U.N.'s Refugee Chief Faces Internal Inquiry
Sexual Harassment Alleged by Staffer
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, May 19, 2004; Page A11
UNITED NATIONS, May 18 -- Ruud Lubbers, the U.N. high commissioner for refugees, acknowledged on Tuesday that he is the target of an internal U.N. investigation into an allegation of sexual harassment.
The probe stems from a formal complaint filed by a female U.N. staff member that the former Dutch prime minister harassed her at a U.N. meeting in December. Lubbers, 65, issued a statement in which he denied the charges, saying "there was no improper behavior on my part."
Lubbers said that the woman, whose name has not been released, filed the complaint on April 27, more than four months after the alleged incident at a Dec. 18 meeting in Geneva. Lubbers said five other U.N. staff members were present at the meeting.
The revelations, which were first reported by the New York Times, came as Lubbers arrived in Washington for a meeting with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. The visit was intended to draw awareness to the refugee crises in Chad, Sudan and other trouble spots that have been overshadowed by the war in Iraq.
Lubbers referred to the sexual harassment charges in prepared remarks at the start of a news conference at the National Press Club, but he declined to respond to questions on the matter. Instead, Lubbers provided an overview of his recent visits to refugee camps in Iran, Afghanistan and Chad -- where more than 120,000 Sudanese have sought refuge from a government-backed campaign to depopulate Sudan's Darfur province.
He charged that the U.S.-led wars against Iraq and al Qaeda have heightened the threat to the United Nations' humanitarian relief workers around the world. He blamed President Bush for widening the rift between the West and the Muslim world in his quest to battle terrorism.
"Terrorism and al Qaeda, in particular, are real problems. But we must avoid becoming paralyzed by this monster," Lubbers said. "We've been damaged by the 'axis of evil' -- this Manichean vision of the world as split between the 'good' and the 'evil.' Unfortunately, like others we are paying the price for this."
Asked by a reporter if his message has been overshadowed by the harassment charge, he said that he did not believe it has.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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N. Korean rail explosion foiled missile shipment to Syria

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Tuesday, May 18, 2004
A North Korean missile shipment to Syria was halted when a train collision in that Asian country destroyed the missile cargo and killed about a dozen Syrian technicians.
U.S. officials confirmed a report in a Japanese daily newspaper that a train explosion on April 22 killed about a dozen Syrian technicians near the Ryongchon province in North Korea. The officials said the technicians were accompanying a train car full of missile components and other equipment from a facility near the Chinese border to a North Korea port.
A U.S. official said North Korean train cargo was also believed to have contained tools for the production of ballistic missiles. North Korea has sold Syria the extended-range Scud C and Scud D missiles, according to reports by Middle East Newsline.
"The way it was supposed work was that the train car full of missiles and components would have arrived at the port and some would have been shipped to Syria while others would have been transported by air," an official said.
Officials said the North Korean shipment to Syria was not meant to have contained chemical or biological weapons. They said foreign rescue crews summoned to the train explosion did not report any chemical contamination.
The explosion was said to have been caused by a collision of two trains. The collision downed an electrical power line, the sparks from which detonated the fuel from the train.
On May 4, the Tokyo-based Sankei Shimbun quoted a military source that reported the death of the Syrian technicians. The newspaper said North Korean military personnel, wearing protective suits, removed the vestiges of the destroyed equipment meant for Syria.
The technicans were representatives of Syria's Center for Scientific Research, which has been cited for helping develop that country's weapons of mass destruction program. The technicians were said to have been trained in North Korea to operate the equipment.
Sankei said the bodies of the Syrians were flown home by a Syrian aircraft, which had arrived in Pyongyang to deliver aid supplies. The newspaper said North Korean personnel were also killed in the explosion.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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Bush Rushing to Show Iraq Handover Strategy

May 19, 8:50 PM (ET)
By Adam Entous
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - An interim Iraqi president, prime minister and other top ministers should be selected in the next two weeks, President Bush said on Wednesday as he prepared to lay out for the American public his strategy for handing sovereignty to Iraqis.
Rushing to stem eroding support at home and abroad for his Iraq policies, Bush discussed with his Cabinet and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi plans for what he called a "full transfer of sovereignty" to an Iraqi interim government on June 30 backed by a new U.N. Security Council resolution.
Berlusconi came to Washington to press Bush to give Iraqis more say over their security forces and military facilities after the handover. While Berlusconi suggested there was a broad consensus, senior Bush administration officials said the interim government would have limited authority in some areas and Iraqi forces, while overseen by fellow Iraqis, would still fall under a U.S.-led command.
In a public address next week, Bush plans to lay out in more detail the course for the remaining month and a half before the scheduled transfer, administration officials said.
Spreading violence and a prison abuse scandal have pushed the president's approval ratings to new lows and he is eager to show Americans he is on top of the situation with time running out before the handover deadline.
Officials said Bush would discuss his Iraq plans when he meets privately with fellow Republicans on Capitol Hill on Thursday.
Bush said he expected decisions to be made in the next two weeks on who will become the new Iraqi prime minister and president, and assume the two positions of deputy president.
Berlusconi proposed an international conference on Iraq be held before elections in January.
He also suggested the president of the interim Iraqi government visit New York in July to meet members of the U.N. Security Council and representatives from coalition member countries.
"It's a very convincing plan," said the Italian leader, a leading ally in the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. "We agreed on all of these future possibilities."
U.N. RESOLUTION
Bush is increasingly confident of winning support for a new U.N. resolution that would recognize the interim government, even though details about its makeup and authority have yet to be settled.
White House spokesman Scott McClellan said he expected action "soon" on the resolution. Washington wants it passed before June 30. McClellan said U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi will also "come back with some names for that interim government soon."
Bush is trying to counter growing concerns inside and outside his administration that the occupation is failing and that he has no strategy to improve the situation.
At G8 talks last week, the foreign ministers of major industrialized countries challenged the United States to transfer real power to Baghdad in the handover.
France, which last year blocked U.N. approval of the U.S. invasion, said Washington must give up control over local forces, while Italy said a new government must have a say over American troop tactics.
Bush administration officials have said the Iraqis would have responsibility for administering the country on June 30, the official end of the occupation.
But they want security to stay under the leadership of the United States, and regulations promulgated by the Coalition Provisional Authority may stay in place until elections in January 2005.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Congress earlier this week that Iraqi troops, although under U.S. command, would be permitted to opt out of any operation.
Bush plans to shift control of oil revenues and the Iraq Development Fund to the new Iraqi leadership, officials said.

(Additional reporting by Caren Bohan, David Morgan and Thomas Ferraro)
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No Consensus on Iraq Bioweapons Labs -White House

May 19, 10:47 PM (ET)
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - It remains unclear whether the CIA was wrong about Iraq's purported prewar mobile biological weapons laboratories, the White House said on Wednesday, disputing a comment by Secretary of State Colin Powell.
White House spokesman Scott McClellan said it was still not known why Iraq had the rolling labs. They had been described in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq as part of an effort to build weapons of mass destruction.
"The latest that has been said by the intelligence community is that there is no consensus. There is disagreement on what the use of those biological laboratories were for," McClellan said at a briefing.
He said that an independent commission appointed by the president to look at prewar intelligence related to weapons of mass destruction would take another look at the laboratories.
Powell expressed regret on Sunday for having made claims in a U.N. Security Council speech now known to have been "inaccurate" and "wrong."
"When I made that presentation in February 2003, it was based on the best information that the Central Intelligence Agency made available to me," Powell said on NBC's "Meet the Press."
"It turned out that the sourcing was inaccurate and wrong and, in some cases, deliberately misleading. And for that, I am disappointed, and I regret it," he said.
As recently as January, Vice President Dick Cheney cited the discovery of two trucks as "conclusive" evidence of the mobile labs described by Powell. But CIA Director George Tenet later told Congress he had warned Cheney not to be so categorical about the discovery.

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The dilemmas of Iran's policy toward Iraq
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

As the occupation forces battle Shi'ite insurgents in several Iraqi cities, most notably in the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf in what a United States general has admittedly described as a "minor uprising", the question of Iran's policy toward post-Saddam Hussein Iraq looms particularly large in the policy circles of Washington and London.
Is Iran playing a cooperative or subversive role in Iraq today, or both at the same time, and, if so, which side has the upper hand? What is the nature of the connection between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the current Shi'ite rebellion spearheaded by junior cleric Muqtada al-Sadr? General Mark Kimmitt, the top military spokesman in Baghdad, has recently said he can't answer whether Muqtada's fighters are state-sponsored. He is quoted by Associated Press, however, as saying that it would be a mistake to call Muqtada's militia Iranian-backed, manned or controlled. But an increasing number of policy experts and members of the US Congress are joining Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who has repeatedly accused Iran of "meddling" in Iraq. Critics of Iran, particularly those affiliated with the pro-Israel think-tanks in Washington, nowadays can be found aplenty on TV news programs blaming Iran's revolutionary guards for setting up training camps on the Iran-Iraq border for Muqtada's "terrorists", as well as bankrolling the latter's military campaign against the occupation armies.
Iran's officials deny these allegations and insist, in the words of Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations, "We seek a stable Iraq, the return of sovereignty and the establishment of a democratic and representative system." Backing words with action, these officials point at Iran's "goodwill" mediation effort tacitly approved by Washington and initiated at London's request, and blame the occupation forces for derailing it with their premature offensive against Muqtada's militiamen.
In fact, Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, incensed by the desecration of holy cities in the hands of US forces, has lashed out at "shameless and stupid" US policy in Iraq, predicting, just as he had prior to Iraq's invasion last year, that "sooner or later, the Americans will be obliged to leave Iraq in shame and humiliation". The ayatollah's tone is clearly different from, to put it mildly, that of Iran's moderate president, Mohammad Khatami, who recently criticized Muqtada, albeit indirectly, for inciting rebellion and thus jeopardizing the "security and well-being of Shi'ites in Iraq". Last year, Muqtada, the scion of a powerful clerical family, was shunned by Khatami and yet warmly embraced by Ayatollah Khamenei, notwithstanding the unconfirmed reports that Muqtada's mentor, Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri, who remains in exile in Iran, appointed Muqtada as his representative in Iraq.
On the whole, however, Muqtada evokes mixed feelings in Iran and is viewed with caution, particularly by those who emphasize his occasional anti-Iran diatribe as evidence of his lack of trustworthiness. Iran's critics in Washington, however, contend that Muqtada is firmly in Iran's camp and his tactical maneuvers against Iran are to shield him from being labeled as Iran's stooge. It may well be that Iran is increasingly enamored of Muqtada's militant anti-Americanism and his militiamen's ability to withstand the US assault to eradicate them from the scene, tilting increasingly in his direction irrespective of their minor misgivings about him. A pro-Muqtada drift inside Iran may actually be in the offing, which can be nipped in the bud if - and only if - his "minor uprising" is uprooted in the near future by America's military might.
The question of Iran's attitude or response toward the "al-Sadr phenomenon" must be couched in the larger framework of Iran's intention in Iraq. There are strong indications of an Iranian "mixed-motive game" in Iraq, where the compliant tendency of cooperation with the US design for a transitional government inclusive of Shi'ite politicians runs in tandem with a parallel tendency to foment problems for the US government, which has labeled Iran as part of its "axis of evil" and has pressured the world community to deny Iran access to peaceful nuclear technology, not to mention the United States' complicity with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to eradicate Palestinian rights in a carefully orchestrated step-by-step strategy.
As a regional power distressed by a post-September 11, 2001, security belt stretching from Iraq to Afghanistan to bases in Turkey and neighboring Central Asia, Iran's national-security interests logically dictate against the entrenchment of US power in Iraq, which has so far translated into new bases near Iran's borders. Iran's options are limited, however, and in the effort to stymie Washington's perceived "neo-imperialist" objectives, Iran's policymakers have pursued a complex, multi-faceted agenda vis-a-vis Iraq that runs the gamut. It includes covert and overt activities, networking with the Kurds, Sunnis, and the various Shi'ite organizations and centers of authority, such as the Dawn Party and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, whose military wing, Badre Brigade, was trained in Iran over a two-decade period.
There is nothing either illogical nor necessarily contradictory about overarching politics of influence, tapping into various sources inside Iraq, nominally committed to the political process promising to bring majority rule by the Shi'ites down the road and, simultaneously, sowing the seeds of rebellion, both to offset the anti-Iran momentum of the US might and to enhance Iran's diplomatic leverage with respect to not just the US but also other powers, notably Saudi Arabia, jockeying for influence in Iraq.
Meanwhile, in light of Iran's official anti-imperialist ideology and formal commitment to the struggle against a US-based unipolar world order, inevitably the issue has been raised in Iran's policy circles as to whether or not Iraq has the potential to become the tombstone for American empire. The stakes in Iraq are, indeed, very high not just for the Iraqi people or the occupation forces, but also Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, which must balance its fears and concerns and the opportunities afforded in today's Iraq. The problem is the script-in-action nature of the fluid and highly unpredictable political process in Iraq, the difficulties of sorting out short-term versus long-term impact and policy consequences, eg of backing or not backing the present Shi'ite rebellion, and the equally difficult task of reconciling Iran's militant ideology with the status quo dimensions of Iran's current Iraq policy.
Concerning the latter, in light of an open admission of certain Iranian foreign-policy officials about the convergence of Iranian and US interests in Iraq, particularly with respect to a federal system based on rule of majority, Iran is hard pressed between the Scylla of its own ideology mandating continuous anti-American and anti-imperialist courses of action and the Charybdis of its national-security interests counseling alliance-type cooperation with the United States toward a peaceful, and fully integrated, Iraq. This "double bind" is somewhat aggravated by the persistent suspicions about America's ultimate aim in Iraq, ie, the reasonable fear that a successful military campaign in Iraq can only embolden Washington to heed the call of its pro-Zionist pundits narrating about "total war" or "war to war". Hence the prognostication of America's future military behavior has been factored in Iran's policy reaction toward Iraq, causing what appears to be a paradoxical policy wherein contradictory elements of cooperation and subversion go hand in hand.
As a clue to the "internal wisdom" of the Iranian system, on the other hand, the clerically dominated ruling elite has successfully disarmed Washington's ability to manipulate Iranian politics in the name of democracy, principally by the not-so-quiet "revanchist" parliamentary coup of this past February, which excluded the liberalist politicians and set up a more unified, and coherent, system, self-immunized from influences from the without. This "regrouping", dictated mainly though not exclusively by the welter of national-security worries, may turn out to haunt the ruling elite at some point in the future, but for now it has enhanced the process of foreign-policy making by centralizing it. One of its side-effects, unfortunately, has been a relative poverty of security discourse in Iran, at least at the public level, as evidenced by the paucity of discussion of vital national-security issues and concerns in Tehran's dailies.
For the moment, however, that appears to be a minor price to pay for what is really at stake with respect to the US-Iran games of strategy spanning the entire region; the game, complex in nature and containing various security, geo-strategic and geo-economic components, and input by several other players, both regional and non-regional, requires a flexible and creative response from Iran, tuned to the survival strategy of Iran and its short-term and long-term role in the region and beyond. It requires, among other things, subtle and sophisticated risk management, so that, to single out one example, its exploitation of the anti-American Shi'ite uprising does not backfire and lessen mainstream Shi'ites' political influence in Iraq or, vice-versa, its status quo approach does not turn it blind to the historic opportunity at the present time to steepen the intrusive Western superpower in a deeper quagmire offsetting its anti-Iran proclivity.
As there is no quick fix in Iraq, the clerical rulers of Iran have clearly opted for a complex agenda that may one day sink in the quagmire of its own incoherence, but for now that danger is glued together by the paradoxical realities of Iraq indicating a long-term presence of US power and, with it, the ongoing nature of US-Iran games of strategy wherein each side seeks to contain the other side. While the ultimate drift or consequence of this "reciprocal containment" strategy is far from certain, one thing is for sure: the hidden hands of Iran in Iraq will continue to sow positive and negative influence no matter what.

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and "Iran's Foreign Policy Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs, co-authored with former deputy foreign minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.
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Seoul may send Iraq troops, GIs from DMZ to go
By David Scofield

While South Korea remains steadfast in discussing commitments - and not the immediate dispatch of 3,000 long-promised troops to Iraq - the United States has made good on its promise to mobilize its forces in Korea to contend with "changing global threats and new force projection technologies" in Iraq. Washington says it will redeploy 3,600 infantry troops from the 2nd Infantry Division, currently stationed a stone's throw from North Korea along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), to Iraq by mid-summer.
Recently reinstated South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, impeached by his opponents on March 12 but restored by the Constitutional Court last week, remains outwardly committed to dispatching troops to Iraq. But with the overwhelming victory of his supporters in Our Open Party (OOP) in general elections on April 15, his backers increasingly are calling on the government to rethink the offer to assist the US in Iraq, many parts of which are again war zones.
Ostensibly, atrocities committed by US guards at Abu Ghraib prison and civilian casualties throughout Iraq, especially during the campaign in Fallujah, have provided the most recent justification for demands that the government reverse its decision to send troops. But the true reason probably has less to do with human rights abuses in Iraq than it does with a tradition of national myopia and anti-US sentiment - more specifically, feelings against the United States Forces, Korea (USFK).
(In another ugly but not uncommon incident over the weekend in Seoul, some US soldiers were arrested after one GI apparently stabbed a Korean civilian in a nightclub district. What makes this unusual is that South Korea's "progressive" Internet news media are equating it with US abuse at Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad, where Iraqi prisoners were tortured by US guards. This incident has been especially poignant as it happened only three days before yesterday's May 18 memorial of the Kwangu Massacre, a city in the country's southwest. In 1980, less than a year after former dictatorial leader Park Chung- hee was assinated, newly self installed president Chun Doo-won ordered Korean Special Forces soldiers to re-take the city of Kwangju by force after students, leftisits and unionists had siezed control demanding an end to the military's hold on political power. The soldiers killed between 500-2000 people, an event that many Koreans believe the United States was either directly involved in, or turned a blind eye to.)
Groups of South Korean lawmakers, and a few of its many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), justify their anti-dispatch stance on feelings of moral outrage at US conduct in Iraq, but these same groups remain mute when confronted with evidence of far more heinous injustices being inflicted on the people of North Korea, less than 100 kilometers from South Korea's capital. Condemnation of US human-rights violations in Iraq offer convenient cover for motives that have less to do with the protection of the world's most vulnerable, than with narrow domestic political objectives - Abu Ghraib being nothing more than a convenient backdrop of moral outrage for Korea-centric policies.
The South Korean government may, as it continues to promise, dispatch troops to Iraq, but the composition of this dispatch will have little to no effect on the security situation on the ground. Those lawmakers who support a dispatch, largely for reasons relating to domestic politics and "defense on the cheap" - which is what the US symbolizes to many of South Korea's more pragmatic elected officials - do not necessarily support a dispatch comprising primarily combat troops. South Korea presently has more than 700 medical and engineering troops in Iraq, but has not committed combat troops capable of conducting operations and maintaining sector security. Many feel that the next dispatch, currently planned to include more than 1,400 combat troops of the 3,000 total, should be redesigned with a heavier emphasis on re-construction, and not security.
The N Iraq deployment area is relatively safe
But as benevolent as soldiers dedicated to reconstruction sounds, this noble objective is unlikely to be met. Putting aside the fact that reconstruction cannot be effectively implemented before local security has been achieved, the location of South Korea's planned troop dispatch requires little reconstruction. It is in the far north of Iraq in areas that have been under Kurdish control since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. Likely locations for Korea's 3,000 troops are Irbil and Sulaimaniya, areas far beyond Saddam Hussein's supporters' effective reach, and as such, area that were not targeted in bombing campaigns last spring. Both are presently secured by only 300 US troops.
In times of battle, half-hearted allies can be worse than non-allies. If South Korea, after much indecision and hand wringing, decides to "honor" its promise in a strictly perfunctory manner, as seems likely, the result will be greater headaches for the US command in Iraq than no participation at all. If South Korea commits combat troops but decides that they will maintain only a small, isolated pocket of sparsely populated land in the far north, the net effect of their contribution of 3,000, would be the freeing of only 300 US combat troops for other areas - a grossly inefficient exercise.
There is another factor beyond South Korea's propensity to involve itself in international efforts only when assured that the pay-off will exceed the contribution many fold - South Korea's participation in the Vietnam conflict comes immediately to mind - and that is cost. South Korea spends less than 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, a fact that is painfully obvious to anyone who happens by its infantry camps, or who has witnessed the dilapidated equipment South Korea's rank and file soldiers are assigned. Maintaining 3,000 troops more than 7,000 kilometers away from South Korea will require a tremendous outlay of resources - resources that would be better used to upgrade and re-focus its own domestic defenses.
The re-deployment of 3,600 US troops from South Korea may be just the beginning. The return date for these troops has also not been set, and some analysts believe this could well be a one-way trip out of the country. President Roh's belief in domestic and foreign policies independent of the United States requires a more Korea-centric approach to defense and military matters. The original agreement to dispatch troops was made not out of any belief in a "50-year blood relationship between the ROK and the US", as is sometimes articulated by officials from both countries old enough to recall the Korean War (1950-53), but out of concern that to appear less than a supportive US ally would weaken America's resolve to maintain the perception of a strong bi-national defense, effectively undermining a central pillar of economic stability in South Korea.
(The US maintains about 37,000 troops in South Korea, mostly in Seoul, and a roughly equal number of dependents, contractors and related personnel. Most will be moving out of the major US base in Seoul to other locations in South Korea, and some may leave the country entirely, though the exact number and deployment timetable is unknown.)
Placating the US is tired strategy
But doing just enough to placate the US and ensure the continued perception of American protection of South Korea and the real economic benefits this generates, is a tired strategy, and ultimately counter-productive for South Korea.
The United States would be wise to take this opportunity to encourage South Korea's self-first (oddly reminiscent of North Korea's juche) philosophy and encourage the nation to move forward in developing a policy consistent with changing national attitudes and developing an indigenous military structure to match. South Korea has become a resource sink for the United States in terms of budget outlay, equipment commitments and human resource allocation. The US can not afford to maintain bases, equipment and personnel in a country that has become increasingly hostile to its presence, and whose citizenry views them as anachronistic with contemporary perceptions of North Korea and its leadership.
South Korea and the United States should use this opportunity to take the first tentative steps toward a more equal relationship long demanded by Roh and an increasing majority of South Korean people, by using this initial re-deployment as a first stage in the complete removal of the USFK and in doing so, the overlord perception it invokes. In return, South Korea can more fully focus on its immediate domestic concerns, of which it has many, by creating domestic solutions to problems long mitigated by the presence of US troops, and proving to its people the fidelity of a progressive intra-Korean agenda independent of perceived United States interference.
David Scofield, former lecturer at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, is currently conducting post-graduate research at the School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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North Korea 101
The new college activism.
By Rachel Zabarkes Friedman
Last week, students at Stanford University sponsored their second annual North Korean Human Rights Week, a four-day program of speakers and other events designed to educate Stanford students about the plight of North Korean citizens. A few weeks before that, about 50 students gathered at Indiana University to listen to a panel of human-rights activists, policy experts, and North Korean defectors speak about the brutality of Kim's regime. Earlier this spring, a nationwide campus movement called Liberation in North Korea, or LiNK, was launched to be a "street team for the North Korean people," distributing information about human-rights violations there through a variety of channels. So far there are LiNK chapters at several dozen colleges.
Call it a trend: Across the country, students are beginning to take steps to increase awareness on their campuses about conditions -- i.e., starvation, isolation from the outside world, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and mass death -- in the Democratic People's Republic.
This wouldn't have been possible a decade ago. Although our knowledge of what goes on in North Korea -- by most accounts the world's most secretive regime -- remains incomplete, over the past several years increasing numbers of defectors and humanitarian organizations inside the country have enabled experts to start piecing together a picture of daily life there. The details are horrific: According to the recent congressional testimony of Suzanne Scholte, president of the Defense Forum Foundation, the regime "daily murders at least 42 people in [its] political prison camps and 391 through starvation." The North Korean government holds an estimated 200,000 political prisoners, and at least one million North Korean citizens have died of starvation since the mid-1990s.
And then there are the defectors' accounts. Take the story of Hae-Nam Ji, who testified almost a year ago before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Imprisoned for two years just for singing a South Korean song, she was tortured, sexually abused, and tried to kill herself while in jail. After her release, unable to make a living by selling her blood -- literally, to transfusion centers -- she escaped to China, hoping to make it to South Korea. But in China, after a series of steps and missteps, she found herself in government hands and was returned to North Korea, where she was jailed again. She made it the South on a second escape attempt, but only after tremendous hardship was she finally able to taste freedom.
Such astonishing figures and first-hand accounts have gradually made their way around policy circles and received a fair amount of attention in Congress. But according to Debra Liang-Fenton, executive director of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), a bipartisan group devoted to generating interest in the issue and improving life for the North Korean people, the awareness level of the public at large is still quite low. While most Americans know of North Korea as a nuclear threat, she says, few know as much about the regime's tyranny.
That goes for college students, too. Liang-Fenton says, "A lot of the students I had come into contact with just weren't aware that there was a serious human-rights problem in North Korea. They knew about the nuclear issue because that's what's covered in the media... Their knowledge of human rights there was very limited, if it existed at all."
Jack Rendler, vice chair of HRNK, agrees. "Human rights get quite a bit of attention in college classes, human rights in North Korea not at all. It's encouraging how many courses have integrated the norms and principles of universal human rights. But in terms of North Korea, it's like everywhere else -- it's not on the radar screen."
But that may not be the case for long. On top of its many other activities -- which include testifying before Congress and administration officials, producing reports on human-rights violations, and educating the public both here and abroad through op-eds, articles, and forums -- the committee recently launched a college-action campaign, designed to bring the issue of North Korean human rights to college campuses. HRNK helped students at Stanford organize their weeklong series of events, and cosponsored the forum at IU. They've also teamed up with students at Georgetown, Harvard, and Cornell, among others, to plan and carry out similar programs.
At Indiana University, HRNK worked directly with undergraduate music major Daniel Levin, the driving force behind the event. Levin first caught a glimpse of life in North Korea from an article describing alleged gas chambers used on prison-camp inmates. "I saw the concentration camps in North Korea and the whole human rights issue there as a pretty direct parallel to the Holocaust," he says. "Growing up Jewish...you always think, if I were there then, I would have done something to prevent it from happening. I saw this article and thought, 'It's happening again, something needs to be done.'"
Levin did an Internet search for groups working on North Korean human rights, and came across a post on NRO's The Corner about HRNK. He got in touch with the committee to ask whether they would bring North Korean defectors to campus -- he thought about how powerful it had been when Soviet defectors came to speak to students -- and they told him they were about to do just that.
So Levin approached Darrin Nix, the president of a non-partisan honors society that hosts speaking events at IU, and asked his group to host an HRNK panel. Nix agreed, and the event took place on April 6.
Nix, an undergraduate economics major also studying in the business school, admits that he didn't know much about human rights in North Korea until the panel, and says that at IU, "North Korea was non-issue until named [as part of the Axis of Evil] in President Bush's State of the Union address." Nix thinks the unusually long question-and-answer session at the HRNK event demonstrated the degree of interest among students, roughly half of whom knew very little about what life is like there.
Since then, Levin has continued his work to raise awareness on campus about human rights abuses in North Korea, and Nix has gotten involved as well. Nix says what he took away from the panel was the importance of motivating ordinary Americans pressure to our government to take what measures it can to loosen Kim's repressive grip. He also learned that one of the most important ways for us to pressure Pyongyang is through our relationship with China.
Some estimate that as many as 300,000 North Koreans have escaped to China and remain stranded there, without resources to make the dangerous trip to Seoul and fearful that the Chinese will capture and repatriate them. As the case of Hae-Nam Ji illustrates, their fear is entirely justified. Although China is a party to an international convention mandating the protection of refugees who will face imprisonment or torture back home,
Beijing insists that the North Koreans within its borders are economic migrants, and gives priority to a treaty with Pyongyang mandating their return.
One recent case that made it into the Western press involved Seok Jae-hyun, a South Korean photographer who in January 2003 went along to document what he and others hoped would be the first in a wave of boatlifts taking refugees from North Korea to South Korea by way of China. But Chinese authorities found out about the plan, and when Seok and the roughly 50 refugees with him reached the Chinese port of Yantai, police were there to greet them. Seok was arrested and spent 14 months in a Chinese prison; the refugees remain in jail in China -- who knows whether they'll make it out.
According to Rendler, students in the IU crowd who didn't know much about North Korea were blown away by the defectors' stories. Some of those who asked questions "were stunned by people having to live on grass for ten or twelve years, competing with one another for a frog or rat -- and by the beatings, and the torture." Some couldn't believe that a regime "could be so repressive that there would be no alternate political beliefs, no opposition, no freedom of thought."
These are the kind of horrific stories that move people to action -- students like Daniel Levin, Darrin Nix, and others. Back in October, Christian students at UC Berkeley formed a group called Students Praying for North Korea, and pooled $400 of their own money to hold an on-campus event at which they watched documentaries, related personal experiences, and prayed for North Korean citizens and refugees. LiNK, the intercollegiate group, has "caught on fire," Liang-Fenton says, in the weeks since it was formed.
These students are in turn working to further involve their peers. LiNK's website describes events and educational projects going on at schools all over the country. The Stanford group has made it a priority to encourage students to write letters to Congress in support of the North Korean Freedom Act of 2004, which calls, among other things, for increased radio broadcasting in North Korea (and the smuggling in of radios on which to listen), greater diplomatic pressure on China to stop catching and repatriating North Korean refugees, and the granting of U.S. asylum to North Korean refugees.
Last year, Hae-Nam Ji concluded her congressional testimony with a plea: "I would like to ask the human right activists...to expose the human right abuses inflicted by the feudal and corrupt North Korean government to the world so that the people in North Korea could escape from a life of humiliation and live freely as soon as possible." As she understands, public outreach is the first step toward improving life for North Koreans. Thanks to groups like HRNK, that potentially lifesaving work is well underway.

-- Rachel Zabarkes Friedman is an NR associate editor.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/friedman200405191033.asp

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DAILY EXPRESS
Protected Speech
by Michael Levi

Only at TNR Online
Post date: 05.19.04
In late April, Israel released Mordechai Vanunu, a scientist imprisoned nearly two decades ago for revealing state secrets that exposed Israel's nuclear weapons program. Vanunu emerged unrepentant, embraced by activists the world over as a beacon of truth and resistance. In their eyes, Israel's nuclear program was a wrong, so Vanunu had done an unquestionable right.
But whatever one thinks of Vanunu or Israel, his release underscored a truth far more disturbing than anything he had to say about Israel: Had Mr. Vanunu worked in a North Korean, Iranian, or Syrian weapons program, he would never have even had the chance to commit his original crime. Only in the free and open states whose possible pursuit of weapons of mass destruction worries us least--states like Germany or Canada or Israel--can we have confidence that scientists will blow the whistle on any covert weapons programs. In those states that worry us most, those scientists are controlled in ways that make such defections unlikely. The international regime for nonproliferation needs to confront this untenable situation.
That much was effectively accepted before the Iraq war, when the world united in demanding that Saddam Hussein turn over weapons scientists for questioning by international inspectors and also allow their families to be free from intimidation. The request was based on sound technical grounds: WMD programs, especially in their early stages, and particularly those for chemical or biological arms, can be effectively hidden from sophisticated inspection teams. Equally important, the world was not confident that it could reliably assess so-called "dual-use" equipment, applicable to civilian or military tasks. Insiders, it surmised, might be able to clarify that difference.
Whether that scheme was effective is still up for debate. The United States contends that Hussein never gave proper access to scientists. Others insist that he did, and that the scientists simply weren't saying what the United States wanted to hear. Either way, there remains a consensus assessment that free interviews of weapons scientists are valuable to international inspections.
And yet for so many repressive countries, open speech by potential weapons scientists is impossible. Securing interviews in Iraq required a special U.N. Security Council resolution. The international treaties governing weapons of mass destruction endow scientists with no special rights or responsibilities to expose illegal weapons programs. In some states, scientists wanting to speak out would have no channel for dissent. In others, they could speak out only on pain of their and their families' death or disappearance. Scientists in Iran or Syria who choose to squeal can only dream of being treated as Vanunu has been.
This can and must be changed. As a first step, a coalition led by the United States should establish a special standing program to absorb weapons scientists who expose illegal weapons programs. Those states should offer permanent immigration for the scientists and their families so that they can speak out without fear of retribution at home. (Before the recent Iraq war, the Senate tried to establish a program like that for Iraq. It was approved the day after the war began.)
But national programs won't be enough. If the U.S.-led coalition is too small, it could appear illegitimate, and even friendly states may call foul; rogue states that reject the intrusions may find a sympathetic audience. Information extracted through this approach might also be viewed suspiciously by the international bodies that monitor nonproliferation commitments--witness the (appropriate) skepticism given to U.S.-managed defectors by international inspectors before the Iraq war.
And even with broad support, there may be problems. If too many scientists take advantage of the program, the United States and its friends may be unable to absorb them. Conversely, scientists in closed societies will have no way of knowing about the protection programs, and thus will never defect.
The solution is to embed this scheme in the treaties that underlie the nonproliferation regime. All state signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, should be required to allow free interviews with any of their scientists, like those Vanunu managed to give. Any violation of that commitment would be considered a violation of treaty obligations, no different from a refusal to allow inspectors into a suspect facility. To give this more teeth, all states would be required to admit some quota of scientist whistleblowers and their families, relieving some burden from the United States. They would explicitly repudiate the unfortunate implication of the U.N. Convention on Refugees, which holds that since scientists in illicit weapons programs are violating international law, they are not entitled to refugee protection. At the same time, routine weapons inspections visits would be used to publicize the protection program to scientists, providing a means to penetrate closed societies.
To accept this arrangement would be to erode state sovereignty in ways that many Americans--and others--find discomforting. But a small sacrifice of American control could yield far more useful concessions from other states. Next time, instead of hearing from a whistleblower like Vanunu in an open and democratic ally like Israel, we might learn from a scientist in Syria or North Korea or Iran.

Michael Levi is Science and Technology Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.

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Democrats Criticize Management Contracts
Conflicts of Interest In Iraq, Report Says
By Robert O'Harrow Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, May 19, 2004; Page A17
Democrats called on the Bush administration yesterday to cancel contracts with private companies hired to oversee $1.7 billion in public works projects in Iraq, saying the companies have conflicts of interests and cannot be trusted to spend the government's money wisely.
Sen. Ron Wyden (Ore.), Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Calif.), Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (N.D.) and Rep. John D. Dingell (Mich.) said their research showed that some of the management companies hired by the Coalition Provisional Authority have a tangle of close financial ties to the construction and engineering firms they are supposed to monitor.
Among the companies cited were Parsons Corp. and CH2M Hill Inc., engineering and construction businesses that received a $28.5 million contract in March to manage four other contractors. The report said that Parsons is a partner of one of those other contractors, Fluor Corp., on "a $2.6 billion joint venture to develop oil fields in Kazakhstan."
CH2M Hill does business with Fluor and two other contractors on the project, Washington Group International Inc. and AMEC Inc., the report said. In one project, CH2M Hill and Washington Group International are "integrated partners" on a $314 million contract with the Energy Department.
Those and other details were included in a brief report called "Contractors Overseeing Contractors: Conflicts of Interest Undermine Accountability In Iraq." In a letter to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, they said the administration has "abdicated its responsibility to ensure that U.S. taxpayers' dollars are spent wisely."
The Democrats said they would introduce amendments to the defense authorization bill to end the contracts and require the Pentagon to provide the management oversight.
"These contractors are being asked to carry out essential government oversight functions, including defining and prioritizing project requirements and actually overseeing the work of construction contractors," the Democrats said in their letter. "It is not appropriate for contractors to exercise these functions -- particularly in view of significant conflicts of interests among these companies."
In a written statement, Parsons said the relationships would have no bearing on the ability of the company to manage the project and that it operates under the supervision of U.S. government personnel.
CH2M Hill did not return phone calls. Jerry Holloway, a spokesman for Fluor, described Iraq as a "fishbowl" and said all the companies there are under great scrutiny. He said the business relationship between Fluor and Parsons has no bearing on their activities in Iraq. "Our contract is with the Defense Department to support the CPA," he said. "That's who we're accountable to."
Defense Department spokesman Glenn Flood said the management contracts are in keeping with a long trend toward use of private companies to provide a wide variety of services. Though he would not speak directly about activity in Iraq, he said the Defense Department has no problem with the oversight of contractors. "The military should focus on its core mission, which is fighting wars and winning battles," Flood said.
Wyden said the companies in Iraq have no incentive to "take out a sharp pencil' and protect taxpayers. "You have a situation," he said, "where there is a cozy nest of interlocking financial interests."


? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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INTERVIEW MIT DEM ?GYPTISCHEN BOTSCHAFTER

"Wir brauchen Uno-Blauhelme im Irak"

Kurz vor dem Gipfel der Arabischen Liga stellt der Botschafter ?gyptens in Berlin, Mohammed al-Orabi, im Interview mit SPIEGEL ONLINE eine Beteiligung arabischer Soldaten unter Uno-Oberkommando im Irak in Aussicht. Von der deutschen Regierung fordert er "neue Ideen" im Nahost-Friedensprozess.

ANZEIGE

Mohammed al-Orabi ist seit 2001 Botschafter ?gyptens in der Bundesrepublik. Von 1994 bis 1998 arbeitete er an der Gesandtschaft seines Landes in Israel, davor diente er dem sp?teren Uno-Generalsekret?r Butros Butros Ghali als Privatsekret?r
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Herr Botschafter, die Situation im Irak wird immer gef?hrlicher. In US-amerikanischen und britischen Zeitungen taucht inzwischen auch das Wort "Exit Strategy" auf. Gibt es eine Abzugsstrategie, die Sie unterst?tzen w?rden?

Mohammed al-Orabi: Ja, wir w?rden einen Abzug der Koalition unterst?tzen. Aber es gibt Bedingungen, die erf?llt werden m?ssen. Es w?re sehr gef?hrlich, einfach alles stehen und liegen zu lassen, und zwar f?r die ganze Region. Auf diese Weise w?rden die USA nur einen weiteren Krisenherd hinterlassen, ohne ihre Mission erf?llt zu haben. Das w?rde auch den Interessen der USA widersprechen. Die USA sollten deshalb behutsam zu Werke gehen und auf den Rat ihrer Freunde h?ren.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Was raten Sie denn den USA?

Orabi: Wir haben von Anfang an gesagt, dass der Irak eine einzigartige Nation, ein Mosaik verschiedenster Gruppen ist. Es war unserer Meinung nach ein Fehler, dass die USA fr?hzeitig die irakische Armee aufgel?st haben. Man h?tte hier von den deutschen Erfahrungen mit der erfolgreichen Integration der DDR-Volksarmee in die Bundeswehr lernen k?nnen. Ich glaube, die USA haben den Irak-Krieg ohne eine eindeutige Vision f?r die Zukunft begonnen. Die Vereinten Nationen sollten deshalb jetzt nach und nach ?bernehmen. Die Iraker brauchen, nach den schrecklichen Erfahrungen von Bombardements und den Misshandlungen in Abu Ghureib erst einmal Zeit, ihr Selbstbewusstsein wieder aufzubauen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Gibt es denn im Irak auch eine Rolle f?r die arabischen Staaten, wie es Bundeskanzler Schr?der k?rzlich andeutete?

Orabi: Ich glaube das nicht. Wir wollen das Problem l?sen helfen, nicht noch mehr ?l ins Feuer gie?en. Dass arabische Truppen Recht und Ordnung in irakischen St?dten sch?tzen, kann ich mir nicht vorstellen; sie w?rden sich verteidigen, vielleicht auch schie?en m?ssen. Das w?rde unweigerlich zu Animosit?ten unter den Arabern f?hren. Es w?re allerdings annehmbar, wenn einige arabische Truppen unter Uno-Flagge in den Irak gingen. Aber eine multilaterale Truppe allein aus arabischen Soldaten, die die Italiener oder Polen abl?st, w?re ein Problem. Was wir im Irak brauchen, sind die Vereinten Nationen, sind Uno-Blauhelme, die nicht als Besatzungsmacht angesehen werden, sondern als Friedenstruppen ins Land kommen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Woher kommt Ihr Optimismus, was die Uno angeht? Schlie?lich war das Uno-Hauptquartier im Irak bereits Ziel eines der verheerendsten Anschl?ge im Land. Islamistische Gruppen betrachten auch die Uno als feindlich. Glauben Sie, dass sich das ?ndern w?rde?

Orabi: Ja, denn die Iraker denken immer mehr an ein normales Leben, an den neuen Irak, an die Zukunft. Sie haben genug gelitten und w?nschen sich geregelte Verh?ltnisse.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Haben die USA in ihren Augen eigentlich noch irgendeine Legitimation im Irak zu sein? Die mutma?lichen Massenvernichtungswaffen wurden nie gefunden. Dann kam es zu den Misshandlungen von Abu Ghureib.

Orabi: Es tut mir Leid, das sagen zu m?ssen, aber die moralische Glaubw?rdigkeit der USA br?ckelt in der Region. Das ist nicht in unserem Interesse, denn wir brauchen ein starkes Amerika mit einem guten Image. Wir brauchen sie als ehrlichen Makler. Zurzeit gehen die USA noch von falschen Voraussetzungen aus. Seit dem 11. September 2001 fragen sie: "Warum hassen sie uns?", anstatt die richtige Frage zu stellen, die da lautet: "Warum haben die Attent?ter getan, was sie getan haben?". Es geht in Wahrheit um einen Mangel an Gerechtigkeit. Das hat auch Bundespr?sident Johannes Rau kurz nach dem 11. September gesagt. Das m?ssen die USA verstehen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Kann es denn im Irak nach dem Fehlstart ?berhaupt noch ein Happy End geben?

Orabi: Wenn die USA nicht einsehen, dass sie in einiger Hinsicht falsch lagen, wird es kein Happy End geben. Ein kuweitischer Parlamentarier hat neulich gesagt: Die USA verhalten sich wie jemand, den man davor warnt, dass er gegen eine Wand f?hrt, und der, anstatt zu bremsen, nach dem Unfall sagt: Du hattest Recht. Dem stimme ich zu.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Die USA hatten zun?chst eine sehr ablehnende Haltung gegen?ber einem Engagement der Uno. Sehen Sie hier einen Wandel?

Orabi: Es gibt durchaus Anzeichen, dass sich mittlerweile auch die USA eine starke Rolle der Uno im Irak w?nschen. Das neue Denken scheint zu sein: OK, wir haben unsere Mission erf?llt. Jetzt sind die anderen dran.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Am kommenden Wochenende wird - h?chst wahrscheinlich - der Gipfel der Arabischen Liga stattfinden. Ist das eine B?hne, von der aus die Araber ihre Vorstellungen der Rolle der Uno im Irak beschreiben k?nnen?

Orabi: Ja, durchaus. Ich denke, wir sollten den Irakern den Eindruck vermitteln, dass es bald an der Zeit ist, dass sie ihre Angelegenheit wieder selbst bestimmen. Wir werden diese Forderung auf unserem Gipfel vertreten. Wir arabischen Staaten k?nnen auch dabei helfen, zum Beispiel indem wir irakische Polizisten ausbilden. Jordanien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate tun das bereits, ?gypten w?re sicher dazu bereit. Wir k?nnen auch eine Rolle beim wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau spielen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Ein weiteres gro?es Thema auf dem Gipfel der Arabischen Liga werden Reformen in den arabischen Staaten sein. An dieser Frage ist das eigentlich f?r M?rz geplante Treffen bereits einmal gescheitert. Gibt es eine Reformagenda, auf die sich alle arabischen Staaten einigen k?nnen?

Orabi: Ich mache mir keine Sorgen wegen der Reformen in der arabischen Welt. Wir haben damit bereits vor vielen Jahren begonnen. ?gypten beispielsweise hat seine Wirtschaftspolitik schon Anfang der Neunziger modernisiert. Wir haben eine freie Presse, Ministerinnen, Botschafterinnen, und so weiter. Die internationale Forderung nach Reformen in der arabischen Welt war, als sie erhoben wurde, Teil der US-Kampagne gegen den Irak. Es war ein Versuch, den Krieg zu rechtfertigen. Dass die USA glaubten, wenn Saddam erst gest?rzt ist, wird die Demokratie sich in die Nachbarl?nder ausbreiten, war aber naiv. Ich glaube nicht, dass man in absehbarer Zeit im Irak eine Demokratie nach westlichem Vorbild haben wird. Nicht morgen, nicht ?bermorgen, und auch nicht unmittelbar nach dem 30. Juni, wenn die Souver?nit?t an das irakische Volk zur?ckfallen soll. Wir stehen hier erst am Beginn eines langen Prozesses. Was den arabischen Gipfel angeht: Wir wollen alle Reformen. Aber wir wollen keine Panzer.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Sie wollen aber auch nicht die Art von Reformen, die den USA im Rahmen ihres Projektes vom "Greater Middle East" vorschweben, oder?

Orabi: Ich sehe keine Notwendigkeit f?r ein solches Projekt. Wir brauchen kein Modell f?r unsere Entwicklung. Jedes unserer L?nder hat seine eigenen Erfahrungen und wird sich daran orientieren. Die USA sollten nicht mit dem Feuer spielen, sondern rational vorgehen. Reformen werden kommen - aber graduell und von innen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Welche Bedeutung hat es in diesem Zusammenhang, dass Bahrein, Saudi-Arabien und der Jemen bereits angek?ndigt haben, nicht am Gipfel der Arabischen Liga teilzunehmen?

Orabi: Das hat nichts mit den Reformen zu tun. Der K?nig von Bahrein wollte schon am urspr?nglichen Gipfel nicht teilnehmen. Wir hatten noch so gut wie nie einen Gipfel mit vollst?ndiger Pr?senz aller F?hrer. Da gibt es Terminprobleme und ?hnliches.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Am Montag war die US-Sicherheitsberaterin Condoleezza Rice in Berlin. Unter anderem ist sie hier mit dem pal?stinensischen Premier Ahmed Kurei zusammengetroffen. Ist das ein Versuch von Seiten der USA, ein wenig Glaubw?rdigkeit zur?ck zu erlangen?

Orabi: Auf jeden Fall.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Ist der Versuch erfolgreich?

Orabi: Ich glaube, es funktioniert. In den vergangenen zwei Jahren haben die USA den Friedensprozess allein mit den Israelis diskutiert. Da ist dieses Gespr?ch ein Fortschritt. Was gestern passiert ist, k?nnte ein erster Schritt zur Wiederbelebung des Friedensprozesses gewesen sein. Das Problem ist nat?rlich, dass der israelische Ministerpr?sident Ariel Scharon seine eigene Roadmap verfolgt. Aber die ?u?erungen von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schr?der und Bundespr?sident Johannes Rau zum Konflikt sind richtige und wichtige Signale. Wir sind m?de, die ganze Welt ist m?de. Wir wollen, dass es endlich Frieden gibt in Nahost. Wir sollten ein neues Kapitel aufschlagen.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Gerade hat der K?nig von Jordanien, Abdullah II., in einem Interview mit der "New York Times" den pal?stinensischen Pr?sidenten Jassir Arafat aufgefordert zu pr?fen, ob sein Verhalten der pal?stinensischen Sache noch dienlich ist. Was halten Sie von dieser verklausulierten R?cktrittsforderung?

Orabi: Jassir Arafat ist das Symbol des pal?stinensischen Widerstandes schlechthin, nicht nur der Pr?sident. Die ?u?erung des K?nigs von Jordanien bezieht sich also zun?chst einmal wohl nur auf Arafats Rolle als Staatsoberhaupt. Aber meiner Meinung nach sollte diese Entscheidung dem pal?stinensischen Volk obliegen. Das Beste w?re, wenn es dort bald freie Wahlen g?be.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Wie steht es um die M?glichkeiten der Bundesrepublik, am Nahostfrieden mitzuwirken? Liegt eine besondere Bedeutung in der Tatsache, dass das Treffen zwischen Condoleezza Rice und Arafats Premier Kurei in Berlin stattgefunden hat?

Orabi: Ja, und das sage ich nicht, weil ich hier Botschafter bin. Deutschland genie?t in unserer Region gro?e Glaubw?rdigkeit und hat gute Beziehungen zu den Arabern und den Israelis. Deutschland kann sagen, was Recht und was Unrecht ist, und jede Seite wird zuh?ren. Manchmal sollte die Bundesrepublik diese Stimme ruhig etwas deutlicher und lauter erheben. Der Deal zwischen Israel und der Hisbollah, den Deutschland vermittelt hat, ist ein Beispiel f?r die M?glichkeiten, die Ihr Land im Nahen Osten hat. Wir warten auf weitere Ideen!

Das Gespr?ch f?hrten Claus Christian Malzahn und Yassin Musharbash
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Another gene genie out of the bottle

May 19th 2004
From The Economist Global Agenda


The European Commission has lifted a five-year moratorium on genetically modified produce, by allowing the sale in Europe of one type of modified corn. But the battle by producers of such crops to win governments' and consumers' acceptance is far from over








Get article background

EARLIER this month, opponents of genetically modified (GM) crops were celebrating a decision by Monsanto, a giant biotechnology firm, to drop its plans to market the world's first strain of GM wheat. Before that, in March, greens were cheered by a decision by Bayer, another biotech giant, to scrap plans to sell GM maize (sweetcorn) in Britain. Nevertheless, the environmentalist lobby has been suffering at least as many setbacks as victories in its drive to rid the world of "frankenfoods". A report in January by ISAAA, a research body partly funded by the biotech industry, shows that the worldwide acreage of GM crops continues to grow sharply (see chart). And on Wednesday May 19th, it was the biotech firms who were celebrating, when the European Commission ended a five-year-long moratorium on imports of any new GM produce.

The European Union had approved a number of GM crops until late 1998, but growing public concern over their supposed environmental and health risks led several EU countries to demand the moratorium. By late 1999 there were enough such countries to block any new approvals of GM produce. Under pressure from the biotech firms, and from America and other big growers of GM crops, the EU then persuaded the anti-GM countries to replace the moratorium with a scheme in which all products containing GM ingredients would have to be labelled as such, and those ingredients traceable to their source.

This label-and-trace scheme came into force last month. However, some EU countries have continued to resist approving new GM crop varieties. So, under the Union's rules on such matters, the decisions on each case have passed to its executive arm, the European Commission. Its decision on Wednesday was to approve imports of a variety of maize which has been modified by a Swiss firm, Syngenta, to incorporate a gene found naturally in soil bacteria that makes it resistant to attack by the corn borer--an insect that can devastate crops. However, the decision does not mean that Syngenta's maize variety can yet be grown in the EU itself.

Last year, while the EU members continued to argue among themselves, three of the largest producers of modified crops--America, Canada and Argentina--filed a complaint at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) about the moratorium, arguing that it was an illegal trade barrier because there is no scientific basis for it. Though the three plaintiff countries will be pleased by Wednesday's announcement, they are expected to continue pressing their complaint at the WTO, since the EU may well drag its feet on considering other applications for GM-crop approval. Furthermore, it still hasn't given its approval for the planting of modified crops on EU soil.

As more studies have been completed on the effects of GM crops, the green lobby's case against them has weakened. Little evidence has emerged of health risks from eating them. And, overall, the studies have shown that the environmental effects of modified crops are not always as serious as the greens claim. Nevertheless, environmentalists continue to find fault with such studies and argue that they are inconclusive.

While Americans seem happy enough to consume food made from GM crops, opinion polls continue to show that European consumers dislike the idea. Their resistance has waned somewhat as the green lobby has struggled to find evidence to support its case. But Europeans seem to be taking the attitude that, since there remains the slightest possibility of adverse consequences and since it is not clear how they, as consumers (as opposed to farmers and biotech firms), benefit from GM crops, they would rather not run the risk. So, while the European Commission's decision means that tins of modified sweetcorn can now be sold across all 25 EU states, it is still not clear whether supermarkets will stock them, nor if consumers would buy them.

So far, European food manufacturers and retailers, fearful of losing customers, have tended to avoid putting GM ingredients--even those approved before the EU moratorium--in their products. But this may not be so easy in future. Though GM crops still represent only a fraction of the world's agricultural output, their planting is growing at double-digit annual rates. One of the world's biggest producer countries, Brazil, gave in to pressure from its farmers last September and approved the planting of a variety of GM soyabeans. The country is fast becoming to such agricultural commodities as soyabeans what Saudi Arabia is to oil: a swing producer, whose decisions can sway the world market.

Up to now, food manufacturers and retailers, and thus their customers, have not had to pay a big premium for GM-free ingredients. But this may change if present trends continue and it gets harder to find non-GM sources for such ingredients as soya oil and maize syrup. Thus, despite the recent decisions by Bayer and Monsanto to drop some of their GM products, it seems likely that Europeans will find foodstuffs carrying the EU-mandated warning labels on their supermarket shelves. GM-free foods will, of course, continue to be on offer--though they are likely to start costing more, as "organic" foods already do. Though it will be a long time before they are as laid-back about GM foods as Americans are, Europe's nervous consumers may increasingly be forced to choose between their phobias and their wallets.


Copyright ? 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.

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