Blowback from South Korea's impeachment
By David Scofield

SEOUL - The impeachment of South Korean President Roh Moo- hyun may backfire against the conservative opposition that always resented the outsider, defender of the common man, the fighter for the weak and dispossessed. They had the money and the connections, but they lost the election, and they have been gunning for him ever since. Now Roh is comfortably back in the role of underdog, a part in which he excels. And the opposition may be in for some blowback, as the polls show.

About 70,000 Roh supporters gathered peacefully downtown over the weekend to protest the impeachment on Friday of their democratically elected president after just one year of his five-year term. Seoul has not witnessed a popular outpouring of such magnitude since the acquittal of two American soldiers on negligent-homicide charges during the run-up to the presidential elections in the autumn of 2002.

And now, as then, Roh has positioned himself to take advantage of a groundswell of righteous indignation - the plucky rebel, defender of the common man, standing up in defiance of larger, more powerful forces. And now as then, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) - its leadership so completely out of touch with the realities of contemporary South Korea - has pushed the great, centrist mass of the electorate toward the pro-government Uri Party, or OOP (Our Open Party), camp, just in time for a general election, April 15.

After the impeachment on Friday (the vote was 193-2 in the opposition-controlled National Assembly) it seemed obvious to many that Roh Moo-hyun and his advisers had grossly underestimated the forces that conspired against him. He fumbled the chance to apologize to opposing political forces during a speech last Thursday - appearing arrogant and unrepentant over campaign irregularities - and he inadvertently galvanized the opposition to his presidency. Indeed, as political-science professor Kim Young-il of Sungkyunkwan University said, "It is an extremely simple matter, all Roh has to do is apologize for violating the law." And Roh did apologize Thursday night - to the South Korean people, but not to the National Election Commission or opposing political forces.

Roh was impeached on two grounds:

Receiving illegal funds; though he himself has not been implicated, close aides have been.
Campaigning as a sitting president for a political party - the Uri or OOP, though he was not officially a member of the party. Still, a president is supposed to remain neutral.

Roh, advisers missed opportunities
Roh himself often appears to act or shoot "from the hip", but his advisers have proved to be most astute at reading the political winds when situations demand it - but not always. Roh's ousting of former foreign and trade minister Yoon Young-kwan, for example - sacrificed in essence for contempt within the ranks of the Foreign Ministry - could have led to the appointment of a pro-independence foreign-policy articulator who would tell the Yankees what's what, but it didn't. Roh has emphasized the importance of a South Korean foreign policy furthering South Korean interests, and emphatically independent of Washington when need be, but as a new foreign minister he chose Ban Ki-moon, a universally respected career diplomat not likely to ruffle feathers.

Since taking office, Roh has bemoaned the difficulties of crafting legislation and managing the affairs of state when the opposition-controlled National Assembly fought him at every turn. Consolidating control within the assembly has been his mission since his inauguration just over one year ago. Indeed, Roh's much-ballyhooed referendum promise - he would resign if the people did not support him - has morphed into a proxy vote this April. Roh has declared that a vote for the pro-government OOP would be a vote of confidence for his presidency.

Roh's ousting may have been the result of incompetence by his domestic advisers, but whether by design or by coincidence the impeachment has accentuated Roh's - and by extension the OOP's - strengths.

Roh has always been an underdog. His "aw shucks" man-of-the-people persona is effective: a former farmboy outsider who became a labor lawyer and fought for the disadvantaged. He comes across in speeches as a self-effacing, genuine personality, in sharp contrast to the slickness - some would say sleaze - of many of the nation's longtime politicians.

Back in 2002 Roh was a long shot in the polls
In October 2002, two months before the presidential election, GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang, longtime conservative politician and former Supreme Court judge, was considered the odds-on favorite to ascend to the nation's highest office. The GNP had the money and the connections, and with former president Kim Dae-jung's family ensnared in seemingly endless bribe and influence-peddling charges, the opposition GNP candidate was a lock - or so it looked.

At the time of the anti-US street demonstrations (two US soldiers had been acquitted of running over two middle-school girls in a training accident), street-savvy Roh saw the potential in the national outpouring after the controversial acquittal. He understood that it was more than a tragic accident, but the passionate manifestation of a nation in change, a movement comprised primarily of voters too young and too affluent to relate to the old Cold War politics that still defines the nation's alliance with the United States.

Roh embraced the younger voter, and played a different political game. He let the GNP attack him, even as it ensured his status as the grossly outmatched underdog. And the GNP heavyweights, long ensconced in privilege and wealth, failed to feel what Roh's supporters were feeling - and so the GNP opposition came to symbolize to many the arrogance of the conservative, pro-American establishment.

But the realities of governing crisis-prone South Korea have been daunting for Roh. Since taking office, his support has dropped from well over 70 percent to around 40 percent before the impeachment. Economic realities, high consumer debt, low consumer confidence, firmly entrenched regionalism and myriad other problems are dealing blow after blow to both the economy and society.

Roh's impeachment has put him squarely back to where he is most comfortable, in the role of underdog, locked in battle with a more powerful foe. This is crisis Roh, and it is Roh at his most potent. Roh is widely considered to be mediocre to ineffectual in his day-to-day governing of the nation, but the opposition has handed Roh a redeeming crisis, a tool with which to rally the Korean people to the cause of the weak but virtuous. This is a perception congruent with many Koreans' perception of themselves and their nation: small, weak and forever put upon by larger, more powerful forces. The GNP has once again ensured Roh's position as the people's president, himself a victim of power and conspiracy.

Koreans think impeachment a mistake - polls
Polls conducted over the weekend show the OOP ahead by double digits throughout the country. Even residents of conservative strongholds such as Daegu respond that the impeachment was a mistake. The GNP is thinking damage control, blaming the press for fanning the flames of dissent, while members of the Millennium Democratic Party (MLD) - co-supporters of the impeachment bill - are calling for the resignation of their party leader Chough Soon-hyung, and others are poised to jump ship to the pro-Roh OOP.

The impeachment has translated into an estimated 5-6 percent increase in support for the OOP, and while it is still a month before the general election, if it can maintain the momentum this impeachment has given them, an OOP victory in April seems likely.

Of course, Roh's impeachment trial before the Constitutional Court will probably not have ended by then. The court has as long as six months to make a decision, and as this is the first democratically elected South Korean president to be impeached, the justices must decide without the aid of precedent, meaning every aspect of the impeachment will have to be examined and conclusively adjudicated. Further, as impeachment prosecutors are members of the National Assembly - the chairpersons of the legislature and the judiciary committees - an OOP election win would theoretically allow the president's OOP supporters to act as his prosecutors.

Roh's camp may not have had the foresight to see the potential boon this impeachment would be to his and the OOP's popularity. Nonetheless, a boon it has been, and while opposition forces begin to attack each other for handing Roh such a "victory", all indications are that Roh and his progressive backers in the OOP may be heading for dominance in the National Assembly. That would allow Roh's team the power and legislative authority to implement far-reaching reforms - including constitutional changes that would relax the single five-year term limit for presidents. Changes would allow presidents to run for re-election after four years, instead of the current single five-year term mandated by the constitution. Such a reform would, according to the OOP, "prevent our national energy from being wasted by frequent elections and stabilize governance". Such a constitutional change would allow a president more time to enact far-reaching changes in South Korea.

How the impeachment came to pass
The Grand National Party, especially the old-guard conservatives within the party, have never accepted Roh's win - he was an outsider, an upstart. To them it was some sort of mistake - after all, they had the money and the connections, they would win. However, there he was in office and there wasn't much the GNP could do - but Roh helped them.

Last autumn, Roh left the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), the party he rode to victory, the party started by former president Kim Dae-jung. He didn't, and still hasn't, officially joined the OOP, composed mostly of former MDP members but some young GNP members as well. Roh burned some bridges when he left. He weakened the MDP considerably, and even those who had campaigned with him began to speak out against him. The straw that broke that camel's back, though, was his open campaigning for the OOP last month. It's technically illegal for a sitting president to campaign for a political party, but all presidents have done so, including Kim Dae-jung - and no one mentioned impeachment then.

What happened here was the perfect storm: the GNP has been gunning for Roh since the election; getting rid of Roh has been their No 1 priority, over and above matters of state, but on their own they lacked the votes to do much. When Roh endorsed the OOP in a speech on February 24, many in the MDP revolted - they joined forces with the GNP. That didn't add up to enough votes, until Roh delivered a haughty speech and refused to apologize to the Election Commission for any wrongdoings; he did apologize to the people for the fuss. That did it - the opposition had enough votes, a landslide impeachment.

With Prime Minister Goh Kun as acting president, not much is expected to happen - in terms of US relations, possible dispatch of 3,000 South Korean troops to Iraq or in terms of North Korean relations - until the elections next month. Then the whole mess may well blow up in the face of the GNP, which watched the some 70,000 Roh supporters protesting the impeachment. Roh appeared on newscasts - smiling, cracking jokes and telling everyone to be calm and let the courts work it out.

So the once and future president appears a likely figure in South Korea's future - once again.

David Scofield is a lecturer at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, Seoul.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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Pyongyang pins false hopes on Kerry
By Yoel Sano

As US Senator John Kerry now appears the presumptive Democratic challenger to President George W Bush, North Korea is assessing how its relations with the United States might change, even improve, with a Kerry victory in November. Although a lot can happen in eight months, and the contest looks very close, some polls show Kerry slightly ahead - and Pyongyang's foreign-policy shapers too are looking head, as reflected in its state-controlled media.

But if Pyongyang's leaders are pinning their hopes for better relations on a Kerry victory, they are almost certainly mistaken - relations probably would not improve significantly in a Kerry presidency, though North Korea might buy more time to increase its nuclear stockpile. Kerry could, in fact, prove to be a hardliner and find himself under enormous pressure from conservatives not to make any concessions to North Korea. Further, an examination of the record demonstrates that while some statements appear more moderate and critical of the Bush administration, some of Kerry's other statements are very similar to those made by President Bush - and some are even tougher.

North Korean media rarely comment on US domestic politics, but the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and Radio Pyongyang - monitored by South Korea's Yonhap news agency - have recently been reporting on Kerry and his criticism of Bush's exaggerated claims about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Kerry's criticism of what he calls Bush's unproductive hardline policy toward Pyongyang also has been reported on North Korean news programs.

Given North Korea's traditional lack of comment on US domestic politics, the continued references to Kerry, a Massachusetts liberal, is considered significant, not incidental, by many Korea watchers.

Highlighting Kerry's criticism of Bush
In a commentary titled "US must approach six-way talks with sincerity", dated February 23, before the last round of talks on Pyongyang's nuclear program, KCNA said:

"Public figures of different countries, regions and international organizations and media hope to see a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with the successful holding of the six-way talks. Growing louder are voices urging the Bush administration to approach the six-way talks beginning from February 25 with sincerity.

"The Bush administration is delaying talks with Pyongyang, said a US Democratic senator [John Kerry] on January 28. He added that it is time a sincere attitude was taken toward negotiation and if the president fails to instruct his officials to honestly approach negotiation and leave no room for this, the US will be unable to get the goal.

"Senator Kerry, who is seeking [the] presidential candidacy of the Democratic Party, sharply criticized President Bush, saying it was an ill-considered act to deny direct dialogue with North Korea." (The KCNA website specifies that quotations must be attributed to the Korean News Service, KCNA, in Tokyo.)

Conservative websites in the US, some of them strongly anti-Kerry, have seized on such comments as proof that the Massachusetts senator is favored by Pyongyang - in effect a kiss of political death - and therefore unworthy of the presidency of the United States.

Judging by these reports, it would appear that North Korea would prefer dealing with a President Kerry than a re-elected President Bush. It is highly likely that Pyongyang would like to see US-North Korea relations return to the status - far from ideal but hardly as dangerous as they are now - they enjoyed in the final 18 months of the presidency of Bill Clinton. That was an all-time high in bilateral relations, but such terms are relative. Clinton almost made a historic, first-ever US presidential trip to North Korea in November 2000, but decided against it at the last minute, apparently uncertain that it would achieve concrete results or become anything but a media circus.

US-North Korean ties improved under Clinton
However, Clinton did receive vice marshal Jo Myong-rok - the first vice chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission and the second-most-powerful man in the Pyongyang regime - at the White House in early October 2000. Jo was acting as a special envoy from North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, and he remains the most senior North Korean ever to have visited the US. The meeting was remarkable in itself, given that in mid-1994 Clinton strongly considered ordering air strikes on North Korea's nuclear facilities, and vice marshal Jo, who was the North's air force commander at the time, was believed to have been ready to order kamikaze suicide attacks on US naval vessels in nearby waters.

Reciprocating Jo's visit, secretary of state Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang two weeks later, on October 23, becoming the most senior US official ever to visit North Korea, where she was hosted by Kim Jong-il himself. (Former US president Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang during the 1994 nuclear crisis and held a meeting with the then "Great Leader", Kim Il-sung, but Carter had been retired for 13 years at that point, and his visit was undertaken in a private capacity.) Other notable Americans who visited North Korea during Clinton's second term included former defense secretary William Perry in May 1999 and, in a bizarre case, Clinton's half-brother Roger, a musician, who performed in a charity rock concert organized jointly by North and South Korean musicians in December 1999.

By contrast, bilateral relations under the Bush presidency have been frosty from the start. After September 11, 2001, Bush designated North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil", joining Iraq and Iran, and shortly afterward US officials leaked a story that North Korea is one of seven countries that the Pentagon sees as possible targets for nuclear strikes under certain conditions. Further, Bush told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward that he personally "loathe[s]" Kim Jong-il.

With all of this in mind, it is hardly surprising that Pyongyang would like to see the back of Bush.

Kerry's agenda is little different from Bush's
Pyongyang may somewhat optimistic, though, if it expects dramatically improved treatment under a President Kerry. True, his few pronouncements on the North Korean issue have had a more moderate tone than Bush's. But the actual picture is somewhat more complicated.

Kerry told the New York Times on March 6 that he favors direct bilateral talks with North Korea - which is one of Pyongyang's long-standing demands rejected by Bush. Kerry also criticized the US for sending "mixed and bad messages" to Pyongyang by breaking the 1972 US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and developing more nuclear bunker-busting weapons.

Kerry's conservative opponents claimed that his willingness to engage in direct talks - as opposed to the current arrangement of six-way North Korea talks involving China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States - makes him too amenable to Pyongyang's demands. The Bush administration repeatedly has said it will not "reward" Pyongyang's "bad behavior" in any way. North Korea seeks direct talks because this would increase its sense of prestige in the world, elevating its status by negotiating with a superpower. The US has favored the multilateral approach because it wants to be seen taking into account the views of key allies Japan and South Korea, as well as major powers China and Russia.

However, should a future President Kerry engage directly with North Korea, Pyongyang might soon find that the six-way talks offer it far more room for maneuver and delay than one-on-one talks. This is because it is inherently more complex for the United States and North Korea to negotiate in the presence of four other countries, at least two of which (China and Russia) have historically been sympathetic to Pyongyang, while the other two have been against it. In the six-way talks, all parties must act not only keeping Washington and Pyongyang in mind, but also minding how they view and relate to one another. Kerry's direct talks - if they ever were to take place - would remove these complications, potentially allowing for greater US pressure on North Korea.

Kerry article spelled out his North Korea policy
Kerry delivered his most comprehensive statement on North Korea in a Washington Post opinion piece published last August 6, long before he became the Democratic Party candidate for the presidency. Overall, it suggests few real differences with the Bush administration's policy.

In the opinion article, Kerry advocated negotiations, but so does the Bush administration. In terms of goals, Kerry wrote that "ultimately, our goal is to force North Korea to dismantle its nuclear-weapons program through an internationally verifiable process ... in a way that prevents the North Koreans from extracting concessions from us absent compliance by them". This is exactly what George W Bush is demanding.

On Pyongyang's demand for a security guarantee from the US, Kerry was slightly more accommodating, noting, "US commitment not to increase its offensive capabilities on the Korean Peninsula while Pyongyang is freezing its nuclear activities is one obvious - and I believe verifiable - way to move forward". However, barely a sentence later, he added, "but we must make clear that we retain all options, including military options, if North Korea breaks the freeze".

Naturally, it's the part about "military options" that worries Pyongyang. Fear of a US invasion a la Iraq has fueled its desire for a non-aggression pact with the United States. Kerry didn't specifically mention such a treaty in his article.

Kerry even tougher on drugs, human rights
Kerry also went on to raise other topics that would surely anger Pyongyang, if he were ever to become president:

"We must be prepared to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that addresses the full range of issues of concern to the United States and its allies - North Korea's nuclear, chemical, and missile programs, conventional force deployment, drug running, and human rights - as well as North Korea's concerns about security and development." The last two of these issues - security and economic development - are fine with Pyongyang, but the other items on Kerry's agenda are steps that even Bush is not demanding.

If a President Kerry were to force these on to the negotiating table, talks between the two sides would soon become very frosty - especially since North Korea is believed to earn a hefty sum from drug smuggling, and because as many as 200,000 of its citizens may be held in concentration and forced-labor camps.

Kerry concluded his article by saying that pursuing comprehensive negotiations would strengthen Washington's position since there would be more grounds for the military option should peaceful efforts fail. On the two occasions that Kerry mentions Kim Jong-il, he refers to him as a "despotic leader" and a "paranoid dictator". Again, this is hardly music to Pyongyang's ears.

Bearing in mind Kerry's statements and article, Pyongyang would be foolish to assume automatically that its national well-being and international relations would be better under a Kerry presidency. Yet it now appears that Pyongyang has decided not to make any serious concessions to the United States in six-way talks this year - with a view to seeing who wins the US election (see Talks aside, North Korea won't give up nukes, March 2).

From all indications, North Korea decided some time ago that its surest form of defense lay in the possession of nuclear weapons, and that it would use negotiations with the US and its allies as a way of stalling for more time in which to build up its stockpile. Further, Pyongyang is probably counting on the likelihood that there will be "no war in '04", since this is an election year, and Bush would not want to jeopardize his popularity by waging a costly war on the Korean Peninsula.

A New Mexican standoff with Bill Richardson?
However, from Pyongyang's point of view, the regime may not necessarily see a contradiction in continuing to push for a security guarantee and diplomatic relations with the US, while retaining its nukes "just in case". Pyongyang appears to see a Kerry victory as more conducive to achieving this goal. This would be especially true in a Kerry administration if his foreign-policy team included many Clinton-era officials who are familiar to Pyongyang.

Indeed, although Kerry has yet to name a vice-presidential running mate, one name that has been floated and whom Pyongyang would probably welcome is New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson. Since December 1994, Richardson has had extensive experience negotiating with Pyongyang; at that time he secured the release of a US helicopter pilot who had been captured by North Korea after a crash. He also had diplomatic contacts with North Korean officials in his capacity as US ambassador to the United Nations from 1997-98 and and as US energy secretary from 1998-2001. In his cabinet posting he oversaw the provision of US fuel shipments and new nuclear reactors for North Korea under the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework - the idea was to give North Korea alternatives to uranium and plutonium that could be used to produce weapons.

In January 2003 the current nuclear crisis was unfolding, after Pyongyang's decision to restart its main nuclear reactor. Then North Korean officials traveled to New Mexico, approaching Richardson and asking him to serve as a back channel to the Bush administration. If Richardson were to become vice president, Pyongyang might see him as a friendly, or at least familiar, ear in the White House.

It is precisely Kerry's moderate background that might preclude him from being hasty in granting concessions to Pyongyang if he becomes president. Democrats have long been accused of being soft on national-security issues, and Kerry would be under intense pressure from Republicans not to concede too much, too quickly. This is especially true given that the neo-conservatives around Bush, who withhold any criticism of the president for fear of alienating him, could become much more vocal if forced into opposition.

The realities of office and power also could make Kerry take a harder line with Pyongyang. Few politicians stick to their pre-election agendas once elected, as they grasp the complexities and competing forces that bear on any issue. Although Clinton mellowed toward Pyongyang in his second term, in early 1993 he visited the inter-Korean Demilitarized Zone and warned, "It is pointless for North Korea to try to develop nuclear weapons, because if they ever used them, it would be the end of their country." And in June 1994, as mentioned already, Clinton was seriously contemplating ordering air strikes on North Korea - which would have led to war.

Democrats not 'soft' on defense and security
North Korea's foreign-policy makers and analysts must also be aware that the notion that Democratic presidents are weaker than Republicans, especially on security, is contradicted by the historical record. Franklin D Roosevelt led the US into World War II, and his successor, Harry S Truman, authorized the first-ever use of the atomic bomb, against Japan. It was also Truman who repelled North Korea's invasion of the South in the Korean War, with a devastating effect on North Korea itself. It was another Democratic president, John F Kennedy, who risked nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis, and it was Lyndon Johnson who escalated the United States' last war in Asia, in Vietnam.

And it was Jimmy Carter - often seen as a weak postwar president - who, five months before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, signed a directive aimed at destabilizing latter's communist regime by supporting Islamic fundamentalist forces.

Pyongyang may at last be waking up to these facts. KCNA stated recently that "whoever is elected US president should be willing to make a switchover in its policy toward the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), drop the hostile policy toward it and express readiness to coexist with it". The key, therefore, lies in a change of policy rather than a change in president.

Paradoxically, if George W Bush wins a second term, then he may be in a better position to reach some sort of agreement with North Korea. For one thing, he would be free of electoral or congressional backlashes. Also, Republicans would more likely tolerate a deal with North Korea signed by a Republican president than a new Democratic president. For Pyongyang, a hardliner would at least clearly spell out terms and conditions, whereas moderation could be mistaken for weakness, or even be seen as a form of deception.

Just as only the late president Richard M Nixon could go to China, perhaps only George W Bush could go to Pyongyang.

Yoel Sano has worked for publishing houses in London, providing political, security and economic analysis, and has been following North Korea, as well as other Northeast Asian developments, for more than 10 years.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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THE ROVING EYE
The emergence of hyperterrorism
By Pepe Escobar

"If you don't stop your injustices, more blood will flow and these attacks are very little compared with what may happen with what you call terrorism."
- Abu Dujan al-Afghani, purported military spokesman for al-Qaeda in Europe, claiming responsibility on video for the Madrid bombings.

The "al-Qaedization" of terrorism in Europe is a political "big bang". According to intelligence estimates in Brussels, there may be an invisible army of up to 30,000 holy warriors spread around the world, which begs the question: how will Western democracies be able to fight them?

The Madrid bombings have already produced the terrorists' desired effect: fear. Cities all across Europe fear they may be targeted for the next massacre of the innocents. On his October 18, 2003 tape, Osama bin Laden warned that Italy, Britain and Poland, as well as Spain - all staunch Washington allies in the invasion and occupation of Iraq - would be struck. Sheikh Omar Bakri, spiritual leader of the Islamist group al-Mouhajiroun, said in London he "wouldn't be surprised if Italy is the next target".

Social paranoia inevitably will be on the rise - and the main victims are bound to be millions of European Muslims. Racist political parties like Jean Marie le Pen's National Front in France and Umberto Bossi's Northern League in Italy will pump up the volume of their extremely vicious anti-Islamic xenophobia. For scores of moderate European politicians, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain their support for a solution to the Palestinian tragedy - as the Sharon government in Israel spins the line that both Israel and Europe are "victims of terrorism".

This Wednesday, the European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, will ask the EU to name an expert to be in charge of "coordinating" the action of the 15 countries (soon to be 25). Belgium's Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt has proposed the creation of a European Intelligence Center to combat terrorism. Currently, each national intelligence service acts on its own, not always connected with Europol, the continent's police body in The Hague. A special cell in Brussels, for instance, conducts its own, separate investigations.

The new al-Qaeda virus
The special cell in Brussels considers that the Madrid bombings required "minute preparations, money, experience and cohesion". This has led European specialists on Islamist movements, like Antoine Basbus, director of the Observatory of Arab Countries, and Olivier Roy, a research director at the French Center of Scientific Research, to agree that al-Qaeda is now operating on three layers: the originals, or Arab-Afghans who were part of the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s; the franchised local groups; and the recent "converts" who provide the crucial link between the "base" and the local outfits.

The anti-terrorist experts in Brussels tell Asia Times Online they had known for some time that the original "base" of the al-Qaeda was greatly depleted. After all, Mohammed Atta, the leading military planner, and Mahfouz Ould, one of the leading ideologues, have been killed. Abu Zubaida, in charge of recruiting, and Ibn Sheikh Al-Libi, in charge of training, are in jail. But unlike the Americans roughly a year ago, the experts in Brussels did not assume that al-Qaeda was broken. They stress that al-Qaeda's real danger is "their persistent capacity to incite and collaborate with local groups" - they estimate there may be around 40 of these - to act in their own countries. "But we are even more concerned about groups that we don't know anything about."

The Moroccan arm of al-Qaeda, for instance, is the little-known Moroccan Islamic Combatants Group. The experts in Brussels now confirm that Saudis and Moroccans came to Madrid to plan the bombings alongside Islamist residents of Spain. But al-Qaeda is not only active in the Maghreb: it is very well connected in sub-Saharan Africa, in places not yet fully investigated like the Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic.

For months now, ever since the Istanbul bombings in November 2003, different European intelligence services have been afraid they would have to confront a mutated enemy. Most services were in fact sure that Istanbul represented the first attack on Europe. The possibility of further use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and even nuclear "dirty bombs", was not, and now more than ever is not, discarded.

Roy says that recruiting is now being conducted locally because "mobility is more difficult; there is not a place anymore where one goes to meet the chief or to get training". Recruiting campaigns continue all over the EU. For instance, one of the perpetrators of the bombing of the UN office in Baghdad in August 2003 was recruited in Italy. Other recruits in Spain, Germany and Norway ended up in Iraq via Syria. Global jihad, of which al-Qaeda is the leading exponent, is above all an idea. It thrives on spectacular terrorist attacks. Targets may have no strategic interest: what matters is terror as a spectacle - like bombing a nightclub in Bali. Madrid represented something much more sophisticated because in the Western collective consciousness it was the link between an American ally and the war on Iraq.

Spain may have become a new symbol of the clash between the jihadis' version of Islam and the "Jews and Crusaders". But as far as global jihad is concerned, it doesn't matter whether a European democracy like Spain is governed by conservatives or socialists. Al-Qaeda is an apocalyptic sect betting on the clash of civilizations: Islamic jihadis against "Jews and Crusaders". It is the same with the Bush administration spinning a "war on terror": James Woolsey, a former Central Intelligence Agency head, believes this is the Fourth World War and conservative guru Samuel Huntington bets on, what else, a "clash of civilizations".

Al-Qaeda's biggest problem is that it has no legitimacy in the Middle East as far as the key issues, Palestine and Iraq, are concerned. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's No 2, were never interested in the Palestinian struggle. In Roy's formula, "Al-Qaeda represents the globalization of Islam, not of the Middle Eastern conflicts."

The Osama factor
Al-Qaeda is a nebula in total dispersion, locally and globally. Take Osama's audio-video productions: they are always delivered to the world via Islamabad, but the distribution chain is so fragmented that no one can go back to the source. Tribal chiefs protect bin Laden all over the Pakistan-Afghan border for two reasons: because he is a Muslim and because he fought in the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s. This has nothing to do with September 11 - which for tribal leaders is something akin to a trip to the moon - and it goes beyond the US$25 million bounty on bin Laden's head. Most Afghans don't like Arabs and blame them for every disaster in the last 25 years. But every tomb of an Arab killed by an American bomb in 2001 is honored like a holy place.

The experts in Brussels consider that the possible capture of Osama in the upcoming spring offensive may not change anything, because in the current global jihad modus operandi the "base" retains all the initiative.

Roy insists military muscle simply does not work: "We are able to fight al-Qaeda with police operations, intelligence and justice. On a political level, one must make sure that they don't have a social base: already they don't have a political wing, sympathizers, intellectuals, newspapers or unions. They must be isolated. There's only one way for this to happen: full integration of Muslims," That's the exact opposite of the stigma privileged by conservative governments and racist, xenophobic parties.

Key conclusions
According to the experts in the Brussels anti-terrorist cell, proving al-Qaeda's responsibility in the Madrid bombings will lead to three important conclusions:
1. Al-Qaeda is back in the spectacular attack business, even if the attack is perpetrated by affiliates.
2. Cells remain very much active around Europe, and the West as a whole remains a key target.
3. Global jihad has achieved one of its key objectives, which is to strike against one of Washington's allies in Iraq.

The repercussions of all these conclusions are of course immense - from Washington to all major European capitals and spilling to the arc from the Middle East to Central and South Asia.

Brussels also alerts that this happens independently of other al-Qaeda objectives which remain very much in place: the departure of all American soldiers from Saudi soil; the fall of the House of Saud; and the expulsion of Jews from the Middle East. Al-Qaeda's ultimate objective is a caliphate. As far as the absolute majority of Muslims in the world are concerned, the global jihad's most seductive appeal undoubtedly remains its struggle to end the American imperial control of Islamic lands.

Romano Prodi, head of the European Commission, says that force is not working against terrorism: "Terrorism now is more powerful than before." Most European politicians and intellectuals - apart from Blair, Berlusconi, Aznar and their friends - consider that the Bush administration's response to asymmetric warfare has only served to increase the threat. It's a classic reductio ad absurdum. Increasingly lethal American military muscle deployed all over the Islamic world has led to more lethal terrorist attacks, in the Islamic world and also in the West. More muscled defense of hard targets, or strategic targets, has led to more indiscriminate attacks on so-called soft targets (like the Madrid trains). Madrid is a tragic mirror of Baghdad and Karbala: more than 200 innocent workers and students died in Madrid, more than 200 innocent pilgrims died in Iraq.

Not only in Brussels or the European Parliament in Strasbourg is there practically a consensus that the beginning of a solution for the terrorism problem is the end of both the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the American occupation of Iraq. Madrid once again proved that terrorism practices the ultimate in nihilist politics. There's no possible diplomacy. No possible negotiation. It does not bend when attacked by military power. It has no territory and no population to defend, and no military or civil installations to protect. Al-Qaeda is not a Joint Chiefs of Staff: it is an idea. It commands faithful servants, not soldiers. It has nothing to do with war - as the Bush administration insists - and much less with a war on Iraq. One of the reasons invoked for the war on Iraq - the link between Saddam and al-Qaeda - was turned upside down: more al-Qaeda infiltration in the West is a consequence of the war, not less.

In the corridors of Brussels, and in the streets of Madrid, Barcelona, Rome, Milan, London and Paris, Europe was given a rude awakening. All the evidence now screams that reshaping the Middle East from a base in occupied Iraq is not leading to less terrorism: it is leading to hyperterrorism.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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The al-Qaeda franchise
By Richard Giragosian

Although the investigation into the recent bombings in Spain is still underway, three different scenarios have emerged, each of which suggests a number of worrisome issues, particularly in the context of the US-led "war on terror". The first scenario, pointing to the Basque ETA separatist organization as the culprits, was the initial reaction that emerged from Spanish authorities and remained firmly entrenched as Madrid's official position for some time.

Despite the fact that this ETA scenario seems increasingly unlikely as the investigation proceeds, initial analysis was grounded in the fact that the explosives and detonators used in the bombings were allegedly linked to the ETA organization. But this factor was the only positive linkage, as the other elements were rooted in either the negative - such as clues pointing away from traditional ETA methods - to the speculative, mainly resting on the political choreography that the attacks were aimed at disrupting Spain's national election.

The second scenario under consideration focuses on al-Qaeda, with the assistance of local activists. Obviously, other factors moving the inquiry in this direction include the arrest and links to the bombings of three Moroccans with allegedly extensive ties to al-Qaeda, the discovery of a stolen van with Koranic tapes and the video release claiming al-Qaeda responsibility. According to this scenario, the bombings represent the al-Qaeda network's first major attack on Europe proper and pose several new troubling developments for the anti-terror movement.

The most notable development in this case includes a modification of tactics by al-Qaeda, moving away from its traditional use of suicide bombers and utilizing synchronized bombs triggered remotely, as well as a more sophisticated recognition of the political vulnerabilities of Western democracies and their inherent susceptibility to properly timed terrorist disruptions. The most interesting implication from this scenario is the suggestion that al-Qaeda has succeeded in using the attacks as its own form of "regime change", forging a role in bringing down a Western government.

The most intriguing analysis, however, is found in the third scenario, suggesting a new alliance between radical elements of the ETA and the al-Qaeda network. This scenario rests on several important, although still somewhat disparate, factors. The first link in this analytical ETA-al-Qaeda chain rests with an individual: Yusuf Galan, a Spanish national (and Islam convert) charged with ties to al-Qaeda back in November 2001. The second link is operational, stemming from a reported record of ETA supplying explosives to Islamic terrorists in general, and to the Palestinian militant group Hamas, in particular. Such a linkage also raises fears in neighboring France, which has its own recent history of ETA members operating on its territory.

Adding to the complexity of the investigation, there is also a deeper level of troubling trends in this possible ETA-al-Qaeda combination. Specifically, the revelation that some 80 radical ETA militants were reportedly in Iraq prior to the war and that some were allegedly implicated in the November 2003 killing of seven Spanish intelligence agents in Suwayrah raise new fears of a renewed terror threat. In fact, two of these 80 radical ETA members that were in Iraq were later arrest by the Spanish authorities as they attempted to transport some 500 kilograms of explosives to Madrid on February 29. Endowing ETA with a new global reach based on a tactical alliance with the al-Qaeda network and/or the Iraqi insurgency would significantly "raise the stakes" in the current round of the war on terrorism, with troubling implications for a Europe set to become only more vulnerable with the looming expansion of its visa-free borders.

Regardless of which scenario turns out to be the most accurate, there is perhaps an even more significant lesson that this speculation over the responsibility for the attacks has tended to obscure: what it reveals about the transformation of al-Qaeda. Even in the event that al-Qaeda itself is not directly involved in the bombings, the renewed focus on the group has demonstrated that it has substantially changed from Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda of September 11, 2001. This transformation consists of a move from what is defined as al-Qaeda from the "corporate terrorism" structure under bin Laden's direct control to what has more recently been termed as a "terror franchise". The attacks in Morocco and Turkey, well before Spain, were what first revealed this "phased transition". The threat is now posed by "al-Qaeda the movement" and not "al-Qaeda the international terrorist organization". Such a decentralizing, broadening shift away from the original al-Qaeda organization into a new more diverse array of local, more distantly linked affiliates makes targeting its center of gravity, or even acquiring the target, especially difficult.

Moreover, this new al-Qaeda movement also incorporates the local offshoots of radical Islamic groups as more autonomous franchises throughout the periphery of the Islamic world. Matched by a more localized focus, this movement is marked by local operators acting on their own soil (local Turks involved with the attacks in Turkey, local Moroccans carrying out the attacks in Morocco, etc) with little or no global reach but using the tenets of al-Qaeda to enhance their standing within their own smaller arena of operations. And although arguably to bolster the global jihad, the priority is on promoting the image, appeal, and even the recruiting opportunities of home-grown groups in their home countries. This is also seen by the increased activity in peripheral states of Indonesia, the Philippines, and most recently even in the West African nation of Chad.

This also seems to be reflected in the current strategy of the remnants of the bin Laden al-Qaeda organization, still struggling to regroup and hindered by a greatly weakened command and control structure. For the al-Qaeda organization, its priorities are Iraq and its remaining refuge along the Pakistani-Afghan border. The attacks carried out under the banner of al-Qaeda by the local, but remote affiliates serve to uphold the broader struggle, an important element, but no longer exhibiting the extensive preparations and global ambitions of the previous al-Qaeda. Thus, it seems likely that attacks in the name of the al-Qaeda movement will continue and most likely spread, but will be limited more to attacks of opportunity than of global strategy and increasingly isolated to the fringe areas of the periphery.

The course of this new al-Qaeda movement is not without historical parallel, however. In fact, there is an ironic similarity between the ideological justification and tactical support provided by the Soviet Union to the international communist movement of the 20th century, whereby so-called communists waged wars of national liberation and/or outright terrorism in the name of an overarching communist ideology in such remote places as small, isolated countries in Central America, Africa or even in parts of Europe through urban terrorism. But in the case of these operatives, including such urban-focused terrorist groups as the Red Brigades, Action Directe, Baader-Meinhoff and others, their viability proved short-lived, with an intensity so destructive that it eventually turned on itself. It remains to be seen whether the al-Qaeda movement will meet the same demise.

Richard Giragosianis a Washington-based analyst specializing in international relations and military security in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region.
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Madrid: UN's credibility critically wounded
By Ritt Goldstein

Within hours of Thursday's fateful Madrid blasts the United Nations Security Council met. During a five minute session the council's 15 members unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the Basque separatist group ETA for the deadly attacks. But as it became increasingly clear that ETA was not responsible, questions of attempted manipulation of the public were abundant.

Spain's ruling Popular Party went down in defeat to the Socialists in Sunday's national election. It did so amid accusations that the government had withheld information on the bombings in an effort to influence the forthcoming vote.

A tough line on ETA had long been part of the Popular Party's platform. If indeed such a horrific ETA attack occurred, it would be certain to win Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar's chosen successor the prime ministership. But with the Iraq war strongly unpopular among Spaniards, Islamic jihadi involvement in Thursday's nightmare would have grave implications for the Popular Party's votes, and it indeed did.

Despite doubts among experts in many corners, the Spanish government's reaction to Thursday's tragedy was immediate. Spain's interior minister, Angel Acebes, demanded that there was "no doubt" with regard to ETA's responsibility. But while Spanish passions could well be expected to influence judgement, what of the 14 remaining members of the Security Council? And notably, this was the first instance of a terrorist attack where any group was ever explicitly condemned by the council, let alone done so in five minutes.

Explaining how ETA came to be blamed, the council's French president, Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sabliere, said: "The Spanish government stated that, and the Spanish delegation has asked the council to put this element in their resolution and members of the council accepted it." The US ambassador to the United Nation, John Negroponte, explained that blame was assigned to ETA at the Spanish government's urging, and because "it is the judgement of the government of Spain that these attacks were carried out by ETA and we have no information to the contrary".

Though repeated questions were raised in many quarters, and the head of Europol, Juergen Storbeck, had voiced reservations regarding ETA's involvement, the Security Council nevertheless chose to condemn ETA. But the fact that council members such as the US and France chose to portray their action based upon the Spanish government's wishes, illustrated a concurrent distancing from the decision. The council's actions were appreciated as questionable from their outset.

On Saturday, as Spanish protesters accused their government of attempting to promote the theory of ETA's responsibility for its political advantage, Acebes repeatedly insisted that ETA was the prime suspect. But on Thursday, the Spanish police had already found a van containing detonators and a tape of Koranic verses, ETA had issued a rare denial of responsibility and concurrently blamed "an operation of the Arab resistance" and an al-Qaeda related group had claimed the act as their own. Something else was uncovered as well.

In Thursday's alleged al-Qaeda letter claiming responsibility, the group Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades taunted Aznar and the coalition forces, saying: "Aznar, where is America? Who will protect you, Britain, Japan, Italy and others from us?" The specter of the "war on terrorism" bringing the terrorism increases that had been warned of by Western intelligence services became suddenly real. And the vulnerability of the Iraq Coalition's democratic governments to be voted from office - many of these governments supporting the war in spite of substantive popular protest - became a reality too.

The Spanish government is the first of those in this category to fall, in spite of the Security Council's action which might have given it the legitimacy to continue. And efforts were made to maintain that legitimacy, to cite ETA as potentially involved - both within Spain and abroad - through Sunday's election.

A Sunday Reuters article reported that: "Some Spaniards were vitriolic in accusing Aznar of 'manipulating' public opinion over the bombings." And on Sunday's national US television, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice all insisted that there was insufficient information to know who was responsible for the Madrid attacks. But this was long after Thursday's Security Council resolution naming ETA, and with an apparent election debacle facing Spain's war supporters that very day.

Notably, the Bush administration has claimed al-Qaeda activity at every opportunity. Their failure to do so here, and in the face of substantive evidence of Islamic jihadi activity, being the one curious exception.

Highlighting another agenda, all three US officials argued that the Madrid attacks should firm world resolve in the "war on terror", with Rice insisting the war was being won. Their television appearances could be described as containing elements of a "pep talk". But as the new Spanish prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, has just said that he will recall Spain's 1,300 Iraqi peacekeeping troops by June 30, the rationale behind a broad effort to preserve and promote war on terror support becomes more apparent.

In a statement laden with paradox, Rumsfeld likened the coalition efforts to helping "the neighborhood children against the bully". But the secretary appears to have blithely forgotten the accusations by many UN members of Bush administration bullying in the run-up to the Iraq War.

Much to his credit, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan repeatedly avoided media queries as regards responsibility for Madrid, but simultaneously demonstrated the UN's weakness in the face of big-power politics. Notably, it was the fate of the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations, to fall during the 1930's as the world's major powers of the time chose to pursue paths of national expediency rather than multilateral interest.

A 1999 report by the US Department of Defense emphasized that the existence of a multilateral world, a multipolar world, was the best way to ensure lasting global stability. But it warned that: "International systems tend to last two to three generations. They are both created and destroyed by large-scale conflict. Like complex biological systems, international systems appear to go through life cycles with birth, flexibility in youth, more rigidity as the system matures, and demise."

Many international diplomats have recently called for the UN's "revision and renewal", and particularly a revised design for the Security Council.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)