US draws a line on Pakistan's nuclear program
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
ISLAMABAD - The United States's patience could finally be running out with Pakistan and its nuclear program, even though Islamabad is scrambling to reassure Washington that any proliferation in the past was an aberration on the part of rogue individuals.
Disclosure by Iran to the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency of the names of people who provided Tehran with nuclear technology - including Pakistani scientists - has clearly alarmed Washington, even though these events took place some years ago.
Under strong US pressure, Pakistan has grilled at least 13 scientists from Kahuta, the site of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, and at least three are expected to be charged with selling Pakistan's nuclear technology to another country. Among those interrogated are former KRL director-general, Mohammed Farooq, and Major Islamul Haq, the principal staff officer of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan. Dr Khan spearheaded Pakistan's nuclear development program until his replacement two years ago as head of KRL, again under severe pressure from the US, which feared connections of al-Qaeda elements with some Pakistani scientists.
All of Pakistan's scientists are also now under heavy surveillance to track their every move, and the government has issued a circular stating that Dr Khan, a long-time celebrity in Pakistan, is not to be invited to any ceremonies or official functions, or in any way treated as a VIP.
Parallel to this Pakistani investigation, though, the US has launched its own independent probe into Pakistan's links to the nuclear programs of Iran, Libya and North Korea, and, depending on the results, according to insiders in the Pakistani administration, Washington could lean on Islamabad to completely abandon its program. Such action would conform with the US's broader agenda to defuse tension on the sub-continent. Already the US has forced India and Pakistan, not quite kicking and screaming, to the peace negotiating table, and for this peace process to last, Pakistan, a perennial meddler in Afghanistan and Kashmir in particular, would need to be tamed.
The US hand has been strengthened by the weekend announcement by President General Pervez Musharraf, who for the first time admitted that "some individual or individuals" may have been involved in proliferating Pakistan's nuclear technology. And on Monday, Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, saying that a two-month probe into allegations of nuclear technology proliferation to Iran and Libya was near completion, added: "One or two people acted in an irresponsible manner for personal profit. Money is involved in the matter. I am not naming any scientist."
According to sources in the Pakistani establishment who spoke to Asia Times Online, after questioning a few Pakistani scientists, US intelligence operators are now looking for a Karachi-based Pakistani entrepreneur who is said to manufacture some of the components that are used in atomic programs. The investigators want to establish the level of proficiency of the manufacturing, and the chances of the products being - or having been - exported.
US attention is also focussed clearly on Dr Khan. US and UK investigators have already made known evidence of him traveling on a personal rather than a diplomatic passport to Iran, North Korea, the United Arab Emirates and the UK. The UK government unofficially informed Islamabad several times of the visits, but received no response, leading investigators to conclude that he was, in fact, on official business. Tehran authorities have also released information concerning a property near the port of Bandar Abbas, officially given to Dr Khan by the government of Iran.
Pakistan builds a time bomb
A Pakistan scientist who was affiliated with Pakistan's nuclear program spoke to Asia Times Online, on condition of anonymity, about the country's nuclear program.
The program was the brain child of former premier Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was a champion of Third World countries and their rights. "If India develops nuclear weapons, Pakistan will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry" in order to develop a program of its own, he said at the time.
Bhutto was instrumental in bringing Dr Khan to Pakistan in the mid-1970s from the Netherlands where he had been associated with Urenco, a British,German and Dutch consortium. After his return to Pakistan, the Dutch government accused Dr Khan of stealing centrifuge plans from the plant. He was tried in absentia and convicted; the verdict was later overturned on a technicality. Western experts believe that Pakistan used Urenco gas centrifuge blueprints and information to build its own facilities.
Through Bhutto's diplomacy, according to the scientist who spoke to Asia Times Online, Iran and Libya were persuaded to make a joint investment in Pakistan's program. As a result, they were privy to the first phases of that program. Due to the secrecy of the program at this stage, all information and financing was channeled directly through Bhutto, even using his personal bank accounts. Dr Khan, too, answered only to Bhutto, and his "welfare" was the premier's responsibility.
Bhutto's government, though, was toppled by General Zia-ul Haq in a coup in 1977 over allegations of vote rigging. Two years later, on April 4, 1979, Bhutto was hanged after being convicted a year earlier on charges of conspiring to murder a political opponent.
Bhutto's demise - both political and physical - ended the cosy relationship that Pakistan had had with Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, while the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which threw out the monarchy, severely strained Tehran's ties with pro-US Pakistan.
These developments obviously forced Pakistan to continue its nuclear program on its own. In 1979 a pilot uranium enrichment facility started up at Sihala, and construction began on a full-scale facility at Kahuta. In April of that year, the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan after learning about its enrichment program.
At the same time, however, Pakistan became the main supply line of arms (mostly from the US) to Afghan mujahideen rallying to fight the Soviets, who had invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. And once the Iran-Iraq war broke out in 1980, Pakistan developed into a key transit point for arms on their way to Iran.
In 1981, because of its importance in the Afghan puzzle, the US Congress granted Pakistan a six-year exemption from the Symington Amendment, which prohibited aid to any non-nuclear country engaged in illegal procurement of equipment for a nuclear weapons program. Pakistan also accepted a US$3.2 billion, six-year aid package from the US that included the sale of F-16 planes. Free from the threat of sanctions, in 1982, there was a cold test at a small-scale reprocessing plant in Pakistan.
Around this time, Allama Ariful Hussaini, the chief of the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqa-i-Jaferia Pakistan, the largest Shi'ite organization in Pakistan, emerged as a go-between for Tehran and Pakistan, first for arms, and ultimately in the transfer of nuclear technology.
By 1986, US sources were reporting that Pakistan had produced weapons-grade uranium (greater than 90 percent U-235.
Hussaini was shot dead in Peshawar in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) a few days before General Zia's death in a plane accident in August 1988. Hussaini's party blamed then corps commander and governor of NWFP, Lieutenant-General Fazal-i-Haq, who was Zia's right-hand man. Haq himself was later murdered by a Shi'ite assassin.
By the late 1980s, then, the US was aware that Pakistan's nuclear program was well advanced, and knew that Pakistan and Iran were cooperating in weapons transfers - most likely including nuclear technology.
In mid-1988, a US oil tanker was fired on and it emerged that US missiles that had been given to Pakistan as supplies for Afghan mujahideen had been used in the attack.
The US was outraged, and proposed an audit at a large ammunition dump at Ojri in Pakistan. Mysteriously, to this day, on August 17, 1988, the dump went up in a huge blast that killed about 100 people and injured thousands. An inquiry did find, however, evidence that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence was involved in selling Stinger missiles and other American arms on the black market.
Since Pakistan was still a trusted ally in the Cold War, the US did not take any action. In June 1989, then prime minister Benazir Bhutto visited Washington DC. In February of that year, Pakistan announced the successful test of two new surface-to-surface ballistic missiles: Hatf I and II, with 80 kilometer and and 300 kilometer ranges. Before Bhutto's trip, though, production of highly-enriched uranium was stopped, a step that was verified by the US. It is believed that production was re-started after heightening tensions with India over Kashmir in 1990.
During these years, the deep seeds of suspicion over Pakistan's trustworthiness were planted, and they are now bearing the fruit that could poison Pakistan's nuclear program, with the country's scientists already feeling the ill effects.
(Note: On May 28 and 30 of 1998, Pakistan conducted underground nuclear tests - six according to the government - in response to India's May 11 and 13 five underground tests.)
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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Fighting the proliferation syndrome
By Ehsan Ahrari
The constant dribbling of news about Pakistan's nuclear scientists' role in the proliferation of nuclear know-how to North Korea, Iran and Libya is likely to damage the United States' ties with Pakistan. The surprising aspect of this development is that Islamabad has shown a certain amount of insensitivity, if not outright ignorance, about the seriousness that the Bush administration attaches to non-proliferation, especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.
Right now, the focus of Washington's attention is the global "war on terrorism", in which Pakistan plays a prominent role. Once that war looses its current primacy, Washington is likely to unleash its criticism, scrutiny and even sanctions against the South Asian nation, unless it clamps down hard now on all potential sources of nuclear proliferation from within.
Recent reports indicate that the transfer of nuclear knowledge to Iran from Pakistan took place in the late 1980s. The father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb - Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan - was reportedly involved. Other Pakistani nuclear scientists are also reported to have assisted Iran under a secret agreement between the two countries. That agreement was supposedly limited to the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology.
Pakistan has launched its own investigation on the foreign involvement of its nuclear scientists under US pressure, and also because of a complaint launched by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last November. That complaint alleges that Pakistani scientists played a prominent role in the development of centrifuges used to enrich uranium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons. The US alleges that Pakistan has played a similar role in North Korea, and even in Libya.
President General Pervez Musharraf has finally publicly conceded that his country's nuclear scientists have been involved in the proliferation of nuclear technology for "personal gain", but rejected any notion of an official sanctioning of their role. He said: "There is no such evidence that any government personality or military personality was involved in this at all."
The government of Pakistan has identified a second prominent scientist, Dr Mohammad Farooq, in nuclear proliferation activities. He has been under government custody since November 22 of last year and is expected to be charged under Pakistan's Official Secrets Act. He is reported to have implicated Khan under questioning. These events are said to have taken place many years ago.
Washington has thus far accepted Musharraf's assurances that all cooperative activities between his country and North Korea have been suspended. However, it continues to watch the pace and scope of this inquiry inside Pakistan.
Musharraf's dilemma is how far he should go in investigating the role of Pakistan's nuclear scientists, and what punitive measures, if any, he must take. Of course, Washington will be delighted to see Khan, Farooq and others receive some sort of punishment; however, they - especially Khan - are regarded as national heroes and cannot be unceremoniously put even under house arrest without a public backlash and resentment. Islamist groups have already shown their rage on the "humiliation" of Pakistani national heroes, and have accused Musharraf of conducting the inquiry to appease the Bush administration.
The very fact that Pakistan's intelligence agency - Inter-Service Intelligence - is conducting the inquiry has already ensured that no ranking past or present military officer will be charged with any involvement in the transfer of nuclear know-how to other countries. In fact, the former chief of army, General Aslam Beg, who, during his tenure (1988-1991) publicly advocated a military alliance with Iran, now denies authorizing the transfer of nuclear technology. He depicts all allegations of his involvement as "part of the conspiracy against me".
Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto has pitched in her own share by maintaining from exile that the military sustained total control of all nuclear matters during her administration, thereby implying that the military was involved in nuclear proliferation to Iran. A former official during her successor Nawaz Sharif's government is also blaming the military of deciding in the 1990s to transfer nuclear know-how to Iran. Even though Iran has not directly named Pakistan in its acquisition of nuclear know-how, the IAEA has surmised that Iran's centrifuges were probably based on Pakistan's designs.
Undoubtedly, Pakistan, despite official denials, is not exactly an innocent party in this nuclear proliferation syndrome. As the inquiry of nuclear scientists and the blame game continue, the US will be content for now if Pakistan ceases all proliferation activities, officially sanctioned or otherwise. Aside from Washington's determination to bring about global nuclear non-proliferation, the international community appears equally resolute to disallow the repeat of the North Korean example of nuclear blackmail.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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ISI - Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Agency
A State within a State ?
TIMELINE ENTRIES ABOUT ISI DIRECTOR LT. GEN. MAHMOOD AHMED
Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, Director of Pakistan's secret service, the ISI, is quite possibly the most taboo suspect of all 9/11 suspects. It was reported in early October 2001 that Mahmood ordered Saeed Sheikh to send $100,000 to hijacker Mohamed Atta. Since then hardly a word has been said about this stunning report, and in fact this once very powerful man appears to have completely disappeared from view.
In December 2002, Senator Bob Graham, head of the Congressional 9/11 inquiry and thus privy to much information still not publicly released, said he was "surprised at the evidence that there were foreign governments involved in facilitating the activities of at least some of the [9/11] terrorists in the United States. ... It will become public at some point when it's turned over to the archives, but that's 20 or 30 years from now." [PBS Newshour, 12/11/02] Is he referring to Pakistan and the role of Mahmood, a man Graham just happened to be discussing bin Laden with in Washington DC as the 9/11 attacks were happening?
If Mahmood had a role in 9/11, this would not only strongly suggest that the rest of the Pakistani government had foreknowledge, but it would also raise curious questions about who else knew, in the US, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. Mahmood seems to be involved in a number of important but obscure meetings before, during and after 9/11.
For more on Mahmood's possible connection with the 9/11 hijackers, see the entries about middleman Saeed Sheikh (also in narrative form). See also the section on the ISI generally. It is possible that the story of Mahmood's involvement in 9/11 is only Indian propaganda, but no Western reporter seems curious to find out.
Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf.
October 12, 1999: General Musharraf becomes leader of Pakistan in a coup. One major reason for the coup is the ISI felt the previous ruler had to go "out of fear that he might buckle to American pressure and reverse Pakistan's policy [of supporting] the Taliban." [New York Times, 12/8/01] Shortly thereafter Musharraf replaces the leader of the ISI, Brig Imtiaz, because of his close ties to the previous leader. Imtiaz is arrested and convicted of "having assets disproportionate to his known sources of income." It comes out that he was keeping tens of millions of dollars earned from heroin smuggling in a Deutschebank account. This is interesting because insider trading just prior to 9/11 will later connect to a branch of Deutschebank recently run by "Buzzy" Krongard, now Executive Director of the CIA (see September 6-10, 2001). [Financial Times (Asian edition), 8/10/01] The new Director of the ISI is Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, a close ally of Musharraf who is instrumental in the success of the coup. [Guardian, 10/9/01] Mahmood will later be fired after suggestions that he helped fund the 9/11 attacks (see October 7, 2001 (B)).
April 4, 2000: ISI Director and "leading Taliban supporter" Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed visits Washington. In a message meant for both Pakistan and the Taliban, US officials tell him that al-Qaeda has killed Americans and "people who support those people will be treated as our enemies." However, no actual action, military or otherwise, is taken against either the Taliban or Pakistan. [Washington Post, 12/19/01]
May 2001 (E): Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a career covert operative and former Navy Seal, travels to India on a publicized tour while CIA Director Tenet makes a quiet visit to Pakistan to meet with President General Musharraf. Armitage has long and deep Pakistani intelligence connections (as well as a role in the Iran-Contra affair). It would be reasonable to assume that while in Islamabad, Tenet, in what was described as "an unusually long meeting," also meets with his Pakistani counterpart, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed (see October 7, 2001). A long-time regional expert with extensive CIA ties stated publicly: "The CIA still has close links with the ISI." [SAPRA, 5/22/01, Times of India, 3/7/01] FTW
Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed. [AFP]
Summer 2001 (F): An Asia Times article published just prior to 9/11 claims that Crown Prince Abdullah, the defacto ruler of Saudi Arabia (see Late 1995), makes a clandestine visit to Pakistan around this time. After meeting with senior army officials, he visits Afghanistan with ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed (see October 7, 2001). They meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar and try to convince him that the US is likely to launch an attack on Afghanistan. They insist bin Laden be sent to Saudi Arabia, where he would be held in custody and not handed over to any third country. If bin Laden were to be tried in Saudi Arabia, Abdullah would help make sure he is acquitted. Mullah Omar apparently rejects the proposal. The article suggests that Abdullah is secretly a supporter of bin Laden and is trying to protect him from harm (see Late 1998 (F)). [Asia Times, 8/22/01] A similar meeting may also take place after 9/11 (see September 19, 2001 (B)).
August 28-30, 2001: Senator Bob Graham (D), Representative Porter Goss (R) and Senator John Kyl (R) travel to Pakistan and meet with President Musharraf. They reportedly discuss various security issues, including the possible extradition of bin Laden. They also meet with Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan. Zaeef apparently tells them that the Taliban want to solve the issue of bin Laden through negotiations with the US. Pakistan says it wants to stay out of the bin Laden issue. All three are meeting with ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks (see September 11, 2001 (H)). Mahmood gave $100,000 to hijacker Mohamed Atta (see October 7, 2001). [AFP, 8/28/01, Salon, 9/14/01] Since the ISI was funding the 9/11 hijackers, what else might have been discussed in these meetings?
September 4-11, 2001: ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed visits Washington for the second time (see April 4, 2000). On September 10, a Pakistani newspaper reports on his trip so far. It says his visit has "triggered speculation about the agenda of his mysterious meetings at the Pentagon and National Security Council" as well as meetings with CIA Director Tenet, unspecified officials at the White House and the Pentagon, and his "most important meeting" with Mark Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The article suggests that "of course, Osama bin Laden" could be the focus of some discussions. Prophetically, the article adds, "What added interest to his visit is the history of such visits. Last time [his] predecessor was [in Washington], the domestic [Pakistani] politics turned topsy-turvy within days." [The News, 9/10/01] This is a reference to the Musharraf coup just after a ISI Director's visit (see October 12, 1999). Mahmood is meeting in Washington when the 9/11 attacks begin (see September 11, 2001 (H)), and extends his stay until September 16 (see September 11-16, 2001).
Left to right: Bob Graham [CNN, 2/23/02], John Kyl [Arizona Daily Star, 9/13/01], and Porter Goss. [CNN, 6/9/99]
September 11, 2001 (H): At the time of the attacks, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed is at a breakfast meeting at the Capitol with the chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, Senator Bob Graham (D) and Representative Porter Goss (R) (Goss is a 10-year veteran of the CIA's clandestine operations wing). The meeting is said to last at least until the second plane hits the WTC. [Washington Post, 5/18/02] Graham and Goss later co-head the joint House-Senate investigation into the 9/11 attacks, which has made headlines for saying there was no "smoking gun" of Bush knowledge before 9/11. [Washington Post, 7/11/02] Note Senator Graham should have been aware of a report made to his staff the previous month that one of Mahmood's subordinates had told a US undercover agent that the WTC would be destroyed (see Early August 2001). Evidence suggests Mahmood ordered that $100,000 be sent to hijacker Mohamed Atta (see Early August 2001 (D)). Also present at the meeting were Senator John Kyl (R) and the Pakistani ambassador to the US, Maleeha Lodhi (all or virtually all of the people in this meeting also met in Pakistan a few weeks earlier (see August 28-30, 2001)). Senator Graham says of the meeting: "We were talking about terrorism, specifically terrorism generated from Afghanistan." The New York Times mentions bin Laden specifically was being discussed. [Vero Beach Press Journal, 9/12/01, Salon, 9/14/01, New York Times, 6/3/02] The fact that these people are meeting at the time of the attacks is a strange coincidence at the very least. Was the topic of conversation just more coincidence? FTW
September 11-16, 2001: ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, extending his Washington visit because of the 9/11 attacks (see September 4-11, 2001 and September 11, 2001 (H)) [Japan Economic Newswire, 9/17/01], meets with US officials and negotiates Pakistan's cooperation with the US against al-Qaeda. It is rumored that later in the day on 9/11 and again the next day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visits Mahmood and offers him the choice: "Help us and breathe in the 21st century along with the international community or be prepared to live in the Stone Age." [Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9/12, LA Weekly, 11/9/01] Secretary of State Powell presents Mahmood seven demands as an ultimatum and Pakistan supposedly agrees to all seven. [Washington Post, 1/29/02] Mahmood also has meetings with Senator Joseph Biden (D), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Secretary of State Powell, regarding Pakistan's position. [Miami Herald, 9/16/01, New York Times, 9/13/01, Reuters, 9/13/01, Associated Press, 9/13/01] On September 13, the airport in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, is shut down for the day. A government official later says the airport had been closed because of threats made against Pakistan's "strategic assets," but doesn't elaborate. The next day, Pakistan declares "unstinting" support for the US, and the airport is reopened. It is later suggested that Israel and India threatened to attack Pakistan and take control of its nuclear weapons if Pakistan didn't side with the US (see also September 14, 2001 (approx.)). [LA Weekly, 11/9/01] Was war with Pakistan narrowly averted? It is later reported that Mahmood's presence in Washington was a lucky blessing; one Western diplomat saying it "must have helped in a crisis situation when the US was clearly very, very angry." [Financial Times, 9/18/01] Was it luck he was there, or did Mahmood - later reported to have ordered $100,000 wired to the 9/11 hijackers (see Early August 2001 (D) and October 7, 2001) - know when the 9/11 attack would happen?
September 14, 2001 (approx.): According to Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker, a few days after 9/11 members of the elite Israeli counter-terrorism unit Sayeret Matkal arrive in the US and begin training with US Special Forces in a secret location. The two groups are developing contingency plans to attack Pakistan's military bases and remove its nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government or the nuclear weapons fall into the wrong hands. [New Yorker, 10/29/01] There may have been threats to enact this plan on September 13, 2001 (see September 11-16, 2001). The Japan Times later notes that this "threat to divest Pakistan of its 'crown jewels' was cleverly used by the US, first to force Musharraf to support its military campaign in Afghanistan, and then to warn would-be coup plotters against Musharraf." [Japan Times, 11/10/01] Note the curious connection between Sayeret Matkal and one of the 9/11 passengers on Flight 11 (see September 11, 2001 (X)).
Mid-September 2001: The Guardian later claims that Pakistani President Musharraf has a meeting of his 12 or 13 most senior officers. Musharraf proposes to support the US in the imminent war against the Taliban and bin Laden. Supposedly, four of his most senior generals oppose him outright in "a stunning display of disloyalty." The four are ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, Lt. Gen. Muzaffar Usmani, Lt. Gen. Jamshaid Gulzar Kiani, and Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz Khan. All four are removed from power over the next month (see October 7, 2001). If this meeting took place, it's hard to see when it could have happened, since the article states it happened "within days" of 9/11, but Mahmood was in the US until late September 16 (see September 11-16, 2001), then flew to Afghanistan for two days (see September 17-18 and 28, 2001), then possibly to Saudi Arabia (see September 19, 2001 (B)). [Guardian, 5/25/02] Why would Musharraf send Mahmood on important diplomatic missions even late in the month if he is so disloyal?
September 17-18 and 28, 2001: On September 17, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed heads a six-man delegation that visits Mullah Omar in Kandahar, Afghanistan. It is reported he is trying to convince Omar to extradite bin Laden or face an immediate US attack. [Press Trust of India, 9/17/01, Financial Times, 9/18/01, London Times, 9/18/01] Also in the delegation is Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz Khan, an ex-ISI official who appears to be one of Saeed Sheikh's contacts in the ISI (see January 1, 2000-September 11, 2001). [Press Trust of India, 9/17/01] On September 28, Ahmed returns to Afghanistan with a group of about 10 religious leaders. He talks with Mullah Omar, who again says he will not hand over bin Laden. [AFP, 9/28/01] A senior Taliban official later claims that on these trips Mahmood in fact urges Omar not to extradite bin Laden, but instead urges him to resist the US. [AP, 2/21/02, Time, 5/6/02] Another account claims Mahmood does "nothing as the visitors [pour] praise on Omar and [fails] to raise the issue" of bin Laden's extradition. [Knight Ridder, 11/3/01] Two Pakistani brigadier generals connected to the ISI also accompany Mahmood, and advise al-Qaeda to counter the coming US attack on Afghanistan by resorting to mountain guerrilla war. The advice is not followed. [Asia Times, 9/11/02] Other ISI officers also stay in Afghanistan to advise the Taliban (see Late September-November 2001).
September 19, 2001 (B): According to the private intelligence service Intelligence Online, a secret meeting between fundamentalist supporters in Saudi Arabia and the ISI takes place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on this day. Crown Prince Abdullah, the defacto ruler of Saudi Arabia (see Late 1995), and Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz, the new head of Saudi intelligence (see August 31, 2001), meet with Gen. Mohamed Youssef, head of the ISI's Afghanistan Section, and ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed (just returning from discussions in Afghanistan (see September 17-18 and 28, 2001)). They agree "to the principle of trying to neutralize Osama Bin Laden in order to spare the Taliban regime and allow it to keep its hold on Afghanistan." There has been no confirmation that this meeting in fact took place, but if it did, its goals were unsuccessful. [Intelligence Online, 10/4/01] There may have been a similar meeting before 9/11 (see Summer 2001 (F)).
Late September-November 2001: The ISI secretly assists the Taliban in their defense against a US-led attack. Between three and five ISI officers give military advice to the Taliban in late September (see also September 17-18 and 28, 2001). [Telegraph, 10/10/01] At least five key ISI operatives help the Taliban prepare defenses in Kandahar. None are later punished for this. [Time, 5/6/02] Secret advisors begin to withdraw in early October, but some stay on into November. [Knight Ridder, 11/3/01] Large convoys of rifles, ammunition and rocket-propelled grenade launchers for Taliban fighters cross the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan on October 8 and 12, just after US bombing of Afghanistan begins (see October 7, 2001 (B)) and after a supposed crackdown on ISI fundamentalists (see October 7, 2001). The Pakistani ISI secretly gives safe passage to these convoys, despite having promised the US in September that such assistance would immediately stop. [New York Times, 12/8/01] Secret ISI convoys of weapons and nonlethal supplies continue into November. [UPI, 11/1/01, Time, 5/6/02] An anonymous Western diplomat later states, "We did not fully understand the significance of Pakistan's role in propping up the Taliban until their guys withdrew and things went to hell fast for the Talibs." [New York Times, 12/8/01]
President Musharraf shakes hands with ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood. [AFP]
October 7, 2001: ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed is replaced in the face of US pressure after links are discovered between him, Saeed Sheikh and the funding of the 9/11 attacks. Mahmood instructed Saeed to transfer $100,000 into hijacker Mohamed Atta's bank account prior to 9/11 (see Early August 2001 (D) or June 29, 2000-September 18, 2000; it hasn't been reported which $100,000 money transfer this refers to). This is according to Indian intelligence, which claims the FBI has privately confirmed the story. [Press Trust of India, 10/8/01, Times of India, 10/9/01, India Today, 10/15/01, Daily Excelsior, 10/18/01] The story is not widely reported in Western countries, though it makes the Wall Street Journal. [Australian, 10/10/01, AFP, 10/10/01, Wall Street Journal, 10/10/01] It is reported in Pakistan as well. [Dawn, 10/8/01] The Northern Alliance also repeats the claim in late October. [FNS, 10/31/01] In Western countries, the usual explanation is that Mahmood is fired for being too close to the Taliban. [London Times, 10/9/01, Guardian, 10/9/01] The Times of India reports that Indian intelligence helped the FBI discover the link, and says: "A direct link between the ISI and the WTC attack could have enormous repercussions. The US cannot but suspect whether or not there were other senior Pakistani Army commanders who were in the know of things. Evidence of a larger conspiracy could shake US confidence in Pakistan's ability to participate in the anti-terrorism coalition." [Times of India, 10/9/01] There is evidence some ISI officers may have known of a plan to destroy the WTC as early as mid-1999 (see July 14, 1999). Two other ISI leaders, Lt. Gen. Mohammed Aziz Khan and Chief of General Staff Mohammed Yousuf, are sidelined on the same day as Mahmood. [Fox News, 10/8/01] Saeed had been working under Khan (see January 1, 2000-September 11, 2001). The firings are said to have purged the ISI of its fundamentalists. But according to one diplomat: "To remove the top two or three doesn't matter at all. The philosophy remains... [The ISI is] a parallel government of its own. If you go through the officer list, almost all of the ISI regulars would say, of the Taliban, 'They are my boys.'" [New Yorker, 10/29/01] It is believed Mahmood has been living under virtual house arrest in Pakistan ever since (which would seem to imply more than just a difference of opinion over the Taliban), but no charges have been brought against him, and there is no evidence the US has asked to question him. [Asia Times, 1/5/02] He also has refused to speak to reporters since being fired [AP, 2/21/02], and outside India and Pakistan, the story has only been mentioned a couple times in the media since (see [Sunday Herald, 2/24/02, London Times, 4/21/02]). If Mahmood helped fund the 9/11 attacks, what did President Musharraf know about it?
January 18, 2003: Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf warns of an "impending danger" that Pakistan will become a target of war for "Western forces" after the Iraq crisis. "We will have to work on our own to stave off the danger. Nobody will come to our rescue, not even the Islamic world. We will have to depend on our muscle." [Press Trust of India, 1/19/03, Financial Times, 2/8/03] Pointing to "a number of recent 'background briefings' and 'leaks'" from the US government, "Pakistani officials fear the Bush administration is planning to change its tune dramatically once the war against Iraq is out of the way." [Financial Times, 2/8/03] Despite evidence that the head of Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, ordered money given to the hijackers (see October 7, 2001), so far only one partisan newspaper has suggested Pakistan was involved in 9/11. [WorldNetDaily, 1/3/02]
But could Musharraf be worried about evidence suggesting involvement of the ISI in the 9/11 attacks?