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BULLETIN
Wednesday, 28 January 2004

>> NEW YORK STATE -Trail of "tiers"
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_40.pdf

DEFUSING THE PENSION BOMB:
HOW TO CURB PUBLIC RETIREMENT COSTS IN NEW YORK STATE
INTRODUCTION
Skyrocketing pension expenses have been a major factor in the fiscal problems afflicting every level of government in New York State. Statewide public pension contributions have soared by more than $2.3 billion over the past two years--and are projected to rise even more in 2004. In New York City, the spike in pension costs has been enough to consume nearly all of the revenue raised by a record property tax hike. Today's resurgent pension obligations represent a return to historical norms after an unprecedented period of declining costs during the 1990s. A significant added infusion of tax money will be needed to make good on New York's generous retirement promises to its public employees for many years to come. The pension problem is not simply a function of the recent stock-market slump or increases in pension benefits, although both helped precipitate the latest crisis. The real cause is the fundamental design of the pension system itself, which obscures costs and wreaks havoc on long-term financial planning. Precisely for this reason, merely tinkering with existing retirement formulas will not be enough to head off another wave of higher pension contributions for government employers. Because the New York State Constitution does not allow pension benefits to be "diminished or impaired" for current public employees, nothing can be done to reverse the recent runup in pension costs. But this system, which contributed to a previous budgetary meltdown in the Empire State,1 will remain a ticking fiscal time bomb if it remains unchanged.
Only by bringing its outmoded, early 20th century pension structure into the 21st century can New York make pension costs more transparent, predictable and controllable. This modernization can be accomplished by shifting from the state's current defined-benefit pension entitlement to a defined-contribution retirement savings plan for government employees.
This change would save money in the long run. At the same time, a personalized, savings-based pension would provide employees with benefits that are flexible, portable--and comparable to those offered by most private-sector retirement plans. By acting now to reform government pensions in a way that protects the interests of both employers and employees, farsighted public officials can make real progress in bringing these costs permanently under control--before another generation of New Yorkers must wrestle with the consequences.
PENSION INSTABILITY = HIGHER TAXES
The last few years have seen a dramatic turnabout in public pension costs in New York State. As shown in Figure 1 on the following page, pension obligations began to rise after state tax revenues began to decline. (A similar trend is affecting New York City, which administers separate pension funds.)
Despite massive tax increases, New York State's total tax receipts have yet to recover to 2001 levels. But pension costs in fiscal 2004 will be nearly five times higher than they were three years earlier.
Civic Report 40
November 2003 2
And the worst is yet to come. As shown in Figure 2, pension contribution rates by New York State and New York City government employers will rise sharply in 2005. These trend lines translate into literally billions of dollars in added obligations. As Figure 2 shows, the Comptroller is requiring state and local governments outside New York City to contribute 12 percent of the employee payroll in fiscal year 2005 just to meet existing pension obligations. Pension contributions in New York City's separate retirement system, measured on a slightly different basis, are even higher. This situation highlights a persistent, built-in shortcoming of the current retirement system:
it tends to demand more money when the government can least afford it. The problem with public pension plans In New York, as in nearly every other state, public employees belong to defined-benefit (DB) pension plans. Under such plans, all workers are promised a stream of post-retirement income based on their peak salaries and career longevity. These payments are financed out of common pension trust funds, invested mainly in stocks and bonds. The funds are administered by government and supported primarily by employer contributions. The percentage of employee salaries that employers must contribute to the pension fund is based on actuarial assumptions concerning the number of active and retired workers; the projected salaries, pensions and life expectancies of retirement system members and their beneficiaries; and, last but not least, the current and projected rate of return on pension fund investments. Retirement systems are considered fully funded when they keep enough money on hand to meet all current and future pension obligations.
When a DB pension fund's investments earn a larger-than-projected return, the required employer contribution to the fund decreases. Conversely, when the rate of return falls short of
Figure 1. Falling Revenues, Rising Costs All Funds NY State Tax Receipts and Annual Pension Costs, 1998-2004 (in millions of dollars)
Sources: New York State Division of the Budget and Office of the State
Comptroller; pension contributions are billed amounts, including group life insurance of about 0. 4 % annually
Figure 2. Heading Off the Charts
Public Pension Contributions in New York 1998-2003 actual; 2004-05 projected *New York State & Local Retirement System - pension contributions as a share of employee pay, fiscal years ending March 31 **New York City municipal pension contributions as a share of total personal services costs, fiscal years ending June 30 Sources: New York State & Local Employee Retirement System, New York City Office of Management and Budget projections, employer contributions must increase to make up the difference. Since stock markets often decline during recessions, DB plans require governments to spend more money on pensions when unemployment is up and revenues are down--exactly when they can least afford it.
Defusing the Pension Bomb: How to Curb Public Retirement Costs in New York State
November 2003 3
This pattern has particularly dire implications for New York, which is much more dependent on revenues from the stock market than most other states. It makes it even harder for New York to weather economic downturns without raising its already high taxes, which in turn depresses the state's economy and harms its business climate.
The right solution
How can the cost of New York's public employee retirement plans be made more predictable and affordable without depriving workers of the benefits they need?
The answer lies in switching from the defined-benefit pension plan to a defined-contribution (DC) model. Instead of a single common retirement fund, a defined-contribution plan consists of individual accounts supported by employer contributions, usually matched at least in part by the employees' own savings. These contributions are not subject to federal, state or local income taxes. Funds in the accounts are managed by private firms and invested in a combination of stocks and bonds.
A key difference between the two types of plans has to do with timing: Under a DB system, the employer promises to finance a future retirement benefit for a large group of current and former workers. Under a DC system, the employer promises to make current contributions to the retirement accounts of each employee. The size of the ultimate retirement benefit generated by a DC plan depends on the amount of savings and investment returns the worker is able to accumulate over the course of his or her working life. The downside risk of unanticipated investment losses and the upside potential for unanticipated investment gains are both shifted from the employer to the employee.
The most common example of a defined-contribution plan is the 401(k), which has become the backbone of the retirement planning for many private sector workers. Such a plan is not unheard of in the public sector--it is now being phased in as the sole pension for state government employees in one major state (Michigan) and as an option in another (Florida). A defined-contribution plan also has been the retirement vehicle of choice for most employees of public higher education systems throughout the country, including the State University of New York (SUNY) and the City University of New York (CUNY).
The financial plus for taxpayers
Over the long term, shifting all civilian public employees to a DC plan in New York State would steadily reduce taxpayers' pension funding obligations to just over one-half the "normal pension cost" projected by the state comptroller.2 The DC plan recommended by this report could deliver competitive retirement benefits within a fixed and predictable cost envelope of 5 to 7 percent of total salaries.3 In current terms, compared to projected 2004-05 pension contribution levels, that would represent an annual savings of more than $600 million for New York City alone--and nearly $1 billion for the state and other local governments.4
At normal turnover rates, roughly half the state and local workforce, not including police and firefighters, would be covered by the new plan within 10 years.5 A sizeable majority would be in the DC plan within 25 years.6 This transition would make a significant dent in public pension obligations during inevitable future downturns in the stock market and tax revenues. It would also greatly simplify financial planning for governments.
Such a plan will also result in equivalent or improved retirement benefits for many if not most government employees. As shown on pages 7-10, employees who spend only part of their careers with government receive much higher pensions with a DC plan, while career, senior-level employees can do just as well if they contribute slightly more than required to their plans.
Like so many other issues, the urgent need to deal with the rising cost of public pensions in New York boils down to a question of equity. Does the current system strike the right balance between the interests of taxpayers and of public employees? To arrive at an answer, it's necessary to review the structure of the current system and to compare its cost and benefits to those of other public and private retirement plans.
Civic Report 40
November 2003 4
PUBLIC PENSIONS IN NEW YORK
There are eight different retirement systems for government employees in New York State, organized along jurisdictional and occupational lines as shown in Appendix A. Taken together, New York's public pension pools hold over $250 billion in stocks, bonds and other financial assets in support of retirement benefits for current and past government workers.7 In 2002, pension payments to roughly 600,000 New York state and local government retirees and their beneficiaries totaled over $12 billion--an amount that exceeded the entire state government payroll. Details vary, but all state and local public pensions in New York share certain basic characteristics:
* Employees are promised fixed retirement payments based their number of years worked and an average of their highest salaries.8
* The benefit structure is designed to favor longterm career employees.
* Employee contributions to the common pension funds, for those still required to make them, are comparatively small. Most employees do not have to make any pension contribution.
* Employees receive a right to pension payments ("vest") only after five years on the job. People who leave before that receive nothing, beyond the right to withdraw their own pension contributions.
* An employee's pension benefits at the time of hiring are guaranteed by the state Constitution9 and, when paid out, are exempt from New York State and New York City income tax.
Trail of "tiers"
New York's public pension plans are organized into benefit "tiers" based on hiring dates, as follows.
* Tier I benefits are available to all employees who landed on a participating government payroll before June 30, 1973;
* Tier II covers all employees hired between June 30, 1973 and before July 27, 1976;
* Tier III covers employees hired between July 27, 1976 and before Sept. 1, 1983; and
* Tier IV includes all employees hired since Sept. 1, 1983.
The cutoff dates for each tier reflect the recent history of legislative attempts to control runaway government pension costs in New York.
The most generous pension plan is Tier I, which requires no employee contribution and allows unrestricted retirement with full pension as early as age 55. Significantly, Tier I does not cap the final average salary (FAS) used as a basis for computing the pension.10 Thus, compared to employees hired after 1973, Tier I members have more ability to significantly pad their pensions by working additional overtime in the year or two before retiring.
Tier II, enacted as fiscal storm clouds were gathering around New York in the early 1970s, raised the basic retirement age to 62. Retirement at age 55 with the maximum pension is still allowed for Tier II employees, but is restricted to those with at least 30 years of service. Pensions are reduced for those with fewer than 30 years in the system who retire between the ages of 55 and 62. In addition, the definition of salary used to compute pensions is subject to a cap. Like Tier I, Tier II requires no employee pension contribution. The creation of Tier III, during the darkest days of the New York City fiscal crisis, marked the first time most state and local employees in New York were required to kick in some of their own money--3 percent of salaries--towards their future retirement benefits. The retirement ages are basically the same as in Tier II, but the cap on final average salary is slightly lowered. For the first 16 years after its enactment, Tier IV also required a 3 percent employee contribution. This tier also initially featured more restrictions on early retirement. However, pension benefits and eligibility rules are now virtually identical under Tiers III and IV. Under pension enhancements passed in 2000, Tier III and IV workers outside New York City, and most civilians in city pension plans as well, are no longer required to make pension contributions after 10 years of government employment.
Carving out special benefits
Over the years, various public employee unions have successfully lobbied the state Legislature to create special plans for specific employee groups within the
Defusing the Pension Bomb: How to Curb Public Retirement Costs in New York State
November 2003 5
tier structure, such as sheriffs, corrections officers and teachers. As a result, Tier IV alone also encompasses 11 separate retirement plans.
Putting aside the often bewildering array of retirement options available under these different plans, virtually all Tier III and Tier IV employees who have attained the five-year "vesting" point can retire from government service and start drawing at least a partial pension as early as age 55, with full benefits at 62. Civilian retirees with fewer than 20 years in the system receive 1/60 of their salary (1.67 percent) for each year of service. Those with 20 to 30 years receive 1/50 of salary (or 2 percent) for each year. For each year of service over 30 years, the pension includes an addition 3/200 (1.5 percent) of final average salary.
In practice, these rules mean the basic pension for a 30-year employee of the state system is at least 60 percent of final average salary, rising to 75 percent for a 40-year employee. When federal Social Security benefits are added to the mix,11 many career New York State and local government employees can retire at more than 100 percent of their final salaries.12
Police and fire
Police officers and firefighters throughout New York are grouped into two pension levels--Tiers I and II-- both of which offer more generous benefits, in some respects, than those available to civilian employees. Members of the police and fire pension systems can retire at half pay after just 20 years on the job, with no age restriction.13 As a result, most New York cops and firefighters who are not promoted to a supervisory ranking choose to begin second careers in their early 40s, backed up by pensions often swollen by overtime in their pre-retirement, peak earning years.14 (In 1992, retirement at half pay after 20 years was also extended to New York City sanitation workers.) Members of the New York State Police and Fire Retirement System, which covers agencies outside New York City, are not required to make any contribution towards their own pensions. In New York City, employee contributions to the police and fire pension funds are determined by age and experience. However, these pension contributions are partially to fully covered by special added pay allowances from the city.
Pensions as a security blanket
Public sector pensions in New York are structured to provide most career government employees with the ultimate in financial security--the guaranteed prospect of retiring at a relatively early age with little or no net decrease in income. For police and firefighters (and, most recently, New York City sanitation workers), the pension system provides a financial platform for embarking on a second career in middle age. Such generous provisions are not uncommon in other states and the federal government--but they are unheard-of for the vast majority of private sector workers who pay government's bills.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PENSION TRENDS
Just over half of all private sector employees (53 percent) participated in any employee-sponsored retirement income plan as of 1996-97, according to a data compiled by the Employee Benefits Research Institute. Among those private workers who did participate in such a plan, the vast majority were in defined-contribution accounts, such as 401(k)s, to which employers usually contribute. Roughly onequarter of private sector workers (27 percent) in 1996- 97 had any stake in a defined-benefit pension plan. DB pension plans are typically found in large, oldline industrial companies--most of which are struggling to limit backbreaking pension obligations.
Prompted initially by changes in federal tax and employee benefit laws starting in the late 1970s, the shift to DC plans picked up more momentum as a long bull market commenced on Wall Street in the 1980s. Steven A. Kandarian, executive director of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., which insures private pension plans, summarized the factors driving employers towards DC plans in recent congressional testimony:
"[I]ncreased competitive pressures ... have led companies to reexamine their entire cost structure. In the 1990s, companies noticed that many workers did not place a high value on their defined-benefit plans, compared to the value they placed on their 401(k) plans. Furthermore, companies became concerned that their financial obligations to defined-benefit plans were highly
Civic Report 40
November 2003 6
volatile, in part because of fluctuations in interest rates and a dependence on equity investment gains. This volatility can make business planning difficult. As a result, many companies have been increasingly unable to afford, or unwilling to maintain, defined-benefit plans. In addition, companies found that demographic trends have made defined-benefit plans more expensive. With workers retiring earlier and living longer, plans must pay annuities for far longer. Today, an average male worker spends 18.1 years in retirement compared 11.5 years in 1950, an additional seven years of retirement that must be funded."15 Each of the corporate concerns cited in Kandarian's testimony could apply with equal force to New York State, New York City and other large government employers. In recent years, two major states have joined the DC trend on a broad scale, while the one state with a DC plan has moved towards a hybrid DB option.
Michigan leads the way
Under the leadership of then-Governor John Engler, Michigan became the first large state to shift from a DB plan to a comprehensive DC plan in 1997. In the DC plan, the state contributes a minimum of 4 percent of each worker's salary to an individual investment account and matches voluntary employee contributions up to an additional 3 percent of salary, making a total contribution of 10 percent. Additional employee contributions up to 13 percent of salary are allowed, but are not matched by the employer. The employer's contributions are considered partially vested after two years and fully vested after four years. The "unvested" portion of the state's contribution is not included in the permanent account a worker can transfer to another employer's retirement plan before the four years is up Michigan's DC plan was mandatory, replacing the previous DB plan, for all employees hired after the March 1997 effective date. Those already in the system at that time were given a four-month window to shift past employee contributions and the discounted "present value" of their accumulated retirement benefits to a DC account. In the limited time available, with unions running a campaign opposed to the change, only 3,600 out of 58,000 workers, according to the Michigan Office of Retirement Services, opted to join the DC plan.16
Counting new workers, however, the DC plan has grown over the past few years to 18,500 members, 30 percent of the total workforce of 61,500. At this turnover rate, most Michigan state employees should be in the DC plan by 2017.17
Florida Follows Suit
Unlike Michigan, Florida did not convert entirely from a DB to a DC plan. Instead, in 2000, the Florida Legislature voted to create a defined-contribution plan as an alternative to the existing DB state plan. Like the existing DB plan, the new defined-contribution account is non-contributory for the worker.
Government employers contribute to personal accounts at a rate of 9 percent of each worker's wages. The Florida DC plan includes a vesting requirement of only one year. After that time, workers have full property rights in the personal account funds and can take those funds with them to any other job. Past service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) for current employees counts toward this one-year requirement. As of July 2003, only 4 percent of state and local employees who already belonged the FRS had opted into the new DC plan. Among new employees, the opting-in rate was 8 percent. As state officials subsequently acknowledged, their timing was terrible:
"During the education and choice periods, employees were exposed to an economic recession, plummeting stock market, negative press accounts of the dangers of 401(k) plans and the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history."18
In addition, as in Michigan, state employee unions mounted a campaign urging members not to switch. Until Michigan's reform, Nebraska was the only state to exclusively offer a DC plan to a broad segment of its public employees. But the Nebraska plan, which has covered state workers since 1964, recently has
Defusing the Pension Bomb: How to Curb Public Retirement Costs in New York State
November 2003 7
been augmented by a new cash-balance plan that is a hybrid of DC and DB models.19
Federal pension reform
For all employees hired after 1984, the federal government's defined-benefit pension for civilian workers was replaced by a system that combines a small DB pension20 with a DC pension known as the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). In TSP, federal agencies will match up to 5 percent in employee contributions, measured as a percentage of pay. On top of that 10 percent, employees can contribute an extra 5 percent a year without a government match.
Higher education precedent
New York and many other states allow their public
college and university employees to opt into definedcontribution
plans.
The choice has been available to SUNY employees for nearly 40 years. Over 85 percent choose a DC plan, such as the one offered by New York-based Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF). Employees contribute 3 percent of salary; the employer contribution in the SUNY system is 8 percent a year during an employee's first 10 years, and 10 percent thereafter. CUNY also offers its employees a DC option, managed exclusively by TIAA-CREF.
COMPARING THE PENSION ALTERNATIVES
As explained on pages 1-3, moving to a defined-contribution plan clearly would represent a better deal for state and local government--and the taxpayers who ultimately foot the bill--while having no effect on current employees, who are constitutionally locked into the DB system. But what would it mean for employees who would be covered by such a plan in the future?
To illustrate the comparative benefits of DB and DC plans, consider two sets of hypothetical state workers and the benefits they could expect under both plans. The first set of examples consists of workers who leave the state pension system 10 to 20 years into their working lives. Such "early-career" state employees have the most to gain from a DC system. This is because such workers never reach the peak earning years that are the basis for the traditional DB pension, and employer pension contributions made in their behalf don't grow in individual accounts after they leave the government.
The second set of examples features two career government employees, one assumed to retire after 30 years of service and the other after 40 years, and projects their actual DB and potential DC benefits upon retirement from state service. The analysis shows that the 30-year employee can equal or exceed the current pension benefit under a DC plan that sets aside 10 to 12 percent of annual salary, while the 40-year employee will need to have set aside more than 12 percent of salary annually to earn benefits fully equivalent to a DB pension. In estimating the returns from defined-contribution pension funds for both sets of examples, we combined actual market returns from 1983 through 2002 with an assumed 4.6 percent real rate of return for the next 10 to 20 years. This figure is based on the cautious mid-range assumptions used by President Bush's Commission to Strengthen Social Security, chaired by the late former Senator Daniel P. Moynihan of New York, to assess proposed private savings accounts.
It's important to note that this estimate is below longterm historical results and lower than projected in the actuarial assumptions built into the current New York State and New York City systems.
Early-career workers
All three employees in this series of examples are assumed to have begun working for the state at age 22 in 1983, at which point they would have become members of Tier IV of the New York State & Local Retirement System.
* Employee A spent 10 years working for the state in a low-level institutional job.21
* Employee B worked for 15 years in the professional, scientific and technical services unit.22
* Employee C was a managerial employee for 20 years before moving to a private sector job in September 2003.23
Civic Report 40
November 2003
To begin with, we calculated the maximum state pension24 that would be due to each worker upon retirement at age 62 in 2023, using the current Tier IV formula combining years of service and final average salary.
We also estimated the pension savings each worker would have accumulated in a 401(k)-style fund if, during their years of state employment, they had instead belonged a defined-contribution pension plan. Savings were calculated for each worker under three different annual contribution levels--8 percent, 10 percent and 12 percent of salary. In each case, these figures are based on pay grades, contractual salary increases and incremental longevity "steps" that were effective during the time of state employment.
Investment and Return Assumptions
It is assumed in these examples that the hypothetical DC employee pension funds were not cashed in or rolled over to a new employer's plan after each worker left the state payroll. Instead, after state employment and contributions ceased, each fund continued to passively accumulate investment gains until the date of the worker's retirement.
Each worker is assumed to have invested in the same fund mix of 60 percent stocks and 40 percent corporate bonds between 1983 and 2002, shifting to a ratio of 50 percent stocks, 30 percent corporate bonds and 20 percent government bonds in future years.25 Performance of the funds between 1983 through 2002 was based on actual returns from stocks and bonds during that period.26
To provide a direct comparison of state pensions and potential DC retirement benefits, each hypothetical pension fund was converted at age 62 into a "single lifetime" annuity.27
Dramatic differences
The results of the hypothetical exercise are displayed in Figure 3. As shown, under all
8
scenarios, the DC retirement benefit stemming from the period of state employment would dwarf the conventional DB pension. Combining actual investment results with conservative future projections, these examples illustrate the benefits of a DC pension for younger workers who don't spend their careers in government. Another advantage, unstated in these examples, is the flexibility and discretion these plans offer. Depending on circumstances, a worker might decide not to convert the pension fund into an annuity but make periodic lump sum withdrawals from an active investment account. Under this scenario, of course, the fund would continue to grow until it is converted into a larger future annuity, used to pre-pay an assisted living facility or nursing home, or passed on to the retiree's heirs.
Figure 3. Annual Retirement Benefits for Early-
Career State Workers
Comparing Current Pension Entitlements and Hypothetical
Annuities at Age 62 2003 Dollars
Employee "A": first 10 working years in state government, FAS of
$20,603
Employee "B": first 15 working years in state government, FAS of
$42,451
Employee "C": first 20 working years in state government, FAS of
$64,339
Defusing the Pension Bomb: How to Curb Public Retirement Costs in New York State
November 2003
Long-term workers
The next comparison features examples of two career state employees, both assumed to be earning $50,000 as of the end of 2002, and both assumed to have started working for the state in 1983. Employee D plans to retire in 2012, after 30 years of service, at age 55. Employee E doesn't plan to retire until 2022, after 40 years of service.
State workers' salaries typically grow faster than the cost of living, both as a result of promotions and of above-inflation settlements in their union contracts. Therefore, we did not simply assume level, inflationadjusted salaries of $50,000 per employee. Instead, we constructed a salary progression to $50,000 over a 20-year period (1983-2002) that reflects average step increases and promotions consistent with theactuary's assumptions.28 On the same basis, we continued to project future salaries until the projected retirement ages for Employees D and E. The results of this analysis are presented in 2003 dollars in Figure 4.
As shown, Employee D could come close to equaling the current Tier IV defined-benefit pension if at least 10 percent of his paywas put aside in a DC account every year. He would exceed the current pension at a contribution rate of 12 percent. Employee E is the most senior, long-termhypothetical worker in any of these examples. Not surprisingly, given the system's pronounced bias in favor of longevity, this employee's guaranteed pension under the current system would be larger than his annuity under a hypothetical 401(k)-style pension savings plan. But it does not necessarily follow that the DC pension is inadequate for this type of worker.
Combined with Social Security, a retirement annuity purchased with the DC savings at a 12 percent contribution rate would provide Employee E with an effective income equivalent to at least 90 percent of final average salary--a "coverage ratio" in line with what is recommended by retire-
9
ment planning experts. Moreover, as an alternative to a straight single-life annuity, his pension fund can be managed in a way that does more to keep up with inflation than the partial cost-of-living adjustment that applies to the current DB pension. Even under the very conservative future rate-of-return scenario used here, Employee E could afford to buy an annuity equaling what would be provided under the DB pension formula merely by depositing 2 percent more in his DC account (boosting the total contribution to 14 percent).
These hypothetical examples do not include late-career entrants to the public retirement system--employees who land a government job for the last 10 to 20 years of their working lives. In any investment scenario, such workers have the greatest advantage under the current pension system. They could not replicate the DB pension under a DC system unless they save much more toward their retirement.
Figure 4. Annual Retirement Benefits for Career
State Workers
Comparing Current Pension Entitlements and Hypothetical
Annuities at Age 62 2003 Dollars
Employee "D": 20 years service as of 2002, retirement in 2012,
FAS=$64,123
Employee "E": 20 years service as of 2002, retirement in 2022,
FAS=$83,772
Civic Report 40
November 2003
Pension bias
As noted in this report, New York's DB public pension plan reserves its biggest payoff for employees who spend their entire careers in government. Moreover, just as the current system discriminates against those who are on a government payroll for brief periods early in their careers, it is tilted in favor of older, late-career workers who pursue government jobs specifically to take advantage of the high pension. Because pension benefits are financed out of a common pool, the lifetime employee's generous pension ultimately comes at the expense of those who don't put in 40 years on the state payroll. By the same token, the late-career worker's windfall ultimately comes at the expense of younger, more mobile employees. REAL PENSION REFORM FOR NEW YORK A defined-contribution plan could be designed for New York to replace the traditional defined-benefit plans for civilian government employees. Ideally, as in Michigan, the plan would require all new workers to enter the DC system and give all existing DB pensioners an option to switch into the system, bringing their accumulated pension assets and credits with them.
Under the New York plan proposed here, state and local government employees would be required to contribute at least 3 percent of their salaries to a retirement account. The government employer would match this threshold amount with a contribution of 5 percent, bringing the total minimum retirement savings to 8 percent of salary per year. Employers would match up to 2 percent of additional employee contributions, so that total retirement savings of 12 percent of salary would consist of up to 7 percent from the employer and 5 percent from the employee. Workers could voluntarily contribute even more pre-tax income to their pension investment funds, subject to federal Internal Revenue Service limits29 but without an employer match for that extra amount. These contribution levels would be equivalent to what is provided under the federal DC plan and the
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Michigan plan, and significantly larger than those provided under some major corporate plans.30 As in SUNY's optional retirement program, workers would choose among several private investment fund managers, which in this case would be approved and regulated by the state comptroller. Workers could switch among investment funds during an open season in the first three months of each year. Administrative expenses would be borne by the plan's sponsoring government agencies. The funds in the new retirement accounts would become the immediate personal property of the worker, with the employer-financed portion vesting after one year, as in the SUNY and CUNY systems.31 However, withdrawals or loans from the account before retirement would be tightly restricted. Workers who left New York state employment would be permitted to roll over their retirement accounts into a subsequent employer's DC fund, such as a 401(k), or into an Individual Retirement Account. The funds and investment returns would continue accumulate in the accounts on a tax-free basis until withdrawn at retirement. Workers could choose to withdraw funds from their accounts without penalty at any time after they reach 59 1/2,32 regardless of how many years they have worked for state or local government. Retirement benefits would be higher the longer the worker waited to withdraw funds. Such a reform plan would provide major advantages for both workers and taxpayers.
Advantages for Workers
* Benefits would be portable. When a worker changes jobs, her retirement account can be transferred to the new employer or converted into an IRA.
* Employer contributions, as well as any and all investment gains on those contributions, become the worker's property after just one year's employement.33
* Workers gain a greater degree of control and discretion over their own retirement planning than is available under the DB plan.
* All employees accumulate benefits on the same basis, regardless of how long they plan to work for government.
Defusing the Pension Bomb: How to Curb Public Retirement Costs in New York State
November 2003
Advantages for Employers and Taxpayers
* The recommended DC plan would effectively cap costs at 7 percent of pay, just over half the fiscal 2004-05 employer contribution for the New York State & Local Retirement System.
* Taxpayers would no longer bear the risks associated with market downturns.
* Public pension costs for the first time would become both predictable and easily understandable.
The real costs of proposed benefit increases would be completely transparent, rather than obscured by complex actuarial calculations. Under a DC system, it would no longer be possible for elected officials to significantly enhance pension benefits under the pretense that they were serving up a fiscal free lunch. This is what happened in 2000, when Governor George Pataki, then-Comptroller Carl McCall and near-unanimous majorities in both houses of the Legislature agreed to add an automatic annual COLA for all retirees and to eliminate the employee share of pension contributions for all Tier IV workers with 10 or more years of experience. At the time, proponents claimed these changes would bring no new costs, as long as the rate of return on investments remained at 8 percent. But the retirement systems proceeded to lose money over the next two years--a risk that no one involved in the 2000 changes was willing to acknowledge. Although the stock market was invariably blamed for the subsequent increase in required employer pension contributions, Albany's pension enhancements clearly made a bad situation much worse-- accounting for fully one-half of the increase in contributions billed by the statewide system for 2003- 04 fiscal years.
On the city level, pension obligations in fiscal 2004 will be $1.8 billion over the April 2000 projection. Fully $771 million of this amount could be attributed to benefit enhancements enacted at the state level or negotiated by the city with its public employee unions, according to an analysis by the Independent Budget Office.34
Criticisms of DC Plans
Probably the most frequent objection to DC plans is that they shift investment risk from the employer to
11
the worker. In a DB plan, the worker receives the specified benefits regardless of investment performance, so the worker apparently bears no investment risk. In a DC plan, the worker's benefits depend entirely on the investment performance of his retirement account, so the worker bears full investment risk. Poor investment performance leads to lower benefits. Concerns about investment risk understandably resonated with retirees during the stock market downturn of 2000-2002. Over the long term, however, such risks can be overstated. As explained by a leading expert in the debate over savings-based alternatives to Social Security: "Stock market investment is indeed risky over the short term. But over the long term, stocks and bonds clearly can form the basis of stable and adequate retirement wealth accumulation for all workers [emphasis added]."35 Even workers retiring during the Great Depression would have received a 4 percent annual return after inflation during their years on the job.36 The Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) has developed a model that projects the proportion of an individual's pre-retirement income that might be replaced by 401(k) plan accumulations, under several different projected scenarios. Based on equity returns from 1926 to 2001, the model finds that a combination of 401(k) benefits and Social Security payments will produce benefits ranging from 103 percent of preretirement earnings for workers in the lowest income quartile to 85 percent in the highest quartile. Significantly, the EBRI reported, "[e]ven if equity returns in the future are projected to replicate the worst 50-year segment in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 history (1929 to 1978), 401(k) accumulations are still projected to replace significant proportions of projected pre-retirement income."37 Moreover, proponents of traditional plans tend to downplay the potentially devastating effects of high inflation on a defined-benefit pension. Adjusting benefits for inflation--even on a partial, limited basis, as was just done in New York--is enough to make an already costly DB plan prohibitively expensive for taxpayers. Under a DC plan, asset value tends to rise along withinflation over the long run, providing something closer to a real market rate of return. This would tend to keep prospective long run benefits rising with inflation.38
Civic Report 40
November 2003
Over a long-term horizon, workers can weather many ups and downs in investment performance. Those nearing retirement, when savings become more vulnerable to market downturns, can minimize risk by changing the mix of their investments to include more bonds than stocks, and by avoiding too big an equity stake in any one industry or company.
Special Issues
As noted, New York police and firefighters are eligible for retirement at half pay after just 20 years on the job. All state correction officers, along with many local jail guards and sheriff's deputies, can retire at half pay after 25 years. Thus, while the pension for most workers is designed to reward longevity, public safety employees have an incentive to retire as early as possible. There's a lot to be said for the argument that chasing bank robbers, fighting fires and guarding hardened criminals is a young person's job. But so is heavy construction and road-building work--yet even unionized workers in these fields generally lack the kind of early retirement pension benefit available to police and firefighters. Nonetheless, early retirement at half pay has come to be viewed as an integral part of the overall police and fire compensation package. In reshaping the pension system to make it more affordable, careful cost benefit analysis needs to be devoted to the relationship of retirement benefits to salaries and work rules, and to the question of whether the minimum service period can reasonably be extended--to, say, the same 25 years as state corrections officers and county sheriff's deputies. Any DC plan designed to preserve an early retirement preference for such workers would require higher payroll contributions than the range described above for other employees. Moreover, since withdrawals from conventional retirement savings plans are subject to a federal tax penalty before age 59 1/2, some combination of DB and DC plans will be needed in order to continue allowing early retirement.
Fairness
New York's public pension system is a vestige of the last century, when ultra-secure retirement benefits
12
and civil service job protections were seen as compensation for the low wages paid to a non-unionized government workforce. Nowadays, public employee unions are the most powerful interest groups New York State. As more than one labor leader has been known to observe, union members effectively elect their own bosses in the State Capitol and City Hall. Elected officials have rewarded unions' campaign support by preserving the traditional pension system and other benefit perks--all the while agreeing to contracts that raise employee wages faster than inflation without regard for performance or productivity (which, in most cases, is not even measured). Career government workers have an obvious interest in preserving a pension guarantee specifically to reward longevity while shielding them from any investment risk. Since the most senior employees also tend to wield the most clout within the unions, this explains why union leaders can be expected to continue supporting a system that actually shortchanges at least a sizeable minority of their members.39 But while this provides the political explanation for the persistence of DB pensions in the public sector, it hardly serves as a justification for continuing the system, especially when the fiscal hazards of maintaining it have been so vividly highlighted by the latest funding crunch.
Costly return to the "norm"
"The boom of the 1990s was an exceptional time that allowed (employer pension) contributions to drop to zero in some years," State Comptroller Alan Hevesi has pointed out. "But it is unrealistic to expect to provide a pension without any cost."40 Government employers in New York, Hevesi says, "must plan to again make contributions of at least 12 to 16 percent of payroll as a normal pension cost."41
In the face of this trend, individual retirement savings accounts represent a fair, sensible alternative to outmoded public employee pension plans whose "normal" costs would place an intolerable burden on taxpayers for decades to come.
Defusing the Pension Bomb: How to Curb Public Retirement Costs in New York State
November 2003 13
APPENDIX A:
NEW YORK'S PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS
Here is a list of the public pension systems in New York State and a description of their primary membership:
New York State & Local Employees Retirement System
All employees--in occupations other than police officers, firefighters and educators--on the payrolls of
the state and of local governments outside New York City
New York State & Local Police and Fire Retirement System
Police officers and firefighters employed by the state and by local governments outside New York City
New York State Teachers Retirement System (TRS)
Teachers and other education professionals employed by school districts outside New York City
New York City Employees Retirement System
City employees other than those employed by the police, fire and education departments
New York City Teachers' Retirement System
Education professionals employed in the city's public schools
New York City Board of Education Retirement System
Civil service workers and other non-education professionals in the city education department
New York City Police Department Pension Fund
City police officers
New York City Police Department Pension Fund
City firefighters
APPENDIX B:
HOW GENEROUS ARE NEW YORK'S PUBLIC PENSIONS?
New York's benefit levels and eligibility guidelines are not atypical for the public sector. Some states offer
earlier retirement ages or larger benefits than New York for some occupations--but such largess is often
accompanied by the requirement that employers and employees contribute much more to their retirement
systems.
Two recent nationwide reviews of public retirement systems showed that New York's employee share of
pension contributions is relatively low compared to requirements in most jurisdictions:
* Of the 85 state and local government retirement systems included in a nationwide survey conducted for
the Wisconsin Legislature in 200042, only 18 had mandatory employee contribution rates lower than the
maximum 3 percent required of most New York public employees during their first 10 years on the job.
Only 11 pension plans required no contribution from some or all employees, as is now the case in New
York.
* Only four of the 34 states with pension systems most comparable to that of New York required no
pension contribution from employees as of 1999, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office43.
Among states in this group requiring a member contribution, only five were below the current New
York maximum of 3 percent.
Civic Report 40
November 2003 14
Private counterparts
As noted on pages 5-6 of the main report, few private employers offer any guaranteed pension. In fact,
even among the shrinking number of companies offering defined-benefit pensions, few rival the package
available to career public employees in New York.
* General Electric, for example, offers workers a DB pension roughly half the size of the New York government
plan, combined with a defined-contribution savings account. IBM also offers a package of DB
and DC retirement benefits, although it is in the process of converting its traditional DB plan into a cash
balance plan.
* Members of the United Auto Workers are famous for their high hourly earnings and big pensions--but
after age 62, their retirement benefits are reduced by the amount of Social Security they receive. New
York government retirees, by contrast, are entitled to full Social Security benefits in addition to their full
pensions.
* Microsoft, the quintessential high-tech growth company, offers no DB pension at all--just a 401(k) plan,
plus the option to purchase company stock at 85 percent of market value.44
Other comparisons
Because there are literally tens of thousands of different privately administered pension plans offering
seemingly endless permutations of benefits and eligibility standards, it is difficult to conjure an "average"
private plan for comparison with public pensions. In the absence of such data, one measure of how New
York's DB pension compares to private plans is a 1999 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report focusing
on the federal government's pension plans for civilian employees.
Even among a select group of larger employers offering more generous retirement benefits, including
guaranteed pensions, the CBO said only 15 percent allowed retirement with a full pension at age 55 after 30
years of service, which is permitted in Tier III and IV of the New York system.45 In this same group, less
than one private employer in ten provided for any kind of regular post-retirement inflation increase, such
as the one extended to New York public employees in 2000.
Consistent with the CBO analysis, Census Bureau data indicate the average state and local government
retirement payment in New York as of 2002 was $20,057 per person, compared to an average company or
union pension of $11,949.46
Defusing the Pension Bomb: How to Curb Public Retirement Costs in New York State
November 2003 15
ENDNOTES
1. High public pension costs also contributed to the New York fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s, prompting
legislative efforts to rein in pension benefits in 1976 and 1983, as reviewed on pages 4-5.
2. "Local governments must plan again to make contributions of at least 12 to 16 percent of payroll as
a normal pension cost," Comptroller Alan G. Hevesi said on Sept. 8, 2003.
3. The precise costs would depend on the level employees choose to contribute, since the employer
contribution would be made on a matching basis. See pages 10-11 for details.
4. The projected employer pension contribution for New York City and New York State and local
government workers other than police and firefighters is at least 12 percent of salary for fiscal years beginning
in 2004.
5. This is based on the state actuary's expectation that approximately 50 percent of newly hired
retirement system members terminate employment within 10 years.
6. The average length of service for members of the New York State and Local Employee Retirement
System is 24 years, according to the state actuary.
7. The $100 billion, 944,500-participant New York State and Local Retirement System alone is the
second largest in the country, after California's massive "CalPERS" system.
8. Most New York State government employees also qualify for subsidized post-retirement health
insurance. However, retiree health benefits are treated as a current expense; they are not financed out of
the pension fund but out of the "general state charges" line in the budget's general fund. While subject to
collective bargaining, they are not part of the pension system or the constitutional pension guarantee.
9. Article 5, Section 7 of the Constitution mandates that "membership in a retirement system shall be
in the nature of a contract, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired." New York is one of
only five states to provide this maximum level of security for government pensions.
10. For most current government workers, final average salary (FAS) is the average of wages earned
during any 36 consecutive months when earnings were the highest, subject to certain limitations. For members
of Tiers II, III and IV, the wages in any year used in the FAS calculation cannot exceed the average wage of
the previous two years by more than 10 percent.
11. On average, Social Security benefits are 40 percent of average annual earnings over a worker's
entire career.
12. For example, a 40-year state employee retiring at 62 with an FAS of $50,000 (roughly the average
for all state workers as of 2002) immediately qualifies for a state pension of $37,500 and Social Security
benefits of $12,948, yielding a total of $50,448. Since the pension payment is not subject to federal payroll
tax or to state and local income taxes, which can approach 10 percent, the effective difference between
retirement and working incomes is even larger than it appears in this example.
13. The average age at retirement in the New York Police Department in recent years has been 43.
New York City police pensions date back to the 1850s and were the first of their kind in the United States.
Retirement at half pay first became an option in 1878.
14. In 2002, newly retired members of the state's police and fire system received an average pension
of $48,456 a year, according to the system's annual report.
15. Statement of Steven A. Kandarian before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures,
Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, April 30, 2003.
16. Unions campaigned against the switch, and the time window was limited. With a wider window
and a marketing campaign that did a better job of informing workers, more might have switched.
17. In addition to the state, four large Michigan counties and the capital city, Lansing, have moved
from DB to DC pensions plans.
18. "The New Choice in Retirement Planning in Florida," state guide posted at http://
www.fsba.state.fl.us/pdf/news/8-11-03.pdf .
Civic Report 40
November 2003 16
19. In making the move, state retirement officials expressed concern that 90 percent of investments
were directed to only three of 11 available funds, principally a conservative "default" option. These statistics
did, indeed, highlight a known weakness in the DC system. Left entirely to their own devices, many
participants in such plans tend to overly cautious in their investment decisions, as reflected in sub-market
rates of return for 401(k) accounts in recent years. However, rather than reforming the manner in which
funds are invested under the existing DC plan, Nebraska officials appear to have been distracted by goals
of "competitiveness" with public DB systems and by a consultant's recommendation to the effect that only
a pension duplicating the worker's pre-retirement standard of living could be called "adequate."
Under the new plan, the employer will guarantee employee account balances and annuities at
retirement. Responsibility for investment decisions (and all the downside risk) is shifted under the cash
balance plan to a state-run Investment Council.
20. Guaranteed pension benefits for post-1984 Federal Employee Retirement System members accrue
at the rate of 1 percent of salary per year--only half the level available to New York State employees.
21. Pay Grade 6.
22. It's assumed the employee's first 10 years were in Pay Grade 14 and the last five were in Pay
Grade 18.
23. It's assumed this employee progressed from Grade 14 to Grade 18 after 10 years, and then to
Grade 23 after 15 years.
24. This would be "Option 0," the single life allowance, which does not provide for payments to a
beneficiary after the retiree's death.
25. This is consistent with the recommendation by most financial planners that workers adopt a
more conservative investment mix, with fewer stocks and more bonds, as they approach retirement.
26. The return on each worker's corporate bond portfolio was equal to the average return on all
corporate bonds rated in this period by Moody's Investor Service. The return on each worker's stock portfolio
matched the composite returns on the S&P 500 as reported by Ibbotson Associates in its 2003 Stocks, Bonds,
Bills and Inflation Yearbook. This index reflects the returns on "large cap" corporate stock and this is a relatively
conservative number; the historical composite returns on "small cap" tend to be higher.
27. Annuities were calculated by entering accumulated savings as "deposits" on the webannuities.com
site, which generates an average annuity estimate from 16 companies.
28. The state actuary assumes underlying annual inflation and wage growth averaging 5.8 percent.
29. The IRS limit on pre-tax employee contributions to 401(k) accounts is $12,000 as of 2003.
Contributions above that amount are taxable.
30. For example, the Microsoft and IBM pension savings plans match only 3 percent of employee pay
contributed to 401(k) savings plans, while General Electric matches up to 3.5 percent of pay.
31. As in all DC plans, the employee's portion of the account, including all investment gains,
immediately is considered the employee's property.
32. This is the minimum age at which the IRS allows penalty-free withdrawals from qualified
retirement savings plans.
33. Under the current system, Tier IV workers with less than 10 years of service can withdraw only
their own contributions, with interest of just 5 percent. After 10 years, there is no right of withdrawal.
34. "What's Driving New York City's Growing Pension Burden?", Independent Budget Office, Inside
the Budget, Number 119, Aug. 13, 2003.
35. Andrew G. Biggs, "Personal Accounts in a Down Market: How Recent Stock Market declines
Affect the Social Security debate," Cato Institute Briefing Paper No. 74, September 10, 2002, p. 2.
36. See Gary Burtless, "Social Security Privatization and Financial Market Risk," Center on Social
and Economic Dynamics, Working Paper no. 10, February 2000, Figure 4, p. 28.
37. Sarah Holden and Jack VanDerhei, "Can 401(k) Accumulations Generate Significant Income for
Future Employee Benefits," Employment Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief, November 2002. The EBRI
model is based on an average contribution of 9.3 percent of pay, which is less than the maximum
recommended for New York. It also assumes levels of funding withdrawals that would be restricted or
prohibited altogether for participants in the proposed New York plan.
Defusing the Pension Bomb: How to Curb Public Retirement Costs in New York State
November 2003 17
38. EBRI's 401(k) model (Ibid.) found that a three-year bear market immediately before retirement
could depress the level of pre-retirement income replacement by 13 to 17 percent. By comparison, inflation
between 1978 and 1981 eroded the value of a dollar by 25 percent.
39. The distribution of worker longevity on state government payrolls can be viewed as a pyramid,
with most workers clustered near the base, in bands with least experience. In 2001-02, from 40 to 44 percent
of the general employees (excluding police and firefighters) in New York City and in others towns, cities
and counties had spent less than 10 years in the public pension system; more than 80 percent had less than
20. The state government's workforce is older and more senior on average; at the state level, about 33
percent of employees had been in the pension system less than 10 years, and 68 percent had been in the
system for less than 20 years.
40. Statement quoted in Press Release from the Office of New York State Comptroller Alan G. Hevesi,
Sept. 8, 2003.
41. Ibid.
42. State of Wisconsin, Retirement Research Committee, "2000 Comparative Study of Major Public
Employee Retirement Systems," Staff report No. 83.
43. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, "State Pension Plans:
Similarities and Differences between Federal and State Designs," March 1999, GAO/GGD-99-45.
44. Other large companies including GE and IBM offer similar stock purchase options.
45. Congressional Budget Office, CBO Memorandum, "Comparing Federal Employee Benefits with
Those in the Private Sector," August 1998, p. 9.
46. Weighted survey data from the March 2002 supplement to the Current Population Survey. These
averages compared only public and private DB plans and did not include income from 401(k) accounts,
Individual Retirement Accounts and other savings-based retirement plans commonly found in the private
sector.

M A N H A T T A N I N S T I T U T E F O R P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
M
52 Vanderbilt Avenue * New York, NY 10017
www.manhattan-institute.org

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Senate Passes Pension Relief Bill
Jan 28, 10:32 PM (ET)
By JIM ABRAMS
(AP) The Senate, acting with rare election-year concord, passed a bill Wednesday, Jan. 28, to reduce by...
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WASHINGTON (AP) - The Senate, acting with rare election-year concord, passed a bill Wednesday to reduce by $96 billion the payments companies will have to make into their pension plans this year and next.
Sponsors said the measure, passed 86-9, will help preserve pension benefits for millions of workers by discouraging financially strapped companies from terminating plans as no longer affordable.
"Our pension plans are being battered by a perfect storm of declining interest rates, stock market declines and a weak economy," said Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass. The bill, he said, "will help the hard-earned pensions of millions of Americans to weather this storm."
The Senate must still work out differences with the House, which passed similar legislation late last year, and answer administration objections to a provision that would excuse airlines and steelmakers with chronic pension underfunding problems from $16 billion in catch-up payments.
For thousands of companies, speed is crucial. They face huge increases in payments to their pension funds if the measure doesn't become law by April.
"A lot of companies have suffered" already as a result of congressional delay, said Lynn Dudley, vice president of the American Benefits Council, a business group representing employers and retirement-plan providers.
She said her group's "members are withholding opening plants, not increasing new hires and avoiding improvements to their programs until they know what their liabilities are."
Unions have also lobbied for the legislation. Although the legislation will result in smaller payments to pension funds over the short run, it gives some financial breathing space to companies that might otherwise go bankrupt, lay off workers, freeze their pension plans or renege on the promised benefits.
Failed pension plans are turned over to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., a government agency that insures pensions for some 44 million people in more than 30,000 defined-benefit pension plans.
The PBGC finances itself with premiums it assesses pension plan sponsors, in much the same way the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. collects premiums from banks and thrift institutions to insure their depositors. Last year the PBGC took over 152 bankrupt single-employer pension plans covering 206,000 people, and saw its deficit rise to a record $11.2 billion.
Workers may lose a portion of their benefits when the PBGC becomes trustee of a plan. For example, the agency announced Wednesday it was taking over the plan of a bankrupt North Carolina construction company with 6,300 workers, pension plan assets of $95 million and benefit promises totaling $215 million. The PBGC estimated it will end up assuming $104 million of the $120 million shortfall, with the rest made up by lower retiree benefits.
Pension plans are in crisis partly because contributions have been tied to the interest rate on 30-year Treasury bonds. But the Treasury Department stopped issuing the bonds in 2001 and interest rates fell precipitously, producing smaller returns on pension plan investments. Underfunding of pension plans is now estimated to total $350 billion nationwide.
The Senate bill would establish a new formula that would make contributions dependent on the investment return from a blend of corporate bond index rates. The PBGC says that will save companies $80 billion over the next two years while Congress and the administration work on long-term overhaul of the pension system.
The measure is particularly important to mature industries such as automobiles, where retirees at some companies outnumber current employees. General Motors Corp. (GM), for example, has 25 retirees for every 10 active employees and will have to pay out $6 billion in pension benefits this year.
The bill also gives relief and requires greater transparency for unions and others involved in multi-employer pension plans.
Its most controversial provision singles out airlines and steelmakers, among others who have chronically underfunded plans, for special breaks.
Currently, such companies must make deficit reduction contributions, above their normal payments, to reduce their underfunded amounts. The bill would allow these employers to pay only 20 percent of their required catch-up pay in 2004, and 40 percent in 2005.
The three Cabinet secretaries who make up the board of the PBGC, Elaine Chao of Labor, John Snow of Treasury and Donald Evans of Commerce, said last week they would recommend a presidential veto if this provision remained in the bill. They said the measure could worsen the underfunding problem.
The bill is H.R. 3108.
On the Net:
Congress: http://thomas.loc.gov/
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.: http://www.pbgc.gov/
ERISA Industry Committee: http://www.eric.org
+++
Senate Pension Agreement Paves the Way for a Taxpayer Bailout
by David C. John
WebMemo #405
January 27, 2004
In a direct parallel to legislative mistakes that helped to create the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, the recent Senate bipartisan agreement on H.R. 3108, the Pension Fund Equity Act, places corporate interests above those of the taxpayer. The agreement between Sens. Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Max Baucus (D-MT), Judd Gregg (R-NH), and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) would make it much more likely that billions of dollars of taxpayer money will end up bailing out underfunded corporate pension plans.
Uncontroversial House language
As passed by the House last year, H.R. 3108 was limited to a minor, but important, change in the way that a pension plan's ability to pay future benefits are calculated. A provision that expired at the end of 2003 had required that the plans use up to 120 percent of the weighted average of the thirty-year treasury bond yield to determine if the plan was properly funded. However, the Treasury Department stopped issuing thirty-year bonds several years ago, and the House legislation replaced that index with another keyed to the yield on corporate bonds for a two-year period. During those two years, Congress is supposed to decide if the new measure should be made permanent or replaced by another.
The House language has been endorsed by the Administration as a first step towards their long term proposal of last year. This proposal is by far the most comprehensive approach to the problem of properly valuing defined benefit pension plans[1].
The Senate special interest agreement
The House provision is relatively uncontroversial, and the Senate should drop its agreement and just approve the House-passed language instead. Unfortunately, the Senate agreement adds special interest provisions that allow certain underfunded pension plans to avoid making additional payments in order to fully pay for their pension promises. Instead, they would only have to make 20 percent of the needed additional contribution in 2004, and 40 percent in 2005.
Airline and steel pension plans would automatically qualify for this relief, as would plans run by a railway workers union and some smaller businesses. Companies in other industries could apply to the Secretary of the Treasury for equal relief, and only the worst funded would fail to qualify. Finally, in a spectacular example of Congress picking winners and losers, the Senate agreement rewards Greyhound Lines, Inc., a bus company, for its lobbying skill by declaring that its pension plan is better funded than it actually is. If it is allowed to remain in the bill, this extremely dangerous exception to the rules is likely to be only the first example of Congress fiddling with pension accounting rules for political reasons.
Setting the stage for a taxpayer bailout of PBGC
The taxpayer is likely to pick up the cost for these special interest provisions. Already, the agency that insures this type of pension plan, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), is seriously underfunded. According to numbers released earlier this month, the agency is running a record $11.2 billion deficit. That number could climb to $85.5 billion if all of the pension plans that could "reasonably" be expected to fail did so.
By allowing companies to avoid funding their pension plans' deficits, the Senate agreement makes it likely that taxpayers will have to pick up that liability. The sad fact is that many companies that qualify for the funding holiday will be in just as poor shape in 2006. The delay is likely to end with their plans running even higher funding deficits. And once they turn their even more underfunded plans over to PBGC, that agency will be further down the road to an inevitable taxpayer-funded multi-billion dollar bailout.
PBGC insures the pensions of about 44 million Americans. As its deficits mount, Congress will be faced with the choice to either allow retired workers to lose pensions they have earned or to pump billions of dollars of taxpayer money into PBGC to make up the difference. No one seriously believes that Congress will renege on PBGC's guarantees, and the Senate pension agreement will do nothing more than to increase the amount that taxpayers will have to provide.
To make matters worse, individual workers could also suffer from a PBGC bailout. Already, workers' pensions tend to be reduced when the plan is turned over to PBGC. As part of a congressional bailout, these benefits are likely to be reduced even further.
Repeating mistakes that caused the S&L bailout
Twenty years ago, Congress faced a funding crisis in the savings and loan industry by allowing S&Ls to declare that they had more assets than they actually did. Congress also passed provisions that gave even more undeserved benefits to specific companies that had the lobbying muscle to get that language hidden in bills. Those S&L bills used the same oblique ways of identifying the lucky recipient as the Senate pension agreement.
Even after receiving special treatment, the savings and loan industry began to run massive deficits that resulted in a bailout that cost ordinary taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars. While a less "generous" Congress would have seen companies fail earlier, the cost to the taxpayer would have been much less.
As the American philosopher George Santayana noted, "Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it." The Senate pension agreement repeats the mistakes that caused the savings and loan bailout. If Congress approves the Senate pension agreement and President Bush signs it into law, the stage will be set for a massive taxpayer-funded bailout of PBGC that could have cost much less.
David C. John is Research Fellow in Social Security and Financial Institutions in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.


[1] For further background on the Administration proposal, see David John, Treasury Department Proposal for Defined Benefits Includes Important Reforms, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1676, August 7, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Regulation/bg1676.cfm.

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-----------------------------------------------
Government Safety Requirements at Nuclear Weapons Facilities Targeted for Elimination
By Nancy Zuckerbrod
Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Bush administration is looking at waiving some current government safety requirements at federal nuclear facilities if contractors don't like them - after Congress directed it to start fining contractors for violations.
Critics contend that long-established government standards at more than two dozen Energy Department nuclear weapons plants and research labs could become unenforceable under the proposal. Energy Department officials say the intent is to give contractors more flexibility without compromising safety.
Sen. Jim Bunning, R-Ky., an author of the 2002 legislation ordering the fines, accused the administration this week of distorting Congress' intent with a plan that "will likely decrease worker protection."
John Conway, chairman of an advisory board overseeing safety at the Energy Department, said the proposal would weaken safety standards covering more than 100,000 workers at the facilities. "The way it's written, I don't like it at all," said Conway, head of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Energy Department officials said they have not made a decision on the proposal and emphasized that the government would retain the authority to approve or reject safety plans written by contractors.
"The department believes the proposed rule seeks to fully protect our workers," Assistant Secretary Beverly Cook said.
The proposal was outlined in a draft regulation put out by the department last month. Cook described it as part of a continuing effort to get contractors to focus on hazards specific to their sites rather than on dangers that don't exist everywhere.
The Energy Department can now fine contractors who expose workers to hazardous levels of radiation, but it has no authority to levy fines for failing to protect workers from other industrial dangers, such as exposure to toxic chemicals.
The proposed rule would change that, allowing the department to assess fines against contractors who violate what would be contractor-written safety plans dealing with industrial hazards.
"The decision making will be largely in the hands of contractors to decide what protections are appropriate," said Rep. Ted Strickland, D-Ohio. "It's the fox guarding the hen house."
The government often gives contractors financial incentives to complete projects ahead of schedule, and tough safety standards could slow contractors down, said Leon Owens, a worker and past president of the local union at the government's uranium plant in Paducah, Ky.
"I don't feel that a contractor would be as inclined to develop rules that would go the extra length to provide adequate protection for workers," Owens said.
Some of the basic standards the Energy Department generally requires contractors to meet mirror Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations at private industrial sites, including commercial nuclear power plants.
While some contractors say they like the new rules, at least one is on record as opposing them. UT-Battelle, which operates the government's Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tenn., said it would prefer one set of rules, based on OSHA guidelines, for all contractors.
On the Net:
Energy Department: http://www.doe.gov/
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board: http://www.dnfsb.gov/
AP-ES-01-28-04 2032EST
This story can be found at: http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGAG40L50QD.html
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FBI Recalls Head of Detroit Field Office
By SARAH KARUSH
Associated Press Writer
DETROIT (AP) -- The FBI agent in charge of the Detroit field office has been temporarily recalled to headquarters amid an internal investigation into a terrorism-related case and the handling of a confidential informant, officials said Wednesday.
Willie Hulon was replaced for the time being by Michael Wolf, who has headed the FBI office in New Haven, Conn., said two federal law enforcement officials, speaking on condition of anonymity.
The FBI declined to comment on the investigation, but issued a statement Wednesday saying that "any time an allegation is received it is investigated by the FBI and/or the Department of Justice to determine if there is any basis to it."
The investigation centers on the Detroit office's handling of the Jan. 20 arrests of Ali Abdul-Karim Farhat and Hassan Farhat, brothers charged with drug trafficking and with giving financial support to the Hezbollah terrorist group, the law enforcement sources said.
In addition, the officials said the internal probe is concerned with a letter written by informant Marwan Farhat contending that an FBI agent told him to break the law by stealing mail from people the government identified as terror suspects. Marwan Farhat is not related to the two brothers.
One federal law enforcement official confirmed the contents of the letter, which was first reported this week by The Detroit News.
The investigation is being conducted by the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility and the inspector general of the Justice Department.
Marwan Farhat also figures in a Justice Department probe of Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Convertino, the lead prosecutor in a major post-Sept. 11 case that ended in two terrorism convictions. A federal judge is deciding whether to grant a new trial in that case because Convertino and his co-counsel failed to turn over evidence that might have helped the defense.
After Marwan Farhat, a defendant in a drug case, became a confidential informant, Convertino recommended that he get a lesser prison sentence than federal guidelines recommend.
Associated Press Writer Curt Anderson in Washington contributed to this report.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
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Mexican Man Says He Buried Bodies in Yard
By OLGA R. RODRIGUEZ
Associated Press Writer
CIUDAD JUAREZ, Mexico (AP) -- A Mexican man who lived in the house where 11 bodies were discovered told police he helped kill and bury victims in his backyard at the behest of drug smugglers - and he thinks there are still more dead to be found, a prosecutor said Wednesday.
Police were tearing up the backyard at the house rented by Alejandro Garcia, who was arrested Tuesday in the border city of Ciudad Juarez, Deputy Attorney General Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos said during a news conference. Garcia allegedly told police they would find more bodies if they keep looking.
Santiago Vasconcelos said officials also plan to search six more homes in Ciudad Juarez. He said three would be searched because people had come forward to say they believed their missing relatives were buried there. He refused to say why they were searching the other three homes.
Officials said Garcia was trying to flee to the United States along with his wife and son when he was caught Tuesday. Over the weekend, officials uncovered the remains of 11 men who had been buried in his backyard, several under a patio that was still being torn apart Wednesday.
Mexican investigators said the property apparently was also used by Humberto Santillan, who was arrested Jan. 15 across the border in El Paso, Texas. Mexican authorities identified Santillan as one of the chief lieutenants for the Vicente Carrillo drug gang.
Garcia, who said he had been working with the Carrillo cartel for a year, told police he killed under the orders of Santillan and a Mexican state police commander. Santiago Vasconcelos did not say what role Garcia played in cartel.
Santiago Vasconcelos said police were investigating how many state police had been helping the drug cartel, adding there was an "extreme breakdown" of the region's law enforcement.
"Instead of protecting and guaranteeing the safety of the population, they are openly working with organized crime," he said. "This is serious, and we're not going to tolerate it. We will fight it to its core."
He added that the recent killings were "a result of this organization trying to guarantee their supremacy and their survival" as federal officials crack down on narcotics organizations across Mexico.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
-------------------------------------------------
Syrian Prisoner's Family Awaits Return
By ALBERT AJI
DAMASCUS, Syria (AP) - Every morning for the past 18 years, Khayreya Fahd al-Muhammad has spoken to a framed photograph of her son Farouk hanging on her wall. The real Farouk has been in prison in Israel.
On Friday, she expects to again see Farouk, 40, after his release as part of a German-brokered exchange of prisoners between Israel and the Lebanese guerrilla group Hezbollah.
Farouk Nasser al-Ali is one of five Syrians in a group of 36 Arab ex-prisoners that a German military plane is expected to deliver to Beirut, the Lebanese capital, on Thursday afternoon. He will then go on to the family home in Dumar, five miles west of Damascus, the Syrian capital, for the reunion.
"It is incredible. My son is getting out," Khayreya said Wednesday.
Farouk was captured by Israeli forces on the Lebanese-Israeli border in 1986 while taking part in a military operation with the Palestinian guerrilla group, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or DFLP. His two comrades were killed in the operation.
For the next three years, Khayreya and her family thought Farouk had been killed.
"The DFLP told us 'your son is a martyr,' and they distributed his photo in the streets. But three years later I received a letter from Farouk through the Red Cross," Khayreya said.
"When I got the news that he was alive, I walked barefoot for eight kilometers (five miles) from home to the Red Cross offices in downtown Damascus."
Indicating the photograph on her wall, she said with watery eyes: "Every morning I stand before the photo and say: 'Good morning, Farouk, will you drink coffee with me?'"
Farouk's father, Nasser Ibn Ahmed al-Ali, 68, said he has been depressed for the 18 years of his son's imprisonment. "When I see him I will cry," he said.
Farouk's sister, Fayrouz, 39, said her brother wrote to her from prison last August to say he was in good health.
Farouk's younger brother Amjad, 23, and sister Majd, 18, do not remember their brother. They know him only from pictures.

Posted by maximpost at 10:44 PM EST
Permalink

>> OUR FRIEND BOB RUBIN...
http://www.brook.edu/views/papers/orszag/20040105.pdf

Democrats' Fiscal Discipline Is Pure Posturing: Baum (Correct)
(Adds dropped word in third paragraph. Commentary. Caroline Baum is a columnist for Bloomberg News. The opinions expressed are her own.)
Jan. 28 (Bloomberg) -- The seven Democratic presidential candidates have been hammering away at President George W. Bush for what they say is his fiscal irresponsibility.
The way they see it, they (in the guise of Bill Clinton) handed over the reins of government in early 2001 to a Republican president who, with the help of a Republican Congress, managed to turn a record $237 billion surplus into a record $374 billion deficit in three short years.
The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office Monday projected a $477 billion deficit for fiscal 2004, which ends Sept. 30. At 4.2 percent of gross domestic product, this year's deficit is below the record 6 percent share of GDP in 1983.
As the booming economy chips away at the Democrats' major campaign issue -- they're hoping anemic job growth persists until the election -- the candidates have resorted to criticizing the burgeoning budget deficit, which for them is synonymous with the Bush tax cuts.
Remember the old stereotypes? The GOP used to be the party of limited government. The Democrats were the party of tax and spend.
Robert Rubin changed all that. The Clinton administration economic adviser and then Treasury secretary nixed the idea of middle-class tax cuts and convinced the president that raising taxes would bring down the deficit, lower long-term interest rates and stimulate the economy. Fiscal responsibility was the new rallying cry.
Legacy
Never mind that there's no known accredited economic school advocating tax increases as stimulative. Rubinomics survives to this day.
Rubin, in his debut as academic economist, teamed up with the liberal Brookings Institution's Peter Orszag and Decision Economics' Allen Sinai on a paper presented at the Jan. 4 American Economics Association annual conference entitled, ``Sustained Budget Deficits: Longer-Run U.S. Economic Performance and the Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray.''
In it, the authors warn of the ``severe economic consequences'' of large, protracted deficits, which need to be addressed by ``a combination of expenditure restraint and revenue increases.''
If the authors think current budget policy is a mess, and it is, they should take a gander at the Democratic candidates' fiscal proposals. While the Democrats have been hyperventilating over ``the red ink in the federal budget, every one of the seven hopefuls would worsen the deficit by billions or even trillions of dollars,'' writes Drew Johnson, a policy analyst for the National Taxpayers Union Foundation, in a paper entitled, ``The Return of Fuzzy Math and Risk Schemes: How Presidential Hopefuls Would Deepen Deficits.'' (The NTUF is the educational and research arm of the National Taxpayers Union, an advocacy group.)
Hey Big Spender
Using the NTUF's BillTally model, a computerized accounting system that calculates the cost of every piece of congressional legislation over $1 million, Johnson found the seven candidates would raise spending on average by $501 billion, 22 percent above planned outlays.
The two biggest spenders, Reverend Al Sharpton and Representative Dennis Kucinich, aren't serious candidates. Excluding their trillion-dollar-plus spending proposals, as well as the conservative platform outlined by Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman (a serious candidate by all measures except votes), ``the average comes down to the high 220s'' (that's billions), Johnson says.
Even if the full rollback of the 2003 tax cut is captured, dollar for dollar, as revenue (Johnson used an optimistic estimate of $135 billion), all the candidates ``offer platforms that call for more spending than would be offset by repealing the Bush tax cut,'' he says.
Challenges
Bill Gale, co-director of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, challenges the NTUF's numbers on a couple of grounds. First, he says there aren't enough specific proposals to do revenue estimates. And ``the spending proposals are even murkier than the tax proposals,'' he says.
Second, the estimate of the revenue loss from the tax cut is too low. The revenue recouped from repeal would probably be more than the four viable Democratic candidates propose to spend, Gale says.
``It's hard to believe anyone has been a bigger fiscal disaster than President Bush,'' he says.
Bush has been as generous in spending the taxpayers' money as he has been in cutting their taxes. Total spending, which includes money for both entitlements (Social Security, Medicare) and discretionary spending (defense, education, transportation), rose from a 34-year low of 18.4 percent of GDP in 2000 to a projected 20 percent in 2004, according to the CBO.
Spending Binge
Some of the increase in spending over the last few years has been linked to the war on terror -- spending for defense and for homeland security, two-thirds of which falls outside the defense budget. Non-defense discretionary spending -- discretionary spending is subject to annual congressional appropriations -- ``has risen almost as rapidly as defense spending in recent years,'' says Veronique de Rugy, a fiscal policy analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute. ``Real discretionary non-defense spending increased 23 percent during President Bush's first three years in office.''
Compare that to the rate of inflation over the same three- year period of about 6 percent.
Analysts like to strip out mandatory, or entitlement, spending, which is on automatic pilot, and defense spending -- presumably national defense is a priority for most Americans --to ascertain how serious the administration and Congress are about controlling the growth of government.
Finding Cover
Non-defense discretionary spending rose 12.3 percent in fiscal 2002, 8.7 percent in fiscal 2003 and a projected 6.9 percent in 2004, according to de Rugy.
Backing out appropriations for homeland security isn't easy since Congress has discovered this no-fault category, which is as murky as ``emergency spending.'' Based on some numbers provided by the CBO, non-defense discretionary spending excluding homeland security rose 9.7 percent in 2002, 3.4 percent in 2003 and 7.7 percent in 2004 (increases are based on spending authorized by Congress, not what was actually spent).
``There's only the faintest whiff of fiscal restraint going on,'' says Susan Hering, an economist at UBS Warburg. ``The acceleration in spending actually began as soon as a surplus emerged.''
It was projections of large deficits as far as the eye could see that forced Congress to find religion on spending in the 1990s. A decade later, with the retirement of the baby boomers close at hand, the enactment of a new prescription drug benefit certain to exceed the $400 billion 10-year estimated cost, and the three largest mandatory spending programs -- Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid -- threatening to gobble up an increasing share of the budget, the administration and Congress need to recommit to real fiscal discipline.
That goes for the presidential wannabes, too.
Last Updated: January 28, 2004 11:24 EST
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Sustained Budget Deficits: Longer-Run U.S. Economic Performance and the Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray

Robert E. Rubin, Peter R. Orszag, and Allen Sinai*

Paper presented at the AEA-NAEFA Joint Session, Allied Social Science Associations Annual
Meetings, The Andrew Brimmer Policy Forum, "National Economic and Financial Policies for
Growth and Stability," Sunday, January 4, 2004, San Diego, CA
* Robert E. Rubin is Member, Office of the Chairman, Citigroup; Peter R. Orszag is Joseph A.
Pechman Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; and Allen Sinai is Chief Global Economist, Decision Economics, Inc. The authors thank Alan Auerbach, William Gale, Robert Greenstein, and Richard Kogan for the joint work upon which parts of this paper are based, as well as for insightful comments and discussions regarding this paper; Henry Aaron, Robert Cumby, Peter Diamond, Doug Elmendorf, Maya MacGuineas, Jonathan Orszag, and David Wilcox for helpful comments and discussions; Emil Apostolov, Matt Hall, and Jennifer Derstine for research
assistance; and Chip Curran, Suleyman Ozmucur, and Michael Gough for research assistance, work with the Decision Economics, Inc. (DE) Budget Models, and economic and budget forecasts. The views presented here do not necessarily represent those of the organizations with which the authors are affiliated.
1
Sustained Budget Deficits:
Longer-Run U.S. Economic Performance
and the Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray
Robert E. Rubin, Peter R. Orszag, and Allen Sinai
I. Introduction
The U.S. federal budget is on an unsustainable path. In the absence of significant policy changes, federal government deficits are expected to total around $5 trillion over the next decade. Such deficits will cause U.S. government debt, relative to GDP, to rise significantly.
Thereafter, as the baby boomers increasingly reach retirement age and claim Social Security and
Medicare benefits, government deficits and debt are likely to grow even more sharply. The scale of the nation's projected budgetary imbalances is now so large that the risk of severe adverse consequences must be taken very seriously, although it is impossible to predict when such consequences may occur.
Conventional analyses of sustained budget deficits demonstrate the negative effects of deficits on long-term economic growth. Under the conventional view, ongoing budget deficits decrease national saving, which reduces domestic investment and increases borrowing from abroad.1 Interest rates play a key role in how the economy adjusts. The reduction in national saving raises domestic interest rates, which dampens investment and attracts capital from
abroad.2 The external borrowing that helps to finance the budget deficit is reflected in a larger
current account deficit, creating a linkage between the budget deficit and the current account deficit. The reduction in domestic investment (which lowers productivity growth) and the increase in the current account deficit (which requires that more of the returns from the domestic capital stock accrue to foreigners) both reduce future national income, with the loss in income steadily growing over time. Under the conventional view, the costs imposed by sustained
deficits tend to build gradually over time, rather than occurring suddenly.
The adverse consequences of sustained large budget deficits may well be far larger and occur more suddenly than traditional analysis suggests, however. Substantial deficits projected far into the future can cause a fundamental shift in market expectations and a related loss of confidence both at home and abroad. The unfavorable dynamic effects that could ensue are largely if not entirely excluded from the conventional analysis of budget deficits. This omission is understandable and appropriate in the context of deficits that are small and temporary; it is increasingly untenable, however, in an environment with deficits that are large and permanent.
Substantial ongoing deficits may severely and adversely affect expectations and confidence, which in turn can generate a self-reinforcing negative cycle among the underlying fiscal deficit, financial markets, and the real economy:
1 The conventional view assumes that in the long term, the economy operates at, or near, full employment.
2 The increase in interest rates may also exert a negative influence on aggregate demand through several channels.
First, the increase in interest rates reduces investment, which is a component of aggregate demand. Second, the increase in interest rates may directly reduce interest-sensitive consumption, such as on credit-financed durable goods. Third, the increase in interest rates may indirectly reduce consumption, by reducing asset values and therefore household net wealth.
2
* As traders, investors, and creditors become increasingly concerned that the government would resort to high inflation to reduce the real value of government debt or that a fiscal deadlock with unpredictable consequences would arise, investor confidence may be severely undermined;
* The fiscal and current account imbalances may also cause a loss of confidence among participants in foreign exchange markets and in international credit markets, as participants in those markets become alarmed not only by the ongoing budget deficits but
also by related large current account deficits;
* The loss of investor and creditor confidence, both at home and abroad, may cause investors and creditors to reallocate funds away from dollar-based investments, causing a depreciation of the exchange rate, and to demand sharply higher interest rates on U.S. government debt;
* The increase of interest rates, depreciation of the exchange rate, and decline in confidence can reduce stock prices and household wealth, raise the costs of financing to business, and reduce private-sector domestic spending;
* The disruptions to financial markets may impede the intermediation between lenders and borrowers that is vital to modern economies, as long-maturity credit markets witness potentially substantial increases in interest rates and become relatively illiquid, and the reduction in asset prices adversely affects the balance sheets of banks and other financial intermediaries;
* The inability of the federal government to restore fiscal balance may directly reduce business and consumer confidence, as the view of the ongoing deficits as a symbol of the nation's inability to address its economic problems permeates society, and the reduction in confidence can discourage investment and real economic activity;
* These various effects can feed on each other to create a mutually reinforcing cycle; for example, increased interest rates and diminished economic activity may further worsen the fiscal imbalance, which can then cause a further loss of confidence and potentially spark another round of negative feedback effects.
Although it is impossible to know at what point market expectations about the nation's large projected fiscal imbalance could trigger these types of dynamics, the harmful impacts on the economy, once these effects were in motion, would substantially magnify the costs associated with any given underlying budget deficit and depress economic activity much more than the conventional analysis would suggest. Indeed, the potential costs and fallout from such fiscal and financial disarray provide perhaps the strongest motivation for avoiding substantial, ongoing budget deficits.TP
3
PT
Conventional analyses of budget deficits also do not put enough emphasis on three other related factors: uncertainty; the asymmetries in the political difficulty of revenue increases and
TP
3
PT As Ball and Mankiw (1995, p.117) argue, "We can only guess what level of debt will trigger a shift in investor confidence, and about the nature and severity of the effects. Despite the vagueness of fears about [these effects], these fears may be the most important reason for seeking to reduce budget deficits."
3
spending reductions relative to tax cuts and spending increases; and the loss of flexibility in the future from enacting tax cuts or spending increases today. Budget projections are inherently
uncertain, but such uncertainty does not provide a rationale for fiscal profligacy. The uncertainty
surrounding budget projections means that the outcome in the future can be either better or worse than expected today. Such uncertainty can actually increase the incentive for more saving ahead of time--in other words, for more fiscal discipline. In addition, it is much harder for the political system to reduce deficits than to expand them. As a result of this asymmetry, enacting a large tax cut or spending increase today is costly because it reduces the flexibility to adjust fiscal policy to future events. Therefore, large tax cuts or spending increases today carry a cost typically excluded from traditional analysis: They constrain policy-makers' flexibility to respond to unforeseen events in the future.
Thus, in our view, to ensure healthy long-run U.S. economic performance, substantial changes in fiscal policy are needed to deal preemptively with the risks stemming from sustained large budget deficits and the economic imbalances they entail. The political system, however, seems unwilling to address the threat posed by future deficits and to make the necessary choices to put the nation on a sustainable fiscal course.4 Failing to act sooner rather than later, though, only makes the problem more difficult to address without considerable instability, raises the probability of fiscal and financial disarray at some point in the future, and runs the risks of further constraining policy flexibility in the future.
We emphasize that our focus is on the effects of ongoing, sustained budget deficits. It is important to underscore that temporary budget deficits can be beneficial by providing short-term macroeconomic stimulus when the economy is weak and has considerable unused resources of capital and labor. When necessary to spur a weak economy, policy-makers could employ various fiscal policy programs, each with relative advantages and disadvantages in different contexts. Whatever decisions are made about short-run fiscal policy when the economy is weak, the objective should be budget balance over the business cycle.
The next section of this paper presents projections of federal government budget deficits over the next 10 years and thereafter, including baseline projections and sensitivity analysis.
Section III presents the conventional view of the effects of federal budget deficits. Section IV
discusses the potentially more important financial and economic effects not included in the conventional view. A final section provides some perspectives on approaches for restoring fiscal
discipline.
II. Budget Projections Over the Next Decade and Thereafter
A. 10-Year Baseline
The most recent medium-term official projections from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cover fiscal years 2004 through 2013. A new set of projections will be released later in January. The following analysis is based primarily on the CBO update from August 2003.5
4 As three leading Washington organizations from across the political spectrum emphasized in a rare joint statement in September 2003, "instead of expressing alarm, many in Washington now argue that escalating deficits do not really matter, that they are self-correcting, that they are unrelated to interest rates or future economic well-being, and
that tax cuts will pay for themselves later by spurring economic growth. It would be wonderful if this were true. It is not." Committee for Economic Development, Concord Coalition, and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
(2003).
5 See CBO (2003a). This section draws upon Gale and Orszag (2003b) and Gale and Orszag (2003c).
The official CBO August 2003 baseline suggests a 10-year unified deficit equivalent to about 1 percent of GDP, with the deficit reaching a maximum of 4.3 percent of GDP in 2004.
Steady declines in the deficit are projected after 2004 and the official baseline, which is more akin to a planning scenario than a true forecast, even shows a surplus by the end of the decade
(top line in Figure 1). This baseline would be heartening if it were predicated on credible
assumptions about the current thrust of budget policy. Unfortunately, statutory and other restrictions prevent the CBO from adopting more reasonable assumptions in its baseline.6
In particular, the CBO baseline assumes that by 2013 discretionary spending has declined by 7 percent on a real per capita basis, that tens of millions of taxpayers will be paying the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) by the end of the decade, and that sunsets on various tax provisions (including the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts) actually occur. Also, the August 2003 baseline projections were published before the Medicare prescription drug benefit had been enacted.
Figure 1: Budget Projections, FY 2003-13, as a Share of GDP (Percent)
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Percent of GDP
With Medicare legislation
CBO August 2003 baseline
Fix AMT
Extend tax provisions
Hold real disc. spending per capita constant
Exclude retirement trust funds
Sources: CBO (2003a); Gale and Orszag (2003b) updated to include cost of Medicare drug benefit.
If one includes the cost of the recently enacted prescription drug benefit, assumes that discretionary spending keeps pace with inflation and population growth, that the growth in the fraction of taxpayers subject to the AMT is eliminated, and that all expiring tax provisions are made permanent, the federal government would face unified deficits averaging about 3.5 percent of GDP over the next 10 years (Figure 1).7 The unified budget deficit for 2004 through 2013, on 6 For a more extensive discussion, see Auerbach, Gale, Orszag, and Potter (2003).
4
7 Since the AMT is not indexed for inflation and was not adjusted on a long-term basis when income taxes were reduced in 2001 and 2003, in the absence of any policy changes AMT participation would rise from about 3 million persons today to about 33 million in 2010. The adjusted budget figures in Figure 1 maintain roughly constant AMT participation over time by making all temporary AMT provisions permanent, raising the AMT exemption, indexing
5
this adjusted basis, would cumulate to about $5 trillion. Those deficits, furthermore, include the
temporary cash-flow surpluses in retirement trust funds. Excluding such retirement trust funds, the projected deficits would be even larger, shown by the bottom line in Figure 1.
These adjusted projections are similar in spirit and magnitude, though different in some details, to those made by the Committee for Economic Development, Concord Coalition, and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; Decision Economics, Inc. (DE); and Goldman Sachs (see Table 1).
As Table 1 indicates, there is broad consensus by independent analysts that the CBO baseline projections over the next 10 years are too optimistic relative to any set of realistic policy
assumptions and economic projections. A reasonable expectation for the cumulated unified budget deficit over the next decade would be about $5 trillion. Under the Decision Economics
$5.4 trillion estimate, the deficits would raise the public debt-to-GDP ratio from at least 35 percent in 2003 to roughly 50 percent by 2013. The 2013 ratio would be the highest, with the possible exception of a few years in the early 1990's, since the mid 1950s, when the nation was still paying down the debt incurred during World War II.
Table 1: Deficit Projections for FY 2004-2013
Organization Adjustments to August 2003 CBO
Projections
10-Year Unified
Budget Deficit
Projection,
$ Trillions
Congressional Budget Office None 1.4
CED/CBPP/Concord Coalition8 Sunsets; AMT; Medicare Rx; removes supplemental from baseline, but adds projected defense costs; domestic discretionary per capita
5.0
Gale-Orszag, updated to include Medicare legislation9
Sunsets; AMT; Medicare Rx;
discretionary spending per capita
5.1
Decision Economics, Inc. (DE)10 Some sunsets; AMT; Medicare Rx;
defense and nondefense discretionary
adjustments; economic projections
5.4
Goldman Sachs11 Sunsets; AMT; Medicare Rx; defense
and non-defense discretionary adjustments; economic assumptions
5.5
Budget Projection Uncertainty
Any single deficit projection, including those in Table 1, should be treated with some caution since substantial uncertainty surrounds such projections. The budget deficit is the difference between two large quantities, federal government taxes and spending. Small the tax for inflation, and allowing exemptions for dependents. Under these assumptions, about 2.7 million taxpayers would face the AMT in 2013 assuming that the other expiring tax provisions are extended. For more details on the adjustments, see Gale and Orszag (2003b).
8 Committee for Economic Development, Concord Coalition, and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2003).
9 Gale and Orszag (2003b).
10 Decision Economics, Inc. (DE); December 2003.
11 Goldman Sachs (2003).
6
percentage errors in either can cause large percentage changes in the differences between them.
For example, in FY 2003, outlays amounted to about $2.2 trillion and revenues about $1.8 trillion, leaving a deficit of slightly under $400 billion. Under-estimating outlays by just 5 percent and over-estimating revenues by just 5 percent would have caused the deficit to increase by about 50 percent, to almost $600 billion.12 The effects on projected budget deficits from assumptions made about spending on defense, Iraq and terrorism outlays, the future of the AMT, the sunsets of certain tax policies, and underlying economic projections can be quite large.
Uncertainty is not by itself grounds for comfort, since the outcome may turn out to be either better or worse than the central estimate; in other words, there is no evidence that the projections are biased toward overestimating deficits.
One particular dimension of budget sensitivity that is frequently noted involves economic growth. The CBO projections assume that real GDP will grow at an annual rate of 3.4 percent in 2004, about 3.4 percent per year between 2005 and 2008, and about 2.7 percent (the growth rate estimated for potential output) between 2009 and 2013. Over the 10-year period between 2004 and 2013, real GDP growth is assumed to average near 3.0 percent per year. Would faster economic growth substantially change the budget outlook?
Table 2 shows how alternative rates of economic growth would affect the federal budget deficit, based on adjustments calculated by CBO for its own baseline projections. The Table shows that if growth is slower than CBO currently assumes, the deficits will be larger. Table 2 also shows that if the economy grew 0.5 percentage point faster than CBO projects, the adjusted budget would show a deficit averaging about 2.7 percent of GDP. Even if economic growth exceeded projections by a full percentage point (that is, the growth rate were about one-third
higher than projected), the budget would likely remain in deficit over the decade.
In evaluating these alternative projections, three points are worth noting. First, the Administration, in its FY 2004 budget, assumed real growth that was 0.1 percentage point faster than CBO for calendar years 2005 through 2008.13 Such a difference in assumed real growth rates would have only a modest effect on the budget totals, as suggested by Table 2. Second, real GDP growth in the boom years of the late 1990s averaged about 4 percent per year.14 It
seems quite unlikely that such rapid growth could be sustained over an entire decade, especially given projected declines in labor force growth rates.15 Our conclusion is that more rapid economic growth can reduce projected deficits, but even relatively large shifts would leave the country with a sizeable fiscal imbalance over the next decade, and one that will become significantly worse after 2013.16 Third, a key question is the type of policies that would spur faster growth in the long term; the calculations in Table 2 assume no change in policies, just in
12 The CBO is admirably candid in acknowledging the uncertainty surrounding budget projections. Recent CBO publications have included a "fan graph" based on past forecasts, to illustrate the likelihood of different budget outcomes. The graph shows a wide range of possible short- and medium-term outcomes.
13 CBO (2003c), Table 12.
14 Real GDP grew by an average annual rate of 4.1 percent between 1995 and 2000. 15 CBO assumes that potential labor force growth will slow from 1.5 percent in 2003 to 0.6 percent in 2012.
Authors' calculations based on spreadsheet on "Key Assumptions in CBO's Projection of Potential GDP"
accompanying CBO (2003a).
16 DE Baseline projections show $5.4 trillion of cumulated deficits over 2004-2013, with real economic growth projected at 3.2 percent per year and potential real GDP growth at 3.1 percent per year, compared with the 3 percent per annum and 2.8 percent per annum projections, respectively, in the CBO baseline.
7
the underlying rate of growth. As we emphasize throughout this paper, though, the deficits themselves pose a risk to economic growth in the future.
Table 2: Effects of Faster Economic Growth on Budget Deficits, 2004 to 2013
CBO baseline (average real growth of 3.0
percent per year) adjusted for growth:
Adjusted Unified
Budget Deficit, $
Trillions (Cumulative)
As Percent of
GDP
(%)
1.0 percentage point slower per year 7.6 5.3
0.5 percentage point slower per year 6.3 4.4
No adjustment (adjusted baseline) 5.1 3.5
0.5 percentage point faster per year 3.8 2.7
1.0 percentage point faster per year 2.6 1.8
Source: Gale and Orszag (2003c), Table 4, updated to include cost of Medicare prescription drug benefit and effects of slower growth.
B. Long-Term Budget Prospects--Beyond the Next Decade
CBO projections suggest that Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid expenditures are expected to rise from about 9 percent of GDP in 2010 to 14 percent by 2030 and almost 18 percent by 2050.17 In the absence of policy and program changes, these and other long-term societal needs would add to the already large, sustained fiscal deficits over time.
Various analysts have generated summary measures of the nation's long-term fiscal imbalances. For example, Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag (2003) conclude that the "fiscal gap" over the long term amounts to between 4 and 8 percent of GDP.18 Gokhale and Smetters (2003) similarly report a $44 trillion fiscal imbalance under current policies, which is roughly comparable to the Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag results. To be sure, substantial uncertainty
surrounds these long-term projections, as emphasized in a recent CBO analyses of long-term budget deficits (CBO 2003b). Variations in assumed health care cost inflation, in particular, can have a substantial effect on the precise projections. Nonetheless, almost all studies that have examined the issue suggest that even if major sources of uncertainty are accounted for, serious long-term fiscal imbalances will remain.19
The Administration's budget also includes a vivid reminder of the nation's long-term budget pressures. Figure 2 is Chart 3-4 from the Analytical Perspectives, one of the volumes in the official budget documents. It shows that under an extension of the Administration's policies and according to the Administration's own estimates, the federal budget deficit increases substantially outside the 10-year budget window--even if productivity growth turns out to be higher than currently expected.
In evaluating these long-term deficits, it is important to recognize that Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are not the only factors exerting a large negative effect on the long-term
budget outlook. Indeed, the projected 75-year cost of the tax cuts endorsed by the Administration in its FY 2004 budget is more than three times the projected 75-year actuarial deficit in Social Security (see Appendix Table 1). The Administration's tax cuts would cost
17 Congressional Budget Office (2003b). These projections are for the "intermediate spending path" in the CBO analysis.
18 The "fiscal gap" is the immediate increase in taxes or reductions in non-interest expenditures required to prevent the ratio of government debt to GDP from ultimately exploding.
19 Lee and Edwards (2001) and Shoven (2002).
more than 2 percent of GDP over the next 75 years in present value; the Social Security actuarial deficit over the next 75 years amounts to 0.7 percent of GDP in present value.
Figure 2: Deficits, as Percent of GDP, Under Administration Policy and Alternative Productivity Growth Paths
Source: FY 2004 Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Chart 3-4.
III. Economic Effects of Sustained Budget Deficits: The Conventional Perspective
The conventional view of sustained budget deficits focuses on their effects on national saving, interest rates, and the current account. We begin with this conventional view; in the next section, we turn to some critical factors that are typically not included in the conventional analysis.
The conventional analysis of ongoing budget deficits reflects basic macroeconomic building blocks.20 National saving is the sum of private saving and public saving (positive when the public sector runs a budget surplus). National saving finances national investment, which is the sum of domestic investment and net foreign investment (the net accumulation by
the U.S. of assets abroad).21 National investment increases the accumulation of financial and real assets. The returns to the additional assets raise the income of Americans in the future.
20 As noted in the introduction, we focus on the long-term effects of budget deficits. The conventional analysis emphasizes that in both the short- and the long-run, budget deficits increase aggregate demand. If the economy is operating well below full employment of labor and capital, the increase in aggregate demand associated with an actively stimulative deficit may be beneficial, since it can bolster consumer spending and increase use of existing stocks of labor and capital to give the economy a boost in the short term. In the long run, however, as full employment is approached, persistent under-use of existing labor and capital does not occur. Under those circumstances, the only way to raise economic growth is to expand the economy's capacity to produce and to generate more income at home and abroad. By reducing national saving and thereby impeding the accumulation of capital over time, deficits hinder that prospect. For further details, see Gale and Orszag (2003a).
21 Net foreign investment is the difference between what the U.S. invests overseas and what foreigners invest in the United States. A decline in net foreign investment takes the form of reduced overseas investments by the U.S., increased borrowing from overseas by Americans, or increased investment in the U.S. by foreigners. Declines in net
foreign investment also correspond to a decline in the current account, defined as net exports of goods and services plus net factor payments from abroad plus net unilateral transfers.
8
9
These building blocks highlight two key aspects of sustained federal budget deficits.
First, an increase in the budget deficit (a decline in public saving) reduces national saving unless
it is fully offset by an increase in private saving. Second, a reduction in national saving reduces future national income.22
Empirical estimates for the United States suggest that private saving offsets perhaps onequarter of changes in the budget deficit.23 Reasonable estimates also suggest that about onethird of the decline in national saving is offset by capital inflows from abroad; the rest is reflected in a reduction in domestic investment.24 In other words, an increase in the budget deficit of $100 reduces national saving by about $75, and that $75 reduction in national saving is reflected in a $25 increase in borrowing from abroad and a $50 reduction in domestic
investment.
Deficits and the Current Account
As noted, estimates for the United States suggest that perhaps one-third or so of a reduction in national saving is financed by increased borrowing from abroad. That introduces a direct connection between budget deficits and current account deficits--budget deficits reduce national saving, and part of the reduction in national saving manifests itself as increased borrowing from abroad through a larger current account deficit.
The current account deficit currently exceeds $500 billion, or more than 5 percent of GDP, and reflects aggregate net foreign investment into the United States from all other countries. Without this access to international capital, the nation's low personal saving rate would even more severely constrain domestic investment. Having access to international capital is beneficial, but not so beneficial as financing the investment through U.S. domestic saving.
Current account deficits essentially mean mortgaging the future returns from the domestic capital stock. Foreign creditors understandably demand some return on their capital, with the required return presumably increasing as the amount that they lend increases. The future returns to the domestic investments financed by such borrowing from abroad therefore accrue, at least in large part, to foreign creditors rather than domestic citizens.
Deficits, Expected Deficits, and Interest Rates
The important empirical effect of budget deficits on domestic investment (with about half the increase in the budget deficit manifesting itself as a reduction in domestic investment) underscores the importance of increases in interest rates in response to increased budget deficits.
The story is a familiar one: budget deficits tend to reduce national saving and therefore put
22 Because national saving is equal to the sum of domestic investment and net foreign investment, the only issues are how that identity comes back into alignment following a decline in national saving. The possibilities are limited:
either domestic investment falls and/or net foreign investment falls. The changes in savings and investment quantities can occur with different combinations of the relevant prices, i.e., changes of interest rates, exchange rates, and price and wage inflation. In any case, however, the reduction in national saving triggers a decline in future
national income, all else being equal.
23 For example, the Congressional Budget Office (1998) concludes that private saving would rise by between 20 to 50 percent of an increase in the deficit. Elmendorf and Liebman (2000) conclude that private saving would offset 25 percent of an increase in the deficit. Gale and Potter (2002) estimate that private saving will offset 31 percent of the decline in public saving caused by the 2001 tax cut.
24 Over the long term, estimates suggest that between 25 percent and 40 percent of changes in national saving tend to be offset by net international capital flows. See the CBO (1997), Dornbusch (1991), Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991),
Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).
10
upward pressure on interest rates. The increase in interest rates facilitates the necessary
reduction in domestic investment and increased borrowing from abroad.
The connection between deficits and interest rates has been questioned by some in recent years. Some of the observers who have concluded that deficits do not affect interest rates have reached that conclusion because they have simply examined the wrong question. Financial markets are forward-looking, so that long-term interest rates reflect expectations of future deficits. One would therefore not necessarily expect to find a relationship between long-term interest rates and current deficits, since the business cycle, the monetary loosening typical during economic downturns, and other factors may obscure the underlying relationship between fiscal policy and interest rates.
As Feldstein (1986) emphasized, it is essential to include expected future deficits in studies of the connection between deficits and interest rates.25 Sinai-Rathjens (1983) provides one of the earliest demonstrations of empirical evidence for the effects of expected future budget deficits on current interest rates.26 Gale and Orszag (2003a) conclude that studies incorporating expectations of future deficits tend to find economically and statistically significant connections between anticipated deficits and current interest rates.
A reasonable range for the increase in interest rates for each percent of GDP in projected deficits is 30 to 60 basis points.27 Using that range, the implication is that the sustained adjusted projected deficits in Figure 1 (which average about 3.5 percent of GDP) raise long-term interest rates by about 100 to 200 basis points compared to a balanced budget. An increase in interest rates of 100 basis points on a 30-year, $150,000 mortgage raises the annual mortgage payment by more than $1,000.
Some skeptics of the linkage between future fiscal conditions and current long-term interest rates argue that the current macroeconomic context "proves" that there is no such connection, since nominal long-term interest rates have remained relatively low despite the recent dramatic deterioration in the long-term budget outlook. This argument is problematic for several reasons. First, it is possible during economic downturns that financial markets do not focus on long-term fiscal issues; if this is the case, the effect of the fiscal deterioration on longterm interest rates will manifest itself only as the economy recovers. Second, the overall level of nominal interest rates is affected by many factors, including inflationary expectations, fiscal policy, monetary policy, and other variables. The Federal Reserve, for example, has reduced the short-term Federal funds rate to historic lows to bolster aggregate demand. For purposes of assessing the effects of future budget surpluses or deficits, it may be more insightful to examine 25 As Feldstein (1986) has written, "it is wrong to relate the rate of interest to the concurrent budget deficit without taking into account the anticipated future deficits. It is significant that almost none of the past empirical analyses of the effect of deficits on interest rates makes any attempt to include a measure of expected future deficits."
26 Sinai-Rathjens (1983, p. 10) noted that "changes in future budget deficits, through legislation or expectations, have a significant impact now on the bond market," and concluded from regression estimates that "expectations of large future budget deficits were shown to prop current long-term interest rates by at least two percentage points,
supporting those here and abroad who argue that bringing down U.S. budget deficits is a key to sustained economic
growth" (p. 15).
27 The President's Council of Economic Advisers has recently suggested that a sustained increase in the deficit equaling one percent of GDP would raise interest rates by 30 basis points (Wall Street Journal, 2003). The Gale-Orszag survey suggests that the effect could be 60 basis points or more, with results from some macro-econometric models, including the FRB/US model used at the Federal Reserve, showing an effect larger than 60 basis points in some simulations.
11
the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates. That spread is currently relatively high compared to its average level since 1960, and has increased substantially since the 2001 tax cut. To be sure, the interest rate spread typically widens during recessions and other periods of sluggish economic performance, and it is unclear to what extent the elevated spread reflects budget dynamics as opposed to other current and expected macroeconomic conditions. The point, however, is that it is not possible to dismiss the potential effect of deficits on interest rates merely by pointing to current market interest rates.
In summary, despite strong assertions by some of no evidence that deficits affect interest rates, empirical research tells a different story. It is essential to take expected future deficits into
account in examining the linkages between deficits and interest rates. Studies that incorporate
deficit expectations tend to find significant connections between deficits and interest rates.
Fiscal Discipline and Short-Term Stimulus
The forward-looking nature of financial markets means that credible future fiscal discipline can boost investment and interest-sensitive consumption before the fiscal policy changes actually take effect. In particular, credible reductions in future budget deficits can put downward pressure on long-term interest rates and raise the value of stock prices, thereby boosting investment, the interest-sensitive components of consumption, and consumption more broadly (because of increased household wealth) even before the deficit reduction itself has
taken effect.28
The most attractive policy combination to spurring demand in a weak economy with excess capacity of capital and labor would thus combine long-term fiscal discipline with shortterm fiscal stimulus. The short-term fiscal stimulus provides a direct spur to aggregate demand, while the long-term fiscal discipline provides an indirect one through forward-looking financial markets. The problem is how to combine the two in a credible manner--too much fiscal
stimulus extended over too long a period raises questions about whether long-term fiscal discipline will occur, thereby undermining the efficacy of such a joint package.
IV. Beyond the Conventional Analysis: The Risks of Financial and Fiscal Disarray
The conventional analysis of sustained budget deficits is important, but it also largely ignores the possibility of much more sudden and severe adverse consequences from permanent large budget deficits. This section moves beyond the conventional analysis, to consider the risks of financial and fiscal disarray that could result from ongoing fiscal imbalances.
We emphasize that many of these risks depend critically on expectations about fiscal conditions, and that shifts in expectations are both difficult to predict and can occur rapidly. It is not possible to know when the types of effects discussed here may manifest themselves, nor to quantify them. The economic and social costs involved are potentially so significant, however, that they provide perhaps the strongest motivation for dealing pre-emptively with large projected budget deficits.
To begin, note that the conventional analysis of budget deficits in advanced economies does not seriously entertain the possibility of fiscal or financial disarray. Government debt in the
28 See Blanchard (1984) for an early theoretical treatment. For a description of how this perspective affected policymaking during the 1990s, see Elmendorf, Liebman, and Wilcox (2002).
12
United States is still viewed as being the safest investment in the world, with virtually no possibility of explicit default or implicit default through high inflation.29 Conventional analyses
of budget deficits properly reflect that expectation. But if that expectation were to change and investors had difficulty seeing how the policy process could avoid extreme steps, the consequences could be much more severe than traditional estimates suggest.
As Ball and Mankiw (1995) argue, "If the debt-income ratio spins out of control, something must be done or default is unavoidable. And it might remain impossible politically to raise income taxes sufficiently."30 The role of financial market expectations in this type of scenario is central. In particular, one of the key triggers would occur if investors begin to doubt whether the strong historical commitment to avoiding substantial inflation in order to reduce the real value the public debt would be weakened.31 If financial markets begin to doubt that commitment, investor confidence would be reduced and an additional premium would be added to the required return on federal government debt.
In evaluating such a potential shift in market sentiment, the expectations of foreign investors may be particularly important given the large current account deficit that the United States is now running. Foreigners own more than one-third of outstanding U.S. government public debt, and account for an even larger share of new purchases (OMB 2003). Such foreign investors may become concerned not only about the size of the federal deficit, but also about the size of the current account deficit. As Truman (2001) emphasizes, a substantial fiscal
deterioration over the longer-term may cause "a loss of confidence in the orientation of U.S. economic policies...In my view, this is the principal international risk with respect to paying down Treasury debt: our failure to do so will undermine the strength of the U.S. economy and confidence in U.S. economic and financial policies."
A loss in confidence among domestic and foreign investors would cause a shift of portfolios away from dollar-denominated assets and put downward pressure on the dollar and upward pressure on domestic interest rates. These same forces could lead investors and businesses to scale back use of the dollar as the leading world currency for international transactions. That, in turn, could limit the ability of the United States to finance U.S. current account deficits through dollar-denominated liabilities and thus increase the nation's net exposure to substantial exchange rate changes.32
The increase in interest rates, depreciation of the dollar, and decline in investor confidence under this type of scenario would almost surely reduce stock prices and household wealth, and raise the costs of financing to business. These effects could then spread from financial markets to the real economy:
29 Unexpected and very high inflation would amount to implicit default, since it would substantially reduce the real value of government debt.
30 Ball and Mankiw (1995), p. 114.
31 We do not explore in detail whether financial markets in this type of environment would place larger weight on the probability of implicit default (through high inflation) or some form of fiscal impasse. The adverse consequences would be similar in many ways under either scenario.
32 The costs of large current account deficits -- which are caused in part by large budget deficits -- may extend beyond narrow economic ones. Friedman (1988) notes that "World power and influence have historically accrued to creditor countries. It is not coincidental that America emerged as a world power simultaneously with our transition from a debtor nation...to a creditor supplying investment capital to the rest of the world."
13
* The increase in interest rates would reduce investment and interest-sensitive consumption;
* The inability of the federal government to control the budget deficit could be interpreted as a broader failure of the nation to address its economic problems, and thus prompt a loss of business and consumer confidence, which would undermine capital spending and real economic activity.
* A potentially sharp downward movement in the exchange rate could cause unexpected shifts in input costs and export opportunities across different sectors, which could cause short-term economic dislocations.
* The disruptions to financial markets could impede the intermediation between lenders and borrowers; uncertainty about the possibility of substantial inflation could cause creditors to eschew the long end of the credit market except at extremely high real interest rates. The effect of the decline in asset prices on bank and other financial intermediaries' balance sheets could exacerbate the disintermediation.
* The drop in asset prices and increase in interest rates could also spark a wave of bankruptcies, which could further restrain real economic activity.
* These various effects can feed on each other to create a dangerous cycle; for example, increased interest rates and diminished economic activity may further worsen the fiscal imbalance, which can then cause a further loss of confidence and potentially spark another round of negative feedback effects.
As CBO (2003b) notes, these various effects of an unsustainable fiscal policy could become extremely costly:
"Taken to the extreme, such a path could result in an economic crisis. Foreign investors could stop investing in U.S. securities, the exchange value of the dollar could plunge, interest rates could climb, consumer prices could shoot up, or the economy could contract sharply. Amid the anticipation of declining profits and rising inflation and interest rates, stock markets could collapse and consumers might suddenly reduce their consumption. Moreover, economic problems in the United States could spill over to the rest of the world and seriously weaken the economies of U.S. trading partners.
A policy of higher inflation could reduce the real value of the government's debt, but inflation is not a feasible long-term strategy for dealing with persistent budget deficits....If the government continued to print money to finance the deficit, the
situation would eventually lead to hyperinflation (as happened in Germany in the 1920s, Hungary in the 1940s, Argentina in the 1980s, and Yugoslavia in the
1990s)...Once a government has lost its credibility in financial markets, regaining it can be difficult."TP
33 T TP 33
PT CBO (2003b), p. 15.
14
It is important to emphasize again that it is impossible to know when such effects may ccur; shifts in investor confidence and perceptions can occur suddenly. It is also difficult to magine all the possible effects that could ensue. As Ball and Mankiw (1995) note, all the ossibilities are "hard to think about because things can go wrong in such a rich variety of ways."34
Despite the difficulties of predicting the precise effects or timing, the risks of financial and fiscal disarray associated with large budget deficits may be a much more important motivation for fiscal discipline than merely avoiding the costs of budget deficits suggested by conventional analysis. Our conclusion is thus similar to the one reached by Ball and Mankiw
(1995):35
"We can only guess what level of debt will trigger a shift in investor confidence, and about the nature and severity of the effects. Despite the vagueness of fears about hard landings, these fears may be the most important reason for seeking to reduce budget deficits...as countries increase their debt, they wander into unfamiliar territory in which hard landings may lurk. If policymakers are prudent,
they will not take the chance of learning what hard landings in G-7 countries are really like."
Uncertainty and Loss of Flexibility
Another effect that is not adequately incorporated into conventional analysis of policies that increase budget deficits is the interaction between uncertainty and the political difficulty of enacting spending cuts or tax increases.
Uncertainty by itself can create a powerful incentive for avoiding long-term tax cuts or spending increases. Just as increased uncertainty increases the incentive for risk-averse families
to save now in order to cushion the blow from possible adverse developments later, increased
uncertainty surrounding the future of the federal budget can increase the incentive for more saving ahead of time--in other words, more fiscal discipline.36
Economists have also begun to apply the insights from "real options" approaches to fiscal policy when policy-makers face both uncertainty and constraints on changing fiscal policies frequently.37 Academic studies, however, have not fully taken into account the important realworld asymmetries between the difficulty of enacting tax increases (or spending cuts) and the ease of enacting tax cuts (or spending increases). As a result of this asymmetry, enacting a large tax cut today is costly because it reduces the flexibility to adjust fiscal policy to future events.
The result is that tax cuts today make it more likely that future policy-makers will either have to
forgo responding to future needs as they arise or bear an increasing and potentially unsustainable
34 Ball and Mankiw (1995), p. 116.
35 Ball and Mankiw (1995), p. 117.
36 Auerbach and Hassett (2001).
37 For an introduction to the "real options" literature, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Auerbach and Hassett (2003) study the role of uncertainty and constraints on policy changes on fiscal policy. They note that uncertainty can create an incentive to wait before acting, if some of the uncertainty will be resolved in the meanwhile and if there are constraints on acting. They confirm the intuition from the real options literature: uncertainty and some cost of acting creates a range of inaction in policy responses, but then larger policy changes when policy-makers do take action.
15
cost from higher budget deficits. As a recent example, had it not been for the budget surpluses of
the late 1990s, responding to the September 11th terrorist attacks and the recent economic downturn would have been more difficult. Policy-makers should thus recognize an additional cost, in terms of reduced future flexibility, associated with policies that expand budget deficits.38
V. Concluding Perspectives
Under current conditions and reasonable projections of the future, the nation faces a long period of sustained high budget deficits and a substantial fiscal gap. Failing to address the nation's long-term budget gap seems especially misguided since sustained and substantial budget deficits may induce fiscal and financial disarray, with potential costs far larger than those presented in conventional economic analyses, and since such deficits reduce flexibility to respond to unforeseen events in the future. Yet many policy-makers appear to be insensitive to the longer-run risks to U.S. economic performance from sustained, large budget deficits. Indeed, the "hole" of long-term deficits appears to be deepening.
Some have advanced the problematic notion that engineering a fiscal crisis will help to restrain discretionary spending and force long-term entitlement reform.39 Provoking a fiscal crisis in the hope of restraining spending, however, seems dangerous and imprudent regardless of whether or not it is successful. Even if it were successful, the result would not necessarily represent a sound shift in fiscal policy, since the net effect could be that economically beneficial government programs would be unduly constrained by the lack of available revenue.
Even more troubling, though, is the very real possibility that such an approach will not work. A transparently self-imposed crisis does not generate the same reaction as a crisis that is perceived to be imposed by external forces. To the extent that the result from a partially selfimposed fiscal problem is not action but political impasse, the ultimate result could be the fullblown fiscal and financial disarray discussed in Section IV.
Despite assertions to the contrary, granting large tax cuts to some groups may thus make it less politically feasible to rein in the desires of other constituencies to obtain increases in spending programs.40 The point is that restraints on both spending increases and tax cuts are necessary to create an atmosphere of fiscal discipline.41 For example, the interest groups adversely affected by spending restraints may be less likely to accept such restraints in the face of large tax cuts. The result may be that abandoning fiscal discipline on one side of the budget induces a period of fiscal irresponsibility on both sides of the budget. It is thus not even clear whether tax cuts impose more or less restraint on spending increases, let alone sufficient restraint on spending to offset the cost of the tax cut itself.42
38 Summers (2000) notes that "Higher saving has the central virtue of providing us with options, not merely if our current economic strength continues as we hope, but also if it does not."
39 David Stockman coined the term "starve the beast" for this effect. For recent discussions, see Bartlett (2003);
Krugman (2003); and Hume (2003). 40 See Kogan (2002) for a similar argument.
41 Similarly, we remain skeptical that transparently creating a fiscal crisis will facilitate long-term entitlement reform. It seems too easy for some of the parties that would be adversely affected by reform to argue that reversing the recent tax cuts would obviate the need for many, if not all, of the painful reform measures. Without significant revenue changes, it thus seems difficult to see how 60 members of the Senate would agree to long-term reform to eliminate the projected deficits in Social Security or Medicare.
42 In other words, by eliminating any semblance of fiscal discipline, the net effect of the large tax cuts over the past three years may have been to encourage rather than restrain additional spending. Indeed, the evidence to date does not appear to be supportive of the view that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts have significantly restrained spending.
16
In our view, balancing the budget for the longer term will require a combination of expenditure restraint and revenue increases.43 Some have argued that the entire adjustment can come through expenditure restraint. Although such restraint is critical, it is unrealistic at this point to expect the lion's share of the adjustment to come on the spending side.44 On the revenue side, a key issue is the treatment of legislation that contains expiring tax provisions. Although expiring provisions used to be a relatively minor part of the tax code, they have exploded in magnitude in recent years, beginning with the 2001 tax reductions, then exacerbated by the 2002 and 2003 tax cuts. All of the newly enacted tax reductions expire by the beginning of 2011, with some provisions sunsetting much earlier. In 2013 alone, extending the expiring provisions would reduce revenues by 2.5 percent of GDP (CBO, 2003a). About 90 percent of the resulting
revenue loss would be related to extending the expiring provisions that have been newly enacted
in the 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax legislation.
Perhaps the single most important act Congress and the Administration could take at this point to rein in the budget over the next decade would be to re-establish the budget rules that existed in the 1990s. These put caps on discretionary spending and required that reductions in taxes or increases in mandatory spending be paid for with other tax increases or spending cuts.45
In the end, though, budget rules are effective only if there is broad political support for reducing budget deficits and some consensus regarding how it should be done. It is our hope that such broad support will develop before it is too late.
43 Diamond and Orszag (2004) similarly argue that Social Security reform will require a combination of benefit reductions and revenue increases, and propose a progressive reform that restores solvency to Social Security through such a combination.
44 Gale and Orszag (2003c) examine the magnitude of spending reductions that would be required in 2008 if budget balance were achieved solely through reductions in spending in that year. Balancing the adjusted unified budget by cutting only non-defense discretionary spending--such as homeland security, education, law enforcement, environmental protection, and scientific research--would require reductions of more than 90 percent, underscoring
the implausibility of reaching balance solely this way.
45 The Administration has advocated the re establishment of the rules, but only in a selective manner; the rule adopted in the Congressional budget plan this year is similarly selective. This is not helpful, since the rules must apply on a broad basis or they will not be seen as being either fair or effective. It is also worth considering modifications to the budget rules to prevent abusive uses of sunsets in the future.
17
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Summers, Lawrence. 2000. "Preparing for the Future by Increasing National Savings." National Tax Association, Washington, DC, June 8.
Truman, Edwin M. 2001. "The International Implications of Paying Down The Debt." Institute
for International Economics. Policy Brief Number 01-7.
The Wall Street Journal Online. 2003. "Federal Reserve Economists Tie Deficits to Interest
Rates." April 25.
20
Table A.1
Present Value Cost of Various Tax and Outlay Measures Over 75 Years
Present Value Over the
Next 75 Years,
Percent of GDP
Present Value Over the Next
75 Years*,
$ Trillions
2001 tax cut if made permanent 1.5 to 1.9 7.9 to 10.0
Dividend / capital gains tax cuts 0.3 1.6
Tax-free savings accounts 0.3 1.6
Other proposed tax cuts 0.2 1.1
Total, Administration tax cuts 2.3 to 2.7 12.1 to 14.2
Social Security actuarial deficit* 0.7 3.8
Medicare Hospital Insurance
actuarial deficit*
1.1 6.2
Combined Social Security and
Medicare HI deficit*
1.8 10.0
*Assumes level of GDP and interest rates projected by the Social Security actuaries. For further details, see Orszag, Kogan, and Greenstein (2003).

Posted by maximpost at 7:24 PM EST
Updated: Wednesday, 28 January 2004 8:29 PM EST
Permalink

>> MEDIA NOTES...

...BOOTSTRAP?
Iraq Gets TV Update with 'Idol' Clone
http://www.npr.org/rundowns/segment.php?wfId=1622861
>
from All Things Considered, Wednesday, January 28, 2004
With Iraqia, the American-funded TV channel in Iraq, struggling to compete with more polished -- and controversial -- Arab satellite channels, a U.S. Army "psy-ops" team has helped the regional network in Mosul to air Talents, a take-off on American Idol. The program shows signs of success. NPR's Anne Garrels reports.
+
...MEANWHILE...
http://www.wnyc.org/onthemedia/
Profitable Occupation
This month, the Pentagon contracted an American company, Harris Corp., to run the much-criticized Iraqi Media Network, now called al-Iraqiya. Harris Corp.'s partner will be the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International. It's not surprising that the respected and well-rounded LBCI was chosen for the project. But some have wondered why an Arab media outlet would cooperate with the reconstruction effort in Iraq, considering how much that effort is scorned by much of the Arab public. Brooke speaks with Michael Young, opinion editor of the Daily Star in Beirut.
+
...
http://www.theworld.org/latesteditions/20040127.shtml
Palestinian collaboration report (4:00)
Vigilante justice is on the rise in Palestinian towns in the West Bank. Militant groups have become judge, jury and executioner of people they consider to be traitors. And the Palestinian Authority has so far been unable to stop them. The World's Aaron Schachter has the story.



----------------------------------------------------------------

>> AHEM...

washingtonpost.com
Ad Agency Is Sought To Pitch Elections
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, January 28, 2004; Page A17
The U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad wants to hire an advertising agency to sell the Iraqi public on its plans for a new democratic government, even as U.S. officials and Iraqi leaders struggle to decide whether that government should be formed through elections, caucuses or some combination.
The occupation authority invited advertising agencies with Middle East experience to "prepare a proposal for planning, developing and executing a full communications plan in support of the Iraq electoral process." Bidders were given six days to formulate their programs, and their proposals were due today.
The bid solicitation said the winning agency should be prepared to educate the Iraqi people on the "caucus/electoral process leading to a democratically elected government in Iraq" and should devise a campaign to "inform and educate the Iraqi people about the transition to sovereignty."
The bidders will have to take into consideration the unsettled nature of the situation. The U.S. and the Iraqi Governing Council agreed on Nov. 15 that a new government would be chosen through a system of 18 regional caucuses by June 30, when the U.S. would relinquish political authority. But Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, is demanding instead that the new government be created through elections, which the United States has said cannot be done by the end of June deadline.
Yesterday, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan agreed to a U.S. request to mediate the dispute by sending a team to Iraq to decide whether popular elections are possible or whether some other compromise is possible.
The Coalition Provisional Authority's solicitation said the winning agency will have to conduct a "major, time-compressed advertising campaign" to promote the caucuses, or elections, that will allow the United States to transfer sovereignty at the end of June.
The request for proposals said the winning agency is to develop a "branding" symbol and slogan for the transition along with "informational campaign products," including tapes for use in radio and television advertisements.
The plan is to "educate the Iraqi population in a non-propaganda style about the electoral process," said the occupation authority's request. Once the transition takes place, the campaign "is to quickly motivate the Iraqi people to express a positive attitude and participate in the process in order to make it a successful initiative."
The occupation authority expects the campaign to last from six months to a year. After the turnover of sovereignty, the successful ad agency would work under the direction of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad "or any successor organization to [the occupation authority] as necessary or required."
Because the proposals will be evaluated by U.S. officials, any Arabic language materials submitted as examples "must include English translation," the request said.
Laurie Pierce, the contracting officer in Baghdad, said in a telephone interview that the bidding is "open to anybody," not just U.S. firms.
Judith Kipper, director of the Council on Foreign Relations Middle East program, said she would be "appalled" if Iraqis were not chosen to handle the election advertising campaign. "We are still looking at Iraq through American eyes," Kipper said. "This is not public relation to be done by outsiders. Professional Iraqis understand the culture and what will work."
She pointed to the recent award of a $96 million contract for running Iraq's former government-owned radio and television networks and national newspaper to Harris Corp., a U.S. electronic equipment company, that turned over running the networks to a Lebanese company and the newspaper to a Kuwaiti company. "We are still not seeing any Iraqis running their own things," she said.
A previous occupation authority advertising campaign, to promote the reintroduction of Saddam Hussein's Iraq radio and television stations and national newspaper, was won by J. Walter Thompson, a major U.S. advertising agency that did the work out of its Beirut office. The $890,000 campaign included ads on television, banners, some of which were hung from Baghdad buildings, and placards on buses in the capital city

? 2004 The Washington Post Company
--------------------------------------------------
>> WAIT FOR 2005?

AP: U.S. in No Rush to Privatize Iraq Oil
By BRUCE STANLEY
AP Business Writer
BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) -- The privatization of Iraq's state-run oil industry has faded as a priority for U.S. officials advising the Iraqi Oil Ministry, despite enthusiastic support for the idea among some American conservatives in the months leading up to the war.
Iraqi opposition to privatization, together with the Oil Ministry's success in ratcheting up its production of crude - to more than 2.3 million barrels a day from almost nothing last June, has eased the pressure for a radical restructuring of Iraq's most important industry.
However, Iraqi oil officials are eager to cooperate with foreign companies to find and exploit new sources of crude, and they hope by this autumn to announce their first rules for foreign investment.
U.S. oil advisers and their Iraqi counterparts, speaking to The Associated Press in recent interviews, said they are focusing for now on the immediate goals of boosting Iraq's crude output to prewar levels and securing its oil facilities and pipelines against sabotage.
Oil is Iraq's most valuable export, and Iraqis need to produce all they can of it to rebuild their country. Wars, mismanagement and 12 years of U.N. sanctions devastated the economy, and looters pillaged much of what was left after Saddam Hussein's ouster last April. Iraq, once home to the Arab world's largest middle class, now has no national phone network. Its hospitals lack medicines, and the capital, Baghdad, suffers lengthy power outages each day.
U.S.-led occupation forces plan to transfer political control to the Iraqis on June 30. Iraqis must move gradually after that if they decide to dismember and sell off their petroleum industry, said Robert McKee, the U.S.-appointed senior adviser to the Oil Ministry
"They have to be realistic. It's probably unlikely that they are, on Day One, going to privatize the oil industry. They may get to that eventually, but I think they'll have to begin with a state-controlled industry. That makes the most sense" he said.
An eventual sell-off of oil assets would most likely be confined to "downstream" businesses such as refining and distribution, he added, echoing earlier comments from Iraq's Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum.
Before and immediately after the war, some conservative American analysts and Bush administration members advocated privatization of the entire Iraqi oil industry. They argued that independent companies could run the industry more efficiently than any government and could better attract investment.
"Even the U.S. has lost interest, mainly because the Iraqis themselves are so 'anti.' It's a nationalistic thing," Leo Drollas, chief economist at the Center for Global Energy Studies, said from the center's London office.
Iraqi oil officials have debated among themselves whether to transform their centralized industry into a Western-style mosaic of firms, said Thamer al-Ghadban, a senior adviser at the Oil Ministry. For now, the consensus is clear.
"There is no policy to privatize the Iraqi industry," al-Ghadban said.
Iraq exported an average of 1.54 million barrels a day in December. After resuming crude production last June, it generated $5 billion earnings in oil sales by the end of December.
All oil income goes into the Development Fund for Iraq - coffers controlled by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Although the money goes toward Iraq's overall reconstruction, McKee said the authority has plowed very little of it back into the oil industry.
Iraq pumped about 2.5 million barrels daily on the eve of the U.S.-led invasion. The ministry wants to increase Iraq's crude production capacity to 2.8 million barrels a day by the end of March and 3 million barrels by the end of this year.
"We could do more than that if we had access through Turkey, but because of the security issues we now have unused production capacity in the North of about 400,000 barrels per day," al-Ghadban said.
Because mature oil fields in southern Iraq are already producing at close to their capacity, the quickest way to boost the country's output would be to exploit the oil wealth trapped in fields near the northern city of Kirkuk.
Sabotage attacks last year forced the closure of the pipeline that normally carries crude from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey.
The Oil Ministry, supported by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and a private British firm - Erinys International Ltd., is training guards to protect its pipelines. Shipments through the pipeline to Turkey could resume within weeks or even days, said Manaa al-Obaydi, deputy general director for Iraq's North Oil Co.
Newer oil fields in southern Iraq will take more time to develop, but they have enough potential to "make any oil man's mouth water," McKee said.
Attracting foreign oil investors to Iraq shouldn't be difficult. The country holds the second-biggest proven crude reserves after Saudi Arabia and has only developed 15 of its 73 identified oil fields. Former oil minister Isaam Al-Chalabi has estimated that these undeveloped fields could one day contribute an additional 4.7 million barrels to Iraq's daily output, according to the Middle East Economic Survey.
The Oil Ministry aims to integrate overseas investors into its development plans but must first establish laws to protect their interests.
"Everyone is waiting to see what the rules will be when the Iraqis take over," said Falah al-Khawaja, the ministry's commercial manager. "I think the picture will take shape in the autumn of this year."
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> OUR FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD...

Jordan, Bulgaria Probe Saddam Bribe Claim
By JAMAL HALABY
Associated Press Writer
AMMAN, Jordan (AP) -- Jordan and Bulgaria announced Wednesday they were investigating allegations prominent citizens were involved in a scam involving illicit sales of Iraqi oil in exchange for political support of Saddam Hussein while he was Iraq's leader.
And in Egypt, activist Mamdouh el-Sheik said he would ask his country's prosecutor-general to reopen an investigation on the involvement of Egyptians after reports about alleged kickbacks.
An Iraqi newspaper, one of dozens of new dailies that have begun publishing in that country since Saddam's ouster last April, reported the alleged bribes this week. Members of the new provisional Iraqi government and opponents of Saddam have since distributed a list of the accused, based on documents from the Iraqi Oil Ministry.
About 270 former Cabinet officials, legislators, political activists and journalists from more than 46 countries are on the list, suspected of profiting from Iraqi oil sales that Saddam allegedly offered them in exchange for cultivating political and popular support in their countries.
The list gives the names of 14 Amman-based firms and Jordanian citizens, including former government officials and legislators.
"The issue is under follow-up, and we are seeking to verify if some people have acquired (Iraqi) graft," Mohammad al-Halaiqa, a deputy prime minister and minister of trade and industry, told Jordan's parliament in response to an inquiry by deputy Saad Hayel Srour on the alleged bribes. Srour demanded an immediate government investigation.
Al-Halaiqa said the Cabinet discussed the alleged Jordanian involvement in the Iraqi bribes at a meeting late Tuesday. Finance Minister Mohammad Abu-Hammore "was given clear instructions to follow up on this issue and collect any dues to the Treasury," he added.
The Baghdad list also says the Bulgarian Socialist Party had sold 12 million barrels of Iraqi oil.
Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov said the charge that his Socialist Party received money from Iraq was "ill-advised black humor," but he ordered an inquiry into the accusation, his office said Wednesday.
The party leader, Sergei Stanishev, told journalists in Bulgaria on Wednesday: "Not a cent from Iraq has been received at our party headquarters."
"The Socialist Party leadership has not negotiated such economic projects with the Baath party. We have not authorized anyone to hold such talks," Stanishev said. He said his party wanted the matter to be cleared up.
Eleven Egyptians or Egyptian companies are also on the Baghdad list, including the son of a former Egyptian president, businessmen, members of parliament and journalists.
Egyptian activist Mamdouh el-Sheik filed suit in May 2003 against several Egyptian politicians and journalists, accusing them of accepting bribes from Saddam, saying it violates Egyptian laws bans lobbying for foreign countries.
"This list will certainly back the charges against these people, who have violated our laws. I hope that the prosecutor-general will allow the case to proceed," el-Sheik told The Associated Press in Cairo.
One of the Jordanians accused, former parliament member Toujan Faisal, denied to the AP on Tuesday that she accepted bribes or participated in illicit deals. She said, however, that she had served as an intermediary between the Iraqi government and an Amman-based oil dealer.
The U.N. oil-for-food program, which had allowed the Saddam regime to sell limited quantities of oil to raise funds to help the Iraqi population, ended three months ago.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
----------------------------------------------------------------

Arabs, Westerners Deny Bribe Allegations
By JAMAL HALABY
Associated Press Writer
AMMAN, Jordan (AP) -- Arabs and Westerners accused by Iraqis of receiving Iraqi oil proceeds in exchange for supporting Saddam Hussein denied Tuesday they had accepted bribes or participated in illicit deals.
The accusations surfaced this week in a report by one of the dozens of new newspapers that have begun publishing in Iraq since Saddam was ousted last March. Since, members of the new provisional Iraqi government and Saddam opponents have distributed a list of the accused, based on documents from the Iraqi Oil Ministry.
About 270 former Cabinet officials, legislators, political activists and journalists from 46 countries are on the list, suspected of profiting from Iraqi oil sales that Saddam had allegedly offered them in exchange for cultivating political and popular support in their countries.
In Jordan, former parliament member Toujan Faisal, who is on the list, said she never took Iraqi bribes, but had served as an intermediary between the Iraqi government and a Jordan-based oil dealer.
"I wanted to help this dealer who happened to be a good of friend of mine do business in Iraq," she told The Associated Press.
Mrs. Faisal, suspected in the selling of 3 million barrels of Iraqi oil, said the deal was brokered in late 2001 and her friend sold 1 million barrels for a commission that didn't exceed 3 cents for each barrel.
"I had nothing to do with this," said the former lawmaker, who visited Iraq several times after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and who was known for her support of the Saddam regime. A framed portrait of Saddam hangs in the living room of her Amman apartment. She once told an AP reporter that the Iraqi leader gave the photograph to her daughter.
Former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, among Europeans on the list, on Tuesday denied receiving bribes from Saddam.
"That's far-fetched," said the conservative hard-liner who headed France's Interior Ministry in the late 1980s and early 1990s. "First, I was never interested in oil. Second, I am not a friend of Saddam Hussein and I do not see how my name came to be in this," he told Europe-1 radio.
In Baghdad, Iraqi Oil Ministry Undersecretary Abdul-Sahib Salman Qutub said the provisional government found documents proving the alleged bribes. He threatened to "sue those who stole the money of the Iraqi people."
"These documents show that the former regime spent lavishly Iraq's wealth here and there on persons, politicians, head of parties and journalists who were backing its corruption," he said.
Iraqi National Congress spokesman Entifad Qanbar, speaking to reporters in Baghdad, said his party had the list of people allegedly bribed with Iraqi oil in return for support to Saddam.
"We have thousands of pages of Iraqi intelligence documentation which back up those lists. What you are seeing in those lists is only the iceberg of what you are going to see in the future," he said.
Qutub, the Iraqi oil ministry undersecretary, said some of the documents had been stolen to "avoid any condemnation to persons who were collaborating with (Saddam's) regime."
The documents, as published in the Iraqi Al-Mada newspaper, showed people who allegedly received Saddam's graft came from 46 countries, including Arab states, Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America.
U.N. spokesman Stephane Dujarric in New York said he wasn't aware of any investigation related to the U.N. oil-for-food program, which had allowed the Saddam regime to sell limited quantities of oil to raise funds to help the Iraqi population. The program ended three months ago.
"The oil-for-food program has been repeatedly audited by internal and external auditors. It has been satisfactorily audited both internally and externally," he said.
Jordanian businessman Fawaz Zreiqat, who's on the list of accused, told AP he had sold Iraqi oil for five years starting in 1998. But he said all his deals were conducted under the U.N. oil-for-food program.
"Selling Iraqi oil is a legitimate business, it's not like selling drugs," he said. "All my deals were done with the approval of the United Nations and the money I received was from international firms I had sold the oil to and not from Iraq."
He said his profit was marginal and did not exceed 10 cents per barrel. He declined to say how many barrels he had sold.
In Cairo, Abdel Adhim Manaf, editor in chief of Sawt al-Arab newspaper, an Egyptian newspaper published in Cyprus, told AP: "I have official letters from Iraqis offering me this issue (oil), but I turned them down and I have documents to prove that."
"Even if I had received (oil), what's the problem?" he asked. "The Iraqis are saying the Arab oil is for all Arabs. This is not a crime, this is not forbidden. I have always supported Saddam and believed in him, and I still do. I will never backtrack."
-
AP reporter Salah Nasrawi in Cairo contributed to this report.
Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

Posted by maximpost at 5:03 PM EST
Updated: Wednesday, 28 January 2004 7:42 PM EST
Permalink

>> CHANGES...

The mortician's tale: Time for US to leave Korea
By David Scofield

SEOUL - The mortician's tale that follows is the legal nightmare of a civilian morgue employee working for the United States military here. It is a small, concrete example that illuminates the depth of resentment among South Koreans toward the continuing US military presence in this strategically important allied nation.
And it's one more piece of evidence that despite the North Korean nuclear crisis, it's time for US forces to go, executing their long-planned East Asian redeployment - elsewhere.
The US deploys about 37,000 active-duty military personnel, and about the same number of civilian contractors, support staff and dependents, all of them covered by an agreement between the US and South Korea known as the the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA.
As part of a plan agreed upon in 1992, the United States plans to shift forces south on the Korean Peninsula. The plan calls for a complete withdrawal from Yongsan base in Seoul and from bases along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) by 2008. The forces will be structured around two bases: one by Osan base at Pyongteak, the other around Camp Humphries in Daegu. The move conforms to changes in US military planning worldwide: creating a a lighter, more mobile force that can react faster to problems elsewhere in the region.
Now to the mortician: In February of 2000, civilian mortician Albert McFarland, employed by the US Forces in Korea (USFK), ordered his staff to dispose of about 120 liters of embalming fluid down a drain in the mortuary at the US Army base at Yongsan in the center of Seoul.
The fluid had been treated at two waste-treatment plants before reaching the Han River, where this capital city gets its drinking water, and later simulation tests indicated the fluid was not toxic when it reached the water. Still, it created a furor.
Toxicity questions aside, McFarland did violate US military environmental regulations while on duty. But similar and far more egregious violations by Koreans have received relatively little notice and little or no punishment.
Accord grants US jurisdiction in cases of US personnel
The Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea, a legally binding treaty first concluded in 1966, defines the rights and obligations of both the US forces and the Korean host government. Article 23, Paragraph 4 of that accord states that violations committed by on-duty personnel under SOFA coverage shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the US military.
Prompted by the current emphasis on "independent" politics - greater assertiveness and a relative distancing from the US - the South Korean Ministry of Justice pursued the mortician's case, tried McFarland in his absence, and ordered him to pay a fine of US$4,000. The fine was paid and the USFK suspended McFarland for 30 days without pay.
Still not satisfied and seemingly undaunted by the law (giving jurisdiction to the US and presumably containing protections against double trials and jeopardy), the Seoul District Court and the Ministry of Justice pressed on, concluding that McFarland and the USFK should be punished further. A retrial was ordered.
This January 9, almost four years after the original incident, McFarland was sentenced, once again in absentia, to six months in prison. The second trial and sentencing underscored what observers call South Korea's penchant for the rule by law rather than the rule of law. The handling of this case presents a serious legal challenge to the US military, dependants, contractors and others affiliated with US forces in Korea.
McFarland has filed an appeal of the South Korean decision, though the US doesn't recognize Korean jurisdiction. He remains closeted in Seoul; he isn't talking; his only contact is through his lawyer.
The agreed-upon Status of Forces Agreement puts specific protections in place so that justice in foreign countries cannot be arbitrarily or politically applied to US military personnel - but this legalistic nicety does not seem to resonate in South Korean officialdom. Similar agreements are in place in other countries, and elsewhere the US is more confident in entrusting some legal affairs to national governments, given their degree of juridical sophistication and genuine independence from governments and political pressure. South Korea hasn't made it to the club of Japan, Britain and Germany when it comes to accords of mutual trust concerning US forces.
Alleging US 'poisoning' of Seoul's water
South Korean officials and figures in Korea's ubiquitous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have railed against the mortician, McFarland, citing what they called his "attempt to poison Seoul's water supply" - as it has been described in local news reports.
However, as evidence of a double standard, there has been strikingly little coverage or discussion of the 15 Korean men arrested just last November for dumping 270 tons of formaldehyde into the Han River. The dumping site was less than three kilometers from where Seoul's drinking water is collected.
This sounds like a witch-hunt, but why?
This tide of anti-Americanism, known as "independencism", that President Roh Moo-hyun rode to power slightly more than a year ago was largely - though not exclusively - predicated on the deaths of two middle-school girls. They were struck on June 13, 2002, by a large armored vehicle driven by two US servicemen near the village of Donggucheon.
The accident investigation fell within the jurisdiction of the USFK, but the United States involved the Korean National Police at every stage of the investigation.
But the Korean people, all too familiar with their own nation's less than impartial approach to law and justice, became convinced that a cover-up was taking place. Although the US and South Korea made public much of the evidence and allowed coverage by the Korean press at an inquest, the belief in cover-up persisted and still persists. It is perpetuated by the press and by independence-minded Internet users.
Five months after the girls' deaths and the conclusion by the Korean National Police and USFK that the tragedy had been an unavoidable accident, the USFK, under its new four-star General Leon LaPorte, initiated a formal court martial at an infantry base in Dongducheon, near the accident site. Those proceedings were open to the victim's families, concerned NGOs and the press - in an effort to demonstrate further the transparency and fairness of US judicial proceedings guaranteed by SOFA.
The US forces, however, gave little consideration to how the trial would be interpreted by Koreans, especially in the run-up to a presidential election. Choi Woon-sung, a former Korean ambassador and Seoul-based professor of international law, said in an interview: "The worst thing the US can do is dig this all up again [with a court martial]. It's not the Korean way and it won't be understood." He was right.
Court martial itself seen as proof of guilt
The trial was viewed by most Koreans as an acknowledgment of the Americans' criminal guilt. Why, they reasoned, would the United States place its own people on court martial unless it knew the defendants were criminally responsible? The trial ended in acquittal for the soldiers - who many US-based legal experts maintained should not have been put on trial in the first place. The acquittal generated a flood of angry anti-US nationalism, and protesters poured into the streets of Seoul and other South Korean cities.
Protesters charged that SOFA "allowed them to get away with murder", demanding the arrest of the two US servicemen and the scrapping of the military agreement.
"Pro-independence" feelings, which permeated the election campaign in the autumn and winter of 2002, had been lying just beneath the surface for decades and had begun surfacing in earnest after the North-South Summit in 2000.
After former South Korean president Kim Dae-jung's groundbreaking - and now controversial - summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in June 2000, and their Joint Communique focusing on "peace, independence and national unity", a fundamental policy and public relations shift was undertaken. It was a distinct move away from the previous harsh depictions of the North and its leadership.
Official announcements also changed radically, presenting kinder, gentler descriptions of the North, and these dominated the print media and airwaves. School curriculums were "updated" to reflect the new, politically correct view of North Korea and some of the nastier bits of recent history concerning North Korea were excluded or extracted from their historical context. Within the nation's universities, academics long quiet about their more tolerant views of the North came loudly to the fore - some assuming the intellectual high ground at South Korea's influential educational institutions.
Perceptions of North Korea began to change, and with them the perceptions of the United States and the Status of Forces Agreement. These reordered perceptions occurred especially among those in their 20s and 30s - a generation that never knew the sufferings caused by North Korea's preemptive attack on the nation 50 years ago.
Older Korean War veterans, young progressives, academics and others view the US Forces in Korea with emotions ranging from reverence to envy to contempt. The US presence is still viewed by many as a necessary evil, vital to the nation's defense. Many others view it as the primary impediment to reunification of the divided peninsula.
All but the most radical find common ground in the "economic necessity" argument for the presence of the US forces, but few seriously support the US presence beyond the pragmatic economic and security reasons.
Roh pledges to redress 'inequities' in US accord
In Roh's presidential election campaign, standing before tens of thousands of Koreans demanding that the US give "pride" back to the Korean people, he pledged to "redress" what he called the seriously prejudicial clauses of the Status of Forces Agreement. Roh advocated a new understanding and model of enlightened relations that would reconcile the presence of the United States with the developed status of the country, and with the Korean people's self-perception as an economically and politically important nation.
But the other side of the argument - the one that sees fundamental shortcomings in South Korea - garners very little attention within the Korean press, even among "conservative" dailies such as the Chosun Ilbo. Proponents of this argument cite the domestic institutional weakness and cycles of corruption that inhibit international faith and trust in South Korea's judicial and other institutions.
Seoul's systemic problems, they say, make it impossible to relax and revise the current Status of Forces Agreement with the US so that it more closely resembles similar but more liberal US military agreements in Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom.
In sharp contrast to the strident rhetoric of Roh's campaign, the previously scheduled SOFA talks shortly after his inauguration produced no great changes, and South Korea signed the treaty without fundamental changes or amendments. The talks were held behind closed doors, but the implication leaked by Seoul to the press was that the weak economy and the North Korean nuclear crisis gave the South Korean authorities little choice but to acquiesce. This interpretation has now become a victim drama play that has become a staple of the country's political system.
South Korea's institutions could be shored up. This is a wealthy, well-educated nation with abundant human capital. But the needed fundamental political and judicial development and reforms are obstructed as lawmakers and officials manipulate national institutions to further their narrow political agendas. Underlying issues remain unresolved, ensuring they will come to the fore as soon as it becomes politically expedient.
Tinkering with SOFA won't solve the problem
Tinkering with the Status of Forces Agreement won't settle the issue. If the US Forces in Korea acknowledged the right of South Korean authorities to prosecute in situations like the McFarland case there could be great US animosity toward Korean "justice". McFarland's six-month sentence - one month longer than that given a South Korean man recently convicted of sexually molesting a five-year-old girl - could rightly generate charges of political influence and prosecutorial bias, exacerbating dissent and animosity.
The only solution is to remove the distraction of the USFK: Remove the Status of Forces Agreement as an issue by removing the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula.
As long as the US military remains, so too will the nationalistic antagonism generated by the troop presence. The very visible presence of the world's most powerful military has been used for decades by political groups of all stripes to deflect criticism from domestic leadership and domestic problems.
Many observers, both Korean and Western, say the US now has an obligation, in support of South Korea's national development, to withdraw its military assets from the country.
Removing troops might seem unwise given the North Korea nuclear threat, but the changed socio-political environment on the peninsula has made it impossible for the US forces effectively to project foreign-policy objectives. South Korea's new policies of relative assertiveness and distancing itself from the United States are increasingly at odds with Washington's strategies.
Indeed, recent surveys indicate that most South Koreans believe the US is a far greater threat to their security than the North.
Recently announced US base closures and the southward movement of some troops is an important first step, but in an effort to promote national development and encourage the "equal" relationship the South Korean government and people have been loudly demanding, it's time for the US Forces in Korea to go.
David Scofield is a lecturer at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, Seoul.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
---------------------------------------------------

Europe Resisting Islam's Dark Ages
By Alexis Amory
FrontPageMagazine.com | January 28, 2004
Long a sea of tolerance that provided a buoyant platform for Muslim immigrants to preach a fundamentalist agenda, Europe seems only now to be waking up to the threat posed by some Muslims intent on bending their host societies to suit themselves.
The original intention, particularly in Britain and France, which admitted large numbers of citizens of their former colonies after granting them independence, was that Muslim immigrants to European shores would assimilate. Many did. But many primitive thinkers flooded into Europe only to be shocked by the enlightened society they encountered. Some groups developed an agenda of imposing their old ways and their religion on their host societies.
In the name of "tolerance", most societies in the West have done their best to accommodate these malcontents - mostly in defiance of the wishes of their own citizens. Now, the tide is turning.
France has just set the cat among the pigeons by announcing a forthcoming ban on the wearing of the hijab (headscarf) in the classroom. [Front Page Magazine January 23 '04 issue.]
In many areas ringing the large industrial cities in France, the Muslim population outnumbers the native French, and there is a perception that wearing the hijab is an act of aggression against the host society. Chirac himself, in a moment of rare candor, called it such.
Member of the Senate Jacques Myard, of Chirac's conservative party, is quoted as saying, "We are facing a genuine political policy that tries to enforce their own Sharia Law on the civil law which is not acceptable."
Eschewing nuance, he also said, "A lot of Muslim girls say that they wear the headscarf freely. But, in fact ... in most cases, [they're] motivated by religious fundamentalists and if you give them just a bit of a finger they will eat up your arm up to the elbow. So we have to be strict and very adamant - and say this is the way things are in France."
Seventy per cent of the French electorate have said amen to that and many moderate Muslims are fully in accord, some of them vocally so.
The first international figure to vocalize the threat of fundamentalism to his own country was Holland's Pym Fortuyn, a flamboyant millionaire businessman turned politician. Holland had long been the ne plus ultra of a tolerant, libertarian society preaching a multicultural message that was not necessarily endorsed by its citizenry.
Despite the "tolerance" required of the Dutch themselves, the Muslim immigrants were granted special rights and favors that did nothing to encourage assimilation. The government encouraged immigrant children to speak Turkish, Arabic or Berber in primary schools rather than insisting they learn in Dutch. Funding was provided for "ethnic diversity projects", including 700 Islamic clubs that were sometimes grabbed as showcases by radical clerics.
Assimilation? Forget it! Even now, 30 years later, between 70 and 80 per cent of Dutch-born members of immigrant families import their spouse from their "home" country, mostly Turkey or Morocco, perpetuating a fast-growing Muslim subculture in large cities, according to London's Daily Telegraph. This means Dutch Muslim men are rejecting Muslim women born in Holland and trawling for someone more ignorant and more obedient from their "home" country. The ones marrying female Dutch-born Muslims are foreign males who pay the girl's family to use marriage as a ticket into the West .
Fortuyn played a strong hand. A homosexual with a multi-hued history of amours, and with a deputy party leader who was not just black, but an immigrant, the left couldn't credibly accuse him of racism. He was the first to understand that the rigid and conservative immigrants, who kept themselves apart, wished to demolish the freedoms and tolerance of which Holland was so proud and were thus a threat to Dutch liberal society. He spoke to the fears of a large number of the Dutch who had kept quiet for fear of being branded "racist". Within a scant three months of forming his conservative party, which called for a moratorium on all immigration until those already in situ were assimilated, the party had already laid claim to 26 of Holland's 150 seats.
Had he lived, it is likely that he would have won the upcoming election and been Holland's prime minister today. But he was murdered almost two years ago - ironically, by a leftie animal rights activist, although what animal rights had to do with anything was never explained. So great was the sense of loss, that Fortuyn's funeral in Rotterdam drew vast crowds and outpourings of grief in an eerie echo of Princess Diana's funeral in Britain three years previously.
Without his brave and charismatic presence, Fortuyn's party fell apart, and the then-upcoming election was won by the usual suspects.
And that, you may suppose, was that.
But no. Two years after his assassination, mainstream politicians are beginning to speak out. Referring to the policy of teaching immigrant children in foreign languages instead of Dutch and encouraging immigrants to cleave to their own culture rather than fitting in with Dutch society, the leader of the Christian Democrats recently said, "Immigrants in the Netherlands top the 'wrong' lists - disability benefit, unemployment assistance, domestic violence, criminality statistics and school and learning difficulties."
And yes, you guessed it. Holland has just become the first country in Europe - perhaps the world - to declare a four-year moratorium on any fresh immigration, including "asylum seekers".
Another wealthy, tolerant European country, Spain, has also had a bracing flirtation with flinging open the windows and letting fresh air pour into the sour corridors of political correctness. A few days ago, a jury in Barcelona returned a verdict of guilty against a Muslim cleric who had written a book advising men how to beat their wives without leaving marks.
Mohamed Kamal Mustafa, who is the iman of a mosque in a small southern resort town, was sentenced to 15 months in prison and fined around $2,200. He wrote that, to discipline a wife, "The blows should be concentrated on the hands and feet using a rod that is thin and light so that it does not leave scars or bruises on the body."
Mustafa, who is all heart, cautioned that beating should only be used as a last resort. First should come verbal warnings and if that didn't work, there should follow a period of sexual inactivity to discipline a disobedient wife. Having seen Mustafa's photo, I'd say he'd be unwise to invest too much faith in the power of withholding his personal charms to get disciplinary results.
If that failed, he said, according to Islamic law, beatings could be then judiciously administered.
The Spanish judge tore into Mustafa, saying his book was "guided by an obsolete machismo that in places is very accentuated. That is against the principles of equality laid out in the [Spanish] constitution resulting in intolerable discrimination". And to cap it, he flung in that prospective readers of the book "do not live in the Arabian desert of the 14th century". So take that, you medieval lunkhead!
Mustafa protested that he was opposed to violence against women.
It was a Spanish human rights group which fought for three years to get Mustafa charged, which is noteworthy, because "human rights" groups commonly side with the multi cultis against civil order and demands that immigrants obey the law of their adopted land rather than the land they fled.
The winds of change are aflutter.
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>> "ICHABOD" AND THE BAGMEN...

Cash-and-Kerry, Part Two
By Lowell Ponte
FrontPageMagazine.com | January 28, 2004
PONTEFICATIONS
"AN AMERICA THAT BELONGS NOT TO THE PRIVILEGED, not to the few, but to all Americans." That was what the winner of the New Hampshire Primary promised Tuesday night in his victory speech.
But, paradoxically, if Senator John Kerry becomes the Democratic nominee and is elected this November, the White House for the next four or eight years will belong to a man born to enormous wealth and privilege.
Kerry as a boy was raised and educated mostly in Europe. He fluently speaks, and thinks in, French. He preferred to marry wealthy women of foreign orientation. He believes that the United Nations and its permanent Security Council members such as France should have veto power over what actions the United States may take to defend its national security.
A Kerry presidency could therefore be tantamount to putting a quasi-European aristocrat in control of the United States and relinquishing to the United Nations a large measure of American sovereignty.
In Kerry-merica, patrician privilege would rule, and ordinary Americans and our Constitution would have less and less sovereign power.
Is he the "Real Deal," as Kerry calls himself, or would a John Kerry presidency be a Dirty Deal, a Steal Deal for most Americans?
To glimpse this alternative future, we need to look deeper into John Kerry's double-dealing past.
Both Bill Clinton and John Kerry modeled their personal ambitions on John F. Kennedy. Clinton imitated the womanizing, playboy JFK. Kerry imitated the young JFK, born to privilege, who volunteered to seek military glory in a PT boat.
Kerry grew up in a world of luxury boats and had gone yachting with John F. Kennedy. But his father had been a test pilot as well as a sailor. He cut his young son's teeth on flying, and Kerry loved to pilot small airplanes. Despite this, when Vietnam beckoned Kerry signed up not for the Air Force but for the Navy to command small "swift boats" that resembled PT-109 in the Mekong Delta.
It was dangerous duty, bringing Kerry three wounds and three Purple Hearts. For risking his life to rescue a Green Beret who had been swept overboard amid enemy fire, Kerry was awarded the Bronze Star for Valor ("for personal bravery"). Days before the 2004 Iowa Caucuses, that now-Republican Special Forces soldier Jim Rassman traveled from Oregon to Iowa to thank Kerry for saving his life.
For single-handedly going ashore after and killing an enemy soldier who was armed with a loaded B-40 rocket launcher, Kerry was awarded the Silver Star ("for gallantry"). Boston Globe reporter David Warsh adduced evidence suggesting that this Viet Cong was alone, already wounded, and might have been shot in the back by Kerry. Soldiers serving under Lt. (Junior Grade) Kerry said Warsh was incorrect.
"I committed the same kinds of atrocities as thousands of others," said Kerry as an anti-war activist guest on NBC's Meet the Press (quoted in Brinkley's book, page 362) after he returned stateside, "in that I shot in free fire zones, fired .50-caliber machine [gun] bullets, used harass-and-interdiction fire, joined in search-and-destroy missions, and burned villages. All of these acts are contrary to the laws of the Geneva Convention, and all were ordered as written, established policies from the top down, and the men who ordered this are war criminals."
But Kerry was an officer in Vietnam who gave such orders to his men. Kerry has therefore confessed to being a war criminal himself. Was he saying that he was "merely following orders" from above, like a good German? Or does he accept his share of legal and moral responsibility for the illegal orders he said he gave? Either way, this is proof that John Kerry is, by his own yardstick, unfit ever to be President of the United States.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 23, 1971, Kerry claimed under oath that American soldiers had "raped, cut off ears, cut off heads, taped wires from portable telephones to human genitals and turned up the power, cut off limbs, blown up bodies, randomly shot at civilians, razed villages, shot cattle and dogs for fun, poisoned food stocks, and generally ravaged the countryside of South Vietnam."
He dramatically told reporters that such atrocities were the norm, not rare exceptions, for U.S. soldier behavior. This Kerry false blood libel against honorable soldiers gave protestors a kind of license to protestors to attack, belittle and ridicule soldiers returning to America.
But when Kerry became a Senator, using fame as his ladder to this political office, he would do something far worse to our soldiers, especially those held as prisoners of war.
For the record, some in the media recently echoed a website story claiming that Kerry had killed 21 unarmed Vietnamese civilians during the war. The author apparently confused Senator John Kerry with now-retired war hero and Senator Bob Kerrey (D-Nebraska).
Kerrey, to quote the liberal magazine The American Prospect (TAP), "had evidently ordered the wanton slaughter of 21 Vietnamese civilians, including babies, at point-blank range," then filed a report claiming that all were Viet Cong. "That report," wrote TAP reporter Robert Dreyfuss, "was enough to win Kerrey a Bronze Star, which he did not refuse."
By contrast, John Kerry has told audiences that he "once refused a direct order from a far-away commander to open fire on a group of Vietnamese civilians standing alongside a riverbank in the Mekong," wrote unabashed Kerry supporter Joe Shea in the January 21, 2004, issue of The American Reporter.
"When [Kerry] got back to base, facing the threat of a court martial," writes Shea, "he defended himself with a tattered copy of the Rules of Engagement he kept handy in his hip pocket. He knew the rules, and he won the day."
Put aside the fact that these Rules of Engagement were always changing, and that many believe these often-bizarre and arbitrary bureaucratic restrictions on where, when and how our troops could fight were the reason America lost in Vietnam.
If we take Kerry's story as true, we then face questions Shea neglected to raise. Did not these rules that Kerry knew by heart also require a soldier to report war crimes, or attempted war crimes, by others? Did Kerry report this officer's illegal order to kill civilians to superiors? Or did Kerry remain silent, thereby becoming this officer's ally and enabler, if not accomplice?
If this story is true, then I hereby ask Senator Kerry to name the officer who issued this illegal order and the officers before whom he defended with that tattered rule book his refusal to obey it. Surely a memory so indelible as to play a role in young Kerry's anti-war speeches can also recall the name of this officer who ordered him to slaughter innocent civilians. (If 60-year-old Kerry's memory is now failing, of course, this is evidence that he may have lost the mental acuity to be President.)
The same questions could be asked about all the other routine atrocities young Kerry alleged before a Senate committee. If he had firsthand knowledge from witnessing who did these illegal things, why did Kerry fail to turn in the criminals in accord with the Rules of Engagement? If he shielded those whose war crimes he witnessed, Kerry is an accomplice after the fact to these atrocities.
On the other hand, if his knowledge was only secondhand gossip, rumor or intoxicated tales told by bored soldiers around jungle campfires - what the law calls hearsay evidence - then Kerry was reckless, irresponsible and almost treasonous to make such outrageous claims under oath before the Senate, the press and the American people.
A paradox worth remembering is that Kerry modeled himself on President John F. Kennedy, the Commander-in-Chief who committed the first 17,000 armed troops into Vietnam. (Republican President Dwight Eisenhower sent only unarmed advisors.) So when Kerry criticizes what happened in Vietnam, and when on victory night in Iowa he embraced Ted Kennedy, Kerry has been wrapped up in the legacy of the very Democratic President who created the morass in Vietnam. Psychoanalysts have words for such mental aberrations.
Like most Leftist Democrats, Cleopatra Kerry has a Queen of Denial fixation with blaming Vietnam not on Democratic Presidents JFK or LBJ but on Republican Richard Nixon, who did not become President until 1969 when JFK's war had been entrenched for seven years.
Coming home, decorated Vietnam veteran John Kerry quickly pushed himself into the spotlight of two anti-war activities funded by Jane Fonda - Vietnam Veterans Against the War and the so-called Winter Soldier Investigations.
If TV cameras were present, Kerry could be found staging events with other veterans - such as throwing medals away in protest on the steps of the Capitol. "This Administration forced us to return our medals," Kerry told reporters at this event. (It later turned out that Kerry was throwing other peoples' medals while keeping his own, an act of deceit and phoniness typical of Kerry.)
Cartoonist Gary Trudeau caught Kerry's inner essence perfectly in two Doonesbury cartoons. "If you care about this country at all, you better go listen to that John Kerry fellow," a stranger lectures Mike Doonesbury and B.D. in the October 21, 1971, strip. "He speaks with rare eloquence and astonishing conviction. If you see no one else this year, you must see John Kerry!"
The stranger departs, and B.D. asks "Who was that?" Mike responds: "John Kerry."
In the next day's Doonesbury, we see Kerry giving a crowd-rousing anti-war speech, at the end of which bubbles above his head reveal his inner thoughts: "You're really clicking tonight, you gorgeous preppie."
Back then Kerry apparently believed that being anti-war was his ticket to fame, wealth and power. He expected to enter the holy city of Washington, D.C., riding a Democratic donkey while the adoring masses threw down palm branches before him.
(Kerry was dropped from Al Gore's 2000 short list for Vice President mostly because Kerry had voted against the successful Gulf War in 1991, a war Gore cut a political deal to support. But in 2004 Kerry has been criticized by Democrats for voting, as Senators Hillary Clinton and John Edwards did, to give President George W. Bush the authority to go to war in Iraq.)
In 2004, ironically, an older Kerry with a fake patina of maturity is trying to seize the White House by depicting himself as a war hero on horseback who says we need more troops for Iraq and comes wearing the Bronze and Silver Stars he once pretended to throw away.
This is worse than schizophrenia. The reality is that Kerry apparently did fight bravely in Vietnam, but he then betrayed his fellow soldiers in several ways. By supplying anti-war-propaganda ammunition to the enemy, Kerry encouraged the North Vietnamese to keep fighting and helped prolong the war.
Only God knows how many more Americans and Vietnamese died because of Kerry's ego-trip activism. Every time you visit that black memorial with nearly 70,000 names in Washington, D.C., remember that some of them died because John Kerry gave aid and comfort to the enemy in order to advance his own celebrity, wealth and power.
Whenever Kerry now prates that the first duty of a Commander-in-Chief is to protect the lives of our soldiers, this hypocrite should be spit on by everyone present in remembrance of all the American soldiers Kerry helped our enemies to kill.
Kerry apparently fancies himself a bridge between America and Vietnam, between those who fought the war and those who fought against it, and between the opposed worlds of Communism and Capitalism.
During the Clinton era, Kerry received an $8,000 campaign contribution from notorious Democratic brown bag man Johnny Chung at a 1996 fundraiser. That same year the Senator took $10,000, in exchange for which Kerry arranged a high level meeting between Communist Chinese intelligence operative Lieutenant Colonel Liu Chaoying, Johnny Chung and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
From Red China's point of view, this SEC meeting apparently had multiple purposes - including money to be made from creating Chinese "front" companies on American stock exchanges, and the potential use of such companies to transfer militarily-useful technologies and hardware to Beijing.
Seen as a friend and ally by the Communist regime in Vietnam, Senator Kerry knew that a huge lucrative prize might be within his grasp. As they are today over Iran, giant multinational corporations have been eager to sell goods and purchase resources in Vietnam. The Marxist Vietnamese dictatorship has been eager to re-enter the world marketplace, especially with its chief ally the Soviet Union gone. A politician who restored links between Vietnam and America could gain huge amounts of money in campaign contributions and other benefits.
What stood in the way of such a profitable thaw in U.S.-Vietnam relations, Kerry knew, were the lack of human rights in Vietnam and its apparent continued holding of many American prisoners of war (POWs) and soldiers missing in action (MIAs) from the war.
To make these stumbling blocks disappear, Kerry in 1991 conjured a new Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs with himself as chairman and his legislative assistant Ms. Francis Zwenig as the committee's Chief of Staff. She would act as liaison to interested corporations through their umbrella organization, the U.S./Vietnam Trade Council (that she would later leave the committee to run).
"Zwenig, according to documents, coached the North Vietnamese to concoct plausible stories on the fate of POW/MIAs in order to show that Hanoi was cooperating to resolve the POW/MIA issue, a hurdle in the diplomatic dance to lift the trade embargo and renew relations with Vietnam," writes Anthony Nguyen at the anti-communist website VietPage.com.
"Senator Kerry," Nguyen continues, "was caught on camera making a promise to the North Vietnamese communists that he would ensure that they weren't embarrassed by their concocted stories."
Senator Kerry also prevented a vote on the Vietnam Human Rights Act (HR2833), which would have made lifting trade restrictions contingent on Communist Vietnam restoring basic human rights. By stopping this measure from becoming law, Kerry protected Marxist Vietnam from pressure to free its slave society.
Through much manipulation and arm-twisting, Kerry persuaded his now-defunct committee to vote unanimously that no POWs existed in Vietnam. And with the disappearance of this and the proposed human rights legislation, Kerry gave Bill Clinton and the Democratic Party the pretext they needed to begin re-opening trade that could help keep the Marxist Vietnamese dictatorship afloat. Those given first place in line for such trade opportunities, of course, were the biggest contributors to Democrats such as Senator Kerry and Bill Clinton.
The year after his committee's vote to give Communist Vietnam a clean bill of health, the strangest thing happened. In December 1992 Vietnam signed its first huge commercial deal worth at least $905 million to develop a deep-sea commercial port at Vung Tau to accommodate all the trade that was to come. It signed the deal with a company called Colliers International. At the time, the Chief Executive Officer of this company was C. Stewart Forbes. Name sound familiar? It should. He is Senator John F. Kerry's cousin. What a coincidence!
Less widely noticed, when the Democratic Party decided to give Kerry a leg up towards its presidential nomination by holding its 2004 National Convention in Boston, certain big corporations rushed to pony up money for the Democratic event. One of the first of these rushing to fill Democratic coffers was Spaulding & Slye Colliers, the current corporate partnership involving Colliers International, which anted up $100,000.
The Boston press sniffed at how this and other companies with business pending before the Democrat-dominated city might be trying to curry favor or satisfy politician demands for money.
But perhaps a more global agenda is at work behind the scenes. Money is fungible, and part of the Vietnam millions channeled to Colliers International can easily be inferred to be co-mingled in this $100,000 donation to the Democratic National Convention.
This July as you watch the red, white and blue balloons fall from that Boston convention ceiling to celebrate the newly-selected Democratic presidential nominee John F. Kerry, think of the red ones as being purchased and used to seduce you by Communist Vietnam.
And if Kerry surprises the world by naming as his running mate Arizona Republican John McCain, former POW and Kerry's close friend and ally in re-opening trade with Vietnam, remember on election day the prisoners of war still in Vietnam who will never come home to their families because they were betrayed by the politics of cash and Kerry.

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Cash-and-Kerry
By Lowell Ponte
FrontPageMagazine.com | January 27, 2004
PONTEFICATIONS
WILL COMMUNIST VIETNAM BE AMONG THE BIGGEST behind-the-scenes bankrollers of the Democratic National Convention this July 26-29 in Boston? It already has been, via a de facto intermediary, thanks to the Massachusetts boy and friend of Hanoi now likely to be nominated there as the Democrats' presidential standard-bearer.
Senator John F. Kerry has a long political career, distinguished by his willingness to go farther Left in politics and lower for money than most other American politicians would dream of going. He has been largely unnoticed outside the liberal Northeast and the approving pages of leftist magazines and newspapers.
But now, with the latest polls showing Senator Kerry likely to follow his Iowa Caucuses win last week with a strong victory this Tuesday in the New Hampshire Primary, it's time for America to wake up and smell the Kerry.
Who is this gaunt and haunted, French-looking apparition nicknamed "Ichabod" by his preppy classmates? And what could America expect from a John Kerry candidacy - or presidency?
"Who would have guessed it," said Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Gillespie last Friday. "Ted Kennedy is the conservative Senator from Massachusetts?" But that is exactly what the leftist group Americans for Democratic Action makes clear by giving Kennedy a lifetime liberal vote rating of only 88 percent but John Kerry's 19 years as the state's junior Senator a lifetime liberal vote rating of 93 percent.
John Forbes Kerry was born December 11, 1943, in a hospital in Denver, Colorado, where his test-pilot father Richard had been sent to treat his tuberculosis. His mother, Rosemary, was by descent a double New England Brahmin, her father James part of the colonial Forbes family and her mother a Winthrop whose lineage included the pilgrim leader who helped establish the Congregational Church in the young Massachusetts Bay Colony.
Rosemary's Forbes family had wealth through its hereditary ownership of much of Cape Cod. Her father used his money to raise his family in France, where aspiring lawyer Richard met her during a youthful idyll. Setting a pattern his son would follow more than once, Richard did not hesitate to wed a rich girl.
In this aristocratic tradition, young John Kerry spent much of his childhood in Europe - with his family in Berlin, Oslo and St. Briac, France - and in an upper-class boarding school in Switzerland. So recounts historian Douglas Brinkley in his fawning-but-eye-opening new biography Tour of Duty: John Kerry and the Vietnam War. Kerry grew up speaking foreign tongues and absorbing a European socialist's view of the world - and of America.
By 1957, his family had returned to the United States and enrolled John in the elitist Fessenden School in West Newton, Massachusetts, and thereafter at patrician St. Paul's school in Concord, New Hampshire, where John began to ponder politics.
While dating Janet Auchincloss, Jacqueline Kennedy's half-sister, Kerry found himself unexpectedly alone in a room of her home with President John F. Kennedy. When the President asked "What are you doing with yourself?" the 6'4" young man blurted out: "Well, I'm about to go to Yale." Harvard graduate JFK smiled: "I'm a Yale man too now!"
At Yale, John Kerry was one of only 15 in his class upper-crusty enough to be invited to join Skull and Bones, as George W. Bush had done two years earlier like his father and grandfather. (The deceased husband of Kerry's current wife, John Heinz, was also Skull and Bones. For such people it's a small world.)
When Kerry in 1986 tried privately to recruit into Skull and Bones Jacob Weisberg, now Slate.com editor, wrote the Boston Herald's Andrew Miga, "Weisberg declined, pointedly asking Kerry how he squared his liberalism with membership in such an elitist club that refused to admit women. `Kerry got sort of flustered....'"
At Yale, Kerry also made a special friendship with David Thorne, whose sister Julia he courted. (One published estimate of Thorne family wealth: $300 million.) They wed in 1970. She was descended from George Washington's Attorney General William Bradford (who ended the Whiskey Rebellion). Her great-uncle was Henry Stimson, the Secretary of State under President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of War under Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman. (Stimson by some accounts made the decision to target Nagasaki, the most Christian city in Japan, for nuclear annihilation.)
"Between the two of them," wrote Brinkley, "John Kerry and Julia Thorne constituted a virtual storehouse of America's most productive and distinguished bloodlines." But what Kerry seemed to love most was that 5'8" dark-haired "Judy" Thorne had spent much of her childhood in Europe as he had, smoked cigarettes, and spoke fluent French and Italian. Part of their courtship had been at the Thorne summer house on Italy's Tuscan seacoast.
"Old Europe," wrote Brinkley, "remained her home, and her culture." Or as he quotes Julia: "I considered myself European." No wonder she felt drawn to the French-looking, French-thinking, aristocratic-but-not-personally-wealthy John Kerry.
But after two children and 12 years of marriage, Julia Kerry had been driven to depression and the brink of suicide. The couple separated in 1982, but on election night she kept this secret from voters as she had during the rest of John's first successful political campaign. He became Lt. Governor of Massachusetts under Michael Dukakis. Although elected on a separate ballot line, as he has stressed since Dukakis' humiliating defeat in the presidential race of 1988, Kerry embraced almost all Dukakis policies including weekend furloughs for convicted murderers, government subsidies for drug addicts and alcoholics, and opposition to the death penalty even for terrorist mass murderers.
John Kerry and Julia did not formally divorce until 1988, by which time Kerry had been dating (in the strict sense adulterously) for more than half a decade. The gossip columns linked Kerry romantically to, among others, actress Morgan Fairchild, Cornelia Guest and Patti Davis, the leftist daughter of Republican President Ronald Reagan.
Kerry, a Roman Catholic, would (like onetime-Congressman Joe Kennedy) in 1997 apply to have his marriage annulled by his church. Julia's outspoken opposition made Kerry back down.
"After his divorce to Julia Thorne was finalized," notes a CBS News timeline on Kerry's career, "it was apparent how much she helped the family financially. The divorce left him strapped for cash...Before finally renting apartments in Washington and Boston, he was a bit of a roamer."
Translation: during six years of separation from his wife Julia, John Kerry continued to live on money she provided to him. Before and after their divorce in 1988, Kerry slept around - both in the beds of other women and in the plush accommodations provided to him by lobbyists, especially after his election to the U.S. Senate in the Orwellian year 1984.
Among the goodies lobbyists and other insiders provided Kerry, writes Michael Grunwald of The New Republic, were "a car he `leased' for 16 months without any payments, a ritzy condo he rented for $200 per month from a friendly developer, a no-risk $21,000 real estate windfall arranged by a top fund-raiser, a lobbyist's $8,000-per-month waterfront apartment where he crashed without paying."
When criticized for giving only $175 one year to charity, notes Grunwald, Kerry claimed that sending his kids to private schools had left him strapped for cash - but, as reporters ferreted out, not too poor to buy a handmade, ruby red $8,600 Ducati motorcycle for his joy rides.
(Such Kerry deception and dissimulation is common. Knowing that his Bohemian Jewish grandfather had changed his name from Kohn to Kerry, look how long Kerry passed himself off as Irish to gain ethnic votes, making such statements as "For those of us who are fortunate to share an Irish ancestry, we take great pride in the contributions that Irish-Americans...." Well, okay, there is a lot of Blarney in Kerry. And probably a lot of European French, too. But it leaves us wondering whether he is what he pretends to be today.)
A new partner soon entered John Kerry's life. At the 1992 environmental summit on global warming, Kerry found himself warming to the widow of Republican Pennsylvania Senator John Heinz.
Teresa Simoes-Ferreira Heinz was born the daughter of a Portuguese physician on October 5, 1938, in Mozambique in East Africa. She earned a BA degree in Romance Languages and Literature in 1960 from the University of Witwatersrand in apartheid-era South Africa. She is fluent in five languages, has worked for the United Nations, and is tough, worldly and cosmopolitan in outlook.
Kerry, five years younger than Teresa, courted and won the older woman's hand. Cynics wondered if his relish to wed her was whetted by Teresa being one of the world's wealthiest women. Her first husband, who died in a 1991 aircraft accident, was heir to the Heinz ketchup and steak sauce fortune. Her inherited wealth exceeds $500 million, and she oversees the Heinz Foundation endowment of $1.2 billion.
(As Kerry doubtless has thought, George Washington made his stake by marrying an older woman, Martha Custis, one of the wealthiest widows in the American colonies.)
Kerry was expected to use Teresa's wealth in his longtime quest for the presidency. He then announced that campaign finance laws limited his political use of her money to $2,000. But now Kerry's once-stalled campaign has been re-ignited with money he has borrowed against multimillion-dollar property they own jointly, a debt she later can pay off from her fortune. This certainly violates the spirit, even if it circumvents the letter, of the law.
Like his Democratic rival Howard Dean, Kerry (after railing against the influence of the evil rich in politics) has decided not to accept Federal matching funds nor the limits that come with such funds for his own campaign.
Kerry, his critics say, has since his teens been angling to become President. Any idealism he began with has been dulled and tarnished with experience in politics.
Kerry has spent 19 years deferring to Massachusetts' senior Senator Ted Kennedy and acting as a rubberstamp second vote for every Kennedy legislative proposal.
One of the easiest ways to embarrass Kerry in an interview, it's said, is to ask him to list the major pieces of enacted legislation he has authored in his career. There are none. As a lawmaker, Kerry is one of the least successful politicians in American history.
But early on, Kerry as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations set out to conduct news-making, important hearings into drugs and the Noriega regime in Panama, Oliver North and Iran-Contra, and other topics that could attract television cameras. One thing his chief investigator vis-?-vis Noriega stumbled onto were the dictator's links to BCCI, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, a bank connected to prominent Democratic Party figures such as Clark Clifford.
"Why did John Kerry not confront Clark Clifford?" asked reporters James Ring Adams and Douglas Franz in their 1992 book A Full Service Bank: How BCCI Stole Billions Around the World. "One explanation lies in Kerry's own character. He tends to operate in bursts, pushing relentlessly on a subject and then seeming to lose interest in it."
[And to his credit, sometimes Kerry touches briefly on bold positions such as criticizing teacher unions, whose members comprise roughly 25 percent of delegates at Democratic National Conventions.]
"Also, Kerry was learning the Washington game," Adams and Franz continue, "and beginning to think of himself as possible presidential timber down the road. That meant that certain people were not attacked, at least not until all the evidence was in."
"By this time, Kerry had become chairman of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee," they write. "Known by its shorthand DSCC, the committee was one of the key fund-raising mechanisms for the party's senators and a big step on the path to power in Washington...Much of both the individual donations and PAC money is channeled through the DSCC...So Kerry's new job put him at the center of power and meant that he would rub shoulders with the movers and shakers who were financing the Democratic Party."
"One of these men was David Paul, the owner of CenTrust Savings in Miami," Adams
and Franz continue. "On July 20, 1988, Kerry hosted a reception honoring Paul, one of the largest contributors to the DSCC, and later the Senator used Paul's private jet to fly to a DSCC leadership meeting."
David Paul would turn out to be deeply involved with the machinations of BCCI. And Kerry would help bring at least some BCCI wrongdoing to light. He would also experience private attacks from several of his Democratic colleagues for doing so. From such punishments, Kerry soon learned how to play the Democratic Party's dirty "Washington game."
Consider two of the big money people backing Kerry's current presidential campaign. One, who since 1999 has reportedly funneled nearly $700,000 in both hard and soft money to Kerry, is Alan Solomont.
Remember the controversy four years ago when it came to light that one of the flagship stations of the Public Broadcasting Service, WGBH in Boston, had been violating the privacy of its contributors and the taxpayer-supported impartiality of this PBS station by giving its confidential lists of contributor addresses, telephone numbers and other personal information to the Democratic National Committee? The partisan person who reportedly committed this outrage was WGBH Board Member and bigtime Democratic fundraiser Alan Solomont, now the Daddy Warbucks of the Kerry Campaign.
Another Kerry moneybags is former Texas Lt. Governor Ben Barnes, who during the same period ponied up more than $450,000 for the Massachusetts senator. This fatcat lobbyist, called by Tom Daschle "the fifty-first Democratic senator," was so adroit as a fixer that he once cut a deal so that, after Texas enacted a state lottery, he and a partner would personally be paid 3.5 cents for every ticket sold - which added up to more than $3 million for them each year. Bill Clinton, a master at backroom money-grubbing, once reportedly told a group of Methodist ministers: "If you all will take a sinner like [Ben] Barnes, you might take me."
A third cash-and-Kerryer, who during this same period gave Kerry more than $180,000, is Hassan Nemazee. This Iranian-American investor raised a cool $250,000 for Al Gore in November 1995, and he and his family slushed another $150,000 to Democrats during the mid-1990s. Six Nemazee family members and friends (including the caretaker of his 12-acre Katonah, N.Y., estate) donated a total of $60,000 - the maximum legally allowed -- to Bill Clinton's legal defense fund.
In the closing days of 1998 Clinton named Nemazee his Ambassador-designate to Argentina. Hillary Clinton embraced the Muslim moneyman at a January 1999 White House celebration of the Islamic holiday Eid. The Senate, however, refused to confirm the controversial nominee after a Forbes Magazine investigation exposed Nemazee's questionable business dealings. "He was," said a bitter former business partner, "the Iranian equivalent of J.R. Ewing."
The Forbes magazine investigation also documented how, in order to get his hands on public-employee pension fund monies allocated for minority managers, the U.S.-born Nemazee had falsely claimed to be a Hispanic of Venezuelan background and, on another occasion, an Asian-Indian.
But Nemazee's cynical lust for money can be frightening as well as laughable. He is a founding board member of the Iranian American Political Action Committee [IAPAC], which seeks to create friendly and lucrative business relationships with the medieval theocratic dictatorship now ruling Iran. Iran is, of course, an "Axis of Evil" nation that seeks to acquire nuclear weapons and is on our State Department's official list of nations that support terrorism. Nemazee seeks to enrich himself by further enriching the power-mad Mullahs ruling Iran.
"The founding member of this group is Mr. Hassan Nemazee, an American of Iranian origin and one discredited, and well-known agent of the Islamic Republic, within the Iranian community in the United States," wrote opponent of the Iran regime Aryo B. Pirouznia of the Student Movement Coordination Committee for Democracy in Iran. "Their [IAPAC's] agenda in their own words is: `...how relations between the Islamic Republic and the United States can be restored in support of the Islamic Republic and the revolution.'"
Pirouznia wrote this in an open letter to Senator Edward Kennedy urging the Massachusetts Democrat to dissociate himself from Nemazee. The more-leftward senator from the Bay State, John Kerry, continues to embrace Nemazee and the suitcases full of money that he donates.
And, needless to say, Kerry welcomes all sorts of other benefactors, e.g., happily pocketing $50,000 apiece from Hollywood actor Dennis Hopper and Viacom Entertainment Chairman Jonathan Dolgen.
Such are the strange bedfellows of John Kerry, these Big Money payers who call his tune and pull his puppet strings today - and will do so if he becomes President of the United States. But these people are clean and honest compared to the evil foreign cesspools where Kerry has gotten cash. To understand these, we need to remember Kerry's past in Vietnam.

-----------------------------------------------
Commentary:
Kerry is even more skewed than
Gore was on global warming
By PATRICK J. MICHAELS
Guest Commentary
IN POLITICS, timing is everything, Howard Dean being a wonderful example. So is Al Gore, who chose to give a completely paranoid speech about global warming in New York two weeks ago, on a day when the temperature was 22 degrees below normal. In a remarkably Dean-like rant to the Democratic organization MoveOn, he said that the reason Americans reject his vision of climate-Armageddon has more to do with what he called "a massive and well-organized campaign of disinformation" on the part of me and my few friends than it does with the thermometer.
When it comes to disinformation about climate change, Al Gore's got competition in the principal beneficiary of Howard Dean's rhetorical largesse, John Kerry. On May 17, 2000, Kerry said:
"In Massachusetts, we always looked forward to fall because the ponds froze over and we could play hockey. Today, you are lucky if the ponds freeze in northern New Hampshire. Up there . . . I do not wear a coat until after November now."
I'm offering a night of free beer to the first journalist who can come up with a picture of John Kerry wearing a coat in November (and expect to have to pay off within one minute of this column's publication). But what about that whopper about northern New Hampshire's ponds?
One lesson in climate hype that Gore never learned (and which may have cost him the Presidency) is that people can look up facts pretty quickly now. Gore lost normally Democratic West Virginia because of his hype on global warming and his resultant vitriol against the coal industry. Miners, who he would have put on unemployment, stayed home or voted for Bush. Now Gore's venting about planetary heating in howling blizzards.
So Kerry should beware. There are lots of data on the Internet, including a study by the U.S. Geological Survey of "ice-out" dates on lakes in northern New Hampshire. That's the day of the year when you can no longer play hockey.
John Kerry is 60 years old, so it's safe to say he was playing hockey in New Hampshire from the ages of 7 to 17, or 1950 through 1959. Near First Connecticut Lake, the average date of ice-out for that period was May 1. From 1991-2000, when, according to Kerry, "you are lucky if the ponds freeze," the average ice-out date is later, on May 5.
A year later, on May 1, 2001, Kerry said, "This summer the North Pole was water for the first time in recorded history," a story that was originally carried by The New York Times in September 2000. It was retracted three weeks later as a barrage of scientists protested that open water is common at or near the pole at the end of summer. Further, it's common knowledge in the scientific community that there has been no net change in Arctic temperatures in the last 70 years.
He went on: "In 1995, after a period of unusual warming, a 48- by 22-mile chunk of the Larsen Ice Shelf in Antarctica collapsed." Disregarding that ice shelves don't "collapse," the fact, as accessible as the nearest Nature magazine, is that Antarctica shows a slight cooling trend in recent decades.
Voters need to stay tuned to Kerry on global warming for the Arizona primary on Feb. 3. John McCain has been on a merciless campaign of badgering the President about climate change, including shepherding the first Senate vote to restrict energy use because of global warming, which only failed by eight votes last fall. You can bet Kerry is going to feed off of McCain's Arizona popularity. He may even entreat him into the veep slot, claiming to be the ultra-centrist and spelling sure defeat for President Bush.
Anyway, now that he's the front-runner, he's going to have to watch what he says. Or what he wears. Again, free beer for that picture of him wearing a coat in November.
If Kerry doesn't check his facts better, he'll soon be sharing the platform with Al Gore, trapped in the limbo of the formerly relevant.
Patrick J. Michaels, senior fellow in environmental studies at the Cato Institute, is author of "The Satanic Gases."

Posted by maximpost at 3:47 PM EST
Updated: Wednesday, 28 January 2004 4:41 PM EST
Permalink

Osama's son `forewarned Iran of 9/11', says defector

BERLIN: An Iranian defector, preparing to testify in Germany's second major September 11 trial, said on Tuesday that a son of Osama bin Laden had personally told Iranian leaders of the planned attacks on US cities in 2001.
Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi rejected the accusation, saying the defector was not credible and had invented his story.
The defector, who goes by the cover name Hamid Reza Zakeri, told Reuters in a telephone interview that al Qaeda had forewarned Tehran of the attacks because it wanted Iran's help in sheltering its leaders afterwards.
"I'm not saying that Iran had a hand in it (September 11). I'm saying that Iran knew about it," Zakeri said.
"Iran would be the safest place for al Qaeda because it wasn't a country where the US could directly or indirectly intervene" to seize al Qaeda leaders on the run after the planned attacks, he added.
Zakeri says he is a former intelligence official who defected in July 2001 and tried to warn the United States, through its embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan, that a major attack would take place on or about September 10.

The Iranian foreign minister, asked about the defector's assertions, told a news conference on Tuesday: "This is untrue. He has made up this information... he has made it up for fraudulent purposes. He wants to make money and his views are of no value."
Western intelligence sources have privately voiced scepticism about Zakeri's accusations, but German prosecutors have taken them seriously enough to call him as a key trial witness.
He is due to testify for the prosecution on Friday in the case of Abdelghani Mzoudi, a Moroccan accused of conspiring with the al Qaeda "Hamburg cell" which provided three of the September 11 suicide hijackers. Another Moroccan, Mounir El Motassadeq, was convicted in Germany on similar charges last year but will hear the outcome of his appeal on Thursday.
Speaking by mobile phone from an undisclosed location, Zakeri said he had handled security arrangements in January 2001 for a visit of about 30 al Qaeda members to Iran, led by Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Zakeri said he had previously seen Zawahiri several times since 1996 at camps used by the militant group Hizbollah in Iran. The talks took place southeast of Tehran, lasted four days and were headed on the Iranian side by a representative of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, he said.
Four months later, in May 2001, Zakeri said he had been ordered to collect a VIP delegation arriving by army helicopter at a special base east of the Iranian capital.
This time the guest was Osama's son Saad bin Laden, accompanied by three bodyguards. Zakeri said the visit lasted three days and included late-night talks with Khamenei, ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and three other top leaders.
Zakeri said he was not part of the discussions and not privy to details of the September 11 plot or the targets, but added: "I knew in general that there was an operation being prepared against Israel and the United States for September 10."
He said he passed a warning to a CIA official in Baku, but "they didn't take me seriously".
Zakeri said he had not wanted to testify in the Mzoudi case, but had been drawn in after telling German investigators he had received information by email from someone else relating to al Qaeda activity in Germany.
He said he was under close German police protection after contacts in Iran had warned him his life was in danger.
"They said: `They sent the people already, and they are very close to the door.' I know what that means. It means they are very close to kill me. But already I informed the German authorities and the German police... I'm all right, hopefully I'm safe," he said. --Reuters
----------------------------------------------------

Frontpage Interview: Steven F. Hayes
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | January 28, 2004


Frontpage Interview's guest today is Stephen F. Hayes, the staff writer at The Weekly Standard whose recent article, Case Closed, reported on the U.S. government's secret memo detailing the links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden.
FP: Welcome to Frontpage Interview Mr. Hayes. It's a pleasure to have you with us.

Let's begin with the State of the Union Address last week. The President talked about the War on Terror, Iraq, the importance of fighting our enemy and finishing the job etc., but he did not touch on the Saddam-Al-Qaeda connection -- which you, among others, have done an excellent job documenting. Why do you think the President was silent on this crucial theme?

Hayes: I'm not sure the State of the Union is the proper setting for any kind of a detailed rehash of prewar arguments.

That said, I think the administration has been too silent on these connections for too long. We have learned some interesting things since the end of the war, not least of which is the support of the Iraqi regime for Abdul Rahman Yasin, an Iraqi native who mixed the chemicals for the 1993 World Trade Center building. Coalition forces found a document in Tikrit several months ago that indicates the former Iraqi regime has provided Yasin housing and a monthly stipend for nearly a decade. Dick Cheney has mentioned this on a couple of occasions, but it has otherwise gone unnoticed. Why?

It's a big deal. It doesn't prove Iraqi complicity in the bombing -- we have not yet found any paperwork that suggests the regime was supporting Yasin before the bombing. But it certainly raises interesting questions. The Iraqis have said for years that they either didn't know where Yasin was or, at times, that he had been imprisoned in Iraq. We now know with reasonable certainty that they were lying. In any case, it demonstrates that Iraq was not only harboring, but supporting, a dangerous terrorist who has attacked America.

I hope the administration will abandon its reluctance to share this kind of information with the American public. Yes, anonymous leaks from sceptics at the CIA are inevitable and hard to challenge. The administration has argued for a year now that Iraq was -- and remains -- the central front in the War on Terror. These revelations will help explain why.

FP: So, let's go over some of the facts. Tell us about the connection between Al Qaeda and Saddam. It's been confirmed beyond reasonable doubt hasn't it?

Hayes: Yes. I think it's telling that before the war, many who were sceptical of such a relationship were saying that there was no connection whatsoever. In the face of additional evidence to the contrary, they now seem to allow that there were "contacts" but tell us that such contacts didn't amount to anything. How they know this is never explained.

The Saddam-al Qaeda relationship began in the early 1990s and was brokered by Sudanese strongman Hassan al Turabi. By 1993, Saddam and bin Laden reached an informal non-aggression pact -- you don't mess with me, I won't mess with you. There is some evidence that they cooperated throughout the mid-1990s, perhaps on chemical and biological weapons -- while al Qaeda was based in the Sudan.

The relationship seemed to pick up in the late 1990s, during periods of increased tensions between Iraq and the U.S. Some of the evidence is more circumstantial and suggestive, some of it is direct and incontrovertible. And much of it is still unknown.

I thought the administration might have oversold the importance of Abu Musab Zarqawi, the al Qaeda affiliate who went to Baghdad for "medical treatment" after the war in Afghanistan. He had a starring role in Colin Powell's presentation before the UN Security Council this time last year. It looks like I was wrong. He seems to have been a central figure in pre-war Iraq/al Qaeda collaboration and, more troubling, is helping to recruit terrorists and coordinate anti-coalition activities in Iraq now. Investigations in Germany and Italy are turning up new things on Zarqawi almost daily.

FP: As you have discussed in your work, there were actual contacts between 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta and Saddam's people in Prague. And one of these meetings occurred in April, 2001, just a few months before 9/11. U.S. and Czech intelligence have confirmed these meetings, including the fact that they involved Saddam's approval for funding Atta. What do you think of the significance of these meetings? How can anyone deny Iraq's direct involvement in 9/11 if Iraqi intelligence officials were meeting with one of the main 9/11 perpetrators?

Hayes: It's a fascinating story. Five top Czech officials are on record as confirming the meeting. The Czechs have also reported to the CIA that al Ani authorized a financial transfer to Atta from the Iraqi Intelligence service to Atta. The FBI and the CIA have not been able to confirm these reports to their satisfaction. Dick Cheney once described reports of the meeting as "credible" but "unconfirmed." I think that's the best way to leave it at this point. Al Ani, now in US custody, has denied it. I expect we'll hear more about the alleged meeting and the conclusions about it in the near future.

FP: Many of those in our liberal media discount the possibility of a Saddam-bin Laden connection because they don't see a possibility of Islamic fanatics colluding with a secular regime. Many officials in the U.S. government have also had this disposition over the years in framing U.S. policy. But isn't this utter nonsense? Anti-American Middle East secularists consistently co-operate with Islamic religious fanatics against U.S. interests. No? Could you talk a bit about this?

Hayes: Well, the standard view that bin Laden considered Saddam an "infidel" and that Saddam was highly suspicious of bin Laden is, I think, essentially accurate. What bothers me is the great leap that the sceptics take, reasoning from those data. The notion that Saddam and bin Laden would never cooperate because of their divergent goals is, as you say, utter nonsense. History is replete with examples of long-time enemies cooperating against a common foe. The facility with which some CIA analysts and sceptical journalists rule out collaboration reflects a rather profound failure of imagination.

The New York Times reported last week that among the documents in Saddam's rat-hole was one warning his Baathists to be "wary" of cooperating with jihadists. That's not terribly surprising. The Times reporter, two paragraphs later, cited the document as further "evidence" that challenges Bush administration claims that Saddam worked with al Qaeda. Huh? The document shows no such thing. Most of those who believe that Saddam and al Qaeda cooperated argue that such a relationship was one of convenience. Evan Bayh, a Democratic senator from Indiana, explained this well in an interview I conducted with him a few weeks back. Saddam wanted to use al Qaeda to conduct terrorist operations on his behalf; al Qaeda wanted to use Iraq for the things that only a state can provide.

FP: What do you think of Saddam's capture? What is its significance?

Hayes: Saddam's capture was huge -- just ask Howard Dean. I had been struck in the months after Baghdad fell, just how many Iraqis told me that things would not improve until Saddam was captured or killed. It seemed ridiculous. Here you had American Bradleys driving throughout central Baghdad and the Iraqis still believed Saddam could actually stage a comeback. On one trip in late July, a member of the Najaf City Council asked Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz if it was true that the CIA was holding Saddam and waiting to use him as punishment if anti-American activities continued. This was a well-educated Iraqi speaking some four months after the end of major combat.

In the short-term, I think one reason the Shia in Iraq have become increasingly vocal over the past month about the need for direct elections is that they had confirmation that Saddam is gone for good. The Shia were horrendously abused under Saddam, of course, and given our repeated failure to make good on promises to them from 1991, have historically had good reason to be suspicious of American motives.

FP: This question posed by the member of the Najaf City Council about the CIA holding Saddam etc., brings to mind the bizarre Arab conspiracy mindset. I must be honest, in almost every one of my political discussions with my Arab acquaintances/friends, I am always on the receiving end of some kind of long monologue that relates a fantastic tale about Saddam being an American agent, bin Laden now living in Miami, the Israelis "fixing" 9/11 etc. Someone else is always in control. There are these dark sinister American and Jewish forces that are behind every Arab failure, let alone every Arab event. The "interpretations" of Saddam's capture in the Arab press I think were a good indication of this phenomenon. Could you give a few comments on this conspiracy mentality?

Hayes: I was at a dinner party within a couple of weeks of September 11 where a young Moroccan told me, matter-of-factly, that the Mossad was behind the attacks. The striking thing for me was not the existence of the conspiracy theory, but that it was posited by someone who had lived in the United States for more than a decade. That's scary and somewhat bewildering.

FP: Yes, it is scary and bewildering. But could you give a little bit of an insight here into the psychological mindset? Is it connected to the fact that the real world is simply too painful for many Middle Eastern Arabs to accept, because it would necessitate too many painful truths about the failures and bankruptcies of their own culture and civilization?


Hayes: Well, that may explain part of it. There is clearly a segment of the Arab world, for lack of a better term, determined to scapegoat Jews, the West, imperialists, America, etc. If you believe the polling in the region - and I'm not sure that I do - that's a big chunk. And it's reasonable to expect that those feelings will diminish the more inhabitants of the Middle East can determine their own future and create their own success. That's not going to happen overnight and it's not going to happen over the next decade. Winning the "hearts and minds" of the Arab world is a long-term problem that requires a long-term commitment and fundamental, systemic changes in relations between countries in the region and the West.

FP: So where are we headed now in Iraq? In what direction should U.S. involvement in Iraq go?

Hayes: I think we're at an important juncture in Iraq. (Of course, I've been saying that for the past nine months, too.) Ayatollah Sistani, the leader of the Shia in Iraq, is by most accounts a reasonable man. He's certainly not a rabble-rouser, just stirring things up to cause trouble. We have no choice but to listen to his requests. I'm told that he's not being nearly as dogmatic in private as the press reports would have us believe. Yes, he has strong views and wants to make certain that the Shia are adequately represented in the new Iraqi government, but he's not ruled out some kind of compromise on direct elections.

I think we're in Iraq for a while. It's now become something of a clich?, but it's a clich? because it's true: we can't afford to fail in Iraq. The changes we have made throughout the Middle East -- in mindsets, if not yet political structures -- are huge. We can't lose that momentum.

FP: Is democracy possible for Iraq? What can we do best to prevent Islamization of the country or a Khomeini-style take-over?

Hayes: Yes. It's difficult for me even to entertain the notion that democracy is impossible. As the late Michael Kelly once put it: who would choose to live in a dictatorship? There's a lot of political space between a Jeffersonian democracy and a dictatorship. I expect that what evolves in Iraq will occupy some of that space.

Your second question is much more difficult. I think even advocates for democracies in the Islamic world struggle to come up with adequate answers. With respect to Iraq, the US has a tremendous potential ally in Ayatollah Sistani. He has quite a following and has indicated repeatedly that he favors some form of democratic government. He qualifies this by insisting that such a government must not conflict with the teachings of Islam - which leaves a lot open to interpretation. But I worry that we could alienate Sistani by refusing to be flexible about how, exactly, elections are to take place in Iraq.

FP: In my recent interview with Dr. Richard Pipes, he stated that he would advise Bush not to bother trying to install a western-style democracy in Iraq and just to concentrate on setting up an effective tribal government. He argues that, "Democracy requires that all institutions standing between the individual citizen and the state be eliminated, but this is not possible in countries with strong tribal traditions." What do you make of this?

Hayes: I'm not sure I'd agree that democracy requires that all such institutions be eliminated. Many democratic theorists argue that a strong civil society is precisely what sustains democracies. The tribes in Iraq today are the source of tremendous power and loyalty - it's one of the reasons that Saddam, after neglecting the tribes for so many years, appealed to them for support when he was threatened. Much of the work that U.S. forces are doing in Iraq is conducted with the active cooperation of tribal sheikhs.

FP: Where do we stand right now in the War on Terror?

Hayes: That's a great question, and one that ironically doesn't get enough attention. I was speaking to a member of the national Commissioner investigating the September 11 attacks not long ago, and he told me that we had captured or killed more than 75 percent of the top al Qaeda leadership. That's astonishing. I think most Americans understandably believe that as long as we don't have bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, we're not winning. It's important to get those guys, but we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that the operation they once had at their disposal has been largely wiped out. That's not to say it isn't regenerating itself. It is. But as a measure of success, I like 75 percent.

One other point on that score. Remember all of the antiwar types who told us that we would lose cooperation in the broader War on Terror if we removed Saddam Hussein? They were wrong. And in some cases, mostly among our would-be allies in the region, we have seen a significant increase in cooperation on al Qaeda and its network.

FP: The antiwar types you refer to argued that we would lose our cooperation in the broader War on Terror if we attacked Saddam because that is what they wanted to happen. The Left clearly wanted the U.S. to be defeated in Iraq, just as it wants American defeat in the War on Terror. Do you agree? Why do you think the Left sides with the bin Ladens and Husseins of the world over the U.S. and freedom?

Hayes: I'm uncomfortable with sweeping generalizations about the Left - it's a pretty diverse crowd. There are certainly some on the fringe who would be happy to see the U.S. defeated in the War on Terror. That has a lot less to do with their desire to bin Laden or Saddam succeed than it does with eagerness to see President Bush fail. It's an imprecise guide, but I think it's not unimportant that many Democrats supported the war in Iraq - including some who want to make political points now.

That said, I was astonished by the number of those on the Left who were unmoved by the human rights arguments for removing Saddam. One failure of the Bush Administration's case for war was its refusal to highlight Saddam's abuses. I understand that some of our allies - chiefly the British - wanted to focus on WMD. And it could have been rightly pointed out that we didn't care so much about Saddam's human rights abuses when he was fighting Iran. Still, I would have relished seeing Dominique de Villepin explain to the world why, in the face of perhaps 1 million Iraqi deaths, France did not support removing Saddam. The mass graves we are finding now were no secret before the war. I interviewed an Iraqi-American in Dearborn, Michigan, who said he knew the precise location of a mass grave and begged me to pass on to the US government directions to it.

At the end of the day, the French and their antiwar counterparts here in American, were determined to oppose us. So I don't think such human rights arguments would have changed things dramatically. But a fuller airing of Saddam's history of torture and murder would have helped expose their arguments as fundamentally political.

FP: Yes, the French made no secret about where their loyalties were on Iraq. What's their problem?

Hayes: The French were determined to oppose us. There's no getting around that fact. It's funny, in the days after the unanimous Security Council vote on resolution 1441, Dominique de Villepin gave an interview with French radio that doesn't get nearly enough attention. In defending the French vote he told the audience two things: 1) that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons that threaten America, and 2) that the language in the resolution threatening "serious consequences" was understood by everyone involved to mean war. Avoiding war, he said, was the responsibility of Saddam Hussein.

The subsequent French posturing was just that - posturing. They knew very well that they had, in effect, already signed off on a war. Everything they did from that point on was designed to position France as the key geopolitical alternative to the United States. It was dishonest in a fundamental way and why, I believe, we were right to deny them the opportunity to bid on Iraqi contracts.


FP: Ok, so tomorrow your phone rings and it is President Bush. He is calling to ask you what concrete steps he should take next in Iraq and the War on Terror. He just wants a few concrete short-term plans. What do you tell him?


Hayes: I tell him to call someone a lot smarter than I am.


FP: Ok, so I guess that question didn't work. Well. . .let's pretend that Bush doesn't call you then. Let's just say I call you and ask you what you think the U.S. should do next in Iraq and the War on Terror. In your estimation, in what direction should U.S. policy be headed?

Hayes: It's important that we remain aggressive. It would be nice to imagine that our work is done, as I think half the country does. They're wrong. It's arguably more important to pressure outlaw regimes now than it was shortly after September 11. The terrorists and their state sponsors think of America as soft, as unwilling to sustain casualties, as lacking the will to fight. They're wrong, I hope, the more we can demonstrate that we are serious about removing threats the better we will be.

This does not, of course, mean more wars. Diplomacy can be more effective now, after the use of force, than it would ever have been after eight years of Clinton Administration dithering. Who, in early 2001, believed we would use force to eliminate terrorists and their state sponsors? Who doesn't believe it now?

FP: Thank you, Mr. Hayes, our time is up. I really appreciate you taking the time out to come on Frontpage Interview.

Hayes: My pleasure Jamie.

*


Posted by maximpost at 3:37 PM EST
Permalink

>> REAL REFORM THIS TIME?

Keeping the Information Edge

By Kevin O'Connell and Robert R. Tomes
Kevin O'Connell is director of RAND's Intelligence Policy Center and adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University. Robert R. Tomes is the deputy chief of the New Concepts Office, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and a member of the Council on Emerging National Security Affairs. The opinions and arguments are the authors' alone.

(Go to Print Friendly Version)

Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?

-- T. S. Eliot



Multifaceted discussions about "America's information edge" transpired throughout the 1990s. In a significant article by that name in Foreign Affairs (March-April 1996), Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens captured the essence and underlying importance of the idea:


The one country that can best lead the information revolution will be more powerful than any other. For the foreseeable future, that country is the United States. America has apparent strength in military power and economic production. Yet its more subtle comparative advantage is its ability to collect, process, act upon, and disseminate information, an edge that will almost certainly grow over the next decade.

In defense policy, the 1990s information-edge thesis appeared in different guises. Concepts such as information superiority, dominant battlespace knowledge, and decision superiority emerged as key elements of joint doctrine. National security strategy discussions focused on national information highways and critical infrastructure protection -- key components of sustaining information-edge capabilities. In the most significant intelligence organizational reform of the decade, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (nima) was founded with the mission of "guaranteeing the information edge." By the end of the decade, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other national security agencies presented strategic plans aiming to sustain and expand America's information edge while planning for increased volumes of information gathered from an increasingly diverse range of sources.

Our adversaries, meanwhile, moved to create and exploit their own information advantages. Al Qaeda, for example, developed a global intelligence capability, adapted the latest commercial information technology for their purposes, and exploited seams in our security defenses (witness the group's sophisticated use of stenography within the World Wide Web to communicate with operatives). Discussion of these seams now dominates national security reform debates. For us, the post-September 11 talk about intelligence transformation begged the question, Quo vadis, America's information edge?

Despite advances in information technology and knowledge management within the most visible area of national security -- the military -- America's overall commitment to preserving its information edge across the larger security bureaucracy, pace Nye and Owens, foundered during the 1990s. To be sure, the situation is improving. Great strides in information sharing are being made. Pockets of innovation do exist. Additional funds are now available to correct nearly a decade of resource shortfalls. Yet we contend that despite significant initiatives to transform, government-wide information-sharing innovations and intelligence-integration initiatives are evolving too slowly.

Framing the coming intelligence debate

We believe that the coming year will witness an unparalleled national debate over the future of American intelligence. Attention at the official level will be necessary to effect change, but by itself it is insufficient. What will also be needed is a reasoned public debate about the purposes and dynamics of U.S. intelligence.

The debate will address a number of issues, though intelligence sharing and cross-agency integration will remain at the forefront. The intelligence-sharing issue has been a favorite topic within American security planning since the summer of 2002. So too have subsequent efforts to discover who had information and intelligence about the September 11 terrorist attacks and what, if anything, would have been different had all information been shared among U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The joint congressional inquiry into the intelligence context of 9-11 provides a number of points for consideration. The inquiry's report decried a failure to capitalize on the "individual and collective significance" of information relevant to the attacks. Other findings faulted details across the intelligence spectrum of collection, analysis, use of technology, and information-sharing policies.

The coming intelligence debate will address more recent issues as well. The flap over the state of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, charges that the intelligence cycle is being politicized, and a perceived lack of innovation in the integration of diverse intelligence sources are likely to amplify arguments over intelligence modernization -- the backbone of our information edge. Intelligence will also figure prominently in the assessment of coalition responses to the escalating Iraqi insurgency.

All of these are appropriate considerations for an intelligence transformation debate, but they are not necessarily useful for organizing action. We believe that the appropriate research question for the policy community is not who in the U.S. government -- intelligence agency, law enforcement entity, or other -- failed to react to specific information about the individuals associated with the September 11 attacks. (Similar questions about the quality of intelligence preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom will not focus our attention on the right issues, either.) Rather, policymakers should be asking what levels of political, financial, and intellectual resources leaders and the public at large are willing to commit -- and whether that commitment will last.

Staying power is critical. So too is putting in place a transformation program that is rooted in a culture of innovation -- guided by an architect with clear strategic objectives -- and that addresses organizational and operational improvement, not just technology. Setting a course for fundamental change also means taking what management theorists call "a long view." The reforms that focused defense policy on information and knowledge occurred over decades; only now are they being reflected in strategy, doctrine, and acquisition.

In fact, antecedents for the much-ballyhooed Revolution in Military Affairs (rma) first emerged in the mid-1970s -- making it at least a three-decades-long journey to today's proclamation of a "new American way of war." Current defense transformation initiatives look beyond the 2020 time frame.

Without an intense focus by the leadership -- and perhaps by the public at large -- it will take at least that long to realize the full potential of any radical or significant overhaul of analytical methods, information sharing, and knowledge-management capabilities. But, just as some defense transformation must occur in the near term to sustain our military advantage in light of new threats and operational realities, intelligence transformation must pursue a mix of near-, mid-, and long-term initiatives.

Allegations that intelligence community and domestic law enforcement officials failed to share crucial information created the political impetus for bold action, which the Bush administration took by creating a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (dhs). More recently, the president instructed the director of central intelligence (dci), the director of the fbi, the attorney general, and the secretaries of homeland security and defense to form a Terrorist Threat Integration Center (ttic) under the leadership of the dci. An undersecretary of defense for intelligence was appointed to coordinate the wide and varied activities of Defense Department intelligence.

Despite our view that we are moving too slowly toward meaningful intelligence integration and information sharing, these changes suggest that the intelligence transformation debate will in some ways be about what to do next. Because of these developments, the fear of change and reluctance to create new relationships may be less significant problems.

Clearly, considerable changes have occurred. Our concern is ensuring that form follows function at the level of policy, in the development of new analytic capabilities, and in the development of community incentives to adopt new ways of doing business. An argument similar to the 1990s information-edge discussion in defense policy recurs among "change" recommendations: The pursuit of information and decision superiority underscores military innovation. Concerning the technological enablers of sharing, many argue for situational awareness and visualization tools similar to those used by military intelligence analysts to integrate diverse sources. Form and function should reflect the current integration imperative, which means that behavior must match the current rhetoric of horizontal integration.

An opportunity exists to use the creation of dhs as a first step toward better alignment of the funding, management, and coordination of intelligence. Advertised as the largest reorganization in American government since the 1947 National Security Act (which created the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency), the Department of Homeland Security will take efficient information sharing, effective knowledge management, and leadership of interagency coordination as the benchmarks of its success. The department cannot function without substantial analytical resources to correlate intelligence from national intelligence agencies, field reports from law enforcement, and internal information about people and material entering the United States. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center performs some of this function, but its explicit relationship to dhs is not yet fully elaborated or understood.

In any case, the sine qua non of creating real homeland security measures is expanding and sustaining the information edge. Updating the lexicon, this means a sustained knowledge edge through integrated source management: processing, disseminating, and exploiting information in time to preempt adversaries and prevent crises. This requires embracing a new attitude within the U.S. government -- and, at some level, in society as a whole -- about more active information sharing across federal and domestic agencies along with a willingness to pursue intelligence-related changes and innovations in the executive and legislative branches. Beyond dhs and ttic, it is difficult to imagine doing this without meaningful intelligence reform, which in turn involves policy, security, and organizational innovation at many levels.

The anticipated intelligence reform debate cannot be limited to getting domestic and national intelligence agencies merely to share information or post data others can access. Anyone who regards this as the core issue has mistaken the tree for the forest. An overhaul of how intelligence and information are created, gathered, and shared throughout the national security enterprise is needed. Although recent discussions have focused on domestic information sharing, this issue also concerns relationships with allies and security partners that are historically dependent on American intelligence to supplement their more austere intelligence activities. When American information and knowledge entities fail internally to correlate and act upon collected or reported data, the negative effects cascade through information networks both inside and outside the Untied States. This has the potential to negatively influence those who share with us, jeopardizing a relatively small but nonetheless critical source of information our human sources are often unable to ferret out.

Organizational politics and parochial quibbling aside, innovations in intelligence analysis and sharing must be central to rethinking how we sustain our comparative advantage.


Rethinking the information component

Since the mass of information available tends to exceed the capacity to evaluate it," Henry Kissinger writes in his Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (Simon & Schuster, 2001), "a gap has opened up between information and knowledge and, even beyond that, between knowledge and wisdom." Fortunately, there are signs of improvement. The Bush administration's national security strategy and defense planning documents have restored intelligence to the core of national security policymaking. Some officials suggest the need for intelligence readiness assessments similar to those used in defense planning. Intelligence, traditionally viewed as a supporting function, is now considered a co-equal element of national power. Many are pushing for intelligence capabilities that enable proactive policy decisions to shape the threat environment. This is a dramatic shift for those who considered intelligence a mere tool (rather than a source of power) for understanding what our adversaries did in the recent past (rather than what they will do in the near future).

Advancing the rethinking of national intelligence requires adapting security controls and policies that have governed the protection of intelligence sources and methods for decades. In essence, a rigid "need to know" regime -- by definition a restrictive concept more suited to the Cold War -- loses its utility in a world where police officers, coast guard captains, and emergency rooms must all remain in the loop. Put another way, the underlying logic of information compartments loses its appeal in an era where much is uncertain, where we grapple with mysteries rather than collect the pieces of a known puzzle, and where we want human abstraction and cognitive capabilities to intuit otherwise hidden relationships. The new imperative is a need to share. This requires unprecedented revisions of policies and procedures. It requires a cultural change for those intelligence professionals who cut their teeth in the current system.

This is not to say that sources and methods are no longer important. Indeed, they must be protected to preserve our information edge. Achieving the requisite levels of sharing while continuing to protect sources and methods may require complex technological solutions. Nonetheless, ease of access must prevail.

Rethinking intelligence requires some understanding of how we got here. During the 1990s, the intelligence community warned of an increasingly diverse and complex range of new security threats at home and abroad. Despite widespread agreement that global security challenges were overwhelming intelligence agencies, the security arms of the U.S. government were not given the proper direction or incentives to fully adapt from Cold War organizational cultures, processes, and business models.

The 1990s witnessed movements to reinvent and reengineer government; initiatives to enhance accountability through performance results; and, in the defense sector, plans to modernize, revolutionize, and finally transform the military. Sadly, the post-Cold War peace dividend in intelligence never came, and the context for a reform of intelligence activities was never ripe in the 1990s politically, financially, or intellectually. Many tried and failed. Intelligence agencies suffered through budget cuts and personnel reductions. The cia was forced to close a significant number of its overseas missions -- many in areas critical to the war on terrorism today. Agencies delayed modernization to satisfy immediate intelligence requirements as the global security environment became more complex and, by some accounts, more dangerous in terms of unpredictable or "wildcard" threats.

Paradoxically, in moving to be more responsive to decision makers' daily needs, intelligence was in danger of being perceived as a news or current affairs center -- one that could not compete with cnn. This was never an honest comparison or a worthy analogy. Intelligence agencies were not treated as a set of professional networks able synergistically to understand adversaries and provide relevant insight. And what is intelligence, to paraphrase Allen Dulles, if not the craft of outthinking our adversaries?

Thankfully, the craft of intelligence has once again become highly valued. Recruitment is up, intelligence is treated more favorably in the media and the entertainment industries, and bipartisan support once again is voiced for analysts. Some reports indicate that the cia is back at the top of the list for college graduates asked where they would like to begin their careers.

Gone from current discussions is the tired argument about the value of open-source as opposed to secret intelligence. An explosion in open-source information in the 1990s led some to question the comparative efficacy of existing intelligence sources and to champion alternatives, restating anew the old question about whether the business of post-Cold War intelligence is primarily about collecting secrets or the better use of available open-source information. Of course, as most intelligence professionals will argue, it involves both.

Pushing for open-source solutions created another debate that was politicized by those with an agenda to shrink the intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, new requirements for open networks and additional open-source analytic expertise were not matched with additional funding. New requirements were funded from modernization and community integration accounts. Exacerbating discussions of intelligence reform were a series of intelligence miscues in places like India and Iraq. They reinforced leadership concerns about giving the U.S. intelligence community more money. Would additional funds be spent to reinforce deficiencies or to correct them? In this environment, arguments that open sources could serve policy more efficiently gained credence beyond their merits.

A related problem concerned resource alignment. Unlike the current division of labor between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and the combatant commands, U.S. intelligence agencies have both operational and acquisition missions. Even within the same agencies, this often leads to unhealthy competition for leadership attention between current operations and modernization, and potentially to inefficient resource allocations in the face of successive crises. In the fray of day-to-day intelligence support, it is often longer-term analysis and research and development on new sources of intelligence that suffers. During the 1990s, as intelligence consumers multiplied, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence organizations experienced further deficits in their accounts for recapitalization and investment in new information-sharing networks. The diffusion of innovative analytic tools and the proliferation of collaborative environments suffered.

Moreover, instead of realigning agencies to meet tough challenges, too often the preferred solution was to create extra-organizational centers of excellence (e.g., the Counter Terrorism Center). This further complicated resource allocation and distracted leaders from modernizing the core structures of their agencies. At the same time, it proved our argument: Information-sharing challenges required the creation of new organizations that were free of the impediments to sharing in the existing agencies. We recognized seams in our own national security information apparatus but addressed only the symptoms -- patching some seams without fixing the underlying problem.

For over a decade, some 300 recommendations were made on the direction and management of U.S. intelligence, yet significant reform proposals lacked leadership focus and bipartisan support, especially in light of the pace of current operations. Subsequently, the solution to the intelligence community's information analysis and sharing problems was often to increase oversight and micromanagement from Congress or the executive branch. While understandable in hindsight, this paucity of actual intelligence reform was -- and remains -- at odds with the continuing need for timely, accurate, complete, and relevant information and knowledge throughout every aspect of national security.

Adaptations in thinking

Accounts of post-September 11 intelligence successes point to an ability to adapt in times of crisis. Operations against adversaries like al Qaeda and proven capabilities to locate, target, and capture or kill fleeing al Qaeda members reflect a traditional, highly technical, and sophisticated American approach to communications, wartime intelligence gathering, and the application of information technology to solve military challenges. Significant innovations in analytic methods and important integration activities surely prevented further attacks on the United States. Our intelligence analysts are taking care of business.

How they are doing their business is another issue. We tend not to adapt our processes and techniques to new challenges as much as surge ahead with them. That is, we move analysts and technical capabilities to the new crises to do more of what we did in the last crisis. We add more analysts and collect more data on the problem at hand. But step-level increases in collection and adding more analysts to the same processes are not viable long-term answers.

Rethinking U.S. intelligence is not an argument for simply increasing the pace, scope, and breadth of information collection. Volume is not the problem. Some 50 years on, U.S. intelligence remains overwhelmingly collection-centric. Some additional collection is needed -- but in focused areas and shared in ways that promote synergy among agencies. For example, domestic agencies should identify intelligence gaps and coordinate global collection plans to fill them. Collection that remains unexploited -- lacking analysis and contextual consideration -- may be as useless as no collection at all.

We believe that many within the intelligence community now recognize this point and are considering solutions. Many are discovering that information management, including optimal management of technical sources, has failed to keep pace with growing requirements for information processing, analysis, correlation, and dissemination across intelligence disciplines. We need to transform our mission management (optimize tasking) and management of analysts (work flows).

Some of this is already happening in homeland security. An underlying criticism of current internal U.S. government information networks involves the traditional American bifurcation of security affairs into national and international, a lingering proclivity to view national security as something that begins and ends at the border. This is largely due to political concerns and legal restrictions now under review for revision. The 9-11 attacks and the ensuing war on terrorism only reinforced arguments for the organizational and procedural blurring of "foreign" and "domestic" categories, which no longer provide a useful framework for organizing defense and security policies. In essence, al Qaeda exploited artificial organizational boundaries that served American citizens well for over 50 years -- boundaries designed to protect Americans at home from intrusions on their constitutional rights.

For cultural and historical reasons, it is revolutionary to place domestic intelligence on par with the support that decision makers receive from national foreign intelligence agencies like the cia. But as the current nima director, Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Clapper, notes about nima's capabilities to leverage satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence, "enormous advances in homeland security are possible by simply overlaying nima's current analytic and planning capabilities onto homeland security missions." It is time to bring our technological and analytic superiority home, where prudence suggests it should always have been. The technical capability for this change has long existed. It is time to remove the barriers preventing it, including the creation of new and more efficient oversight methods that are consistent with America's democratic values. While this may seem radical, we believe that it is one of the easier steps that can and should be undertaken.

Clearly, the legal and political boundaries for U.S. intelligence have to be reconsidered not only by our political leaders, but also by the public at large. Note that this is not an argument for giving free rein to criminal investigators whenever they encounter cases, crimes, or actors with alleged ties to suspected terrorists or terrorist groups. Implicit in our elaboration of the information-edge thesis is a steadfast fidelity to American core values regarding the rights of citizens and an unwavering commitment to civil liberties, including the fair treatment of noncitizens legally in the United States. One of the most important benefits of a domestic information-edge focus is the potential to dampen the negative effects of revamped policies and processes on noncitizens, the overwhelming majority of whom are attempting to follow in the footsteps of previous generations of immigrants toward the American dream.

Another reason to encourage further changes in intelligence support to homeland security is the possibility that doing so will engender a debate and political context conducive to overcoming traditional impediments to reform.

On U.S. intelligence reform

Sustaining america's information edge requires fewer hierarchical approaches to information and knowledge services. Ultimately, reform is not about intelligence in the classic sense of intelligence cycles and consumer-producer relationships. It is about information and knowledge, wisdom and foresight, agility and flexibility, leadership and vision. Unlike most corporate knowledge management approaches, and contrary to digital-age business models, until the late 1990s most end-to-end intelligence processes remained wedded to an artificial, Newtonian machine-parts perspective more appropriate for the nineteenth century than the current one.

Consider the prevailing views of the intelligence cycle. Experts have long recognized that the classic depiction of the cycle -- requirements or tasking, collection, processing, analysis, dissemination -- promotes too linear an approach to getting information to decision makers. And this cycle continues to exist for each discipline. At present, government "stovepipes" continue to define how information agencies (e.g., intelligence agencies) manage their respective domains, including day-to-day operations and acquisition processes. The recent transition from a central imagery tasking office, an activity managed by nima, to a broadened source management activity -- as well as the new analytic fusion initiatives between nima and the National Security Agency (nsa) -- represent an important move away from stovepipes.

Yet for situations like Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, and Yemen -- and ongoing problems like countering nuclear proliferation -- the most compelling intelligence comes from small collaborative efforts between analysts from across the intelligence disciplines that engage in all-source analysis and have multi-int capabilities, which are not necessarily the same thing. Whereas all-source analysts have the ability and expertise to leverage information from any intelligence discipline or source (something that is done in practice by analysts in numerous agencies), multi-int analysis involves leveraging the frequently untapped characteristics of raw data from technical collectors within the all-source environment. Examples of this would be the synergistic overlay of imagery and signals intelligence atop detailed terrain and feature maps, the ability to combine tradecrafts for new types of interpretation and exploitation, a multidisciplinary analysis capability based on geographic referencing of disparate data sources, and new ways of structuring decision making that use hypothesis-driven methods to predict future courses of action.

American defense and intelligence planning evolved during the 1990s under the assumptions that faster is better, that existing processes and structures were capable of meeting new challenges, and that America's comparative intelligence advantage was unsurpassed. For the most part, this thinking led to mere incremental improvements in intelligence.

The contextual threads for intelligence described above -- a more complex security environment, an increased number of intelligence consumers with temporally demanding needs, and a political context of relative inattention -- meant that every time a U.S. national security crisis sprung forth, numerous reform proposals were tabled but few were implemented. Yet even when they were implemented, the reforms generally yielded minor qualitative improvements in capabilities. While patience is often a virtue when arrived at deliberately for strategic reasons, delay and indecision about reforming American intelligence were based on bureaucratic inertia and a reluctance to accept risk (political, technical, or another sort).

Since September 11, the most prominent public discussions about intelligence have centered on stale intelligence issues like the need for spies over technical intelligence and how to reorganize the boxes above and around the dci and the secretary of defense. Why is this happening? In part, organizational self-interest continues to restrict the realm of possibility concerning reorganization. But rather than focusing on rearranging the boxes -- overly risky in a time of war and uncertain in light of our complex security landscape -- we should focus on helping agencies work and share information better.

Defense and intelligence community efforts to quicken the pace and expand the scope of so-called horizontal integration efforts are a positive development. These efforts must overcome a variety of long-standing impediments to integration.

First, development of new methods for collaboration and expanding insight across government remain limited by our rigid divisions of intelligence disciplines (e.g., human intelligence, imagery intelligence, signals intelligence) and by legal and security impediments to information exchange. Differences between human intelligence and technical intelligence sources are often confused with different analytic and cognitive approaches to intelligence production and estimate writing. The sheer volume of information collected means that, in the filtering and sorting of information required just to begin analysis, we may be losing vital information. Filtering and sorting is not intelligence. Neither is the current penchant to talk of a new "process, post, and use" information cycle that further obscures the heart of intelligence: analysis.

Intelligence must be a more holistic enterprise. Efficiency should not be held up as the overarching goal at the expense of better understanding. Supporters of human intelligence, for example, often falsely associate human intelligence with some mythical or spiritual capability to understand cultures or adversary intent. In doing so, they frame their own reform ideas in terms of cost-benefit tradeoffs between human and other sources. This is wrongheaded. It also reflects the defensive posture of human intelligence enthusiasts lamenting past cuts in human intelligence programs. Of course we need better human sources, with all of the infrastructure and support this entails. But America also needs clandestine services that have overwhelming technological capabilities for covert surveillance, data transmission, and agent protection.

Second, where one sits with regard to intelligence continues to determine where one stands on reform issues. In information and intelligence, 10 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, we have not yet torn down our own walls. In spring 2002, some observers commented that the electronic communication from an fbi field office in Phoenix to fbi headquarters describing the activities of foreign nationals enrolled in flight schools did not constitute "intelligence." The case illustrates what has become an endemic problem and exposes its deep historical roots. This problem extends into the agencies as well.

A third reason for the lack of tangible intelligence reform stems from unwillingness among middle and senior managers to aggressively support innovation -- a syndrome perpetuated by scarce resources, dwindling tolerance of risk, and meager entrepreneurial activism at senior levels. We see these as negative externalities of the 1990s cutbacks in funding and work force reductions. Reform enthusiasts remain disappointed and aloof after 10 years of supporting what many see as a largely useless "reinventing government" fervor. For them, much political capital was depleted while little change was accomplished (and some careers were ruined).

A fourth impediment concerns the pathos of "studying without action." Most pressing intelligence issues have been studied and debated ad nauseam. By the end of the 1990s agencies found themselves beleaguered by a seemingly endless assault of commissions and studies on intelligence reform, all of which drained extensive resources but resulted in very limited change. Despite numerous reports and recommendations on the subject, for example, it remains painfully difficult to implement information system reforms because of complicated and divergent security regimes.

Another obstacle to intelligence community reform is the existing planning and budgeting system. Despite attempts to integrate processes in both the executive and legislative branches, intelligence-planning processes are essentially formalized systems to tend fiscal rice bowls. This is a far cry from the days in which a few senior leaders from both branches were involved in planning and budgeting, with the lion's share of the technical and programmatic integration done by the people actually responsible for conceiving, creating, and using intelligence systems. Some call this the era of "heroic leadership," where a handful of scientists and program managers could, for example, build and oversee the launch of entire satellite systems with minimal political interference.

Today, too many structural barriers and intellectual boundaries exist, including ingrained expectations about procedures and oversight mechanisms. Technical systems are no longer conceived and built in an environment structured to sustain an innovative spirit; rather, they emerge from a consensus-based process designed to satisfy as many standardized engineering requirements as possible. Planning occurs from the top down. One official lamented that Congress has become the systems integrator for the U.S. intelligence community. Systems integration, which should derive from technological best practices, has become a political and actuarial process that values integration within agencies at the expense of integration across agencies. As we argue here, this contradicts the direction in which American intelligence should be headed.

As stated above, form should follow function -- not vice versa. Compartmentalize the planning and funding of information and knowledge sharing and you will reinforce compartmentalization practices. Although difficult to implement, a more effective means of making oversight and other planning activities an enabler rather than an obstacle to knowledge creation and sharing would be to redesign the entire intelligence enterprise from the consumer's level. Doing so presumably would allow the pantheon of U.S. information and knowledge agencies to self-organize and adapt to the environment more freely, allowing our internal organizations and structures to reflect the complex and adaptive aspects of the world and its ever-changing reality. If form follows function, then perhaps the best place to begin thinking about reform is with a true national intelligence strategy that spans national, domestic, and military domains.

A final point concerns the tendency for intelligence "change" discussions to become stuck on marginal issues. Too much is riding on our ability to rethink sharing and collaboration for decisions to be delayed by debate on the margins of large issues, detracting from attention to core intelligence problems.

Outsmarting the adversary

Nye and owens were right. America's information edge is its ability to collect, process, act upon, and disseminate information: the ultimate comparative advantage in the digital information age. What they addressed only in passing is the extent to which others would benefit from the information age, making discontinuous advances in information collection and processing and developing asymmetric capabilities designed to thwart America's strengths.

An overwhelming source of advantage for American power -- information -- has value only when it creates knowledge, is used in specific decision-making situations to achieve a comparative advantage, and is provided early enough to influence outcomes (e.g., negotiation or war). What was known historically as "operating inside the enemy's decision loop" means that information needs must be serviced faster and better before an adversary has the information necessary to implement his asymmetric plans.

Historically, what the United States seeks to know before acting militarily or making a policy decision is comparatively much more complicated than what its adversaries require. America's global reach and the political context for our overseas involvement are among the first reasons for this; our relentless pursuit of precision in warfare is yet another. America's political processes, image abroad, and military doctrines are information-intensive. There are sound political and operational reasons why the United States tends to require more abundant, timely, accurate, and precise information than our adversaries do. Because information must be gleaned from databases and knowledge sets that are global in nature, and because American institutions increasingly reward precision, seeking accuracy over timeliness and initiative, adversaries enjoy a structural advantage in situations characterized by dueling information edges.

The evolution of American intelligence agencies during the Cold War proceeded apace with relations between Washington and Moscow and was organized in terms of the East-West polarization of international affairs. For most nations, intelligence-sharing activities at home and abroad unfolded within this framework, which scripted a narrow slate of intelligence requirements. This was true for the U.S. intelligence community as well as other national intelligence services. For example, the Israelis focused on Middle Eastern countries and their relationship with the Soviet Union and, perhaps of equal importance, on developments in Washington that affected the regional balance of power.

Today, global intelligence agencies operate within a much less structured framework, which effectively limits the ability of agencies to organize activities around a known set of security challenges with specific collection targets. Flexibility and adaptation are key. Concurrently, the diffusion of information technology and increased awareness of historical U.S. intelligence practices have increased the ability of adversaries to protect information or to deceive U.S. intelligence agencies outright.

Adversaries also draw on globally available information. Much of the electronic data that al Qaeda acquired prior to the September 11 attacks, for example, came from websites; individuals performing their own surveillance verified some of this information. Beyond internet-based sources of analysis about foreign military and security developments, new technical sources of information -- gps navigational data, commercial space imagery -- are also available to anyone who has an interest and a modest budget. Coupled with instantaneous communication through cell phones, instant messaging, email, and other sources, foreign governments and nongovernmental actors can be part of a "virtual" surveillance team, military action group, or terrorist cell.

In essence, the information age may have spawned a new intelligence age, an age characterized by a footrace to provide information to support U.S. national security decision making better than an adversary can obtain his own. Ostensibly, the United States is running a series of footraces against multiple adversaries, including nation-states as well as terrorists, all focused on defeating American intelligence activities in the context of their own strategies and security activities.

Often overlooked is the advantage afforded to others from commercially available information and information technology with relatively little security. Here, adversaries draw on two aspects of the footrace. First, the information age provides unprecedented access to data and analysis of relevance to security policy. Second, the comparative benefit such access brings is, for adversaries, multiplied by lower accuracy and precision thresholds for operations. While we might want to limit the impact of a strike to a particular location in a building, there is nothing that prevents an adversary from just wanting to destroy the neighborhood. In other words, where we require precision for political and operational reasons, they do not. This asymmetry is evident in Iraq, where insurgency tactics and the use of fear are being used strategically to undermine the coalition's stability initiatives.

This vulnerability does not justify censorship or control of these kinds of information, nor should it prompt a longing for the more information-limited period of the past. We are in a period of increased transparency in security affairs, one that should drive wholly new concepts of diplomacy, military operations, and intelligence, including the reforms discussed heretofore. Rather than thinking about control as the operating paradigm -- keeping digits buttoned up is a near-futile endeavor -- U.S. intelligence agencies must reach beyond simply moving faster and more efficiently; they must become qualitatively more effective in collecting, processing, disseminating, and acting upon information. In other words, in a rapidly changing information market, U.S. intelligence innovations must drive toward increasingly specific and specialized forms of information.

During the Cold War, there was an understanding of how war might occur and how each side would fight. Even if conflict occurred, a set of rules moderated behavior. A specter of nuclear war hung over us, and extraordinary measures evolved to prevent it. Consequently, even lower levels of conflict and regional crises remained within commonly understood rules. Wars involving suicide bombings, unconventional attacks on civilian populations, and economic terrorism were generally precluded by these rules or at least constrained from upsetting regional politics. Now, however, whatever advantages are currently enjoyed by the United States in terms of conventional forces (including manpower, weaponry, and mobility), American notions of limiting firepower and damage to the absolute minimum for political and moral purposes do not deter an adversary bent on blowing up an entire city, shopping mall, or neighborhood.

As doctrine for the war on terrorism evolves, American and allied information and intelligence support must change dramatically, requiring at the very least a new infostructure linking the spectrum of diplomatic, military, law enforcement, and other operations that sustains America's information edge in areas where asymmetrical information footraces are developing. If the United States is to win -- or even stay relevant -- in the intelligence footrace, it must approach information in a way that is radically different from its approach in the past. The intelligence community does seem to be moving in this direction.



Honing America's information edge

Intelligence reform and the importance of improving U.S. intelligence are again prominent in the minds of American decision makers, both inside and outside the intelligence community. The joint congressional inquiry on the intelligence surrounding September 11 found both factual and systematic deficiencies that created the conditions for successful attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The creation of a dhs national warning system has provided some information related to possible terrorist attacks, but it also has created as much uncertainty as the system was designed to thwart. And threat-related hearings involving the dci and the fbi director have brought much-needed public attention to the fact that U.S. intelligence must be reformed as quickly and as smartly as possible. Intelligence sharing between federal, state, and local governments, as well as between government and private entities, seems to be the locus of public attention.

Rather than focusing solely on intelligence sharing as the goal of reform, and rather than merely increasing the number of terrorism analysts working within existing organizations, reform efforts should aim at transforming more than intelligence. The objective should be reforming the overall approach to end-to-end information processes, including the intelligence processes that underpin national security decision making. The procedure is straightforward and, initially, incremental. First, identify the information and knowledge needs of intelligence consumers. Then define the resources and processes required to meet them. Next, compare the needs and optimal structure with existing agencies and sharing processes. Finally, make required changes, including doing away with organizations, structures, or policies if need be. Overall, information sharing must be the focus of arguments for reforming national security and homeland security.

While many of the proposals for intelligence reform call for large-scale organizational changes, we believe that more practical solutions lie at a level beneath wholesale deconstruction of U.S. intelligence agencies or the intelligence community. Initiatives need to identify and adapt the tacit and explicit obstacles that prevent the sharing of intelligence and intelligence-relevant information across agencies at various levels. To cite a number of recent examples, among the problems associated with old approaches to knowledge management are artificial boundaries in analytic processes (e.g., the cia holding general warning data while the fbi held data about flight school training); inefficient databases (e.g., ins records on visas); impediments to interoperability (i.e., access to law enforcement data at the federal, state, and local levels); and a failure to sustain innovation across the intelligence community (few revolutionary collection or exploitation capabilities have been funded in the past decade).

While it is true that information technology has enhanced analyst communication and modernized some community interactions, the creation of information infrastructures within and between agencies has not created dynamic sharing relationships -- what we have called infostructures. In other words, while merely improving information pipes between people and agencies is easy -- this is the focus of many politically motivated initiatives -- it is a far cry from the cultural and procedural changes that will need to take place within and among organizations, especially if we are to deal with the analytic aspects of terrorism-related intelligence, such as dealing with fragmentary and deceptive information. It will also require true leadership. Information does not flow like water. Connecting the pipes merely creates the potential to share.

Organizationally, sustaining America's information edge also requires restructuring and realigning congressional committees to integrate defense and intelligence community funding and acquisition. Congressional streamlining to encourage innovation in information agencies will help create an environment more conducive to substantive change. It requires restructuring the budget and planning processes so that information and knowledge readiness ascend to the very top of the national security agenda. An information and knowledge readiness process is required, one that relates strategic information needs to agency programs intended to meet them. Decision makers in the executive and legislative branches must view the information edge as a readiness category that is coequal to traditional measures of defense preparedness.

People are the most important factor in honing the information edge. The mandated reduction in personnel that crippled intelligence capabilities in the 1990s created a long-term problem. Current policies requiring something similar to the joint service requirements in the military are not enforced, with many agencies seeking waivers. Central to future "joint intelligence" executive training must be information and knowledge management courses that address community information-sharing issues.

Realists understand that openness does not mean indiscriminate, undisciplined information sharing. Without some safeguards we undermine our advantage, perhaps leaving us more vulnerable than before. The answer lies somewhere along the spectrum between the current stovepipes, with their inherent knowledge seams, and the point where too much openness creates vulnerabilities.

We believe that the key to success in the global intelligence footrace is a renewed focus on innovation across the intelligence spectrum. In his classic Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (Basic Books, 1989), James Q. Wilson viewed innovations as new programs or technologies that "involve the performance of new tasks or a significant alteration in the way in which existing tasks are performed." We agree with Wilson that real innovations alter core tasks -- an extremely difficult undertaking for centralized, insular intelligence organizations that persist more as self-protective guilds than as the complex adaptive organizations required to anticipate and respond to rational, strategic adversaries engaging in asymmetric attacks. These adversaries are rational in that they learn, adapt, and organize based on our defenses; they are strategic because they have long-term objectives and engage in planning to meet them by adjusting to our actions, capabilities, and knowledge about the strategic environment. Managing knowledge to sustain America's information edge is less about infrastructure than leadership, engendering cultural change, encouraging entrepreneurial analysis, and learning to accept risk, whether in operational, informational, or acquisition processes. It requires focus and innovation at every level, with an active public debate about the strategic effectiveness and future direction of U.S. intelligence.

There is a need to nurture and reinvigorate the intelligence community's innovation ethos -- to reenergize and focus American ingenuity on emerging intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination challenges. Doing so, in past eras, has underwritten both our leadership role in international security affairs and our ability to prevent conflicts or terrorist attacks at home and abroad. The global war on terrorism and the broader U.S. national security environment provide a context that is ripe for pursuing innovations across the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of Homeland Security, a context that must be exploited to drive comparative information advantages against our adversaries. When the time comes, Congress and the administration must expend political capital to champion innovation without over-politicizing or otherwise biasing the process.



Feedback? Email polrev@hoover.stanford.edu.

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Malone move casts shadow over Murdoch succession
Chris Tryhorn
Thursday January 22, 2004
Malone: speculation he is planning takeover bid for News Corp
Questions were raised today about the future of News Corp after Rupert Murdoch's sometime-ally and sometime-foe John Malone became the second largest voting shareholder in the company through a shock overnight deal.
Mr Malone, a notoriously shrewd dealmaker who made his money in cable TV and owns QVC shopping channel and half of the Discovery network, increased his stake to 9%, a major change for News Corp as Mr Murdoch has never before had a shareholder with almost one third as many votes as him.
The deal immediately raised questions about Mr Malone's plans - some analysts have speculated as to whether he is planning a takeover bid and whether the move could scupper Mr Murdoch's succession plans involving his sons James and Lachlan.
Others believe it could be a sign of a new and formidable alliance between the two moguls.
Mr Malone's move cements his key position at News Corp, as the man who can confirm or deny Mr Murdoch's plan to pass control of the media group to his family.
"Privately the Murdochs will be meeting behind closed doors and asking 'what's going on here?'" one Australian analyst told the Australian Financial Review, which follows News Corp closely.
According to reports, Mr Murdoch only learned of Mr Malone's new holdings on Tuesday. "It is shocking that the transaction would take place without a phone call from Malone to Murdoch," a US media executive told the New York Times.
In terms of pure equity, Mr Malone's company, Liberty Media, now holds 17% of News Corp, exceeding the Murdoch family's 14%, and if it chose to swap more of its stock for voting shares it could get to a point where it could outvote the Murdochs.
Liberty's ?375m acquisition, announced in a US securities filing last night, took Wall Street by surprise.
Mr Malone has previously been seen as a passive investor who takes strategic stakes in media and technology companies, but there has been speculation he is moving towards a more proactive approach.
"There's a small chunk of ordinary shares that control a much bigger chunk of preference shares, that control a major chunk of English TV, and US TV," Macquarie analyst Alex Pollak told the AFR today. "That would be very attractive to a long-time cable player like Malone."
Mr Malone's decision to seek a bigger say in News Corp comes less than a month after Mr Murdoch sealed the acquisition of DirecTV.
The Colorado-based tycoon is notoriously secretive and at one point looked as if he was going to mount a rival bid for the US satellite TV company.
Ultimately, however, he stepped aside from the bidding, paving the way for Mr Murdoch to land a ?4bn deal that realised his dream of creating a worldwide satellite TV empire.
Mr Malone bought more than ?300m-worth of additional News Corp shares in March, which helped Mr Murdoch to finance the DirecTV transaction.
Mr Malone gained a substantial share in Mr Murdoch's company as part of News Corp's 2001 investment in US publishing and interactive TV company Gemstar but it was all non-voting stock.
The Murdoch family has remained unchallenged as by far the leading shareholder in News Corp, which has its origins in the Australian newspaper business founded by Mr Murdoch's father.
Mr Murdoch has made it clear he intends to keep the firm in the family, with sons Lachlan and James, the new chief executive of BSkyB, lined up to inherit his crown.
But if the family were seriously challenged or even outvoted, the path of succession might become less clear.
In a statement, the Liberty president and chief executive officer, Robert Bennett said: "We have capitalised on an opportunity to exchange non-voting shares for voting shares at attractive prices to become the second largest voting block on one of the world's premier media companies."
News Corp said it welcomed the investment. "In our view this is a another sign of confidence in our company's health and future strategy by Dr Malone," a News Corp spokesman told AFP.
Liberty has strategic investments in other media giants such as Time Warner, Viacom and Vivendi Universal.
Mr Malone is expected to play a pivotal role in the likely merger between UK cable companies Telewest and NTL, taking stakes in each company following their restructuring processes.
? To contact the MediaGuardian newsdesk email editor@mediaguardian.co.uk or phone 020 7239 9857
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>> STRUCTURAL DEFICIT OR NOT?

from the January 28, 2004 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0128/p01s03-usec.html
Deficit forecast collides with Bush's plans
Projections of $477 billion budget gap sharpen debate over extending tax cuts.
By Peter Grier | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
WASHINGTON - The nation's fiscal outlook has now come full circle in three years: from sunny surplus to deficit overcast as far as economists can see.
Things have become so bad that some analysts believe President Bush may be starting to scale back aspects of his domestic spending agenda. For instance, Bush's State of the Union speech included no mention of his proposal to send men to Mars, an expensive proposition that had received a cool reception in Congress.
But Bush has only redoubled calls to make his tax cuts permanent, and there's increasing evidence that such a move might make it extremely difficult to fulfill another of his pledges - halving the deficit by 2009.
"Extending the tax cuts is the largest single policy change they're talking about - that alone would expand the deficit by $2.2 trillion over 10 years," says Robert Bixby, executive director of the Concord Coalition, a fiscal watchdog group in Washington.
A new forecast issued by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on Monday emphasized the scale of the deficit problems ahead.
This year's deficit will be a record in dollar terms, at $477 billion, according to CBO. That's equal to about 4.5 percent of the nation's gross domestic product.
Economists consider the size of the deficit as percentage of GDP to be an important measure of what the nation can afford. By this standard the record US deficit was that of 1983, at around 6 percent of GDP. Without any changes in spending or tax policy, the deficit might gradually fade away, according to CBO's new numbers. By 2014, the budget might actually return to surplus.
But Washington abhors legislative stasis, and it's virtually certain that the White House will propose and Congress will pass major bills in coming years. Making permanent all of the Bush tax cuts now set to expire would result in deficits of around $300 billon a year for the foreseeable future, absent spending cuts.
Curbing a scheduled increase in the alternative minimum tax would add around $25 billion a year to the deficit. Expansion of the just-passed Medicare prescription drug benefit might add billions more - as might a manned mission to Mars.
Since the CBO last issued budget projections in August, its 10-year accumulated deficit estimate has increased by $1 trillion - mostly due to spending changes. "About 70 percent of that [increase] results from new legislation, such as the Medicare law," says CBO's report.

The Bush administration explains the huge deficits as primarily the result of the recent recession. Furthermore, they see the tax cuts as providing needed stimulus to a slow recovery and encouraging business investment that will produce new jobs. Many economists agree that the first installments of the tax cuts did provide a short-term boost. But they warn that extended deficits are risky and could do long-term damage to the US GDP.
"We think large, sustained deficits matter very much," said Alice Rivlin, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, at a recent seminar marking the release of a study on deficit issues.
That's because the government has to borrow to pay the deficits, and that means they compete with private borrowers, putting upward pressure on interest rates. Deficits in the range of 3.5 percent of GDP will eventually raise long-term interest rates by one or two percentage points, said Ms. Rivlin. "That translates into lower capital expenditures, lower productivity growth, lower GDP," she said. "We estimate that it means about $1,800 less income per household in 2014."
There's also a chance - although a relatively small one - that sustained deficits might cause other nations to lose confidence in US economic stewardship, and foreign investors to begin pulling money out of the US. That could cause US interest rates to spike even higher.
Administration officials retort that such talk is alarmist. The president has said he will halve the deficit within five years, "and that's what we intend to do," White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Monday.
The administration's $2.3 trillion budget proposal is due in Congress on Monday. It will hold nondefense, nonsecurity spending to a 0.5 percent increase, according to the White House.
But spending is not the part of the budget that is out of line with historical trends, according to some analysts.
CBO's new figures predict that US government revenues will fall to 15.8 percent of the economy in 2004, the lowest since 1950, according to an analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Income tax revenues will be 8 percent of the economy, the lowest since 1942, according to the generally liberal-leaning group. "Spending has grown in recent years, particularly in the areas of defense, international affairs, and homeland security," notes an analysis by the group. "Spending has not attained especially high levels in historical terms, however, and the spending increases that have occurred have been considerably smaller than the revenue declines."
* David R. Francis contributed to this report

Posted by maximpost at 3:08 PM EST
Updated: Wednesday, 28 January 2004 3:50 PM EST
Permalink

US draws a line on Pakistan's nuclear program
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
ISLAMABAD - The United States's patience could finally be running out with Pakistan and its nuclear program, even though Islamabad is scrambling to reassure Washington that any proliferation in the past was an aberration on the part of rogue individuals.
Disclosure by Iran to the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency of the names of people who provided Tehran with nuclear technology - including Pakistani scientists - has clearly alarmed Washington, even though these events took place some years ago.
Under strong US pressure, Pakistan has grilled at least 13 scientists from Kahuta, the site of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, and at least three are expected to be charged with selling Pakistan's nuclear technology to another country. Among those interrogated are former KRL director-general, Mohammed Farooq, and Major Islamul Haq, the principal staff officer of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan. Dr Khan spearheaded Pakistan's nuclear development program until his replacement two years ago as head of KRL, again under severe pressure from the US, which feared connections of al-Qaeda elements with some Pakistani scientists.
All of Pakistan's scientists are also now under heavy surveillance to track their every move, and the government has issued a circular stating that Dr Khan, a long-time celebrity in Pakistan, is not to be invited to any ceremonies or official functions, or in any way treated as a VIP.
Parallel to this Pakistani investigation, though, the US has launched its own independent probe into Pakistan's links to the nuclear programs of Iran, Libya and North Korea, and, depending on the results, according to insiders in the Pakistani administration, Washington could lean on Islamabad to completely abandon its program. Such action would conform with the US's broader agenda to defuse tension on the sub-continent. Already the US has forced India and Pakistan, not quite kicking and screaming, to the peace negotiating table, and for this peace process to last, Pakistan, a perennial meddler in Afghanistan and Kashmir in particular, would need to be tamed.
The US hand has been strengthened by the weekend announcement by President General Pervez Musharraf, who for the first time admitted that "some individual or individuals" may have been involved in proliferating Pakistan's nuclear technology. And on Monday, Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, saying that a two-month probe into allegations of nuclear technology proliferation to Iran and Libya was near completion, added: "One or two people acted in an irresponsible manner for personal profit. Money is involved in the matter. I am not naming any scientist."
According to sources in the Pakistani establishment who spoke to Asia Times Online, after questioning a few Pakistani scientists, US intelligence operators are now looking for a Karachi-based Pakistani entrepreneur who is said to manufacture some of the components that are used in atomic programs. The investigators want to establish the level of proficiency of the manufacturing, and the chances of the products being - or having been - exported.
US attention is also focussed clearly on Dr Khan. US and UK investigators have already made known evidence of him traveling on a personal rather than a diplomatic passport to Iran, North Korea, the United Arab Emirates and the UK. The UK government unofficially informed Islamabad several times of the visits, but received no response, leading investigators to conclude that he was, in fact, on official business. Tehran authorities have also released information concerning a property near the port of Bandar Abbas, officially given to Dr Khan by the government of Iran.
Pakistan builds a time bomb
A Pakistan scientist who was affiliated with Pakistan's nuclear program spoke to Asia Times Online, on condition of anonymity, about the country's nuclear program.
The program was the brain child of former premier Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was a champion of Third World countries and their rights. "If India develops nuclear weapons, Pakistan will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry" in order to develop a program of its own, he said at the time.
Bhutto was instrumental in bringing Dr Khan to Pakistan in the mid-1970s from the Netherlands where he had been associated with Urenco, a British,German and Dutch consortium. After his return to Pakistan, the Dutch government accused Dr Khan of stealing centrifuge plans from the plant. He was tried in absentia and convicted; the verdict was later overturned on a technicality. Western experts believe that Pakistan used Urenco gas centrifuge blueprints and information to build its own facilities.
Through Bhutto's diplomacy, according to the scientist who spoke to Asia Times Online, Iran and Libya were persuaded to make a joint investment in Pakistan's program. As a result, they were privy to the first phases of that program. Due to the secrecy of the program at this stage, all information and financing was channeled directly through Bhutto, even using his personal bank accounts. Dr Khan, too, answered only to Bhutto, and his "welfare" was the premier's responsibility.
Bhutto's government, though, was toppled by General Zia-ul Haq in a coup in 1977 over allegations of vote rigging. Two years later, on April 4, 1979, Bhutto was hanged after being convicted a year earlier on charges of conspiring to murder a political opponent.
Bhutto's demise - both political and physical - ended the cosy relationship that Pakistan had had with Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, while the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which threw out the monarchy, severely strained Tehran's ties with pro-US Pakistan.
These developments obviously forced Pakistan to continue its nuclear program on its own. In 1979 a pilot uranium enrichment facility started up at Sihala, and construction began on a full-scale facility at Kahuta. In April of that year, the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan after learning about its enrichment program.
At the same time, however, Pakistan became the main supply line of arms (mostly from the US) to Afghan mujahideen rallying to fight the Soviets, who had invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. And once the Iran-Iraq war broke out in 1980, Pakistan developed into a key transit point for arms on their way to Iran.
In 1981, because of its importance in the Afghan puzzle, the US Congress granted Pakistan a six-year exemption from the Symington Amendment, which prohibited aid to any non-nuclear country engaged in illegal procurement of equipment for a nuclear weapons program. Pakistan also accepted a US$3.2 billion, six-year aid package from the US that included the sale of F-16 planes. Free from the threat of sanctions, in 1982, there was a cold test at a small-scale reprocessing plant in Pakistan.
Around this time, Allama Ariful Hussaini, the chief of the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqa-i-Jaferia Pakistan, the largest Shi'ite organization in Pakistan, emerged as a go-between for Tehran and Pakistan, first for arms, and ultimately in the transfer of nuclear technology.
By 1986, US sources were reporting that Pakistan had produced weapons-grade uranium (greater than 90 percent U-235.
Hussaini was shot dead in Peshawar in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) a few days before General Zia's death in a plane accident in August 1988. Hussaini's party blamed then corps commander and governor of NWFP, Lieutenant-General Fazal-i-Haq, who was Zia's right-hand man. Haq himself was later murdered by a Shi'ite assassin.
By the late 1980s, then, the US was aware that Pakistan's nuclear program was well advanced, and knew that Pakistan and Iran were cooperating in weapons transfers - most likely including nuclear technology.
In mid-1988, a US oil tanker was fired on and it emerged that US missiles that had been given to Pakistan as supplies for Afghan mujahideen had been used in the attack.
The US was outraged, and proposed an audit at a large ammunition dump at Ojri in Pakistan. Mysteriously, to this day, on August 17, 1988, the dump went up in a huge blast that killed about 100 people and injured thousands. An inquiry did find, however, evidence that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence was involved in selling Stinger missiles and other American arms on the black market.
Since Pakistan was still a trusted ally in the Cold War, the US did not take any action. In June 1989, then prime minister Benazir Bhutto visited Washington DC. In February of that year, Pakistan announced the successful test of two new surface-to-surface ballistic missiles: Hatf I and II, with 80 kilometer and and 300 kilometer ranges. Before Bhutto's trip, though, production of highly-enriched uranium was stopped, a step that was verified by the US. It is believed that production was re-started after heightening tensions with India over Kashmir in 1990.
During these years, the deep seeds of suspicion over Pakistan's trustworthiness were planted, and they are now bearing the fruit that could poison Pakistan's nuclear program, with the country's scientists already feeling the ill effects.
(Note: On May 28 and 30 of 1998, Pakistan conducted underground nuclear tests - six according to the government - in response to India's May 11 and 13 five underground tests.)
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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Fighting the proliferation syndrome
By Ehsan Ahrari
The constant dribbling of news about Pakistan's nuclear scientists' role in the proliferation of nuclear know-how to North Korea, Iran and Libya is likely to damage the United States' ties with Pakistan. The surprising aspect of this development is that Islamabad has shown a certain amount of insensitivity, if not outright ignorance, about the seriousness that the Bush administration attaches to non-proliferation, especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.
Right now, the focus of Washington's attention is the global "war on terrorism", in which Pakistan plays a prominent role. Once that war looses its current primacy, Washington is likely to unleash its criticism, scrutiny and even sanctions against the South Asian nation, unless it clamps down hard now on all potential sources of nuclear proliferation from within.
Recent reports indicate that the transfer of nuclear knowledge to Iran from Pakistan took place in the late 1980s. The father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb - Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan - was reportedly involved. Other Pakistani nuclear scientists are also reported to have assisted Iran under a secret agreement between the two countries. That agreement was supposedly limited to the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology.
Pakistan has launched its own investigation on the foreign involvement of its nuclear scientists under US pressure, and also because of a complaint launched by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last November. That complaint alleges that Pakistani scientists played a prominent role in the development of centrifuges used to enrich uranium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons. The US alleges that Pakistan has played a similar role in North Korea, and even in Libya.
President General Pervez Musharraf has finally publicly conceded that his country's nuclear scientists have been involved in the proliferation of nuclear technology for "personal gain", but rejected any notion of an official sanctioning of their role. He said: "There is no such evidence that any government personality or military personality was involved in this at all."
The government of Pakistan has identified a second prominent scientist, Dr Mohammad Farooq, in nuclear proliferation activities. He has been under government custody since November 22 of last year and is expected to be charged under Pakistan's Official Secrets Act. He is reported to have implicated Khan under questioning. These events are said to have taken place many years ago.
Washington has thus far accepted Musharraf's assurances that all cooperative activities between his country and North Korea have been suspended. However, it continues to watch the pace and scope of this inquiry inside Pakistan.
Musharraf's dilemma is how far he should go in investigating the role of Pakistan's nuclear scientists, and what punitive measures, if any, he must take. Of course, Washington will be delighted to see Khan, Farooq and others receive some sort of punishment; however, they - especially Khan - are regarded as national heroes and cannot be unceremoniously put even under house arrest without a public backlash and resentment. Islamist groups have already shown their rage on the "humiliation" of Pakistani national heroes, and have accused Musharraf of conducting the inquiry to appease the Bush administration.
The very fact that Pakistan's intelligence agency - Inter-Service Intelligence - is conducting the inquiry has already ensured that no ranking past or present military officer will be charged with any involvement in the transfer of nuclear know-how to other countries. In fact, the former chief of army, General Aslam Beg, who, during his tenure (1988-1991) publicly advocated a military alliance with Iran, now denies authorizing the transfer of nuclear technology. He depicts all allegations of his involvement as "part of the conspiracy against me".
Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto has pitched in her own share by maintaining from exile that the military sustained total control of all nuclear matters during her administration, thereby implying that the military was involved in nuclear proliferation to Iran. A former official during her successor Nawaz Sharif's government is also blaming the military of deciding in the 1990s to transfer nuclear know-how to Iran. Even though Iran has not directly named Pakistan in its acquisition of nuclear know-how, the IAEA has surmised that Iran's centrifuges were probably based on Pakistan's designs.
Undoubtedly, Pakistan, despite official denials, is not exactly an innocent party in this nuclear proliferation syndrome. As the inquiry of nuclear scientists and the blame game continue, the US will be content for now if Pakistan ceases all proliferation activities, officially sanctioned or otherwise. Aside from Washington's determination to bring about global nuclear non-proliferation, the international community appears equally resolute to disallow the repeat of the North Korean example of nuclear blackmail.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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ISI - Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Agency
A State within a State ?
TIMELINE ENTRIES ABOUT ISI DIRECTOR LT. GEN. MAHMOOD AHMED
Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, Director of Pakistan's secret service, the ISI, is quite possibly the most taboo suspect of all 9/11 suspects. It was reported in early October 2001 that Mahmood ordered Saeed Sheikh to send $100,000 to hijacker Mohamed Atta. Since then hardly a word has been said about this stunning report, and in fact this once very powerful man appears to have completely disappeared from view.
In December 2002, Senator Bob Graham, head of the Congressional 9/11 inquiry and thus privy to much information still not publicly released, said he was "surprised at the evidence that there were foreign governments involved in facilitating the activities of at least some of the [9/11] terrorists in the United States. ... It will become public at some point when it's turned over to the archives, but that's 20 or 30 years from now." [PBS Newshour, 12/11/02] Is he referring to Pakistan and the role of Mahmood, a man Graham just happened to be discussing bin Laden with in Washington DC as the 9/11 attacks were happening?
If Mahmood had a role in 9/11, this would not only strongly suggest that the rest of the Pakistani government had foreknowledge, but it would also raise curious questions about who else knew, in the US, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. Mahmood seems to be involved in a number of important but obscure meetings before, during and after 9/11.
For more on Mahmood's possible connection with the 9/11 hijackers, see the entries about middleman Saeed Sheikh (also in narrative form). See also the section on the ISI generally. It is possible that the story of Mahmood's involvement in 9/11 is only Indian propaganda, but no Western reporter seems curious to find out.
Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf.
October 12, 1999: General Musharraf becomes leader of Pakistan in a coup. One major reason for the coup is the ISI felt the previous ruler had to go "out of fear that he might buckle to American pressure and reverse Pakistan's policy [of supporting] the Taliban." [New York Times, 12/8/01] Shortly thereafter Musharraf replaces the leader of the ISI, Brig Imtiaz, because of his close ties to the previous leader. Imtiaz is arrested and convicted of "having assets disproportionate to his known sources of income." It comes out that he was keeping tens of millions of dollars earned from heroin smuggling in a Deutschebank account. This is interesting because insider trading just prior to 9/11 will later connect to a branch of Deutschebank recently run by "Buzzy" Krongard, now Executive Director of the CIA (see September 6-10, 2001). [Financial Times (Asian edition), 8/10/01] The new Director of the ISI is Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, a close ally of Musharraf who is instrumental in the success of the coup. [Guardian, 10/9/01] Mahmood will later be fired after suggestions that he helped fund the 9/11 attacks (see October 7, 2001 (B)).
April 4, 2000: ISI Director and "leading Taliban supporter" Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed visits Washington. In a message meant for both Pakistan and the Taliban, US officials tell him that al-Qaeda has killed Americans and "people who support those people will be treated as our enemies." However, no actual action, military or otherwise, is taken against either the Taliban or Pakistan. [Washington Post, 12/19/01]
May 2001 (E): Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a career covert operative and former Navy Seal, travels to India on a publicized tour while CIA Director Tenet makes a quiet visit to Pakistan to meet with President General Musharraf. Armitage has long and deep Pakistani intelligence connections (as well as a role in the Iran-Contra affair). It would be reasonable to assume that while in Islamabad, Tenet, in what was described as "an unusually long meeting," also meets with his Pakistani counterpart, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed (see October 7, 2001). A long-time regional expert with extensive CIA ties stated publicly: "The CIA still has close links with the ISI." [SAPRA, 5/22/01, Times of India, 3/7/01] FTW
Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed. [AFP]
Summer 2001 (F): An Asia Times article published just prior to 9/11 claims that Crown Prince Abdullah, the defacto ruler of Saudi Arabia (see Late 1995), makes a clandestine visit to Pakistan around this time. After meeting with senior army officials, he visits Afghanistan with ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed (see October 7, 2001). They meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar and try to convince him that the US is likely to launch an attack on Afghanistan. They insist bin Laden be sent to Saudi Arabia, where he would be held in custody and not handed over to any third country. If bin Laden were to be tried in Saudi Arabia, Abdullah would help make sure he is acquitted. Mullah Omar apparently rejects the proposal. The article suggests that Abdullah is secretly a supporter of bin Laden and is trying to protect him from harm (see Late 1998 (F)). [Asia Times, 8/22/01] A similar meeting may also take place after 9/11 (see September 19, 2001 (B)).
August 28-30, 2001: Senator Bob Graham (D), Representative Porter Goss (R) and Senator John Kyl (R) travel to Pakistan and meet with President Musharraf. They reportedly discuss various security issues, including the possible extradition of bin Laden. They also meet with Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan. Zaeef apparently tells them that the Taliban want to solve the issue of bin Laden through negotiations with the US. Pakistan says it wants to stay out of the bin Laden issue. All three are meeting with ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks (see September 11, 2001 (H)). Mahmood gave $100,000 to hijacker Mohamed Atta (see October 7, 2001). [AFP, 8/28/01, Salon, 9/14/01] Since the ISI was funding the 9/11 hijackers, what else might have been discussed in these meetings?
September 4-11, 2001: ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed visits Washington for the second time (see April 4, 2000). On September 10, a Pakistani newspaper reports on his trip so far. It says his visit has "triggered speculation about the agenda of his mysterious meetings at the Pentagon and National Security Council" as well as meetings with CIA Director Tenet, unspecified officials at the White House and the Pentagon, and his "most important meeting" with Mark Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The article suggests that "of course, Osama bin Laden" could be the focus of some discussions. Prophetically, the article adds, "What added interest to his visit is the history of such visits. Last time [his] predecessor was [in Washington], the domestic [Pakistani] politics turned topsy-turvy within days." [The News, 9/10/01] This is a reference to the Musharraf coup just after a ISI Director's visit (see October 12, 1999). Mahmood is meeting in Washington when the 9/11 attacks begin (see September 11, 2001 (H)), and extends his stay until September 16 (see September 11-16, 2001).
Left to right: Bob Graham [CNN, 2/23/02], John Kyl [Arizona Daily Star, 9/13/01], and Porter Goss. [CNN, 6/9/99]
September 11, 2001 (H): At the time of the attacks, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed is at a breakfast meeting at the Capitol with the chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, Senator Bob Graham (D) and Representative Porter Goss (R) (Goss is a 10-year veteran of the CIA's clandestine operations wing). The meeting is said to last at least until the second plane hits the WTC. [Washington Post, 5/18/02] Graham and Goss later co-head the joint House-Senate investigation into the 9/11 attacks, which has made headlines for saying there was no "smoking gun" of Bush knowledge before 9/11. [Washington Post, 7/11/02] Note Senator Graham should have been aware of a report made to his staff the previous month that one of Mahmood's subordinates had told a US undercover agent that the WTC would be destroyed (see Early August 2001). Evidence suggests Mahmood ordered that $100,000 be sent to hijacker Mohamed Atta (see Early August 2001 (D)). Also present at the meeting were Senator John Kyl (R) and the Pakistani ambassador to the US, Maleeha Lodhi (all or virtually all of the people in this meeting also met in Pakistan a few weeks earlier (see August 28-30, 2001)). Senator Graham says of the meeting: "We were talking about terrorism, specifically terrorism generated from Afghanistan." The New York Times mentions bin Laden specifically was being discussed. [Vero Beach Press Journal, 9/12/01, Salon, 9/14/01, New York Times, 6/3/02] The fact that these people are meeting at the time of the attacks is a strange coincidence at the very least. Was the topic of conversation just more coincidence? FTW
September 11-16, 2001: ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, extending his Washington visit because of the 9/11 attacks (see September 4-11, 2001 and September 11, 2001 (H)) [Japan Economic Newswire, 9/17/01], meets with US officials and negotiates Pakistan's cooperation with the US against al-Qaeda. It is rumored that later in the day on 9/11 and again the next day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visits Mahmood and offers him the choice: "Help us and breathe in the 21st century along with the international community or be prepared to live in the Stone Age." [Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9/12, LA Weekly, 11/9/01] Secretary of State Powell presents Mahmood seven demands as an ultimatum and Pakistan supposedly agrees to all seven. [Washington Post, 1/29/02] Mahmood also has meetings with Senator Joseph Biden (D), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Secretary of State Powell, regarding Pakistan's position. [Miami Herald, 9/16/01, New York Times, 9/13/01, Reuters, 9/13/01, Associated Press, 9/13/01] On September 13, the airport in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, is shut down for the day. A government official later says the airport had been closed because of threats made against Pakistan's "strategic assets," but doesn't elaborate. The next day, Pakistan declares "unstinting" support for the US, and the airport is reopened. It is later suggested that Israel and India threatened to attack Pakistan and take control of its nuclear weapons if Pakistan didn't side with the US (see also September 14, 2001 (approx.)). [LA Weekly, 11/9/01] Was war with Pakistan narrowly averted? It is later reported that Mahmood's presence in Washington was a lucky blessing; one Western diplomat saying it "must have helped in a crisis situation when the US was clearly very, very angry." [Financial Times, 9/18/01] Was it luck he was there, or did Mahmood - later reported to have ordered $100,000 wired to the 9/11 hijackers (see Early August 2001 (D) and October 7, 2001) - know when the 9/11 attack would happen?
September 14, 2001 (approx.): According to Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker, a few days after 9/11 members of the elite Israeli counter-terrorism unit Sayeret Matkal arrive in the US and begin training with US Special Forces in a secret location. The two groups are developing contingency plans to attack Pakistan's military bases and remove its nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government or the nuclear weapons fall into the wrong hands. [New Yorker, 10/29/01] There may have been threats to enact this plan on September 13, 2001 (see September 11-16, 2001). The Japan Times later notes that this "threat to divest Pakistan of its 'crown jewels' was cleverly used by the US, first to force Musharraf to support its military campaign in Afghanistan, and then to warn would-be coup plotters against Musharraf." [Japan Times, 11/10/01] Note the curious connection between Sayeret Matkal and one of the 9/11 passengers on Flight 11 (see September 11, 2001 (X)).
Mid-September 2001: The Guardian later claims that Pakistani President Musharraf has a meeting of his 12 or 13 most senior officers. Musharraf proposes to support the US in the imminent war against the Taliban and bin Laden. Supposedly, four of his most senior generals oppose him outright in "a stunning display of disloyalty." The four are ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, Lt. Gen. Muzaffar Usmani, Lt. Gen. Jamshaid Gulzar Kiani, and Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz Khan. All four are removed from power over the next month (see October 7, 2001). If this meeting took place, it's hard to see when it could have happened, since the article states it happened "within days" of 9/11, but Mahmood was in the US until late September 16 (see September 11-16, 2001), then flew to Afghanistan for two days (see September 17-18 and 28, 2001), then possibly to Saudi Arabia (see September 19, 2001 (B)). [Guardian, 5/25/02] Why would Musharraf send Mahmood on important diplomatic missions even late in the month if he is so disloyal?
September 17-18 and 28, 2001: On September 17, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed heads a six-man delegation that visits Mullah Omar in Kandahar, Afghanistan. It is reported he is trying to convince Omar to extradite bin Laden or face an immediate US attack. [Press Trust of India, 9/17/01, Financial Times, 9/18/01, London Times, 9/18/01] Also in the delegation is Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz Khan, an ex-ISI official who appears to be one of Saeed Sheikh's contacts in the ISI (see January 1, 2000-September 11, 2001). [Press Trust of India, 9/17/01] On September 28, Ahmed returns to Afghanistan with a group of about 10 religious leaders. He talks with Mullah Omar, who again says he will not hand over bin Laden. [AFP, 9/28/01] A senior Taliban official later claims that on these trips Mahmood in fact urges Omar not to extradite bin Laden, but instead urges him to resist the US. [AP, 2/21/02, Time, 5/6/02] Another account claims Mahmood does "nothing as the visitors [pour] praise on Omar and [fails] to raise the issue" of bin Laden's extradition. [Knight Ridder, 11/3/01] Two Pakistani brigadier generals connected to the ISI also accompany Mahmood, and advise al-Qaeda to counter the coming US attack on Afghanistan by resorting to mountain guerrilla war. The advice is not followed. [Asia Times, 9/11/02] Other ISI officers also stay in Afghanistan to advise the Taliban (see Late September-November 2001).
September 19, 2001 (B): According to the private intelligence service Intelligence Online, a secret meeting between fundamentalist supporters in Saudi Arabia and the ISI takes place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on this day. Crown Prince Abdullah, the defacto ruler of Saudi Arabia (see Late 1995), and Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz, the new head of Saudi intelligence (see August 31, 2001), meet with Gen. Mohamed Youssef, head of the ISI's Afghanistan Section, and ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed (just returning from discussions in Afghanistan (see September 17-18 and 28, 2001)). They agree "to the principle of trying to neutralize Osama Bin Laden in order to spare the Taliban regime and allow it to keep its hold on Afghanistan." There has been no confirmation that this meeting in fact took place, but if it did, its goals were unsuccessful. [Intelligence Online, 10/4/01] There may have been a similar meeting before 9/11 (see Summer 2001 (F)).
Late September-November 2001: The ISI secretly assists the Taliban in their defense against a US-led attack. Between three and five ISI officers give military advice to the Taliban in late September (see also September 17-18 and 28, 2001). [Telegraph, 10/10/01] At least five key ISI operatives help the Taliban prepare defenses in Kandahar. None are later punished for this. [Time, 5/6/02] Secret advisors begin to withdraw in early October, but some stay on into November. [Knight Ridder, 11/3/01] Large convoys of rifles, ammunition and rocket-propelled grenade launchers for Taliban fighters cross the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan on October 8 and 12, just after US bombing of Afghanistan begins (see October 7, 2001 (B)) and after a supposed crackdown on ISI fundamentalists (see October 7, 2001). The Pakistani ISI secretly gives safe passage to these convoys, despite having promised the US in September that such assistance would immediately stop. [New York Times, 12/8/01] Secret ISI convoys of weapons and nonlethal supplies continue into November. [UPI, 11/1/01, Time, 5/6/02] An anonymous Western diplomat later states, "We did not fully understand the significance of Pakistan's role in propping up the Taliban until their guys withdrew and things went to hell fast for the Talibs." [New York Times, 12/8/01]
President Musharraf shakes hands with ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood. [AFP]
October 7, 2001: ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed is replaced in the face of US pressure after links are discovered between him, Saeed Sheikh and the funding of the 9/11 attacks. Mahmood instructed Saeed to transfer $100,000 into hijacker Mohamed Atta's bank account prior to 9/11 (see Early August 2001 (D) or June 29, 2000-September 18, 2000; it hasn't been reported which $100,000 money transfer this refers to). This is according to Indian intelligence, which claims the FBI has privately confirmed the story. [Press Trust of India, 10/8/01, Times of India, 10/9/01, India Today, 10/15/01, Daily Excelsior, 10/18/01] The story is not widely reported in Western countries, though it makes the Wall Street Journal. [Australian, 10/10/01, AFP, 10/10/01, Wall Street Journal, 10/10/01] It is reported in Pakistan as well. [Dawn, 10/8/01] The Northern Alliance also repeats the claim in late October. [FNS, 10/31/01] In Western countries, the usual explanation is that Mahmood is fired for being too close to the Taliban. [London Times, 10/9/01, Guardian, 10/9/01] The Times of India reports that Indian intelligence helped the FBI discover the link, and says: "A direct link between the ISI and the WTC attack could have enormous repercussions. The US cannot but suspect whether or not there were other senior Pakistani Army commanders who were in the know of things. Evidence of a larger conspiracy could shake US confidence in Pakistan's ability to participate in the anti-terrorism coalition." [Times of India, 10/9/01] There is evidence some ISI officers may have known of a plan to destroy the WTC as early as mid-1999 (see July 14, 1999). Two other ISI leaders, Lt. Gen. Mohammed Aziz Khan and Chief of General Staff Mohammed Yousuf, are sidelined on the same day as Mahmood. [Fox News, 10/8/01] Saeed had been working under Khan (see January 1, 2000-September 11, 2001). The firings are said to have purged the ISI of its fundamentalists. But according to one diplomat: "To remove the top two or three doesn't matter at all. The philosophy remains... [The ISI is] a parallel government of its own. If you go through the officer list, almost all of the ISI regulars would say, of the Taliban, 'They are my boys.'" [New Yorker, 10/29/01] It is believed Mahmood has been living under virtual house arrest in Pakistan ever since (which would seem to imply more than just a difference of opinion over the Taliban), but no charges have been brought against him, and there is no evidence the US has asked to question him. [Asia Times, 1/5/02] He also has refused to speak to reporters since being fired [AP, 2/21/02], and outside India and Pakistan, the story has only been mentioned a couple times in the media since (see [Sunday Herald, 2/24/02, London Times, 4/21/02]). If Mahmood helped fund the 9/11 attacks, what did President Musharraf know about it?
January 18, 2003: Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf warns of an "impending danger" that Pakistan will become a target of war for "Western forces" after the Iraq crisis. "We will have to work on our own to stave off the danger. Nobody will come to our rescue, not even the Islamic world. We will have to depend on our muscle." [Press Trust of India, 1/19/03, Financial Times, 2/8/03] Pointing to "a number of recent 'background briefings' and 'leaks'" from the US government, "Pakistani officials fear the Bush administration is planning to change its tune dramatically once the war against Iraq is out of the way." [Financial Times, 2/8/03] Despite evidence that the head of Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, ordered money given to the hijackers (see October 7, 2001), so far only one partisan newspaper has suggested Pakistan was involved in 9/11. [WorldNetDaily, 1/3/02]
But could Musharraf be worried about evidence suggesting involvement of the ISI in the 9/11 attacks?

Posted by maximpost at 3:06 PM EST
Updated: Wednesday, 28 January 2004 3:54 PM EST
Permalink

No consensus found for the immigration law
Opposition refuses to accept the idea of a point system, one of the proposal's core issues
By Heidi Sylvester
The opposition Christian Democratic parties, showing little willingness to work with the government during negotiations that are supposed to lead to a new immigration law being pasted together, are refusing to accept one of the proposal's core issues - the "point system."
Immigration based on a point system is "not something we would negotiate," the deputy parliamentary leader of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union parliamentary group, Wolfgang Bosbach, said on Thursday.
But the CDU/CSU has been reluctant to state what it would propose in place of the point system, and Bosbach's statement came less than a week after a mediation committee failed to come to agreement on the issue. The committee negotiates between the German parliament, which has already passed the law, and the Bundesrat, the opposition-controlled chamber representing the states which must also pass the law for it to come into force.
With no consensus in sight, the committee postponed negotiations until Feb. 27, leaving time for further talks between the parties.
"The immigration law is dead and buried, if that's the Union's last word on the issue," commented Wolfgang Beck, the parliamentary business manager for the Greens, the junior partner to the Social Democratic Party in the government.
The point system, based on the model pioneered in Canada, would be a method of determining which immigrants should be admitted into the country. Points would be given for desirable traits such as German-language skills or advanced degrees. It would allow a number of applications to immigrate even without a job offer.
Similar systems in place in Australia and, to some extent, the United States, are considered a useful tool in attracting highly qualified immigrants.
After two years of often emotional debate that cut to the heart of the issue of German identity, the legislation for the new immigration law was pushed through in 2002, but was later annulled by the Federal Constitutional Court on procedural grounds. The parties have been negotiating on a possible compromise since last February.
While the recent debate centers on the issue of introducing a point system to determine which immigrants are granted entry, the parties have also come to no consensus on political asylum seekers and the limitations that will be imposed on immigrants attempting to gain access to the social system.
Germany, which has long thought of itself as "not an immigration country," already has a large foreign population. There are currently an estimated 7.3 million foreigners, about 9 percent of the total population, living legally in Germany. A report on migration flows released last Friday showed that the number of immigrants to Germany fell significantly in 2002, the last year for which complete data is available, while the number of Germans leaving the country increased.
Jan. 23

? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2002
All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or
in part is prohibited.

----------------------------------------------------
Earth to WSJ
By Mark Krikorian

Now, I like the Wall Street Journal. But its editorials on immigration always have a whiff of the Soviet about them. Like an apparatchik blaming the collapse of the USSR's agriculture on 75 straight years of bad weather, the Journal's writing on immigration has no connection to reality. Tuesday's lead editorial claims that the United States has tried in vain for two decades to enforce the immigration law, and now it's time to try something new (namely, the president's guestworker/amnesty proposal ). The piece is laced with the usual libertarian contempt for conservatives, with such leftist smears as "extreme," "restrictionist right," and "nativist wing of the GOP," and even refers to "undocumented," rather than illegal, aliens.
But it's the basic factual claim of the piece that's so absurd. The new party line is that open borders aren't just desirable (a la the Journal's perennial call for a constitutional amendment abolishing America's borders) -- they're inevitable. Another member of the open-borders apparat, Tamar Jacoby, had a recent piece in The New Republic (here, but you have to pay for it) subtitled "Why we can't stop illegal immigration." In the Journal's words, "if a policy keeps failing for nearly two decades maybe some new thinking is in order."
Actually, I agree. The problem is that the "new thinking" we need is a commitment to enforce the law. Over the past 20 years, we have done almost nothing to control immigration except beef up the Border Patrol. And while that's a worthwhile goal in itself, any border agent will tell you that his job is only one part of any effort to enforce sovereign borders.
The Journal claims that the ban on hiring illegals, passed in 1986, has been tried and failed. Again, this is false. Enforcement of this measure, intended to turn off the magnet attracting illegals in the first place, was spotty at first and is now virtually nonexistent. Even when the law was passed, Congress pulled its punch by not requiring the development of a mechanism for employers to verify the legal status of new hires, forcing the system to fall back on a blizzard of easily forged paper documents.
And even under this flawed system, the INS was publicly slapped down when it did try to enforce the law. When the agency conducted raids during Georgia's Vidalia onion harvest in 1998, thousands of illegal aliens -- knowingly hired by the farmers -- abandoned the fields to avoid arrest. By the end of the week, both of the state's senators and three congressmen -- Republicans and Democrats -- had sent an outraged letter to Washington complaining that the INS "does not understand the needs of America's farmers," and that was the end of that.
So, the INS tried out a "kinder, gentler" means of enforcing the law, which fared no better. Rather than conduct raids on individual employers, Operation Vanguard in 1998-99 sought to identify illegal workers at all meatpacking plants in Nebraska through audits of personnel records. The INS then asked to interview those employees who appeared to be unauthorized -- and the illegals ran off. The procedure was remarkably successful, and was meant to be repeated every two or three months until the plants were weaned from their dependence on illegal labor.
Local law-enforcement officials were very pleased with the results, but employers and politicians vociferously criticized the very idea of enforcing the immigration law. Gov. Mike Johanns organized a task force to oppose the operation; the meat packers and the ranchers hired former Gov. Ben Nelson to lobby on their behalf; and, in Washington, Sen. Chuck Hagel (R., Neb.) (coauthor, with Tom Daschle, of the newest amnesty bill, S.2010) made it his mission in life to pressure the Justice Department to stop. They succeeded, the operation was ended, and the INS veteran who thought it up in the first place is now enjoying early retirement.
The INS got the message and developed a new interior-enforcement policy that gave up on trying to actually reassert control over immigration and focused almost entirely on the important, but narrow, issues of criminal aliens and smugglers. As INS policy director Robert Bach told the New York Times in a 2000 story appropriately entitled "I.N.S. Is Looking the Other Way as Illegal Immigrants Fill Jobs": "It is just the market at work, drawing people to jobs, and the INS has chosen to concentrate its actions on aliens who are a danger to the community." The result is clear -- the San Diego Union-Tribune reported earlier this month that from 1992 to 2002, the number of companies fined for hiring illegal workers fell from 1,063 to 13. That's thirteen. In the whole country.
Coming at it from the other side, when we have tried to enforce the law, it's worked, until we gave up. The aforementioned Operation Vanguard in Nebraska was a good example -- if enforcement wasn't working, why would the employers have bothered to organize against it? Likewise, in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the 1986 immigration law, illegal crossings from Mexico fell precipitously, as prospective illegals waited to see if we were serious; we weren't, so they resumed their crossings.
In the wake of 9/11, when we stepped up immigration enforcement against Middle Easterners (and only Middle Easterners), the largest group of illegals from that part of the world, Pakistanis, fled the country in droves to avoid being caught up in the dragnet. And the Social Security Administration in 2002 sent out almost a million "no-match" letters to employers who filed W-2s with information that was inconsistent with SSA's records; i.e., illegal aliens. The effort was so successful at denying work to illegals that advocacy groups organized to stop it and won a 90-percent reduction in the number of letters to be sent out.
Tony Blankley, the Washington Times's editorial-page editor, summed it up nicely in a recent column:
I might agree with the president's proposals if they followed, rather than preceded, a failed Herculean, decades-long national effort to secure our borders. If, after such an effort, it was apparent that we simply could not control our borders, then, as a practical man I would try to make the best of a bad situation. But such an effort has not yet been made.
The Journal's editorial writers, despite their many strengths, suffer from the malady of all utopian ideologues: an unwillingness to acknowledge facts that are inconsistent with infallible theory.

-- NRO Contributor Mark Krikorian is executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies and a visiting fellow at the Nixon Center.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/krikorian200401281002.asp

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Leaving on the blinders
By Christian Schw?gerl
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Does Germany invest enough money in researching the messenger molecule RNS, which biologists now consider to be just as important as the DNS hereditary molecule and the key to new gene therapies? Why are German academics, unlike their American colleagues, unable to really apply the findings of brain research? Does Germany need at least one major gene sequencing center, of which America has four, or a "bio database" comprising the genetic and health data of the population, such as the one that is currently being created in Britain? Why did pharmaceuticals giant Novartis build its biomedical research center in Boston rather than Berlin?
These questions have two things in common: They bear no relation to embryonic stem cells, and Chancellor Gerhard Schr?der has shown no interest in them over the past few years. "Taking off the blinders," was the title of the article in a weekly newspaper with which Schr?der entered the so-called bio debate in 2000. Schr?der, though, never took off the blinders and still focuses unerringly on one point: the question of whether human embryos should be used to cultivate human tissue. Meanwhile, the crucial issues of research policy have been gathering dust in the Chancellery. Naturally, the embryo issue has major bioethical and legal implications, but there are more important innovation and research policy issues to deal with.
Germany has enough stem cell lines and animal cells to clarify all major questions related to development biology and tissue culture for many years. And there is reason for hope that creative science will learn to cultivate tissue for patient treatment without having to kill embryos.
In the face of demographic chan-ge and the resulting increase in degenerative illnesses, which could be attenuated or healed with stem cells, nobody can seriously negate the importance of regenerative medicine. So why does a government obsessed with stem cells not spend more than a ridiculous EUR3 million a year on stem cell research, given that Italy, Australia, the United States and China are creating massive research centers for regenerative medicine?
The Max Planck research society has just completed scientific planning for a new "Institute for Aging Research," which is supposed to shed light on the molecular processes related to aging and thus help provide insight into one of the most important social processes. Because of a shortage of funds in Germany, the society is now considering locating this center in Switzerland.
The chancellor should be concerned by this. In Dresden, a researcher just tried to plant genetically modified apple trees that are resistant to diseases, but Schr?der's agriculture and consumer protection minister, Renate K?nast, banned the tests because a small local citizens' initiative protested the plans. Is that what innovation policy looks like?
Over the past 10 years, a fantastic network of universities and commercial gene research has sprung up in and around Berlin, which will officially be bundled in a "Center for Functional Genomics" in mid-January. Almost unnoticed by the public, a world-class nano- and nanobiotechnology industry has emerged in Germany. But Japan and the United States invest more and better. Rather than pumping billions into North Rhine-Westphalia's outdated coal industry, Schr?der should channel public funds into promising nano structures.
There's a lot to be done during this "year of innovation," as the chancellor has called it. Through further social reforms, Schr?der could mobilize funds for future-oriented activities such as RNS research and gene sequencing centers. He could promote an understanding of the usefulness of bio databases and the importance of nano technology and foster a scientific elite in Germany that would make Germany the natural location of choice for the next pharmaceutical research center.
Repeated debates about embryo protection, however, will only divert attention from more pressing research issues.
Jan. 23

? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2002
All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or
in part is prohibited.
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GEFANGENEN-AUSTAUSCH
Terroristen-Drehscheibe K?ln-Wahn
Von Ulrike Putz
Es ist ein Szenario wie aus einem Spionage-Film. Abgeschirmt von der ?ffentlichkeit werden Israel und die Hisbollah am Donnerstag auf dem Rollfeld des Bundeswehr-Fliegerhorsts K?ln-Wahn ihre Gefangenen austauschen. Die Vorbereitungen laufen unter Hochdruck. Das israelische Milit?r ist bereits angereist.
AP
Deutsche Flaggen im Libanon: Dank an die Vermittler
Berlin - Bundeswehr-Fliegerhorst Wahn, Flughafenstra?e 1, 51147 K?ln. Mit dieser Adresse wird man ab Donnerstag ein St?ck Geschichte verbinden, dass unter deutscher Federf?hrung geschrieben wurde: Den Gefangenen-Austausch zwischen Israel und der libanesischen Hisbollah, bei dem der j?dische Staat 435 Gefangene gegen einen Gesch?ftsmann und drei - vermutlich tote - Soldaten austauschte.
Noch allerdings ist das Tauschgesch?ft, das ein israelischer Milit?rsprecher "unglaublich kompliziert" nennt, nicht gemacht, noch kann alles schief gehen. F?r Ernst Uhrlau, Geheimdienstkoordinator im deutschen Kanzleramt und Vater des Deals, begann am Mittwoch der Countdown f?r den Moment auf den er jahrelang hingearbeitet hat.
In K?ln-Wahn traf die israelische Delegation unter der Leitung des obersten Milit?rrabbiners ein. Zu ihr geh?ren neben ?rzten, die den schwer kranken israelischen Gesch?ftsmann Elhanan Tennenbaum in Empfang nehmen sollen, auch Gerichtsmediziner der Polizei und Soldaten einer Ehrengarde ein. Die Milit?rs sollen die Leichen der drei f?r tot erkl?rter Soldaten nach Hause geleiten, berichtet die israelische Tageszeitung "Ha'aretz".
Zeitgleich mit den Vorbereitungen auf dem Fliegerhorst besuchten Rot-Kreuz-Delegationen und deutsche Vermittler am Mittwoch die arabischen Gefangenen in israelischen Gef?ngnissen, berichtet die Zeitung weiter. Sie f?hrten kurze Interviews und medizinische Tests an den Gefangen durch. Im Libanon erhielten Abordnungen Deutschlands und des Roten Kreuz' Zugang zu Tennebaum. Im Libanon bereiten sich ganze Landstriche auf die Heimkehr der Gefangenen vor. In der s?dlibanesischen Stadt Sidon, aus dem die meisten Heimkehrer kommen, feiern Dutzende schon jetzt die deutschen Vermittler und schwenken schwarz-rot-goldene Fahnen.
Zwar schweigen die deutschen Organisatoren unter Uhrlau zum Ablauf des Austauschs. Aus der israelischen und libanesischen Presse sind trotzdem Einzelheiten zu erfahren. Das Prozedere, dass unter der Oberaufsicht von Uhrlau stehen soll, zeugt von dem Misstrauen der beiden verfeindeten L?nder.
AP
Israelische Maschine in K?ln-Wahn: Ankunft der Milit?rs
Danach werden am Donnerstag zwei deutsche Flugzeuge exakt zeitgleich in Beirut und Tel Aviv abheben und Kurs auf K?ln nehmen. Die eine Maschine wird dabei den Israeli Tennenbaum und die Leichen der drei f?r tot gehaltenen Soldaten transportieren. An Bord der anderen werden 33 Gefangene der Israelis sein: 23 Libanesen, drei Sudanesen, sechs Syrer und Libyer sowie der Deutsche Steven Smyrek, der wegen Mitgliedschaft in der Hisbollah und Planung eines Selbstmordanschlags in Israel inhaftiert war.
Sollte sich herausstellen, dass die drei im Jahr 2000 gekidnappten israelischen Soldaten tats?chlich tot sind, werden die israelischen Gerichtsmediziner sofort nach der Ankunft beiden Flugzeuge mit der Identifizierung der Leichen beginnen. Sollten dazu DNA-Tests notwendig sein, werden die arabischen Gefangene in ihrer Maschine auf dem Rollfeld festgehalten, bis die Identit?t der Israelis einwandfrei gekl?rt ist. Daraufhin wird in Israel mit der Entlassung von 400 pal?stinensischen Gefangenen begonnen, die per Bus nach Gaza oder ins Westjordanland gebracht werden. An einem Grenz?bergang an der libanesisch-israelischen Grenze ?bergibt Israel die Leichen von 59 bei K?mpfen in S?d-Libanon get?teter Libanesen.
Zeitgleich werden in Deutschland die Gefangenen, die in den Libanon ausreisen wollen, in ein Flugzeug umsteigen, das sie nach Beirut bringen wird. Nach Angaben der "Ha'aretz" wird auch der Deutsche Smyrek an Bord dieser Maschine gehen: Smyrek habe aus Angst vor Verh?ren durch die deutschen Beh?rden darum gebeten, in den Libanon ausreisen zu d?rfen. Den drei Sudanesen, die wegen illegalen Aufenthalts in Israel inhaftiert waren, wurde politisches Asyl in Schweden gew?hrt, sie reisen dorthin weiter.
Ein Marokkaner und ein weiterer Mann arabischer Herkunft sollen es in letzter Minute abgelehnt haben, gemeinsam mit den anderen Gefangenen ausgetauscht zu werden. Der Marokkaner, der wegen h?uslicher Gewalt inhaftiert ist und abgeschoben werden soll, hat sich geweigert, in den Libanon auszureisen. Auch der zweite Mann, der auf Bitten der Hisbollah freigelassen werden soll, lehnt dies ab.
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Aktuell
GEFANGENENAUSTAUSCH
"R?ckschlag im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus"
Beim Gefangenaustausch zwischen Israel und der Hisbollah k?nnten auch zwei Mykonos-Attent?ter aus Deutschland frei gelassen werden. F?r die Angeh?rigen der Opfer sei das unvorstellbar, sagt der Anwalt und fr?here Nebenkl?ger Hans Joachim Ehrig im Interview mit SPIEGEL ONLINE.
Rechtsanwalt Hans-Joachim Ehrig war Nebenkl?ger in dem Mykonos-Verfahren 1997 in Berlin. In seiner Praxis arbeitete auch die heutige Verbraucherschutzministerin Renate K?nast (Gr?ne). Ehrig ist auch Vorstandsmitglied in der Rechtsanwaltskammer in Berlin
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Sie haben als Anwalt der Nebenklage Angeh?rige der vier iranischen Oppositionsf?hrer vertreten, die 1992 bei einem Attentat auf das Mykonos-Restaurant in Berlin ermordet wurden. Nun kursieren Ger?chte, dass zwei in Deutschland zu einer lebensl?nglichen Haftstrafe verurteilte und einsitzende Terroristen im Austausch mit dem israelischen Piloten Ron Arad oder dessen Leichnam freikommen sollen. Sie haben Kontakt zu eingeweihten Kreisen. Stimmen diese Meldungen?
Hans-Joachim Ehrig: Zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt halte ich das zu 99,9 Prozent f?r ausgeschlossen. Ich habe meine F?hler in eingeweihte Kreise ausgestreckt und mir wurde versichert: Es ist nichts im Busche. Die Spekulationen in der israelischen Presse gibt es immer wieder. Eine neue Situation ergibt sich, wenn sich herausstellen sollte, dass der Pilot Ron Arad noch lebt oder sein Leichnam den Israelis ?bergeben werden soll. Wenn in diesem Zusammenhang die Mykonos-Gefangenen freik?men, hielte ich das aber f?r einen herben R?ckschlag im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Sie halten die Freilassung der beiden M?nner, einem Iraner und Libanesen, aber nicht f?r undenkbar?
Ehrig: Es ist eine Frage der Abw?gung. Nat?rlich w?re eine Freilassung unter Umst?nden eine gro?e Hilfe f?r Israel. Aber bisher hat sich die Bundesregierung auch nicht zur Rettung eines Menschenlebens auf einen Deal eingelassen. Das zeigt der Fall des deutschen Gesch?ftsmannes Hofer, der von den iranischen Mullahs als Antwort auf das Mykonos-Urteil als Geisel gefangen genommen wurde. Die Mullahs wollten einen Austausch gegen die Verurteilten erzwingen. Hofer kam aber schlie?lich frei, ohne dass die iranischen Terroristen im Gegenzug ihre Leute bekamen. Ich sehe nicht, warum die Bundesregierung in ihrer Abw?gung jetzt zu einem anderen Urteil kommen sollte.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Wer trifft letztlich die Entscheidung?
Ehrig: Eine Freilassung ist nur durch einen Gnadensakt des Bundespr?sidenten m?glich. Dazu geh?rt, dass der Bundespr?sident Ratschl?ge einholt und die Bundesanwaltschaft h?rt. Es kann also keine einsame Entscheidung geben.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Was sagen die Angeh?rigen der Mykonos-Opfer zu den Ger?chten?
Ehrig: Ich bekomme fast t?glich Anrufe von besorgten Angeh?rigen. F?r sie ist es unvorstellbar, dass die rechtskr?ftig verurteilten Terroristen, die in Deutschland einsitzen, freikommen k?nnten.
Das Interview f?hrte Alexander B?rgin
------------------------------------

NACHWUCHS-TERRORIST SMYREK
Aus Detmold ins Paradies
Von Henryk M. Broder
Ein junger Deutscher wollte M?rtyrer werden und heuerte bei der Hisbollah an. Nun sitzt er in einem israelischen Gef?ngnis und wartet auf seine zweite Chance. Die gelungene TV-Dokumentation "F?r Allah in den Tod" zeigte, wie schmal der Grat zwischen Idealismus und Terrorismus ist.
NDR
Smyrek: "Es ist f?r uns eine Ehre, in den Tod zu gehen"
Wie wird man ein M?rtyrer? Gibt es Berufsberater, die einem sagen k?nnen, was man machen, was man lernen, wo man sich melden muss? Offenbar gibt es sie nicht, und deswegen sind junge M?nner und Frauen, die M?rtyrer werden m?chten, auf eigene Initiativen und die Hilfe des Fernsehens angewiesen. In Deutschland ist man mit "Big Brother", dem Schlager-Grand-Prix und zuletzt der Doku-Soap "Ich bin ein Star - holt mich hier raus!" schon ziemlich weit, aber wem solche Erfahrungen nicht qualvoll genug sind, der muss sich etwas einfallen lassen, um das ultimative Ding zu erleben.
Wie Steven Smyrek, der Ende 1997 im Auftrag der libanesischen Terrormiliz Hisbollah von Braunschweig ?ber Amsterdam und Rom nach Tel Aviv reiste, um "F?r Allah in den Tod" (ARD gestern Abend 21.45 Uhr) zu gehen. Seit sechs Jahren sitzt der heute 32-J?hrige in einem israelischen Gef?ngnis, in die Luft sprengen konnte er sich nicht, daf?r wurde er zu zehn Jahren Gef?ngnis verurteilt, und das ist schon einiges, auch wenn es nicht das erhoffte Paradies ist.
Gestern hat die ARD die Geschichte des Steven Smyrek aus Braunschweig in einer Dokumentation nacherz?hlt, und es war einer der inzwischen raren Momente, da man den Kollegen vom Ersten vieles nicht mehr ?bel nimmt, nicht einmal "Bunte TV" oder "Wellness TV". Denn wenn die ARD nur will, dann kann sie auch, was sie am besten kann: Nachrichten aufarbeiten, Geschichten pr?sentieren, Hintergr?nde erkl?ren.
Da sitzt also ein junger Deutscher im Besucherraum eines israelischen Gef?ngnisses und sagt S?tze wie: "Es ist ja nicht ein Selbstmordanschlag in dem Sinne, es ist f?r uns eine Ehre, in den Tod zu gehen. Das Ziel ist, dass wir dem Feind Verluste beif?gen k?nnen." W?hrend er dies sagt, grinst er die ganze Zeit, als w?rde er Szenen aus der "Feuerzangenbowle" nacherz?hlen. Immer wieder rutscht ihm ein "Sag' ich mal so" raus. Er sagt auch gerne "wir" und "man", um seine Haltung zu erkl?ren. "Wir denken nicht ?ber diese Sache nach. Man hat keinen Freiraum, dar?ber nachzudenken."
Dabei wirkt er gar nicht wie ein Fanatiker, nur wie ein ?berzeugungst?ter, der einen Auftrag erhalten hat, an dessen Ausf?hrung er leider gehindert wurde. Gefragt, wer ihn auf die Reise geschickt hat, setzt er wieder sein Grinsen auf und verweigert die Aussage: "Kann ich mich leider nicht zu ?u?ern, m?chte ich mich nicht ?u?ern."
HEZBOLLAH-MILITARY MEDIA / AP
Hisbollah-Milizen (im S?d-Libanon, 2002): "Ich habe Angst, wenn er rauskommt, was k?nnte er machen?"
Smyrek ist kein Antisemit, er hat nichts gegen Juden. Als er nach Israel flog, hatte er "keine Informationen" ?ber das Land. Er war ein kleines, aber wichtiges R?dchen im Getriebe der Hisbollah, ein williges Werkzeug, der "Gottes Krieger f?r die gerechte Sache" werden wollte und sogar seinen Gef?ngnisaufenthalt als eine Art moralische Wertsch?pfung empfindet. "Man wird hier weiter gebildet, sag' ich mal so."
Smyrek ist in Detmold aufgewachsen, aber das kann kein Grund sein, um sp?ter als Selbstm?rder bei einer Terrorfirma anzuheuern. Als er sechs Jahre alt war, haben sich seine Eltern scheiden lassen. Auch das reicht als Erkl?rung nicht aus, denn Millionen von Scheidungskindern werden keine "Gotteskrieger", sondern terrorisieren nur ihre eigenen Familien. Er hat in England, wohin die Mutter mit ihrem zweiten Mann zog, ein Milit?rinternat besucht, wurde sogar "Kadett des Jahres". Zur?ck in Deutschland, diente er vier Jahre in der Bundeswehr, aber der deutsche Drill war ihm zu lasch.
"Er war ein Traumt?nzer", sagt die Mutter. Der Vater kann sich an einen Satz erinnern, den sein Sohn ihm mal gesagt hat: "So arbeiten wie du m?chte ich nicht." Steven handelt eine Weile mit Drogen, bekommt "viel Geld f?r wenig Arbeit". Die Eltern machen einen sympathischen Eindruck, verkneifen sich jenen ?blichen Unsinn vom lieben Sohn, der es nicht gewesen sein kann, den Eltern in solchen Situationen gerne erz?hlen. Aber auch sie k?nnen sich nicht erkl?ren, warum der Junge eines Tages austickte und zum Islam ?bertrat.
"Der Islam ist der richtige Weg, die richtige Religion, es ist die Wahrheit", sagt Smyrek. Er nennt sich jetzt Abdel Karim, "der Gro?z?gige", und will sein Leben f?r eine gute Sache opfern. Die Mutter kann ihn nicht aufhalten. "Ich habe gemerkt, dass ich ihn verliere, er hat eine Gehirnw?sche gekriegt." R?ckblickend macht sie sich Vorw?rfe. "Ich h?tte zur Polizei gehen sollen." Aber was h?tte sie der Polizei sagen sollen? Dass ihr Sohn in einer Wohnung lebt, in der nur ein Gebetsteppich und eine Matratze liegen? Dass er sich ?ber M?dchen aufregt, die zu kurze R?cke tragen? Dass er kein Toilettenpapier mehr benutzt? All das kam ihr seltsam vor, aber strafbar war es nicht.
Hinterher ist man nat?rlich immer schlauer. R?ckblickend f?gt sich vieles zu einem Mosaik zusammen, das f?r sich genommen keinen Sinn ergab. Die Dokumentation von Eric Fiedler zeigt, wie schmal der Grat vom Idealisten zum Terroristen ist, der nicht nur sein eigenes Leben opfern, sondern m?glichst viele in den Tod mitnehmen will, aber sie zeigt nicht, warum einer zum Terroristen wird. Denn diese Frage ist nicht zu beantworten.
Auch nicht die: Was macht man mit einer tickenden Zeitbombe? Steven Smyrek k?nnte bald freikommen. Er steht auf der Liste der 400 Gefangenen, welche die Hisbollah gegen drei tote israelische Soldaten tauschen m?chte. Seine Mutter macht sich Sorgen: "Ich habe Angst, wenn er rauskommt, was k?nnte er machen?"
Ihr Sohn dagegen schaut zuversichtlich in die Zukunft. "M?chtest du ein M?rtyrer sein?" fragt ihn der Reporter am Ende der Unterhaltung. Smyrek antwortet: "Wir m?ssen alle mal sterben. Um diese Auszeichnung zu erlangen, werde ich mein Leben geben." Und grinst wieder. Denn lebensm?de oder verr?ckt ist er nicht. Er m?chte nur ins Paradies. Das kann "Big Brother" eben nicht bieten.

Posted by maximpost at 1:10 PM EST
Updated: Wednesday, 28 January 2004 1:23 PM EST
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