>> BREMER AND SISTANI...

Call Me Ali
http://www.wnyc.org/shows/bl/episodes/current
Juan Coleprofessor of modern Middle East and South Asian History at the University of Michigan and author, Sacred Space And Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi'ite Islam (I.B. Tauris, 2002)
explains the rise and vision of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani


BREMER AND QUIL...
Kirkuk report (6:00)
http://www.theworld.org/latesteditions/20040130.shtml
The Northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk is a site of turmoil involving the city's three main ethnic groups. The battle for political control is on hold, but the scramble to control Kirkuk's re-emerging economy is well under way. The World's Quil Lawrence has the story.

BREMER AND THE HAJ...
Iraq passport report (6:00)
http://www.theworld.org/latesteditions/20040129.shtml
From overwhelming bureaucracy to disarray at the passport office, getting a passport in Iraq these days isn't easy. The World's Quil Lawrence reports from Baghdad.

>> HUMAN RIGHTS THEY SAID...

http://www.wnyc.org/shows/lopate/episodes/current
William Schulz
William Schulz argues that since 9/11, human rights violations carried out in the name of the war on terror have become all too common in the United States. His new book is Tainted Legacy: 9/11 and the Ruin of Human Rights. Schulz is the executive director of Amnesty International USA.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH INTERVIEW...
Listen to World Update
Updated daily at 10:00 GMT
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/programmes/world_update.shtml

U.S. Officials Still Holding Juveniles in Guantanamo Prison for Terror Suspects

By Ian James Associated Press Writer
Published: Jan 30, 2004
GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL BASE, Cuba (AP) - The United States is still holding juveniles at its prison for terrorist suspects in Guantanamo Bay despite this week's release of the three youngest detainees, officials said Friday.
Human Rights Watch said the United States is violating an international treaty that obligates it to rehabilitate child soldiers.
On Thursday the United States freed three boys, believed to be between 13 and 15. The International Committee of the Red Cross said Friday it helped reunite them with their families in Afghanistan.
Two of the boys were captured during raids on Taliban camps and were imprisoned at Guantanamo in January 2002, while the third was captured trying to obtain weapons for the Taliban and taken to Guantanamo in February 2003, military officials said in November. However, officials said Thursday that all three arrived in February 2003. It wasn't immediately possibly to clarify the discrepancy.
Military officials said the boys were kept apart from adult detainees, and were given lessons, including in English, and allowed to play soccer and to watch videos.
But other juveniles aged 16 and 17 are being held among the approximately 650 other detainees from about 40 countries whose exercise periods are limited and whose only diversion are books.
"There is still a small group of juveniles under 18 at Guantanamo," said Amanda Williamson of the ICRC's office in Washington, D.C. The Department of Defense has confirmed that an unspecified number of 16- and 17-year-olds are still in detention, and Jo Becker of Human Rights Watch said the Pentagon had said there are "a handful."
"Guantanamo is not really an appropriate place to detain juveniles because they're taken so far from their culture and are unable to benefit from the support of their families," said Williamson. His ICRC organization is the only independent group allowed to visit the detainees.
Pressure has been mounting on U.S. officials to release the juveniles or transfer them to another facility. Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, who is in charge of the detention mission, recommended in August that the three youngest boys be sent home, saying they "were kidnapped into terrorism (by) despicable people who are using juveniles as a part of this scourge of terrorism."
The United States turned its naval base on Cuba's eastern tip into a prison during the war in Afghanistan, when soldiers arrested hundreds of suspected al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Military officials said the boys had provided viable intelligence but had no further value and were no longer a threat to the United States.
Human Rights Watch asked when the other juveniles would be freed.
Becker said that the United States was violating the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Children, which it ratified in December 2002. The treaty establishes 18 as the minimum age for participation in armed conflict and obligates governments to demobilize and rehabilitate former child soldiers, Becker said.
AP-ES-01-30-04 2204EST
---------------------------------
>> IF ONLY WATCH...

UN votes on tough terror measures

By Susannah Price
BBC correspondent, United Nations
The United Nations Security Council has voted unanimously to name and shame countries that fail to report on their efforts to fight global terrorism.
It passed by 15-0 a resolution aimed at strengthening sanctions against al-Qaeda, Taleban and related groups.
Last year, a UN committee said stronger measures might be needed to compel UN member states to help fight terrorism.
It is hoped a threat of being publicly named will encourage governments to enforce sanctions against such groups.
More than half of the UN's member states have not submitted reports on what they are doing to limit the activities of these groups through freezing assets, a travel ban, or arms embargoes.
This latest resolution means the UN's al-Qaeda monitoring committee will be able to circulate a list of countries that do not submit a report by the end of March.
They will also publicise the reason behind the failure, whether it is a question of resources or political will.
The chairman of the monitoring committee and sponsor of the resolution, Ambassador Heraldo Munoz of Chile, said this would send a strong signal.
The new resolution calls on governments to look out for al-Qaeda or associated groups, trying to channel funds through different means, such as the informal banking system.
But it does not include any real new sanctions.
American diplomats said they wanted to improve the implementation of measures in the original resolution before taking any further steps.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3446769.stm
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Published: 2004/01/31 02:13:12 GMT

Ex-French PM guilty of corruption


A court has found former French Prime Minister Alain Juppe guilty of involvement in a party funding scam in Paris in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Juppe, one of President Jacques Chirac's closest allies, immediately appealed against the conviction.
The court gave him an 18-month suspended sentence and barred him from political office for up to 10 years.
However, he will be able to continue as mayor of Bordeaux, and as head of the governing UMP party during the appeal.
It's a hammer blow for Jacques Chirac, who thus loses his closest adviser and his designated successor, for whom he had real affection
Anita Hauser, political commentator
The prosecution argued that Juppe allowed party employees to be put on the city payroll and to be paid for by private companies when he was deputy mayor of Paris.
Mr Chirac was then the city's mayor.
Juppe denied the charges, saying that he put an end to all irregularities as soon as he found out about them.
He said this month he would quit politics if found guilty.
Earthquake
He had widely been expected to run as the centre-right's candidate in the 2007 presidential election if Jacques Chirac does not seek a third term.
JUPPE'S CAREER
1976: Hired as speech writer to Mr Chirac
1983-1995: Deputy Mayor of Paris
1986-1988: Deputy Finance Minister
1993-1995: Foreign Minister
1995-1997: Prime Minister
2002-present: Head of the governing UMP
"You can imagine the political earthquake this is going to cause," said Anita Hauser, political commentator for the private LCI television channel.
"It's a hammer blow for Jacques Chirac, who thus loses his closest adviser and his designated successor, for whom he had real affection," she said.
Juppe was prime minister between 1995 and 1997, when he lost an election amid industrial unrest caused by his attempts to push through social and economic reforms.
'Unjust'
He made no comment after the verdict was announced and left the courtroom by a back door.
The court wanted to throw Mr Juppe out of politics
Juppe defence lawyer Francis Szpiner
But his lawyer, Francis Szpiner, said the verdict was "questionable and unjust" and said he would file an appeal.
"The court wanted to throw Mr Juppe out of politics," he said.
Correspondents say Juppe's departure from the political scene would create an awkward vacuum at the top of the UMP party, which could result in a power struggle.
BBC Paris correspondent Caroline Wyatt says the sentence itself could also raise fresh questions about Mr Chirac's own role in the party-funding affair, even though as French president he has immunity from prosecution.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3444239.stm
Published: 2004/01/30 14:32:53 GMT
? BBC MMIV

John Kerry and Other Men's Money
by Ann Coulter
Posted Jan 29, 2004
After the New Hampshire primary, Dennis Kucinich's new slogan is: ".001 Percent of America Can't Be Wrong!" John Edwards' new slogan is: "Vote for Me or We'll See You in Court." Joe Lieberman's new slogan is: "Sixth Place Is Not an Option." (Bumper sticker version: "Ask Me About My Delegate.") Al Sharpton's new slogan is "Hello? Room Service?" Wesley Clark's new slogan is: "Leading America's War on Fetuses." Howard Dean's new slogan is: "I Want to Be Your President ... And So Do I!"
That leaves John Kerry (new slogan: "Nous Sommes Nombre Un!"), who is winning Democratic voters in droves on the basis of his superior ability to taunt George Bush for his lack of combat experience. Like every war hero I've ever met, John Kerry seems content to spend his days bragging about his battlefield exploits. Wait, wait ... Let me correct that last sentence: like no war hero I've ever met ...
As everyone has heard approximately 1 billion times by now, Kerry boasts that he has REAL experience with aircraft carriers, and if Bush wants to run on national security, then ... BRING IT ON!
I note that when George Bush directed that precise phrase at Islamic terrorists who yearn to slaughter American women and children, liberals were enraged at the macho posturing of it. But they feel "Bring it on!" is a perfectly appropriate expression when directed at a dangerous warmonger like George Bush. ("Bring it on!" was deemed better than Kerry's first impulse, "Let's get busy, sister!")
Kerry was indisputably brave in Vietnam, and it's kind of cute to see Democrats pretend to admire military service. Physical courage, like chastity, is something liberals usually deride, but are tickled when it accidentally manifests itself in one of their own. One has to stand in awe of Kerry's military service 33 years ago. Of course, that's where it ends, including with Kerry -- inasmuch as, upon his return from war in 1970, he promptly began trashing his fellow Vietnam vets by calling them genocidal murderers.
But if Bush can't talk to Kerry about the horrors of war, then Kerry sure as hell can't talk to anyone about the plight of the middle class. Kerry's life experience consists of living off other men's money by marrying their wives and daughters.
For over 30 years, Kerry's primary occupation has been stalking lonely heiresses. Not to get back to his combat experience, but Kerry sees a room full of wealthy widows as "a target-rich environment." This is a guy whose experience dealing with tax problems is based on spending his entire adult life being supported by rich women. What does a kept man know about taxes?
In 1970, Kerry married into the family of Julia Thorne -- a family estimated to be worth about $300 million. She got depressed, so he promptly left her and was soon seen catting around with Hollywood starlets, mostly while he was still married. (Apparently, JFK really was his mentor.) Thorne is well-bred enough to say nothing ill of her Lothario ex-husband. He is, after all, the father of her children -- a fact that never seemed to constrain him.
When Kerry was about to become the latest Heinz family charity, he sought to have his marriage to Thorne annulled, despite the fact that it had produced two children. It seems his second meal ticket, Teresa Heinz, wanted the first marriage annulled -- and Heinz is worth more than $700 million. Kerry claims he will stand up to powerful interests, but he can't even stand up to his wife.
Heinz made Kerry sign a prenuptial agreement, presumably aware of how careless he is with other people's property, such as other people's Vietnam War medals, which Kerry threw on the ground during a 1971 anti-war demonstration.
At pains to make Kerry sound like a normal American, his campaign has described how Kerry risked everything, mortgaging his home in Boston to help pay for his presidential campaign. Technically, Kerry took out a $6 million mortgage for "his share" of "the family's home" -- which was bought with the Heinz family fortune. (Why should he spend his own money? He didn't throw away his own medals.) I'm sure the average working stiff in Massachusetts can relate to a guy who borrows $6 million against his house to pay for TV ads.
Kerry's campaign has stoutly insisted that he will pay off the mortgage himself, with no help from his rich wife. Let's see: According to tax returns released by his campaign, in 2002, Kerry's income was $144,091. But as The Washington Post recently reported, even a $5 million mortgage paid back over 30 years at favorable interest rates would cost $30,389 a month -- or $364,668 a year.
The Democrats' joy at nominating Kerry is perplexing. To be sure, liberals take a peculiar, wrathful pleasure in supporting pacifist military types. And Kerry's life story is not without a certain feral aggression. But if we're going to determine fitness for office based on life experience, Kerry clearly has no experience dealing with problems of typical Americans since he is living in the lap of other men's money.
Kerry is like some character in a Balzac novel, an adventurer twirling the end of his mustache and preying on rich women. This low-born poseur with his threadbare pseudo-Brahmin family bought a political career with one rich woman's money, dumped her, and made off with another heiress to enable him to run for president. If Democrats want to talk about middle-class tax cuts, couldn't they nominate someone who hasn't been a poodle to rich women for the past 33 years?
Copyright ? 2003 HUMAN EVENTS. All Rights Reserved.

The Anti-Federalist Society
Why Turkey, Iran, and Syria all have worries about Iraq's new federalist outlook.
by Gerald Robbins
01/28/2004 11:40:00 AM

TURKEY'S PRIME MINISTER Recep Tayyip Erdogan is scheduled to meet with President George Bush in Washington today. Among the topics that will be discussed are Iraq's political future. While the aim of this parley is to correct the recent dissonance in U.S.-Turkish relations, recent signals from Ankara indicate that this will not be a simple task.
The two leaders last met in December 2002. The major issue then concerned Washington's ultimately futile attempt to secure Turkish support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Both sides now wish to move past those differences, yet Iraq still remains a contentious topic. There's major discord over how to govern post-Saddam Iraq. Whereas Washington believes in a federalist solution, Ankara thinks otherwise.
Generally speaking, Turks are wary about federalism. It is a concept at variance with the nation's administrative infrastructure. History explains why: The Ottoman Empire's decentralized character was a major factor in its eventual downfall. Loose management of a multiethnic population resulted in constant rebellions and general instability.
Kemal Ataturk, modern Turkey's founding father, saw autonomy's detrimental effects and sought to rectify it. His solution was to create a strong, centralized system, largely derived from the French model of governance. This structure has remained intact throughout the past 80 years, warding off all attempts at reform.
THE ISSUE of the Kurds substantiates Turkey's centralist nature. Fears that a centralized Iraq can augment separatist notions among Turkey's estimated 13 to 16 million Kurds (approximately 20 to 25 percent of the nation's 67 million inhabitants) are based on precedent. From the early 1980s to mid 1990s, the Turkish government fought a Kurdish insurrection which claimed 37,000 lives. Turkey's national psyche is still scarred.
Yet comparing Turkey's Kurds with their Iraqi brethren is mixing apples and oranges. The Kurdish populace is a collection of different tribes and dialects that are often at cross-purposes with one another. This even extends to the political sphere--Turkey's Kurdish separatists adhere to Marxist-Leninist precepts while Iraq's Kurdish leadership reflects a meshing of clan affiliation with social democratic thought.
It can be further argued that a de facto federalism already exists in Kurdish Iraq. A U.N.-sponsored Kurdish enclave was established after the 1991 Gulf War ended. Cognizant of Turkey's cross-border concerns, it hasn't turned into a staging area for Kurdish separatism. Trading thrives between this landlocked entity and the Turkish interior.
FEARS ABOUT FEDERALISM aren't a uniquely Turkish phenomenon. The very idea of decentralization also worries Iraq and Syria. In Teheran's case, the prospect of a federalist structure succeeding within the region is particularly vexing. It not only possesses a sizeable minority of 6.5 to 8 million Kurds, but nearly one quarter of Iran--66.5 million people--are Azeri Turks. When Arab, Baluchi, and other groups are further added to Iran's ethnic picture, it turns out that only 51 percent of the country's total population is of Persian descent.
NONETHELESS, democratic Turkey, theocratic Iran, and authoritarian Syria are all united in their stances against federalism. There's a censuring tone that's nearly indistinguishable among their respective leaderships. When Syrian president Bashir al-Assad visited Turkey earlier this month (the first time a Syrian leader traveled there), he stated that a Kurdish state in Iraq would be "a red line, not only as far as Syria and Turkey, but for all the countries in the region." Prime Minister Erdogan recently told the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram that federation "contradicts the reality of Iraq and the will of neighboring countries." Even the Turkish military, usually known for averting public discourse, had their say. "If there is a federal structure in Iraq on an ethnic basis, the future will be very difficult and bloody," one of Turkey's top generals commented.
Amid all this knee-jerk reaction, signs of a more amenable tone towards federalism have begun to appear. Several Turkish analysts note that it isn't federalism that they object to per se, but the emphasis on an ethnic and religious criteria for Iraq. A regional federalism is advocated instead, with Germany seen as the ideal prototype: They would like to see Bavaria's relation to Berlin emulated by the Kurds formulating their ties to Baghdad.
Germany's model can be studied, but to view it as the potential solution to Iraq's political future is an exercise in specious thinking. Bavarian and Turkish sociopolitics can't be homogenized into a one-size-fits-all apparatus. There is no set methodology to federalism, Iraq's model will differ from German and even American designs.
At least the Turks appear willing to give federalism a closer look. It doesn't fit current regional viewpoints, but Ankara and her autocratic neighbors lack any viable alternatives. It will be a tough task marketing, but decentralization is the best solution for Iraq and the future Middle East.

Gerald Robbins is an Associate Scholar with the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.

Cringe-onomics
Did any of the Democratic presidential contenders take Economics 101?

By J. Edward Carter

You can learn a lot about economics by watching Howard Dean and his rivals tussle over the Democratic presidential nomination. If you pay close attention, take copious notes, and ignore nearly everything the Democratic contenders say, you will learn a lot. Dean, Clark, Edwards, and Kerry have each offered campaign proposals that would make any self-respecting economist cringe.
While some of their proposals may be characterized as merely ineffective or misleading, others are downright harmful. Some of their more egregious proposals include:
To "help families live and thrive off their wages," Howard Dean says he "will press Congress to move toward increasing the minimum wage to $7.00 per hour." Despite the populist appeal of such a move, increasing the minimum wage will only harm the least-skilled and least-educated members of the labor force. Even Dean's economic advisers have cautioned against raising the minimum wage.
As Joseph Stiglitz, former chairman of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors and an occasional Dean advisor, wrote in his textbook, "a higher minimum wage does not seem a particularly useful way to help the poor." Why? According to Alan Blinder, another former Clinton economist known to be advising Dean, "The primary consequence of the minimum wage law is not an increase in the incomes of the least skilled workers but a restriction of their employment opportunities."
To spur economic growth and job creation, Dean would create "a White House Office of Economic Growth" (OEG). As the old saying goes, for every perceived problem there is an acronym in Washington waiting to be created. This reflects the notion that creating a new office and a new layer of bureaucrats is the same as finding a solution. Presumably Dean would add the OEG alongside the two currently existing offices in the White House that deal solely with economic matters -- the National Economic Council (NEC) and the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA).
John Edwards has called for a slew of new federal spending programs and (paradoxically) a return to fiscal discipline. Among other things, Edwards wants to lavish $50 billion on state governments and provide massive federal subsidies for education and health care. The cumulative price tag for his proposals could amount to nearly $1 trillion. Yet, Edwards insists he is an advocate of "fiscal discipline."
Unfortunately, in Washington, the common-sense notion of fiscal discipline -- being frugal and watching what you spend -- has been hijacked and redefined to mean "a willingness to raise taxes." In truth, raising taxes is akin to buying larger pants in lieu of exercise and a low-calorie diet. True fiscal discipline entails keeping government spending under control to minimize the drain of resources from the private sector to the public sector.
Likewise, Wesley Clark has yet to grasp the true meaning of fiscal discipline. Although Clark proposes to "save $2.35 trillion over ten years," tax increases account for more than half ($1.2 trillion) of the total. Reduced debt-service costs generate another $600 billion in savings. Actual spending cuts account for less than one-fourth of the total. And the vast majority of those spending cuts are unspecified and concealed under sweeping generalities such as "streamline government." But more importantly, Clark's spending cuts -- his "tough steps" -- equal less than two percent of what the federal government is expected to spend over the next ten years.
John Kerry routinely preaches that corporations should pay their "fair share" of the nation's tax burden." That sounds like a no-brainer. But it isn't. As most college freshmen learn in Economics 101, corporations do not pay taxes, people do. The burden of corporate taxation is ultimately borne by customers (through higher prices), stockholders (smaller dividends and capital gains), and employees (lower wages). As one introductory economics textbook warns, "Suffice it to say that you should be cautious when you advocate increasing corporate income taxes. You may be the one who ultimately ends up paying the increase."
The contenders for the Democratic nomination have much in common. They want to raise taxes. They want to spend more taxpayer dollars on a range of politically popular causes. And, unfortunately, they often demonstrate a poor understanding of basic economics. So sharpen your pencils and get ready to ignore almost everything you hear on the campaign trail. You can learn a lot.
-- J. Edward Carter is an economist in Washington, D.C., and the chairman of Economists for Bush.
http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof_comment/carter200401300856.asp

----------------------------------------------------
Get Thee to the CIA
A new job for David Kay.

David Kay has returned from Iraq, having failed to locate the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) he was sent there to find. President George W. Bush's would-be successors and other critics have seized upon his conclusion that -- notwithstanding U.S. and foreign-intelligence assessments to the contrary -- they ceased to exist in large quantity after 1991 to justify charges of presidential malfeasance.
President Bush could be forgiven for feeling annoyed with Dr. Kay. A heated reelection campaign is not exactly the moment any candidate would chose have new turmoil engendered over one of his most controversial decisions.
The president should, instead, feel grateful to the erstwhile head of the Iraq Survey Group, both for his past, courageous public service and for his present candor. And there is no better, or more appropriate, way to express his appreciation than to ask him to replace George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
David Kay has, after all, demonstrated once again the qualities of intellect, integrity, and independence that are always desirable in leaders of the U.S. intelligence community, but rarely more necessary than right now. Although he has expressed a view about the status of Saddam's missing weapons programs that is debatable -- and may ultimately be proven wrong -- the former weapons inspector has certainly said many things that have long needed saying.
For example, Dr. Kay has made clear that, if there is fault to be found over Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, the blame should lie with those intelligence officials who produced the faulty data, not those policymakers who made decisions on the basis of it. As he told National Public Radio last Sunday, "It's an issue of the capabilities of one's intelligence service to collect valid, truthful information."
In congressional testimony yesterday, Dr. Kay went even further: "I actually think the intelligence community owes the president [an apology] rather than the president owing [one to] the American people." He went on to warn President Bush's partisan critics that, "We have to remember that this view of Iraq was held during the Clinton administration and didn't change in the Bush administration. It is not a political 'got you' issue. It is a serious issue of how you could come to the conclusion that is not matched by the [facts]."
One of Dr. Kay's most important observations cut the legs out from under those who insist the president and his subordinates -- in particular, Vice President Dick Cheney -- manipulated the intelligence they received from the CIA and other agencies. "In the course of [his work in Iraq], I had innumerable analysts who came to me in apology that the world that we were finding was not the world that they had thought existed and that they had estimated. Reality on the ground differed in advance. And never -- not in a single case -- was the explanation, 'I was pressured to do this.' The explanation was very often, 'The limited data we had led one to reasonably conclude this. I now see that there's another explanation for it.'"
He went on to note that, "...Almost in a perverse way, I wish it had been undue influence because we know how to correct that. We get rid of the people who, in fact, were exercising that. The fact that it wasn't tells me that we've got a much more fundamental problem of understanding what went wrong and we've got to figure out what was there. And that's what I call fundamental fault analysis."
Dr. Kay also offered an opinion on the question that properly should be the focus of the debate in this election cycle: Given what the Bush team was being told about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime, did it act not only properly, but prudently?
He told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "Based on the intelligence that existed, I think it was reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Now that you know reality on the ground as opposed to what you estimated before, you may reach a different conclusion -- although I must say I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place, potentially, than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war."
That danger lay in the reality that, no matter how large the stocks of weapons of mass destruction retained by Saddam Hussein at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, he surely retained at least small quantities, a likelihood David Kay acknowledges. As Secretary of State Colin Powell reminded the U.N. Security Council in his appearance before it on the eve of war, even a tiny vial of biological weapons could be employed to kill tens of thousands of people.
Underscoring this danger, Dr. Kay added: "After the war and with the inspection effort that we have carried out now for nine months, I think we all agree that there were not large amounts of weapons available for imminent action; that's not the same thing as saying it was not a serious, imminent threat that you're not willing to run for the nation. That is a political judgment, not a technical judgment."
More to the point, Dr. Kay's team has established that the Iraqi despot had the production capacity and know-how to produce a great deal more chemical and biological weaponry when international economic sanctions were lifted. It should be recalled that Russia, France, and Germany, among others, were actively working to bring about such an outcome. In fact, they would almost certainly have succeeded, but for President Bush's decisive leadership and action.
Even if Democratic presidential candidates refuse to acknowledge it, David Kay's testimony actually confirms the president's most important claim to reelection: He spared us the very difficult problem of having to do something about the "Butcher of Baghdad" after the U.N. had let Saddam out of the so-called "box" in which he was supposedly being "contained." Had that happened, there can be no doubt the Iraqi despot would not only have been the "grave and growing danger" President Bush said he was, but a truly "imminent" one.
George W. Bush could do himself and the country an enormous favor by recognizing that David Kay is the sort of man who should be fixing what ails America's intelligence services, notably by ending the practice of trying to get intelligence "on the cheap" without the costly and time-consuming investment in clandestine human assets (also known as spies). More importantly, Dr. Kay could be relied on as director of central intelligence to do what he has been doing ever since he got back from Iraq -- speaking truth to power, something we are likely to need more than ever if the war on terror is to be won by freedom-loving people.
-- Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is president of the Center for Security Policy and an NRO contributing editor.

http://www.nationalreview.com/gaffney/gaffney200401290843.asp
-----------------------------------------------

DCI ANNOUNCES DUELFER TO SUCCEED KAY AS SPECIAL ADVISOR
Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet announced today that Dr. David Kay will be stepping down as his Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs. The DCI also announced that Dr. Kay will be succeeded by Charles A. Duelfer, who served as Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from 1993 until its termination in 2000 and is currently a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Duelfer, 51, will be working closely with Major General Keith W. Dayton, who commands the Iraq Survey Group (ISG).
In making the announcement, Tenet praised Dr. Kay for his "extraordinary service under dangerous and difficult circumstances."
"David is a model private citizen who willingly lent his unique expertise to his government in a time of need," Tenet said. "At a time when our WMD hunt efforts were just beginning, David provided a critical strategic framework that enabled the ISG to focus the hunt for information on Saddam's WMD programs."
Dr. Kay will be returning to the private sector.
In accepting Dr. Kay's resignation and announcing Duelfer's appointment, Tenet said, "Building on the framework that David has put in place, I am very confident that Charlie and the ISG will continue to make progress in the months ahead in determining the status of the former Iraqi regime's WMD programs."
"Given his knowledge of Iraqi weapons programs and his understanding of the nature and extent of Iraqi efforts to conceal these programs, I can think of no one better suited to carry on this very important work than Charlie Duelfer," the DCI said.
In accepting the position, Duelfer said, "I'm honored that Director Tenet has asked me to tackle this challenging assignment. I'm approaching it with an open mind and am absolutely committed to following the evidence wherever it takes us."
In submitting his resignation, Dr Kay said: "It has been my honor and privilege to work with a tremendous group of men and women in Iraq, Qatar, and Washington. Despite arduous working conditions and an inhospitable and often threatening environment, the ISG, led by General Dayton, has performed its important mission with great skill and the utmost integrity. While there are many unresolved issues, I am confident that the ISG will do everything possible to answer remaining questions about the former Iraqi regime's WMD efforts."
Duelfer, like his predecessor, will be based in Iraq and will be in charge of directing the overall approach for the search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. ISG will continue to provide direct support to the Special Advisor.
Before joining UNSCOM in 1993, Duelfer was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for arms control and multilateral defense matters. From 1990 to 1992, he was in charge of defense trade matters as the Director of the Center for Defense Trade and deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs. In this capacity, he had responsibility for arms transfers, munitions licensing, and conventional arms control. Duelfer has a B.A. from the University of Connecticut and a M.Sc. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

McCain Calls for Intelligence Error Probe
By KATHERINE PFLEGER
ASSOCIATED PRESS
WASHINGTON (AP) -
Parting company with many of his fellow Republicans, Sen. John McCain said Thursday he wants an independent commission to take a sweeping look at recent intelligence failures.
The White House has dismissed the proposal, saying the CIA is committed to reviewing the intelligence behind claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration also argues that the weapons search is not yet complete.
Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Pat Roberts, R-Kan., has expressed frustration with those who suggest an outside investigation is needed before his committee has a chance to complete an inquiry now underway. Senate Armed Service Chairman John Warner, R-Va., supports letting the committee finish its work.
In an interview with The Associated Press, McCain said he believes the public needs an assessment that won't be clouded by partisan division. The Arizona senator said he is seeking a full-scale look not only at apparently botched intelligence on Iraq's weapons capabilities, but also flawed estimations of Iraq, North Korea and Libya and the faulty assessments from other Western intelligence services.
"I am absolutely convinced that one is necessary," McCain said, "because this is a very serious issue and we need to not only know what happened, but know what steps are necessary to prevent the United States from ever being misinformed again."
McCain's comments come less than one week after the CIA's lead weapons inspector, David Kay, left his position and began stating publicly that purported weapons of mass destruction didn't exist.
Democratic presidential candidates Sen. John Edwards, Sen. John Kerry, and Howard Dean also called for an independent investigation during a debate held Thursday in South Carolina.
National security adviser Condoleezza Rice reiterated the administration's position Thursday, saying that efforts to learn the extent of Saddam's weapons arsenal are sufficient.
"No one will want to know more than the president the comparison between what we found when we got there and what we thought was there going in," Rice said on NBC's "Today" show.
When asked if she thought Americans have a legitimate concern about whether intelligence was manipulated to justify the decision to go to war, Rice replied, "The president's judgment to go to the war was based on the fact that Saddam Hussein for 12 years had defied U.N. resolutions" regarding his stock of weapons."
She added that the administration went to war, because Saddam "had been considered a danger for a long time and it was time to take care of that danger."
Kay and some Democrats, including Senate minority leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., have also stated the need for an outside investigation into the intelligence community. Along with the Senate inquiry, several retired intelligence officers have delivered a review to CIA Director George Tenet on the performance of the CIA and other agencies.
McCain, who was one of the loudest voices in a successful campaign to form a commission on the Sept. 11 attacks, said he spoke to administration officials, but doesn't know what - if any - action the White House will take. McCain believes the investigation would take over a year, removing the findings from election-year politics.
McCain said the commission should consider a series of questions: Were the estimates wrong? If so, why? Who is responsible? What steps need to be taken to ensure that the president has accurate intelligence information?
Names McCain suggested for the commission include former House Speaker Tom Foley, D-Wash., former Secretary of State and Treasury George Shultz, former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

----------------------------

U.S. Military Sure of Catching Bin Laden
By STEPHEN GRAHAM
Associated Press Writer
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) -- The U.S. military is "sure" it will catch Osama bin Laden this year, perhaps within months, a spokesman declared Thursday, but Pakistan said it would not allow American troops to cross the border in search of the al-Qaida leader.
Thursday also was one of the deadliest days for American forces in Afghanistan: Seven soldiers were killed when a weapons cache exploded southwest of the capital. Three other American soldiers were wounded and another was missing after the blast, the U.S. Central Command said.
U.S. military spokesman Lt. Col. Bryan Hilferty's prediction about capturing bin Laden comes as the Army readied a spring offensive against Taliban and al-Qaida holdouts. A U.S. official hinted Wednesday that the offensive might extend into Pakistan.
Bin Laden, chief suspect in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that sparked the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, is believed to be holed up somewhere along the mountainous border.
Pakistani Brig. Javed Iqbal Cheema, a senior security official who coordinating counterterrorism efforts with U.S. officials, said Pakistani policies do not allow American troops to operate in the country.
The U.S. commander in the region, Gen. John Abizaid, said Thursday American forces will continue conducting "limited military operations" along the Afghan border, but he has no plans to put U.S. troops inside Pakistan against Pakistani wishes.
Since last month's capture of Saddam Hussein, American commanders in Afghanistan have expressed new optimism about finding bin Laden. Hilferty said the military - the United States has 11,000 men in the country - now believes it could seize him within months.
"We have a variety of intelligence and we're sure we're going to catch Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar this year," Hilferty said. "We've learned lessons from Iraq and we're getting improved intelligence from the Afghan people."
Hilferty declined to comment on where he believed bin Laden or Mullah Omar, the former Taliban leader, might be hiding.
Earlier this week, the American commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno, told the British Broadcasting Corp. that he expects bin Laden to be brought to justice by year's end.
American forces are pinning hopes for better intelligence from Afghans on new security teams setting up in provincial capitals across a swath of southern and eastern Afghanistan.
The security teams are supposed to open the way for millions of dollars in U.S. development aid and allow the Afghan government to regain control over lawless areas largely populated by ethnic Pashtuns, from which the Taliban drew their main support.
This month alone, about 70 people have died violently, including two international peacekeepers killed by suicide bombers in Kabul. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the bomb attacks.
The spring offensive touted by U.S. defense officials Wednesday would come just when the new security teams are supposed to be up and running, and warmer weather opens the high mountain passes.
Hilferty said he could not talk about future operations.
Pakistani officials said Thursday they would not allow American forces to use their territory for any new offensive. Cheema said he had not heard of the plan for a spring offensive.
U.S. forces used Pakistani bases and airspace during the campaign that led to the ouster in late 2001 of the Taliban regime, but Pakistan insisted it only provided logistical support.
"As a matter of fact they (the United States) have not contacted us for this purpose," Cheema told The Associated Press.
A Pakistani intelligence official said Pakistani authorities had no specific information about bin Laden's whereabouts.
Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, a key U.S. ally, would face withering criticism from political opponents, particularly Islamic hard-liners, if American forces deploy inside Pakistan.
Abizaid called Musharraf a "strong ally" of the United States and said, "We'll help him where he wants help.
"The idea that we would work uncooperatively with the Pakistanis is not one that I'm entertaining," he said.
Despite periodic reports that the Taliban are making a comeback in Afghanistan, "I believe the Taliban is in deep trouble," both as a military and political force, Abizaid said.
Pakistan says it has arrested more than 500 al-Qaida men over the past two years; many of them have been handed over to the United States.
Residents have reported seeing a small number of foreign personnel on such operations, but Pakistan denies it.
"We will not allow any foreign troops to conduct any operations in Pakistan," Pakistani army spokesman Gen. Shaukat Sultan said. "Whenever they (the United States) ask for such thing, we always decline."
In January, Pakistani forces raided a border village where al-Qaida fighters were believed to be hiding. The interior minister said 18 suspected terrorists were captured.
Associated Press writers Bob Burns in Washington and Munir Ahmad in Islamabad, Pakistan, contributed to this report.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

Venezuela
Nearing the Moment of Truth
By Mark Falcoff
Posted: Tuesday, January 27, 2004

LATIN AMERICAN OUTLOOK
AEI Online (Washington)
Publication Date: February 1, 2004


Available in Adobe Acrobat PDF format

On December 19, forces opposed to President Hugo Chavez turned over thousands of petitions to the National Electoral Council (CNE) requesting a referendum that would determine whether the Venezuelan leader will remain in office until his present term ends in 2006. Theoretically the council should have rendered a judgment on the authenticity of the signatures within thirty days. As this Outlook goes to press, however, the verdict remains unclear. The delay is perhaps understandable: a fateful step in Venezuela's future hinges upon the outcome.

The recall petition was inspired by provisions of Chavez's own 1999 constitution, which allows for a referendum to determine midway through the term of any president whether he or she should continue in office. But before such a referendum can be held, certain requirements must be met. The most important of these is that the petitioners must gather signatures from at least 20 percent of the electorate; further, in the event the referendum takes place, the challengers must win not merely a majority but exceed in absolute numbers the votes that the president won in his original election--in this case, 3.9 million.

So far the opposition, divided into dozens of small groups and formerly without a clear focus other than removing Chavez, has managed the feat admirably, gathering 3.4 million signatures, exceeding the number required by more than one million. In order to achieve this outcome, it was necessary to deploy its forces all over the country, including in some of the remotest areas; to negotiate past various bureaucratic obstacles the government attempted to place in its way; to convince many people not only to place their signature on the petition but also the number of their national identity card; and to overcome the general distaste that many Venezuelans in recent years have developed for politics and politicians.

Moreover, the exercise revealed the opposition to be more motivated both in their numbers and in their intensity than Chavez's supporters, who were circulating a petition of their own--in their case, to recall "disloyal" members of the National Assembly who, elected on Chavez's ticket, have since turned against him, as well as other office holders not to the liking of the president. In their exercise they were only able to gather 2.6 million signatures-a remarkably small number considering the role government plays in the lives of ordinary Venezuelans and the immense economic resources at Chavez's disposal to punish the disloyal or reward the pliant.

If the opposition petition is validated by the council, a referendum will be held, probably in May. Given the stakes, it can hardly be surprising that Chavez is in no hurry to rush matters along. He has already claimed that one million of the signatures gathered are fraudulent, an allegation strongly contested by observers from both the Organization of American States and the Carter Center in Atlanta. Chavez has also made veiled--or not so veiled--threats to the council itself, suggesting in a newspaper interview that "if the referee loses the respect of the players, the game may well not end at all" (El Universal, January 13).

Economic Deterioration

If Chavez seems unenthusiastic about the possibility of a referendum, he has his reasons. True, he has recovered some popularity in recent months, thanks partly to the generous (some might say reckless) disbursal of government money in the poorer areas of Caracas and to a broad popular reaction against the opposition-led lockout strikes last year. Nevertheless, Chavez is still opposed by six out of ten Venezuelans. This is not surprising. In spite of oil prices holding at their highest level in more than a decade, for most Venezuelans the economic situation continues to deteriorate. Since Chavez took office, some 500,000 have emigrated, many of them skilled professionals. Last year real GDP growth dropped by 20 percent, while the consumer price index rose by almost a quarter. The rapid disappearance of much of Venezuela's private sector, particularly construction, has produced serious unemployment. The decline in manufacturing has rendered the country more vulnerable than ever to the vagaries of international petroleum market, and there is some question whether the state oil company, PDVSA, would be in a position to increase production significantly in the event of a sudden price decline.

The centrality of oil in Venezuela is such that PDVSA's operations are no longer merely subject to technical discussion but political debate as well. Since the enterprise was started up again early last year after a crippling strike, which cost the country some $16 billion, the government insists that it is now producing 3.1 million barrels a day (the opposition claims 2.6 million). The latter also points to the loss of many technicians, while the government asserts that--paradoxically--their departure actually made the enterprise more productive and cost-effective. (The current PDVSA leadership claims that the company was bloated by an excessively large management staff.) According to the Oil and Gas Journal (December 22, 2003), line managers are less sanguine about the company's operations than (politically appointed) top managers. Wherever the truth may lie in this matter, Chavez has placed a double burden on the company--its receipts must support not only a subsidized price for gasoline at home, but finance various social projects, including supporting local communities where company facilities happen to be.

Oil Minister Ali Rodriguez claims that the company invested $3.25 billion in new facilities in 2003 and looks forward to investing another $5 billion in the near future. Raising such a sum on international capital markets will not be easy, because of the country's mounting internal debt and a hydrocarbons law passed in 2001 that the international energy community finds unattractive. Rodriguez is quoted in a leading trade paper as saying that PDVSA would carry out its investment plan without adding to its current debt of $8 billion, but in fact Venezuela's industry requires an average investment of $2 billion each year just to compensate for declining output from existing wells (Oil Daily, January 12, 2004).

Rodriguez's targets seem even more remote in light of the fact that the government has announced plans to freeze the growth of third-party operating agreements, under which the state company paid private oil companies to exploit marginal fields. (Such operations currently represent about 500,000 barrels per day of Venezuelan production.) The oil minister plans to convert these contracts into joint ventures with majority state participation, as required by the hydrocarbons law. So far only two companies have agreed to the new arrangements, and the article in Oil and Gas Journal cited above emphasizes the extreme caution with which foreign investors now view the oil and gas sectors in Venezuela.

To be sure, not all of Venezuela's economic indicators are negative. Chavez claims that Venezuela's economy will grow 10 percent this year, while some U.S. economists put the figure at 7 percent. Even so, it would still have quite a ways to go, however, to recover the ground lost since 1998, when Chavez became president. High oil prices have driven the country's reserves to a record $21.3 billion, and the quest for higher yields at a time of low interest rates worldwide has made it easier to sell Venezuelan debt paper on Wall Street and elsewhere. (Its new thirty-year bond issue was bid up to $3 billion.) On the other hand, neither Chavez nor his finance minister has been very specific as to what the money will be used for.

Chavez's Latest Posturing

As things stand today, it seems unlikely that Chavez could win a referendum. If it is held before August 19, the constitution mandates a new election within thirty days. After that date, however, his defeat would simply allow his vice president, Jose Vicente Rangel, to fill out the remainder of his unexpired term. This would constitute at best a Pyrrhic victory for the opposition, since Rangel is an ideological clone of Chavez, although notably more clever and more artful. This explains why the president and his associates take the view that if the exercise has to happen at all, it should not happen soon. No doubt they will urge upon the CNE every delaying tactic and recourse.

Meanwhile, however, Chavez has been engaged in a war of nerves against both the CNE and the opposition. Apart from claiming fraud, he also asserts (somewhat disingenuously) that since it is virtually certain that the opposition will lose the referendum anyway, they should forget about it and concentrate on elections for governors and mayors scheduled for July. On his Sunday morning radio call-in show, he raises the rhetorical temperature far higher, insisting, for example, that all his opponents are "terrorists" and "coup-makers"; if they try to repeat the unsuccessful military ouster of April 11, 2002, he will "fill them full of lead."

Lately the president has also taken to attacking foreign personalities he suspects of being sympathetic with his opposition, or at least insufficiently respectful of his conduct and policies. They include U.S. ambassador Charles Shapiro, OAS secretary-general Cesar Gaviria, the papal nuncio, and Enrique Iglesias, president of the Inter-American Development Bank. In recent weeks he has added President Bush, Spanish prime minister Jose Aznar, and Colombian president Alvaro Uribe. In the run-up to the Monterrey Summit of hemispheric leaders, he described National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice--who had admonished Chavez to respect his own constitution insofar as the referendum is concerned--as an "illiterate." (He invited her to take advantage of the Cuban literacy brigades that are presently fanning out over the Venezuelan countryside.) He has also stirred the South American diplomatic pot by insisting on Bolivia's right to territory on the Pacific lost in a war with Chile in 1879. As one Cuban exile living in Caracas writes, "to live in Venezuela today is a journey back in time, a replay of 1961 without the revolutionary mystique."[1] He might have added, without a revolution either.

Ending the Stalemate

Paradoxically one of the principal beneficiaries of the opposition's signature-gathering exercise (known in Spanish as the reafirmazo) has been Chavez himself insofar as it had the effect of calming--temporarily, at least--Venezuela's tense political environment. The opposition had a concrete task in front of it and went about its business with enthusiasm and even brio. It has clearly fulfilled its side of the bargain. For Chavez to refuse to respect his own institutionality would revive a mood of confrontation and even violence, causing the country to lurch into a pre-civil war mood of the type that characterized the weeks before the failed coup of April 11, 2002. The president would be well-counseled to accept defeat at the polls if in fact that were the outcome, since he would still remain by far the most popular single politician in the country, and the responsibility for cleaning up the mess he has created would fall to his hapless successors. He might well be returned in glory at the earliest possible opportunity--and by clean elections!

Unfortunately, many signals indicate that this is a risk the Venezuelan leader would rather not confront. One is the fact that he is expanding the army by 65,000 new recruits, a curious number for a country facing no serious military or geopolitical threat. Another is his evident desire to politicize the armed forces and make of them the party he has never bothered to create. Yet another are plans to expand the Supreme Court from twenty to thirty-two members and to increase the number of members specifically charged with deciding constitutional issues from five to seven. There is much talk now of reviving a draft "Law of Content" that would essentially establish government censorship of the media, the one power in the country that Chavez has been unable to subordinate to his will.

Venezuela today is languishing in something close to a classic stalemate, but one that might well be broken under very unpropitious circumstances. Neither government nor opposition can eliminate one another, and neither seems particularly interested in reaching a compromise. But there is a difference between the two. If the opposition loses the referendum, it will accept its defeat with grudging good grace. Chavez, however, has already made it clear that he has no intention of leaving power, come what may. Nor does he seem to be interested in politics as usual, with its give-and-take. Unless he changes his tune (and his behavior), the consequences are all too thinkable--and fearsome. The petitions are sitting at the National Electoral Council; the ball is now in Chavez's court.

Notes

1. Benigno Nieto, "Venezuela, una tragedia cubana," Cubaencuentro.org, January 20, 2004.

Mark Falcoff is a resident scholar at AEI.

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:
"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on
(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."
At the DCI's request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of the Intelligence Community's assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.
Acquisition by Country
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 30 June 2003. We have excluded countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern.
Iran
Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce WMD-nuclear, chemical, and biological-and their delivery systems as well as ACW. To this end, Iran continued to seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how. During the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe.
Nuclear. The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in violation of its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, Iran sought technology that can support fissile material production for a nuclear weapons program.
Iran tried to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group disclosed that Iran was secretly building a heavy water production plant and a "nuclear fuel" plant. Press reports later in the year confirmed these two facilities using commercial imagery and clarified that the "fuel" plant was most likely a large uranium centrifuge enrichment facility located at Natanz. Commercial imagery showed that Iran was burying the enrichment facility presumably to hide it and harden it against military attack. Following the press disclosures, Iran announced at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) September 2002 General Conference that it had "ambitious" nuclear fuel cycle plans and intended to develop all aspects of the entire fuel cycle. By the end of 2002, the IAEA had requested access to the enrichment facility at Natanz, and the IAEA Director General (DG) for the first time visited the facility in February 2003. The IAEA is investigating the newly disclosed facilities, and previously undisclosed nuclear material imports to determine whether Iran has violated its NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement in developing these facilities and their related technologies. At the June 2003 Board of Governors meeting, the IAEA DG presented a report on the Iranian program noting Tehran had failed to meet its safeguards obligations in a number of areas. The DG's report described a pattern of Iranian safeguards failures related to the undeclared import and processing of uranium compounds in the early 1990s, expressed concern over the lack of cooperation from Iran with IAEA inspections, and identified a number of unresolved concerns in Iran's program that the IAEA will continue to investigate. The IAEA Board on 19 June welcomed the report and called on Iran to answer all IAEA questions, cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors, and sign and implement an Additional Protocol immediately and unconditionally.
Although Iran claims that its nascent enrichment plant is to produce fuel for the Russian-assisted construction projects at Bushehr and other possible future power reactors, we remain concerned that Iran is developing enrichment technology to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons under the cover of legitimate fuel cycle activities. Iran appears to be embarking on acquiring nuclear weapons material via both acquisition paths--highly enriched uranium and low burn-up plutonium. Even with intrusive IAEA safeguards inspections at Natanz, there is a serious risk that Iran could use its enrichment technology in covert activities. Of specific proliferation concern are the uranium centrifuges discovered at Natanz, which are capable of enriching uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Iran claims its heavy water plant is for peaceful purposes. In June, Iran informed the IAEA that it is pursuing a heavy water research reactor that we believe could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. We also suspect that Tehran is interested in acquiring fissile material and technology from foreign suppliers to support its overall nuclear weapons program.
Ballistic Missile. Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during the first half of 2003 continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)--including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8)--as well as a variety of large unguided rockets. Already producing Scud SRBMs, Iran announced that it had begun production of the Shahab-3 MRBM and a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-110. In addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran is also pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles.
Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents--and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them--which it previously had manufactured.
Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran's biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Tehran also sought high-quality products, particularly weapons components and dual-use items, or products that proved difficult to acquire through normal governmental channels.
Iraq
During the period covered by this report, coalition forces took action under Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq. A large-scale effort is currently underway to find the answers to the many outstanding questions about Iraq's WMD and delivery systems.
North Korea
Nuclear. In December 2002, North Korea announced its intention to resume operation of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, which had been frozen under the terms of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. IAEA seals and monitoring equipment were removed and disabled, and IAEA inspectors expelled from the country.
On 10 January 2003, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT Treaty). In late February 2003, North Korea restarted its 5 Mwe reactor which could produce spent fuel rods containing plutonium.
In late April 2003, North Korea told US officials that it possessed nuclear weapons, and signaled its intent to reprocess the 1994 canned spent fuel for more nuclear weapons. On 9 June, North Korea openly threatened to build a nuclear deterrent force. We continued to monitor and assess North Korea's nuclear weapons efforts.
Ballistic Missile. North Korea also has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its extensive ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources. In the first half of 2003, North Korea continued to abide by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests adopted in 1998, but announced it may reconsider its September 2002 offer to extend the moratorium beyond 2003. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2--capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload--may be ready for flight-testing. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles, and has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that have enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts.
Chemical. North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). During the reporting period, Pyongyang continued to acquire dual-use chemicals that could potentially be used to support Pyongyang's long-standing chemical warfare program. North Korea's chemical warfare capabilities included the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agent, using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. North Korea possesses a stockpile of unknown size of these agents and weapons, which it could employ in a variety of delivery means.
Biological. North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, but nonetheless has pursued biological warfare (BW) capabilities since the 1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used to support North Korea's BW efforts. As of the first half of 2003, North Korea was believed to have possessed a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents, and may have such weapons available for use.
Libya
Nuclear. An NPT party with full-scope IAEA safeguards, Libya continued to develop its nuclear infrastructure. The suspension of UN sanctions provided Libya the means to enhance its nuclear infrastructure through foreign cooperation and procurement efforts. Tripoli and Moscow continued talks on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center and a potential power reactor deal. Such civil-sector work could have presented Libya with opportunities to pursue technologies also suitable for military purposes. In addition, Libya participated in various technical exchanges through which it could have tried to obtain dual-use equipment and technology that could have enhanced its overall technical capabilities in the nuclear area. Although Libya made political overtures to the West in an attempt to strengthen relations, Libya's assertion that Arabs have the right to nuclear weapons in light of Israel and its nuclear program--as Qadhafi stated in a televised speech in March 2002, for example--and Tripoli's continued interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear infrastructure upgrades raised concerns.
Ballistic Missile. The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 allowed Libya to expand its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. During the first half of 2003, Libya continued to depend on foreign assistance--particularly from Serbian, Indian, Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese entities--for its ballistic missile development programs. Libya's capability therefore may not still be limited to its Soviet-origin Scud-B missiles. With continued foreign assistance, Libya will likely achieve an MRBM capability--a long-desired goal--probably through direct purchase from North Korea or Iran.
Chemical and Biological. Libya also remained heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for CW precursor chemicals and other key related equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions, Tripoli reestablished contacts with sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Libya has indicated--as evidenced by its observer status at the April 2003 Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference and previous Convention Conferences of States Parties--a willingness to accede to the CWC. Such efforts are consistent with steps that Tripoli is taking to improve its international standing. Tripoli still appeared to be working toward an offensive CW capability and eventual indigenous production. Evidence suggested that Libya also sought dual-use capabilities that could be used to develop and produce BW agents.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Libya continued to seek new advanced conventional weapons and received assistance from other countries in maintaining its inventory of Soviet-era weapons.
Syria
Nuclear. Syria--an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards--has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are looking at Syrian nuclear intentions with growing concern.
Ballistic Missile. During the first half of 2003, Damascus continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance--primarily from North Korean entities. Damascus also continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition, Syria was developing longer-range missile programs such as a Scud D and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran.
Chemical and Biological. Syria continued to seek CW-related expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also continued to develop an offensive BW capability.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Syria continued to acquire limited quantities of ACW, mainly from Russia. Damascus's Soviet-era debt to Moscow and inability to fund large purchases continued to hamper efforts to purchase the large quantity of equipment Syria requires to replace its aging weapons inventory.
Sudan
Chemical and Biological. Although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the US is working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to seek capabilities from abroad.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. During the reporting period, Sudan sought a variety of military equipment from various sources and received Mi-24 attack helicopters from Russia. In the long-running civil war, as well as for a general military modernization campaign, Khartoum has generally sought older, less expensive ACW and conventional weapons that nonetheless offered more advanced capabilities than the weapons of its opponents and their supporters in neighboring countries. We continued to remain concerned that Sudan might seek a ballistic missile capability in the future.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism
The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials remained high. Many of the 33 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors worldwide have expressed interest in CBRN. Although terrorist groups probably will continue to favor long-proven conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings, the arrest of ricin plotters in London in January 2003 indicated that international mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting to conduct chemical and biological attacks.
Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the September 11 attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian and government targets to CBRN attacks.
One of our highest concerns is al-Qa'ida's stated readiness to attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Usama Bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was "a religious duty."
Individuals from terrorist groups worldwide undertook poison training at al-Qa'ida-sponsored camps in Afghanistan and have ready access to information on chemical, biological, radiological, and to some extent, even nuclear weapons, via the Internet, publicly available scientific literature, and scientific conferences, and we know that al-Qa'ida was working to acquire some of the most dangerous chemical agents and toxins. A senior Bin Ladin associate on trial in Egypt in 1999 claimed his group had chemical and biological weapons. Documents and equipment recovered from al-Qa'ida facilities in Afghanistan show that Bin Ladin had a more sophisticated unconventional weapons research program than was previously known.
We also know that al-Qa'ida has ambitions to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and was receptive to any outside nuclear assistance that might become available. In February 2001, during the trial on the al-Qa'ida bombings of the American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, a government witness--Jamal Ahmad Fadl--testified that al-Qa'ida pursued the sale of a quantity of purported enriched uranium (which in fact probably was scam material) in Sudan in the early 1990s.
We assess that terrorist groups are capable of conducting attacks using crude radiological dispersal devices--i.e., ones that would not cause large-scale casualties, even though they could cause tremendous psychological effects, and possibly create considerable economic disruption as well. This type of threat first appeared in November 1995 when Chechen rebels placed a package containing radioactive cesium on a bench in Moscow's Izmailovo Park. In addition, we are alert to the very real possibility that al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups might also try to launch conventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States to cause panic and economic disruption.
Key Suppliers:
Russia
During the first half of 2003, Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and nuclear industries continued to be eager to raise funds via exports and transfers. Some Russian universities and scientific institutes also showed a willingness to earn much-needed funds by providing WMD or missile-related teaching and training for foreign students. Given the large potential proliferation impact of such exports, transfers, and training, monitoring the activities of specific entities as well as the overall effectiveness of the Russian Government's nonproliferation regime remained an important element of the US bilateral dialogue with Russia on nonproliferation.
Nuclear. During the first half of 2003, Russia continued to play a key role in constructing the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project in Iran. However, President Putin has insisted that all Iranian programs in the nuclear field be placed under IAEA control.
President Putin in May 2000 amended the presidential decree on nuclear exports to allow Russia in exceptional cases to export nuclear materials, technology, and equipment to countries that do not have full-scope IAEA safeguards. For example, Russia supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear program in 2001.
Ballistic Missile. Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China. Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production.
Chemical and Biological. During the first half of 2003, Russian entities remained a key source of dual-use biotechnology equipment, chemicals and related expertise for countries of concern with active CBW programs. Russia's well-known biological and chemical expertise made it an attractive target for countries seeking assistance in areas with CBW applications.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Russia continued to be a major supplier of conventional arms. Following Moscow's abrogation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement in November 2000, Russian officials stated that they saw Iran as a significant source of potential revenue from arms sales and believed that Tehran could become Russia's third-largest conventional arms customer after China and India. In 2001, Russia was the primary source of ACW for China, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, and one of the largest sources for India. As an example, Russia actively marketed its thermobaric weapons at international arms shows, which likely increases the availability of this type of weapon in the open market.
Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India's and China's naval nuclear propulsion programs. In addition, Russia discussed leasing nuclear-powered attack submarines to India.
Export Controls. The Duma enacted new export control legislation in 1999, and Putin in 2000 and 2001 reorganized the export control bureaucracy to establish an interdepartmental export control coordinating body, the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation. This organization was to establish federal oversight over export control, including compliance with international export control standards. Further, in 2001, Putin signed into effect several of the new law's implementing decrees, which updated export control lists for biological pathogens, chemicals, missiles, and related dual-use technologies and equipment. In May 2002, Russia amended its criminal code to allow for stricter punishment for violations involving the illegal export of material, equipment, and scientific-technical information that may be used in creating WMD or military equipment. The Code of Administrative Violations was also updated and became law as of July 2002. This enactment provided the Department for Export Control (under the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade) with significant administrative enforcement authority. In May 2003, President Putin signed the new Customs Code of the Russian Federation that simplifies customs rules and procedures with the ultimate goal of reducing red tape and arbitrary actions of customs officers. The Code also brings Russia in compliance with the Kyoto Convention on Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures.
Despite progress in creating a legal and bureaucratic framework for Russia's export controls, lax enforcement remained a serious concern. To reduce the outward flow of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and expertise, top officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities--as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them--that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law will be prosecuted.
North Korea
Nuclear. In late April 2003 during the Beijing talks, North Korea privately threatened to export nuclear weapons.
Ballistic Missile. Throughout the first half of 2003, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Pyongyang attached high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology were one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which supported ongoing missile development and production.
China
Over the past several years, Beijing improved its nonproliferation posture through commitments to multilateral arms control regimes, promulgation of export controls, and strengthened oversight mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of great concern.
Nuclear. In October 1997, China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on supplying a uranium conversion facility (UCF), not to enter into any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and to bring to conclusion within a reasonable period of time the two existing projects. We remained concerned that some interactions of concern between Chinese and Iranian entities were continuing. China also made bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. For example, in May 1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. We cannot rule out, however, some continued contacts subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
Ballistic Missile. In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and in August 2002, as part of its commitment, promulgated a comprehensive missile-related export control system, similar in scope to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex. China is not a member of the MTCR, but on several occasions has pledged not to sell MTCR Category I systems.
Although Beijing has taken some steps to educate firms and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations--offering its first national training course on Chinese export controls in February 2003--Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the first half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant MRBMs. Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. In addition, firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern--such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
Chemical. Since 1997, the US imposed numerous sanctions against Chinese entities for providing material support to the Iranian CW program. Evidence during the current reporting period showed that Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran. In October 2002, China promulgated new controls on biological items and updated chemical-related regulations, and now claims to control all major items on the Australia Group lists.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. During the first half of 2003, China remained a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan and Iran. Islamabad also continued to negotiate with Beijing for China to build up to four frigates for Pakistan's navy and to develop the FC-1 fighter aircraft.
Other Countries
Countries of proliferation concern continued to approach entities in Western Europe, South Asia, and the US to provide needed acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs. Proliferators and associated networks continued to seek machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals. Although western European countries strove to tighten export control regulations, Iran continued to successfully procure dual-use goods and materials from Europe. In addition, several Western European countries remained willing to negotiate ACW sales to Libya, India, Pakistan, and other countries in order to preserve their domestic defense industries. North Korea approached Western Euro-pean entities to obtain acquisitions for its uranium enrichment program. A shipment of aluminum tubing--enough for 4,000 centrifuge tubes--was halted by German authorities.
Western European countries were still an important source for the proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and training. The relatively advanced research of European institutes, the availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, the enthusiasm of scientists for sharing their research, and the availability of dual-use training and education may have shortened development time for some WMD and missile programs.
Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers
As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable technologies continued to be more available around the world, new sources of supply emerged that made the challenge of stemming WMD and missile proliferation even more complex and difficult. Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related technologies have spread to the point that, from a technical view, additional states may be able to produce sufficient fissile material and to develop the capability to weaponize it. As developing countries expanded their chemical industries into pesticide production, they also advanced toward at least latent chemical warfare capability. Likewise, additional non-state actors became more interested in the potential of using biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage. The proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile designs and technology posed the threat of more countries of concern developing longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks to regional stability.
In this context, there was a growing concern that additional states that have traditionally been recipients of WMD and missile-related technology might have followed North Korea's practice of supplying specific WMD-related technology and expertise to other countries or by going one step further to supply such expertise to non-state actors. Even in cases where states took action to stem such transfers, there were growing numbers of knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD- and missile-related materials and technology, who were able to act outside government constraints. Such non-state actors were increasingly capable of providing technology and equipment that previously could only be supplied directly by countries with established capabilities.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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BEYOND IC21?
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Intelligence and Claims of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction listen
Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Powell all said Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. So did Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. France and Russia never denied it. David Kay, America's former top weapons inspector, once thought so too but has concluded that he and other intelligence experts "were all wrong" about what they were telling political leaders. Skeptics, both here and abroad, still suspect evidence was manipulated to justify war in Iraq. How could so many intelligence agencies have been so wrong about weapons of mass destruction? What was the intelligence based on? Were analysts stuck with out-dated assumptions? What kind of evidence should be required to justify pre-emptive war? We speak with journalists, former CIA intelligence officials, political scientists and the head of the Carnegie Institute's Non-Proliferation Project.


ON PAKISTAN...

FOGGY SPEAK...
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Pakistan interview (4:00)
The US Department of Defense is planning a spring offensive in Afghanistan. The US military hopes to find Osama bin Ladin this year, but if he crosses into Pakistan, the hunt could get complicated. Pakistan said today it won't allow US forces on its territory. The World's Lisa Mullins speaks with Teresita Schaffer, Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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10:00 PM 1/29/2004
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Diplomatic Dilemmas in Korea
by Kent E. Calder
http://www.sais-jhu.edu/pubaffairs/publications/saisphere/winter03/calder.html


For more than half a century, from the Korean War until the Pyongyang Summit of June 2000, the political profile of the Korean peninsula was frozen along the cease-fire line, where the heavy guns fell silent in the summer of 1953. With intense maneuvering among allies on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), North-South communication remained highly rhetorical and static for close to five decades. With few real prospects for peace or conciliation, diplomatic dilemmas were the least of the problems policymakers faced. Amid the myriad uncertainties of North Korean politics and political-military intent, the clear imperatives of containment and deterrence were manifest.

Matters began to blur and grow more volatile with the waning of the Cold War in Europe. The first catalyst for change was the collapse of the Soviet Union--one of North Korea's two chief protectors--at the end of 1991. This accelerated the downward spiral in North Korean economic performance by cutting off vital aid and trade, intensifying that Hermit Kingdom's paranoid isolation.

That isolation in turn accelerated efforts in the North to develop nuclear weapons. During this period Pyongyang appears to have diverted enough plutonium from its ostensibly civilian nuclear reactor at Yongbyon to fabricate a small number of nuclear devices. In early 1993 North Korea pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, leading ultimately to the nuclear crisis of 1994.

Through the intervention of former President Jimmy Carter, the so-called Agreed Framework agreement was concluded between the United States and North Korea, with the timely support of South Korea and Japan. The framework ultimately provided for canning and thus neutralizing the roughly 8,000 nuclear fuel rods at the North Korean facility in Yongbyon, and the freezing of nuclear construction elsewhere in the country. North Korea made these concessions in return for U.S. provision of heavy oil supplies to the North; trilateral U.S., Japanese, and South Korean commitment to provision of a light-water, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor to North Korea; and Pyongyang's agreement to conclusively verify its non-nuclear status by the time the reactor was completed.

Over the past decade the United States and its North Pacific allies, Japan and South Korea, have faced three underlying challenges in dealing with North Korea: (1) whether to provide the nuclear reactor and the heavy oil promised under the Agreed Framework in the expectation that the North would abandon nuclear-weapons development; (2) whether to take stronger measures to dissuade the North from further nuclear development, should violations become clear, even at the cost of possible escalation or retaliation by the North; and (3) how extensively to rely on longstanding adversaries in the region, particularly China, in achieving and verifying agreement. Diplomatic dilemmas of relying on military force as a tool of diplomacy have been heightened by both uncertainties regarding the location of possible North Korean nuclear devices and Pyongyang's strong retaliatory capabilities. North Korean forces reportedly have over 10,000 artillery pieces and short-range rockets, armed with conventional chemical and biological weapons, well within range of Seoul, South Korea's capital of over 12 million people. The northern suburbs of Seoul lie less than 20 miles south of the DMZ.

The diplomatic dilemmas of dealing with North Korea have been further compounded by the manifest lack of outside information about that Hermit Kingdom and its prospects. It is by no means clear how far Pyongyang's nuclear program has progressed, whether it would be prepared to barter the program away for economic advantage, or whether that program, and the country more generally, would be critically vulnerable to stiff economic sanctions if currently ongoing six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear program fail. Satellite surveillance, signals intelligence and ongoing contacts with the North provide a much more substantial assessment of its capabilities and intentions than was available a decade ago, yet the imponderable gaps--and the subjective differences in assessment--still remain.

Urgent Issues for the United States
From the American perspective, diplomatic dilemmas on the Korean peninsula fall into five major categories: (1) how to deal with Pyongyang against the backdrop of broader global security priorities; (2) how to manage the U.S.-South Korean political-military alliance relationship against the backdrop of rising domestic frustrations in Seoul; (3) how to enlist Chinese cooperation in the context of rising U.S. economic frictions and continuing security tensions with China; (4) how to cope with Japanese anxieties at the prospect of a nuclear North Korea, given Japan's manifest technical and economic ability to re-arm; and (5) how to assess and prepare for the complex regional transformations in Northeast Asia that are likely to accompany the unification of Korea--gradual or not--in coming years. Any one of these problems is daunting individually--both in its analytical scope and in the political requisites for its resolution. Taken together, the policy dilemmas surrounding the Korean peninsula represent one of America's foremost global foreign-policy challenges today.

The diplomatic dilemmas in Korea are especially challenging because their resolution cannot readily be postponed. North Korea's nuclear program is proceeding apace and economic change is occurring, regardless of whether policymakers act. Secretive outward migration from the brutal, economically comatose North is slowly increasing. If policymakers do not actively confront the deepening dilemmas at hand, new unpleasant realities will still generate themselves.

The dilemma for the United States in dealing bilaterally with Pyongyang is deep and fateful, especially in the nuclear area: whether to apply stiff global anti-proliferation standards--and contemplate military action should the North proceed with its nuclear program--or to accept, at least tacitly, new nuclear realities. The argument for the latter, pressed quietly by a South Korea seriously vulnerable to artillery attacks from the North, is the possibility that U.S. military action against North Korean nuclear facilities could trigger retaliation against Seoul; estimates of potential casualties, depending on the scale and timing of the attack, range up to a million people. North Korean nuclear capacity, however, could mean "dirty bombs" in the hands of terrorists or weaponized nuclear devices delivered against Japan by North Korean intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).

Dealing with North Korea can be maddeningly difficult. One former U.S. negotiator describes it as being like "having all your teeth pulled out at the same time--every day." Yet the argument for dealing with the North is persuasive. Over the decade since the Agreed Framework, for example, U.S. military capabilities fueled by the Information Revolution and the related Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) have risen much faster than those of North Korea. This dynamic has shifted the military balance inexorably toward the United States and its allies, despite North Korean's manifest violation of the Agreed Framework. Provided that special vigilance is maintained at monitoring prospective North Korean ties with terrorists--and the United States makes clear that evidence of such collaboration will be severely punished--the United States needs to negotiate with the North, reserving preemptive military steps, other than embargoes and blockades, for all but the most extreme cases of clear North Korean cooperation with terrorism.

Managing U.S. relations with South Korea is also fraught with challenges. The United States is powerful and generally remote from any potential North Korean retaliation; Seoul is highly vulnerable. South Korea has built-in incentives to conciliate Pyongyang, and its inclinations to do so have in recent years been intensified by a strong wave of populism in South Korea. Accidents, crime, and environmental problems have alienated much of the South Korean public, especially younger people, from the U.S. military presence. And structural changes in Korean politics--particularly democratization and local government autonomy--have magnified these shifts in popular sentiment.

Eliminate the DMZ Tripwire?
Ironically, despite recent popular discontent regarding the U.S. military presence, one central current issue in recent U.S.-South Korean security relations has nevertheless been U.S. plans to scale back that presence, north of Seoul. The United States maintains that, by removing U.S. troops from vulnerable "tripwire" positions along the DMZ, such redeployment will strengthen deterrence of the North by making U.S. military power more credible. South Korea conversely fears an erosion of deterrence with elimination of the DMZ tripwire.

The best resolution of this tactical dilemma is an announcement of U.S. intention to redeploy, coupled with some postponement of implementation. Such an approach places maximum longer-term pressure on the North, without triggering North Korean fears of a preemptive U.S. strike. Fortunately, a variant of this approach seems to have been recently adopted as joint U.S.-South Korean policy.

Among the greatest dilemmas for U.S. policy is its approach toward China. As North Korea's sole neighbor across the Yalu River and as its major energy supplier, China has notable leverage on the North. Yet it also has strong stakes in avoiding chaos there. China has been slow to pressure North Korea on the nuclear question, although intermittent cuts in oil supply, high-level political visits and sponsorship of the Beijing six-party talks indicate Beijing's increasing seriousness in seeking a resolution. The United States should enlist China fully as a broker on North Korean issues, while also maintaining direct lines of at least informal "track 2" communications with Pyongyang.

Japan is a crucial background actor in the Korean crisis. Its promised aid to the North--effectively, reparations for the Korean sufferings of the 1910-45 colonial period--is the "carrot" in the current equation. Such aid depends on normalizing diplomatic relations, which Japan is making contingent on resolution of the nuclear issue. The issue is central to Japanese security because North Korean Nodong missiles, already operational, are capable of delivering chemical, biological and now possibly nuclear weapons against Japan.
Should North Korea clearly go nuclear, with a weaponized, deliverable nuclear capability, Tokyo would at a minimum likely introduce missile defense, possibly intensifying prospects for an intraregional arms race with China, despite Japan's long-standing "nuclear allergy" as the only wartime victim of nuclear armaments. Many security specialists see the unsettling implications for Japanese rearmament as being the most persuasive argument for preventing North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Managed astutely, the current crisis could provide the catalyst for resolving the fifth and last of the major dilemmas confronting American policy: funding the looming large-scale political-economic transformation of Northeast Asia. Should North Korea become a stable, productive member of the world community--following a resolution of the nuclear crisis that eliminates the prospect of North Korean nuclear weapons--the financial package that would and should follow could provide a huge stimulus to both regional and global growth. Turning swords--both nuclear and otherwise--into plowshares is profoundly in the interest of the United States, the nations of Northeast Asia and the broader world.

Kent E. Calder is the Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of East Asian Affairs, director of the Japan and Korean Studies Program and director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies.



-------------------------------------
ANOTHER CAMBODIAN POLITICIAN KILLED
2004-01-27

A Cambodian opposition party politician from the royalist FUNCINPEC party has been shot dead in the latest in a series of killings of political figures, RFA's Khmer service reports. And opposition politician Sam Rainsy has published a list of five people including himself who he says will be the next targets for government-backed assassination.

Meach Youen, 40, who was a local election candidate for FUNCINPEC in 2002, was shot in the mouth with an AK-47 automatic assault rifle in the early hours of Jan. 25 as he lay asleep in his house.

FUNCINPEC issued a statement announcing his death and condemning the spate of recent murders in Cambodia of opposition activists, who recently united against the government of Prime Minister Hun Sen to form the Alliance of Democrats.

"These murderous acts are the result of the relevant authority that is incompetent, unable to guarantee people's social justice and security," said the statement.

Meanwhile, a list of public figures in need of protection faxed to RFA by Sam Rainsy identified the next five likely targets of what the opposition is calling a government-sponsored killing campaign.

The list comprised Sam Rainsy, President of the Sam Rainsy Party; Eng Chhay Eang, secretary general of the Sam Rainsy Party; Norodom Sirivudh, FUNCINPEC secretary general; Kem Sokha, director of the Cambodia Center for Human Rights; and Rong Chhun, president of the Cambodian Independent Teachers' Association.

Earlier Tuesday, the United Nations condemned the murder of trade-union leader Chea Vichea, who was shot on Jan. 22 after reportedly receiving death threats.

"The highest levels of political leadership in the country must send a clear message that those responsible for this murder will be held to account," Bernard Ramcharan, acting U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, said in a statement. "The problem of impunity remains a central obstacle to the process of building democratic institutions and advancing the enjoyment of human rights under the rule of law in Cambodia."

FUNCINPEC also called on the government to "render justice" to the victims and their families, especially in the cases of Chou Chetbarith, Touch Sonnich, and Chea Vichea, as well as other members of the FUNCINPEC and Sam Rainsy parties.

It is estimated that 23 activists of the three main parties have been killed in Cambodia since January 2003. But the government has maintained that the slayings were the result of personal disputes and robberies, with no political motive behind them.

On Jan. 15, two Sam Rainsy Party activists, Chhin La and Keo Chan, were killed by four unidentified gunmen. Two days before, another Sam Rainsy Party supporter, 42-year-old Lay Kong, was also shot. Both attacks were carried out with AK-47s. #####

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Farewell
by Ali Al-Ahmed
(Washington DC - January 23, 2004) ...
Dear readers;
Due to funding issues, Saudi Information Agency will be shutting down by the end of January.
We would like to thank all our supporters and readers since the launch of this service in the summer of 2003.
Sincerely
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Editor
1900 L Street, N.W. Suite No. 309, Washington, D.C. 20036 Phone : 202-466-2300 editor@arabianews.org





----------------------------------------------------------------
International Terrorism: Made with pride in Saudi Arabia
by Saeed Al-Saleh
Things are changing fast, and you have lots of things to do. You can not do all what you need. YOU need help, and you can depend on US. What ever you need, we deliver.
We have our own trained terrorists. We don't buy cheap ones; we raise them from the ground up to get the job done.
We mentor them from childhood in schools and mosques, until they grow up in our own summer camps.
We even follow up with them in Saudi Universities and Institutions. We do not leave liberals to brain wash them! We continue to educate them by our own university staff members, who are paid by us.
So, by the time they graduate, they are ready to roll.
They can take any task, so you do not have to worry. They can kill anyone, just name it.
While we prefer to kill Christians and Jews, we can kill Muslims too.
Not just that, we go beyond any other group, we kill children, women and elderly too.
Others might use time bombs, or remote control to bomb their target, we do too.
But we use suicide bombers that are committed to reach the largest number of people.
We work globally, so your business continues growing. We can deliver anywhere on the planet.
If you are hesitant, we can prove it to you since we have a record to defend and to show. We bombed Americans in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1995, and in Khobar Saudi Arabia, just one year later.
We are proudly responsible for bombing American Embassies in Africa in 1998, and USS Cole in Yemen in 2000.
Of course, we are behind our best piece of art, September 11, 2001 operation that got WTC down.
Still, we reached Americans and others in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the 12th of May 2003.
Our terrorists are home grown; home taught and home trained; and delivered all over the world. That doesn't mean we do not recruit others, we do, and we have available positions all the time because we loose some of ours at the job.
You might wonder how we did achieve such a tremendous success. The answer is simple; Ideology and Money.
Our ideology is second to none. We grow our own terrorists. We teach them how to become radicals. We teach them hate to others; even their own people, so they are ready to kill their own families if asked.
We receive lots of money from Saudi government and other nonprofit organization who support our cause. That is why, money is not a concern. We do not charge that much, in fact we do not charge money at all; in fact we will give money to who needs our support and help.
We thank the Saudi government for all the support it gives us, and I want to thank the Saudi establishments individually:

1- Saudi Minister of Interior: he gave us the power to use mosques, shops and supermarkets to spread our ideology and get financial support for our cause.

2- Ministry of Foreign Affairs: gave us diplomatic immunity and financial support through Saudi Embassies to distribute hate materials all over the globe.

3- Ministry of Education: gave us the opportunity to put our hate material into school books and gave us a great opportunity to recruit our future terrorists at early age.

4- Ministry of Higher Education: supported us at the university level by letting our own radical staff to teach students how to hate the west, other Muslims, and to recruit them to fight for us.

5- Ministry of Islamic Affairs: supported us by printing our books, spreading our decrees locally and globally, paid our clerics and their recruits in mosques, built lots of recruiting stations, like mosques and religious schools. In addition, assigning our clerics in all the mosques of the whole country, and abroad to distribute hate, violence and terrorism. Thanks a thousand times.

6- Ministry of Justice: for assigning our staff as judges all over the country, to practice discrimination and promote hatred.

7- Ministry of Defense: for adopting our ideology as its doctrine, practicing our ideology in discrimination against Shia, and for distributing our books promoting hatred and violence.
Need References?

1- Prince Sultan - Minister of Defense

2- Nayef Al-Saud - Minister of Interior

3- Turkey Alfaisal - former head of intelligence
Paid for by: Al-Qaeda
(This is a strictly satirical article, we actually do not support terrorism)
1900 L Street, N.W. Suite No. 309, Washington, D.C. 20036 Phone : 202-466-2300 editor@arabianews.org

----------------------------------------------------
US Ambassador to Riyadh Persona Non-Grata
by Ali Al-Ahmed
(Washington) ...September 21, 2003 ...US ambassador to Riyadh has been declared persona non-grata in the Kingdom by senior members of the ruling family fearful of American involvement in local Saudi politics, SIA has learned.
Ambassador Robert Jordan was asked to leave after he made controversial comments regarding the political future of Saudi Arabia, a source familiar with the events told SIA Friday by phone form Saudi Arabia.
Jordan's comments came in two dinner parties sometimes late spring of this year.
The first was in Riyadh at the house of Dr. Usama Kurdi, a member of the King's appointed consultative council.
Jordan reportedly said the US government "decided" to support Crown Prince Abdullah as king, and that the next crown prince will come from the 3rd generation of Al-Saud ruling family instead of the 2nd generation. The 2nd generation - the sons of King AbdulAziz, - include Prince Abdullah and dozens others such as Naif, Nawaf, Sultan, Mishael, Bader, AbdulRahman, Talal, Turkey, Miteb, and others.
Defense minister Sultan bin AbdulAziz, the first man inline for the coveted crown prince post, who comes from the 2nd generation, was reportedly angered by Jordan's comments. Sultan then asked a guest who attended the dinner to personally meet with Crown Prince Abdullah and convey Jordan's comments.
Abdul Rahman Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri Secretary-General of Supreme Economic Council, who is close to Abdullah, informed the Crown Prince of the dinner discussions.
Talal bin AbdulAziz, who holds no official posts, got also into the mix and called his brother Sultan to inform him of Jordan's comments, sources said. Talal is seeking the Crown Prince position for himself or his son Al-Waleed, on a liberal platform.
After the comments were published in July by an Arab newspaper in London, Jordan expressed to other Saudis his feeling of betrayal. He said these comments "were private and were told to friends in confidence", a source who heard the ambassador's comments told SIA news on condition of anonymity.
The State Department didn't announce the termination of Jordan's assignment to date. The department speaker' Richard Boucher told a reporter last week, he wasn't aware of the ambassador leaving his position.
Jordan will return to the United States two years short of his four-year appointment by his longtime friend, President George W. Bush.
The termination of Jordan's term might have been discussed outside the channels of the State Department, which is responsible for ambassadorial issues.
The termination might have been discussed during ambiguous meetings between Saudi ambassador to Washington Bandar bin Sultan and former President George Bush on August 27th -- in Kennebunkport, Maine, in his vacation home, and Vice President Dick Cheney August 28th at his ranch in Wyoming. Cheney and Bush senior are close friends and business associates of Jordan.
Robert Jordan is the 2nd US ambassador to be expelled from Saudi Arabia. US ambassador Hume Horan was expelled in April 1988, six months into his Riyadh appointment, after he reportedly raised the issue of Saudi purchase of Chinese long-range missiles, "East Wind" which has a rang of over 1000 kilometers.
The US has no history of expelling Saudi diplomats, but has recently declined the Saudi nominee for head of security at the Saudi embassy, sources in the embassy told SIA news.
editor@arabianews.org
-----------------------------------------------------
King Fahd Hospitalized
by Saeed Al-Saelh
2: 15 A.M.
(Riyadh) May 18, 2003 .. Sources here told SIA news Sunday afternoon -Washington time - that ailing King Fahd has been rushed to King Faisal Specialist Hospital Sunday.
The sources couldn't confirm the reasons of the king admission, but an official at the Saudi Washington embassy who didn't wish to be named claimed the king is due for a cataract operation.
SIA news couldn't confirm separate reports that the King is in a coma.
Witnesses told SIA reporter in Riyadh security has been tightened around the hospital complex for no apparent reason. One witness who entered the hospital said it took him three hours to reach it.
The King, 86, who suffered a stroke in 1995, which left him wheelchair bound, also suffers from ?Alzheimer's, diabetes, hypertension and other ailments.
The last time he entered a hospital was last summer when he was treated in Geneva University Hospital for cataract.
In what could be related to the King's health situation, Saudi Ambassador to Washington abruptly canceled his appearances on several Sunday shows such as, Meet the Press and Fox news without explanation.

----------------------------------------------------
Nine Months and No Delivery
by Inas Younis
(Washington Dec. 22, 2003)...Two Saudi reform activists, speaking on behalf of fifty three members of their human rights association, publicly announced, last Wednesday December 17th , that they have been waiting for a government reply regarding the status of their application, to form an independent commission for human rights in the country.
It has been over nine months since the initial request was made and the mandated papers filed with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. All fifty three members, including academicians, writers, and intellectuals, among them ten women, are looking for any indication that sincere efforts by government officials are underway.
Najeeb Al Khounazi , a writer and democratic advocate, states that the initial application was made to the Ministry of Labor and Social affairs. Which has since informed them, that their request was submitted to a "higher authority."
In response to mounting pressures, government officials have maintained that they are in the process of forming not one, but two human rights commissions. Since this announcement was made no government action has been taken. Nor has legal authority been granted for independent groups to operate.
Al Khounazi asserts that the application for an independent, non- government sponsored team of human rights activists is in accordance with the assurances made by officials to support and enforce the legal rights of all citizens in the kingdom.
Another outspoken member of the group writer and poet, Ali Al Dimeeni, stressed that human rights reforms should not be viewed as a one dimensional project, but as a multi dimensional conception which should hopefully lead to a more democratic system. He and other members of his party are campaigning for the fulfillment of government obligations and for some accountability to be upheld in the face of un-delivered promises.
Meanwhile, the country of Bahrain recently celebrated the formation of The Bahraini Committee for Human Rights. In a show of support, Both Al Dimeeni and Al Khounazi attended the festivities along with other Saudi activists.
Encouraged by the success of their neighbors and the international community at large, Saudi activists are still clinging to the words of Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Feisal, who last May, acknowledged, in principle, to the establishment of a National Commission on Human Rights, and promised that its activities will start
"soon." Nine months have since passed, and words serve as the only consolation that someday there may be something to celebrate, more closer to home.

------------------------------------------------
Torture in Saudi Arabia, Official and Real

May 9, 2002
P.O. Box 6642
McLean, VA 22101
Tel: (703) 766-0200
E-mail: saudiinstitute@hotmail.com
www.saudiinstitute.org


Torture in Saudi Arabia

Although Prince Naif denied the charges of torture in Saudi prisons, it continues to be a common tool of interrogations approved and ordered by the highest security officials, including Prince Naif. The government claims torture is banned, but it is occurs daily, according to released prisoners and several members of Saudi Mabahith who spoke to the Institute. Some of the following torture methods were used with Mr. Sampson. They include the following:

The state was founded on 22 September 1933, after the land under the control of AbdulAziz was renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 15 years before the state of Israel.

Torture in Saudi Arabia is widely used by secret police and other security apparatus. The main focus here is what takes place in Mabahith prisons. Information are so scares and are usually are obtained from released prisoners, who are forced to sign affidavits to stay silence of anything the experience or witness inside prison. Another source is security personal who object to torture but powerless to stop it. Both Saudi citizens are foreigners are subjected to torture, but its severity varies based on racial, tribal, religious, national and other considerations. Political and religious prisoners are the main subject for torture.

Torture is used with knowledge of senior officials as a tool of interrogations, punishment of prisoners, and part of judicial sentences. It is widely known to occur, and has been confirmed in all human right reports written by international organizations and governments.

Police, Mabahith, intelligence, religious police, and military forces all commit acts of torture, which can be by physical and psychological methods.

Political Environment

The country is the largest absolute monarchy in the world ruled by royal decrees. There are no elections, or formal representation. Women, who make up 57% of population, are excluded from the limited political process.

All non Sunni minorities are also excluded from the political and religious institutions.

The vast majority of the political apparatus is made up from members of the royal family and the family of Mohamed Ben AbdulaWahab, the founder of Wahhabism.

The political positions are denominated by members of the royal family, who enjoy automatic special financial and legal privileges. The presence of members of the royal family in government positions is at its highest in history.

The religious institutions are dominated by AbdulWahabi family. These institutions which include the justice system, ministry of Islamic Affairs, religious police, and others are limited to Wahhabi Muslims, which excludes the majority of Saudi population.

Legal Environment

The country depends on Sharia law as interpreted by the Wahhabi denomination of the Hanbali Sunni Islam. All judges in the country are Hanbali (Wahhabi) and graduates of religious institutions like Imam Mohamed Bin Saud University. There are no Maliki, Shafey or Shia judges in the country. This has proven especially hard on Shia citizens who have to face judges deeming them as heretics. Saudi judges do not accept Shia testimonies against Sunnis, or in matters effecting Sunnis.

The Saudi council of ministers approved Monday October 2nd 2001 the new law regulating lawyers licensing, which allows defendants to appoint lawyers to represent them before courts and other government agencies.

The decree also restated that defendants are not to be tortured physically or physiologically by security forces. The law also limited the arrest of defendants to five days if charges were not filed.

A major point of concern is the new law gives unlimited powers to the minister of interior to detain people indefinitely. Also the law doesn't clarify probable cause needed to hold prisoners over five days. Both powers would be a source of abuses of the rights of prisoners.

The law allows for secret trials which is the norm in the country until the writing of this report. The law allows for flogging and other forms of punishments administratively and judicially.

The law apparently sanctions the harming of prisoners. It reads as follows:

"Banning the physical and physiological harming arrested persons and no punishment can be given except for crimes prohibited by Shariah law and Saudi regulations".

Although the law was passed in October 2001, lawyers have not been allowed to represent defendants so far except in the case of British and Belgian defendants accused of bombing and alcohol charges.

Confessions are the primary mean to confect defendants in Saudi courts. This legal structure encourages officers to extract confessions from defendants through torture and deception.

There are no cases of remedies or compensations for torture victims. Judges have been powerless to prevent and address torture incidents.

Extra Judicial Flogging

Although they don't have any judicial powers members of the royal family, local governors, and many security officers ordered flogging for reasons that vary from interrogation, extracting information, punishment to pure revenge.

Interior minister: Prince Naif like many members of the royal family order flogging of citizens as a punishment or "to teach a lesson" to the victims.

On the night of August 12, 1980 which was the night of Muslim feast Eid Al-Fiter, hundreds of prisoners in Dammam Mabahith headquarters started to sing in jubilation for the happy occasion. The prison authority tried to stop the singing by moving 10 prisoners to individual cells. The situation escalated after police started beating prisoners who objected to the movement of their cellmates. On the next day Prince Naif ordered the flogging of all prisoner 100 lashes on their backs. His orders were read to prisoners prior to the flogging.

Provincial Governors: Prince Salman Ben AbdulAziz governor of Riyadh has ordered torture by lashing without judicial process. Al-Riyadh newspaper reported on Tuesday 25 September 2001 Issue No.12146 Year 38, that prince Salman, the governor of the capital city Riyadh ordered the doubling of lashes form 15 to 30 to a teenager who harassed women. The lashes were ordered against 13 young men by a committee of religious police, Riyadh governorship, and Riyadh police, none of which have any judicial authority according to Saudi law. Prince Salman also ordered the immediate lashing of four youths who were accused of harassing females in public, according to Al-Riyadh news paper Thursday 17 January 2002 No.12260 Year 39.

Prince Meqran Ben AbdulAziz of Madina ordered the lashing of a dozen Shia high school students who got into a fight with a teacher who insulted their religious beliefs inside class. They were all flogged 300 times. In another incident, an Egyptian man was flogged after he was accused of harassing an Indonesian woman. Arab News said "The Egyptian was flogged before the rioters upon the orders of Madinah Governor Prince Muqrin, and then forwarded to the local court for questioning. ArabNews added "Special security forces were deployed to contain the riot. The Egyptian man was arrested and flogged before the rioters in a bid to defuse the tension." (ArabNews March 2002).

A similar action was taken by Prince Meshael Ben Saud of Najran, who ordered the lashing of high School students: Ali Mahdi Al-Masaad, Mubarick Salim Al-Misaad, Ali Yahia Al-Salim, and Ali Siraj Al-Saloom.

Torture Methods

Rotisserie Chicken (Farooj): The victim is shackled and cuffed. The hands and feet of the victim are tide together, while he is lifted by a wooden bar and suspended in the air in close resemblance to a rotisserie chicken. The helpless victim is then severely beaten by sticks and cables and electric shocks are applied.

Saudi Hanging: Also known as "Carcass Hanging." The victim is cuffed then lifted by his handcuffs from a special hook on the wall or ceiling, and from the metal doors. The victim is hanged from his hands as long as 16 days, such as one case of Ismaili religious prisoner in Al-Hair prison in Riyadh. The victim is beaten all over the body and on the gentiles while hanged.

Blood Circulation: The handcuffs are tightened to cut off blood circulation for hours which causes terrible pain. Several prisoners reported temporary paralysis, or weakening of limps after this torture.

Falaqah: The legs are shackled and lifted by a special wooden bar. Cables and stick are used to beat the sole of the feet for hours at the time. Bleedings are common in these sessions. The victim will crawl for weeks after the beatings.

Severe Beatings: The victim is tied to and beaten by sticks, cables, and any hard objects such as chairs or machine guns. Several prisoners said they were beaten continuously for a week from morning until night.

Penis Blocking: Tying the penis with a thin string to prevent urination for hours or days while the victim is Saudi-hanged.

Anal Molestation: A broomstick in inserted in the anal canal while the victim is hanged from his cuffs or in the Farooj position. General Suliman A-Alwan and Thafer Al-Shehri subjected several prisoners to this torture in Dammam.

Sleep Deprivation: The victim is sleep deprived for up two weeks such as the case of Shaikh Habeeb Hamada from Qateef, who was sleep deprived for two weeks by Thafer Al-Shihri in Dammam Mabahith headquarters. The victim is beaten, soaked with water, and forced to stand. The victim will start hallucinating in few days.

Deprivation of Bathroom Privileges: The victim is not allowed to use the bathroom facilities for days. Shaikh Mohamed Al-Khudair was a victim to this method, which lead to a colon surgery in Al-Markazi hospital in Dammam.

Torture in Saudi prisons is common and a tool of investigations. Torture is carried out with the knowledge and consent of the highest Saudi security officials.

We have confirmed that the following Saudi citizens have been continuously tortured daily for months by Saudi investigators in Riyadh and Dammam.

Torture Victims:

1- Ahmed Turki Al-Saab, 42, a tribal leader of the Ismaili tribe of Yam in Najran. He was arrested Tuesday January 15 form his house. Several witness reported seeing him in King Khalid hospital in Najran suffering from bruises which indicates torture. Al-Sa'ab was arrested a week after Wall Street Journal published his comments on the religious persecution and demographic mutilation his tribe faced.

2- Nedhal AlMarzooq (AlShawykhat): 19, from Saihat city arrested 11 September 1996. The former Mabhith chief in Dammam, Sulimam AlAlwan and chief investigator Thafer AlShehri tortured him by cross hanging from his right foot and left hand combined with severe beatings and electric shocks. AlAlwan now serves as the Mabhith chief in Qaseem since 1997.

3- Wajeeh Al-Khatim: from Saihat arrested 11 September 1996, was tortured by Major Mesfer Al-Ghamdi. He was hanged upside-down and was severely beaten by several soldiers with metal cables at same time.

4- Abdullah Al-Jafaal: from Saihat arrested 11 September 1996 and tortured in Dammam and Riyadh AlHair prison by severe beatings and Saudi hanging.

5- Basil Abu AlSaud: from Qateef was tortured severely using different methods, which drove him to try to commit suicide. He was threatened with rape by Colonial Suliman Al-Alwan.

6- Nasir Abu Al-Liraat: 24, from Qateef was arrested June 28 and transferred to Riyadh after he was tortured in Dammam.

7- Abdullah AlJarash: 35, teacher from Qateef was tortured in Dammam and Riyadh in the presence of several senior interior ministry officials to confess responsibility to Khober bombing. He remains in Al-Hair maximum-security prison since his arrest in August 1996.

8- Shaikh AbdulLatif Mohamed Ali: 42, from Dammam arrested September 1996. He spent two years in solitary confinement and was tortured severely. He was taken to hospital several times due to torture.

9- Syed Mostafa AlQasaab: from Qateef arrested April 1997. He was tortured daily for 6 months. He remains in Al-Haier maximum-security prison in Riyadh.

10- Shaikh Ali Abu Taaki: from Qateef was arrested 26April 1996 then was transferred to Riyadh after Khober bombing. He was tortured by electric shocks and hanging. His torture was sever he had to be carried in a blanket after torture sessions.

11- Shaikh Saeed AlBahar: 34, was tortured by Lieutenant Salah AlMehtersih AlOtaibi. Shaikh Albahhar was kept in solitary confinement for two years.

12- Ali Al-Qattan: 34, teacher from Qateef arrested in August 1996 was tortured in Dammam before was transferred to Riyadh. He had three surgeries due to torture in Alhair prison in Riyadh. A senior Mabahith official who conducted contacts with US officials tortured AlQattan.

13- Mohamed Al-Rabaabi: was tortured in Dammam and Riyadh and lost two teethes. He was tortured to confess responsibility to Riyadh bombing in 1995. He was taped giving that false confession.

14- Hussain Mughais: from Qateef arrested August 1996. He was tortured in Dammam and transferred to Riyadh. He was tortured by hanging and electric shocks on his chest.

15- Shaikh Ali Al-Ghanim Shia Jafari, 36, from Safwa was arrested August 11, 2000 from Saudi-Jordanian borders. He was interrogated in Dammam Mabahith headquarters and tortured severely on daily bases for 5 months. An interior ministry official sentenced him to 5 years in a 10-minute kangaroo court. The institute contacted Dr. Saleh Al-Hujailan, a prominent Saudi lawyer to represent Al-Ghanim but he declined the case.

16- Hussain Marzook Al-Ghobary is 47 year old employee of minister of agriculture from Najran was arrested after the police attack on the main Ismaili mosque in Al-Mansoorah April 23, 2000. He was tortured severely and was beaten on his head and body, which resulted in a mental breakdown. He spent three months in King Khalid hospital in Najran after his release October 2000.

17- Shaikh Salim Al-Qurad tribal leader from Najran was sentenced to 1500 lashes in September 2001 after writing poetry praising the supreme Ismaili leader Shaikh Hussain Al-Makrami.

18- Kamil Abbas, 30, unemployed from Safwa was arrested in September 15 2001 in Safwa police station. He was sleep deprived for 3 days beaten by Officer Ali Al-Motairi in Safwa police station. He remains held incommunicado in Mabahith Dammam headquarters. He has not been allowed a lawyer or family visitation. Famous Saudi lawyer Dr. Salah Al-Hujailan, who is representing Britons in bombing case declined to defend Abbas.

19- Four Ismaili students were flogged because they had a fight with a teacher that follows the official Wahhabi sect who insulted their religious beliefs in the classroom. They were sentenced between 2 to 4 years and 500 to 800 lashes. They were lashed inside their school. They are: Ali Mahdi Al-Masaad, Mubarisk Salim Al-Misaad, Ali Yahia Al-Salim, and Ali Siraj Al-Saloom. Ali Siraj Al-Saloom, and Ali Yahya Al-Salim, both Ismaili prisoners were released January 22 after they served their sentences. They were arrested 20 months ago and were lashed 500 times.



Death by Torture

The Murders of Mohamed Al-Hayek, AbdulAzizi Al-Tamimi, and Myatham Al-Baher:

1- AbdulAziz Al-Tamimi, 28, a government employee was arrested with his younger brother from Hawtat Bani Tameem in late 1996 after a murder case. The healthy Al-Tamimi died in February 1997 in Al-Hair maximum prison in Riyadh, and was buried in Al-Oud cemetery in Riyadh, according to his cousin Qanas Al-Tamimi.

2- Mohamed Hassan Al-Hayek: A government employee, 28, from Qateef was murdered by severe torture in early September 1996 inside Al-Hair prison in Riyadh in the presence of a senior Mabahith officials. Al-Hayek was arrested 27 June 1996 from his office in Jubail and was transferred to Riyadh 3 July 1996. He was buried in undisclosed location somewhere in Riyadh, and his body was never returned to his family. Lieutenant Colonel Al-Hamaad Mabahith chief in the Dammam informed his family in 21 June 1998 of Al-Hayek death and burial.

3- Maytham Al-Baher: 19, college student from Qateef was tortured by Major Mohamed Ibrahim Al-Aseeri of Mabahith in Dammam. He was tortured by hanging from his cuffs and severe beatings his back and kidneys. Al-Baher died while he was cuffed to his deathbed in Dammam Central hospital 14 October 1996. He was refused any medical treatment for two weeks prior to his hospital admission. He was arrested 13 September 1996. A cellmate of Al-Baher said he was beaten with sticks and kicked on his back, which lead his illness and subsequent death at the Al-Markazi hospital in Dammam.

4- Ali Al-Malblab, 70, from Al-Jaffer, a Shia prayer caller was arrested by religious police from the mosque sometime in November 1998. He was beaten to death in few hours, and his body was left in front of the mosque. The body then was taken by the government and returned for burial a year after his killing. The killers of Al-Malblab were transferred to Al-Oyoon headquarters as punishment. His family wrote to Prince Na?f and Crown Prince Abdullah and got no response or compensation.

Flogging

Although lashing is part of Islamic penal code, it was prescribed in Koran for only two very specific situations. 100 lashes were prescribed for adultery. Adultery is only satisfied after four credible witnesses seeing the actual act. The 2nd situation 80 lashes are prescribed for libeling of female honor. Both punishments were mentioned in Koran Chapter 24 (Al-Noor) verses 2 & 3.

40 to 80 lashes for alcohol consumption were prescribed in tradition of the

Prophet Mohamed. The Islamic penal code call these corbel banishments (Had), which means limit or maximum. In Legal terms it means it is the maximum punishment prescribed. In another word, the maximum flogging prescribed in Islamic law is 100 lashes with soft straps or small branches. In addition flogging was prescribed only in the above three situations.

Saudi Arabia however has expanded the use of flogging beyond what is prescribed in Islam to penalize persons such as, rowdy high school students and political dissidents. The Saudi practice of flogging victims thousands of times is beyond any previous Islamic tradition in 1400 years of Islam, and is only practiced in the Kingdom. Surpassing the `Had" limit of 100 lash is in violation of Islamic rules, according to prominent Shia and Sunni Muslim clerics contacted by the institute.

Ismaili Yam Tribe leader Shaikh Ahmed Turki Al-Saab, 42, was sentenced to torture by floggings 1200 times and seven years in prison at Najran city court (South) on Tuesday April, 23, 2002, less than four months after his statements to the Wall Street Journal.
Shaikh Mahdi Theeb Al-Mahaan, 50, Ismaili cleric was arrested prior to the April 23, 2000 government attack on the main Ismaili mosque in Najran. Al-Mahan was charged with sorcery and sentenced for three years and 3000 lashes. He was released in early January from Al-Malaz prison in Riyadh.
A court in Jeddah sentenced a Saudi man 4750 floggings for having sex with his sister-in-law. (Al-Iqtisadia newspaper, January 1, 2002).


Tools of Flogging

Islamic law calls for using soft leather straps, robes, and small branches for executing such lashings. Flogging is done for the purpose of humiliation not injury or torture. The government has exceeded these Islamic limitations by using ? wooden sticks or metal cables and canes that cause injury, skin and bone damage, extremes pain and bleeding.

The execution of lashing as Islamic code prescribes is done with mild force. The arm of the executer (the person holding the strap) should not by lifted high enough to expose his armpit. The tradition calls for holding a Koran underneath the armpit while executing a lashing to prevent harsh force from being applied. Lashing must be light and shouldn't break skin, cause bleeding, and break bones. Lashing according the Head of Islamic Figh Council of America, DR. Taha Jaber Al-Alwani and AyotAllah Syed Mortaza Shirazi, is meant to humiliate and send a message not to torture, injure flesh and destroy skin.

Due to the work of international organizations on torture in Saudi Arabia, the government took several steps to shield the practice of torture.

Methods of torture have shifted from sever beatings and electric shocks which have caused deaths and physical markings to less obviously physical means, but equally cruel methods. The victims are blindfolded during torture sessions.

It has also taken measures to hide the identity of torturers by giving perpetrators of torture numbers instead of using their real names. Salah Al-Mehtrish Al-Otaibi has been used officer # 118 in his dealing with prisoners instead of his real name. Al-Otaibi is notorious interrogator in Dammam Mabahith headquarters.

Recommended Action:

Public:

Contact your local representatives to express your objection to torture in Saudi Arabia. Ask your government to make torture a permanent agenda item in all talks between your government and the Saudi officials.
Call and write the provided address below of Saudi embassies and officials.
Governments:

Make torture a permanent agenda item in all talks with Saudi officials.
Make public statements to object to torture in Saudi jails.
Require all Saudi security and military officials to answer questioners about torture when applying to visas.
Ban all Saudi officials accused of torture from visiting your country, and publish their names.
Investigate torture cases and claims.
Offer grants to Saudi torture victims for treatment and rehabilitation.
Hold workshop on torture at your embassy in Riyadh fro Saudi public.
Ask Interior minister Prince Naif, who is currently in Geneva to return the body of Mohamed Al-Hayek to his family for burial.


Useful Addresses:

Send your Faxes directly to interior minister Prince Naif who is currently in Geneva, Switzerland, and ordered the arrest. FAX: 41-22- 758- 0000

Call Adel Al-Jubair at the Saudi Embassy in Washington DC. USA.

Phone: 202-342-3800 Ext. 3000

601 New Hampshire Ave NW

Washington DC 20028

Call prominent Saudi lawyer Dr. Salah Al-Hujailan to ask him to represent Al-Saab. His number is: 966-1- 479-2200.

Time Differences: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia + 7 hours - Geneva + 5 hours. All time Eastern.

? www.saudiinstitute.org


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saudi Institute
Religious Freedom in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Focus on Citizens
Under embargo
Until 30 January, 2001
P.O. Box 344
McLean, VA 22101
Tel: (703) 383-3863
E-mail: saudiinstitute@hotmail.com
WWW: http://www.saudiinstitute.org


Introduction

Saudi Arabia this year witnessed many acts of religious intolerance by the government and several religious figures. The most prominent event was the attack on the main Ismaili mosque in the southern city of Najran, the closure of several Shia mosques and communty halls (husayniahs), the arrest of several Shia clerics, and the proliferation of hateful religious web sites that promote sectarian hatred. This report discusses the situation of Sunni and Shia religious minorities in Saudi Arabia and the limitations placed by the government on the free expression and exercise of their beliefs.

I. Minorities, an Overview:
Saudi Arabia has several religious minorities. The Hanbali sect, the official sect endorsed by the state, is dominant only in the Central region. The Shafey, Maliki and Hanafi sects dominate in the Western region of the country. The Shia Jafaris dominate the Eastern region with some Shafeis and Hanbalis. The Southern region has a mix of Shia Ismailis, Shia Zaidis and some Hanbalis.

The Official Hanbali Sect:
The sect is probably the largest of all sects in the country and the most powerful. It is the official sect of the state and the religious institution. Hanbalis are concentrated in the Central Province (Najd) and number in the millions. The Mufti and all judges are always selected among Hanbali sect. Although the government endorses the sect, it is subject to a tighter official control than any other sect.

Sunni Minorities:

1. The Shafey Sect:
The Shafey sect is one of the four major schools in Sunni Islam. Shafeis were the numerical majority in the kingdom until few decades ago. They constitute the majority in the Western Province (Hijaz). Their numbers are believed to be in the millions (1).

Shafey religious institutions have been slowly wiped out by the Najdi-dominated Hanbali sect. In the past, renowned Shafey clerics such as Zaini Dahlan attracted followers from around the Muslim world (2). Nowadays Hanbali zealots refer to Shafeis as Sufis. Sufism is banned in the country. Their numbers, especially in the Eastern province, have been diminished over the past years. Shafeis are not allowed to lead prayers in Makkah and Madina as they historically were. One of the Shafey prominent figures is the former information minister Dr. Mohamed Abdu Yamani.

2. The Maliki Sect:
Like Shafeis and Hanafis, they are concentrated in Hijaz especially in Makkah, where their leader Shaikh Mohamed Alawi AlMaliki resides. They also face attacks from Hanbali religious zealots. Several government-financed books were written by Hanbali clerics to attack Shaikh AlMaliki accusing him of Sufism and apostasy. Algerian-born Shaikh Abu Baker AlJazairi, who worked as a speaker at the Prophet's mosque and a teacher at the Islamic University in Madina, attacked Shaikh AlMaliki in several speeches and in at least one book (3). Shaikh Abdullah Bin Manee, a high ranking judge and a member of the Council of Senior Ulma, wrote a book calling AlMaliki an apostate and a religouse deviant. The late Grand Mufti, Shaikh AbdulAziz Bin Baz, wrote the book's forward (4).

When AlMaliki attempted to teach at the Grand Mosque in Makkah like his father and grandfather, the Council of Senior Ulma barred him (5). He doesn't have a mosque to pray and has to publish his books abroad, mainly in Egypt. Malikis are not allowed to lead prayers or give sermons in the Grand Mosque or the Prophet's Mosque in Madina as they historically were. One of the Maliki prominent figures is the former oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani.

3. The Hanafi Sect:
Hanafis are the smallest of the Sunni sects, and their religious institutions don't exist anymore. Because they share geographical and religious proximity to Shafey and Maliki sects, they tend to depend on them for religious instruction. There are no known Hanafi clerics.

Shia Minorities:


The Late Ismaili Dayee
Shaikh Hussein AlMakrami
1. Ismaili Sect
Shia Ismailis are concentrated in the Southern region of Najran. Almost the entire Yam tribe is Ismaili. Their present leader, known also as AlDayee, is Shaikh Hussain Bin Ismail AlMakrami. Their numbers vary from 200,000 to one million according to different sources. Discrimination against them has increased in the past few years after the oponitemnt of the current governor, Prince Mishaal Bin Saud (6). Ismailis are prevented from using their distinctive prayer call anywhere, including in their own mosques.

2. Jafari Sect:
Shia Jafaris constitute the majority in the Eastern Province. They also have big communities in Madina and Wadi Fatima and smaller communities in Jeddah and Riyadh. Their number is a matter of dispute, and range from 900,000 to 2 million. They are probably the most active minority in the country struggling with the government for their rights. Their situation receives most of the attention given to minorities in the Kingdom.

3. Zaidi Sect
They are concentrated in the southern cities of Asir, Najran, Jeddah and Yunbo. There are no known Zaidi mosques or any organized religious institutions; Saudi Zaidis rely on Yemeni Zaidis for spiritual guidance. Their number is not known and they tend to hide their faith in Sunni dominated cities. The government confiscated the Zaidi mosque in Najran three years ago, and installed a Hanbali Imam to lead prayers in it.

Hidden Shia
Extreme anti-Shia feelings and discrimination in predominantly -Sunni cities compels many Shia of all sects to hide their faith. The native Najdi Shia community in Riyadh is not known to residents of the city. I had the chance to meet a famous artist from that community.

Many Shia from Madina Asir and Najran live in Jeddah and other cities and don't declare their faith. This environment led to some conversions to the Sunni sect. There were also many reports of Sunnis converting to Shiasm secretly (7). A member of the royal family has secretly adopted Shiasm recently (8).

II. Government Control of Religious Institutions

Mosques:
The country has 37,850 mosques, according to the ministry of Endowments. The government builds most mosques. Mosques built by private citizens must be handed over to government control. The government has also financed the construction of over 1600 mosques around the world, including the United States (9).

Shia Ismailis, Jafaris, and Zaidis are not allowed to build mosques. Most of their existing mosques date back to the Turkish rule and are privately constructed. There are no Zaidi mosques. There are also no exclusively Shafey or Maliki mosques.

The government appoints the Imams in all Sunni mosques and controls most of their activities. It's believed that all sermons (kutbah) in Sunni mosques come from the ministry of Islamic affairs. The sermons in the two holy mosques (AlHaramain ASharefain) in Makkah and Madina also must be pre-approved by the Ministry of Islamic affairs (10).

Shaikh Saud AlShuraim, one of the Grand Mosque speakers, was suspended from delivering sermons after he criticized efforts to broaden tourism in the country. Also, Imams in Sunni mosques are obliged to pray for the king (11). This year a ban was enforced on Qonoot, lifting the hands during prayers, after many Imams were praying for Chechen victory against Russia.

Shia Jafaris in Madina, a substantial minority in the city, have no mosques. The government destroyed their mosque and husayniah (community center) decades ago. They maintain underground mosque(s)in the forest outside the city or pray in the basements of private homes (12).

Imam AlHussain mosque in AlBattalia in the Eastern Province was shut down in April. It's believed the mosque was built using a home permit. Most Shia mosques built since the foundation of Saudi Arabia were built as homes but slowly converted to mosques (13).

Shia Ismaili mosques are closed by police on Eid day whenever the Ismaili Eid differs from the government Eid. Ismailis use different methods than the official religious institution to determine Eid.

Husayniat
Husayniah is a Shia religious and social institution that performs the function of a community center. Religious sermons, weddings and funerals are usually held at husayniahs. They are illegal in the country and are usually built using home permits.

This year, seven husayniahs were closed in AlAhsa region during Muhharam commemorations. They include AlQaim and AlMojtaba in AlMubaraz, AlRassol Al-Adam in AlBatalia, AlMortada and Azzahhra in AlGarn, and AlAskari in AlAndalus (14). There were also several closures of home-based sermons in AlAhsa and AlJesh, and several homeowners were jailed for several months for holding these sermons at their homes. One example is Naser AlMorey from AlAhsa.

Wedding Halls and the Qudayh Tragedy
Wedding halls are widespread in Saudi cities and towns with one exception, Qateef city and the surrounding Shia areas. Also, Qateef strangely dosen't have any hotels. This is the result of a ban imposed by the minister of interior Prince Naif over 15 years ago to prevent Shia from using the halls to organize religious and communal gatherings, such as weddings.

The increasing population and dwindling number of husayniahs made large tents the only option available for wedding parties. This resulted in the largest tragedy in Saudi Arabia in the past several years, the tragedy of Qudayh.

On 28 July 1999, fire engulfed a wedding tent killing 76 women and children and injuring dozens at Qudayh city in Qateef region (15). Prince Mohamed Bin Fahd, the governor of the province who lives 20 minutes away did not visit the site of the tragedy or the families of the victims, as common around the world. In contrast, Prince Na?f visited the survivors and the site of an accidental explosion near Jeddah that killed four children on 29 July 2000(16). On the other hand, Crown Prince Abdullah sent a message of condolences to the families of the Qudayh victims. It was reported that he donated a plot of land to build the first wedding hall in Qateef.



The Site of Qudayh Fire

The Funerals of Some Victims

Religious Shrines
The country had many shrines at the beginning of the 20th century, but most if not all have been demolished since the foundation of Saudi Arabia.

In 1925, government forces demolished the Baqee cemetery in Madina, which holds the graves of many historical Islamic figures and is holy to Shafey, Maliki and Shia sects. Late King Hussain visited the Baqee cemetery during his last trip to the city. Also, several Islamic sites were destroyed including the houses of Prophet Mohamed in Madina. In Makkah the shrine of the Prophet's first wife was also demolished.

Several columns in the Grand Mosque dating back to the 7th century were also removed. The government demolished the shrine of Prophet Elisha in AlAwjam west of Qateef decades ago.



The Baqee Shrine in Madina before 1925

Part of the Baqee Today. These are tombs of some Islamic figures.


The Tomb of Prophet Elisha in Awjam City in Eastern Province

Clerics
Several clerics from various minority sects remain in jail. The longest held is Shaikh Saeed AlZuair, a Hanbali cleric, who is imprisoned at AlHair maximum-security prison outside of Riyadh. He was arrested six years ago.

Shaikh AbdulLatif Mohamed Ali, Shaikh Saeed AlBahaar, and Shaikh Habeeb Hamdah among other Shia clerics from the Eastern Province have been in jail four years without charge.

Shaikah Mohamed AlKhayat, an Ismaili cleric was arrested while teaching in AlMansorah mosque in Najran 23 April 2000, and accused of sorcery. His arrest triggered clashes between the Ismaili community and security forces that left at least six dead and 600 jailed. A report suggested that Shaikh AlKhayat was forced into confessing on tape to sorcery after his arrest (17).

Shaikh Hassan AlKhawildi, 40, a well-known Shia cleric from Safwa, was suspended in May after mentioning in his sermon the reprimand of some Shia women teachers who wore black to school on Ashura day. Traditionally, Shia women wear black during the months of Muhharam and Safar.


S. Saeed Zuair

S. AbdulLatif Ali

S. Hassan AlKhawildi

Other clerics who remain on suspension are Shaikh Ayed AlQarni, a Hanbali cleric from Riyadh who has been barred for several years. Shaikh Ali AbdulKarim AlAwwa, a Shia cleric from Awamia has been barred from any religious activities for more than 10 years. Also Shaikh Jafar AlMobarak from Safwa was banned from leading prayers or teaching religion to children and became a fisherman three years ago after his release from prison (18).

On 9 July 2000, Shaikh Safar AlHawali and Naser AlOmar, both Hanbalis, were allowed to start teaching purely religious texts again. Both were released from prison last year after five years of imprisonment for their political opinions. Naser AlOmar is the author of the anti-Shia memo (Waqe AlRafidah fe Belad Attawheed), the Rejectionists in the Land of Unitarianism. The memo was written in 1992 to the Council of Senior Ulma calling on the government to destroy all Shia husayniahs, arrest Shia clerics, and fire all Shia government employees(19).

III. Government Control of Education and Culture

Education
The General Directory for Woman's Education is one of the most anti-Shia institutions in the country. Shia women teachers are not allowed to teach religious subjects or hold positions such as, school principals, guidance counselors, and university professors. The General Directory for Women's Education has rejected all Shia applications to build private girls schools.

Ahmed Al-Zahrani, a Sunni teacher at Yarmook boy elementary school in Safwa told Shia 5th and 6th graders that they worship stones instead of God. Parents called the principal but the teacher was not admonished. In April 2000, the department of education in the Shia-dominated Eastern Province nominated 47 guidance counselors, none where Shia.

Religious Education
The government prevents the teaching of non-Hanbali religious texts in schools and universities. Shafey, Maliki and Shia views are not represented in religious education. Non-Hanbali clerics are not allowed to teach their faith even in private. Most Shia Jafari clerics were educated abroad in Iran, Iraq and Syria. Syed Munaeer AlKhabaz, a Shia cleric from Qateef was arrested December 1999 and released after his return from Iran where he was studying (20).

Religious Universities
There are eight universities in the country, three of which are predominantly religious. Imam Mohamed Bin Saud University in Riyadh and Islamic University in Madina refuse to admit Shia Jafari or Ismaili students or hire Shia faculty or staff. Naser AlQafari wrote his doctorate thesis at Imam Mohamed Bin Saud University on Shia Jafaris, and referred to them using the derogatory term Rafidah (rejectionists of religion). The thesis was later published using government funds (21).

School Textbooks
The government controls religious education in public and private schools from first grade through university. All religious and history curriculums are written according to the Wahhabi interpretation of the Hanbali sect. No other Sunni or Shia opinions are infused in those texts. In the past years, textbooks referred to many religious practices by Shia, Shafeis and Malikis, such as celebrating the birthday of the Prophet, as innovation in religion (bedah). There are new textbooks for the coming school year but not yet available for our review.

King Endowment and Prizes:

Manea Al-Jehani

King Fahd donates money to Hanbali religious institutions and mosques only. The king donated several million dollars this year to several religious projects and institutions inside and outside the country, like a religious university in Pakistan. There is no evidence of the king giving mone to Shafey, Maliki or Shia religious institutions or projects ever. (22)

The most prestigious prize in the country is the King Faisal Prize, which is awarded annually in several categories like service to Islam, medicine and literature. It has been awarded since 1979 to over 110 people from 31 countries, including the United States. There were no Shia winners ever in any category (23). There was only one Shia nominee, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, the famed Islamic philosopher and professor at George Washington University in USA. He was notified of winning the prize in 1979 but later the prize was withdrawn with no explanation.

Prince Mohamed Bin Fahd, the governor of the Eastern Province awarded Dr. Manea Al-Jehani his first prize for charitable work. Dr. Al-Jehani is the head of World Muslim Youth Association (WAMY) and a member of the consultative council. WAMY publishes anti-Shia books that claim Shiasm to be a Jewish conspiracy against Islam. These books are published in several languages and distributed for free. (24) WAMY is financed by government funds and maintains an office in Washington.

Names
The interior ministry controls citizen's names through the civil record administration. Names that are not suitable to the official religious institution are banned.

Many Shia citizens were forced to change their names, especially in the past few years. Names used exclusively by Shia, such as AbduliNabi, AbdulRassol, AbdulHussain, are all banned. Saudi Media also don't use these names such as the name of famouse Kwaiti comidian AbdullHussain AbdulReda, whos named is changed to Hussain Redah.

In 1992 a new directive was issued restricting more names. This directive banned names derived from the Koran such as Iman and Sura and are acommonly used by Shafey, Maliki, and Shia citizens (25).

Descendents of the Prophet Mohamed, commonly referred to as Sada or Ashraaf are banned from using their titles in identification cards or official documents. All neighboring countries allow them usage of these titles.

Books
There is a ban on importing religious books that are not accepted by the official religious institution. Shia and Sufi religious books are banned and confiscated upon arrival. Fines, lashes or prison are possible punishments. Several Shia youths were arrested in Awamia city for selling Shia books from their homes. Ahmed AlHamad was identified among the detainees

Libraries of Saudi universities do not contain Shia books or books by Maliki clerics, like Shaikh Mohamed Alawi AlMaliki. He publishes his books secretly in the country or in Egypt or Lebanon, and distributes them himself because bookstores cannot legally sell them.

In contrast, anti-Shia books are available in the country and are sold legally and freely. Some are even printed by government institutions and distributed for free. All Saudi libraries stock anti-Shia books. Shaikh Hassan AlSaffar, a leading Shia cleric, was able to publish only one book. He also maintains a web site (26).

Music
Religious songs applauding the Prophet Mohamed (Madeeh) and commonly used by Malikis and Shafeis in the Western Province and Egypt are banned. The family of the late famous Saudi singer Talal AlMadah worked in religious singing. Shia religious songs used during commemorations and known as Noha or Aza are also banned. There were many arrests of religious singers in the Eastern Province (Shayaleen) this year. The vice-governor Prince Saud Bin Na?f reportedly ordered these administrative arrests that lasted between two to six months (27).

Religious Holidays
The government recognizes only two holidays, Eid AlFitr (after Ramadan) and Eid Aladha (After Haj). Other religious holidays like Prophet Mohamed's birthday, celebrated by Shafey, Maliki and Shia sects are not allowed nor acknowledged by local media (28). Hijazi citizens celebrate the birthday of Prophet Mohamed (Mawled) in secret.

Shia holidays like Ashura and others commemorating the death of Prophet Mohamed, his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali are all officially banned. Skipping work or school to attend religious activities can lead to discipline or termination. Shia teachers are not allowed to take the day off work during Shia religious holidays. In Safwa, several teachers at the Fourth Middle School for girls (AlMatwasta AlRabiah) were reprimanded by the principal for wearing black and sent home to change (29) Also several boys were beaten by a teacher in Deraar Elementary School in Safwa, and were sent home to change. (30)



The Grayqaan Celebration
Ismailis are prevented from attending Eid prayers when their Eid day differs from the state-declared days. Police cars in Najran prevent the opining of any Ismaili mosques if the official Eid day was before or after the official Eid day. Shia Ismailis and Jafaris independently decide their own Eid days. Ismailis use astronomical calculations to determine their Eid day, while the official religious institution use moon sighting to decide the Eid.

Also banned is the traditional festivity known as (Grayqaan) and celebrated by both Shia and Sunnis in all Gulf countries. During the festival children knock on doors and collect treats while singing traditional songs and wearing traditional clothes.

Internet
King Abdul Aziz City for Science Technology regulates Internet access in the country, and blocks web sites for moral, political and religious reasons. Numerous religious Shia sites are blocked while anti-Shia sites propagating the murder and expulsion of Shia citizens are freely accessible. Such sites like (sahab.net and muslm.net) are full of derogatory terms that are used against Shia by some Hanbali religious zealots, such as Rafidah, (Rejectionist).

They also propagate accusations that Shiasm is a Jewish conspiracy, and that Shia hold sexual parties in husayniahs during Ashura commemorations.

Following a fatwa by the Grand Mufti Shaikh Abdul Aziz AlShaikh permitting hacking "suspicious" web sites, a flurry of hackers attacked and disabled many Shia sites. (31) This has been referred to as "Cyber Jihad."



The Muft, Shaikh
AbdulAziz AlShaikh

The fatwa by the Grand Mufti
allowing the hacking of suspicious web sites

Examples of Shia sites hacked by Hanbali zealots:
reach.to/etehamat
www.hajr.com
www.shialink.org
www.danafajr.org
www.alhaq.com

Examples of blocked Shia sites:
www.rafed.net
www.alhaq.com
www.shialink.org
www.karbala.com
www.aqaed.com

Examples of sites promoting sectarian hatred which are accessible from the country:
rafidha.hypermart.net
www.sahab.net
www.ansar.org
www.alsalafyoon.com
www.khayma.com/najran

IV. Discriminatory Laws and Legal Practices

Prisons
Although Shia are a minority in the country, over 95% of prisoners held for political or religious reasons are Shia. The majority of those prisoners are Shia Ismailis, 500, followed by Shia Jafaris, 85. There are four Shia prisoners who have been missing since 1996. Several released Shia prisoners reported that belonging to the Shia sect was among the charges they faced. During interrogations, Shia and Sunni differences were discussed and prisoners were asked to become Sunni in exchange for reduced charges and sentences. Imprisoned clerics were asked to stop religious activities and seek other business.

Shaikh Jafar AlMobarak who was released in 1997 abandoned his religious role and became a fisherman due to repeated imprisonment. Discrimination against Shia was also obvious in prison. A former Shia prisoner said, "Sunni political prisoners were treated like guests and were not tortured, unlike Shia" (32).

Judges:
All judges in the country are graduates of religious institutions like Imam Mohamed Bin Saud, and are Hanbalis. There are no Maliki, Shafey or Shia judges in the country. Judge Fuad AlMajid in Qateef, who sentenced Sadiq Mallallah to death for apostasy in 1993 following an argument remains in his position (33). The head of Najran court, Mohamed AlAskari, was reportedly behind the attack on AlMansorah Ismaili mosque on April 23. He was visited at his home by Prince Na?f, the interior minister in June. (34). The judge of Sharoorah city near Najran refused to approve marriage licenses for several Ismaili men to Sunni girls.

Travel Ban:
Sources estimate that over 6000 Shia in the Eastern Province and Madina are banned from leaving the country. Passports are seized without judicial process. Reasons for seizure vary from traveling to Iran to unknown causes, such as the case of Fatima AlJarash from Qateef. Numerous children were included in travel bans. Several hundred people got their passports back this year, again for unknown reasons (35).

Religious Violence:

The Holiday Inn in Najran
where 4 Ismaili
citizens where killed
On April 23, 2000, Najran witnessed the most violent attack on a religious minority this year. According to several Ismaili witnesses and news reports the incident started with an attack by the religious and secret police (Mabahith) supported by the religious police (Hay'a) on AlMansoorah mosque, the main Ismaili mosque in the city.

The attack was made to arrest Shaikh Mohamed AlKhayat, an Ismaili cleric from Yemen who was teaching some Ismaili citizens at the mosque. An exchange of fire occurred in front of the Holiday Inn after the local governor, Prince Mishael Bin Saud, refused to meet with the protesters who were demanding the release of Shaikh AlKhayat(36).


Mishael Bin Saud,
governor of Najran
Four Ismaili citizens and two soldiers died in the clashes that lasted 30 hours. An army unit was deployed 10 hours after the incident and withdrew five days later. A teenage boy, Ibn Shqaih, and a deaf man, Ibn Natash were identified among the victims. Over 600 Ismailis were arrested following the clashes and 500 remain in jail (37).

In another incident, the body of Shia prayer caller Ali AlMalblab, 70, was returned to his family and buried one year after his death. AlMalblab was killed by religious police inside their headquarters November 1998 in AlJaffer (Eastern Province). His family wrote to Prince Na?f and Crown Prince Abdullah and got no response or compensation. The killers of AlMalblab were transferred to AlOyoon headquarters as punishment for the killing.

Collective Punishment
It seems that collective punishment is reserved to religious minorities and not used against tribal or regional groups. For example, hundreds of Shia Ismailis were demoted, fired and transferred from Najran after the clashes of April. At least 70 Ismaili teachers were transferred from Najran to the Northern Province August 9, 2000. No Ismaili students were accepted at military colleges this year, unlike the past years (38). Similary collective puishment isused against the Shia Jafaris.


1. Interview with a Shafey doctor (2000), May.
2. Syed Hashim AlRefaey (unknown) Advice to our Brothers, the Scholars of Najd.
3. AlJazairi, Abu Baker (1986) "They Came Running, Wait the Propagators of Deviousness."
4. Bin Manee, Abdullah Bin Suliman (1983) "A Dialogue with AlMaliki to Reject his Sins and Deviousness."
5. Syed hashim AlRefaey, Op Cit.
6. Interview with an Ismaili community leader (2000) July.
7. Interview with a Shia citizen no.1 (2000) July.
8. Interview of a Shia businessman, formerly Sunni (1999).
9. AlRiyadh newspaper (2000) Sunday May 14, No.11647.
10. Interview with a Hanbali citizen (2000) July.
11. Interview with a former Hanbali prisoner (2000) August
12. Interview with a Shia citizen no. 2 (2000)
13. Interview with a Shia prisoner, (2000) May.
14. The Committee to Defend Human Rights in the Arabia Peninsula.(1999) Communiqu? # 87.
15. www.saihat.org
16. AlJazirah newspaper (2000) Sunday, July 30, #10167
17. Interview with an Ismaili citizen (2000)
18. Interview with a Shia citizen no. 3 (2000)
19. AlOmar, Naser (1992). (Waqe AlRafidah fe Belad Attawheed) The Rejectionists in the Land of Unitarianism.
20. The Committee to Defend Human Rights in the Arabia Peninsula, Op. Cit.
21. AlQafari, Naser (1981) The Tenants of Shia Sect.
22. AlJazirah newspaper (2000). July 27, no. 10164. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
23. AlRiyadh newspaper (2000) Sunday May 14, No.11647.
24. Ismaeel, Saeed (1995) The Difference Between the Shi'ites and the Majority of Muslim Scholars.(WAMY).
25. Interview with a Shia citizen no.1 (2000) July
26. www.saffar.org
27. Interview with a Shia prisoner, (2000) May.
28. Interview with a Shafey doctor (2000), May.
29. Interview with a Shia citizen no.1 (2000) July.
30. Interview with a Shia elementary student (2000) July
31. AlDawa Magazin (2000) May 11. # 1741
32. Interview with a Shia prisoner, (2000) May.
33. Ibid. 32.
34. AlRiyadh newspaper. (2000) Sunday 30 July, no11724.
35. Interview with a Shia citizen no. 3 (2000)
36. Interview with Ismaili community leader (2000) July.
37. Interview with an Ismaili citizen (2000)
38. Ibid. 37.
39. AlRiyadh Newspaper (2000) Friday 07 July No.11701 Year 37
40. Rahim, Rend; Fuller, Graham (1999) The Shia Arabs, The Forgotten Muslims

? www.saudiinstitute.org