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Briton Key Suspect in Nuclear Ring
Man accused of smuggling parts tells Guardian: 'I was framed'.
By Guardian Newspapers, 2/11/2004
A Middle East-based British businessman has emerged as a key suspect in a secret network supplying Libya, Iran and North Korea with equipment to build nuclear bombs.
Speaking for the first time yesterday, Paul Griffin denied that his company played any part in shipping prohibited material from the Far East.
He told the Guardian: "We have been framed."
His comments came as diplomatic sources and nuclear experts around the world stepped up their warnings of a growing proliferation crisis as atomic technology and expertise is increasingly traded on the black market.
Regulators have warned of a dangerous illegal "supermarket" in atomic know-how, spanning five countries.
Last night President George Bush added his voice to the growing chorus of alarm. He talked of the threat of black market dealers motivated by "greed, or fanaticism, or both".
For the first time Mr Bush publicly accused Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, of being at the centre of a network supplying North Korea with the centrifuge technology that is needed to make highly enriched uranium for atomic bombs.
The names of individuals and companies supposedly involved in Dr Khan's clandestine network - including that of Mr Griffin - have been leaking slowly into the public domain. The US authorities have named a Dubai-based Sri Lankan businessman, BSA Tahir, as a key middle man in the nuclear proliferation network.
Mr Bush last night named Mr Tahir as Dr Khan's deputy and said he ran SMB computers, a business in Dubai. "Tahir used that computer company as a front for the proliferation activities of the AQ Khan network. Tahir ... was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients."
The CIA director, George Tenet, last week named a Malaysian company, Scomi Precision Engineering, as the firm that manufactured 14 components for a nuclear centrifuge dispatched to Libya last year. The equipment was seized in a high-security operation in October when the container vessel carrying it, the German-owned BBC China, entered the Mediterranean. Intelligence agents persuaded the owners to divert the ship to the southern Italian port of Taranto, where the material was confiscated.
Pleading that it thought the components were destined for the oil or gas industry, Scomi in turn named British-owned and Dubai-based Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) as the company which placed the order.
GTI, which was established in 2000, is run by Mr Griffin and his father, Peter. Its registration form with the Dubai Chamber of Trade and Commerce describes it as trading in "pumps, engines, valves and spare parts". It is listed on another Middle East website as a steel trading company.
"The allegations are totally untrue," Mr Griffin told the Guardian from Dubai. "We trade in engineering products. The first I knew about the press release [from Scomi] was when I was telephoned about it at 7.15am on Tuesday.
"I was asked whether we had really bought $3.5m of equipment from Malaysia.
"It's total nonsense, rubbish. I'm trying to find out myself what [is supposed to have been going on]. I have approached the Malaysian consulate to find out how everything happened. I haven't bought anything from Malaysia at all.
"If I was going to buy high precision parts I would order them from Europe; you know what you are getting from there. I would notice if I had brought some precision-engineered parts. They are not something you go pick up at a supermarket."
Mr Griffin, 40, and originally from south Wales, said he had met Mr Tahir when GTI bought some computers from his company last year. GTI had also asked him to sort out a computer virus on his system. "That was it," Mr Griffin said.
Asked whether he knew Dr Khan, the metallurgist, Mr Griffin said that he had, coincidentally, met him at a wedding in Pakistan "about 18 years ago".
He added: "I went to a friend's wedding and he [Khan] was the local dignitary. I was introduced to him.
"I have never met him in Dubai or since then. I don't even know where he lives. I haven't had any [other] contact with him.
"If we were anything to do with [this smuggling], I would have thought British or US intelligence would have contacted me. The British embassy know me here. I haven't been contacted by the authorities here. If I was doing something dodgy, I would have been picked up."
The bill of lading with the German company, BBC Chartering and Logistic, which owned the BBC China, would show he had nothing to do with the centrifuge order, he said. "They have promised to send me the documentation. They told me they had never heard of us. It's all a mystery. The last time I saw Tahir was eight months ago. These allegations are all a load of bullshit." Mr Griffin, who has lived in Dubai on and off since 1986, said his father, Peter, had now retired to Paris. GTI was still tendering for work with the oil industry in the region.
GTI's registered office is in a low-rise building at the side of the eight-lane Sheikh Zayed Highway on the way to the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi.
On the ground floor, House of Cars sells four-wheel-drives to expatriates and Jebal Arafat Tailors caters to the Arab residents of the building.
Yesterday, the office smelled of paint and appeared to be in the process of being re-let. Mr Griffin lives in a single-storey villa in the smart Jumeirah area of the city, surrounded by palm trees. He told the Guardian his company had moved premises.
Malaysian security authorities said they did not know the whereabouts of Mr Tahir, who allegedly ordered the centrifuge parts from Scomi Precision Engineering, which is controlled by the son of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. A centrifuge is used to concentrate, or enrich, radioactive material. A police spokesman said investigators were keen to speak to him. "He is a crucial part of our ongoing investigation so we are keen to talk to him but we have yet to locate him," the spokesman said.
Mr Bush said that Mr Tahir, who has a Malaysian wife, "is in Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his activities".
Western diplomatic sources in Kuala Lumpur say they would like to see the investigation intensified but in reality it is losing momentum because Scomi has been cleared of any wrongdoing by Malaysian police. A police spokesman said: "Our investigation is still ongoing and we want to get to the bottom of the matter."
The Malaysian police chief, Mohd Bakri Omar, on Sunday absolved Scomi of any participation in the nuclear weapons trade. "So far, no wrongdoing has been committed," he said.
Scomi is continuing its operations. It insists it believed it was making equipment for the oil and gas industry.
A Scomi factory manager, Che Lokman Che Omar, told reporters during a tour of the site last week that the case was being blown out of proportion.
"It is not difficult to make," he said. "It could be one of thousands of parts used by the oil and gas industry. In fact, we have made more complex and difficult parts before." In its latest statement Scomi said it was making "generic items", not "sensitive parts" and that it "never knowingly manufactured" nuclear weapons parts.
The Foreign Office declined to comment about the allegations against GTI or Mr Griffin.
Investigators at the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency probing nuclear trafficking networks in at least a dozen countries believe Dubai is the centre for traders and middlemen running the black market.
The Americans hailed the seizure of the BBC China as a triumph for US intelligence that helped to persuade Colonel Muammar Gadafy of Libya to renounce his weapons of mass destruction pro grammes under the deal announced in December.
Other informed sources are convinced that, in fact, the boat was seized after the Libyans informed the CIA about it.
BBC Chartering and Logistic GmbH, the shipping company based at Leer in northern Germany which owns the BBC China, said: "This was a regular container transport from Dubai to Libya. We were surprised by the visits from the secret service and the [German] economics ministry. We're not involved at all in this story."
Rolf Briese, the company's managing director, said: "This is not so simple. We've made a declaration to the economic ministry and we have an agreement not to give any more information about it."
Investigation sources say the shipping company has been cleared of any suspicion in the incident and the BBC China is plying its business as usual.
While the IAEA investigators were denied access to the material on the BBC China by the Americans, the agency's inspectors found similar equipment in Libya during a visit in December.
According to diplomats in Vienna, the equipment bore stickers bearing the name KRL, referring to Khan Research Laboratories, the facility south of Islamabad at the heart of the Pakistani bomb project and named after Dr Khan.
The stickers found on the equipment in Libya explain why Dr Mohammed ElBaradei, the IAEA head, has taken to describing the clandestine nuclear trade as a "supermarket."
The disclosure of Dr Khan's smuggling network has been punctuated by heated claims and counter-claims about whether US and western intelligence agencies penetrated the hidden trade or completely missed its significance.

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PDF...http://announcements.klse.com.my/EDMS/subweb.nsf/7f04516f8098680348256c6f0017a6bf/e8cf4ae8af7e164748256d09000df628/$FILE/ATT4F3GQ/Scomi-Info%20On%20ScomiGrp%20I%20(560KB).pdf

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5 Februari 2004
Kenyataan Akhbar Ketua Polis Negara berkaitan tuduhan penglibatan Malaysia dalam membekalkan 'uranium centrifuge components' kepada Libya
Kenyataan akhbar ini adalah bertujuan untuk menjelaskan beberapa persoalan dan kekeliruan yang melibatkan Malaysia berpunca daripada berita-berita media asing berkaitan peranan seorang pakar senjata nuklear dari Pakistan. Pada 10 November 2003, pihak CIA dan M16 telah memaklumkan kepada Cawangan Khas perkara-perkara berikut:-
Bahawa BSA Tahir, seorang rakyat Sri Lanka dan ahli perniagaan yang berpengkalan di Dubai terlibat sebagai orang tengah atau 'middleman' dalam pembekalan komponen-komponen tertentu 'centrifuge' dari Malaysia untuk 'uranium-enrichment programme' oleh Libya; dan
Bahawa pada 4 Oktober 2003, sebuah kapal iaitu BBC China telah diperiksa di Pelabuhan Taranto, Itali di mana sejumlah lima kontena untuk Libya telah dirampas kerana dikatakan mengandungi sebilangan komponen-komponen 'centrifuge'. Komponen-komponen tersebut dikatakan diletakkan dalam kotak-kotak kayu yang mempunyai tanda nama Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn. Bhd. (SCOPE). SCOPE adalah anak syarikat kepada Scomi Group Bhd.
Berasaskan maklumat ini satu siasatan yang rapi telah dijalankan oleh pihak polis ke atas penglibatan BSA Tahir dan juga pihak SCOPE. Siasatan awal mendedahkan bahawa:
Sekitar tahun 2001, BSA Tahir telah menawarkan satu kontrak kepada SCOPE untuk menyediakan komponen yang dikatakannya adalah satu urusniaga yang 'legitimate'; dan
Pihak SCOPE telah menerima tawaran tersebut dan untuk menghasilkan komponen ini sebuah kilang telah didirikan di Shah Alam. Siasatan awal juga menunjukkan bahawa komponen 'centrifuge' yang dirampas daripada kapal BBC China juga boleh digunakan untuk alat-alat 'petro-chemical', 'water treatment' dan kegunaan kesihatan seperti 'molecular biology for protein separation'. Malahan pakar-pakar dalam bidang nuklear juga mendapati sukar untuk memastikan secara positif bahawa komponen-komponen yang dirampas itu adalah merupakan sebahagian komponen untuk unit 'centrifuge'.
Dakwaan yang tersiar dalam beberapa media asing bahawa sebuah kilang di Malaysia mampu mengeluarkan 'centrifuge' adalah satu dakwaan yang tidak berasas. Siasatan setakat ini menunjukkan bahawa tidak ada sebarang syarikat di Malaysia yang mampu mengeluarkan unit 'centrifuge' yang lengkap kerana ini memerlukan keupayaan teknologi dan kepakaran yang tinggi dalam bidang senjata nuklear.
Sehubungan ini juga BSA Tahir dan pihak SCOPE telah dan sedang memberi kerjasama yang sepenuhnya dalam membantu pihak polis untuk penyiasatan ini. Walaupun BSA Tahir sedang di bawah siasatan pihak polis tetapi dia tidak dikenakan tahanan sepertimana yang didakwa oleh media asing.
Penyiasatan rapi masih diteruskan dan pihak berkuasa Malaysia sedang bekerjasama dengan International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), sebuah agensi di bawah Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB) yang bertanggungjawab menguatkuasakan peraturan-peraturan dan kawalan senjata nuklear di bawah Triti Pencegahan Pembiakan Senjata Nuklear atau Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) bagi memastikan siasatan ini benar-benar 'transparent'.
Kenyataan akhbar yang lengkap akan dibuat sebaik sahaja penyiasatan mengenai perkara ini selesai kelak.
Dikeluarkan oleh Penguasa Perhubungan Awam, Polis Diraja Malaysia
4 Februari 2004, 7.25pm
Disediakan oleh:
Cawangan Perhubungan Awam, Polis Diraja Malaysia, Ibu Pejabat Polis Bukit Aman, 50560 Kuala Lumpur.
Tel: 603 - 2262 6310 Faks: 03 - 2272 2710 Email: rmp@rmp.gov.my
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Sri Lankan link to nuclear deal is free
KUALA LUMPUR, Friday (Reuters) - Officials denied knowledge today of whether a Sri Lankan businessman under scrutiny for helping Libya and Iran to develop nuclear programmes was in Malaysia, but said B.S.A Tahir was free to come and go.
"He's a free man," said an intelligence source who declined to be identified. But he said Tahir -- head of Dubai-based Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) -- was being investigated by Malaysian authorities.
"So far it doesn't warrant any arrest unless you have concrete evidence of breach of law," the source told Reuters.
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, whose son Kamaluddin Abdullah is linked to a local firm that supplied centrifuge parts to GTI, bridled after U.S. President George W. Bush suggested a Malaysian link to the nuclear secrets-for-sale scandal.
Bush said Tahir was in Malaysia and described him as a deputy to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic programme who confessed early this month to leaking nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
"I don't know where he got the evidence," Abdullah said on Thursday in reference to Bush's comments. "We are not in any way involved, not at all," he told reporters in the southern state of Johor.
Whether Washington would push for action against Tahir remains unclear, a question U.S. officials in Kuala Lumpur declined to answer today. However, one Western diplomat cited Malaysia's obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it ratified in 1970.
"It's pretty clear that many people involved in this knew what was going on. The question is how far did it go up?" said the diplomat.
The Malaysian manufacturer, a unit of Scomi Group Bhd, says the relevant parts were ordered for oil and gas work. Police have already said they have found nothing to suggest any wrongdoing by the firm.
Copyright ? 2001 Wijeya Newspapers Ltd. All rights reserved.
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No evidence, so Tahir remains free
KUALA LUMPUR -- Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, doubting US intelligence on Malaysia's role in a global nuclear trafficking network, said the man at the centre of the row would not be arrested, for now.
"He is on his feet and free to move around," Mr Abdullah said of Mr B S A Tahir, allegedly a middleman who helped Pakistan's top nuclear scientist sell equipment and know-how to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Mr Abdullah said police have spoken to Mr Tahir and "asked him a lot of questions". The police said they are not detaining Mr Tahir because he has apparently not broken local laws.
US President George W Bush called Mr Tahir the "chief financial officer and money launderer" of the network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
"We are not involved in any way. I don't know where Bush is getting his evidence from," Mr Abdullah said. -- AP
KUALA LUMPUR -- Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, doubting US intelligence on Malaysia's role in a global nuclear trafficking network, said the man at the centre of the row would not be arrested, for now.
"He is on his feet and free to move around," Mr Abdullah said of Mr B S A Tahir, allegedly a middleman who helped Pakistan's top nuclear scientist sell equipment and know-how to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Mr Abdullah said police have spoken to Mr Tahir and "asked him a lot of questions". The police said they are not detaining Mr Tahir because he has apparently not broken local laws.
US President George W Bush called Mr Tahir the "chief financial officer and money launderer" of the network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
"We are not involved in any way. I don't know where Bush is getting his evidence from," Mr Abdullah said. -- AP KUALA LUMPUR -- Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, doubting US intelligence on Malaysia's role in a global nuclear trafficking network, said the man at the centre of the row would not be arrested, for now.
"He is on his feet and free to move around," Mr Abdullah said of Mr B S A Tahir, allegedly a middleman who helped Pakistan's top nuclear scientist sell equipment and know-how to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Mr Abdullah said police have spoken to Mr Tahir and "asked him a lot of questions". The police said they are not detaining Mr Tahir because he has apparently not broken local laws.
US President George W Bush called Mr Tahir the "chief financial officer and money launderer" of the network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
"We are not involved in any way. I don't know where Bush is getting his evidence from," Mr Abdullah said. -- AP
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Computer firm in Dubai was hub for black market nuke network
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Thursday, February 12, 2004
LONDON - A Dubai-based company in the United Arab Emirates has been cited as the linchpin in the lucrative nuclear weapons black market that has supplied Iran, Libya and North Korea.
The United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency have determined that the UAE company served as the hub for the traffic of nuclear weapons components. Officials said the company coordinated with a range of nuclear suppliers for orders from such countries as Iran, Libya and North Korea.
The Bush administration identified the UAE firm as SMB Computers, a key element in the nuclear weapons black market operated by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. The company was found to have served as a clearinghouse for nuclear components ordered by Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Another UAE company involved in the nuclear black market was Gulf Technical Industries, which worked closely with SMB's Tahir, Middle East Newsline reported. The Dubai-based Gulf Technical, founded by British engineer Peter Griffin, an associate of Khan, contracted with Malaysia's Scomi Group Berhad for the manufacture of centrifuge equipment identified as P-2.
The public confession on Feb. 4 by Khan - the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program - in which he admitted to facilitating the network, has shocked the world and prompted new warnings that terrorists could gain access to weapons of mass destruction.
"The supply network will grow, making it easier to acquire nuclear weapon expertise and materials," IAEA director-general Mohammed El Baradei wrote in the New York Times on Thursday. "Eventually, inevitably, terrorists will gain access to such materials and technology, if not actual weapons."
"Khan and his associates," a White House fact sheet said, "used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges, and purchased other necessary parts through network operatives based in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Libya, Iran, and North Korea were customers of the Khan network, and several other countries expressed an interest in Khan's services."
The company was said to have processed orders for such goods as uranium hexafluoride - used for the centrifuge process that can produce enriched uranium for nuclear bombs - as well as components and complete centrifuges.
The shipments were said to have been disguised and often relabeled in Dubai to avoid detection.
SMB was operated by a deputy of Khan. Officials said the deputy, identified as Bukhari Sayed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan native, employed his Dubai company as the front for the nuclear network that sought to provide up to 1,000 centrifuges to Libya.
"Tahir acted as both the network's chief financial officer and money launderer," President George Bush said in a speech on Wednesday. "He was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed the Malaysia facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs, and then ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai. Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for shipment to other customers."
The nuclear network, which was said to have been penetrated by the CIA, contained companies and people from both Western and Third World countries, officials said. They included Belgium, China, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the UAE and the United Arab Emirates.
Dubai served as the port of destination for these shipments. Officials said Tripoli acquired nuclear weapons components manufactured in Malaysia, shipped and processed in Dubai and then sent to Libya.
"As a result of our penetration of the network, American and the British intelligence identified a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts manufactured at the Malaysia facility," Bush said. "We followed the shipment of these parts to Dubai, and watched as they were transferred to the BBC China, a German-owned ship. After the ship passed through the Suez Canal, bound for Libya, it was stopped by German and Italian authorities. They found several containers, each forty feet in length, listed on the ship's manifest as full of 'used machine parts. In fact, these containers were filled with parts of sophisticated centrifuges."
Bush outlined a new policy to prevent nuclear proliferation by a crackdown on the black market and a ban on the sale of some legal equipment to countries that do not submit to close international supervision.
In 2002 and 2003, officials said, Gulf Technical maintained a representative from Dubai to Malaysia to oversee the production of P-2 for Middle East clients. The P-2, made of maraging steel, has double the uranium enrichment capacity of the earlier model P-1, which is composed of aluminum.
For its part, the IAEA has questioned European businessmen suspected of having helped supply orders from Iran and Libya. They included executives from the German firm Leybold Heraeus, a leading maker of vacuum technology and a unit of the Swiss firm Unaxis AG. The agency cited four former Leybold employees that transferred centrifuge components to Iran and conducted business with other countries interested in nuclear technology, such as Saudi Arabia and Syria.
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S M B Computers L.L.C.
Al Musalla Towers,
Khalid Bin Waleed Road,
P.O.Box : 8736 Dubai - UAE.

Phone:
Sales / Support: (00 971 4) 3974744
Fax: (00 971 4)3974743General Inquiries: info@smbcomputers.com
Webmaster : webmaster@smbcomputers.com
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Bush seeks to restrict nuclear fuel
David E. Sanger/NYT
Thursday, February 12, 2004
WASHINGTON Declaring that terrorists with deadly unconventional weapons pose ``the greatest threat to mankind,'' President George W. Bush announced a new proposal Wednesday to limit the number of nations allowed to produce nuclear fuel.
In an afternoon speech at the National Defense University here, Bush called for a re-examination of what one administration official called the ``basic bargain'' underlying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: that those states that promise not to pursue nuclear weapons will receive help in producing nuclear fuel for power generation.
The president did indeed call for tougher controls on nuclear fuel production, but he also cited biological and chemical weapons, saying that they along with nuclear weapons constituted a deadly peril.
``In the cold war, Americans lived under the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but believed that deterrence made those weapons a last resort,'' Bush said. ``What has changed in the 21st century is that in the hands of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would be a first resort, the preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random murder.
``America and the entire civilized world will face this threat for decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes and unbending purpose.''
The president said the global network in nuclear goods set up by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the developer of Pakistan's bomb, exposed huge gaps in accords to stop the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The president noted that the Pakistani government had promised to share all information from its investigation in the affair and has issued assurances that its country will never again become a source of weapons proliferation.
Iran admitted last year that it had cheated on the nonproliferation agreement for 18 years, secretly building uranium enrichment facilities, though the country denied that it intended to produce weapons. North Korea abandoned the treaty last year and declared it was making nuclear arms.
Khan's network secretly sold equipment to both countries, and to Libya, American and Pakistani officials have said. Libya's leader, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, ``made the right decision'' in agreeing recently to abandon his country's development of deadly weapons, Bush said. Banning weapons of mass destruction can lead to better relations with the United States, he said. But isolation, hardship ``and other unwelcome consequences'' await countries that do not see the light, Bush said.
The president did not call for a reopening of the 1970 treaty. Instead, he appealed to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 40 countries that sell most nuclear technology, to refuse to sell equipment to any country that is not already equipped to make nuclear fuel, either by enriching uranium or by reprocessing spent fuel for plutonium. The United States is ready to help any country enforce its laws and controls, Bush said. ``The way ahead is not easy, but it is clear,'' the president said.
In a briefing on Tuesday evening, one administration official said Iran and North Korea were examples of ``regimes which have cynically exploited loopholes in the existing treaty'' to build up their capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear fuel.
While experts have long agreed that the treaty is flawed, Bush's proposal is bound to raise protests from developing nations, which say the United States and, by extension, the other declared nuclear states -- Britain, France, Russia and China -- are trying to extend their rights to produce weapons while denying that status to other nations.
In addition to those five, Israel, India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, and North Korea is believed by American intelligence agencies to have at least two and perhaps several more. Israel is a particularly difficult case for the United States because it has never declared its nuclear ability and has never signed the nonproliferation treaty. Its Arab neighbors and Pakistan have said that any reopening of nuclear regulation should start with forcing Israel to sign the treaty.
In his speech, Bush gave some details of how Khan's network operated. But he refrained from any criticism of President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, portraying Khan, the former head of Khan Research Laboratories, as a rogue scientist.
Bush was applauded when he described the Khan case as a victory for U.S. and British intelligence operations.
The director of central intelligence, George Tenet, made a similar case last week, and administration officials hope the story of the intelligence surrounding the Khan network will be a counterpoint to criticisms of how Iraq's weapons program was misjudged.
The national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was asked Wednesday in an interview on NBC's ``Today'' show whether the White House could explain how Musharraf could have pardoned Khan after he admitted giving nuclear secrets to North Korea, Iran and Libya.
``What President Musharraf has done is to give us the opportunity now to wrap up and to destroy what is one of the most active networks, the most active as we know it today, of this kind of shadowy underworld of nuclear entrepreneurs who are out there selling knowledge and expertise on the black market,'' Rice said. ``And because of Pakistan's cooperation, because of Pakistan's action based on information that they've been receiving from a number of sources, and because of very good intelligence work by the United States, Great Britain and others, we really now have a chance to wrap up this group. And that's the most important thing.''
Bush identified B.S.A. Tahir, a Sri Lanka-born trader who moved to Dubai as a child, as a key figure in the Khan network. Tahir, who divides his time between Kuala Lumpur and Dubai, negotiated with a Malaysian company called Scomi to produce parts for high-speed centrifuges, which enrich uranium, Scomi officials have said. It was the interception of one such shipment to Libya in October that allowed American intelligence officials to present Pakistan with evidence about Khan.
In recent days, efforts to reach Tahir in Malaysia have been unsuccessful. He owns 49 percent of a computer company, S.M.B. Computers, in Dubai, according to Dubai government documents. Scomi officials have identified him as one of the men who negotiated the deal under which they produced the parts.
Bush's speech marked the first time that Tahir has been publicly identified by the United States as a major player, though intelligence officials have mentioned, on background, what they say was his central role in arranging the transfer of centrifuge components from Malaysia to Dubai and on to Libya.

The New York Times

Copyright ? 2003 The International Herald Tribune


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Aiseh, man...
Saya akan pastikan bahawa tidak ada tempat dalam pentadbiran saya untuk pemimpin politik yang "cakap tidak serupa bikin" -- Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 9 Jan 2004, Kuala Lumpur.

Thursday, February 12, 2004
Get Smart, Get BSA Tahir
Again, don't lose sight of this:
The break for American intelligence operatives tracking Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear network came in the wet August heat in Malaysia, as five giant cargo containers full of specialized centrifuge parts were loaded into one of the nondescript vessels that ply the Straits of Malacca.
The C.I.A. had penetrated the factory of Scomi Precision Engineering, where one of the nuclear network's operatives -- known to the workers only as Tinner -- watched over the production of the delicate machinery needed to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. [via The New York Times]
Note that the CIA chose to spy on Scomi -- either through an agent or by bugging the factory -- instead of collaborating with Malaysian police.
One wonders what or who else George Tenet's goons are keeping an eye on here, but Tinner was their man then, a very important man:
... Throughout the work at Scomi Precision, the man known as Tinner, an engineer sent from Dubai by Mr. (BSA) Tahir, was on site overseeing the work, a Scomi official said.
Next item of note: Scomi Precision lets Tinner have the run of the factory, but doesn't even bother to find out his full name.
The question for Malaysians is not who Tinner is, but who Tahir is to Scomi, or to anyone else.
The company obviously so trusted the Sri-Lankan born businessmen with the Malaysian wife that they accepted whoever he brought in for the operation, and whatever he got them to produce, without question:
In a statement, Scomi said the shipments had consisted only of "14 semifinished components." Company officials said they never knew of the intended use of the parts.
A senior Bush administration official disputed the company's account, saying it would be highly unlikely that someone there did not know what they were producing. American and European weapons experts also said that the shipment headed for Libya contained thousands of centrifuge parts.
Scomi probably meant 14 types of semifinished components, not 14 components in total, but it would be good if the company publicly says so itself.
And who said no one there "did not know what they were producing"?
There was Tahir and the mysterious Tinner, who must have lied to the company on the true nature and purpose of the components they were manufacturing.
Scomi is very likely innocent of knowingly supplying centrifuge parts to the Libyans, but it would not be unreasonable to speculate that there are people here who would rather have Malaysians not know so much about Tahir's local wheelings and dealings.
Here's one more of the growing number of facts on Tahir:
Malaysian police have been investigating Tahir, who is married to the daughter of a former Malaysian diplomat, the (Malaysian) official said. [via The Wall Street Journal Online]
Bonds forged by marriage are not only one of the strongest, but indeed one of the most useful, especially if you're in trouble.
In any event, we're upset that we are being unfairly singled out:
... A senior (Malaysian) official, however, accused Bush Wednesday of unfairly singling out this Southeast Asian nation's role in the secret network, insisting the sole known case of Malaysian involvement was the unwitting manufacture of parts seized en route to Libya last year.
"He's overblown Malaysia's role in this, the role of Malaysian companies in this," the official said on condition of anonymity. "Making Malaysia the central conduit to this is misleading."
However, Lim Kit Siang, a veteran opposition politician, called for an independent inquiry, saying Bush's speech made the quick exoneration of the company involved "untenable."
Police say they are still investigating the whole affair, and it should not be too long before that is completed.
After all, the man practically the entire world is accusing of being a lynchpin in the nuclear arms blackmarket is here.
In addition, he can clear our name.
Instead of crying foul at every accusation thrown at us, why don't we get Tahir to make a public confession of his complicity. and of our innocence?
Why haven't we?
Posted at 05:27 PM in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)
Bigger And Bigger
They're getting bigger and bigger:
Lands and Cooperative Development Minister Tan Sri Kasitah Gaddam has been arrested by the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) this morning.
He was seen arriving at the ACA headquarters at 8.55am and was then taken by officers into the building. He was then arrested 10min later.
It was learnt that he was arrested over some shares in a company. He is expected to be charged later this morning.
This is the second high-profile arrest by the ACA in the past few days. [via The Star Online]
Now, how about a major BN figure?
Don't tell me that UMNO (especially), MCA and MIC leaders from the peninsula are entirely clean.
Posted at 09:51 AM in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)
Wednesday, February 11, 2004
Our Man BSA Tahir
Malaysia is set to be in the international limelight once more:
In an afternoon speech at the National Defense University (Wednesday) ... (president George) Bush will ... identify B. S. A. Tahir, a Sri Lanka-born trader who moved to Dubai as a child, as the "other major node" in the Khan network.
... In recent days, efforts to reach Mr. Tahir in Malaysia have been unsuccessful. He owns 49 percent of a computer company, S.M.B. Computers, in Dubai, according to Dubai government documents. Scomi officials have identified him as one of the men who negotiated the deal under which they produced the parts.
Mr. Bush's speech will mark the first time Mr. Tahir has been publicly identified by the United States as a major player, though intelligence officials have mentioned, on background, what they say was his central role in arranging the transfer of centrifuge components from Malaysia to Dubai and on to Libya. [via The New York Times]
The Malaysian police say Tahir is not under arrest as he has broken no laws.
Nevertheless, he is being portrayed, rightly or wrongly, as "a major player."
The implications of such an allegation is that he would a "player" who is walking around freely in our own backyard.
That will certainly look bad on the country.
Maybe it's time we provide the media, both local and foreign, access to Tahir, so that he can clear our name.
Oh, and clear his own good name, of course.
That said, the question of why we are so protective of Tahir remains.
Who is this Sri-Lankan, with the Malaysian wife on one arm, and impressive business and political contacts on the other?
Posted at 03:26 PM in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)
Tuesday, February 10, 2004
The Proving Ground
The arrest of former Perwaja Steel managing director Eric Chia marks the beginning of a new phase in Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's fight against corruption, and drive for a higher degree of accountability.
He has displayed, in this instance, the will to back his tough talk with concrete action, as befits a leader that leads by example.
The bold move is also one step along the path towards fulfilling the people's now sky-high hopes of seeing a cleaner, more transparent and democratic Malaysia.
Eric Chia is indeed a sizeable fish, and the Prime Minister has now come to the crunch.
Chia's trial in August needs to be a fair one in the people's eyes. It is certain to be full of drama, as Chia has promised fireworks.
This time, there can be no scapegoating, no whitewash, no witness too high as to avoid subpoena, no expunging of "irrelevant" evidence.
This country cannot afford one more trial of that nature; the people will no longer tolerate a repeat performance.
And neither does it stop there, nor can it be stopped there.
Malaysians know Chia is not the only bottom dweller in the putrefying, oxygen-deprived pond of power abuse, political wrongdoing and corruption.
They know there are other, bigger, fatter fish still swimming around freely.
They will want their heads, too.
With Chia's arrest, Pak Lah has proven that he his committed to the cause.
In the coming weeks, months and years, he will have to prove it again, and again, and again.
Posted at 07:29 PM in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)
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Bush calls Pak nuclear sales an 'international failure'
Vasantha Arora (IANS)
Washington, February 12
US President George W Bush, speaking publicly for the first time on Pakistan's nuclear black market network, has cited it as a failure of the international safeguard regime.
But he scrupulously avoided comment on the pardon granted by President Pervez Musharraf to Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is said to have been at the centre of it all.
Bush made use of his highly publicised speech on "international action against spread of weapons of mass destruction" at the National Defence University here Wednesday to make his first public comment on the nuclear black market run by Khan.
Bush highlighted ongoing efforts to break up Khan's proliferation network and projected it as a success story of the US and British intelligence, now under attack for their role in the pre-war Iraq.
"For decades, Khan remained on the Pakistani government payroll, earning a modest salary. Yet he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles through the sale of nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from North Africa to the Korean peninsula," he said.
Bush said Khan had confessed to his crimes, and his top associates were now out of business. Bush said it points to the need for the nations of the world to come together to deal with a specific threat, just as they have to combat terrorism.
"These regimes and other proliferators like Khan should know: we and our friends are determined to protect our people and the world from proliferation," he said.
He said: "The government of Pakistan is interrogating the network's members, learning critical details that will help them prevent it from ever operating again," and "Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf has promised to share all the information he learns about the Khan network and has assured the United States that his country will never again be a source of proliferation".
He made out a strong case for new international efforts to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), saying the most dangerous threat before the world is the potential for terrorists or rogue nations to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons in a surprise attack.
More must be done, Bush said, to combat the international black market in weapons of mass destruction, and to prevent countries from developing nuclear arms under the guise of building civilian power plants.
He announced seven proposals that would modernise non-proliferation laws, restrict the sale and transport of nuclear technologies and equipment, and stop the sale of nuclear technology to countries that do not agree to vigorous international inspections to ensure their nuclear programmes are for peaceful purposes.
Bush also urged the United Nations Security Council to quickly approve a US-proposed resolution that would require all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.
He also proposed to expand efforts to do away with weapons left over from the Cold War.
Bush noted that a former customer of the Khan network, Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, had "voluntarily agreed to end his nuclear and chemical weapons programmes, not to pursue biological weapons, and to permit thorough inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons."
Gaddafi "made the right decision, and the world will be safer once his commitment is fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his example," Bush said.
The president presented a detailed picture of the Khan network, pieced together over several years by American and British intelligence.
"Governments around the world worked closely with us to unravel the Khan network, and to put an end to his criminal enterprise," Bush said.
He said, "AQ Khan, himself, operated mostly out of Pakistan. He served as director of the network, its leading scientific mind, as well as its primary salesman. Over the past decade, he made frequent trips to consult with his clients and to sell his expertise.
"He and his associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium as well as a nuclear design stolen from the Pakistani government. The network sold uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifuge process can transform into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs.
"Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these countries with components, and in some cases, with complete centrifuges," he said.
To increase their profits, President Bush pointed out, Khan and his associates used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts were purchased through network operatives based in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
These procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear technologies as a shortcut to personal wealth, and they set up front companies to deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials, he said.
He said, "Khan's deputy -- a man named BSA Tahir -- ran SMB computers, a business in Dubai. Tahir used that computer company as a front for the proliferation activities of the AQ Khan network. Tahir acted as both the network's chief financial officer and money launderer.
"He was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed the Malaysia facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs, and then ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai.
"Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for shipment to other customers."
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Wednesday, February 11, 2004 ? Last updated 1:36 p.m. PT

Excerpts of Bush speech on WMD
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Excerpts from President Bush's speech on weapons proliferation, as recorded by the White House:
In the past, enemies of America required massed armies and great navies, powerful air forces to put our nation, our people, our friends and allies at risk. In the Cold War, Americans lived under the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but believed that deterrents made those weapons a last resort. What has changed in the 21st century is that, in the hands of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would be a first resort, the preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random murder.
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A. Q. Khan is known throughout the world as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. What was not publicly known, until recently, is that he also led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how.
For decades, Mr. Khan remained on the Pakistani government payroll, earning a modest salary. Yet, he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles through the sale of nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from North Africa to the Korean Peninsula.
A. Q. Khan himself operated mostly out of Pakistan. He served as director of the network, its leading scientific mind, as well as its primary salesman. Over the past decade, he made frequent trips to consult with his clients and to sell his expertise. He and his associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium, as well as a nuclear design stolen from the Pakistani government. The network sold uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifuge process can transform into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these countries with components, and in some cases, with complete centrifuges.
To increase their profits, Khan and his associates used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts were purchased through network operatives based in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. These procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear technologies as a shortcut to personal wealth, and they set up front companies to deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials.
Khan's deputy, a man named B.S.A. Tahir, ran SMB computers, a business in Dubai. Tahir used that computer company as a front for the proliferation activities of the A. Q. Khan network. Tahir acted as both the network's chief financial officer and money launderer. He was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed the Malaysia facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs, and then ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai. Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for shipment to other customers.
---
Breaking this network is one major success in a broad-based effort to stop the spread of terrible weapons. We're adjusting our strategies to the threats of a new era. America and the nations of Australia, France and Germany, Italy and Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom have launched the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict lethal materials in transit. Our nations are sharing intelligence information, tracking suspect international cargo, conducting joint military exercises. We're prepared to search planes and ships, to seize weapons and missiles and equipment that raise proliferation concerns, just as we did in stopping the dangerous cargo on the BBC China before it reached Libya. Three more governments, Canada and Singapore and Norway, will be participating in this initiative.
---
First, I propose that the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more than shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action against proliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not just among intelligence and military services, but in law enforcement, as well.
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Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and international controls that govern proliferation. At the U.N. last fall, I proposed a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.
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Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep weapons from the Cold War and other dangerous materials out of the wrong hands. ... We must also prevent governments from developing nuclear weapons under false pretenses. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was designed more than 30 years ago to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those states which already possessed them. Under this treaty, nuclear states agreed to help non-nuclear states develop peaceful atomic energy if they renounced the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the treaty has a loophole which has been exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran. These regimes are allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs. ...

The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.
---
It is the charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover banned nuclear activity around the world and report those violations to the U.N. Security Council. We must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to fulfill its essential mandate. America and other nations support what is called the Additional Protocol, which requires states to declare a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities, and allow the IAEA to inspect those facilities. As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only states that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programs.
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We must also ensure that IAEA is organized to take action when action is required. So, a sixth step, I propose the creation of a special committee of the IAEA Board which will focus intensively on safeguards and verification.
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And, finally, countries under investigation for violating nuclear non-proliferation obligations are currently allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors. For instance, Iran, a country suspected of maintaining an extensive nuclear weapons program, recently completed a two-year term on the Board. Allowing potential violators to serve on the Board creates an unacceptable barrier to effective action.
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Le discours de M. Bush sur la lutte contre les armes de destruction massive
Le pr?sident appelle la communaut? internationale ? intensifier la lutte.
(retour au d?but)
Pendant des dizaines d'ann?es, M. Khan a gard? son emploi de fonctionnaire, touchant un salaire modeste. Cependant, ses complices et lui finan?aient un train de vie de riches gr?ce ? la vente de technologies et d'?quipement nucl?aires ? des r?gime d?voy?s situ?s de l'Afrique du Nord ? la P?ninsule cor?enne.
Pour sa part, M. Khan menait ses activit?s ? partir du Pakistan. Il ?tait le directeur du r?seau, son principal cerveau scientifique, et aussi son principal vendeur. Au cours des dix derni?res ann?es, il s'est d?plac? ? maintes reprises pour avoir des consultations avec ses clients et pour vendre son savoir-faire. Ses complices et lui ont vendu des plans de centrifuges pour enrichir l'uranium ainsi que d'autres plans li?s au nucl?aire appartenant au gouvernement pakistanais. Le r?seau a vendu de l'hexafluorure d'uranium, un gaz que le processus de centrifugation peut transformer en uranium enrichi pour bombes nucl?aires. M. Khan et ses complices ont fourni ? l'Iran, ? la Libye et ? la Cor?e du Nord les plans d'anciennes centrifugeuses pakistanaises, ainsi que les plans de mod?les de centrifugeuses plus sophistiqu?es et plus efficaces. Le r?seau a fourni ? ces pays d'autres ?l?ments de centrifugeuses, et dans certains cas, des centrifugeuses enti?res.
Pour augmenter leurs b?n?fices, M. Khan et ses complices ont eu recours ? une usine en Malaisie pour fabriquer des pi?ces importantes de centrifugeuses. D'autres pi?ces essentielles ont ?t? achet?es par le truchement d'agents attach?s ? des r?seaux situ?s en Europe, au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique. Pour ces interm?diaires, le commerce des techniques du nucl?aire ?tait un moyen de s'enrichir rapidement, et ils ont cr?? des soci?t?s de fa?ade pour amener des entreprises l?gitimes ? leur vendre des mat?riaux ?troitement contr?l?s.
L'adjoint de M. Khan - un homme appel? B.S.A. Tahir - ?tait directeur de la soci?t? SMB computers, une entreprise de Duba?. M. Tahir s'est servi de cette soci?t? d'informatique pour couvrir les activit?s de prolif?ration du r?seau d'A.Q. Khan. M. Tahir ?tait ? la fois le principal responsable financier du r?seau et celui qui blanchissait les fonds. Il ?tait aussi son agent d'exp?dition, utilisant son entreprise d'ordinateurs pour couvrir l'envoi de pi?ces de centrifugeuses ? divers clients. M. Tahir a ordonn? ? l'usine de Malaisie de produire ces pi?ces selon les plans pakistanais, et a ensuite ordonn? ? l'usine d'envoyer les ?l?ments ? Duba?. M. Tahir a aussi fait en sorte que des pi?ces achet?es par d'autres acheteurs europ?ens transitent par Duba? afin d'?tre exp?di?es ? d'autres clients.
Les agents des services am?ricains et britanniques du renseignement ont pris plusieurs ann?es pour reconstituer le puzzle du r?seau Kahn. Nos services du renseignement ont peu ? peu mis ? jour la port?e de ce r?seau et identifi? ses principaux experts, agents et financiers. Des agents ont suivi ses transactions, dress? la carte de ses op?rations. Ils ont surveill? les d?placements d'A.Q. Khan et de ses principaux associ?s. Ils ont suivi des membres du r?seaux aux quatre coins du monde ; ils ont enregistr? leurs conversations ; ils ont infiltr? leurs op?rations ; ils ont mis ? jour leurs secrets. Ce travail implique de grands risques et tous les Am?ricains peuvent ?tre reconnaissants pour la diligence et le d?vouement de nos excellents professionnels du renseignement.
Les gouvernements du monde entier ont oeuvr? en ?troite coop?ration avec nous pour exposer le r?seau Khan et pour mettre fin ? ses agissements criminels. A. Q. Khan a avou? ses crimes et ses principaux associ?s ont d? cesser leurs activit?s. Le gouvernement du Pakistan interroge actuellement les membres du r?seau et recueille aupr?s d'eux des d?tails critiques qui lui permettront de pr?venir toute r?cidive de leur part. Le pr?sident Musharraf a promis de partager tous les renseignements qu'il obtiendra sur le r?seau Khan et nous a assur? que son pays ne serait plus jamais une source de prolif?ration.
M. Tahir est en Malaisie, o? les autorit?s enqu?tent sur ses activit?s. Les autorit?s malaisiennes nous ont assur? que l'usine utilis?e par le r?seau avait cesse de produire des pi?ces pour centrifugeuses. Quant aux autres membres du r?seau encore en libert?, ils seront trouv?s un ? un et il sera mis un terme ? leur carri?re dans le commerce des armements.
Gr?ce ? notre p?n?tration du r?seau, nos services de renseignement et les services de renseignement britanniques ont identifi? un envoi de pi?ces sophistiqu?es pour centrifugeuses provenant de l'usine malaisienne. Nous avons suivi ces pi?ces jusqu'? Duba? et avons observ? leur transbordement sur le BBC China, navire de propri?t? allemande. Apr?s ?tre pass? par le Canal de Suez ? destination de la Libye, il a ?t? arraisonn? par les autorit?s allemandes et italiennes, qui y ont trouv? plusieurs conteneurs d'environ 12 m?tres de long, dont le contenu ?tait d?crit sur le manifeste du navire comme des "pi?ces m?caniques usag?es". En r?alit?, ils contenaient des pi?ces sophistiqu?es pour centrifugeuses.
L'interception du BBC China a eu lieu alors que des repr?sentants des autorit?s libyennes, britanniques et am?ricaines examinaient la possibilit? pour la Libye de mettre fin ? ses programmes d'armes de destruction massive. Les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni ont pr?sent? aux repr?sentants officiels de la Libye ces preuves de l'existence d'un programme nucl?aire actif et illicite. Il y a environ deux mois, le dirigeant de la Libye avait convenu volontairement de mettre fin ? ses programmes d'armements nucl?aire chimiques, de ne pas entreprendre de programmes d'armements chimiques et d'autoriser des inspections compl?tes de l'Agence internationale de l'?nergie atomique et de l'Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques. Nous oeuvrons maintenant en partenariat avec ces organisations et avec le Royaume-Uni pour aider le gouvernement libyen ? d?manteler ces programmes et ? ?liminer tous les mat?riaux dangereux.
Le colonel Kadhafi a pris la bonne d?cision et le monde sera plus en s?curit? une fois qu'il aura rempli ses engagements. Nous nous attendons ? ce que d'autres r?gimes suivent son exemple. Le renoncement aux programmes d'armements illicites peut mener ? de meilleures relations avec les Etats-Unis et avec les autres nations libres. La poursuite de tels programmes n'apportera pas la s?curit? ni le prestige international ; elle n'am?nera que l'isolement politique, des difficult?s ?conomiques et autres cons?quences ind?sirables.
Nous savons que la Libye n'?tait pas le seul client du r?seau Khan. D'autres pays ont exprim? un vif int?r?t pour les services de ce r?seau. Ces r?gimes et d'autres ?l?ments qui contribuent ? la prolif?ration doivent savoir ceci : nous sommes, nous et nos amis, d?termin?s ? prot?ger notre population et le monde de la prolif?ration.
La destruction de ce r?seau repr?sente un succ?s majeur dans le contexte d'un effort de grande envergure engag? pour enrayer la propagation d'armes terribles. Nous adaptons nos strat?gies aux menaces d'une ?re nouvelle. L'Am?rique et d'autres nations, l'Allemagne, l'Australie et l'Espagne, la France et l'Italie, le Japon et les Pays-Bas, la Pologne, le Portugal et le Royaume-Uni ont lanc? l'Initiative de s?curit? contre la prolif?ration (ISP) pour interdire le transport de mat?riels l?taux. Nos pays partagent les renseignements, surveillent les cargaisons internationales suspectes et proc?dent ? des exercices militaires conjoints. Nous sommes pr?ts ? fouiller les avions et les navires, ? saisir les armes et les missiles et le mat?riel qui suscitent des pr?occupations en mati?re de prolif?ration, comme nous l'avons fait en stoppant l'envoi de la cargaison dangereuse du BBC China avant qu'elle n'arrive en Libye. Trois autres pays, le Canada, Singapour et la Norv?ge, participeront ? cette initiative. Nous continuerons d'?largir le groupe des pays de l'ISP et, ? mesure que celle-ci se d?veloppera, les prolif?rateurs se heurteront ? des difficult?s croissantes dans le commerce des armes illicites.
Il y a un consensus entre les nations sur le fait que la prolif?ration ne peut pas ?tre tol?r?e. Toutefois, ce consensus n'a gu?re d'importance s'il ne d?bouche pas sur un passage ? l'action. Il est de l'int?r?t de toutes les nations civilis?es de pr?venir la propagation des armes de destruction massive. Ces mat?riaux et ces technologies, et les gens qui en font le trafic, traversent de nombreuses fronti?res. Pour stopper ce commerce, les nations du monde doivent se montrer fortes et d?termin?es. Nous devons oeuvrer de concert ; nous devons agir de mani?re efficace. Je pr?sente aujourd'hui sept propositions pour amplifier les efforts mondiaux visant ? enrayer la propagation d'armes meurtri?res.
Premi?rement, je propose que les travaux de l'Initiative de s?curit? contre la prolif?ration soient ?largis pour traiter des activit?s autres que les exp?ditions et les transferts. Nous pouvons, en faisant fond sur les instruments que nous avons ?labor?s pour lutter contre les terroristes, passer ? l'action directe contre les r?seaux de prolif?ration. Il faut pour cela une coop?ration accrue, pas seulement entre les services de renseignement et les forces arm?es, mais aussi avec les forces de police. Les participants ? l'ISP et les autres nations qui y sont dispos?es devraient faire usage d'Interpol et de tous les autres moyens pour traduire en justice ceux qui pratiquent le trafic des armes meurtri?res, fermer leurs laboratoires, saisir leurs mat?riaux, geler leurs avoirs. Nous devons suivre toutes les pistes. Nous trouverons les interm?diaires, les fournisseurs et les acheteurs. Le message que nous adressons aux prolif?rateurs doit ?tre clair : nous vous traquerons et nous n'aurons pas de cesse que nous n'ayons mis fin ? vos activit?s.
Deuxi?mement, j'engage toutes les nations ? renforcer les lois et les contr?les internationaux qui r?gissent les questions de prolif?ration. Aux Nations unies, ? l'automne dernier, j'ai propos? une nouvelle r?solution du Conseil de s?curit? qui exigerait que tous les Etats criminalisent la prolif?ration, adoptent de strictes mesures de contr?le ? l'exportation et assurent la s?curit? de tous les mat?riaux sensibles pr?sents sur leur territoire. Le Conseil de s?curit? devrait adopter cette r?solution promptement. Cela fait, l'Am?rique sera pr?te ? aider les autres gouvernements ? formuler et ? appliquer la nouvelle l?gislation qui nous aidera ? faire face ? la prolif?ration.
Troisi?mement, je propose d'?tendre nos efforts visant ? ?viter que les armes de la guerre froide et les autres substances dangereuses ne tombent dans des mains ind?sirables. En 1991, le Congr?s a adopt? la loi Nunn-Lugar. Le s?nateur Lugar avait une vision claire, ainsi que le s?nateur Nunn, de la fa?on de traiter avec l'ex-Union sovi?tique. Dans le cadre de ce programme, nous aidons les anciens Etats sovi?tiques ? trouver des emplois productifs pour leurs scientifiques sp?cialis?s en armements. Nous contr?lons, nous d?mantelons et nous d?truisons les armes et les mat?riels provenant de l'arsenal sovi?tique d'ADM. Nous avons encore du travail ? faire dans ce domaine.
A la suite des travaux du G-8 de 2002, nous avons convenu d'allouer 20 milliards de dollars sur une p?riode de 10 ans, la moiti? provenant des Etats-Unis, pour appuyer de tels programmes. Nous devrions ?largir le champ de cette coop?ration ? d'autres r?gions du monde. Nous engagerons les scientifiques et les techniciens sp?cialis?s en ADM dans des pays tels que l'Irak et la Libye. Nous aiderons les nations ? mettre un terme ? l'emploi d'uranium ? usage militaire dans les r?acteurs de recherche. J'engage vivement les autres nations ? contribuer ? ces efforts. Les nations du monde doivent faire tout ce qu'elles peuvent pour contr?ler et ?liminer tous les mat?riaux nucl?aires, chimiques, biologiques et radiologiques.
Tout en poursuivant et en d?truisant ces r?seaux, nous devons aussi emp?cher les gouvernements de d?velopper des armes nucl?aires sous de faux pr?textes. Le Trait? de non-prolif?ration nucl?aire a ?t? con?u il y a plus de 30 ans pour pr?venir la propagation des armements nucl?aires au-del? des Etats qui en poss?daient d?j?. En vertu de ce trait?, les Etats nucl?aires ont convenu d'aider les Etats non nucl?aires ? d?velopper l'?nergie atomique ? vis?e pacifique s'ils renon?aient au d?veloppement d'armes nucl?aires. Mais il y a dans le trait? une faille qui a ?t? exploit?e par des pays tels que la Cor?e du Nord et l'Iran. Ces r?gimes sont autoris?s ? produire du mat?riel nucl?aire qui peut servir ? fabriquer des bombes sous le couvert de programmes nucl?aires civils.
Donc aujourd'hui, ? titre de quatri?me mesure, je propose un moyen de rem?dier ? cette carence du trait?. Le monde doit cr?er un syst?me ordonn? et sans danger autorisant la mise en place d'installations nucl?aires ? usage civil sans accro?tre les dangers de prolif?ration des armements. Les principaux exportateurs nucl?aires mondiaux devraient veiller ? ce que les Etats aient acc?s de mani?re fiable et ? des co?ts raisonnables au combustible destin? aux r?acteurs civils, sous r?serve que ces Etats renoncent ? l'enrichissement et au retraitement. L'enrichissement et le retraitement ne sont pas n?cessaires pour les pays qui cherchent ? exploiter l'?nergie nucl?aire ? des fins pacifiques.
Les 40 nations du Groupe des fournisseurs nucl?aires devraient refuser de vendre des ?quipements et des technologies servant ? l'enrichissement et au retraitement ? tout Etat qui ne poss?de pas d?j? des usines d'enrichissement et de retraitement bien ?tablies et en activit?. Cette mesure emp?chera de nouveaux Etats d'acqu?rir des moyens de produire des mati?res fissiles pour fabriquer des bombes nucl?aires. Il faut emp?cher les prolif?rateurs de manipuler le TNP pour se doter de l'?quipement et de l'infrastructure n?cessaires pour produire des armements illicites.
Pour que les normes internationales soient efficaces, il faut qu'elles soient appliqu?es. C'est l'Agence internationale de l'?nergie atomique qui est charg?e de d?couvrir les activit?s nucl?aires interdites dans le monde entier et de signaler les violations au Conseil de s?curit? des Nations unies. Nous devons veiller ? ce que l'AIEA dispose de tous les instruments dont elle a besoin pour s'acquitter de son mandat essentiel. L'Am?rique et les autres nations appuient le Protocole additionnel, comme on l'appelle, qui exige des Etats qu'ils d?clarent une large gamme d'activit?s et d'installations nucl?aires et qu'ils autorisent l'AIEA ? inspecter ces installations.
A titre de cinqui?me mesure, je propose que d'ici l'an prochain, seuls les Etats signataires du Protocole additionnel soient autoris?s ? importer du mat?riel pour leurs programmes nucl?aires civils. Les pays qui entendent s?rieusement lutter contre la prolif?ration approuveront et appliqueront ce protocole. Je l'ai soumis au S?nat et je le prie instamment de consentir imm?diatement ? sa ratification.
Nous devons ?galement veiller ? ce que l'AIEA soit organis?e de mani?re ? lui permettre d'agir quand il le faut. En tant que sixi?me mesure, donc, je propose la cr?ation d'une commission sp?ciale au sein du Conseil de l'AIEA qui concentrera ses travaux intensivement sur les garanties et la v?rification. Cette commission, o? si?geront des repr?sentants de gouvernements en situation r?guli?re avec l'AIEA, renforcera la capacit? de l'agence ? faire en sorte que les nations s'acquittent de leurs obligations internationales
Enfin, les pays faisant actuellement l'objet d'enqu?tes pour violations de leurs obligations en mati?re de non-prolif?ration nucl?aire sont actuellement autoris?s ? si?ger au Conseil des gouverneurs de l'AIEA. C'est ainsi que l'Iran, pays soup?onn? de mener un vaste programme d'armement nucl?aire, vient d'achever son mandat de deux ans. Le fait d'autoriser les transgresseurs ? si?ger au Conseil constitue un obstacle inacceptable qui s'oppose ? une action efficace. Aucun Etat faisant l'objet d'enqu?tes pour violations des dispositions de non-prolif?ration ne devrait ?tre autoris? ? si?ger au Conseil des gouverneurs de l'AIEA, ni ? la nouvelle commission sp?ciale. Et tout Etat y si?geant actuellement et sur lequel une enqu?te est ouverte devrait ?tre frapp? de suspension du Conseil. L'int?grit? et la mission de l'AIEA d?pendent de ce simple principe : il ne faut pas confier ? ceux qui violent activement les r?gles la t?che de les faire respecter.
Dans les actions que nous entreprendrons pour relever ces d?fis, nous consulterons nos amis et alli?s sur tous les nouvelles mesures. Nous ?couterons leurs id?es. Ensemble, nous d?fendrons la s?curit? de toutes les nations et pr?serverons la paix mondiale.
Au cours des deux derni?res ann?es, une grande coalition s'est form?e pour vaincre les terroristes et s'opposer ? la propagation des armes de destruction massive, engagements ins?parables de la guerre contre le terrorisme. Nous avons montr? que l'on peut d?couvrir la prolif?ration et la stopper. Nous avons montr? que les r?gimes qui choisissent une attitude de d?fi s'exposent ? de s?rieuses cons?quences. La voie ? suivre n'est pas facile, mais elle est claire. Nous agirons comme si la vie de nos citoyens d?pendait de notre vigilance, car telle est la r?alit?. Les terroristes et les Etats terroristes sont lanc?s dans une course pour se doter d'armes d'assassinat collectif, une course qu'ils doivent perdre. Les terroristes sont imaginatifs ; nous le sommes davantage. Ils sont d?termin?s ; nous devons l'?tre encore plus. Nous ne nous d?tournerons jamais de notre but et notre r?solution ne fl?chira pas. Nous pers?v?rerons sans rel?che pour assurer la d?fense des nations libres et nous nous montrerons ? la hauteur des dures exigences de ces temps dangereux.

Que Dieu vous b?nisse tous.

(Fin de la transcription)

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Malaysia questions Bush allegations
AP - Malaysia's leader questioned US intelligence on this country's role in a global nuclear trafficking network, and said the man President George W Bush called its "chief financial officer and money launderer" would not be arrested, for now.
"He is on his feet and free to move around," Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said of BSA Tahir, allegedly a middleman who helped Pakistan's top nuclear scientist sell equipment and know-how to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Malaysia has said Bush was unfairly singling out this South-East Asian country with his assertions about its role in the network run by the scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan.
"There is no such thing as Malaysia's involvement," Abdullah told reporters, when asked to respond to the remarks Bush made in a speech.
"We are not involved in any way. I don't know where Bush is getting his evidence from."
Bush said Khan and his associates used a company in Malaysia to make parts for centrifuges - which can be used to enrich uranium for weapons - and that front companies had been used to "deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials."
The Malaysian company doesn't deny making the parts, but says it didn't know what they were for.
Both US officials and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency say the seized components were clearly for nuclear use, disputing Malaysian police assertions that they could have had other purposes.
Tahir, a Dubai-based Sri Lankan, operated a computer company there to order centrifuge components from a Malaysian factory - using designs from Pakistan - Bush said. Other parts came from Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, he said.
"Tahir acted as both the network's chief financial officer and money launderer," Bush said.
"He was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients."
In his speech, Bush demanded tougher laws to stop the illicit spread of weapons technology.
The Malaysian-made parts were seized in October in a shipment of items bound for Libya.
The seizure was central to uncovering Libya's now-renounced secret nuclear program, which was allegedly helped by Khan, often considered the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb.
The Malaysian company, Scomi Precision Engineering, says it supplied 14 semifinished machine components, ordered by Tahir, to Dubai. It insists that it understood the parts were for use in the oil and gas industry.
The company's parent, Scomi Group, is majority-controlled by Kamaluddin Abdullah, the prime minister's only son, who does not play an official management role in the company.
Malaysia's leader has promised that the current police investigation into the matter will be conducted "without fear or favour." Police say they have found no evidence of wrongdoing by Scomi.
A senior official, speaking to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity, said Bush had "overblown Malaysia's role in this. Making Malaysia the central conduit to this is misleading."
Malaysian police have been investigating Tahir, who is married to the daughter of a former Malaysian diplomat, the official said.
Police say they're not detaining him since he has apparently broken no local laws.
"Malaysian police have spoken to him and asked him a lot of questions," Abdullah said.
Tahir has not been reachable for comment.
Malaysia is cooperating with US authorities and "especially in focusing on Tahir," the official said.
"In questioning him, we're trying to get a bigger picture of the network."
The investigation focuses largely on the deal Tahir struck with Scomi to make the parts, the official said.
The US embassy said information about Tahir was still being gathered.
"We're following the issue closely and we will implement and take action required by relevant laws," said embassy spokesman Frank Whitaker.
"It's still early in the process and we simply haven't reached a conclusion of what would be the appropriate action to take regarding Tahir and Scomi both," Whitaker said.
Malaysia has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it is unclear whether its laws allow criminal prosecution for nuclear parts trafficking.
Bush urged the United Nations and member states to draw up laws that spell out criminal penalties for nuclear trafficking.
Khan, a national hero in Pakistan for helping create a nuclear deterrent against archrival India, confessed on Pakistani television last week to masterminding a network that supplied rogue states with nuclear technology. President Pervez Musharraf then pardoned him.
Pakistani government and intelligence officials have said Khan used unspecified Malaysian factories to recondition equipment bound for Libya, North Korea and Iran.

?AAP 2004
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Malaysian Leader OKs Probe of Son's Firm
ROHAN SULLIVAN
Associated Press
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia - Malaysia's prime minister said Thursday authorities will probe "without fear or favor" into a deal involving a company his son controls that allegedly supplied components destined for Libya's nuclear program.
Police revealed they are investigating the deal, part of a widening international inquiry into a global nuclear black market triggered by Pakistan's admission that its top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, sold nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Najib Razak, Malaysia's defense minister and the prime minister's deputy, told The Associated Press that Malaysia had no nuclear weapons program and has no ambitions to become a nuclear power. "Absolutely not," he said.
The Malaysian company under investigation, a precision-engineering firm that makes specialized industrial equipment, confirmed some details of the deal but said it didn't know what the components it made were to be used for or that they were headed for Libya.
National police chief Mohamed Bakri Omar said the company, Scomi Precision Engineering, or SCOPE, accepted a contract from a Dubai-based company after negotiating with a middleman, identified as a Sri Lankan, B.S.A. Tahir.
SCOPE's parent company, the Scomi group, confirmed it made "14 semi-finished components" for Gulf Technical Industries and shipped them in four consignments between December 2002 and August 2003, under a deal negotiated by Tahir and worth $3.4 million.
Kamaluddin Abdullah, 35, the only son of Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, is Scomi's largest shareholder, although he has no management role. He could not be reached for comment Thursday.
Police said the CIA and Britain's MI6 informed Malaysian authorities last November that wooden boxes marked with SCOPE's name were among items seized the previous month from a ship in Italy headed for Libya.
The foreign intelligence services said the deal between SCOPE and Tahir involved "supplying certain centrifuge components from Malaysia for Libya's uranium enrichment program," the police chief said.
But he said the Malaysia components could also be used in petrochemical, water treatment and health applications such as molecular biology for protein separation.
Centrifuges are used to enrich uranium for a variety of purposes, including weapons production. They are also used in many other industries for non-nuclear purposes.
A Scomi spokeswoman, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the company was never told the "end-use" for the components and that "there's no way we can tell" if it was centrifuges.
Abdullah, who is also home minister responsible for security, said Thursday he wouldn't interfere with the investigation.
"I told them, go ahead, investigate thoroughly without fear or favor," Abdullah said.
Investigations so far had shown that "there is no capability within the country or within the company concerned to produce nuclear bombs or any complete components to make nuclear weapons," Abdullah said.
Malaysia, a mostly Muslim country in Southeast Asia, is a signatory to international nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaties.
In Pakistan, government and intelligence officials indicated they believe Malaysia's involvement may be wider than the deal revealed Thursday.
Khan, whom President Pervez Musharraf pardoned on Thursday after he publicly apologized for leaking nuclear secrets to countries abroad, occasionally ordered "disused equipment" to be sent to Malaysia for reconditioning before it was shipped to Iran, Libya and North Korea, Pakistani officials told AP on condition of anonymity.
The Malaysian involvement was believed to be restricted to the reconditioning at unspecified factories, the officials said.
A Malaysian official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AP that Khan visited Malaysia several times in recent years, including to attend the wedding of Tahir.
Tahir is married to a Malaysian and is not in custody because he has committed no crime here, officials said. Police said that both Scomi and Tahir were cooperating in the investigation.
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Malaysia probes alleged Libyan nuclear link
Related News ?
* Malaysia denies nuclear link
* Malaysia pledges to help US over nuclear shipments
* US says Musharraf probing nuclear claims, hints 'rogue' scientists to blame
more>>
KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysian police are investigating a company controlled by a son of Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi over allegations that it was involved in supplying parts for Libya's nuclear weapons programme.
National police chief Bakri Omar said in a statement issued to "clarify several questions and confusion" that the probe was sparked by information provided last November by US and British intelligence services
The CIA and MI-6 told Malaysia's special branch that the company, Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn. Bhd. (SCOPE), was supplying centrifuge components made in Malaysia for Libya's uranium-enrichment program.
SCOPE is a unit of listed oil and gas firm Scomi Group, in which the premier's son, Kamaluddin Abdullah, is the biggest shareholder. Scomi's price dropped on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Thursday by 0.40 ringgit to 12.90 ringgit (3.4 dollars).
The intelligence revealed that five containers allegedly containing centrifuge components were seized from a ship, BBC China, in Taranto, Italy on October 4.
The containers had a "SCOPE" seal and Malaysian police investigations confirmed that a Dubai-based Sri Lankan businessman, B.S.A. Tahir had in 2001 contracted SCOPE to manufacture the components.
Tahir was named by the intelligence agencies as a middleman apparently used by the founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who has admitted selling atomic secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
Bakri said in the statement issued Wednesday night that Tahir and SCOPE were "cooperating fully in helping the police in this investigation", and denied reports in some media that Tahir was in custody.
Centrifuges can be used for enriching uranium used in nuclear reactors or bombs, but Bakri said initial investigations showed that the seized components "can also be used in petrochemical and water treatment equipment and for health purposes such as molecular biology for protein separation."
Scomi said in a statement the contract to manufacture 14 semi-finished components for Gulf Technical Industries LLC (GTI) in Dubai, worth 13 million ringgit (3.42 million dollars), was arranged by Tahir, but it was never told of the end-use of these components.
It had shipped them to GTI in four consignments from December 2002.
Bakri said a full statement would be issued "once investigations into this matter are completed."
- AFP
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Malaysia pledges cooperation on nuclear inquiry
2004-02-13 / Associated Press /
Malaysia pledged yesterday to share with Washington information from its investigation of a man that U.S. President George W. Bush has described as a major player in a vast network trafficking nuclear technology.
But a senior official accused Bush of unfairly singling out this Southeast Asian nation's role in the secret network in a speech Wednesday, insisting that the sole known case of Malaysian involvement was the unwitting manufacture of parts seized en route to Libya last year.
"He's overblown Malaysia's role in this, the role of Malaysian companies in this," the official said on condition of anonymity. "Making Malaysia the central conduit to this is misleading."
However, Lim Kit Siang, a veteran opposition politician, called for an independent inquiry, saying Bush's speech made the quick exoneration of the company involved "untenable."
The seizure of the shipment - which included 14 semi-finished components from Malaysia allegedly for centrifuges to enrich uranium - was central to uncovering Libya's secret nuclear program, which was helped by the network established by the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan.
The seizure figured large in Bush's speech, where he demanded tougher laws to stop the illicit spread of weapons technology.
The parts were ordered by B.S.A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan with business interests in Dubai, from Scomi Precision Engineering, a Malaysian firm that is majority controlled by Kamaluddin Abdullah, the only son of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.
The younger Badawi does not play an official management role. Police said over the weekend that the company had no idea of what the parts would be used for or that they were bound for Libya and said the firm had been cleared, though the investigation continues.
Malaysian police have been investigating Tahir, who is married to the daughter of a former Malaysian diplomat, the official said on condition of anonymity. But they are not detaining him since he has apparently broken no local laws.
Bush accused Tahir of acting as the Khan network's "chief financial officer and money launderer." He was also "its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients," Bush said. "Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for shipment to other customers."
The Malaysian official said, "We're cooperating with the U.S. authorities, especially in focusing on Tahir. In questioning him, we're trying to get a bigger picture of the network."
The investigation is centered largely on the deal Tahir struck with Scomi to machine the parts and has not branched off in other directions because his "involvement here was very focused," the official said.
The U.S. Embassy said information about Tahir was still being gathered.
"We're following the issue closely and we will implement and take action required by relevant laws," spokesman Frank Whitaker said.
"It's still early in the process and we simply haven't reached a conclusion of what would be the appropriate action to take regarding Tahir and Scomi both," Whitaker said.
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>> MALAYSIA BLOG WATCH...
http://www.jeffooi.com/


ANOTHER EVENTFUL WEEK? First, an update of who's the Big Fish to get netted - some say this Monday week - as PM Abdullah Badawi has said the government would continue with the momentum in hauling up high-profile corruptors.
Mingguan Malaysia re-interviewed Dr Rais Yatim to elaborate on the 18 high-profile cases he mentioned a day earlier. The de facto law minister confirmed the involvement of cabinet minister, and there are no new cases except the 18 which are currently being finalised. Their files are all over 18 months old.
Besides the three entities hinted yesterday - Perwaja Steel Sdn. Bhd., Projek Perumahan Rakyat Termiskin, and Malaysia Airlines - Mingguan today added one more name: the Tabung Haji.
However, Rais declined to reveal further details as those were the job for the Public Prosecutor.
Meanwhile, a woman minister has taken the offensive in the midst of intense rumour-mongering about her fate. Via Bernama February 15, 2004 17:24 PM:
International Trade and Industry Minister Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz Sunday warned opposition leaders she will sue them if they slander her to their whims.
"If I hear any slander against me, I will sue, that's all I can say. Don't slander me as you like," she told reporters when asked to comment on claims by opposition leaders that she was among the ministers in the Anti-Corruption Agency's (ACA) list to be charged in court for corruption.
A little bird says there is a PDF file floating in the Internet, referring to a minister codified as B1. However, the authenticity has neither been confirmed nor denied.
Leslie Lau of Singapore Sunday Times points to at least one Cabinet minister from Umno who is said to be linked with corrupt practices involving the issuance of commercial vehicle licences.
He quotes ACA director-general Zulkipli Mat Noor as saying: 'There are many rivers and the oceans are vast. Do not tell me we cannot catch any fish?'



US Official: No record of Scomi supplying centrifuge parts
Click here to see how a gas centrifuge works (Source: BBC News)

The Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ) today quoted a US official as saying that "they have no records of the (Malaysian) firm, reported to be allegedly prodhttp://www.jeffooi.com/ucing centrifuge parts, being a regular supplier for proliferating states".
The AWSJ quoted the senior official as saying that the Malaysian centrifuge components, intercepted by European security agents on a German vessel bound for Libya last October, were "dual-purpose parts that can be used in any number of applications."
Last night, Bukit Aman issued a media statement saying Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn Bhd (SCOPE), a subsidiary of Scomi Group Bhd , and BSA Tahir, a Sri Lankan national and businessman based in Dubai, are now cooperating fully with the police in the investigations.
SCOPE had admitted to manufacturing 14 semi-finished components for Dubai-based Gulf Technical Industries L.L.C (GTI), but maintained it was not informed of the end use of these components.
In Scomi's IPO documents (Page 244), it was disclosed that SCOPE had signed a 2-year material agreement with GTI on Dec 8, 2001.
Nuclear black market? Meanwhile, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said February 3 that its Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has focused international attention on an emerging and sophisticated "nuclear black market" in weapons technology.
Considerable light on the global network has come from the IAEA's ongoing verification of nuclear programmes in Iran and Libya, he said.
However, he stressed that the emerging picture so far has not indicated governments are involved, but rather points to individuals engaged in illicit trafficking of material and equipment.
BBC News reported Feb 5 that ElBaradei had told reporters Abdul Qadeer was "just the tip of the iceberg for us" and that the scientist was "not working alone".
The IAEA Board is scheduled to meet in Vienna March 8.
For context, please read previous blog, the AWSJ (subscription required) and Bernama despatch time-stamped 13:02hr today.
The New York Times Thursday runs a despatch by Raymond Bonner, timelined Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Company Tied to Nuclear Trade Network. Excerpts:
But with the tight control that the Malaysian government has traditionally exercised, many Malaysians and foreign diplomats doubt that a sale of this nature would have been possible without the knowledge of at least some senior government officials, probably in the military.
DPM/Defence Minister Najib Razak today told Rohan Sullivan of Associated Press, which is picked up by Washington Post and The Guardian, that Malaysia had 'absolutely' no ambitions to be a nuclear power.
Posted by jeffooi at February 5, 2004 01:42 PM | TrackBack
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Bernama.com
Malaysian National News Agency

Claims That M'sia Produces Nuclear Weapon Components Unfounded
General
February 04, 2004 21:47 PM
KUALA LUMPUR, Feb 4 (Bernama) -- Malaysian police investigations reveal that no local companies are manufacturing or capable of manufacturing components for making uranium centrifuge used in producing nuclear weapons.
Refuting foreign media allegations on the production of the components by a local company, Inspector-General of Police Datuk Seri Mohd Bakri Omar said investigations showed that production of the components needed high technology and expertise in nuclear weapons.
In its media statement on Wednesday, Bukit Aman said police were cooperating closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that the investigations were truly transparent.
The investigations began as soon as the Special Branch (Police) was contacted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States (US) and the British Intelligence Agency (MI6) on Nov 10, last year, on the seizure of five containers containing components for making the centrifuge from a ship, BBC China, which was inspected in Taranto, Italy on Oct 4 last year.
It was claimed that the five containers were bound for Libya, and the components were placed in wooden boxes marked Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn Bhd (SCOPE), a subsidiary of Scomi Group Bhd.
Both intelligence agencies had notified BSA Tahir, a Sri Lankan national and businessman based in Dubai, who was involved as the middleman in supplying the centrifuge components from Malaysia for the uranium enrichment programme in Libya.
Preliminary police investigations revealed that "BSA Tahir had offered a contract to SCOPE to prepare the components which was said to be a legitimate transaction," according to the three-page statement.
"SCOPE had accepted the offer and a factory had been built in Shah Alam to manufacture the components," he said.
He said preliminary investigations showed the components for the centrifuge seized from the BBC China could also be used for petrochemicals, water treatment and health applications such as molecular biology for protein separation.
"In fact, nuclear experts also found it difficult to determine positively that the components seized were part of the components for the centrifuge units," he said.
The IGP said investigations so far indicated that no company in Malaysia was capable of manufacturing the complete centrifuge unit as it required high technology and expertise in the field of nuclear weapons.
"As such, BSA Tahir and SCOPE are cooperating fully with the police in the investigations.
"Although BSA Tahir is under police investigations, he is not being detained as claimed by the foreign media," according to the statement, stressing that investigations were still on-going with the cooperation of the IAEA to ensure that the probe was truly transparent.
Mohd Bakri also said a detailed statement would be made as soon as investigations were completed.
Meanwhile Scomi Group Bhd said in a press statement issued here on Wednesday evening that its wholly owned subsidary, SCOPE, was awarded a contract to provide tooling services to Gulf Technical Industries L.L.C (GTI), a corporation based in Dubai.
The contract was arranged by BSA Tahir, who is currently the subject of investigations by Malaysian, American and British intelligence authorities over his alleged involvement in the supply of nuclear technology to Libya, it said.
It said SCOPE, which is involved in the provision of specialised tooling work for third party customers in the oil and gas, automative and general components industry, had manufactured 14 semi-finished components, although the end use of these components was never disclosed to SCOPE.
The company had shipped these components to the GTI in four consignments commencing in December 2002, and "since the delivery of the last consignment in August 2003, the company has not received any new orders from GTI," it said.
The total value of the contract was RM13 million over a period of two years, beginning 2002.
It said: "This accounts for only 3.5 percent of Scomi Group Berhad's consolidated turnover amounting to approximately RM360 million over the same perod (2003 turnover unaudited). The contract with GTI was disclosed accordingly during the listing exercise of Scomi."
Scomi Group, which is involved in the oil and gas services industry and listed on the Second Board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, "has since cooperated fully with the Malaysian police in this investigation," it said.
-- BERNAMA
Copyright ?2004 BERNAMA. All rights reserved.

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Malaysian net catches sharks - or anchovies
By Anil Netto
PENANG, Malaysia - The arrest on Thursday of a Malaysian cabinet minister on corruption charges marks the second high-profile catch this week in Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's anti-corruption crusade.
The arrests come at a time when the ruling coalition is trying to convince Malaysians that it is serious about wiping out graft ahead of a general election expected in a few months, but some skeptics believe many more heads have to roll.
Police and Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) officers brought Land and Cooperative Development Minister Kasitah Gaddam to the Sessions Court in Kuala Lumpur on Thursday, where he faced two counts of corruption involving share transactions.
Dozens who got wind of the news flocked to the court premises. "It was packed inside the court and there was an air of anticipation," a lawyer who witnessed the proceedings said. "It was standing room only and they had to bring in an extra bench to provide additional seats for reporters. Everyone was fighting for seats to see the minister."
Kasitah pleaded not guilty to abusing his position in 1996 as executive chairman of the Sabah Land Development Board in taking part in the approval of a share transaction in which he had an interest. He was also alleged to have deceived the board by concealing a firm's offer of shares in its proposal for listing on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
Kasitah, who is not as high-profile as his other cabinet colleagues, was granted bail of RM1 million (US$263,000). If found guilty, he faces lengthy jail terms, fines or both.
On Monday, ACA officers and police swooped down on another prominent personality, the former head of the ailing state-owned steel giant, Perwaja Steel. Eric Chia Eng Hock, who was hand-picked by former premier Mahathir Mohamad, was charged the next day with fraud - eight years after ACA investigations first began (see Tycoon's arrest boosts corruption crusade, February 11).
Abdullah raised public expectations by declaring a war on corruption soon after he took over from Mahathir last November. This week's arrests appear to boost that campaign, although at the time, skeptics felt he lacked the political base to introduce radical reforms and wipe out money politics and corruption.
The boost to the ruling coalition arising from Chia's arrest was also dampened by news on Wednesday that an opposition politician was offered money to defect to the ruling party, United Malays National Organization. The independent web portal Malaysiakini reported that a youth leader from the opposition Parti Keadilan Rakyat (Keadilan) claimed that he had been offered RM500,000 to switch camps.
In the run-up to general elections, news outlets often publish suspicious reports of mass defections of opposition politicians to the ruling coalition, accompanied by photographs of the defecting politicians handing in their application forms.
Critics say the recent high-profile arrests do not go high enough and they will not be satisfied until the ikan jerong (sharks) are arrested along with the ikan bilis (anchovies).
Abdullah's onetime rival, jailed ex-deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim, hit out from his prison cell near Kuala Lumpur. "There has been no action taken against the hugely corrupt, including cabinet ministers who are involved in hundreds of millions of ringgit in commissions on arms purchase deals and in share allocations," he said in a statement.
Anwar, now serving jail terms totaling 15 years, had lodged a police report against Chia and Mahathir in 1999 over their role in Perwaja, now saddled with RM11 billion ($2.9 billion) in losses.
Abdullah insists that he is willing to go all the way in fighting corruption. "Big or small, we will cast a net," he told visiting regional editors. "I am not thinking about political backlash at all because if we do, we will only get frightened."
Opposition politician Lim Kit Siang noted some similarities between Abdullah's and his predecessor Mahathir's first 100 days in power. "Although 22 years apart, both started with a bang in the revamp of the civil service and the war against corruption."
Lim noted that Abdullah needs "to fully empower the Anti-Corruption Agency and the attorney general to scrupulously follow the simple anti-corruption principles enunciated by Mahathir 22 years ago, but never implemented".
Some also see Kasitah's arrest as linked to the upcoming elections in the northern Borneo state of Sabah across the South China Sea. The term of the current state assembly expires on April 12 and state elections must be held by June 12.
Kasitah's arrest could thus provide a boost for the ruling coalition's campaign in Sabah, given the backdrop of graft and abuse of power in the state.
"In the past 10 years, the ACA in Sabah had initiated countless corruption investigations, as the administration of every chief minister under the two-year rotation system [among ruling-coalition parties] seemed to have spawned an unique set and legacy creating more misgovernment, abuse of power and even corruption," observed Lim.
Some think Abdullah has not yet netted the big fish. They say that Chia was, after all, only prominent as a tycoon in the early 1990s while Kasitah is an almost unknown cabinet minister.
Others feel that if the government is serious about corruption, it has to introduce radical reforms to the legal system and the judiciary and make the ACA more independent. At present, the ACA comes under the prime minister's department.
"One of the main things Abdullah needs to do is to abolish the Official Secrets Act," said Cynthia Gabriel, executive director of human-rights group Suaram, pointing out that the withholding of information has actually strengthened the roots of corruption in society.
"While we laud his moves to fight corruption, they must be accompanied by the opening up of various other institutions and the repeal of laws that facilitate the breeding of corruption in society," Gabriel added.

(Inter Press Service)
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Libya's black market deals shock nuclear inspectors

Ian Traynor in Vienna
Saturday January 17, 2004
The Guardian
Colonel Muammar Gadafy of Libya has been buying complete sets of uranium enrichment centrifuges on the international black market as the central element in his secret nuclear bomb programme, according to United Nations nuclear inspectors.
The ease with which the complex bomb-making equipment was acquired has stunned experienced international inspectors. The scale and the sophistication of the networks supplying so-called rogue states seeking nuclear weapons are considerably more extensive than previously believed.
The purchase of full centrifuges, either assembled or in parts, marks a radical departure in what is on offer on the black market, sources said. While it is not yet clear where Col Gadafy obtained the centrifuge systems, at least 1,000 machines, believed to have been made in Malaysia, were seized last October by the Italian authorities on a German ship bound for Libya.
Diplomatic sources familiar with the results of a recent visit to Libya by nuclear experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said the Gadafy bomb programme differed in crucial respects from nuclear projects in Iran, Iraq or North Korea.
"What was found in Libya marks a new stage in proliferation," said one knowledgeable source. "Libya was buying what was available. And what is available, the centrifuges, are close to turnkey facilities. That's a new challenge. Libya was buying something that's ready to wear."
As the climax to nine months of secret negotiations with British and US intelligence, Col Gadafy announced last month that he was renouncing his weapons of mass destruction programmes after purchasing what sources said were "a few thousand" centrifuges for enriching uranium to weapons grade.
Another well-placed source said: "We all now realise there is this extraordinarily developed and sophisticated market out there enabling anyone to get this centrifuge equipment."
Mohammed El Baradei, the IAEA chief, visited Libya a couple of weeks ago to view the Libyan equipment and take charge of the upcoming effort to dismantle the Libyan bomb programme. He described the experience as "an eye-opener".
A centrifuge is made up of hundreds of separate components. Typically, a country covertly seeking the uranium enrichment technology will seek to cover its tracks by obtaining a design blueprint and then purchasing the varied components separately from different suppliers.
The German ship was seized by Italians after a tip-off from the CIA. Knowledgeable sources said the centrifuges on board were "made-to-order" in Malaysia for Libya, based on designs directly or indirectly from Pakistan.
While US government sources have claimed that the seizure persuaded Col Gadafy to do his deal with Washington and London, diplomats and analysts closely following the nuclear trade are convinced that the ship was impounded because of information provided by the Libyans.
According to this version circulating in Vienna, headquarters of the IAEA, Col Gadafy told the CIA about the shipment as a goodwill gesture to convince the Americans and the British that he was committed to the deal being negotiated.
A Finnish expert leading the IAEA investigations into the Libyan and Iranian nuclear projects has so far been denied access to the equipment impounded by the Italians, apparently because of the tug-of-war between the Americans and the Vienna agency over how to dismantle the Libyan programme.
Senior US and British officials are due in Vienna on Monday to negotiate with Dr El Baradei over how to proceed in Tripoli. The Americans will be led by John Bolton, the hawk in charge of nuclear proliferation issues at the State Department. He has a reputation for scorning the UN agencies and his officials disparaged the El Baradei trip to Tripoli as a publicity stunt.