developing these facilities and their related technologies. At the June 2003 Board of Governors meeting, the IAEA DG presented a report on the Iranian program noting Tehran had failed to meet its safeguards obligations in a number of areas. The DG's report described a pattern of Iranian safeguards failures related to the undeclared import and processing of uranium compounds in the early 1990s, expressed concern over the lack of cooperation from Iran with IAEA inspections, and identified a number of unresolved concerns in Iran's program that the IAEA will continue to investigate. The IAEA Board on 19 June welcomed the report and called on Iran to answer all IAEA questions, cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors, and sign and implement an Additional Protocol immediately and unconditionally.

Although Iran claims that its nascent enrichment plant is to produce fuel for the Russian-assisted construction projects at Bushehr and other possible future power reactors, we remain concerned that Iran is developing enrichment technology to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons under the cover of legitimate fuel cycle activities. Iran appears to be embarking on acquiring nuclear weapons material via both acquisition paths--highly enriched uranium and low burn-up plutonium. Even with intrusive IAEA safeguards inspections at Natanz, there is a serious risk that Iran could use its enrichment technology in covert activities. Of specific proliferation concern are the uranium centrifuges discovered at Natanz, which are capable of enriching uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Iran claims its heavy water plant is for peaceful purposes. In June, Iran informed the IAEA that it is pursuing a heavy water research reactor that we believe could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. We also suspect that Tehran is interested in acquiring fissile material and technology from foreign suppliers to support its overall nuclear weapons program.

Ballistic Missile. Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during the first half of 2003 continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)--including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8)--as well as a variety of large unguided rockets. Already producing Scud SRBMs, Iran announced that it had begun production of the Shahab-3 MRBM and a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-110. [Iranian press reporting, Tehran IRNA, 11 Sep 2002] In addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran is also pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles.

Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents--and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them--which it previously had manufactured.

Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran&'s biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Tehran also sought high-quality products, particularly weapons components and dual-use items, or products that proved difficult to acquire through normal governmental channels.

Iraq
During the period covered by this report, coalition forces took action under Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq. A large-scale effort is currently underway to find the answers to the many outstanding questions about Iraq&'s WMD and delivery systems.

North Korea
Nuclear. In December 2002, North Korea announced its intention to resume operation of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, which had been frozen under the terms of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. IAEA seals and monitoring equipment were removed and disabled, and IAEA inspectors expelled from the country.

On 10 January 2003, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT Treaty). In late February 2003, North Korea restarted its 5 Mwe reactor which could produce spent fuel rods containing plutonium.

In late April 2003, North Korea told US officials that it possessed nuclear weapons, and signaled its intent to reprocess the 1994 canned spent fuel for more nuclear weapons. On 9 June, North Korea openly threatened to build a nuclear deterrent force. We continued to monitor and assess North Korea's nuclear weapons efforts.

Ballistic Missile. North Korea also has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its extensive ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources. In the first half of 2003, North Korea continued to abide by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests adopted in 1998, but announced it may reconsider its September 2002 offer to extend the moratorium beyond 2003. [FBIS KPP20021117000001] The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2--capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload--may be ready for flight-testing. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles, and has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that have enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts.

Chemical. North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). During the reporting period, Pyongyang continued to acquire dual-use chemicals that could potentially be used to support Pyongyang's long-standing chemical warfare program. North Korea's chemical warfare capabilities included the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agent, using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. North Korea possesses a stockpile of unknown size of these agents and weapons, which it could employ in a variety of delivery means.

Biological. North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, but nonetheless has pursued biological warfare (BW) capabilities since the 1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used to support North Korea's BW efforts. As of the first half of 2003, North Korea was believed to have possessed a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents, and may have such weapons available for use.

Libya
Nuclear. An NPT party with full-scope IAEA safeguards, Libya continued to develop its nuclear infrastructure. The suspension of UN sanctions provided Libya the means to enhance its nuclear infrastructure through foreign cooperation and procurement efforts. Tripoli and Moscow continued talks on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center and a potential power reactor deal. Such civil-sector work could have presented Libya with opportunities to pursue technologies also suitable for military purposes. In addition, Libya participated in various technical exchanges through which it could have tried to obtain dual-use equipment and technology that could have enhanced its overall technical capabilities in the nuclear area. Although Libya made political overtures to the West in an attempt to strengthen relations, Libya&'s assertion that Arabs have the right to nuclear weapons in light of Israel and its nuclear program--as Qadhafi stated in a televised speech in March 2002, for example--and Tripoli's continued interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear infrastructure upgrades raised concerns.

Ballistic Missile. The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 allowed Libya to expand its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. During the first half of 2003, Libya continued to depend on foreign assistance--particularly from Serbian, Indian, Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese entities--for its ballistic missile development programs. Libya&'s capability therefore may not still be limited to its Soviet-origin Scud-B missiles. With continued foreign assistance, Libya will likely achieve an MRBM capability--a long-desired goal--probably through direct purchase from North Korea or Iran.

Chemical and Biological. Libya also remained heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for CW precursor chemicals and other key related equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions, Tripoli reestablished contacts with sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Libya has indicated--as evidenced by its observer status at the April 2003 Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference and previous Convention Conferences of States Parties--a willingness to accede to the CWC. Such efforts are consistent with steps that Tripoli is taking to improve its international standing. Tripoli still appeared to be working toward an offensive CW capability and eventual indigenous production. Evidence suggested that Libya also sought dual-use capabilities that could be used to develop and produce BW agents.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Libya continued to seek new advanced conventional weapons and received assistance from other countries in maintaining its inventory of Soviet-era weapons.

Syria
Nuclear. Syria--an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards--has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are looking at Syrian nuclear intentions with growing concern.

Ballistic Missile. During the first half of 2003, Damascus continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria&'s liquid-propellant missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance--primarily from North Korean entities. Damascus also continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition, Syria was developing longer-range missile programs such as a Scud D and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran.

Chemical and Biological. Syria continued to seek CW-related expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also continued to develop an offensive BW capability.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Syria continued to acquire limited quantities of ACW, mainly from Russia. Damascus's Soviet-era debt to Moscow and inability to fund large purchases continued to hamper efforts to purchase the large quantity of equipment Syria requires to replace its aging weapons inventory.

Sudan
Chemical and Biological. Although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the US is working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to seek capabilities from abroad.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. During the reporting period, Sudan sought a variety of military equipment from various sources and received Mi-24 attack helicopters from Russia. In the long-running civil war, as well as for a general military modernization campaign, Khartoum has generally sought older, less expensive ACW and conventional weapons that nonetheless offered more advanced capabilities than the weapons of its opponents and their supporters in neighboring countries. [Source: B&A, CIA Arms Trade Database] We continued to remain concerned that Sudan might seek a ballistic missile capability in the future.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism

The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials remained high. Many of the 33 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors worldwide have expressed interest in CBRN. Although terrorist groups probably will continue to favor long-proven conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings, the arrest of ricin plotters in London in January 2003 indicated that international mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting to conduct chemical and biological attacks.

Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the September 11 attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian and government targets to CBRN attacks.

One of our highest concerns is al-Qa'ida's stated readiness to attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Usama Bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was "a religious duty."

Individuals from terrorist groups worldwide undertook poison training at al-Qa'ida-sponsored camps in Afghanistan and have ready access to information on chemical, biological, radiological, and to some extent, even nuclear weapons, via the Internet, publicly available scientific literature, and scientific conferences, and we know that al-Qa&'ida was working to acquire some of the most dangerous chemical agents and toxins. A senior Bin Ladin associate on trial in Egypt in 1999 claimed his group had chemical and biological weapons. Documents and equipment recovered from al-Qa&'ida facilities in Afghanistan show that Bin Ladin had a more sophisticated unconventional weapons research program than was previously known.

[FBIS, EUP20030109000129, U]

We also know that al-Qa&'ida has ambitions to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and was receptive to any outside nuclear assistance that might become available. [White House Fact Sheet, 20 Dec 2001] In February 2001, during the trial on the al-Qa&'ida bombings of the American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, a government witness--Jamal Ahmad Fadl--testified that al-Qa&'ida pursued the sale of a quantity of purported enriched uranium (which in fact probably was scam material) in Sudan in the early 1990s.

We assess that terrorist groups are capable of conducting attacks using crude radiological dispersal devices--i.e., ones that would not cause large-scale casualties, even though they could cause tremendous psychological effects, and possibly create considerable economic disruption as well. This type of threat first appeared in November 1995 when Chechen rebels placed a package containing radioactive cesium on a bench in Moscow's Izmailovo Park. In addition, we are alert to the very real possibility that al-Qa&'ida or other terrorist groups might also try to launch conventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States to cause panic and economic disruption.


Key Suppliers:
Russia
During the first half of 2003, Russia&'s cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and nuclear industries continued to be eager to raise funds via exports and transfers. Some Russian universities and scientific institutes also showed a willingness to earn much-needed funds by providing WMD or missile-related teaching and training for foreign students. Given the large potential proliferation impact of such exports, transfers, and training, monitoring the activities of specific entities as well as the overall effectiveness of the Russian Government&'s nonproliferation regime remained an important element of the US bilateral dialogue with Russia on nonproliferation.

Nuclear. During the first half of 2003, Russia continued to play a key role in constructing the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project in Iran. However, President Putin has insisted that all Iranian programs in the nuclear field be placed under IAEA control.

President Putin in May 2000 amended the presidential decree on nuclear exports to allow Russia in exceptional cases to export nuclear materials, technology, and equipment to countries that do not have full-scope IAEA safeguards. For example, Russia supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear program in 2001.

Ballistic Missile. Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China. Iran&'s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production.

Chemical and Biological. During the first half of 2003, Russian entities remained a key source of dual-use biotechnology equipment, chemicals and related expertise for countries of concern with active CBW programs. Russia&'s well-known biological and chemical expertise made it an attractive target for countries seeking assistance in areas with CBW applications.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Russia continued to be a major supplier of conventional arms. Following Moscow&'s abrogation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement in November 2000, Russian officials stated that they saw Iran as a significant source of potential revenue from arms sales and believed that Tehran could become Russia&'s third-largest conventional arms customer after China and India. In 2001, Russia was the primary source of ACW for China, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, and one of the largest sources for India. As an example, Russia actively marketed its thermobaric weapons at international arms shows, which likely increases the availability of this type of weapon in the open market.

Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India&'s and China&'s naval nuclear propulsion programs. In addition, Russia discussed leasing nuclear-powered attack submarines to India.

Export Controls. The Duma enacted new export control legislation in 1999, and Putin in 2000 and 2001 reorganized the export control bureaucracy to establish an interdepartmental export control coordinating body, the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation. This organization was to establish federal oversight over export control, including compliance with international export control standards. Further, in 2001, Putin signed into effect several of the new law&'s implementing decrees, which updated export control lists for biological pathogens, chemicals, missiles, and related dual-use technologies and equipment. In May 2002, Russia amended its criminal code to allow for stricter punishment for violations involving the illegal export of material, equipment, and scientific-technical information that may be used in creating WMD or military equipment. The Code of Administrative Violations was also updated and became law as of July 2002. This enactment provided the Department for Export Control (under the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade) with significant administrative enforcement authority. In May 2003, President Putin signed the new Customs Code of the Russian Federation that simplifies customs rules and procedures with the ultimate goal of reducing red tape and arbitrary actions of customs officers. The Code also brings Russia in compliance with the Kyoto Convention on Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures.

[CEP20020530000303, CEP20020508000315, CEP20020423000166]

Despite progress in creating a legal and bureaucratic framework for Russia&'s export controls, lax enforcement remained a serious concern. To reduce the outward flow of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and expertise, top officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities--as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them--that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law will be prosecuted.

North Korea
Nuclear. In late April 2003 during the Beijing talks, North Korea privately threatened to export nuclear weapons.

Ballistic Missile. Throughout the first half of 2003, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Pyongyang attached high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology were one of the North&'s major sources of hard currency, which supported ongoing missile development and production.

China
Over the past several years, Beijing improved its nonproliferation posture through commitments to multilateral arms control regimes, promulgation of export controls, and strengthened oversight mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of great concern.

Nuclear. In October 1997, China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on supplying a uranium conversion facility (UCF), not to enter into any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and to bring to conclusion within a reasonable period of time the two existing projects. We remained concerned that some interactions of concern between Chinese and Iranian entities were continuing. China also made bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. For example, in May 1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. We cannot rule out, however, some continued contacts subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan&'s nuclear weapons program.

Ballistic Missile. In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and in August 2002, as part of its commitment, promulgated a comprehensive missile-related export control system, similar in scope to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex. China is not a member of the MTCR, but on several occasions has pledged not to sell MTCR Category I systems.

Although Beijing has taken some steps to educate firms and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations--offering its first national training course on Chinese export controls in February 2003--Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the first half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant MRBMs. Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. In addition, firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern--such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

Chemical. Since 1997, the US imposed numerous sanctions against Chinese entities for providing material support to the Iranian CW program. Evidence during the current reporting period showed that Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran. In October 2002, China promulgated new controls on biological items and updated chemical-related regulations, and now claims to control all major items on the Australia Group lists.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. During the first half of 2003, China remained a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan and Iran. Islamabad also continued to negotiate with Beijing for China to build up to four frigates for Pakistan's navy and to develop the FC-1 fighter aircraft.

Other Countries
Countries of proliferation concern continued to approach entities in Western Europe, South Asia, and the US to provide needed acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs. Proliferators and associated networks continued to seek machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals. Although western European countries strove to tighten export control regulations, Iran continued to successfully procure dual-use goods and materials from Europe. In addition, several Western European countries remained willing to negotiate ACW sales to Libya, India, Pakistan, and other countries in order to preserve their domestic defense industries. North Korea approached Western Euro-pean entities to obtain acquisitions for its uranium enrichment program. A shipment of aluminum tubing--enough for 4,000 centrifuge tubes--was halted by German authorities.

Western European countries were still an important source for the proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and training. The relatively advanced research of European institutes, the availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, the enthusiasm of scientists for sharing their research, and the availability of dual-use training and education may have shortened development time for some WMD and missile programs.

Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers
As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable technologies continued to be more available around the world, new sources of supply emerged that made the challenge of stemming WMD and missile proliferation even more complex and difficult. Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related technologies have spread to the point that, from a technical view, additional states may be able to produce sufficient fissile material and to develop the capability to weaponize it. As developing countries expanded their chemical industries into pesticide production, they also advanced toward at least latent chemical warfare capability. Likewise, additional non-state actors became more interested in the potential of using biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage. The proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile designs and technology posed the threat of more countries of concern developing longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks to regional stability.

In this context, there was a growing concern that additional states that have traditionally been recipients of WMD and missile-related technology might have followed North Korea's practice of supplying specific WMD-related technology and expertise to other countries or by going one step further to supply such expertise to non-state actors. Even in cases where states took action to stem such transfers, there were growing numbers of knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD- and missile-related materials and technology, who were able to act outside government constraints. Such non-state actors were increasingly capable of providing technology and equipment that previously could only be supplied directly by countries with established capabilities.





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Source: http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm

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Italy Seizes Weapons From U.S.-Bound Ship
AIDAN LEWIS
Associated Press Writer
ROME (AP) -- Authorities in southern Italy seized about 7,500 Kalashnikov assault rifles and other combat-grade firearms from a ship headed for New York, officials said Tuesday.
The weapons - AK-47s, AKM rifles and machine guns worth more than $6 million - were found mixed in with properly labeled guns in cargo containers on board a Turkish-flagged ship that docked at the port of Gioia Tauro, a police official said.
Documents accompanying the cargo indicated the weapons were destined for a company in the U.S. state of Georgia, the official said, declining to name the company.
During customs controls in Italy, officials found that two of the ship's containers held combat-grade Kalashnikov rifles hidden under conventional firearms that included SKA rifles and Mauser rifles. The rifles were designated combat weapons because they had bayonets affixed and cartridges that held up to 30 rounds, the official said.
The official said police suspected the arms were being smuggled, and he declined to give the name of the company in Georgia, citing the need for secrecy during the investigation.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the weapons were discovered 10 days ago, but that police delayed an announcement until they had carried out further checks.
The ship was traveling from the Romanian port of Constanta to New York.
The AK-47 rifles had been altered so they couldn't be used for rapid fire, but the alteration could be easily reversed, police said.
A 1994 ban prevents the U.S. gun industry from making, importing or selling military style semiautomatic weapons because. But that law expires in September.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

Posted by maximpost at 10:09 PM EDT
Permalink

>> PROGRESS REPORTS?...


Iraq awards oil contracts to U.S., European firms

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, April 19, 2004
BAGHDAD - Iraq has awarded oil contracts to companies from Europe and the United States.
The Iraqi Oil Ministry awarded these companies the right to purchase six million barrels of oil from the Kirkuk fields. The leading award was relayed to ExxonMobil of the United States, which won the right to purchase three million barrels of oil.
ExxonMobil, which won a similar award in March, was followed by Spain's Repsol, Greece's Hellenic Petroleum and Turkey's Tupras. They were awarded one million barels each.
The ministry said the oil will be loaded at the Turkish terminal of Ceyhan, along the Mediterranean Sea. The oil will be transported via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, operations of which were renewed in March after a seven-month recess.
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Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.


U.S. Marines engaged in 'silent war' near Syrian border

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, April 19, 2004
BAGHDAD - The United States has been fighting what officials term a silent war with Syria which killed at least five soldiers over the weekend.

U.S. officials said U.S. Marines have deployed along the Syrian border to stop the flow of insurgents and equipment to Iraq. They said Marines have engaged with both Sunni insurgents as well as some Syrian security personnel along the border in clashes that have intensified over the last few weeks.
The U.S. military presence - increased by more than a third over the last two months - was said to be focused on the western Iraqi towns of Al Qaim and Qusaybah, regarded as key points in the smuggling of insurgents and weapons from Syria to Iraq.
Officials acknowledged that at least five soldiers of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, who replaced the 82nd Airborne Division, were killed in battle with 150 insurgents in Husaybah over the weekend, Middle East Newsline reported.
"The Marines did suffer some casualties there," Maj. Gen. John Sattler, director of operations for U.S. Central Command, said. "But in the end, they were able to go ahead and calm that area down. I would say the last six, seven, eight days, we've had some sporadic fighting up in that area, but very limited casualties on the part of the Marines."
In a briefing on April 16, Sattler outlined the mission of the Marines along the Syrian border. He said the mission included constant air and mobile patrols as well as operation of reconnaissance and sensor assets.
Sattler said the Marines have deployed a quick reaction force that includes helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft for attacks along the Syrian border. He said the insurgents move through the Syrian border past Al Qaim to Ramadi and Fallujah. Eventually, he said, many of the insurgents arrive in Baghdad.
"It is a large border and at nighttime there's a lot of wadis and places where individuals can go in and work their way across," Sattler said. "But once they get across they still have a vast portion of desert to come through, and we constantly patrol that to either A. deter them because we are out there in such force, or B. catch them and go ahead and bring them to justice."
U.S. officials said that despite numerous warnings Syria continues to allow Al Qaida-aligned insurgents to enter Iraq. The officials said Syrian border guards have been bribed to ignore the infiltration of insurgents into Iraq.
So far, they said, the Syrian military has not engaged the U.S. Marines along the Iraqi-Syrian border. But they said in some cases Syrian border guards were involved in clashes between insurgents and U.S. troops. They did not report casualties among the Syrian guards.

Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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>> OIL FOR SCANDAL CONTINUED...


Oil-for-Terror?
There appears to be much worse news to uncover in the Oil-for-Food scandal.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/rosett200404182336.asp
By Claudia Rosett

Beyond the billions in graft, smuggling, and lavish living for Saddam Hussein that were the hallmarks of the United Nations Oil-for-Food program in Iraq, there is one more penny yet to drop.

It's time to talk about Oil-for-Terror.
Especially with the U.N.'s own investigation into Oil-for-Food now taking shape, and more congressional hearings in the works, it is high time to focus on the likelihood that Saddam may have fiddled Oil-for-Food contracts not only to pad his own pockets, buy pals, and acquire clandestine arms -- but also to fund terrorist groups, quite possibly including al Qaeda.
There are at least two links documented already. Both involve oil buyers picked by Saddam and approved by the U.N. One was a firm with close ties to a Liechtenstein trust that has since been designated by the U.N. itself as "belonging to or affiliated with Al Qaeda." The other was a Swiss-registered subsidiary of a Saudi oil firm that had close dealings with the Taliban during Osama bin Laden's 1990's heyday in Afghanistan.
These cases were reported in a carefully researched story published last June by Marc Perelman of the New York-based Forward, relying not only on interviews, but on corporate-registry documents and U.S. and U.N. terror-watch lists. It was an important dispatch but sank quickly from sight. At that stage, the U.N. was still busy praising its own $100-billion-plus Oil-for-Food program, even while trying quietly to strip out the huge graft overlay from the remaining $10 billion or so in contracts suddenly slated for handover to the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). That was shortly before the records kept in Baghdad by Saddam began surfacing in such damning profusion that Secretary-General Kofi Annan was finally forced last month to stop stonewalling and agree to an independent investigation -- though just how independent remains to be seen.
As it now appears, Oil-for-Food pretty much evolved into a BCCI with a U.N. label. The stated aim of the program, which ran from 1996-2003, was to reduce the squeeze of sanctions on ordinary Iraqis by allowing Saddam to sell oil strictly to buy food and other relief supplies. As Oil-for-Food worked in practice, however, the program gave Saddam rich opportunity not only to pad his own pockets, but to fund almost anything and anyone else he chose, while the U.N. assured the world that all was well. (For the full saga, see my article in the May issue of Commentary, "The Oil-for-Food Scam: What Did Kofi Annan Know and When Did He Know It?").
For a sample of the latitude enjoyed by Saddam, there's Treasury's announcement last week that the U.S., in its latest round of efforts to recover Saddam's loot, is asking U.N. member states to freeze the assets of a worldwide group of eight front companies and five individuals that were "procuring weapons, skimming funds, operating for the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and doing business in support of the fallen Saddam Hussein regime." The list includes a Dubai-based firm, Al Wasel & Babel General Trading, a major contractor under the Oil-for-Food program that turned out to be a front company set up by Saddam's regime specifically to sell goods (and procure arms) via the program -- right under the U.N.'s approving eye. Indeed, Al Wasel & Babel's website boasts that the company was set up in 1999 especially to "cater to the needs of Iraq Government under 'Oil for Food Program.' "
HOW SADDAM GOT HIS WAY
In this context, which suggests just how easily money might also have been passed right along to terrorists, Perelman's tale of terrorist links deserves a reprise. We will get to that below. The details are complex, which in matters of terrorist financing tends to be part of the point. Complications provide cover. So before we dive into a welter of names and links, let's take a look at how Oil-for-Food was configured and run by the U.N. in ways that left the program wide open not only to the abuses and debaucheries by now well publicized, but also to the funneling of money to terrorists -- if Saddam so chose.
And though this avenue remains to be explored, it is at least worth noting that the explosive growth of Oil-for-Food -- from a limited program for Iraqi relief introduced in 1996 to a kickback-wracked fiesta of fraud and money-laundering by the late 1990s and beyond -- coincided neatly with the period in which al Qaeda really took off. It was in 1998 that Oil-for-Food began to expand and more fully accommodate Saddam's scams. If allegations detailed in a Wall Street Journal story on March 11 prove correct, 1998 was also the year that Saddam may have begun sending oil to a Panamanian front company linked to the head of the program, Benon Sevan. And it was in 1998 that Osama bin Laden issued his fatwa, specifically denouncing U.S. intervention in Iraq and urging Muslims to "Kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they can find it."
To be sure, there is no evidence of a causal connection. But there is certainly room to wonder whether Saddam, a master of manipulation, on record as sharing bin Laden's sentiments at least in regard to U.S. involvement in Iraq, would not have been tempted to involve himself in the terrorist boom of the next few years. In principle he was still under sanctions, but Oil-for-Food gave him loopholes through which billions of dollars could pass.
As Oil-for-Food worked in practice, there were two glaring flaws that lent themselves to manipulation by Saddam. One was the U.N. decision to allow Saddam to choose his own buyers of oil and suppliers of goods -- an arrangement that Annan himself helped set up during negotiations in Baghdad in the mid-1990s, shortly before he was promoted to Secretary-General. The other problem was the U.N.'s policy of treating Saddam's deals as highly confidential, putting deference to Saddam's privacy above the public's right to know. Even the Iraqi people were denied access to the most basic information about the deals that were in theory being done in their name. The identities of the contractors, the amounts paid, the quantity and quality of goods, the sums, fees, interest, and precise transactions involved in the BNP Paribas bank accounts -- all were kept confidential between Saddam and the U.N.
With Saddam allowed to assemble a secret roster of favorite business partners, the only hope of preserving any integrity under Oil-for-Food was that the U.N. would ferociously monitor every deal, and veto anything remotely suspect. Instead, the Security Council looked for weapons-related goods; the Secretariat looked for ways to expand the program (while collecting its three-percent commission on Saddam's oil sales); and Saddam looked for -- and found -- ways to pervert the program.
To grasp just how easily the U.N. let Saddam turn Oil-for-Food to his own ends, it helps to see his lists of contractors, which the U.N. kept confidential. Luckily, some lists have leaked, and in paging through the wonderland of Saddam's U.N.-approved clientele, including many hundreds of oil buyers and goods suppliers, what one finds is a vast web of business partners that -- had the U.N. followed any reasonable policy of disclosure -- should have set off major alarms from beginning to end of the program. Why, for instance, was Saddam allowed to peddle oil (especially under-priced oil -- yielding fat profits) to clusters of what were clearly middlemen in such financial hideouts as Cyprus, Liechtenstein, and Panama? Was it wise to let him kick off the program by including among the first 50 or so oil buyers a full dozen based in Switzerland? Did nobody at the U.N. wonder about his choice of business partners -- such as a holding company in the Seychelles; the Burmese state lumber enterprise; and the Center for Joint Projects at the executive committee of the Belarus-Russia Union?
On the suppliers' list, the entries are no less intriguing. To take just one typical example: On the vague and generic lists provided by the U.N. to the public, you can see that Saddam bought both milk and oil-industry equipment from Russia. Once you see the in-house spreadsheet, however, what emerges is that Saddam bought not only oil equipment, but more than $5 million worth of milk from a Russian state oil company, Zarubezhneft. What look like diverse suppliers in various countries in some cases track back to fronts elsewhere, or to parent companies that in the graft-rich environment of Oil-for-Food clearly had enough of an inside track with Saddam to garner hundreds of millions worth of business -- hidden at least to some extent from both their competitors and the wider public, which was asked to trust the U.N.
In other words, Saddam did pretty much what he wanted, and the U.N. role seems to have consisted largely of occupying one more slot -- and not a terribly vigilant one -- on his patronage payroll.
AIDING AL QAEDA?
Which brings us to back to terrorist ties, and Perelman's story of June 20, 2003, for which the reporting checks out. In brief (hang on for the ride): One link ran from a U.N.-approved buyer of Saddam's oil, Galp International Trading Corp., involved near the very start of the program, to a shell company called ASAT Trust in Liechtenstein, linked to a bank in the Bahamas, Bank Al Taqwa. Both ASAT Trust and Bank Al Taqwa were designated on the U.N.'s own terror-watch list, shortly after 9/11, as entities "belonging to or affiliated with Al Qaeda." This Liechtenstein trust and Bahamian bank were linked to two closely connected terrorist financiers, Youssef Nada and Idris Ahmed Nasreddin -- both of whom were described in 2002 by Treasury as "part of an extensive financial network providing support to Al Qaeda and other terrorist related organizations," and both of whom appear on the U.N.'s list of individuals belonging to or affiliated with al Qaeda.
The other tie between Oil-for-Food and al Qaeda, noted by Perelman, ran through another of Saddam's handpicked, Oil-for-Food oil buyers, Swiss-based Delta Services -- which bought oil from Saddam in 2000 and 2001, at the height of Saddam's scam for grafting money out of Oil-for-Food by way of under-priced oil contracts. Now shut down, Delta Services was a subsidiary of a Saudi Arabian firm, Delta Oil, which had close ties to the Taliban during Osama bin Laden's heyday in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. In discussions of graft via Oil-for-Food, it has been assumed that the windfall profits were largely kicked back to Saddam, or perhaps used to sway prominent politicians and buy commercial lobbying clout. But that begs further inquiry. There was every opportunity here for Saddam not solely to pocket the plunder, but to send it along to whomever he chose -- once he had tapped into the appropriate networks.
Are there other terrorist links? Did Saddam actually send money for terrorist uses through those named by the Forward? Given the more than $100 billion that coursed through Oil-for-Food, it would seem a very good idea to at least try to find out. And while there has been great interest so far in the stunning sums of money involved in this fraud, there has been rather less focus on the potential terrorist connections. While Treasury has been ransacking the planet for Saddam's plunder, there is, as far as I have been able to discover, no investigation so far in motion, or even in the making, focused specifically on terrorist ties in those U.N. lists of Saddam's favored partners.
Indeed, the whereabouts of the full U.N. Oil-for-Food records themselves remain, to say the least, confusing. By some official U.N. accounts, they were all turned over to the Coalition Provisional Authority; by others they were not. A U.N. source explained to me last week that some of the records might be in boxes somewhere on Long Island; yet another says they were sent over to the U.S. Mission to the U.N. Especially crucial, one might suppose, would be the bank records, which should show into which accounts, and where, the Oil-for-Food funds were paid. But what is clear is that no one has so far sat down with access to the full records and begun piecing together the labyrinth of Saddam's financing with an eye, specifically, to potential terrorist ties.
If there is a silver lining to all this, it is that those contract lists and bank records could be a treasure trove of information -- an insider tour of what Saddam's regime knew about the dark side of global finance. There are plenty of signs that the secret U.N. lists became, in effect, Saddam's little black book (papered over with a blue U.N. label). Though perhaps "little" is not the correct word. The labyrinth was vast. The wisest move by the U.N., the U.S., or any other authority with full access to these records, would be to make them fully public -- thus recruiting help from observers worldwide, not least the media, in digging through the hazardous waste left by Oil-for-Food. The issue is not simply how much Saddam pilfered, or even whether he bought up half the governments of Russia and France -- but whether, under the U.N. charade of supervision, he availed himself of the huge opportunities to fund carnage under the cover of U.N. sanctions and humanitarian relief. We are way overdue to pick up that trail.

-- Claudia Rosett is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and an adjunct fellow with the Hudson Institute.
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KILLER GOT U.N. OIL 'REWARD'

By NILES LATHEM
Lebanese businessman George Tarkhaynan
http://www.nypost.com/news/worldnews/22925.htm
April 19, 2004 -- WASHINGTON - In a sinister oil-for-murder plot, Saddam Hussein used the scandal-plagued U.N. oil-for-food program to set up the assassination of a prominent Iraqi exile politician, the slain man's family has charged.
A mysterious George Tarkhaynan appears on an Iraqi Oil Ministry list, published by a Baghdad newspaper, of 270 politicians and businessmen who received sweetheart oil deals under the U.N. humanitarian program.
Safia al-Souhail, a leading political figure in post-Saddam Iraq, told The Post she has evidence that Tarkhaynan is a former Beirut shirtmaker and once-trusted family friend who helped Iraq assassinate her father, anti-Saddam dissident Sheik Taleb al-Souhail al-Tamimi, in Lebanon in 1994.
"George Tarkhaynan was a good agent for them. He facilitated the killing of my father who was an enemy of the regime. This oil voucher was like a present for what he did," al-Souhail said by phone from Baghdad.
The plot is the latest allegation to surface in the mushrooming U.N. scandal in which Saddam is said to have pocketed a staggering $10.1 billion through illegal oil sales and kickbacks.
Tarkhaynan and three Iraqi diplomats in Beirut spent two years in jail for murdering the 64-year old al-Souhail, who had helped organize an unsuccessful 1993 coup against Saddam.
Although media reports at the time said Lebanese prosecutors had solid evidence against them, including coded messages from Baghdad, they were released in 1996 and sent to Iraq as part of a controversial deal to reopen economic ties between the two countries.
Tarkhaynan was later allocated vouchers enabling him to buy up to 7 million barrels of Iraqi oil at below-market prices that could be resold at profits of between 25 and 50 cents a barrel.
That means he was slated to receive up to $3.5 million in oil profits.
Al-Souhail was outraged to learn that Tarkhaynan and others had gotten oil deals.
"These people were covering for Saddam, they were lobbying for him . . . The money they got belongs to the Iraqi people," she said.
Tarkhaynan, who has in the past protested his innocence, could not be reached for comment.
Al-Souhail said Tarkhaynan spent at least seven years in Iraq after being sprung from jail and fled Baghdad days before Saddam fell. She said he'd been employed by the State Oil Marketing Organization, which sold Iraqi oil abroad, and was often a point of contact for foreigners seeking deals with SOMO under the U.N. program.
Al-Souhail described Tarkhaynan as a trusted advisor to her father, who fled Iraq in 1968.

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The Oil-for-Food Scam: What Did Kofi Annan Know, and When Did He Know It?
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/SpecialArticle.asp?article=A11705017_1
Claudia Rosett

For years, the United Nations Oil-for-Food program was just one more blip on the multilateral landscape: a relief program for Iraq, a way to feed hungry children in a far-off land until the world had settled its quarrels with Saddam Hussein. Last May, after the fall of Saddam, the UN Security Council voted to lift sanctions on Iraq, end Oil-for-Food later in the year, and turn over any remaining business to the U.S.-led authority in Baghdad. On November 20, with some ceremony, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan lauded the program's many accomplishments, praising in particular its long-serving executive director, Benon Sevan. The next day, Oil-for-Food came to an end.

But it has not ended. Suddenly, Oil-for-Food is with us again, this time splashed all over the news as the subject of scandal at the UN: bribes, kickbacks, fraud, smuggling; stories of graft involving tens of billions of dollars and countless barrels of oil, and implicating big business and high officials in dozens of countries; allegations that the head of the program himself was on the take. In February, having at first denied any wrongdoing, Sevan stopped giving interviews and was then reported to be on vacation, heading into retirement. By March, the U.S. Congress was preparing to hold hearings into Oil-for-Food. Kofi Annan, having denied any knowledge of misdeeds by UN staff, finally bowed to demands for an independent inquiry into the UN program, saying, "I don't think we need to have our reputation impugned."

The tale has been all very interesting, and all very complicated. For those who look yearningly to the UN for answers to the world's problems, it has provoked, perhaps, some introspection about the pardonable corruption that threatens even the most selfless undertakings. For those who believe the UN can do nothing right, Oil-for-Food, whatever it was about, is a delicious vindication that everyone and everything at the world organization is crooked, the institution a fiasco, and politicians who support it fit for recall at the next electoral opportunity.

The excitement may be justified, but a number of important facts and conclusions have gone missing. Oil-for-Food, run by the UN from 1996 to 2003, did, in fact, deliver some limited relief to Iraqis. It also evolved into not only the biggest but the most extravagant, hypocritical, and blatantly perverse relief program ever administered by the UN. But Oil-for-Food is not simply a saga of one UN program gone wrong. It is also the tale of a systematic failure on the part of what is grandly called the international community.

Oil-for-Food tainted almost everything it touched. It was such a kaleidoscope of corruption as to defy easy summary, let alone concentration on the main issues. But let us try.

Oil-for-Food had its beginnings in the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq following Saddam Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. These prohibited UN member states from trading with Iraq until the regime had satisfactorily disarmed. Saddam refused to comply, and in the aftermath of the first Gulf war the sanctions remained in place. (Even under sanctions, Iraqis were theoretically allowed to import essential foods and medicines, but Saddam's repressive system prevented them from earning the necessary foreign exchange.) Reports fed by Saddam's regime soon began to surface that the sanctions were imposing severe suffering on ordinary Iraqis. The UN, then led by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, broached the idea of allowing Iraq to sell oil in limited quantities, strictly to buy relief supplies.

At first, Saddam resisted this, too. But in the mid-1990's, perhaps because he was feeling the pinch, or quite likely because he had by then seen ways and built up the leverage to turn such a plan to his advantage, he finally agreed. On April 14, 1995, the UN (then under Boutros Boutros-Ghali) passed Resolution 986, authorizing as a "temporary measure" what become known as the Oil-for-Food program, and then spent months working out with Saddam the details of implementation.

From the start, the program was poorly designed. Saddam had blamed the fate of starving Iraqi children on the sanctions regime and specifically on the United States. Seeking to address these charges, the Clinton administration went looking for a compromise; with the Secretariat in the lead, the Security Council agreed to conditions on Oil-for-Food that were, to say the least, amenable to manipulation. Saddam, the author of the miseries of Iraq, was given the right to negotiate his own contracts to sell Iraqi oil and to choose his own foreign customers. He was also allowed to draw up the shopping lists of humanitarian supplies--the "distribution plans"--and to strike his own deals for these goods, picking his foreign suppliers. The UN also granted Saddam a say in the choice of the bank that would mainly handle the funds and issue the letters of credit to pay these suppliers; the designated institution was a French bank now known as BNP Paribas.1

To be sure, the UN reserved for itself the authority to reject Saddam's proposed contracts and his plans for distribution of goods inside Iraq; to control the program's bank accounts; and to ensure that Saddam's buying and selling were in compliance with the UN's humanitarian plan. As spelled out in Resolution 986, oil was to be sold "at fair-market value," and the proceeds were to pay solely for goods and services that would be used "for equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country."

To all this, the UN added another twist. Unlike most of its relief programs, in which both the cost of the relief itself and UN overhead were paid for by contributions from member states, Oil-for-Food would in every respect be funded entirely out of Saddam's oil revenues. The UN Secretariat would collect a 2.2-percent commission on every barrel of Iraqi oil sold, plus 0.8 percent to pay for UN weapons inspections in Iraq.

If the aim of this provision was to make Saddam bear the cost of his own obstinacy, the effect was to create a situation in which the UN Secretariat was paid handsomely, on commission, by Saddam--to supervise Saddam. And the bigger Oil-for-Food got, the bigger the fees collected by Annan's office. Over the seven years of the program, oil sales ultimately totaled some $65 billion. On the spending side, the UN says $46 billion went for aid to Iraq, and $18.2 billion was paid out as compensation to victims of Saddam's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait. As for commissions to the Secretariat, these ran to about $1.9 billion, of which $1.4 billion was earmarked for administrative overhead for the humanitarian program (the UN says it turned over $300 million of this to help pay for relief, but no public accounting has ever been given) and another $500 million or so for weapons inspections in Iraq. Discrepancies in these numbers can be chalked up to interest paid on some of the funds, exchange-rate fluctuations, or simply the murk in which most of the Oil-for-Food transactions remain shrouded to this day.

Whether Saddam should have enjoyed the right to dispose of all Iraqi oil was never questioned. In Iraq, oil was the province of a state monopoly, which Saddam in effect claimed for his own, and on that basis was the UN deal struck. The arrangement actually helped strengthen Saddam's chokehold at home. With sanctions effectively forbidding all other foreign commerce, Iraq's only legitimate trade was whatever flowed through Saddam's ministries under the supervision of the UN program. Thus the UN gave to Saddam the entire import-export franchise for Iraq, taking upon itself the responsibility for ensuring that he would use this arrangement to help Iraq's 26 million people. The success of the program depended wholly on the UN's integrity, competence, and willingness to prevent Saddam from subverting the setup to his own benefit.

This was perhaps an impossible brief. But the Secretariat eagerly shouldered the burden, accepting along with it the commissions that flowed straight from Iraq's oil spigots. Introduced as an ad-hoc deal, Oil-for-Food soon took on the marks of a more permanent arrangement. It was a project in which Annan had a direct hand from the beginning. As Under-Secretary General, he had led the first UN team to negotiate with Saddam over the terms of the sales under Oil-for-Food. The first shipment went out in December 1996; the following month, Annan succeeded Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General.

Nine months later, in October 1997, Annan tapped Benon Sevan, an Armenian Cypriot and longtime UN official, to consolidate and run the various aspects of the Iraq relief operation under a newly established agency called the Office of the Iraq Program (but usually referred to simply as Oil-for-Food). Sevan served as executive director for the duration, reporting directly to Annan. The program was divided into roughly six-month phases; at the start of each phase, Sevan would report and Annan would recommend the program's continuation to the Security Council, signing off directly on Saddam's "distribution plans."

An issue that would later become important was how, precisely, the responsibilities for executing the program were parceled out between the Security Council--a committee of fifteen member states--and the Secretariat, run by Annan. All of Saddam's proposed contracts flowed through the Security Council, which doubled as the Iraq "sanctions committee." But in practice, the fifteen member governments were mostly on the watch for so-called dual-use items: goods that might be used to make weapons.

As it turned out, only two of the five permanent, veto-wielding members appear to have done any overseeing at all. These were the UK and the U.S., both of which had almost no direct business with Saddam's Iraq. The UN representatives of the other three--France, Russia, and China--devoted their energies chiefly to urging expansion of the program and forwarding the paperwork submitted by the many contractors in their respective nations whom Saddam had selected as his buyers and suppliers. As for the ten rotating members of the Security Council, some--like Syria--were among Saddam's favored trading partners, while most of the others lacked the resources to keep track of the huge volume of business the program soon generated.

If final responsibility lay anywhere at all, it lay with the Secretariat. It was this body that fielded a substantial presence in Iraq (the U.S., apart from weapons inspectors ejected early on, had none), employing at the height of the program some 3,600 Iraqis plus 893 international staff working in Iraq for the nine UN agencies coordinated by the Oil-for-Food office; another 100 or so were employed back in New York. The Secretariat was the keeper of the contract records and the books, and controller of the bank accounts, with sole power to authorize the release of Saddam's earnings to pay for imports to Iraq. The Secretariat arranged for audits of the program, was the chief interlocutor with Saddam, got paid well for its pains, and disseminated to the public extremely long reports in which most of the critical details of the transactions were not included.

One of the first changes introduced by Sevan was greater secrecy. According to John Fawcett, the co-author of a 70-page report on Saddam's finances released in 2002 by the Washington-based Coalition for International Justice, the UN had been fairly open about the specifics of Saddam's contracts during the first year of the program. From about 1998 on, however, it categorized the most germane details as "proprietary"--carefully guarding Saddam's privacy in his business deals. Thus, there was no disclosure of such basic information as the names of individual contractors or the price, quality, or quantity of goods involved in any given deal--all vital to judging the integrity of contracts.

Instead, the Office of the Iraq Program released long lists representing billions of dollars in business but noting only the date, country of origin, whether or not the contract had been approved for release of funding, and highly generic descriptions of goods. Typical of the level of detail were notations like "electric motor" from France, "adult milk" from Saudi Arabia, "detergent" from Russia, "cable" from China. Who in particular might be profiting, or at what price, was kept confidential. Nor did the UN disclose interest paid on the Oil-for-Food accounts at BNP Paribas or (possibly) other banks, which toward the end of the program held balances of more than $12 billion. Nor did it ever share with the public the details of how the $1.9 billion in commissions flowing from Saddam for aid and arms inspections (the latter were discontinued from late 1998 to late 2002) were spent by the UN Secretariat.

The year 1998, the first full year of the program under Sevan's directorship, is of special interest in this connection. For starters, if evidence cited in the Wall Street Journal turns out to be correct, this was the year in which Saddam's government may have begun covertly sending gifts of oil to Sevan himself by way of a Panamanian firm. It was also the year in which the UN terminated a contract with a UK-based firm, Lloyd's Register, for the crucial job of inspecting all Oil-for-Food shipments into Iraq, and replaced it with a Swiss-based firm, Cotecna Inspections, with ties to Kofi Annan's son Kojo. At the time, neither Cotecna nor the UN declared these ties as a possible conflict of interest, which they were.2

Also in 1998, at Sevan's urging, the UN expanded Oil-for-Food to allow Saddam to import not just food and medicine but oil-industry equipment, and at Annan's urging more than doubled the amount of oil Iraq was allowed to sell, raising the cap from roughly $4 billion to more than $10 billion per year. That same year, after much hindering and dickering, Saddam threw out the UN weapons inspectors--forbidding their return until the U.S. and Britain finally forced the issue four years later.

This brings us to 1999-2000, when, following Sevan's urging, the program expanded yet further; with more funds devoted to the oil sector, and with the weapons inspectors gone, the UN now removed the limits on sales. In 2000, Saddam enjoyed a blockbuster year. By this time he was not only selling vastly more oil but had institutionalized a system for pocketing cash on the side.

It worked like this. Saddam would sell at below-market prices to his hand-picked customers--the Russians and the French were special favorites--and they could then sell the oil to third parties at a fat profit. Part of this profit they would keep, part they would kick back to Saddam as a "surcharge," paid into bank accounts outside the UN program, in violation of UN sanctions.

By means of this scam, Saddam's regime ultimately skimmed off for itself billions of dollars in proceeds that were supposed to have been spent on relief for the Iraqi people. When the scheme was reported in the international press--in November 2000, for example, Reuters carried a long dispatch about Saddam's demands for a 50-cent premium over official UN prices on every barrel of Iraqi oil--the UN haggled with Saddam but did not stop it.

Beyond that, Saddam had also begun smuggling out oil through Turkey, Jordan, and Syria. This was in flagrant defiance of UN sanctions and made a complete mockery of Oil-for-Food, whose whole point was to channel all of Saddam's trade. The smuggling, too, was widely reported in the press--and shrugged off by the UN. In the same period, Saddam imposed his own version of sanctions on the U.S., demanding that Oil-for-Food funds be switched from dollars into euros. The UN complied, thereby making it even harder for observers to keep track of its largely secretive and confusing bookkeeping.

As Oil-for-Food grew in size and scope, the U.S. mission to the UN began putting a significant number of its relief contracts on hold for closer scrutiny. Both Sevan and Annan complained publicly and often about these delays, describing them as injurious to the people of Iraq and urging the Security Council to push the contracts through faster. What Sevan did not convey was that, by 2000, complaints had begun reaching him about Iraqi government demands for kickbacks from suppliers on the relief side. These (according to a recent report in the Financial Times) Sevan simply buried, telling complainants to submit formal documents to the Security Council through their countries' UN missions (something they had no incentive to do since Saddam would most likely have responded by scrapping the deals altogether).

By 2002, the sixth year of the program, it was no longer credible that the UN Secretariat could be clueless about Saddam's systematic violations and exploitation of the humanitarian purpose of Oil-for-Food. On May 2, in a front-page story by Alix M. Freedman and Steve Stecklow, the Wall Street Journal documented in detail Saddam's illicit kickbacks on underpriced oil contracts, noting that "at least until recently, the UN has given Iraq surprising influence over the official price of its oil." In fact, against the resistance of Russia, France, China, and the UN Secretariat, the U.S. and Britain had been trying to put a halt to the kickbacks through an elaborate system to enforce fairer pricing--but with only limited success. Sevan, clearly aware of the scam, was quoted in the Journal article as saying he had "no mandate" to stop it.

Apparently, however, there was a near-boundless mandate for the Secretariat to expand the scope of the spending. A mere fortnight later, on May 14, 2002, the Security Council passed a resolution cutting itself out of the loop entirely on all Oil-for-Food contracts deemed humanitarian, and giving direct power of approval to the Secretary-General. Henceforth, the Security Council would confine its oversight to items of potential dual use, such as chemical spraying equipment, or forbidden goods like highly enriched uranium, nuclear-reactor components, and the like. Unimpeded responsibility for the "humanitarian" aspect of the program fell to Annan.

The next month, "humanitarian" became a broad category indeed. On June 2, Annan approved a newly expanded shopping list by Saddam that the Secretariat dubbed "Oil-for-Food Plus." This added ten new sectors to be funded by the program, including "labor and social affairs," "information," "justice," and "sports." Either the Secretary-General had failed to notice or he did not care that none of these had anything to do with the equitable distribution of relief. By contrast, they had everything to do with the running of Saddam's totalitarian state. "Labor," "information," and "justice" were the realms of Baathist party patronage, propaganda, censorship, secret police, rape rooms, and mass graves. As for sports, that was the favorite arena of Saddam's sadistic son Uday, already infamous for torturing Iraqi athletes.

Then came the autumn of 2002, when President Bush delivered his warning to Saddam to comply with sixteen previous UN resolutions to disarm, and the U.S. persuaded the Security Council to pass a seventeenth. Though there was by this time no dearth of damning information in the public domain, Oil-for-Food rolled on. On September 18, the Coalition for International Justice released its heavily researched report, Sources of Revenue for Saddam & Sons, documenting rampant corruption and smuggling under UN sanctions and Oil-for-Food, warning of an Iraqi shift from "informal, on-the-sly deals" to increasingly "brazen and formal government-to-government arrangements," and asking how, "given . . . the world's largest humanitarian program ever, can there remain shortages of basic medicines and foodstuffs" in Iraq? Four months later, with Saddam still defiant and war looking likely, Annan signed a letter to the Security Council in which, among other things, he approved the use of $20 million in Oil-for-Food funds to pay for an "Olympic sport city" and $50 million to equip Saddam's propaganda arm, the Ministry of Information.3

By then, of course, debate over Iraq was raging in the Security Council, and the U.S. and Britain were bitterly at odds with France and Russia. Annan weighed in publicly on the side of the latter, urging yet more time and tolerance. He did not mention his own interest as the boss of a massive relief program funded by Saddam. Neither did he mention that Saddam's commercial deals heavily favored French and Russian companies, though he had access to actual numbers about those deals that, thanks to UN secretiveness, the public did not.

On March 17, with the U.S.-led coalition poised to invade, Annan pulled his international staff out of Iraq. Three days later, as coalition forces rolled into Iraq, he expressed regret that war had come "despite the best efforts of the international community and the United Nations." Describing the UN as the keeper of international "legitimacy," he assured the Iraqi people that, as soon as possible, the UN would be back to do "whatever it can to bring them assistance and support."

Following the fall of Saddam's regime, the U.S.-led coalition decided that Iraq had experienced enough of UN-style "assistance and support," at least as far as Oil-for-Food was concerned. With Russia and France suddenly willing to go along, perhaps to avoid scrutiny of Oil-for-Russia and Oil-for-France, the Security Council voted unanimously on May 22 that the program should be wound down. No more oil revenues were to flow in, but the UN Secretariat was to continue administering the remaining relief contracts until November, when any unfinished business would be turned over to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad.

At that stage, Oil-for-Food had close to $13 billion in BNP Paribas's Iraq accounts, most of it set aside to pay for contracts already approved. During the summer and early fall, the New York office began tidying up loose ends, renegotiating, "prioritizing," and basically removing the graft elements from the remaining contracts before handover to the CPA. In these efforts, the UN got some prompting from the U.S. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)--the agency that has been auditing Halliburton's recent activities in Iraq.

From the thousands of remaining contracts, the DCMA (together with the Defense Contract Audit Agency) culled a batch of 759 of the largest deals, valued altogether at $6.9 billion. The reviewers estimated that among these contracts, almost half were overpriced by about 21 percent, for a total of $656 million that Saddam's regime had overpaid. This was in all likelihood the kickback component, part of which the suppliers were meant to share illicitly with the regime. Dryly, the DCMA's report adds that, in the course of its researches, "Some items of questionable utility for the Iraqi people (e.g., Mercedes Benz touring sedans) were identified."

By the time the Oil-for-Food office was finished renegotiating its contracts, it had scrapped more than a quarter of them. Some of the reasons, listed in UN public documents, are intriguing. There was, for example, the Syrian supplier of "spare parts for rotating equipment" whom it was "not possible to contact"; the Lebanese vendor of "welding machines" who was "unwilling to accept the 10-percent deduction"--i.e., a price minus the bribe-plus-kickback; and the Jordanian seller of school furniture whose contract had to be dropped because "company does not exist and the person in charge moved to Egypt."

Then came the formal ceremonies to which I have already alluded. On November 19, Sevan's office put out a press release praising Oil-for-Food as "one of the most efficient of UN programs." On November 20, Annan chimed in with his own praise for Oil-for-Food, paying tribute to the staff and "particularly to its executive director, Benon Sevan." On November 21, almost seven years after setting up shop as a temporary and limited measure to bring food and medicine to hungry people in Iraq, the program shut down, handing the CPA a royal mess.

Sevan had assured the Security Council that, along with control of the more than $8 billion in funds and contracts still to be administered, the CPA would get "the entire Oil-for-Food database." In fact, the transfer was incomplete. Plenty of contract information was missing. So Byzantine were the BNP Paribas accounts that, rather than risk interrupting relief deliveries, the CPA simply left them under the management of the UN treasurer, who until almost a year after the fall of Saddam never got around to sending any current bank statements, let alone prior records.4

Meanwhile, however, the Iraqi Governing Council had itself begun to pore over records of the Saddam regime from various ministries, and former Baath officials were also starting to talk. On December 5, a British adviser to the Council, Claude Hankes-Drielsma, wrote from Baghdad to Annan, urging the UN to "take the moral high ground" and appoint an independent commission to investigate profiteering under Oil-for-Food.

Not a moment too soon: now the revelations were beginning to flow rapidly. On January 25 of this year, the Iraqi newspaper Al-Mada published a list, reportedly recovered from the Iraqi oil ministry, of some 270 individuals and entities in some 50 countries who were alleged to have received vouchers good for oil from Saddam Hussein. The list was an eye-opener. It included the former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, British MP George Galloway, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a large number of Russian oil companies, the Russian state, and the Russian Orthodox Church. It also included the family name of the head of the UN Oil-for-Food program: Sevan.

Those named in Al-Mada's list ignored, denied, or dismissed it on grounds that they had legitimately bought oil from Saddam. As for Sevan, he categorically repudiated the notion that he had ever received oil or oil money from the Iraqi regime, while Annan, in a statement more artfully hedged, said: "As far as I know, nobody in the Secretariat has committed any wrongdoing." A spokesman for the UN Secretariat repeated the by-now usual line that Oil-for-Food had been the most audited program at the UN--"audited to death" was the exact phrase--and in late February the Oil-for-Food office released a seven-page statement clearly aimed at deflecting blame for any graft involved with the program.

According to this official account, the Secretariat had no responsibility for confirming that contract-pricing was fair, or that suppliers were legitimate (that was the job of Saddam and the UN country missions); no responsibility for implementing the program (that too was the job of Saddam); no responsibility for either spotting or stopping corruption by Saddam via Oil-for-Food contracts (that was the job of the Security Council); and no awareness of unauthorized oil exports (though the office confirmed its knowledge of "media reports on alleged violations"). By the light of this clarification, indeed, it was hard to tell what the Oil-for-Food program was, in fact, responsible for, beyond controlling the opaque bank accounts, checking that the contracts--honest or not--were properly punctuated, watching Saddam do whatever he chose, and collecting a 2.2-percent commission on his oil.

And so we arrive at the denouement--at least so far. On February 29, the New York Times published a long news article based on "a trove of internal Iraqi government documents and financial records" unearthed by the Iraqi Governing Council. The article described oil traders lugging suitcases full of illicit cash to the ministries and cited stacks of evidence showing that, through Oil-for-Food, Saddam's regime had squirreled away billions for itself while ordinary Iraqis received expired medicines and substandard rations.

Still the UN hung tough. On March 3, Hankes-Drielsma notified Annan that Iraqi authorities had asked an auditing firm, KPMG International, and a law firm, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, to prepare an independent report. In his letter, Hankes-Drielsma explained his reasoning:

Based on the facts as I know them at the present time, the UN failed in its responsibility to the Iraqi people and the international community at large. The UN should not be surprised that the Iraqi people question the UN's credibility at this time and any future role for the UN in Iraq. It will not come as a surprise if the Oil-for-Food program turns out to be one of the world's most disgraceful scams and an example of inadequate control, responsibility, and transparency, providing an opportune vehicle for Saddam Hussein to operate under the UN aegis to continue his reign of terror and oppression.

On March 10 came confirmation that Annan's son Kojo had held a consultancy with Cotecna right around the time the company won the UN job to inspect goods coming into Iraq. On March 11 came an article in the Wall Street Journal detailing further links between Saddam's oil largesse and Sevan. The following week came word that Congress would hold hearings on Oil-for-Food. And on March 19, having ignored, stonewalled, and denied, Annan finally conceded that "it is highly possible there has been quite a lot of wrongdoing," and called for an independent inquiry.

As the various audits, investigations, and hearings gear up to delve into the saga of UN involvement in Saddam's Iraq, we may learn even more about his worldwide net of corruption. With skill, we may locate some of the billions he is believed to have salted away under UN oversight. With luck, we may get to this money ahead of the terrorists with whom he consorted--if they have not gotten to it already. Already known, for example, is that two firms doing business with Saddam through Oil-for-Food were linked to financier Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, now on the UN's own watchlist of individuals "belonging to or associated with" al Qaeda.

But let us retain our focus. That Saddam Hussein was a monster and a corrupt monster is not news. That he would exploit, for massive personal gain, a humanitarian program meant to relieve the miseries of his countrymen is horrifying but hardly astonishing. Nevertheless, any investigation that confines itself to detailing the abundantly evident corruption of Saddam Hussein will have missed the point.

What lies at the core of this story is the United Nations, and how it came to pass that an institution charged with bringing peace and probity to the world should have offered itself up--willingly, even eagerly--as the vehicle for a festival of abuse and fraud.

To begin with, Oil-for-Food was an enormous venture in central planning, the biggest project of its kind launched in many a decade and one that utterly ignored the lessons about such systems learned at agonizing cost over the past century. The UN Secretariat, in its well-paid arrogance, set out to administer virtually the entire economy of Iraq. Under its eye, all legitimate trading privileges became the franchise of a tyrant who laid first claim to every barrel of oil and every dollar (or euro) of proceeds. How could Oil-for-Food not help consolidate Saddam's grip on power? Nevertheless, it was with this grand thief of Baghdad that the UN cut its humanitarian deal, chalking in a fat commission for the Secretariat.

Nor did anyone in the UN system so much as lift an eyebrow, even after questions began to be raised. Last November, before the Security Council of the United Nations, the organization's Secretary-General proclaimed it a splendid achievement that the UN had legitimized a scheme by which 60 percent of Iraq's population depended entirely on the rationing cards of a totalitarian state. This was an event that should have seized the vaunted international community with horror. Instead, from out of the mouth of the Angolan ambassador who that month was chairing the UN Security Council there issued only unctuous praise for "the exceptionally important role of the program in providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq."

But all that is only prelude. The scope of UN dereliction is much broader, encompassing factors institutional, personal, and, finally, political.

It is true that Oil-for-Food managed to deliver to Iraqis some portion of what it promised. On sales totaling $65 billion, some $46 billion (by Annan's uncheckable reckoning) went for "humanitarian" spending. Of this amount, an official total of $15 billion worth of food and health supplies--the original rationale for the program--had been received by the time Saddam fell. The actual figure was no doubt considerably less if you factor in the kickbacks and spoiled goods; from the remainder came the equipment for Saddam's oil monopoly, the construction materials, the TV studio systems, the carpets and air conditioners for the ministries, and all the rest.

But at what cost? Are we supposed to conclude that, in order to deliver this amount of aid, the UN had to approve Saddam's more than $100 billion worth of largely crooked business, had to look the other way while he skimmed money, bought influence, built palaces, and stashed away billions on the side, at least some of which may now be funding terror in Iraq or beyond?

No, something was at work here other than passive acquiescence. At precisely what moment during the years of Oil-for-Food did the UN Secretariat cross the line from "supervising" Saddam to collaborating with him? With precisely what deed did it enter into collusion? Even setting aside such obvious questions as whether individual UN officials took bribes, did the complicity begin in 1998, when Saddam flexed his muscles by throwing out the weapons inspectors and when Oil-for-Food, instead of leaving along with them, raised the cap on his oil sales? Did it come in 1999, when, even as Saddam's theft was becoming apparent, the UN scrapped the oil-sales limits altogether? Or in 2000 and 2001, when Sevan dismissed complaints and reports about blatant kickbacks? Did it start in 2002, when Annan, empowered by Oil-for-Food Plus, signed his name to projects for furnishing Saddam with luxury cars, stadiums, and office equipment for his dictatorship? Or did the defining moment arrive in 2003, when Annan, ignoring the immense conflict posed by the fact that his own institution was officially on Saddam's payroll, lobbied alongside two of Saddam's other top clients, Russia and France, to preserve his regime? Certainly by the time Annan and Sevan, neck-deep in revelatory press reports and standing indignantly athwart their own secret records, continued to offer to the world their evasions and denials, the balance had definitively tipped.

Annan's studied bewilderment is itself an indictment not only of his person but of the system he heads. If anyone is going to take the fall for the Oil-for-Food scandal, Sevan seems the likeliest candidate. But it was the UN Secretary-General who compliantly condoned Saddam's ever-escalating schemes and conditions, and who lobbied to the last to preserve Saddam's totalitarian regime while the UN Secretariat was swimming in his cash.

Annan has been with the UN for 32 years. He moved up through its ranks; he knows it well. He was there at the creation of Oil-for-Food, he chose the director, he signed the distribution plans, he visited Saddam, he knew plenty about Iraq, and one might assume he read the newspapers. We are left to contemplate a UN system that has engendered a Secretary-General either so dishonest that he should be dismissed or so incompetent that he is truly dangerous--and should be dismissed.

The final perfidy, though, is not personal but political. The UN, in the name of its own lofty principles, and to its rich emolument, actively helped sustain and protect a tyrant whose brutality and repression were the cause of Iraqi deprivation in the first place. What can this mean? The answer may be simply that, along with its secrecy, its massed cadres of bureaucrats beholden to the favor of the man at the top, its almost complete lack of accountability, external oversight, or the most elementary checks and balances, the UN suffers from an endemic affinity with anti-Western despots, and will turn a blind eye to the devil himself in order to keep them in power. Certainly there is much in its history and its behavior to support this view.

Perhaps, then, the complicity was there all along, built in, and was merely reinforced year after year as the UN collected the commissions and processed the funds that transformed Oil-for-Food into the sleaziest program ever to fly the UN flag and the single largest item on every budget of all nine UN agencies involved, plus the Secretariat itself. That, in the end, may be the dirty secret at the center of the Oil-for-Food scandal.

And is this the same United Nations that, now, we are planning to entrust with bringing democracy to Iraq?


Claudia Rosett, who contributes a bi-weekly column on foreign affairs to the Wall Street Journal's online edition, OpinionJournal.com, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and an adjunct fellow of the Hudson Institute.

1 As of 2001, one of the largest shareholders in BNP was Iraqi-born Nadhmi Auchi, among Britain's richest citizens. In the 1980's Auchi had brokered business deals for Saddam; last year he was convicted in France of illicit profiteering as part of the huge Elf oil scandal. The UN says the Oil-for-Food contract was awarded to BNP on a strictly competitive basis.

2 According to a spokesman at the UN Secretary-General's office, Kojo Annan had been a trainee at Cotecna from December 1995 to February 1998, and two months later was back at work for the firm as a consultant; his consultancy, which lasted until December 1998, thus coincided with the period during which the UN would have been receiving and reviewing bids for the Oil-for-Food inspection job. Both Kojo and Kofi Annan have denied that Kojo's consulting work was in any way related to the UN.

3 This is especially significant in light of the role that would be played by Saddam's televised propaganda during the war. In the event, Saddam may have had to rely on equipment brought in earlier under Oil-for-Food from places like France and Jordan. He was unable to take delivery of TV studio equipment ordered from Russia and approved and funded by the Secretariat on February 7, 2003, just six weeks before the war. But that was not for want of Kofi Annan's approval.

4 Not only the occupation authority but the Iraqis themselves have failed to penetrate the UN wall of disdain, although it is their own money they wish to know about. The Iraqi Central Bank began requesting copies of the relevant BNP bank statements in July 2003. Not until late March of this year, after I aired the matter in a piece in National Review Online, was there some halting sign of movement in the UN treasurer's office. Similar stonewalling--no accounting given, no access to statements--has met the repeated efforts of Kurds in northern Iraq to find out what happened to about $4 billion in separate allocations owed to them under Oil-for-Food.


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Volcker's U.N. Cleanup
The Russians are blocking a proper Oil for Food probe.

Monday, April 19, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
Meanwhile, back at the United Nations Oil for Food scandal, the news leaked Friday that Secretary-General Kofi Annan has picked Paul Volcker to lead a three-man panel to investigate what we now know was a Saddam Hussein skimming operation. What we'd also like to know is why it is taking so long for the Volcker appointment to be formally announced.
Mr. Annan first offered the job to Mr. Volcker, the former Federal Reserve Chairman, some two weeks ago. It shouldn't take this long to close the deal--unless some members of the U.N. Security Council really don't want a probe. Word is that Mr. Volcker, who is nobody's toady, doesn't want to lend his reputation to this exercise unless the Security Council passes a new resolution calling on members to cooperate with his team. Under pressure from the U.S. and Britain, Mr. Annan has agreed.
But, lo, the Russians are objecting to any resolution. "We don't mind for the Secretary-General to appoint the commission but we don't see the need to support his decision in the form of a resolution," says Russia's U.N. Ambassador Gennady Gatilov. In other words, he wants Mr. Volcker to serve as eyewash for the U.N. but without the political clout to expose what really happened. We don't suppose it is a coincidence, comrade, that Russians were among Saddam's best business partners. No word yet on where the French stand on a resolution, but we can guess.
The Oil for Food program was designed to let Iraq sell some oil to finance food and humanitarian aid for Iraqis hurt by sanctions against Saddam's regime. But we have learned that Saddam skimmed off as much as $10 billion to build his own palaces and pay off apologists for his regime around the world.
Only last week, Detroit businessman Shakir al-Khafaji admitted to the Financial Times that he received Oil for Food allocations. Mr. al-Khafaji had earlier denied receiving such allocations in an interview with our Robert Pollock, who recently reported that Mr. al-Khafaji had helped to finance a pro-Saddam documentary by former weapons inspector Scott Ritter and had donated to antiwar Congressional Democrats. Another hearing in Congress is scheduled this week into what is already the worst corruption scandal in U.N. history.
A new resolution would be especially helpful because Security Council nations and members of the U.N. Secretariat have been implicated in the scandal. If Mr. Volcker is going to conduct a credible probe, he'll need the political clout that a new resolution would provide. We trust he's also asking for an independent staff of his own choosing and ample funding. And while a public accounting is necessary, we hope Mr. Volcker will also conduct the probe with an eye to U.S. banking and other laws that may have been broken.
All of this relates not merely to a "look backwards," as Mr. Gatilov dismissively puts it, but directly to the U.N.'s current ambitions in Baghdad. Iraqis now know that the U.N. and some of its leading members conspired with their former dictator to fleece them of their national wealth. The very least Iraqis should expect is that the U.N. will come clean about its sins and punish those who profited at their expense. George Bush, John Kerry and others who now want to give the U.N. control in Baghdad should also settle for nothing less.


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Texas Talk on Palestine
The president's critics attack him for telling the truth.

Saturday, April 17, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
Listening to the furious reaction to President Bush's letter to Ariel Sharon, you would never know that it reiterated his call for a Palestinian state that is "viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent."
Instead, Mr. Bush now finds himself blasted for a "drastic and unfortunate policy reversal" that will "put the final nail in the coffin of the peace process." His move, say critics, risks "inflaming the Arab world," angers "moderate" Arab governments and might aggravate the situation in Iraq.
There may indeed be a lost opportunity here, but it's not the one Mr. Bush's opponents think. In his declaration that any two-state resolution of the crisis could include some Israeli settlements on post-1949 lands and the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, Mr. Bush did not so much break new ground as acknowledge demographic reality. Those attacking him for daring to speak this frankly only encourage Palestinian hardliners to continue along their debilitating course of rejectionism.
Rather than losing his credibility as an honest broker, as critics charge, the President's straight talk has strengthened his position. Anyone who claims to be a moderator in the pursuit of a just, two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians cannot at the same time tolerate ideas that would lead to the demise of one of those states. A "right of return" for Palestinians to Israel is such an idea.
All this passion over Mr. Bush's words, moreover, overshadows the significance of the withdrawal plan itself. After three years of relentless terror, Prime Minister Sharon--the father of the settlement movement--has agreed to withdraw all 7,500 Israeli settlers and all military installations from Gaza and four settlements from the West Bank.
At the very least, such a withdrawal will remove frictions between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza, ending daily confrontations over roadblocks, checkpoints and curfews. The security barrier Israel builds in conjunction with the disengagement plan is designed to make it harder for terrorists to carry out their attacks, reducing the number of Israeli counterattacks. This will be the first positive step in the region in more than three years. By leaving Gaza, Mr. Sharon puts the ball squarely into the Palestinian court.
In his letter, Mr. Bush lays out the obligations Palestinians have: to stop the terror, to demonstrate a commitment to political reform, to start behaving like a respectable government. But the underlying message--underscored by the U.S. embrace of the Sharon plan--is that the Palestinian failure to meet those obligations will have consequences in American foreign policy.
In this light, keeping alive the myth that Palestinian refugees will "return" to Israel does the Palestinian people a disservice by emboldening hard-liners and making it impossible for moderate voices to gain popular support. Mr. Bush makes plain that he remains willing to work with the Palestinians in pursuit of a viable state and lays out the terms for doing so. The real question here is whether they will take him up on it.




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>> WHAT? - NO WIRES WATCH...

Analysis: Nuke-for-energy deal for Kim?
By Jong-Heon Lee
UPI Correspondent
Published 4/19/2004 11:40 AM
SEOUL, South Korea, April 19 (UPI) -- Will North Korean leader Kim Jong Il bring a breakthrough on the nuclear impasse?
Kim's surprise visit to Bejing this week for a summit with Chinese President Hu Jintao raised hopes of progress in the long-stalled nuclear issue.
China is considered one of few nations that have leverage over Kim's defiant regime, which has been heavily dependent on Beijing's food and energy aid. Beijing's economic assistance is vital for the North's tattered economy. China also needs North Korea to ease the nuclear standoff to boost its leverage in pressing for a more accommodating U.S. stance toward Taiwan.
"The two nations need each other's help. The Beijing summit was arranged for mutual benefit," said Moon Heung-ho, a China expert at Hanyang University in Seoul. "We hope to see progress in the nuclear stalemate in the North Korea-China summit," Seoul's Foreign Ministry official said.
Kim held talks with Chinese President Hu on Monday in Beijing after arriving in the Chinese capital by train earlier in the day for an informal visit, according to South Korea's media reports and diplomatic sources in Seoul.
Neither the South Korean nor the Chinese government would confirm Kim's visit, which was cloaked in secrecy. But both sides are widely expected to announce his visit after Kim returns to Pyongyang, as they have done in the past.
When Kim visited China in 2000 and 2001, neither side announced the visits in advance or commented on the trips until after he returned home. "North Korea has requested that Kim's schedule be kept secret due to security concerns," a diplomatic source in Seoul said.
Kim crossed the border city of Sinuiju into China around 9 p.m. Sunday after leaving his office in Pyongyang at 1 p.m. that day by special train. Kim was greeted at the Chinese border city of Dandong by Wang Jiarui, the Communist Party's director of international relations, South Korea's official Yonhap News Agency said in a report from the Chinese capital that quoted "informed diplomatic sources."
Kim's train, carrying an entourage of some 40 high-level ruling party, state and military officials, drew into Beijing's main railway station around 6 a.m. Monday amid tight security. Beijing's railway station was guarded by military police and a station official said it was closed for the arrival of a "special visitor."
A convoy of unmarked cars, including a black Mercedes limousine, pulled out of the railway station and headed west towards the state guesthouse, where Kim has stayed on previous trips, said Yonhap and Seoul's state-run television, KBS.
Kim reportedly met Hu over lunch at Zhongnanhai, the leadership compound in Beijing. It was the first summit between the two communist allies since the new Chinese leaders took office last year.
No details of the summit were available, but media reports quoted sources as saying it was focused on how to end the standoff over Pyongyang's nuclear arms ambitions, Beijing's food and energy assistance, and North Korea's economic reforms.
At the summit, Kim said his country was ready to give up its nuclear development program if the United States dropped its hostile policy towards Pyongyang. He also asked for economic and energy aid from China.
In return, Hu reportedly called for Pyongyang to move to ease the nuclear crisis, saying U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney on a visit to Beijing last week warned that time was running out for a resolution on the issue.
Analysts in Seoul said Beijing wanted to hear Kim's position on North Korea's nuclear program and use the summit to make progress toward six-party talks to end the nuclear crisis. "China invited the North Korean leader to visit Beijing to offer economic aid and persuade Pyongyang to make concessions to break the nuclear impasse," said Paek Seung-joo, an analyst at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis in Seoul.
China has been mediating between North Korea and the United States at the six-way talks, which also involve South Korea, Japan and Russia, aimed at seeking a peaceful resolution to the crisis. China hosted two rounds of six-party talks, the latest one in February, but no agreement has been reached.
"North Korea is not in a position to dismiss Chinese pressure," said Lee Tae-hwan, a China specialist at the Sejong Institute, a private think tank in Seoul, "because China provides between 70 percent and 90 percent of North Korea's oil and more than one-third of its imports and food aid."
"Beijing wants to use its role in defusing the nuclear crisis as leverage in dealing with Washington over the Taiwan issue," a Western diplomat said, requesting anonymity. "With the North Korea card in hand, China would call for the United States to discourage Taiwan from adopting a confrontational stance with the mainland following Chen Shui-bian's re-election as the island's president.
Kim Jong Il's China trip came after Cheney came to China last week armed with fresh evidence of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities and pressing Beijing to take a tougher line with its communist neighbor.
After the summit, Kim visited Zhongguancun technology park, China's leading high-tech development zone. He is scheduled to have a series of meetings with Chinese leaders, including former President Jiang Zemin, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, parliamentary leader Wu Bangguo and Vice President Zeng Qinghong.
On his way back to North Korea on Wednesday, he is expected to visit Shenyang or Dalian in China's northeast to study government efforts to boost the economy with outside investment.

Copyright ? 2001-2004 United Press International

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N. Korea's Kim in Beijing for Rare, Secretive Talks
Mon Apr 19, 5:45 AM ET

By John Ruwitch and Benjamin Kang Lim

BEIJING (Reuters) - Reclusive North Korean leader Kim Jong-il arrived unannounced in Beijing on Monday and went straight into talks on his nuclear weapons ambitions after Washington urged Beijing to push to end the crisis.
Kim, whose special train drew into Beijing after an overnight journey from Pyongyang, will be in China for up to four days, during which he expects to meet his counterpart, military chief Jiang Zemin, and do some sightseeing, said a Chinese source familiar with the talks.
He met President and Communist Party chief Hu Jintao for lunch in the high-walled Zhongnanhai leaders' compound and for talks dominated by the nuclear crisis and the North's economic and food problems, South Korea (news - web sites)'s Yonhap news agency said.
Kim was likely to tour a Beijing high-tech zone dubbed "China's Silicon Valley," it said.
Solving the nuclear issue is key to unlocking outside aid to the ailing and isolated North Korean economy, including from China, the North's closest friend.
Kim's trip, cloaked in the secrecy that traditionally surrounds his rare overseas journeys, comes less than a week after Vice President Dick Cheney (news - web sites) warned in Beijing that time was running out to resolve the crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions that has gripped North Asia since late 2002.
China's leaders are likely to dangle the prospect of economic help while repeating that they oppose a nuclear-armed Pyongyang and insist on a peaceful resolution to a problem that has enraged Washington and triggered nervousness among neighbors.
"Putting pressure on North Korea (news - web sites) isn't a good way to do things," said Korea expert Piao Jianyi with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "But we have emphasized all along that the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully."
Kim's first visit to China in three years was expected to last about four days. His previous two trips were not publicized until after he left.
Chinese officials declined formally to confirm the visit but a second source said Kim had originally been scheduled to visit last week.
"The arrangements are being kept secret," he said. "He was supposed to have arrived last week. But it was delayed because things had not been sorted out."
Cheney was in Beijing last Tuesday and Wednesday. And Thursday marked the 92nd anniversary of the birth of Kim's father, North Korea's late founder Kim Il-sung.
The first sign of his arrival was a convoy of unmarked cars, including a black Mercedes limousine, that pulled out of Beijing's main railway station. The station was guarded by military police and an official said it was closed for the arrival of a special visitor, whose identity was a secret.
ECONOMIC NEEDS
Kim's entourage included 40 high-level ruling party, state and military officials in a trip aimed to shore up ties, South Korean state broadcaster KBS said. Kim, who avoids travel by plane, was also seeking economic aid and might tour the northeastern city of Shenyang or Dalian, Yonhap said.
Kim is also to meet Premier Wen Jiabao, who is at the helm of China's booming economy, and former president and Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin, KBS said. Jiang and Kim both command the military in their respective countries.
In 2001, the leader of the communist North toured Shanghai and was reportedly impressed with the glitz of China's financial hub. He later began to experiment with market reforms.
"The backdrop of the Kim Jong-il trip is that North Korea is in a situation where it has to resolve the nuclear issue before there can be progress on the economic front," said Koh Yoo-hwan, Dongguk University professor on North Korea studies.
The United States is key.
Cheney came to China last week armed with fresh evidence of the North's nuclear weapons capabilities and pressing Beijing to take a firmer line with its communist neighbor.
China has played host at two rounds of inconclusive six-party talks with the two Koreas, the United States, Japan and Russia aimed at ending the crisis. A third round is planned before July.
Regional tensions have simmered since October 2002, when U.S. officials say Pyongyang disclosed it was working on a clandestine program to enrich uranium -- in addition to a plutonium-based program that had been mothballed in 1994.
In the talks in February, the six agreed to meet again before mid-year and to start working-level talks before that to discuss the dispute. No progress has been reported since. (Additional reporting by Paul Eckert and Jack Kim in Seoul)





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Iran gets its hands dirty
By Safa Haeri

PARIS - It took a hail of bullets into the car of Iranian envoy Khalil Naimi in Baghdad on Thursday to jeopardize Tehran's attempts to become an influential mediator in Iraq, with the strong hope of seeing itself removed from George W Bush's "axis of evil".
Press and cultural attache Naimi died instantly when the car in which he was traveling near the Iranian embassy was raked by three heavily-armed men.
Against all odds, Iran had embarked on an unlikely diplomatic mission to get the American "Satan" out of its difficulties in Iraq. A five-man Iranian foreign ministry delegation, headed by the ministry's director for Persian Gulf affairs, Hossein Sadeqi, is in Najaf to assist in the crisis over the rebel leadership of cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Shi'ite followers have been engaged in week-long battles with US-led occupation forces.
Muqtada, whom US forces have vowed to "kill or capture", is barricaded inside Najaf, Iraq's holiest city. The US has massed more than 2,000 troops for an offensive, though both sides have said that they want to avoid bloodshed.
Now, though, Iran finds itself as yet another victim of the spiral of violence in Iraq that has seen citizens of a host of countries - ranging from Italy to Japan - either killed or kidnapped over the past weeks, and its official involvement in the country becomes problematical. It was not immediately clear whether the assassination had any direct impact on Sadeqi's plans in Iraq, although the envoy ruled out holding any talks with Muqtada after earlier hinting that this might be a possibility.
And the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, on an unannounced visit to Baghdad, said that the last thing Iraq needed was "influence from neighboring countries trying to promote or protect their own self interest".
Sunni Muslims in Iraq, who for many years under Saddam Hussein and even before dominated the corridors of power, are known to be extremely fearful of Shi'ites - who form the majority in the country - becoming the new rulers. And they constantly warn in newspapers and at mosques of Iran interfering in Iraq and attempting to stir sectarian trouble.
In their first reaction, authorities in Tehran vehemently condemned the murder of Naimi, blaming it indirectly on the American presence in Iraq. But diplomats did not rule out a possible connection between the killing and the mediation efforts undertaken by Tehran to assess the chances of calming down Muqtada, the young and volatile cleric who has plunged American forces and their allies into their fiercest battles since their triumphant entry into Baghdad a year ago.
This was the first time that an Iranian diplomat had been assassinated in Iraq, where Iran, with its strong Shi'ite ties to the Shi'ite majority in Iraq, would think itself "immune" to such attacks.
"Those who killed our diplomat are the same that do not want to see Iraq living in peace and stand up on its feet," one Iranian diplomat in Baghdad said, while in Tehran, Hamid Reza Asefi, the Iraqi-born official spokesman of the foreign affairs ministry squarely accused the Americans, saying: "The violence and bloodshed in Iraq are the direct result of American's foolish policies in the region, making the whole world an unsafe place for humanity."
Officials in Washington confirmed that Britain had invited the Iranian delegation to help restore calm and security in Iraq, as, in the words of Mehdi Karroobi, the speaker of the majlis, or parliament, "it is obvious that Iran has strong influence in Iraq, where the people have traditional brotherly bonds with the Iranians".
An aide to Muqtada told French news agency Agence France Presse that the cleric welcomed the Iranian initiative because it came from an Islamic country. He said Muqtada was ready to meet the Iranian diplomats.
A senior State Department official said in Washington of the Iranian mediation: "They were invited by the British trying to put an end to the bloody standoff between American-led coalition forces with the Mahdi Army of Mr al-Sadr," explaining, however, that although the US went along with the British initiative, the proposal did not come from the Bush administration.
Iranian foreign affairs minister Kamal Kharrazi said in Tehran hours after the delegation left for Iraq that "naturally, there are such requests from the US and Britain that we help improve the situation in Iraq, and we are making efforts in this regard. There has been a lot of correspondence with the US about Iraq and the Swiss embassy in Tehran, which represents US diplomatic interests in the Islamic republic, played a mediating role in the recent exchanges," Kharrazi added, accusing at the same time the US of breaking its promises in Iraq and "taking a wrong path".
"When the Americans, or their most close and trusted ally, the British, call on Iran to help, this shows the influence Iran exercises in Iraq and the region, something that is not to the liking of many Arab nations and their proxies in Iraq hating the Iranians," one Iraqi diplomat told Asia Times Online.
Jean Pierre Perrin, chief of the foreign desk at the leftist French paper Liberation and a former correspondent of the French news agency AFP in Tehran, commented: "Iran's main adversary is not Washington but the two traditional enemies of the Iranian political Shi'ism: the exacerbated Arabian nationalism that carried to Iran the hardest strokes under Saddam Hussein and the imported Islam Wahhabite of Saudi Arabia that always sees in Shi'ism a 'plot of the Jewish on the one hand and the other groups that are currently engaged against the Americans in the Sunnite regions of Iraq'."
Tehran's attempts to help the US out of its troubles in Iraq (even if for self-serving reasons) have not dulled the rhetoric coming out of Tehran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, leader of Iran, told the country's state-run, conservative-controlled television: "The United States accuses other countries of intervening in Iraq and of inciting the Iraqis, but it is very clear that the crimes of the occupation and their insulting behavior with regard to the young and the women are at the origin of the reaction of the Iraqis, Shi'ite or Sunni."
For the Supreme Leader, it is obvious that "sooner or later, the Americans will be forced to leave Iraq in shame and humiliation".
The assassination happened just hours before Sadeqi and his delegation were to leave for Najaf, from where Muqtada had earlier announced that he would obey the supreme religious authorities, and if necessary give himself up to an independent Iraqi court and dismantle his army, transforming it into a political party.
Michael Rubin, who recently resigned as an "advisor" to the US-installed Iraqi Governing Council, wrote: "The British government, with tacit US approval, has initiated discussions with the Iranian foreign ministry. A team led by top Iranian diplomat Hossein Sadeqi visited Iraq in recent days, but his talks went nowhere. The Iranian regime used Washington and London's outreach not to promote dialogue, but to humiliate the United States at a time our soldiers make sacrifices to preserve Iraq's freedom."
Leaking news of the talks on Iranian television, foreign minister Kharrazi demonstrated to his domestic audience that the US was not in control and had run to Iran for assistance. Moving in for the propaganda kill, Kharrazi stated: "The solution is for the occupiers to leave Iraq."
And Iran's repeated offer for a meeting of Iraq's neighbors to "advise" the Americans who "ignore both the situation in Iraq and the psychology of the Iraqi people", helping them "not to repeat and cumulate mistakes" there.
But at the same time, though the Iranian leaders call on Iraqis to give a lesson to the "wounded American monster", they are nevertheless worried of impending chaos in Iraq, and have avoided any direct praise for the Sunnite opposition in Fallujah, and even for Muqtada's revolt.
So while the Arab press in general glorifies Muqtada, describing him as a "hero", a "popular figure" fighting the occupation of Iraq by foreign forces, etc, the Iranian media are more cautious, observing that the young cleric is "a noise", without any religious or political legitimacy.
The Iranian daily Aftab Yazd said that the media were "wrongly" presenting the activities of Muqtada and his followers as the widespread resistance of the Iraqi people. "It is quite erroneous for our media to give implicit or open backing to people like Sadr, whose causes are not entirely known to us," it said, adding that "clearly no friend of liberty would defend the occupation in Iraq, but it is one thing to oppose occupation and another to take sides in a fight where none of the potential winners are favorably inclined toward Iran".
Columnist Ali Hamade said in the an-Nahar of Beirut, referring to the handling of Muqtada and his Mahdi Army, "The United States administration has made a major blunder in Iraq by thinking it could follow Israel's heavy-handed example against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza without having to pay the political price."
"The Americans are on their way to doom in Iraq. In addition, the US failure in Iraq will have drastic implications on US plans for the region ... Iraq has shown that it was one thing to bring down an unpopular regime in an Arab state, but quite another to be able to rule that state. Iraq has shown that ruling post-war Iraq was the closest thing to hell for the Americans," Hamade said.
Columnist Rafik Khoury wrote in al-Anwar, another Lebanese Arabic-language daily: "Muqtada al-Sadr, the young Shi'ite militia leader, has shown that the Americans did not come to introduce democracy, but to rule Iraq and lay their hands on its vast oil resources. Washington, which came to Iraq under the pretext of liberating its people from the previous regime of Saddam Hussein, has now saddled them with a more repressive authority," he said, adding: "Meanwhile, Sadr has become the symbol of anti-American Iraqi armed resistance, and Fallujah has become the symbol of Iraqi cities being oppressed by allied force."
Commented the London-based al-Qods al-Arabi. "It was impossible for the United States to succeed in wiping out Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army because it is not an organized group, but a popular movement that expresses a religious ideology."
The paper said that US forces represented the largest power in the world, one that could defeat the Iraqi army and "perhaps the entire Arab armies united in a few days, because of the military disparities, but the US army is unable to defeat the ideas and religious ideologies in a country like Iraq".
According to this paper, capturing and killing Muqtada, as promised by the Americans, would "make him a martyr, while if he is arrested alive, he will become a symbol of resistance, just like Nelson Mandela or the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin", the founder and spiritual leader of the Palestinian Islamic resistance movement Hamas. However, that if the US forces fail to arrest Muqtada, it will constitute "a blow to US credibility".
Meanwhile, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports that US officials have repeatedly accused Iran of trying to meddle in Iraq's internal affairs. Iran has rejected the accusations.
On April 12, the head of US forces in the Gulf region, General John Abizaid, said that Iran and Syria had been involved in what he called "unhelpful actions" in Iraq. But he acknowledged that there are elements in Iran who are trying to limit the influence of Muqtada.
Iranian officials have distanced themselves from the cleric. On April 10, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami indirectly criticized the insurgency led by Muqtada. He said Iran "considers any policy that would intensify the crisis in Iraq and jeopardize the establishment of security to be harmful for Shi'ite and Islam".
Gary Sick is a professor of Middle East politics at New York's Columbia University and was a top White House aide for Iran during the 1979 Islamic Revolution and ensuing hostage crisis. Sick said that, despite US criticism of Tehran, Washington has been relying on Iran's assistance in Iraq.
"There have always been two strains to US policy. Just as Iran often seems to follow policies where the one part of the government seems to differ from what the other part of the government is doing, we see the same thing in the United States very much. We have, from the beginning, in fact, relied on Iran and its assistance, especially in the south and its relations with the Shi'ite, to maintain peace and order and to lend support to a more moderate perspective in Iraqi politics. At the same time, almost without stop, we have been criticizing Iran's activities in Iraq," Sick said.
Sick said the US had been maintaining indirect contacts with Iran through British officials and also through members of the Iraqi Governing Council, some of whom have made several official trips to Tehran.
"If you really want to work out cooperation on the ground, you have to do it in person. It's very difficult to send a letter and say, 'Why don't you do such-and-such', and the other side comes back and says, 'Why don't you do such-and-such'. You really need to sit down and talk to each other to do that," Sick said.
Sick said Tehran's role in Iraq cannot be ignored, given Tehran's influence among Iraq's Shi'ite and its past experiences with Baghdad. "If Iran wishes to cooperate with the United States, it's going to be helpful. If Iran decides to openly oppose the United States, that is going to be very unhelpful from the US point of view and could, in fact, be disastrous. So it seems to me that developing a working relationship - it doesn't mean that the countries have to reestablish diplomatic relations, it doesn't mean that they have to express love for each other - it basically means working together on issues that are of mutual significance. What happens in Iraq is tremendously important to Iran, and it's tremendously important to the United States," Sick said.
Iran and the United States cut diplomatic ties following the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis. Since then, the two countries have communicated through the Swiss embassy in Tehran, which represents US interests in Iran. Diplomats from the two sides have reportedly held talks in Geneva over the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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>> OKC SLEEPER...

Document: Oklahoma City Bombing Was Taped

By JOHN SOLOMON, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON - A Secret Service document written shortly after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing described security video footage of the attack and witness testimony that suggested Timothy McVeigh (news - web sites) may have had accomplices at the scene.
"Security video tapes from the area show the truck detonation 3 minutes and 6 seconds after the suspects exited the truck," the Secret Service reported six days after the attack on a log of agents' activities and evidence in the Oklahoma investigation.
The government has insisted McVeigh drove the truck himself and that it never had any video of the bombing or the scene of the Alfred P. Murrah building in the minutes before the April 19, 1995, explosion.
Several investigators and prosecutors who worked the case told The Associated Press they had never seen video footage like that described in the Secret Service log.
The document, if accurate, is either significant evidence kept secret for nine years or a misconstrued recounting of investigative leads that were often passed by word of mouth during the hectic early days of the case, they said.
"I did not see it," said Danny Defenbaugh, the retired FBI (news - web sites) agent who ran the Oklahoma City probe. "If it shows what it says, then it would be significant."
Secret Service spokesman Charles Bopp declined to discuss the video footage reference, saying it would be addressed by witnesses later this week at the capital murder trial of McVeigh co-defendant Terry Nichols. "It is anticipated Secret Service employees will testify in court concerning these matters," he said.
Other documents obtained by AP show the Secret Service in late 1995 gave prosecutors several computer disks of enhanced digital photographs of the Murrah building, intelligence files on several subjects in the investigation and a file detailing an internal affairs inquiry concerning an agent who reconstructed key phone evidence against McVeigh.
"These abstract sheets are sensitive documents which we have protected from disclosure in the past," said a Secret Service letter that recounted discussions in late 1995 with federal prosecutors on what evidence would be turned over to defense lawyers.
Lawyers for Nichols say they have never been given the security video, photo disks or internal investigative file referenced in the documents.
The trial judge has threatened to dismiss the death penalty case if evidence was withheld. McVeigh was executed in 2001 on a separate federal conviction. Nichols was sentenced to life in prison on federal charges before being tried by the state this year.
The government has maintained for years that McVeigh parked the Ryder rental truck carrying a massive fertilizer bomb outside the Murrah building and left alone in a getaway car he parked around the corner. The bombing killed more than 160 people.
The only video prosecutors introduced at trial showed the Ryder truck without any visible passengers as it passed a security camera inside a high-rise apartment building a block away from the Murrah building.
But the Secret Service log reported on April 24 and April 25, 1995, that there was security footage showing the Ryder truck pulling up to the Murrah building. The log does not say where such video came from or who possessed it.
A log entry on April 25 states that the security footage allowed agents to determine the time that elapsed between suspects leaving the truck and the explosion.
An entry a day earlier on the same log reported that the security video was consistent with a witness' account that he saw McVeigh's getaway car in the lead before a woman guided the truck to its final parking spot in front of the Murrah building.
"A witness to the explosion named Grossman claimed to have seen a pale yellow Mercury car with a Ryder truck behind it pulling up to the federal building," the log said. The witness "further claimed to have seen a woman on the corner waving to the truck."
A Secret Service agent named McNally "noted that this fact is significant due to the fact that the security video shows the Ryder truck pulling up to the Federal Building and then pausing (7 to 10 seconds) before resuming into the slot in front of the building," the log said. "It is speculated that the woman was signaling the truck when a slot became available."
Defenbaugh said the FBI had talked to several witnesses suggesting two people had left the truck, but prosecutors never introduced the scenario at trial because it couldn't be corroborated. That's why a new security video would be significant, he said.
"It would have taken the investigation in a very specific direction," Defenbaugh said. "Rather than having to go down an eight-lane highway during rush hour, we would have gone down a faster path with just two or four lanes."
Defenbaugh said the FBI kept a log similar to the Secret Service document inside the Oklahoma City investigation command center that might help solve the mystery of the video. Justice officials declined to discuss documents, citing the ongoing Nichols' trial.
In addition to the witness mentioned in the Secret Service document, a woman working in Murrah's Social Security (news - web sites) office who was rescued from the rubble and a driver outside the building both reported to the FBI seeing two men leave the truck, according to government documents.
The Secret Service (news - web sites) log contained other information about the case -- including that McVeigh made 30 calls to an Illinois gun dealer in the months before the attacks to seek dynamite and that the gun dealer subsequently failed a lie detector test. The Secret Service lost six employees in McVeigh's bombing, the single largest loss in agency history.
Nichols' attorneys last week asked the judge to dismiss the case on grounds the government withheld evidence, including the security video footage.
New documents obtained by AP show the Secret Service provided prosecutors other evidence that may not have been provided to defense lawyers, including a file showing the Secret Service agent who reconstructed crucial phone evidence against McVeigh was subjected to an internal affairs investigation and eventually cleared for her conduct in the case.
FBI officials say that file details allegations the agent wrongly collected grand jury-subpoenaed phone information about McVeigh's calls without FBI knowledge, and kept it for weeks while she produced analysis that helped the investigation.
The internal investigation caused complications for prosecutors. They decided it tainted the agent as a witness and they chose instead to hire an outside expert to re-do the phone analysis for trial, officials said.
Bopp said the Secret Service did nothing wrong.
"The Secret Service worked cooperatively with the FBI and other federal state and local law enforcement throughout the investigation," Bopp said. "The expertise of the Secret Service on electronic crimes and telecommunications provided unique and timely information to the ongoing investigation."

On the Net:

The FBI: http://www.fbi.gov

The documents obtained by The Associated Press can be viewed at http://wid.ap.org/documents/okc/okcdoc2.pdf

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OKC BOMBING FALLOUT
Video shows McVeigh had accomplices?
Secret Service account indicates previously unknown footage

Posted: April 19, 2004
5:45 p.m. Eastern

? 2004 WorldNetDaily.com
A Secret Service document to be entered as new evidence this week contradicts government accounts of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, indicating the existence of a videotape showing Timothy McVeigh with accomplices at the scene.
"Security video tapes from the area show the truck detonation 3 minutes and 6 seconds after the suspects exited the truck," says the document according to the Associated Press.
The Secret Service report, six days after the bombing, was a log of agents' activities and evidence in the investigation, the AP said.
The government, which has concluded McVeigh acted along at the scene, contends there was no video of the blast or of the area minutes before the April 19, 1995, explosion that killed more than 160 people.
Danny Defenbaugh, the retired FBI agent who led the investigation, told the AP he had not seen the document, but if it "shows what it says, then it would be significant."
Others who worked the case said it either could be a misconstrued accounting of investigative leads or significant evidence kept hidden for nine years.
Secret Service agents are expected to testify on the log this week at the capital murder trial of McVeigh co-defendant Terry Nichols, Secret Service spokesman Charles Bopp told the AP.
McVeigh was executed in 2001 on a separate federal conviction. Nichols was given a life sentence on federal charges and now is being tried by the state of Oklahoma.
The Secret Service log has an entry April 24 consistent with the account of a "witness to the explosion named Grossman claimed to have seen a pale yellow Mercury car with a Ryder truck behind it pulling up to the federal building and a "woman on the corner waving to the truck."
A Secret Service agent named McNally "noted that this fact is significant due to the fact that the security video shows the Ryder truck pulling up to the Federal Building and then pausing (7 to 10 seconds) before resuming into the slot in front of the building," the log said. "It is speculated that the woman was signaling the truck when a slot became available."
Defenbaugh said a security video would be significant because it would corroborate the accounts of several witnesses who told the FBI two people had left the truck.
Their testimony was not introduced at trial because it lacked corroboration, the agent told the AP, noting it would have led the investigation in a new direction.
Prosecutors entered a security video at McVeigh's trial, but it showed no passengers.
Other government documents, the AP said, report a rescued woman working in the Murrah building's Social Security office and a driver outside the building both told the FBI they saw two men leave the truck.
Investigative reporter Jayna Davis' new book, "The Third Terrorist: The Middle Eastern Connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing," convincingly concludes McVeigh and Terry Nichols did not act alone.
The new release by WND Books presents substantial evidence of Iraqi involvement and a refusal by federal government agents to investigate the bombing.
As WorldNetDaily reported, Davis said last week Sept. 11 Commission testimony by former FBI Director Louis Freeh lent credibility to the theory. She repeatedly has tried since 1997, without success, to convince the FBI to examine her investigation, but when asked by a commissioner to respond to assertions in her book, Freeh was careful to say he knew of no other "credible source," instead of dismissing the premise of the book outright.
"I find it very encouraging," she said, "because every time the FBI has been asked to officially comment in any fashion about my research, we have the same canned response that the Department of Justice is confident that all those responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing have been arrested, charged and prosecuted."
Davis's reporting was vetted by former CIA director James Woolsey and given credibility by the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals last April when it dismissed a lawsuit filed against her after finding "defendants did not recklessly disregard the truth" in reporting on an Iraqi soldier's alleged involvement in the bombing.
"After eight years of oppressive litigation, the courts have vindicated my work ethic as a dedicated journalist," Davis told WorldNetDaily at the time. "The lawsuit was obviously designed to silence a legitimate investigation into Middle Eastern complicity in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing."
In an interview with WND in October 2001, attorney David Schippers, who prosecuted the House of Representatives' impeachment case against Bill Clinton, said his examination of the evidence Davis presented him was conclusive.
"I am thoroughly convinced that there was a dead-bang Middle Eastern connection in the Oklahoma City bombing," he said.
Read WorldNetDaily's extensive coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing case.


Jayna Davis's blockbuster - "The Third Terrorist: The Middle Eastern Connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing" - is available now from the source, WorldNetDaily. Order today and qualify for three FREE issues of WND's acclaimed Whistleblower magazine.



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OKC BOMBING FALLOUT
Ex-congressman's aide has video of explosion?
Police raid home for evidence Nichols' attorneys say investigators never saw

Posted: February 1, 2004
1:00 a.m. Eastern

This story appears in today's edition of the McCurtain Daily Gazette.
By J.D. Cash
? 2004 McCurtain Daily Gazette
The Fairfax County, Va., home of John Culbertson - once a member of former U.S. Rep. James Traficant's scandal-plagued congressional office - was raided Friday afternoon by Oklahoma City police detectives searching for evidence related to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.
A copy of the search warrant obtained by the McCurtain Daily Gazette described the evidence sought by detectives as including any and all computer equipment, letters, correspondence, electronic mail and image files.
The raid follows a Jan. 27 closed-door meeting attended by prosecutors and defense attorneys involved with the Terry Nichols murder trial, set to begin one month from now in Oklahoma.
During the meeting, it was brought to the attention of prosecutors Culbertson could have critical evidence concerning the bombing - evidence that had not come to the attention of state or federal prosecutors.
According to the affidavit filed with the search warrant, Nichols' defense attorneys filed a motion under seal with the court and further advised prosecutors Culbertson ''may have possession of a video and/or still photographs of a Ryder truck parked in front of the Alfred P. Murrah building before the explosion and during the explosion.''
The affidavit also indicates Nichols' defense attorneys said they attempted to contact Culbertson and he was not cooperative in showing them the possible evidence.
The motion presented by defense attorneys also stated Dallas, Texas, attorney Thomas W. Mills Jr. observed and described a video and still photos that Culbertson showed him.
Oklahoma City police detective Mark R. Easley interviewed Mills at his law office after District Judge Steven Taylor recommended an investigation into the matter.
Mills said he had gone to Washington, D.C., years ago to meet with Culbertson and actually viewed the video on Aug. 26, 1998.
Mills specifically told police detectives he saw a portion of a video and possibly three still pictures that were stored on Culbertson's laptop computer.
In an affidavit obtained by this newspaper, Detective Easley said Mills told him the images he was shown included the Murrah building in ''pristine condition.''
Mills then said, ''Mr. Culbertson pushed a button and a second photograph came up with a small glow at the bottom of the building. Mr. Culbertson pushed another button and another frame appeared of a ball of fire rising from the building and the building fell.
''Mr. Mills asked where the video and pictures came from (and) Mr. Culbertson said it came from an ATF agent.''
In the motion filed by Nichols' defense earlier, attorney Mark Earnest explained he interviewed both Mills and Culbertson about the potential evidence. He said Culbertson told him his request for a copy of the video and photographs ''placed Culbertson in a tight spot.''
When contacted by telephone late last week, Culbertson told an Oklahoma City police detective he had turned over a copy of the evidence to the House Judiciary Committee several years ago. Asked if he still had a copy of the material, Culbertson was described as evasive - refusing to divulge that information.
Appearing July 27, 2000, before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, the record shows Culbertson alluded to the subject of the possible existence of a videotape of the bomb blast in Oklahoma City.
Speaking as the director of the Center for Reform in Washington, D.C., Culbertson told members of the committee: ''With respect to the statements made by the Department of Justice that there are no photos or videos of the explosions of the Murrah Building, we have discovered that some indeed exist and are known to members of the law enforcement community.
''We have a short video presentation with a federal police officer describing a surveillance tape he personally witnessed at a gathering of law enforcement officers and comparing it to similar photos we have obtained in the Oklahoma City investigation, which will be presented after this opening statement, with your consent, Mr. Chairman. It is about two minutes long.
''This is a video taken April 13 of this year. It is a federal police officer describing a surveillance tape from Oklahoma City he personally witnessed and comparing it to other photos we have uncovered.''
During his appearance before the House Committee, Culbertson filed an affidavit containing statements he says were made by a federal agent who, Culbertson claimed, told him he was present at a training seminar after the bombing when the videotape was alleged to have been shown to several federal agents.
The statement included in the official record of the hearing is as follows:
''The federal police officer described two distinct explosions the locations of which are consistent with evidence uncovered in the course of investigating the attack on the Murrah Federal Building. The federal police officer also stated that the photos and video frames recovered as described above are consistent with the surveillance video that he witnessed in the training seminar. The officer's statement as well as photos obtained in the investigation is contained in this document.''
Culbertson went on to testify: ''The Department of Justice has deprived the public of this important information as well as the courts in various jurisdictions charged with trying cases related to the bombing. This act is nothing short of callous and malicious obstruction of justice in what many might consider one of the most important cases of the 20th century.''
However, under direct examination by a member of the committee, Culbertson admitted he did not have possession of the film.

The transcript of the hearing contains this exchange between Culbertson and Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York:

NADLER: Have you seen it?

CULBERTSON: I actually conducted the interview in Mr. Traficant's office.

NADLER: Have you seen the tape, I asked.

CULBERTSON: The surveillance tape?

NADLER: No. You have not seen the surveillance tape. Do you have it with you today?

CULBERTSON: The videotape?

NADLER: No, the surveillance tape.

CULBERTSON: No.

NADLER: So this is a tape of an officer talking about a different tape that we cannot see?

CULBERTSON: We are attempting to get this tape. This is a tape of a police officer describing what he saw and comparing it to photographs and videotape frames that we have in our possession. There are more than one series of surveillance.

On July 30, 2002, a federal judge sentenced Culbertson's boss, James Traficant, to eight years in prison and fined him $150,000 after a jury found the Ohio Democrat guilty on 10 counts of bribery, racketeering and tax evasion.
The guilty verdict led the House to strip Traficant of his seat, making him only the second member of Congress kicked out since the Civil War. Culbertson remained on the former congressman's office staff for a short time until elections could be held to fill the vacancy.
An inventory of the items removed from the Culbertson residence has not been made public.
Read WorldNetDaily's extensive coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing

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Top Guerrilla Killed in Chechnya
Saudi Who Led Arab Fighters Was Suspect in Moscow Bombing
Reuters
Monday, April 19, 2004; Page A14
MOSCOW, April 18 -- A Saudi who led Arab fighters in Chechnya was killed there a few days ago, his brother said Sunday.
Russian officials have said the Saudi, known as Abu Walid, was among those who organized a bombing in the Moscow subway that killed about 40 people in February.
"My brother has been martyred," Abdullah Saeed Ghamdi said from the Saudi capital, Riyadh. "We don't have any details but we know he was killed recently. We received the news yesterday and now people are coming to congratulate us on his martyrdom."
In Russia, a spokesman for the Federal Security Service declined to comment.
The pro-Moscow Chechen president, Akhmad Kadyrov, said there was a "real possibility" that Abu Walid had been killed.
"Those who offered armed resistance [in the past week] have been killed. In particular, more than 10 rebels have been killed in Vedensky region near village Tazen-Kale and Ersenoi. Among them were fighters who looked like Arab fighters," Kadyrov was quoted as saying by the Russian Tass news agency.
On Sunday, Russian news agencies said troops had killed four Chechen rebels linked to the guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev in a shootout with militants near the Chechen border.
Separately, troops in the Chechen capital, Grozny, killed a Wahhabi militant who Russian security services said could be linked to a suicide bomb attack on President Murat Zyazikov of the Ingushetia region. The austere Wahhabi creed is Saudi Arabia's mainstream Muslim denomination.
The insurgency in mainly Muslim Chechnya has attracted mujaheddin, or holy fighters, from Saudi Arabia and many other Arab countries.
In March, the al-Jazeera satellite television network broadcast a videotape it said featured Abu Walid vowing to stage a new wave of attacks in Russia.
The Kremlin blames Chechen rebels for a spate of attacks, including a suicide bombing that killed almost 50 people on a train in southern Russia before last December's parliamentary elections. The Kremlin believes Abu Walid was also among those behind the 1999 apartment bombings across Russia.

Russia has been fighting separatists in Chechnya for a decade.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Gorelick role raised early


By Charles Hurt
THE WASHINGTON TIMES


Former acting FBI Director Thomas J. Pickard told the September 11 commission in a private interview earlier this year that he was surprised that Jamie S. Gorelick is serving on the panel because she had played a key role in setting the very counterterrorism policies being investigated.
According to a summary of that interview obtained by The Washington Times, Mr. Pickard said Ms. Gorelick -- who was No. 2 in the Clinton Justice Department under Attorney General Janet Reno -- resisted efforts by the FBI to expand the counterterrorism effort beyond simple law enforcement tactics and agencies.

"Mr. Pickard indicated that it was a growing concern that the international terrorism threat was 'bigger than law enforcement,' " according to the notes from a Jan. 20 meeting at the commission's New York office.
"Despite expression of these concerns by FBI executive management, Attorney General Reno and her Deputy Jamie Gorelick believed that a law enforcement approach was appropriate," the notes say.
In a footnote, the FBI employee who attended the meeting and kept the notes wrote: "Mr. Pickard stated that he finds her 'membership on your Commission surprising since it [the decision to counter international terrorism with a law enforcement-only approach] was her and Reno's policy.' "
The notes show that concerns about Ms. Gorelick's impartiality on the commission were raised months before House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Wisconsin Republican, called for her resignation last week.
Mr. Sensenbrenner's demand came after a memo Ms. Gorelick wrote was declassified by Attorney General John Ashcroft and blamed for hampering U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Mr. Pickard, who spent most of his career at the FBI as deputy director during the Clinton administration, testified publicly before the commission last week and talked about his brief tenure as acting director of the FBI in 2001 before the terrorist attacks.
But in that open, televised testimony, he never mentioned Ms. Gorelick, her role in confining the counterterrorism effort, or his concerns about Ms. Gorelick's service on the commission.
Nor did Ms. Gorelick recuse herself from Mr. Pickard's testimony or refrain from questioning him, as she did when Miss Reno and former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh testified.
According to the commission guidelines on recusals: "Commissioners and staff will recuse themselves from investigating work they performed in prior government service."
The rules also state: "Where a commissioner or staff member has a close personal relationship with an individual, or either supervised or was supervised by an individual, the commissioner or staff member should not play a primary role in the Commission interview of that person."
Ms. Gorelick has defended her impartiality to sit on the panel and judge U.S. counterterrorism efforts even as she has strenuously defended her own actions in the past on some of those very efforts. She appeared last week on several TV programs to say she won't step down from the board and has the support of the Republican chairman of the panel.
During one television interview, Chris Matthews of MSNBC asked her if the release of her 1995 memo and current calls for her resignation were in response to her tough questioning about Mr. Ashcroft's policies and those of the Bush Justice Department.
Ms. Gorelick did not speculate on any political motives by her opponents, but said, "I'm not bringing a partisan ax to grind here."
Yesterday, however, in an opinion piece that appeared in The Washington Post, Ms. Gorelick implied a link between Mr. Ashcroft's release of the memo and prior questioning about his department.
"At last week's hearing, Attorney General John Ashcroft, facing criticism, asserted that 'the single greatest structural cause for September 11 was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents' and that I built that wall through a March 1995 memo," she wrote. "This is simply not true."
In that column -- as well as during her TV appearances last week -- she also defended her role in fighting terrorism at the Justice Department, distancing herself from the "wall" separating law enforcement fighting terrorism and intelligence services that gather counterterrorism information.
She didn't raise the wall, Ms. Gorelick said, and her memo was simply intended to define the boundaries between law enforcement and intelligence services so that cases against terrorists would not be thrown out of court because law enforcement had overstepped its bounds.
"Look: In my view, if we could have lowered that wall sooner, we should have," she told Mr. Matthews.
But that was not what she was saying around the time she wrote her memo. Ms. Gorelick appeared in October 1995 before the Senate Intelligence Committee, where she testified that many people wondered why the government doesn't merge law enforcement and counterintelligence agencies.
"I mean, they have a lot of resources. You have a lot of resources, you have all got the same enemies, why don't you just merge to achieve greater efficiency?" she said to the assembled senators, including Sen. Bob Kerrey, Nebraska Democrat, who has since left the Senate and now sits with Ms. Gorelick on the 9/11 commission.
"I think on both sides of the river, if you will, we think this would be a serious mistake," she said. "There are ample reasons, both in history and in constitutional principles, to maintain a clear demarcation between the missions of the two communities."
Even in her 1995 memo, she noted that the separation procedures outlined "go beyond what is legally required."

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The Wall Truth
Gorelick provides the clearest proof yet that she should resign.

By Andrew C. McCarthy

The grandstanding Richard Clarke having made apologies all the rage, one should expect that President Bush and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will be getting one in the next day or two. Something like this:



Dear Mr. President and Dr. Rice:
Very sorry about all that high dudgeon a couple of weeks ago. You remember, when we couldn't pass a microphone, a pencil, or a camera without perorations about the vital need to have the President waive executive privilege and ignore scads of history so Dr. Rice could be permitted to testify under oath and publicly (and improve our Nielson numbers) to address provocative allegations by another commission fave -- er, witness -- Richard Clarke. Turns out we should have mentioned that if Condi had just zipped an op-ed over to the Washington Post that would have done the trick. We regret any inconvenience to you, your staff, or the Constitution.
Respectfully, the 9/11 Commissioners.

If that note is not forthcoming, then someone's got some explaining to do about "The Truth About 'the Wall,'" Jamie Gorelick's remarkable Washington Post op-ed from Sunday, which purports to put to rest the nettlesome squawking about her untenable position as a commissioner judging the causes of pre-9/11 intelligence failure, a matter in which she was a key participant. Leaving aside, for a moment, how off-the-wall her account of the wall is, the fact that she well knows she needed to say something is the clearest indication yet that she belongs in the witness chair, not on the commissioners' bench.

Gorelick's op-ed intentionally raises five different points in her purported defense. Around them are sandwiched two others -- opening and closing salvos that she can't resist mentioning but avoids identifying as argument points because she is too smart not to know that they scream out for her recusal. I'll take them in the order in which she makes them.

1. Ashcroft is wrong. Gorelick starts by asserting that Attorney General John Ashcroft gave testimony that was "simply not true" when he claimed both that "the single greatest structural cause for September 11 was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents[,]" and that Gorelick "built that wall through a March 1995 memo." In fact, Ashcroft's testimony was entirely true: The wall was a policy that virtually guaranteed intelligence failure, and the March 1995 memo was its first building block, a harbinger of the further institutionalizing of the wall that would come, from Gorelick, only a few months later. That, however, is beside the point.

When witnesses give differing accounts, it is left to an impartial arbiter -- not one of the witnesses -- to sort it out. Moreover, the commission's standard, announced to maximum preening effect only three weeks ago after Clarke's testimony spawned demands for Rice's testimony, is that essential witnesses, and particularly those who are in a position to clarify or refute the testimony of prior essential witnesses (i.e., the position Rice was in vis-?-vis Clarke), must testify under oath and in public. Not surprisingly, while brazenly accusing the attorney general of the United States of giving false testimony, Gorelick elides mention of the Clarke/Rice dust-up. But it did happen, and Gorelick was gleefully in the thick of it. Why is what's sauce for the goose not sauce for the commissioner?

2. "I did not invent the "wall," which is not a wall but a set of procedures implementing a 1978 statute (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA) and federal court decisions interpreting it." Gorelick did invent the wall. The wall was not a set of procedures implementing FISA as construed by federal decisional law. To quote Gorelick's 1995 memorandum (something she carefully avoids doing), the procedures her memorandum put in place "go beyond what is legally required...[to] prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation." (Emphasis added.) As this rather straightforward English sentence illuminates, the wall exceeded the requirements of FISA and then-existing federal case law.

What the wall implemented was not the FISA statute as construed by the courts but rather Gorelick's overheated view of what would be useful to avoid being accused of misusing FISA. To be sure, it is often prudent for the government to hamstring itself beyond legal requirements; going-the-extra-mile improves the (already good) chances that courts will reject motions by defendants to suppress damaging evidence (like incriminating recorded conversations). It is, however, irresponsible for the government to hamstring itself when that means national security will be imperiled -- which is what happens when agents are forbidden from communicating with one another.

3. The prohibition on prosecutors directing intelligence investigations was in effect long before the 1995 guidelines issued by the Reno Justice Department. This is transparent misdirection. The government usually collects evidence of ordinary crimes under the criminal law, not FISA; but there is nothing inherently wrong with collecting evidence of ordinary crimes under FISA. The error that was made during the 1980s was FISA's certification requirement (which merely called for a representation that the government was seeking FISA-interception authority for the purpose of collecting national-security intelligence) was read as if it limited the government's ability to use FISA-derived evidence in ordinary criminal cases. The federal courts compounded this error by fashioning a "primary purpose" test which required the government, before it could use FISA evidence in a criminal case, to prove that it had been motivated to use FISA by national-security concerns -- i.e., that it hadn't used FISA as a pretext to conduct what was really a criminal investigation.

This was the state of play in 1995, when the Reno Justice Department -- with Gorelick pulling the laboring oar -- instituted the wall. Gorelick may be correct -- we'd have to hear her testify subject to cross-examination to be sure -- when she declares that "[t]he point [of the Reno guidelines] was to preserve the ability of prosecutors to use information collected by intelligence agents." (My own sense, for what little it may be worth, is that the point was to mollify civil-liberties activists and conspiracy theorists who trumped up baseless fears that the government would dishonestly use FISA authority to investigate people who were not national-security risks -- but I am not the person who wrote the guidelines, and we should probably give her the benefit of the doubt regarding her intentions. But good intentions hardly mean the actions they spawn will be sound.)

The wall generally forbidding intelligence agents from communicating with their criminal counterparts was a suicidally excessive way to ensure that what little information intelligence agents were permitted to pass would be admissible in court. This is the product of a mindset that insists, beyond all reason and common sense, that terrorism is just a law-enforcement problem. The object of a rational counterterrorism approach is to prevent mass murder from happening in the first place, not to improve your litigating posture for the indictment you return after thousands of people have been slaughtered.

4. The Ashcroft Justice Department failed to dismantle the wall prior to the 9/11 attacks. Yes, that's true. And it was dumb, which was why Ashcroft got grilled over it by Gorelick's fellow commissioners. But Gorelick's argument actually makes my point. If it was relevant, probative and highly material for the commission to probe why Ashcroft did not eradicate the wall when he had the chance in the months before 9/11, it is doubly relevant, probative, and highly material to probe why on earth Gorelick erected the wall in the first place.

5. Gorelick's March 1995 memo concerned only two cases and permitted "freer coordination between intelligence and criminal investigators than was subsequently permitted by the 1995 guidelines" and the Ashcroft Justice Department. So what? The fact is that Gorelick's 1995 memo was excessively prohibitive. Who cares if it was somewhat less excessively prohibitive than the July 1995 guidelines -- especially given that Gorelick was responsible for the 1995 guidelines (that were reaffirmed in 2001). If Gorelick is looking for a medal because she was, at least as she sees it, marginally less irresponsible in March 1995 than she was in July 1995, she should not hold her breath.

And her hyperventilating about acting to protect the two cases (including mine) from the threat of having convictions reversed is specious. By the time she penned her March 1995 memo, the first World Trade Center bombing prosecution had been over for a year and my case was in its third month of trial. The only conceivable threat to eventual convictions would have been (a) if the prosecutors and agents in my case had learned information about defense strategy by virtue of the government's continuing investigation of some of our indicted defendants for possible new crimes; or (b) if the continuing investigation had turned up exculpatory information about the defendants in my case and I had not been told about it so I could disclose it. Far from being unique to national-security matters, that situation is a commonplace when the government deals with violent organizations (which tend to obstruct justice and routinely plot to kill or influence witnesses, prosecutors, and/or jurors, thus requiring continuing investigations even as already indicted cases proceed).

To avoid constitutional problems in such a situation, the government regularly assigns a prosecutor and agent who are not involved in the already indicted case to vet information from the continuing investigation before it is permitted to be communicated to agents and prosecutors on the indicted case. This way, the team on the indicted case learns only what it is allowed to know (viz., evidence of new crimes the defendants have committed), but not what it should not know (viz., defense strategy information and incriminating admissions about the indicted case made without the consent of counsel); and the government maintains the ability to reveal any exculpatory information (as federal law requires). As Gorelick's 1995 memorandum recounts, the U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York had already made sure that was done in my case long before Gorelick's memo. There was no need for Gorelick to do more; what she did served only to place additional, unnecessary barriers to information sharing which -- her memo, again, acknowledges -- were not required by existing law.

6. The July 1995 guidelines -- the wall -- did not really prevent information sharing and merely implemented court decisions. The guidelines did prevent information sharing -- that was their purpose. They literally permitted some information to be passed over the wall if intelligence agents realized that evidence they'd developed might prove the commission of a serious crime. Intelligence agents, however, were hardly in a position to come to such a realization with any confidence because the wall generally forbade them from coordinating with criminal agents. Thus, they were ill equipped to recognize the significance of information to which they were privy.

More importantly, the hyper-technical 1995 guidelines were so byzantine as to be inscrutable for non-lawyer agents in the field, who found it far easier to assume they weren't allowed to communicate with one another than to venture into Gorelick's labyrinth without benefit of Ariadne's golden cord. That is why, for example, the FBI's criminal division declined to assist its intelligence division in August 2001, when an astute agent was frantically trying to find Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, the eventual suicide hijackers who steered Flight 77 into the Pentagon. Whether or not the wall procedures dictated that decision, the culture of dysfunction the procedures had fostered was by then firmly entrenched.

7. The relevant history regarding the wall is well known, Gorelick has recused herself from consideration of her own actions and those of the Justice Department while she was there, and her fellow commissioners have spoken up in her defense. This is offered as Gorelick's wind-up. If it is adopted as the new standard, the commission should stop wasting everyone's time and money right now. First, the relevant history of many aspects of the 9/11 investigation is extensively well documented; yet, the commission has insisted on calling witnesses -- despite the fact that our nation is at war and many of the witnesses have been taken away from their wartime responsibilities for hours (and sometimes days) to comply with commission requests for information and testimony. To this point, no witness has been permitted to get away with a curt "you don't need me -- you've already got enough information."

Second, Gorelick's conflict is not so tidy as to be solved by avoiding inquiry into her time in the Justice Department. If that were the case, John Ashcroft could have been a commissioner -- and just imagine the howling if someone had proposed that. Gorelick's conflict, central to the matter of intelligence lapse, goes to the heart of the commission's investigation. Whenever she asks a question on another subject -- even if she does it in good faith -- the public is entitled to wonder whether she is trying to shift blame or scrutiny away from herself. The legitimacy of the commission is thus critically undermined.

Finally, the support of Gorelick's fellow commissioners is irrelevant. Again, these are the same guys who were screaming for Rice three weeks ago, for no better reason than that Clarke had made allegations Rice was in a position to shed light on. Ashcroft has now made assertions far more central to the salient matter of institutional impediments to information sharing. That those same commissioners are not being consistent, that they are not calling for Gorelick to step down and be sworn as a witness, is inexplicable. I'm sure they have all bonded; I'm quite certain they admire and respect Gorelick's powerful mind and exemplary work ethic -- they'd be foolish not to. But imagine for a moment that Gorelick had not been appointed to serve on the commission. Is there anyone on the planet who doesn't think she'd have been subpoenaed to testify after her memorandum came to light during last week's proceedings? Is there anyone who thinks she could have avoided testifying under such circumstances by writing an op-ed?

Gorelick's "defense" merely underscores how inappropriate it is for her to sit in judgment as a commissioner. Obviously, she's hell-bent on staying. And so we watch as the commission slowly mutates from a potentially useful exercise, to a politicized teledrama, to a hopelessly suspect irrelevancy.

-- Andrew C. McCarthy, a former chief assistant U.S. attorney who led the 1995 terrorism prosecution against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others, is an NRO contributor.


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>> NOW SELL THEM NUKE TECH?

China Lets Cheney Speak on TV but Censors Remarks Afterward
By JOSEPH KAHN

Published: April 20, 2004

Pool photo by Eugene Hoshiko
Vice President Dick Cheney speaking to students at Fudan University in Shanghai. The session was broadcast on Chinese television.
BEIJING, April 19 -- Before his high-profile visit to China last week, Vice President Dick Cheney insisted that Beijing leaders allow him to speak, live and uncensored, to the Chinese people.
After weeks of intense negotiations, Mr. Cheney was granted that measure of openness -- but not one millimeter more.
Anyone who tuned in to CCTV-4, China's all-news television channel, shortly after 10 a.m. on Thursday could watch Mr. Cheney deliver an address to students at Fudan University in Shanghai. A State Department translator provided simultaneous interpretation.
But the broadcast received no advance promotion or even listing in the Chinese news media and was not repeated. The authorities promptly provided leading Web sites with a "full text" of the vice president's remarks, including his answers to questions after the speech, that struck out references to political freedom, Taiwan, North Korea and other issues that propaganda officials considered sensitive.
The censorship showed that even a hopeful sign of political progress in China can be more like a mirage. Officials sought to convey a relaxed attitude about what Mr. Cheney might say in public but worked to alter the record. "What they do to control the media is sometimes surreal," said Yu Maochun, a China expert at the United States Naval Academy who noticed discrepancies between Mr. Cheney's speech and the Chinese transcript. "Censorship is a habit they can't kick."
In a similar sleight of the invisible hand late last year, a government-owned Chinese publisher issued an authorized Chinese version of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton's autobiography, "Living History," that removed most of Ms. Clinton's references to her and former President Bill Clinton's visits to China.
The Chinese company did not notify Ms. Clinton's publisher that it was making any changes to the text, and it was sold as an unabridged translation.
American officials say that to the best of their knowledge the Chinese side lived up to the letter of their agreement on Mr. Cheney's speech, but expressed frustration that the record was later expunged.
"It was extremely important to the White House to have a live and uncensored broadcast," said a United States consular official in Shanghai. "We feel good that we were able to do that."
Bush administration officials said they had not negotiated how the Chinese transcript would be handled. When the excised version came to their attention, they worked to prepare their own Chinese version. It was posted on Friday to the American Embassy's Web site, which is not blocked within China.
Although Mr. Cheney was accorded the trappings of a state visit by a major foreign leader -- motorcades, television coverage and meetings with top officials -- there were no large crowds, and interest among the public most likely was limited to the well informed in urban areas.
In his speech last Thursday, Mr. Cheney spoke broadly about American foreign policy. But he devoted much of the talk and a subsequent exchange with students to links between political and economic freedom in China, as well as Taiwan, the most delicate topic in United States-China relations.
The Chinese transcript was prepared by the official People's Daily immediately after the address, and was distributed to newspapers and Web sites across the country. While faithful to most of what Mr. Cheney said, it dropped many references to "political freedom" and "individual freedom."
While Mr. Cheney praised "rising prosperity and expanding political freedom" across Asia, the official Chinese transcript refers only to "rising prosperity." It drops his statements that "the desire for freedom is universal" and that "freedom is indivisible."
It also wiped out any record of what Mr. Cheney had said about the Taiwan Relations Act, an American law mandating that the United States sell Taiwan military equipment so it can defend itself against any attack from the Chinese mainland. China maintains that the act violates agreements with the United States.
Mr. Cheney said the campaign against terror must not be used to suppress "legitimate dissent." The Chinese, who have battled dissidents in their largely Muslim region of Xinjiang, dropped that phrase.
The longest elisions involved Mr. Cheney's references to the North Korean nuclear crisis, North Korea's acquisition of nuclear technology from Pakistan and the problem of weapons proliferation generally. China, which has close ties to North Korea, is acting as a broker in negotiations over how to end the North's nuclear arms program.
The full address was carried live by China Central Television on its Chinese-language news channel and a second channel that broadcasts in English. Although China Central Television is the country's main television news provider, the number of people who watch its specialty news channel during working hours is thought to be quite small.
The edited text, without indications of editing changes, was posted on the Web sites of People's Daily, the New China News Agency and other online locations.
An editor at the People's Daily Web site involved with preparing the transcript denied that any censorship had occurred. The editor, who declined to be identified, said missing sentences or sections were attributable solely to the speed with which the transcript had been prepared.
Administration officials have been on guard against censorship since the visit of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to China in February 2003. State Department officials arranged an interview with Mr. Powell on China Central Television that by diplomatic agreement was to be broadcast unedited, administration officials said. The broadcast nonetheless left out Mr. Powell's references to human rights abuses, among other sensitive issues.
The consular official said the American side had tried to anticipate how the Chinese might censor Mr. Cheney's remarks but could not prevent all alterations. "It's a challenge," the official said.

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Brazil Refusal on Inspection Angers IAEA
By GEORGE JAHN
ASSOCIATED PRESS

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - Brazil's refusal to allow the U.N. atomic agency to fully inspect one of its nuclear facilities has led to frustration within the organization, even though its officials do not believe the country is hiding a weapons program, diplomats said Monday.
The diplomats, who are familiar with the International Atomic Energy Agency's work, suggested the Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog is more annoyed than worried about Brazil's decision to deny access earlier this year to uranium enrichment centrifuges at a facility being built near Rio de Janeiro.
"It's not a question of suspecting that Brazil has a covert nuclear weapons program," said one of the diplomats, who all spoke on condition of anonymity. "It's more a question of principle."
Although Brazil signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1997 and said its nuclear program has purely peaceful objectives, questions about its commitment have simmered for more than a year.
The government earlier this month confirmed that IAEA inspectors were denied access in February and March to centrifuges at the facility, in the town of Resende.
It cited the need to protect industrial secrets and said the centrifuges were, and will remain, off-limits for visual inspection.
The diplomat in Vienna, however rejected that argument.
"The agency monitors some 900 facilities around the world with a myriad of technologies and has a good record of protecting those trade secrets," he said.
Another diplomat said Brazil's argument could set a worrying precedent at a time the agency is fighting to gain full access to Iran's nuclear secrets to test Tehran's assertions that it was not pursuing a weapons program.
Iran became a focus of world concern after last year's discovery that it was assembling thousands of centrifuges for uranium enrichment, which has uses ranging from generating power to making nuclear weapons. Iran denies any weapons ambitions, saying it only wants to produce electricity.
"Brazil's reticence could lead other countries to follow suit," and make the agency's job of policing nuclear programs more complicated, said the diplomat.

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>> THEIR NEW FRIEND...

Gadhafi Seeks Abolition of Courts, Laws

ASSOCIATED PRESS
TRIPOLI, Libya (AP) - Moammar Gadhafi on Sunday called for the abolition of Libya's three decade-old exceptional courts and other strict laws criticized by human rights groups.
During talks in Tripoli with judges and prosecutors, the Libyan leader urged delegates meeting across the country since Saturday in weeklong annual People's Congress forums to annul the laws, which were passed three years after Gadhafi seized power in a 1969 military coup.
Libya's exceptional laws have, among other things, banned the formation of political parties and stipulated death penalties for dissidents.
The official news agency JANA reported that Gadhafi also called for an end to arrests without warrant and urged the congresses to endorse international anti-torture conventions.
Long considered a rogue state and sponsor of terrorism, Libya recently started winning back international support with Gadhafi's decision to abolish the nation's weapons of mass destruction program and accept responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie jetliner bombing.
His appeal Sunday came after the March visit to Libya by a team of human rights workers from Amnesty International, the organization's first to the North African nation in 15 years.
The Amnesty team visited Libyan prisons and met with Gadhafi, urging him to abolish the country's exceptional laws and People's Court, which handles political and security cases, and replace them with ordinary criminal courts.
Those convicted by the People's Court have no recourse to appeal and no right to obtain independent legal counsel.
Gadhafi had promised to consider Amnesty's recommendations.
The regional People's Congress forums usually adopt Gadhafi's recommendations, which eventually reach the General People's Congress, Libya's version of a parliament that meets annually in March, for ratification.
There have been occasions when Gadhafi's calls have not been accepted, such as his appeal for free primary school education.
Gadhafi, who holds that Libya is ruled by the people, abolished the country's constitution when he came to power. His "Green Book" - a political philosophy that mixes socialism, populism and Arab nationalism - is the closest thing his country has to a constitution.

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Powell Asks Syria to Boost Iraq Patrols
By GEORGE GEDDA
ASSOCIATED PRESS
WASHINGTON (AP) - Secretary of State Colin Powell on Monday said he has asked Syrian President Bashar Assad to send more forces to the border area with Iraq to prevent infiltration by militants opposed to the U.S. military presence there.
Powell said in an interview with The Associated Press that a letter he sent to Bashar last week did not link Syrian border control efforts to the administration's plan to impose sanctions against Syria that Congress has approved.
The legislation has a range of options for sanctions from which the administration can choose.
"We're exploring ways of working with the Syrians to increase the density of forces with surveillance over that (the Iraqi) border," Powell said.
He said Syria has taken steps to control border crossing sites but added that more can be done. He acknowledged the difficulty in patrolling an area 600 miles long.
"It is in our mutual interest to deal with the problem," Powell said. "It is not in Syria's interest to be seen as a base from which infiltrators can come across to kill innocent Iraqis or to kill coalition troops."
Last week, Maj. Gen. John Sattler, director of operations for Central Command, said Marines have had great success in shutting off the flow of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq.
"We had an extreme amount of success on the front side, meaning that we did find, fix and ultimately finish a number of cells that were up there that were facilitating" the infiltration, he said.
The Bush administration is assessing how to administer Syria sanctions legislation signed by President Bush in December. Powell said the administration will take action on the sanctions in the near future.
The legislation, passed by broad majorities in both houses, reflects the view that Syria has been a detriment to the fight against terrorism in the Middle East and Iraq.
It notes that Syria provided a safe haven for anti-Israeli militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad and is accused of pursuing the development and production of biological and chemical weapons.
It states that Syria must end its support of terrorists, terminate its 27-year military presence in Lebanon, stop efforts to obtain or produce weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles and prevent terrorists and weapons from entering Iraq.
If Syria fails to meet those conditions, the president must ban sales of dual-use items, which can have both civilian and military applications.
He also must impose at least two out of a list of six possible penalties: a ban on exports to Syria, prohibition of U.S. businesses' operating in Syria, restrictions on Syrian diplomats in the United States, limits on Syrian airline flights in the United States, reduction of diplomatic contacts or a freeze on Syrian assets in the United States.

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>> ARKANSAS MAFIA WATCH...

Clinton leaves Jamaica Holidayed at Tryall

Monday, April 19, 2004
FORMER US first lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, left Jamaica yesterday after a one-week vacation at the exclusive Tryall Club in Hanover, highly placed sources confirmed.
Hotel officials declined to confirm or deny Rodham Clinton's stay at the property, but one knowledgeable source told the Observer: "She had a quiet, delightful and restful holiday. That was the way she wanted it."
According to Observer sources, between her aides, friends and Secret Service protectors Rodham Clinton's entourage occupied 40 rooms.
Her visit, like that of President George Bush's daughter, ??, was kept quiet for privacy and security reasons.
The wife of former president Bill Clinton, Rodham Clinton is now a member of the US Senate from New York, the first former first lady ever to be elected to the US legislature. She is being touted as a likely Democratic presidential candidate in 2009.
Rodham Clinton had planned to holiday at an old Jamaican plantation house after her Senate campaign in November 2000, but shelved the plan in the wake of the close, and controversial, presidential race between Bush and Bill Clinton's vice president Al Gore that was eventually decided by the US Supreme Court.
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FEC investigating
Hillary fund-raiser
2000 Hollywood event collected
$1 million for Senate campaign

Posted: April 19, 2004
5:00 p.m. Eastern

? 2004 WorldNetDaily.com

The Federal Elections Commission is investigating a Hollywood fund-raiser that brought in more than $1 million for Hillary Rodham Clinton's 2000 Senate campaign.
According to a report in the Los Angeles Times, a source familiar with the probe supplied information about the investigation, which began several weeks ago.
Sen. Hillary Clinton, D-N.Y.
In addition to the FEC action, the paper reported a federal grand jury in Los Angeles has been examining evidence of wrongdoing by a number of people in connection with the activities of Aaron Tonken, the fund-raising guru who staged the Hillary event.
Sources say Tonken, who in December pleaded guilty to fraud charges involving charity events, is cooperating with investigators.
The Hollywood gala took place in August 2000 on the eve of the Democratic National Convention in L.A. Billed as a tribute to outgoing President Clinton, the event also brought in much-needed cash for Hillary's campaign, the Times reported.
Peter Paul, an Internet entrepreneur who helped pay for the event, is locked in a court battle with the Clintons over allegations the then-first couple defrauded him in connection with the fund-raiser. According to the report, Paul is one of those being questioned in the FEC probe.
The FEC normally works in secret and would not comment on the investigation for the Times.
Part of Tonken's current bankruptcy proceedings includes his contention that over $2 million in charity funds was diverted to nearly three dozen Hollywood celebrities and power players.
Philip Dapeer, Tonken's attorney, tells the paper his client "has been personally threatened." Tight security was provided at a bankruptcy creditors' meeting last week. According to the report, Tonken refused to answer some questions at the meeting because California Attorney General Bill Lockyer's office had served notice that it was considering criminal charges against him.
Tonken is writing a book for WND Books with a working title of "King of Cons: Exposing the Dirty Rotten Scandals of the Washington Elite and Hollywood Celebrities." The book is due out next year. Negotiations are under way with film producer Michel Shane to make a movie version of the book. Shane was credited as executive producer on the recent Steven Spielberg film "Catch Me If You Can."
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Now Can We Talk About Health Care?
By HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

know what you're thinking. Hillary Clinton and health care? Been there. Didn't do that!

No, it's not 1994; it's 2004. And believe it or not, we have more problems today than we had back then. Issues like soaring health costs and millions of uninsured have yet to fix themselves. And now we are confronting a new set of challenges associated with the arrival of the information age, the technological revolution and modern life.

Think for a moment about recent advances in genetic testing. Knowing you are prone to cancer or heart disease or Lou Gehrig's disease may give you a fighting chance. But just try, with that information in hand, to get health insurance in a system without strong protections against discrimination for pre-existing or genetic conditions. Each vaunted scientific breakthrough brings with it new challenges to our health system. But it's not only medicine that is changing. So, too, are the economy, our personal behaviors and our environment. Unless Americans across the political spectrum come together to change our health care system, that system, already buckling under the pressures of today, will collapse with the problems of tomorrow.

Twenty-first-century problems, like genetic mapping, an aging population and globalization, are combining with old problems like skyrocketing costs and skyrocketing numbers of uninsured, to overwhelm the 20th-century system we have inherited.

The way we finance care is so seriously flawed that if we fail to fix it, we face a fiscal disaster that will not only deny quality health care to the uninsured and underinsured but also undermine the capacity of the system to care for even the well insured. For example, if a hospital's trauma center is closed or so crowded that it cannot take any more patients, your insurance card won't help much if you're the one in the freeway accident.

Let's face it -- if we were to start from scratch, none of us, from dyed-in-the-wool liberals to rock-solid conservatives, would fashion the kind of health care system America has inherited. So why should we carry the problems of this system into the future?

21st-Century Problems
At the dawn of the last century, America was coping with the effects of the industrial revolution -- crowded living conditions, dangerous workplaces, inadequate sanitation and infrastructure in cities and pollution and infectious diseases like typhoid fever and cholera that exacted a huge toll on the oldest and youngest in society.

Since then, a century's worth of advances yielded remarkable results. Antibiotics were developed. Anesthesia was improved. Public health programs like mosquito control and childhood immunizations succeeded in reducing or even eradicating diseases like malaria and polio in this country. Congress passed legislation regulating the quality of food and drugs and assuring that safety and science guided medical developments. Workplace and product-safety standards resulted in fewer deaths and injuries from accidents. Effective campaigns cut tobacco use and alcohol abuse. Employers began providing some workers with health care coverage, primarily for hospitalization costs. And to aid some of those left out, President Lyndon B. Johnson persuaded Congress to establish Medicare and Medicaid to address the poorest, sickest, oldest and highest-risk patients in our society. As a result of these accumulated gains, life expectancy grew from 47 years in 1900 to 77 years for those born in 2000.

As astounding as those changes were, we are likely to see even more revolutionary changes in the next 100 years. Advances in medicine coincide with advances in computers and communications. The American workplace is changing in response to global pressures. But even positive advances may come with a negative underside. Our affluence contributes to an increasingly sedentary lifestyle that, combined with a diet filled with sugar and fat-rich foods, undermines our ability to fend off chronic diseases like diabetes. And research is proving that the pollutants and contaminants in our environment cause disease and mortality.

It is overwhelming just thinking about the problems, never mind dealing with them. But we have to begin applying American ingenuity and resolve or watch the best health care system in the world deteriorate.

Medical Advances
The pace of scientific development in medicine is so rapid that the next hundred years is likely to be called the Century of the Life Sciences. We have mapped the human genome and seen the birth of the burgeoning field of genomics, offering the opportunity to pinpoint and modify the genes responsible for a whole host of conditions. Scientists are exploring whether nanotechnology can target drugs to diseased tissues or implant sensors to detect disease in its earliest forms. We can look forward to ''designer drugs'' tailored to individual genetic profiles. But the advances we herald carry challenges and costs.

Think about the potential for inequities in drug research. Today, pharmaceutical and biotech companies have little incentive to research and develop treatments for individuals with rare diseases. Never heard of progeria? That's the point. This fatal syndrome, also called premature-aging disease, affects one in four million newborns a year. It's rare enough that there is no profit in developing a cure. This is known as the ''orphan drug'' problem. Genetic profiles and individualized therapies have the potential to increase the problem of orphaned drugs by further fragmenting the market. Even manufacturers of drugs for conditions like high blood pressure might focus their efforts on people with common genetic profiles. Depending on your genes, you could be out of luck.

The increasing understanding and use of genomics may also undermine the insurance system. Health insurance, like other insurance, exists to protect against unpredictable, costly events. It is based on risk. As genetic information allows us to predict illness with greater certainty, it threatens to turn the most susceptible patients into the most vulnerable. Many of us will become uninsurable, like the two young sisters with a congenital disease I met in Cleveland. Their father went from insurance company to insurance company trying to get coverage, until one insurance agent looked at him and said, ''We don't insure burning houses.''

Many have worked to get laws on the books to protect people from genetic discrimination, but we have yet to pass legislation that addresses job security and health coverage. The challenges do not stop there. Health insurance will have to change fundamentally to cope with predictable, knowable risks. Will health insurance companies offer coverage tailored to a person's future health prospects? Right now, if you have asthma, or even just allergies, insurers in the individual market can exclude your respiratory system from your health insurance policy. Will all health plans stop offering benefits that relate to genetic diseases?

The ability to predict illness may overwhelm more than just the insurance system; it may overwhelm the patient and the provider. Studies in The Journal of the American Medical Association found that nearly 6 out of 10 patients at risk for breast and ovarian cancer declined a genetic test, and a similar fraction of those at risk for colon cancer also declined testing. Why? One reason is probably to avoid higher insurance premiums. But the decision to undergo genetic testing is a complex one that involves many issues. Positive test results often indicate increased risk but no certainty that a disease will occur. Negative results also come without guarantees. The development of genetic profiles and individual therapies will exponentially increase the amount of information a physician is expected to manage. Instead of remembering one or two drugs for any condition, a physician will have to analyze all the different genetic, demographic and behavioral variables to generate optimal treatment for a patient.

Medical advances have the potential to overwhelm the health care system top to bottom. At the very least, the pace of technological progress is so rapid that our antiquated health care system is ill equipped to deliver the fruits of that progress. But these advances are not occurring in isolation from other factors affecting both how we finance health care and how much care we need and expect.

Globalization
The globalization of our economy has changed everything from how we work as individuals to what we produce as a nation to how quickly diseases can spread. American companies -- and workers -- compete not only with one another but all over the world. It is called competitive advantage, but it can put American businesses and workers at a disadvantage.

The United States' closest economic rivals have mandatory national health care systems rather than the voluntary employer-based model we have. Automakers in the United States and Canada pay taxes to help finance public health care. But in the United States, automakers also pay about $1,300 per midsize car produced for private employee health insurance. Automakers in Canada come out ahead, according to recent news reports, even after paying higher taxes.

At the same time, American companies are outsourcing jobs to countries where the price of labor does not include health coverage, which costs Americans jobs and puts pressure on employers who continue to cover their employees at home.

And many new jobs, especially those in the service sector and part-time jobs, don't include comprehensive health benefits. More uninsured and underinsured workers impose major strains on a health system that relies on employer-based insurance. In addition, the failure of government to help contain health costs for employers has led to a fraying of the implicit social contract in which a good job came with affordable coverage.

Gone are the days when a young person would start in the mail room and stay with the company until retirement. Employee mobility is now the rule rather than the exception. Those who pay for health care -- insurance companies and employers -- increasingly deal with employees who change jobs every few years. This has the effect of not only increasing the numbers of uninsured but also of decreasing the incentive for employers to underwrite access to preventive care.

At the same time, war, poverty, environmental degradation and increased world travel for business and pleasure mean greater migration of people across borders. And with people go diseases. The likes of SARS can travel quickly from Hong Kong to Toronto, and news of a strange flu in Asia worries us in New York. Welcome to the world without borders.

The Pulitzer Prize-winning science writer Laurie Garrett has described it as ''payback for decades of shunning the desperate health needs of the poor world.'' No matter the blame, the need to act now to address issues of global health is no longer just a moral imperative; it is self-interest.

Lifestyle and Demographic Changes
One hundred years ago, who could have predicted that living longer would be a problem?

In three decades, the number of Medicare beneficiaries will double. By the year 2050, one in five Americans will be 65 or older. We will have to find a way to finance the growing demand not only for health care but also for long-term care, which is now largely left out of Medicare.

Our society's affluence is only half of the story. Widening disparities in wealth and in health care too often cleave along ethnic lines. Today, a Hispanic child with asthma is far less likely than a non-Hispanic white child to get needed medication. African-Americans are systematically less likely to get state-of-the-art cardiac care. As our country becomes more and more diverse, these disparities become more obvious and more intolerable.

Our changing lifestyles also contribute to behavior-induced health problems. We can shop online, order in fast food, drive to our errands. Entertainment -- movies, TV, video games and music -- is one click away. The physical activity required to get through the day has decreased, while the pace and stress of daily life has quickened, affecting mental health. Persistent poverty, risky behaviors like substance abuse and unprotected sex and pollution from cars and power plants all add to the country's health problems. As Judith Stern of the University of California at Davis so aptly put it, genetics may load the gun, but environment pulls the trigger.

Old Problems Persist
If all we had to do was face these tremendous changes, that would be daunting enough. But many of the systemic problems we have struggled with for decades -- like high costs and the uninsured -- are simply getting worse.

In 1993, the critics predicted that if the Clinton administration's universal health care coverage plan became law, costs would go through the roof. ''Hospitals will have to close,'' they said, ''Families will lose their choice of doctors. Bureaucrats will deny medically necessary care.''

They were half-right. All that has happened. They were just wrong about the reason.

In 1993, there were 37 million uninsured Americans. In the late 90's, the situation improved slightly, largely because of the improved economy and the passage of the Children's Health Insurance Program. But now some 43.6 million Americans are uninsured, and the vast majority of them are in working families.

While employer-sponsored insurance remains a major source of coverage for workers, it is becoming less accessible and affordable for spouses, dependents and retirees. In 1993, 46 percent of companies with 500 or more employees offered some type of retiree health benefit. That declined to 29 percent in 2001. When you think about the new economy and worker mobility, it's no wonder employers are dropping retiree health benefits. You can only wonder how many yet-to-retire workers are next.

Even those Americans not among the ranks of the uninsured increasingly find themselves underinsured. In 2003, two-thirds of companies with 200 or more employees dealt with increasing costs by increasing the share that their employees had to pay and dropping coverage for particular services. With rising deductibles and co-pays, even if you have insurance, you may not be able to afford the care you need, and some benefits, like mental health services, may not be covered at all.

The problem of the uninsured and underinsured affects everyone. A recent Institute of Medicine study estimates that 18,000 25- to 64-year-old adults die every year as a result of lack of coverage. But even if you are insured, if you have a heart attack, and the ambulance that picks you up has to go three hospitals away because the nearby emergency rooms are full, you will have suffered from our inadequate system of coverage.

If, as a nation, we were saving money by denying insurance to some people, you could at least say there's some logic to it -- no matter how cruel. But that's not the case. Despite the lack of universal coverage in our country, we still spend much more than countries that provide health care to all their citizens. We are No. 1 in the world in health care spending. On a per capita basis, health spending in the United States is 50 percent higher than the second-highest-spending country: Switzerland. Our health costs now constitute 14.9 percent of our gross domestic product and are growing at an alarming rate: by 2013, per capita health care spending is projected to increase to 18.4 percent of G.D.P.

What drives skyrocketing spending? The cost of prescription drugs rose almost twice as fast as spending on all health services, 40 percent in just the last few years.

Hospital costs have been rising as well, in large measure because more than one in four health care dollars go to administration. In 1999, that meant $300 billion per year went to pay for administrative bureaucracy: accountants and bookkeepers, who collect bills, negotiate with insurance companies and squeeze every possible reimbursement out of public programs like Medicare and Medicaid. Asthma and other pulmonary disorders linked to pollution contribute significantly to these costs, according to the health economist Ken Thorpe. Diabetes, high blood pressure and mental illness are also among the conditions that keep these costs rising.

If we spend so much, even after administrative costs, why does the United States rank behind 47 other countries in life expectancy and 42nd in infant mortality?

A lot of the money Americans spend is wasted on care that doesn't improve health. A recent study by Dartmouth researchers argues that close to a third of the $1.6 trillion we now spend on health care goes to care that is duplicative, fails to improve patient health or may even make it worse. A study in Santa Barbara, Calif., found that one out of every five lab tests and X-rays were conducted solely because previous test results were unavailable. A recent study found that for two-thirds of the patients who received a $15,000 surgery to prevent stroke, there was no compelling evidence that the surgery worked.

In situations in which the benefits of intervention are clear, many patients are not receiving that care. For example, few hospitalized patients at risk for bacterial pneumonia get the vaccine against it during their hospital stays. A recent study in The New England Journal of Medicine by Elizabeth McGlynn found that, overall, Americans are getting the care they should only 55 percent of the time.

As a whole, our ailing health care system is plagued with underuse, overuse and misuse. In a fundamental way, we pay far more for less than citizens in other advanced economies get.

How We Deliver Care
There is no ''one size fits all'' solution to our health care problems, but there are common-sense solutions that call for aggressive, creative and effective strategies as bold in their approach as they are practical in their effect.

First, the way we deliver health care must change. For too long our model of health care delivery has been based on the provider, the payer, anyone but the patient. Think about the fact that our medical records are still owned by a physician or a hospital, in bits and pieces, with no reasonable way to connect the dots of our conditions and our care over the years.

If we as individuals are responsible for keeping our own passports, 401(k) and tax files, educational histories and virtually every other document of our lives, then surely we can be responsible for keeping, or at least sharing custody of, our medical records. Studies have shown that when patients have a greater stake in their own care, they make better choices.

We should adopt the model of a ''personal health record'' controlled by the patient, who could use it not only to access the latest reliable health information on the Internet but also to record weight and blood sugar and to receive daily reminders to take asthma or cholesterol medication. Moreover, our current system revolves around ''cases'' rather than patients. Reimbursements are based on ''episodes of treatment'' rather than on a broader consideration of a patient's well-being. Thus it rewards the treatment of discrete diseases and injuries rather than keeping the patient alive and healthy. While we assure adequate privacy protections, we need care to focus on the patient.

Our system rewards clinicians for providing more services but not for keeping patients healthier. The structure of the health care system should shift toward rewarding doctors and health plans that treat patients with their long-term health needs in mind and rewarding patients who make sensible decisions about maintaining their own health.

Harnessing Modernization
As paradoxical as it is that advances in medical technology could potentially break our antiquated system, advances in other technologies may hold the answer to saving it. Using a 20th-century health care system to deal with 21st-century problems is nowhere more true than in the failure to use information technology.

Ten years ago, the Internet was used primarily by academics and the military. Now it is possible to imagine all of a person's health files stored securely on a computer file -- test results, lab records, X-rays -- accessible from any doctor's office. It is easy to imagine, yet our medical system is not there.

The average emergency-room doctor or nurse has minutes to gather information on a patient, from past records and from interviewing the patient or relatives. In the age of P.D.A.'s, why are these professionals forced to rely on a patient's memory?

Information technology can also be used to disseminate research. A government study recently documented that it takes 17 years from the time of a new medical discovery to the time clinicians actually incorporate that discovery into their practice at the bedside. Why not 17 seconds?

Why rely solely on the doctor's brain to store that information? Computers could crunch the variables on a particular patient's medical history, constantly update the algorithms with the latest scientific evidence and put that information at the clinician's fingertips at the point of care.

Americans may not be getting the care they should 45 percent of the time, but the tools exist to narrow that gap. Research shows that when physicians receive computerized reminders, statistics improve exponentially. Reminders can take the form of an alert in the electronic health record that the hospitalized patient has not had a pneumonia vaccine or as computerized questions to remind a doctor of the conditions that must be fulfilled before surgery is considered appropriate.

Newt Gingrich and I have disagreed on many issues, including health care, but I agree with some of the proposals he outlines in his book ''Saving Lives and Saving Money,'' which support taking advantage of technological changes to create a more modern and efficient health care system. I have introduced legislation that promotes the use of information technology to update our health care system and organize it around the best interests of patients. Improvements in technology will end the paper chase, limit errors and reduce the number of malpractice suits.

I strongly believe that savings from information technology should not just be diffused throughout the system, never to be recaptured, but should be used to make substantial progress toward real universal coverage. By better using technology, we can lower health care costs throughout the system and thereby lower the exorbitant premiums that are placing a financial squeeze on businesses, individuals and the government. At the same time, some of those savings should be used to make substantial progress toward real universal coverage. (I may have just lost Newt Gingrich.)

Taking the Broader View: Public Health And Prevention
While we focus on empowering the individual through technology, we also have to recognize the larger factors that affect our health -- from the environment to public health.

If asthma and other pulmonary disorders are the main drivers of increased health spending, that argues strongly that we should rethink how social and environmental factors impact our collective health. Consider that over the last century we have extended life expectancy by 30 years but that only 8 of those years can be credited to medical intervention. The rest of our gains stem from the construction of water and sewer systems, draining mosquito-infested swamps and addressing spoilage, quality and nutrition in our food supply. Yet we continue to underinvest in these important systematic measures -- resulting in expensive health consequences like the explosion of asthma among children living in New York City or the harmful levels of lead found among children drinking water from the District of Columbia water system.

Our neglect of public health also contributes to spiraling health costs. We tend to address health care -- as a nation and as individuals -- after the sickness has taken hold, rather than addressing the cause through public health. Public health programs can help stop preventable disease and control dangerous behaviors. Take obesity, for example. Individuals should understand that they put their lives at risk with unhealthy behavior. But let's face it -- we live in a fast-food nation, and we need to take steps, like restoring physical-education programs in schools, that support the individual's ability to master his or her own health. Studies conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have identified ''Programs That Work,'' which should be financed. It comes down to individual responsibility reinforced by national policy.

The public health system also needs to be brought up to date. The current public health tools were developed when the major threats to health were infectious diseases like malaria and tuberculosis. But now chronic diseases are the No. 1 killer in our country. We need to be concerned not just about pathogens but also about carcinogens.

Over the last three years, I have introduced legislation to increase investment in tracking and correlating environmental and health conditions. I have met with people from Long Island to Fallon, Nev., who want answers about cancer clusters in their communities. The data we have seen about lead and mercury contamination in our food and water suggest that the effects they have on the fetus and children may have contributed to the increasing number of children in special education with attention and learning disorders. We need more research to determine once and for all if increasing pollution in our communities and increasing rates of learning-related disabilities are cause and effect.

We should also be looking at sprawl -- talking about the way we design our neighborhoods and schools and about our shrinking supply of safe, usable outdoor space -- and how that contributes to asthma, stress and obesity. We should follow the example of the European Union and start testing the chemicals we use every day and not wait until we have a rash of birth defects or cancers on our hands before taking action. And we should look at factors in our society that lead to youth violence, substance abuse, depression and suicide and ultimately require insurance and treatment for mental health.

After Sept. 11, mental health was a significant factor in the health toll on our nation's first responders. And yet our mental health delivery system is underfinanced and unprepared.

Finally, as a society, we need greater emphasis on preventive care, an investment in people and their health that saves us money, because when families can't get preventive care, they often end up in the emergency room -- getting the most expensive care possible.

Expanding Coverage
All that we have learned in the last decade confirms that our goal should continue to be what every other industrialized nation has achieved -- health care that's always there for every citizen.

For the first time, this year a nonpartisan group dedicated to improving the nation's health, the Institute of Medicine, recommended that by 2010 everyone in the United States should have health insurance. Such a system would promote better overall health for individuals, families, communities and our nation by providing financial access for everyone to necessary, appropriate and effective health services.

It will, as I have been known to say, take the whole village to finance an affordable and accountable health system. Employers and individuals would share in its financing, and individuals would have to assume more responsibility for improving their own health and lifestyles. Private insurers and public programs would work together, playing complementary roles in ensuring that all Americans have the health care they need. Our society is already spending $35 billion a year to treat people who have no health insurance, and our economy loses $65 billion to $130 billion in productivity and other costs. We are already spending what it would cost if we reallocated those resources and required responsibility.

In the post 9/11 world, there is one more reason for universal coverage. The anthrax and ricin episodes, and the continuing threat posed by biological, chemical and radiological weapons, should make us painfully aware of the shortcomings of our fragmented system of health care. Can you imagine the aftermath of a bioterrorism attack, with thousands of people flooding emergency rooms and bureaucrats demanding proof of insurance coverage from each and every one? Those without coverage might not see a doctor until after they had infected others.

Insurance should be about sharing risk and responsibility -- pooling resources and risk to protect ourselves from the devastating cost of illness or injury. It should not be about further dividing us. Competition should reward health plans for quality and cost savings, not for how many bad risks they can exclude -- especially as we enter the genomic age, when all of us could have uninsurable risks written into our genes.

So achieving comprehensive health care reform is no simple feat, as I learned a decade ago. None of these ideas mean anything if the political will to ensure that they happen doesn't exist.

Some people believe that the only solution to our present cost explosion is to shift the cost and risk onto individuals in what is called ''consumer driven'' health care. Each consumer would have an individual health care account and would monitor his or her own spending. But instead of putting consumers in the driver's seat, it actually leaves consumers at the mercy of a broken market. This system shifts the costs, the risks and the burdens of disease onto the individuals who have the misfortune of being sick. Think about the times you have been sick or injured -- were you able under those circumstances to negotiate for the best price or shop for the best care? And instead of giving individuals, providers and payers incentives for better care, this cost-shifting approach actually causes individuals to delay or skip needed services, resulting in worse health and more expensive health needs later on.

Meanwhile, proposals like those for individual health insurance tax credits, without reforms for the individual insurance market, leave individuals in the lurch as well. We know that asthmatics can have their entire respiratory systems excluded from coverage. Individual insurance companies can increase your premium or limit coverage for factors like age, previous medical history or even flat feet. Those in the individual market cannot pool their risk with colleagues or other members of the group. The coverage you can get and the price you pay for it will reflect individual risk, and you simply don't receive many of the benefits of what we consider traditional insurance when people pool risks. So the proposal to give individuals tax credits to buy coverage in the individual market, without any rules of fair play, won't provide much help for Americans who need health care. In the same way, the recent Medicare bill, which seeks to privatize Medicare benefits, long a government guarantee, threatens to leave the ''bad risks'' without any affordable coverage. With the new genetic information at our disposal, that could mean any one of us could one day be denied health insurance.

When many of those who opposed the Health Security Act look back, they are still proud of their achievement in blocking our reform plan. The focus of that proposal was to cover everybody by enabling the healthier to pool the ''risk'' with others. The plan was to redirect what we currently pay for uninsured care into expanding health coverage.

We could make cosmetic changes to the system we currently have, but that would simply take what is already a Rube Goldberg contraption and make it larger and even more unwieldy. We could go the route many have advocated, putting the burden almost entirely on individuals, thereby creating a veritable nationwide health care casino in which you win or lose should illness strike you or someone in your family. Or we could decide to develop a new social contract for a new century premised on joint responsibility to prevent disease and provide those who need care access to it. This would not let us as individuals off the hook. In fact, joint responsibility demands accountability from patients, employers, payers and society as a whole.

What will we say about ourselves 10 years from today? If we finally act to reform what we know needs to change, we may take credit in building a health care system that covers everyone and improves the quality of all our lives. But if we continue to dither and disagree, divided by ideology and frozen into inaction by competing special interests, then we will share in the blame for the collapse of health care in America, where rising costs break the back of our economy and leave too many people without the medical attention they need.

The nexus of globalization, the revolution in medical technology and the seismic pressures imposed by the contradictions in our current health care system will force radical changes whether we choose them or not. We can do nothing, we can take incremental steps -- or we can implement wide-ranging reform.

To me, the case for action is clear. And as we work to develop long-term solutions, we can take steps now to help address the immediate problems we face. As Senator John Kerry has proposed, we should cover everyone living in poverty, and all children; allow people to buy into the federal employee health benefits program; and also help employers by reinsuring high-cost claims while assuming more of the costs from hard-pressed state and local governments.

We can pass real privacy legislation that will ensure that Americans continue to feel secure in the trust they place in others for their most intimate medical information. And we can realize the promise of savings through information technology and disease management by passing quality health legislation now.

If we do not fix the problems of the present, we are doomed to live with the consequences in the future. As someone who tried to promote comprehensive health care reform a decade ago and decided to push for incremental changes in the years since, I still believe America needs sensible, wide-ranging reform that leads to quality health care coverage available to all Americans at an affordable cost.

The present system is unsustainable. The only question is whether we will master the change or it will master us.

Hillary Rodham Clinton is a Democratic senator from New York.


Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
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>> GOOD LUCK WITH THIS...

WHO's on Last?
A politicized and irrelevant global agency.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/bate200404190820.asp
By Dr. Roger Bate

A 1999 World Bank analysis of its own donations for health projects in the previous ten years demonstrated that over two thirds of them had failed to deliver the expected benefits, and were deemed "failures." Such is the world of aid, that even internal audits of projects show massive failure.
As a result, faith in the usefulness of aid and in the reputations of the dispensing agencies, has diminished from its peak in the 1960s. After 50 years of pursuing the U.N. aid model, its flaws are becoming too obvious to ignore. Aid expenditure continued to fall as a percentage of GDP to the end of the century, when AIDS gave it a shot in the arm.
Today, the World Health Organization (WHO) is benefiting from a turn in the tide of aid fatigue. Tens of billions of dollars are being pledged to deliver treatment to those afflicted by HIV/AIDS. But has anything really changed at the WHO?
Not really. The politically minded Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, who took over as general director in 1998, did much to raise the organization's profile. Her predecessor, Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima, oversaw an ineffectual, and some said, corrupt regime, and there were high hopes for Dr. Brundtland. Although AIDS was a huge medical issue at that time, there was little political interest and it did not feature as a target for her time in charge. Instead, she chose to halve the number of global malaria cases and to establish a tobacco-control convention.
The "Roll Back Malaria" initiative has failed disastrously in the five-plus years it has been operating. Rather than reducing malaria rates, the number has increased by about ten percent since the WHO put political niceties above medical expediency. The WHO will not adopt insecticide spraying, which is the cheapest method for reducing the number of mosquitoes that transmit the disease.
The tobacco convention is in place, but one wonders why. Rather than going after infectious diseases (like cholera or dengue) in poor countries, or at least "involuntary" disease in rich countries (like cancer or hypertension), the WHO decided to go after "voluntary" smokers. It's debatable whether smoking-related diseases should be classified as a public health issue at all -- surely, it's a private matter if you decide to smoke.
While there is merit in heading off a future problem, the main effect of the anti-tobacco convention has been to introduce a far-reaching power base from which WHO has launched other initiatives that encroach deep into private life.
No critical analyst or journalist seriously believed WHO that the tobacco convention was the only one WHO would establish in its campaign against lifestyle choices. Back in 2001, I attended one of the tobacco-control workshops organized by WHO. One journalist in the audience asked whether "alcohol and food were next." The WHO officials insisted tobacco was different from other lifestyle issues. But, no sooner was the convention signed last fall, than the WHO announced an obesity initiative.
Of course, officially, this was set up by Dr. Brundtland's successor, the Korean doctor, Lee Jong-wook. Dr. Lee himself is more interested in AIDS, but lower-level officials have been pushing hard for the obesity initiative. They have engaged in a fairly rancorous battle with William Steigers (aide to Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson), who has become a thorn in the side of the anti-corporate WHO obesity initiative. Targeting the Coca-Cola vending machines in schools seems to be the main thrust of the WHO obesity plan.
Dr. Lee has set AIDS as his main target. He, laudably, wants to treat three million Africans in a few years, trumping the two million target of President Bush. On account of the lack of public-health capacity, the high incidence of poverty, and the absence of political will in many African countries, this target is doomed to failure. But with insiders claiming that Dr. Lee wants to win the Nobel Peace Prize for promoting AIDS treatment in Africa, an heroic failure may do the trick.
The now-infamous report of the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health advocates health investment as a "means to achieving other development goals relating to poverty reduction." Essentially, the WHO is saying that countries, owing to disease, are too poor to grow. Although at first sight this seems a common-sense argument, it is obviously false, as no country in history could have ever developed! It takes managerial incompetence to really hold up development, but bureaucracies are immune to such nuance.
The commission says it needs $22 billion per year by 2007, and $31 billion dollars per year by 2015, in order to save eight million lives a year. These "saved" lives, it calculates, will become economically active and boost GDP many-fold, thereby repaying all costs. This is an awful lot of money based on an awful lot of supposition, but even this is only the beginning.
Naturally, most of the expenditure will come via WHO, since it apparently houses "the expertise." As the U.S. is the largest funder of the WHO, it has the most to lose from failed policies. Fortunately, some Senate committees, notably Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, are beginning to look carefully at appropriations for AIDS. It's not a moment too soon.

-- Dr. Roger Bate is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a director of health-advocacy group, Africa Fighting Malaria.

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The Out-of-Towner
While Bush vacationed, 9/11 warnings went unheard.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Wednesday, April 14, 2004, at 4:54 PM PT



In an otherwise dry day of hearings before the 9/11 commission, one brief bit of dialogue set off a sudden flash of clarity on the basic question of how our government let disaster happen.

The revelation came this morning, when CIA Director George Tenet was on the stand. Timothy Roemer, a former Democratic congressman, asked him when he first found out about the report from the FBI's Minnesota field office that Zacarias Moussaoui, an Islamic jihadist, had been taking lessons on how to fly a 747. Tenet replied that he was briefed about the case on Aug. 23 or 24, 2001.

Roemer then asked Tenet if he mentioned Moussaoui to President Bush at one of their frequent morning briefings. Tenet replied, "I was not in briefings at this time." Bush, he noted, "was on vacation." He added that he didn't see the president at all in August 2001. During the entire month, Bush was at his ranch in Texas. "You never talked with him?" Roemer asked. "No," Tenet replied. By the way, for much of August, Tenet too was, as he put it, "on leave."

And there you have it. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice has made a big point of the fact that Tenet briefed the president nearly every day. Yet at the peak moment of threat, the two didn't talk at all. At a time when action was needed, and orders for action had to come from the top, the man at the top was resting undisturbed.

Throughout that summer, we now well know, Tenet, Richard Clarke, and several other officials were running around with their "hair on fire," warning that al-Qaida was about to unleash a monumental attack. On Aug. 6, Bush was given the now-famous President's Daily Brief (by one of Tenet's underlings), warning that this attack might take place "inside the United States." For the previous few years--as Philip Zelikow, the commission's staff director, revealed this morning--the CIA had issued several warnings that terrorists might fly commercial airplanes into buildings or cities.

And now, we learn today, at this peak moment, Tenet hears about Moussaoui. Someone might have added 2 + 2 + 2 and possibly busted up the conspiracy. But the president was down on the ranch, taking it easy. Tenet wasn't with him. Tenet never talked with him. Rice--as she has testified--wasn't with Bush, either. He was on his own and, willfully, out of touch.

A USA Today story, written right before Bush took off, reported that the vacation--scheduled to last from Aug. 3 to Sept. 3--would tie one of Richard Nixon's as the longest that any president had ever taken. A week before he left, Bush made a videotaped message for the Boy Scouts of America. On the tape, he said, "I'll be going to my ranch in Crawford, where I'll work and take a little time off. I think it is so important for the president to spend some time away from Washington, in the heartland of America."

Dana Milbank and Mike Allen of the Washington Post recently wrote a story recalling those halcyon days in Crawford. On Aug. 7, 2001, the day after the fateful PDB, Bush, they wrote, "was in an expansive mood ... when he ran into reporters while playing golf." The president's aides emphasized that he was working, now and then, on a few issues--education, immigration, Social Security, and his impending decision on stem-cell research. On Aug. 29, less than a week after Tenet found out about Moussaoui, Bush gave a speech before the American Legion. The White House press office headlined the text of the address, "President Discusses Defense Priorities." Those priorities: boosting soldiers' pay and abandoning the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty. Nothing about terrorism, Osama Bin Laden, hijackings. Nothing that reflected the PDB or Moussaoui.

Anyone who has ever spent time in Washington knows that the whole town takes off the month of August. Despite the "threat spike," August 2001, it seems, was no different.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA officer and the State Department's counterterrorism chief from 1989-93, explained on MSNBC this afternoon, during a break in the hearings, why the PDB--let alone the Moussaoui finding--should have compelled everyone to rush back to Washington. In his CIA days, Johnson wrote "about 40" PDBs. They're usually dispassionate in tone, a mere paragraph or two. The PDB of Aug. 6 was a page and a half. "That's the intelligence-community equivalent of writing War and Peace," Johnson said. And the title--"Bin Laden Determined To Strike in US"--was clearly designed to set off alarm bells. Johnson told his interviewer that when he read the declassified document, "I said 'Holy smoke!' This is such a dead-on 'Mr. President, you've got to do something!' " (By the way, Johnson claimed he's a Republican who voted for Bush in 2000.)

Bush got back after Labor Day. That first day, Sept. 4, was when the "Principals Committee"--consisting of his Cabinet heads--met in the White House to discuss terrorism. As Dick Clarke has since complained, and Condi Rice and others have acknowledged, it was the first time Bush's principals held a meeting on the subject.

This morning, Roemer asked Tenet if he brought up the Moussaoui briefing at that meeting. No, Tenet replied. "It wasn't the appropriate place." Roemer didn't follow up and ask, "Why not? Where was the appropriate place?" Perhaps he was too stunned. He sure looked it.

The official story about the PDB is that the CIA prepared it at the president's request. Bush had heard all Tenet's briefings about a possible al-Qaida attack overseas, the tale goes, and he wanted to know if Bin Laden might strike here. This story is almost certainly untrue. On March 19 of this year, Tenet told the 9/11 commission that the PDB had been prepared, as usual, at a CIA analyst's initiative. He later retracted that testimony, saying the president had asked for the briefing. Tenet embellished his new narrative, saying that the CIA officer who gave the briefing to Bush and Condi Rice started by reminding the president that he had requested it. But as Rice has since testified, she was not present during the briefing; she wasn't in Texas. Someone should ask: Was that the only part of the tale that Tenet made up? Or did he invent the whole thing--and, if so, on whose orders?

The distinction is important. If Bush asked for the briefing, it suggests that he at least cared about the subject; then the puzzle becomes why he didn't follow up on its conclusions. If he didn't ask for the briefing, then he comes off as simply aloof. (It's a toss-up which conclusion is more disturbing.)

Then again, it's easy to forget that before the terrorists struck, Bush was widely regarded as an unusually aloof president. Joe Conason has calculated that up until Sept. 11, 2001, Bush had spent 54 days at the ranch, 38 days at Camp David, and four days at the Bush compound in Kennebunkport--a total of 96 days, or about 40 percent of his presidency, outside of Washington.

Yet by that inference, Bush has remained a remarkably out-of-touch--or at least out-of-town--leader, even in the two and a half years since 9/11. Dana Milbank counts that through his entire term to date, Bush has spent 500 days--again, about 40 percent of his time in office--at the ranch, the retreat, or the compound.

The 9/11 commission has unveiled many critical problems in the FBI and the CIA. But the most critical problem may have been that the president was off duty.

Update, April 15, 2004: On Wednesday evening, after the hearings, a CIA spokesman called reporters to tell them Tenet had misspoken: It turns out he did brief Bush in August 2001, twice--on Aug. 17 and Aug. 31. Assuming the correction is true, it doesn't negate the point. The first briefing, which the spokesman described as uneventful, took place before Tenet learned about Moussaoui. The second occurred after the president returned to Washington.

Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate.

Article URL: http://slate.msn.com/id/2098861/

Posted by maximpost at 12:04 AM EDT
Permalink
Saturday, 17 April 2004

>> PORTRAIT OF THE DICTATOR AS A YOUNG MAN...HOW LONG WILL HE LAST? 10, 20, 30 YEARS?


The Myth of Syria's Old Guard
by Gary C. Gambill



When Bashar Assad assumed power in Damascus after the death of his late father in June 2000, many Western observers expressed hope that the youngster would introduce political reforms in Syria, modernize its stagnant economy, adopt a more moderate stance toward Israel, and improve Syrian relations with the United States. Three and a half years later, however, the process of political liberalization launched by the late Hafez Assad has ground to a halt and even suffered reversals. Economic reform has fallen by the wayside and high-level corruption has become more rampant than ever. Rather than moderating its stance toward Israel, Syria has dramatically increased the scale and breadth of its sponsorship of militant anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. Instead of upgrading ties with the United States, Assad provided material support to Saddam Hussein's military in the months leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom - a foolish initiative that did nothing forestall its defeat by US-led coalition forces, but prompted Washington to re-assess its longstanding policy of constructive engagement with Damascus.

In spite of this track record, however, the vast majority of Western journalists, academics, and government officials have yet to utter a disparaging word about Assad, who is frequently described as Western-educated (he isn't - he merely completed part of his medical residency in a London hospital) and reform-minded, with a lasting affinity for the music of Phil Collins and an unshakeable Gameboy addiction. The young dictator's reputation as a well-meaning reformer has remained untarnished in the West because of a pervasive, but highly questionable, assumption about Syrian politics - that Assad is checked at every turn by a powerful cabal of corrupt military and intelligence officials who constitute an independent sphere of authority, the so-called "old guard." The London Times, for example, considers Assad to be "in no position to confront his father's old guard."[1] According to Flynt Leverett, a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council, Assad has "demonstrated some reformist impulses, but has been constrained by his father's still-powerful retainers."[2]

The "old guard" assumption underlies most thinking about Syria in the American foreign policy establishment. It is gospel for Syria's apologists in the State Department, who justify constructive engagement on the grounds that it can strengthen Assad's hand against hard-liners. This premise is even accepted by hawks, who typically argue that efforts to woo Assad are misguided because he is not the one running the show in Damascus. This fundamentally benevolent view of Syria's young leader remained unshaken even at the height of Syrian-US tensions last April, when Bush administration officials publicly accused Damascus of funneling arms to Saddam Hussein's military. The Syrian president was never publicly accused of personally approving, or even knowing about, the weapons transfers.

Etymology of a Catch Phrase

References to Syria's "old guard" predate Bashar's ascension. The term first gained currency among Western observers in the mid-1990s, when the elder Assad was said to be on the brink of signing a peace treaty with Israel. In 1994, Janes Defence Weekly reported that Assad was replacing much of the "old-guard, combat-tested officers who have kept him in power since he took over in November 1970, with a new breed of security controllers" who were less opposed to peace.[3] Although Assad did, if fact, fire many senior security officials, he remained as unwilling as ever to make peace with the Jewish state. Nevertheless, the notion that it was the regime's "old guard," not Assad, that obstructed peace persisted. "Assad must still cater to the old guard," reported Business Week in 1999. "The Syrian President maintains his power through a network of military and intelligence commanders, and he must be careful not to look soft in the talks. That's one reason Assad can't afford to settle for anything less than a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights."[4]

Use of the term "old guard" as a means of deflecting responsibility for negative aspects of Syrian policy away from Assad was not confined to the West. Arabic variations of the term have long been used by Syrian intellectuals when criticizing the Assad regime. As in the West, the term was favored not because of its analytical precision, but because of its political correctness. Fearful of disparaging Assad personally, or the regime as a whole, Syrian intellectuals attributed dismal conditions in the country to a nameless clique of power barons standing in the way of needed reforms. Assad was typically portrayed as being unable to assert his authority over the "old guard," not unwilling, for the latter would imply that he was indirectly responsible for its excesses (even oblique criticism of the Syrian dictator was dangerous).

This dynamic is not uncommon in the Arab world. In Jordan, where freedom of expression is much less restrained, the prime minister and his cabinet are regularly pilloried in the media, but no one criticizes the king. In fact, criticisms of the government are frequently couched as appeals to the king, urging him to sack this or that minister or informing him of those who ostensibly scheme behind his back. But no one in Jordan imagines that the king does not personally approve all major government decisions, or that cabinet ministers do not serve in office at his whim.

Following the ascension of Bashar Assad in 2000, references to an "old guard" constraining the young dictator's authority became virtually ubiquitous among Western observers writing about Syria. Although the term's meaning became somewhat more nuanced because of the generational gap between Assad and senior officials in the regime and the former's lack of military credentials, its fundamental connotation remained the same - that Assad's lack of authority, not his mindset or intentions, account for the unsavory behavior of his regime.

Is There an "Old Guard"?

The most obvious flaw in the "old guard" assumption is that it presupposes the existence of cohesive hard-liner and reformist factions of the regime with discernibly different interests. There are, of course, divergences of interests within the regime, but they do not fall neatly into the hard-liner/reformist dichotomy. Due to the dismal performance of Syria's economy in recent years the amount of "surplus" lining the pockets of the regime's top beneficiaries has diminished and competition among them for pieces of an ever-shrinking pie has been quite fierce. Limited economic reforms introduced by Bashar have served to concentrate these diminishing spoils in fewer hands. For example, portions of the traditional Sunni bourgeoisie of Aleppo and Damascus who were coopted by the regime in the 1990s have been brushed aside as private sector businessmen close to Assad have seized control over lucrative markets. Economic opportunities have also become increasingly concentrated within Assad's own clan, at the expense of competing Alawite tribal groups that shared power under his father.[5] In short, the beneficiaries of Assad's presidency are not bona fide economic "reformers" in any meaningful sense of the word, nor are those who have seen their privileges shrink necessarily opponents of economic liberalization.

With respect to political reform, the divergence of interests within the regime is much less discernible. Syria's political and economic elite is strongly united by an overriding stake in the stability of the Baathist regime - were it to collapse, no one who was highly privileged during its reign in power would have much of a future in Syria. Within the regime's Alawite core, a successor government even minimally representative of the country's majority Sunni population is seen as an existential threat. The few Sunnis who occupy high-level positions in government, such as Vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam and Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass, would not fare much better - in the Middle East, betrayal of one's own ethno-sectarian group is usually viewed as an unforgivable offense.

It is true that Assad inaugurated an expansion of public freedoms during the first six months of his presidency as a means of bolstering the regime's legitimacy. It is also true that the so-called "Damascus Spring" was suddenly brought to a halt in 2001, with the country's ten leading dissidents all finding themselves behind bars by the end of the year. However, the notion that an "old guard" within the regime was responsible for this reversal is a canard. The Damascus Spring was a temporary, carefully managed political opening engineered by Assad to outmaneuver his rivals and consolidate his grip on power by drawing support from outside the regime. Once he had fully asserted his authority, the activities of the reformers became a liability for the Syrian president and were quickly curtailed. While many in the regime had misgivings about the increasingly bold activities of Syrian dissidents, many of those who were arrested ran into trouble after they criticized people close to Bashar or challenged the legacy of his father. For example, the country's leading dissident, MP Riyad Sayf, was arrested after he released a study showing that a lucrative mobile phone contract awarded to Syriatel, a company controlled by Assad's cousin, Rami Makhlouf, would cost the government billions of dollars in lost revenue. Riyad al-Turk was arrested after he condemned the country's "hereditary republic" - a direct swipe at Bashar.

Significantly, this crackdown happened to coincide with major administrative changes in the government and security forces that consolidated Assad's authority. The dramatic expansion of civil liberties that took place early in Assad's tenure was not brought to a halt because the young dictator lacked authority, but because he had acquired enough of it to dispense with reformist pretenses. One striking indication of this is that three quarters of the sixty or so officials in the regime's upper political and military echelon had been replaced by the end of his second year in office.[6]

The old guard concept continues to inform Western thinking in part because of Assad's habitual claims of ignorance regarding his regime's involvement in illicit activities ranging from terrorism to arms trafficking - the idea that he is unaware of or powerless to prevent wrongdoing that draws American criticism is a self-serving lie. But it is an illusion that the Syrian leader is having more and more difficulty maintaining.

Mounting evidence compiled by US authorities in Iraq indicates that Assad almost certainly approved Syrian military assistance to Saddam Hussein prior to the US-led invasion. Documents gleaned from computer hard drives at the Baghdad office of Al-Bashair Trading Company - the largest of the former Iraqi regime's military procurement companies - show that a Syrian company, SES International Corp., signed more than 50 contracts to supply arms and equipment worth tens of millions of dollars to Iraq's military prior to the war. The general manager of SES, Asef Isa Shaleesh, is a first cousin of Assad, and one of its major shareholders, Maj. Gen. Dhu Himma Shaleesh, is a relative of Assad who heads an elite presidential security corps. According to the report, the director-general of Al-Bashair, Munir A. Awad, fled to Syria during the war and is now living there "under government protection."[7] Other captured documents and interviews with captured members of Saddam's inner circle indicate that Iraqi officials met with representatives of North Korea on Syrian soil to negotiate the purchase of missile technology - meetings that would have been impossible without the knowledge of intelligence chiefs close to Assad, such as Maj. Gen. Assef Shawkat.[8]

Of course, a number of senior figures who rose to power during the late Assad's 30-year reign continue to hold positions of influence in Syria (and some who don't continue to be influential behind the scenes), but the commonly-held view that they are in serious conflict with the president and have the power to act independently is unsubstantiated. Indeed, plenty of informed Syrian analysts say it is a myth. "If we speak of two currents (in the regime), that implies that there is conflict between them, but we have not seen evidence of that yet," said Riyad al-Turk after his release from prison last year under pressure from the European Union (which accords him more freedom than his peers to speak candidly).[9] Ibrahim Hamidi, the Damascus correspondent for the London-based daily Al-Hayat, dismisses the idea that there is even a difference in mindsets:


We should be very careful when we talk about the "old guard" and the "reformists." I know some of the "new guard" and they are not very different from the old . . . The maximum they want is to change some names, to get rid of some people. Their goal is continuity, not to make substantial changes beneficial for the people.[10]
"This story of an old guard that prevents some reforms is nonsense," concurs one Syrian businessman interviewed by a Western NGO. "Bashar manipulates everybody and this serves him as a cover, especially for intoxicating European officials who believe in him."[11]

Notes

[1] "Sitting targets," The Times (London), 7 October 2003.
[2] "America must do more to engage with Syria," The Financial Times, 9 October 2003.
[3] Quoted in "Assad shuffles intelligence," The Jerusalem Post, 30 November 1994.
[4] "Will Peace Push Syria into the Modern World?," Business Week, 27 December 1999.
[5] See "As Reform Falters, Syrian Elite tighten Grip," The Christian Science Monitor, 30 September 2003.
[6] See Volker Perthes, Syria Under Bashar al-Assad: Modernization and the Limits of Change (forthcoming).
[7] "Banned Arms Flowed Into Iraq Through Syrian Firm," The Los Angeles Times, 30 December 2003.
[8] "For the Iraqis, a Missile Deal That Went Sour; Files Tell of Talks With North Korea," The New York Times, 1 December 2003.
[9] Interview with Al-Hayat, quoted in "Reform at a Snail's Pace in Damascus," Mideast Mirror, 6 January 2003.
[10] Alan George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom (London: Zed Books, 2003), p. 162.
[11] International Crisis Group, Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges, 11 February 2004.


? 2004 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. All rights reserved.
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SYRIA UNDER BASHAR (II):
DOMESTIC POLICY CHALLENGES
11 February 2004
ICG Middle East Report N?24
Amman/Brussels

ICG Middle East Report N?24 11 February 2004
SYRIA UNDER BASHAR (II): DOMESTIC POLICY CHALLENGES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Bashar al-Assad's presidency has failed to live up to the hopes for far-reaching domestic reform that greeted it in 2000. After a brief opening, Syria clamped down on dissent, and economic change remains painfully slow. Many who once viewed Bashar as a potential partner, open-minded, and Western-oriented, now perceive him as, if anything, more ideological than and just as tied to the Baathist regime as his father. Both assessments are overly simplistic and poor guides to dealing with a Syria that is at a crossroads. Syrian officials hint at significant steps in mid-2004, including possible changes in the Baath Party hierarchy and doctrine and moves toward a more open and inclusive political system. Scepticism is in order, as such pledges have repeatedly been made in the past only to be ignored. But with reform now a strategic imperative, Syria should turn hints into reality and the international community should find ways to encourage and to assist it. There is good evidence that Bashar came to office aware that bold economic measures were needed to rationalise public administration, curb corruption and otherwise modernise the country. But his legitimacy and power base are closely tied to the Baathist system. However much he may understand that his plans cannot succeed with the current regime, he fears that he may not long survive without it. It is not a question of merely ridding the system of remnants of his father's rule. The system has been shaped by powerful constituents - a political/economic elite entrenched in the public sector, the army, security services and a vast, lethargic bureaucracy accustomed to benefit from the status quo. Far more than his father, Bashar has to share authority with multiple power centres, as Syria's "pluralistic authoritarianism" becomes less authoritarian, more pluralistic. An aspiring reformist, the President realised that his longevity was tied to the stability of the regime he sought to reform. In the past, foreign policy dividends - income generated by aid from Iran in the 1980s, from the Gulf in the early 1990s, and from illicit trade with Iraq since then - made up for domestic shortfalls. Those days are gone. Syria urgently needs domestic change. Its economy is plagued by corruption, ageing state industries, a volatile and under-performing agricultural sector, rapidly depleting oil resources, an anachronistic educational system, capital flight and lack of foreign investment. The image of a regime that owes its durability solely to repression and a narrow, sectarian base is wide of the mark; the Baathists built support from a cross-section of Syria's socio-economic and religious groups. Still, the regime is by no means immune to internal challenge should the economycontinue to deteriorate. At the least, a flagging economy will gradually undercut its legitimacy and undermine its support, and shrinking economic resources will reduce the availability of rents and economic privileges that have been used to ensure backing from key groups. Syria's foreign reserves should not be used as a pretext to defer reform but rather to put in place the safety net necessary to protect the population from hardships that will inevitably accompany restructuring. To be effective, however, economic reform must be accompanied by political liberalisation. Without greater accountability, transparency and a freer media, it will be extremely difficult to break the cycle of corruption and inefficiency. And with fewer economic resources to distribute, it is all the more important to build a stronger domestic consensus through greater public participation.
Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges
ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page ii
Any reforms will, no doubt, be gradual and carefully managed; even so, some argue that they will spark unrest and open the door to radical Islamism. While the history of the Muslim Brotherhood's violent activities in Syria certainly is cause for concern, the available evidence suggests that the rise of militant Islam has been nurtured by a repressive, closed system that prevents free expression and association and has badly damaged the bond of trust between citizens and state. The stifling of political participation and the discrediting of official ideology leads to a vacuum that radical Islamic discourse is best equipped to fill. This report is published simultaneously with another on Syria's foreign policy challenges.1 The twosubjects are interconnected. A strengthened domestic Syrian consensus, including national reconciliation and renewed political legitimacy for its leadership, will make it possible for Syria to play a more effective and confident role on the regional scene. Conversely, what happens internationally affects Bashar's domestic standing and ability to push through reform.

RECOMMENDATIONS
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To the Government of Syria:

1. Promote national dialogue and reconciliation
by:

(a) issuing a general amnesty for political activists, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, in Syria and in exile, who have not engaged in violence and allowing the return of exiled opposition figures who have not engaged in violence;

(b) convening a national conference of political parties, opposition figures and political activists to discuss the process of national reconciliation and commit to non-violence and the forsaking of extrajudicial retribution for prior abuses; and

(c) removing the ban on the Kurdish language, allowing Kurds to organise their own cultural activities and revoking census results so as to extend 1 ICG Middle East Report N?23, Syria Under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy Challenges, 11 February 2004. full and equal citizenship rights to all Kurdish "non-nationals" (maktumin) and their offspring.

2. Begin political liberalisation by:

(a) lifting the state of emergency;

(b) giving civil society and political organisations the space to organise and establishing a more transparent legal framework that enables NGOs to be recognised and operate more freely; and (c) encouraging freer media coverage of public policy issues.

3. Accelerate economic reform by:

(a) drawing up and implementing an administrative reform plan and making economic management more transparent, including by initiating a strong anticorruption campaign and taking steps to reduce collusion between state and businesses;

(b) establishing a transparent tender mechanism for public procurement and one-stop licensing procedures; and

(c) drawing on foreign exchange reserves to help finance job-creation and poverty alleviation programs.
To Members of the Syrian Opposition:

4. Promote political change only through nonviolent
means, and in particular:

(a) repudiate any past resort to violence and pledge not to engage in extra-judicial retribution for past regime abuses; and

(b) pursue an open dialogue with the Baath Party, avoiding inflammatory rhetoric. To the European Union (EU), its Member States, and Japan:

5. Bolster reformers within the Syrian leadership by promoting administrative and institutional reform, focusing on the presidency and on ministries or ministerial secretariats led by reformists.

6. Offer assistance to help cushion hardship caused by economic liberalisation, for example by providing funds and expertise to assist the Syrian Agency for Combating Unemployment.

7. Provide assistance for civil society development
and capacity-building and press Syria on human rights issues - including individual cases and measures such as lifting the state of emergency - and, in the case of the EU, identify mechanisms to follow up on the clause on democratic principles and human rights in the Association Treaty.
To the U.S. Government:

8. Lift opposition to Syria entering negotiations aimed at joining the World Trade Organisation.

9. Increase people-to-people contacts, particularly in the area of education.
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Amman/Brussels, 11 February 2004
ICG Middle East Report N?24 11 February 2004
SYRIA UNDER BASHAR (II): DOMESTIC POLICY CHALLENGES
I. BACKGROUND: THE OTHER
BAATHIST REGIME
A. THE ORIGINS OF ASSAD'S SYRIA
The history of modern day Syria is closely identified with that of both the Baath Party, an organisation that aspired to Arab unity on the basis of socialism and nationalism,2 and the army, which came to play a key role in political affairs. The Baath, which was active in Syria, Iraq and other parts of the Fertile Crescent, originally appealed to lower middle class intellectuals and ethnic religious minorities that felt marginalised. In Syria, this meant Druze, Christians, and principally Alawis.3 During the mandate period, the French promoted communal identity, encouraging "separatism and . . . the widening of the gap between the Sunni-Moslem majority and the various minorities".4 After independence in 1946, Alawis and Druze faced an effort by the Sunnidominated regime to curtail their autonomy and influence. Minority and marginalised groups were attracted to the Baath's pan-Arab, socialist, secular
message and to the military as a means of social
2 See ICG Middle East Report N?6, Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath, 1 October, 2002, pp. 4-5.
3 Alawis, who are roughly 12 per cent of the Syrian population, live principally in the mountain chains in the northwest, along the Mediterranean coast. There are various accounts of their religious origins, though the most likely is that they are an offshoot of the Twelver Shiites. See H. Laoust, Les Schismes dans L'Islam (Paris, 1977), p. 147. For a long time, Alawis were a poor, rural community ostracised and discriminated against by the rest of Syrian society. When he became president, Assad sought the help of Imam Musa al-Sadr, a leading Shiite Cleric in Lebanon, to certify that Alawis were Moslem Shiites. Al-Sadr issued a fatwa to that
effect. Patrick Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East (1988), p. 173.
4 Ma'oz, Ginat and Winckler, "Introduction: The Emergence of Modern Syria", in Modern Syria (1988).
mobility and protection against Sunni dominance. "The Ba'th recruited all those who were outside the system of connections, patronage and kin on which the old regime was built".5 While it would be wrong to reduce either the Baath or the military to one sectarian group, a mutually reinforcing system of recruitment meant that Alawi Baath Party members were disproportionately represented in the army's senior officer corps.
The Baath Party came to power on 8 March 1963 following a tumultuous period of internal strife, competition between rival political organisations and military conspiracies. Though the officers who spearheaded the coup belonged to several Arab nationalist parties, Baathists took the lead. The twenty-man National Council for the Revolutionary Command had twelve Baathists and eight Nasserists and Independents.6 Over time, and by virtue of Baathist control of key military and security positions, party members consolidated their power and eliminated their rivals, acquiring influence that far exceeded their political weight in the country at large. The Baath Party remained an important political actor throughout the 1960s, both a key decision-maker and a means of promoting a new leadership from the rural population. The multi-party system that had existed since 1946 came to an end, and the Baath gained a virtual political monopoly as the "leading party" (al-hizb al-qa'id).7 Still, from very early on the Baath suffered from a deficit of political legitimacy and deep internal divisions based on personal ambition as well as 5 Raymond Hinnebusch, "Party and Peasant in Syria," quoted in ibid, p. 3; see also Eyal Zisser, "Appearance and Reality", Middle East Review of International Affairs, May 1998. 6 Seale, Assad, op. cit., p. 78. 7 Between 1945 and 1963, Syria experienced intense political competition and organized multiparty elections - with the exception of 1958-1961 when it was merged in union with Nasser's Egypt.
Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 2
regional, clan, religious and ideological splits. In 1966, a faction led by two officers, Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jedid, pushed aside the party's historic leaders, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar. This further exacerbated intra-party tensions, and factions became surrogates for rival officers. Alliances within the army increasingly formed along confessional and regional lines. The centre of power had moved from the political arena, to the army, to the Baathists within the military and, from 1966 on, to those Alawi officers who held dominant positions in both party and army. As one observer noted, those who held power "were a fraction of what was itself a minority, a military splinter group of a semi-defunct party without popular base".8
By 1970, the faction led by Defence Minister Hafez al-Assad had gained control over all vital military and security branches. In November, he staged a successful coup that was dubbed the "Corrective Movement" in an attempt to claim the mantle of Baathist legitimacy. The coup, which marked the supremacy of the military over the party, also began a new phase in Syria's modern history. Emerging from the traumatic experience of the 1967 Six Days War, Assad chartered a more pragmatic path, in which the foreign policy priority was to recover the Golan Heights from Israeli occupation. Domestically, it ushered in an era of unprecedented stability that was based on a systematic effort at state and institution-building and revolved around Assad's own authoritarian, highly personalised power, in contrast to past collective leadership. After year of battles between political parties, within the Baath and within the military, Assad represented a "firm,
centralised and stable rule".9
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE REGIME
Though in some respects founded on a narrow communal base, the regime represents far broader constituencies and is governed by an elaborate system of institutions. Assad meticulously built a hybrid: personalised rule coexisted with highly structured state and party institutions; a narrow Alawi, family and personal power base coexisted with a broader inter-religious coalition and social contract; and a sophisticated, omnipresent militarysecurity apparatus coexisted with a strong political
8 Seale, Assad, op. cit., p. 85.
9 Zisser, "Appearance and Reality", op. cit.
party and powerful social relays.10 When it deemed it necessary for survival, the regime did not hesitate to resort to brutal violence to crush dissent; Assad's "was a government which grew out of seven years of bloody struggle, and its foundations were and would remain the army, the security services and the party and government machines".11 But importantly, the regime also coalesced around itself an array of constituents by offering economic opportunities, coopting segments of the population via patronage and channelling social forces through a corporatist system involving the creation of popular organisations, professional associations and unions; in short "the regime [was] more representative of the population as a whole, its constituent parts, and their balance of strength than is commonly assumed".12 Core elements - particularly sensitive military and security positions - remained in Alawi hands, more specifically members of Assad's Qalbiyya tribe. Assad's rule marked the first time that Alawis were openly the pre-eminent power-holders; earlier Alawi leaders had preferred to remain behind the scenes. Assad relied heavily on a "`jama'a' of personal followers, often his kin, appointed to crucial security and military commands."13 But Alawi dominance was far from uniform; he carefully placed Sunnis in top positions, including the defence ministry, the vice presidency and the foreign affairs ministry.14
10 Syria's security services and intelligence agencies include the Amn as-Siyyasi (Political Security), the Mukhabarat al- `Askariyya (Military Intelligence) - subdivided into the "Palestine Branch", "Investigative Branch", "Regional Branch" and "Airforce Branch" - and the Mukhabarat al- `Ama (General Security) -subdivided into the "Investigative Branch", the "Domestic Branch" and the "Foreign Branch". Each of these agencies operates its own prisons and interrogation centres in near-complete independence from the judicial and penal system. ICG interviews with Syrian human rights activists and lawyers in Damascus, July 2003. One estimate puts the number of people working for these agencies at one of every 153 adult Syrians. See Alan George, Syria, Neither Bread nor Freedom (London, 2003), p. 2.
11 Seale, Assad, op. cit., p. 178.
12 Zisser, "Appearance and Reality", op. cit.
13 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution From Above (New York, 2001), p. 67.
14 According to Zisser, "approximately 60 per cent of the cabinet ministers, the members of the People's Assembly and the deputies to the Party Congress are Sunnis. . . . The informal ruling cadres, by contrast, attest to the real power and predominance of the `Alawis: Close to 90 per cent of the officers commanding the major military formations are `Alawis, and so are most of the top echelons in the various security services". Zisser, "Appearance and Reality", op. cit.
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ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 3
Efforts to reach out to non-Alawis went beyond bringing them into the regime. Non-Alawi constituencies and social forces were promoted and co-opted, including other minorities (Druze, Christians, Isma'ilis) for whom Alawi control meant protection from Sunni dominance, and rural Sunnis who had traditionally been excluded from economic and political power. Breaking from Baath socialist traditions, Assad gave greater latitude to the private sector, dominated by the Sunni urban economic and commercial elite, particularly in Damascus. Liberalisation intensified with the passage of Investment Law no. 10 in May 1991, which provided generous fiscal incentives to domestic and foreign private investors.15 As a result of this limited economic opening (infitah) and with the growth of collusive statebusiness relations, some large entrepreneurs allied themselves with the regime. In turn, high state officials gained a foothold in the private sector, largely via their children (the awlad al-mas'ulin, children of the powerful).16 The regime felt confident enough about the new bourgeoisie's support to allow them to contest elections and fill "independent seats" designated for non-Baathists.17 The regime, therefore, was constructed at the political level around an Alawi/Sunni contract and at the socioeconomic level around a compact that benefited "Sunni Moslem peasants, the new middle class, `blue collar' workers, and residents of the remote provinces. To those one should add the over one million Baath members and their families who also owe allegiance to the regime and its policies".18 Financial assistance from Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, helped the Baathist regime
15 See Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad (London, 1995), p. 58.
16 See Bassam Haddad, "The Formation and Development of Economic Networks and Their Institutional and Economic Reverberations in Syria", in Steven Heydeman (ed.), Networks of Privilege: The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, (Palgrave-St Martin's Press, forthcoming).
17 In 1990 the number of seats was raised from 165 to 250 to allow non-partisan delegates to enter parliament. Most were newly successful businessmen. Two-third of the seats remained reserved for the Baath and officially recognised parties.
18 See Aslan Abd al-Karim, "An-Nizam as-Shamuli", in Arab Commission for Human Rights, Al-Huquq al-Insan wa ad-Dimuqratiyya fi Suriyya (Paris, 2002). further broaden its basis of support.19 Such revenues poured in especially after Syria sided with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia against Iraq in the Gulf war of 1991 and contributed troops to the U.S.-led coalition.20 Rising oil revenues since the early 1990s also provided much-needed foreign currency.21 Syria developed a quasi-corporatist system, built around patron-client relations and a widespread network of economic allegiance and corruption. The regime promoted the creation of a myriad of professional associations and trade unions - for peasants, workers, teachers, students, artists, engineers, and so forth - that rapidly became instruments of both personal enrichment and political surveillance. Politically, the regime mixed harsh repression and tight control by multiple security services with an almost obsessive adherence to institutional procedures and symbolic political gestures. Having consolidated his rule, and alongside the shadow power structure, Assad insisted on an appearance of legitimacy by following formal rules enshrined in a constitution, with clear lines of authority between presidency, parliament and government. He promoted the National Progressive Front, an umbrella group that included the Baath and other parties allowed to contest elections22 but the Baath enjoyed a highly privileged status. For instance, it alone could recruit in the army and universities. From the outset, the regime's most potent foe was the powerful Islamist opposition led by the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamists were particularly influential
19 Hinnebusch, Syria, op. cit., p. 7 describes Syria as a "partial or indirect rentier state".
20 Estimates put the aid Syria received from Gulf countries directly following the war at U.S.$2-3 billion. See Eyal Zisser, Assad's Legacy: Syria In Transition (London, 2001), pp. 190-191.
21 With international prices for crude at high levels, Syrian oil exports peaked in 1996 at 353,000 barrels a day. See OAPEC, http://www.oapecorg.org/images/DATA/.
22 Established in 1972, the National Progressive Front (NPF) was comprised of five parties that, with the exception of the Syrian Communist Party, all belonged to the nationalist Arab current in its Baathist and Nasserite incarnations. Although the 1973 Constitution provides these parties with a formal leadership role in the country, they remained wholly subject to Assad's rule. Subservience to the Baath led to disagreement and division. Jamal Atassi's faction of the Nasserist Arab Socialist Union promptly joined the ranks of the opposition; a wing of the communist party (called Communist Party - Political Bureau or CP-PB) led by Riad al-Turk rejected the NPF and also joined the opposition. In 1980, most of its leadership, including al-Turk, was arrested. Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 4 in Sunni urban centres such as Homs, Hama and Aleppo, where resistance to the notion of an Alawi military leader was strong. By the end of the 1970s, the struggle had turned violent; the Brotherhood and splinter factions including Islamic Vanguard (at- Tali'a al-Islamiyya) assassinated members of the Baath and Alawi officers and launched several attacks in Damascus and elsewhere. This culminated in 1982 with the tragic events of Hama.23 A violent uprising by Islamist militants was met with brute force. The price of the regime's victory was high; estimates of the dead range from 10,000 to 30,000. Bloodied, divided and with its leadership either killed or exiled (in Europe, Iraq and Saudi Arabia), the Islamistmovement no longer presented a threat.24 One key to its defeat was that the movement was circumscribed to Sunni towns in the north. "The rural Sunni population, the minorities, and even the urban Sunnis of Damascus remained supportive of the regime, or at least firmly refrained from acting against it".25 In the wake of the Hama atrocities, Hafez al-Assad faced another serious challenge, this time from his brother Rifaat al-Assad, who began plotting when the president fell ill. After an armed clash between Rifaat's 55,000-strong Defence Brigades and Special Forces and regular army units in February/March 1984, Rifaat was temporarily promoted to the largely ceremonial position of vice president and soon thereafter effectively expelled from Syria.26 In the early 1980s, the non-religious oppositionorganised around the trade unions and left-wing parties called for democratic reform as a third way between Baathist authoritarianism and Islamism.27 The decade
23 For a detailed analysis of events in and leading to Hama see Hans G. Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien, (Hamburg 1995).
24 On the role of Islamists today, see below III.B.1.
25 Zisser, Assad's Legacy, op. cit.
26 In 1992 Rifaat al-Assad returned to Syria to engage in business activities. However, in 1999, violent clashes occurred between men loyal to him and regime security forces in the port of Lattakiya, after which he returned to London. See Alan George, Syria, op. cit., p. 115.
27 In 1980, professional unions led by the Bar Association entered the political arena by publicly calling for the end of martial law imposed since 1963 and establishment of the rule of law and a multiparty system. In response, the regime disbanded the unions' elected executive councils, undertook large-scale arrests of union heads and replaced them with Baathists. Simultaneously, left-wing opposition parties, led by Jamal Atassi's party and Riad Al-Turk's Communist Party-Political Bureau, joined forces in the National Democratic Alliance (al-tajammu al-watani al-dimuqrati) was marked not only by the regime's success vis-?vis the opposition (religious and secular) but also by its effective use of repression to deter potential adversaries. In a political and ideological arena that had become "empty . . torn apart [and] demoralised", Assad could present himself as society's sole "arbiter and saviour."28 By the mid-1990s, the regime was able to lift some of the more repressive aspects of its rule and released groups of detainees, including some members of the Muslim Brotherhood. At his death on 10 June 2000, Hafez al-Assad had ruled Syria for nearly 30 years, longer than any predecessor. The regime had survived a powerful Islamist revolt, an internal insurgency, the collapse of its Soviet ally, separate major Israeli agreements with Egypt, the Palestinians and Jordan and an economic crisis, not to mention the many regional challenges presented by Israel, Iraq, Iran and Lebanon.
C. BASHAR AL-ASSAD AND THE BIRTH OF A HEREDITARY REPUBLIC
That his son Bashar succeeded him was not a surprise, though it was a novelty in the region, the first Arab republican hereditary regime.29 The strength of the father's rule also was the regime's principal weakness: extreme dependence on the president and the balance of power he had carefully crafted. The influence and political-economic weight of the different circles within the regime were measured by proximity to the president. Were the system to be modified, it could unravel into sectarian and socio-economic rivalries. All major components of the political system agreed that the son's accession was indispensable to sustain it. Bashar was the only candidate around whom they could rally without jeopardising political equilibrium and provoking a new round of internal strife. As a Western diplomat who witnessed the transition put it: "Bashar was picked as president because he did not and issued demands mirroring those of the unions. The regime once again responded with arrests, most of which affected the leadership and cadres of the Community Party- Political Bureau.
28 B. Ghalioun, "La fin de la `revolution' baasiste", Confluences M?diterran?e, N?44, Winter 2002-2003, p. 13.
29 Hafez al-Assad originally had groomed his elder son Basil to be his successor, but he was killed in a car accident in January 1994.
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pose a challenge to any of the factions in power".30 A system that traditionally operated at an unhurried pace amended the constitution in record time to enable Bashar - younger than the minimum legal age - to become president and inherit all his father's key titles, including Secretary General of the Baath and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.31 Bashar was left with more than titles; he also inherited the regime his father had built. The tailormade power structure outlived the dead leader. Yet, more than before, the regime rested on multiple pillars, "a system of pluralist authoritarianism".32 Bashar depends on the same constituencies as his father but is less able to control them. Any effort to modify radically the political architecture of which he is both product and captive would imperil the power relationships upon which he depends to endure. In the three years since he came to office, views regarding Bashar have changed dramatically. Initially hailed as a Western-oriented, sophisticated reformer - including by U.S. officials who met him early on33 - he currently is perceived by many in Washington as both less pragmatic and more ideological than his father.34
The most common view at the outset was that he was a reformist prisoner of the "old guard," the Baathists who had surrounded his father and who, desperate to hold on to their privileges and power, were seeking to prevent any genuine change.35 Early in the Bush administration, many U.S. officials believed Bashar was relatively open-minded and
30 ICG interview with Western diplomat, Damascus, 27 September 2003.
31 A week after Hafez al-Assad's death, the Baath Party held its first congress since 1985 to elect Bashar secretary general. Simultaneously, the constitution was amended to lower the minimum age and allow Bashar (then 34) to become president. On 17 July 2000, Bashar delivered his presidential inaugural address. See S. Boukhaima, "Bashar al-Assad: Chronique d'une succession en Syrie", Maghreb-Machreck, N?169, July 2000.
32 ICG interview with Robert Springborg, head of Middle East Institute in London, 9 October 2003.
33 ICG interviews with former U.S. officials, September 2003.
34 ICG interviews with U.S. officials, September-November 2003.
35 Among Middle East analysts, the notion of a rivalry between an "old guard" and a "new guard" has become fashionable, invoked to explain power struggles among Palestinians, Syrians and others. See ICG Middle East Briefing, The Meanings of Palestinian Reform, 12 November 2002, p. 7.
aware of Western realities and that the views he expressed were depended significantly on whether he was the sole Syrian official at a given meeting.36 As he engaged in what Washington considered repeated missteps, the perception took hold that he was perhaps too inexperienced and lacking his father's sophistication and policy flair.37 Over time, views significantly hardened, prompted chiefly by Syria's posture toward the Iraq war and its defiance of U.S. demands regarding support for radical Palestinian groups,38 though failure to carry out meaningful domestic reforms also played a part. Increasingly, U.S. officials appear inclined to see in Bashar "more of Nasrallah [the head of Hizbollah] and Khameini [the Iranian Supreme Leader] than of Assad [the father]",39 an ideologically committed pan-Arab. Bashar is believed to see the U.S. occupation of Iraq and broader presence in the region as a strategic threat to Arab interests.40 In their black-and-white characterisations, both the former and current assessments appear off the mark. The categorisation of new-versus old guards is misleading on several counts. The assumption upon which it is based - a generational gap between reformers and those who seek to maintain the status quo - is flawed. As a Western diplomat put it, "it has nothing to do with generations. It has to do with mindsets".41 While some more recent members of the regime (the "new old guard") are no less repressive or corrupt than their predecessors, many older
36 ICG interviews with current and former U.S. officials, Washington, May-June 2003.
37 Hinting at this view, the White House characterized Bashar al-Assad's leadership as "relatively new" and "relatively untested". Press Briefing, Ari Fleischer, 30 April 2003. Most Israeli commentaries went further, "Assad's father had an acute sense of smell for danger. The son has none whatsoever. He has not yet undergone a formative experience", Yediot Ahronot, 13 April 2003. For a similar but more detailed argument see Eyal Zisser, "Does Bashar al-Assad Rule Syria?", Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003.
38 See ICG Report, Bashar's Syria (I), op. cit.
39 ICG interview with U.S. official, Washington, September 2003.
40 Rejecting the notion that Bashar is held back by his father's entourage, a Syrian businessman said, "This story of an old guard that prevents some reforms is nonsense. Bashar manipulates everybody and this serves him as a cover, especially for intoxicating European officials who believe in him. He is the son of his father by belief and methods." ICG interview, Damascus, April 2003.
41 ICG interview with Western diplomat, Damascus July 2003.
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generation officials and civil servants are frustrated with the slow pace of reform.42 Personal and ideological rivalries exist within generations, and alliances cut across them; much of the domestic paralysis results from a vast, lethargic bureaucracy accustomed to the status quo.43 Furthermore, the distinction between old and new guards wrongly assumes that positions on reform are fixed, regardless of the stakes or issues. Yet, an official can be a proponent of a free market economy when a family member stands to benefit from a state concession to a private company and turn "socialist" when privatisation plans threaten jobs of those under his patronage. Nor is economic reform talk all that new: it was first announced after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and has repeatedly surfaced, though it has rarely amounted to much. Ultimately, "the old and new guard paradigm, whether in Palestine or Syria, has the sole virtue of re-labelling as political analysis what is mere demographic tautology: that young generations will succeed older ones".44 But to see in Bashar an unreconstructed pan-Arab nationalist, resistant to economic and political reform is equally questionable. There is little doubt that he remains dependent on the regime he inherited and of which he is a quintessential product. He may have received part of his medical instruction in the UK, but his entire political education is Baathist as are the foundations of his rule. He has yet to devise or implement a coherent project or strategy of his own, domestic or foreign. At the same time, there is good reason to believe that Bashar, more than many others within the regime, is aware that its longer-term stability requires change, modernisation and foreign help to salvage the country from an economic crisis generated by widespread corruption, a vast and unproductive public work force, outdated socialist laws and considerable red tape.
42 Vice-President Khaddam, for example, a reputed hawk on foreign policy matters, reportedly has advocated a more open economy. ICG interview with Syrian economist, Damascus July 2003.
43 Osama Ansari, a London-based Syrian banker, explained: "It is not just hard-core socialists, but civil servants" who are resisting change. Quoted in The Washington Post, 23 November, 2001. According to an EU estimate, the public sector employs 73 per cent of the labour force but contributes only 33 per cent to the Gross Domestic Product. Euro-Med Partnership, "Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006", no date.
44 ICG interview with Middle East analyst, London, December 2003.
Ultimately, Bashar seems a reluctant, albeit willing captive - an aspiring reformist who realises that his longevity is tied to the stability of the Baathist regime, which, in turn, is tied to the perpetuation of certain domestic and regional policies.45 His approach is ideological in the sense that ideological fidelity is an important ingredient in a pragmatic strategy of regime survival. In foreign policy, this has meant avoiding any radical departure from his father's approach, which would have exposed him to strong domestic criticism; resisting what are perceived as hostile U.S. regional moves; and banking on the U.S. bogging down in Iraq and failing on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Domestically, this has meant initial, modest steps to modernise and rationalise public administration, streamlining the public sector without challenging the economic, let alone political system as a whole.
45 ICG interviews, Beirut, Damascus, June-September 2003.
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II. THE FATE OF REFORM
A. THE DAMASCUS SPRING
Syrians were optimistic that Bashar would preside over the regime's liberalisation. This was largely based on his youth, that he had studied three years in London, his stated intention to modernise the country and tolerate "constructive criticism" and his insistence on transparency and fighting corruption.46 His government took steps to end nearly four decades of state monopoly over banking and foreign exchange, introduced legislation to encourage foreign investment and relax rent control, spearheaded efforts to enhance the autonomy of state-owned enterprises and undertook some educational reforms, including private schools and universities. For the first time in at least three decades, the government presented its annual budget before the start of the year. There were also hints of political change such as the decision, publicised in July 2003, that "party institutions and comrades should stay away completely from the daily implementation [of state policies] and refrain from intervening in the work of institutions ... of the state".47 From June 2000 to August 2001, Syria's longsilenced civil society took advantage of this changed atmosphere to call, from within the country or via the relatively free Lebanese press, for a democratic opening. Poets, writers, academics and artists entered the political arena, speaking up on such once taboo topics as public freedoms, human rights, corruption, the right of citizens to participate in decision-making and the fate of detainees and exiles. Meetings, communiqu?s, forums for public discussion (muntadayat) and informal groupings flourished. In September 2000, leading intellectuals signed the "Manifesto of the 99" demanding the
46 In his inaugural address, Bashar pointed at the lack of a clear economic strategy during his father's rule and the need for reforms based on "accountability", "transparency", "active participation", "administrative reform", "the rule of law" and "democratic thinking". The latter, he explained, is "based on the principle of accepting the opinion of the other". Yet Bashar added that "Western democracy" culminated from historical events different from Syria's own evolution: "We [therefore] have to have our democratic experience which is special to us, which stems from our history, culture, civilisation and which is a response to the needs of our society and the requirements of our reality". At-Thawra , 17 July 2000.
47 Decision 408, cited in Al-Iqtisadiyya, 8 July 2003.
lifting of the state of emergency and martial law imposed in 1963, a general amnesty for all political prisoners and the return of political exiles. The petition also called for freedom of expression, freedom of the press and "the freeing of public life from the restrictive chains imposed on it".48 Signatories included the poet Adonis and writers Sadiq al-Azm and Abd al-Rahman Munif, who count among modern Arabic literature's foremost. Soon, 1,000 intellectuals went further, demanding free elections and the end of the Baath political monopoly.49 Nizzar Nayouf, a human rights activist, told a Lebanese newspaper that it was his "dream to get rid of the remnants of dictatorship and totalitarianism in Syria".50
Opposition parties also became more active. In May 2001, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood published a National Charter in London that called for a modern and democratic state and rejected political violence.51 Left-wing parties, nationalist and Marxist, held debates on such topics as the rule of law, democratisation and independence of the judiciary. Non-Baathist members of parliament such as Riyad Seif and Ma'mun al-Homsi spoke in favour of sweeping reforms, measures to stamp out corruption and the need for greater civil liberties. Calls for change also emanated from official and quasi-official institutions; 70 lawyers of the Baathdominated Bar Association urged the state to clear the way for more political parties. The regime's initial response was encouraging. It pardoned hundreds of political prisoners, including communists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, shut down the notorious al-Mazza and Palmyra prisons, allowed other parties in the National Progressive Front to publish and sell their own newspapers and approved a license for publication of two private magazines, Ad-Dumari and Al-Iqtisadiyya.
But the liberalisation drive came to a rapid and sharp halt. Beginning in February 2001, senior officials began accusing activists of facilitating a "neocolonialist movement".52 In a memorandum, the
48 The full text of the letter was printed in the Lebanese daily
As-Safir on 27 September 2000.
49 See As-Safir, 11 January 2001.
50 Cited in Mulhaq an-Nahar, 21 July 2001.
51 See Al-Hayat, 4 May 2001.
52 As then Minister of Information Adnan Umran put it: This "neocolonialism no longer needs armadas and armies. It relies on other and cheaper means, such as the civil society
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Baath Party attacked them for weakening or discrediting state institutions and perpetuating the economic crisis.53 The government tightened censorship, placed strict restraints on political activities (in particular contacts with the outside world) and arrested key figures. It also issued new guidelines on publications, banning the printing of any information that might "harm national security, unity of society, security of the army, the country's international ties, the country's dignity and prestige, the national economy and monetary security", and threatened violators with three years imprisonment and fines up to U.S.$20,000.54 Baath Party members were dispatched throughout the country to accuse activists of "harming the stability and unity of Syria" and "collaborating with Syria's enemies".55 Organisers of meetings were ordered to submit in advance lists of participants and agendas. When Riad Seif held a meeting without seeking permission, he was immediately arrested.56 Others shared his fate, including the head of the dissident Communist Party, 71 year-old Riyad al-Turk;57 former University of Damascus economics professor Aref Dalila, a free-market advocate and frequent speaker at various gatherings; and Ma'mun al-Homsi, a member of parliament.
B. AFTER IRAQ
In the immediate aftermath of the Iraq war, speculation was rampant about the fate of the movements that are paid for by foreign embassies". Cited in An-Nahar, 9 February 2001.
53 See Al-Hayat, 19 March 2001.
54 The new press law was issued in September 2001. For an analysis see Human Rights Watch, "Memorandum to the Syrian Government, Decree N?50/2001: Human Rights Concerns", 31 January 2002.
55 The Baath party reportedly issued an order for its members to attend meetings and forums to express these accusations. See Al-Hayat, 9 February 2001.
56 Others believe that Seif crossed the regime's line by accusing the government of corruption in the decision to issue two mobile phone company contracts, at heavy cost to the state treasury. ICG interview with Syrian political analyst, Damascus, July 2003. For Seif's memorandum to parliament (4 August 2001) see "'Aqd al-Khaliwi yadi'u 400 milyar Lira `ala ad-Dawla as-Suriyya", Appendix 2 in Arab Commission for Human Rights, op. cit..
57 Al-Turk was sentenced in June to 30 months in prison for attempting to change the constitution. Bashar subsequently ordered his release on 16 November 2002 for "humanitarian reasons". Al-Turk suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure.
neighbouring Baathist regime, particularly in Washington.
At first blush, there are striking similarities: authoritarian and secular regimes both, with significant power in the hands of a hegemonic political party and a minority group (Alawi in one case; Sunni in the other), strong roles for the military, and numerous security and intelligence agencies. Both featured a Republican Guard, drawn heavil from the privileged minority group and akin to a praetorian guard tasked with defending the capital and protecting the regime against a coup or popular uprising.58 The military and special forces had been used in both cases to subdue rebellions: the 1982 uprising in Syrian Hama and the 1991 intifada in southern Iraq. Another similarity, particularly during Hafez al-Assad's presidency, was the personality cult, with typical symbolic manifestations (statues, monument, giant portraits, hymns). Under both regimes, the state and public sectors played central economic roles and corporatist central control was exercised through trade unions, professional associations and the like. Both faced a Kurdish problem, though far more intensely in Iraq.59 Moreover, if the first "dynastic presidency" was in Syria, Saddam Hussein was clearly grooming his sons. Yet, the similarities went only so far, and to read Syria's future through an Iraqi lens would be a serious mistake. Significant differences go well beyond the important personality distinctions between Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad.60 They relate to the genesis and development of the state structures and societies. Notwithstanding the atrocities committed in the early 1980s, Syria never witnessed the degree of perpetual state repression and sheer brutality of Iraqi Baathism. Several explanations have been offered. As noted, authoritarian rule in Syria required cooptation of
58Maher Assad, the President's brother, is responsible (together with Bashar) for the Republican Guard forces deployed in the mountains around Damascus and supervises the regime's security apparatus.
59 Kurds are present in northeastern Syria and in big cities, and are roughly 9 per cent of the population.
60 "Saddam Hussein's cult, like his person, is flamboyant and audacious....He is physically youthful and vigorous. Assad is emphatically not charismatic; he is not even particularly energetic. His speeches are deliberate and slow....Assad is cautious, a politician known for his cleverness rather than his bravado". Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago, 1999), p. 28.
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many forces beyond the regime core. In part because the Alawi minority is only 12 per cent of the population, it has sought arrangements with other important groups, especially constituencies among Sunnis, who are not a politically, socially or culturally homogenous group. Damascus holds a unique place in this political architecture. The regime constantly has striven to ensure the loyalty of its commercial and religious institutions, and it was virtually the only significant urban centre not to experience the bloody events of the 1980s. Syria's relatively meagre oil resources also arguably required it to seek domestic tranquillity by complementing economic patronage and state-violence with negotiation and compromise: Unlike Iraq, where Saddam's domestic and regional ambitions were matched by his financial means, our country is poor. That is why the Syrian regime has had to display the flexibility and tactical deftness that its Iraqi alter ego so clearly lacked.61 Ironically, the Syrian regime has become far more embedded in the nation's social fabric than was its Iraqi counterpart because of its comparative limitations and weaknesses.
Still, the political impact of Saddam's ouster on the Syrian regime was palpable, not least of all because it shattered the myth of the omnipotent authoritarian Arab state.62 To a number of Syrians, "the way Baghdad fell, without much resistance, was humiliating. It shed a new light on how things were here at home, how vulnerable the regime was, how empty its slogans"63 "Iraq, which in the eyes of the Arab world once embodied the myth of military, police and technological power, crumbled at lightning speed! Today, the strength that our regimes claimed to represent is a sheer lie that no longer fools 61 ICG interview with journalist belonging to Syrian opposition, Damascus, April 2003.
62 As the war unfolded and its outcome became clear, Syrian officials went out of their way to distinguish their regime from the Iraqi. Buthayna Shaaban, then spokeswoman of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and close advisor to President Bashar, wrote: "The Iraqi crisis provides from the outset proof that the Iraqi people is the victim of a bloody dictatorship . . . The regime had . . . mobilized the country's resources as well as its human and cultural capital at the service of a handful of people unworthy of representing their country and their people". As- Sharq al-Awsat, 18 April 2003. 63 ICG interview with Syrian analyst, Damascus, July 2003. anybody".64 Fear of the Syrian state - already markedly diminished with Hafez al-Assad's death - eroded further. In the immediate aftermath of the war, many Syrians displayed far greater willingness than openly to question their political system. Expectations of rapid change were widespread among the intellectual opposition: "In Syria, we do not need a war to achieve regime change! The regime can fall very quickly: at the first sign of trouble, the oligarchy will almost certainly flee with the money it has stolen and already safely placed abroad".65 A prominent Syrian opposition figure explained: After Iraq, the ordinary Syrian citizen expects a change, expects that things will move. The authoritarian regime in Syria died with the U.S.'s victory in Iraq. Since that time, one can sense a growing politicisation of Syrian society and a genuine desire to have a role in public life. People are much more eager to speak out.66 Also notable, including among some early Baath Party founders, was a certain satisfaction at the collapse of what they considered a betrayal of Baathism - Baathism as an instrument of social coercion. Another regime critic and leading Baathist from the 1940s-1950s, said:
Nothing would give me more satisfaction than the definitive elimination of the Baath and its obliteration from the Arab world. In Syria, since the February 1966 coup, it has become a loose assortment of incompetent individuals without a genuine sense of identity, nothing more than clienteles ready to be bought ... What matters today is that my children can eat....If you give people the freedom to think, to write and to decide, maybe new and competent elites will emerge who will be able to govern this country.67
64 ICG interview with Syrian movie director, Damascus, April 2003.
65 ICG interview with university student, Damascus, April 2003. Some went so far as to predict that, sensing the regime's demise, a challenger would come from the inside. "Should a Chalabi or a Karzai emerge in Syria, he probably would come from within the regime itself, and not from the current opposition". ICG interview with Islamist militant, Damascus, April 2003.
66 ICG interview with Riyyad at-Turk, Damascus 22 April 2003.
67 ICG interview, Damscus, April 2003.
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Calls for greater freedom, heard during the Damascus Spring but then quickly silenced, once again were voiced by Syrians at home and via the Lebanese press. Seeking to invoke the Iraqi events in a way that might be more acceptable to the regime, and fearing association with the U.S., whose Middle East policies were hugely unpopular, 68 opposition figures called for a national awakening and democratic opening precisely in order to stave off foreign intervention. Opposition members made clear they would not challenge the Syrian regime "on the back of an American tank".69 In one petition, 120 members of the exiled and internal opposition wrote: The United States has never dared occupy a country where there exists minimal harmony between those who govern and those who are governed. All U.S. wars have been wars against weak, illegitimate regimes that are cut off from their people and incapable of embodying national unity against foreign threats ... The war against Iraq demonstrated the inability of the single party and of the security apparatus to defend national independence, sovereignty and dignity . . . People living under oppression cannot protect and defend their country.70 In another, 287 intellectuals and political activists denounced the U.S. intervention in Iraq and Israeli aggression, which "place Syria between two enemies with forces it has never seen before".71 The only way to face this challenge is to mobilise "a free society", hold a national conference with the participation of all Syria's political figures and respect human rights: Today, we are facing a dilemma: either the dictatorship continues indefinitely, or we go down the Iraqi road with the risk of chaos and long-term foreign occupation. I am afraid for my country and it is important for me that it not collapse into a cycle of violence, vengeance and pillage. The only wise course is for
everyone to take his responsibility and work
68 ICG interviews, Damascus July-September 2003.
69 Haithem al-Manna', a veteran critic of the Syrian regime, as quoted in Arabicnews.com, 25 August 2003. Manna' was allowed back into Syria in August 2003 after having lived in Paris in exile since 1978. ICG interview with Haithem al- Manna', Damascus, August 2003.
70Akhbar as-Sharq, 23 April 2003.
71 For the full text of the petition, see Akhbar as-Sharq, 1 June 2003.
for a change that is not accompanied by a national catastrophe.72
Signalling a degree of tolerance for this approach, Syrian television aired a call by Tayyib Tizini, a philosophy professor, for "national reconciliation".73 General Bahjat Suleiman, head of the security services and a central regime figure, implicitly praised Syria's opposition on the grounds that, unlike its Iraqi counterpart, it was not seeking to overthrow the regime or willing to cooperate with the U.S.74 The regime proclaimed several positive steps over the six months following the war. In April 2003, the ministry of education dropped the 30-year old mandatory military uniform for students from kindergarten to high school and the "military training" module from the national curriculum75 and dismantled several Baath Party youth organisations.76 Schools were allowed to accept assistance in English-language training from the U.S. embassy77 and, breaking a tradition of tightly state-controlled higher education, two private universities were licensed to operate in the provinces.78 NGOs working on "soft" issues such as the environment and women's rights were allowed to operate.79 The
72 ICG interview with a signatory of the "Manifesto of the 99", Damascus, April 2003.
73 This occurred on 3 May 2003, and was aired on Syria's satellite television station.
74 "In Syria, the regime does not have enemies but `opponents' whose demands do not go beyond certain political and economic reforms such as the end of the state of emergency and of martial law, the adoption of a law on political parties and the equitable redistribution of national wealth". As-Safir, 15 May 2003.
75 See Middle East International, 16 May 2003.
76 See The Washington Post, 12 May 2003.
77 ICG interview with U.S. diplomat, Damascus August 2003.
78 The Syrian Minister for Higher Education, Hassan Risheh, openly considered inviting the American University in Beirut to open a branch in Syria. He also called on the U.S. to increase student exchanges. See As-Sharq al-Awsat, 25 August 2003. One of the newly licensed universities is owned by a cousin of Bashar al-Assad. ICG interview with Syrian economist, Damascus August 2003. 79 ICG interview with Syrian NGO activist, Damascus July 2003. Syria counts approximately 500 to 600 officially recognised and functioning NGOs, a strikingly small per capita number as compared to most countries in the region. ICG interview with Haithem al-Maleh, Syrian human rights activist, July 2003. See also Karim Abu Halawa, "At- Tahuwwulat al-Mujtama'iyya wa Dawr al-Munazamat al- Ahliyya", in Arab Commission for Human Rights, op. cit. Other more politically oriented NGOs, such as human rights
organisations, operate in a legal limbo.
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government also abolished the notoriously corrupt and harsh "economic security courts" and lifted strict penalties on illegal trading in foreign currencies.80 Even the security forces were widely seen by civil society activists to have relaxed their stringent surveillance and interrogation techniques.81 In early 2004, the regime released 123 political prisoners, primarily members of Islamist parties and the Iraqi Baath but also Fares Murad, a communist activist detained since 1975.82
Despite early expectations, however, there was no fundamental change. The March 2003 parliamentary elections were held under basically unaltered rules and the Baath Party won 167 of 250 seats, leaving the previous allocation basically unmodified. Draconian emergency laws stayed in effect while roughly 1,000 political prisoners and the ten activists of the Damascus Spring remained behind bars.83 Fourteen other civil society activists, arrested in August 2003 on their way to a lecture on the "state of emergency", currently are on trial before a military court in Aleppo.84
C. WHAT DOES BASHAR WANT?
The more recent setback, like the period that followed the Damascus Spring, led to a host of interpretations regarding President Bashar and the nature of the political system. The most commonly advanced explanation by Syrian opposition activists is that, having built centralised, authoritarian rule, Syrian officials - reform-minded or not - feared that changing one aspect of the system could pull it all apart. A signatory of the "Manifesto of the 99" said: The islahi (reformist) current grew out of Bashar's inaugural address. At the end of the day, however, it chose to close ranks with those in the
80 ICG interview with Syrian economist, Damascus, August 2003.
81 ICG interview with Syrian political and human rights activists, Damascus July-September 2003.
82 Bayan, 1 February 2004.
83 ICG interview with Haithem al-Maleh, Damascus August 2003. Syria's longest held political prisoner is Imad Chiha who has been in prison for 28 years, allegedly for membership in the unauthorized Arab Communist Organisation.
84 The group includes two prominent political activists, Fateh Jamus and Safwan `Akkar, who earlier spent fifteen years in prison for membership in the illegal Communist Action Party. The fourteen claim to have been tortured during their interrogations. See Jama'iyyat Huquq al-Insan fi Suriyya, Bayan, 26 January 2004.
regime who favour the status quo rather than with elements of Syrian society who aspire to change. No doubt, this had to do with power relations and political calculations. But it chiefly had to do with the fear they all shared of losing the power and privileges inherited from Assad-the-father.85 In this, the economic and the political are interlinked: deep public sector reforms would undermine patronage and clientelism.86 Likewise, widespread corruption is a central feature of the system, affecting all administrative levels and regulating entire facets of the economy. In the public sector, extremely low wages have made it a virtual necessity. What is relatively new is that private sector businessmen who took advantage of economic liberalisation have become major beneficiaries of corruption. As a result, they have monopolised most of the new lucrative markets and compete directly with the traditional bourgeoisie of Aleppo and Damascus that Hafez al-Assad had studiously tried to co-opt.87 Ironically, because they have been so limited, the economic reforms may have done as much harm as good. A businessman explained: "Everyone benefits from corruption, the old guard as much as the so-called new. The sons of regime officials have thrown themselves into the business world and have carved out privileged zones. Corruption has become all-encompassing, whereas under Assad-the-father, it was at least somewhat constrained".88
That said, and as stated above, a strong case can be made that Bashar came into office intent on modernising Syria and if not halting then seriously reducing corruption, and aware that this would require bold economic and perhaps even political steps. During the first two years of his presidency, three quarters of the roughly sixty top political, military and administrative office holders reportedly have been replaced.89 Among those Bashar promoted are persons educated in the West who share a more reformist outlook and, in several instances, are not members of 85 ICG interview with Syrian movie director, Damascus, 30 April 2003.
86 ICG interview with Syrian opposition member, Damascus, April 2003.
87 See Joseph Bahout, "Les Entrepreneurs Syriens. Economie, Affaires et Politique", Cahiers du CERMOC, N?7, Beirut 1994.
88 ICG interview with leading Damascus businessman, Damascus, April 2003. Nabil Sukkar remarked: "Hesitant reforms will get us nowhere. Either you have an old-style socialist economy or a modern capitalist one". Quoted in National Review, 2 December 2002.
89 See Volker Perthes, Syria Under Bashar al-Assad: Modernization and the Limits of Change, (London, Adelphi Paper, Forthcoming).
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the Baath. By the same token, it almost certainly is the case that, particularly in the early days of his rule, and unlike his father, Bashar has had to share authority with other power centres, including the political/economic elite that is entrenched in the public sector, the army and security services.90 He lacks any permanent cadre to help him.
The result is two-fold. At one level, people resisted Bashar and his attempted economic and public sector reforms. Although unconfirmed, Damascus is replete with rumours of presidential decisions thwarted by the system - party, security services or elite.91 Describing how the system ignores the president, a member of parliament said: "Bashar is akin to the traffic signs in this country. It is in principle forbidden to use your horn and yet the noise is overwhelming".92 At another level, Bashar was resisting his own earlier impulses, recognising both that changes could imperil regime stability and that perpetuation of patronage and clientelism could buttress it. Hence, he put the brakes on the former and turned a relative blind eye to the latter. The crackdown engineered in the wake of the Damascus Spring and the decision to slow reform in the aftermath of the Iraq war appeared to reflect a 90 Volker Perthes in "Emerging Syria 2002", part of the Emerging Markets Series, prepared by the Oxford Business Group, pp. 28-29.
91 As illustration of the Syrian regime's ability to block political reforms, observers point to Bashar's apparent backtracking on his June 2003 promise to grant individual amnesty to returning exiled opposition members. According to various reports, the move was blocked by Syria's intelligence and security services. ICG interviews with Syrian journalist, political analyst close to the regime and Syrian opposition figures in Damascus and London, September 2003. Another instance of alleged behind-the-scenes infighting involved decision 408 spearheaded by Bashar and adopted by the Baath Party Regional Command in June 2003, which called for a strict separation between party institutions and state daily policies. The decision was widely perceived as an attempt by Bashar to pave the way for the appointment of more non-Baathists to government positions; yet in the new cabinet, formed almost two months after Bashar had first announced his intention to appoint a reformist government, the share of Baathist ministers increased, and some of those closest to Bashar were not appointed, including Ratib Shalah, the Syrian Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and economist Nabil Sukkar - both of whom were rumoured as possible choices for prime minister. ICG interviews with European diplomat and Syrian observers, Damascus September 2003. See also Muhammad Jamal Barut's analysis in Akhbar as-Sharq, 13 October 2003.
92 ICG interview, Damascus August 2003. compromise: political change was blocked while some limited economic reforms were allowed to proceed. As justification, the latter were portrayed as prerequisites to subsequent political liberalisation.93 Even nonpolitical reforms have run into trouble. According to a recent study by the University of Damascus, some 1900 decrees, laws and administrative orders carrying Bashar's signature have been issued since 2000.94 Yet very few have been implemented, a result of bureaucratic inertia or outright opposition by high-ranking officials, but also because the measures were not underpinned by an overall, coherent reform vision.
All told, many reforms advocated by the president were relatively modest. But they would have created their own momentum and might well have had unplanned consequences had their implementation been facilitated.
93 As stated by Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam: "The Europeans experienced real democracy only after citizens' economic needs had been addressed....As there is yet no economic maturity in Syria, there can be no democracy". Cited in Al-Hayat, 10 July 2001.
94 ICG interview with Syrian academic, Damascus July 2003. One example of an ill-fated law involves the decision to hand back to their original owners land exploited by state farmers. According to several accounts, the ministry of agriculture resisted, arguing that the land had been owned by the state for nearly 40 years and that the state farmers were all "good party members". The decision reportedly was cancelled because of excessive controversy. ICG interviews, Damascus, July 2003. See also Volker Perthes, Syria Under Bashar al-Assad , op. cit.
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III. THE DEBATE ABOUT REFORM
A. AN URGENT NEED FOR CHANGE
Plagued by widespread corruption, ageing state industries, a volatile and under-performing agricultural sector, rapidly depleting oil resources, an anachronistic educational system, capital flight and a lack of foreign investment, Syria's economy has become unproductive. The country once was able to make up for this through what may be called "foreign policy dividends," income generated by aid from Iran in the 1980s and the Gulf in the early 1990s (in both cases largely in appreciation for Syria's role in countering Iraq), and more recently through trade with Iraq in violation of UN sanctions. "The regime's foreign policies were Syria's main export product".95 No such safety valve now exists. Moreover, if extraction continues at the current rate, oil resources risk running out within the next ten years. 96 While regime elements have been the staunchest opponents of reform, they also are likely to be the first victims of its absence because the economy is gradually undermining the regime's support base. Insufficient job creation is one clear indicator of problems ahead. With slackening growth and annually over 300,000 new jobseekers, unemployment is high and increasing.97 Government job-creation programs are unable to keep pace. There also is anecdotal but compelling evidence of growing income disparities98 and of significant and rising poverty.99 Together, these developments cannot but
95 ICG interview with Syrian academic, Damascus July 2003. 96 For estimates of Syria's oil reserves, see U.S. Department of Energy, EIA, "Country Analysis Brief: Syria", March 2003. For recent discussions of Syria's economic crisis see Nabil Sukkar in As-Safir, 14 and 16 June 2003; Hanadi Salman in As-Safir, 31 July 2003; Hussayn al-Qadi , Al-Islah al-Iqtisadi fi Suriya, Ila `Ayna? (Damascus, 2002).
97 Official estimates vary but some suggest that unemployment reached 15 per cent in 2003. See Tishrin, 7 May 2003. For a discussion of official statistics see Muhammad al-Rifa'i in Tishrin, 18 August 2003. According to independent estimates, the figure is closer to 20 per cent. ICG interviews with Nabil Sukkar, Damascus, July 2003 and Lebanese economist Kamal Hamdan in Beirut, September 2003.
98 An estimated 5 per cent of the population is believed to control some 50 per cent of national income. See Volker Perthes, Syria Under Bashar al-Assad, op. cit.
99 Unofficial estimates of poverty vary widely between 25 and 60 per cent of the population. See Hanadi Salman in As-Safir, 31 July 2003; Violette Dagher, "Muqadamma", in Arab erode regime support among the poorer and lower middle classes that have been among its most important constituencies. In their eyes, Syria has become a country of "neither bread nor freedom".100 In other ways, too, the political repercussions of a cash-strapped economy are already at work. A shrinking real economy reduces the availability of bribes, rents and economic privileges, thereby undermining regime ability to rely on patronage and economic control. Tribal challenges to Baathist supremacy used to be contained by distributing "business" opportunities and oligopoly positions in customs collection, cattle export to Saudi Arabia and local transport companies. In mid-2003, reduced revenues from all these sources triggered intensified rivalry, culminating in gang warfare and scoresettling between tribes in Aleppo, each of which appeared to be backed by local branches of the secret service (mukhabarat).101 Inability to preserve law and order further turned locals against the regime.102 Finally, according to reports, the effects of corruption can be felt in foreign policy: the provision of military hardware to Iraq prior to the war, and the turning of a blind eye to the infiltration of militants across the border in its aftermath both have been attributed in part to personal initiatives by officials or wellconnected elites motivated by financial gain. This apparent privatisation of foreign policy in a system formerly known for highly centralised control must be another concern, particularly in a volatile international environment.
Judging from the regime's own discourse, the need for change is gradually becoming more widely acknowledged in official circles.103 Reformist Commission for Human Rights, op. cit.; `Amr Mahmud, "Al-Iqtisad bayna al-Waqi' wa al-Aafaq", in Arab Commission
for Human Rights, op. cit.
100 Alan George, Syria, op. cit..
101 The tribes involved were the Basri and Hamidi. Several persons are said to have been killed in daylight assassinations. ICG interviews in Aleppo, August 2003.
102 "As tribal conflicts were played out on the streets people realised that the government's influence was waning, and they got angry. So they embraced Islamist slogans denouncing the local authorities' corruption and incompetence." Ibid.
103 The Lebanese Daily Star published a Syrian statesponsored dossier entitled "Syrian Arab republic: A New, Proactive Direction" that stressed the virtues of economic liberalisation and Syria's vast potential for foreign investors. See The Daily Star, 22 April 2003. For the government's official reform drive, see Syrian Arab Republic, "The Ninth
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elements within the regime also seem to recognize the strategic benefit from enhancing Syria's international stature. Yet, there still is insufficient awareness of the gravity of the problem and its potential political impact. Some seem to harbour a belief that foreign currency reserves are sufficient to stave off an economic crisis;104 a diplomat explained the complacency by observing: "Syria's economy basically thrives on two factors: rain and oil. For now, both are ok".105 In fact, the availability of financial resources means that the time is ripe to initiate serious reforms while a safety net can be put up to limit attendant economic hardships.106 For other officials, genuine change is impossible to contemplate as it would threaten their privileged positions. An important implication is that absent genuine political reform - greater accountability, transparency, public participation and a freer media, all of which would create new instruments of legitimate rule - it will be extremely difficult to introduce the necessary economic changes and break the cycle of corruption and inefficiency. What this means, as well, is that to succeed the reform movement (whether within the regime or the opposition) will need to reach out to a broader segment of Syrians than thus far. While most criticism for the failure of reform to date must fall on the regime, the opposition is not exempt. In explaining the failure of the Damascus Spring, some Syrians note that the educated, urban middle class that spearheaded it had few if any ties to the broader public, particularly in rural areas. This also holds for efforts after the Iraq war. Both appeared to be instances of elite movements that neither spoke nor listened to the concerns of the vast majority of Syrians. One Spring activist lamented: Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social development for the Years 2001-2005", Damascus, March 2002. 104 Syria's foreign currency reserves are estimated at a comfortable U.S.$14 billion but they are dwindling (in 2002, they were U.S.$ 23.5 billion). ICG interview with Syrian and foreign economists, Damascus and Beirut August-September 2003. The 2002 figure is from Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, "Syrian Statistical Abstract 2002", Damascus, 2003. "With reserves like these and its tight fiscal policy, Syria has effectively implemented an IMF program without the IMF". ICG interview with foreign economist, Beirut October 2003.
105 ICG interview, Damascus, December 2003.
106 As a diplomat posted in Damascus put it, "in another five or six years, the situation may be very different". ICG interview, Damascus, December 2003. The forums were a good beginning but we were largely talking to ourselves. A clear or real alternative to the regime's policies failed to emerge and so very few actually listened to what we were saying. But what can you expect? For 35 years they have effectively been killing political society. The great leader was thinking for us all.107
Some participants in the Damascus Spring also acknowledge that they may have pushed too far, too fast, issuing maximalist demands that provoked a sharp response. The key, they say, is to persuade regime officials that reforms will not necessarily threaten their survival.108 Some opposition figures suggested that human rights abuses committed at the height of the armed clashes between the regime and the Islamists in the early 1980s should be the subject of a mutual amnesty. Others have proposed that the Baath retain its dominant role during a transitional period to a multi-party system,109 thus giving the opposition the chance to show it could "behave responsibly."110 Some reform-minded Baathists have called for splitting the party into two factions as a first step toward controlled pluralism.111
B. THE FEARS
Pressed about the need to accelerate economic and especially political change, Syrian officials cite a number of fears.112 They need to be taken seriously; though sometimes feigned and often exaggerated, they reflect concerns genuinely felt even by many who support the reform movement.
107 ICG interview with Syrian opposition figure in Damascus, 22 July 2003.
108 ICG interviews with Syrian opposition figures in Damascus and London, July-December 2003. See also Burhan Ghalyun, Al-Ikhtiyar ad-Dimuqrati fi Suriyya, ( Damascus, 2003), p. 154.
109 Youssef al-Faysal, the secretary general of the legalised faction of the Communist Party, said: "Some of the leaders of the muntadayat (discussion forums) were too extremist and proposed changing the system or the constitution, like Article 8 [stipulating the Baath's leading role in state and society] ... This extremism invited a similar reaction from the Bath party". Cited in Hanadi Salman, An-Nahar, 31 July 2003.
110 ICG interview with Syrian opposition figure in Damascus, December 2003.
111 ICG interview with Baath party member, Damascus, December 2003.
112For an interesting discussion of the regime's fears, see Ghalyun, op. cit. Although officially banned, the book is available in Damascus bookstores.
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1. The Islamist Threat
The argument against opening up the political system most often repeated is the risk of an Islamic fundamentalist takeover.113 It is often made to Western audiences; as a close advisor to Bashar put it, "Islamism is a real danger threatening Syrian society. Veils are present everywhere. The West should help us confronting that danger. Democracy will only allow these forces to mobilise".114 The argument carries weight with some U.S. and European diplomats, who see the secular Syrian regime as a bulwark against a far more dangerous, radical, Islamist takeover.115 For many Syrians, unquestionably, the memory of the earlier confrontation with the Islamists remains vivid. Equally undeniably, Syrian society has lately become more Islamic, evidenced by the increased number of veiled women (muhajabat), skyrocketing mosque-construction, a thriving religious literature market, significant growth in Islamic charity organisations and rising attendance at informal home Koran classes.116 Political Islamism as such lacks any active organisational structures. The Muslim Brotherhood, plagued by prolonged leadership struggles, forced into exile and with the death penalty hanging over membership, never recovered from the crackdown of the early 1980s.117 Operating between Jordan and European capitals, it claims "thousands of members" but all outside Syria.118
113 Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam told civil society activists in 2001, "We will not allow you to turn Syria into another Algeria". Cited in Al-Hayat, 19 February 2001. "If elections were to take place in Syria, there is a good chance we would find ourselves in the same position as Algeria. Americans have such short-term perspective!" ICG interview with high-ranking Syrian official, Damascus, May 2003.
114 ICG interview, Damascus 23 April 2003.
115 ICG interviews, Damascus, July 2003.
116 ICG interviews with Syrian journalists, political activists and imams, Damascus July-September 2003. See also Hanadi Salman in As-Safir, 29 July 2003, Thanna' al-Imam in An- Nahar, 23 January 2002. Shaaban `Abbud in An-Nahar, 30 December 2003. "Before, people who fasted in observance of Ramadan were subject to ridicule. Now, it is the other way around". ICG interview, Damascus, November 2003.
117 For an analysis of post-1982 divisions within the Muslim Brotherhood, see Anwar Abd al-Hadi Abu Taha et al., al- Ahzab wa al-harakat wa al-jama'at al-Islamiyya, (Damascus, 2000), pp. 296 ff.
118 ICG interview with Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's murshid al-`am (Supreme Leader), Ali Bayanuni, London 28 June 2003.
That said, it appears to retain a large reservoir of dormant sympathy, especially among lower middle class Sunnis. A leader of the secular opposition described it as still "the most credible" of Syria's opposition forces, a view echoed by some religious leaders.119 This can at least partly be explained by the regime's almost obsessive denunciation of the party since the 1980s. A schoolteacher recalled, "When I grew up we were forced to shout slogans at school against the Muslim Brotherhood. Not having any idea who they were or what they stood for, we began to like them because it was the regime that was making all our lives miserable".120 Over time, the Brotherhood's social base appears to have changed, from the business classes to the urban underclass, urbanised villagers, merchants, in effect mimicking the Baath's own populist origins. An advisor to President Bashar remarked that, through changes in its social base and its ideological transition from freemarket adherents to populist advocates of state control, the Brotherhood had become "very much a replica of the Baath."121
But the belief that opening up the system might pave the way for a violent, extremist form of Islamism raises several questions. While immediate free elections might indeed prove destabilising and therefore inadvisable, there is a strong case that the rise of Islamism in Syria has been fuelled precisely by the lack of economic opportunity, the closed nature of the political system and the deficit of democratic representation, all of which have led Syrians to search for alternative channels of expression and forms of social assistance. Many developments have been important in enhancing the appeal of Islam, including particularly anger at U.S. policies. But the domestic situation should not be overlooked and, indeed, the combination of the two is potentially explosive: "There is no doubt that islamicisation has been given a boost by U.S. policies in Iraq and by its bias in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Because people are unable to express themselves freely, they give rise to their anger by turning to religion".122 In this respect, "although they lack a legal political organisation, the Islamists make use of the entire religious
119 ICG interview with Riyyad at-Turk, Damascus 22 April
2003; ICG interview with imam, Damascus, September 2003.
120 ICG interview, Aleppo, August 2003.
121 ICG interview, Damascus, August 2003.
122 ICG interview with Syrian journalist, Damascus,
November 2003.
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ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 16 infrastructure, including mosques and charitable institutions, which allows them to spread their influence and lay the groundwork for future political activism".123 Stifling of political participation and discredited official ideology lead to a vacuum that Islamic discourse is best equipped to fill. Informal religious schooling, which tens of thousands of Syrians - mainly women - are believed to attend, is an example. Impossible for the mukhabarat, to control fully, it offers a rare space for Syrians to discuss politically sensitive issues openly. At the same time, it helps cushion the effects of poverty, as participants may set up joint funds from which all can borrow in turn. As an indication the phenomenon may be spreading, the mukhabarat reportedly arrested individuals who attended home classes to discourage others.124 With the most popular Islamic tutors, such as Munira al-Qubaysi, who has virtual star status among segments of the population, the regime's margin of manoeuvre appears to be constrained.125 Moreover, despite its secular ideology, the regime itself has from the early 1980s sought to co-opt religious discourse as a means of compensating for the fragility of its popular support. The strategy has antecedents in Egypt and Algeria but to an extent backfired in both by encouraging a demand for religion that government was not qualified to satisfy and so promoting militant Islam without buttressing the regime's credentials. The Grand Mufti of Damascus, Sheikh Ahmad Kaftaru, has received large subsidies that have allowed him to spread an increasingly conservative variation of Sunni Islam via a host of Koranic schools, religious centres and mosques.126 Some Baath officials themselves have sought to highlight their religious beliefs, "forming a new movement in the regime, Islamist but who favour the status quo".127
123 ICG interview with member of Syrian opposition, July 2003.
124 ICG interview with a prominent imam in Damascus, September 2003.
125 Ibid.
126 For a study of Kaftaru's Islamic teachings and institutions, see Annabelle Boettcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Assad (Karlsruhe 1998). Muhammad Sahrur, a controversial liberal Moslem thinker, stressed the danger represented by the state-sponsored conservative religious establishment. ICG interview, Damascus, July 2003.
127 ICG interview with Syrian activist, Damascus, July 2003. Moreover, on the eve of the Iraq war, a "Jihadist" group led by Sheikh Abu Ka'ka was given permission to hold rallies The regime appears particularly concerned about moderate forms of political Islam, suggesting that it fears the growth of a potentially powerful rival.128 Several imams who sought to initiate local community projects or criticised the regime in Friday sermons were either fired or transferred to remote areas.129 In April 2003, 24 persons were arrested who, citing Moslem values, had taken an initiative to sweep the streets and remove rubbish in their neighbourhood in Darya, near Damascus, and videotaped this as an example for others.130 Likewise, the regime rejected requests by moderate Islamists, including Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, to establish political parties. By suppressing vehicles for peaceful expression of political Islam, a source close to the government warned, the regime is playing with fire: Anti-Americanism is rising in virtually all segments of society. When mixed with Syria's gradual islamicisation, it becomes only a matter of time before such sentiments get translated into violent forms of jihadism. Faced with this threat, the regime is making various concessions, for example by tolerating fierce anti-U.S. verbal attacks in mosques, thereby only making the situation worse. It would be better advised to allow mainstream and moderate Islamist groups into parliament and the government, so as to channel this energy peacefully.131
and military-style marches in black uniforms in Aleppo. After reports surfaced that the movement had been infiltrated by Syria's secret service, it quickly fizzled. ICG interviews, Damascus-Aleppo, July-August 2003. In this instance, according to several sources, the regime had allowed or perhaps even encouraged the movement in order to identify radical militants who might otherwise have formed their own clandestine organisations.
128 The regime also has taken repressive measures against socalled Jihadist groups such as Hizb al-Tahrir. ICG interviews with NGO activists and political analysts, Damascus, August 2003. They form the bulk of Syria's political prisoners. See Syria chapter , in "Amnesty International Report 2003".
129 ICG interview with Syrian Imam, Damascus, September 2003.
130 ICG interviews with Syrian human rights activist and observer, Damascus July 2003. The Human Rights Association of Syria reported that eleven members of the group were tried in military court without proper defence and sentenced to three to four years in prison on charges of taking part in an illegal demonstration. See "Human Rights in Syria", HRAS Newsletter, January 2004.
131 ICG interview, Damascus, December 2003.
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Much debate in Syria regarding the Islamist threat has to do with the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. Clearly responsible for terrible acts in the early 1980s, and suppressed by the regime, the Brotherhood is still viewed by the Baath as a violent foe intent on imposing an extremist, theocratic system. Contacts between the regime and the Brotherhood were initiated in the mid-1990s after the organisation's former leader, Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda, was granted permission to retire in Syria. But negotiations aimed at allowing members to return failed.132
Through its statements and political program, the Muslim Brotherhood clearly has sought to dispel its former image. It has stopped insisting on the right to use violence, no longer calls for the introduction of Islamic law (shari'a) and claims to espouse democratic principles. In the same vein, it has ceased to play openly the communitarian card and appeal for Sunni mobilisation against the Alawi - an attitude that backfired in the 1980s. Riyyad at-Turk, along with a number in the secular opposition, believes that the Brotherhood:
has reached a certain political maturity and is prepared to accept the democratic game. Of course, more extreme trends exist among them, but they can be contained through political competition and pluralism. Islamists always prevail during transitional phases because they are the best organised: they have the mosque and do not need to go underground like all other political forces. But I am convinced that their status will decline once democracy is introduced.133
132 According to the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Leader, Ali Bayanuni, the principal stumbling block was the regime's position that there would be no general amnesty but rather a case-by-case process pursuant to which each returning Muslim Brotherhood member would have to repent for past crimes. ICG interview with Ali Bayanuni, London, 28 June 2003. The regime disputed the movement's sincerity in asserting it wants to become a moderate, peaceful organisation, claiming it was driven by tactics or lack of funds. See, for example, Sha'ban Abbud in An-Nahar, 7 September 2002.
133 ICG interview with Riyyad at-Turk, Damascus, 22 April 2003. An assistant to the Grand Mufti, Sheikh Kaftaru, commented that "at some point, the Muslim Brotherhood would be a potential candidate for a party, perhaps under another name". ICG interview, Damascus, August 2003. Others take the view that Syria is, in effect, already in a post-Algeria phase, in that the traumatic experience of the 1980s has hurt the regime but also discredited an Islamist state. "Even in Hama, which witnessed the worst of the regime's brutality, the people blame both sides for the tragic events".134
While the regime should do its part to co-opt more moderate Islamic forces, for example by extending an amnesty to political activists, including Brotherhood members, who have not participated in acts of violence,135 the Brotherhood also needs to take steps. It has not yet publicly accepted responsibility for its share of violence in the 1970s and early 1980s.136 It also remains ambiguous as to whether it will still seek retribution for past human rights abuses against its members, thereby fuelling concerns within the regime.137 It should make absolutely clear its commitment to non-violence, democracy and respect for the rule of law, and that it excludes any score-settling.
2. Sectarian and Ethnic Strife
Sectarianism is seldom discussed openly.138 The opposition treads carefully: "the confessional question is absent from the opposition's discourse. To a large extent it has to do with fear of the regime's reaction, but it also reflects a desire not to undermine national unity".139 Yet, beneath the surface, anxieties and tensions are palpable. Alawis close to the regime fear a sectarian backlash in the event of political change and question their future in a Sunni-dominated country.
134 ICG interview with Syrian opposition member, Beirut, July 2003.
135 An advisor to Bashar claimed he had been pressing this point, so far to no avail. ICG interview, January 2004.
136 In an interview with ICG, Ali Bayanuni took a step in that direction: "We didn't start the violence. It was a reaction to the terrorism of the regime. We couldn't isolate ourselves from the public sentiments at the time. But, yes, it was a mistake to get involved in violence". ICG interview, London 28 June 2003. Secular opposition groups are united in their demand that the Brotherhood recognise its responsibility as well. ICG interviews, Damascus, August 2003.
137 Bayanuni acknowledged that some in the regime fear what might happen to them in the event the Muslim Brotherhood were to return amidst a process of reform. "But the Syrian people should decide what we will do with the past. If the regime's victims will call for prosecuting them in courts we will not stop them." Ibid.
138 See Burhan Ghalyun, Al-Ikhtiyar, op. cit., pp. 142 ff.
139 ICG interview with Riyyad al-Turk, op. cit.
Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 18 Memories of the Muslim Brotherhood's violent campaign against Alawis in the 1970s - during which they were denounced as apostates (kuffar) - understandably remain fresh.140 How well founded these worries still are is uncertain. As previously noted, the lines between Alawis and Sunnis are not as clearly drawn, and the regime has been relatively successful in co-opting Sunnis in the military, state bureaucracy and the business class. When asked, opposition members are quick to dismiss the prospect of inter-sectarian strife, arguing that the Alawis are not, as a community, in power: Power is not being used by the Alawis; rather, the Alawis are being used by those in power. The regime is built around a core group whose members tend to come from a single confessional group, particularly in the security and intelligence services, but they do not represent the Alawis in their entirety. Indeed, all religious groups are more or less represented in the regime.141
Haysam al-Maleh, an Islamist human rights activist, echoes this view: "it is not the case of a confessional community that governs; instead it is the case of a group that uses a confessional group to govern".142 Syrians also note that just as the regime has strong allies within the Sunni community, so too are many of its opponents Alawis. One such explained: "The Alawis don't rule Syria. We all live under the same regime. Indeed, Alawis are highly over-represented among Syrian political prisoners".143 On this issue, too, however, the Muslim Brotherhood has yet to distance itself clearly from past behaviour.144 In the view of some officials, another unwantedconsequence of political liberalisation could be the demand by Kurds - roughly 10 per cent of the population - for autonomy or even independence. During the Iraq war, some in the regime appear to have feared the example set by Iraqi Kurds. Officials reportedly urged Syrian Kurdish leaders to state
140 See Hans G. Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand, op.
cit., pp. 199-200, 269, 278.
141 ICG interview, Damascus, April 2003.
142 ICG interview, Damascus, April 2003.
143 ICG interview, Damascus, April 2003.
144 Asked about the issue of sectarianism, Moslem Brother leader Bayanuni blamed the regime for "ruling as a minority", while adding, "We are a majority". He then claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood has excellent relations with non-Sunni opposition members. ICG interview with Ali Bayanuni, London, 28 June 2003. opposition to the U.S. invasion. Several Kurds were arrested and peaceful Kurdish demonstrations suppressed prior to, during and directly following the war.145 Even some members of the opposition accused Syrian Kurds of espousing a "Kurdish chauvinist reading of history".146 Like their Sunni counterparts, however, a number of Kurdish leaders with genuine popular followings have become part of prominent state institutions, with Sheikh Kaftaru, the Grand Mufti, perhaps the most prominent example. Kurds have grievances - including the denial in 1962 of Syrian nationality to up to 200,000 born in Syria and their offspring,147 the government ban on Kurdish language and cultural expressions, and the harassment and arrest of Kurds for organising cultural activities, such as the Nawruz (new year) celebrations. But for the most part, and aside from minority views predominantly held in the exile community, Syria's Kurds have not echoed their Iraqi counterparts' demands and have framed their claims in terms of equal citizenship rights.148 Keeping Kurdish activism away from nationalist demands should be possible, but will require something other than the regime's at times heavy-handed approach.149
145 ICG interview with Syrian human rights activist, Damascus July 2003. See also The Human Rights Association in Syria, "The Effect of Denial of Nationality on the Syrian Kurds", Damascus, November 2003, p. 10.
146 See Akram al-Bunni in Al-Hayat, 24 September 2003. Similar accusations were levelled by Sham'un Danhu in theopposition newspaper Akhbar as-Sharq, 13 October 2003. Danhu argued that as a result of events in Iraq, Syrian Kurds increasingly use the terms "West Kurdistan" and "Syrian Kurdistan" and are "distorting and `kurdinising' Syrian history".
147 In 1962, a census taken in al-Jazira province deliberately failed to register up to 200,000 Kurds in an attempt to "arabise" the region. Among other things, these Kurds (almaktumin - the "unregistered") have been denied the right to hold a passport, vote, own property and officially register their marriages. See Human Rights Watch, "Syria: The Silenced Kurds", October 1996, The Human Rights Association in Syria, "The Effect of Denial of Nationality", op. cit.
148 One Kurdish group in exile, the Western Kurdistan Association, insists on full independence within a larger Kurdistan. It dismissed the view that Kurds would be satisfied with equal treatment, saying, "Kurds in Syria can't speak their minds freely". ICG interview, London, October 2003. The civil rights agenda was most clearly articulated by Faysal Youssef, the leader of the Syrian branch of the Kurdish Progressive Party (KDP). See An-Nahar, 8 August 2003.
149 In June 2003, eight Kurdish civil rights activists were arrested after demonstrating in front of the UNICEF building in Damascus. Their trial is scheduled for February 2004. Two Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 19 President Bashar promised improvements and, in August 2002, paid an unprecedented visit to the predominantly Kurdish province of Hasaqa, during which he reportedly agreed that the 1962 census was "a big mistake".150 Practical follow-up is needed.
3. The Fear of Economic Dislocation
One of the strongest arguments against economic reform is that it is virtually certain to involve painful, immediate socio-economic repercussions, including more unemployment and poverty. Reforms will mean labour cuts in state-owned enterprises151 while food prices are likely to increase as subsidies and price controls are lifted. Avoiding necessary reforms now, however, will only postpone them to what probably will be a more precarious moment, when fewer resources will be available with which to fund a safety net. The economic blow should be cushioned with intensified job-creation programs, which the international community should help with by cofunding. At the same time, measures to fight corruption and collusion between the state and private businesses, combined with steps to increase commercial opportunities for medium and smallsized businesses could help improve competitiveness and redistribute income. Should reform occur in a climate of improved relations with the U.S., moreover, as advocated in the companion ICG report, the economy could be strengthened by increased tourism and, especially, the opening of Iraq's market to products from Syria's labourintensive industrial and service sectors.152 other Kurdish activists were arrested in a similar demonstration in December 2002 and have been held incommunicado. See Amnesty International, "Syria: Kurdish Prisoners of conscience must be released immediately", 9 January 2004.
150 Cited by Faysal Youssef in An-Nahar, 8 August 2003. On the census, see fn. 145 above.
151 A European businessman based in Syria explained that reforms would be "very painful. State companies that currently employ 5,000 people may well end up with only 400 on their rolls. You can't implement a reform program without taking this element into account. This is the big issue". ICG interview, Damascus, July 2003.
152 ICG interviews with Syrian economist and academic in Damascus, July 2003.
C. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
As with many Middle East issues, differences between U.S. and European policies toward Syria have grown starker after President Bush's election and the events of 11 September 2001. European countries have maintained a strategy of engagement, seeking to nudge Syria to reform by offering technical and economic assistance. In particular, the EU negotiated an Association Treaty with Syria that includes political, economic, commercial, social and cultural provisions. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy commented, "the agreement will help Syria better integrate into the world economy, and paves the way for other initiatives, including possible future membership in the World Trade Organisation."153 The EU also expressed the hope that clauses "regarding respect for human rights, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and fight against terrorism will enhance our ability to engage with Syria on these important issues".154 In contrast, and at roughly the same time, President Bush - frustrated with Syria's non-responsiveness to repeated demands to change its regional policies - signed into law the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSA) pursuant to which U.S. assistance can only resume if Syria ceases its support for Palestinian and other groups regarded as terrorist, stops sending or allowing volunteers into Iraq, ends its occupation of Lebanon and halts development of WMD and allows UN and other observers to verify the dismantling of any such weapons.155
Whether and to what extent third party involvement - pressure or engagement - can encourage political and economic change is a matter of debate among Syrian reformers and opposition. There is a growing - if grudging - recognition that it may be needed for real change, particularly on the political front. "Syrian society does not seem capable of initiating indigenous changes that will modify our system of governance. Reform will materialise as a 153 "EU-Syria: Conclusion of the Negotiations for an Association Agreement", http://europa.eu.int/comm/exernal_relations/syria/intro/ip03_1704.htm.
154 Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relations, in ibid .
155 See http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_public_laws &docid= f:publ175.108.pdf. Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 20 result of outside involvement".156 But even Syria's staunchest reform advocates and most opposition members alike argue that in the present climate U.S. pressure is more likely to backfire than to help.157 In light of terrorism-related sanctions and SALSA, moreover, there is little in terms of immediate, positive incentives that Washington isin a position to provide.
While on the foreign policy side the U.S. role is critical, on the domestic side the EU and Japan are in the lead158. In particular, the Association Treaty (subject to signing) gives the EU an important tool. There is little doubt that Syria, and especially Bashar, are "very keen" to conclude the agreement.159 The EU should use it to seek commitments on issues such as respect for human rights and reforms generally. European and Japanese efforts should be based on the following principles:
Bolstering reformers within the Syrian leadership. Starting from the premise that President Bashar is a genuine reformer thwarted by a recalcitrant and incompetent bureaucracy, France sent senior experts on administrative reform to audit the state administration and recommend actions. Still in its initial stages, the project aims at encouraging him to establish a strong presidential office staffed by a small but capable team of reform-minded
156 ICG interview with Syrian opposition member, Damascus, July 2003.
157 Riyyad at-Turk's view is fairly representative in this respect. Describing U.S. assistance to the Syrian opposition to bring about reform as undesirable, he said, "We want the citizens of the country to be the force behind any change because we're not ready to forfeit our independence and sovereignty". Cited in An-Nahar, 29 September 2003. The leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood noted, however, that he would welcome "U.S. pressures on Syria to reform", though he added that he was sceptical that it would be genuinely forthcoming: "We have witnessed so far that U.S. pressures have little to do with domestic reform. The U.S. talks about what happened in Halabja [where the Iraqi regime reportedly killed some 5,000 people] but it does not mention Hama [where the Syrian regime killed perhaps 10,000 to 30,000]". ICG interview with Ali Bayanuni, London, June2003.
158 Japan's International Cooperation Agency is by far the largest donor in Syria. It primarily finances technical development projects in healthcare, industry and agriculture. In terms of institutional and economic reforms, the European Union sees itself as "only donor capable of making the necessary interventions". Euro-Med Partnership, op. cit., pp 19-20.
159 ICG interview with European diplomat, Damascus, December 2003.
advisors. It has recommended an inter-ministerial "General Secretariat" "to coordinate and rationalize the activities of the different administrations".160 This initiative should be followed in particular by an increase in the EU budget for administrative reform in Syria (currently ?21 million) and for improving structures of ministries or ministerial secretariats led by reformers.161 Similarly, the EU could assist on judicial reform. More generally, it should initiate a dialogue on political and administrative prerequisites of economic reform.
Syria's partners should examine how to cushion immediate reform hardships. Under the Association Treaty, both parties gradually would lift trade barriers to allow freer trade. As a result of years of neglect and low productivity, Syria's industrial and agricultural sectors risk being destabilised by European competition.162 To mitigate these short-term effects, the EU should provide funds and expertise to assist the Syrian Agency for Combating Unemployment, which has yet to meet expectations but has proven it can make a difference.163 Egypt's Social Fund for Development, which provides micro-credits and water sanitation programs and seeks to create employment, has shown that such efforts can have genuine, if modest, results.164
160 ICG interview with French diplomat in Damascus, January 2004. The secretariat was launched in October 2003.
161 These could include the ministry of economy and trade, led by Ghassan Rifa'i, the ministry of labour and social affairs, led by Siham Dallulu, the ministry of tourism, led by Sa'adallah Agha al-Qal'a, and the ministry of education, led by Hani Murtada.
162 The olive, vegetable and textiles industries - all major contributors to Syria's GDP - will be particularly endangered. ICG interview with Ratib Shalah, Damascus July 2003. One reason for the delays in negotiations was that Syria wanted a longer grace period for its industries. See interview with former Minister for Industry Issam Za'im in Al-Hayat, 16 December 2001.
163 This office was established at the end of 2001 and provides micro-credits and educational programs for the unemployed. With a budget of U.S.$1.5 billion and considerable administrative independence, it claims that its financing of hundreds of projects through 2002 created around 16,000 new jobs. See Tishrin, 7 May 2003. In parallel, the European Investment Bank announced it will provide ?40 million for financing projects of Syrian small and mediumsized companies. See European Commission's Delegation in Syria, "EIB Sets up an Innovative ?40 Million Scheme", 10 September 2003.
164 See World Bank, "Poverty in MENA", August 2003. http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Sectors/ MNSED/
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ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 21
Europe should press Syria on political reform. This could be done via the Association Treaty, which contains a clause requiring respect for democratic principles and human rights165 but does not specify serious follow-up or monitoring mechanisms as in other fields of cooperation.166 The EU should consider steps to broaden debate on political reform and strengthen Syria's civil society and human rights activists, for example through people-to-people exchanges or the organisation of conferences.167 Technical aid could be provided to train NGOs and encourage Syria to modify restrictive laws regulating their operation.168 The European Commission's human rights assessment - being prepared in anticipation of Syria's possible application for assistance under the European Initiative forDemocracy and Human Rights - could serve as an appropriate starting point for a dialogue.169
7207569843A8C7C385256DA300453D4C?OpenDocument.
165 In most such agreements, the clause reads: "Relations between the two parties, as well as the provisions of this Agreement itself, shall be based on democratic principles and fundamental human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guides their internal policy and constitutes an essential element of this agreement". Taken from the Association Treaty with Lebanon, Article 2.
166 See for example Amnesty International, "Algeria: When Token gestures Are Not Enough: Human Rights and the Algeria-EU Accord", 19 April 2002. In April 2003 the European Commission signaled the need for strengthened EU actions on human rights and democratisation in the region but, thus far, there have been no concrete proposals. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, "Reinvigorating EU actions on human rights and democratisation with Mediterranean Partners", 8 April 2003.
167 The German Friedrich Naumann Foundation initiated an awareness raising program on "citizenship" in the region which includes Syrian civil society activists. It also organised practical training workshops for NGO staff in Damascus and invited Syrian civil society activists to Europe. In December 2003 the Konrad Adenauer Foundation organized a debate in Damascus on the Arab UNDP report and the Canadian embassy co-sponsored a conference on Arab women's rights. ICG interviews with European diplomats and Syrian civil society activists, Damascus, November 2003-February2004 and telephone interview with Uli Vogt, representative of the Naumann Foundation, on 15 January 2004.
168 During an NGO training workshop held on 11 October 2003, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Siham Dello said she was preparing to change the NGO law in 2004. "Yet her ministry is weak and she is crying for help". ICG interview with European diplomat in Damascus, 1 December 2003. 169 Like others, Syria may voluntarily apply for funding for human rights-related projects under the European Initiative for Recognising the limited potential for U.S.
intervention, there remain areas where it could be effective, especially in concert with the EU. In particular, the U.S. should drop opposition to the opening of Syrian membership negotiations with the World Trade Organisation. As European officials have recognised, such membership would require a major revision of Syria's economic and political structures and so encourage the kinds of economic reforms - including transparency and rule of law - that would strengthen reformers. The failure even to start WTO talks was a setback for reformers - including the president - who, after a long internal debate, had overcome the resistance of many conservatives within the leadership.170 The U.S. also should consider making an exception to allow private funding for Syrian NGOs and for exchanges and assistance in education, along the lines of its Lebanon policy. As a former official in the Bush administration remarked, "right now, our policy does not even allow U.S. government funds to go to civil society activists or micro-entrepreneurs in Syria because of the prohibition on any U.S. government money going to a state sponsor of terrorism. This prevents us from engaging and empowering reformists in Syria".171 Under current legislation, aid has effectively ceased to be available as a U.S. foreign policy tool with Syria. To remedy this, the president should at least be enabled to resume assistance when he certifies this to be in the U.S. national interest.
Democracy and Human Rights by presenting a "National Action Plan". See Commission of the European Communities, 21 May 2003.
170 ICG interview with Ratib Shalah, Damascus July 2003.
171 Testimony by Flynt Leverett, U.S. Senate, 30 October 2003.
Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges
ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 22
IV. CONCLUSION
Syria faces difficult regional and domestic challenges and is at a turning point. Over three years, President Bashar appears to have consolidated his position and enhanced his powers but whether for lack of will or capacity, the reform agenda has stalled. What change there has been will not suffice either to revive the economy or broaden regime support. Economic development, popular participation and government responsiveness are all necessary to ensure longerterm stability and allow Syria to play a more effective regional role.
Much depends on the international community's ability to offer Syria concrete alternatives if this is to happen.172 ICG's two reports outline the steps the international community, and particularly the U.S., ought to take in this respect.
But much, too, depends on Syria. The institutions and political actors that have formed the backbone of the regime - the army, security services, Baath Party and political-economic elites - have navigated repeated domestic and foreign crises for three decades, providing the country unprecedented stability. Wary of change and attached to a formula that so far has served them well, they will be hard to persuade of the merits of a course change. Nor should their fears of an Islamist take-over, sectarian or ethnic conflict, and renewed and prolonged instability be taken lightly. Even assuming Bashar wishes to take bold steps, it would be unrealistic to expect a rapid transformation.
Nevertheless, with a failing economy, endemic corruption, growing income disparities, shrinking popular support base, and regional changes that increase external pressures while reducing outside sources of income, there is no guarantee that the old recipe will work much longer.
Syria's challenge is to revitalize, even if only gradually, its political and social contracts. That begins with but must go beyond the modernisation efforts currently spearheaded by the president. 172 Some observers have noted that progress on the Arab-Israeli peace process has tended to strengthen the more reform-minded elements in the regime while the reverse has bolstered hard-liners. Volker Perthes, "Syrie: Le Plus Gros Pari d'Assad", Politique Internationale, Vol. 87 (2000), pp. 177-192.
Officials hint to ICG that 2004 will see major political and economic transformations, possibly including modification of Baath Party doctrine, a renewal of leadership, an opening of the political arena and the convening of a national conference to which some opposition groups would be invited. Such utterances have been made in the past to little effect but it is important that this time they become reality. For President Bashar, reform should be viewed not as a luxury but as a strategic imperative that can broaden his popular support and enhance his country's stature and stability.
Amman/Brussels, 11 February 2004
Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges ICG Middle East Report N?24, 11 February 2004 Page 23

Posted by maximpost at 1:10 PM EDT
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Thursday, 15 April 2004

>> IRAQ WMD? WHERE?


Radioactive materials disappearing in Iraq
Associated Press

United Nations -- Iraq's nuclear facilities remain unguarded, and radioactive materials are being taken out of the country, the UN's nuclear watchdog agency reported after reviewing satellite images and equipment that has turned up in European scrap yards.
The International Atomic Energy Agency sent a letter to U.S. officials three weeks ago informing them of the findings. The information was also sent to the UN Security Council in a letter from its director, Mohamed ElBaradei, that was circulated Thursday.
The IAEA is waiting for a reply from the United States, which is leading the coalition administering Iraq, officials said.
The United States has virtually cut off information-sharing with the IAEA since invading Iraq in March, 2002, on the premise that the country was hiding weapons of mass destruction.
No such weapons have been found, and arms-control officials now worry that the war and its chaotic aftermath may have increased chances that terrorists could get their hands on materials used for unconventional weapons or that civilians may be unknowingly exposed to radioactive materials.
According to Dr. ElBaradei's letter, satellite imagery shows "extensive removal of equipment and, in some instances, removal of entire buildings" in Iraq.
In addition, "large quanitities of scrap, some of it contaminated, have been transferred out of Iraq from sites" previously monitored by the IAEA.
In January, the IAEA confirmed that Iraq was the likely source of radioactive material known as yellowcake that was found in a shipment of scrap metal at Rotterdam harbour.
Yellowcake (uranium oxide) could be used to build a nuclear weapon, although it would take tonnes of the substance refined with sophisticated technology to harvest enough uranium for a single bomb.
The yellowcake in the shipment was natural uranium ore that probably came from a known mine in Iraq that was active before the 1991 Persian Gulf war.
The yellowcake was uncovered Dec. 16 by Rotterdam-based scrap-metal company Jewometaal, which had received it in a shipment of scrap metal from a dealer in Jordan.
A small number of Iraqi missile engines have also turned up in European ports, IAEA officials said.
"It is not clear whether the removal of these items has been the result of looting activities in the aftermath of the recent war in Iraq or as part of systematic efforts to rehabilitate some of their locations," Dr. ElBaradei wrote to the council.
The IAEA has been unable to investigate, monitor or protect Iraqi nuclear materials since the U.S. invaded the country in March, 2003. The United States has refused to allow the IAEA or other UN weapons inspectors into the country, saying that the coalition has taken over responsibility for illicit weapons searches.
So far those searches have come up empty-handed, and the CIA's first chief weapons hunter has said he no longer believes Iraq had weapons just before the invasion.

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Russia's ominous Iraq exodus
By Sergei Blagov
MOSCOW - As Russia begins to evacuate its citizens from rebellion-torn Iraq, Moscow's move comes as a grim reminder of increasing volatility in the US-occupied country, as well as an ominous sign for Russia's pursuit of Iraqi oil riches.
Russia's Emergency Situations Ministry, which has already dispatched planes to Baghdad, plans to evacuate 553 Russian citizens, as well as 263 citizens of other former Soviet states, who are working for Russian companies in Iraq.
Russia advised all of its citizens to leave the country in light of the ongoing hostage crisis there. Eight employees of energy company Interenergoservice - three Russian citizens and five Ukrainians - were in Baghdad to repair power stations. They were seized by gunmen late Monday. Hostages told Russian television channels that they were released on Tuesday as soon as the abductors realized they were working for a Russian company.
It took Moscow little time to blame Iraqi administrators for the hostage crisis. The Russian Foreign Ministry said the kidnappings were the result of the deteriorating situation in Iraq and that it is the coalition forces that are responsible for the country's inadequate security.
Russian media speculated that the hostages were released promptly because of Moscow's opposition to the United States-led invasion of Iraq. Russia, which opposed the operation to depose former president Saddam Hussein right from the start, does not have any troops in the country.
But Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said it is up to the companies themselves to decide whether to evacuate or not. Evacuation of Russian experts does not mean Russia has completely pulled out of Iraq, Lavrov stated this week.
Some Russian companies are already pulling their workers out of the country. State-owned Tekhnopromexport has announced it is evacuating its 370 staffers, who are building the Yusifiya power station near Baghdad.
Interenergoservis, which is restoring five Iraqi power stations under a US$30 million contract, has 365 workers in Iraq. However, some experts reportedly volunteered to stay in Iraq. Many of them come from depressed Russian regions or less affluent former Soviet states such as Ukraine, hence their modest income in Iraq is a strong stimulus to stay. According to Russian media reports, employees of Interenergoservice are being paid wages of $600-700 per month for their hard and dangerous work in Iraq.
Already this month, some 100 Russians have been evacuated, including representatives of oil company Tatneft, truck maker Kamaz and foreign trade association Mashinoimport. Representatives of oil companies Zarubezhneft and LUKoil reportedly remain in Baghdad.
Russia's Iraqi interests
For Russian businesses, the stakes are high in Iraq. Current contracts of Russian companies in Iraq reportedly total $1 billion. Meanwhile, evacuated firms could face penalties for breach of contracts.
Moscow has been keen to secure its remaining economic interests in Iraq. Last December, Russia offered to write off more than half of Iraq's $8 billion debt to Moscow, and pledged $4 billion in investments to rebuild the country. The debt writeoff and investments have yet to materialize.
However, Russia's top oil firm, LUKoil, reopened a small office in Baghdad aiming to revitalize a suspended project to develop the West Qurna oilfields, which contain some of the largest oil deposits in the world. A 23-year multibillion-dollar deal to develop the West Qurna field was signed in 1997 between Iraq and a LUKoil-led consortium.
Under the agreement, the Russian group would have developed reserves set at 7 billion to 8 billion barrels. Saddam's government canceled the contract in February 2003, but LUKoil, which owns 68.5 percent of the West Qurna project, insists that the contract is still valid and has threatened to sue in international courts if the contract is canceled.
Aiming at returning to Iraq, LUKoil moved to cooperate with the US and supply oil products. Last month, LUKoil's fully owned subsidiary LUKoil International Trading and Supply Co (LITASCO) signed a contract with Refinery Associates of Texas Inc to deliver gasoline and diesel fuel to Iraq. According to the contract, Geneva-registered LITASCO would supply 1.3 million barrels (180,000 tons) of gasoline and 950,000 barrels (130,000 tons) of diesel fuel per quarter from April 1 onward.
Also last month, LUKoil president Vagit Alekperov traveled to Iraq to meet with Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulloum to discuss the West Qurna contract. Alekperov and Bahr al-Ulloum signed a memorandum of understanding for LUKoil to help rebuild the Iraqi oil industry and to train 100-150 Iraqi oil workers a year. They also reached "an understanding" on the West Qurna-2 contract, according to Alekperov. Yet with a backdrop of deteriorating security and the withdrawal of experts, it remains to be seen how LUKoil could help rebuild the Iraqi oil industry.
When Saddam was still in power, Iraqi oil traded in the United Nations Oil for Food Program brought Russian companies more than $4 billion. The Kremlin had also been in discussions with Saddam's regime for a five-year economic cooperation program worth $40 billion.
But in the wake of Saddam's demise, Moscow's expectations in Iraq have become less ambitious indeed. Nonetheless, many Russian companies, including Interenergoservis and Tekhnopromexport, still work on contracts in Iraq related to the rebuilding of the country's infrastructure under the Oil for Food Program.
However, allegations of graft in the program have dealt a blow to Russian plans in Iraq. Early this year there were media reports that some 40 Russian companies and individuals, including entities linked to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, allegedly took part in an illegal kickback scheme for trading Iraqi oil under the Oil for Food Program.
After UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's moves to approve a probe of corruption in the program, Russian officials and oil companies have denied allegations of graft, yet Moscow has been lukewarm over a possible UN investigation.
Russia was Iraq's largest supplier in the program. Of the $18.3 billion in Oil for Food contracts approved by the UN Security Council since the program began, some $4.2 billion went to Russia. Eleven Russian oil companies - Zarubezhneft, LUKoil, Onako, Sidanko, Sibneft, Alfa Eko, Zarubezhneftegazstroi, Mashinoimport, Rosneft, Nafta-Moskva and MES - were buying tens of millions of barrels of oil from Iraq in Oil for Food deals.
Russia has also insisted that US accusations of illegal arms sales to Iraq, such as claims of Oil for Food graft, were intended to elbow the Russians away from Iraqi riches. The war of words first began in March 2003, when Washington accused Russia of failing to stop sales of night-vision goggles, Global Positioning System navigation jammers and anti-tank missiles to Iraq. The Kremlin has repeatedly criticized the administration of US President George W Bush for floating allegations that Russian companies had supplied Saddam with defense equipment in violation of a UN arms embargo.
Whatever the veracity of claims and counter-claims, Russia and Iraq have maintained military ties for decades. Between 1958 and 1990, Iraq was one of the world's largest importers of weapons systems from the Soviet Union. During those three decades, the Soviet government in Moscow supplied Iraq with 4,630 tanks, 5,524 armored vehicles, 725 anti-tank missile systems, 325 air-defense missile systems, 1,593 portable "Igla" air-defense missiles, 1,145 military aircraft and 41 naval vessels, according to Russian media reports. The total bill reportedly amounted to more than $30 billion. Upgrading these arsenals could provide Russia with a number of lucrative deals.
Before the war, the Kremlin had publicly spoken against the use of force on Saddam's regime without authorization from the UN Security Council, where as a permanent member Russia has a veto. While Moscow remains critical, President Vladimir Putin has stated that Russia does not wish to see the US defeated. Russia has also called for a political settlement to end the conflict and restore Iraqi sovereignty.
In the meantime, Russia's evacuation of its nationals from Iraq also highlight Moscow's differences with other former Soviet states. Foreign Minister Lavrov told reporters in Ukraine on Tuesday that Russia is ready to help Ukrainian citizens leave Iraq, although Ukraine has not yet requested this kind of aid. Ukraine and Kazakhstan earlier indicated no plans to withdraw their peacekeepers from Iraq. On Tuesday, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and Deputy Speaker Ziyafet Askerov of the Azerbaijani parliament both announced that their countries were not going to withdraw from Iraq. Georgia and Azerbaijan each have some 150 peacekeepers in the country.
In the meantime, Russia still has no plans to dispatch any of its own troops to Iraq.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)


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The general and his labyrinth

Explosive allegations by a sacked officer of collusion between the Colombian army and death squads could damage cosy relations between Washington and Bogot?, writes Ana Carrigan

Thursday April 15, 2004
Colombia's president, Alvaro Uribe, visited Washington last month seeking more military aid. Since spring 2000, Colombia has received more than three billion "Plan Colombia" dollars, most of it for the army and police. But Plan Colombia - a US aid package aimed officially at bolstering counter-narcotics operations by the Colombian armed forces - expires next year, and Uribe wants a new multi-year deal.
The Bush administration, meanwhile, wants to double the number of US soldiers and civilians supporting Colombia's anti-drug - and anti-insurgency - activities, and the Pentagon has been lobbying Congress for an immediate rise in the current troop cap.
Uribe's star shines brightly in the US, where he is warmly received as Washington's leading hemispheric ally in the war on terror. Even so, this may not be the best moment for Congress to agree more aid for the Colombian armed forces. Not when a story has just broken in Bogot? which threatens to confirm allegations that they conspire with the United Self-defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) - an illegal paramilitary army headed by the country's most feared warlord, Carlos Casta?o - to carry out massacres and terrorise farmers and villagers.
The man at the eye of the storm is former army general Jaime Alberto Usc?tegui, who is awaiting trial for his participation in a gruesome paramilitary atrocity. In the tragic annals of Colombian atrocities there have been too many massacres, but events in the southern jungle town of Mapirip?n in July 1997 haunt the Colombian collective memory with a particularly painful intensity. Usc?tegui is accused of supporting the paramilitaries as they spent five days and nights terrorising the town, torturing more than thirty people to death and dismembering their victims alive in the municipal slaughterhouse.
Now, according to Bogot?'s weekly news magazine Cambio, Usc?tegui has put his military superiors on notice. From his quiet prison cell at an army base in the capital, the general has said that unless his superiors help him avoid jail, he will go public with documentary evidence of a policy of official military collusion with paramilitary terror.
As reported by Cambio, the documents in Usc?tegui's possession were retrieved from an army computer belonging to a military intelligence agent and equipped with a special password used in all communications between the army and the paramilitaries.
According to the general, the material includes pamphlets produced at battalion headquarters and handed out by the paramilitaries at Mapirip?n and other massacre sites, the rules of paramilitary engagement as drafted and drawn up by the army, and a complete list - including names and aliases - of all 93 members of the AUC front that committed the Mapirip?n massacre. The latter item also contains the payroll and individual monthly salaries for all the members of the front, together with their rank and responsibilities. There are also texts of assorted death threats, and thank-you notes to the bosses of the Cali cocaine cartel, acknowledging their financial contributions.
Usc?tegui has already been tried once in a military court, where he received a three-year sentence for failing to prevent a massacre. The Colombian supreme court promptly threw out the conviction and ordered a civilian trial that is scheduled to begin next week and could result in a possible 40-year jail sentence.
So, questions abound. Will the trial go forward? And if so, will Usc?tegui blow the whistle and will his claims stand up to scrutiny? Or will the trial be postponed? Will the country's attorney general, Luis Camilo Osorio, who has previously thrown out cases against senior military officers and paramilitary leaders, find a way to dismiss or derail it?
Only last month, Osorio - citing insufficient evidence - dismissed a similar case against Rito Alejo Del Rio, another general sacked for his paramilitary links. That decision brought a shocked response from 67 organisations, churches and individuals in the region where troops under Del Rio's direct command have been widely and repeatedly accused of collaborating with Casta?o's paramilitaries in atrocities that led to a mass population displacement. It also brought a request from Human Rights Watch for the appointment of a special investigator to examine the attorney general's actions.
"The trial will be my moment of glory," Usc?tegui tells an un-identified colleague in the transcript of a conversation published by Cambio. "If I go to trial, it will be far more serious than anything that has happened in Colombia to date, because this proves something that we have spent our entire lives denying - that is, the link between the military and the paramilitary."
He also makes it clear that he is in no doubt about the strength of his information.
"It seems that the attorney general's office, the inspector general's office and the president's office all know that terrible things happened [in Mapirip?n] for the army and the country ... and that this could topple Plan Colombia," he says.
There is then one final question. How will Washington handle Usc?tegui's information if it falls into the public domain?

? Ana Carrigan is a freelance journalist and author of The Palace of Justice, A Colombian Tragedy


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L'Europe ? reculons sur la lev?e de l'embargo d'armes vers la Chine

Bruxelles : de notre correspondante Alexandrine Bouilhet
[15 avril 2004]
Washington a obtenu gain de cause. L'Europe n'est plus pr?te ? lever l'embargo sur les ventes d'armes ? la Chine. La pression exerc?e par les Etats-Unis, conjugu?e ? celle des opinions publiques europ?ennes, a fini par changer la donne sur le Vieux Continent. Favorable, fin janvier, ? un r?examen rapide des sanctions impos?es ? P?kin depuis 1989, les Quinze avancent d?sormais ? reculons sur cet ?pineux dossier.
En visite officielle depuis deux jours ? P?kin, Romano Prodi, a tenu ? pr?venir les autorit?s chinoises. ?C'est un d?bat compliqu? en Europe. Il y a encore des diff?rences entre les Etats membres et des r?ticences de la part de l'opinion europ?enne?, a insist? le pr?sident de la Commission, apr?s sa rencontre avec le premier ministre Wen Jiabao. ?Nous reconnaissons qu'il y a eu des efforts en Chine sur les droits de l'homme, mais ils ne sont pas encore suffisants?, a-t-il ajout?. Dans la bouche de Romano Prodi, le message ne pouvait ?tre plus clair. L'embargo europ?en sur les armes ne sera pas lev? sans contreparties.
Principale alli?e de la Chine dans cette affaire, la France tablait sur une d?cision rapide des Quinze, si possible avant le 1er mai. Le retrait d'une sanction europ?enne exige en effet l'accord unanime des Etats membres, une position plus facile ? obtenir ? Quinze qu'? Vingt-cinq. Les espoirs de P?kin et de Paris, qui qualifie l'embargo d'?anachronique?, risquent d'?tre d??us. Si l'embargo sur les armes reste inscrit ? l'ordre du jour de la r?union des ministres des Affaires ?trang?res, le 26 avril ? Bruxelles, plus aucun diplomate ne parie sur une d?cision prise ce jour-l?. Un report en juin semble encore plus improbable, ce mois co?ncidant avec l'anniversaire de la r?pression de la place Tiananmen. ?Des ?tudiants sont toujours en prison?, rappelait, hier, Amnesty International. Aussi conciliante soit-elle, la pr?sidence irlandaise de l'Union souhaiterait ?viter d'?tre associ?e ? un verdict cl?ment pour les marchands d'armes, qui la mettrait en porte ? faux tant vis-?-vis de Washington que de son opinion publique.
La pression diplomatique des Etats-Unis, des associations de droits de l'homme, m?l?e aux probl?mes de politique int?rieure des Quinze, le tout ? deux mois des ?lections europ?ennes, ne plaide pas en faveur des amis de la Chine. M?me l'Allemagne se montre divis?e sur le sujet. Gerhard Schr?der s'est prononc? en faveur de la lev?e de l'embargo lors d'une visite en Chine en d?cembre, mais les Verts ont de s?rieuses r?ticences, ce qui contraint Yoschka Fischer ? la plus grande prudence. Etrangement silencieux cet hiver, au point d'inqui?ter Washington, le gouvernement de Tony Blair met aujourd'hui l'accent sur les droits de l'homme, afin de retarder la d?cision europ?enne. Le Foreign Office sugg?re m?me de repousser le d?bat au mois d'octobre, lors du sommet Chine-Union europ?enne.
Pour avoir sugg?r? qu'il n'?tait pas insensible aux arguments fran?ais, le premier ministre danois, Anders Rasmussen, a ?t? convoqu? devant le Parlement, o? il s'est empress? de poser une s?rie de conditions. Sans ?tre isol?e, la France compte aujourd'hui ses alli?s sur les doigts d'une main : l'Allemagne, l'Autriche, l'Italie et la Gr?ce. Des supporters de plus en plus discrets ? mesure qu'approchent les ?lections europ?ennes. Le Parlement europ?en s'est prononc? contre la lev?e de l'embargo contre la Chine, estimant que P?kin n'avait toujours pas ratifi? la convention de l'ONU sur les droits civils et politiques.
Les plus cyniques, eux, rappellent que cet embargo, vieux de quinze ans, n'a emp?ch? aucun marchand d'armes europ?en de commercer avec P?kin.

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New way for NATO to do business
Katrin Bennhold/IHT IHT
Friday, April 16, 2004

PARIS With NATO member states just days away from awarding a E4 billion military contract to a transatlantic consortium of aerospace companies, a new era of joint procurement may be dawning for the alliance, defense experts said Thursday.
A group of six companies, led by European Aeronautic Defense Space, known as EADS, and Northrop Grumman of the United States, looked set to win the contract, worth $4.8 billion, to build a mixed fleet of manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft for the alliance by 2010, said a NATO official familiar with the selection process.
After procurement experts at NATO's Brussels headquarters threw their support behind the EADS-Northrop consortium, officials in national capitals were expected to sign off on that decision "within days" the official said.
"It seems to be a genuine multinational procurement decision, and that is quite a significant step for cooperation in this area," said Steven Everts, a defense expert at the Centre for European Reform, a think tank in London. "There is an acceleration of the desire to cooperate more closely within the EU and across the Atlantic."
Against a backdrop of violence in Iraq and heightened concerns that terrorists may be targeting Europe following the Madrid train bombings, pragmatism may be gaining the upper hand over the political procurement decisions of the past, analysts said. While some major European governments continue to disagree with America on a wide range of issues, including the war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the willingness to deepen their cooperation within NATO may herald a renewed commitment to the alliance.
James Appathurai, a spokesman for NATO called the decision "historic," confirming a report on Thursday in The Financial Times.
"This is only the second time in NATO's history that members join forces in procurement on this scale," he said. The first time, he said, was the AWACs surveillance system developed in the 1960s. "The decision was reached pragmatically on the basis of price, capability and scheduling considerations - not necessarily three factors that have determined procurement decisions in the past," Appathurai said.
Governments have preferred to keep national control of procurement, both to determine the exact nature of a project and to award contracts to the titans of a country's defense industry.
As a result, defense capabilities within the European Union, where most countries also belong to NATO, have often been duplicated.
The idea for a joint fleet of air-to-ground surveillance aircraft has been considered for about a decade at NATO, Appathurai said. Recent progress on the matter "reflects a realization on the part of NATO nations that our troops are out there in the field, and they need this type of cooperation," he said.
This evolving pragmatism is rooted at least in part in financial reality. With technology becoming more sophisticated and expensive every year, collective procurement makes financial sense, analysts said. In addition, recent sluggishness in the global economy has depleted state coffers, leaving less room for governments to bolster defense budgets.
"Pooling is the way to go," Everts said. "It's good news for taxpayers and also good news for political cooperation that common sense has won."
The EADS-Northrop consortium includes Galileo Avionica of Italy, General Dynamics Canada, Indra of Spain, and Thales of France. In addition, more than 80 other companies from NATO countries support the joint proposal, which would provide a mixed fleet of manned A320 Airbus planes and unmanned Global Hawk planes.
According to Alexander Reinhardt, an EADS spokesman, the price for an A320 is about E50 million, though a modified version for intelligence purposes may vary in price. The Global Hawk aircraft that Northrop has been building for the U.S. Air Force costs about $30 million, James Stratford, a spokesman for the company said.
A competing consortium, led by Raytheon of the United States and including Siemens of Germany and Marconi of Britain, has complained that NATO's procurement officials took too little time to examine the two proposals, which were submitted only four months ago. Appathurai, of NATO, rejected the complaint.

International Herald Tribune

Copyright ? 2003 The International Herald Tribune

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-Inflation looks to be next export from China
Keith Bradsher and Chris Buckley/NYT NYT Friday, April 16, 2004
Economy's growth lifts prices for goods from rice to steel

GUANGZHOU, China After nearly a decade of mostly flat to falling prices in China that have helped hold down costs around the world, the country has suddenly turned into an exporter of inflation, with growing signs of a spiral of wages and prices similar to what the United States suffered in the 1970s. As managers from Chinese businesses of all sizes staffed exhibition booths here Thursday for the opening day of China's biggest trade fair, the common refrain was that prices of everything from rice to steel were rising sharply, and that prices for exports to the United States, Europe and other markets would have to follow. A socket wrench manufacturer had raised prices by 10 percent for high-quality models and by up to 50 percent for poor-quality models, for which the main cost is increasingly expensive steel. An exporter of exhaust manifolds, brake drums and suspension parts to American repair garages had raised prices by 10 percent in several increments since December. A few manufacturers had not raised prices yet, but said they were considering doing so, like one of the many makers of sinks and toilets who said he had just given his workers a raise to help them with rising expenses.
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``The cost of living -- transport, food, everything -- is going up,'' said Su Han Xiang, the director general of Jinshan Ceramic Industries. Beijing announced Thursday that the economy had grown 9.7 percent in the first quarter, faster than expected, and said that raw material prices and other costs for businesses were rising and were increasingly likely to spill into inflation in consumer prices. ``There is a time lag, but it can't be too long, and there is pressure for price rises,'' said Zheng Jingping, the spokesman of China's National Bureau of Statistics, at a news conference in Beijing on Thursday. ``If this goes on for a long time it will cause problems.'' Using two terms that the Chinese government has conspicuously avoided until now, the state-run Xinhua news agency on Thursday quoted Morgan Stanley's China economist, Andy Xie, describing the Chinese economy as ``a bubble'' and an International Monetary Fund economist, Raghuram Rajan, warning that the Chinese economy showed ``some signs of overheating.'' Xie said by telephone that while the National Bureau of Statistics reported Thursday that consumer prices were exactly 3 percent higher in March than a year earlier, the true increase could be 7 percent or 8 percent. ``The State Council has said they want to keep inflation below 3 percent, so they have to report an increase of 3 percent,'' he said, referring to China's cabinet.
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To be sure, ferocious competition has kept prices from rising in China for some big-ticket items that a growing proportion of China's population is buying, like cars, household appliances and mobile phones. By next year, many new steel mills now under construction could start alleviating the acute shortages that are driving up steel prices. But growing evidence suggests that while China has publicly embraced the market, it has been using extensive but informal price controls on state-owned enterprises to control inflation until now.
.
Two representatives of one of China's largest state-owned chemical companies said that while the company had just raised by 50 percent the export price of a popular insecticide for rice and cotton, the government had prevented the company from charging more to Chinese farmers.
.
Yet the increase in the export price is an accurate reflection, they said, of rising costs. Yellow phosphor, the key ingredient in the insecticide, is in short supply like many raw materials. And while chemical factories commonly ran seven days a week until a few months ago, many are now idle for two or three days a week because of blackouts, so that the steep investment cost for each production line can only be spread over a smaller output of chemicals. The United States and Western European nations found in the 1970s that price controls can limit inflation for a while, but cause markets to become less efficient and slow economic growth, while prices jump even faster when the controls are lifted. China has a different eco nomic model, in which companies with disappearing profit margins or even losses are allowed to continue borrowing large sums from the state-owned banks. Credit-rating agencies estimate that the banks are not receiving payments on nearly half their loans. This proportion has fallen somewhat in recent months, however, as the banks have sharply increased their loans and the borrowers have not yet had time to de fault on the new loans. As market-based approaches to the problem prove ineffective, Beijing is beginning to turn to older, more direct measures. The Xinhua news agency reported Thursday that local governments had stopped approving new economic development zones, which offer low taxes and other preferences, and had even canceled many previously approved zones. ``Since last year, rectifying the land market by using the `iron hand' has become an important measure in our country's macro-economic controls,'' the agency said. While it may seem in Wal-Mart stores as though a big part of the American family's purchases are made in China, exports from China to the United States last year were only equal in value to 1.2 percent of the goods and services produced within the United States.
.
Huge companies like Wal-Mart also have a considerable ability to force sellers to hold down price increases; the main buyers at the Guangzhou Trade Fair are wholesalers who supply small and medium-sized retailers. Yet China has had an outsized effect in stabilizing global prices until very recently because its very low labor cost has allowed it be the country to beat on prices in many industries.
.
As Chinese prices rise, many other low-income and middle-income countries exporting to the United States -- including Mexico and countries in Eastern Europe and Central and South America -- are likely to find it easier to raise prices as well. The New York Times Chris Buckley reported from Beijing.
.


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Irak : M. Chirac propose une conf?rence pour sortir de l'impasse
LEMONDE.FR | 15.04.04 | 20h14
"La France estime qu'une conf?rence r?unissant l'ensemble des composantes de la soci?t? irakienne permettrait peut-?tre de donner ? la transition politique - en attendant des ?lections - toute la l?gitimit? n?cessaire" a d?clar? M. Chirac, jeudi, ? Alger.
Jacques Chirac a exclu cat?goriquement, jeudi 15 avril, toute implication militaire de la France en Irak et a propos? l'organisation d'une conf?rence interirakienne sous l'?gide de l'ONU pour sortir de l'impasse actuelle. Le pr?sident fran?ais, qui s'exprimait ? l'issue d'une visite de travail en Alg?rie, a par ailleurs condamn? les prises d'otages en Irak et exig? la lib?ration imm?diate de tous les ressortissants ?trangers d?tenus.
Il a exprim? sa "sympathie" et sa "solidarit?" ? l'Italie ? la suite de l'ex?cution d'un otage italien.
"Ce qui se d?roule actuellement en Irak d?montre qu'au-del? de la s?curit?, la solution ne peut ?tre en r?alit? qu'une solution politique. Elle passe par un transfert rapide, complet, visible de la souverainet? aux Irakiens eux-m?mes et par la mise en place d'institutions irakiennes qui soient r?ellement repr?sentatives, l?gitimes et pleinement responsables", a dit le chef de l'Etat lors d'une conf?rence de presse.
Estimant qu'on est "loin de cette situation", Jacques Chirac juge, par cons?quent, qu'un engagement militaire de la France aux c?t?s des forces de la coalition pour stabiliser la situation est pour l'heure "hors de question". "Dans ce contexte, il est tout ? fait hors de question que la France puisse r?pondre de fa?on positive ? une demande de pr?sence militaire en Irak", a-t-il dit.
R?UNIR TOUTES LES COMPOSANTES DE LA SOCI?T?
"Toute option qui ne tiendrait pas compte de la volont? exprim?e par le peuple irakien de recouvrer au plus vite sa totale ind?pendance serait lourde de cons?quences pour la stabilit? du pays, et plus largement pour la stabilit? de la r?gion", a-t-il soulign?.
La date du 30 juin, ?ch?ance fix?e par les Etats-Unis pour le transfert de la souverainet?, doit ? ce titre "marquer une v?ritable rupture", a estim? le pr?sident fran?ais. Dans cette perspective, "la France estime qu'une conf?rence r?unissant l'ensemble des composantes de la soci?t? irakienne permettrait peut-?tre de donner ? la transition politique - en attendant des ?lections - toute la l?gitimit? n?cessaire".
Cette conf?rence, plac?e sous l'?gide de l'ONU, s'inspirerait du mod?le de la conf?rence sur l'Afghanistan organis?e ? Bonn (Allemagne), en novembre 2001, par Lakhdar Brahimi, alors envoy? sp?cial de l'ONU dans ce pays, et qui avait
permis de donner naissance au gouvernement de transition afghan.
Jacques Chirac a indiqu? que la France attendait le rapport de l'envoy? sp?cial de l'ONU en Irak, Lakhdar Brahimi, pour se prononcer sur le r?le que pourrait jouer l'ONU dans ce cadre. "La France examinera en liaison avec ses partenaires au Conseil de s?curit? (...) le r?le que les Nations unies pourraient jouer dans ce processus politique." Lakhdar Brahimi est attendu ce week-end ? New York.
Critiquant implicitement la strat?gie militaire am?ricaine, Jacques Chirac a lanc? un appel aux forces d'occupation pour qu'elles ?pargnent les populations civiles et facilitent l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire.
"Les affrontements dans plusieurs villes d'Irak affectent tr?s durement la population civile. (...) Cette population doit ?tre prot?g?e et l'aide humanitaire doit pouvoir lui parvenir. C'est une responsabilit? qui incombe aux puissances occupantes", a-t-il soulign?.

Avec AFP et Reuters



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>> GREENSPAN FILES...

Floyd Norris: Greenspan races the rate clock
Floyd Norris International Herald Tribune
Friday, April 16, 2004



Alan Greenspan has bested the critics. Now the only test left is to see if he can bring interest rates back to something like normal levels without causing too much pain. Unhappily for the Federal Reserve chairman, however, the markets may not be willing to give him as much time as he would like to pull that off.
In the late 1990s, Greenspan decided to ignore the growing bubble in technology stock prices. In 1996, he did mutter something about "irrational exuberance," but he soon changed his tune and embraced the new economy. By the peak of the craziness, in the spring of 2000, he was happily quoting absurd forecasts from Wall Street analysts.
There was no way to know if it was really a bubble, he said then. But if the bubble burst, he would know what to do.
Now the evidence seems clear: He did know. For a time after the bubble burst, it looked like the problems might be long-lasting, but now fears of deflation and of a prolonged economic slump have been quashed. This is a self-sustaining recovery.
So why are investors not celebrating? The decline of bond prices in response to the strong economic news this week may not have been surprising, but the weakness of the stock market was. And why would evidence of a booming economy hurt commodity prices? An answer is that the Fed has kept short-term interest rates so low for so long that a lot of leveraged speculation has built up in what Wall Street calls the "carry trade," so named because the expected profits from the investment are more than enough to carry the cost of borrowing money to finance it. That was particularly true for bonds, but it was also true for stocks, currencies and commodities. The more someone borrowed, the higher the profit.
Banks and hedge funds seem to have a lot of carry trades.
The strong retail sales numbers on Tuesday reminded traders that short-term rates had to rise someday, and caused some of those trades to be unwound. Whether it was copper, or stocks, or the euro, the market showed signed of leveraged investors cutting back on their positions. Then came the inflation report. Until now, rapidly rising commodity prices had not been passed through to consumer prices. Rising prices have largely been confined to things that either don't show up in inflation figures - like home prices - or in areas where international competition could not hold down price rises, like college tuition, which is up 10.2 percent over the past 12 months, the biggest rise in more than a decade. But now prices are rising even in areas where they had been falling.
It has been convenient for the Fed to assume that any inflation threat - and therefore any pressure to raise short-term interest rates - is far, far away. Speeches by Fed officials have played down inflation, and it will be interesting to see if that begins to change. "They will find themselves with a big credibility problem if they do not acknowledge that there is more inflation than they expected," said Roger Kubarych, an economist with HVB Group.
By engineering negative real interest rates - that is, rates lower than the inflation rate - Greenspan has bolstered the economy at the risk of encouraging speculation. Some of the rise in copper - from 60 cents a pound, or E1.11 per kilogram, at the economic nadir in the fall of 2001 to a peak last month of almost $1.40 - is due to rising demand from real users. But some of it reflects speculation on borrowed money. Similarly, the search for yield has allowed companies - and countries - with dicey credit to borrow money cheaply. History says some of those loans will go bad in a few years, creating pain for investors.
Markets are starting to realize that the economy is too strong to justify keeping short-term rates so low. A federal funds rate of 2.5 percent, far above the current 1 percent, might be reasonable. That won't happen quickly, but expectations are growing that the Fed will have to begin raising rates well before this fall's U.S. presidential election. Now the Fed needs to gradually change expectations so that speculative trades can be unwound without doing unnecessary damage to markets.
"The last trick Alan Greenspan has to pull off," said Robert Barbera, chief economist of ITG/Hoenig, "is to get the federal funds rate up from crazy easy and still have everyone live happily ever after."

com

Copyright ? 2003 The International Herald Tribune
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Omri Sharon: If PM loses Likud vote on Gaza plan, he might resign

By Mazal Mualem, Aluf Benn and Nadav Shragai, Haaretz Correspondents

While his father exchanged diplomatic assurances this week with United States President George W. Bush in Washington, MK Omri Sharon canvassed Likud members.
He warned them that if the disengagement plan is not approved in the upcoming party referendum, slated for May 2, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon might quit his post.
The resignation, Omri Sharon added, would lead to the party's loss of its hefty share of 40 Knesset seats, since the public would seek a political alternative in the next national elections.
Hours before his father held a joint press conference with Bush on Wednesday, Omri Sharon met with one local Likud branch head after another at a popular Tel Aviv coffee shop.
Sharon asked them to re-mobilize the same party workers who campaigned for his father in the Likud primaries held a year and a half ago. Sharon added that there is no money in the coffers, so rank-and-file Likud members who work on ensuring that the disengagement plan is approved in the May 2 referendum will have to campaign voluntarily.
The results of the referendum, well-placed sources said, will depend on organizational ability.
Opponents of the plan appear to have an advantage - Likud observers assume that hard-line opponents to territorial concessions and settlement evacuation will not miss the opportunity to vote against the plan, while the prime minister's likely backers are less ideologically committed and more apt not to vote.
Given this, the sources said, Sharon's aides know that a tremendous organizational effort will be needed to ensure that backers of the plan indeed vote.
Clear understanding
Omri Sharon has a clear understanding of these facts. He knows that the 160 Likud branch heads constitute the most promising organizational foundation. These political veterans are personally acquainted with party members who will be voting in the referendum, and therefore, Sharon has concentrated his lobbying efforts on the local party heads.
However, if the prime minister's aides succeed in winning approval for the separation plan in the referendum, the coalition is likely to unravel.
The National Union party announced on Thursday that if the disengagement plan is approved by the government and Knesset, it will quit the coalition.
In contrast, the National Religious Party has yet to decide how to respond in the event that the plan wins cabinet approval.
Lawmaker Shaul Yahalom said Thursday that the party should make non-committal statements on the issue: as long as there is hope of stopping rhetoric from turning into the actual uprooting of settlements on the ground, the NRP should consider staying in the coalition, Yahalom said.
Diplomatic loose ends
As Sharon deploys his parliamentarian son and associates for the tense contest in next month's referendum, his bureau chief will wrap up some diplomatic loose ends with Washington in the upcoming days. Dov Weisglass soon will send a letter to U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice detailing Israeli obligations that have yet to be carried out.
The letter will spell out agreements between Israel and the United States regarding the borders and status of areas where settlements have been built and a future freeze on settlement construction.
Washington's ambassador to Israel, Dan Kurtzer, soon will meet with Israeli security officials to discuss definitions of built-up areas in the settlements.
Last year, Israel announced that new construction on settlements will be conducted only in "built-up areas," but refrained from defining the borders of these areas.
Weisglass' letter will also state that Israel will deliver to Kurtzer within 30 days a list of outposts to be dismantled and a timetable for their evacuation.
The letter will also convey a commitment to take down, as security circumstances allow, roadblocks on the West Bank that encumber the Palestinian population.




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Marines trade `culturally sensitive' training for bullets

By Lourdes Navarro
Associated Press
Pfc. Phillip Marquez, 21, of Coachella, Calif., passes a heavy sand bag as he and Marines of Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, fortify their position at a home in the northwest section of Fallujah, Iraq, on Wednesday. -- Hayne Palmour IV, North County Times / AP photo
FALLUJAH, Iraq -- On a rooftop overlooking Fallujah's industrial wasteland, Lance Cpl. Tom Browne pokes his machine gun muzzle out of a hole in a barrier wall, singing to himself to pass the time.
In the street below, the corpse of an insurgent suspect lies baking in the sun. Browne, from Boston, says he has killed several rebels, probably Iraqis, so far.
"I don't even think about those people as people," he says.
It wasn't supposed to be this way.
The band of Marines in this insurgent stronghold received two big orders this year. They were told to return to Iraq to stabilize the Sunni areas west of Baghdad, Iraq's toughest patch of territory. The normally clean-shaven Marines also were told to grow mustaches in an attempt to win over Iraqis who see facial hair as a sign of maturity.
"We did it basically to show the Iraqi people that we respect their culture," said Lance Cpl. Cristopher Boulwave, 22, from Desoto, Texas.
But after the brutal killing of four American contractors in Fallujah on March 31, they tossed aside such pretenses. First to go were the mustaches.
"When you go to fight, it's time to shoot -- not to make friends with people," said Sgt. Cameron Lefter, 34, from Seattle.
In the fight for Fallujah -- which has killed more than 600 Iraqis, according to city doctors and about a dozen Marines -- the Marines now seem to be following the second half of their famous motto: "No better friend, no worse enemy."
The Marines say it's easier to cope with the daily work of killing inside Fallujah -- where a seemingly unending supply of rebels continues to fight -- if they don't think about the suspected rebels they are targeting as people who, under different circumstances, they might have been trying to help.
"If someone came and did this to our neighborhood, I'd be pissed, too," said Capt. Don Maraska of Moscow, Idaho, a 37-year-old who guides airstrikes on enemy targets in the town. "I've never had people look at me the way these people look at me. I don't know what came before, but at this point, what else can we possibly do but fight?"
The Marines were hoping to lull Fallujah and Anbar province into a state of well-being by passing out $540 million in rebuilding funds, and showing off a more educated attitude about Arab sensitivities than they believed their U.S. Army predecessors displayed.
Before returning to Iraq, the Marines took a crash course in cultural training that included a video teleconference with an Arabic studies professor and the distribution of a culture handbook with tips warning against showing the soles of their feet or eating with their left hands.
About three dozen Marines from one unit took a three-week intensive language course in Arabic. And, of course, they grew mustaches.
"We grew them for the Iraqi people. We shaved them off for us," said Lt. Col. Brennan Byrne, who originally ordered his men to sport the facial hair.
These days, the Marines are speaking a more familiar language.
"We didn't initiate this," said 1st Marine Regiment Commander Col. John Toolen. "I came in here with more money than bullets. Now I'm running out of bullets, but the money is still in my pocket."
The Marines are frustrated with the negotiations to halt the firing in Fallujah. Many say they want to finish the battle, take control of the rebel city by brute force -- whatever it takes -- rather than wait for Iraqi negotiators to thrash out a deal to stop the fighting.
"We're the guys that go in and put our foot in the door," said Maraska, a veteran of the first Gulf War and Somalia. "We'll do any mission. But we're better at pushing and fighting."
Behind the front line, Marines are trying to supply the holed-up locals that they encounter with food and water, one of the few areas where their cultural training is put to use.
But Cpl. David Silvers, based in a front-line building nicknamed "the tower," says his experience with Iraqis has been limited to dodging bullets from a persistent and shadowy gunman he dubbed "Bob the sniper."
"He's the guy who wakes us up every morning and fires at us all day. He hasn't got anyone yet, but he's come close a few times," Silvers said.
Even though the Marines have given Bob his name, they say they still want to kill him.
"This is the closest relationship I have with an Iraqi right now," Silvers said.
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S.Korea Nuke Assessment of North Unchanged
By SANG-HUN CHOE
Associated Press Writer
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) -- South Korea said Wednesday that it was not changing its assessment of North Korea's nuclear capabilities despite a report that a Pakistani scientist had visited a secret underground plant in the communist country and seen nuclear devices.
The United States, Japan and South Korea discussed the information that Pakistan gleaned from investigations of its disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, and agreed that it was too early to draw a conclusion about what Khan saw in North Korea, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said.
"South Korea, the United States and Japan share the understanding that it is desirable for them to take a more cautious position on this matter," Ban said during a regular briefing.
He said there was no change in South Korea's basic assessment that the rival North has only enough plutonium for one or two atomic bombs. South Korea has stuck to that evaluation for years, citing a lack of new concrete evidence on the North's secretive nuclear weapons programs.
The CIA takes that assessment a step further saying it assumes North Korea has one or two bombs already built.
South Korea has sent questions to the Pakistani government asking for more information about what Khan saw in North Korea, Ban said. But the government in Seoul has not yet heard back.
Pakistan said Tuesday it was sharing with other countries information divulged by Khan, but refused comment on a report that he had seen North Korean nuclear devices.
The New York Times reported Tuesday that Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, told interrogators he inspected the weapons briefly during a trip to North Korea five years ago. If true, it would be the first time that any foreigner has reported inspecting an actual North Korean nuclear weapon, the newspaper said.
Ban said Pakistan shared Khan's information with South Korea "recently."
"It contained many unclear things, and there is ambiguity about the circumstances. Thus we are trying to make additional confirmation," Ban said.
North Korea is currently locked in a regional dispute over its nuclear programs. Since last August, the United States, China, Japan, Russia and the two Koreas have held two rounds of talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions, but those meetings ended without major breakthroughs.
Ban said North Korea should allow nuclear inspections and freeze all its nuclear facilities as a first step toward what the United States and its allies call a "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling" of its nuclear programs. Only then, he said, will the allies provide economic aid to the impoverished country.
North Korea says it needs a nuclear "deterrent" against the United States. It demands economic aid and security guarantees in return for giving up its nuclear weapons.
The six nations plan to hold a third round of talks before July aiming to defuse tensions.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.



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Cheney Pushes Asian Nations on N. Korea
By TOM RAUM
Associated Press Writer
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) -- Vice President Dick Cheney challenged Asian powers Thursday to do more to contain North Korea's nuclear program, saying that letting it grow unchecked could spark a new arms race in the region and create a weapons bazaar for terrorists.
"We must see this undertaking through to its conclusion," Cheney told a university audience in Shanghai, China. "Time is not necessarily on our side." He expressed clear frustration with the current diplomatic stalemate before flying to South Korea, his last stop of a weeklong Asia trip.
The speech was carried by China's state television without deletions or blackouts, which U.S. officials took as an encouraging sign of change.
Cheney praised China for setting up six-way talks to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program, but he prodded Chinese leaders to be more aggressive in bringing pressure to bear on Pyongyang.
The six-way talks include the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas.
"We'll do our level best to achieve this objective through diplomatic means, and through negotiations. But it is important that we make progress in this area," Cheney said.
He suggested that North Korea represented a double threat - it could stock its own nuclear arsenal and sell weapons to the highest bidder, including al-Qaida and other terror organizations.
"The people of Asia are particularly vulnerable to the threats of (weapons) proliferation," Cheney said. "Many countries that have the means to develop the deadliest weapons have refrained from doing so."
But he said a continued North Korean nuclear threat could persuade other powers in the region to develop their own nuclear weapons, triggering a new arms race across the region "and the likelihood that one day those weapons would be used."
Cheney said recent information gleaned from a top former Pakistani nuclear scientist provided compelling evidence that Pyongyang has an active atomic weapons program.
The reclusive communist government "must understand that no one in the region wants them to develop those weapons," Cheney said.
During Cheney's Asia trip, citizens from all three countries he visited - Japan, China and South Korea - were seized by militants in Iraq. Three Japanese hostages were released Thursday. The South Korean and Chinese hostages were freed earlier.
Cheney has engaged in unusually blunt talk in his travels, urging allies with troops in Iraq not to bow to pressure from militants and telling Chinese leaders that U.S. defensive military sales to Taiwan are largely a response to their own military buildup on the Taiwan Strait.
In remarks at Shanghai's Fudan University, almost exactly 20 years after President Reagan spoke on the campus, Cheney praised China's economic advances but pointedly suggested they be coupled with "full freedom of religion, speech, assembly and conscience."
"Prosperous societies ... come to understand that clothing, cars and cell phones do not enrich the soul," he said.
The vice president arrived in South Korea on Thursday shortly before polls closed in parliamentary elections. A liberal party loyal to South Korea's impeached president won the most seats.
The win by the Uri party could result in the crafting of a foreign policy more independent of the United States, South Korea's traditional ally, and the forging of closer ties with the North.
Cheney came seeking South Korea's support on the North Korea nuclear issue and its commitment to a promise to send more than 3,000 troops to Iraq
He was meeting with South Korea's acting president, Prime Minister Goh Kun, and visiting U.S. troops stationed in Seoul before returning Friday to Washington.
In a question-and-answer period, one student asked Cheney to describe his relationship with President Bush, given that he was often described as "the most powerful vice president in history."
"That's not a question I had anticipated," Cheney said to laughter.
He said the role of the U.S. vice president had evolved over recent years into one of more responsibility. But he said that the vice president's actual authority, other than his constitutional duty to cast tie-breaking votes in the Senate, was "based strictly upon your relationship with the president."
"I've been fortunate," he said.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.


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Cuba, N. Korea Criticized on Human Rights

By NAOMI KOPPEL
Associated Press Writer
GENEVA (AP) -- The top United Nations human rights watchdog passed resolutions Thursday criticizing conditions in Cuba and North Korea, but Russia and China avoided censure.
The 53-nation U.N. Human Rights Commission voted 22-21 to 21 for a Honduras-proposed resolution that "deplored" Cuba's jailing 75 dissidents arrested on March 18, 2003.
Moments later, a member of the Cuban delegation attacked an anti-Castro activist outside the meeting, knocking him to the ground after he approached a group of Cubans.
"All of a sudden I passed out," Frank Calzon said in a telephone interview with the Associated Press. He said he was unconscious for a minute or two.
Calzon said he didn't see who struck him. But he said a witness reported to him later that the attacker hit him from behind with clasped hands.
Cuban Ambassador Jorge Mora Godoy, who didn't see the incident, blamed Calzon.
"There was a provocation from Frank Calzon against one woman in the Cuban delegation, and he received the due response from our Cuban delegation," Mora Godoy told the AP.
Cuba said the resolution against it was the work of the United States. Shortly after the vote, the Cuban delegation said it had filed a resolution claiming widespread human rights abuses by the United States against detainees at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
The Honduran resolution criticizing Cuba called for the commission's experts on torture, judicial independence and arbitrary detention to investigate the situation. Richard Williamson, head of the U.S. delegation, said his only disappointment was that the vote was so close.
"The fact is no one can argue repression doesn't happen in Cuba," Williamson said. "It's an island prison. It's good to have a resolution putting some pressure on that regime."
In Washington, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the resolution "sends a strong message to courageous Cubans who struggle daily to defend their human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to the repressive Castro regime."
Despite longtime ties with Cuba, Mexico also voted for the resolution.
Mexican President Vicente Fox said later that it was a "vote in favor of a cause; not against a nation." He added that Mexico had acted "in keeping with our principles" to defend human rights.
Also Thursday the commission voted 29-8 to condemn North Korea for its precarious humanitarian situation and for systematic and widespread rights violations.
The motion, brought by the European Union and the United States, cited violations including torture, forced abortions and infanticide, as well as harsh restrictions on freedom of expression and foreign travel and severe punishments meted out to those who try to flee the country.
Resolutions also were passed criticizing the rights records of Belarus and Turkmenistan.
However the commission threw out an EU resolution condemning Russia for its record in war-plagued Chechnya. Russia mustered support from Cuba, Brazil, India, China and African countries to defeat the motion 23-12.
China also ducked censure when it used a procedural "no-action" motion to block discussion of a U.S.-sponsored resolution criticizing its rights record.
Chinese Ambassador Sha Zukang said there was no good reason to single out his country. It was the 11th time that China had prevented discussion of such a resolution at the commission's annual meeting.
"China is neither heaven nor hell. It is just in the process of building a society with decent living standards," he said.
China's foreign ministry spokesman, Kong Quan, said Friday in Beijing that Washington should "abandon confrontation" over human rights.
He was quoted by the official Xinhua News Agency as saying "the United States isolated itself" by submitting the resolution.
A similar no-action motion also blocked discussion of an EU resolution criticizing the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. President Robert Mugabe has stepped up measures against dissent, arresting opposition and labor leaders and cracking down on the independent press.
The commission's six-week session continues until April 23. Voting on the Guantanamo Bay resolution as well as on a Mexican resolution on human rights and counterterrorism are due to take place next Thursday.
AP writer George Gedda in Washington contributed to this report.

Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
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>> PAKISTAN DAWN...

Bush claims credit for busting N-network
By Our Correspondent
WASHINGTON, April 14: President George W. Bush has credited his administration with unravelling a dangerous network of nuclear proliferators headed by Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan.
In his Tuesday night news conference, Mr Bush presented the busting of nuclear scientists' network as one of his administration's major victories in the war against terror.
"The A.Q. Khan bust, the network that we uncovered" was another victory in the war against terror, he said. Mr Bush described the group as a shadowy network of folks that were willing to sell state secrets to the highest bidder.
Dr Khan's network, he said, had made the world more unstable and more dangerous. "You've often heard me talk about my worry about weapons of mass destruction ending up in the hands of the wrong people. Well, you can understand why I feel that way, having seen the works of A.Q. Khan. It was a dangerous network that we unravelled. And the world is better for it, he added.

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>> BENAZIR COMING CLEAN?

Benazir says she sanctioned Korean missile purchase
By Our Correspondent
WASHINGTON, April 14: Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has said that in 1994 she had sanctioned the purchase of ballistic missile technology from North Korea. But she said during her second term - 1994 to 1996 - she also declined to approve another budget proposal to locally develop a long-range missile technology.
She said her government believed in the policy of "keeping parity with India" and did not want to "develop longer ranged missiles than theirs." In a letter to United Press International, Ms Bhutto said that after Pakistan detonated nuclear devices in May 1998, it came under great financial pressure.
"If any swap (of nuclear technology for money) took place, it would be some time after May 1998 when Pakistan no longer had money to make payments." "After Pakistan's financial crisis in May 1998, there were hawks who argued that Pakistan could earn money selling nuclear technology," she said.
She dismissed media reports as speculative that Libyan leader Col Qadhafi had visited the Canadian-built reactor in Karachi. She said the project in Karachi started in the 1960s.
"Munir Ahmed Khan was indeed the long-term chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and considered by many as the real 'father' of Pakistan's bomb," said Ms Bhutto.
She was also asked to comment on a report that Mohammed Beg, who claimed to be a senior official in her father's government, had revealed that Col Qadhafi "supervised transfers of suitcases filled with US dollars to Pakistan on PIA flights."
"Mohammed Beg was never a confidant of my father. I do not even recall him, and I can recall the small group of people that could call on my father," said Ms Bhutto. "Power is a lonely mountain top and my father was not the type of man to share secrets freely." She rejected the suggestion that Z.A. Bhutto had renamed the Lahore stadium after Col Qadhafi because he had financed Pakistan's nuclear programme.
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'External interference won't be tolerated': Adjournment motion on Dr Khan's pardon

By Our Staff Reporter
ISLAMABAD, April 14: Foreign Minister Mian Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri on Wednesday informed the Senate that Pakistan being a sovereign state always guarded its independence and would never tolerate foreign interference in its internal affairs.
The minister said this while opposing an adjournment motion jointly moved by parliamentary leaders of the PPP and PML-N, Senators Raza Rabbani and Ishaq Dar, respectively, concerning the conditional pardon granted to nuclear scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan.
Chairman Mohammedmian Soomro ruled the adjournment motion out of order. "We greatly regard our independence and sovereignty and do not tolerate any external interference in the issues of national security," Mr Kasuri said, adding "we always take strategic decisions independently in the best interest of the country."
He explained that Dr Khan was accorded pardon with the condition that he would cooperate with the government agencies and added that he was cooperating in the proliferation case. He said the pardon also pertained to what had been mentioned in the FIR registered against Dr Khan.
The minister emphasized that Dr Khan had made immense contribution in achieving strategic parity with India which helped maintain a balance of power between the two countries. At the same time, he maintained, Pakistan was also mindful of its international obligations regarding nuclear non-proliferation.
Mr Kasuri brushed aside the impression that Pakistan had surrendered to the US diktat on the matters of national security. He said there were issues on which Pakistan was cooperating with the US while there were many other issues on which it was not supporting the US policies.
He referred to the issue of Afghanistan in which the government had acted keeping in view the public interest. He further said that Pakistan had never sent its troops to Iraq and had not even supported the US resolution on Iraq in the Security Council.
"Pakistan always extend support to US when its own interest demands so," he explained. He, however, argued that it was not wise to confront the US because it was a superpower and only a 'foolish' country would go in confrontation with it.
Earlier, Mr Raza Rabbani said the motion pertained to a 'blatant' and 'open interference' by America in the internal matters of Pakistan to which the latter was succumbing.
He recalled that on Feb 5 President Pervez Musharraf addressed a press conference in which he granted pardon to Dr Khan without ifs and buts. But on Feb 6, US Secretary of State Colin Powell talked to the president and on Feb 7, the Foreign Office spokesman announced that the pardon was conditional while on Feb 9 the spokesman again stated that it was not a 'blanket' pardon.
"These two statements of the FO spokesman originating after the phone calls of Colin Powell were in contradiction to what the president had said earlier at his press conference," he maintained. Senator Rabbani also asked as to why the pardon was granted if the inquiry against Dr Khan was not completed yet.
AFP ADDS: Meanwhile, Foreign Office spokesman Masood Khan said that Pakistan was sharing information from a probe into proliferation by Dr Khan but refused to confirm reports that he (Dr Khan) had seen three nuclear bombs in North Korea.
According to a report in The New York Times on Tuesday, Dr Khan told interrogators he was shown the devices at a secret underground plant when he visited North Korea five years ago.
"I have seen the report," the spokesman said at his weekly news briefing, but he declined to elaborate, adding only: "I would not like to go into specifics." He said: "We have been sharing information with the international community and other countries who have a direct interest in this matter."
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>> FOGGY BOTTOM BACKBONE?

US regrets Hashmi's conviction
By Our Correspondent
WASHINGTON, April 14: The United States has issued a rare warning to its key ally in Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf, for the sentencing of opposition politician. Javed Hashmi who was convicted on a sedition charge.
The US State Department on Tuesday regretted "the closed nature" of proceedings against Mr Hashmi and urged Pakistani authorities to handle his case in a fair and transparent manner. The reaction, displayed on the US government's website on Wednesday with a headline: "US calls for judicial fairness for Pakistan opposition figure."
It quotes spokesman Richard Boucher as saying that US officials had repeatedly expressed concerns to the Pakistani government that Mr Hashmi's case "be handled in a fair and transparent manner and with due regard for his rights."

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Powell calls Musharraf
By Our Correspondent
WASHINGTON, April 14: US Secretary of State Colin Powell called President Pervez Musharraf and discussed the regional situation with him, the State Department said on Wednesday.
Spokesman Richard Boucher told a briefing in Washington that Mr Powell telephoned Gen Musharraf on Tuesday and it was "about the situation in that region". He gave no further details.

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Probe Casts Doubt on Iraq Nuclear Security
UNITED NATIONS (AP) -- Some Iraqi nuclear facilities appear to be unguarded, and radioactive materials are being taken out of the country, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog agency reported after reviewing satellite images and equipment that has turned up in European scrapyards.
The International Atomic Energy Agency sent a letter to U.S. officials three weeks ago informing them of the findings. The information was also sent to the U.N. Security Council in a letter from its director, Mohamed ElBaradei, that was circulated Thursday.
The IAEA is waiting for a reply from the United States, which is leading the coalition administering Iraq, officials said.
The United Sattes has virtually cut off information-sharing with the IAEA since invading Iraq in March 2003 on the premise that the country was hiding weapons of mass destruction.
No such weapons have been found, and arms control officials now worry the war and its chaotic aftermath may have increased chances that terrorists could get their hands on materials used for unconventional weapons or that civilians may be unknowingly exposed to radioactive materials.
According to ElBaradei's letter, satellite imagery shows "extensive removal of equipment and in some instances, removal of entire buildings," in Iraq.
In addition, "large quanitities of scrap, some of it contaminated, have been transfered out of Iraq from sites" previously monitored by the IAEA.
In January, the IAEA confirmed that Iraq was the likely source of radioactive material known as yellowcake that was found in a shipment of scrap metal at Rotterdam harbor.
Yellowcake, or uranium oxide, could be used to build a nuclear weapon, although it would take tons of the substance refined with sophisticated technology to harvest enough uranium for a single bomb.
The yellowcake in the shipment was natural uranium ore which probably came from a known mine in Iraq that was active before the 1991 Gulf War.
The yellowcake was uncovered Dec. 16 by Rotterdam-based scrap metal company Jewometaal, which had received it in a shipment of scrap metal from a dealer in Jordan.
A small number of Iraqi missile engines have also turned up in European ports, IAEA officials said.
"It is not clear whether the removal of these items has been the result of looting activities in the aftermath of the recent war in Iraq or as part of systematic efforts to rehabilitate some of their locations," ElBaradei wrote to the council.
The IAEA has been unable to investigate, monitor or protect Iraqi nuclear materials since the U.S. invaded the country in March 2003. The United States has refused to allow the IAEA or other U.N. weapons inspectors into the country, claiming that the coalition has taken over responsibility for illict weapons searches.
So far those searches have come up empty-handed and the CIA's first chief weapons hunter has said he no longer believes Iraq had weapons just prior to the invasion.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.


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>> 9/11 ...

Republicans see conflict, urge Gorelick to quit panel
By James Lakely
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Pressure is growing for Jamie S. Gorelick to resign from the September 11 commission for what the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee has called "an inherent conflict of interest."
Ms. Gorelick, who served in the No. 2 position in the Clinton Justice Department under Attorney General Janet Reno, was the author of a 1995 directive to the FBI, which repeatedly has been cited in testimony as a major hindrance to antiterrorism efforts prior to the 2001 attacks.
House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Wisconsin Republican, said yesterday he thinks "the commission's work and independence will be fatally damaged by the continued participation of Ms. Gorelick as a commissioner."
"Commissioner Gorelick is in the unfair position of trying to address the key issue before the commission when her own actions are central to the events at issue," Mr. Sensenbrenner said. "The public cannot help but ask legitimate questions about her motives.
"Testifying before the commission is Ms. Gorelick's proper role, not sitting as a member of this independent commission," he said.
The Gorelick directive is credited with thickening the "wall" that prevented federal prosecutors and counterterrorism agents from communicating even though their separate investigations could help catch terrorists.
"These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that [federal law] is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation," Ms. Gorelick wrote in the previously secret memo.
Appearing on CNN's "Larry King Live" last night, Ms. Gorelick said, "All of the commission members have some government experience. Everyone is subject to the same recusal policies. You could have had a commission with nobody who knew anything about government. And I don't think it would have been a very helpful commission."
Attorney General John Ashcroft declassified the four-page document just before his testimony to the commission on Tuesday to help make his point that Ms. Gorelick's directive created "draconian barriers" to uncovering the September 11 plot.
"If the commission doesn't take this issue seriously, undoubtedly a large segment of the American people will see its findings as incomplete and partisan," said Mark Levin, president of the Landmark Legal Foundation, which also has demanded that Ms. Gorelick step down.
Commission Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton both dismissed the calls for resignation.
"Of course not. That's a silly thing," said Mr. Kean, who said Ms. Gorelick has followed the same rules as every other commission member and has, in fact, been one of the most "nonpartisan" members.
Ms. Gorelick was appointed to the commission by Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, South Dakota Democrat, and former House Democratic leader and presidential candidate Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri.
She has been criticized by Republicans for what they see as the partisan tone of her questioning of witnesses from the Bush administration.
During the testimony of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice last week, Ms. Gorelick characterized the White House's attempts to coordinate intelligence gathering as "feckless" and argued with Miss Rice's contention that President Bush put the federal government at their "battle stations" when terrorist chatter increased in summer 2001.
Ms. Gorelick took as much time making comments and asking questions as Miss Rice did answering them and finished her session with Miss Rice by saying that "the debate will continue" over whether the Clinton or Bush administrations better thwarted terrorist attacks.
In an interview on Sean Hannity's national radio show yesterday, Mr. Ashcroft also suggested that Ms. Gorelick should resign from the commission
"I think that individuals who are the actors whose policies are under inspection and judgment probably should not sit as judges in those cases," Mr. Ashcroft said.
Failure to remove her from the commission, he said, will leave people questioning its standards when the final report is released in July.
The commission "has to decide what kind of standards it's going to have," Mr. Ashcroft said. "Whether it's going to have standards that would reflect a disaffection for those kinds of conflicts or whether it is going to ignore" the conflict.
Mr. Ashcroft said yesterday he declassified the Gorelick memo because he felt the other commission members "ought to know."
"It was a fact that had simply not been made known," he said.
Indeed, the first commissioner to question Mr. Ashcroft, former Republican Illinois Gov. James R. Thompson, asked to see a copy of the memo on Tuesday.
Ms. Gorelick recused herself this week from questioning her former boss, Miss Reno, and former FBI director Louis J. Freeh, who had to abide by her directive in 1995. But she gave no hint that the memo's revelation would cause a conflict of interest.
"As my colleagues know, the vast preponderance of our work, including with regard to the Department of Justice, focuses on the period of 1998 forward, and I have been and will continue to be a full participant in that work," she said during Tuesday's hearing.
Mr. Levin said her continued participation "taints the whole process."
"The commission wasn't even aware of her memo until John Ashcroft revealed it," Mr. Levin said. "She is hopelessly conflicted.
"The fact that she's a commissioner insulates her from scrutiny, and that's the problem," he said. "She should not be a commission member, she should be a star witness."
Ms. Gorelick suggested that if Mr. Ashcroft was so concerned about the restrictions placed by her policy, he had an opportunity to change it before the attacks, but did not.
"My successor [as deputy attorney general] wrote a memo before 9/11 in August of 2001 leaving those policies in place," Ms. Gorelick said on CNN Tuesday night. "[Commission member] Slade Gorton pointed out in his exchange with John Ashcroft, a fairly tough exchange, I might say, that in the four areas that Attorney General Ashcroft says were problematic and that he inherited, he left three of them in place."
* Stephen Dinan contributed to this report.


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CIA Warned of Attacks As Early As'95
By JOHN SOLOMON
Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) -- The CIA warned as early as 1995 that Islamic extremists were likely to attack U.S. aviation, Washington landmarks or Wall Street and by 1997 had identified Osama bin Laden as an emerging threat on U.S. soil, a senior intelligence official said Thursday.
The official took the rare step of disclosing information in the closely held National Intelligence Estimate for those two years to counter criticisms in a staff report released Wednesday by the independent commission examining pre-Sept. 11 intelligence failures.
That staff report accused the CIA of failing to recognize al-Qaida as a formal terrorist organization until 1999 and mostly regarding bin Laden as a financier instead of a terrorist leader during much of the 1990s.
But the U.S. intelligence official, who spoke only on condition of anonymity, said the 1997 National Intelligence Estimate produced by the CIA mentioned bin Laden by name as an emerging terrorist threat on its first page. The National Intelligence Estimate is distributed to the president and senior executive branch and congressional intelligence officials.
The 1997 assessment, which remains classified, "identified bin Laden and his followers and threats they were making and said it might portend attacks inside the United States," the official said.
Philip Zelikow, executive director of the Sept. 11 commission, confirmed the 1997 warning about bin Laden but said it was only two sentences long and lacked any strategic analysis on how to address the threat. "We were well aware of the information and the staff stands by exactly what it says," he said.
The intelligence official also said that while the 1995 intelligence assessment did not mention bin Laden or al-Qaida by name, it clearly warned that Islamic terrorists were intent on striking specific targets inside the United States like those hit on Sept. 11, 2001.
The report specifically warned that civil aviation, Washington landmarks such as the White House and Capitol and buildings on Wall Street were at the greatest risk of a domestic terror attack by Muslim extremists, the official said.
Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin testified Wednesday that by early 1996 his agency had developed enough concern about bin Laden to create a special unit to focus on his threat. "We were very focused on this issue," McLaughlin told the commission.
The commission's report did credit the CIA after 1997 with collecting vast amounts of intelligence on bin Laden and al-Qaida, which resulted in thousands of individual reports circulated at the highest levels of government. These carried titles such as "Bin Laden Threatening to Attack U.S. Aircraft" in June 1998 and "Bin Laden's Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons" in February 2001.
Despite this intelligence, the CIA never produced an authoritative summary of al-Qaida's involvement in past terrorist attacks, didn't formally recognize al-Qaida as a group until 1999 and did not fully appreciate bin Laden's role as the leader of a growing extremist movement, the commission said.
"There was no comprehensive estimate of the enemy," the commission report alleged.
But the senior intelligence official said the commission report failed to mention that CIA had produced large numbers of analytical reports on the growth, capabilities, structure and threats posed by al-Qaida throughout the late 1990s and those detailed reports were distributed to the front lines of terror-fighting agencies.
The CIA most frequently provided these individual and highly detailed analyses to the White House Counterterrorism Security Group charged with formulating anti-terrorism policies and responses, the official said.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.


Posted by maximpost at 11:11 PM EDT
Permalink

Military considered hijacked plane exercise, and rejected it

By Nicole Gaudiano
Times staff writer
http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2819359.php
Five months before Sept. 11, 2001, an air defense planner proposed an exercise scenario in which military officials would have to deal with foreign terrorists who were threatening to crash a hijacked foreign commercial plane into the Pentagon, according to a North American Aerospace Defense Command-U.S. Northern Command spokesman.
But the scenario was rejected -- as were many others, said Canadian Army Maj. Douglas Martin, spokesman for Norad-U.S. NorthCom.
Martin, responding to a report by a government watchdog group that highlighted the proposed exercise, said the reason for scrapping the idea was tied to the training objective, which was supposed to involve the movement of forces into the Korean peninsula.
"If you're looking at a training exercise where your main objective is overseas and you have a scenario that causes something traumatic on the homeland, the homeland is going to be your focus -- not your training objectives in a foreign country," he said.
Asked why the idea wasn't used at a later exercise, Martin said Norad's focus was not domestic airspace back then.
"Our mission was threats that could come toward the U.S. [and Canada]," he said. "Because of Sept. 11, our mission has evolved. ..."
The proposal surfaced during planning for a combined exercise in April 2001: Positive Force, an exercise run by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for evaluating decision making; and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration, an exercise involving the Republic of Korea and Pacific Command that focused on deploying forces.
Norad, now Norad-U.S. Northern Command, was invited to participate. The planner was asked for a scenario in which the Pentagon was rendered inoperable and part of its functions in the exercise had to be moved to another location. Martin would not identify the planner, but said he still works at Norad.
On Tuesday, the watchdog group Project on Government Oversight, known as POGO, released an e-mail, written by a former Norad employee and sent to seven people on Sept. 18, 2001, citing the proposal and its rejection.
The employee, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, wrote that Joint Staff action officers rejected the idea as "too unrealistic."
The lieutenant colonel, who could not be reached for comment, also wrote that U.S. Pacific Command "didn't want [the exercise] because it would take attention away from their exercise objectives."
The author of the e-mail began by stating that he was writing "in defense of my last unit, NORAD," whose mission is to defend U.S. and Canadian airspace. He had already retired upon its writing.
Though he was not at the planning session, Martin said the e-mail's depiction of the Joint Staff's and U.S. Pacific Command's response could be judged as the writer's opinion.
A spokeswoman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not return a call for comment. Marine Corps Maj. Guillermo Canedo, media officer for PaCom, said on Wednesday, "We have seen the alleged document and we're looking into the matter."
While the idea may seem prophetic now, a Pentagon spokesman said things were different before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
"In April of 2001, was that a likely scenario?" asked Navy Lt. Commander Dan Hetlage. "Up until that time, hostages had been safely landed. Sadly 9/11 taught us a whole different paradigm."
Martin could not say who rejected the proposal, but added, "I think a lot of people are putting a lot of weight on the rejection of the scenario as if this could have cured Sept. 11. What his suggestion was and what happened on Sept. 11 have literally no connection."
In a statement released with the e-mail, POGO pointed to April 8 testimony from National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice before the 9/11 Commission in which she said, "I do not remember any reports to us, a kind of strategic warning, that planes might be used as weapons."
Peter Stockton, senior investigator for POGO, said on Tuesday he plans to turn the e-mail over to the 9/11 Commission.
"We believe the 9/11 Commission should ask the Joint Chiefs why they prevented NORAD from training to respond to the possibility that terrorists might hijack commercial airliners and use them as missiles," he said in a statement.
Stockton said POGO received the e-mail from a source in the military who has been "highly reliable over time." He was not sure why it was given to POGO or why it was written, and would not say whether the source knows the author of the e-mail.
Asked about the significance of the e-mail, Stockton said, "I'm not arguing we could have averted 9/11 because of this. The argument is that if these exercises had gone ahead, we might have been better prepared to respond to this kind of a threat."

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Commander vows to restore order in flashpoint city of Fallujah

By Gidget Fuentes
Times staff writer
Lance Cpl. Ryan Deady, 20, of Chicago, with Weapons Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, keeps watch on an alleyway in Fallujah, Iraq, on Thursday. -- M. Scott Mahaskey / Marine Corps Times
FALLUJAH, Iraq -- The commander of a Marine Corps division poised to resume fighting in this city where a wavering, six-day cease fire has been in place vowed Wednesday to wipe out anti-coalition forces and reopen the city.
More than three battalions of his Marines, reinforced with tanks and armored vehicles and supported by aerial gunships, have been holding their lines since the top military command in Iraq ordered a temporary cessation in offensive operations on April 9.
Although the Marines have allowed some food and supplies into the beleaguered city, the worry here is in the longer term. "Our concern right now is what's happening to the innocent people the longer we stay here," said Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, who commands the 1st Marine Division, a 22,000-member force based at Camp Pendleton, Calif. He spoke with reporters at the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment's outposts on one edge of Fallujah..
"Eventually we have got to open this town up," he said. More than 60,000 residents fled after the Marines entered the city last week.
Like other Marines here, the situation has frustrated Mattis, who said the enemy isn't abiding by the spirit of the cease-fire.
"This is bulls--t right now, and you can quote me," said Mattis, a soft-spoken but tough commander who is popular with his troops and officers for his plain-spoken, pointed style.
Mattis said he doesn't think the wait will be long before the Marines move on the city.
"I have no doubt that we will respond appropriately if they don't knock it off," he said. "And when they tell us it's time to go, the Marines will be fired up and ready to go."
Although Fallujah has garnered much attention in the past week, Mattis' fighting force, along with an Army brigade, is spread throughout Anbar province, from east of Fallujah to the Syrian border. At every camp and on many combat patrols and civil reconstruction projects, Marines and soldiers have been attacked, ambushed, sniped at or mortared.
In Fallujah, despite the so-called cease-fire, the barrage is a constant.
"I tell you right now that if they move against my men, if they fire against my men, we will respond with decisive force," Mattis said. "We are not going to permit them to get in some cheap shots and then have us play by certain rules that they want to be violated."
Hours before dawn Wednesday, an AC-130 Spectre gunship fired dozens of 105mm artillery rounds and 40mm gunfire at two locations targeted by a Marine air controller with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. A battalion operations officer said the targets included a "safe house" and weapons cache believed used by enemy fighters that had regularly attacked one of the infantry companies' locations and a second building that contained weapons.
For an hour, sounds of the cannons fired by the aircraft flying above and unseen in the darkened sky echoed across the battalion's outpost, followed by the whizzing of rounds slicing through the air and the subsequent booms in the near distance.
Throughout the morning, like previous days, Marines with 1/5 encountered sporadic sniper and rocket fire. At one point, a mortar landed about 75 meters from an infantry position in a warehouse area of the city. No one was injured.
Mattis said the attacks show the "lack of good faith" among enemy fighters in Fallujah who are attacking his Marines. He didn't hide his disdain for their tactics.


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Familiar Scene
Feeding continues, so terror continues.
By Rachel Ehrenfeld
"I am the beating arm for Hezbollah and Hamas here in Iraq," declared Muqtada al-Sadr last week. Yet, despite President's Bush's statement Tuesday night that "The violence we are seeing in Iraq is familiar, " the U.S. fails to directly acknowledge that there is no difference between the Shiite and Sunni militias in Iraq and Palestinian terrorism. As a matter of fact, it was the Palestinian-Jordanian Musab al-Zarkawi (whose real name is Fedel Nazzel Khalayleh), one of al Qaeda's major operatives in Iraq, helped to coordinate the infiltration of Palestinian, Yemenite, Afghani, North African, and other insurgents, into Iraq.
The horrid pictures of a raging, incited mob, lynching uniformed soldiers in broad daylight, have certainly been seen before -- not only in Mogadishu, but also in the Palestinian territories. In October 2002, the Palestinians murdered, dismembered, and dragged the bodies of two Israeli soldiers throughout the streets of Ramallah in the West Bank.
Even the use of mosques as military forts, and ambulances to transport terrorists with their armaments, has been practiced for many years by the Palestinian terrorists. What we see in Iraq is really not much different than what we have been witnessing in the West Bank and Gaza for the last decade, only here, American and Coalition forces are the targets.
The historical and persisting failure of the U.S. and the West to denounce the Palestinian terrorists' atrocities, and to put an end to their activities, was clearly perceived as a weakness by the Islamists. This weakness is now being exploited by al Qaeda and other Muslim fundamentalists, who have taken up arms against the U.S. and Coalition forces.
Al-Zarkawi, and his group, Anzar al Islam, like Hamas, al Qaeda, and other Muslim fundamentalist terrorists, adhere to the teachings of the Muslim brotherhood, and call upon their followers in Iraq, as in the Palestinian territories, "to burn the earth under the occupiers' feet." Similar statements are made by Abdel-Aziz al-Rantissi, who, in a televised address two weeks ago, pointed out the similarities between the U.S. and Israel: "We knew that Bush is the enemy of God, the enemy of Islam and Muslims. America declared war against God. Sharon declared war against God and God declared war against America, Bush and Sharon." He went on to say that, "The war of God continues against them and I can see the victory coming up from the land of Palestine by the hand of Hamas." Now that al-Sadr sees himself as a representative of Hamas, he added Iraq to the equation.
The increasing violence in Iraq, supported by foreign insurgencies from Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, will be as difficult to control as the ongoing terror activities by the Palestinians. As long as tens of millions of dollars in funding from Iran continue to fuel the thousands of unemployed and disenfranchised that have joined al-Sadr's Shiite militia, and as long as tens of millions will continue to flow from Saudi Arabia to Palestinian terror organizations, terrorism will continue.
Despite the Saudi crackdown on dissidents in the Kingdom and their claims that they are taking steps to stop both terrorism and terrorist funding, and even despite Condoleezza Rice's recent praise of the Saudi Kingdom's cooperation in the war on terrorism, Saudi money continue to fuel terrorist activities against the U.S. and Israel.
Recent revelations about the transfer of millions of dollars in suspicious transactions by the Saudis through Riggs Bank in Washington, D.C., including to some Muslim charities that have been identified as fronts for al Qaeda, cast doubt on the sincerity of Saudi cooperation in stopping the funds for terrorism.
Similarly, of all the Arab League countries, Saudi Arabia is the only one that continues to fund the Palestinian Authority, led by Yasser Arafat, who, as a U.S. investigation just concluded, approved the attack on a U.S. embassy convoy in which three Americans were killed in 2003. The Saudi contribution, even before latest "reforms" in the PA were announced, amounts to $15.4 million every two months, and at least $50 million continues to flow to Hamas "charities" in the West Bank and Gaza.
The jihadist ideology, both on the Sunni and Shiite fronts, will not be easy to change. And despite the president's assertion that we have deprived the terrorists of their shelter and many of their leaders, we could do much more to prevent them from carrying out their "holy war" against us -- we should do more to cut off their funds.

-- Rachel Ehrenfeld, author of Funding Evil; How Terrorism is Financed -- and How to Stop It, is director of the New York-based American Center for Democracy.


http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ehrenfeld200404140848.asp
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Tax Twister
Sen. Dorgan is crafty, but deceiving, this time of the year.

It's once again the time of year when competing interests play battle of the press release on taxes. The goal is to capture the taxpayer's allegiance during that brief period when his attention is focused on his tax burden, as he fills out tax forms and, often, writes large checks to state and federal governments. Both sides play this game.
One long time player is the Tax Foundation, which annually calculates "Tax Freedom Day." Its assumption is that we pay our taxes from the first dollar we earn each year. When we have worked enough to pay all our taxes for the year, we are then free to work for ourselves. According to the latest study, Americans could start to keep all their earnings on April 11 this year, the earliest date since passage of the Kennedy tax cut in the 1960s. This represents a sharp reduction from the last year of the Clinton administration, when Tax Freedom Day fell on May 2.
Other countries also calculate their tax freedom days. According to the Adam Smith Institute in London, Tax Freedom Day in Britain falls on May 30. The Fraser Institute in Vancouver calculated Canada's Tax Freedom Day to be June 28 last year.
After many years when advocates of lower taxes were the primary players in the tax game, the tax increasers are now also vigorous participants. However, since no one likes paying taxes and few want to hear about why they should pay more, the tax increasers have to play the finesse game. Their approach is to dramatize the insufficient taxes paid by fat cats. Those of modest means are thereby led to believe that they would pay less if only the rich paid their "fair share."
Sen. Byron Dorgan, Democrat of North Dakota, has become the point man for liberals looking to make hay on tax day. Back in 1993, he had the U.S. General Accounting Office look at taxes paid by U.S.-based and foreign-based corporations. The report found that a significant percentage of foreign-controlled corporations paid no federal income taxes in the U.S. But it also showed that many domestic corporations paid no income taxes, either.
This initial report got little attention because it was not released until June 11, too late to catch the attention of taxpayers. In 1999, Sen. Dorgan wised up and got another report on the same subject out on March 23. This report received a lot more attention by once again showing that many corporations pay no income taxes. However, its main focus was still on foreign companies, even though the percentage of domestic corporations with no tax liability was almost exactly the same.
This year, Sen. Dorgan was even smarter. He got the GAO to do yet another report on corporate taxes, but this time was clever enough to make them get it done by February 27. And rather than release it then, when few would be paying attention, Sen. Dorgan got the GAO (which his staff misnames the "Government Accounting Office") to hold the report until his office could release it on April 2, in the middle of tax season.
Sen. Dorgan was also smarter this year in playing up the percentage of U.S. corporations, as well as foreign companies, with no tax liability. For shifting the emphasis in this manner, he was rewarded with a front-page article in the Wall Street Journal, as well as heavy play in the Los Angeles Times and other papers. With the data showing that almost three-fourths of foreign corporations and two-thirds of U.S. corporations had no tax liability in 2000, many individual taxpayers with large tax liabilities no doubt felt some anger and resentment.
This is exactly what Sen. Dorgan was hoping for. It will help pave the way for tax increases on corporations in order to expand the welfare state and perhaps put Democrats back in control of the White House and Congress.
Unfortunately, the GAO report provided little context for its findings. It would have been helpful to know that 45 percent of all corporations had no net income and nearly 60 percent had assets of less than $100,000 in 2000, according to the Internal Revenue Service. It is hardly surprising that a company pays no taxes when it has no income and virtually no assets. After all, about 40 percent of individual income-tax returns report no tax liability, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Another point worth mentioning is that all of this alleged tax avoidance came during the Clinton administration. Yet because the data have been released now, many casual readers are probably left thinking that the Bush administration is responsible.
In the battle of the press releases, Sen. Dorgan probably won this year. By the time analysts are able to explain why his data are misleading, tax season will be over.

-- Bruce Bartlett is senior fellow for the National Center for Policy Analysis. Write to him here.

http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof_bartlett/bartlett200404140835.asp
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U.S. to pull out most forces from Korean DMZ this year
Special to World Tribune.com
EAST-ASIA-INTEL.COM
Tuesday, April 13, 2004
The U.S. military will withdraw most if its forces from the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea this year, an official announced today.
The withdrawal means the United States will no longer have combat troops anywhere on the DMZ except at Panmunjom, where a U.S.-Korean battalion, commanded by a U.S. army lieutenant colonel, remains on guard in what is known as the Joint Security Area.
Therefore South Korea, which has a 600,000-member military, will face North Korea's armed forces, the world's fifth largest with 1.1 million soldiers, most of whom are concentrated near the DMZ.
The United States will turn over Observation Post Ouellette, which provides a view into North Korea, as part of a force reshuffle, the official said. U.S. forces will no longer guard the border, except except for the troops at the JSA in Panmunjom.
South Korean forces will take over Ouelette, just as they have replaced U.S. forces everywhere else along the DMZ since the Korean War ended in 1953. South Korea officials, however, want the U.S. to keep its troops in the Joint Security Area as symbols of America's commitment to defend the South.
The 2 1/2-mile wide, 151-mile long DMZ, is considered one of the last remaining symbols of the Cold War. However it is still an active war zone with mines, barbed wire and tank traps.
U.S. troops guarding the inter-Korean border have served as a strategic "tripwire" because they are presumed to come under fire during a North Korean attack, thereby prompting U.S. intervention in South Korea's defense.
The United States has about 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea, but has long kept fewer than 200 soldiers along the DMZ, at Observation Post Ouellette and Panmunjom, said U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Deborah Bertrand, a spokeswoman for U.S. Forces Korea.
Details on the timing of Ouellette's turnover and the eventual troop level at Panmunjom are still being decided in consultation with South Korea, Bertrand said, adding: "It will be this year."
U.S. Gen. Leon J. LaPorte, joint commander of the U.S. Forces Korea and the United Nations. Command overseeing the cease fire that ended the 1950-53 Korean War, has briefed Congress on U.S. plans to give South Korea more autonomy in its defense.
He said the "Republic of Korea will replace all United States personnel directly involved in security patrols, manning observation posts, and base operations support" along the DMZ, except for Panmunjom, where the United States will maintain command over a battalion of joint U.S.-South Korean forces.
The United States is currently reviewing its military posture in South Korea as part