>> OUR LEADERS, OUR SELVES?
QUERYING KERRY
February 15, 2004 -- IN the more than 250 days until Nov. 2, John Kerry can answer questions that linger in spite of, or because of, all he has said so far. Such as:
Other than denoting your disapproval, what does the adjective mean in the phrase "special interest"? Is the National Education Association a special interest? The AFL-CIO?
You abhor "special tax giveaways for the privileged and special interests." When supporting billions in ethanol subsidies, mostly for agribusinesses, did you think about corn-growing, caucus-holding Iowa?
Is the National Rifle Association a "special interest"? Is "special" a synonym for "conservative"?
When you denounce "lobbyists" do you include those for Planned Parenthood and the Sierra Club? Is "liberal lobbyist" an oxymoron?
All the Americans affected by laws you pass - that is, all Americans - refuse to pipe down and mind their own business so that you can mind their business for them. Often they hire lobbyists to exercise their First Amendment right to "petition the government for a redress of grievances." Can you despise lobbyists without disparaging that right?
You say the rich do not pay enough taxes. In 1979 the top 1 percent of earners paid 19.75 percent of income taxes. Today they pay 36.3 percent. How much is enough?
You say the federal government is not spending enough on education. President Bush has increased education spending 48 percent. How much is enough?
In January 1991, after Iraq extinguished Kuwait's sovereignty, you opposed responding with force rather than economic sanctions. Have such sanctions ever undone such aggression?
On Jan. 11, 1991, you said that going to war was abandoning "the theory of deterrence." Was it not a tad late to deter Iraqi aggression?
The next day you said, "I do not believe our nation is prepared for war." How did unpreparedness subsequently manifest itself?
On Jan. 22, 1991, responding to a constituent opposed to the Gulf War, you wrote "I share your concerns" and would have given sanctions more time. Nine days later, responding to a voter who favored the war, you wrote, "I have strongly and unequivocally supported President Bush's response to the crisis." Did you have a third position?
You say the Bush administration questions "the patriotism" of its critics. You say that as president you will "appoint a U.S. trade representative who is an American patriot." You mean the current representative, Robert Zoellick, is not a patriot?
You strongly praise former Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin, who strongly supports NAFTA and free trade. Have you changed your mind about him or about free trade (as you have changed your mind about No Child Left Behind, the 2002 war resolution, the Patriot Act, etc.)?
You oppose immediate termination of U.S. involvement in Iraq, and you opposed the $87 billion to pay for involvement. Come again?
In 1994, the year after the first attack on the World Trade Center, you voted to cut $1 billion from counterterrorism activities. In 1995 you proposed a $1.5 billion cut in intelligence funding. Are you now glad that both proposals were defeated?
You favor civil unions but not same-sex marriage. What is the difference? What consequences of gay marriage worry you? Your state's highest court says marriage is "an evolving paradigm." Do you agree? You say you agree with what Dick Cheney said in 2000: States should have a right to "come to different conclusions" about same-sex marriage. Why, then, were you one of only 14 senators who opposed the Defense of Marriage Act, which protects that right? Massachusetts opponents of the same-sex ruling are moving for a referendum to amend the state constitution to define marriage as between a man and a woman. How will you vote?
You favor full disclosure of political spending. Organized labor is fighting new regulations requiring full disclosure to union members of the political uses of their mandatory union dues. As president, would you rescind these regulations?
Praising McCain-Feingold restrictions on political contributions, you said: "This bill reduces the power of the checkbook, and I will therefore support it." In December you saved your sagging campaign by writing it a $6.4 million check. Why is your checkbook's unfettered freedom wholesome?
You deny that restricting campaign contributions restricts speech. How much of the $6.4 million did you spend on speech - broadcast messages?
Billionaire George Soros says he will spend whatever is necessary - just a few million so far, but more coming - to defeat Bush. As one who believes - well, who says - there is "too much money" in politics, are you appalled?
There are 28 more questions where these 28 came from.
E-mail: georgewill@washpost.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Beacon Hill Nightmare
Some perspective on John Kerry's mortgage.
The story of Senator John Kerry's mortgaged home in Beacon Hill is worth looking at. What made the papers was the suggestion that his access to it, in usufruct, was threatened by the sheer size of the loan and the attendant obligations of financing it. All of this, of course, in the context of his need for money to finance the ongoing campaign for the presidency.
There are several perspectives one needs in order to evaluate the problem of Mr. Kerry's mortgage. The first, of course, is that if you own a house valuable enough to warrant a loan of $6 million, you are living, by common standards, in an economic stratosphere, the implications of which require adjusting to normal standards of evaluation. If you hock the Hope Diamond for $10 million, attention focuses on your owing $10 million whereas, properly, it should focus on your owning the Hope Diamond.
Senator Kerry's widely publicized point is that he has had to finance his campaign by using his own resources, which are limited. But of course that is Hope Diamond talk. If a bank lends you $6 million, it knows it's going to get the money back.
How? Well, Senator Kerry is not wealthy, but he does have undisclosed assets. That is, assets undisclosed to the public, but not to the bank. All the bank needs is approximately $200,000 per year in interest payments, which is a little more than Senator Kerry's income as a senator. This point is mentioned in the news stories.
Where else would the bankers look, if they thought themselves threatened? Well, of course, to the property on which the loan was made, namely the house on Beacon Hill. There is a difficulty, which is that the house is jointly owned by Mr. Kerry and his wife. She has to be careful, even though she made out a prenuptial agreement with John. If he divorced her, one assumes, she would keep the house, to say nothing of her fortune.
Bear this poignancy in mind, that Mrs. Kerry is not permitted, under the law, to give Mr. Kerry more than $2,000 when he is running for office. Now some may classify this as an example of the problems of the idle rich. But this would be flippant. It is a big enough story of a human plight, to make the press worldwide.
Now pity for Mr. Kerry is immediately evoked by the circumstances of the mortgage. It is not as if he was taking $6 million to buy himself a G-V jet. No, he was using $6 million to pay the staff of his campaign and take out ads, all of this in anticipation of the returns in Iowa and New Hampshire. It added up to this, that returns from his campaign weren't large enough to satisfy his inclination to advance the cause of the campaign by additional advertising.
Now if he had lost out in Iowa, he'd have needed to reduce spending, which would have given his most resolute backers a challenge, namely to continue to support John Kerry at least to the point of giving him back his home on Beacon Hill. But if he did well in Iowa, as indeed he did, everybody could assume that the flow of money would not only continue, but increase. The publicity attached to the mortgage can only have served the cause of alerting his donors to the need to save not only the nation, but the house.
This is because current law denies to a candidate the right to repay past loans from money that comes in after the operative political date (in this case, the national convention in late July). After that, you can only use $250,000 of campaign contributions to repay old debts, and $250,000 comes to only a little over one year's interest on the Beacon Hill loan.
So it has to be cleared up before then, Kerry supporters are being told.
Campaigning for president in l956, Governor Adlai Stevenson crossed his legs while sitting on a chair on the dais, waiting to give his speech and a photographer shot a picture of his shoe. Lo!-there was a hole in his shoe.
That shoe with the hole became a talisman of Stevenson for President. Tiny gold and copper replicas were made to pin on to your handbag or lapel. What it said was: Vote for this man who, though so straitened as not to be able to afford to repair his shoes, walks on day after day, wearing out life's shoe leather, in the cause of America.
Get it?
John Kerry for President devoutly hopes you do.
------------------------------------------------------------------
'This won't go away. What happened is much nastier than is being reported'
By Adrian Blomfeld in Nairobi and Andrew Alderson
(Filed: 15/02/2004)
PHOTO
http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/02/15/wus15.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/02/15/ixnewstop.html/news/2004/02/15/wus15.xml
Alex Polier, the twenty-four year old journalist who could end Senator John Kerry's hopes of becoming the next president of the United States is alleged to have had a two-year affair with the front-runner for the Democratic nomination. Last night the rumours were in danger of becoming a full-blown scandal.
Alex Polier, 24, is alleged to have had an affair with John Kerry
"This is not going to go away," one American friend of Miss Polier said yesterday. "What actually happened is much nastier than is being reported."
The allegations come at a crucial time for the senator. Polls showed him leading Mr Bush by 52 per cent to 42 per cent, and aides will be anxious to see if the apparent scandal affects his standing among voters.
Miss Polier, a former intern who also spent some time in 1998 doing work experience at the Houses of Parliament in London, is in Kenya staying with Yaron Schwartzman, her fiance and a member of the country's fashionable young set. The couple have refused to make any comment on her alleged links with Senator Kerry, who is married to Teresa Heinz Kerry, an heiress to the food empire.
Senator Kerry, a decorated Vietnam veteran dubbed the new JFK, has vehemently denied any relationship with Miss Polier, and shrugged off allegations that he had a two-year affair with her from 2001. "I just deny it categorically. It's rumour. It's untrue. Period," he said.
Mr Kerry, 60, has won 12 out of the 14 Democratic primaries and has looked all but certain to seal the nomination to take on President George W. Bush in November's elections.
His aides have blamed a dirty tricks campaign for bringing the allegations about Miss Polier into the public eye; they first surfaced last week on a Right-wing internet site, the Drudge Report, which famously first broke the news of Bill Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky.
Miss Polier's parents, Terry and Donna, from Malvern, Pennsylvania, added fuel to the fire by claiming that Mr Kerry did pursue their daughter.
"I think he's a sleazeball. I did wonder if she didn't get that feeling herself," said Mr Polier. "He's not the sort of guy I'd choose to be with my daughter.
"John Kerry called my daughter and invited her to be on his re-election committee. She talked to him and decided against it."
The Drudge website also quoted retired Gen Wesley Clark, one of Mr Kerry's rivals for the nomination, as having told journalists off the record: "Kerry will implode over an intern issue."
Mr Clark later dropped out of the race and endorsed Mr Kerry.
Miss Polier, a journalist who once worked for Associated Press, is a graduate of Columbia University, New York. She apparently met the senator as she was beginning her media career. Miss Polier and her fiance were believed to be hiding yesterday at the Nairobi home of Mr Schwartzman's parents, who moved to Kenya from Israel.
She appears to have few friends of her own in Kenya: she has never lived in the country and makes only occasional visits. "She seemed perfectly nice, although she was a little cool," said a Schwartzman family friend.
"She didn't seem to be very willing to open up but whether it was because she was aloof or just shy, I couldn't work out."
? Copyright of Telegraph Group Limited 2004
-------------------------------------------------
Dems fret over Kerry's 'Clintonian' response
Privately concerned he didn't flatly deny allegations of affair
Posted: February 13, 2004
8:53 p.m. Eastern
? 2004 News World Communications Inc.
Top Republican and Democrat strategists are curious about Sen. John Kerry's choice of words to radio mega-host Don Imus concerning rumors burning up the Internet and newsrooms about a possible extramarital affair with a young woman.
Painfully similar to former President Bill Clinton's careful parsing of words, Kerry told Imus in a morning interview yesterday the following when asked about an item first revealed in print by Internet guru Matt Drudge:
"Well, there is nothing to report," Kerry told Imus. "So there is nothing to talk about. I'm not worried about it. No."
The failure to issue a flat-out denial that he had an extramarital affair or relationship "is very Clintonian," a top Democratic aide told Insight Online. "It's worrying."
A senior White House aide declined to speak directly on the issue but when pressed, smiled and said: "It was an interesting choice of words."
News organizations have not been able to get responses from Kerry or his campaign on what the senator actually meant with the three-part response to Imus.
Democratic strategists in Washington are worried in private because Kerry lately has been fairly black and white in his answers on important issues. "Why didn't he just say the rumors are false?"
Clinton, when confronted with rumors about Monica Lewinsky, told reporters early on in the scandal that "I've had no sexual relations with that woman. Miss Lewinsky."
The use of a term of art, sexual relations, was subsequently revealed to be a coy way to deflect questions swirling around the former president.
In fact, Clinton had engaged in sexual contact of another nature with the former White House intern as was subsequently revealed.
"Kerry needs to come clean and be absolutely clear about this rumor and other ones now starting to surface," a Senate source close to Kerry told Insight Online. "We need to know flat out if he's [fooled] around with women besides his wife."
Democrats still feel the sting of Clinton's sexual escapade and lying about it and worry that failure to fully dispel rumors involving Kerry will open old wounds and let out steam from the front runner for the party thus far.
"People's memories are not that short to forget the national embarassment Clinton caused and compounded with lies," a top GOP strategist said. "We don't want to touch this one with a ten foot pole but it'll be interesting to see if the press pursues this further."
Thus far, however, Kerry's carefully worded response seems to have quelled immediate press questions about the rumored affair though parents of the former intern have stated they think Kerry's character is less than desirable.
"This is a touchy subject because of Bill Clinton and it needs to be killed right away," the Senate source close to Kerry said. "His answers on the Imus show were less than forthcoming."
Meanwhile, reports that several news organizations are pursuing the alleged fling, and other sexual relations outside of his two marriages are being pursued.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The V-Day Chronicles
Like flowers and chocolates, performances of Eve Ensler's "The Vagina Monologues" have become a Valentine's Day tradition--and controversy is not far behind.
by Rachel DiCarlo
02/13/2004 12:00:00 AM
RATHER THAN SPEND 24 HOURS celebrating love and romance tomorrow, some politically correct feminists would prefer we spend Valentine's Day pondering rape, incest, and domestic violence. Inaugurated in 1998, "V-Day"--the term a coalition of feminist groups use to describe their new version of Valentine's Day--is, according to its organizers, "a palpable energy, a fierce catalyst, . . . a global movement to stop violence against women and girls."
This year V-Day has been promoted as a celebration of the "vagina warriors," with over 2,000 V-Day events scheduled, mostly at colleges. The main attraction of all these events is Eve Ensler's one woman play "The Vagina Monologues." The verbally (and often visually) explicit play consists of 15 vignettes in which women portray their vaginas, and talk about such experiences as rape, genital mutilation, the view that men are innately violent, and lesbian statutory rape.
In one scene, a 24-year-old woman gets a 13-year-old girl drunk and has her way with her. Afterward, the girl says, "if it was rape, it was a good rape. I'll never need to rely on a man." Shouting "vagina"--the word is used over 100 times in the play--is touted as "real" sexual liberation, as well as a way to end violence against women. (By the way, the 24-year-old molester is portrayed as rescuing the 13-year-old from male violence.)
IN 2002, the embarrassment of several university officials over the scene prompted the elimination of the reference to "good rape," and the 13-year-old victim became 16. But the sex scene remains and the girl still concludes that she'll "never need to rely on a man."
Of course, it's likely--in fact, probable--that a storm of outrage would have ensued if the idealization of child molestation in the play had been initiated by a male offender. In this case, the "Vagina Monologues" went on to win the prestigious Obie award. Actresses like Susan Sarandon, Winona Ryder, Swoosie Kurtz, Glenn Close, Kimberly Williams, and Whoopi Goldberg have jumped at the chance to perform in the play, and the New York Times has called Ensler "the Messiah heralding the second wave of feminism."
In past years, protests from conservatives about the play's content have not been taken too seriously. In 2000, for example, Robert Swope, a student at Georgetown University, was fired from his student newspaper, the Hoya, for writing a piece protesting the use of tuition dollars for a production of the play at his school. The editors of the Hoya thought that Swope's repeated criticisms of the Georgetown Women's Center, which sponsored the play, "hurt the newspaper's credibility."
This year the play finds itself surrounded by more controversy. Ensler forgoes all profits made by Valentine's Day performances of her play if the proceeds go to agencies that aid women. Thus, in keeping with its contractual agreements with World/Wide Campaign/V-Day C&C Productions, a tiny theater in New Hampshire has earmarked its proceeds for the Portsmouth Feminist Health Center, which provides first trimester abortions.
There are other examples of controversy. For instance, taxpayer money will help fund a production of the "Vagina Monologues" at Amherst-Pelham Regional High School in Massachusetts, the only high school so far to sponsor a production of the play. The decision has drawn national attention. In 1999, the school board of Amherst refused to allow a production of "West Side Story" because of claims that the musical promotes racial stereotypes toward Hispanics. Controversy over the play, of course, only serves as publicity for the "Vagina Monologues." Which means, sadly, that it's likely the play will be with us for many "V-Days" to come.
Rachel DiCarlo is an editorial assistant at The Weekly Standard.
? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> TALKING TO THEMSELVES?
Gauging the Future of Iraqi Self-Rule
http://www.npr.org/rundowns/segment.php?wfId=1677166
?
from All Things Considered, Saturday , February 14, 2004
Difficulties and disagreements remain as the U.S. vies to meet a June 30 deadline to transfer the governing of Iraq to Iraqis. NPR's Steve Inskeep discusses prospects for Iraqi sovereignty with Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group, Juan Cole of the University of Michigan and Isam al-Khafaji, of the Open Society Institute.
-----------------------------------------------
http://www.npr.org/features/feature.php?wfId=1658915
Live from Virginia, It's Alhurra
Later this month, the U.S government launches Alhurra, a new 24-hour, Arabic language TV news channel designed to compete with the Arab world's al-Jazeera. As NPR's Steve Inskeep reports, Alhurra's mission is to present the American perspective to the Arabic world.
Saturday, February 7, 2004
>> QUICK HIDE THE I.G.?
http://www.wnyc.org/onthemedia/
Operation No Post
Recently, defense reporter John Donnelly discovered a memo on the website of the Defense Department's Inspector General. In the note, the I.G. informed his staff of new restrictions on information that could be posted on the site. Donnelly tells Brooke that the new restrictions are dangerously broad, and explains why the National Press Club has sent the Pentagon a formal letter of protest.
>> CHECHNYA DISPATCH...1
MUG SHOTS AT...
http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/article.php?id=2386
Dock for Putin is ready
In response to the calls of European politicians to peace settlement in Ichkeria, Russian leadership was pretending not to hear anything. In reality, the reason for silence was lack of any acceptable arguments for objection, the arguments that would not expose the interest of the Russian leadership in continuing the bloodshed. Maniac Putin has been quiet until the blasts in Moscow occurred. Then he made his statement in the middle of the bloody mess in the Moscow metro, just like Nero did in the middle of burning city of Rome.
The accusations against European parliamentarians with claims that their calls for peace are coordinated with 'acts of terrorism' were designed for Russian consumers. Average citizens will not delve into details, since they have been convinced by the propaganda anyway that Chechen Mujahideen (figthers) are acting by the instructions from the CIA, even though Russian human rights activists, ex-tycoon Berezovsky and Western 'experts' whom he is funding, have been trying to push another idea into the minds of the public: that Chechen Mujahideen are allegedly in conspiracy with the FSB. (Like, Chechens cannot be an independent nation, they must certainly have a 'master').
The export contents of the statement that the Russian president made has another meaning: look who you are offering me to negotiate with!
?The very fact of this kind of calls to negotiations with Maskhadov, after the crimes committed, indirectly confirms Maskhadov's ties to bandits and terrorists?, Putin stated without even explaining how the calls by Europeans to peace between Russia and Ichkeria can confirm ?Maskhadov's ties to terrorists?. Unless the Kremlin's vampire views peace as terrorism.
There is no way Putin did not know about peace initiatives or calls for negotiations that were announced even before the metro blasts. By giving his 'fact', Putin is lying as usual. Just as he lied that the Central Market of Jokhar did not get bombed by tactical missiles. Just as he lied that the hostages in the Moscow theater did not die from gas, that the gas was allegedly harmless. And just as he lied about the 'training exercise' in Ryazan (when the FSB/KGB got cought planting explosives in an apartment buildings to blame the blast on the Chechens).
However, you can agree with Putin that there still is a connection between calls for negotiations and the blast. But the conclusion will not be in favor of the Kremlin's master. First he keeps silence without reacting to the peace proposals, but then he gets paranoid and starts rejecting them, standing on the top of a pile of dead bodies, while these dead bodies are the main and irrefutable evidence of his total political failure, false promises and gravest crimes that he will have to answer for sooner of later.
The time of retribution is drawing near. The dock for the Kremlin's maniac is ready for him to sit on.
Salman Daudov,
for Kavkaz-Center
2004-02-13 00:16:31
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> CHECHNYA DISPATCH...2
The country needs a lethal injection
Anything secret sooner or later comes to light. When KGB generals were planning and carrying out the blasts of apartment building in Moscow, when they were planting hexogen from army warehouses, they were figuring no one was going to find out about it. In Russian city of Ryazan the next morning they were assuring us that it was nothing but a 'training exercise'. But the course of the further events and their further actions blew their cover.
The blasts became a perfect pretext for a new invasion of Chechnya. The raiders drove in their tanks and it started... Tortures with electric shock, beatings, cutting off heads, ears and arms, and sales of dead bodies. 'Kindhearted and sympathetic' Russian people showed their true face in Chechnya. The crimes of Stalin, who started a barbaric deportation of Chechens back in 1944 were surpassed. Sadist generals were issuing orders and sick soldiers, contracted servicemen (mercenaries), and professional cutthroats were carrying out the orders with sadistic pleasure: they would surround peaceful villages, shoot the locals, break into the houses and rob and take people away during 'cleansings', so that a few days later the fellow villagers discover their dead bodies with traces of tortures in the woods nearby, only barely covered with soil...
Whichever excuses you can come up with to justify it, still fascism has come to Russia. Bloody terrorist dictatorship, killing without looking at the law, and torturing and maiming anyone who somehow gets in its way. With all of the oaths of sticking to democracy and with all of its curtsies before the West, the bloody crimes of Russian military clique in Chechnya or the totally totalitarian policy of Putin's bureaucrats in Russia can just never be called democratic!...
Many people are guessing: how far the dictatorship can go this time? As far as Stalin's camps with millions of inmates cutting trees for timber industry? As far as Brezhnev's mental facilities with their straight jackets (see NOTE) and aminazine? So far we can see the main crime of this regime in Chechnya: outright genocide of an entire nation. And inside Russia these are the same ethnic cleansings going on: police terror against people from the Caucasus, outright persecution of democratic opposition by the KGB, totally false spy trials, when the poor 'suspects in espionage' are locked up in prisons for years...
Independent mass media have been defeated or shut down, or taken away from their owners and nationalized, - one way or another, there is virtually no free press remaining that would dare openly criticize the authorities like it did back in the '90s during Yeltsin. Russian Orthodox Church is rushing to the government sinecure too: the most reactionary and fundamentalist organization, hostile to the very idea of rights and freedoms (what kind of rights can 'slaves' of God ever have?...), dreaming of making everybody live by its rules and pushing its ideas into schools, hospitals, prisons, army, all over...
Russia of the early 21st century is a goon with a camouflage uniform on, with a black mask on his face and a gun in his hands. This thug just killed a Chechen woman or a Chechen child. He is ready to shoot or kick anybody who dares to say a single word against him - whether in Chechnya or inside Russia. He is a butcher, which says it all. He has no elementary ideas about personal rights, about value of human life or presumption of innocence. Force is the only thing he understands and has respect for. You can't explain to him that he is wrong, that he is a criminal - you can only shoot him.
In Russia there will probably be no need for the new government to be sending millions of inmates to cut down trees. Why do that since everybody is obedient like sheep anyway? ?For them are sheers and slaughter-stall...? And those few who dare resist, come out and protest will most likely face tortures a lot more severe than aminazine or haloperidol in psycho wards of the Brezhnev era. An example is the hard-to-believe case of Eugene Novozhilov from Krasnodar, whom FSB framed and locked up in a loony bin after charging him with violation of Article 207 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (?Deliberately False Report on Act of Terrorism?).
So how else can these poor victims oppose the authorities, other than their personal courage and selflessness? So far a slogan on a sign is the only weapon. Even a megaphone will probably be outlawed, since legal rallies permitted by the authorities are coming to an end at least in Moscow. Only non-sanctioned ones are remaining, with the arrest within the next five minutes, and all sorts of addresses to people in the form of leaflets and samizdat. As well as the Internet, as long as they don't deny the access so far...
The subjects of a totalitarian state are not supposed to have any rights or freedoms: in Russia there have never been any for centuries. There was only a 'right' to die by the fancy of another tyrant while praising the tyrant with your lips. In 1991 in only seemed to us, we only had a happy dream that Freedom had come and that the people finally obtained their legitimate rights. Today that short thaw has come to an end and everything is coming back to where it used to be. Just like it's always been, criticizing the government is automatically equaled to high treason and is punished as far as the death sentence (which will be introduced again, this time really with no irony, ?upon requests by the working people?, who are really asking for it, even demanding).
The blood of the Chechen people is putting an indelible stain on the regime: now the regime has no place to go; now any opposition must be crushed at any cost, under any pretext, - by beatings and violence. Otherwise somebody will have to answer for bombings of Grozny (Jokhar), for all 'cleansings', and for the Moscow blasts of September 1999...
In vain did the human rights activists have gotten into the habit of talking about the need to comply with the law. How naive! Like the country has the force capable of making the FSB officers obediently comply with the laws and human rights!... But who can ever make them do that and how? Maybe human rights activists with their speeches and petitions to the Council of Europe? No, a brute totalitarian force that speaks the language of prisons, concocted criminal charges, tanks and nuclear blackmail to its opponents, cannot be dealt with in such a way.
Democratic mechanisms - elections, referendums, etc. - have been run by this KGB militarist gang for quite a while. No one can be elected anywhere unless the Kremlin power will want to see him elected. During the appearance of maintaining constitutional democratic mechanisms their entire job turned into a profanation. When the entire alternative at the elections is an FSB general or an acting official from the higher strata of Communist bureaucracy, - it make no sense of even going to these elections...
FSB grabbed the throat of freedom with its paws - and it is orchestrating a profanation at the same time. This is one of the most important weapons at the new stage of the existence of our 'millennium Reich'. Really, why execute and drive hundreds and thousands of dissidents and human rights activists to cut down trees, while all you need to do is set up a 'civil forum', for an example, where you can get them domesticated pretty well? Why get the Council of Europe and the entire civilized world outraged about physical retaliations against journalists, when you can quietly and noiselessly organize a 'dispute of two entities' in totally obedient courts? A big show will be put on, everybody will be demonstratively happy, just like after a lobotomy. And those who refuse to undergo this surgery will be executed under some 'financial' or 'espionage' pretext.
But the lives of educated and civilized citizens won't be any easier if millions of voluntary slaves do not get driven to the prison camps this time. You can set up a prison camp right where you reside or work, and drag barbed wire all along the perimeter of the country's borders and thus create a big prison camp - just like we always had actually. They say you can't be running a business here without violating any laws either. But you can pass such laws that will be impossible not to violate at all. And looks like this is what everything is heading for...
Everything must get started all over again, from the very first proclamations, from the experience of the populists, without repeating the mistakes that we already know of, of course. We must give up all hopes that maybe the things will get by and settle down by themselves - and we must stop working with no hopes for success, where there is no other prospect except for a room in a psycho ward. ?Abandon hope, ye who enter here?. You can't be practicing revolution on weekends or in the evening after work, - a revolution can only be an occupation and a calling at the same time. And one must leave for the revolution like leaving for a monastery, while giving up all vain and mundane business and concerns. Revolution is Service, when you bear your cross, and Nechayev was right when he wrote: ?a revolutionary is a doomed man?.
We don't know when there will be a pretty noticeable number of such people in Russia. So far you can count them on the fingers of one hand. Dull dictatorship, described by Russian fiction writer Strugatsky, is triumphing in all directions. ?Masks are thrown off, fascism is coming!? - one communist poet wrote in 1991...
There is only one support that the revolutionaries have in this country: the nations oppressed by the empire, the natives of national 'autonomies'. This is where the percentage of those who do not accept Putin's policies is always higher, let alone the support of Chechnya in Muslim regions of the empire.
If 'patriots' are outraged that 'thieves' were running the country during Yeltsin, - i.e. shy 'little thieves' like Alchen, - now the country is run by shameless KGB, butchers of entire nations, which is a lot worse. It would be better if they were stealing!... After all, money and property come and go. But even the most honorable human rights activist Robles (who from time to time mentions the 'improvement' with human rights in Chechnya) will never bring the dead bodies back to life, which were 'cleansed' to death and buried right at the site of a military base where they were tortured.
The savage country with savage people, who adore a whip and dictatorship with a dictator, is continuing its life after death. What for? Who ever needs it? (I just feel like answering with the words from a popular Russian song: 'No one needs it!') Their children are getting grabbed when the police break into student dorms, they get dragged right out of their beds, get handcuffed and drafted into the army without giving a darn about any postponements, - and they will keep quiet! All 'trial balloons' launched by the authorities are welcomed here by everybody except for a handful of human rights activists, capable of gathering a rally right in Moscow with as much as 100 people participating, and capable of endlessly complaining about the actions of the authorities to obedient courts and prosecutors' offices...
There have never been any freedom or democracy in Russia anyway. And turned out Russia is not genetically predisposed to them at all. Whatever is happening in the country right now is a natural reaction of rejecting an extraneous body by an organism. Freedom and democracy have always been foreign to Russia. And yearning for dictatorship, barracks and whips, which is irrational for any normal person, is quite natural and normal. From Putin's ratings and his actions we can see the power of how the force of rejection is: from genocide of the Chechen people to severe atrocities against new political prisoners in Russia. Whichever crimes are being committed, the rating is persistently stays where it is.
This country needs a revolutionary party like it needs a breath of life. Such a party would have been the only doctor that would be able to finally give a prescribed shot of euthanasia to it. Just to put it out of its misery. We have been walking around the circle for a few centuries in a row, we have been stepping on the same shovel. And we are still trying to start liberal reforms that for some reason always end up with riots against foreigners and bonfires for infidels. (Or even for their holy books first, like it already happened in Yekaterinburg in the Urals). Enough! We got sick of it! Time to get it over with!
They are clamping down on everything real tight! Yeltsin's thaw is becoming a thing of the past. It is too naive to appeal to courts and prosecutors' offices and demand its return. The people must find the power, get up, wipe off this government, place it under arrest and preferably hang it on the light poles...
NOTE: (on straight jackets at Brezhnev's mental facilities) The prisoner would be tightly wrapped from feet to armpits in a wet sheet or strips of canvas. As the material (the straight jacket) dried out, it shrank, inflicting terrible pain on the prisoner, and scorching his body all over. Usually the prisoner would quickly lose consciousness...nurses would loosen the roll-up and tighten it again.
Boris Stomakhin,
for Kavkaz-Center
2004-02-15 00:46:04
--------------------------------------------------------
>> CHECHNYA DISPATCH...3
About level of danger and hypocrisy
UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland stated that Chechnya is a territory with the so-called fifth level of danger. It is the highest degree of danger, according to the UN classification. But it has nothing to do with the danger which the entire population of Ichkeria faces each day. This particular UN classification marks the danger for... its personnel present in the country.
Security for UN officials could be viewed as an important issue, if the UN were not called the United Nations or if its duties were not providing people's security.
UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs managed to spot some 'positive' changes in the region after visiting Chechnya (meaning return of some of the refugees back to the country). Here he found common terms with the Russian officials, who have been terrorizing the refugees in neighboring Ingushetia in order to have them brought on the territory of even greater terror.
According to the UN official, starting the year 2000 over 0 million has been spent on the implementation of the aid program in the Northern Caucasus. It was not specified how much the refugees actually received. But if this amount of money says nothing to you, it will be interesting to discover that the amount of the UN aid to the Northern Caucasus is equal to the cost of oil pumped out from the territories of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for the same period of time.
So what was the result of the visit by UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs to Chechen Republic of Ichkeria occupied by the Russian troops? Full mutual understanding has been reached with the Russian invaders on bringing Chechen refugees back into the country, which has a positive moment of reducing their number in Ingushetia. The Chechen population found out that the 'fifth level of danger' exists on the territory of Chechnya, and as a result the UN observers cannot be present there and defend their right. Apparently, the level of danger must be reduced for the UN to be present. Then it's not too clear what they will be needed for.
From all of it it follows that the UN doesn't care about what happens to the Chechen population. For the past two years the UN Human Rights Commission blocked the resolution on Chechnya twice. Delegations of Cuba, China, Syria and Lybia were especially distinguished in noting 'positive' changes in Chechnya along with Russia.
This visit of a UN official to the Northern Caucasus did not expect to change anything either. But it's not only the matter of indifference alone. Any attempts to give assistance to Chechen refugees by Islamic charities are being nipped in the bud by Russian authorities. For this purpose they bring absurd accusations against them, like supporting terrorism or abetting separatists.
Inaction of international structures in the middle of ongoing tyranny by the Russian invaders can be regarded as complicity in crimes committed by the Russian regime against the Chechen people. Weak calls to the Russian side to stick to humanitarian standards sound unconvincing and hypocritical after that.
Mockery of people and common sense was contained in the reports about Jan Egeland being impressed with the amounts of payouts (which no one ever saw) to the people who suffered during the war operations in Chechnya, as well as about his response to the question about a possibility of UN mission being set up in Chechnya.
Jan Egeland said that this issue involves the release of the head of MSF mission (Doctors Without Borders) Arjan Erkel, who was captured in the Northern Caucasus a year and a half ago.
Mr. Egeland stressed that his release would be a forcible argument for constant UN presence in the Northern Caucasus.
Considering the unwillingness of the Russian side to have witnesses of their crimes be present in Chechnya, and the direct involvement of FSB in kidnapping Arjan Erkel, Mr. Egeland's statement can be regarded as a friendly step towards the Russian authorities. The longer the doctor is held hostage, the more chances there are Russians won't be bothered with foreign presence.
Sure the US envoy does not care about how many Chechen citizens have been kidnapped and are still missing after the kidnapping of Arjan Erkel, and how many will still have to suffer.
Salman Daudov,
for Kavkaz-Center
2004-02-14 00:36:04
>> OUR FRIENDS IN SOUTH KOREA...
South Korea's Intelligence Targets U.S. Technology
As one of the Four Dragons of East Asia, South Korea has achieved an incredible record of economic growth. Little more than a generation ago, Korea was one of the world's poorest countries. In 1963 its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of only $100 was comparable to those of other poor countries in Asia and Africa. Today, Korea, with a GDP of $434.5 billion (with a year 2000 estimated purchasing power parity of $764.6 billion) and a per capita GDP of $9,019 (with an estimated purchasing power parity of $16,100 in 2000) boasts the world's eleventh largest economy. Its GDP, now greater than that of India, is on a par with those of the lesser economies of the European Union.1 (See Table 1.)
Korea's leaders are keenly aware of the critical role of science and technology in fostering and maintaining their country's economic development. Science and technology have ``significantly contributed to the improvement of the [Korean] people's quality of life, as well as in social and economic development [and are a] key element of national wealth, industrial competitiveness, and national security.''2 In an effort to join the ranks of the technologically advanced nations, the Korean government has placed a ``special emphasis on strengthening its scientific and technological capacity.''3 An integral part of this ``special emphasis'' is the conduct of economic intelligence collection and technology transfer operations against technologically advanced nations. The late Dr. Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, once stated, ``South Korea gets enormous economic benefits from spying.'' The Koreans, he said, have been
179
Edwin S. Cochran is a former United States Army intelligence officer. His career included assignments in the Republic of Korea, Panama, Germany, and the United States. His articles on security matters have been published in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Israel Affairs, and Parameters.
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16: 179-201, 2003
Copyright # 2003 Taylor & Francis
0885-0607/03 $12.00 + .00
DOI: 10.1080/08850600390198715
``extremely active trying to get, grab, and steal technology that will benefit their industry.''4 South Korea has developed an aggressive and sophisticated economic intelligence collection program, whose principal target, ironically, is its foremost ally and protector, the United States of America. Both the South Korean government in Seoul and Korean businesses have conducted intelligence operations directed at collecting U.S. proprietary information in a wide variety of technology areas.5 South Korea has been seeking U.S. [scientific and technological] and economic information in an increasingly aggressive fashion [since] the 1990s. Its collection approach features many person-to-person contacts, and the South Koreans also possess a major intelligence presence in the United States. These activities are directed at both U.S. military and civilian targets, and are carried out by a range of South Korean Government entities and private corporations.6
POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Policy guidance and direction governing South Korean scientific and technological development, as well as supporting economic intelligence Table 1. Representative Comparisons of GDP, South Korea, and Selected Countries
Country GDP (Billion US$) Per Capita GDP Comments
South Korea1 $434.6 $9,019 2001 estimate
India2 $390 $420
Austria3 $207.96 $25,655 1999 estimate
Belgium4 $266 $25,567 1999 estimate
Greece5 $120.25 $113,305 1998 estimate
The Netherlands6 $406 $25,695 2000 estimate
Spain7 $558.3 $13,203 2000 estimate
Sources:
1 Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: South Korea, Internet, www.state.gov=r=pa=ei=bgn=2800.htm#econ.
2 Department of State, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, Background Note: India, Internet, www.state.gov=r=pa=ei=bgn=3454.htm#econ.
3 Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Austria, Internet, www.state.gov=r=pa=ei=bgn=3165.htm.
4 Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Belgium, Internet, www.state.gov=r=pa=ei=bgn=2874.htm.
5 Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Greece, Internet, www.state.gov=r=pa=ei=bgn=3395.htm.
6 Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: The Netherlands, Internet, www.state.gov=r=pa=ei=bgn=3204.htm.
7 Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Spain, Internet, www.state.gov=r=pa=ei=bgn=2878.htm.
180 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
collection programs, is formulated at the highest governmental levels. Primarily responsible for the development and supervision of Korean science and technology policy are the National Science and Technology Council and the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Established in January 1999, the National Science and Technology Council's functions are to ``review and coordinate national S&T policies and [research and development] programs'' and to set priorities for budget allocations. The Council, chaired by the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK), is composed of representatives of government industries and the Korean scientific community, with a supporting secretariat provided by the Ministry of Science and Technology.7
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) formulates and manages all aspects of national science and technology policy and coordinates the work of other Korean government ministries in this area. Specific functions ascribed to MOST include:
Formulation of ``policies for S&T development and [performance] of technology forecasting.''
Development of ``core technology, future-oriented technology, and large-scale technology.''
Pursuit of ``technological self-reliance for the safe use of nuclear technology.''
Support to ``basic and applied research conducted by government sponsored institutes, universities, and private research institutes.''
Formulation of policies for ``[research and development] investment, human resources development, S&T information, and international S&T cooperation.''8 Policy guidance concerning the conduct of economic intelligence collection in support of Korean scientific and technological development programs originates at the presidential level. In May 1991 the Korean government established the Presidential Advisory Council for Science and Technology (PACST) to ``advise the President about science and technology policy in the Republic of Korea.'' Composed of members drawn from the Korean government, industry, and academia (see Figure 1), the PACST has three primary tasks: (1) development of ``policy strategies for technological innovation and human resources development in Korea;'' (2) provision of ``guidelines for institutional reform'' related to science and technology; and (3) to ``undertake special tasks as requested by the President.'' According to PACST Chairman Chun Soung-Soon, these ``special tasks'' are now playing ``a more critical role'' in Korean scientific and technological development.9
The Secret Service
In December 1997 the Korean Yonhap News Agency reported that newly elected President Kim Dae-Jung was drafting a series of intelligence
181 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
reforms that included an ``intensive buildup of economic informationcollecting capabilities'' against overseas targets. Previous Korean press reporting concerning intelligence service involvement in economic intelligence operations emphasized the collection of foreign scientific and technological information in support of Korean commercial enterprises.10 For its size, South Korea possesses one of the world's most effective intelligence organizations. Its National Intelligence Service (NIS) possesses a cadre of technically proficient intelligence officers supported by enormous financial resources and well-organized agent networks.11
Formally established on 22 January 1999, the NIS is the successor agency to the former Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and the Agency for National Security Planning. The NIS's organizational chart (Figure 2) suggests that the agency is composed of three operational directives: the First (International Affairs) Directorate, presumably responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence; the Second (Domestic Affairs) Directorate, responsible for internal security issues; and the Third (North Korean Affairs) Directorate. Organizational functions of the NIS include:
``Collection, coordination, and distribution of information'' concerning Korea's security and national security.
Maintenance of classified ``documents, materials, and facilities.'' Figure 1. Presidential Advisory Council on Science and Technology Membership
182 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
Investigation of ``crimes concerning national security'' and those ``related to the missions of the NIS staff.''
``Planning and coordination of information and classified information.''12 In addition to collecting intelligence information concerning those states posing the greatest potential threat to South Korea's security--North Korea, China, and Russia--the NIS and its predecessors have also carried out operations against South Korea's allies. The United States and Japan are the two friendly nations in which South Korean intelligence operatives have been the most active; political, economic, and technological information have all been targets of South Korean intelligence collection operations.13
The ROK's economic intelligence collection program appears to have emerged as a coordinated effort in 1997 with the creation of a ``Science and Technology Foreign Cooperation Committee,'' whose function is to consolidate the separate foreign economic intelligence collection programs of the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry, National Defense, and Science. This committee was formed on the basis of a report by the Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI--a think tank subordinate to the Ministry of Science and Technology), which found that the coordination of scientific and technological intelligence collection efforts and the integration of collection targets with the requirements of Korean industry constituted a ``bottleneck'' in the country's foreign economic intelligence program. The committee's objectives include the development of a systematic collection strategy in order to better Figure 2. National Intelligence Service Organization. Source: Korean National Intelligence Service, Internet, www.nis.go.kr=english=about=mission_index.html
183 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
coordinate collection operations and prevent duplication of effort. The committee is reportedly composed of groups of specialists organized by geographic regions and a council of working-level personnel drawn from STEPI, the Korean Trade Promotion Agency, national laboratories, universities, and Korean corporations.
This consolidated collection program, intended to counter the ``increasing reluctance of advanced countries to transfer science and technology,'' includes the creation of local ``Korea Centers'' to collect foreign scientific and technological information, and the establishment of overseas branches of Korean government agencies, national laboratories, and companies ``to provide information on foreign S&T.'' In addition, in order to ``strengthen overseas S&T collection'' and build an information system capable of linking Korean organizations to overseas sources of technology, STEPI was to create an ``Overseas Science and Technology Information Center.'' This center would integrate the information collected by ``overseas Korean scientists and engineers associations, Korean diplomatic and consular officers in foreign countries, large Korean trading companies, and the overseas offices of national [laboratories].''14
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
South Korea's conduct of intelligence collection against the United States reflects changes within the international environment associated with the end of the Cold War, as well as internal and external policy objectives of the government in Seoul.
While foreign intelligence operations directed against U.S. economic interests are neither unusual nor unprecedented, the international environment in which they now occur is radically different from that of only a decade ago. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Cold War and the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies that dominated world politics since the end of World War II, ushered in a ``new world order'' marked by changing perceptions of national power. Historically, military strength has been the gauge of national power. Perhaps the most important change in the international environment after the Cold War has been the seeming shift in the overall relevance of different sources of national power, with military power declining and economic power increasing in importance.15 Many nations, including the United States, have come to equate economic security with national security.
Economic intelligence collection has therefore become of correspondingly greater importance. A 1994 report by the U.S. National Economic Council found that ``economic espionage is becoming increasingly central to the
184 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
operations of many of the world's intelligence services and is absorbing larger portions of their staffing and budget.''16
The United States is the primary target of foreign nations' economic intelligence collection efforts. These consist of both the clandestine and overt collection of classified or sensitive U.S. economic, industrial, technological, or related proprietary or trade secret information, as well as the unlawful acquisition of critical technologies. These operations may be conducted by either a foreign government or a foreign company; while usually targeted against private U.S. firms, they may also be targeted directly against the United States government.17 Strong U.S. capabilities ``in a wide variety of cutting-edge, technical, and scientific fields, and the open nature of the United States'' make it ``the top target of foreign countries in economic [intelligence] collection and espionage.''18 The end of the bipolar international system and increasing national emphasis on economic security have blurred many of the traditional distinctions between ``friendly'' and ``enemy'' states. This has been particularly evident in the area of economic intelligence collection. In February 1996, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis J. Freeh characterized economic intelligence collection ``perpetrated by foreign governments, institutions, instrumentalities, and persons against the United States'' as a ``critical national security issue.''19
Just as foreign military establishments are the primary recipients of U.S. defense-related information gathered by their intelligence services, foreign companies and commercially oriented government ministries are the primary beneficiaries of collected U.S. economic and technological information. In its Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage for 2001, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive estimated that during calendar year 2000 economic espionage cost the U.S. business community $100-250 billion in lost sales. The greatest losses to U.S. companies involved information concerning manufacturing processes and research and development.20 Foreign economic intelligence collection also has broader implications for U.S. national security. In the United States during the Cold War, the relationship between economics and security was indirect: the economy produced the taxes needed to supply the trillions of dollars dedicated to defense spending.21 In the post-Cold War world, the relationship is more direct. More than ever before, U.S. national security and commerce have become mutually reinforcing; America's defense edge is part and parcel of its economic prowess.22 Foreign economic intelligence collection operations directly target elements of the U.S. defense technology and industrial base, those ``business firms, laboratories, and academic institutions that provide
185 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
products and services to the Department of defense and foreign customers,''23 and which ensure the maintenance of America's continued military-technical superiority over potential adversaries. Key elements of the U.S. defense technology and industrial base include munitions, armored vehicles, shipbuilding, military aircraft, electronics, and defense research and development.24
Foreign nations, Freeh told the Senate Intelligence Committee, ``pose various levels and types of threats to U.S. economic and technological information.'' Freeh also noted:
Some ideological and military adversaries continue their targeting of U.S. economic and technological information as an extension of a concerted intelligence assault on the United States conducted throughout the Cold War.
Other [nations] targeting U.S. economic and technological information are either long time allies of the United States or have traditionally been neutral. These countries target U.S. economic and technological information despite their friendly relations with the United States. In some cases they take advantage of their considerable legitimate access to U.S. information and collect sensitive information more easily than our traditional adversaries. Some countries traditionally considered allies have infrastructures that allow them to easily internalize high-tech information and utilize it in competition against U.S. firms.25
The conduct of economic intelligence collection against the United States is not restricted to foreign intelligence services. Foreign-sponsored nonintelligence personnel, such as industry representatives, students, scientists, researchers, and foreign employees of U.S. companies, may all engage in intelligence collection activities. In addition, the expansion of information technology and increased use of computers and telecommunications systems has widened the environment in which economic intelligence collection occurs to include cyberspace. Many nations have been able to leverage these and other widely available sophisticated technologies to enhance their intelligence collection capabilities.
SEOUL'S PENETRATIONS
South Korea is assessed to be one of five allied nations most actively involved in the conduct of economic intelligence collection operations against the United States.26 These operations are motivated by several factors, including military force modernization objectives, economic competition, and industrial modernization efforts employing technologies with dual-use applications.27 The ROK's economic intelligence collection operations against the U.S. are driven by three specific, interrelated factors: (1) the
186 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
requirement for continued access to advanced technologies to ensure continued economic growth; (2) support for Korea's indigenous arms industry; and (3) wider political considerations related to Korea's foreign policy objectives.
Access to Advanced Technologies
Among the factors that have contributed to Korea's phenomenal economic advancement have been an export-led growth strategy and the adoption of foreign technology.28 Korean industries now produce and export advanced electronic components, computers, telecommunications equipment, automobiles, and a wide range of consumer electronic products to markets around the world.
Japan has traditionally served as Korea's source of advanced technology. Since normalizing relations in 1965, the two countries have developed an extensive relationship focused on mutually beneficial economic activity. But Japan charges high royalties for technology transfer and competes sharply with Korea in the export of high-tech products. Faced with a decline in the competitiveness of its export products, the high cost of buying foreign technology, and the difficulty of developing new technologies through indigenous resources, Korea has developed a system of processes to obtain foreign technology by ``indirect'' means, particularly from U.S. companies.29
Technologies targeted for acquisition from U.S. sources by Korean government research institutes and companies include aerospace, automobiles, bioengineering, computers, communications, electronics, environmental controls, metals and machinery, medical equipment, nuclear power systems, and semiconductors. The Koreans most frequently target those technologies that reflect their own major high-tech export fields: electronics, data communications and processing, and semiconductor technology. Within this most frequently targeted group, the highest priorities for collection include high-speed CD-ROM, ultra-high-resolution monitor design, traffic control systems, flash memory, digital signal processors, application-specific integrated circuits, cable television converters, digital communications, image-data processing, asynchronous transmission mode technology, fiber optics, and audio-video compression technology.30
Support to Korea's Arms Industry
A 1996 report by the General Accounting Office found that a common goal of many economic intelligence collection operations directed against the United States by friendly or allied nations to be the support to their national defense industries:
187 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
Countries seek U.S. defense technologies to incorporate into domestically produced [weapon] systems. By obtaining the technology from the United States, a country can have cutting-edge weapon systems without the cost of research and development. The cutting-edge technologies not only provide superior weapon systems for a country's own use, but also make these products more marketable for exports.31
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States has committed itself to the security of the ROK under the terms of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. In support of this commitment, the U.S. maintains approximately 37,000 military personnel in South Korea. In order to ensure compatibility of weapon systems, the U.S. has historically been Korea's primary external source of arms and military equipment.
High levels of military spending and, presumably, a desire to reduce their dependence on the U.S., led South Korea's leaders to establish a domestic arms industry during the 1970s. South Korea's arms manufacturing sector has evolved rapidly over the past 30 years, thanks in large part to the country's prowess in the civilian heavy industry and electronics sectors. Korea is now largely self-sufficient in terms of military production. Whereas military equipment accounted for 4.9 percent of all Korean imports in 1973, that figure had dropped to 0.8 percent by 1990. While driving up overall costs, domestic arms production has significant benefits for Korea. It keeps more money in the country, provides employment for its citizens, provides export opportunities, and results in the acquisition of technology and production techniques from foreign partners.32
South Korea is emerging as an important second-tier arms exporter. In 1997 the ROK exported $58.02 million worth of arms and military equipment. This figure climbed to $147.19 million in 1998, and to $196.3 million in 1999. While the value of Korean military exports fell to $53.37 million in 2000, Korean government sources expected it to exceed $200 million in 2001.33
Korea now produces all small arms, and has developed its own 105mm and 155mm towed artillery pieces and 130mm multiple rocket launcher systems. Korean firms have also built and exported infantry fighting vehicles (the K-200, manufactured by Daewoo Heavy Industries and Machinery), as well as military trucks, mine detection equipment, munitions, parachutes, uniforms, and body armor to countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. Korean companies also design and manufacture a variety of naval weapon systems. These include patrol boats, minesweepers, Po Hang-class corvettes, Ulsanclass frigates, KDX-type destroyers, combat data systems, search radars, 40 mm light naval guns, the K731 heavy torpedo, and undersea countermeasures equipment. Reports from the ROK Ministry of Defense and from within the arms industry itself indicate the development of
188 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
short-range shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, guided or ``smart'' bombs, ship-to-ship missiles, and unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles.34 According to Lee Pil-Joong, a professor at Korea's National Defense University, South Korea is looking beyond the threat posed by North Korea and is developing the types of weapons needed to safeguard its security in the twenty-first century.35 Many Korean weapon development projects, in fact, appear to have objectives broader than that of the ROK's immediate defense needs. Seoul has sought to use co-production projects to decrease its dependence on foreign suppliers and to enter new export markets. Korea is the leading recipient of offset agreements with U.S. defense manufacturers in the Pacific Rim, and among the top ten recipients worldwide. Many of these agreements represent direct investments in the Korean defense industry. For example, as part of an offset agreement connected to the 1991 sale of F-16 fighter-bombers, the Lockheed Martin Corporation agreed to help South Korea build an indigenous training=light attack aircraft. A beneficial result of such agreements, from the Korean perspective, is the transfer of high technology to local industry.36
Foreign Policy Goals
In addition to the domestic importance of continued economic growth, the ROK's economic intelligence collection program also indirectly supports the accomplishment of broader foreign policy objectives. Economic considerations have a high priority in Korean foreign policy. Korea seeks to build on its economic accomplishments to increase its regional and global role, to include playing an increasingly important role in Pacific Rim political and economic activities. In pursuit of this objective, for instance, Korea was one of the founding members of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum.37
COLLECTION METHODOLOGIES
ROK economic intelligence operations targeted against the United States employ both clandestine and overt collection methodologies. A clandestine intelligence collection operation is one that is ``sponsored or conducted . . . in such a way as to ensure secrecy or concealment.'' Because the fundamental objective of a clandestine operation is to deny one's adversary knowledge of the fact of its existence, the emphasis is on concealment of the operation itself, rather than the identity of the sponsor. An overt operation is one that is ``conducted openly, without concealment.'' While the activities associated with an overt intelligence collection operation may be openly conducted, the true identity of their sponsor may still be concealed.38
189 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
Clandestine Collection
Clandestine collection methodologies employed by South Korea include agent recruitment, physical access, exploitation of private sector organizations, and special technical collection operations. They may also include the recruitment of Korean students and researchers studying and working in the United States.
(a) Agent Recruitment An intelligence collector's best source is a trusted person inside a company or organization whom the collector can task to provide classified or proprietary information. Clandestine human collection ``is another way of saying `espionage,' entailing the use of both human sources and technical devices such as `bugs' emplaced by humans. In other words, it is old fashioned spying, the recruitment of agents and manipulation of people.''39
In a ``classic'' agent recruitment operation, an intelligence officer (a professional employee of an intelligence agency) seeks to recruit an agent (a foreign national) to collect information either in his home country or a third nation.40 Intelligence officers assess potential agents in terms of both their placement within an organization and their access to desired information. Therefore, a foreign intelligence collector's interest in a U.S. company's employees may not be commensurate with their rank in the organization. While corporate executives, key managers, and researchers can all be targets for recruitment, so can support employees such as secretaries, technicians, computer operators, and maintenance personnel. The latter frequently have good, if not often the best, access to sensitive information, and their lower pay and status may provide fertile ground for manipulation.
Recruitment need not be voluntary on the agent's part; foreign intelligence collectors may also identify and exploit a wide range of human weaknesses. This may include the use of prostitutes for sexual blackmail, or the use of a ``swallow'' (an attractive woman) or a ``raven'' (an attractive man) to form a close personal relationship with an employee having knowledge of sensitive information.41 Foreign intelligence collectors may also employ ethnic targeting, which entails the recruitment of U.S. nationals or permanent resident aliens to acquire sensitive information. This may be accomplished through appealing to an individual's sense of ethnic loyalty or patriotism toward his native country, or by threatening the safety of family members still residing in the home country.
Korean agent recruitment operations make extensive use of ethnic targeting. A survey of Korean press reporting conducted by the U.S. National Counterintelligence Centers revealed that ``[s]ubstantial documentation exists on South Korea's interest in exploiting the ethnicity of overseas Koreans to obtain commercial and technological information.''
190 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
Korea's government and private industry operate systems to identify potential recruits who are in a position to transfer high-level technology and who, because of their ethnicity, may be predisposed to accept offers to ``contribute'' their knowledge to the ROK. Korea aggressively targets ``present and former nationals working for U.S. companies and researchinstitutions.'' Often, members of the Korean community in the United States have been manipulated or coerced into participating in intelligence collection operations.42
An example of ethnic targeting and recruitment, albeit for political and military rather than economic intelligence collection, is that of Robert C. Kim, a U.S. Department of the Navy civilian computer specialist assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Kim was arrested on 24 September 1996 and charged with passing classified U.S. defense information to Captain Baek Dong-Il, the South Korean Naval attache? in Washington. On 11 July 1997, Kim was sentenced to nine years in jail after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage. Kim, a native of Korea, became a U.S. citizen in 1974 and had lived in the United States for thirty years. According to investigators, over a five-month period Kim passed dozens of classified documents (including some that were Top Secret) to Captain Baek out of loyalty to his country of birth. The documents included military assessments about North Korea and China, as well as U.S. intelligence assessments of South Korean government officials.43
(b) Physical Access A far simpler means of acquiring sensitive or proprietary information is simply to steal it. Korean intelligence operatives aggressively pursue access to secure or ``closed source'' environments through a variety of means. These include the use of surveillance and reconnaissance to determine the location of sensitive information, surreptitious photography, and the conduct of surreptitious entry (``black bag jobs'') to steal proprietary information from office files and computers.44
(c) Exploitation of Private Sector Organizations The ROK's economic intelligence collection operations often exploit private sector organizations, particularly Korean businesses, both for collection and to provide operational cover for intelligence officers. While intelligence officers assigned overseas are usually posted to South Korean embassies as members of the diplomatic staff, they may also be afforded ``non-official'' cover by one of Korea's industrial conglomerates, such as Hyundai, Samsung, or the Lucky Group. These corporations are at least sometimes aware of the presence of intelligence officers working out of their corporate offices. According to one former Korean intelligence official, ``They would get [a]
191 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
call [from government officials], and it would be arranged easily. Most times, no questions would be asked by them.''45
In addition to operations conducted by the NIS, Korean corporations have learned that their own employees can yield a wealth of competitive intelligence information concerning competitors' plans and technologies. While this type of collection may not necessarily result in technology transfer, it does allow Korean corporations ``to get a pulse on worldwide [research and development] activities'' and to use this information for their own purposes.46
(d) Special Technical Collection Operations Special technical collection operations include computer intrusions, telecommunications targeting and intercept, and exploitation of private-sector encryption weaknesses. These clandestine collection activities by foreign economic intelligence collectors account for the largest portion of sensitive information lost by U.S. companies. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, Korean economic intelligence collection operations have included stealing information from computerized databases maintained by the United States government and U.S. companies.47
(e) Recruitment of Students and Researchers According to the National Science Foundation, 115,367 foreign students were enrolled in graduate studies programs at U.S. universities in 1999. Of these, 109,904 were enrolled in science or engineering programs. This large number, especially those studying in technical fields, represents a potentially rich source of information for foreign intelligence collectors. This is particularly true of students from Asian countries. United States institutions of higher learning are a significant source of doctoral education of Asian students; of the approximately 22,853 doctoral degrees awarded in science and technology in the U.S. in 1990, fourteen percent (3,200) were awarded to graduate students from six Asian countries--China, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. And because Asian graduate students come to the U.S. primarily for training in science and engineering, they are and will continue to be an integral part of U.S. universities' science and engineering strengths.48
Students may be recruited by their nation's intelligence services either prior to leaving their home countries, possibly as a pre-condition for departure, or after arrival in the United States. Students may be motivated by appeals to their ethnic identity, patriotism, or simply a fear of the intelligence service involved. Foreign students may be targeted against specific research projects, serving as assistants to professors conducting research in specific technology areas, and be ``encouraged'' to seek employment with targeted U.S. companies after graduation.
192 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
Korean students and researchers are often sent abroad to acquire advanced degrees or study specific fields of knowledge. For Korea, however, there is a greater sense of national purpose to these exchanges than for many other countries. The Korean government has tasked its national laboratories to aid domestic industry by providing ``practical'' support for new product development and ``internationalizing their research activities.'' The establishment of ``centers of excellence,'' staffed by leading foreign universities and research institutes, provides Korean researchers with opportunities to ``come into contact'' with high-level scientists and advanced technologies. According to Korean press reporting, the Korean Ministry of Machinery and Metals (subordinate to the Ministry of Science and Technology) sought to establish joint research and development centers at Stanford University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to ``acquire leading future technologies.''49
Overt Collection
The South Korean government and Korean corporations have successfully organized and implemented a variety of overt methods for the collection of economic intelligence and the ``indirect'' transfer of technology from U.S. sources. These include international cooperation, direct foreign participation, sponsored research, hiring U.S. scientific and technical personnel, and open source collection.
(a) International Cooperation ``International cooperation'' denotes a range of Korean government and industry programs whose aim is the acquisition of foreign technology. The ROK government has both sanctioned and supported the establishment of ``S&T forums'' to act as a bridge between Korean commercial enterprises and U.S. high-technology companies to facilitate the transfer of technology. The purpose of these state-sponsored ``foundations'' is to ``remedy Korea's weaknesses in key industrial sectors by creating opportunities to interface with scientists working with specific U.S. technologies.''50
The Korean government sponsors a number of programs to foster ``strategic cooperation'' with U.S. firms. In the Korean context, strategic cooperation involves ``identifying gaps in indigenous technology, finding a foreign company that has the technology, and engaging the latter in some kind of cooperative relationship that results in the transfer of the technology to South Korea.''51 Because the initial focus of much of the research developed through strategic cooperation programs is noncommercial, foreign companies are reportedly more willing to share their technology than they would be through more ``conventional'' channels. The Korean government is often involved at different levels of the strategic cooperation process, specifically identifying weaknesses in the national
193 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
scientific and technological infrastructure, finding foreign companies willing to transfer their technology for commercial purposes, and subsidizing the actual transfer. When South Korean companies obtain foreign technology through the development process as part of a transfer agreement, the Korean press describes the transfer itself as ``joint development.''52 The Korean government sponsors a number of these programs in the United States. The Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC), for instance, sponsors the operations of the Information and Communications Venture Support Center (I-park) in California's Silicon Valley. I-park is an information technology ``incubator'' whose function is to facilitate ``strategic cooperation'' with local companies. I-park's Web page identifies facilitating technology transfer as one of the organization's main functions. The site also acknowledges support from the Institute of Information Technology Assessment (IITA); the IITA's Web page also lists technology transfer as one of its main projects. The IITA was founded in 1992 as an affiliate of the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (now a part of MIC), South Korea's state-run telecommunications research facility chartered to disseminate innovative technology to Korean manufacturers. The MIC also sponsors the Korean Venture Center (KVC), a high-tech ``incubator'' in Fairfax County, Virginia. According to the center's director, the KVC's goal is to assist Korean firms in arranging for ``joint research and development'' with U.S. companies.
In late 2001 the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), a quasi-official organization that serves as an intermediary between Korean companies and government policymakers, announced plans to establish a biotechnology ``liaison center'' near San Diego, California. The proposed ``Korea BioValley'' is intended to serve as a focal point for Korean products into the U.S. market, and to facilitate the acquisition of U.S. biotechnology. FKI's plans reportedly call for the joint participation of large Korean companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and biotech startups in establishing this ``bridgehead'' in the ``hub'' of the life sciences industry.
BioValley is part of a larger FKI proposal released in October 2001 titled ``A Plan for Developing the Biotech Industry.'' According to this document, the primary purpose of BioValley is ``to grasp in real time the latest advances in biotechnology and trends in the biotech industry.'' A secondary goal is to promote the introduction of Korean biotech products into the U.S. and adjacent countries ``with a minimum of investment.''53 (b) Direct Foreign Participation Direct foreign participation includes both foreign direct investment (FDI) and participation in foreign scientific, technological, and industrial training programs. All of the major Korean
194 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
corporations have established overseas subsidiaries in an effort to claim markets and take advantage of both lower production costs and local technical expertise. The United States is now the third leading destination of Korean FDI funds; the total value of Korean investments in the U.S. is now estimated to be $790 million.54 Most of these investments are in hightechnology areas. Samsung Electronics, for example, spent $1 million to set up Image Quest Technology in Silicon Valley (Santa Clara, California). Image Quest Technology was built to research and design thin-film technology (TFT) for liquid crystal displays (LCDs) and is staffed primarily by local hires.
Hyundai Electronics's subsidiaries have also been active in the development and assimilation of advanced technology from U.S. courses. Hyundai developed a 10.4-inch TFT LCD at one of its U.S. branches, and brought the technology to Korea for manufacturing. Hyundai Electronics has also set up centers in San Jose, California, and Boston, Massachusetts, for the design of application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). According to Korean press reporting, heavy machinery, oil refining, and factory automation companies all take advantage of their geographic location in nations with advanced technology. One newspaper reported that the Pohang Iron and Steel Company's subsidiary in Maryland, Posco International Corporation, would use its position to engage in technical information gathering.55
Korean companies regularly send employees abroad for on-site training at overseas companies. This practice exposes Korean technicians to the technology, operations, and practices of a foreign company. For example, Korean firms have regularly sent researchers and technicians to aircraft manufacturers in the United States to introduce them to advanced aerospace technology. Korean Air sent six employees to participate in the Boeing Company's 777 aircraft project in order to accumulate manufacturing design experience. In another instance, Samsung Aerospace sent sixty employees to the United States for technical training, and Halla Heavy Industries sent an eight-person technology training team to study satellite technology.56
(c) Sponsored Research South Korea takes advantage of the favorable research climate in the United States to sponsor research activities at U.S. universities and research centers. Major Korean-owned, U.S.-based research facilities include Samsung Electronics's San Jose Research Institute (85 employees); LG Electronics's San Jose Research Institute (10 employees); LG North American Operations in Chicago, Illinois (15 employees); Hyundai Electronics's SEMR Research Institute in San Jose (29 employees); and LG Semicon in San Diego, California, with 60 people conducting semiconductor technology surveys.57
195 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
(d) Hiring U.S. Personnel ROK companies favor hiring foreign experts for Korean operations as an indirect method of technology transfer. This approach is recommended by Seoul government experts, facilitated by official and semiofficial Korean organizations, and widely practiced in Korean industries. The Korean media has reported that the government will match funds spent by companies recruiting and employing high-level foreign personnel. These funds include salary incentives for qualified and accomplished foreign personnel, at rates well above international standards. According to Korean press reporting, during the early 1990s Samsung Aerospace recruited 140 foreign aeronautical specialists, 40 from the United States and the remainder from Russia and Ukraine. A Samsung mission visiting the United States in June 1993 was able to recruit sixteen general managers of design, nine group leaders, and five senior technicians. Korean companies periodically take out full-page ads in Silicon Valley newspapers to recruit engineers, and have been able to scout out talented personnel. In an effort similar to ethnic targeting for clandestine recruitment, the Korean Ministry of Science and Technology operates a system to recruit scientists and technicians, drawing from the 40,000 ethnic Koreans working overseas in scientific and technical fields, a third of whom are affiliated with the General Federation of Korean Science and Technology Organizations. The purpose of this ``brainpool'' is to provide incentives for overseas Koreans and other foreign scientists to help Korea acquire at an early date the newest science, technology, and know-how in the research and development stage in advanced countries.58
(e) Open Source Collection Foreign economic intelligence collectors routinely exploit the vast amount of competitive information that is legally available in the United States. Commercial databases, trade and scientific journals, computer bulletin boards, freely available government publications and reports, Freedom of Information Act requests for corporate publications, and Internet Web sites--all of these are potentially valuable sources of information in their own right or as tools to identify intelligence gaps and generate leads for clandestine collection. The rapid growth and commercialization of the World Wide Web has made all of this information more freely available, significantly reducing the cost of information acquisition. The Korean government and major Korean corporations have recognized that foreign databases are an excellent and inexpensive source of technological information. ROK government research institutes have provided Korean companies with access to foreign databases containing industrial, scientific, and technological information. Capitalizing on these databases has allowed South Korea to acquire considerable scientific and technological information within a limited time.59
196 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
ONE EXAMPLE AMONG MANY
South Korea provides a clear example of one allied nation's conduct of economic intelligence collection operations against the United States. The Korean government has developed and implemented a structured, systemic approach for the acquisition of sensitive economic information and ``indirect'' transfers of technology from U.S. sources. These efforts are centrally orchestrated, and take place within a policy and organizational framework managed at the highest levels of the Korean government. Most significantly, this framework has allowed the Korean government to coordinate the activities of various government agencies--the National Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Science and Technology and other government ministries, and national laboratories and research institutes-- with those of private industry for the accomplishment of specific collection objectives in support of wider national-level internal and external policy interests.
REFERENCES
1 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: South Korea, September 2001, Internet, www.state.gov=r=pa=ei=bgn=2800.htm; Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2001, Internet, www.cia.gov=publications=fact book=inex.html.
2 Korean Ministry of Science and Technology, ``Organization and Legal Framework,'' Internet, www.most.go.kr=index_e.html.
3 Korean Ministry of Science and Technology, ``Science and Technology Policy: A Brief History,'' Internet, www.most.go.kr=index_e.html.
4 Quoted in Peter Schweitzer, Friendly Spies: How America's Allies Are Using Economic Espionage to Steal Our Secrets (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993), p. 207.
5 Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Operations Security Intelligence Threat Handbook, May 1996, Internet, www.fas.org=irp=nsa=ioss=threat 96, part 05.htm.
6 Foreign Collection Against the Department of Energy: The Threat to U.S. Weapons and Technology, 1998, p. 19, reproduced in Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000), p. 223.
7 Korean Ministry of Science and Technology, ``Organization and Legal Framework.''
8 Ibid.
9 Korean Presidential Advisory Council for Science and Technology, ``Mission,'' Internet, www.pacst.go.kr=English=3=3.htm; ``Chairman's Message,'' Internet, www.pacst,go.kr=English=1=1.htm.
10 National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea Informal Technology Acquisitions,'' Counterintelligence News and Developments, Vol. 2, June 1998, Internet, www.ncix.gov=nacic=news=1998.htm#rtoc2.
197 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
11 Peter Schweitzer, Friendly Spies, p. 186.
12 Korean National Intelligence Service, ``Mission,'' Internet, www.nis.gov.kr=English=about=mission.html.
13 Peter Schweitzer, Friendly Spies, p. 186.
14 National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea Informal Technology Acquisitions.''
15 Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 23; David Jablonsky, ``National Power,'' Parameters, Vol. 27, No. 1, Spring 1997, p. 43; Samuel P. Huntington, ``America's Changing Strategic Interests,'' Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1, January-February 1991, p. 5.
16 National Economic Council, Report to Congress on Foreign Acquisition and Espionage Activities Against U.S. Critical Technology Companies, 1994, p. 5, cited in John J. Fialka, Statement Before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 17 June 1997, p. 2, Internet, www.fas.org=irp=congress=1997_hr=j970601f.htm.
17 There is no clear operational definition of foreign economic espionage and intelligence collection. The U.S. Attorney General defines economic espionage as ``the unlawful or clandestine targeting or acquisition of sensitive financial, trade, or economic policy information, proprietary economic information, or critical technologies.'' This definition excludes the collection of openly and legally available information that constitutes a significant majority of economic intelligence collection. Aggressive intelligence collection that is entirely open and legal may harm U.S. industry, but it is not espionage. However, it can help foreign intelligence services identify information gaps and in some cases may be a precursor to economic espionage. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 defines industrial espionage as ``espionage conducted by a foreign government or by a foreign company with direct assistance of a foreign government against a private U.S. company and aimed at obtaining commercial secrets.'' This definition does not extend to the activities of private entities acting without foreign government involvement, nor does it pertain to lawful efforts to obtain commercially useful information. While some of these legal activities may be precursors to clandestine collection, they do not constitute industrial espionage.
The definition of foreign economic intelligence collection offered here includes elements of generally accepted definitions of both economic and technical intelligence. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1989), pp. 8-9.
18 National Counterintelligence Center, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 1998, p. 3, Internet, www.nacic.gov=nacic=reports=fy98.htm.
19 Louis J. Freeh, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information, Hearing on Economic Espionage, 29 February 1996, p. 10, Internet, www.fas.org=irp=congress=1996_hr=s960228f.htm.
198 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
20 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2001, Internet, www.ncix.gov=pubs=reports=fy01.htm#c.
21 Samuel P. Huntington, ``America's Changing Strategic Interests,'' p. 8.
22 Michael Hirsh, ``The Great Technology Giveaway? Trading with Potential Foes,'' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5, September-October 1998, p. 3.
23 Gordon Boezer, Ivars Gutmanis, and Joseph E. Muckerman, II, ``The Defense Technology and Industrial Base: Key Component of National Power,'' Parameters, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer 1997, p. 26.
24 Ibid., pp. 30-37.
25 Louis J. Freeh, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information, Hearing on Economic Espionage, 29 February 1996, p. 3.
26 General Accounting Office, Economic Espionage: Information on Threat from U.S. Allies, GAO=T-NSIAD-96-114, 28 February 1996, Internet, www.fas.org=irp=gao=nsi96114.htm. Initially identified by the GAO only as countries ``A'' -``E,'' these states have since been identified in open source literature as Israel, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea.
27 National Counterintelligence Center, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 1998, p. 2.
28 Central Intelligence Agency; William J. Taylor, Jr. and AbrahamKim, ``The Koreas in the Changing Northeast Region,'' in Dianne L. Smith (ed.), Asian Security to the Year 2000 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 15 December 1996), p. 25. Other factors have included Korea's highly skilled and educated labor force working at low wages; close relations between government and business, including directed credit, import restrictions, and state sponsorship of specific industries; and the adoption of foreign capital.
29 Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: South Korea; National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea: Indirect Technology Transfers,'' Counterintelligence News and Developments, Vol. 2, June 1996, Internet, www.ncix.gov=nacic=news=1996=jun96.htm#rtoc1.
30 National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea: Indirect Technology Transfers.''
31 General Accounting Office, Economic Espionage: Information on Threat from U.S. Allies.
32 Federation of American Scientists, U.S. Arms Clients Profiles--South Korea, Internet, www. fas.org=asmp=profiles=south_korea.htm; ``ROK's Yonhap: Korean Arms Industry, Development, Potential, Shortfalls,'' KPP 20011002000001 Seoul Yonhap in English 0001 GMT 2 October 2001, Internet, groups.yahoo.com=group=arms trade=message=6309.
33 Federation of American Scientists; Korea Herald, ``Seoul to Export $200 Million Worth of Defense Goods,'' 26 March 2001, Internet, www.indg.org=korea.htm.
34 ``ROK's Yonhap: Korean Arms Industry, Development, Potential, Shortfalls.''
35 Ibid.
199 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
36 Federation of American Scientists, ``Seoul to Export 100 Million Worth of Defense Goods.''
37 Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: South Korea.
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub. 1-02, 10 June 1998, pp. 79 and 333. A covert operation, by comparison, is one ``that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity or permit plausible deniability by the sponsor'' (p. 115).
39 Samuel Halpern, ``Clandestine Collection,'' in Roy Godson (ed.), Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: The Elements of Intelligence (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1983), p. 31.
40 See Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, pp. 234-238.
41 Edwin Fraumann, ``Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined,'' Public Administration Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, July-August 1997, p. 304.
42 National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea: Indirect Technology Transfers,'' Counterintelligence News and Developments, Vol. 2, June 1996, Internet, www.ncix.gov=nacic=news=1996=jun96.#rtoc1; National Economic Council, Report to Congress on Foreign Acquisition and Espionage Activities Against U.S. Critical Technology Companies, 1994, p. 23, cited in Peter Schweitzer, ``The Growing Threat of Economic Espionage,'' Business Forum, Vol. 23, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring 1998, p. 2; Peter Schweitzer, Friendly Spies, p. 187.
43 Defense Personnel Security Research Center, Recent Espionage Cases, 1996, Internet, www.dss.mil=training=espionage=1996.htm.
44 Edwin Fraumann, ``Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined,'' pp. 304, 306.
45 Peter Schweitzer, Friendly Spies, p. 187.
46 National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea: Indirect Technology Transfers.''
47 Interagency OPSEC Support Staff; Neil Munro, ``South Korea Said to Eye U.S. Technology,'' Washington Technology, 19 May 1994, p. 1.
48 National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Studies, Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering, 1999, Internet, www.nsf.gov=sbe=srs=nsf01315=dst.htm; Jean M. Johnson, Human Resources for Science and Technology: The Asian Region, NSE 93-3-3 (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1993), pp. 1, 5, 9. 49 Department of Commerce, Office of Technology Policy, Korea's Strategy
for Leadership in Research and Development, June 1997, p. 24, Internet, www.ta.doc.gov=Reports=Korea=Korea.pdf; National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea Informal Technology Acquisitions''; National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea: Indirect Technology Transfers.''
50 National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea: Indirect Technology Transfers,'' Department of Commerce, p. 21.
51 Ibid.
200 EDWIN S. COCHRAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
52 Ibid.; and Department of Commerce, ``Korea's Strategy for Leadership in Research and Development,'' p. 26.
53 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, ``South Korea: Biotech Consortium to Build Tech-Transfer Facility in San Diego,'' 21 December 2001, Internet, www.ncix.gov.
54 Korea Ministry of Finance and Economy, ``China Replaces U.S. as Korea's Investment Destination,'' 8 August 2001, Internet, www.korea.net=kwnews; ``Korean Investment in China Up, U.S. Down,'' Asia Times, 7 February 2002, Internet, www.atimes.com=koreas=DB07Dg01.html.
55 Department of Commerce, ``Korea's Strategy Leadership in Research and Development,'' pp. 19-20.
56 Ibid., p. 18.
57 Ibid., p. 20.
58 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
59 National Counterintelligence Center, ``South Korea: Indirect Technology Transfers,'' Department of Commerce, p. 35.
201 SOUTH KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Posted by maximpost
at 3:34 PM EST