Warning Shots Fired at N.Korean Patrol Boat in West Sea
A North Korean patrol boat crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL) at around 4:47 p.m. on Wednesday, but retreated after the South Korean Navy fired warning shots. This is the first time that a North's patrol boat has trespassed the NLL since the North and South's military authorities activated the hot line on June 15 to prevent accidental confrontation between the two nations.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the North's patrol boat crossed the NLL 0.7 miles towards the south while controlling Chinese ships engaging in illegal operations 15 miles west off the sea from Yeonpyong Island. But it retreated 7 minutes after the South's Navy fired warning shots.
At around 4:40 p.m., right before the boat crossed the NLL, the Navy broadcasted a warning message saying, "Your boat is approaching the NLL. Please, move back to the North immediately." Then, at 4:48, seeing the boat trespass the line, they sent another warning message three times saying, "Your boat crossed the NLL. If you do not move towards the north immediately, we will fire warning shots." Despite these warning messages, the North Korean patrol boat continued to move south, so the Navy fired two shots at 4:54 and drove the boat away north of the NLL at 5:01.
A JSC official said, "Considering that four Chinese fishing ships were operating on the northern sea when the North Korean patrol boat crossed the NLL, we think that they crossed the line accidentally while supervising illegal fishing activities."
There is a possibility, however, that the boat invaded into the NLL to test the South Korean will to guard themselves in this atmosphere in which inter-Korean military tensions have eased following the recent general-level military talks. This assumption was made because unlike other days, there were strange problems in communication between the South and North's patrol boats that day.
Last year, North Korean patrol boats crossed the NLL five times in total and retreated after receiving warning shots three times.

(englishnews@chosun.com )

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Seoul's confusing love-in with Pyongyang
By David Scofield

It's been confusing times recently for North Korea's supporters and alleged collaborators in South Korea, a relatively new democracy that has launched a virtual political love-in with Pyongyang, turning a blind eye to its widespread repression and human-rights abuses. Some critics of the North, such as those who try to run an anti-Pyongyang radio station, Free North Korea, have been harassed - FNK may even be forced off the air. And yet a pro-Pyongyang professor languishes in jail - and his sentence soon may be increased for his refusal to denounce the North.
First, on July 1, the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths proclaimed that three North Korean spies who died 30 years ago in South Korean custody were actually "martyrs" in Korea's fledgling democracy movement. Then a day later, the state prosecutor's office announced it would seek to increase the seven-year sentence of German-Korean Professor Song Du-yul, another North Korean supporter, to 15 years for his refusal to renounce involvement in activities in "praise and support" of North Korea's leadership. The Truth Commission has little genuine interest in the plight of Song now, but 30 years after his death he too may be retrospectively labeled a "martyr" in modern South Korea's struggle to realize democracy.
Song Du-yul, like the North Korean spies of 1970, has been imprisoned under anti-subversion, anti-communist legislation that since 1991 has been called the National Security Law (NSL).
The NSL was designed to "suppress anti-state acts that endanger national security". There is no direct reference to North Korea, but Article 1 of that country's constitution states, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an independent socialist state representing the interests of all the Korean people." This strongly suggests that the Pyongyang government is the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula and, as such, has earned the title "anti-state" by South Korean authorities.
Professor Song, who returned to South Korea last September 22 at the urging of the Korea Democracy Foundation, was detained by authorities upon arrival at Incheon airport for his "anti-State" activities. Song, a naturalized German citizen, had been convicted by a Seoul court on March 30, 2003, of joining the (North) Korean Workers Party, accepting money from that "anti-state" organization and planning meetings with the same group - offenses still punishable by death in South Korea.
Song knew there was a high likelihood he would be arrested upon his return, but the presidential election of Roh Moo-hyun, the self-styled defender of human rights and ardent advocate of democracy, prompted Song and the Korea Democracy Foundation to challenge the anachronistic law on "anti-state" activities, a decision that Song is paying for with his freedom.
Song is currently in prison awaiting a ruling on the appeal of charges against him, but he is not the only party appealing. The state prosecutor has said the court erred in not finding Song guilty of planning academic meetings in North Korea and it is appealing the sentence, demanding that Song serve a minimum 15 years for his actions and beliefs.
Of course, while Song cools his heels in detention, potentially for the next 15 years, the South Korean government is fully committed to supporting all manner of rapprochement with the "anti-state" government of North Korea. The current administration, like the preceding one under former president Kim Dae-jung, has made reconciliation with North Korea the top priority. South Korea has played host to innumerable events and festivals in celebration of intra-Korean friendship. Most recently Workers Party members from North Korea, "praisers" of the "anti-state North", celebrated with South Koreans at Munhak Stadium in the port city of Incheon in recognition of the four-year anniversary of the North-South summit of June 15, 2000. Not even the arrival of outspoken human-rights activist Norbert Vollersten, displaying photos of the malnourished and starving people in North Korea, could dampen the mood at the intra-Korean love-in.
Explicit articles within the National Security Law notwithstanding, South Korea's rapprochement polices, focused as they are on financial incentives, are illegal and punishable by prison sentences ranging from a year in prison to death, a reading of the document shows.
Intra-Korean cultural festivals and sports meets have become convenient channels for government-sanctioned cash payoffs to North Korea, an offense punishable by seven years in jail. The fourth anniversary of the now-infamous North-South Summit that was celebrated in Incheon last month in itself was a product of a widely reported US$500 million payoff to North Korean leader Kim-Jong-il. The North Korean cultural ambassadors and athletes who have come to South Korea since the summit have left with bags far heavier than when they arrived, as the goodwill of North Korea comes with a high price. Indeed, during the Peace Festival on the South Korean island of Cheju last year, North Korean participants refused to board their plane, already loaded down with new appliances from South Korea, as they said the money being sent to the "Dear Leader" was simply not enough, according to reports. The group demanded, and eventually got, an additional $1 million for Kim, it was reported.
Concerning the "cash for summit" scandal, as it was called in South Korea, former president Kim Dae-jung acknowledged that $100 million went to North Korea, while reports at the time put the amount at $500 million. Many speculated, however, that the real figure was closer to $1 billion. There was a trial and many of Kim Dae-jung's underlings were convicted of the payoff, but all received light, suspended sentences, since the crime was committed with the motive of reunification, or so thought the judge.
During the past year, the South Korean government has become increasingly savvy in finding ways to channel cash to North Korea. The much-heralded Gaesung Industrial Complex appears set to become another conduit for cash to North Korea. Since its inception, those involved with the project have expressed doubt about the viability of the project. The lack of any adherence to market principles - combined with the North Koreans' strong adherence to the pan-Korean practice of making deals and promises only to change agreements unilaterally later as it suits them - make the prospects of profit from the zone, even when the North Korean workers will be paid less than $2 a day, a very remote possibility. Undaunted, the government of South Korea has pledged that any losses incurred by Southern companies will be absorbed by Seoul. The message is clear: you invest the money, we will reimburse you.
So why is Song in jail?
The National Security Law represents to conservatives in South Korea the last line of defense, thwarting ideological invasion from North to South, and it would a mistake to assume that the leftist, pro-North rhetoric so often articulated by those in the Blue House is representative of all government organs, especially those conservative bureaucrats involved in state security. For incumbent administrations, the law's vaguely written articles allow the prosecution of, and the government maximum leeway in interpreting, "anti-state" violations, so that the law becomes a very powerful tool of internal control, and further insurance that all dealings with North Korea will be channeled through the government.
South Korea's use of the NSL to muzzle and imprison ideological supporters of Pyongyang, and not those simply committed to policies of rapprochement through financial appeasement, calls into question the liberal democracy that South Korea purports to be. True reconciliation and rapprochement should be a product of free information and open discussion. Information empowers individuals and changes societies, as the leadership in North Korea is well aware; they maintain unprecedented control over information within the country, a key to the regime's survival
But South Korea, with its liberal democratic institutions, should be establishing itself as an example to its brethren to the north. Let the people of South Korea freely speak, disagree, and debate their beliefs and convictions. The maintenance of the NSL and the imprisonment of Song give the impression that South Korea is not sure of its democracy or democratic principles, fearing plurality and discord, and opting for suppression rather than discussion and debate.

David Scofield, former lecturer at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, is currently conducting post-graduate research at the School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom.

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Logging on to terror.com
By Sudha Ramachandran

BANGALORE - While militant and terrorist groups have been using the Internet for almost a decade, its growing popularity as a meeting place for terrorist groups over the past few years has made cyberspace a key battleground in the "war on terror". Far from successful at "smoking out terrorists" from their hideouts in the mountains and caves of Afghanistan, counter-terrorism strategists are finding the task of tracking terrorists and their activities in cyberspace even more daunting.
There has been a sharp increase in the number of militant groups using the Internet for their activities. In 1998, about half of the 30 militant groups that were labelled terrorist organizations by the US maintained websites. By 2000, almost all terrorist groups had established their presence on the web. According to Gabriel Weimann, senior fellow at the Washington-based United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and professor at the Haifa University in Israel, the number of terrorist-run websites has increased by 571% over the past seven years.
The Internet has become the terrorists' preferred choice of communication for the same reasons it is popular among people in general: it is quick, inexpensive and easily accessible. What makes it particularly attractive to terrorists is that it gives access to huge audiences spread across the world, provides anonymity and is hard to police or regulate.
Not only have the number of terrorist websites increased, but also the uses to which terrorists put the Internet have diversified. Its use as a propaganda tool is perhaps the most overt. Terrorist websites typically outline the nature of the organization's cause and justifications for the use of violence. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) website, for instance, carries accounts of the LTTE's "freedom struggle", the legality of its demand for an independent Tamil Eelam and the legitimacy of its armed struggle. The website carries interviews given by LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakaran and his speech on "Heroes Day". It also carries press releases that provide the media with its take on events in Sri Lanka.
But use of the Internet as a propaganda tool is just the tip of the iceberg. Terrorists are using the Internet as a weapon in psychological warfare, to raise funds, recruit, incite violence and provide training. They also use it to plan, network and coordinate attacks. Thomas Hegghammer, who researches Islamist websites at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, says that "in a sense, [the Internet has] replaced Afghanistan as a meeting place".
Groups with links to al-Qaeda used the Internet as a weapon in psychological warfare in the recent spate of kidnappings and beheadings that they carried out. Gruesome videos of the killing of Daniel Pearl and the beheadings of Nick Berg, Paul Johnson, Kim Sun-il and others were posted on the Internet. By doing this, the terrorists were able to reach out to a global audience, and in the process amplify many times over the terror generated by a single terrorist incident.
The "heroism" of the fighters, their "sacrifices" and their "martyrdom" are recurrent themes on which militant websites focus. These are aimed at motivating others to join the cause and also to encourage donations. It is said that while websites play an important role in motivating youngsters to contribute in one way or another to the cause, they stop short of actually recruiting through the web.
Women and children are targeted by these websites, too. Mothers are exhorted to send their sons to battlefields. One website - Princess Taliban - details the many ways women can help the jihad cause, including reading the proper bedtime stories to prepare their children for a future as combatants.
Several websites incite violence and provide know-how, even online training in terror tactics. In an interview with ABC's Lateline reporter Tony Jones, former Reuters journalist Paul Eedle, who is studying radical Islamic websites, compared the Internet with a training camp. He drew attention to two fortnightly magazines, one general political and the other specifically military, being developed by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Explaining the significance of these online training magazines to al-Qaeda, Eedle pointed out: "They have to replace their physical bases in Afghanistan somehow and so long as there is a small number of highly trained people to lead groups, then these detailed manuals of writing how to write recipes for explosives are all crucial."
The Palestinian militant group Hamas has been providing online training in bomb-making for several years. The module consists of 14 lessons, including the production of a belt filled with explosives used often by suicide bombers. Those who show lack of commitment by missing a class are not allowed to continue with the course.
"The Terrorist's Handbook", "The Anarchist Cookbook" and the "Mujahideen Poisons Handbook", which provide detailed instructions on how to construct bombs and concoct homemade poisons, are posted on several militant websites.
Another manual distributed through the Internet is "The Encyclopedia of Jihad". Prepared by al-Qaeda, it provides detailed instructions on how to establish an underground organization and execute attacks. A recent edition of the al-Qaeda's publication al-Battar - or "The Sword" - provides a comprehensive guide to kidnapping, suggested hostage-taking methods, potential targets, negotiating tactics and directions on how to videotape the decapitation of victims and post the video on the web. Incidentally, this online information was posted ahead of the recent spate of kidnappings and beheadings in West Asia.
Speaking at the New American Foundation in Washington last week, Weimann pointed out that the Hezbollah site provides links to downloadable games. "These games are training children to play the role of terrorists, to be suicide bombers and to actually kill political leaders," Weimann said.
The Internet has been described as a virtual Afghanistan, where terrorists can meet, discuss and plan their operations. Terrorists have been hiding pictures and maps of targets in sports chat rooms, on pornographic bulletin boards and on web sites. Encrypted messages are being sent in pictures on websites - a practice known as steganography - containing instructions for terrorist attacks.
In a USIP-published report "How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet", Weimann points out that al-Qaeda used the Internet extensively while planning and coordinating the September 11 attacks. Thousands of encrypted messages were posted in a password-protected area of a website. By accessing the Internet in public places and sending messages via public e-mail the operatives preserved their anonymity. He also describes how Hamas militants and sympathizers "use chat rooms to plan operations and operatives exchange e-mail to coordinate actions across Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Israel". Instructions in the form of maps, photographs, directions and technical details of how to use explosives are often disguised by means of steganography, which involves hiding messages inside graphic files.
Sometimes, however, instructions are delivered concealed in only the simplest of codes. Mohammed Atta's final message to the other 18 terrorists who carried out the attacks of September is reported to have read: "The semester begins in three more weeks. We've obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering." (The reference to the various faculties was apparently the code for the buildings targeted in the attacks.)
But experts like Hegghammer reject the view that militants use the Internet to plan and coordinate attacks. He believes that the sort of planning required for attacks is done in secret "very, very carefully". The Internet, he argues, is used mainly to share ideas and spread propaganda.
While it is the use of the Internet by Islamic militants that has grabbed the attention of intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism officials over the past several years, the Internet is being used by an array of groups with very different ideologies, including American white supremacist and militia groups, anarchists and groups with secessionist ambitions like the self-proclaimed "Republic of Texas". They, too, incite violence and provide input on bomb-making.
Fighting a losing battle
Counter-terrorism experts find themselves in the deep end in their "war on terror" in cyberspace. The rapid pace at which information technology is advancing makes it hard to fight terrorists. Several Islamist militant groups might be using medieval methods of violence, such as beheading, but the skill with which they are using the Internet indicates that their feet are firmly placed in the 21st century.
Shutting down websites does not help, as they re-emerge quickly on different servers. It is difficult to catch moving targets. Weimann describes terrorism on the Internet as "a very dynamic phenomenon: websites suddenly emerge, frequently modify their formats, and then swiftly disappear - or, in many cases, seem to disappear by changing their online address but retaining much the same content".
Not only is the task of intercepting encrypted messages and images on the Internet's estimated 28 billion images and 2 billion websites a tough one, but also interpreting it is difficult as it is impossible to read an encrypted message without cracking the encryption's code. Cracking a code is time-consuming. However, a highly encrypted message crossing the net can sometimes grab the attention of security sleuths who are then likely to crack it. This has prompted several militants to opt for low-tech, text only messages, as these are unlikely to catch attention.
Analysts are suggesting that instead of engaging in a futile effort of closing down websites, counter-terrorism strategists should simply listen to what is being discussed in cyberspace - in the chat rooms and discussion rooms. The discussion rooms provide intelligence on attacks, but more importantly, on how ideology and opinion is shaping in the larger Muslim community. Hegghammer argues: "That is where you really get the early signs of the ideological developments, which are later going to affect us, or might affect us, physically."
Governments and counter-terrorism experts are doing their best to keep up with the terrorists. But barring major technological advances, the cat and mouse game going on in cyberspace is likely to continue, with the mouse remaining elusive.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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Pakistan faces its jihadi demons in Iraq
By Kaushik Kapisthalam

When it comes to troops for Iraq, it is no secret that the United States is not too gently pressuring Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf to send soldiers for peacekeeping purposes. And with the appointment of the current Pakistani ambassador to the US, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, as the next United Nations envoy to Iraq, it appears likely that Islamabad will bow to the pressure.
Should this happen, among the threats its soldiers are likely to face are those from a number of foreign jihadis. While current world attention - thanks to Washington's conviction - seems to be largely focused on Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his al-Tawhid force, one of the least-reported foreign jihadi groups in Iraq is one of Pakistan's very own - Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
LeT's origins
LeT is a Pakistani Salafist (Wahhabi) jihadi group that was formed in 1986 as the military wing of the Markaz Da'wa wal-Irshad (MDI) or "Center for Religious Learning and Social Welfare". Pakistani Salafists Zafar Iqbal and Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, both professors in the Islamic studies department of the University of Engineering and Technology of Lahore, set up LeT with seed money from a Saudi "sheikh" whom many believe to have been Osama bin Laden. There were also generous contributions from the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Another founding member of the LeT was bin Laden's mentor, Abdullah Azzam, who also had a role in the founding of the Palestinian Hamas.

LeT and the Markaz soon set up bases in the eastern Afghanistan provinces of Kantar and Paktia, both of which had a sizable number of Ahle-Hadith (Salafi) sect followers of Islam, with the aim of participating in the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Because the LeT joined the Afghan jihad at a period when it was winding down (the Soviets invaded in 1979), the group did not play a major part in the fight against the Soviet forces, which pulled out in 1989. However, the Afghan campaign helped LeT gain the trust of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency as well as gain a cadre of war-hardened fighters. In the 1989-90 period, however, the LeT turned its attention from the internecine squabble in Afghanistan to Kashmir, which is where it gained its notoriety.

Although confused by many analysts as a "Kashmiri" group, LeT in fact is mainly made up of Pakistani Punjabis, with a smattering of Afghans, Arabs, Bangladeshis, Southeast Asians and the occasional Western Muslim recruit. Though the LeT's nominal goal was to help Pakistan annex Indian-administered Kashmir, it fit in well with its grand plans of establishing an Islamic caliphate. LeT sees Hindu-majority India as an obstacle on a par with the US and Israel to the Islamist dream of creating a unified empire that spans the entire Muslim world. LeT is still active in Kashmir, while simultaneously being faithful to its original goal.

Dilshad Ahmad and Fallujah
In April, Indian journalist Praveen Swami, who has long experience in reporting on terrorism, defense and security matters, broke a story in Outlook about a leading LeT ringleader named Dilshad Ahmad being arrested in Iraq by British forces, and then given over to the US for interrogation. A few other people were arrested with Ahmad, who went under several aliases, including Danish Ahmad and Abdul Rehman al-Dakhil.

After the interrogators determined Ahmad's identity, they reached out to their Indian counterparts to find out more about his origins. Ahmad, a longtime Lashkar operative from the Bahawalpur area of Pakistan's Punjab province, was LeT's operational lead for its campaign of violence in India between 1997 and 2001. Ahmad is also known to be a confidant of Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, the second-in-command in the Lashkar military hierarchy, and has trained many LeT fighters in its Maskar Abu Bashir camp in Afghanistan.

In 1998, Ahmad addressed a major LeT conference in the group's headquarters at Muridke, near Lahore, arguing for the need to extend the organization's activities outside Kashmir. Given all this, Ahmad's presence in Iraq signals an intent on LeT's part to set up a beachhead in Iraq, and therefore should have sent alarm bells ringing among US authorities. But so far there has been little direct mention of the LeT arrest in Iraq beyond the original report of Ahmad's arrest.

Other media reports, while not directly talking about LeT in Iraq, have hinted at such a presence, especially in the violence-torn central Iraqi city of Fallujah. A June 25 report in the Washington Times said that jihadis from foreign nations, including Pakistan, had set up checkpoints throughout Fallujah and were imposing Taliban-like harsh Islamic laws. Even before that a few media reports and comments by military analysts noted the presence of Pakistani jihadis in Iraq. It is quite possible that LeT operatives had set up bases in the Fallujah area in the Sunni triangle.

LeT's suitability for Iraq
Among all the Pakistani jihad groups, there are many reasons the LeT is most suited to operate in Iraq. First, unlike the Deobandi (Islamic thought) jihadi groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, LeT does not have any political ambitions inside Pakistan. The Deobandis have built a powerful political movement within Pakistan, but their political participation has also resulted in periodic tussles with the Pakistani army, which although highly supportive of jihad in Afghanistan and India, nevertheless brooks no challenge to its vise-like grip on political power within the nation. In contrast, the LeT-led Pakistani Salafist movement has traditionally stayed apolitical, and instead focused on global jihad outside Pakistan. Given this, LeT has had a free hand to operate within Pakistan.

Another aspect of LeT's activities is its charitable wing, the Dawa. In fact, the current name of the LeT's parent group is Jamaat-ud-Dawa, or the Party for Preaching. Through its charitable wing, LeT attracts many doctors, engineers and educated professionals to its cause. This could provide a great cover for the LeT to infiltrate into a strife-torn nation such as Iraq. The LeT also has strong links among Saudi Islamists, as well as some members of the royal family. According to LeT's own past claims, a significant portion of its funding comes from Saudi sources, given its Wahhabi ideals. LeT has a good number of Arab volunteers, and it also makes it compulsory for its non-Arab recruits to learn Arabic, which means that its members can easily mingle with Iraq's Arabic-speaking population. For all these reasons, it is not surprising that the LeT sees Iraq as a golden opportunity to strike at its biggest target - the United States.

LeT's overseas experience
LeT has a proven track record of operating far away from its Pakistani base. In what has come to be known as the "Virginia jihad" case, US authorities broke up a terrorist cell in the state of Virginia this year. The ringleader of the cell was a man named Randall Royer, an American convert to Islam. During the trial, six men pleaded guilty, while three more were convicted of terrorism-related charges. The men, belonging to various ethnic backgrounds, admitted to being members of LeT and the published indictment laid out the dates and periods when they went to Pakistan to train in LeT's camps.

The indictment also pointed out that LeT's own website, which constantly changes its address, said the group had four facilities for training mujahideen from around the world, including camps named Taiba, Aqsa, Um-al-Qura and Abdullah bin Masud. The trained LeT fighters, the website claimed, participated in jihad in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo and the Philippines. The website also prominently displayed a banner portraying LeT's dagger penetrating the national flags of the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, India and Israel. Another LeT cell was recently broken in Australia, with plans to blow up a nuclear reactor, among other targets.

A call to arms
LeT's publications, which are still freely available in Pakistan, have long been a harbinger of the group's plans. Of late, LeT's official statements have concentrated on Iraq more than Kashmir. In fact, a recent editorial in LeT's weekly Urdu publication Ghazwa (Arabic for a raid against unbelievers; September 11, 2001, is described by al-Qaeda as a Ghazwa) called for sending mujahideen to Iraq to take revenge for US actions in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal as well as for the "rapes of Iraqi Muslim women". A translated excerpt from that editorial is below:


The Americans are dishonoring our mothers and sisters. Therefore, jihad against America has now become mandatory. We [LeT] should send our mujahideen to Iraq to fight with the Iraqi mujahideen. Remember that the mujahideen are the last hope for Islam. If the mujahideen are not supported today, Islam will be erased from the map tomorrow.
In this context, Indian reporter Praveen Swami and Pakistani correspondent Mohammad Shehzad recently broke a story that claimed that up to 2,000 Pakistani men had signed up for LeT's armed operations in Iraq, based on their leaders' calls for jihad. Pakistan's border with Iran is porous and could provide an easy opportunity for LeT's fighters to enter Iraq from the east. Notably, Dilshad Ahmad was reportedly captured in Basra, which is close to Iran. LeT's intimate ties with Saudi Arabian Islamists provide another convenient route into Iraq, from the largely unguarded southern Iraqi border with the kingdom.

Banned but free?
What perplexes most analysts is why the US has not pressed Pakistan to shut down the LeT in the first place. Under pressure from the US and the military threat from India, Musharraf banned the LeT, along with some other groups, in January 2002. While more than 2,000 terrorists were arrested, all but a handful were released after a few weeks.

But what happened with the leaders was egregious. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, LeT's Emir Hafiz Saeed was whisked away to a safe house of Pakistan's ISI. After a few months, he was released without any charges being pressed against him. To make up for the inconvenience, Pakistan government apparently even paid him a stipend during his "arrest".

Soon after his release, Emir Saeed barnstormed around Pakistan collecting funds and recruiting volunteers for jihad in Kashmir, Afghanistan and other places. Things got so blatant that US Ambassador to Pakistan Nancy Powell had to issue a harsh statement about the farcical ban, which forced the Pakistanis to act. Even then, the Pakistanis placed LeT on a "watchlist". To make clear where things stood, LeT organized a 150,000-strong rally just hours after being put on the list, and Emir Saeed promised the faithful that its jihad would continue in Kashmir, as well as in Iraq.

LeT also has close ties with al-Qaeda. In April 2002, top al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida was arrested from an LeT safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. Pakistani officials did not, however, arrest the local LeT leader who had housed Zubaida. LeT also prides itself in its fighters' ability to be brutal. French Islamic experts Maryam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy note in their recent book Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection that LeT teaches its members such skills as beheading and eviscerating victims to inflict terror. LeT has also pioneered fidayeen or suicide attacks with multiple fighters on the same target to cause maximum damage.

The upshot for the US and Pakistan
This saga of LeT expanding from a home-grown Pakistani jihadi group focused on Kashmir into a possible multinational terror network points out the danger in allowing nations such as Pakistan to make distinctions between "good terrorists" (who don't attack Americans or Pakistanis) and "bad terrorists" (who target Americans or Pakistanis).

For the Pakistanis, the blowback from a policy of state sponsorship of jihadi groups began in 2002 when a five-member "coalition" of the jihadi organizations was launched to avenge the US invasion as well as Musharraf's about-turn in Afghanistan, where he renounced the Taliban. The coalition was called Brigade 313 (from the number of warriors in the battle of Badr in the times of the Prophet Mohammad) and was made up of the jihadi groups LeT, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Almi and Lashkar-e Jhangvi. The 313 group is said to be responsible for the killings of Christians in Pakistan, and also attempts on Musharraf's life. Despite this, Musharraf has tried to cut deals with groups such as LeT, instead of shutting them down. It would be ironic if Pakistan sends its troops to Iraq, only to end up fighting terror groups fostered by its own military establishment.

For the US, the scenario is starker. Perhaps US authorities did not want to press Musharraf on LeT because they thought the group was not directly targeting Americans. Or maybe they figured that the general was sincere in his promises to shut down the group. But LeT's Iraq campaign and its ability to recruit fighters openly in Pakistan to fight Americans abroad has exposed the hollowness of such a strategy.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)


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Arms suppliers scramble into Iraq
By Thalif Deen

NEW YORK - When the 15-member United Nations Security Council legitimized the US-imposed interim government in Baghdad in June, the five-page unanimous resolution carried a provision little publicized in the media: the lifting of a 14-year arms embargo on Iraq.
The Security Council's decision to end military sanctions on Iraq has triggered a rush by the world's weapons dealers to make a grab for a potentially multimillion-dollar new arms market in the already over-armed Middle East.
The former US-run Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which handed over power to the new Iraqi government on June 28, finalized plans for the purchase of six C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft, 16 Iroquois helicopters and a squadron of 16 low-flying, light reconnaissance aircraft - all for delivery by next April.
The proposed purchases were part of an attempt to rebuild and revitalize Iraq's sanctions-hit, weapons-starved military.
But some experts question the strategy.
"The flow of weapons to Iraq will not improve the security situation in Iraq, nor will it make the country safe from outside threats or an external invasion," said Naseer H Aruri, chancellor professor (emeritus) at the University of Massachusetts. "With 140,000 US military personnel, 20,000 from the so-called coalition of the willing and another 20,000 contracted civilians, Iraq remains occupied and denied effective sovereignty," said Aruri, author of Dishonest Broker: The US Role in Israel and Palestine.
"Purchasing weapons at this time, therefore, is more relevant to the needs of the occupier relating to the suppression of armed opposition, and consolidation of US hegemony. Moreover, it is not appropriate for the interim government, a subcontracting agency for the United States, to go shopping for arms as numerous arms exporting countries compete feverishly for contracts," he told Inter Press Service (IPS).
The United States, the United Kingdom and Jordan are providing assistance and training for the creation of a 40,000-person Iraqi army.
With blessings from the US Congress, the former CPA also earmarked about $2.1 billion for national security, including $2 billion for the new army and $76 million for a civil defense corps.
Since late last year, Iraq has purchased 50,000 handguns from Austria, 421 UAZ Hunter jeeps from Russia and millions of dollars' worth of armored cars from Brazil and Ukraine, along with AK-47 assault rifles, 9mm pistols, military vehicles, fire-control equipment and night-vision devices.
The biggest single deal was a $327 million contract with a US firm to outfit Iraqi troops with body armor, radios and other communications equipment. The contract has been challenged by two non-US firms that lost out on the bidding process.
The decision by the CPA to purchase the handguns from the Austrian gun maker Glock late last year evoked a strong protest to the Pentagon. "There are a number of US companies that could easily provide these weapons," Representative Jeb Bradley, a member of President George W Bush's Republican Party, said in a letter to US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, "Why were other firearms companies, namely American companies, passed over?" he asked.

The US Army Corps of Engineers awarded two contracts, totaling $2.7 million, to US firms in March for transmission, distribution, communications and controls for the Iraqi infrastructure. A third contract valued at $7.8 million - for a modern, digital cellular, command and control system to link the various sites of the Iraqi armed forces and the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team - was also awarded to a US-based company.

The US has also awarded a $150 million contract for the renovation of four military bases at Umm Qasr, al-Kasik, Tadji and Numaniyah in various parts of Iraq. And the Pentagon has plans to expand existing military bases near Mosul, Baghdad and Kut, specifically for the US Army. This contract is estimated at about $600 million.

"It does not seem wise to introduce new weaponry and military capability into Iraq's volatile mix of ongoing war and occupation, civil strife and political transition," said Frida Berrigan, senior research associate with the Arms Trade Resource Center, a project of the World Policy Institute.

On average, more than two US soldiers are killed each day, she said, and inter-Iraqi violence is taking a deadly toll on civilians and government officials. "Before Iraq is outfitted with high-tech weaponry, it seems that the low-tech needs of clean water and reliable electricity should be met," Berrigan told IPS.

In addition, if experience with the Iraqi police force is any indication of what is to come from a US-armed and -trained security force, she said, this is not the right time for the interim leadership to embark on an arms spending spree.

"Instead of aiding the United States in putting down the uprisings, thousands from Iraq's newly trained police force deserted, and many reportedly turned over their US-issued weapons to street fighters. How many of the 135 Americans killed during that month faced American guns and ammunition?" Berrigan asked.

"It's a well-known fact that Iraq is saturated with weapons and ammunition, particularly firearms and light machine-guns, but also others," said Mouin Rabbani, a Middle East analyst based in Jordan and a contributing editor to the Washington-based Middle East Report.

That is one reason the US has experienced so much difficulty in its efforts to eradicate the insurgency, he said: the insurgents do not appear to be dependent on a flow of weapons from outside their borders.

At the same time, the Iraqi security forces, particularly the Iraqi national army once it is properly reconstituted, does not have - or has only very few - weapons systems normally associated with national self-defense, such as combat aircraft, artillery and air defenses, Rabbani said.

"One can argue about whether or not investing in such systems constitutes a particularly wise move by the Iraqi national authorities given the numerous and severe challenges facing Iraqi society," he told IPS.

But it is a fact that a sovereign Iraqi state has a legitimate right to acquire sophisticated weapons systems and, given the way political and military leaders invariably behave, will seek to acquire them, he added.

Rabbani said Iraq has a long military tradition, some would even say a long tradition of militarism, and the dissolution of the Iraqi armed forces, combined with the destruction of much of the heavy weaponry that was left at the end of a previous war, means the government will have to invest considerably more in developing an effective military than would otherwise have been the case.

But, he added, "It would be particularly reprehensible if American and other arms exporters exploit their control of Iraq and its government to foist upon it the purchase and acquisition of weapons systems that are either prohibitively expensive, including systems marked up in price to make a fast buck, or unnecessary."
If they do so, Rabbani said, they will be repeating a pattern of weapons sales seen during the past several decades to, for example, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states (part of the system known as petrodollar recycling).
Overall military spending in the Middle East is estimated to reach about $55 billion annually by 2007, rising from about $52 billion in 2003, according to Forecast International, a US-based defense market research organization.
The big spenders include Saudi Arabia, which will average more than $18 billion in defense spending annually through 2007, followed by Israel (more than $9 billion), Iran ($4.5 billion), the United Arab Emirates (about $3.7 billion) and Egypt (more than $3 billion).
A large proportion of the funds is earmarked for weapons purchases, mostly from the US, the UK, France and Russia.
Iraq's first decisions concerning military acquisitions will be critical, Rabbani said, because they will virtually determine subsequent purchases (in terms of compatibility, for example).
"It therefore seems to me crucial that such decisions be made by a genuinely independent Iraqi government, upon the recommendation of a professional assessment by a genuinely independent Iraqi military high command, on the basis of both the current and future needs of the country and its existing traditions," he said.
Even "grants" of sophisticated weapons by the US or other states with military export industries will interfere with this process, said Rabbani. "The pattern in Iraq so far is that it is being seen as a financial bonanza - and where civilian contractors like Halliburton and Bechtel have gone, military contractors such as Lockheed and Raytheon can be expected to follow."

(Inter Press Service)


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Radio Free Syria to Break Assad's Media Monopoly
By Nick Grace
June 17, 2004

Radio Free Syria will hit the airwaves this weekend, Clandestine Radio Watch (CRW) has learned, marking the first phase of a sophisticated media campaign to chip away at the Ba'ath Party regime in Damascus and to promote democracy and tolerance.
The station's inaugural broadcast will occur on June 20, 2004, and air thereafter on Sundays at 1800 UTC on 13650 kHz.
Sources within the Reform Party of Syria, which built the station, tell CRW that the schedule is planned to expand after a period of testing. Although the sources would not confirm the location of the transmitter reports in the Israeli press point to a facility in Cyprus allegedly funded by Washington. "We are not funded by anyone," one source close to the station's operations said. "Radio Free Syria is being built independently with the support of Syrian businessmen and women who want openess and peace."
Radio Free Syria will be the first station run by Syrians, themselves, that promotes democracy, freedom of conscience and respect for minority and human rights. Its planners expect this message to serve as a burst of fresh air for their target audience, which is subjected to state-run propaganda that serves to bolster the ruling Ba'ath Party as well as Islamist programming preaching intolerance broadcast by such outlets as The Arabic Radio and Hezbollah's TV and radio stations. Live roundtable discussions are planned as well as comedy and entertainment that all listeners can enjoy - Muslims, Christians, Arabs, Kurds and Assyrians.
"This is just the first phase," a planner said. "The regime's feet is about to be put into the fire."
Listeners are welcome to contact the station by e-mail, webmaster@radiofreesyria.org. The station also has a Web site that contains programming that can be downloaded, www.radiofreesyria.org.

Run by the Reform Party of Syria the station began test broadcasts on the Internet on Mar 31, 2004, and is planning actual radio broadcasts to Syria via Cyprus.


Copyright ?1996-2004 ClandestineRadio.com. All rights reserved.

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Radio Free World
Liberty-starved countries see a boom in clandestine radio.

By Nir Boms & Erick Stakelbeck
Although it often seems like a solitary outpost of democratic sanity, the U.S. is not alone in waging the war of ideas.
Since 9/11, over a dozen privately owned, pro-democracy radio stations have emerged in freedom-starved countries like North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Cuba.
From the earliest days of World War II to its peak during the Cold War, clandestine radio played a critical role in the fight for liberty. Today is no exception.
Iraq's Radio al-Mustaqbal figured prominently in the CIA's covert plans to topple Saddam Hussein throughout the past decade. Likewise, Voice of the People of Kurdistan played an integral part in the Pentagon's psychological war prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq last March, eventually helping to secure the surrender of 9,000 Iraqi soldiers at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Following the fall of Saddam, these clandestine outlets, now fully licensed, joined the rapidly growing Iraqi media market, which is comprised of over 50 fledgling radio and television stations. Among them is Radio Dijla, Baghdad's only private, commercial radio station. Operating out of a modest house in the Baghdad suburbs, Radio Dijla allows listeners a forum to freely express their views and concerns, a concept unheard of in Iraq just 15 months ago.
In Afghanistan, where an estimated 96 percent of all households own a radio unit, clandestine radio has also begun to blossom. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, a pair of successful Afghan-Australian businessmen, Zaid and Sadd Moshen, returned to Afghanistan and developed the first commercial FM radio station in the country's history.
Called "Arman" (the Afghan word for home), the station addresses issues such as human rights, women's rights, national reconciliation, and the importance of private-sector contribution and social responsibility.
Beginning in 1979, Iran saw a similar rise in pro-democracy broadcasting spurred by the ascension of Ayatollah Khomeini's tyrannical regime. Today, there are no fewer than 16 clandestine, anti-government radio stations operating over Iranian airwaves.
One of the most successful of these subversive outlets is KRSI radio, which began broadcasting into Iran from Los Angeles in 1999.
"Every time we hear of a political prisoner being arrested, we announce his name, write to the U.S., U.N., and the human-rights community, and start a campaign," says Ali Reza Morovati, one of the founders of KSRI. "Now the people in Iran have a voice, and I sense that even the ayatollahs are being more cautious."
An important newcomer to the clandestine-radio arena is Syria. Last week, the U.S.-based Syrian Reform party launched "Radio Free Syria" in order to "educate the Syrian public on issues of democracy, freedom and the cessation of violence." The station, which is available on shortwave frequency and the Internet, plans to air cynical and humorous programs criticizing Syria's ruling Baath party as well as on-air plays written by dissident Syrian playwrights.
"Radio Free Syria will help us unite and consolidate the reformers inside Syria with the reformers pressuring the regime from the outside," says Farid Ghadry, president of the Syrian Reform party and Syrian Democratic Coalition.
Elsewhere, a dissident station called Radio Free North Korea began operating out of Seoul this past April, thanks to the efforts of a small group of North Korean defectors. "Our program aims to help North Koreans know better about their actual situation and to let the rest of the world know about the reality of the North Korean government," says Kim Sung-Min, the station's president and chief writer. "(Our aim is also) to finally lead the nation to become a democratic nation like South Korea."
A precedent of sorts exists for the efforts of Sung-Min, Ghadry, and Morovati: It can be argued that the U.S.-backed Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty helped hasten the fall of the Iron Curtain and defeat Soviet Communism during the 1980s. Unlike these programs, however, the purveyors of clandestine radio operate without state funding.
"What we're seeing is a true grassroots effort to democratize these countries without the help of state dollars," says Nick Grace, Washington managing editor of Clandestine Radio.com, a monitoring project that tracks subversive media around the world. "Commercial opposition broadcast radio predates September 11. However, it is clear that the war of ideas awakened a number of pro-democratic groups around the world to the effectiveness of the media as a weapon to spark a change in their respective countries."
Over the last two years, the U.S has become much more engaged in its attempts to foster democracy around the world, particularly in the Middle East. Institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy and Voice of America, along with projects like the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), have almost quadrupled their funding over this period. MEPI, according to State Department statistics, received $29 million in 2002 and $100 million in 2003, while $145 million has been committed for 2004.
But only $3.2 million, or 3.3 percent, of MEPI's funds were directed to help indigenous NGOs, and none of this money was allocated to voices of opposition in countries like Syria, Saudi Arabia, or Iran (which is currently ripe for change, in large part because of its burgeoning pro-democracy movement).
While U.S. policymakers have invested millions in radio and TV stations that aspire to deliver a "natural" voice aired out of Washington, they've bypassed opportunities to help genuine pro-democracy advocates that often struggle merely to stay on the airwaves. If the U.S. wishes to be truly effective in its efforts to spread democracy, it should reconsider this strategy.
-- Nir Boms is a senior fellow at the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. Erick Stakelbeck is senior writer for the Investigative Project.


http://www.nationalreview.com/voices/nir_boms_stakelbeck200407130857.asp

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The Benefits Trap
Old-line companies have pledged a trillion dollars to retirees. Now they're struggling to compete with new rivals, and many can't pay the bill.

June 28 was the day hope ran out for United Airlines' 35,000 retirees. That was the day the government announced it would not guarantee the bankrupt airline's loans -- virtually assuring that if UAL Corp., (UALAQ ) the airline's parent, is to remain in business it will have to chop away at expensive pension and retiree medical benefits. The numbers are daunting. UAL owes $598 million in pension payments between now and Oct. 15, and a total of $4.1 billion by the end of 2008, plus an additional $1 billion for retiree health-care benefits, obligations the ailing airline can't begin to meet. And if United finds a way to get out of its promises, competitors American Airlines (AMR ), Delta Air Lines (DAL ), and Northwest Airlines (NWAC ) are sure to try to as well.

UAL workers are about to find out what other airline employees already know: The cost of broken retirement promises can be steep. Captain Tim Baker, a 19-year veteran of US Airways Inc. (UAIR ), was one of several union representatives sorting through that airline's complicated bankruptcy negotiations in March, 2003. Of the airline's many crises, the biggest was the pilots' pension plan, a sinkhole of unfunded liabilities. Baker reluctantly agreed to back US Airways' proposal to dump the pension plan on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC), the government agency that is the insurer of last resort for hopelessly broken plans. It's a move that practically guarantees that retirees will receive less than they were promised, in some cases less than 50 cents on the dollar. But of a raft of bad options, it seemed the only one that could keep the company afloat. "It was the pension underfunding and its future requirements that were going to put in jeopardy the airline's ability to get out of bankruptcy," says Baker. "At some point you have to look around and say that is all there is."

Baker has paid dearly for that decision. He was voted out of his union position by angry fellow pilots and instead of the six-figure annual pension he was promised, when he retires in 15 years he'll get just $28,585 a year from the PBGC, plus whatever he can save in his 401(k).

Stories like Baker's are becoming dreadfully common as employers faced with mounting retiree costs look to get out from under. It's not just troubled industries like airlines that are abandoning their role as retirement sponsors to America's workers, either. The escalating cost of retirement plans is a critical issue at a range of long-established companies from Boeing (BA ) to Ford Motor (F ) to IBM (IBM ), many of which compete against younger companies with little or nothing in retiree costs.

SHIFTING THE RISK
As employers abandon ever-more-costly traditional retirement plans, the burden is falling on individuals and taxpayers

Why are retirees being left out in the cold? An unsavory brew of factors have come together to put stress on the retirement system like never before. First, there's the simple fact that Americans are living longer in retirement, and that costs more. Next come internal corporate issues, including soaring health-care costs and long-term underfunding of pension promises. Perhaps most important, in the global economy, long-established U.S. companies are competing against younger rivals here and abroad that pay little or nothing toward their workers' retirement, giving the older companies a huge incentive to dump their plans. "The house isn't burning now, but we will have a crisis soon if some of these issues aren't fixed," says Steven A. Kandarian, who ended a two-year stint as the executive director of the PBGC in February. Kandarian is not optimistic about how that crisis might play out, either. "By that time it will be too late to save the system. Then you just play triage."

As industry after industry and company after company strive to limit -- or eliminate -- their so-called legacy costs, a historic shift is taking place. No one voted on it and Congress never debated the issue, but with little fanfare we have entered into a vast reorganization of our retirement system, from employer funded to employee and government funded, a sort of stealth nationalization of retirement. As the burden moves from companies to individuals -- who have traditionally been notoriously poor planners -- it becomes near certain that in the end, a bigger portion will fall on the shoulders of taxpayers. "Where the vacuum develops, the government is forced to step in," says Sylvester J. Schieber, a vice-president at benefit-consulting firm Watson Wyatt Worldwide (WW ). "If we think we can walk away from these obligations scot-free, that's just a dream."

EVIDENCE OF THE SHIFT is everywhere. Traditional pensions -- so-called "defined-benefit" plans -- and retiree health insurance were once all but universal at large companies. Today experts can think of no major company that has instituted guaranteed pensions in the past decade. None of the companies that have become household names in recent times have them: not Microsoft (MSFT ), not Wal-Mart Stores (WMT ), not Southwest Airlines (LUV ). In 1999, IBM, which has old-style benefits and contributed almost $4 billion to shore up its pension plans in 2002, did a study of its competitors and found 75% did not offer a pension plan and fewer still paid for retiree health care.

Instead, companies are much more likely to offer defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k)s, to which they contribute a set amount. In 1977, there were 14.6 million people with defined-contribution benefits; today there are an estimated 62.5 million. Part of their appeal has been that a more mobile workforce can take their benefits with them as they hop from job to job. But just as important, they cost less for employers. Donald E. Fuerst, a retirement actuary at Mercer Human Resource Consulting LLC, notes that while even a well-matched 401(k) often costs no more than 3% of payroll, a typical defined-benefit plan can cost 5% to 6% of payroll.

Despite the stampede to defined-contribution plans, there are still 44 million Americans covered by old-fashioned pensions that promise a set payout at retirement. All told, they're owed more than $1 trillion by 30,000 different companies. Many of those employers have also promised tens of billions of dollars more in health-care coverage for retirees. Even transferring a small part of the burden to individuals or the government can have a profound impact on the corporate bottom line. The decision by Congress to have Medicare cover the cost of prescription drugs, for example, will lighten corporate retiree health-care obligations by billions of dollars. Equipment maker Deere & Co. (DE ) estimates that the move will shave $300 million to $400 million off its future health-care liabilities starting this year.

The U.S. Treasury, on the other hand, pays and pays dearly. That drug benefit, which takes effect in 2006, is expected to cost the government the equivalent of 1% of gross domestic product by 2010, and other potentially big taxpayer costs are looming, too. In mid-April, over the objections of the PBGC, Congress granted a two-year reprieve from catch-up pension contributions for two of the most troubled industries: airlines and steel. Congress also lowered the interest rate all companies use to calculate long-term obligations, lowering pension liabilities. While these moves lighten the corporate burden, they increase the chances taxpayers will have to step in. "The less funding required, the more risk that's shifting to the government," says Peter R. Orszag, a pension expert and senior fellow in economic studies at the Brookings Institution. "The question is: How comfortable are we with the risk of failure?"

Company-sponsored health care, which generally covers retirees not yet eligible for Medicare and supplements what Medicare will pay, is likely to disappear even faster than company pensions. Subject to fewer federal regulations, those benefits are easier to rescind and companies are fast doing so. It's much harder to renege on pension promises. So instead, many profitable companies are simply freezing plans and denying the benefits to new employees. Last fall, Aon Consulting (AON ) found that 150 of the 1,000 companies they surveyed had frozen their pension plans in the previous two years, a dramatic increase from earlier years. Another 60 companies said they were actively considering following suit.

STRESS ON A FRAGILE SYSTEM
The government bailout fund is $9.7 billion in the red, and Social Security and personal savings are hardly going to be enough

The cost of honoring PBGC's commitments could be higher than anyone is expecting. The government bailout fund has relied on having enough healthy companies to pony up premiums to cover plans that fail. But in a scenario of rising plan terminations, healthy companies with strong plans still in the PBGC system would be asked to pay more. For corporations already fretting that pensions have become a competitive liability and a turnoff to investors, this could be the tipping point. Faced with higher insurance costs, they could opt out, rapidly accelerating the system's decline as the remaining healthy participants become overwhelmed by the needy. In the end, the problem would land with Congress, which could be forced to undertake a savings-and-loan-type bailout. It's almost too painful to think about, and so no one does. But when the bill comes due, it will almost certainly be addressed to taxpayers.

Most worrisome is the record number of pension plans in danger of going under. According to the PBGC, as of September, 2003, there was at least $86 billion in pension obligations promised by companies deemed financially weak. That's up from $35 billion the year before. And it's on top of a record number of companies that managed to dump their troubled pension plans on the PBGC last year: 152. In 2003, a record 206,000 people became PBGC pensioners, including 95,000 from its biggest takeover ever, Bethlehem Steel Corp.

Even for healthy companies, pensions have become a serious drag. The companies of the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, for example, continue to run an aggregate pension deficit of $149 billion, according to David Bianco, an accounting analyst at UBS (UBS ). That's despite a strong stock market in 2003, which pushed up pension plan assets, and despite the billions companies contributed, including $18.5 billion from General Motors Corp. (GM ) alone. If conditions don't change, Bianco figures the S&P 500 companies will end the year $192 billion in the hole.

WHAT TODAY MIGHT be seen as an isolated problem for a limited number of companies promises to bloom into big trouble for us all. By conventional math, the PBGC is already insolvent: As of September, 2003, it had $46.5 billion of liabilities and only $35 billion of assets, a deficit of $11.5 billion that had close to tripled in one year. The agency paid 2003 benefits of $2.5 billion, but only took in $1 billion of premium income from companies with defined-benefit plans. (The PBGC says the deficit had dropped to $9.7 billion as of March, but can't give further details.) The PBGC is not directly funded by the taxpayer, but it is backed by the U.S. government, which would likely bail it out in a crisis.

The fragility of that system only increases the stress on other sources of retirement income and insurance: Social Security, Medicare, and personal savings. Social Security has its own $11.9 trillion deficit. And the still-recent history of personal savings vehicles like 401(k)s shows that people generally save too little, pay too much in fees, and fail to adequately diversify their risk. Olivia S. Mitchell, executive director of the Wharton School's Pension Research Council, is among the many who think one result is that we will all have to work longer than we thought. "It used to be thought Social Security was the safe leg of the retirement stool, but that's not safe either," says Mitchell.

Demographic trends will only make matters worse. As recently as 1985 there were three U.S. workers for every retired person. Now it's close to even. And we're still six years away from 2010, when the first of the baby boomers will hit 65. Not only are more people retiring, but they're living longer once they get there. Today 17% of the U.S. population is age 60 or older. According to Census Dept. data, that figure will rise to 26% by 2050, when college graduates entering the workforce today can finally begin to think about retiring. It's the complete reversal of the years after World War II, when companies first began offering pension plans in great numbers. In those days the workforce was young and retirees were only a sliver of the population. It was easy to make promises.

The world has changed dramatically since then. In the '40s and '50s, if a company offered retirement benefits, its competitors probably did too. Pattern bargaining by unions held entire industries to the same standard. But companies that once could rely on geographic boundaries and market dominance to minimize the threat of upstarts and outsiders are now struggling to keep up in a global marketplace full of new competitors. Companies like IBM, Verizon Communications (VZ ), and even General Motors today must contend with rivals who don't bear the cost of old-style benefits. For every lumbering US Airways there's an agile Southwest or Jet Blue Airways Corp. (JBLU ), newer rivals with cheaper benefits. For every GM, there's a Toyota Motor Corp., with a leaner and younger U.S. workforce.

Nowhere are pension obligations a greater competitive millstone than in Detroit. The U.S. carmakers today have some of the biggest pension obligations and pool of retirees anywhere. By contrast, their Japanese competition only started U.S. manufacturing in the late 1980s, and have far lower costs. General Motors has 514,120 participants in its hourly-rate employee pension plan, all but 142,617 of whom are retired. Pension and health-care costs for those retirees added up to about $6.2 billion in 2003, or roughly $1,784 per vehicle according to Morgan Stanley (MWD ). Compare that to Toyota's U.S. (TM ) plan, which had only 9,557 participants, just two of whom were retired as of Toyota's latest Internal Revenue Service filing covering 2001. Toyota's pension cost is estimated at something less than $200 per vehicle.

The impact on profits is dramatic. Excluding gains from its finance arm, GM earned $144 per vehicle in the U.S. in 2003. GM's margins are now 0.5%, among the worst in the industry. But without the burden of pension and retiree health-care costs, the auto makers' global margins would be 5.5%, according to Morgan Stanley. That's not great, but a lot closer to Asian carmakers like Honda Motor Corp., which earns 7.5% on its global sales.

GOODBYE, RETIREE HEALTH CARE
Companies are racing to cut or drop retiree medical benefits to give a quick boost to their bottom lines

Retiree health-care coverage, which is easier to eliminate than pensions, is disappearing even faster. Unlike pensions, which are accrued and funded over time, retiree health care is paid for out of current cash accounts, so any cuts immediately bolster the bottom line. Estimates are that as many as half of the companies offering retiree health care 10 years ago have now dropped the benefit entirely. Many of those that have not yet slammed the door are requiring their former workers to bear more of the cost. Some 22% of the retirees who still get such benefits are now required to pay the insurance premiums themselves, according to a study by Hewitt Associates Inc. (HEW ). Some 20% of employers told Hewitt that they might make retirees pay within the next three years. This hits hardest those who retire before 65 and are not yet eligible for Medicare. But even older retirees suffer when they lose supplemental health benefits like prescription coverage.

IT'S NOT JUST struggling companies, either. IBM, which is already fighting with retirees in court over changes made to its pension plan in the 1990s, is now getting an earful from angry retirees about health-care costs. In 1999, IBM capped how much retiree health care it would pay per year at $7,500 of each employee's annual medical-insurance costs. Although IBM is certainly in no financial distress -- the company earned $7.6 billion on $89 billion in sales last year -- Big Blue says its medical costs have been rising faster than revenue. Last year the company says it spent $335 million on retiree health care.

This year, for the first time, many IBM retirees are beginning to hit the $7,500 limit. Sandy Anderson, who worked as a manager at IBM's semiconductor business for 32 years, and today is the acting president of a group of 2,000 retirees called Benefits Restoration Inc., saw his own insurance bill triple this year. He suspects that the company is trying to make the perk so expensive that retirees drop it, a cumulative savings calculated by the group at $100,000 per dropout.

But more than that, Anderson is angry that as a manager, IBM encouraged him to talk to his staff about retirement benefits as part of their overall compensation. The job market was tight, and IBM's message was our salaries aren't the highest, but we will take care of you when you stop working, he says. Now he feels the company is reneging. "I feel I've misled a lot of people, that I've lied to people," says Anderson. "It does not sit well with me at all." IBM says its opt-out levels are low and that it often sees retirees return to the plan after opting out for a period of time. The company also argues that it has not changed its approach to retiree medical benefits for more than a decade and that the rising cost of health care is the real issue.

Even with the reductions, Anderson and his generation of retirees are better off than many. In 2003 the giant computer maker said it would pay nothing toward health insurance for future hires when they retire.

THE PERFECT PENSION STORM
Three years of stock market declines plus record-low interest rates have left pension funds woefully underfunded

One reason companies have hit the accelerator on dumping their benefits is because of sharp price increases. Retirement plans have become radically more expensive in the past two years alone. Due to smoothing mechanisms built into pension accounting, their investments are still suffering from the equity market declines of 2000, 2001, and 2002. That has put a big dent in the value of their stock holdings, generally 60% or more of their total assets. At the same time, interest rates, which are used to calculate the size of a company's liability, have remained stubbornly low, implying a bigger pension liability. Although the recent legislation eases the problem somewhat, it doesn't nearly close the gap between what these funds owe and what they have in assets.

Combined with the rise in retirees, those market conditions have led to two years of record underfunding in company-sponsored plans. A recent study by analysts at CreditSights Ltd. found that 85% of the defined-benefit plans in the S&P 500 don't have enough assets to cover their pension obligations. Together the underfunding equals 15% of their 2003 cash flow. As a result, companies will have to put billions of dollars of cash into these plans this year to help close the gap.

It's a drastic turnaround from the late 1990s when these plans had more than enough money. In 1999, the average S&P 500 pension was overfunded by $726 million, according to CreditSights. Four years later, at the end of 2003, it was $463 million underfunded, a swing of almost $1.2 billion. A steady rise in interest rates and a strong stock market could help to solve that underfunding, but experts worry that the whipsaw effect of the past few years and the billions companies have been forced to contribute has heightened executive discomfort with the volatility of pensions. According to Credit Suisse First Boston (CSR ) analyst David Zion, the companies in the S&P 500 have contributed $88 billion to their pension plans over the past two years. They're likely to have to add another $31 billion over the next two years. Despite an $18.5 billion infusion into its pension plan in 2003, it will take years before General Motors, for example, has fully funded plans. "These things have a fairly long tail," says GM Chairman and CEO G. Richard Wagoner Jr.

Companies didn't make it any easier on themselves by contributing as little as possible to their pensions in the booming 1990s. As recently as 2001, half of the large pensions monitored by actuaries at Milliman USA were generating pension income, contributing an aggregate $12.5 billion boost to their parent companies' reported earnings. Companies with overfunded pension plans were often able to fund retiree health care with pension overage. Many companies contributed little or nothing to their pension plans as the bull market drove up assets more than enough. Former PBGC chief Kandarian notes that adjusting for inflation, in the early 1980s plan sponsors were putting $63 billion per year into their plans. By the last half of the 1990s that had dropped to $26 billion, and companies had become used to getting expensive benefits on the cheap.

WHEN THEY DID contribute, it was often not with cash but with stock, real estate, and other less liquid "alternative" investments. With pension promises basically free, companies were also offering pension increases in lieu of salary raises, increasing their obligations. From 1980 to 2000, the size of the promises made grew 2.3 times, Kandarian says.

Among those making the most extravagant retirement pledges were the steel mills, and it was in their plans that the industry's weakness was most dramatically realized. In a massive wave of bankruptcies, the steelmakers have shifted $7.5 billion of their obligations to the PBGC in the past 3 years.

But in that disaster some have found an opportunity to arbitrage the difference between the old retirement model and the new. International Steel Group Inc. (ISG ) has in the past two years grown into the largest steelmaker in the country by acquiring the mills of old steel companies, including Bethlehem Steel, LTV, and Acme Metals out of bankruptcy, once they've been freed of pension and health-care promises. These companies had been pummeled by cheaper international competition as well as lower-cost U.S. mini-mills, and as they shrank to cut costs, their retiree bases mushroomed to many times the size of the active workforce. Faced with the possibility that they would lose all the remaining jobs left at these companies, the United Steelworkers union was eventually willing to compromise.

RISK ARBITRAGE
A company free of its retiree promises can become a tougher competitor -- though former workers suffer

Free of those pension promises, ISG chairman Wilbur L. Ross Jr. enjoyed the big run-up in steel prices on a much cheaper cost base than many of his competitors. ISG's predecessor companies shed $12 billion of legacy health-care costs and another $9 billion of pension obligations. The company today claims to be competitive with both international steelmakers and efficient U.S.-based mini-mills. ISG's defined-contribution cost for employees was $45 million in 2003. Its very modest retiree health-care benefits cost $4.3 million. By contrast, Bethlehem Steel alone was paying out $500 million a year in pension benefits. Today, U.S. Steel Corp. (X ) has moved to an ISG-style defined-contribution pension plan, but only for future retirees. It still owes $8 billion to existing pensioners.

It's a bit of retiree-cost arbitrage that won't last forever. But before it's over, Ross predicts other industries will follow this harsh path to competitiveness. Those most at risk: textile makers, airlines, tire and rubber companies, auto-parts suppliers and, potentially, he says, the auto makers. "There is a huge unfunded liability that's building up because of the defined-benefit system," says Ross. "If nothing changes, the stone they [PBGC] have to roll up the hill will just get heavier."

Workers bear the brunt of it. Bill Luoma, head of the Mahoning Valley Steelworkers Retirees Council, which counts bankrupt LTV retirees among its members, says that with their health insurance gone, many have stopped visiting doctors other than for emergencies. For companies struggling to compete in the global economy, carrying those burdens themselves is like strapping on a 200-pound weight to run a 40-yard dash. But to shed them is to leave decades of workers devastated. In the end, someone will have to pay. The only question is who.


By Nanette Byrnes with David Welch in Detroit




Copyright 2000-2004, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.

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Underground Dwellers
There are more than you might think.



Last week, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris issued a new report on the underground economy. This is only the latest study showing that a large fraction of employment and production in major countries as well as developing nations is taking place off the books, unrecorded in national accounts and untaxed by governments.

According to the report, the underground economy varies from 1.5 percent of gross domestic product in the United Kingdom to almost half in the Kyrgyz Republic. The OECD does not present data for the United States, but there is much data showing that it is a growing problem here as well. A recent book, The Shadow Economy: An International Survey (Cambridge University Press) by economists Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste, estimated the U.S. underground economy at between 6.7 percent of GDP and 13.9 percent in 1990, depending on the method used for calculation.

One common method is to look at currency in circulation as an indication of underground economic activity. By its nature, such activity is done almost entirely in cash so as to avoid detection by the authorities through checks or credit cards. On this basis, underground economic activity in the U.S. has probably risen sharply since 1990.

According to the Treasury Department, in 1990 there was $1,105 of currency in circulation for every American. By March of this year, that figure had risen to $2,455, an increase of 122 percent. It is highly unlikely that all of this increase is due to the needs of consumers to buy more goods and services, because per capita personal consumption expenditures only rose by 79 percent over the same period. This suggests that at least 35 percent of the increased demand for cash was for underground economic activity.

A further indication that this is the case is shown by looking at the composition of currency in circulation. Since 1990, 84 percent of the increase in currency is accounted for by $100 bills. Such bills now represent 71 percent of the monetary value of all U.S. currency, up from 52 percent in 1990. Average people do not ordinarily use $100 bills, but they are used heavily in the underground economy, which includes drug dealing and other illegal activity. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the increased demand for $100's is due almost entirely to an increase in the underground economy.

Of course, even if this is true, it doesn't necessarily mean that the underground economy is growing here. U.S. currency is the exchange medium of choice for underground activity worldwide. Indeed, 45 percent of U.S. currency circulates outside the U.S. for this reason. According to the Commerce Department, the U.S. "exported" $16.6 billion in currency last year, almost all of it in the form of $100 bills.

The former chief economist for the International Monetary Fund notes that the European currency, the euro, is now competing for the underground economy's business by having 500 euro notes, worth more than 5 times the U.S. $100, the largest bill printed by the Treasury in more than 50 years. He notes that $1 million in $100's would fit in a briefcase, but $1 million worth of 500 euro notes would fit in a purse -- a big advantage in the underground world.

The underground economy results from many factors, including criminal activity. But the bulk of it arises from ordinary businessmen and workers who are evading taxes and government regulations. The OECD downplays the importance of taxes and puts most of the responsibility on regulation. However, other studies have found that high tax rates are the most important factor in stimulating growth of the underground economy.

"In various surveys, the tax burden has always been identified as the main cause for the growth of the shadow economy," according to Schneider and Enste. Their analysis found that a 10-percentage point increase in the tax burden would cause the underground economy to rise by 3 percent of GDP. A Federal Reserve study found an even higher response, with an increase in the tax rate from 9.3 percent to 10 percent leading to a 1.5 percent rise in underground output.

A recent IMF study found that the composition of taxation was very important. High taxes on small businesses and the self-employed were most likely to lead to underground economic activity. "Raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy," the study concluded.

One indication that taxes are stimulating tax evasion here is that the amount of income reported on tax returns has fallen compared to the amount of income paid as calculated by the Commerce Department. This income gap tends to rise and fall with the tax burden.

Whether caused by taxes or regulations, it is clear that government is the prime cause of the underground economy.

-- Bruce Bartlett is senior fellow for the National Center for Policy Analysis. Write to him here.


http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof_bartlett/bartlett200407140832.asp


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China's Bourses: Stock Markets Or Casinos?
They're still roller coasters of instability -- and change may take some time


When shares of Han's Laser Technology Co. began trading on June 26, it was a red-letter day for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which hadn't seen an initial public offering since October, 2000. But the joy was short-lived for any investors who had been hoping for more than a speculative pop from the stock. After soaring 367% on its opening day of trading, shares of the Shenzhen maker of laser markers deflated by the maximum 10% limit the next day -- and the next, and the next. By July 7, Han's Laser was nearly 50% off its high and, though still above its offering price, showed no signs of stabilizing. Such volatility "doesn't have any meaning at all," says a Han's Laser spokesman. "It only reveals speculation." To experts, the stock was acting just like the market in which it trades. "It's like a casino," says Zhang Qi, analyst at Haitong Securities Co. in Shenzhen. "Everybody's speculating."

Indeed, Shenzhen and the larger Shanghai Stock Exchange both have a reputation for being little more than short-term trading dens that scare away serious investors. That's a problem, because China has a pressing need for stock markets capable of efficiently allocating capital to its fast-growing industrial base. As in the 1990s dot-com boom in the West, nothing exposes the instability of China's markets better than IPOs. Seven other companies made their debut on the Shenzhen market the same day as Han's Laser. Each rose an average of 129.9% before beginning a downward spiral.

The stock-flipping behind these gyrations, by both brokers and retail punters, even has a name: chao gu, which translates roughly as "stir-fried shares." Fundamentals? Some companies have them, some don't. (Han's Laser, for its part, is profitable, boasting net income of $4.44 million last year.) No matter: In the 13-year history of the mainland bourses, the initial success rate of IPOs has been almost 100%. Last year the average first-day gain among the 64 new listings in Shanghai was an eye-popping 72% -- and last year was a bear market. Most quickly lose altitude. One exception: China Yangtze Power Co., whose shares have climbed steadily since it debuted last November. But trading in new stocks is typically purely speculative. Almost no one in these markets thinks of buying and holding stocks -- a sure sign of an immature market.

BRING ON THE FOREIGNERS
What can be done to create authentic market conditions? The China Securities Regulatory Commission has been declaring its good intentions since it was created in 1992. But the agency has been hampered by its inexperience and lack of independence -- it is basically an arm of the State Council, China's all-powerful Cabinet. Plus, the markets were established solely as a way for state-owned companies to privatize, not as a way to raise money for deserving companies. (The CSRC did not reply to faxed questions.)

One strategy authorities are pursuing to strengthen Chinese bourses is to allow in foreign investors. The theory is that with foreigners demanding higher standards for listed companies, trading will become more regular and IPOs more thoroughly vetted, and the reputation of the exchanges will improve, making them competitive with rival Hong Kong. Thus, under the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors program, which began in May, 2003, foreign institutions may now invest directly in the $500 billion A-share markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen, which were previously off-limits.

But things are off to a slow start. According to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, out of $1.8 billion in foreign investment capital approved at the end of March and earmarked for financial investments, only 63% has gone into securities and convertible bonds. The rest is parked in bank deposits. Most foreign fund managers find slim pickings among mainland equities and have concentrated on 50 to 100 stocks from the 1,300 available. "There's certainly nothing like HSBC (HBC ) or General Electric (GE ) or IBM" says Mandy Yang, general manager of China International Fund Management Co. in Shanghai, JPMorgan Fleming's joint venture with Shanghai International Trust and Investment.

The IPO practices on the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges are especially exasperating. For one thing, the shares are priced according to a rigid formula dictated by the government, so that IPO prices bear little or no relation to the underlying fundamentals of the company. Strict rules on who can subscribe to an IPO also create a false scarcity that drives demand -- for a short time. "The IPO market is not really market-driven, it's more regulation-driven," says Nicole Yuen, head of China equities at UBS in Hong Kong, and a member of the CSRC listing committee.

An even bigger problem with China's stock markets stems from the government's reluctance to relinquish control over state-owned enterprises when they list. About two-thirds of all listed companies' shares are nontradable blocks held by state agencies and other state-owned companies. This makes for thinly traded shares, which increases volatility. It also deters investors from taking a buy-and-hold approach, for fear the government will one day dilute their holdings by releasing its shares. One solution under consideration: allow existing shareholders to buy untradable shares at a discount.

Yet the government, despite its vow to fix the system, remains reluctant to unleash real market forces. "I don't think the capital markets have anything to do with risk; they have everything to do with funneling money to state-owned enterprises," says Carl E. Walter, chief operating officer for JP Morgan Chase & Co. in China. This in turn provides little incentive for local underwriters to conduct thorough due diligence on the stocks they bring to market. "It's a joke," says Walter.

With such structural problems, it's hard to see how the mainland exchanges will rapidly mature. But fund managers are quietly exerting more discipline on the market by buying stocks of well-run companies, to which they make regular visits. The number of funds has grown to about 135 since 1998, with some $30 billion under management, representing 5% of the market. Beginning last year, a number of foreign houses, including ABN Amro (ABN ), ING Group (ING ), and JPMorgan Fleming Asset Management (JPM ) have set up joint-venture fund companies. "Mutual funds and more transparent institutional investors have brought some sense to the market," says Joon L?, deputy chief investment officer at China International Fund Management.

The presence of long-term investors hasn't put a stop to the IPO wildness, but some brakes are being applied. On June 29, for example, Jinan Iron & Steel Group's debut fizzled, closing just marginally above its 76 cents IPO price, reflecting investor concern that a Beijing-imposed slowdown in the steel industry would hurt earnings. A flat IPO? That may be a sign that one day mainland exchanges may behave like real stock markets.


By Frederik Balfour in Shanghai, with Chen Wu in Hong Kong




Copyright 2000-2004, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.

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N.E. nuclear plants first to seek storage damages
Trial against US over waste costs begins
By H. Josef Hebert, Associated Press | July 13, 2004

WASHINGTON -- The government's failure to open a dump site for commercial nuclear waste could expose taxpayers to tens of billions of dollars in damages. The first in an expected string of trials to determine how much began yesterday across the street from the White House.

ADVERTISEMENT

More than two decades ago, the government signed a contract with utilities promising to take charge of the highly radioactive used reactor fuel at commercial power plants by 1998. But the government has yet to come up with a central storage site.

A number of court cases have ruled that the Energy Department is liable for the cost of keeping the waste -- and possibly punitive damages -- because of a breach of contract. How much is at stake is anyone's guess, but the industry has put the number as high as $56 billion.

The first case, involving three utilities that own the Yankee group of reactors in Maine, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, went to trial yesterday before the US Court of Federal Claims. The trial is expected to last seven weeks.

Jerry Stouck, a lawyer representing the utilities, outlined a case that was expected to focus on the government's repeated failures, dating to 1983, to get approval for a central waste dump at Yucca Mountain in Nevada and its refusal in the interim to accept the waste at some other facility.

The courts already have ruled that the government violated its contract with the nation's utilities to take charge of the waste. Now the utilities are seeking damages, with 65 claims having been filed.

''Damages. Damages. It's all about damages. How much money are we entitled to," Stouck said during a break in the proceedings.

The case before Judge James Merow of the claims court is limited to used reactor fuel that is being stored at Maine Yankee in Wiscasset, Connecticut Yankee in Haddam Neck, and Yankee Rowe in Rowe, Mass., nuclear plant sites. The issue is of special importance to the utilities because the reactors have been shut down and keeping the waste is more expensive and may affect site cleanup.

''If this litigation is successful, it will provide some financial relief to the electric customers who bear the increasing costs to store fuel at these sites as a result of the DOE's failure to meet its legal obligations," said Bruce Kenyon, chairman of Yankee Atomic Electric Co.

The utilities together are asking for $548 million in damages for the costs incurred to keep the spent reactor fuel in dry-cask storage until 2010. That is when the proposed Yucca Mountain waste site is expected to begin taking waste from commercial power plants.

The damages sought by the New England utilities is nearly double the $268 million cited in 1999 when they began litigation. Stouck said the costs of keeping the waste on site had been underestimated and storing it has become more expensive because of increased security needs with today's terror threats.

But the money sought in this trial is only a fraction of what the government may have to pay, given that these are only three of 65 claims filed -- claims by the owners of the country's 102 reactors at 72 power plants.

And the bill could grow if the Yucca Mountain waste site fails to open in 2010 as planned. A federal appeals court last Friday raised new questions about the Energy Department's ability to keep its timetable when it rejected the government's proposed radiation protection standard for the Yucca site.

In a recent letter to Congress on problems getting funding for Yucca Mountain, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham estimated utilities will incur $500 million a year in costs for keeping used reactor fuel on site for every year the Yucca Mountain dump is delayed past 2010.

? Copyright 2004 Globe Newspaper Company.

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US in talks over biggest missile defence site in Europe

Ian Traynor in Warsaw
Tuesday July 13, 2004
The Guardian

The US administration is negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic over its controversial missile defence programme, with a view to positioning the biggest missile defence site outside the US in central Europe.
Polish government officials confirmed to the Guardian that talks have been going on with Washington for eight months and made clear that Poland was keen to take part in the project, which is supposed to shield the US and its allies from long-range ballistic missile attacks.

Senior officials in Prague also confirmed that talks were under way over the establishment of American advanced radar stations in the Czech Republic as part of the missile shield project.

"We're very interested in becoming a concrete part of the arrangement," said Boguslaw Majewski, the Polish foreign ministry spokesman. "We have been debating this with the Americans since the end of last year."

Other sources in Warsaw said Pentagon officers have been scouting the mountain territory of southern Poland, pinpointing suitable sites for two or three radar stations connected to the so-called Son of Star Wars programme.

As well as radar sites, the Poles say they want to host a missile interceptor site, a large reinforced underground silo from where long-range missiles would be launched to intercept and destroy incoming rockets.

Under Bush administration plans, two missile interceptor sites are being built in the US - one in California, the other in Alaska. Such a site in Poland would be the first outside America and the only one in Europe.

"An interceptor site would be more attractive. It wouldn't be a hard sell in Poland," said Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a former Polish defence minister.

"This is a serious runner," said a west European diplomat in Warsaw. "It's pretty substantial. The Poles are very keen to have an interceptor site. They want a physical American presence on their territory. They wouldn't be paying anything. It would be a totally American facility."

"I knew about possible radar sites, but I was surprised to hear talk about missile silos," said another source in Warsaw.

In the Czech Republic, too, the proposed radar site, extending to 100 sq km, could be declared extraterritorial and a sovereign US base.

The talks are at the exploratory stage and no decisions have been taken, officials stressed. US officials played down talk of central European participation in the missile shield. But the confidential nature of the negotiations, being led on the US side by John Bolton, the hardline under-secretary of state for arms control, has angered senior defence officials in the region, who have been kept in the dark.

Milos Titz, deputy chairman of the Czech parliament's defence and security committee, learned of the talks last week and immediately called the defence minister, Miroslav Kostelka, to demand an explanation. According to the Czech web newspaper, Britske Listy, Mr Kostelka conceded to Mr Titz that the talks were going ahead and promised to supply details to the committee this week.

The committee is to hold an extraordinary session today, apparently to demand more information on the issue from the government.

According to a Washington-based thinktank, the Arms Control Association, the Pentagon has already requested modest funding for preliminary studies on a third missile interceptor site based in Europe.

Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, director of the Pentagon's Missile Defence Agency (MDA), told Congress this year of plans to construct a missile shield base abroad. "We are preparing to move forward when appropriate to build a third [ground-based interceptor] site at a location outside the United States," he said.

In addition to Poland and the Czech Republic, the Washington thinktank reported last week that the US was also talking to Hungary about possible involvement in the missile shield which is yet to be properly tested and which many experts believe is unworkable. Sources in Warsaw said the US was also talking to Romania and Bulgaria. Last week, the Australian government signed a 25-year pact with the US on cooperating in the missile shield programme.

The two interceptor sites being built in Alaska and California are primarily to insure against a potential ballistic missile attack on the US by North Korea. The possible European site is being widely seen as a shield against missiles from the Middle East, notably Syria or Iran.

But many believe that any such facility in Poland would be concerned mainly and in the long term with Russia. Such concerns appear to be reflected in Polish government thinking.

While the Poles were still waiting for specific proposals from the Americans, said Mr Majewski, they were also insisting that any Polish participation had to be squared first with Moscow for fear of creating military tension in the region.

"The Americans are working quite hard on this," he said. "They need to clear the path with the Russians and reach a consensus before we will move ahead."

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NOW KOFI WANTS TO RUN THIS FUND...TRUST....?

http://theworld.org/latesteditions/20040713.shtml
US and UN AIDS report (4:30)
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has asked the United States to show the same commitment to the fight against HIV/Aids as to the war on terror. Mr Annan is attending the International Aids Conference in Bangkok. He says the US was spending huge amounts to tackle terrorism and weapons of mass destruction but had failed to deliver on its promises to combat the spread of Aids. The World's Katy Clark has more.






THE REAL WORLD

Drip, Drip, Drip
More Oil for Food details leak out. When will the U.N. come clean?

BY CLAUDIA ROSETT
Wednesday, July 14, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

Kofigate continues. Another stack of secret United Nations Oil for Food documents has now reached the press, this batch procured by congressional sources and providing--at long last--a better view of Saddam Hussein's entire U.N.-approved shopping list. This huge roster of Oil for Food relief contracts fills in a few more of the vital details about Saddam's "humanitarian" partnership with the U.N., spelling out the names of all his U.N.-approved relief suppliers and the price of every deal.

We need no longer wonder which Russian company got the contracts, on the eve of war, in February 2003, to sell broadcasting gear to Saddam, or for how much. The U.N. list says Nord Star, from which Saddam--approved directly by Secretary-General Kofi Annan's office, in the name of relief, in the thick of the U.N. debate over Iraq--ordered up $3.4 million worth of TV studio equipment. Or, if one wants to admire the versatility of Saddam's Russian suppliers, it's now clear it wasn't just one Russian oil firm, Zarubezhneft, that made a sideline out of selling milk to Saddam. In late 2002, Russia's Kalmyk Oil & Gas Co. did a deal to supply Iraq with $1 million worth of "instant full cream milk powder."

And, if anyone has been wondering exactly which nameless Saudi supplier backed out of a $5 million contract to sell vegetable ghee to Iraq when the U.N., post-Saddam, began renegotiating a kickback surcharge of some 10% out of the remaining Oil for Food contracts, the name on the U.N. list is the Al Riyadh International Flower Co. (Which, by the way, turned up last year on a Pentagon list of Oil for Food suppliers overpaid by Saddam, with overpricing in Al Riyadh's case estimated at about 20%, and total overpayment on three contracts estimated at $8.6 million.)





This kind of information won't get you all the way to confirming the precise who, when and how-much of the illicit side deals, the U.N.-condoned influence peddling, the billions in graft and smuggling, that became the hallmarks of Oil for Food. But if, during the course of the seven year Oil for Food program, the U.N. had made a habit of releasing instead of hiding such basic details as names and prices, there might have been enough public alarm raised early on so that it might not now be necessary for anyone to investigate the program.
Transparency during Oil for Food, instead of leaks after the program ended, would have brought before the public, much sooner and more clearly, not just the strange bent of Saddam's business with his pals in places like France, Syria and especially Russia, but also his taste for selling oil via such financial hideaways as Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Panama and, above all, Switzerland. That might have fueled many more calls, much earlier, for reform. There might have been no need for the eight or nine (or have we reached 10?) investigations now in motion.

Had the U.N. been forthright about Oil for Food, there might have been no need last summer for Pentagon auditors to check the strangely high prices on many Oil for Food contracts, and report back that this U.N. relief program had entailed a spree of overpayments for such stuff as Tunisian baby food and Syrian bathroom sets--overpricing being a route for Saddam's regime to collect kickbacks from U.N.-approved suppliers. And had the U.N. published this latest leaked list, even in its current form--which, as a printout instead of a computer file, does not lend itself to a quick search--perhaps someone during those interminable Security Council fights of early 2003 might have gone through the painstaking job of adding up what France and Russia were actually raking in from Saddam's regime. Please stay tuned, especially should anyone now choose to leak the U.N.'s secret list of individual oil contracts, which would help complete the picture.

This list means progress, at least, in the great paper chase attending upon efforts to explain to the aggrieved Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his senior staff why a U.N. relief scandal involving $10 billion or more in embezzlement might be of interest even to those not working for Paul Volcker's U.N.-authorized investigation. A vast U.N. spreadsheet leaked some time back showed only the relief contracts from 1997 through early 2001, more than two busy years short of the full program.

This latest list, which runs to hundreds of pages, totaling tens of billions worth of deals, goes all the way from the first relief contract negotiated by Saddam's regime with the Australian Wheat Board, in 1997, to the final spate of Saddam's contracts processed in mid-2003 for such goods as millions of dollars worth of "detergent" from Egypt, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Along the way, this list offers an opportunity to browse such stuff as an order for $286,481 worth of "milk and yogurt homogenizer" from the financial fields of Liechtenstein. Or the dozens of contract entries, totaling hundreds of millions worth of Oil for Food business, awarded by Saddam to one of his regime's own front companies, as designated in May by the U.S. Treasury: Dubai-based Al Wasel & Babel. It would be helpful, of course, to know the official quality and quantities of goods purchased, information still socked away in the secret hoards of the actual contracts. Although, given recent General Accounting Office testimony that Cotecna, the Swiss-based inspections firm hired by the U.N. to check Oil for Food imports into Iraq, looked at only 7% to 10% of the deliveries, we may have to hunt elsewhere for confirmation of just how well these sales figures reflect actual shipments of, say, authentic sugar and genuine steel.

But bit by bit, the picture comes into sharper focus. More than a year ago, while trolling the U.N. Web site looking for clues as to what in creation was really going on inside the black hole called Oil for Food, I came across a most wondrously cryptic notation. It appeared on the U.N.'s public list of Iraq relief contracts, a list so generic that it was impossible to identify Saddam's business partners, or how much of what, exactly, they were selling, or at what prices. But even in that bland landscape--in which, for instance, the lone word car served to describe $5 million worth of vehicles supplied via two contracts out of the United Arab Emirates--one entry stood out for sheer vagueness: The contractor's country was Russia, and the contract was for "Goods for Resumption of Project."
What goods? What project? Querying the U.N. produced only the answer that such details were secret. The U.N. was protecting the confidentiality of Saddam and his goods-for-resumption-of-project suppliers.

Now, thanks to assorted studies and leaked lists, it is possible with a little cross-referencing to discover that the supplier was a Russian state company, Technopromexport, and the contract was for "mechanical equipment," sold to Iraq for $1,475,261. The question remains: Why should this have been a U.N. secret?

The U.N. to this day has refused to release any more detail to the public, first citing the need to protect the privacy of Saddam and his business partners, then sending out letters in April reminding the overseers of oil sales and relief imports to keep quiet, and now deflecting all inquiries to the Volcker investigation--which doesn't answer questions about Oil for Food and won't have a final report out until at least the end of the year.

It's intriguing, in its way, to trace the clues back and forth, trying to piece together the biggest jigsaw puzzle of graft, fraud and theft in the history of humanitarian relief. But wouldn't it have spared us all a lot of grief had the U.N. chosen to run this program not as a private consulting arrangement with Saddam, but as an open book? Just this week, U.N. spokesman Stephane Dujarric reiterated to the San Francisco Chronicle what has clearly become Mr. Annan's party line--that the Secretariat, which collected a $1.4 billion commission on Saddam's oil sales to run this program, was "not mandated to police the contractors; it's not the way the program was set up by the Security Council members."

Interesting how Mr. Annan bowed to the Security Council when it was the ordinary people of Iraq being robbed, but now that his own office is under fire, he feels free to let his subordinates run around blaming the Security Council. Wasn't anyone at the U.N. paid to think?

Ms. Rosett is a fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Hudson Institute. Her column appears here and in The Wall Street Journal Europe on alternate Wednesdays.

Afghan intelligence officials talk to Mullah Omar

KABUL, July 8: Afghan intelligence agents have talked to Taliban founder Mullah Mohammed

Omar after commandeering a satellite phone being used by his top aide, an official claimed

on Thursday.

Mullah Omar, along with Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, has escaped a US-led dragnet which

now numbers some 20,000 soldiers since the ousting of his government in 2001.

A man believed to be Mullah Omar's aide, Mullah Sakhi Dad Mujahid, was captured on Tuesday

while carrying a satellite telephone containing the phone numbers of top members of the

ousted government, Kandahar intelligence chief Abdullah Laghmanai said.

"We contacted Mullah Omar by Mullah Mujahid's phone," he said, adding that at first Mullah

Mujahid was forced to talk to his boss on the phone. "But when he (Omar) realized the

situation ... he cut off the phone."

"Salam-aleikum, where are you?" Mullah Omar asked Mullah Mujahid, according to Mr Laghmanai,

who did not say when the call was made. Mullah Mujahid, as he is known locally, was arrested

on Tuesday during a raid in Dara-i-Noor, some 70kms north of Kandahar.

The area is in the rugged border region between Uruzgan and Kandahar and known to US

military officials as the 'Taliban heartland'. Mullah Mujahid served as Mullah Omar's

secretary under the Taliban's 1996-2001 rule.

"Currently he was serving as Mullah Omar's military assistant," he said. Kandahar military

spokesman General Abdul Wasay confirmed the arrest. "The arrest of Mullah Mujahid will

pacify Taliban's activities in the area," where he was captured, he said.

Mr Laghmanai said subsequent efforts to contact Mullah Omar had been unsuccessful as the

one-eyed Taliban boss refuses to answer phone calls 'from strange numbers'.

"Maybe Omar has found out that his friend is under our control," he said. "He doesn't answer

his telephone." Mullah Mujahid was transferred in handcuffs to Kabul on Wednesday for

investigation, which authorities hope could lead to the arrest of other militants.

Mr Laghmanai alleged that intelligence reports as well as information received from Mujahid

suggested Mullah Omar was hiding in Pakistan's tribal areas near Kandahar and close to

Quetta. "The information Mujahid provided, and also our intelligence, suggests that Omar is

in Pakistan's tribal areas," he said.

FOREIGNERS HELD: Three foreigners, including a US national, have been arrested for setting

up a private vigilante group here to detain suspected terrorists, a minister said Thursday.

"Three foreigners who had formed a self-made group and were claiming their aims were to act

against those carrying out terrorist attacks, have been arrested," Interior Minister Ali

Ahmad Jalali said.

Four Afghans were also arrested along with the foreigners for allegedly illegally holding

eight local people in a private jail as part of their personal war against terror. "They did

not have any legal connection with anyone and the United States was also chasing them," Mr

Jalali said. "They are actually rebels."

"The group had illegally arrested eight Afghans from Kabul and kept them in their custody,"

Mr Jalali added. The men were arrested on Monday night in a house near the Intercontinental

Hotel in western Kabul.

The identity of the two other foreign nationals is not known. "They were operating under the

fake name of an export company," Mr Jalali told a press conference in Kabul.

A spokesman for the US embassy, who asked not to be named, said he was unable to confirm the

number of American nationals arrested. On July 5 the American-led coalition force issued a

press release in which it warned against an individual named as Jonathan K. Idema.

"US citizen Jonathan K. Idema has allegedly represented himself as an American government

and/or military official," the statement said. "The public should be aware that Idema does

not represent the American government and we do not employ him." -AFP






-------------------------------------------------------------
Civilian shipments to Iraq hampered by insurer fears



SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, July 5, 2004
ABU DHABI - Gulf Arab insurers continue to cut back on coverage for cargo shipments to Iraq.

Industry sources said leading insurers in the Gulf Cooperation Council have significantly

reduced war risk coverage to insure business to or in Iraq. The sources said the refusal to

provide such insurance has hampered the supply of civilian cargo to Iraq.

In April, GCC insurers decided to suspend coverage for cargo destined for Iraqi transports,

Middle East Newsline reported. The sources said the insurers were willing to insure cargo

until the Iraqi port. But from the port, the cargo would not have been insured.

GCC insurers have been led by the industry in Bahrain. Insurance companies in Bahrain were

expected to benefit from a new Saudi law that would open the kingdom to foreign firms.

International insurers, such as Lloyds of London, have been willing to provide some war

coverage. But the lack of competition drove up the price of war risk coverage.

GCC insurers have offered coverage to preferred clients when backed by massive reinsurance

support from Lloyds, the sources said. They said the premium could amount to 100 times the

normal war risk premium in other countries.




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Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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THE TWO KOREAS:
Time to Leave South Korea

Thomas Henriksen

Why it makes sense for U.S. forces to leave Korea's demilitarized zone.

Thomas Henriksen is a senior fellow and associate director at the Hoover Institution.
Despite escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula in recent months, it is time to start

the pullback of the 14,000 American troops stationed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and

the GIs garrisoned in the nearby capital rather than waiting a year. Implementing Secretary

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's plans for repositioning U.S. forces from the DMZ and their

central Seoul base will better align Washington's decades-old obligations with newfound

perils on the peninsula and beyond. The United States can honor its commitment to defend

South Korea from another northern invasion by our formidable land and carrier-based

airpower. This military reconfiguration in South Korea should be part of an overhaul of

American post-Cold War strategy.

There are two time warps on the Korean peninsula. There is the familiar one north of the DMZ

with a communist regime that resembles Josef Stalin's Soviet Russia of the 1930s, with

prison camps, starvation, oppression, and propaganda campaigns against the United States.

The other, less acknowledged, time warp is south of the DMZ. Since the end of the Korean War

in 1953, U.S. forces have been frozen in defensive positions against another North Korean

assault. Currently, there are a total of 37,000 U.S. forces in all of South Korea. Their

mission is static, and their training and equipment make them unfit for new fast-paced

operations. Moreover, North Korea's heavy-duty conventional artillery and self-proclaimed

nuclear weapons make this force more hostage than defender.

South Korea's 600,000 troops ought to assume the primary role in defending their own

country, relieving U.S. troops for security operations in liberated Iraq or for swift-

response roles in the campaign against terror, for example. American forces are stretched

thin around the globe in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Japan, Germany, and now the Philippines

and Kyrgyzstan. A rebalancing of American power should have taken place after the collapse

of the Soviet Union, when the world enjoyed a brief respite from major threats.

The current volatile international environment is no excuse not to undertake such a review

now--for it is actually during times of war, hot or cold, that conditions compel change.

Halcyon eras, like the 1990s, breed complacency. The U.S. military and geopolitical

framework underwent profound changes in World War II and again with the onset of the Cold

War. The war on terror necessitates carefully executed adjustments but so, too, does a world

vastly altered by the end of the Soviet confrontation. North Korea is no longer Moscow's

proxy.

Obviously, there are risks. A sudden transformation could cause instability in Asia. North

Korea could interpret American withdrawal as a lack of resolve. But this seems unlikely

given that an attack across the DMZ, with or without our small Maginot-line force, would be

seen as an act of war by Washington, triggering a counterattack and imperiling the Pyongyang

regime itself. In one sense, the absence of a U.S. force on the DMZ would make a massive U.

S. retaliation easier; otherwise American troops would no doubt be overrun by the world's

fifth-largest army and face the danger of errant friendly fire.

Our DMZ contingent has neither halted Pyongyang's nuclear weapons ambitions nor inhibited

its missile sales to Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, or Syria. It cannot be expected to stop nuclear

material transfers to other rogue states or possibly terrorist networks. More important,

American ground units in Korea have not assuaged fears in Japan, Taiwan, or military circles

in South Korea about Pyongyang's nuclear arming. These states will increasingly look to

their own defense. Japan, the most pacifistic state, has now openly abandoned its long-held

prohibition of U.S. nuclear-powered warships in its harbors. Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba

stated that his country is prepared to wage a preemptive strike against a possible missile

launch by North Korea. Pyongyang's likely production of 10 or more new atomic bombs will

deepen anxiety among its neighbors. They will consider defensive measures, perhaps a nuclear

option, even with U.S. ground forces in South Korea.

Finally, the anti-American sentiment that burst forth in the South Korean presidential

elections last fall also dictates a fresh look at our presence at the DMZ. Led by their new

president, Roh Moo Hyun, many South Koreans no longer fear their brothers across the DMZ, an

impression that Pyongyang has fostered and utilized against the United States. America is

caught in the middle of its commitment to defend the South and that country's awakened

nationalism against a perceived foreign tutelage.

The last time the United States was boxed in between protecting an Asian country from its

northern communist neighbor amid anti-Americanism and emerging nationalism in the south, it

fared badly. Although we look for Vietnam War analogies in the Middle East, we might better

see shades of them in the new Korea. It makes sense to anticipate looming realities. Sooner

rather than later the divide on the Korean peninsula will end. When it does, the United

States will cut its commitment just as we did in reunified Germany after the fall of the

Berlin Wall. States nearby will counterbalance a reunified peninsula, which in all

likelihood will have nuclear capabilities.

In Germany, where anti-U.S. feelings have also arisen, it now makes strategic sense to

reposition U.S. troops from Cold War installations into the more pro-American former Warsaw

Pact countries, such as Poland and Hungary. Reconstituted into expeditionary forces, these

units could be rapidly deployed in the Middle East and Central Asia in tune with changing

American interests. But nowhere are the operational realities more out of date than in

Korea. It is time to recognize the historical wind shifts and realign our forces or be

buffeted by them.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Special to the Hoover Digest.

Available from the Hoover Press is Democracy and the Korean Economy, edited by Jongryn Mo

and Chung-in Moon. Also available is Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in

Korea, edited by Larry Diamond and Doh C. Shin. To order, call 800.935.2882.

CONVERSATIONS OF INTEREST...

http://www.moretothepoint.com/

Israel's Nuclear Weapons listen
There's a "glimmer of hope" for a nuclear-weapons free Middle East. Those optimistic words were voiced today by Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, after his meeting with Israel's Ariel Sharon. That optimism is based on a host of conditions. So far, only Israel is believed to have nuclear weapons, but Iran is suspected of working hard to develop nukes of its own. Is Iran developing nuclear weapons? Are Israel's nukes making the region safer, or increasing the danger of confrontation? Warren Olney reveals just how challenging that prospect is in his conversation with a spokesman for the IAEA, the director of the Carnegie Endowment's Nonproliferation Program, other experts in Middle East arms and arms control, and Iran's first ambassador to the UN.

Ken Lay, George Bush and Texas Cronyism
In Houston today, former Enron CEO Ken Lay surrendered to federal officials and was led away in handcuffs. Later, he pleaded innocent to criminal charges of securities and wire fraud, and misleading investors, which could land him 175 years in prison and millions in fines. But in addition to being involved in one of America's most spectacular business collapses, Lay has also been a Bush family insider. Robert Bryce, author of Cronies: Oil, the Bushes, and the Rise of Texas, America's Super-State, expounds.

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http://www.wnyc.org/shows/lopate/episodes/07062004
Henry Valentino and Robert Templer
Henry Valentino, senior advisor at the International Foundation for Election Systems, on Indonesia's first presidential elections. He is joined by Robert Templer, Asia program director for the International Crisis Group.

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http://www.theworld.org/latesteditions/20040708.shtml
Pakistan report (5:15)
Pakistan is an ally in the war on terrorism. Yet the country's a hot-bed of Islamic militants. Islamic schools produce them every day. Pakistan's president has promised to crack down on those schools, but they're still operating and turning out potential recruits for terrorism. The World's Mary Kay Magistad reports from Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province.

Security interview (4:30)
To get an assessment of the government's assessment of Al Qaeda's strategy of attack, host Marco Werman speaks to Juliette Kayyem, former member of the National Commission on Terrorism. She's at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

-------------------------------------------------------

http://www.theworld.org/latesteditions/20040707.shtml
Darfur and the Arab world interview (5:00)
Darfur has been called the world's worst humanitarian problem. Arab fighters have been attacking African farmers in a campaign many have referred to as ethnic cleansing and genocide. But in many Arab countries, the crisis isn't a major concern. Host Marco Werman discusses the Arab response to Darfur with Abdul Rahman Al Rashed, general manager of the satellite news channel al-Arabiya.

Iran-Israel nuclear weapons interview (5:00)
Israel, pressed by the U.N. to consider a nuclear weapons-free Middle East, expresses fear that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons and might use them against it. Host Marco Werman examines the Middle East's unacknowledged arms race with Robert Gallucci, dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and a former U.N. weapons inspector.

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Iraq Confirms U.S. Has Removed Nuclear Material
Thu Jul 8,12:03 PM ET Add World - Reuters to My Yahoo!
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iraq (news - web sites)'s interim government confirmed Thursday the United States has removed radioactive material from Iraq, saying ousted dictator Saddam Hussein (news - web sites) could have used it to develop nuclear weapons.
U.S. and U.N. officials said Wednesday Washington had transported 1.8 tons of enriched uranium out of Iraq for safekeeping more than a year after looters stole it from a U.N.-sealed facility left unguarded by U.S. troops.
Iraq's interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi said the uranium and about 1,000 highly radioactive items from the former Iraqi nuclear research facility had been taken to the United States.
"I can now announce that the United States Department of Defense (news - web sites) and Department of Energy (news - web sites) have completed a joint operation to secure and remove from Iraq radiological and nuclear materials that the ousted regime could have potentially used in a radiological dispersal device or diverted to support a nuclear weapons program," Allawi said in a statement.
"Iraq has no intention and no will to resume these programs in the future. These materials which are potential weapons of mass murder are not welcome in our country and their production is unacceptable," Allawi said.
A "radiological dispersal device," or dirty bomb, uses a conventional explosive to disperse radioactive material over a wide area.
U.S. officials said lightly enriched uranium, which could be used in such a bomb, was airlifted to an undisclosed U.S. site after its removal from the Tuwaitha nuclear complex south of Baghdad, a one-time center of Iraq's nuclear weapons programs.
U.S. officials said the move would help keep potentially dangerous nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists.
The Tuwaitha nuclear complex was dismantled in the early 1990s after the first Gulf War (news - web sites).
But tons of nuclear materials remained there under the seal of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, until last year's U.S.-led invasion of Iraq when it was left unguarded and looted by Iraqi civilians.
The IAEA learned a week ago that the transfer had taken place on June 23, the agency said in a letter to the U.N. Security Council made public Wednesday.

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Ariel Sharon acceptera de d?nucl?ariser Isra?l, dans un "contexte de paix"
LEMONDE.FR | 08.07.04 | 16h00
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Le premier ministre isra?lien et le directeur de l'Agence internationale de l'?nergie atomique, Mohamed ElBaradei, se sont rencontr?s jeudi 8 juillet. Ariel Sharon, qui reste flou sur les capacit?s nucl?aires d'Isra?l, ne veut envisager la cr?ation d'une zone d?nucl?aris?e que dans un "contexte de paix".
Le premier ministre isra?lien, Ariel Sharon, s'est d?clar? pr?t ? d?nucl?ariser Isra?l dans un contexte de paix au Proche-Orient, a indiqu?, jeudi 8 juillet, le directeur de l'Agence internationale de l'?nergie atomique (AIEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, apr?s s'?tre entretenu avec lui. "La politique d'Isra?l continue d'?tre la m?me, ? savoir que dans le contexte de la paix au Proche-Orient, Isra?l envisagera favorablement la cr?ation d'une zone d?nucl?aris?e", a affirm? M. ElBaradei lors d'une conf?rence de presse.
"Ce n'est pas une politique nouvelle, mais j'estime que le fait m?me qu'elle soit r?affirm?e au niveau du premier ministre est un d?veloppement bienvenu et positif", a-t-il ajout?, m?me si aucune date ni aucun cadre n'ont ?t? retenus pour des discussions en ce sens.
ISRA?L RESTE "AMBIGU?" SUR SES CAPACIT?S ATOMIQUES
M. ElBaradei a par ailleurs estim? qu'"un dialogue sur des questions s?curitaires peut ?tre envisag?" avec Isra?l. Selon lui, il pourrait notamment ?tre question de "cr?er dans le cadre de la 'feuille de route' un sous-comit? charg? du contr?le des armements".
Mise au point par le Quartet international (Etats-Unis, Russie, Union europ?enne, ONU), la "feuille de route" est un plan de paix qui pr?voit la cr?ation d'un Etat palestinien d'ici ? 2005 et la fin des violences. La seconde phase de ce plan envisage la reprise de n?gociations multilat?rales notamment sur les questions du partage de l'eau, de l'environnement, du d?veloppement r?gional, des r?fugi?s et du contr?le des armements. Ce projet lanc? en juin 2003 est jusqu'? pr?sent rest? lettre morte, en raison de la poursuite des violences isra?lo-palestiniennes.
La rencontre de M. ElBaradei avec M. Sharon est survenue au dernier des trois jours de sa visite en Isra?l. Elle a dur? plus d'une heure, selon le porte-parole de l'AIEA, Mark Gwozdecky. Depuis six ans, M. ElBaradei fait campagne pour d?nucl?ariser le Proche-Orient, mais M. Sharon avait d'embl?e indiqu? vouloir pr?server l'ambigu?t? sur les capacit?s atomiques d'Isra?l.
Selon des sources ?trang?res, Isra?l disposerait de 200 ogives nucl?aires et des vecteurs ad?quats pour les larguer.
Avec AFP
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La CIA savait que l'Irak avait abandonn? son programme d'ADM
LEMONDE.FR | 06.07.04 | 08h40 * MIS A JOUR LE 06.07.04 | 15h19
A 12 h 15 par e-mail, d?couvrez toute l'actualit? ?conomique et financi?re. Abonnez-vous au Monde.fr, 5? par mois
Le rapport de la commission du renseignement du S?nat am?ricain, qui doit ?tre rendu public cette semaine, devrait contenir une mise en cause cinglante de la CIA. Selon le "New York Times", l'agence d?tenait avant la guerre contre l'Irak des ?l?ments invalidant l'accusation port?e contre le r?gime de Saddam Hussein de d?tenir des armes de destruction massive.
La CIA aurait omis de transmettre au pr?sident am?ricain, George W. Bush, des informations fournies par des proches de scientifiques irakiens sur l'abandon par Bagdad de son programme de d?veloppement d'armes de destruction massive (ADM), affirme, mardi 6 juillet, le New York Times. L'existence d'ADM avait ?t? l'une des justifications de la guerre en Irak. Le secr?taire d'Etat am?ricain, Colin Powell, avait pr?sent? en f?vrier 2003 devant l'ONU de pr?tendues preuves de l'existence de ces ADM.
Le New York Times, citant des responsables gouvernementaux anonymes, pr?cise dans sa version en ligne que ce dysfonctionnement de l'agence am?ricaine de renseignement a ?t? d?couvert par une commission sp?cialis?e du S?nat am?ricain.
La CIA aurait conduit avant le d?clenchement de la guerre contre le r?gime de Saddam Hussein un programme secret d'interrogatoires des proches de scientifiques irakiens, mais n'aurait pas ensuite transmis leurs d?clarations au pr?sident ou ? d'autres membres de l'ex?cutif am?ricain, indique le journal.
La commission du S?nat a ouvert une enqu?te sur l'utilisation faite par l'ex?cutif des informations fournies par les services de renseignement avant la guerre, apr?s qu'Am?ricains et Britanniques eurent ?chou? ? d?couvrir en Irak des armes de destruction massive, dont l'existence pr?sum?e avait ?t? utilis?e pour justifier le d?clenchement des hostilit?s.
Le rapport de la commission s?natoriale du renseignement, qui devrait ?tre rendu public cette semaine, contiendra certainement une mise en cause cinglante de la CIA et de ses dirigeants, pour ne pas avoir reconnu que les ?l?ments en leur possession ne justifiaient pas l'accusation qu'ils ont port?e contre le r?gime de Saddam Hussein de d?tenir des armes de destruction massive, ajoute le New York Times.
MAUVAIS TRAVAIL DE COLLECTE ET D'ANALYSE
Les responsables de la CIA auraient minimis? l'importance des informations fournies par les proches des scientifiques irakiens, soulignant que seuls quelques-uns avaient affirm? que les programmes de d?veloppement d'ADM avaient ?t? abandonn?s, selon le journal.
La conclusion de la commission du S?nat est que la CIA et le reste de la communaut? du renseignement ont fait un bien mauvais travail dans la collecte d'information sur l'?tat des programmes d'ADM irakiens et un travail pire encore dans l'analyse des renseignements recueillis, affirme le New York Times.
Le rapport, selon le journal, cite des cas de d?formation des informations afin qu'elles corroborent la th?se que l'Irak avait bien des programmes chimique, biologique et nucl?aire.
Le S?nat a ainsi d?couvert, ajoute le journal, qu'un transfuge irakien, qui aurait fourni des preuves de l'existence d'un programme d'armes biologiques, avait en fait d?clar? tout ignorer d'un tel programme.
Un autre cas, cit? par le rapport s?natorial, concerne la saisie d'une cargaison de tubes en aluminium destin?s ? l'Irak, qui a ?t? consid?r?e comme une preuve que Bagdad tentait de fabriquer une bombe atomique, ce qui a conduit la commission du S?nat ? se demander si la CIA n'?tait pas devenue l'avocat d'une cause plut?t qu'un observateur objectif.
Mais, selon le New York Times, la commission n'a pas trouv? d'indications que les analyses de la CIA avaient ?t? modifi?es ? la suite de pressions politiques de la Maison Blanche.
Avec AFP

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Arafat's militant fighters call for reform
Move challenges leader's authority
By MOLLY MOORE and JOHN WARD ANDERSON
Washington Post
MIDEAST RESOURCES
JERUSALEM -- The armed wing of Yasser Arafat's Fatah political movement has called for a comprehensive campaign against corruption in the Palestinian Authority, recommending that Arafat relinquish some of his powers and that militant groups -- including Islamic organizations -- be granted a formal governing voice.
The proposal, a major shift in the strategy of militant fighters, was presented to senior Palestinian officials by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and is the first formal attempt by an armed resistance group to seek a political role in the Palestinian Authority since the current uprising against Israel began nearly four years ago.
The 10-page document calls for the expulsion and prosecution of government officials involved in corruption, a wholesale purge of relatives and cronies of officials from government payrolls and a halt to the practice of officials monopolizing sectors of the Palestinian economy.
The paper lashes out at "wives and sons and daughters of officials who are registered as employees and receive high salaries from the Palestinian Authority and are either at home or abroad." It attacks bureaucrats who "hold official titles and government jobs ... when in fact they have no role other than the salary and position." It demands "eradication of the corruption in most of the PLO embassies and representatives" overseas.
According to Zakaria Zbeida, who heads the al-Aqsa group in the northern West Bank city of Jenin, al-Aqsa leaders in the West Bank and Gaza Strip crafted the proposal partially in response to Israel's announced plan to withdraw soldiers and Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip within the next few years.
"We want to take part in this stage and not have the political process bypass us," Zbeida said. "We come with this initiative to prove we are not just a group of fighters throwing bullets here and there. ... We are ready to sit and talk."
The document urges separation of powers between the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, saying "it is inconceivable" that both organizations be headed by the same person. Arafat is chairman of the PLO executive committee and president of the Palestinian Authority.
"There's no doubt what it's calling for is significant," said Khalil Shikaki, a Palestinian political analyst. "This is a way of saying to Arafat that `It's time for you to step down as head of the Palestinian Authority.' ... That's a direct assault on Arafat. It's a clear indictment of the whole old guard."
Arafat spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeineh, dismissed the proposal, saying it did not sound "serious."
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Russia's fiscal crisis explodes
By Martin Sieff
UPI Senior News Analyst
Washington, DC, Jul. 8 (UPI) -- Plunging stock prices, a renewed Kremlin drive to smash the Yukos oil corporation and now a major bank locks out its depositors: Is Russia set for a rerun of its 1998 financial crisis?
Only a week ago, the question would have sounded alarmist, even ridiculous to most ears. But now the concerns are mounting thick and fast. Russia already faces a collapse of popular confidence in its banking system greater than any the United States has experienced the climax of the Great Depression in March-April 1933.
The Guta Bank, formerly the 22nd largest in Russia has shut its doors, frozen all its electronic operations and locked out its depositors. Concerns and rumors are swirling around the Alfa Bank.
"Spooked by the closure Tuesday of mid-sized Guta and reports that top-tier Alfa was on the ropes, depositors descended on banks in droves Wednesday, intensifying a trend that has seen an estimated $5 billion, or 10 percent of all household savings, taken out of the system in the last two months," the Moscow Times reported Thursday. A major Russian bank has locked out its depositors in a nationwide shutdown, the Moscow Times newspaper reported Wednesday.
That report followed Guta's bombshell decision to shut its doors to its depositors Tuesday.
"Due to an outflow of funds throughout June exceeding 10 billion rubles ($345 million) and a significant increase in payments in July, Guta Bank is currently unable to carry out current payments and complete payments on deposits," said a sign posted on one of the bank's Moscow branches. "Guta Bank management is undertaking necessary measures to restore (its) liquidity."
Guta officials refused Wednesday to issue any official statement. Earlier, a company representative told the paper that Guta's Internet service, its telephone-banking service and ATM networks were all down, allegedly for "technical" reason.
Also, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, chief shareholder, founder and former chief executive officer of the giant Yukos oil corporation prepares to go on trial on charges of fraud and tax evasion, top Russian officials have doubled the already killing tax bill of $3.4 billion they had saddled the company with and are talking darkly about even boosting that.
Fueled by fears over the banks and wild uncertainty over the future of Yukos, Russian stock markets have tumbling and the ruble has taken a pounding too.
Now the Moody's rating agency has given its imprint of condemnation to these troubles: it has announced that it is placing the long-term foreign currency ratings of no less than 18 Russian banks and the financial strength ratings of four banks on review for possible downgrade.
Russian banking executives understandably are playing down the significance of this decision." Russian banks understand that the situation is stable and there is money on the market," Bank of Moscow Chairman Oleg Tolkachov said.
But Moody's is not alone in its fears. On Wednesday, a senior Western finance official expressed concern over the lack of fiscal support for Russia's ruble.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development considers Russia's Stabilization Fund for the ruble to be scanty, OECD Economic Department Director Andrew Dean said during a review of the Russian economy, according tot a report carried by RosBusinessConsulting.
"According to him, the OECD is concerned about the fact that extra profits from oil exports are spent on decreasing the social tax instead of being transferred to the Stabilization Fund," RBC said. "It would be more reasonable for Russia to pay its foreign debt first and then start decreasing taxes, Dean believes."
Reflecting the growing worries, Russia's Central Bank Wednesday raised its official exchange rate to 35.91 rubles for one euro, dropping the value of the ruble by 0.14 rubles against the EU currency. In a three day period, the euro has gained 0.58 rubles or 1.6 percent of the Russian currency's value, the Moscow Times newspaper noted.
"The ruble's weakening against the European currency is explained as coming from a sharp surge in the euro against the dollar on the world market," the paper said. "The dollar has lost 0.5 percent against the euro over the past 24 hours and almost 2.5 percent compared with June 25."
Now Russian banks are fleeing tumbling stocks to invest in U.S. dollars. The official dollar exchange rate set by the Russian Central Bank for Thursday strengthened by 0.02 rubles against the dollar.
"As Russian stocks have tumbled, led by Yukos and the activity on the interbank market has significantly decreased, banks have nothing to do but buy dollars," RBC said. "Ruble liquidity has improved, therefore banks are more interested in dollar deals."
They are especially interested because not to use their ruble deposits is to lose them. Russia's ruble has fallen against the euro, the main currency of the European Union for three days in a row by the middle of this week.
Russia's Central Bank Wednesday raised its official exchange rate to 35.91 rubles for one euro, dropping the value of the ruble by 0.14 rubles against the EU currency, the paper said. In a three day period, the euro has gained 0.58 rubles or 1.6 percent of the Russian currency's value, it said.
Hovering over all is the question of what is going o happen to Yukos, he largest oil corporation in Russia and one of the largest in the world. For on Tuesday, Russia's top prosecutor signaled that despite previous reassurances from President Vladimir Putin himself, they were determined to squeeze Yukos until it burst.
"This is snowballing," Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov told Ekho Moskvy radio Tuesday, the paper said. "There is a beginning to this affair but there but it's very difficult to see the end. The level of stealing, fraud and tax evasion is so huge that it cannot all be packed into one case."
Yukos is Russia's largest oil company and is facing bankruptcy because it cannot pay off $3.4 billion in overdue taxes due by Thursday. Last week, Russia's Federal Tax Service hit Yukos with another $3.4 billion claim for 2001. Ustinov even told Ekho Moskvy Yukos could also be hit with additional tax claims for 2002 and 2003.
Russia's long-term macro-economic prospects ought to be bright. The country is one of the world's largest oil exporters and it soil and gas exports are soaring in an energy-hungry global market defined by soaring demand and inelastic supply: In other words, a major producer's sweetest dream.
But the fears sweeping Russia's bank depositors and market investors at the moment testify that without a sound financial system, the greatest natural resources cannot guarantee stability, let alone prosperity. Until President Putin and his government can address these concerns, Russia's latest crisis is likely to only grown worse.
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China calls U.S. 7-carrier exercise in Pacific 'naked intimidation'
Beijing is denouncing a large-scale U.S. naval exercise as targeted at China, U.S. officials said. The Summer Pulse exercise will involve the simultaneous deployment of seven U.S. carrier battle groups around the world. China's government is also upset that Taiwanese naval forces are involved in the exercises. A Chinese military source said China cannot handle more than two carrier battle groups. "This is gunboat diplomacy in the 21st Century," the source remarked.


Russia suddenly takes active role in N. Korea's nuclear crisis; Gas pipelines a factor
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S. Korean commission justifies N. Korean spies, setting off firestorm
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N. Korea missile engineer who defected to South, now seeks asylum in U.S.
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China warns Rice it won't 'sit idle' if US backs Taiwan independence
Thu Jul 8, 1:09 PM ET
BEIJING (AFP) - China's military strongman Jiang Zemin told visiting US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (news - web sites) China would not "sit idle" if foreign forces supported Taiwan independence.
AFP/File Photo
"If Taiwan authorities are determined to pursue Taiwan independence; if foreign forces interfere and support this, we would definitely not sit idle without doing anything," Jiang was paraphrased on Chinese state-run television station CCTV as saying.
The aging but still powerful former president's veiled warnings against US military intervention if Taiwan formally declares independence and China attacks the island came amid increasing tension between Beijing and Taipei.
The recent re-election of pro-independence Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian has fueled fears in Beijing that Chen may be moving toward a formal split in his second term.
Beijing hopes Washington will curb any such moves by Chen.
Jiang told Rice Taiwan was the "most sensitive" issue in Sino-US relations and expressed dismay with Washington's recent handling of Taiwan matters.
"The US side's recent series of actions, especially plans to sell arms to Taiwan made Chinese people feel seriously concerned and dissatisfied," said Jiang, chairman of the Central Military Commission.
He said while China prefers to settle the Taiwan issue peacefully, it "will definitely not tolerate Taiwan independence."
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, in his talks with Rice, "strongly" urged the US to understand the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue and "gravity" of the current situation, the Xinhua news agency reported.
"The Taiwan issue has a bearing on China's key interest and is the most crucial factor that affects the smooth development of China-US relations," Li said.
He urged the US to not only stop selling arms to Taiwan, which Beijing fears will embolden Chen, but to halt military and official relations with Taiwan.
A senior administration official travelling with Rice told AFP she conveyed President George W. Bush (news - web sites)'s reaffirmation of US backing for the One-China policy, which recognizes Taiwan as a part of China, and his "non-support" for Taiwan independence or any actions by Taipei to change the status quo.
But she reiterated Washington's commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, under which the United States pledges to defend the island if it is attacked.
"Rice, on behalf of the president, expressed our continuing commitment to the obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act ...," said the official who declined to be identified.
China considers Taiwan part of its territory awaiting reunification, by force if necessary, and has refused to recognize Taiwan's 55 years of de-facto independence since they separated at the end of a civil war in 1949.
Human rights, religious freedom and weapons proliferation issues were also raised by Rice during discussions, said the official, who declined to give details.
A US source said Rice specifically raised concerns about retired military doctor Jiang Yanyong who exposed Beijing's coverup of last year's SARS (news - web sites) epidemic, but is now reported by US media to be under 24-hour supervision and being forced to undergo "brainwashing sessions."
He had recently called for a government reassessment of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.
Rice nonetheless painted a positive picture of US-China relations.
"China is an important power in Asia and globally and we have an excellent relationship with China," she said.
"It's a relationship that we think is built on mutual trust and an understanding that China and the United States need to cooperate."
Iraq (news - web sites) and North Korea (news - web sites) also were discussed, but no details were given by either side.
The US sees China as a key partner in trying to end the standoff with Pyongyang.
At six-party talks in Beijing last month, the United States offered Pyongyang three months to shut down and seal its nuclear weapons facilities in return for economic and diplomatic rewards.
Beijing has urged Washington to soften its tone and has indicated displeasure over the deployment this month of 10 F-117 Nighthawk stealthfighters to South Korea (news - web sites).
Rice meets President Hu Jintao Friday before leaving for Seoul.

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Rice, China's Jiang Discuss N.Korea Nuclear Issue
Thu Jul 8, 2004 08:29 AM ET
By Benjamin Kang Lim
BEIJING (Reuters) - U.S. national security adviser Condoleezza Rice discussed the urgent issue of North Korea's nuclear ambitions with China's military chief Jiang Zemin in Beijing Thursday, but her host showed more interest in Taiwan.
The United States, North and South Korea, Russia, Japan and host China have held three rounds of inconclusive talks on how to resolve the nuclear crisis in North Korea, which Washington has branded part of an "axis of evil" along with Iran and pre-war Iraq.
Rice and Jiang "discussed the need for North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions," said a senior U.S. administration official on her delegation. He declined to give further details.
North Korea viewed the outcome of the last round of six-way talks in June as broadly positive, but said a U.S. proposal showed there was little new on offer to resolve the crisis.
The United States offered security guarantees and South Korean aid in return for North Korea agreeing to dismantle its nuclear programs, including a uranium enrichment scheme the North denies it has.
Rice flew to Beijing from Tokyo, where she met Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Wednesday and vowed to pursue a diplomatic solution to the standoff with North Korea, which may already have built one or two nuclear bombs.
"For the United States, the nuclear issue is an urgent one, and we are focusing on how to get the North to give up its nuclear programs," Rice was quoted as telling Koizumi.
But Jiang appeared more interested in Taiwan.
Jiang told Rice China will "not sit back and watch and do nothing if the Taiwan authorities cling obstinately to their push for Taiwan independence and if foreign forces meddle and support" the island, Chinese state television reported.
"The Taiwan issue is the most important and the most sensitive key issue in Sino-U.S. relations," Jiang said.
"China's sovereign and territorial integrity are paramount," he was quoted as saying. "We will never tolerate Taiwan independence."
"SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AND UNHAPPY"
"The Chinese people are seriously concerned and unhappy with the sale of advanced weapons to Taiwan," Jiang said. Television made no mention of the North Korean nuclear crisis.
Beijing has vowed to attack the self-ruled island if it formally declares statehood. The two have been rivals since their split at the end of a civil war in 1949.
Rice reaffirmed President Bush's commitment to the "one China" policy, the official said. Beijing switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, but remains the island's main arms supplier and trading partner.
She repeated Bush's opposition to any unilateral steps to change the status quo and non-support for Taiwan independence, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Rice reiterated Bush's commitment to U.S. obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to arm the island and maintain a sufficient self-defense capability against a Chinese attack.
Nonetheless, U.S.-China ties were good and strong.
"The relationship is very good, very strong," the official said. "We are here to keep that relationship moving forward...a sign of the president's deep commitment to the region."
Earlier in the day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said Taiwan was the key to stable Sino-U.S. ties.
"Whether or not Sino-U.S. relations can maintain sustainable stability depends, to a large extent, on whether the Taiwan question can be solved properly," Zhang said.
China hoped Washington would approach Sino-U.S. relations from a strategic, long-term perspective, Zhang said.
Sino-U.S. ties have matured over the past quarter century, with trade booming and the two cooperating in several diplomatic areas, including the North Korea crisis and in the war on terror.
But tension has never been far beneath the surface, especially when Taiwan is involved.
Since Taiwan held a presidential election and a referendum in March, China has repeatedly called on the United States to stand by its commitment to the "one China" policy and refrain from sending the wrong signals to Taiwan independence seekers.
Rice will meet Chinese President and Communist Party chief Hu Jintao Friday before flying to Seoul.
? Copyright Reuters 2004. All rights reserved.
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Beijing factories hit by rolling power cuts
By James Kynge in Beijing
Published: July 8 2004 16:39 | Last Updated: July 8 2004 16:39
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1087373586025&p=1012571727169
Beijing, China's capital, has become the latest of several industrial centres to fall victim to electricity shortages, with authorities preparing to impose rolling blackouts on some 6,400 factories from yesterday until the end of August.
The arrival of regular power cuts in Beijing marks the failure of efforts to shield the capital from almost nationwide shortages.
Beijing is the last of China's big cities to succumb to power rationing. Shanghai and Guangzhou have already implemented widespread curbs on power usage.
Several towns and cities in Shanxi and Inner Mongolia, two provinces near Beijing, have had their electricity and coal supplies diverted over the past few months to keep the capital running smoothly.
But the power stations serving the capital have now hit maximum capacity. Even running at full tilt, they cannot satisfy the summer surge in demand as people turn up air conditioners against an early heat wave.
Tang Fenghan, a director at Beijing Electric Power Corporation, said: "In order to guarantee electricity supply to the city, we will impose restrictions on the use of electricity among 6,400 enterprises in the suburban area of Beijing from July 8 to August 31."
The cuts would affect factories in the suburbs and outskirts and are not expected to be felt in the city proper.
Each electricity stoppage will be scheduled, officials said, allowing companies to prepare production and worker rosters well in advance.
"Some of the enterprises will have their electricity stopped once a week, some will be once a day, some will have it stopped for a whole week. It varies. Enterprises in Beijing city proper will not be affected," said a second official at the Beijing Electric Power Corporation.
Manufacturing executives said that as long as Beijing power authorities could stick to the rationing schedule they announce and unexpected blackouts were avoided, the disruption to production could be contained because overtime shifts could be arranged on days when there was enough power.
Yang Hongming, executive chairman of Datang Power, the main supplier of electricity to the capital, said the company was running at full capacity. He said problems encountered earlier this year in securing a stable supply of coal had been overcome and Datang now had an inventory of five to seven days of coal, up from two to five days a month ago.
A coal transport executive in Jiexiu, Shanxi, said the price of some types of coal had recently started to ease, reversing more than a year of increases.
In Guangzhou, authorities have forced 4,000 local companies to shut off electricity two days a week to prevent overloading the power grid. About another 100 are being asked to lower consumption by 10-20 per cent.
Electricity use in Shanghai has hit record one-day highs this summer and thousands of workers have also been told to take staggered one-week holidays for a month from mid-July.xref Is China's growth sustainable?
Join the discussion at www.ft.com/chinaforum


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S. Korean military told to lose 'hostile feelings' for the enemy
Special to World Tribune.com
EAST-ASIA-INTEL.COM
Thursday, July 8, 2004
South Korea's National Security Council Secretary Gen. Yi Chong-Sok recently told South Korean military officers to reduce their feelings of hostility toward the enemy, East-Asia-Intel.com reported in its current edition.
Yi told the officers during a military academy speech June 19: "It will make a stronger military when soldiers serve along the barbed-wire fences [in the Demilitarized Zone] with enhanced sense of citizenship and pride and affection for the country, rather than with hostile feelings toward enemy forces, will it not?"
One general then asked Yi, "I understand you are saying that arousing hostile feelings toward the enemy alone cannot render our military stronger. In that case, how can we educate our men on their perspectives toward the enemy in the reality where the North and South are confronting each other?"
Yi then sought to clarify his statement: "I only mentioned a general idea. I did not say it with North Korea in mind."
The government of South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has been criticized for having pro-North Korea views.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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Iraq's Dirty Stash
By H. Josef Hebert
Associated Press | July 8, 2004
WASHINGTON - In a secret operation, the United States last month removed from Iraq nearly two tons of uranium and hundreds of highly radioactive items that could have been used in a so-called dirty bomb, the Energy Department disclosed Tuesday.
The nuclear material was secured from Iraq's former nuclear research facility and airlifted out of the country to an undisclosed Energy Department laboratory for further analysis, the department said in a statement.
Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham described the previously undisclosed operation, which was concluded June 23, as "a major achievement" in an attempt to "keep potentially dangerous nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists."
The haul included a "huge range" of radioactive items used for medical and industrial purposes, said Bryan Wilkes, a spokesman for the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration.
Much of the material "was in powdered form, which is easily dispersed," said Wilkes.
The statement provided only scant details about the material taken from Iraq, but said it included "roughly 1,000 highly radioactive sources" that "could potentially be used in a radiological dispersal device," or dirty bomb.
Also ferried out of Iraq was 1.95 tons of low-enriched uranium, the department said.
Wilkes said "a huge range of different isotopes" were secured in the joint Energy Department and Defense Department operation. They had been used in Iraq for a range of medical and industrial purposes, such as testing oil wells and pipelines.
Uranium is not suitable for making a dirty bomb. But some of the other radioactive material - including cesium-137, colbalt-60 and strontium - could have been valuable to a terrorist seeking to fashion a terror weapon.
Such a device would not trigger a nuclear explosion, but would use conventional explosives to spread radioactive debris. While few people would probably be killed or seriously affected by the radiation, such an explosion could cause panic, make a section of a city uninhabitable for some time and require cumbersome and expensive cleanup.
Nuclear nonproliferation advocates said securing radioactive material is important all over the world.
A recent study by researchers at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies concluded it is "all but certain" that some kind of dirty bomb will be set off by a terrorist group in the years ahead. There are just too many radioactive sources available across the globe, the report said.
"This is something we should be doing not just in Iraq," Ivan Oelrich, a physicist at the Federation of American Scientists, said when asked to comment on the Energy Department announcement.
Oelrich hesitated to characterize the threat posed by the uranium and other radioactive material secured in the secret U.S. operation because few details were provided about the material. The Energy Department refused to say where the material was shipped.
But Oelrich said it is widely believed that medical and industrial isotopes can be used in a dirty bomb.
The low-enriched uranium taken from Iraq, if it is of the 3 percent to 5 percent level of enrichment common in fuel for commercial power reactors, could have been of value to a country developing enrichment technology.
"It speeds up the process," Oelrich said, adding that 1.95 tons of low-enriched uranium could be used to produce enough highly enriched uranium to make a single nuclear bomb.

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Musharraf, You're No Churchill
By Robert Spencer
FrontPageMagazine.com | July 7, 2004
Call the roller of big cigars: Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf is hard at work auditioning for the role of today's Winston Churchill. Last Monday he declared: "A new iron curtain seems to be falling. This iron curtain somehow is dividing the Muslim world on one side and the West on the other side. This is very dangerous."
How dangerous? Well, the Islamic world is on the brink of falling into new "depths of chaos and despair." It seems that "Muslim states are seen as the source of terrorism," which evidently our new Churchill finds disturbing; I suppose he would prefer that we search for terrorists among the Ohio Amish. Musharraf warns of more "terrorism and an impending clash of civilizations" -- unless, that is, the United States goes to what he identifies as the root of the problem: "If you manage to finish off one organization like al Qaeda ... you've chopped off a branch of that tree, but the tree will still grow. You must identify the root, and the root happens to be political disputes ... the root happens also to be illiteracy and poverty." Many Muslims, he explained, "feel deprived, hopeless, powerless." This leaves them vulnerable to being "indoctrinated by distorted views of Islam."
Musharraf is probably not familiar with numerous studies that indicate that the conventional wisdom he is purveying here is actually false. The idea that terrorists are desperately poor, uneducated, and easily enticed by the promise of a few dollars or a bit of manipulative religious twaddle that the cynical power elite purvey but don't believe in themselves -- it flies in the face of the facts. Most recently, Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer, has found through extensive background studies of known Al-Qaeda operatives that most Islamic terrorists are, according to a Knight-Ridder report, "well-educated, married men from middle- or upper-class families, in their mid-20s and psychologically stable ... Many of them knew several languages and traveled widely." Sageman strongly ruled out the idea that terrorists were misfits and sociopaths: "The data suggest that these were good kids who liked to go to school and were often overprotected by their parents."
Sageman says that for these men, terrorism constitutes "an answer to Islamic decadence - a feeling that Islam has lost its way." And this sentiment could never be aroused in them if they didn't already have the idea that Islam's purity could somehow be restored by violence. The reality is that educated people who begin to get serious about their Islamic faith all too often turn to terrorism because they are taught that acts of violence against unbelievers is part of their religious responsibility.
They are teaching this sort of thing in the new Churchill's back yard, although all the cigar smoke may be keeping him from seeing this fact. Last March, the acting President of the radical Muslim party Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), Qazi Hussain Ahmad, threatened to launch nationwide protests if the curriculum in Pakistan's Islamic schools (madrassas) were reformed to eliminate verses from the Qur'an that taught violent jihad. "To combat this," Qazi warned, "a major jihadi campaign has become necessary." He sent Musharraf a pointed reminder: "the general should note that the country came into existence on Islamic ideology and it could survive on that basis alone." That ideology is taught daily in many of Pakistan's 27,000 madrassas. A significant percentage of these, according to Newsweek, "steep their students in the doctrine of holy war and function openly as jihad enlistment centers."
Will Great Society programs aimed at stamping out Pervez Musharraf's twin bogeymen, illiteracy and poverty, really put an end to all this? When the Ottoman Empire was the richest, most powerful nation in the world, it still pursued jihad against Christian Europe. None of Osama bin Laden's millions have ever persuaded him that he'd rather haunt the nightclubs of Beirut than the caves of Afghanistan. But Musharraf isn't alone: few in the West want to face the implications of studies like Sageman's. It is far easier to imagine that a few dollars and a voucher or two to MIT will put everything right again in the Middle East, than to try to digest the implications of a religion in need of massive reform on a global scale.
But all this obfuscation is ultimately self-defeating: with the root causes of terror left unaddressed, the terrorists are still free to recruit and proliferate. Let Pervez Musharraf speak about the real roots of Islamic terror, and he'll actually deserve that Churchillian mantle.
Robert Spencer is the director of Jihad Watch and the author of Onward Muslim Soldiers: How Jihad Still Threatens America and the West (Regnery Publishing), and Islam Unveiled: Disturbing Questions About the World's Fastest Growing Faith (Encounter Books).
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TERRORISM MONITOR

Volume 2 Issue 13 (Jul 01, 2004)
THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN
By Afzal Khan
Violence in Pakistan has gone through all conceivable phases before becoming pinned to the broader concept of global terrorism inspired by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda after September 11, 2001. Pakistan was born in violence, as communal riots broke out between Muslims and Hindus in 1947 when British India was partitioned between Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority areas. A legacy of that partition was the undetermined status of Kashmir - with a Muslim majority population and a Hindu maharajah - that led to endless insurgency and two wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.
Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the problem of violence in Pakistan had been largely confined to insurgency in Kashmir and occasional sectarian clashes between the majority Sunni Muslims and minority Shi'a Muslims - who comprise between 15 percent and 20 percent of the population. There were also episodes of ethnic fighting in Karachi between muhajirs or refugees who had originally migrated from India, native Sindhis, and other settlers such as Pathans and Punjabis from other parts of Pakistan, as well as Bihari refugees from Bangladesh after it was mid-wifed out of East Pakistan in 1971.
It was after 1979 that the whole perspective on violence in Pakistan began to change, during the military government of Islamist General Zia-ul Haq (1977-1988). As he became increasingly embroiled in the U.S.-supported war against Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, the insurgent, sectarian and ethnic violence in Pakistan began to take a new dimension. This new dimension developed into a new kind of militancy that sought legitimacy under the banner of Islam, and, henceforth, came to be labeled in the West as Islamic militancy or terrorism.
President Zia-ul Haq crossed the Rubicon after accepting - with the encouragement of the United States - millions of dollars in Saudi money tainted with the proselytizing message of Wahhabism, a fundamentalist sect of Sunni Islam. The most prominent player in that transfer of oil wealth to sustain a jihad against the infidel Russians was Osama bin Laden. He had arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan - with the blessings of Saudi royalty - to fight the jihad. In collaboration with his revered leader, Abdullah Azam, he set up in February 1980 the Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK) or Services Center, a support organization for Arab volunteers for the jihad in Afghanistan that would later evolve into al-Qaeda in 1989.
Within less than a year, MAK had several thousand volunteers training in its boot camps in Pakistani tribal territory and Afghanistan. By its second anniversary in 1982, it was estimated that MAK had trained some 10,000 jihadis, nearly half of them Saudi. Others came from Algeria (around 3,000) and Egypt (2,000). A few hundred came from Yemen, Pakistan, Sudan, Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Tunisia. Only a fraction of these were Afghans. [1]
Between 1982 and 1992, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East would "pass their baptism under fire" with the Afghan mujahidin. Tens of thousands more foreign Muslim radicals came to study in the hundreds of new madrassahs that General Zia ul-Haq's military government set up along the Afghan border, thanks to Saudi money. Eventually, more than 100,000 Muslim radicals were to have "direct contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan" and be influenced by the jihad. [2]
After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Islamic militants or so-called mujahidin fought among themselves to oust the Soviet proxy government in Kabul under Najibullah, which they did in 1992. Then many of them drifted to Pakistan, beefing up the insurgency against the Indian occupation of Kashmir and boosting Sunni militancy against the Shi'a.
When the Taliban came into power in Afghanistan in 1996, the die was cast for more Islamic extremism. Pakistan supported the Taliban to be their proxy power in Afghanistan. In the meantime, Osama bin Laden was also back in Afghanistan after returning home to Saudi Arabia in 1990 and living in exile in Sudan from 1992 until 1996 for confronting Saudi royalty over its collusion with the United States in the First Gulf War against Iraq. Bin Laden's money propped up the Taliban regime under Mullah Omar. The jihadis were once again in training camps in Afghanistan. But this time they were looking to defeat the United States, Israel and India in their subjugation of Muslim brethren in the Middle East, Palestine and Kashmir.
Insurgency groups in Kashmir now had fanatical Afghans and Afghan-Arabs in their ranks to fight Indian troops in Kashmir and slaughter Hindu civilians and Muslim collaborators. Of some two-dozen Kashmiri and Pakistani insurgent groups active in Kashmir during the 1990s, bin Laden's al-Qaeda penetrated several, including Harkat-ul Mujahidin and Lashkar-e Taiba. Al-Qaeda - staunchly Sunni Wahhabi and anti-Shi'a - also financed and trained several anti-Shi'a groups such as Sipah-e Sahaba and its underground splinter arm, Lashkar-e Jhangvi. [3] This infiltration of al-Qaeda elements into Pakistan's Kashmir insurgency and sectarian terrorist groups took place during the prime ministerships of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.
Then came September 11, 2001. The Taliban regime and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda were dismantled between October and December of that year. However, a low-level opposition continued in the mountains on the border with Pakistan's pro-Taliban tribal region. General Pervez Musharraf, who ousted Prime minister Nawaz Sharif in a military coup in October 1999, turned about-face on existing support of the Taliban in Afghanistan under U.S. pressure. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants from the war in Afghanistan poured in to take shelter in Pakistan.
Even before September 11, General Musharraf took a dim view of Islamic extremism in Pakistan. He considered those involved in sectarian violence to be terrorists, and in August 2001 he banned Lashkar-e Jhangvi and Sipah-e Mohammed. In October 2001, he sacked two of his generals he deemed to be sympathetic to the Taliban. On January 12, 2002, he delivered a landmark speech in which he announced a ban on two of the most prominent Pakistan-based insurgent groups fighting in Kashmir - Jaish-e Mohammed and Lashkar-e Taiba. This, in response to accusations by India that five members of Pakistani-backed Kashmiri militant groups were responsible for a spectacular attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. [4]
Over 500 al-Qaeda militants have been handed over by Pakistan to the United States and countries of their origin since September 11. The most spectacular catch was third-ranking al-Qaeda operative Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who was captured with FBI help in Rawalpindi on March 1, 2003. More recently, the Pakistani military in the Pashtun tribal belt has been collaborating in a "hammer and anvil" exercise with U.S. forces across the border in Afghanistan to flush out al-Qaeda and pro-Taliban elements. But the hunt for Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri as well as the Taliban leader Mullah Omar has so far proved futile.
In two intensive forays into the South Waziristan tribal agency in March and June, the Pakistani military claimed to have killed many militants, remnants of the Afghan-Arabs and other foreign Muslim radicals who fought first the Russians in the 1980s, and then the Northern Alliance and U.S. forces in support of the Taliban in the 1990s and 2001-02.
There have been sporadic arrests of al-Qaeda militants who presumably have fled from South Waziristan because of these military operations. On May 19, Pakistani intelligence agencies arrested five foreign militants in Peshawar - a Saudi, a Kuwaiti, an Afghan and two Uzbeks. It was not known whether the Uzbeks were from Uzbekistan or northern Afghanistan. [5] In another report, a Russian was arrested on June 6 at a military checkpoint outside Miranshah, the headquarters of the North Wazirstan tribal agency. The man was carrying a fake Pakistani identification card and during interrogation confessed that he had been living in the tribal region for the past four years.
Most notably, the tribal insurgency in South Waziristan has been connected with violence in Karachi. A new terrorist group calling itself Jund Allah or God's Brigade allegedly trained in South Waziristan and fought the Pakistani military there before deploying in Karachi. On June 10, Jund Allah tried to assassinate Karachi's Corps Commander Lieutenant General Ahsan Saleem in a well-organized ambush that killed 11 soldiers and police in the convoy, including the driver of the general's car. Jund Allah is believed to be linked to Brigade 313, which also includes the established Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e Mohammed, Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami, Lashkar-e Jhangvi and the newer Al Alami. Al Alami, an offshoot of the banned Harkat-ul Mujahidin, has claimed responsibility for the abortive attempt on President Musharraf's life in April 2002 and the suicide bombing of the U.S. consulate in Karachi in the same year. [6]
Historical acts of violence in Pakistan have become embellished by the al-Qaeda concept of global Islamic dominance and militancy. The target of this terrorism now includes President Musharraf and all those progressive forces and institutions in Pakistan that eschew Islamic extremism and want to maintain a link with the United States and the West.

Notes:
1. Bin Laden - behind the mask of the terrorist, pgs. 91-93, Adam Robinson, Arcade Publishing, New York, 2002.
2. Taliban,Ahmed Rashid, pgs. 130-131, Yale University Press, 2000.
3. Inside Al Qaeda, Rohan Gunaratna, pg. 206, Columbia University Press, 2002.
4. Pakistan: eye of the storm, pgs. 24-29, Owen Bennett Jones, Yale University Press (Second Edition), 2003.
5. Dawn, Peshawar, 20 May 2004.
6. Friday Times, Karachi, 21 June 2004. INSIDE THIS ISSUE

1983-2003 ? The Jamestown Foundation

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Can't Keep My Hands Off of You,
No Bounce for Metrosexual Duo
July 8, 2004
PHOTOS AND MORE...
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_070804/content/rush_is_right.guest.html
Listen to Rush...
(...roll the new love song update for Kerry & Edwards: Can't Keep My [Hands] Off of You)
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
RUSH: If you haven't seen this yet, what you need to do, you need to go to the Drudge Report, www.DrudgeReport.com and take a look at the pictures there. Uh, you gotta click on the link that says "Can't Keep Hands Off Each Other." Looks like these guys are bringing that old Frankie Valli song from 1967: "Can't Keep My Hands Off of You." They're bringing it to life Kerry and Edwards are. You've got to look at these pictures. My gosh it's a couple of metrosexuals, and I'll tell you why. The issues have just gone south on them. The job numbers are the best they've ever been since 2000. We've got the situation in Iraq straightening out. So all these guys can do is act weird! It's absolutely el strange-o out there. Greetings -- and to me it looks like John Kerry finally, ladies and gentlemen, has found what's he's been looking for his whole life, and that is a trophy wife, in his vice presidential nominee, John Edwards.
It's the Rush Limbaugh program, and here we are from high atop the EIB building in midtown Manhattan. In New York all week. Our telephone number is 800-282-2882. The e-mail address is rush@eibnet.com. If you'll go to the Drudge Report link that I just suggested that you go to, here's what you will see. "Hugs, kisses, to the," You'll see pictures of this! "Hugs, kisses to the cheek, affectionate touching of the face, caressing of the back, grabbing of the arms, fingers to the neck, rubbing of the knees. John Kerry and John Edwards can't keep their hands off each other." Can't take my hands off of you. (Singing.) (Laughing.) Grab that Frankie Valli song that's going to become our theme song for these two guys.
"In the past 48 hours candidate handling has become the top buzz on the trail. News photographers have been going wild with photos of the two Johns." (Laughing.) A little subliminal message there. "'I've been covering Washington and politics for 30 years. I can say I've never seen this much touching between two men publicly,' e-mailed one wire photographer. When asked for the Johns are acting out of cynical focus-grouped series of poses perhaps to show warmth to the chilly Bush-Cheney a Kerry spokesperson explained I think we're just seeing genuine affection between them."
Hey, that's going to help! But the spokesperson added, "I hope we don't see them wearing matching outfits when they ride bicycles this weekend." So there you have it. They've got to do something out there, folks. Did you find the song? Listen to this, folks. Let's go back to 1967. I can remember this one. When this song came on, all the little high school girlfriends of mine -- I didn't have a high school girlfriend -- high school girl friend, would just swoon when this song came on. Play just a little bit of it, our new Kerry and Edwards theme song. (You're just too good to be true...) Substitute "hands" here. Can't take my hands off of you. (You'd be like heaven to touch. I want to hold you so much....) They're doing it all. (At long last love has arrived, and I thank God I'm alive.) 1967. (Laughing) (You're just too good to be true. Can't keep my eyes off of you...)
Okay, that's enough. That's sets the stage for what you'll see when you scope out these pictures. Also, ladies and gentlemen, Zogby is out. No big bounce in the polls for Kerry here. Kerry Edwards pulls ahead of Bush-Cheney 48 to 46. That's about a three-point bounce. I mean the "bounce," usually you get anywhere from eight-to-12 points on something like this. Clinton got, what was it? I think Gore did get a big one with Lieberman, and Clinton, Clinton got a 19% bump when he named Gore. This is nothing. I'm telling you, folks, this is Panic City out there. This is not the way this was supposed to come down. This is going to make people think, "We've made the wrong choice," because the sole reason for this choice was to get a bump going into the convention and get another bump coming out of the convention. There's no bump going into the convention, no big bounce for Kerry. Now, we have been observing for you here, ladies and gentlemen, how the liberals bounce between the economy and Iraq, depending upon where the bad news was on that given day. There's no job growth, if the economic news is not good then they forget Iraq and terror, and they harp on the economy. If there's good economic news with job growth like there is today, they forget the economy and they go back to terror and the war in Iraq and how that's a "failure."
But now their own actions are signaling news out of Iraq as either too good or else not bad enough, and the economy is too good now to even demagogue, and so it's the Era of Good Hair; it's the Era of Warm, Fuzzy Love. Cupid's arrow has already smitten not just the anchorettes and the info babes on television. It appears that Cupid's arrow has already smitten the two candidates on the Democrat side. Are we in here for Arousal Gap 2? If we are, there's just one small problem, and that is this. Who is that dull, tall, gray guy standing next to John Edwards? (shuffling papers, laughing) I'll tell you, this is just amazing. It's December Me romance. I know May, but December Me romance. No, folks, I don't want to be misheard. I said "metrosexual," and I'm standing by it. Don't take this anywhere we don't intend it to go. We're not saying anything here. We're not saying anything. Tell you to go look at the pictures and make up your own mind.
A little more data here on the poll bounce, because Zogby gives it a two-or-three-point bounce for Kerry after selecting Edwards. "A CBS News poll taken immediately after the pick found that Kerry gained four points. An NBC News survey showed Kerry got more impressive 9% jump," or bump in the polls, but a little comparison here is interesting. "Four years ago Algore's candidacy got a 17-point shot in the arm when he chose Joe Lieberman, and in 1992 Clinton got a 19-point bounce when he tapped Gore as his running mate." So, not impressive, not exciting, has to be a huuuge let-down internally within the cloakrooms and the bowels of the Democrat digestive system, wherever it is today. This is not good news because when you get right down to it, folks, I'm going to tell you: Kerry probably did not really want this guy on a personal basis, personal way, personal level. Doesn't like him, never has liked him, doesn't think he's spent enough time, doesn't think he's paid his dues. This was poll-driven, and the polls may have misled them. We'll find out in due course.
END TRANSCRIPT
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Democrats Pooh-Pooh Terrorist Threat
July 8, 2004
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_070804/content/truth_detector.guest.html
Listen to Rush...
(...illustrate more kookism that occupies the left despite a serious warning by Ridge)
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
RUSH: Tom Ridge, who is the director of homeland security, made an announcement today a little bit late in the press conference, and this is basically what he said.
VOICE: Since September 11th, 2001, we have had intelligence that Al-Qaeda intends to launch more attacks against the homeland. Credible reporting now indicates that Al-Qaeda is moving forward with its plans to carry out a large-scale attack in the United States in an effort to disrupt our democratic process.
RUSH: Yeah. Now, the press is just crazy with this. The Democrats are crazy with this because it's nothing new. They think this is a ploy to take attention away from Kerry and Edwards. They think this is the administration making this up because there's no news in here, there's nothing new. Just another update on a potential threat, but no date given, no site given and so the media says, [doing impression] "This is just a trick. They're just trying to take away from the fabulous attention that Kerry and Edwards are getting." And here is sort of an illustration of that with the question that Ridge got from an unidentified reporter.
REPORTER: Sir, once again you're saying that Al-Qaeda wants to disrupt the democratic process. There are some, you know, who will interpret that as the administration sending a subtle message that a vote for John Kerry is a vote for Osama bin Laden. How do you address those concerns?
RIDGE: First of all it's the wrong interpretation. We are basically laying out before the general public the kind of information that we received and it's not us -- these are not conjectures or mythical statements we are making. These are pieces of information that we could trace comfortably to sources that we deem to be credible.
RUSH: All right. Now, here's what's happening here. And I'm not kidding you, the media all morning, I'm channel surfing around. The Media: "I haven't heard anything new here. What about that, Johnny? I haven't heard anything new, either, Carol, did you hear? No, Fred, I didn't hear anything new. How about you, Ron? No, nothing new here." They were all going back and forth, until it was learned that the Kerry campaign was offered a briefing on this information last week by the Bush administration, and the Kerry campaign refused -- well, we haven't refused it, they just haven't taken the time to get the briefing on this latest threat because, as the Kerry campaign said, "We were busy making our vice presidential selection."
So what you have here are people basically trying to say on the left and in the media, that this is a fake, trumped-up, no-news report designed politically to take away any attention from Kerry and Edwards and to highlight their lack of strength on this whole issue. And they don't have strength on this issue, because they don't talk about it and they are trying to pretend that this threat doesn't exist anyway, but they were given a chance to get this briefing and they haven't taken the opportunity to do that yet. Let me tell you what's really driving this. It's not politics -- well, there may be some politics in it -- but do any of you remember the 9/11 commission report? Remember what that's gonna say? CIA bungled this, CIA bungled that, CIA is going to take the fall for everything, and we didn't connect the dots, remember that phrase? Didn't connect the dots.
We had all this information before 9/11 happened, but nobody said anything about it, the American people weren't put on alert. That mistake is not going to be made again. That mistake is not being made again, and that's all this is. They've got information. You've got the two conventions coming up, we had what happened in Spain. Ridge that said they've got credible evidence that Al-Qaeda is working on another attack in this country. Everybody knows that if Al-Qaeda can, they will. Nobody thinks there's not going to be another one, the administration is not raising the threat level, they're simply asking people to be vigilant, and it's as much as anything, they're not going to be caught short again, they're not going to have another attack happened while nobody was told it might happen, sharing of information even though it's whatever specifics are known are not being shared or maybe there aren't any specifics known yet. They're trying to connect the dots. I think it's understandable, folks, the left would look at this cynically because they're weak on this issue. I think it's a great example, rather than rally around this, rather than hunker down and say okay, we've got a serious threat coming, and try to act as though they take it seriously too -- I'm talking about the Democrats -- they want to pooh-pooh it and say, ah, this is nothing, this is just the Bush administration feeling weak and defensive because they can't compete with John Edwards on the vice presidential ticket.
It's silly. But it illustrates the kookism and the conspiracy-theory thinking and mentality that occupies the left right now. And, by the way, we've got sound bites coming up, you know, Bush had this great slam-dunk of Edwards yesterday. [doing impression] "What about Edwards?" Well, the difference between Edwards and Cheney is Cheney could be (story) president. And so they're out there today, all these Democrats saying that, hey, Edwards has got more experience than Bush does. All right, here's the way to answer that, folks. The answer to that is fine, then we need term limits, because if you can go in the United States Senate and in five years, less than a full term, get enough experience to be president, then that's the only length of time you need to serve. Let's just reinstitute term limits. If you could become qualified to be president after five years in the Senate, let's term limit everybody to one term because you can't learn anymore after that. Hunka hunka hunka.
END TRANSCRIPT
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We're Fighting Militant Islam, Not Terror
July 8, 2004
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_070804/content/stack_a.guest.html
Listen to Rush...
(...read the article about Germany and its war on terror)
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
RUSH: Germany said Thursday it would create a central database on suspected radical Islamists provoking concern from the country's large Muslim community. Interior minister Otto Schily also announced plans (story) to boost the fight against terrorism by pooling intelligence from the three national security agencies at a new joint analysis center.
Whoa, this is not going to please the American left! This is Ashcroftesque. This sort of stuff, why, this is the sort of stuff that countries serious about dealing with terrorists and criminals do, and Germany is one of our allies. Germany is laissez-faire. I mean Bernie Sanders will not approve of this. Kerry certainly will not approve of this. Edwards will sue Germany over this. Can you imagine you liberals in this country, the arrogance of this, a database, on the Muslim population of Germany, which is rapidly rising? Talk to the French about that, too.
A Muslim leader, reacting to news of the database, said innocent Muslims risk falling under suspicion unless the term "Islamist" was properly defined. He said, "When you speak about Islamism, you have to clarify what you mean by it. We're concerned that every Muslim could fall under this catchall term, which is unacceptable."
You've got to be careful about this because the Muslim communities around the world are doing everything they can to obscure and fog this whole notion of who is a terrorist. And that's what I was saying yesterday. I was telling some people last night. This terrorist war, terrorist is actually a misnomer for what we're up against. We are in a war against religious extremists and they are at war with other religions. These militant Islamists, Muslims, whatever you want to call them, the Al-Qaedas of the world, they are at war with the world's Christians and Jews and anybody else that disagrees with them. And their religion is Islam. They happen to be militant extremists, but this is a religious war, and they are using terrorism as their plan. But to say we're in a war against terrorists doesn't quite accurately describe this, and until it's accurately described people aren't going to know what we're really up against. And I think it's important to do that.
END TRANSCRIPT


Muslims Alarmed as Germany Plans Islamist Database
Thu Jul 8, 2004 11:25 AM ET
By Mark Trevelyan, Security Correspondent
BERLIN (Reuters) - Germany said Thursday it would create a central database on suspected radical Islamists, provoking concern from the country's large Muslim community.
Interior Minister Otto Schily also announced plans to boost the fight against terrorism by pooling intelligence from the three national security agencies in a new joint analysis center.
The moves, announced after two days of talks between Schily and interior ministers from the 16 states or 'Laender', are designed to strengthen Germany's defenses against terrorism by making its complex security structure work more efficiently.
Germany has stepped up its guard against radical Islamists since 2001, when three of the suicide hijackers involved in the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States turned out to be Arab students from Hamburg.
Authorities are investigating about 150 cases involving alleged Islamic militants, and have conducted several prominent trials.
But a Muslim leader, reacting to news of the database, said innocent Muslims risked falling under suspicion unless the term 'Islamist' was properly defined.
"When you speak about Islamism, you have to clarify what you mean by it. We are concerned that every Muslim could fall under this catch-all term, which is unacceptable," said Nadeem Elyas, chairman of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany.
"We're worried that people may be caught up arbitrarily who have nothing to do with terrorism. By arbitrarily, I mean at the discretion of officials or authorities, which would be a violation of data protection rules."
A spokesman for the federal data protection commissioner said it was important to establish clear rules on who could enter or view data on suspects, and how long entries would be held in the system.
Because of its historic experience of Nazi and Communist dictatorship, Germany has strict rules on data protection and on separating the functions of the police and the intelligence services.
With its federal structure, it also has more than 30 bodies responsible for security -- a federal crime office and two spy agencies, plus police and domestic intelligence services in every state.
To avoid duplication and the risk of vital information falling between the cracks, Schily last month proposed bringing the state services under the direct control of their federal equivalents. But the idea has been vigorously resisted by interior ministers in the 16 Laender.
The national police union said it was baffling to ordinary Germans why such questions were still being ponderously thrashed out nearly three years after Sept. 11. "One can only hope that international terrorism will show due consideration for German thoroughness," it said in a statement.
? Copyright Reuters 2004.
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The Edwards Pick
A little competition.
By National Review Editors
EDITOR'S NOTE: This editorial appears in the (forthcoming) July 26, 2004, issue of National Review.
With the selection of John Edwards, John Kerry has shown that he is more ambitious than self-indulgent. It would have been natural for Kerry to carry resentments from the primaries. He could reasonably have feared that Edwards's fans in the press would write that Kerry will be upstaged by his running mate. Kerry decided that Edwards would help him win the election, and all merely personal considerations were laid aside.
We are inclined to think that Kerry's calculation was correct: Edwards brings real strengths to the Democratic ticket. He is an attractive figure. Voters seem to respond to youth, energy, and good looks. Edwards may also help Kerry appeal to centrist voters: Americans outside the South have a dated perception of how conservative southern Democrats are. Edwards's campaign speech, though centered on the idea that Americans who are not rich have little hope of making it on their own, somehow comes across as optimistic. So Kerry may find himself competing with Edwards over who can better excite the crowds. The competition may be good for Kerry. Edwards does not much help him win voters concerned about national security -- but Kerry was always going to have to stand or fall on his own in this area.
Republicans will be tempted to make an issue of Edwards's background as a trial lawyer. They should not overestimate the extent to which the public at large shares their dislike of trial lawyers. They make their money, after all, by telling sympathetic stories that win over ordinary people.
Edwards does, however, have weaknesses. He has a very liberal voting record. Kerry-Edwards is the least ideologically balanced ticket the Democrats have run since 1984. Edwards reinforces the protectionist cast of the ticket, and of the contemporary Democratic party. While many voters worry about jobs going abroad, how well does that worrying comport with the optimism that the campaign wishes to project?
Edwards believes that President Bush, by trying to end the tax code's bias against savings, has sided with "wealth" over "work." Edwards is therefore very nearly making a frontal assault on the new investor class. Millions of Americans want to build wealth in capital markets, and do not believe they should pay taxes for the privilege. A smart Republican campaign should be able to mobilize them.
Like Kerry, Edwards voted to authorize war in Iraq -- and, like Kerry, voted against funds for the post-war mission. That is a hard position to defend, and suggests unseriousness or worse. Like Kerry, Edwards voted for the Patriot Act, and then spent months claiming that its implementation was a threat to civil liberties. Kerry has switched positions, or at least emphases, again. Presumably Edwards will, too. But voters may want a steadier commitment to fighting terrorism.
Bush and Cheney have shown some lassitude this year. They should get their campaign started. The spur of competition might do them some good, too.
http://www.nationalreview.com/issue/editors200407080833.asp

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The Anti-Growth Ticket
On torts, trade, and taxes, Kerry and Edwards will do big damage.
John Kerry's choice of North Carolina Senator John Edwards as his running mate sets in motion a classic economic-populist, class-warfare, trade-protectionism assault on the free-market principles that have made the American economy the most prosperous of any industrialized nation over the past 25 years.
Edwards may be an attractive personality and an effective communicator, but on policy substance -- namely torts, trade, and taxes -- he's resoundingly anti-growth and prosperity. (Just like Kerry.)
In a January primary speech in Des Moines, Edwards said, "There are two Americas -- one for the powerful insiders, and another for everyone else." This became his signature line. He would also say, "One America that is struggling to get by, another America that can buy anything it wants -- even a Congress and a president."
Or a political party. After all, with Edwards -- the tort bar's man in Washington -- on the ticket, the takeover of the Democratic party by the 60,000 member Association of Trial Lawyers of America is now complete.
Trial lawyers are clever and crafty -- make no mistake about it. Through aggressive venue shopping, tort lawyers like Edwards bring national cases to favored local courts and squeeze out ridiculous settlements, making millions for their firms and frequently providing little or nothing to consumers.
Here's but one infamous case: In a settlement of a class-action suit filed in Texas against the Blockbuster movie-rental company, plaintiff lawyers received $9.25 million while each class-action member received two coupons for movie rentals and one $1 off coupon. The case was about late movie return charges. The lawyers made enough money to produce their own movie, but Blockbuster customers couldn't even use their coupons to buy a bag of popcorn. Their coupons were for non-food items.
Edwards is also on the wrong side of the fence on trade. He is a devout protectionist. During the Iowa primary debate last January he proclaimed, "I didn't vote for NAFTA. I campaigned against NAFTA. I voted against the Chilean trade agreement, against the Caribbean trade agreement, and against the Singapore trade agreement."
Both Edwards and Kerry (the latter now saying he will vote against NAFTA should it come up again) are more than happy to buck the world tide and go it alone on trade -- even though steep tariffs will hurt ordinary Americans who shop low-cost imports at the giant chain stores. By protecting a small handful of unionized and inefficient companies in North Carolina and elsewhere, trade protectionism undermines the living standards of the near 135 million Americans who shop at Wal-Mart, Kmart, Costco, Target, Home Depot, and Best Buy.
On taxes, Edwards is a strong class-warrior. Criticizing President Bush during the primaries, he said, "By the time he's done, the only people who pay taxes in America will be the millions of middle class and poor Americans who do all the work."
Here, the North Carolinian runs into some factual problems. The top 1 percent of taxpayers pay over one-third of income-tax collections. The top 10 percent pay two-thirds. The bottom 50 percent pay only 4 percent of income taxes. And those making under $30,000 a year essentially pay no income taxes at all.
By the time Kerry and Edwards get finished with their proposed $900 billion tab on higher health-care spending, you can bet their tax-hiking proposals will reach much deeper into the American pocket book than their publicly stated $200,000 DMZ line.
Of course, this sort of thinking argues that successful earners and investors are never entitled to reap the fruits of their labor -- even though the rest of the population is entitled to massive health-care subsidies and central-planning price-control schemes. But the politics of envy misses a key point: Higher tax rates on success blunt incentives for the non-rich who are working hard to climb the American ladder of prosperity. Study after study shows that the middle class is shrinking -- not because more are becoming poor, but because more are getting richer.
Repealing tax cuts on investment would also do great damage to economic recovery. It was the decimated investment sector that brought the economy down between 2000 and 2002. The Kerry-Edwards tax-the-rich proposals would in effect prevent the investment seed corn from reinvigorating the very businesses that create jobs in the first place. The so-called rich won't suffer -- they're already rich. Instead, the middle class will face a higher toll-gate barrier as they try to move up the ladder.
On torts, trade, and taxes, the Kerry-Edwards vision will do enormous damage to the welfare of consumers and businesses. Opposing tort reform, raising taxes, erecting new trade barriers, and confiscating the rewards for personal effort and investment is a prescription for economic demoralization -- not growth.
A big question remains, however. Will Messrs. Bush and Cheney be successful in making this case?
-- Larry Kudlow, NRO's Economics Editor, is CEO of Kudlow & Co. and host with Jim Cramer of CNBC's Kudlow & Cramer.
http://www.nationalreview.com/kudlow/kudlow200407070839.asp
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Inquiry will back intelligence that Iraq sought uranium
By Mark Huband in London
Published: July 7 2004 22:38 | Last Updated: July 8 2004 0:49
FT.COM
A UK government inquiry into the intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq is expected to conclude that Britain's spies were correct to say that Saddam Hussein's regime sought to buy uranium from Niger.
The inquiry by Lord Butler, which was delivered to the printers on Wednesday and is expected to be released on July 14, has examined the intelligence that underpinned the UK government's claims about the threat from Iraq.
The report will say the claim that Mr Hussein could deploy chemical weapons within 45 minutes, seized on by UK prime minister Tony Blair to bolster the case for war with Iraq, was inadequately supported by the available intelligence, people familiar with its contents say .
But among Lord Butler's other areas of investigation was the issue of whether Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger. People with knowledge of the report said Lord Butler has concluded that this claim was reasonable and consistent with the intelligence.
President George W. Bush referred to the Niger claim in his state of the union address last year. But officials were forced into a climbdown when it was revealed that the only primary intelligence material the US possessed were documents later shown to be forgeries.
The Bush administration has since distanced itself from all suggestions that Iraq sought to buy uranium. The UK government has remained adamant that negotiations over sales did take place and that the fake documents were not part of the intelligence material it had gathered to underpin its claim.
Butler to say Iraq missile claim 'not supported'
Read more
The Financial Times revealed last week that a key part of the UK's intelligence on the uranium came from a European intelligence service that undertook a three-year surveillance of an alleged clandestine uranium-smuggling operation of which Iraq was a part.
Intelligence officials have now confirmed that the results of this operation formed an important part of the conclusions of British intelligence. The same information was passed to the US but US officials did not incorporate it in their assessment.
The 45-minute claim appeared four times in a government dossier on Iraq's WMD issued in September 2002, including in the foreword by Mr Blair.
It became the subject of intense scrutiny when government scientist David Kelly was alleged to have voiced concerns about the claim's accuracy to Andrew Gilligan, then a BBC reporter.
Mr Gilligan's report of his conversation with Mr Kelly unleashed a fierce dispute between the government and the BBC that culminated in Mr Kelly's suicide, an inquiry into the circumstances of his death, and the resignation of the BBC's two most senior officials.
Lord Butler is said to have produced a report that criticises the process of intelligence gathering and assessment on Iraq but refrains from criticising individual officials.


MI6 rushed to back case for Iraq war
By Stephen Fidler and Mark Huband
Published: July 8 2004 21:55 | Last Updated: July 8 2004 21:55
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1087373594015&p=1012571727088
The Butler report into intelligence on weapons of mass destruction will paint a picture of Britain's intelligence services rushing to try to justify a political decision to go to war in Iraq.
A central finding of the report, according to people familiar with its contents, will be that intelligence failings stemmed from Downing Street's decision first to be ready for war and later to publicly justify it by the threat seen posed by Iraq's WMD.
The report, due to be released on Wednesday, is expected to avoid criticism of government members or intelligence officials and to focus on ensuring appropriate procedures are followed in future. But it concludes that MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service, delivered inadequate intelligence, that there were flaws in the way it was assessed and that, in some respects, the way it was publicly presented was misleading.
The inquiry says that while Tony Blair's government was genuinely concerned about the spread of WMD and the risk they could fall into the hands of terrorists, Iraq had not been seen as a primary threat.
As a result, MI6 had concentrated on other threats regarded as more immediate, such as Libya, Iran and the nuclear network led by Abdul-Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist. Here, the report will conclude that procedures worked well.
However, after Downing Street decided to back the Bush administration's desire for regime change in Baghdad in 2002, the intelligence services had to hurry to expand the material they produced from Iraq. This appears to have driven MI6 to rely on sources inside Iraq that could not be tested for reliability.
The report is expected to say that some of the intelligence provided by MI6 was inadequately sourced. This includes one of the most highly-publicised parts of the September 2002 government dossier on Iraq's WMD - the claim that Saddam Hussein could deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes.
But the five-person panel headed by Lord Butler has also concluded that the claim in the dossier that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger was consistent with the intelligence.
The inquiry has also found the dossier omitted caveats that were contained in the original secret assessments by parliament's joint intelligence and security committee, which evaluates the work of the intelligence services.
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Unrelated networks could jointly destabilize South Asia
By Sol Sanders
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
July 8, 2004
A suicide bombing opposite the U.S. embassy in the Sri Lanka's capital Colombo dramatizes increasing violence in South and Southeast Asian.
The Sri Lnkan episodes could mark the end of a truce between the Tamil Tigers [ITTE] minority Tamil guerrillas, who have waged war for almost 20 years. Bitter divisions in the Sri Lankan government and the breakaway of a charismatic Tiger warlord have brought negotiations to a standstill.
The conflict not only inhibits progress in potentially rich Sri Lanka but has serious implications for India. The Sri Lankan Tamils have close ties -the insurgency depends on them - to the south Indian Tamilnad state. The ITTE ultimately aims at creating a "Greater Tamilnad" to include their 65 million South Indian fellow ethnics. Volatile Tamilnad politics with a pivotal role in New Delhi's shifting federal alliances, make such a scenario realistic enough to create an explosive issue.
Of even greater urgency for New Delhi's shaky new coalition is rapidly escalating violence in Nepal, wedged between India and Chinese Tibet. Again, for almost two decades an excruciatingly brutal insurgency has aimed at overthrowing the monarchy and establishing a self-proclaimed Maoist regime. The Maoists, who denounce the "revisionism" of current Chinese leadership, have followed the classic pattern of targeting police and school teachers, setting up guerrilla administered areas where they reward collaborating peasantry. They have been able to call strikes in Katmandu, the capital, lining up support among unemployed students and other dissidents.
Indian support along with U.S. aid to Nepali armed forces is not impeding Maoist growth. New Delhi not only has to worry about the spread of the dissidents in the border lowlands where no geographic barrier divides the two countries, but about Maoist connections in India. The Nepali Maoitss are closely allied with Naxallite guerrilla bands which operate in north central India and have been spreading south, again taking their inspiration from Mao and traditional Indian dacoitry [banditry]. Longer term political implications are even more worrying: although there have been no proved connections between the Maoists and the Chinese who still have unresolved border issues with New Delhi, the Katmandu government has recently appealed to Beijing for support with the prospect Beijing could be mediator. The Maoists through the Naxallites also have close relations with the Communist Party of India [Marxist-Leninist] ruling in India's important West Bengal [Calcutta, now Kolkata] state for two decades. [The Bengali Communist CMP took a pro-Beijing position when Moscow-Beijing alliance exploded and the Indian party split.] Further complication: the current Congress Party-led government needs the CMP for its parliament majority.
In southern Thailand, the outbreak of an old separatist movement among the majority Moslem Malays, continues to grow despite draconian military and police suppression and economic aid promises to a region which has benefited little from the country's post-World War II development. Ties between the local teenage fighters and the international Islamicist terrorist movement are unclear. But with a Southeast Asian network operating in neighboring Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines allied to Osama Ben Ladin, the Thailand Islamicists using the same slogans and [if less sophisticated] tactics will inevitably build those ties if they are not snuffed out.
The threat to Bangkok may be less than the implications for Malaysia just over the border. During the Communist "Emergency" in the 1950s and 60s in Malaya and Singapore, defeated by the then British colonial government, the Communists used southern Thailand sanctuaries. There has always been Malaysian.popular sympathy with the Thai Malays.WhileKuala Lumpur, after winning a recent election against Islamicist opposition, maintains a correct attitude and promises cooperation with the Thai authorities, a local border state government is in the hands of radical Islamacists.
In the southern Philippines, again in a Moslem majority area, training camps are operating for the terrorist organization which perpetrated the deadly Bali October 2002bombing, according to U.S. Ambassador Francis Ricciardone . As Ricciardone points out, annoying the recently reelected President Gloria Arroyo's government, the operation is a threat to the whole neighborhood. Next door Indonesia, in the midst of its first direct election for president, finds candidates angling for the Islamicist vote in what is nominally the world's largest Moslem nation. The U.S,. and its anti-terrorist allies, have been critical of Indonesia's less than enthusiastic pursuit of the Jemaah Islamiyah network, linked to Al Qaeda, which calls for a regional unitary radical Islamic state.
Asia does not face the sophisticated centrally directed Cold War campaign of combat and infiltration directed by Moscow [and later aided and abetted by the Chinese Communists]. But as elsewhere armed dissident movements with different goals have often collaborated. [The Tamil Tigers were a product of tacit cooperation between Indira Gandhi's Indian government, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Moscow but had working relations with India's Sikh insurgency]. The danger is if these pockets of violence grow they could work together to destabilize the whole region.
Sol W. Sanders, (solsanders@comcast.net), is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International. He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.
July 8, 2004

Intelligence backs claim Iraq tried to buy uranium
By Mark Huband in Rome
Published: June 27 2004 21:56 | Last Updated: June 27 2004 21:56
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1087373295002&p=1012571727085

Illicit sales of uranium from Niger were being negotiated with five states including Iraq at least three years before the US-led invasion, senior European intelligence officials have told the Financial Times.
Intelligence officers learned between 1999 and 2001 that uranium smugglers planned to sell illicitly mined Nigerien uranium ore, or refined ore called yellow cake, to Iran, Libya, China, North Korea and Iraq.
These claims support the assertion made in the British government dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme in September 2002 that Iraq had sought to buy uranium from an African country, confirmed later as Niger. George W. Bush, US president, referred to the issue in his State of the Union address in January 2003.
The claim that the illicit export of uranium was under discussion was widely dismissed when letters referring to the sales - apparently sent by a Nigerien official to a senior official in Saddam Hussein's regime - were proved by the International Atomic Energy Agency to be forgeries. This embarrassed the US and led the administration to reverse its earlier claim.
But European intelligence officials have for the first time confirmed that information provided by human intelligence sources during an operation mounted in Europe and Africa produced sufficient evidence for them to believe that Niger was the centre of a clandestine international trade in uranium.
Officials said the fake documents, which emerged in October 2002 and have been traced to an Italian with a record for extortion and deception, added little to the picture gathered from human intelligence and were only given weight by the Bush administration.
According to a senior counter-proliferation official, meetings between Niger officials and would-be buyers from the five countries were held in several European countries, including Italy. Intelligence officers were convinced that the uranium would be smuggled from abandoned mines in Niger, thereby circumventing official export controls. "The sources were trustworthy. There were several sources, and they were reliable sources," an official involved in the European intelligence gathering operation said.
The UK government used the details in its Iraq weapons dossier, which it used to justify war with Iraq after concluding that it corresponded with other information it possessed, including evidence gathered by GCHQ, the UK eavesdropping centre, of a visit to Niger by an Iraqi official.
However, the European investigation suggested that it was the smugglers who were actively looking for markets, though it was unclear how far the deals had progressed and whether deliveries of uranium were made.

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The company Powell keeps
(Washington, D.C.): Last Thursday, Secretary of State Colin Powell engaged in the Bush Administration's latest outreach to members of the Arab-American and Muslim-American communities. Unfortunately, as with virtually every one of the Administration's previous efforts of this kind, those embraced by Mr. Powell are part of the problem - not the solution - in the war of ideas that is at the heart of the war on terror.
According to a press release issued last week by one of the four organizations asked to participate, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Secretary of State used the meeting to "discuss foreign policy" with its executive director, Nihad Awad, and representatives of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC). Specifically, the meeting addressed: "the Middle East peace process, the war in Iraq, efforts to promote democratization and reform, America's image in the Muslim world, and the role American Muslims can play in helping to formulate polices that will improve that image."
It is entirely understandable that senior U.S. officials like Secretary Powell would want to hear - and to be seen listening to - the views of American Muslims. After all, there is a growing appreciation that, as the Center for Security Policy has long argued, if the United States and Western civilization more generally hope to prevail in the current struggle with terror-wielding enemies, the military, political and diplomatic strategies being employed must be complemented by an as-yet-unarticulated ideological component.
Enlisting Muslims and Arabs who have benefited greatly from their time in this country and who prize its tolerance, respect for religious diversity and human rights, value the rule of law in accordance with a secular, legislated code and appreciate the economic opportunities America offers could be decisively helpful in defeating our common enemies: the radical, virulently intolerant and anti-Western ideology that masquerades as a strain of the Muslim faith, known as Islamism.
With Friends Like These
While the organizations Secretary Powell chose to meet with style themselves as "leaders" of the Arab and Muslim communities in this country, they certainly do not represent the foregoing views. Instead, they or their officials have all been associated with, supported and/or defended various Islamists and their causes.
For example, CAIR's Nihad Awad has publicly announced his support for Hamas. At a September 10, 2003 hearing of the Senate Judiciary Terrorism Subcommittee entitled "Two Years After 9/11: Connecting the Dots," Sen. Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New York, stated that the Council on American-Islamic Relations has "intimate links with Hamas," and "ties to terrorism." Even Sen. Richard Durbin, an Illinois Democrat who has tended to echo the Muslim activists' line, declared at the hearing that CAIR is "unusual in its extreme rhetoric and its associations with groups that are suspect." Since 2002, three CAIR officials have been arrested and charged with terrorism-related crimes.
The Islamic Society of North America is a well-known front for the promotion of Wahhabism - Saudi Arabia's state-sponsored version of Islamism - in the political, doctrinal and theological infrastructure in the United States and Canada. Established by the Saudi-backed Muslim Students Association, ISNA seeks to marginalize leaders of the Muslim faith who do not support Wahhabism. Through its sponsorship of Islamist propaganda and mosques, ISNA is pursuing a strategic goal of eventual Wahhabi dominance of Islam in America.
The Muslim Public Affairs Council publicly opposed the United States government's designation of Hamas, Hezbullah, and the Islamic Jihad as terrorist organizations and discouraged Muslims from cooperating with the FBI after the 9/11 attacks. In fact, MPAC literature has urged Muslims not to cooperate with "police, FBI, INS, or any other law enforcement or investigator" except to report "hate crimes" or "hate incidents" against Muslims. MPAC criticized the 2003 arrest of alleged Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Sami Al-Arian in Florida and demands repeal of one of President Bush's most important accomplishments on the domestic front in the war on terror: the USA Patriot Act.
Although the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy purports to provide scholarship to educate policymakers and to "counter widely held prejudices and misconceptions" on Islam, two individuals who were, until last year, members of CSID's Board of Directors - Taha Jaber Al-Alwani and Jamal Barzinji - have been implicated by federal officials in "financial and ideological relationships with persons and entities with known affiliations to the designated terrorist Groups Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS."
The Bottom Line
The danger of consulting with these sorts of groups is not simply that they are unlikely to prove truly helpful to U.S. efforts to counter their ideological and institutional friends, who are our avowed enemies. Meetings like that Secretary Powell had last week actually makes matters worse insofar as it appears to validate such groups' claims to leadership of their community. That is the last thing we should be doing if we wish to enlist and empower those truly moderate, pro-American Muslims who have as much to fear from the Islamists as do the rest of us - and who are our natural allies in waging the war of ideas against the terrorists.
Center for Security Policy
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North Korea rejects disarmament timetable
By Andrew Ward and Song Jung-a in Seoul and Guy Dinmore in Washington
Published: June 28 2004 17:31 | Last Updated: June 28 2004 17:31
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1087373319796&p=1045050946495
North Korea has rejected a US proposal to freeze its nuclear weapons programme but said six-party talks last week about the dispute made "positive progress".
US officials arrived at the meeting in Beijing with a new offer of political and economic incentives for the regime of Kim Jong-il to disarm.
In its first public response to the proposal, North Korea on Monday said the three-month timeframe for freezing its nuclear facilities was "unscientific and unrealistic".
However, it praised the "sincere atmosphere" of the talks and welcomed the US acknowledgement that the country must be compensated for halting its nuclear programme.
Pyongyang's rejection did not come as a surprise, said a US official involved in the negotiations. But he said: "We are happy the tone went well." The US and North Korea were still "light years" apart in terms of substance but the talks in Beijing had at least kept the process going, he said. A fourth round is expected in September.
The meeting, between the US, China, Japan, Russia and the two Koreas, marked the start of serious negotiations to end the crisis after months of diplomatic stalemate. Under Washington's plan, North Korea would receive a security assurance and energy aid in return for a promise to scrap all its nuclear activities.
The communist state would be given three months to freeze the facilities and after that must meet deadlines for inspections and dismantlement. The proposal marked the first time that the administration of George W. Bush, US president, has offered incentives for North Korea to disarm, having previously ruled out rewards until the country's nuclear programme had been scrapped.
"One positive progress made at this round of talks is that agreement has been reached on taking simultaneous actions and discussing the freeze-for-compensation issue," said a spokesman from North Korea's foreign ministry.
The ministry warned that Pyongyang and Washington remained separated by "a large difference" in opinion. The biggest barrier to agreement is US demands that North Korea's suspected uranium enrichment programme be scrapped along with its plutonium-based facilities, despite Pyongyang's denial that the former programme exists.
Monday's statement called on the US to drop its "groundless claims" about uranium enrichment.
Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, said on Monday in a meeting in Moscow with Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, that he was keen to visit North Korea to push for the return of UN inspectors.
"[Mr Lavrov] is going to North Korea this week. I told him he can tell them that I'm ready to come any time and discuss future co-operation," he said.
UN inspectors were expelled from North Korea in December 2002, shortly before the country restarted its nuclear reactor and withdrew from the international non-proliferation treaty.
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North Korea: playing for time
The latest round of six-nation talks to attempt to resolve the crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons programme opened in Beijing on 23 June. JID's regional correspondent reports on the role China is playing in these negotiations and assesses Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions.
Following the previous round of talks that took place in May 2004, an effective stalemate had been reached. It appears that the regime in Pyongyang is in no hurry to make significant concessions on an issue that still has the capacity to cause political difficulties for the US administration in the run-up to November's presidential election.
The six-party talks largely came about through Beijing's consistent diplomacy in which China has sought to play the role of an 'honest broker'. The Chinese leadership has a vested interest in securing a peaceful settlement to the crisis in the Korean peninsula and has nothing to gain from a nuclear-capable North Korea fuelling an unconventional arms race in the region.
In June, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission said China was not fully using its leverage - millions of dollars' worth of economic aid - to encourage Pyongyang to resolve the current standoff. In fact, the commission cited further proliferation to North Korea by Chinese companies supplying dual-use missile-related items and raw materials, as well as noting China's continuing opposition to the imposition of sanctions against the 'Hermit Kingdom'. It also claimed that China had allowed North Korea to use its air, rail and sea ports to ship missiles and other weapons. These criticisms are calling into question the effectiveness of the US administration's pursuit of a partnership with Beijing to resolve the crisis.
For its part, North Korea has insisted on dealing directly with Washington since none of the other parties involved in the negotiations are able to provide, on behalf of the USA, the security assurances the leadership in Pyongyang is demanding. Meanwhile, the Bush administration appears to be committed to the pursuit of its main strategy: hoping that North Korea's isolated regime, headed by the reclusive Kim Jong-il, will eventually collapse, allowing the USA to open negotiations with an alternative government.
In order to hasten the demise of the communist regime, the USA is planning for a scenario that may include launching air strikes, as well as seeking international support for an economic embargo and a naval blockade. However, this strategy is likely to alienate South Korea and Japan, while provoking a potentially serious diplomatic rift between Washington and Beijing.


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UPI Hears
Posted June 28, 2004
Insider notes from United Press Interntional
Americans whose loved ones are killed by terrorists in Saudi Arabia may soon be given the authority to decide if they should be executed. Last week King Fahd gave the terrorists one month to turn themselves in or face being killed. King Fahd guaranteed the personal safety of those who surrender, but they would be tried under Sharia law, leaving open the possibility that the families of their victims will decide their fate.
The Saudi ambassador to Britain, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, commented during an interview: "The state will drop its claim on these individuals if they give themselves up, but the private claims of the families of those who were killed or who were assaulted or who were wounded will remain for them to decide and not for the state."
When asked by interviewer Jonathan Dimbleby if the families of Westerners killed could demand that terrorists face the death penalty, Al-Faisal replied, "It is up to them. They will decide." The method of execution in Saudi Arabia is beheading by sword.
********
The growing but quiet Chinese diplomatic and economic penetration of the Middle East has been one the more striking regional developments of the last few years. While up to now Chinese interest largely has been limited to petro-states, Beijing is now expanding its reach.
At a June 23 "investment conference" held during Syrian President Bashar Assad's state visit to China, 79 Syrian businessmen met representatives of Chinese firms in Beijing's China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. Washington's sanctions are helping drive the two nations closer together; the depreciation of the dollar due to Washington's fiscal policy underwriting the war on terror combined with the Federal Reserve's decision to keep interest rates low have hammered Syria's dollar-dominated economy.
Symptomatic of the new "Silk Road" is the announcement of a $100 million deal between Syria's Fredstone Organization and China's state-owned MCC to establish the Middle East's largest tire factory in Syria, with a capacity of 2.2 million tires per year.
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Who says that there's no good military news from the Middle East? The submarine USS Razorback is returning home, having had an illustrious history spanning more than six decades. After fighting in the Pacific, the boat was present at the signing of the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay on Sept. 2 1945. The boat would spend the bulk of its career in Asian waters, serving in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. It was awarded five battle stars during World War II and four during the Vietnam War.
In 1970 the old warhorse was transferred to the Turkish navy and renamed the Murat Reis. The sub, with more than 60 years' service, served longer than any submarine in history.
A group of Arkansas businessmen were determined to save a boat sharing the same name as the vaunted University of Arkansas football team and negotiated with Ankara for two years before finally gaining title. The USS Razorback sailed from the Gulf of Izmit on May 5 and will enter the Arkansas River on July 16 en route to its final berth in Little Rock. Once there, the USS Razorback will be the centerpiece of a $15 million naval exhibition and will berth beside an old friend from Hawaii, the USS Hoga tugboat, which was at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.
********
Proving that a war against terrorism can be won if a government is sufficiently committed, Peru's antiterrorist police arrested one of the remaining Shining Path guerrilla leaders in the capital, Lima.
Rosa Calderon Lara, alias "Comrade Gaviota" (Seagull), was working as a teacher at a school in the densely populated Ate Vitarte district and was captured at her home on June 25 after resisting arrest. Calderon Lara, also using the nomme de guerre "Irma," was a member of the assassination unit of the Shining Path's regional metropolitan committee. Police had 16 different warrants issued for her arrest for her suspected involvement in a number of attacks. Calderon Lara is said to have participated in the dynamite attack on the El Polo shopping center on March 20, 2002, which killed nine people. The blast occurred a few days before a visit by U.S. President George W. Bush.
While Shining Path's armed operations are concentrated in the central regions of Ayacucho and Junin, its political work is mostly in Lima. Shining Path began its campaign against the government in 1980. More than 69,000 people would be killed before the government's harsh tactics prevailed over the Maoist guerrillas.
UPI is a sister news organization of Insight.

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Russia vows to press ahead with Iran nuclear deal
June 28, 2004 Posted: 10:36 Moscow time (06:36 GMT)
Russia's top nuclear official vowed on Sunday to avoid any further delays in the launch of a Russian-built atomic reactor in Iran by speeding up talks with Tehran on a key bilateral deal. Russia, under strong U.S. pressure to ditch the project, has promised to sign a special agreement with Iran obliging it to return spent fuel from the reactor to Moscow to ease concerns Tehran could extract plutonium and make nuclear bombs.
But the document's signing has been delayed repeatedly, raising speculation that Moscow could bend to U.S. pressure and shelve the $800 million project. "We don't face any difficulties with signing of the deal on the return on nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear plant," said Alexander Rumyantsev, head of the Russian Atomic Energy Agency.
"Our Iranian colleagues have confirmed they are ready to sign this document... We will speed up talks if we see the process is being delayed because we need to fulfil our contractual obligations." Washington has branded Iran part of an "axis of evil" of states seeking weapons of mass destruction and fears Iran would use Bushehr as a cover for the transfer of other sensitive nuclear technology.
Both Russia and Iran say Tehran could not make a nuclear bomb with the technology Moscow has been providing. Industry insiders say disagreement over technical matters between Russia and Iran, as well as Moscow's efforts to avoid spoiling relations with the United States nearly prompted Moscow and Tehran to abandon the project earlier this year.
Speaking alongside U.N. nuclear watchdog head Mohamed ElBaradei, Rumyantsev said Iran was simply taking time to study ways to "optimise costs" in the return of spent nuclear fuel. The document on the fuel's return must be signed soon for Bushehr's first 1,000-megawatt reactor to go onstream in late 2005 and reach full capacity in 2006.
Once the agreement is signed, Russia will ship fuel to Iran to start up Bushehr. Spent fuel will be sent back to a storage centre in Siberia after roughly a decade of use. ElBaradei, in Russia to mark 50 years since the launch of the world's first atomic power plant near Moscow, said the International Atomic Energy Agency was closely watching Bushehr.
"Our role is make sure that when Bushehr is completed...it is is under verification and that it is used for peaceful purposes," ElBaradei said. "We are working with the Iranians to make sure this is taking place." GAZETA.RU
Source URL: http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=44389


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Iran: Tehran To Resume Building Nuclear Centrifuges
By Golnaz Esfandiari
The head of the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency on 27 June urged Iran to abandon its decision to build centrifuges as part of its nuclear program. Iran announced in a letter last week that it will resume building centrifuges as of tomorrow, but will continue to suspend uranium enrichment. Iran's decision came after a recent IAEA resolution criticized Tehran for not cooperating fully with nuclear inspectors.
Prague, 28 June 2004 (RFE/RL) -- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States, and the European Union have criticized Iran's decision to resume building centrifuges -- an apparatus that can be used to create weapons-grade enriched uranium.
Iran's decision to manufacture centrifuge components and assemble and test centrifuges for its nuclear program was announced last week in a letter to the head of the IAEA as well as to Britain, France, and Germany.
Iran says its decision came after Britain, France, and Germany failed to keep their promise to convince the IAEA to remove from its agenda by June its investigation into Iran's nuclear program.
Under a deal brokered last year by France, Germany, and Britain, Iran agreed to fully cooperate with the IAEA and to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities. The three European countries in return promised to ease Iran's access to advanced nuclear technology.
Tehran says its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only, and not to build weapons of mass destruction, as the United States has alleged.
Britain's "The Guardian" newspaper today quoted unnamed Western diplomats as saying Iran had never fully honored its promise. The paper quoted one as saying, "They had suspended about 95 percent of the activities, but it's the other 5 percent that bothers us."
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi said yesterday that Tehran wants the IAEA and the three European countries to supervise Iran's building, assembling, and testing of centrifuges when the program resumes. Assefi said Iran will continue to suspend its uranium-enrichment program, despite proceeding with work on the centrifuges.
Defense analyst Paul Beaver said Iran's decision has a "dangerous connotation." "The problem is that, if it just builds centrifuges, it's a little bit like Iran saying, 'Well, we're going to have nuclear warheads and we're going to have ballistic missiles, and keep them in different parts of the country so you need not worry,'" he said. "It wouldn't take them very long to start the centrifuge program. I see this as a negotiating tool, a negotiating ploy. This is their current position and I can see them having that position in place as a way of trying to influence the international community and trying to gain some political or diplomatic power."
The IAEA board of governors unanimously adopted on 18 June a resolution "deploring" Iran's lack of full cooperation in disclosing the extent and details of its nuclear program. The EU-drafted resolution was condemned by Iran as politically motivated.
Speaking yesterday in Moscow, IAEA Director-General Muhammad el-Baradei expressed hope that the move will be temporary, and that Iran will go back to full suspension of its activities. "They said that they are going to boost manufacturing, assembly, and testing of part of their centrifuges," he said. "That's what the letter says. I hope it wouldn't change the dialogue. I hope it will be temporary. I hope Iran will also go back to a comprehensive suspension as they have committed to us before. So I hope this is not a major reversal. But we still need to work with them."
The United States condemned on 27 June Iran's decision to continue making centrifuges. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said, "Iran needs to come clean and fully cooperate with its international obligations." He said the United States has expressed concern within the IAEA about the need to seriously consider sending the matter to the UN Security Council. "Whether we close the Iranian file next months or in six months from now depends on the cooperation we get from Iran." -- el-Baradei
U.S. national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said that Iran was providing daily proof why it belonged in the "axis of evil" -- the phrase used by President George W. Bush to describe Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. But at the same time, Rice said that a diplomatic solution to the row over its nuclear program was still "within sight."
In a joint statement on 26 June, the United States and the European Union called on Iran to rethink its decision to resume centrifuge construction. The countries of the EU are engaged in a policy of constructive dialogue with the Islamic republic. Some analysts view Iran's decision to resume building centrifuges as a blow to the EU's policy of engagement.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Assefi said yesterday that Iran's decision did not mean an end to dialogue with the EU. He added that talks between Tehran and Paris, Berlin, and London are planned for the coming days. He also said Iran had cooperated with the IAEA in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
The UN nuclear agency says it will not remove the Iranian issue from its agenda until it has the assurances it wants that Tehran is not pursuing a weapons program. Speaking yesterday, el-Baradei said, "Whether we close the Iranian file next months or in six months from now depends on the cooperation we get from Iran."

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Tehran to resume building centrifuges
By Ali Akbar Dareini
ASSOCIATED PRESS
TEHRAN -- Within days, Iran said yesterday, it will resume building centrifuges for its nuclear program in a rejection of international castigation.
But Tehran said it welcomed international supervision of the building program and said it would not use the devices to enrich uranium -- for the time being. The process can convert uranium into fuel for peaceful or military nuclear purposes.

The White House called Iran's decision further proof that it was trying to build an atomic bomb. And the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency -- the United Nations' nuclear watchdog -- said in Moscow that he hoped Iran would reverse its decision, a setback in international attempts to resolve the standoff.
"Iran's continued failure to comply with the IAEA and continued failure to [halt] all enrichment-related reprocessing activities only reinforces the concerns we have expressed," White House spokesman Scott McClellan said in Washington.
"Iran needs to come clean and fully cooperate with its international obligations."
"I hope that this decision is of a temporary nature. I hope it will be reversed," IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said at a press conference in Moscow, where he was attending a meeting on nuclear power.
"Iran needs to do the maximum to build confidence after a period of confidence deficit. I look at this whole suspension of enrichment as part of this confidence building."
Iran suspended the building of centrifuges and the enrichment of uranium under international pressure, part of the IAEA's attempts to determine the intent of Iran's nuclear program, much of which was kept secret for years.
The United States accuses Iran of trying to build nuclear weapons, and President Bush has labeled Iran part of an "axis of evil" with North Korea and prewar Iraq.
Iran maintains that its atomic program is peaceful and geared toward producing energy.
Tehran's announcement yesterday came after the IAEA approved a European-drafted resolution rebuking Iran for past coverups in its nuclear program.
Iran informed the IAEA and the governments of Britain, Germany and France that it would resume building centrifuges tomorrow, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said.
But Tehran invited the IAEA and the three European countries to supervise the building, assembling and testing of centrifuges when the program resumes, Mr. Asefi said.
"We will do that according to regulations, under IAEA supervision," he said.
Iran suspended uranium enrichment last year under international pressure and in a deal with Britain, Germany and France that extracted a European promise to make it easier for Iran to obtain advanced nuclear technology.
Iran says it will remain committed to that suspension despite European failure to provide the technology.
"Nothing important has happened," Mr. Asefi said. "Europeans failed to respect their commitments. Therefore, there is no reason for us to keep our moral promise.
"We remain committed to voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment. We had cooperation with the IAEA, we have [it] now, and we will cooperate with the IAEA in the future."
Though Mr. Asefi was critical of the Europeans, he said Iran's decision did not mean that Tehran would end dialogue with them. Rather, another discussion between Iranian and European analysts is planned "in the coming days."
Iran has said repeatedly that it wants to control the whole nuclear fuel cycle -- from extracting uranium ore to enriching it to a low grade for use as nuclear reactor fuel. Uranium enriched to low levels can be used in power plants, and highly enriched uranium is needed for bombs.
In an appearance on "Fox News Sunday," National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice called Iran's nuclear program a "very tough situation" but "one that still has a diplomatic solution within sight."
"But the Iranians every day demonstrate why the United States has been so hard on them and why the president put Iran into the 'axis of evil' when he talked about Iraq, North Korea and Iran back in his State of the Union address in January 2002," Miss Rice said yesterday.

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Walking Back the Chalabi Cat
By Daniel Pipes
FrontPageMagazine.com | June 22, 2004
The Iranian government learned recently that American intelligence has deciphered its codes and can read its mail. This is a blow to U.S. interests, for it means losing the ability to access the enemy's confidential communications, with all the advantages that offers.
Who is to blame for this development?
Ahmad Chalabi - the Iraqi politician whom I have known, worked with, supported, and admired since 1991 - has for the past month sat in the hot seat, accused by unnamed intelligence officials of informing the Iranian regime that its codes had been cracked.
Chalabi denies the accusation, saying that he and his organization, the Iraqi National Congress, have not received "any classified information" from the U.S. government. For what it is worth, the Iranians also deny that Chalabi told them about U.S. code breaking.
Thinking this through logically, I conclude that Chalabi is not responsible for the damage to U.S. interests; rather, the blame falls on his opponents in the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department. Here is my logic, a form of "walking back the cat" (spook-speak, defined by William Safire as applying "what is now known to the actions and events of a previous time").
To begin with, I make three assumptions: First, that the reaction in Washington (which includes possible criminal prosecutions) bespeaks sincerity and confirms that U.S. cryptographers did indeed crack the Iranian codes. Second, that Tehran interprets the U.S. reaction as proof that its codes were cracked. Third, that it is taking the necessary steps to regain secrecy.
One possibility is that Chalabi told the Iranians nothing. In which case, the allegation that he did so originated elsewhere:
? Perhaps State or the CIA made it up. (Plausible: Time magazine has documented how since April, the White House has been attempting to marginalize Chalabi.)
? Or the Iranians floated it to check if their codes were broken. (Plausible: It would explain why they used that same code to tell about the code break.)
Or Chalabi did tell them that Washington had cracked the code. In which case:
? Perhaps he made this up and just happened to be right. (Plausible: Chalabi reportedly took steps in 1995 to trick the Iranians.)
? Or he thought he was providing disinformation but actually was telling the truth. (Unlikely: Too convoluted.)
? Or he knowingly divulged classified information. (Unlikely: Why should the Americans give Chalabi, a British subject known to be in close contact with the Iranian regime, a crown jewel of U.S. state secrets?)
Whichever scenario actually took place, the implication is identical: the brouhaha in D.C., not what Chalabi did or did not say, signaled Tehran that the Americans broke their code.
That's because anyone can assert that the code was cracked, but why should he be believed? The Iranians surely would not accept Chalabi's assertion on its own and go to the huge trouble and expense of changing codes because of his say-so. They would seek confirmation from U.S. intelligence; and this is what the unnamed sources who leaked this story did - they supplied that proof. Their fury at Chalabi instructed the Iranians to change codes.
In the end, what Chalabi did or did not do is nearly irrelevant; his detractors in the U.S. government, ironically, bear the onus for having informed the Iranian opponent about a vital piece of intelligence.
Americans might pay heavily for the rank irresponsibility of those in State and the agency who publicly confirmed the code break as part of their turf wars with the Defense Department and, more broadly, their fight with the so-called neoconservatives.
On this latter point, note how gleefully elements of the American press exploited the allegations against Chalabi. To take one example of many, the Los Angeles Times on June 10 published "A Tough Time for `Neocons'," which states that neoconservatives are "under siege" partly because, "in a grave threat to their reputation, Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi ... is enmeshed in an FBI investigation of alleged intelligence leaks that supplied secrets to Iran."
Were the press properly doing its duty, it would stop playing the Washington favorites game and investigate the likely damage Chalabi's opponents have done. Were State and CIA managements doing their job, they would be punishing the elements who conveyed a vital secret to the militant Islamic government in Iran.
Daniel Pipes (www.DanielPipes.org) is director of the Middle East Forum and author of Miniatures (Transaction Publishers).

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Saudis: Al Qaeda member surrenders
Monday, June 28, 2004 Posted: 5:20 PM EDT (2120 GMT)
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia (CNN) -- One of Saudi Arabia's most wanted militants has turned himself in to the authorities, the first senior suspect to surrender under a one-month government amnesty announced last week.
Othman Al-Omari, number 19 on Saudi Arabia's most wanted list of 26, accepted King Fahd's offer of amnesty, which was made last week, according to Saudi sources Monday.
Al-Omari, who turned himself in on Sunday night, was a business partner of Shaban Al Shihri -- the first al Qaeda member to accept the offer when he turned himself in Friday.
Al-Omari and Al Shihri shared a vegetable stall in a market in Medina. Al Shihri, according to sources, was in part responsible for persuading Al Omari to turn himself in.
Sources said the most wanted list of 26 was not arranged in order of importance.
When the one-month amnesty was announced by Crown Prince Abdullah last week, sources in the kingdom said it was aimed at mid-ranking and junior al Qaeda supporters.
After that period militants would face forceful consequences, Abdullah said.
"We are announcing for the last time that we are opening the door to repentance and for those to return to righteousness," he said in a televised address last Wednesday.
The amnesty move came days after U.S. engineer Paul Johnson Jr., who was working in the kingdom, was kidnapped and beheaded -- and after months of battles between Saudi forces and al Qaeda terrorists.
"To everyone who has gone out of the righteous way and has committed a crime in the name of religion and to everyone who belongs to that group that has done itself a disservice, everyone who has been captured in terror acts is given the chance to come back to God if they want to save their lives, their souls," Abdullah said.
"If they give themselves up without force within one month maximum from the date of this speech, we can promise them that they are going to be safe."
Abdullah said all such people would be dealt with fairly, in accordance with Islamic law.
"If they are wise and they accept it, then they are saved. And if they snub it, then God is not going to forbid us from hitting them with our force, which we get from our dependence on God."
He added that Saudi forces would not hesitate to act.
Johnson Jr., who worked for Lockheed Martin Corp, was kidnapped on June 12. After a 72-hour deadline passed without the demanded release of all al Qaeda prisoners and the departure of all Westerners from the kingdom, photographs of Johnson's head and body were posted on an Islamist Web site.
Hours later, al Qaeda cell leader Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin and three other terrorists were killed in a gun battle with Saudi police, and 12 other suspected members of the cell were captured.
This month's terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia are the latest in a string of al Qaeda gunbattles and bombings that has lasted for more than a year.
Al Qaeda attacks during the weekend of May 29 in the Saudi oil city of Khobar left at least 22 people dead -- 19 of them from other countries.
A car bombing last November believed to be the work of al Qaeda struck a mostly Arab neighborhood near Riyadh's diplomatic quarter, killing at least 17 people and wounding 122 others.
In May of 2003, triple al Qaeda car bombings in Riyadh killed 23 people, plus the 12 bombers, at three complexes housing Westerners.
CNN Senior International Correspondent Nic Robertson contributed to this report.
Find this article at:
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/28/saudi.omari/index.html

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'Gitmo' court ruling heartens Saudi families
The Supreme Court said Monday that 'Gitmo' prisoners can challenge detention.
By Faiza Saleh AmbaH | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA - Abdullah al-Juaid was close to tears or joy when he heard the Supreme Court had ruled that inmates at the US naval base in Guant?namo Bay, where his brother is held, can contest their captivity in US courts.
"I'll go to the States and attend his trial if they let me. The idea of seeing him again, hearing his voice and sitting with him makes me very emotional," says the 34-year old civil servant.
The ruling applies to nearly 600 inmates, most of them captured after the 2001 fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The US had argued that US law did not apply to the terror suspects because the base is not on American soil.
Mr. Juaid, who filed his brief in January in connection with families of two others detained in Guant?namo Bay, says his faith in the US justice system has been restored. "I had hope that if the US government did not get involved, we would win the case," he says.
But he's still angry. "They caged my brother like an animal," he says, showing magazine photos of men in orange jumpsuits in their outdoor cages. Juaid has filled a thick file with newspaper clippings on the detainees, as well as photos and letters from his brother Abdul-Rahman, who was a student in Pakistan when the war broke out.
Like many families here, he believes his brother was "sold" by Pakistani and Afghan mercenaries to the Americans. "They took up to $3,000 dollars for each Arab they handed to the Americans," he says.
The Saudi government claims the majority of the Saudis picked up were innocent proselytizers or charity workers helping a war-torn nation. The rest, they say, were young men led astray by extremists.
While the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan, hundreds of devout Saudis considered it a pure Muslim state and traveled there to work, live, study, or train for jihad, which they believe is a duty of all Muslims.
News that their sons were at Guant?namo was a shock to many Saudi families. Saeed Salem al-Shaher, for example, received word his 20-year-old son Salem had died in Afghanistan during the US attack. Hundreds of friends and family in Asir province came to observe three days of mourning. But eight months later, Mr. Shaher learned that another son had received a letter from Salem via the Red Cross.
"I was happy he was alive but sad he was with the Americans in Cuba," he says. "I don't know what they're doing to him. In his last letter, 13 out of 29 lines were censored."
Graphic pictures of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq have caused Saudi families of Guant?namo detainees much anguish. Youssef al-Sulami has a brother at Guant?namo. "Abu Ghraib brought the pain of Yahya's detention to the forefront all over again," he says. "It feels like he was detained last week, not almost three years ago."
Mr. Sulami kept news of the Abu Ghraib scandal from his mother for weeks, hiding newspapers or not allowing them into the house. When his mother found one of the hidden papers and saw the photos, she just fell to the floor, he says.
His brother Yahya was 19 and had been married for two months when the US went into Afghanistan. Nightly news footage of the war there and the death of civilians consumed him. "Every night [Yahya] prayed for the victory of our Muslim brothers over the Americans," says Youssef. "Then one day he just left. He didn't tell us where he was going." He was arrested several months later in Pakistan. "We don't know if he'd even made it into Afghanistan," says his brother.
Badr al-Zahrani, a young teacher of the Koran, has a twin brother, Fawaz, who spent a year and a half at Guantanamo and has been jailed in Haer, near the Saudi capital, Riyadh, since May 2003. "The Americans used to spit on the Korans. Several times they urinated on some of our [Muslim] brothers," he reads from his transcriptions of talks with Fawaz. Badr has put his notes in a journal that he hopes to turn into a book one day.
Neither the men who were released, their families, nor the lawyers for the remaining 124 Saudis know why some were released and others remain at Guant?namo. Or why the Saudi government still holds the five sent back behind bars.
Officials have told the families that the five were sent by the US as a sort of trial case. "If the government releases the ones here, then the Americans might not release the rest," says Ali al-Omar, whose brother is also in Haer.
Fawaz recounted to his twin how, after months of detention in Afghanistan, they were flown blindfolded, hands and feet restrained, ears plugged, and r mouths covered, for what seemed to be days. When he landed he didn't know what continent he was on. "He thought it might be Africa or Asia, because there were a lot of trees and it was hot," he says.
"We're with the Americans in a country called Cuba," he later wrote. "Pray for me."
Unable to afford plane expenses, Badr makes a monthly nine-hour car trip to Riyadh to visit his brother. There he hears stories of mistreatment, but also of how the detainees prayed, memorized the Koran, and kept each other's spirits high. "They became very spiritual in Guant?namo. They all turned to God even more because there was no one else to turn to," says Badr.
Abdullah al-Qahtani says his brother Jaber, who worked with the Wafa charity group, was picked up while walking on the street. He heard he could get his brother released by paying money to his captors, and applied for government permission to travel to Pakistan. By the time he got it, his brother had been "sold" was on his way to Guantanamo, he says.
Juaid, the unofficial spokesman for the families in the Western mountain city of Tayef, has educated himself about international law. His conversation is filled with references to the Geneva Conventions, prisoners' rights, and the US constitution. He travels regularly to Riyadh and Jiddah to speak with officials and to the Abha and Mecca to meet and coordinate with families there. "This was something very new to us," he says. "Most of the families with sons in Guantanamo are simple and of limited income. They didn't know where to turn or who to talk to, and it took us a while to get organized."
Mr. Qahtani says that despite efforts by the lawyers and Saudi government, the case of the detainees had been stagnating for years. Now news of the Supreme Court ruling has given the families a much-needed push. "I'm so excited, I can't think or talk straight," he says. "This is the first good piece of news I've heard since Jaber was arrested. It's a victory from God. A victory for justice. Our prayers have been answered."
But Al-Juaid sounded a cautionary note as he traveled to his parents' house to tell them the good news. "This is the first step in a long journey," he says. "And I'm going to spend whatever time or money it takes till my brother comes home."

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Iyad Allaoui, le prot?g? de la CIA
LE MONDE | 28.06.04 | 13h23
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Le nouveau premier ministre par int?rim de l'Irak, Iyad Allaoui, souffre d'une r?putation sulfureuse et d'un lourd pass? au service de l'espionnage britannique et de la CIA. Portrait d'un homme du secret.
A premi?re vue, la lourde silhouette d'Iyad Hashem Allaoui dans le poste de capitaine du bateau ivre qu'est devenu l'Irak n'avait vraiment rien pour plaire aux deux marionnettistes, am?ricain et britannique, qui tirent, depuis quinze mois, les ficelles du pays. Ancien baasiste pur et dur, le premier ministre par int?rim a, contre lui, trente-deux ann?es d'exil hors d'Irak, une r?putation sulfureuse d'affairiste, un parti politique sans aucune assise populaire et surtout, surtout, un lourd pass? d'"honorable client", d'abord de l'agence d'espionnage britannique, le MI 6, puis, et concomitamment, de son homologue am?ricaine, la CIA.
Au MI 6, Iyad Allaoui a fourni, d?but 2003, la retentissante all?gation qui manquera co?ter son poste ? Tony Blair, selon laquelle Saddam Hussein dispose d'armes de destruction massive "op?rationnelles en quarante-cinq minutes".
Quant ? la CIA, elle a subi en 1996, gr?ce ? M. Allaoui, "le plus colossal fiasco de son histoire, juste derri?re l'affaire de la baie des Cochons", d'apr?s l'excellent livre de Patrick et Andrew Cockburn, deux journalistes v?t?rans ? Bagdad (Saddam Hussein, an American Obsession). On y reviendra.
Le docteur Ha?fa Al-Azzaoui a bien connu notre homme dans sa jeunesse : "Quiconque a fait ses ?tudes de m?decine ? Bagdad dans les ann?es 1960 ne peut avoir oubli? ce gros bras baasiste. Il se disait syndicaliste, se baladait sur le campus avec un pistolet au c?t? et poursuivait les ?tudiantes jusqu'? leur porte." Selon ce rare t?moin qui ?crit dans un m?dia arabe, le dipl?me dont se pr?vaut le "docteur" Allaoui "est bidon." C'est "le Baas qui le lui a fourni avant de l'envoyer ? Londres, avec une bourse de l'OMS, pour soi-disant terminer ses ?tudes, en fait pour espionner les ?tudiants envoy?s ? l'?tranger". A la fin des ann?es 1960, Iyad Allaoui est pr?sident, pour l'Europe, de l'Association des ?tudiants irakiens ? l'ext?rieur. Le poste l'autorise ? voyager, ? nouer des amiti?s avec d'autres jeunes nationalistes arabes, et aussi ? traquer les "tra?tres" et dissidents de la premi?re heure qui seront, selon le docteur Azzaoui, "d?nonc?s et punis", de mani?re parfois exp?ditive.
La rupture avec Saddam Hussein, nomm? vice-pr?sident du pays fin 1969, se produit officiellement deux ans plus tard. On parle de diff?rend personnel. Certains ?voquent plut?t un divorce politique. Iyad Allaoui est un baasiste historique premi?re version. Comme la majorit? des jeunes du Moyen-Orient ? l'?poque, il est socialiste et nationaliste arabe. Il croit aux id?aux de la r?volution. Les "d?viations" id?ologiques et la mise en coupe r?gl?e du parti par Saddam et son clan tribal de Tikrit lui d?plaisent.
On verra qu'il n'est pas le seul. Fin 1971, selon l'historiographie officielle, l'ancien pr?sident des ?tudiants irakiens d'Europe d?chire sa carte du parti et part en exil. D'abord au Liban, puis retour ? Londres. Il a 27 ans. Il ne ressemble pas encore de mani?re aussi frappante qu'aujourd'hui ? Tony Soprano, le mafieux de la c?l?bre s?rie am?ricaine.
Que fait-il ? partir de l? ? Myst?re. L'int?ress? n'a pas donn? suite aux demandes d'entretien du Monde. Aucun de ceux qu'il a accord?s jusqu'ici n'?claire cette p?riode. Selon la br?ve biographie distribu?e ? Bagdad par la coalition, il obtient sa ma?trise de m?decine en 1976, son doctorat trois ans plus tard. Il est de plus consultant de l'OMS et du PNUD. Est-il aussi, comme le pr?tendent Patrick et Andrew Cockburn, "clandestinement au service du Baas" ? Ou bien, ce qui n'est pas contradictoire, travaille-t-il d?j?, en agent double, pour le MI 6 britannique ?
Toujours est-il que sept ans apr?s sa "d?fection" officielle, trois inconnus s'introduisent, le 4 f?vrier 1978, dans sa villa londonienne et lui ass?nent trois coups de hache. Un derri?re la t?te, un sur la poitrine, un dernier sur la cuisse, qui "manque de lui sectionner la jambe". Les assassins le croient mort, il ne l'est pas. Le MI 6 le fait discr?tement admettre sous un faux nom dans une clinique galloise. Un an apr?s, il refait surface. Sa famille affirme avoir re?u une menace anonyme ainsi libell?e : "Vous pouvez vous enfuir sur Mars, on vous retrouvera." Pour M. Allaoui, qui ne pr?sente aujourd'hui aucune cicatrice apparente, pas m?me un boitillement, "c'est la preuve" que les tueurs, qui n'ont jamais ?t? identifi?s, ?taient bien aux ordres de l'apprenti sorcier de Bagdad.
Contrairement ? certains de nos interlocuteurs, plus soup?onneux quant aux circonstances de l'attentat, le professeur Saadoune Al-Douleimi, rentr? d'exil en 2003 pour diriger le Centre irakien de recherches et d'?tudes strat?giques, ne conteste pas la version officielle. "Iyad Allaoui ?tait un personnage important du Baas. Il savait beaucoup de choses et les passait au MI 6. C'est pour cela que les agents du Moukhabarat, la s?curit? de l'Etat, ont re?u l'ordre de le tuer." Le futur pilote du grand projet d?mocratique am?ricain en Irak dispara?t en tout cas des radars journalistiques.
En septembre 1980, Saddam Hussein attaque la R?publique islamique d'Iran. Une h?catombe de huit longues ann?es commence. Iyad Allaoui, alors titulaire d'un passeport britannique, passe le plus clair de son temps autour de son pays, en Jordanie, en Syrie, au Kowe?t, en Arabie saoudite. H?ritier d'une grande famille commer?ante chiite de Nassiriya, fils d'un m?decin qui fut parlementaire sous la monarchie, neveu d'un homme qui fut ministre de la sant? jusqu'? la chute du roi, en 1958, et petit-fils d'un grand notable qui participa aux n?gociations devant mener l'ancienne M?sopotamie ? l'ind?pendance en 1932, Iyad Allaoui a la politique dans le sang. Il ne coupera jamais tout ? fait les ponts avec les officiers baasistes de l'arm?e et du renseignement qui, comme lui, estiment, sans vouloir ou pouvoir agir, que Saddam Hussein m?ne le pays ? la ruine.
En 1983, les services saoudiens s'int?ressent ? leur tour ? sa personne. Il lance bient?t, depuis Djedda, la Radio de l'Irak libre, qui ne fera gu?re de vagues mais lui permettra de rester dans la course. Parall?lement, il se lance dans les affaires - p?troli?res, dit-on - et accumule un joli magot. En f?vrier 1991, alors que Saddam Hussein est chass? du Kowe?t par l'op?ration "Temp?te du d?sert" am?ricaine et que le r?gime para?t plus chancelant que jamais, Iyad Allaoui cr??e Al-Wifaq, autrement dit l'Entente nationale irakienne (ENI). Objectif : se placer pour l'apr?s- Saddam, qui ne devrait plus tarder. Mais le dictateur, ?pargn? par les l?gions de Bush l'Ancien, se maintient.
L'ann?e suivante, l'ENI, press?e par les Saoudiens et leurs alli?s am?ricano-britanniques, s'allie avec un autre mouvement, le Congr?s national irakien (CNI). Iyad Allaoui conna?t bien l'homme qui dirige cette formation rivale : c'est son cousin par alliance, Ahmad Chalabi. Les deux hommes ont les m?mes commanditaires, appartiennent l'un et l'autre ? la tendance la plus la?que du chiisme irakien et ils ont pratiquement le m?me ?ge - Allaoui est n? en 1944, Chalabi en 1945. Mais ils se d?testent cordialement. La richissime famille Chalabi a quitt? l'Irak en emportant ses millions d?s la chute de la monarchie, en 1958. En 1992, l'ann?e o? son cousin est forc? ? s'allier avec lui, Chalabi est inculp? d'escroquerie bancaire en Jordanie et condamn? par contumace ? vingt-deux ans de prison. L'alliance tactique des cousins n'ira pas loin.
Affairiste lib?ral, Ahmad Chalabi est fonci?rement antibaasiste. Il le d?montrera d?s avril 2003 en poussant les Am?ricains ? commettre l'une de leurs plus grosses fautes tactiques en Irak occup? - la "d?baasisation" tous azimuts et le d?mant?lement complet de l'arm?e et de l'administration. A l'inverse, Iyad Allaoui, comme il a recommenc? ? le faire depuis sa rentr?e ? Bagdad, s'efforce de recruter ses anciens fr?res d'armes et fera tout, d?s son retour d'exil, pour s'opposer ? la politique suicidaire des purges massives d?cid?es par le proconsul, Paul Bremer.
Au fond, rien n'a chang?. D?j?, en octobre 1995, Ahmad Chalabi avait convaincu ses ma?tres am?ricains de financer et d'armer un soul?vement populaire irakien command? par lui depuis le Kurdistan. Allaoui ne croyait pas une seconde ? ses chances de succ?s. Il avait raison. Ce sera une sanglante d?b?cle.
Quatre mois plus tard, d?ment autoris?e par Bill Clinton en campagne pour sa r??lection, l'Agence de Langley pr?pare une deuxi?me tentative de coup d'Etat. Cette fois-ci, c'est le cousin Allaoui qui a sa chance. "Contrairement ? Chalabi, se souviendra Samuel Berger, conseiller de s?curit? du pr?sident Clinton, Allaoui avait su gagner la confiance des pouvoirs arabes de la r?gion. Il ?tait bien consid?r? par ceux qui pr?paraient l'op?ration. Il ?tait moins flamboyant que son cousin, paraissait moins concern? par sa promotion personnelle."
A la mi-janvier 1996, l'affaire est faite. La CIA fournit 6 millions de dollars, les Saoudiens et le Kowe?t, idem. La Jordanie assure la base arri?re de l'op?ration. Le coup se fera par l'arm?e.
Allaoui se flatte du soutien de plusieurs dizaines d'officiers de haut rang. C'?tait peut-?tre vrai, on ne le saura jamais. Un mois avant la fin juin, date pr?vue pour l'op?ration, le patron de l'ENI, qui veut quand m?me se placer pour la suite, r?v?le au Washington Post "l'imminence d'une op?ration secr?te" contre le r?gime honni. Personne n'y croit, sauf Saddam, qui a d?j? captur? l'un des envoy?s d'Allaoui au pays. Et qui le fait parler. Le 20 juin, les arrestations commencent. En dix jours, une trentaine de g?n?raux f?lons sont ex?cut?s. Cent vingt autres seront arr?t?s et tortur?s. Au total, on estimera que la sanglante purge ?liminera pr?s de huit cents personnes. "Un colossal fiasco", ?crivent les Cockburn. Mais un fiasco secret, qui n'a co?t? aucune vie am?ricaine et qui sera discr?tement enfoui sous une pile d'archives ? Langley.
Apr?s sa d?b?cle de 1995, Chalabi est all? trouver des oreilles plus compatis- santes au Pentagone. Allaoui, lui, reste le "Joe" d?ment r?tribu? de la CIA, du MI 6 et des Saoudiens. Il dirige, en juillet 2003, le comit? de s?curit? du d?funt Conseil de gouvernement mis en place par Paul Bremer, tandis que son cousin, le g?n?ral Ali Allaoui, et son beau-fr?re, Nouri Al-Badrane, occupent les postes, plus expos?s, de "ministres" de la d?fense et de l'int?rieur - aucun des deux ne sera pr?sent dans le nouveau cabinet. Finalement, "faute de mieux", comme ils disent, les mandarins du d?partement d'Etat am?ricain l'adoptent ? leur tour, et, le 27 mai, leur poulain est nomm? chef du gouvernement int?rimaire, n'en d?plaise aux Nations unies - et aux Fran?ais, que l'int?ress? m?prise. Le voici en place pour un galop d'essai avant le grand derby ?lectoral, pr?vu pour janvier 2005. Le coureur de fond a-t-il une chance ? "Avec lui, c'est un peu la CIA qui ?pouse notre pays", constate, sans illusions, un commentateur du cru. "Mais, dans le chaos actuel, o? la priorit? absolue est le r?tablissement de la s?curit? publique, Allaoui est sans doute le meilleur du pire. Il est chiite sans ?tre religieux. Pro-sunnite sans l'?tre lui-m?me. Il est bien avec les Am?ricains, les Anglais, les Saoudiens et tous les r?gimes qui nous entourent. Sauf peut-?tre l'Iran, quoique le grand ayatollah Sistani - un Iranien - lui ait accord? une sorte de timide soutien. Bref, c'est quelqu'un qui a l'avantage de susciter une m?fiance ? peu pr?s ?gale dans tous les camps. Ce peut ?tre son avantage", conclut notre interlocuteur.
"Il faut admettre, ajoute un diplomate europ?en, que la mani?re dont il a b?ti sa strat?gie de prise du pouvoir, en infiltrant d'abord les d?bris des services secrets avant de les remettre en marche et en se conciliant les anciens g?n?raux sunnites d'une arm?e qu'il est en train de reconstituer ? sa main, est astucieuse. C'est une strat?gie ? l'ancienne, qui a fait ses preuves."
Iyad Allaoui est-il bien ce "d?mocrate irakien" annonc? par la Maison Blanche ? "Allons, ricane Ka?s Al-Azzaoui, le directeur francophile d'Al-Jadida, le journal des socialistes irakiens, c'est un ancien officier des "moukhabarates", les services secrets. Dans la r?daction, on l'appelle d?j? le "Saddam-sans-moustache"." Hazem Abdel Hamid An-Noue?mi, chercheur en sciences politiques ? l'universit? de Bagdad, n'est pas d'accord. "Bien s?r que c'est un d?mocrate, sourit-il. Un d?mocrate ? l'arabe. A l'?gyptienne, ou ? l'alg?rienne si vous pr?f?rez..."
Patrice Claude
* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 29.06.04
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The Undeclared Oil War
By Paul Roberts
Monday, June 28, 2004; Page A21
While some debate whether the war in Iraq was or was not "about oil," another war, this one involving little but oil, has broken out between two of the world's most powerful nations.
For months China and Japan have been locked in a diplomatic battle over access to the big oil fields in Siberia. Japan, which depends entirely on imported oil, is desperately lobbying Moscow for a 2,300-mile pipeline from Siberia to coastal Japan. But fast-growing China, now the world's second-largest oil user, after the United States, sees Russian oil as vital for its own "energy security" and is pushing for a 1,400-mile pipeline south to Daqing.
The petro-rivalry has become so intense that Japan has offered to finance the $5 billion pipeline, invest $7 billion in development of Siberian oil fields and throw in an additional $2 billion for Russian "social projects" -- this despite the certainty that if Japan does win Russia's oil, relations between Tokyo and Beijing may sink to their lowest, potentially most dangerous, levels since World War II.
Asia's undeclared oil war is but the latest reminder that in a global economy dependent largely on a single fuel -- oil -- "energy security" means far more than hardening refineries and pipelines against terrorist attack. At its most basic level, energy security is the ability to keep the global machine humming -- that is, to produce enough fuels and electricity at affordable prices that every nation can keep its economy running, its people fed and its borders defended. A failure of energy security means that the momentum of industrialization and modernity grinds to a halt. And by that measure, we are failing.
In the United States and Europe, new demand for electricity is outpacing the new supply of power and natural gas and raising the specter of more rolling blackouts. In the "emerging" economies, such as Brazil, India and especially China, energy demand is rising so fast it may double by 2020. And this only hints at the energy crisis facing the developing world, where nearly 2 billion people -- a third of the world's population -- have almost no access to electricity or liquid fuels and are thus condemned to a medieval existence that breeds despair, resentment and, ultimately, conflict.
In other words, we are on the cusp of a new kind of war -- between those who have enough energy and those who do not but are increasingly willing to go out and get it. While nations have always competed for oil, it seems more and more likely that the race for a piece of the last big reserves of oil and natural gas will be the dominant geopolitical theme of the 21st century.
Already we can see the outlines. China and Japan are scrapping over Siberia. In the Caspian Sea region, European, Russian, Chinese and American governments and oil companies are battling for a stake in the big oil fields of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In Africa, the United States is building a network of military bases and diplomatic missions whose main goal is to protect American access to oilfields in volatile places such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and tiny Sao Tome -- and, as important, to deny that access to China and other thirsty superpowers.
The diplomatic tussles only hint at what we'll see in the Middle East, where most of the world's remaining oil lies. For all the talk of big new oil discoveries in Russia and Africa -- and of how this gush of crude will "free" America and other big importers from the machinations of OPEC -- the geological facts speak otherwise. Even with the new Russian and African oil, worldwide oil production outside the Middle East is barely keeping pace with demand.
In the run-up to the Iraq war, Russia and France clashed noisily with the United States over whose companies would have access to the oil in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Less well known is the way China has sought to build up its own oil alliances in the Middle East -- often over Washington's objections. In 2000 Chinese oil officials visited Iran, a country U.S. companies are forbidden to deal with; China also has a major interest in Iraqi oil.
But China's most controversial oil overture has been made to a country America once regarded as its most trusted oil ally: Saudi Arabia. In recent years, Beijing has been lobbying Riyadh for access to Saudi reserves, the largest in the world. In return, the Chinese have offered the Saudis a foothold in what will be the world's biggest energy market -- and, as a bonus, have thrown in offers of sophisticated Chinese weaponry, including ballistic missiles and other hardware, that the United States and Europe have refused to sell to the Saudis.
Granted, the United States, with its vast economic and military power, would probably win any direct "hot" war for oil. The far more worrisome scenario is that an escalating rivalry among other big consumers will spark new conflicts -- conflicts that might require U.S. intervention and could easily destabilize the world economy upon which American power ultimately rests.
As demand for oil becomes sharper, as global oil production continues to lag (and as producers such as Saudi Arabia and Nigeria grow more unstable) the struggle to maintain access to adequate energy supplies, always a critical mission for any nation, will become even more challenging and uncertain and take up even more resources and political attention.
This escalation will not only drive up the risk of conflict but will make it harder for governments to focus on long-term energy challenges, such as avoiding climate change, developing alternative fuels and alleviating Third World energy poverty -- challenges that are themselves critical to long-term energy security but which, ironically, will be seen as distracting from the current campaign to keep the oil flowing.
This, ultimately, is the real energy-security dilemma. The more obvious it becomes that an oil-dominated energy economy is inherently insecure, the harder it becomes to move on to something beyond oil.
Paul Roberts is the author of "The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World."
? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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LUKoil to Pump Iraq Oil in '05
Combined Reports LUKoil plans to extract the first oil from Iraq's giant West Qurna field next year, the firm's chief executive, Vagit Alekperov, said Monday.
Alekperov's comments, quoted by Interfax, coincided with the U.S. hand-over of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government, two days earlier than planned.
Interfax gave no details of Alekperov's comments, and there was no indication whether LUKoil had reached agreement with Iraqi officials on its rights over the field. A 1997 deal on exploration rights has been repeatedly put into question.
LUKoil spokesman Dmitry Dolgov would not say whether the company had unequivocally reached an agreement. But he did say: "I would assume Alekperov had reason to say we will be pumping oil in Iraq next year."
Iraq scrapped LUKoil's $3.7 billion deal late in 2002, months before the U.S.-led invasion to topple Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. It accused the company of failing to meet its obligations to begin work.
LUKoil said its hands were tied by United Nations sanctions then in force. It considers the deal still valid under international law.
Alekperov has said LUKoil will need to wait until the Iraqi government was in place to start tapping the field.
LUKoil's most recent attempt to revive the contract was in March, when Alekperov went to Baghdad to sign a memorandum of cooperation with the Iraqi Oil Ministry.
(Reuters, MT)

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$2bn already invested in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
June 29, 2004 Posted: 09:24 Moscow time (05:24 GMT)
BAKU - Some $2bn have been spent on the project of constructing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Trend news agency reported citing Nagit Aliyev, the President of the Azerbaijani State Oil Company (GNKAR). On the whole, according to him, shareholders in the project will invest about $3bn.
The current pace of construction is about 1 kilometer of a pipeline a day. Aliyev noted that the oil pipeline would be ready for operation by the time oil production started in the central part of the Azeri field.
The GNKAR head also declared that many European companies were interested in the project of laying the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline. Moreover, he mentioned that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development had decided to allocate a $170m credit to GNKAR to finance its share in Phase-1 of the Shakh-Deniz project and $1m on reorganizing the state company.
The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is planned to be finished by the end of 2004. The capacity of the 1,760-kilometer pipelineу is 50m tons of oil per year. The cost of the construction is estimated at $2.95bn. Among shareholders in the project are BP (30.1 percent), GNKAR (25 percent), Unocal (8.9 percent), Statoil (8.71 percent), TPAO (6.53 percent), Eni (5 percent), Total (5 percent), Itochu (3.4 percent), Inpex (2.5 percent), ConocoPhillips (2.5 percent) and Amerada. RosBusinessConsulting
Source URL: http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=44405

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Switzerland Admits Being a Base for al-Qaida and 9/11
NewsMax.com Wires
Friday, June 25, 2004
BERN, Switzerland - Investigators have concluded that Switzerland was likely used as a base for financing and logistical support for the Sept. 11 attacks by al-Qaida, the country's attorney general said Thursday.
Federal Prosecutor Valentin Roschacher said authorities planned to begin court proceedings in the coming weeks in three terror cases, capping investigations started four days after the 2001 homicide hijackings in New York and Washington.
Story Continues Below
A special task force initially was charged with investigating Mohammed Atta, the alleged leader of the hijackers. Atta reportedly spent several hours in Zurich in July 2001 en route from Miami to Madrid, Spain.
But the scope of the investigation widened. The task force also focused on officials of the now-defunct Al-Taqwa Management Organization, a Swiss-based firm that went into liquidation in December 2001.
The U.S. government says Al-Taqwa helped fund Osama bin Laden's terrorist network. The company was founded in 1988 and run from Lugano by its Egyptian-born managing director, Youssef M. Nada, and his Syrian-born associate, Ali Himat.
Swiss authorities blocked the accounts of the company and the personal accounts of board members. Neighboring Liechtenstein froze the accounts of an affiliate firm.
Company officials have repeatedly denied links to terrorism, and accused Swiss authorities of taking part in a U.S.-led anti-Muslim campaign.
"I have nothing to do with terrorism. I have nothing to do with violence," Nada said in an interview late Thursday with Swiss public radio.
"If they say I am Islamist, yes, I am. If they say I am an activist, yes I am. But I am against terrorism and violence." He said bin Laden's acts were "against humanity."
Another investigation focused on a Saudi businessman with ties to Switzerland and the United States who allegedly acted as an al-Qaida contact.
The unidentified man, a former president of the Muwafaq charitable foundation, is believed to have used Swiss accounts to transfer millions of Swiss francs to individuals tied to al-Qaida. Prosecutors said Swiss authorities have frozen around $20 million in a Geneva bank as a result of their investigation.
The man has denied any links with terrorists, officials said.
A third inquiry centered on the alleged ties of Swiss-based militants to a series of bombings on foreigners' residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May 2003.
The attacks, linked to al-Qaida, killed 35 people including one Swiss citizen.
Overall, Swiss investigators have blocked around $27 million in connection with investigations into al-Qaida. And since December, Swiss police have arrested 10 foreigners in connection with the Saudi attacks. Two have been released.
The suspects in custody allegedly helped citizens from Arab nations enter Switzerland illegally and provided them with fake identities.
? 2004 Associated Press. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
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Speech: Terrorism - Policing the Unknown
Police Federation Annual Conference - 20 May 2004, Bournemouth
INTRODUCTION
First time speaking to this conference and grateful to you for inviting me.
Let me introduce myself. My role in the Home Office is to ensure we deliver on policing and counter-terrorism measures. I am responsible to the Home Secretary who leads on counter-terrorism and on our preparedness.
Want to focus on the broad picture of what we have in place to prevent a terrorist attack, what we have in place to recover from such an attack and the valuable lessons we have learned and progress we have made over the past few years.
Colin Smith and Paul Forbes will speak in more detail about procuring equipment and ensuring those expected to deal with a CBRN incident have the right training - now and in the future.
First, however, want to set this in context by giving you a general overview of the threat we face.
THE TERRORIST THREAT
Since 9/11 the UK has been on a heightened state of alert and that remains the position. There is considerable intelligence from various parts of the world to indicate that Al Qaida, and the groups associated with them, remain engaged in a continuing programme of terrorist activity.
Since the September 11th attacks we and our partners have had some significant successes in damaging Al Qaida's capability, and in thwarting potential attacks. By its nature much of this can not be made public though I dare say that at least some in this audience will know at least something of this through the work they do. Would like to pay tribute, in particular, to the work of the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Metropolitan Police, to the Special Branches in all of our forces for their work and to the Security Service. All have contributed to the greatly increased joint working and intelligence-sharing which we now have both in this country and between governments and law enforcement agencies across the world.
But, despite these successes, the terrorist threat remains real, and serious. As the events in Madrid showed, no country is immune from attack, and it is simply not possible to guarantee against such attacks in the future.
What does this mean for what we ask the public to do? The threat is not, at the current time, to specific targets. But we do need to ask the general public to be continually vigilant, to take responsibility and, if in doubt, to raise their concerns; to report the bag without an apparent owner; to report the van having its number plates changed; to report any suspicious or out of the ordinary behaviour to the Anti-Terrorist hotline [0800 789 321]; and above all to work with you, the police. The balance which we need to strike is for the public to be alert to activities that give cause for concern, but not to be so alarmed by the broader terrorist threat that it disrupts their daily lives.
GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO TERRORISM
And what are the implications which the current level of threat carries for us - the law enforcement community? Important in that context to remember that the threat of terrorism is not new to the UK and did not start on 11 September 2001. The UK has over 30 years of counter-terrorism experience to draw on.
However, 9/11 did change the way we think about it. It underlined the threat of multiple attacks by terrorists seeking to cause maximum destruction and harm irrespective of whether they live or die. In this new world any type of attack might be used including suicide bombs or the use of chemical, biological or radiological material. We know also that some of the terrorist groups we face do not have a traditional, hierarchical structure, which makes it harder to infiltrate them and disrupt their activities. These are the challenges we have had to respond to post 9/11 and why we have had to adapt our counter-terrorism strategy accordingly.
In particular, we have had to revisit well-established crisis response mechanisms to ensure that they are fit for purpose and able not only to respond to potentially catastrophic incidents but also to respond to their consequences were they ever to happen.
To do this the Government's strategy, led by the Home Secretary, is based on :
* Prevention - addressing the underlying causes of terrorism here and overseas: that means, among other things, ensuring that our Muslim citizens enjoy the full protection of the law and are able to participate to the full in British society;
* Pursuit - using intelligence effectively to disrupt and apprehend the terrorists - we have increased joint working and intelligence sharing between governments and law enforcement agencies across the world. We are tightening our border security, making identity theft harder and bearing down on terrorist finance;
* Protection - ensuring reasonable security precautions are in place from physical measures such as increased checks at airports to Counter-Terrorism Security Advisors providing guidance on protective security to sites holding potentially dangerous CBRN materials; and
* Preparedness - making sure the people and resources are in place to effectively respond to the consequences of a terrorist attack. I will come onto this in more detail later on.
We have also recognised since 9/11 that we needed to broaden the range of stakeholders involved in counter-terrorism planning. Exercises are a good example. Previously counter-terrorist exercises tended to begin with hostage negotiation or a hijack and end with the deployment of special forces. We still exercise such scenarios but our national counter-terrorism exercise programme is now designed to test a much wider range of possible events including what would happen if bombs did go off; if they did contain chemical or radioactive material; if a biological substance was released; if it was carried across local, regional or even international borders. 3 live counter-terrorism exercises are held each year. These are supplemented by some 15 table-top exercises held around the UK. But that is only part of the picture. We are constantly testing specific elements of the response at a local and regional level.
The exercise at Bank station in London last September is a good example. It focussed on how the emergency services worked together and it specifically tested the new equipment for decontamination and the procedures that came with it. The most important outcome, as with all such exercises, were the lessons learned. In that instance the areas we identified that needed further development included:
- work to improve the ability of those wearing protective suits to be able to communicate under difficult conditions;
- Ambulance crews needing to be able to provide earlier assessment, care and delivery of specific antidotes to contaminated casualties; and
- not under-estimating the number of people and specialist equipment required to respond to such emergencies.
Let me turn now to what we have actually put in place to be able to respond to the consequences of a terrorist attack if, despite all our efforts at prevention, one were to occur.
Particularly want to focus on the work we have done to prepare for a CBRN attack. This does not mean that there is a specific or imminent threat from CBRN, but the measures we need to have in place cannot be introduced overnight. To meet this challenge the CBRN Resilience Programme was established in 2001.
The Programme consists of a structured series of projects designed to deliver the necessary equipment, training and information and to improve our resilience. A nominated department leads each individual project.
The programme is overseen by a Home Office led cross-government Programme Board, which includes senior representatives from the emergency services, the devolved administrations and local and regional government. The Board's job is to keep the projects on track; to address risks to their delivery; and to enable myself and, ultimately Hazel Blears and the Home Secretary, to make sure the programme is delivered.
So what in practical terms, has the programme delivered? Let me take this under four headings.
First, training and Personal Protective Equipment. We now have over 5,000 fully CBRN trained police officers compared to just the few specialist individuals we had on 9/11. So we are now very close to our 5% target and are working with the Police National CBRN Centre to reach this as soon as possible. The Centre also runs an annual programme of refresher training - something which I know is of concern to this audience.
At the same time we have also been concerned to meet the needs of the 95% of you in this audience who have not had specific CBRN training but who need to have some awareness of CBRN incidents and what they involve. That is why the Police National CBRN Centre and the Metropolitan Police Service have jointly produced and disseminated a CBRN awareness CD-ROM which has been distributed to all police forces. The Fire Service have a similar interactive CD-ROM and a version is to be made available to Ambulance staff shortly. We know that these CD-ROMS are being used and we have received some very positive feedback on them.
Second, decontamination equipment. In July 2003 the first mass decontamination equipment for the Fire Service began to be delivered. Since then we have provided through the New Dimension Programme 80 purpose built Incident Response Units equipped with mass decontamination equipment. In addition we have put into service 360 mobile decontamination units around the country for use by the Ambulance Service and hospital Accident & Emergency Departments. From a capability limited to occasional accidents requiring decontamination we now have the capability to decontaminate 200 people per hour at a major incident.
Third, detection equipment. The Police and Fire Services now have more effective detection equipment available to them. After 9/11 we found that an increased number of `snake oil salesmen' were approaching individual forces directly, trying to sell them detection equipment. In response to concerns from police forces that they had no way of telling which items of equipment did what they said on the box, we set up a programme to test this. We have now issued guidance on the results so that the emergency services can make an informed choice about what to buy. For the police this guidance is co-ordinated through the Police National CBRN Centre. This programme of testing is continuing and further guidance will be issued in the summer. At the same time we have been working with the emergency services to capture their own requirements for detection capabilities so that we can drive industry to develop new products that provide what we want rather than having to make do with what's available.
Fourth, guidance. In September 2001, planning and practising for the consequences of a CBRN terrorist attack was limited at best. Since then we have, in consultation with local authorities, the emergency services, the health service and across government, published guidance for the emergency services and local authorities on decontaminating people (published Feb 2003, revised May 2004); guidance on CBRN specifically for local authorities (published October 2001, revised August 2003); guidance on decontaminating the open environment (April 2004) and, most recently, guidance on decontaminating buildings and infrastructure (May 2004). The purpose of the guidance is to assist planning for recovery from a CBRN attack and to encourage those responsible for planning and their partners to give us feedback on what does and does not work. The guidance can then be kept up-to-date and issues that you identify on the ground can be taken up and resolved as part of the continuing programme of work. All of this guidance is publicly available on the UK Resilience website [www.ukresilience.info].
CONCLUSION
Hope this helps to confirm that there is real substance behind the rhetoric. Of course, in one sense no amount of training, equipment or, indeed, money will ever be "enough". Just as we can not guarantee to disrupt every terrorist plan that may conceivably exist, we can not guarantee either that we will in every conceivable circumstance; in every conceivable location or at any conceivable time of the day or night be able to mount a totally resilient response. But the fact is that we are now far better prepared than we were in the past both in terms of understanding the threat and dealing with it were it to materialise.
We are also extending our preparedness. Where we are today is not the end point. We are developing our capacity to respond to new and more severe eventualities, but always guided by the latest intelligence assessment of the threat we face. This is sensible prioritisation. It is too easy simply to invent a particularly lurid scenario and say we would struggle to contain it. The important thing is that we prioritise; that we identify the threats what we are most likely to face; and that, based on this, we deliver what is most needed in terms of people, equipment, training and funding. That is what we are doing.
This is not a job which any of us, in government, in the Police Forces or in local government can do alone. Much of what we have achieved has only been possible through joint working and we will only be able to continue to deliver by maintaining this relationship and the constructive dialogue we have established.
Thank you

Iran 'covered up nuclear spill'
By Con Coughlin
(Filed: 27/06/2004)
Western intelligence officials are examining reports that Iran's Revolutionary Guards attempted to cover up a nuclear accident that occurred during the delivery of a secret shipment of weapons-grade uranium from North Korea.
The accident allegedly caused Teheran's new ?260 million international airport to be sealed off by Revolutionary Guard commanders within hours of its official opening on May 9.
The first scheduled commercial landing at the airport - an Iran Air civilian flight from Dubai - was intercepted by two Iranian air force jets and diverted to Isfahan, 155 miles away, even though it was low on fuel. At the same time, trucks were placed across the runway to prevent other aircraft from landing.
The airliner's interception, which was ordered by the Revolutionary Guards, prompted an official complaint from Iran's Civil Aviation Organisation (CAO). "No regulation in the world permits threatening a passenger plane," it said in a statement.
Seven weeks later, the showpiece airport named after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Iranian revolution, is still closed. All commercial flights are required to use the capital's ageing Mehrabad complex.
At the time of the incident, Revolutionary Guard commanders claimed that Khomeini airport had been closed because of "security problems".
Iranian aviation officials, however, believe that Teheran wanted to cover up evidence of the previously unreported nuclear accident in 2002, linked to Iran's secret programme to build an atom bomb. Although the airport, 30 miles south of Teheran, was not ready to take commercial traffic until this spring, military flights have landed there for at least two years.
In December 2002, according to officials with access to the airport, a North Korean cargo jet delivering a consignment of nuclear technology, including some weapons-grade uranium, was being unloaded at night under military supervision. During the delivery, a container slipped and cracked on the Tarmac. All personnel in the vicinity were taken from the site and given thorough medical examinations.
Crews from the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) wearing protective suits were brought in to clean up the spillage. The scientists worked at the site for several days, staying indoors during daylight and working only in darkness.
They later determined that the site had been completely decontaminated, and Revolutionary Guards allowed airport construction to resume, confident that they had concealed the incident from the outside world.
Their attitude changed, however, after inspectors working for the United Nations-backed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uncovered evidence in June 2003 that Iran had secretly enriched uranium to weapons grade at the Kalaye electric centrifuge plant, on the outskirts of Teheran. Iran had previously denied having the necessary technology.
The Kalaye revelations embarrassed Revolutionary Guards' commanders, who are responsible for protecting Iran's secret nuclear facilities. The findings prompted the IAEA to intensify pressure on Teheran for a full disclosure on the extent of Iran's nuclear programme, which Iranian officials continue to insist is being developed for purely peaceful purposes.
Iranian aviation officials, who cannot be named for their own security, believe that the Revolutionary Guards ordered the closure of Khomeini International Airport in case the IAEA inspectors detected deposits of enriched uranium. The airport will remain closed until Russian nuclear experts can examine the site of the spill and make sure that no traces of the illegal shipment remain.
A senior Western intelligence official said: "We are aware of the concerns being expressed by Iranian aviation experts and are trying to investigate them. The problem is that the Revolutionary Guards will not allow access to the airport to any foreign nationals, including UN inspectors."
Earlier this month the IAEA rebuked Iran over its failure to give a full account of its atomic programme as suspicions mounted that Iran is continuing with its efforts to build nuclear weapons.
Last week, American intelligence officials provided satellite evidence that they claimed showed a nuclear site at Lavizan Shiyan in Teheran. They said that it had been razed to remove evidence of research work that had been conducted there.
The airport closure reflects Iran's obsession with national security, which last week led to Revolutionary Guards seizing eight British servicemen patrolling the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iraq and Iran. The men were released after they were cleared of any wrongdoing.

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Al-Qaeda steals Saudi police cars for expat attacks
BY KEITH JONES in Riyadh AND PHILIP SHERWELL
(Filed: 27/06/2004)
AL-QAEDA MILITANTS in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, have stolen police cars as part of a strategy to set up fake official roadblocks to abduct or kill Westerners.
The theft of up to 15 police cars, possibly with the help of al-Qaeda sympathisers within the force, was disclosed by an international security company working in the kingdom. The militants have also painted other vehicles to resemble official ones and made replica uniforms.
The United States embassy has urged American citizens not to run security checkpoints after reports that Paul Johnson, the US engineer who was beheaded nine days ago, was taken hostage by men in uniforms driving what appeared to be a police car.
Some expatriates were said to have driven at speed through police checkpoints last week, prompting fears that they could be shot at by real officers. The Saudi authorities have installed extra checkpoints across the country, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate and rogue roadblocks.
Officials there have denied al-Qaeda claims that their security services have been penetrated by the militants. The US State Department has said that there is no evidence that members of the Saudi security forces were involved in Mr Johnson's murder.
Prince Turki al-Faisal, the Saudi ambassador to Britain , also contested claims of collusion in the Johnson case. He said: "I can go and buy the best English police uniform from a shop here in England." Asked about the apparent use of police cars, he added: "You can go into a garage and paint them and put these lights on them."
Foreign security consultants and Western intelligence services, however, believe that Saudi security forces have been infiltrated widely. One security report presented to a large foreign company described an alleged incident at the King Fahad National Guard Hospital a fortnight ago. Saudi men wearing military uniforms entered the building and asked staff where they could find the Westerners' offices. The guard who first directed them became suspicious and called the police, but the intruders escaped.
The same meeting was told that two men dressed in women's robes had tried to enter a secure ward at the Security Forces Hospital in Riyadh where one of the terrorists in the Al-Khobar hostage killings was being treated. The report said that the men were found only when a child saw the muzzle of a gun protruding through the robe.
Under its new leader, Saleh al-Awfi, the Saudi al-Qaeda network is believed to have targeted foreign workers, particularly Americans and Britons; Western airlines; the Saudi royal family and the oil industry. US intelligence believes that al-Qaeda has started inserting its agents at oil installations in preparation for an attack.
Awfi, a former police officer in charge of recruitment for the terror faction, became leader after the previous chief, Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin, was killed in Riyadh. He is believed to have recruited members of the security forces and the military as intelligence sources. Using the cover of a car salesman, he also made trips to Europe, possibly to set up financial networks or buy arms.
A security adviser for a British multinational company has advised employees to stay in secure areas after the Saudi interior minister said that expatriates could carry guns to protect themselves.
? Copyright of Telegraph Group Limited 2004.
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Saudi envoy's Zionist claims 'are offensive'
By Christopher Hart
(Filed: 27/06/2004)
The Saudi ambassador to London has reinforced controversial claims by the kingdom's royal family of a link between "Zionists" and recent al-Qaeda terror attacks in the country.
In a television interview, to be broadcast today, Prince Turki al-Faisal is asked about comments made by Crown Prince Abdullah, Saudi Arabia's de facto leader, that "Zionist hands" have been behind the attacks.
The ambassador replies: "When you're under attack by people who come and kill your countrymen and visitors to your country, and you see at the same time an attack on the kingdom from the outside, from Zionist circles, it is natural to make a connection."
He declined to expand on his remarks yesterday but his comments were condemned by Lord Janner of Braunstone, the former Labour MP. "In my view it is highly offensive and he must realise that the statement is totally unfounded."
"No terrorism serves the interests of Zionism. The allegation by the Crown Prince was rubbish and he must know that."
Prince Abdullah made his original remarks when he addressed a conference of leading Saudi officials and academics last month after an attack on contractors at the Yanbu oil facility that left six Westerners - including two Britons - dead.
"Zionism is behind it," he said. "It has become clear now. It has become clear to us. It is not 100 per cent, but 95 per cent that Zionist hands are behind what happened."
In his interview today, Prince Turki contends that Saudi Arabia has been subjected to concerted attacks by "so-called 'experts' with Zionist connections" for 50 years, and particularly since the terror atrocities of September 11, 2001.
"Is it beyond any comprehension or understanding that such attacks come at us from the Zionists on one side and from al-Qaeda on the other side and not make connection between them?" he asked.
The ambassador also says that the families of victims of terror attacks committed in Saudi Arabia, including Westerners, can still insist on the death penalty for their killers under Islamic sharia law, despite the offer of a state amnesty to terrorists who surrender in the next month.
He insists that the regime is doing everything it can to root out terrorists and rejects claims that the Saudi royal family's days are numbered.
Publishers wishing to reproduce photographs on this page should phone 44 (0) 207 538 7505 or e-mail syndicat@telegraph.co.uk

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China's military threat
The Pentagon's "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China" is a troubling document for a variety of reasons. Not the least of these is that the report makes clear that China, despite attempting a more tempered approach in recent years, is still committed to Communist ideology as it relates to foreign policy. Released in May, the report outlines how China's military buildup is in direct connection to its regional ambitions, which include challenging U.S. dominance in the Pacific. China's goal of regional hegemony is still many years off, though approaching at a pace that demands immediate attention.
China reasons correctly that it must upgrade its military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), to U.S. armed forces standards through a prolonged concentration on increasing investment and procurement of high-tech, "network-centric" systems. As the report notes, "China's military modernization is oriented on developing the capabilities to fight and win 'local wars under high-tech conditions.' Based largely on observations of U.S. and allied operations since Operation Desert Storm [in 1991], PLA modernization envisions seeking precision-strike munitions, modern command and control systems, and state-of-the-art [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)] platforms. Beijing sees its potential future adversaries, particularly the U.S. Armed Forces, acquiring these advanced systems, and this is the driver in PLA defensive and offensive force modernization." According to the report, China's military spending will increase 11.6 percent to $25 billion this year. The amount in real terms is actually higher, the report cautions, when research and foreign purchases are added, which would bring it between $50 billion to $70 billion. Such spending makes China the third-largest defense spender after the United States and Russia. China's military imports also rose 7 percent from last year, 90 percent of which come from Russia alone.
With its ISR advancements, the PLA expects to "provide a regional, and potentially hemispheric, continuous surveillance capability," according to the report. This would include land, air, sea and space systems comparable to U.S. systems. Also included in the PLA's modernization program are space-based systems with military and intelligence potential, antisatellite systems capable of disabling enemy satellites and electronic warfare systems capable of concealing PLA movement and operations, weakening enemy air-defense early-warning systems and disrupting integrated air-defense systems. In short, these are not only the high-tech systems that the U.S. military has employed with such deadly efficiency upon lesser enemies, but they are the sort that a military would need to defeat the United States.
The balance of power in Eastern Asia is quickly shifting in China's favor, especially in regards to Taiwan. Even if high-tech nations restrict arms trade with China, it is committing more resources toward modernizing its military than any other nation in the region. It is only a matter of time. As such, it is clear that the Bush administration's security strategy of ensuring U.S. military preeminence in the world applies to both fighting terror as well as guaranteeing peace.

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Analysis: Afghanistan And Iran Confront Their Drug Problem
By Bill Samii and Amin Tarzi
The international community will mark the International Day Against Drug Abuse on 26 June. Global opium cultivation is down, but increased cultivation in Afghanistan and higher opium yields led to a 5 percent increase in illicit global opium production between 2002 and 2003. Indeed, Afghanistan leads the world in opium production, and Iran leads the world in seizures of opiates, according to the "World Drug Report 2004" released on 25 June (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/world_drug_report.html). Therefore, the fate of the world heroin market depends on events in Southwest Asia.
Since the collapse of the Taliban, the situation in Afghanistan has improved in almost every aspect except in the area of stemming opium poppy cultivation. Initially the Taliban used the income from opium to finance its regime and production rose steadily from 1996, peaking in 1999 to an estimated 4,600 tons. By 2000, Afghanistan was responsible for 70 percent of the global production of illegal opium. But in July of that year, having been hounded by the international community, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar issued a decree banning opium cultivation in the country but not its trade (likely a gesture to gain international recognition for the Taliban regime). According to the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), opium production in Afghanistan was reduced greatly following the ban from 3,300 tons in 2000 to just 185 tons the following year.
Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime and the creation of the Afghan Interim Administration, Chairman Hamid Karzai in January 2000 banned both the cultivation and trade of opium poppies in the country. However, with the central authority's influence being limited to Kabul and a few main cities and the international military forces concentrating on the war on terrorism, drug dealers and their supporters found a good opportunity to exploit the situation.
According to UN estimates, Afghan farmers produced 3,400 tons of opium in 2002 compared to 185 tons the preceding year -- an alarming increase. The numbers have continued to worsen. In 2003, a year in which three-quarters of the global opium supply originated in Afghanistan, production increased by another 6 percent to 3,600 tons. It is projected that cultivation will increase yet again in 2004. The UN's most recent report asserts that the potential farmgate value of global opium production in 2003 is about $1.2 billion; more than 85 percent of this output was made in Afghanistan. It is estimated that 7 percent of the Afghan population -- 1.7 million people -- is directly involved in opium production. More than two-thirds of the farmers told the UN that they intend to increase poppy cultivation.
Also worrisome is the fact that opium cultivation has been introduced to regions of Afghanistan that traditionally have not grown the crop and an increasing number of Afghans are becoming addicted to heroin -- a fact that has translated into an increase in HIV cases in the country through the sharing of needles. The officially AIDS-free Afghanistan recently announced the first case of death from the disease.
UNODCCP Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa warned recently that the international community faces critical decisions, adding that if counternarcotics commitments to Afghanistan are not translated into lower levels of opium production, there is a "risk of [the] opium economy undermining all that has been achieved in creating a democratic modern Afghanistan." Costa also warned the International Conference on Counternarcotics, held in Kabul from 8-10 February, that "fighting drug trafficking equals fighting terrorism."
Costa then asked for the resources to increase the number of operations against drug laboratories and that the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) also be involved in combating drugs in Afghanistan. However, NATO has so far been reluctant to commit itself to tackling this issue. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently stated that counternarcotics operations were not the main responsibility of the NATO-led international force. In November 2003, outgoing NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson said the alliance was "going to Afghanistan because" it did not want Afghanistan to come to Europe, "whether it be in terms of terrorism or drugs." It seems that once NATO actually went to Afghanistan, Robertson's message was lost in the political shuffle, giving the drug dealers and various warlords in Afghanistan the upper hand in this dangerous game.
The commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno said last week that his country is planning to be more aggressive in an effort to curb opium poppy cultivation in the country, but conceded that U.S. troops will not actively destroy the crops, Reuters reported on 17 June. Barno cited a "finite force" whose "primary focus continues to be counterterrorist operations."
International forces and local authorities have an immense challenge ahead of them: to stop the cultivation of opium poppies, to stop the trafficking of drugs, and to destroy the laboratories that process the opium into heroin.
Indeed, the level of international involvement in dealing with Afghan narcotics is a major Iranian grievance. Iran does not, furthermore, believe that its counternarcotics activities get sufficient attention or credit from the West, the ultimate destination of most opiates originating in Afghanistan. In a 1 June meeting with a visiting Kuwaiti official, Interior Minister Abdolvahed Musavi-Lari said Iran cannot afford to wait for Western help, IRNA reported. He complained about the extent of opium cultivation in Afghanistan despite the presence of military personnel from Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Iran leads the international community in intercepting the opium, morphine, and heroin that originate in Afghanistan, according to the UN (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/global_illicit_drug_trends.html). Tehran reports that approximately 2 million people in the country abuse drugs. Poor relations with the Taliban regime meant that Iran made little headway in persuading its eastern neighbor to curtail opium production. It therefore relied mainly on interdiction efforts.
Relations with Kabul now are friendly and Tehran is involved with the promotion of crop substitution plans. Iranian Deputy Agriculture Jihad Minister Gholamreza Sahrain visited the Afghan capital on 12 June to discuss these activities, IRNA reported. In a meeting with Agriculture and Livestock Minister Seyyed Hussein Anwari, the Iranian official noted that so far Tehran has provided $10 million in aid for opium eradication.
Iran is also working closely with other states that neighbor Afghanistan in an effort to create a "security belt" that will stop the narcotics shipments. In late May and early June, Ali Hashemi, head of Iran's Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ), visited Uzbekistan. He met with his Uzbek counterpart, Kamal Dustemov, on 1 June and they discussed the necessity of regional states closing ranks in the drug control campaign, IRNA reported. The two officials expressed the belief that peace and stability in Afghanistan would be matched with reduced narcotics production. In the following days, Hashemi met with Interior Minister Zokirjon Almatov and Public Health Minister Feruz Nazirov.
In the latter meeting, Hashemi noted that there are 350 centers in Iran that treat drug addicts. Treatment and demand-reduction are receiving more and more attention in Iran. Citing a figure of 214 billion rials (about $27 million), Hashemi said in Tehran on 26 May that more than 36 percent of the country's drug control budget is allocated for prevention programs, IRNA reported. This money will go to education for young people, cultural centers, mosques, and other nongovernmental organizations. A total of 600 billion rials (about $76 million), he said, will be used for prevention and interdiction.
Hashemi's earlier comments about the success rate in treating drug addicts were not very encouraging. He said at a 12 May meeting of the drug control planning department in Rasht that 10-15 percent of the addicts are treated successfully. He added that 200,000 people in Iran are addicted to heroin and 64,000 are infected with AIDS.
Unless the Iranian government can provide the professional and social opportunities that will discourage people from abusing drugs, the addiction and HIV infection figures will probably worsen. And until opium cultivation in Afghanistan is eliminated, Iran will continue to be a consumer of these products.



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Ex-CIA analyst: Iran tied
to 9-11, al-Qaida
Tehran, bin Laden sought 'to cooperate against a common enemy'
Posted: June 26, 2004
1:00 a.m. Eastern
? 2004 WorldNetDaily.com
Former CIA analyst Douglas MacEachin, a member of the 9-11 commission staff, said in testimony last week Iran and its terrorist group ally Hezbollah were linked to the al-Qaida terrorist group.
Other U.S. intelligence officials said there is also evidence Iran is linked to the Sept. 11 attacks. According to the officials, two of the hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, who were aboard the aircraft that hit the Pentagon, had stayed at the Iranian ambassador's residence in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, before entering the United States in January 2001.
MacEachin disclosed that the Iran-al-Qaida ties were revealed in the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers residence complex that housed U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia. The bombing killed 19 Americans.
The attack was believed to be the work of a Saudi Shi'ite Hezbollah group with help from Iran.
"Intelligence obtained shortly after the bombing, however, also supported suspicions of bin Laden's involvement," MacEachin said. "There were reports in the months preceding the attack that he was seeking to facilitate another shipment of explosives to Saudi Arabia, and on the day of the attack he was congratulated by other members of the Islamic Army."
U.S. intelligence agencies mistakenly assumed that, since a Shi'ite group was involved, rival Sunnis were not, he said.
"Later intelligence, however, showed a far greater potential for collaboration between Hezbollah and al-Qaida than many had previously thought," MacEachin said.
Several years before the Khobar bombing, bin Laden and Iranian officials held talks on ending differences "to cooperate against a common enemy," he said.
"A small group of al-Qaida operatives subsequently traveled to Iran, and another group went to Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon for training in explosives and intelligence," he said. "And Bin Laden is reported to have showed particular interest at this time in the Hezbollah truck-bombing tactics used in Lebanon in 1983 that had killed 241 U.S. Marines. So in sum, we have seen now strong but indirect evidence that bin Laden's organization did in fact play some as yet unknown role in the Khobar attack."
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from the June 24, 2004 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0624/p16s01-cogn.html
Six key questions for the future of Iraq - and its oil
By David R. Francis
In a week, the new Iraqi government takes charge of the world's second largest pool of oil. That's important not only to the Iraqis, but to motorists and other oil consumers around the world.
It is sometimes alleged that the real reason the United States invaded Iraq was to control that nation's petroleum. But if that was a hope of some neo- conservatives and US oil industry executives, the war has so far failed to achieve that objective.
Indeed, Iraq's new oil minister, Samir Ghadban, talks of taking back full sovereignty over the oil wealth July 1, of reestablishing the Iraqi National Oil Co.'s vital role in production as it used to be before Saddam Hussein, and of dismissing all US and other outside advisers, according to an interview in the London-based Financial Times.
Such words don't seem to disturb Washington. Officials there speak of "a lot of respect" for Mr. Ghadban, a British-educated technocrat who is a Shiite, and they call him "a man who knows how to get things done."
Ghadban has been talking for months to many people about how to manage his nation's oil resources, and of making some structural reforms to improve the oil industry's efficiency.
Despite a new round of sabotage, Ghadban figures that oil will still produce $16 billion in revenues this year. Today's high price of oil has meant the Coalition Provisional Authority, the US-led occupation body, has had an extra $2.5 billion on top of its original budget to spend on security and development.
Up to now, the Iraqis have striven to bring their oil industry back to its pre-war production levels. Now the oil ministry faces major questions about the long-term future of Iraq's oil industry. The actual decisions are expected to await the government to be elected seven months from now. Here are the big questions.

1. Will the oil ministry invite foreign oil companies, with their capital and technical expertise, to search for and develop new oil fields and build infrastructure, thereby opening the door for US firms? Or will it leave that work to the Iraqi National Oil Co. with its skilled workers? Or will it be a mixture of both?

2. How will the oil revenues be used? At the moment, Iraq's oil revenues go into a development fund created under a United Nations resolution. Next week the Iraqis, not the occupation regime, decide how to use that fund to pay for repairs of power grids, schools, and other needs.

3. How much of the oil revenues will be used to pay off Iraq's massive debts? Already, 5 percent of that development fund is allotted to pay reparations for damage and casualties from Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Some $48 billion in claims have been accepted, and $18 billion paid on them. Another $80 billion in claims have yet to be adjudicated by a UN compensation commission.
When that's finished, perhaps by the end of this year, Iraq will owe about $46 billion in compensation, calculates Bathsheba Crocker, an expert at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington.
Iraq owes another $120 billion to foreign governments and other foreign entities. The US has been striving to negotiate a dramatic reduction in that amount, perhaps by two-thirds. But at the G-8 summit earlier this month, France refused to go below a 50 percent cut. When the debt talks are over, Iraq may still owe more than $40 billion on these debts.

Full repayment of the debts, even with Iraq's huge oil wealth, is most unlikely.

4. How will the Kurds' desire for control of the northern oil fields be worked out? At the moment, the plan is for the Baghdad government to centralize the oil revenues and then distribute the benefits to the entire country, including the Kurdish areas in the north. The Kurds get some oil money directly now.

5. Will Iraq make all oil payments public and transparent in order to discourage corruption? That is being urged on all oil-producing nations by the Open Society Institute in New York, a George Soros group.

6. What model will Iraq take for its oil industry? That of Saudi Arabia, Norway, Venezuela, or even Alaska? Alaska distributes some of its oil profits to its citizens. Nancy Birdsall, president of the Center for Global Development, would like Iraq to do something similar as a means of avoiding what is commonly called the "resource curse."

For most developing countries, "oil riches are far from the blessing they are often assumed to be," write Ms. Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian, an International Monetary Fund official, in a forthcoming Foreign Affairs article. "In fact, countries often end up poor precisely because they are oil rich."
Oil wealth, they note, tends to impede the development of institutions and values crucial to open, market-based economies and civil liberties, including the rule of law, protection of property rights, and political participation.
The 34 oil-rich developing countries have weak political and economic institutions. In some cases, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola, they're nonexistent. Even Libya and especially rich Saudi Arabia suffer from "underdeveloped political institutions."
Oil riches often have led to high-level corruption and unchecked abuse of state power. With oil prices usually volatile, a nation relying on oil wealth sometimes faces a pattern of flush spending and then disruptive spending cuts that hurt development efforts.
Major oil revenues can also force up the value of a nation's currency on foreign-exchange markets, making it difficult for other industries to compete.
To avoid the oil curse, Birdsall and Mr. Subramanian suggest Iraq should incorporate into its constitution a provision enshrining the right of each Iraqi household to receive a share of the country's oil proceeds.
The chances of that happening appear slim. But one way or another, Washington officials say, Iraq's oil wealth must be used to serve the Iraqi people.
"Oil doesn't correlate with national success that often," a Washington official admits. In one week's time, it will be up to Iraqis to figure out how to avoid the resource curse.

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Mourning After
by Kenneth Pollack
Post date: 06.25.04
Issue date: 06.28.04
Bill Galston is one helluva debater. In the fall of 2002, well before the invasion of Iraq, I faced Bill--a University of Maryland professor and a former colleague of mine in the Clinton administration--in a public debate, and he kicked my rhetorical ass. He did it by holding up a copy of my book, The Threatening Storm, and saying to the audience, "If we were going to get Ken Pollack's war, I could be persuaded to support it. But we are not going to get Ken Pollack's war; we are going to get George Bush's war, and that is a war I will not support." Bill's words haunted me throughout the run-up to the invasion. Several months ago, I sent him a note conceding that he had been right.
The primary cause of our current problems in Iraq is the reckless, and often foolish, manner in which this administration has waged the war and the reconstruction. For that reason, when I think back to the prewar debate, the thought that nags at me most is that I, too, should have foreseen what Bill Galston did--that the Bush administration would not fight the war properly. It looms in my thinking as something that probably could have been known before the war and that, had I recognized it, might have led me down a different intellectual path.
The absence of an aggressive, threatening Iraqi WMD program was just as significant as the administration's mishandling of the occupation. But, for all of the reasons I laid out in an article in the January 2004 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, it would have been extremely difficult to recognize this before the war. Although it is commonplace for people to come forth after the fact and insist they had known all along, the truth is that very, very few of those claiming "I told you so" actually did. There was a consensus among the governments of the world and a virtual consensus among the experts about the basic threat from Iraq; the great debate was over whether a war was necessary to remedy it. Few claimed that Iraq had no WMD programs, many of those who did seemed to have been discredited in some way or another, and they argued with less evidence than could be mustered in support of the mainstream position.
Other aspects of my rationale for why a war would ultimately be necessary--just not when and how the Bush administration waged it--have been borne out by the course of events. The human rights argument was always an important element of my thinking, and the revelations of mass starvation throughout the Shia south and mass graves throughout the country have substantiated at least this aspect of the argument.
Similarly, Saddam again proved himself to be exactly the kind of dangerous decision-maker that I, and other Iraq experts, feared would make him difficult to deter if he were to acquire nuclear weapons. Here I want to take issue with an assertion that Tom Friedman has made--that, since Saddam was not known to be suicidal, he could have been deterred, even if he were to acquire nuclear weapons. While I have the utmost respect for Tom, I think this point is ahistorical at best. The annals of warfare abound with leaders who embarked on foreign policy adventures they did not believe would result in their own destruction--political or literal--but that did. Napoleon did not think he was committing suicide when he invaded Russia, but he was. Hannibal did not think he was committing suicide when he attacked Rome, but he was. Not even Hitler thought he was committing suicide when he launched World War II, but he was. There is a long, long list of other examples.
Saddam himself had embarked on a number of monstrously risky foreign policy adventures during his 30-plus years in power--many of which could easily have proved suicidal and were seen as such even by the sycophants who comprised his inner circle. The fact that they did not lead to his fall was mostly dumb luck. Over the last year, the debriefings of senior Iraqi officials captured during the invasion have revealed that, even with roughly 100,000 ground troops massed on the Iraqi border, Saddam convinced himself that the United States would never actually launch a war and, therefore, he could continue to play games with weapons inspectors. But, this time, Saddam's luck finally ran out and his reckless and delusional risk-taking resulted in his own (political, at least) suicide.
Which is why my own thinking keeps coming back to that debate in the fall of 2002. Bill Galston was right on the money. The issue with which I constantly wrestle is whether I, too, should have foreseen that this administration would not do the job right.
To some extent, I had actually been expecting Bill's objection. Before my book was published, I asked Foreign Affairs Managing Editor Gideon Rose to critique the manuscript, and he warned me that the key question I might some day have to answer was whether I would still support a war fought without all the preparations I considered essential. Half of the argument of my book is devoted to the importance of going to war the right way (for example, by dealing with Al Qaeda and the war on terrorism first, restarting the Arab-Israeli peace process, building a large multinational coalition, employing at least 250,000 troops, and being ready to make a full commitment to what I expected would inevitably be a long and difficult process of reconstruction afterward). Gideon astutely observed that I might have to decide whether the war was still worth fighting if we were only going to do it the wrong way.
So, thanks to Gideon's caution, I was ready with a rejoinder to Bill that night. I said it was up to the American people to ensure that the Bush administration fought the war the right way. I even had evidence to back up my point. I noted that, although in the spring of 2002, Bush officials had insisted that they did not need the blessings of either Congress or the United Nations to invade Iraq, thanks to strong popular pressure, President Bush had chosen to seek out a congressional resolution of support and to go back to the United Nations to secure international sanction.
It wasn't a bad answer. In the fall of 2002, it was possible to believe that the administration would fight the war responsibly, and there was plenty of time to attend to all of the preconditions I had laid out in my book. But, even then, I harbored the fear that Bill was right and the Bush administration would not handle the war properly. Although the administration's policy in Afghanistan was still evolving, there were ominous signs that Bush officials were going to walk away from that problem as quickly as they could. Likewise, statements by some senior administration officials regarding Iraq suggested a rash determination to topple Saddam with little regard for the potential costs and risks--for example, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Woflowitz's dismissal of Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki's prescient estimate that we would need "several hundred thousand soldiers" to secure Iraq. I feared that, if they persevered in that approach, then, as I had warned in my book, a war with Iraq would create as many problems as it solved.
I still have great difficulty fathoming why the administration chose not to fight the war the right way. I remain convinced that, while reconstruction was never guaranteed to succeed, the current mess we now find ourselves in is largely, if not entirely, a product of the administration's determination to do things the wrong way.
Why did they try to fight the war (and do the reconstruction) on the cheap? Why attack with only four divisions of ground troops when roughly another four were available--and were all deployed to Iraq within the following year (albeit only to relieve the invasion force)? Why did the administration seem to go out of its way to alienate so many of our allies and devote so little time to the U.N. process? Rumsfeld's quips about "old Europe" and not needing the British to fight the war seemed deliberately calculated to frighten off potential allies. Why, too, did they dismiss all of the preparations for postwar reconstruction performed by the Department of State, usaid, the intelligence community, the uniformed services, and a host of other agencies, and instead follow Ahmed Chalabi's siren song? It would have been one thing if none of that work had ever been carried out. But, as someone who participated in many of those exercises, I know that much good planning was available and was discarded by those in the Pentagon charged with reconstruction.
These questions are among the great mysteries of the war. At present, I suspect that the answers lie in a combination of factors: The "transformationists" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (probably including the secretary himself) wanted to prove that a big Army was unnecessary; the president's political minders probably wanted to keep the war small and inexpensive to make it more palatable to the American public; and the administration's "regime changers" wanted to demonstrate that toppling rogue regimes could be accomplished cheaply and easily to make it possible to go after others.
I still do not believe it was obvious (or even inevitable) that the administration would act so recklessly. The past record of many of the Bush principals suggested the opposite--a key element in my own thinking whenever I pondered Bill Galston's charge. Secretary of State Colin Powell was famous for a doctrine that insisted that the United States fight wars only in a highly conservative fashion--with all of the resources at the disposal of the country and all of the support that could possibly be mustered. And, in the fall of 2002 and winter of 2003, after the president decided to go back to the United Nations, Powell again seemed to be playing a major role in steering Iraq policy. When Cheney was secretary of defense, he was famous for having told (not asked) General Norman Schwarzkopf that he was getting another 250,000 troops to fight the Gulf war. Indeed, many members of the Bush foreign policy team had served in the George H.W. Bush administration, which had done a magnificent job enlisting the support of the United Nations at a time when the United Nations was not considered a useful vehicle for building a war coalition. That administration had also done everything possible to ensure the kind of broad coalition of European, Asian, and Arab allies that we needed this time as well.
In addition to reversing course in the fall of 2002 to seek both a congressional resolution authorizing the use of force and a new U.N. resolution, this Bush administration had also taken other steps that initially demonstrated a willingness to fight the war the right way. In particular, many in the administration had once supported Ahmed Chalabi's hare-brained scheme to send a few thousand lightly armed Iraqi oppositionists into Iraq, backed by nothing but U.S. air power, to try to take down Saddam's regime. But, when war suddenly became a real prospect, they dumped this nonsense and instead opted for a realistic invasion plan relying on a large American ground force--albeit one not big enough to handle postwar reconstruction.
The willingness of members of the Bush administration to abandon their past records of prudence and match Saddam's reckless and delusional behavior with their own may have been the most important element missing from my own thinking about the war. By the time the war began, I recognized that they had not taken most of the precautionary measures I had recommended (although, even then, I did not realize the extent to which they had simply dismissed all the postwar planning done by agencies other than the Pentagon), and I was already anguished over the war.
Today, even knowing what I do about our mistaken assessment of Iraq's WMD and our mistaken decisions about postwar reconstruction, I remain deeply torn about the decision to invade Iraq. At this moment, there are still positives to be weighed against the growing negatives. But, as I warned beforehand, I suspect history will judge that decision based principally upon whether reconstruction succeeds or fails. If it fails--and Iraq and the region are plunged into chaos--as current trends threaten, then it will be hard for anyone to justify the war.
Kenneth Pollack is research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution.

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Good Times, Bad Times
From the July 5 / July 12, 2004 issue: The New York Times can't decide whether or not there's a connection between Saddam and al Qaeda.
by William Kristol
07/05/2004, Volume 009, Issue 41
Here is the New York Times, editorializing in high dudgeon on June 17:
Now President Bush should apologize to the American people. . . . Of all the ways Mr. Bush persuaded Americans to back the invasion of Iraq last year, the most plainly dishonest was his effort to link his war of choice with the battle against terrorists worldwide. . . . Mr. Bush and his top advisers . . . should have known all along that there was no link between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
Here are excerpts from a front-page article by Thom Shanker in the New York Times one week later, on June 25:
Contacts between Iraqi intelligence agents and Osama bin Laden when he was in Sudan in the mid-1990s were part of a broad effort by Baghdad to work with organizations opposing the Saudi ruling family, according to a newly disclosed document obtained by the Americans in Iraq. . . .
The new document, which appears to have circulated only since April, was provided to the New York Times several weeks ago. . . .
A translation of the new Iraqi document was reviewed by a Pentagon working group in the spring . . .
The task force concluded that the document "appeared authentic," and that it "corroborates and expands on previous reporting" about contacts between Iraqi intelligence and Mr. bin Laden in Sudan, according to the task force's analysis. . . .
The document, which asserts that Mr. bin Laden "was approached by our side," states that Mr. bin Laden previously "had some reservations about being labeled an Iraqi operative," but was now willing to meet in Sudan, and that "presidential approval" was granted to the Iraqi security service to proceed. . . .
The document is of interest to American officials as a detailed, if limited, snapshot of communications between Iraqi intelligence and Mr. bin Laden, but this view ends with Mr. bin Laden's departure from Sudan. At that point, Iraqi intelligence officers began "seeking other channels through which to handle the relationship, in light of his current location," the document states.
Members of the Pentagon task force that reviewed the document said it described no formal alliance being reached between Mr. bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence. The Iraqi document itself states that "co-operation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop freely through discussion and agreement." . . .
The Iraqi document states that Mr. bin Laden's organization in Sudan was called "The Advice and Reform Commission." The Iraqis were cued to make their approach to Mr. bin Laden in 1994 after a Sudanese official visited Uday Hussein, the leader's son, as well as the director of Iraqi intelligence, and indicated that Mr. bin Laden was willing to meet in Sudan.
A former director of operations for Iraqi intelligence Directorate 4 met with Mr. bin Laden on Feb. 19, 1995, the document states.
So much for "no link between Iraq and al Qaeda." So much for the claim of the Times editorial, and of its page-one headline the same day mischaracterizing the 9/11 Commission staff report. We look forward to the editors' apology.
More important, we look forward to the Bush administration seriously and relentlessly engaging the debate over the Saddam-al Qaeda terror connection. We hope we do not wait in vain.
Vice President Cheney did sally forth last week, the day after the release of the 9/11 Commission staff report. But he hasn't much followed up since then, and others have been mostly silent. Does the Bush team really think it can command majority support for the war in Iraq if it allows its opponents an uncontested field to make the case that Saddam had no significant links to terrorists?
After all, the situation on the ground in Iraq is likely to remain ambiguous over the next few months. So simply depending on things to turn out well after the June 30 turnover of power is, to say the least, politically risky. Large caches of weapons of mass destruction are unlikely to turn up soon. This does not mean Saddam's history of concealing his weapons programs from inspectors was not a solid ground for his removal. But it does mean that the WMD issue is not a likely winner for the administration.
The terror link issue, by contrast, should be a clear winner. Saddam and Osama had a "relationship" in the past, and sought continuing "cooperation" between their two "organizations." Could the president of the United States have simply left Saddam in power, with sanctions coming off, reconstituting his weapons programs, confident that Saddam and al Qaeda would not work together again in the future? Would this have been a reasonable course of action?
This is a genuinely important debate for the country to have in this election year. It is a good debate for the Bush administration--if it has the wit and the nerve to engage it.
--William Kristol
? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved

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This Terrorist Is Bad Enough on His Own
By PETER BERGEN
WASHINGTON -- Despite the finding by the 9/11 commission staff that there is no evidence of a "collaborative relationship" between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, Bush administration officials continue to insist the two worked together. As evidence, they frequently cite Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the 37-year-old Jordanian who is arguably the most dangerous terrorist in the world today. Mr. Zarqawi, who fled his Afghan training grounds after the American invasion and found safe haven in Iraq, was most likely behind the string of bombings across Iraq on Thursday that killed more than 100; in May, he beheaded Nicholas Berg, an American communications engineer working in Iraq.
The day after the 9/11 staff report came out, Vice President Dick Cheney again put forward Mr. Zarqawi. "After we went in and hit his training camp, he fled to Baghdad," Mr. Cheney said, adding that Mr. Zarqawi "ran the poisons factory in northern Iraq out of Baghdad." The administration has also pointed out that American intelligence believes Mr. Zarqawi received medical treatment in Baghdad in 2002.
So is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi really the missing link between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein? Actually, the evidence of his relationship with either is far from clear cut. Mr. Zarqawi runs an organization separate from Al Qaeda called Tawhid. One indication of his independence is that when he founded his training camp in Afghanistan in 2000, he did so near the western city of Herat, on the Iranian border, hundreds of miles away from Al Qaeda's camps.
Roger Cressey, who was a counterterrorism official on the National Security Council staff at that time, told me that Mr. Zarqawi's camp was set up "as much in competition as it was in cooperation" with Al Qaeda. Indeed, Shadi Abdullah, a Tawhid member apprehended in Germany in 2002, told investigators that his group saw itself to be "in rivalry" with Mr. bin Laden's, according to a German official privy to the details of the interrogation.
And in January, American forces found a letter believed to have been written by Mr. Zarqawi to Al Qaeda leaders hiding on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. It requested aid in fighting the Shiites of Iraq: "You, gracious brothers, are the leaders, guides and symbolic figures of jihad and battle. We do not see ourselves as fit to challenge you if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy; we will be your readied soldiers." The tone of the letter is clearly that of someone outside Al Qaeda appealing for its help. And Al Qaeda's leaders seem little interested in fomenting a Sunni-Shiite civil war in Iraq; in the audiotapes he has released in the past year, Osama bin Laden has made no mention of the Shiites.
"The central question the administration has failed to answer is: Was there guidance or direction from the Al Qaeda leadership to Zarqawi?" Mr. Cressey, the former counterterrorism official, told me. "The evidence presented so far is there was not." At a briefing on June 17, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seemed to agree with that assessment, saying of Mr. Zarqawi that "someone could legitimately say he's not Al Qaeda."
Mr. Zarqawi's connections to Saddam Hussein are equally tenuous. After fleeing Afghanistan, he probably spent as much time living in Iran as in Iraq. What Mr. Cheney described as the "poisons factory" Mr. Zarqawi ran was actually in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq, an area protected by American jets since 1991. Mr. Rumsfeld had more control than Saddam Hussein over that part of Iraq.
As for the medical treatment Mr. Zarqawi supposedly received in Baghdad, for some time American officials thought it was a leg amputation. However, the footage of Mr. Zarqawi in the video of Mr. Berg's execution seems to show a man in possession of both limbs. And last week Mr. Zarqawi released an audiotape on a jihadist Web site containing a blistering critique of Saddam Hussein, whom he described as a "devil" who "killed the innocent."
Mr. Zarqawi is a ruthless murderer, and capturing or killing him would be a major step toward pacifying Iraq. But if he is, as President Bush has said, the "best evidence" of a link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, the administration's case is a weak one.
Peter Bergen is a fellow at the New America Foundation and the author of "Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden."
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
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Europe's Commitment To Iraq
By Romano Prodi and Chris Patten
Saturday, June 26, 2004; Page A23
The occupation of Iraq will be formally over in a matter of days. As acres of newsprint have testified, last year's invasion provoked serious divisions across Europe: between governments and peoples, within governments and among them. We share the experience of being from countries whose governments supported the invasion in the face of substantial public protest.
These European divisions over the coalition's military action spilled over into public disagreement with, and in many cases hostility toward, the power and role of the United States. In some U.S. circles, the feeling was reciprocated -- we heard a great deal about European cowardice and naivete.
These misconceptions are as widespread as they are wrong: The United States can be, and historically has been, a powerful force for good in the world and, of course, for good in Europe. But Europe has also played its part in making the world more prosperous and stable. It has been and should continue to be willing to take on its full share of the burdens of peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict prevention across the world. For one reason or another, these views, widely shared by almost everyone in Europe, have not been heard or understood on the other side of the Atlantic.
In particular, Europeans do not underestimate the importance of the fight against terrorism. On the contrary, not only do we believe it is one of the most serious challenges to the security of our societies, we also have a long and difficult experience in dealing with this threat. Many Europeans were, however, convinced that the invasion of Iraq would make Islamist terrorism more difficult to overcome, even though all agreed that Saddam Hussein was an appalling dictator.
Debate on how and why we came to this point will occupy historians and political scientists for years to come. The state of Iraq, and its implications for the region, present a more urgent question: What now?
Three issues in particular are brought into stark relief. First, how should a superpower, indeed the superpower, exercise its global leadership role, and how should others respond? Second, how can we reinforce the effort, begun in earnest after Sept. 11, 2001, to build a global consensus on dealing with new threats -- weapons of mass destruction, gross abuses of human rights and terrorism? Third, and in response to the other two, how can we equip the United Nations system to deal with these issues appropriately and effectively -- agreeing, for example, whether and when there might be a legal justification for preventive use of force.
We cannot allow these debates to continue indefinitely, and we look forward to the report of Kofi Annan's high-level panel later this year to help resolve them. In the meantime, the situation in Iraq denies us the luxury of waiting for these proposals: A clear international consensus, now, is a necessary condition for a successful transition in that troubled country. America and Europe will have to work together to ensure an acceptable outcome in Iraq. We will all be damaged if we fail.
The stakes are extremely high: Failure could mean Iraq's disintegration. One of the most predictable developments over the coming months will be the attempt to discredit or murder the moderate leadership in each community in Iraq in an attempt to foment the civil war that could break this fragile country apart, with dangerous regional implications. An Iraq sliding into chaos would become a breeding ground for international terrorism. We are already seeing the warning signs in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan. The human cost is obvious, and compelling. Self-interest obliges us to consider the potential economic cost of instability in the world's foremost suppliers of oil. Politically, failure can only cause the divide between Europe and the United States to grow.
It is precisely to avoid this nightmare scenario that the European Commission has worked from the very beginning to promote European and international consensus on the way forward in Iraq. Since March of last year, when European leaders unanimously supported a central role for the United Nations in the postwar transition, we have worked to create a multilateral umbrella for reconstruction efforts, enabling countries that did not support the invasion to nonetheless support the transition. The participation of Russia, Iran, Turkey and others in Iraq's reconstruction is not unrelated to this work. We have backed this policy with substantial financial resources.
This month we have presented proposals for a medium-term strategy for Iraq, looking at how the EU can progressively engage with a country with which it has never had any formal relationship. We are keen to start working with a new Iraqi administration with real authority to govern, in order to develop plans for the future together. Alongside this we are aware of the need to work with Iraq's nascent civil society to promote a broader engagement. Of course, given the current uncertainties, we are not expecting any overnight miracles. Rather, as conditions allow, we hope to build the same kind of long-term relationship with Iraq as we have already with most of the Arab world, bearing in mind that the EU is the biggest trading partner and donor of development assistance for nearly all the countries of that region.
We hope, then, that the meeting we will have with President Bush today at the U.S.-EU summit in Ireland, the first meeting of the leaders of the European Union's now 25 states with the United States, will be an opportunity to demonstrate that, whatever differences we may have had, for the future we are united in a common resolve to work together, side by side as true partners to see the emergence of a pluralist, democratic Iraq, at peace with itself and its neighbors, playing a full role in the international community.
Romano Prodi is president of the European Commission. Chris Patten is European commissioner for external relations.


? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Think Again: Al Qaeda
By Jason Burke
May/June 2004
The mere mention of al Qaeda conjures images of an efficient terrorist network guided by a powerful criminal mastermind. Yet al Qaeda is more lethal as an ideology than as an organization. "Al Qaedaism" will continue to attract supporters in the years to come--whether Osama bin Laden is around to lead them or not.
"Al Qaeda Is a Global Terrorist Organization"
No. It is less an organization than an ideology. The Arabic word qaeda can be translated as a "base of operation" or "foundation," or alternatively as a "precept" or "method." Islamic militants always understood the term in the latter sense. In 1987, Abdullah Azzam, the leading ideologue for modern Sunni Muslim radical activists, called for al-qaeda al-sulbah (a vanguard of the strong). He envisaged men who, acting independently, would set an example for the rest of the Islamic world and thus galvanize the umma (global community of believers) against its oppressors. It was the FBI--during its investigation of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa--which dubbed the loosely linked group of activists that Osama bin Laden and his aides had formed as "al Qaeda." This decision was partly due to institutional conservatism and partly because the FBI had to apply conventional antiterrorism laws to an adversary that was in no sense a traditional terrorist or criminal organization.
Although bin Laden and his partners were able to create a structure in Afghanistan that attracted new recruits and forged links among preexisting Islamic militant groups, they never created a coherent terrorist network in the way commonly conceived. Instead, al Qaeda functioned like a venture capital firm--providing funding, contacts, and expert advice to many different militant groups and individuals from all over the Islamic world.
Today, the structure that was built in Afghanistan has been destroyed, and bin Laden and his associates have scattered or been arrested or killed. There is no longer a central hub for Islamic militancy. But the al Qaeda worldview, or "al Qaedaism," is growing stronger every day. This radical internationalist ideology--sustained by anti-Western, anti-Zionist, and anti-Semitic rhetoric--has adherents among many individuals and groups, few of whom are currently linked in any substantial way to bin Laden or those around him. They merely follow his precepts, models, and methods. They act in the style of al Qaeda, but they are only part of al Qaeda in the very loosest sense. That's why Israeli intelligence services now prefer the term "jihadi international" instead of "al Qaeda."
"Capturing or Killing Bin Laden Will Deal a Severe Blow to Al Qaeda"
Wrong. Even for militants with identifiable ties to bin Laden, the death of the "sheik" will make little difference in their ability to recruit people. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently acknowledged as much when he questioned in an internal Pentagon memo whether it was possible to kill militants faster than radical clerics and religious schools could create them. In practical terms, bin Laden now has only a very limited ability to commission acts of terror, and his involvement is restricted to the broad strategic direction of largely autonomous cells and groups. Most intelligence analysts now consider him largely peripheral.
This turn of events should surprise no one. Islamic militancy predates bin Laden's activities. He was barely involved in the Islamic violence of the early 1990s in Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia, and Kashmir. His links to the 1993 World Trade Center attack were tangential. There were no al Qaeda training camps during the early 1990s, although camps run by other groups churned out thousands of highly trained fanatics. Even when bin Laden was based in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, it was often Islamic groups and individuals who sought him out for help in finding resources for preconceived attacks, not vice versa. These days, Islamic groups can go to other individuals, such as Jordanian activist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who set up his al Tauhid group in competition with bin Laden (rather than, as is frequently claimed, in alliance with him) to obtain funds, expertise, or other logistical assistance.
Bin Laden still plays a significant role in the movement as a propagandist who effectively exploits modern mass communications. It is likely that the United States will eventually apprehend bin Laden and that this demonstration of U.S. power will demoralize many militants. However, much depends on the manner in which he is captured or killed. If, like deposed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, he surrenders without a fight, which is very unlikely, many followers will be deeply disillusioned. If he achieves martyrdom in a way that his cohorts can spin as heroic, he will be an inspiration for generations to come. Either way, bin Laden's removal from the scene will not stop Islamic militancy.
"The Militants Seek to Destroy the West so They Can Impose a Global Islamic State"
False. Islamic militants' main objective is not conquest, but to beat back what they perceive as an aggressive West that is supposedly trying to complete the project begun during the Crusades and colonial periods of denigrating, dividing, and humiliating Islam. The militants' secondary goal is the establishment of the caliphate, or single Islamic state, in the lands roughly corresponding to the furthest extent of the Islamic empire of the late first and early second centuries. Today, this state would encompass the Middle East, the Maghreb (North Africa bordering the Mediterranean), Andalusia in southern Spain, Central Asia, parts of the Balkans, and possibly some Islamic territories in the Far East. Precisely how this utopian caliphate would function is vague. The militants believe that if all Muslims act according to a literal interpretation of the Islamic holy texts, an almost mystical transformation to a just and perfect society will follow.
The radical Islamists seek to weaken the United States and the West because they are both impediments to this end. During the 1990s, militants in countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria began turning their attention abroad as they grew frustrated by their failure to change the status quo at home. The militants felt that striking at the Arab regimes' Western sponsors (the "far enemy" as opposed to the "near enemy") would be the best means to improve local conditions. This strategy, which bin Laden and those around him aggressively advocate, remains contentious among Islamic radicals, especially in Egypt.
Yet, as the March 11, 2004, terrorist bombings in Madrid revealed, attacks on the "far enemy" can still be employed with great effect. By striking Spain just before its elections, the militants sent a message to Western governments that their presence in the Middle East would exact a heavy political and human toll.
"The Militants Reject Modern Ideas in Favor of Traditional Muslim Theology"
No. Although Islamic hard-liners long to return to an idealized seventh-century existence, they have little compunction about embracing the tools that modernity provides. Their purported medievalism has not deterred militants from effectively using the Internet and videocassettes to mobilize the faithful.
At the ideological level, prominent thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb and Abu Ala Maududi have borrowed heavily from the organizational tactics of secular leftist and anarchist revolutionaries. Their concept of the vanguard is influenced by Leninist theory. Qutb's most important work, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq (Milestones), reads in part like an Islamicized Communist Manifesto. A commonly used Arabic word in the names of militant groups is Hizb (as in Lebanon's Hizb Allah, or Hezbollah), which means "party"--another modern concept.
In fact, the militants often couch their grievances in Third-Worldist terms familiar to any contemporary antiglobalization activist. One recent document purporting to come from bin Laden berates the United States for failing to ratify the Kyoto agreement on climate change. Egyptian militant leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has decried multinational companies as a major evil. Mohammed Atta, one of the September 11 hijackers, once told a friend how angered he was by a world economic system that meant Egyptian farmers grew cash crops such as strawberries for the West while the country's own people could barely afford bread. In all these cases, the militants are framing modern political concerns, including social justice, within a mythic and religious narrative. They do not reject modernization per se, but they resent their failure to benefit from that modernization.
Also, within the context of Islamic observance, these new Sunni militants are not considered traditionalists, but radical reformers, because they reject the authority of the established clergy and demand the right to interpret doctrine themselves, despite a general lack of academic credentials on the part of leading figures such as bin Laden or Zawahiri.
"Since the Rise of Al Qaeda, Islamic Moderates Have Been Marginalized"
Incorrect. Al Qaeda represents the lunatic fringe of political thought in the Islamic world. While al Qaedaism has made significant inroads in recent years, only a tiny minority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims adhere to its doctrine. Many sympathize with bin Laden and take satisfaction at his ability to strike the United States, but that does not mean they genuinely want to live in a unified Islamic state governed along strict Koranic lines. Nor does anti-Western sentiment translate into a rejection of Western values. Surveys of public opinion in the Arab world, conducted by organizations such as Zogby International and the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, reveal strong support for elected government, personal liberty, educational opportunity, and economic choice.
Even those who believe "Islam is the solution" disagree over precisely what that solution might be and how it might be achieved. Radical militants such as bin Laden want to destroy the state and replace it with something based on a literal reading of the Koran. However, some political Islamists want to appropriate the structures of the state and, in varying degrees, Islamicize them, usually with a view toward promoting greater social justice and outflanking undemocratic and powerful regimes. An example of the latter would be the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) movement, currently led by veteran activist Qazi Hussein Ahmed. JI represents a significant swath of Pakistani popular opinion, and although it is tainted by appalling levels of anti-Semitism, it has taken a stance against bin Laden and the Taliban when politically feasible. Often, as in Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey, such groups are relatively moderate and can serve as useful interlocutors for the West. They should not be rejected out of hand as "Islamists"; refusing to engage them only allows the extremists to dominate the political discourse.
"The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Is Central to the Militants' Cause"
Wrong. Televised images of Israeli troops violently repressing Palestinian protesters in the occupied territories certainly reinforce the militants' key message that the lands of Islam are under attack and that all Muslims must rise up and fight. However, although a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would help alleviate political tensions in the region, it would not end the threat of militant Islam.
The roots of contemporary Sunni Islamic militancy cannot be reduced to any single, albeit thorny, problem. Militants feel the umma is under attack. In their view, Israel is merely the West's most obvious outpost--as it was when it became a Crusader kingdom in the 12th century. If the Jewish state disappeared, the Islamists would still fight in Chechnya, Kashmir, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Algeria. Their agenda is typically determined by local grievances, often with lengthy histories. For instance, although bin Laden was already calling for a boycott of U.S. goods to protest support for Israel in the late 1980s, he had never been involved in an attack on an Israeli target until recently. His primary focus has always been to topple the regime in his homeland of Saudi Arabia. Likewise, Zawahiri's lengthy 2002 book, Knights Under the Prophet's Banner--part autobiography, part militant manifesto, which first appeared in serial form in 2001--focuses almost exclusively on the author's native Egypt.
Moreover, considerable support for the Islamic cause stems from Muslims' sense of humiliation. A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which would still leave the "Zionist entity" intact, would therefore offer little succor to the wounded pride of any committed militant or, more crucial, to the pride of those in the wider community who support and legitimize extremism and violence.
"Sort Out Saudi Arabia and the Whole Problem Will Disappear"
No. Saudi Arabia has contributed significantly to the spread of radicalism through the government-subsidized export of its Wahhabist strand of hard-line Islam. This policy arose from the turmoil of the late 1970s, when outrage over government corruption and the royal family's decadence prompted hundreds of Islamic radicals to occupy the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The 1978-79 Shiite revolution in Iran threatened Saudi leadership in the Muslim world and offered a cautionary tale of the fate that could await the House of Saud. In an effort to appeal to religious conservatives and counter the Iranian regime, the royal family gave the Wahhabi clerics more influence at home and a mandate to expand their ideology abroad.
Since then, Saudi money disbursed through quasi-governmental organizations such as the Muslim World League has built hundreds of mosques throughout the world. The Saudis provide hard-line clerics with stipends and offer financial incentives to those who forsake previous patterns of worship. In Pakistan, money from the Persian Gulf has funded the massive expansion of madrasas (Islamic schools) that indoctrinate young students with virulent, anti-Western dogma. This Saudi-funded proselytism has enormously damaged long-standing tolerant and pluralist traditions of Islamic observance in East and West Africa, the Far East, and Central Asia. Wahhabism was virtually unknown in northern Iraq until a massive push by Gulf-based missionaries in the early 1990s. And many of the mosques known for radical activity in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada were built with donations from private and state sources in Saudi Arabia.
The inequities of the Saudi system--in which most people are very poor and ruled by a super-rich clique--continues to create a sense of disenfranchisement that allows extremism to flourish. Many of the most militant preachers (and some of the Saudi hijackers who perpetrated the September 11 terrorist attacks) come from marginalized tribes and provinces. A more inclusive style of government and a more just redistribution of resources would undercut the legitimacy of local militants and deny radicals new recruits. Yet, while such reforms might slow the spread of Wahhabism and associated strands outside Saudi Arabia, in much of the world the damage has already been done. As with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Saudi Arabia is one of the many causes of modern Islamic militancy, but it has no monopoly on blame.
"It Is Only a Matter of Time Before Islamic Militants Use Weapons of Mass Destruction"
Calm down. Although Islamic militants (including bin Laden) have attempted to develop a basic chemical or biological arsenal, those efforts have been largely unsuccessful due to the technical difficulty of creating, let alone weaponizing, such materials. As one of the first journalists to enter the research facilities at the Darunta camp in eastern Afghanistan in 2001, I was struck by how crude they were. The Ansar al-Islam terrorist group's alleged chemical weapons factory in northern Iraq, which I inspected the day after its capture in 2003, was even more rudimentary. Alleged attempts by a British group to develop ricin poison, but for the apparent seriousness of the intent, could be dismissed as farcical.
Nor is there any compelling evidence that militants have come close to creating a "dirty bomb" (a conventional explosive packaged with radioactive material). The claim that Jose Padilla, an alleged al Qaeda operative arrested in the United States in 2002, had intended to deploy a dirty bomb has been largely discounted--it was an aspiration rather than a practical plan. Constructing a dirty bomb is more difficult than most imagine. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency warns that more than 100 countries have inadequate control of radioactive material, only a small percentage of that material is lethal enough to cause serious harm. It also requires considerable technical sophistication to build a device that can effectively disperse radioactive material. Some have also voiced the fear that militants might obtain a "prepackaged" working nuclear warhead from Pakistan. However, that would only be a plausible scenario if an Islamic regime came to power, or if high-ranking elements of the Pakistani military developed greater sympathy for the Islamists than currently exists.
The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Japan highlights the difficulties terrorist groups face in deploying weapons of mass destruction. Despite possessing sophisticated research facilities funded by an estimated $1 billion in assets, the group failed nine times to launch a successful attack prior to the incident in the Tokyo subway system. (Even then, the fatalities were mercifully limited to a dozen people.) Confronted with such constraints, Islamic militants are far more likely to use conventional bombs or employ conventional devices in imaginative ways--as was the case with the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and the March 11, 2004, train bombings in Spain.
"The West Is Winning the War on Terror"
Unfortunately, no. The military component of the war on terrorism has had some significant success. A high proportion of those who associated with bin Laden between 1996 and 2001 are now either dead or in prison. Bin Laden's own ability to commission and instigate terror attacks has been severely curtailed. Enhanced cooperation between intelligence organizations around the world and increased security budgets have made it much harder for terrorists to move their funds across borders or to successfully organize and execute attacks.
However, if countries are to win the war on terror, they must eradicate enemies without creating new ones. They also need to deny those militants with whom negotiation is impossible the support of local populations. Such support assists and, in the minds of the militants, morally legitimizes their actions. If Western countries are to succeed, they must marry the hard component of military force to the soft component of cultural appeal. There is nothing weak about this approach. As any senior military officer with experience in counterinsurgency warfare will tell you, it makes good sense. The invasion of Iraq, though entirely justifiable from a humanitarian perspective, has made this task more pressing.
Bin Laden is a propagandist, directing his efforts at attracting those Muslims who have hitherto shunned his extremist message. He knows that only through mass participation in his project will he have any chance of success. His worldview is receiving immeasurably more support around the globe than it was two years ago, let alone 15 years ago when he began serious campaigning. The objective of Western countries is to eliminate the threat of terror, or at least to manage it in a way that does not seriously impinge on the daily lives of its citizens. Bin Laden's aim is to radicalize and mobilize. He is closer to achieving his goals than the West is to deterring him.
Jason Burke is chief reporter for Britain's Observer and author of Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003).

Danger of Chem-Bio Terror Attacks Peaks This Week
DEBKAfile Special Report
June 26, 2004, 9:59 PM (GMT+02:00)
The closing days of June bring closer than ever before the danger of Iraqi Baathist guerrillas and al Qaeda letting loose with chemical and biological weapons which most authoritative sources believe they secretly possess. The menace is not limited to Iraq's borders.
A spate of terrorist strikes in Ankara, Antalya, Istanbul and its international airport augurs ill for the 44 world leaders planning to hold their annual NATO summit in Istanbul Monday and Tuesday, June 28-29. The attacks were small in scale and strenuously played down by the Turkish authorities. Nonetheless they marked out the extended reach of the two dangerous organizations and were anxiously watched across the entire Middle East.
The Istanbul summit's agenda is dominated by three items of business: 1) Washington's request for troops and military instructors to train and equip the close to quarter of a million recruits the US administration has enlisted to the new Iraqi army, police and the security forces. 2) A decision on the flag under which the instructors' corps will operate - UN or NATO. 3) The Bush Middle East Initiative for democratic and economic reform.
Jittery Turkish forces will start breathing only after the flock of world leaders heads for home Tuesday and the security limelight switches back to Baghdad where, a few hours later, the US formally transfers national sovereignty, though not military control, to the interim Iraqi government.
Saturday morning, June 26, a suicide bomber's explosive charge blew up prematurely, killing the killer and injuring three at the entrance of the small Hatipoglu hotel in the Antalyan town of Alanya. Local Turkish officials described the incident as a gas explosion in the hotel's air-conditioning system that killed a Turkish woman tourist. DEBKAfile's counter-terror sources affirm it was a terrorist's "work accident."
Friday night, June 25, Turkish police discovered a bomb operated by remote control under a jeep in Istanbul international airport's parking section and blew it up by controlled explosion before any harm was caused. The airport authorities denied the incident from first to last.
Thursday, June 24, a bomb exploded not far from the Ankara Hilton where President George W. Bush is due to stay from Saturday night, injuring three and pointing to a chink in the security shield thrown around the US president and other world leaders in Turkey. Bush arrived ahead of the NATO summit for weekend talks with Turkish leaders. Also Thursday, four Turks were killed in a bus blast in Istanbul hastily attributed by Turkish officials to a far left fringe group.
The Ankara Hilton and Istanbul bus bombs were drowned out by the ferocious terrorist attacks against Iraqi police and US targets across five Iraqi cities that claimed more than 100 Iraqi lives, three of them US soldiers, and injured 320 on that same Thursday. The blasts of ten exploding cars were accompanied by the clatter of mortar shells, recoilless grenades, hand grenades and automatic weapons wielded by bands of men in black, the uniform of the dreaded Saddam's Fedayeen.
DEBKAfile's counter-terror experts comment that the planners who scheduled the NATO summit and Iraq's transition in such close proximity, albeit 1,613 km apart, were governed by political objectives rather security judgment.
Turkish police are taking extreme security precautions across the country, but Turkey's barn door is wide open.
Baghdad and Istanbul are connected by a comfortable modern road system; northern Iraq has good rail and aviation links with Turkey; if the money is right, sophisticated smuggling networks will whisk men, weapons and explosives clandestinely across the border with no questions asked. The border region is seething with a violent admixture of Iraqi guerrillas, Arab fighters from around the Middle East, al Qaeda cells, Turkish Kurdish guerrillas pledged to wage a terror war against Ankara and Turkish extremist groups working with al Qaeda in Iraq, Iran and the Hizballah in Lebanon. This motley assortment of anti-Western elements dominates the lawless border region. For them, slipping back and forth past American and Turkish forces is a cake walk. There is not much to bar them from mounting synchronized terrorist actions in Baghdad and Istanbul - or for that matter anywhere else in the Middle East where a partner in the Bush democracy vision, for instance Jordan, Kuwait or Israel, may be targeted.
It would not be the first time Iraqi guerrillas carried out extraterritorial operations in Qaeda's service. In mid-April, a band was apprehended preparing a large chemical attack on behalf of their fundamentalist allies in Amman. Then, on April 21, Iraqi guerrillas were contracted to execute the double bomb car assault on Saudi General Intelligence headquarters in Riyadh which is charge of fighting terrorism, killing nine Saudi intelligence officers - some very senior - and injuring 125. The Iraqis crossed in to the kingdom via Kuwait.
Five weeks later, on May 29, al Qaeda again drew on its Iraqi partners-in-terror for aid in its hostage-taking shooting operation in the eastern Saudi town of Khobar that ended in the slaughter of nine foreign oil workers taken hostage and another 13 deaths. Iraqis drove the cars into Saudi Arabia via Kuwait bringing with them weapons and explosives.
DEBKAfile quotes senior counter-terror official as saying: "In the current situation, no security authority in any Middle East country or even Europe can take it for granted that his sector is not targeted by an Iraqi or al Qaeda terrorist cell. Turkish towns come immediately to mind, but so too do Moscow, Berlin, Paris, Rome and London."
US and Turkish security planners hope they can ward off a long-range mortar or improvised rocket barrage on the Ankara Hilton or the Istanbul hotel hosting the US President, on the lines of the Iraqi insurgents' blast against Baghdad's Rashid Hotel during visits by US officials. They also fear hijacked airliners crashing into one of the hotels hosting the US president like the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington.
The unspoken menace hanging over every scenario is provided by the unmarked 155-mm artillery shell containing sarin nerve gas that a US convoy encountered on May 15 on the road to Baghdad airport. Washington and the US military command in Iraq do not doubt, according to our military and intelligence sources, that the Baath guerrillas, the al Qaeda terrorists swarming in Fallujah and around the Sunni Triangle and the Shiite rebel Moqtada Sadr have access to Saddam's leftover caches of sarin and mustard gas and know how to pack the toxic substances into explosive charges.
The prevailing intelligence assumption today, according to our sources, is that the terrorists will bring these banned weapons out around the date of the transition - the last week of June or early July - and use them in Iraq or outside the country.
This danger was directly addressed by Charles Duelfer, head of the US Iraqi Survey team assigned with the hunt for weapons of mass destruction, in an interview with Fox TV on Thursday, June 24. He revealed the discovery by his group of at least ten or twelve artillery shells filled with sarin and mustard, adding that they are finding new WMD evidence "almost every day." Even if the shells had degraded over time, he stressed, they were still capable of killing dozens of people. He warned both soldiers and civilians in Iraq to carry gas masks and have access to chem-bio suits. Instructions to this effect have been issued to American troops in Iraq.


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Israel and Iran chart collision course
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The United States and its European allies may be self-indulging in a Wilsonian "greater Middle East" project or discourse frowned on by the region's politicians and intellectuals, yet there is little doubt about the operation of Israeli power well beyond her tiny borders pushing for a "greater Israel".
This much can be surmised by studying Israel's foreign policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus since the Soviet Union's breakup, which, in tandem with Turkey, has allowed Israel to launch its own version of "sphere of influence" politics in what the late Israeli prime minister Izhak Rabin termed as "the new Middle East"; this concept has been viewed rather favorably by Israeli pundits since it implies the region's jailbreak from the Arab-dominated sub-system.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that, per a report in the latest issue of the New Yorker, Israel is actively involved in supporting the Iraqi Kurds, who are fast sowing the seeds of their independence, albeit often under the convenient guise of a new Iraqi federalism. According to the article by veteran writer Seymour Hersh, who has aptly unearthed the secrets of Israel's nuclearization, not to mention the Abu Ghraib prison torture fiasco, Israel's secret service, Mossad, is engaged in covert operations among Iranian and Syrian Kurds, in addition to training Iraqi Kurd commandos and setting up the latter as a counterweight to Shi'ite militias.
Raising the ire of Turkey, whose government has criticized Israel's iron fist approach toward the Palestinians, the government of Israel has reportedly denied the allegations in Hersh's article. In Hersh's "Plan B", Israel's rationale has been described as purely a response to the fear of militant Shi'ism emanating from Iran, and the US's inability to contain this threat.
Maybe so, but what Hersh has missed is the economic dimension of Israel's push for a Kurdish state or, at the least, a largely autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq which could realize the long sought-after dream of an oil pipeline from Mosul to Haifa, echoing the statement last March in the Israeli paper, Haaretz, by Minister for National Infrastructures Joseph Paritzky, that such a pipeline would diversify Israel's sources of energy and lessen its dependence on expensive Russian oil. The fact that this pipeline would have to travel through the "weak" and compliant state of Jordan does not seem, at least from the prism of Israel's national (security) interests to be an insurmountable problem.
Unfortunately, Hersh appears all too willing in his article to adopt Israel's stated rationalization, ie, fear of Shi'ite radicalism, without probing either the geoeconomic factors or Israel's growing ambitious foreign policy casting a wider and wider net just as this "regional superpower" grows in military and economic might in a rather stagnant region. Equally absent in Hersh's piece is any reference to Israel's direct assistance to American counter-insurgency operations, which has been the subject of investigative journalism by various European newspapers such as the Guardian in the United Kingdom.
Regardless of the Israeli government's official denial, Hersh's story is bound to reverberate throughout the Middle East and fuel the fire of conspiracy theorists who depict a "proxy war" by the US, articulated by a largely Jewish group of Washington policymakers known as "neo-conservatives", in the interest of Israel. In turn, such news makes it even harder for the US to win the legitimacy battle in Iraq as well in the entire Arab world.
Still, it is noteworthy that in light of the Sunni-Shi'ite divisions, Israel's self-portrayal as a deterrent force against Iran-led Shi'ite insurgency may strike a harmonious cord with some Sunnis, but it is doubtful that with growing Shi'ite-Sunni cooperation against the US occupation, Israel's strategy may find too many admirers either in Iraq or elsewhere in the Muslim world. Rather, news of Israel's clandestine operations in Kurdish Iraq, fomenting Kurdish irredentism, will likely cause an anti-Israel backlash, including in Turkey, which must reckon with its own volatile Islamists.
Nonetheless, strategically speaking, any immediate or short-term harm to Israel's strategic alliance with Turkey may be worth the long-term dividend of a divided Iraq light years removed from menacing Israel again and, what is more, featuring a pro-Israel Kurdish enclave mirror imaging pro-Iran warlords in Afghanistan. Whether or not Israel can then utilize its "Kurdish stick" for a quid pro quo with Iran vis-a-vis the Hizbollah in Lebanon or Hamas and Jihad in the occupied territories remains to be seen. For the moment, however, in terms of regional balance of power, the post-invasion opening of Iraq to foreign influence has seemingly set up a new, and dangerous, chapter in Israel-Iran rivalry that in all likelihood will permeate Iraq and the "new Middle East" indefinitely.
This, in turn, raises serious questions about the nature and intent of the "Greater Middle East" project about to be discussed at the upcoming North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Istanbul. The diplomatic niceties of this benign discourse aside, which components have yet to be disentangled clearly, the facts on the ground, such as the clashing interests of two regional powers and their multidimensional games of strategy spanning the entire region, need to be explicitly addressed, otherwise the said project will hardly influence beyond the summit's talking shops and change the security calculus of the Middle East.
Part of the problem right now is the discursive battle over Middle East cartography and the lingering indecision of whether or not the idea of "greater" Middle East should require re-mapping the region inclusive of the newly-independent Central Asia Caucasus? Or is it simply a matter of socio-political progress and democratization? And, indeed, how are the local actors expected to trust the noble intentions behind this "soft power" approach by Washington barely disguising its current basking in the unipolarist exercise of its giant military power?
After half a century of playing "subordinate sub-system" in the Cold War's architecture, the Middle East is today at the nodal point of contradictory cross-currents where the forces of progress, development, peace and stability compete with the forces of stagnation, irredentism, and conflict. With the momentum for a Kurdish state gaining daily, it may be the fulfillment of the Kurdish dream, and simultaneously a nightmare for Iraq's neighbors with a Kurdish population, but in the larger scheme of things, it heralds a new chapter in inter-regional competition by two diametrically-opposed religious states, one Jewish the other Shi'ite.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and "Iran's Foreign Policy Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs, co-authored with former deputy foreign minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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Tehran's demons revisited
By Safa Haeri

PARIS - Barely one month after the ruling Iranian conservatives secured the control of the 290 seats in the majlis, or parliament, the result has been political chaos, an increase in crackdowns on the population, mostly youngsters and dissidents, a visible comeback of pressure groups, and a harder line in foreign policy.
Before being "selected" by the leader-controlled Guardian Council, the body that vets all candidates to all elections in the republic, the candidates who found their way to the new majlis had been told not to try to "waste" their time in "futile" political debates, the "trade mark" of the outgoing parliament that was dominated by reformers and considered as one of the country's most dynamic and democratic parliaments. Instead, the new legislators were advised to be more concerned about people's real problems, such as jobs for the millions of unemployed, security, fighting corruption and social injustices.
But despite these recommendations, the seventh majlis started its work with shouts of "Death to America" during its inaugural session, followed by statements from some hardline deputies urging the government to emulate North Korea by getting out of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), amid threats of not approving the Additional Protocol to the NPT, thus raising tensions in the dispute between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - the United Nations' nuclear watchdog - that accuses Tehran of not fulfilling promises made last October to Britain, France and Germany on suspending uranium-enriching activities and providing the UN full and complete reports on its nuclear programs and projects.
"If the majlis feels that the Additional Protocol serves the interests of the nation, it will ratify it. If not, it will reject it and the government has to abide by the decision," Dr Qolamali Haddad-Adel, the new Speaker - and the first ever not being a cleric - said in a session broadcast live on state radio, adding, "Iran's majlis does not take orders from foreigners."
His comments followed those of Mehdi Kouchakzadeh, a staunch anti-American lawmaker, who urged the authorities to stop cooperation with the IAEA and withdraw from the NPT. "If the IAEA gives in to US pressure, we will react strongly to defend Iran's national interests ... as a lawmaker, I think Iran has to stop cooperation with the IAEA and seriously consider withdrawing from the NPT," he said. Kouchakzadeh, a former member of the elite hardline Revolutionary Guards, drew public attention when he chanted "Death to America" during the opening session of the majlis last month.
"These people are hand-picked by the Guardian Council and the conservatives and they have to respond to what the ruling hardliners expect them to do," commented Sho'leh Sa'di, a lawyer and former member of the majlis, predicting more difficult times ahead for Iranian people and in Iran's relations with the international community.
At the same time, some once "dormant" Islamist ideologues with the Revolutionary Guards and pressure groups controlled by the conservatives, such as the Ansar Hezbollah, have started giving public statements denouncing US and Western "hegemony" over the Muslim world, calling for the creation of a "common Islamic front" to boot the "miscreants" and the "infidels" out of Iraq and other Muslim lands.
"We must follow a strategy of terrorism in order to frighten the Americans. Such terrorism is sacred. The modernity, a Zionist and Western phenomenon, was implemented with violence, we must retaliate on them using the same methods," Dr Hasan Abbasi, an ideologue for the Revolutionary Guards and driving force behind the the so-called "Center For Recruiting Suicide Volunteers" said recently in an address to basiji units, or volunteer militias.
As the name suggests, the center organizes Muslim volunteers to fight American and other "infidel" forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the Muslim world by means of suicide operations. According to Abbasi, the center has already listed "thousands" of volunteers and aims at recruiting "at least 4 million, ready to go to the battlefront the moment [Supreme Leader] Ayatollah [Ali] Khamenei decides".
Abbasi says that the center has designated 29 objectives, including some in the US. "The list of the targets has also been passed on to other [terrorist] organizations around the world and they could be hit by the suicide volunteers. We have pinpointed America's Achilles Heel, and given [the list] to all the world's guerrilla organizations in order to cut down the roots of the Anglo-Saxon race for good," said Abbasi, while also threatening Persian Gulf emirates like Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar "not to become a base for enemies of Islam or you will be washed out by our bullets".
Attacking liberal democracy, Abbasi said, "We have to uproot liberal democracy from the face of the world to prepare the ground for the return of Mahdi [Shi'ite Muslims' 12th and last imam who went into hiding more than 1,000 years ago at the age of eight].
Observes Sho'leh Sa'di, "Such statements demonstrate the regime's desire and tendency to renew a policy of generalized antagonism. By giving a free arena to new hardline voices connected to the ruling conservatives, the regime is returning to its former demons of the beginning of the Islamic Revolution [1979], saying goodbye to the era of detente initiated by President Mohammad Khatami," he told the Persian service of Radio France International (RFI).
"With the reformists out of the race and President Khatami becoming a virtual yes man of the conservatives on the one hand, and the clouds getting darker over the head of the Islamic Republic, the regime is facing serious challenges and threats from both outside and inside," Sho'leh Sa'di added.
According to Alireza Noorizadeh, an independent journalist and an analyst of Iranian affairs based in London, the picture has begun to change since the recent parliamentary elections, when the Guardian Council banned or prevented the participation of more than 2,800 reformist candidates to prevent a repeat of what happened four years ago when the reformists obtained full control of the parliament.
"At the same time, 47 Revolutionary Guards officers entered the new parliament, and additionally a Revolutionary Guards colonel, namely Ezzatollah Zarqami, was appointed by Khamenei to head the Broadcasting and Television Authority," Noorizadeh noted.
"The aim of Khatami's policy had been to reduce tensions with the outside world; his achievements in establishing good relations with neighboring countries, the European Union countries, and the Arab world provided him a large measure of independence. The Iranian leaders and the conservatives always sensed the importance of Khatami's role in distancing the threats and dangers lying in wait for them, and therefore they had left the sphere of foreign relations to Khatami," Noorizadeh pointed out. This appears to have changed now.
Pointing out the recent harsh resolution approved by the board of governors of the IAEA on the initiative of Britain, France and Germany and the Dublin-sponsored statement by the 25-members of the European Union "deploring" Iran's lack of clearcut and full cooperation with the IAEA and the worsening condition of human rights in Iran, Sho'leh Sa'di warned that "by taking wrong decisions and making wrong policies, the hardliners have laid down the bed for foreign menaces. Seemingly, this is what they are after, now that they have no more friends anywhere in the world."
"Statements by people like Abbasi are part of the new policies adopted by the conservatives. They are part of the carrot and stick, as seen with the IAEA. On the one hand, and considering that Abbasi and company are connected to the hardliners, they send messages to world leaders. But at the same time, they can always retreat, saying the threatening declarations are made by independent people with no official responsibilities," Sho'leh Sa'di commented.
Dr Ehsan Naraqi, a prominent Iranian intellectual, says that since the conservatives secured control of the majlis, the political order that had prevailed in the Iranian establishment between the reformists and the hardliners had collapsed. "There is no more order. The reformists are out of the political theater and the conservatives are not yet fully reorganized. The result is chaos," he told Asia Times Online.
One telling example of this state of chaos was offered to the world when a naval unit of the Revolutionary Guards, which on Monday seized three British patrol boats and their two officers and six soldiers who had strayed into Iranian waters off the Aravand Roud (the Iranian name of the Shat el-Arab River that runs between Iran and Iraq before flowing into the Persian Gulf) refused to obey orders from both their high command and the government to release the captures.
The incident then became a major diplomatic incident after al-Alam Television, the 24-hour Arabic service of Iranian Radio and Television, showed shots of humiliated British soldiers walking blindfolded in the blazing sun or sitting in an interrogation center, with confiscated weapons and equipment said to be spying gear. The captives were finally freed on Thursday after top-level British government intervention.
"The incident was full of messages," Masoud Behnoud, an Iranian journalist, told Asia Times Online. "One [message] was addressed to Iraqi public opinion in particular and the Arab world in general, saying, 'see how the very men who have occupied your land and are ruling over you as masters behave like sheep in our hands, humiliated and defeated'. The other message is addressed to the British and the Europeans, telling them no matter your hard line at the IAEA and on human rights, we don't want to retaliate."
"However, the more the Iranian authorities increase oppression and crackdowns, the more they antagonize the world outside, the more they get unpopular at home and the more isolated abroad, hastening the countdown to their own demise," Behnoud concluded.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)


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Assad Purges Armed Forces, Keeps up Anti-US Terror Front

DEBKAfile Exclusive Report & DEBKA-Net-Weekly 161
June 22, 2004, 3:31 PM (GMT+02:00)
Obeying a tradition of more than a quarter of a century, the Syrian army shifts some officers around twice a year - in summer and winter. It is a game of musical chairs with little impact on the armed forces as a whole.
This time was different.
On June 1, DEBKA-Net-Weekly exclusive military sources uncovered the largest single purge in the annals of Syria's armed forces that was carried out on the orders of President Bashar Assad.
Forty percent of the staff officers with the general command in Damascus were dismissed or forced into retirement; half the Syrian divisional commanders in Syria and Lebanon relieved of their duties - laid off or assigned to minor staff positions in Damascus and elsewhere. The top level of the Syrian air force has been peeled off and replaced with younger men - except for the top commander and the head of its intelligence branch.
Hundreds of officers were swept away in the purge - according to our sources, on the advice of General Ali Aslan, the late Hafez Assad's most trusted military adviser. Aslan, now retired, advised Bashar's father for years on how to keep his minority Allawi sect firmly in control of the regime and the opposition from raising its head. Assad Senior's agents were planted deep inside in Muslim and Palestinian groups In the 1970s and 1980s in obedience to one of Aslan tactics.
Assad junior's purge appears to be aimed primarily at cutting military spending by slashing its largest budget, namely wages. But he also needs to solidify his grip on the military. Last month, Mustafa Tlas, who at 72 is still regarded as Syria's strongman, retired as defense minister. Aslan warned the president against further direct moves against Tlas, but rather to take advantage of his exit to cut him off from his power bases in the armed forces.
DEBKA-Net-Weekly's military experts do not see the purge leading to radical changes in the Syrian army command structure, the deployment of Syrian divisions or the firepower available to its antiquated military. At best, Syria's warplanes and navigation systems date back to the mid-1980s. The navy's missile boats are in such bad shape that no competent task force can be mustered. Quite simply, Assad is short of the cash to modernize his military. The only fully functional segment of Syria's defense system are the military industries a military intelligence. Large funded by Iranian money, Syrian factories turn out short-to-medium-range Scud C and D surface-to-surface missiles, various types of weaponized chemical substances and some biological warfare items.
Our military sources note that, for the relatively modest investment of $45 million to $60 million a year, Iran has acquired control over the most sophisticated sectors of Syria's military industries. They are available as Tehran's backdoor suppliers of missiles, non-conventional weapons and ammunition for any contingency, such as the Iranian armed forces or a surrogate, like the Hizballah, being called upon to fight in a part of the Middle East that is far from the Islamic Republic's borders.

DEBKAfile's military analysts note that while the Syrian army is not directly mixed up in US-insurgent warfare in Iraq, its military intelligence remains a separate and potent instrument of the Assad regime's strategic policies. This entity is currently proactive on four fronts:

1. Iraq. Syrian military intelligence supports the Baathist guerrilla campaign by recruiting, training and dispatching combatants to Iraq from among the terrorist groups Assad sponsors such as the Lebanese Hizballah and such radical Palestinian organizations as the Jihad Islami and Jibril's Popular Front - General Command. Recruiting also takes place in Syrian city slum districts and among Palestinian refugee camp inmates with Syrian citizenship.

2. Palestinian front. Syrian military intelligence engages in smuggling on this border too - arranging for Hizballah and radical Palestinian combatants, arms and money to infiltrate the West Bank via the Golan Heights.

3. Hizballah. The military and intelligence alignment between Syria and the Hizballah is as close as ever. As we reported last week, the sporadic attacks the Lebanese Shiite group has been carrying out against northern Israel were at the behest of President Assad who demanded an escalation of war tension.

4. Al Qaeda. Damascus persists in disavowing involvement in al Qaeda's operations and its adherents' participation in the Iraq war. Nonetheless, Syria is still the main highway taken by Osama bin Laden's followers and other anti-US combatants for entering Iraq.

Assad appeared to step briefly out of character last month when he ordered arrests of volunteers for the Iraq war, including al Qaeda members. The aberration did not stem from penitence but was the outcome of an in-family Assad episode that came to a head in the purported April 27 terrorist attack in the Maza diplomatic quarter of Damascus. The strike was carried out with the familiar terrorist weapons of a car bomb, machine guns, grenades and rockets; the (empty) UN offices were set on fire and the Canadian embassy targeted. The only odd feature was its location in the state capital of a prime terrorist sponsor.
A thick blanket of secrecy was quickly drawn over the episode. Initially, DEBKAfile and DEBKA-Net-Weekly identified the perpetrators as Syrian al Qaeda members back from fighting in Fallujah. Since then, our sources discovered that, although al Qaeda members were involved, this was not an authentic terror attack. European-based Rifaat Assad, Bashar's uncle has a running dispute with the owners of a building and parcel of land in the al Maza quarter. Claiming they cheated him out of the property, he hired al Qaeda heavies living in Damascus as hit-men to blow up his opponent's family home and make it look like a terror attack. The president, once he caught on to his uncle's game, scrambled to hush it up before the full extent of al Qaeda operatives sheltering in Damascus was discovered.



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USA
Wie Hitler in den Wahlkampf einzieht
Der US-Wahlkampf wird mit immer h?rteren Bandagen gef?hrt. Inzwischen werfen sich die Kampagnenleiter von George W. Bush und John Kerry gegenseitig vor, Vergleiche mit Adolf Hitler zu verwenden, um den Gegner zu diskreditieren. J?ngstes Beispiel: ein Bush-Werbe-Video im Web.
Washington - Seit Donnerstagabend kursiert laut "Newsweek" ein Werbevideo im Internet, das sechs Millionen Mal per E-Mail an Bush-Unterst?tzer verschickt wurde. In dem 87 Sekunden langen Filmchen mit dem Titel "Die Gesichter von John Kerrys Demokratischer Partei" sind unter anderem Clips der Demokraten Al Gore, Howard Dean, des Regisseurs Michael Moore und vom Pr?sidentschaftsbewerber selbst zu sehen. An zwei Stellen ist ein laut sprechender Hitler zu sehen, ?berblendet mit den Worten "sponsored by MoveOn.org", einer links gerichteten Organisation, die Gelder f?r die Abwahl von Bush sammelt.
Die Hitler-Passage stammt aus einem Web-Video, das auf der MoveOn-Webseite im Januar im Rahmen des Wettbewerbs "Bush in 30 Seconds" ver?ffentlicht wurde. Nach scharfen Protesten nahm die Organisation den Film von der Seite.
Der Sprecher der Bush-Kampagne, Scott Stanzel, findet nichts dabei, die Hitler-Passage gegen Kerry zu verwenden. Immerhin sei der Hitler-Clip zuerst bei MoveOn.org gezeigt worden. "Es ist bezeichnend f?r die B?sartigkeiten, die wir von John Kerry und Seinesgleichen gesehen haben." Immer wieder h?tten Demokraten Vergleiche zwischen Bushs Regierung und Hitler und dessen Regime gezogen.
Der Protest von Kerrys Wahlkampfb?ro lie? nicht lange auf sich warten. "Die Tatsache, dass George Bush glaubt, es sei angemessen, in seiner Kampagne Bilder von Adolf Hitler zu benutzen, wirft die Frage auf, ob er noch in der Lage ist, weitere vier Jahre im Wei?en haus zu verbringen", ?tzte Sprecher Phil Singer.
? SPIEGEL ONLINE 2004
Alle Rechte vorbehalten
Vervielf?ltigung nur mit Genehmigung der SPIEGELnet GmbH


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This article can be found on the web at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040712&s=shapiro

Rehnquist, Cambodia & Abu Ghraib
by BRUCE SHAPIRO
[posted online on June 25, 2004]
It is April of 1970. President Richard Nixon, frustrated with the Vietnam War, orders tens of thousands of US and South Vietnamese troops to invade neutral Cambodia. He launches his new war--and widens his bombing campaign--without consulting an outraged Congress. Demonstrations engulf campuses and cities. Aides to National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger quit in protest. And at the Justice Department, an assistant attorney general named William Rehnquist, in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, makes a case for the legality of Nixon's new war in a white paper, "The President and the War Power."
It is half a lifetime from that spring to this one, and half a world from Cambodia to Iraq. The historical chasm abruptly collapsed, though, with the release of the memo on torture written for the White House in August 2002 by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, Rehnquist's latter-day successor at the Office of Legal Counsel. What do Nixon and Cambodia have to do with the beatings and rapes at Abu Ghraib? Ask Bybee, because it is his memo that makes the comparison with Cambodia and Rehnquist, a comparison that lays open the deeper motivations, goals and implications of the Bush Administration's interrogation policy.
The Bybee memo attempts to erect a legal scaffolding for physical and psychological coercion of prisoners in the War on Terror. Coming from the Office of Legal Counsel, it holds the authority of a policy directive. The memo proposes so finessed and technical a reading of antibrutality laws that all manner of "cruel, inhuman or degrading" interrogation techniques--including beatings and sexual violations like those in Abu Ghraib--simply get reclassified as Not Torture. The memo's language so offends common sensibility that within a few days of its release, White House officials were disavowing its conclusions and selectively declassifying documents allegedly showing the President's commitment to humane treatment of prisoners.
(How exculpatory is the Bush Administration's self-serving document dump? Not a single page is concerned with prisoners in Iraq. Not one sentence refers to the CIA, which according to Seymour Hersh first employed coercive interrogation in Afghanistan with the acquiescence of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Indeed, the most substantial and authoritative Pentagon document declassified by the White House, the April 4, 2003, "Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism," explicitly limits its scope to "DOD personnel in DOD interrogation facilities." Contract interrogators and CIA operatives are nowhere covered; neither are prisoners held under the authority of foreign governments, paramilitary allies or US intelligence agencies.)
Yet even while putting up a smokescreen of concern for humanitarian treatment of prisoners, the Administration made no attempt to distance itself from Bybee's most crucial theme: unreviewable presidential war powers. Anti-torture laws, the memo argues, simply do not apply to "detentions and interrogations of enemy combatants pursuant to [Bush's] Commander-in-Chief authority." All the documents released by the White House reflect this same obsession with presidential war powers-and in many cases, incorporate Bybee's precise language.
It is in defense of his view of the Commander in Chief's legal impunity that Bybee invokes the Cambodia precedent, citing Rehnquist's 1970 white paper as his principal authority. Rehnquist spelled out his arguments both in that memo and in an article later that year for the New York University Law Review.
One glance at the Rehnquist documents and it is easy to see why his 1970 reasoning resonates throughout the Bush Administration's 2002 and 2003 memorandums. Just as Bybee finds that torture isn't torture, Rehnquist argued that the invasion of Cambodia wasn't really an invasion: "By crossing the Cambodian border to attack sanctuaries used by the the enemy, the United States has in no sense gone to war with Cambodia." The Bybee memo offers officials accused of torture the "necessity" defense; in 1970, Rehnquist argued that pursuing Vietcong troops into previously neutral territory was "necessary to assure [American troops'] safety in the field."
In particular, Rehnquist offered the Nixon White House a bold vision of the Commander in Chief's authority at its most expansive and unreviewable: The President's war power, he wrote acerbically, must amount to "something greater than a seat of honor in the reviewing stand." Cambodia--where the devastation of the war and the Nixon Administration's carpet-bombing following the invasion would prepare the way for the Khmer Rouge holocaust--amounted to "the sort of tactical decision traditionally confided to the commander in chief."
For Rehnquist, the invasion of Cambodia in May of 1970 was a dual watershed. On the one hand, it marked the greatest assertion of expansive presidential warmaking power, crystallized in the white paper cited by Bybee. At the same time, protests against the Cambodian invasion led Nixon to centralize the gathering of domestic political intelligence directly in the White House; Rehnquist supported this domestic expansion of executive-branch authority, arguing in court for no-knock entry, preventive detention, wiretaps and other ancestors of today's Patriot Act.
The authority of Nixon and his successors was soon curtailed--at least on paper--by reform-minded legislation: the War Powers Act, the Freedom of Information Act, CIA reform, the War Crimes Act and a host of other statutes. And ever since the invasion of Cambodia, a parade of conservative policy-makers--among them Rehnquist, Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney--have repeatedly sought to regain the expansive presidential power asserted in Rehnquist's memo.
This is what is really at stake in the torture scandal. The circle of history has come around: The Bush Administration's theory of unconstrained war powers connects straight back to its Nixonian origins. Sometime in the coming few days, William Rehnquist will be among the Supreme Court Justices ruling on the Guant?namo Bay detentions and the designation of American citizens as enemy combatants. However he and the Court rule, his career-long crusades, rooted in the Nixon presidency, on behalf of gloves-off policing practices and executive-branch warmaking prerogatives now come together in a Baghdad prison. The Bush Administration's memos not only facilitate torture as public policy. Like the Nixon Administration in 1970, they articulate a philosophy of the presidency best described as authoritarian. That is the hidden message of Abu Ghraib.
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Judge's Memo Displays Heat Of the Debate On Restitution
By NATHANIEL POPPER
June 25, 2004
In a sign of the growing personal and emotional dimensions of the Swiss bank settlement, the federal judge overseeing the case, Edward Korman, fired off an unexpected attack at a prominent lawyer who has had little to do with the case, and who, even the judge called a "latecomer to the proceedings."
Korman filed a legal memorandum June 17, claiming that Thane Rosenbaum "promoted a campaign of misinformation" during his testimony at a public hearing in April on how funds from the settlement should be distributed among Holocaust survivors. Korman criticized Rosenbaum for failing to disclose his personal relationship with Sam Dubbin, the lawyer for the main group representing American survivors, the Holocaust Survivors Foundation USA.
The foundation has been the main critic of Korman's past decisions to distribute a majority of any unclaimed money from the Swiss bank settlement to survivors in the former Soviet Union rather than the United States, and Rosenbaum implicitly supported their position in his testimony.
But Rosenbaum, a law professor at Fordham University, has written numerous books and essays on the Holocaust and the reparations process, and he vigorously disputed Korman's contention that his friendship with Dubbin compromised his ability to speak as an independent observer.
"I was practically the only one in that courtroom who didn't stand to gain from the judge's decision, and I am the one he attacked," Rosenbaum said. "The judge has a vision, and he didn't want anyone standing in his way."
The memorandum, however, pointed to a debate that goes beyond Rosenbaum's testimony. Korman appeared to use Rosenbaum as a foil of sorts to lay out his views on some central debates that have plagued the Swiss case, such as sensitive questions about who should be considered a survivor and what role suffering during the Holocaust should play in decisions about allocations.
The testimony at the April hearing, during which Rosenbaum put forward his own views on these subjects, was one of the most powerful moments in a day filled with drama, as the judge reckoned with dozens of requests from survivors for financial support. During his impassioned speech, Rosenbaum called Korman's past decisions in the case "morally misguided" and the two took part in a volley of carefully worded criticisms.
Afterward, Rosenbaum swept out of the room, receiving hugs and kisses from survivors and their representatives, including Dubbin.
In last week's memorandum, Korman wrote that he came upon the personal relationship between Dubbin and Rosenbaum in the acknowledgements section of one of Rosenbaum's novels, in which Rosenbaum thanks Dubbin and calls him a part of his "extended family."
The lawful memorandum should have no legal repercussions for Rosenbaum or the progress of the case, but Rosenbaum said he plans to file an affidavit with the court in the near future, objecting to Korman's failure to mention all Rosenbaum's other friendships with restitution figures, including ones who have opposed Dubbin's positions.
This is not the first time that Korman has used a memorandum to chastise participants in the case. Perhaps not coincidentally, the last such memo, in March, was directed at Dubbin, whose work Korman called "worthless" and "irrelevant." But while Dubbin has been a presence in the case from the beginning, Rosenbaum has had little involvement before his voluntary testimony in April. Rosenbaum saw more than a few similarities between the two memos.
"The tone has a hysterical quality to it," Rosenbaum said. "The memos don't feel dignified to me. They seem hysterical and personal and mean."
The larger question at stake in the case, even beyond the dispersal of restitution funds, is the historical record itself.
During his testimony, Rosenbaum, who is the child of concentration camp survivors, questioned whether aging Jews who fled to the Soviet Union during the Holocaust deserve the title of survivor.
"While it is true that many of these Russians experienced terrible hardships after the Holocaust," Rosenbaum said, "they were fortunate to be in the Soviet Union during the Holocaust."
This view is relatively common among many American survivors, but it rarely has been spoken in public. That changed at April's hearing. At a protest outside the courthouse, sponsored by Dubbin's organization, arguments broke out between survivors about who among them had suffered enough to deserve the remaining funds not claimed by Holocaust-era bank account holders.
Korman was visibly disturbed by the disputes, and he heatedly asked Rosenbaum during his testimony: "How many months in a concentration camp? How many months in a ghetto? And how are we going to sit down and calculate this?"
In his memorandum, Korman provided a more historical perspective on the question and challenged the notion that survivors who fled east suffered any less. Korman pointed to research by Joshua Rubinstein, a professor at Harvard University, who has found that up to "one-half of all the Jews killed in the Holocaust were killed in Soviet or Soviet occupied territory."
From the beginning of the Swiss bank settlement, Korman has attempted to avoid such historical debates by basing all allocation decisions in the case on current need rather than on past suffering. As a result, Korman wrote that Rosenbaum's current call to use suffering as a benchmark makes Rosenbaum's argument "legally irrelevant and reflects either his lack of familiarity with or his disregard for the terms of the settlement agreement in this case."
In a preface to his speech, Rosenbaum said he had come to "restore dignity to the process," by attempting to "speak for the dead." In the memorandum, Korman said that "comments like this strip the process of dignity, not the opposite."
It is evident, however, that Rosenbaum has come to represent more than just himself. In an article the day after the hearing, the New York Times said that Rosenbaum's words were successful in "capturing the mood in the crowded courtroom." After Rosenbaum's speech, many survivors stood before Korman to tell of their own painful tales of suffering in the Nazi concentration camps, and asked why they did not deserve some recompense.
Korman delivered his memorandum as dissent against his allocation decisions is growing. Two top officials from the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany recently wrote a letter calling for "more equitable" distribution of funds.
Some American survivor groups have used Rosenbaum's line of reasoning to argue that more funds from the Swiss bank settlement should come to the United States, where more survivors from Central Europe live. But in his memorandum, Korman pointed out that much of the funding requested by American groups ends up supporting immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who are among the neediest survivors in America.
Korman wrote that "Professor Rosenbaum is apparently willing to count such survivors when asserting a claim for funds if not when deciding who should receive the funds."
Speaking to the Forward, Rosenbaum did not sound convinced by Korman's arguments, but he expressed a certain sympathy with the vehemence of the debate.
"The context of the Holocaust makes everyone weak at the knees," Rosenbaum said. "Given its level of enormity, everyone is rendered different."


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Israeli Settlements Come under... MI6 Surveillance

DEBKAfile Special Report - Part I

June 13, 2004, 11:55 AM (GMT+02:00)
The Israeli government is getting ready to offer down payments to voluntary evacuees from 21 Gaza settlements and four West Bank locations that Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon plans to remove by the end of 2005. This move is designed to stimulate departures and jump the gun on two major delaying factors: the cabinet only approved the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement outline; voting on settlement removals is not due until March 2005 and then it will be piecemeal. Secondly, compensation to departing settlers entails long and tiresome legislation, whereas down payments do not. Broad hints that the first comers will get the best deal have been thrown out already. The bargaining is clearly about to begin.
A second Middle East party has also hit on the notion of financially rewarding people willing to change address. DEBKAfile's Palestinian and Jordanian sources reveal that Jordan's King Abdullah is offering non-returnable "mortgages" - cash on the nail - to high Palestinian officials willing to purchase and move to luxury villas in Amman. The king is hoping to shut the West Bank door to the Egyptians, whose arrival is described as imminent under a putative proposal agreed by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Sharon and British prime minister Tony Blair (about which more later). The Amman villas come with a proviso: purchasers must list their new addresses on their calling cards. Their dual residency is intended to provide Jordan with a foothold at Palestinian Authority headquarters in Ramallah and represent the king's interests on the West Bank.
According to our sources, several Palestinians have taken Abdullah up on his offer; two are prominent: Yasser Abd Rabo, Palestinian co-signatory of the Geneva Accords and Jibril Rajoub, Yasser Arafat's own national security adviser, evoking a nasty letter from Arafat to the palace in Amman announcing that he would not stand for Jordanian officers and agents running around Palestinian territory. The West Bank is not the Gaza Strip! He declared.
Both are anxious to stall momentum on the Mubarak-Blair-Sharon project, on which White House national security adviser Condoleezza Rice has been briefed, for Egypt to send 150 instructors to Jericho to set up a new training academy for intelligence and special operations officers. These instructors are to double as the nucleus of the projected Egyptian military intelligence presence which will work in harness with British Secret Service MI6 agents to supervise the reorganization (called "reforms" in the Middle East road map) and operation of Palestinian security and intelligence bodies.
Abdullah and Arafat share in interest in sabotaging this Jericho project, but are too far apart on everything else to collaborate.
The prime minister's office in Jerusalem has not shared the ins and outs of this proposal with outsiders including cabinet ministers. In important respects it is an offshoot of President George W. Bush's limited gains from the Europeans and the United Nations on Iraq; jocular encounters and amiable speeches have so far yielded no offers of troops or authority to fly NATO or UN flags over the US-led multinational force.

Even the president's resuscitation of the virtually moribund Middle East Quartet elicited a tepid response. Britain, which already has troops in Iraq, was the only European power prepared to jump back into the Palestinian-Israel conflict, in its own inimitable fashion and for its own reasons.

Tony Blair believes fervently that restoring Britain to Arab favors as a lead player in the Middle East is the key to Britain's revival as a political and economic power. However, he suffers from five handicaps: 1. Gone are the glory days of formidable British fighting strength. 2. Investment capital is in short supply. 3. The British public has no taste for foreign adventure. Blair's military involvement in Iraq is unpopular and eroding his own and his Labor party's electoral standing. Labor came third and last in local council elections last week, trailing the opposition Conservatives and Lib Dems. 4. Behind the grandiloquent rhetoric lauding the close US-UK pact, Washington is clearly delimiting British expansionist aspirations - especially in Iraq. British military presence and influence are carefully winnowed down to a narrow - albeit strategically important - strip of the south between the Iraqi-Iranian border cities of Basra and al Amara, outside the southern oil fields and with scarcely a toehold in most other cities including Baghdad. 5. Parts of the Blair government cling fondly to Britain's former pretensions as the great friend of the Muslim Arab world, forgetting they were unceremoniously pushed out of the Middle East half a century ago and not always remembered with affection.

6. MI6, the operational arm of British expansion, historically opted for the Middle East camp opposed to Israel and cultivated a special relationship with Yasser Arafat going back decades.

Strictly speaking, Egyptian intelligence invented the Palestinian national leader and used his services between the 1960s and well into the 1990s. Even today, the Egyptian official assigned to keeping tabs on him is intelligence minister General Omar Suleiman. It is less well known that during those decades, British intelligence ran a covert operation to build him up as a world figure. London saw in him a vehicle for planting British influence deep inside the Arab-Muslim orbit (which is why he was never received in Islamic revolutionary Tehran) and an instrument for keeping Israeli intelligence in check and limiting its influence in Washington.
These ties were somewhat loosened after the 1993 Oslo peace accord, when he relocated from Tunis to Gaza and Ramallah. But they were never abandoned.
The British have performed two key services for the Palestinian cause:
A. They sponsored the concept of Palestinian statehood as a means of reducing the Jewish state to what London considered its natural dimensions, sitting behind Arafat's shoulder and lobbying the international case for a Palestinian state year after year until it was taken up by President Bush.
Few Israelis are aware of the pivotal role parts of MI6 through the British Foreign Office played over the years in developing and shaping Palestinian diplomatic and PR strategy, helping to make the Palestinian cause far more resonant internationally than the Israeli case - even when Arafat openly espoused and practiced terrorism.
B. They instigated the first Palestinian uprising against Israel in 1987; it was not provoked by Arafat then still in Tunis or even the PLO leadership, but MI6 agents operating in the Rafah refugee camp of the southern Gaza Strip. The trigger was a road accident in which an Israeli army truck ran over a group of Palestinian children. The local protest raised spread quickly and was presented opportunistically to the media as a "popular uprising."
Again in 2004, British "activists" are working hard to win Arab "hearts and minds." Now "volunteers" are sent over to shield Rafah residents against Israeli military operations and support Palestinian protests against Israel's anti-terror barrier.
But, despite these five obstacles, Blair's chances of making progress towards his goal are a lot better now than they were in 1987.
For one thing, President Bush owes him a big favor for standing alongside the United States in Iraq. MI6 agents may therefore swarm over the West Bank under fairly lax control from Washington.
For another, the British path is paradoxically eased by the Israeli prime minister's office's spin campaign around Sharon's disengagement plan and the Israeli media's readiness to buy uncorroborated reports presenting Egypt and European governments as eager to accept a role in the plan's execution and lavishly fund its costs. The UK is thus granted an opportunity to depict its agents' presence in the West Bank as laying the groundwork for the Egyptian military and intelligence personnel supposedly coming to supervise the reorganization and operation of "reformed" Palestinian security bodies.
This is far from the truth. Egypt has not yet decided finally to get involved in Sharon's disengagement scheme. The coordination between London and Cairo is flimsy at best, resting only on the initiative of Muhammed Rashid, a private Palestinian Kurdish individual, who commutes regularly between the two capitals, the while pushing hard for his London-based business partner, former Gaza strongman Muhammed Dahlan, to make a comeback. Furthermore, Arafat's promises to streamline his security apparatus are trumpeted far and wide without awkward questions on implementation.
Last Thursday, June 10, Israelis were afforded a rare glimpse in the sky of Venus passing the sun; on the ground, they saw the MI6 in action. Israeli radio announced dryly that a group of British intelligence officers had visited Jenin and carried out surveillance of Israeli settlements. No one asked whether the group was on a cowboy spying mission or had received authorization. And if authorized, by whom? The Israeli government is after all the competent security jurisdiction in the territory.
That was not the end of the matter. DEBKAfile's Washington sources report that shortly after the incident was discovered, the British premier handed the US president at the Georgia G-8 summit a secret intelligence report that was a clear signpost to where the Blair government is heading.
The report claims the Palestinians have made a good start on cracking down on terrorists - except that they are severely hindered by... the IDF. Israel's Shin Beit and its troops - and their unremitting efforts day and night, year after year, to keep Palestinian suicidal terrorists at bay - rate no mention in the MI6 report except as an obstacle to Palestinian good intentions.
The London report, our sources learn, was handed to other leaders attending the summit. A copy was even addressed to Ariel Sharon and another to Yasser Arafat.
This development raises some interesting questions about the game developing around the Israeli prime minister's disengagement plan - to be the subject of the second part of this DEBKAfile Special Report.

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THE SITUATION: Israel's Fence, New Tactics Seen Behind a Decline in Bombings
By Ofer Shelah
June 25, 2004
TEL AVIV -- Israelis cheered silently Tuesday when the government published its latest terrorism statistics, holding their collective breath lest their streak of good luck run out. For the Israeli Defense Forces, the announcement was an occasion for a careful pat on the back, a sign of a job well done. The announcement of the tally of terrorist activity for the first half of 2004 showed a sharp decline -- estimated to be 75% -- in the number of successful suicide attacks. IDF Intelligence wing chief Major General Aharon Zeevi Farkash told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset that since the beginning of 2004, 62 attempts to carry out terror attacks were foiled and only 10 succeeded.
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz praised the army and the internal security service, the Shabak, for their efforts.
"This is a new trend. The level of terror is in decline," Mofaz said during a visit to the IDF Central Command. "But we have to keep up the attacks. We have an excellent army and an excellent chief of staff," Mofaz added, a remark made all the more noteworthy because of his sometime stormy relationship with Chief of Staff General Moshe Ya'alon.
Mofaz also indicated that for the first time in three years, there are signs of cooperation from the Palestinian Authority. "The P.A. has confiscated some money sent to the terrorists, and for quite some time our intelligence notes efforts by the P.A. to prevent terror," he said.
Central Command officers told Mofaz that in the past six months, they foiled no fewer than 58 attempts to carry out suicide bombings and arrested more than 2,000 Palestinians. The number of arrests points to one of the keys to the new-found success of the Israeli security forces: de-facto, unlimited, no-holds-barred control over the West Bank. The IDF moves freely in and out of every Palestinian town, often occupying central parts of major cities (such as Nablus, considered to be the major hub of terror in the past year) for prolonged periods. It also has erected roadblocks, the number of which is estimated at more than 100. Shabak, which had lost many of its sources after the Oslo accords, has regained much knowledge of the terrorists' plans and whereabouts, and developed an efficient system of "closing circles" -- military jargon for quickly turning information into action.
Another major factor is the security fence. Although barely one-third of its planned length is completed, it poses new difficulties for the terrorists. Before its erection in northern Samaria, more than 80% of suicide bombers penetrated Israel from that region. Now, terrorist organizers in Nablus or Jenin have to smuggle the would-be bomber to Ramallah, where he or she must contact another operative, and receive the explosive belt, which must be smuggled separately. Another operative, often a resident of East Jerusalem (who carries an Israeli ID, and therefore has an easier pass through the roadblocks), tries to smuggle the person and charge into Israel. All this activity takes time and makes it easier for Shabak to trace it somewhere along the way. Six such attempts were foiled in or around Ramallah in the past two months.
The continuing pressure, as well as the disintegration of Palestinian organizations because of Israeli closures and raids, has created a "localization" of terrorist activities: They are carried out not by large organizations, headed by operatives who send orders to the ranks, but rather by local cells, most of them loosely organized. A major force in financing and encouraging these activities is Hezbollah. Its top operative, Keis Ubeid, the mastermind of the kidnapping of Israeli citizen Elhanan Tennenbaum (since freed in a hostage deal), is now the single most important person in Palestinian terrorism, far more influential then Fatah or Hamas leaders.
Proud as they may be of their success in the field, IDF commanders are aware that it is temporary. "Over time, the other side will adapt," senior officers told the Forward. "If we do not change the situation drastically, military measures alone may not suffice."
They are also well aware of the effect of the measures taken on their own soldiers. One notable brigade commander, Colonel Roni Numa, told the Forward of a talk he had with several of his troops. "We have become numb," they told him. "When we erect a roadblock, we are polite in the first hour, less polite in the second, nervous in the eighth. By the 10th hour, we may smash someone's headlight because we are tired and irate."
The soldiers carry on, of course, knowing that their activity is aimed at saving lives in Israel. But their words, as well as testimonies of other soldiers about "Operation Rainbow in a Cloud" in Rafah a few weeks ago, paint an alarming picture. They warn the Israeli public that although terror is on a sharp decline and the security forces succeed in stopping most attempts, the relief may be only temporary.

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Slain editor's newspaper suggests list of suspects
Wealthy mayoral candidate denies any involvement
By IOAN GRILLO
Copyright 2004 Houston Chronicle Foreign Service
MEXICO CITY -- A Tijuana newspaper speculated Friday that a millionaire businessman running for mayor of the rough border city may have masterminded the killing of one of its editors in front of his children.
Friday's edition of Zeta, the first published since Tuesday's slaying of Francisco Ortiz Franco, listed possible suspects in the crime -- Tijuana mayoral candidate and racetrack owner Jorge Hank Rhon; gang members from San Diego's Logan Heights district; and a group of army deserters called Los Zetas.
Leo Gonzalez, a spokesman for Hank Rhon's election campaign, called the suggestion that the candidate was somehow involved baseless.
"It is irresponsible for Zeta to make unfounded speculations when the police are conducting their investigation," Gonzalez said. "Hank Rhon denies any involvement in the murder."
Ortiz, 48, one of the founders of the weekly Zeta, was shot four times at point-blank range while he was driving home from a clinic with his two children. Police said the slaying appeared to have been carried out by a professional assassin.
Federal Attorney General Rafael Macedo de la Concha said Thursday that the Arellano Felix drug cartel could be behind the killing.
But in a special report on the slaying that was published Friday, Zeta editor and publisher Jesus Blancornelas wrote that Hank Rhon had a motive to organize the killing.
Ortiz was among several journalists and government officials working with the Miami-based Inter-American Press Association on an investigation into the 1988 murder of Hector Felix Miranda, also an editor of Zeta. Two men were convicted and imprisoned for that killing, including Antonio Vera Palestina, who worked as a bodyguard for Hank Rhon.
In 1988, police cleared Hank Rhon of any involvement in that slaying. But as part of the IAPA investigation, Ortiz dug up evidence that could imply Hank Rhon's guilt, Blancornelas wrote. Among this evidence, he said, were court statements by Hank Rhon that he never knew the jailed Vera as well as proof that the millionaire was supporting Vera's family.
Raul Gutierrez, a spokesman for the Baja California state police, said detectives were following all lines of investigation, including whether Hank Rhon was involved in the slaying.
"We will investigate every possibility," Gutierrez said.
Blancornelas also speculated that a gang member from the Logan Heights area of San Diego was involved in the killing.
According to Zeta's published report, a man with a shaved head, baggy jeans and a moustache was observed standing on the street before the killing and giving a hand signal before the firing started.
"The mustached skinhead had all the characteristics of a Logan" gang member, Blancornelas wrote.
When Blancornelas was shot and seriously wounded in 1997, one of the attackers killed in the crossfire was a member of one of several Logan gangs.
Misha Piastro, a spokesman for the Drug Enforcement Agency in San Diego, said many gang members from the working-class Logan Heights district have been involved in murders in both Mexico and the United States.
Blancornelas presented another hypothesis: that a member of Los Zetas had killed Ortiz.
The Zetas, who have no relation to the Zeta newspaper, were originally part of an elite army unit trained to fight drug traffickers near Mexico's northern border. But they deserted the military and joined the gangsters they had been hunting.
The slaying of Ortiz appeared to have been carried out with military precision, the newspaper said, adding that the killer "had a high capacity to move and shoot fast in the precise locations."
Police said the gunman spent less than three seconds firing the fatal shots.
The Zeta newspaper has published hundreds of investigative reports on drug traffickers and corruption since it was founded in 1980.
Ortiz's killing has been condemned by politicians, press groups and international organizations.
On Friday, Koichiro Matsuura, director-general of the United Nations' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, said the killing was a tragedy.
"Ortiz will be remembered for his independence and the quality of his investigations," Matsuura said, according to Mexican media. "His work was an example of the contribution a free press makes to democracy."



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Regional security forum to focus on North Korea, terrorism
JAKARTA : Ministers from 23 countries will gather this week in the Indonesian capital to discuss threats to regional security including the North Korean nuclear crisis.
Seaborne terrorism in the Malacca Strait will also be on the agenda when the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) -- which groups countries as diverse as Canada and Cambodia -- meets next Friday.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell and North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun are among those scheduled to attend ARF, which follows talks between Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers on Wednesday.
"The nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula is something we will no doubt want to discuss, the issue of terrorism, the issue of (nuclear) proliferation," said Marty Natalegawa, foreign ministry spokesman for Indonesia, which currently chairs ASEAN.
Anthony Davis, a security analyst with Jane's Information Group, said there would be "an element of regional concern" that six-nation talks on North Korea's nuclear ambitions did not seem to be moving fast.
"Clearly it's a very worrying flashpoint and it falls within the ambit of ARF. There will be regional interest in just how effectively the six-party framework is addressing the issue," he said.
"The questions are: Is North Korea playing for time? Can the Chinese apply more pressure on North Korea?"
The latest round of negotiations involving the United States, the two Koreas, China, Russia and Japan ended Saturday in Beijing.
Maritime security will be the focus of terrorism discussions, Davis said.
The United States and Singapore are worried about security in the piracy-prone Strait of Malacca, suggesting that terrorists could hijack an oil or gas tanker and use it as a floating bomb in a maritime version of 9/11.
However, the US recently backed away from suggestions that US forces might help patrol the waterway after it raised hackles in Indonesia and Malaysia.
The 10-year-old ARF includes the 10 ASEAN countries plus Japan, South and North Korea, China, India, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the European Union, Canada, the United States and Mongolia.
The forum will admit Pakistan next Friday after India dropped objections.
Andrew Tan of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore said some saw ARF as a "talkshop" because it does not produce binding agreements and lacks an institutional setup.
The decision to set up an ARF unit within the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta would not help, he said.
At Wednesday's ministerial meeting, Indonesia will present its proposals for an ASEAN security community. Jakarta's plan for a regional peacekeeping force as part of this has been quietly shelved following objections from other members.
The draft action plan for the security community was one of three "pillars" included in a concord endorsed last October at a summit in Bali.
Together with economic and socio-cultural communities, the concord lays the foundation for the creation of a European-style ASEAN Community by 2020.
Natalegawa said a security community would try to promote openness and confidence among members.
"An ASEAN Peacekeeping Force is something we don't see as immediately doable now but the notion of a capacity to maintain peace and stability is alive and well," he said.
Tan said the main constraints on the security community proposal were regional diversity and "continuing mutual suspicion" within ASEAN.
He said the security proposal was part of Indonesia's attempts to reassert its regional clout after years of political and economic problems.
Natalegawa denied this. "What Indonesia is saying is we wish for us to invest in a regional capacity but we're not saying that they are the best options. Let's have all the options available so countries can choose."
Developments in ASEAN's most controversial member, Myanmar, are not on the agenda although the military-ruled state may choose to make a presentation.
Fellow members before their Bali summit pressed Yangon to free opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. She remains under house arrest nine months later.
- AFP
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Britain's armed forces face massive cuts: report
LONDON : The British government on Saturday dismissed a report that the armed forces will face massive cuts under a government spending review expected within the next few weeks.
The Mail on Sunday reported that Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown is planning cuts in the defence budget that will require manpower to be slashed by as much as 15,000, with four of the Army's 40 battalions scrapped and six of the once-mighty Royal Navy's 30 warships taken out of commission.
The British finance ministry, known as the Treasury, dismissed the claims and said the spending review would provide sufficient funding to ensure that the armed forces were equipped for the tasks facing them.
"Far from cuts, the 2002 spending review delivered the biggest sustained increase in defence spending for 20 years and on top of that, we have met in full the cost of campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and the war on terror," said a Treasury spokeswoman.
"We are ensuring, and will continue to ensure, that our armed forces are best equipped to do the job we ask of them," she added.
A Ministry of Defence (MOD) spokesman said that the result of the latest spending round was not yet known, and any report on its impact on the armed forces was "purely speculative".
According to the newspaper, the proposed cuts would require Royal Air Force (RAF) numbers to be cut from 49,000 to 39,000, with at least one air base -- probably Coltishall in Norfolk, east England -- closed and 41 Jaguar planes axed.
The Navy will lose four Type 42 destroyers and two Type 23 frigates, the paper claimed.
The Army would lose also four infantry battalions, bringing its strength down from 103,000 to 100,000, according to the report.
"We don't know the results of the spending review and nor does the Mail on Sunday," an MOD spokesman said. "I think this is purely speculative."
"We will wait and see what the outcome of the spending review is before we make any judgment on it."

- AFP

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http://www.aisehman.org/
Butt Out
Foreigners just love our country. We had BSA Tahir earlier in the year, now we have this dude:
A Malaysian man was arrested Tuesday and charged with trying to sell parts for sophisticated military fighter jets to Iran without a license.
Hamid M. Butt, 71, formerly of Humble, Texas, was arrested Tuesday afternoon after getting off a flight from Malaysia that had landed at George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott Christie said.
A Pakistani native, Butt had been living in Malaysia for several years, and was arrested upon his return to the U.S.
The criminal complaint against Butt was signed on Jan. 20 but had remained sealed until his arrest. It deals with an attempt to sell parts for the F14 Tomcat fighter to Iran in 1999. [Associated Press via The Wall Street Journal Online]
What was he doing here?
Maybe the police should find out. Maybe they already know.
Anyway, Houston Chronicle says he is a US citizen, not Malaysian:
Butt owned Humble Parts Distribution, an aircraft-parts company, before moving to Malaysia. Christie was unable to say when Butt moved to Malaysia or what business, he is engaged in there.
A naturalized U.S. citizen, Butt is originally from Pakistan. [Houston Chronicle]
What next?



Man accused of arms deal with Iran
By HARVEY RICE
Copyright 2004 Houston Chronicle
A former Humble aircraft-parts dealer was arrested Tuesday at Bush Intercontinental Airport and charged with selling F-14 Tomcat fighter parts to Iran without a license.
Hamid M. Butt, 71, who now lives in Malaysia, was arrested about 2:15 p.m. after landing on a flight from Malaysia, said Scott Christie, assistant U.S. attorney for the New Jersey district.
Christie said a criminal complaint signed against Butt Jan. 20 charged him with one count of shipping fighter parts on Oct. 6, 1999.
Butt's scheduled federal court appearance was put off today in Houston. His initial appearance could happen this afternoon or later this week.
U.S. customs agents intercepted the parts at Newark International Airport in New Jersey en route on Continental Airlines from Houston to a freight forwarder in Frankfurt, Germany, he said.
Customs agents discovered a navigation light, an integrated circuit, 100 demodulators and five microcircuits, all on the United States Munitions List, Christie said. All items on the list require an export license.
The complaint, which remained sealed until Butt's arrest, charges him with violating the Arms Control Export Act by exporting the fighter parts without a license.
Christie said he could not comment about whether Butt had made other arms sales that may have violated U.S. laws.
Butt owned Humble Parts Distribution, an aircraft-parts company, before moving to Malaysia. Christie was unable to say when Butt moved to Malaysia or what business, he is engaged in there.
A naturalized U.S. citizen, Butt is originally from Pakistan.
Christie said that Butt received an order Oct. 6, 1999, for the F-14 parts from the Office de Distribution et Maintenance, a French company that sold parts to Algeria, Iran, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
The United States and Iran were the only countries with the F-14 in their military air fleets in 1999. The United States supplied the F-14s to the former Shah of Iran before his ouster.
Butt is scheduled to appear at 10 a.m. today before U.S. Magistrate Judge Calvin Botley. He could face up to 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine if convicted.



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The Associated Press contributed to this report.
Bipolar Hill Alert
Feds attack and rescue Big Tobacco.
Rep. Henry Waxman (D., Calif.), a big-government liberal, rarely concurs with Rep. Jeff Flake (R., Ariz.), a dedicated free-marketeer. But watching their colleagues in the GOP Congress recently exhibit the self-restraint of hounds in heat made them both recoil in full-blown, left-right disgust.
"We often disagree on issues," the two lawmakers admit in a June 9 joint Dear Colleague letter. "Today, we are writing to make you aware of one issue we agree on: the 'tobacco bailout' in the FSC bill is a bad deal for taxpayers."
They describe Rep. Bill Thomas's (R., Calif.) brand-new boondoggle: $9.6 billion in free money targeted at the tobacco industry. That's right, almost $10 billion for the hard-working, peace-loving folks who raise one of America's oldest and greatest crops -- courtesy of you, the United States taxpayer.
"Under current law," Waxman and Flake add, "tobacco can only be grown if the grower owns or rents a 'tobacco quota.' Under the bailout provision, the federal government would pay $7 per pound to quota owners and $3 per pound to tobacco growers (up to a total payment of $10 per pound for a quota owner who grows tobacco). The proposed compensation amounts to three to four times the market value of tobacco quotas."
Will America's general welfare benefit from this scheme -- maybe through more earth-friendly farming techniques on Tobacco Row, or perhaps bioengineered plants that prevent mosquitoes from stinging?
No such luck. Quota holders and leaf growers can do what they please with the money.
"This is a no-strings-attached cash payment," the congressmen continue, "There is no requirement that either the quota owner or the tobacco grower stop growing tobacco."
Where exactly will Congress find $9.6 billion to blow on tobacco interests? "The bill purports to fund the bailout through the existing excise tax on cigarettes, which is currently used to fund children's health care," Waxman and Flake explain.
So, nearly $10 billion will be pried from the fingers of cigarette smokers, diverted from medical treatment for boys and girls, and steered into the wallets of those who produce Marlboros and Chesterfields. What a Lucky Strike!
Of course, Washington is utterly bipolar about the beneficiaries of this largesse, equal to the GDP of Tanzania. According to the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, the current federal budget includes $100 million for the Office of Smoking and Health, plus at least $70 million for the National Cancer Institute's tobacco-related disease research. Meanwhile, the Justice Department is preparing a $280 billion racketeering lawsuit against Philip Morris, Lorillard, and four other cigarette manufacturers. Says Justice spokesman Charles Miller: "We go to trial September 13."
Uncle Sam simultaneously considers Big Tobacco a respected industry and a cabal of cancer merchants who should be shouted, regulated, and litigated out of business. Which is it? In federal Fantasyland, both.
Even worse, Big Tobacco's gift comes in a highly extravagant package. H.R. 4520 -- the Foreign Sales Corporation/Extra Territorial Income bill -- simply was supposed to eliminate a $5 billion annual export subsidy (worth $50 billion through 2014) that triggered European Union sanctions. So far, Congress' handiwork resembles a harpsichord tuned with a pick ax. This measure includes nonsense like a tax provision for "sonar devices suitable for finding fish," special language on aviation-grade kerosene, and a new tax on hepatitis A vaccines.
This 424-page bill reduces taxes by $149.5 billion through 2014 while hiking levies by $115.1 billion. Sickened by the tobacco gratuities and lots more, Flake and 22 other Republicans uncharacteristically opposed this net tax-cut, grotesque though it was.
"I'm convinced that Congress is bent on losing what little fiscal credibility we have left," Rep. Flake laments. "The addition of the tobacco buyout provision was the straw that broke Joe Camel's back.
Nevertheless, H.R. 4520 passed June 17, 251 to 178. It now will be reconciled with a Senate plan that cuts business taxes by $180.5 billion before raising them $181.3 billion.
That compromise should be defeated and replaced with a 10-year, $50 billion across-the-board corporate tax-rate cut.
Whether this prosperous industry deserves America's constant applause or brand-new lawsuits, it's past time for Big Tobacco to harvest its crop on its own dime.

http://www.nationalreview.com/murdock/murdock200406251502.asp

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Abu Sayyaf rebels linked to kidnapping shot dead
By MUGUNTAN VANAR
KOTA KINABALU: Three Abu Sayyaf bandits, believed to be holding three East Ocean 2 crewmen as hostages, were killed by Philippines marines in a gunbattle on Tawi Tawi island on Friday afternoon.
However, there were no signs of the hostages - Sarawakians Toh Chiu Tiong, 56, and Wong Siu Ung, 52, and their Indonesian skipper J.E. Walter Sampel, 53, - the Philippines military said yesterday.
Philippines naval spokesman Capt Geronimo Malaban said that among the dead gunmen was Abu Sayyaf sub-commander Ayub Bakil, who had a one million peso (RM100,000) bounty on his head.
The two others were his brother Jabir and nephew Basir.
Capt Malaban told The Star that they were killed in an ambush as they were walking from Maraning in Laguyan.
"We still do not know where the hostages are," he said, adding that the three were leaders of the Abu Sayyaf group, which both Washington and Manila have alleged to be linked to the al-Qaeda terror network of Osama bin Laden.
The Philippines naval Task Force 62 Commander Captain Feliciano Angue said when they were informed that about 20 bandits were in the vicinity, the marines waited in ambush and killed the three in a brief clash. No soldiers were hurt.
He confirmed that the hostages were not with the three bandits.
The hostages were grabbed near the island of Taganak on April 11 and attempts to negotiate their release have been futile so far.
Four other hostages taken from Borneo Paradise resort were freed last month through negotiations.

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Fahrenheit 9/11 gets help offer from Hezbollah
Samantha Ellis
Thursday June 17, 2004
The Guardian
The controversy over Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 just won't go away. The film, which is being advertised with the strapline "Controversy? What controversy?", has been rated R by the Motion Picture Association of America, meaning no one under 17 can see it unless accompanied by an adult. Distributors Lions Gate Films and IFC Films, opening the film next week, are appealing against the decision. The rating came partly because the film shows images of US soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners, images Moore says he had long before the scandal erupted. He told Associated Press he kept quiet because he thought he'd be accused of "just putting this out for publicity for my movie".
Anger at Moore is building up, too. Pro-military lobby group Move America Forward is campaigning to "Stop Michael Moore from profiting in his attacks on America and our military"; Michael Wilson is making a documentary called Michael Moore Hates America; and the website www.moorelies.com is out "to expose America's fakest pseudo-muckraker".
Meanwhile, in the United Arab Emirates, the film is being offered the kind of support it doesn't need. According to Screen International, the UAE-based distributor Front Row Entertainment has been contacted by organisations related to the Hezbollah in Lebanon with offers of help. All in all, Tony Blair must be relieved that Moore is not going to make a film about him; Moore rebuffed the rumour in a message on his website headlined: "Sorry to scare you, Tony. Michael Moore was just kidding."

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SPIEGEL ONLINE - 26. Juni 2004, 19:36
URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,306062,00.html
Verbale Entgleisung
Cheney entschuldigt sich nicht - im Gegenteil
Nachdem US-Vizepr?sident Dick Cheney im Streit mit einem Senator ?ffentlich die Worte "fuck yourself" gebraucht hatte, erwartete man eigentlich eine Entschuldigung. Doch der Bush-Stellvertreter begl?ckw?nschte sich selbst zu seinem heftigen Statement.
Washington - Dass einem im Wirbel des politischen Gesch?ft einmal der Kragen platzt, kann passieren. Als Cheney anfangs der Woche einem demokratischen Widersacher in die Arme lief und der wieder ?ber fragw?rdige Irak-Gesch?fte der Regierung reden wollte, platzte dem Vizepr?sidenten der Kragen. Senator Patrick Leahy musste sich die Worte "fuck yourself" anh?ren - was frei und vorsichtig ?bersetzt soviel hei?t wie "verpiss Dich".
Leahy selbst wollte aus dem Zusammensto? kein gr??eres Aufhebens machen und sagte: "Ich glaube, er hatte einfach einen schlechten Tag." Doch Cheney, der sonst stets k?hl agiert und sich lieber im Hintergrund aufh?lt, wollte sich nicht entschuldigen. "Ich habe mich ziemlich deutlich ausgedr?ckt, und anschlie?end ging es mir besser", kommentierte Cheney seine derben Worte im Fernsehen.
Leahy hatte Cheney in der Vergangenheit mehrfach wegen seiner Verbindung zur ?lservice-Firma Halliburton angegriffen. Die Firma macht gro?e Gesch?fte im Irak und steht wegen ?berh?hter Rechnungen massiv in der Kritik. Cheney war vor seiner Ernennung Chef von Halliburton. US-Medien verwiesen in ihren Berichten unter anderem darauf, dass Cheney und Pr?sident George Bush vor dreieinhalb Jahren mit dem Versprechen angetreten waren, den Ton und Umgang von Politikern untereinander in Washington zu verbessern Besseren zu ?ndern.
? SPIEGEL ONLINE 2004
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Opposition: Saudi security knew Johnson's location
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Wednesday, June 23, 2004
Saudi opposition sources said Saudi security commanders knew of the location of Al Qaida chief Abul Aziz Al Muqrin at least three days before he executed a U.S. hostage.
The Washington-based Saudi Institute said Saudi authorities knew of the whereabouts of the Al Qaida cell that abducted and threatened to kill Lockheed Martin engineer Paul Johnson. But the institute said the Saudi government decided not to move until Johnson, captured on June 12, was executed.
"The Saudi government knew the location of a number of the terrorists but waited until they killed American hostage Paul Johnson before moving against them," the Saudi Institute said in a statement on Tuesday.
The institute has been regarded as a liberal opposition group that relayed accurate information on Saudi Arabia and its security system, Middle East Newsline reported. The institute was said to have sources in Saudi security agencies and government.
About 15,000 Saudi troops and police searched neighborhoods in Riyad for two days before Johnson was beheaded by Al Qaida insurgents last weekend. On June 18, hours after Al Qaida's announcement that Johnson was executed, Al Muqrin and three of his leading aides were surrounded by Saudi forces and helicopters and killed in a shootout in Riyad.
The institute cited both open-source and exclusive information for its conclusion that Saudi security forces were ordered to wait until Johnson was executed. The opposition group cited the wife of slain Saudi police officer, Mohamed Ali Al Qahtani, as saying her husband knew of what she termed an "important operation" to kill Al Muqrin and his aides two days before the attack. Al Qahtani was killed in the shootout with Al Qaida.
"A Saudi security source has also told the Saudi Institute that the government knew about the whereabouts of many of the terrorists days before they were eventually killed," the institute said. "A statement by Crown Prince Abdullah three days before the shootout similarly suggested that he knew they would be killed, and was just a matter of when."
On June 14, Abdullah told a Saudi delegation, "You will see good news very soon," the official Saudi Press Agency reported.
A U.S. official said he could not confirm the report by the Saudi opposition group. But the official said U.S. intelligence has concluded that most of the Saudi security forces, including the National Guard, has been infiltrated by Al Qaida. He said members of the FBI and State Department team sent to Riyad to help in the search for Johnson expressed concern that Saudi security forces were avoiding suspected Al Qaida hideouts in Riyad.
The institute said it was told by a Saudi security source both before and after the Al Qaida shootout that the government knew the "whereabouts of Al Muqrin and his associates, but chose not to arrest or shoot them."
"They would rather have the terrorists free to justify the widening security clampdown," the security source said.
On May 30, Saudi security forces were ordered to allow an Al Qaida cell to escape the Oasis compound outside Khobar after Islamic insurgents had executed 22 foreigners in the two-day hostage ordeal. Saudi officials later said the government agreed to an Al Qaida demand to allow its members to escape rather than blow up the foreign housing compound.
Western governments with a significant presence in Saudi Arabia have been discussing the deployment of special forces to protect their embassies and consulates. On Wednesday, the London-based Telegraph reported that Britain has sent the SAS special force to Saudi Arabia to guard official British facilities and help in any emergency evacuation of the 20,000 Britons who work in the kingdom.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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Incitement to Jihad on Saudi Government-Controlled TV
By: Steven Stalinsky*
As part of MEMRI's TV Monitoring Project, Saudi government controlled television channels including TV1, TV2 and satellite channels such as Iqraa TV, are continually monitored.(1) These channels include shows with leading Saudi religious figures, professors, members of the royal family, government leaders and intellectuals. Constant themes within Saudi television shows include: calls for the annihilation of Christians and Jews, rampant anti-Americanism and antisemitism, support for Jihad, incitement against U.S. troops in Iraq, and the coming Islamic conquest of the U.S. Segments from these TV shows can be found at www.memriTV.org.
Saudi Religious Establishment 'Demonstrated that It is the Body Most Competent ... at De-Legitimizing Al Qa'ida's Cultist Ideology'
In a June 15 press release, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, maintained that "senior religious scholars in Saudi Arabia have continually and unequivocally condemned terrorism. In our war against terrorism, these condemnations are a powerful weapon." In this statement, as well as in close to two dozen others by the Saudi embassy in Washington D.C. since the Riyadh bombings on March 12, 2003, the government of Saudi Arabia promoted the idea that the royal family and religious establishment have been espousing a message of tolerance. As Nail Al-Jubeir, director of the Saudi information office, said on May 6, 2004: "Our religious establishment has taught moderation to our people. The religious establishment has demonstrated that it is the body most competent and effective at de-legitimizing Al Qa'ida's cultist ideology."
In fact, on June 20, 2004, Saudi cleric Dr. Muhammad Bin Suleiman Al-Mani'i hosted a talk show on Saudi TV 1 and spoke out against killing Jews and Christians. Excerpts of his statements include: "Islamic law in general prohibits any Muslim from raising a weapon against any lover of peace - dhimmi (protected person), Jewish or Christian, a merchant, or anyone who enters (the country) on a work contract. Islamic law permits raising a weapon only against whomever aims a weapon at the Muslim in order to fight him."
While Al-Mani'i's statement against killing Jews and Christians is almost unprecedented within Saudi Arabia, he went on to explain that if non-Muslims are treated well by Muslims, they will eventually convert to Islam: "The Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian subjects had their autonomous rule under Islam, and at the same time these Muslim states, and the caliphs, preserved their rights, treated them well, maintained neighborly relations and dealt with them honestly and in good faith, treated their sick, granted them their rights, and called them to convert to Islam. Therefore, the Jewish, Christian, and other subjects converted to Islam."
Saudi Professor: Allah Permits Annihilating Christians and Jews
Sheik Dr. Ahmad Abd Al-Latif, a professor at Um Al-Qura University, was asked the following question on Saudi channel TV1 on May 24: "Some imams and preachers call for Allah to annihilate the Jews and those who help them, and the Christians and those who support them... Is it permitted according to Islamic law?" Professor Al-Latif responded: "What made them curse the Jews is that the Jews are oppressors... The same goes for the Christians, because of their cruel aggression against Islamic countries ... while the truth is that this is a crusading war whose goal is to harm Muslims. This is why a Muslim is allowed to curse the oppressors from among the Jews and Christians... Cursing the oppressing Jews and the oppressing and plundering Christians and the prayer that Allah will annihilate them is permitted."
Former Saudi Embassy Official on 'Big Explosion' Coming
Sheik Muhammad Al-Munajid, a disciple of one of Saudi Arabia's most revered religious leaders, Sheik `Abd Al-`Aziz ibn `Abdallah ibn Baaz, was identified in a report in the Washington Post on December 11, 2003, as running "a Web site that promotes intolerance of Christians and Jews and calls for holy war on Shiite Muslims," and was included as one of sixteen clerics associated with the Saudi embassy's Islamic Affairs Department who was stripped of diplomatic credentials.
Al-Munajid stated on Iqraa TV on April 15: "The issue is not one person, two, ten or a hundred going out with their guns to support their brothers. Defeating the infidels requires a much greater effort. It requires the mobilization of the nation. How can the nation be mobilized? I believe that the stupid acts of these Jews and Crusaders mobilize the nation. The big explosion will come! In spite of everything, it will happen!"
Much of Saudi TV is based upon religious programming. Many of these programs refer to the spread of Islam throughout the world and the battle against non-Muslims. On a May 20 episode of Iqraa TV's 'Mushkilat Min Al-Hayat' (Problems from Life), Saudi Sheik Abdallah Al-Muslih, chairman of the Commission on Scientific Signs in the Koran and Sunnah of the Muslim World League, used evidence from early Islam to support his claim that suicide bombings on enemy land are permitted according to Islamic law: "... Regarding a person who blows himself up, I know this issue is under disagreement among modern clerics and jurisprudents... There is nothing wrong with [martyrdom] if they cause great damage to the enemy. We can say that if it causes great damage to the enemy, this operation is a good thing. This is when we talk of Dar Al-Harb. But, if we speak of what happens in Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia ... this is forbidden, brothers! This is the land of the Muslims. We must never do this in a Muslim country."
Prominent Saudi Professor: Allah Willing, the U.S. Will Collapse
Supporting Jihad against U.S. troops in Iraq is the topic of many Saudi TV programs. On May 10, Dr. Yassin Al-Khatib, a professor of Islamic law at Um Al-Qura University, declared on the UAE's Al-Majd TV, which frequently has Saudi guests on it, that "the honor, blood, property and mostly the fact that they entered the country [i.e. Iraq] ... make it every Muslim's duty to go out against them, not only the Iraqis. This is every Muslim's duty. Jihad today has become an individual duty that applies to each and every Muslim. It is forbidden for a person to remain silent... When the Muslims fought in Afghanistan they destroyed the Soviet Union, which was a superpower. It collapsed and Allah willing, so will this [the U.S.] collapse."
The Coming Islamic Takeover of the U.S.
Saudis often discuss the issue of the U.S. becoming a Muslim state in the future. On a March 17 broadcast on Iqraa TV, Saudi preacher Sheik Said Al-Qahtani discussed this issue, as well as the cases in which Muslims are permitted to declare a defensive Jihad: "... We did not occupy the U.S., with 8 million Muslims, using bombings. Had we been patient, and let time take its course, instead of the 8 million, there could have been 80 million [Muslims] and 50 years later perhaps all the US would have become Muslim... What should a Muslim do if he is attacked in his country, on his land? In this case, there is no choice besides defense, self-sacrifice, and what religious scholars call - Defensive Jihad... We attacked their country, and this caused them to wake the dormant enmity in their hearts... Especially since there is global Zionism, the enemy of Islam, and Judaism, and fundamentalist Crusaders... They interpret this whole incident as only the beginning and thus there is no choice but a preemptive strike."
Al-Qahtani added on another Iqraa TV show on May 5: "Allah said, 'prepare against them all the force and horsemen that you can.' What for? In order to strike fear into their hearts... At the same time, [we should] establish strategies for the future, even if only for the short term, and prepare ... so that one of these days, even 100, 200, or 400 years from now, we will become a force that will be feared by the infidel states."
Prominent Saudi Professor: America is on It's Way to Destruction
Saudi professor Nasser Bin Suleiman Al-Omar, who runs a large Islamic internet website, www.almoslim.net, appeared on Al-Majd, on June 13, 2004, to discuss the approaching collapse of the U.S. and the growing strength of Muslims within the U.S. Al-Omar stated: "America is collapsing from within. Where are America's principles of justice and democracy? ...Islam is advancing according to a steady plan, to the point that tens of thousands of Muslims have joined the American army and Islam is the second largest religion in America. Today, America is defeated. I have no doubt, not even for a minute, that America is on its way to destruction. But as Ibn Khaldoun said, just as it takes decades for nations to rise, it takes them decades to collapse. They don't collapse overnight. Because Communist Russia opposed reality it collapsed immediately. America may not collapse this way. It will be destroyed gradually. America will be destroyed. But we must be patient."
Saudi Arabia's Highest Ranking Government-Appointed Cleric: Hopefully the Jews' End Will Soon Occur
One month prior to Canada's decision to bar Saudi Arabia's highest ranking government-appointed cleric, Sheikh Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sudayyis, from entering the country, (2) the Saudi preacher gave a sermon on Saudi TV 1 discussing Jihad. Al-Sudayyis, who serves as one of the imams of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, stated: "The history of the Jewish people is written in black ink, and has included a series of murders of the prophets, the Mujaheedin and righteous people... But maybe it is the beginning of their end... You have revived the hopes of this nation through your blessed Jihad... With Allah's help, one of two good things will be awarded you: either victory or martyrdom." On June 11, Al-Sudayyis was given the honor of leading Friday prayers for over 10,000 worshippers gathered in the East London Mosque to hear him call, in English, for interfaith peace and harmony in an event that included Prince Charles via satellite and British Minister for Racial Equality, Fiona MacTaggart.(3)
In reaction to the May 1, 2004 terrorist shooting in the offices of an oil contractor in Yunbu', Saudi Arabia, in which seven people, among them two Americans, were killed, Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah ibn Abd Al-'Aziz stated at a gathering of Saudi dignitaries, including top Muslim clerics and preachers, that "the Zionists" were to blame. The statement was made at a May 2 gathering of the royal family, which aired on Saudi TV 1: "Be assured that the Zionist are behind everything. This is certain. I don't say this with 100% [confidence], but with 95%."
In addition to other leading Saudi officials, such as Interior Minister Prince Nayef, the following day Dr. Salem Al-Aufi, the secretary general of King Fahd Center for Printing the Koran, reiterated on Saudi TV 1: "Yesterday we heard the Crown Prince say that Zionism is behind these attacks. Who helps them carry out these kinds of attacks? Who gives them money? Who gives them weapons? Who presents them with the evil ideology that brought them to this? There is no doubt that behind this, there are international organizations aspiring to undermine this country's security, and terminate its achievements, and at the top of these organizations stands Zionism, the enemy of the religion."
Saudi Royal Family Can End Jihad Programming at Any Time
According to the websites of the television channels mentioned in this article, programming is presented by the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and is advertised as a "balanced blend of religious and cultural programs." The Ministry of Culture and Information's website indicates that it is responsible for the Kingdom's television and radio broadcasting and publication of printed material, and one of its defined roles includes the undertaking of information campaigns for the Kingdom. Therefore, the Saudi royal family can end its support for Jihad programming at any time.
*Steven Stalinsky is Executive Director of MEMRI.
Endnotes:
(1) Today, as part of MEMRI's Capitol Hill Lecture Series, Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Charles Schumer (D-NY), and Rick Santorum (R-PA) sponsored a MEMRI briefing that included a screening of recent broadcasts from Saudi government-controlled TV. Many of these broadcasts include anti-American incitement, antisemitism, and support for Jihad.
(2) According to the May 15, 2004 edition of the National Post (Canada), Conservative Canadian MP Jason Kenney said: "Al-Sudayyis refers to Jews as 'the scum of the Earth,' and he exhorts his followers against the Christian 'worshippers of the cross' and the 'idol-worshipping Hindus.'"
(3) Arab News (Saudi Arabia), June 12, 2004.


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Iranian Source: British Sailors Apprehended To Swap For 40 Iranian Volunteers for Suicide Missions Captured in Iraq

The London Arabic-language daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported on what it described as the real reason for the detention of the sailors of British vessels captured in Iranian waters. The following is the article:(1)
'The Real Reasons and Factors in the Apprehension of the British Navy Vessels'
"A source close to the [Iranian] Revolutionary Guards told Al-Sharq Al-Awsat of the real reasons and factors in the apprehension of the three British Navy vessels and the arrest of the sailors by Iranian Coast Guard patrol forces on Monday [June 21, 2004]. He indicated that the British Army command in Iraq had understood the message sent them by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards command by their capture of the ships."
'Detention of 40 Volunteers for Suicide Operations Was Great Concern to the Revolutionary Guards'
"According to the source, the content of the message was very simple: 'Release our comrades, whom you are holding, and we will release your soldiers.' The source clarified that the detention of 40 volunteers for suicide operations by the Ukrainian forces acting in Iraq was of great concern to the Revolutionary Guards command, because they [the 40] constituted the first group of volunteers participating in the Organization for the Commemoration of the Shahids, which was established recently by Revolutionary Guards Commander Col. Dhu al-Qadr.
"Al-Sharq Al-Awsat was informed that one of the senior leaders of the Revolutionary Guards, who had formerly held the post of head of the Committee for Iran-Ukraine Military Cooperation, had gone to Kiev for talks regarding the Iranian detainees. However, it turned out that the Ukrainian units had already handed the volunteers for suicide operations over to British forces acting in southern Iraq.
"Despite contacts between the Iranian and British military committees at the borders and daily contact between them in small conflict resolution - [such that] this has become routine since the British forces entered southern Iraq - the British command has so far refused to acknowledge that it is holding 40 Iranian volunteers in one of its detention camps. According to the Iranian source, this caused the Revolutionary Guards leadership to seek a semi-military solution to bring its men back from Iraq."
A Major Problem for President Khatemi
"The seizure of the British vessels is of great concern to the president of the [Iranian] Republic Muhammad Khatemi, because foreign relations is the only area that remains in his control, following the harmful reduction of his powers by Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei and other elements connected to him.
"Based on statements by a former reformist MP, the aim of Khatemi's policy was to reduce the tensions with the outside world; his achievements in establishing good relations with the neighboring countries, the European Union countries, and the Arab world provided him a large measure of independence.
"Iranian Leader [Ali Khamenei] and the conservatives had always sensed the importance of Khatemi's role in distancing the threats and dangers lying in wait for them, and therefore they had left the sphere of foreign relations to Khatemi.
"However, the picture has begun to change since the recent parliamentary elections [in Iran], when the Guardian Council banned or prevented the participation of more than 2,800 reformist candidates in the elections [to the seventh Majlis], in order to prevent a repeat of what happened four years ago when the reformists obtained full control of the Majlis. Similarly, 47 Revolutionary Guards officers entered the new parliament, and additionally a Revolutionary Guards colonel was appointed by Khamenei to head the Broadcasting and Television Authority. Also, Revolutionary Guards forces took over a Tehran airport, even though it had been opened by Khatemi, and conducted a campaign of arrests of reformists and student organization leaders on the eve of the anniversary of the July 1999 student uprising."
Endnotes:
(1) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), June 23, 2004.

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IAEA probing yet another hidden
Iran nuke facility
The International Atomic Energy Agency plans to examine the possibility that Iran has concealed another nuclear weapons facility. The IAEA has received information regarding an alleged nuclear site in Lavizan Shiyan, a neighborhood in Teheran. Commercial satellite imagery of the site, first taken in the summer of 2003 and again in March 2004, showed that several buildings and laboratories were razed and the topsoil removed.

Assad seeks expanded military tech support in 1st visit to China


Syria is top investor in Saudia Arabia, followed by Japan
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Wednesday, June 23, 2004
ABU DHABI - Syria has been identified as the leading Arab investor in Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi General Investment Authority cited Syria as being the sixth largest investor in Saudi Arabia. But Damascus was termed as the leading Arab investor in the kingdom.
The Saudi group said Syria invested 1.87 billion riyals, or about $480 million, since 2000. The GIA did not cite the nature of Syrian investment.
The United States was the leading foreign investor in Saudi Arabia with 15.57 billion riyals. Japan was No. 2 with 11.2 billion riyals, followed by France, Britain and Canada.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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SOME CONVERSATIONS...
http://www.moretothepoint.com/

Iraq Reconstruction Contracts listen
Government auditors say that Iraq's reconstruction has been plagued by fraud, waste, and mismanagement. When Iraq takes control of its own affairs next week, congressional oversight will come to an end Friday, on To the Point, Warren Olney looks at who will keep track of how private contractors are spending billions of taxpayers' dollars.



Will the US and UN Take Action on Sudan? listen
It took 20 years to end civil war between the north and the south in poverty-stricken Sudan, an African country the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. But in the western province of Darfur, Arab militias called Janjaweed--with the support of the government-- have made refugees of 1.1 million black Africans. In addition to murder, rape and displacement, they now face disease and hunger, as seasonal rains begin. The Bush administration says 320,000 refugees may die by the end of this year. The Congressional Black Caucus calls it "genocide." Senator John McCain says it could be worse than Rwanda. Warren Olney hears from a UN official bound for Sudan with Secretary General Kofi Annan and demands for action from an American Congressman.


Using 9-11 Fears to Set National Security Policy listen
The attacks of September 11 occurred almost three years ago, when they were "like a blinding flash, benumbing the country with a sudden knowledge of unimagined dangers." Three years later, the war on terror dominates US policy-making and the presidential campaign. Senator Kerry attacks President Bush's actions, but not his goal of fighting the terrorist threat at all cost. Critics of both men concede that the threat is real enough, but ask if it is being exaggerated for political gain. Will actions based on excessive fear give the terrorists what they could never get on their own? Does Kerry offer a sufficient alternative? Is there any real choice? Warren Olney discusses the impact of 9-11 on setting national security policy with journalists from The Nation and the Los Angeles Times, national security and military affairs analysts, and a foreign policy advisor to the Kerry campaign.



Militant Islamic Terrorism in Saudi Arabia listen
After year-long attacks on residential compounds and Paul Johnson's beheading, foreign workers in Saudi Arabia already feared for their lives. After Johnson's grizzly death, Saudi security forces said they'd destroyed the al Qaeda cell responsible and killed its leader, Abdulaziz al-Muqrin. But today's Saudi newspapers carry reports that al Qaeda may have infiltrated the nation's security forces. How deep is Saudi resentment against the royal family? What's being done to stop religious leaders from stirring up hatred? Are Saudi oil exports in jeopardy? Warren Olney hears how life has changed in the desert kingdom from journalists in the Middle East, officials at the Saudi Embassy in Washington and London, and an American couple that has spent more than a decade working in Saudi Arabia.


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Document Shows Iraq Sought Al Qaeda's Help Against Saudis
By THOM SHANKER
WASHINGTON, June 24 -- Contacts between Iraqi intelligence agents and Osama bin Laden when he was in Sudan in the mid-1990's were part of a broad effort by Baghdad to work with organizations opposing the Saudi ruling family, according to a newly disclosed document obtained by the Americans in Iraq.
American officials described the document as an internal report by the Iraqi intelligence service detailing efforts to seek cooperation with several Saudi opposition groups, including Mr. bin Laden's organization, before Al Qaeda had become a full-fledged terrorist organization. He was based in Sudan from 1992 to 1996, when that country forced him to leave and he took refuge in Afghanistan.
The document states that Iraq agreed to rebroadcast anti-Saudi propaganda, and that a request from Mr. bin Laden to begin joint operations against foreign forces in Saudi Arabia went unanswered. There is no further indication of collaboration.
Last week, the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks addressed the known contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda, which have been cited by the White House as evidence of a close relationship between the two.
The commission concluded that the contacts had not demonstrated "a collaborative relationship" between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The Bush administration responded that there was considerable evidence of ties.
The new document, which appears to have circulated only since April, was provided to The New York Times several weeks ago, before the commission's report was released. Since obtaining the document, The Times has interviewed several military, intelligence and United States government officials in Washington and Baghdad to determine that the government considered it authentic.
The Americans confirmed that they had obtained the document from the Iraqi National Congress, as part of a trove that the group gathered after the fall of Saddam Hussein's government last year. The Defense Intelligence Agency paid the Iraqi National Congress for documents and other information until recently, when the group and its leader, Ahmad Chalabi, fell out of favor in Washington.
Some of the intelligence provided by the group is now wholly discredited, although officials have called some of the documents it helped to obtain useful.
A translation of the new Iraqi document was reviewed by a Pentagon working group in the spring, officials said. It included senior analysts from the military's Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency and a joint intelligence task force that specialized in counterterrorism issues, they said.
The task force concluded that the document "appeared authentic," and that it "corroborates and expands on previous reporting" about contacts between Iraqi intelligence and Mr. bin Laden in Sudan, according to the task force's analysis.
It is not known whether some on the task force held dissenting opinions about the document's veracity.
At the time of the contacts described in the Iraqi document, Mr. bin Laden was little known beyond the world of national security experts. It is now thought that his associates bombed a hotel in Yemen used by American troops bound for Somalia in 1992. Intelligence officials also believe he played a role in training Somali fighters who battled Army Rangers and Special Operations forces in Mogadishu during the "Black Hawk Down" battle of 1993.
Iraq during that period was struggling with its defeat by American-led forces in the Persian Gulf war of 1991, when American troops used Saudi Arabia as the base for expelling Iraqi invaders from Kuwait.
The document details a time before any of the spectacular anti-American terrorist strikes attributed to Al Qaeda: the two American Embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998, the strike on the destroyer Cole in Yemeni waters in 2000, and the Sept. 11 attacks.
The document, which asserts that Mr. bin Laden "was approached by our side," states that Mr. bin Laden previously "had some reservations about being labeled an Iraqi operative," but was now willing to meet in Sudan, and that "presidential approval" was granted to the Iraqi security service to proceed.
At the meeting, Mr. bin Laden requested that sermons of an anti-Saudi cleric be rebroadcast in Iraq. That request, the document states, was approved by Baghdad.
Mr. bin Laden "also requested joint operations against foreign forces" based in Saudi Arabia, where the American presence has been a rallying cry for Islamic militants who oppose American troops in the land of the Muslim pilgrimage sites of Mecca and Medina.
But the document contains no statement of response by the Iraqi leadership under Mr. Hussein to the request for joint operations, and there is no indication of discussions about attacks on the United States or the use of unconventional weapons.
The document is of interest to American officials as a detailed, if limited, snapshot of communications between Iraqi intelligence and Mr. bin Laden, but this view ends with Mr. bin Laden's departure from Sudan. At that point, Iraqi intelligence officers began "seeking other channels through which to handle the relationship, in light of his current location," the document states.
Members of the Pentagon task force that reviewed the document said it described no formal alliance being reached between Mr. bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence. The Iraqi document itself states that "cooperation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop freely through discussion and agreement."
The heated public debate over links between Mr. bin Laden and the Hussein government fall basically into three categories: the extent of communications and contacts between the two, the level of actual cooperation, and any specific collaboration in the Sept. 11 attacks.
The document provides evidence of communications between Mr. bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence, similar to that described in the Sept. 11 staff report released last week.
"Bin Laden also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime," the Sept. 11 commission report stated.
The Sudanese government, the commission report added, "arranged for contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda."
"A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan," it said, "finally meeting bin Laden in 1994. Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded."
The Sept. 11 commission statement said there were reports of further contacts with Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan after Mr. bin Laden's departure from Sudan, "but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship," it added.
After the Sept. 11 commission released its staff reports last week, President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney said they remained convinced that Mr. Hussein's government had a long history of ties to Al Qaeda.
"This administration never said that the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated between Saddam and Al Qaeda," Mr. Bush said. "We did say there were numerous contacts between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. For example, Iraqi intelligence officers met with bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda, in the Sudan. There's numerous contacts between the two."
It is not clear whether the commission knew of this document. After its report was released, Mr. Cheney said he might have been privy to more information than the commission had; it is not known whether any further information has changed hands.
A spokesman for the Sept. 11 commission declined to say whether it had seen the Iraqi document, saying its policy was not to discuss its sources.
The Iraqi document states that Mr. bin Laden's organization in Sudan was called "The Advice and Reform Commission." The Iraqis were cued to make their approach to Mr. bin Laden in 1994 after a Sudanese official visited Uday Hussein, the leader's son, as well as the director of Iraqi intelligence, and indicated that Mr. bin Laden was willing to meet in Sudan.
A former director of operations for Iraqi intelligence Directorate 4 met with Mr. bin Laden on Feb. 19, 1995, the document states.
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company |
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Cheney Speaks
A Weekly Standard exclusive: Vice President Cheney on the Iraq-al Qaeda connection.
by Stephen F. Hayes
06/24/2004 1:05:00 PM
VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY said yesterday that suggestions the former Iraqi regime did not have a relationship with al Qaeda are "not accurate," and said he would like to see the U.S. government declassify some of the intelligence that supports Bush administration claims about an Iraq-al Qaeda connection.
"I think we should declassify as much as we can," Cheney said in a wide-ranging, 45 minute interview in the vice president's residence at the Naval Observatory in Washington. Cheney said the desire to make public some of the intelligence about Iraq and al Qaeda must be balanced against the need to protect sources and methods. "There is always the temptation to respond to the pressures of the moment by putting as much stuff out there as possible. But you don't want to do so in a way that is damaging to our capacity to collect information in the future." The call for declassification of material relating to the Iraq-al Qaeda connection has come from a variety of sources, including this magazine and the New York Times editorial page.
Cheney's comments come as some Democrats have stepped up their criticism of the Bush administration and its case for war in Iraq. House Democrats filed to the floor of that chamber in recent days to denounce the administration for misleading Americans on Iraq. Numerous top Democrats-including party chairman Terry McAuliffe and Senate majority leader Tom Daschle-attended the U.S. premiere of Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11, a film that accuses the Bush administration of lying to take the nation to war. Former Vice President Al Gore is set to give a speech today at Georgetown University's Law Center focusing on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship and accusing the Bush administration of using "dishonesty as an essential part of their policy process."
While Cheney was less aggressive in his comments on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship yesterday than he was in his criticism of news accounts last week about the September 11 Commission staff statements, he did not back down from his central argument: it is "not accurate" to suggest that there was no relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.
"I think it is important to the public that there be a dialogue to make sure to make a distinction" between potential Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks and a more general Iraq-al Qaeda connection, Cheney said. "On the question of whether or not there was Iraqi participation and support for what al Qaeda did in attacking the United States on 9/11," he continued, "we've never been able to prove that, we've been unable to confirm it. The second proposition is between Iraq and al Qaeda and Iraqi intelligence services over a longer period of time and there [we] have said yes there was, and we have been able to confirm that."
CHENEY SAID people are sometimes "sloppy" in confusing the two issues. The faulty reasoning, he says, goes like this: "Well, there is no proof that Saddam Hussein was involved with 9/11, therefore there is no relationship. That's not accurate. There was a relationship. But we have not been able to confirm that there was any involvement in 9/11."
Cheney himself has been accused of such sloppiness. "I try not to be. It's possible that I am sloppy on occasion, but I try not to be."
The vice president reiterated his claim that the "relationship goes back to the early nineties, to 1992." He would not say whether he considers that relationship "collaborative," something the 9/11 Commission staff statements, in muddled language, seemed to reject.
"You would have to ask them. They would have to define collaborative," he said. "We haven't seen the final report yet. We're still dealing with staff drafts. I mean, in fairness, the commission-many of the members have worked very hard for a long time and had to deal with a very tough set of issues and I would like to see the final report before I evaluate it and pass judgment on it."
CIA Director George Tenet has testified on several occasions that his agency could demonstrate that the relationship consisted of at least "contacts, safe haven and training."
"Credible reporting states that al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities," Tenet wrote to the Senate Intelligence Committee on October 7, 2002. "The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs." When Tenet testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 12, 2003, he noted "very compelling" intelligence about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship. "We also know from very reliable information that there's been some transfers, training in chemical and biologicals from the Iraqis to al Qaeda."
Other reporting suggests that the former Iraqi regime provided funding for al Qaeda and its affiliates, including $300,000 to Ayman al Zawahiri, former leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and currently bin Laden's top deputy. A communications intercept included in a May 2002 report from the National Security Agency indicates that an Iraqi intelligence officer provided Ansar al Islam-an al Qaeda affiliate that operated in northern Iraq, in territory not under the direct control of Saddam Hussein-with $100,000. Abdul Rahman al Shamari, an Iraqi detainee who claims to have worked for Iraqi intelligence from 1997 to 2002, has told journalists and U.S. intelligence interrogators that he served as a conduit for funding between the regime and Islamic terrorists, including Ansar al Islam.
CHENEY WOULD NOT COMMENT SPECIFICALLY on the case of Abdul Rahman Yasin, an Iraqi who has admitted to mixing the chemicals for the first World Trade Center attack, and has been living in Iraq for the past decade. The vice president raised the case of Yasin in an interview with CNBC's Gloria Borger last week. "There's Mr. Yasin, who was a World Trade Center bomber in '93 who fled to Iraq after that. And we've found since, when we got into Baghdad, documents showing that he was put on the payroll and given housing by Saddam Hussein after the '93 attack-in other words, provided safe harbor and sanctuary." Cheney refused to speculate whether those documents-which would seem to arouse few concerns about sensitive sources and methods-might be declassified. "I think that would have to be addressed by the Agency."
Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard and the author of The Connection.
? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved

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Iran again turns to Russia
By Sergei Blagov

MOSCOW - Despite American criticism, Russia has pledged to continue its nuclear ties with Iran. Yet it remains unclear whether Moscow is driven by mainly commercial motives, or if it is making a point in favor of global "multi-polarity" against American unilateralism.
Russia has a good chance of winning the contract to build the Bushehr-2 nuclear site in Iran, Center for Modern Iran Studies head Rajab Safarov told journalists in Moscow earlier this week. Moscow and Tehran are expected to sign a protocol of intent on building Bushehr-2 during Russian Federal Nuclear Energy Agency chief Alexander Rumyantsev's visit to Iran in July or August, Safarov said. The plant would be Iran's second nuclear facility.
In fact, Safarov reiterated and clarified earlier pledges by Russia's federal nuclear agency, which indicated that Moscow would continue building the Bushehr nuclear reactor despite criticism of Iran by Mohamed ElBaradei, chief of the United Nations watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The US is pressing for Iran to be taken to the UN Security Council for allegedly secretly developing nuclear weapons, but has not won support for this yet at the IAEA. But earlier this month, ElBaradei hardened the tone of the IAEA's investigation into Iran's nuclear program.
Yet Russia still insists on its nuclear ties with Iran. "Russia has no reasons for curtailing its cooperation with Iran in completing the construction of the first Bushehr reactor, scheduled to be launched in 2005," Russian Federal Nuclear Energy Agency spokesman Nikolai Shingaryov said earlier this month, adding that "negotiations will be continued on Russia's participation in the construction of a second Bushehr reactor. No convincing evidence that the Iranian nuclear program may have a military aspect have been found."
Earlier in June, first deputy chairman of Russia's State Duma, Lyubov Sliska, told Iranian news agency IRNA that Russia seeks to expand its ties with Iran. "We should not heed US views in expansion of our ties with other countries around the globe," she said. "The Russian president knows better how and where to establish friendly ties and cooperation with others."
Russian President Vladimir Putin has said Russia sees no reason to halt cooperation with Iran in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. On June 10, Putin told reporters at the end of the Group of Eight (G8) summit on Sea Island in the US state of Georgia that Russia would halt cooperation only if Iran refused to be transparent and stopped cooperating with the IAEA. "But for the moment, we have no reason to do that," he said.
Putin's comments came as G8 leaders - even Putin - said they were "deeply concerned" about Iran's compliance with IAEA requirements and stressed: "We deplore Iran's delays, deficiencies in cooperation, and inadequate disclosures." Iran rejected the G8 statement, saying there is no proof Iran has done anything wrong.
Russia has long been under fire for its help in building the first Bushehr nuclear plant on Iran's Gulf coast. The US insisted that the Russian technology could be used to develop nuclear weapons, but Moscow and Tehran argued that the plant could be used only for civilian purposes. Moscow has brushed off repeated US demands that it cancel the US$1 billion Bushehr 1,000 megawatt light-water nuclear reactor project.
Meanwhile, Russia has said it would freeze construction on the Bushehr nuclear plant and it would not begin delivering fuel for the reactor until Iran signs an agreement that would oblige it to return all of the spent fuel back to Russia for reprocessing and storage. This agreement was reported as close to being signed last September but so far the deal has failed to fully materialize.
Last October, Russia announced a delay for the launch of the Bushehr nuclear reactor till 2005, and urged Tehran to improve disclosure of its nuclear plans. However, there has been no talk about dropping the Bushehr agreement. Nonetheless, the Kremlin has repeatedly argued it abides by international agreements banning the proliferation of nuclear technologies.
Russian officials have also complained that the criticism of the Bushehr project was in part sparked by commercial considerations. Russia's nuclear executives have claimed that unnamed "competitors" were trying to undermine Russia's nuclear energy exports, which could eventually bring Moscow up to $3 billion a year.
Tehran seemingly appreciates Russia's stance on Bushehr. Coincidence or not, earlier this week Iran approved enlargement of Russia's preferred project, the North-South transport corridor agreement: Tehran approved the membership of Turkey and Ukraine in the project. Russia is trying to make the North-South transport connection a viable alternative to Red Sea routes as well as US-backed Eurasian transport links. Russia, India and Iran signed an agreement on the development of the North-South corridor in 2000 and the agreement also includes Kazakhstan, Oman, Tajikistan and Belarus.
On the other hand, Russia's insistence on nuclear ties with Iran indicates an absence of double standard approaches, which still allow some chosen nations to rely on nuclear weapons but ban other countries from any nuclear ambitions.
Russia makes no secret of its reliance on atomic weapons. Russia now has three missile armies and 16 divisions that have a total of 735 intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with 3,159 nuclear warheads, according to Russian media reports. Only Russia's missile-nuclear shield "can safeguard our sovereignty and national security", Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has said.
Moscow argues it strictly follows international agreements banning the proliferation of nuclear military technologies. But Russia concedes that other nations may also have civilian nuclear ambitions of their own: this argument could also serve to back up Moscow's preference of global "multi-polarity", a concept that opposes American unilateralism.
In the meantime, hypocrisy and double standards have become a matter of concern for the IAEA. In a speech in Washington earlier this month, ElBaradei urged nations to "abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue nuclear weapons but morally acceptable for others to rely on them".
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty signed more than three decades ago called on the declared nuclear states - the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France - to move toward full nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile, these nuclear powers pressuring Iran and North Korea to stick with non-proliferation and abandon nuclear arms are themselves still actually relying on the weapons.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)


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Real Freedom
State backs Iranian "reformers" -- who don't exist.

By Mohammad Parvin

Recently, the State Department has posted a 15-page document on its website under the title of "Voices Struggling to be Heard." This document has been presented as a "fact sheet," but much of it is more fiction than fact. Although it's a positive step on the part of the State Department to publish such a report in the first place, what is disappointing is that this publication is geared more towards promoting the so-called reformists in Iran than exposing human-rights violations by the Islamic regime.

State Department: "Today the courageous voices of the Iranian people are being stifled as they call for their rights, beliefs and needs to be respected. In response, the non-elected elements of the Iranian Government hierarchy are rebuffing these calls and attempting to extinguish the voices."

Fact: The State Department reference to "non-elected elements of the Iranian Government" implies that some elements of the government in Iran are elected. The State Department is wrong. There are no democratically elected elements in Iran. For example, Presdient Mohammed Khatami, the darling of the U.S. and Europe, was among just four selected candidates by the Guardian Council after 234 candidates were eliminated. All the so-called reformists who were "elected" in the previous parliament were first selected by undergoing the same filtering process.

State Department: "In June 1997 and again in 2001, a decisive election victory ushered President Mohammed Khatami into office under the auspices of a reformist agenda. The realization of this reform movement has been actively stifled by hard-line elements within the government, most specifically by the un-elected Guardian Council, a board of clerical leaders and legal scholars. Reformist and dissident voices within the government and society have been repressed and harassed by government and quasi-government factions under the influence of the hard-line clerics."

Fact: The proclaimed "reform movement" by Khatami did not materialize because he never had the intention of changing the status quo. He used the hollow promise for reform to stabilize the shaky regime and to prevent the escalation of popular unrest. What the oppositionists (not the reformists) want is very different from what the reformists within the government want. The reformists realize that some changes must be made if the whole system is going to be preserved. What the freedom-loving people of Iran want is a fundamental overhaul of the system; they want a separation between religion and state.

State Department: "In a move to diminish pro-reformist reelection chances, the Guardian Council disqualified approximately one-third of the 8,200 submissions for candidacy, including those of more than 80 reformists currently holding Majlis seats, effectively limiting the democratic alternatives available to Iranian voters."

Fact: The Guardian Council follows the rules and laws written into the Islamic constitution. Contrary to the State Department's assumption, all these actions are very much within the law. Those who accept this constitution, including the reformists, have nothing to complain about. Where were they when the other candidates were eliminated in last "election"? These sham elections are not democratic because at best, they only allow regime loyalists to participate, thus eliminating any chance of a real democratic election for Iranians. Therefore, there is no democratic alternative available to Iranians.

State Department: "Students have mobilized to demand greater freedoms and to support reform efforts by the Khatami Government, the Majlis, and individuals willing to speak the truth."

Fact: The Iranian students no longer support reform efforts by Khatami and his government and have repeatedly rejected him. Slogans such as "shame on Khatami" and "Resign Khatami" have been favorite catchphrases in recent demonstrations. The Iranian students are struggling for a secular democratic regime that by its definition cannot include the clerical elements.

In sum, the State Department has used human rights as a tool to promote the reformist faction of the government in order to justify reestablishing relations with the Islamic regime. The so-called hardliners have also started making hollow gestures towards reform. And why shouldn't they? It works. It does not cost them anything and it makes them competitive with their reformist rivals. (The recent move of the hardliners on banning torture in Iran was well received by the entire world. Nobody noted, however, that the Islamic constitution allows torture under the name of tazir and that this has remained intact.)
We believe that the majority of Iranian people does not recognize the Islamic regime as its elected representative and is determined to change the regime of terror by civil disobedience and nonviolent action. If the Islamic regime claims otherwise, it should take up the challenge of a nationwide referendum monitored by the international human-rights community.
Let's hope that the State Department and other U.S. institutions will eventually show respect for the freedom movement in Iran by not legitimizing and promoting its enemy, the Islamic regime of Iran.
-- Mohammad Parvin is an adjunct professor at the California State University and director of the Mission for Establishing Human Rights in Iran.
http://www.nationalreview.com/voices/parvin200406240938.asp

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Kim Jong-Il's brother-in-law under house arrest as succession struggle rages





U.S. Revises Proposal at North Korea Nuclear Talks
Fuel Aid, Security Statement Possible During 3-Month Test
By Philip P. Pan and Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, June 24, 2004; Page A17
BEIJING, June 23 -- The Bush administration presented a more specific proposal for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis Wednesday, offering the North the possibility of energy aid from South Korea, security assurances and other benefits during a three-month test period if it promises to disclose and end its nuclear weapons programs.
U.S. negotiators at talks among six nations -- the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia -- on the standoff also backed away from hard-line language calling for the "complete, verifiable and irreversible" dismantling of the programs. The administration had insisted that the North Korean government agree to the language in two previous rounds of the talks but said it was now willing to consider other wording to describe the same goal.
One senior U.S. official described the proposal as a "repackaging and elaboration of things we have said before" and said it was likely to be rejected by the North Koreans. But other U.S. officials described it as a legitimate effort to flesh out a U.S. plan for ending the stalemate.
In any case, the proposal represents an attempt by the Bush administration to address criticism from its allies as well as domestic critics. The allies complain that the administration has not been flexible enough in the talks, while critics such as Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kerry have described its strategy as a failure that has allowed North Korea to produce nuclear materials undisturbed for nearly 20 months.
North Korea's delegation did not immediately respond and indicated it wanted to confer with superiors in the capital, Pyongyang. A diplomat at the talks said the Chinese were not pleased with aspects of the plan, and Russian officials said it would be impossible for North Korea to accept it.
U.S. officials in Beijing and Washington acknowledged they drafted the new proposal largely because of pressure from South Korea and Japan. Both nations, as well as China, the host of the talks, have been pushing the Bush administration to show more flexibility and let North Korea demonstrate it is willing to dismantle its nuclear program. An official in Washington said "alliance management" was one of the key motivations for making the proposal.
But a White House official said the proposal also was designed to gauge North Korean intentions. "It is a test," he said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "It is a pragmatic and reasonable way forward."
A senior U.S. official who briefed reporters in Beijing on condition of not being identified said the plan is "more tangible and more specific" about what North Korea stands to gain by abandoning its nuclear programs and "spells out in detail" what North Korea needs to say in its promise to disarm.
Previously, U.S. officials had privately outlined a three-stage approach for ending the crisis, placing much of the onus on North Korea and providing only vague suggestions about what it would receive in return. The proposal outlined Wednesday includes stages tied directly to North Korea's performance in dismantling its nuclear programs, and various elements could be suspended or slowed if North Korea lagged in one or more areas, officials said.
Under the plan, South Korea and possibly other countries could begin providing heavy fuel oil to the North's battered economy immediately if the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, promises to dismantle the country's plutonium and uranium arms programs, U.S. officials said. The idea was floated by South Korea at the last round of talks and was neither rejected nor endorsed by the United States.
U.S. officials said this fuel would aid North Korea with its desperate energy situation and provide an incentive to begin preparations for dismantling its programs. Once North Korea began to display and secure its materials and weapons -- and its claims have been verified by U.S. intelligence -- the United States and the other nations at the negotiations would issue provisional security assurances. This formula would effectively say the countries had "no intention to invade or attack" North Korea. The United States also would lay the groundwork for a study of North Korea's non-nuclear energy needs, discussions on lifting economic sanctions and removing North Korea from a U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.
After Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld protested, President Bush rejected a State Department proposal to immediately offer security assurances to North Korea at the same time that fuel shipments were started by South Korea, said an administration official familiar with the interagency discussions.
North Korea would be given only three months to halt and disclose all of its nuclear activities, including a secret uranium enrichment program that it says does not exist, and to begin securing and destroying nuclear materials under the supervision of international monitors, the officials said. Otherwise, these preliminary benefits would be halted.
North Korea has said it needs nuclear weapons because of Bush's "hostile policy" and has demanded written security guarantees from the United States before dismantling its programs.
The proposal does not specify a timetable of benefits that the North would receive in exchange for specific steps, as North Korean negotiators have previously demanded.
The Bush administration is retreating from its demand for the "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" of the North's programs because the phrase "seems to inflame sensibilities," one official said. Another administration official said the United States was using slightly softer language -- asking North Korea to dismantle its programs "in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to effective verification" -- because North Korean negotiators declared in a working-level session last month that the previous wording was "culturally offensive."
Kessler reported from Washington.
? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Pakistani restrictions slow U.S. search for bin Laden
By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Osama bin Laden remains on the run along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, with the U.S. manhunt hindered by restrictions on the movements of covert warriors.
Defense sources say bin Laden plays less of a hands-on role in running al Qaeda than at the time he managed the September 11 plot. A new crop of terror leaders now is planning attacks at the local levels in extremist spinoff groups linked to bin Laden.
"He is much less in day-to-day control because he is on the run so much," a defense source said yesterday. "To the extent that he runs operations, he uses cutouts, human messengers, because he doesn't use cell phones."
U.S. government promises to capture the terror mastermind have ceased in recent months. As bin Laden stays under the radar, an ally, Abu Musab Zarqawi, the most wanted man in Iraq, has dominated headlines as one of the world's most gruesome terrorists.
Zarqawi is believed to be responsible for the beheading of American civilian Nicholas Berg. He has organized a series of suicide car bombings that killed scores of Iraqis and Americans.
Meanwhile, bin Laden moves through the rugged mountains by any means available -- foot, donkey or vehicle -- and attracts a loyal following willing to provide cover, defense officials say.
For years, he has traveled with his top deputy, Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahri, a surgeon whom one U.S. official described as particularly vicious.
Washington believes bin Laden is still alive. He has not been heard from since April and no longer appears in videotapes. An April audiotape of bin Laden turned up at Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based satellite news channel that the Pentagon says is sympathetic to Islamist terrorists.
In that tape, bin Laden offered a "truce" to any European country that pulled its troops out of Iraq. In a January audiotape, he called on all Muslims to conduct a holy war in the Middle East against Americans.
In an infamous 1998 fatwa, or religious decree, he declared war on the United States, urging Muslims to kill Americans anywhere, anytime.
Before a spring offensive code-named Mountain Storm, U.S. military officers in Afghanistan made bold predictions that bin Laden would be captured by the year's end. That rosy scenario has given way to more sober comments.
Asked at a June 17 press conference how the hunt for bin Laden and former Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar was progressing, Lt. Gen. David Barno, the top commander in Afghanistan, made no predictions.
"That hunt continues," he said. "We have a focused effort here that's dedicated on a daily basis to looking for those leaders that are at the tops of these organizations, but it's important to get at the organization, the network, and to take down those terrorist networks as attacking the leadership. We'll continue to focus on finding the key leaders in these organizations and bringing them to justice."
A second Pentagon source said the measured statements reflect the reality of trying to catch elusive terrorists in vast, rugged areas, some of which are off-limits to uniformed personnel.
Despite a new offensive by Pakistani troops, there remain areas in the tribal regions of eastern Pakistan where government troops will not go. Although the CIA operates in Pakistan, the country is off-limits to American infantrymen who could hunt for bin Laden in the same way they hunted down Saddam Hussein and his two sons in Iraq.
"They remain optimistic, but the amount and ability of Pakistan to cooperate ebbs and flows," the official said. "There are certain places Pakistani forces can go and certain places where they cannot."
This is because President Pervez Musharraf needs the allegiance of tribal leaders as he tries to shift the country away from radical Islam and embrace the United States as an ally in the war on terrorism. Militants have made two attempts on his life, using bombs that nearly struck his armored limousine.
Officials say he must be judicious in how many missions he launches into the ungoverned areas so as not to trigger a rebellion.
Last winter, the Pentagon shifted elements of the secretive Task Force 121 from Iraq to Afghanistan to aid the search for bin Laden.
The task force is a mobile mix of intelligence collectors, aviators and warriors. It includes CIA officers; a military intelligence unit that has been known as Grey Fox; Navy SEALs and Army Delta Force soldiers attached to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC); and the 160th Special Operations Regiment.
A senior defense source said JSOC and U.S. Special Operations Command have planned scores of missions for Task Force 121, but the team has not located bin Laden or al-Zawahri.

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Who Is Ahmed Hikmat Shakir?
According to Knight-Ridder, the mysterious Iraqi was "employed with the aid of an Iraqi intelligence officer" and later "accompanied two Sept. 11 hijackers from the airport to a hotel where the pair met with Ramzi Binalshibh, a key planner of the attacks, and Tawfiz al Atash, who masterminded al Qaida's strike on the USS Cole in October 2000." Interesting, no?
by Stephen F. Hayes
06/23/2004 9:10:00 AM
THE WASHINGTON POST reported yesterday morning that an Iraqi present at a key al Qaeda summit may not be the same Iraqi listed on lists of officers of the Saddam Fedayeen captured in postwar Iraq.
In Al Qaeda Link to Iraq May be Confusion Over Names, the Post broke very little new ground. Both the Wall Street Journal (which broke the story) and this magazine (which confirmed it) openly acknowledged that possibility. And John Lehman, the September 11 Commissioner who raised the issue on Meet the Press on Sunday, allowed that "still has to be confirmed."
The Post added to the debate in one interesting way when it reported that U.S. intelligence officials have "discounted" reports in this magazine that Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, the Iraqi at the al Qaeda meeting, was "under Iraqi intelligence control." That the Post has finally acknowledged the existence of Shakir might be considered a promising development, since his name has never previously graced its pages. But having whetted our appetite for substance, the Post account simply ends.
Here is the Shakir chronology as reported in this week's WEEKLY STANDARD:
Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. Shakir, as WEEKLY STANDARD readers may recall, is an Iraqi who was present at the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. U.S. intelligence officials do not know whether Shakir was an active participant in the meeting, but there is little doubt he was there.
In August 1999, Shakir began working as a VIP greeter for Malaysian Airlines. He told associates he had gotten the job through a contact at the Iraqi embassy. In fact, Shakir's embassy contact controlled his schedule--told him when to report to work and when to take a day off. The contact apparently told Shakir to report to work on January 5, 2000, the same day September 11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar arrived in Kuala Lumpur. Shakir escorted al Mihdhar to a waiting car and then, rather than bid his guest farewell, jumped in the car with him. The meeting lasted from January 5 to January 8. Shakir reported to work twice after the meeting broke up and then disappeared.
He was arrested in Doha, Qatar, on September 17, 2001. Authorities found both on his body and in his apartment contact information for a number of high-ranking al Qaeda terrorists. They included the brother of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Hajer al Iraqi, described by one detainee as Osama bin Laden's "best friend." Despite this, Shakir was released from custody. He was detained again on October 21, 2001, in Amman, Jordan, where he was to have caught a flight to Baghdad. The Jordanians held Shakir for three months. The Iraqi regime contacted the Jordanian government and either requested or demanded--depending on who you ask--his release. The Jordanians, with the apparent acquiescence of the CIA, set him free in late January 2002, at which point he returned to Baghdad. Then earlier this spring, Shakir's name was found on three lists of the officers of Saddam's Fedayeen.
It's possible, of course, that there is more than one Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. And even if the Shakir listed as an officer of the Saddam Fedayeen is the same Shakir who was present at the 9/11 planning meeting, it does not mean that the Iraqi regime helped plan or even had foreknowledge of those attacks.
The Post article mentions none of this; we learn only that these reports have been discounted by intelligence officials who talked to the Post, but never why. Here is one possible explanation, from a WEEKLY STANDARD article on Shakir last October:
Some intelligence officials believe that the Iraqi embassy employee who got Shakir his airport job may have been an agent of Saddam Hussein's intelligence service, the Mukhabarat, and that high-ranking elements of the government, perhaps including Saddam, knew about his activities. After all, the intelligence service placed its agents liberally in Iraqi embassies throughout the world. In some cases, intelligence agents made up more than 50 percent of the employees in an Iraqi embassy. This doesn't mean that Saddam or anyone in his government necessarily had foreknowledge of September 11; only that his intelligence service may have provided logistical support to the men who gave us September 11--again, perhaps without precise knowledge of their plans.
Others, primarily at the CIA, are more skeptical. They point out that the Iraqi embassy employee who got Shakir his job and managed his schedule was a lower-ranking embassy official. That, they argue, does not fit the profile of a Mukhabarat foreign agent. There are alternative explanations for some of the details, too. Shakir may have accompanied the September 11 hijackers to the Kuala Lumpur Hotel because they gave him a big tip or, some have suggested, because he knew the way. It's possible that Shakir was an Iraqi who had joined al Qaeda and, apart from his contact with the Iraqi embassy employee, had nothing to do with the Iraqi regime. The Iraqi regime, for its part, may have simply requested Shakir's release from the Jordanian government as a routine matter.
So was Saddam Hussein involved in September 11? Evidence, at this point, is scarce . . .
There are two critical questions, then, about Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. Was the Shakir in Kuala Lumpur the same man listed as an officer of the Saddam Fedayeen? And more important, what was the relationship, if any, between the Ahmed Hikmat Shakir who is known to have been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting and the Iraqi government?
I don't have the answer to either one. (In fact, that uncertainty is why the first chapter in my book is not a declarative statement, but a question: "Case Open: Who is Ahmed Hikmat Shakir?")
JONATHAN LANDAY, a reporter for Knight Ridder, also spoke to intelligence officials who doubt that the Shakir in Kuala Lumpur is the same one on the captured lists. "But U.S. officials told Knight Ridder on Monday that U.S. intelligence experts were highly skeptical that the Iraqi officer had any connection to al-Qaida."
But in contrast to the Post's report, Landay attempted to answer the second of the two main questions about Shakir: Here is how Landay reported that question (with a slightly different name spelling):
Ahmad Hikmat Shakir was employed with the aid of an Iraqi intelligence officer as a "greeter" or "facilitator" for Arabic-speaking visitors at the airport at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
In January 2000, he accompanied two Sept. 11 hijackers from the airport to a hotel where the pair met with Ramzi Binalshibh, a key planner of the attacks, and Tawfiz al Atash, who masterminded al-Qaida's strike on the USS Cole in October 2000.
There's no evidence that Ahmad Hikmat Shakir attended the meeting. Four days after it ended, he left Kuala Lumpur.
Several days after the Sept. 11 attacks, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir was arrested in Qatar in possession of highly suspicious materials that appeared to link him with al-Qaida.
The Qataris inexplicably released him, and he flew to Amman, Jordan, where he was arrested again. The Jordanians freed him under pressure from Iraq and Amnesty International, and he went to Baghdad.
This account is reason enough for the September 11 Commission to take a good look at Shakir. According to Landay, Shakir was "employed with the aid of an Iraqi intelligence officer" and later "accompanied two Sept. 11 hijackers from the airport to a hotel where the pair met with Ramzi Binalshibh, a key planner of the attacks, and Tawfiz al Atash, who masterminded al Qaida's strike on the USS Cole in October 2000." After his capture in Jordan the Iraqi regime exerted "pressure" and, upon his release, he fled to Baghdad. Landay notes that no major al Qaeda operative has implicated Shakir in the 9/11 attacks and that U.S. intelligence analysts are "highly skeptical" that he played a role.
Landay may be right. There may be an innocent explanation for Shakir's activities in Kuala Lumpur. We may see that explanation in the September 11 Commission's final report later this summer. But that report will be incomplete if it does not attempt to answer the question: "Who is Ahmed Hikmat Shakir?"
Stephen F. Hayes, a staff writer at The Weekly Standard, is the author of The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America.
? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved

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Part 1: The 'arch-proliferator'
China has been widely reviled as the world's arch-proliferator, opening a Pandora's Box of weapons of mass destruction, and

helping Pakistan, Iran and Algeria. The truth, as usual, is more complex, with valid arguments on both sides. China's record

is mixed and at times decidedly unsavory, but its recent moves and noises are positive, and those who point fingers at

Beijing have records that are far from spotless.
So, is China a proliferator or a nonproliferator, a one-time proliferator who has seen the light and now is a

nonproliferator, or still something of both? Those are some of the questions asked as China, in this post-Cold War age of

existential angst is hardly the only country often cited in regard to proliferation of "weapons of mass destruction". But it

is the world's largest and a favorite whipping boy for military planners and political ideologues.
So, what is China's record? Any honest appraisal has to acknowledge that China has come a long way towards nonproliferation,

certainly in word, and to a significant extent in deed.
By the definition of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, following its first nuclear test in 1964, China is one of the five

de jure nuclear-weapon states because it declared and tested a nuclear weapon before 1967.
During its early years as a nuclear weapons state, China's rhetoric favored nuclear weapons proliferation, particularly in

the Third World, as a rallying point for anti-imperialism. Through the 1970s, China's policy was not to oppose nuclear

proliferation, which it still saw as limiting United States and Soviet power. But after China began to open up to the West in

the 1970s, its rhetorical position gradually shifted to one opposing nuclear proliferation, explicitly so after 1983.
But China's years of isolation and disengagement from the rest of the world were costly, in terms of demonstrating its

nonproliferation credentials. In particular its nuclear practices did not conform to international non-proliferation regime

standards, and major efforts over 20 years were required to persuade China to bring its nuclear trade practices into

alignment with the policies of the other nuclear supplier states.
Do as I say, not as I do
But it has been an uphill slog for China, since it has had to cope with a "do as I say, not as I do" situation. For example,

consider that China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, but it did not join the nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) until 1992. During this period, the non-proliferation regime, at US urging, was itself raising

the bar with stiffer export control requirements, making the standards applied to China today higher and stricter than those

most Western states themselves lived by during the Cold War. Ironically, nowadays those higher standards are considered

indispensable for nonproliferation regime effectiveness and Western states continue to pressure China to comply with them.
Bear in mind that after joining IAEA, China has declared that it conducts its nuclear trade according to the following three

principles:
All exports should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes;
All exports should be subject to IAEA safeguards;
No exports should re-transferred to a third country without prior Chinese approval.
Most recently, on May 31, China was accepted into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at a meeting in Sweden. The NSG is made

up of 40 nuclear-capable nations that work with each other to control the trade of nuclear materials and technology for

business purposes.
According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC, in the past, "China posed challenges to the

international non-proliferation regime because of the role of Chinese companies in supplying a wide range of materials,

equipment and technologies that could contribute to NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] weapons and missile programs in

countries of proliferation concern. Specifically, China disregarded international norms during the 1980s by selling nuclear

materials to countries such as South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Argentina, without requiring that the items be placed under

IAEA safeguards."
While China's record has been improving during the 1990s, especially since it acceded to the NPT in 1992, questions still are

raised about its role in weapons proliferation. Since taking office, the administration of President George W Bush has

imposed sanctions at least eight times on entities of the People's Republic of China, but not on the government itself, for

transfers relating to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and cruise missiles to Pakistan and Iran.
China gave nuclear aid to Pakistan for 15 years
In regard to nuclear proliferation, the most serious charges center on the following: Chinese assistance to Pakistan over the

past 15 years is considered crucial to Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons. According to the Carnegie Endowment, in the

early 1980s China was believed to have supplied Pakistan with the plans for one of its earliest bombs and possibly to have

provided enough highly enriched uranium for two such weapons.
China also assisted Pakistan's civilian nuclear program by helping to build a 300-megawatt (MW) power reactor, thus enabling

Islamabad to circumvent a nuclear trade embargo.
Back in 1996 some in the US Congress called for sanctions against Beijing after reports that China sold non-safeguarded ring

magnets to Pakistan, apparently in violation of both the NPT and various US laws. Specifically, a Chinese state-owned company

transferred to the Abdul Qadeer Khan Laboratory in Pakistan 5,000 ring magnets that can be used in gas centrifuges to enrich

uranium. Khan is considered the father of Pakistan's nuclear program and admitted to selling nuclear technology to other

countries.
What tends to be overlooked in discussions of Chinese assistance to Pakistan is its motivation. Chinese transfers derive

largely from Chinese concerns about the regional balance of power: specifically China's effort to pursue a containment policy

in regard to India.
Also, back in 1995, at US urging, China suspended a sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. China also built an electromagnetic

isotope separation system for enriching uranium at the Kkarja nuclear facility.
Before that China had provided Iran with three zero-power research reactors and one very small, 30-kilowatt reactor.
China gave nuclear aid to Iran - with safeguards
China did continue until 1997 to assist Iran in constructing a plant near Esfahan to produce uranium hexafluoride, the

material fed into gas centrifuges for enrichment. Chinese technicians also assisted Iran with uranium mining and processing

and fuel fabrication. Yet these activities were carried out in accordance with NPT and IAEA safeguards.
China has also pursued a continuing nuclear export relationship with Algeria, dating back to 1983 when it was involved in the

secret construction of the Es Salem 15-MW research reactor at Ain Oussera. Shortly after the reactor was discovered and

publicized in April 1991, Algeria agreed to place it under IAEA safeguards, and a safeguard agreement for this purpose was

signed in February 1992. Thus the reactor has been subject to IAEA inspections since its inauguration in December 1993.

Although Algeria later acceded to the NPT, its interest in plutonium reprocessing and the possibility that China may have

helped Algeria with this activity have kept Algeria on the watch-list.
China has signed agreements with Algeria covering nuclear cooperation between the two countries. China is apparently helping

to construct the Algerian Center of Nuclear Energy Research, which will be placed under IAEA safeguards.
Earlier this year, Chinese nuclear weapons designs were reportedly discovered at Libyan facilities, probably the result of

Pakistani proliferation according to the Washington, DC-based Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Still overall, while there are still frictions, when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation, China and the United States are

increasingly finding areas of convergence, moving from Washington's condemnation of China and India's nuclear weapons tests

in 1998 to cooperation in defusing the North Korean nuclear weapons program.
Tomorrow: All the right noises
David Isenberg, a senior analyst with the Washington-based British American Security Information Council (BASIC), has a wide

background in arms control and national security issues. The views expressed are his own.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales

and syndication policies.)


PART 2: All the right noises
In the past, China has undeniably contributed to proliferation, fueled by its economic reforms, liberalization and urgent

quest for foreign markets for its defense industrial complex.
According to an analysis last year presented to Congress by Leonard Spector of the Monterey Institute Center for

Nonproliferation Studies, "Chinese economic reforms that began in 1979 loosened controls on exports and reduced government

support for China's defense industrial complex. The result was a surge in Chinese proliferation activity, as Chinese defense

enterprises took advantage of new opportunities to seek foreign markets for their products, including exports of ballistic

missiles, nuclear technology, and precursor chemicals and equipment useful for the production of chemical weapons." Chinese

weapons went to Pakistan, Iran, Algeria and Saudi Arabia.
But in the past decade or so China has become much more engaged with the world community on arms control issues. So how does

its record on nonproliferation look?
The answer is generally better than Beijing is given credit for. This contradicts the conventional wisdom on China in regard

to nuclear proliferation, which says that Beijing is a source of continuing concern. But the conventional wisdom is wrong.
For example, the latest biannual report from the US Central Intelligence Agency, "Acquisition of Technology Relating to

Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Advanced Conventional Munitions", notes: "Over the past several years, Beijing improved its

nonproliferation posture through commitments to multilateral arms control regimes, promulgation of export controls, and

strengthened oversight mechanisms."
Even the US State Department's arms control unit, which under the leadership of neo-conservative John Bolton, the under

secretary of state for arms control and international security, has been uniformly hawkish, acknowledges that China has been

cooperative when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation. Testifying before the House International Relations Committee on May

18, John S Wolf, assistant secretary for nonproliferation, noted that the US supported China's application for formal

membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), also known as the Zangger Committee. He noted that since the US first

suggested Chinese membership in the NSG in 1994:
First, China promulgated nuclear export controls in September 1997 and based those controls on an itemized list that was

substantively identical to the trigger list developed and used by the Nuclear Suppliers Group;
Second, at the October 1997 US/China summit, China committed publicly not to provide any assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear

facilities and nuclear explosive programs;
Third, China promised to promulgate strengthened dual-use controls by the middle of 1998, which it did. Those dual-use

controls employ a control list substantively identical to the one used by the NSG;
Fourth, China did join the Zangger Committee, or the NSG, in 1997 and has been a cooperative member ever since.
The 40-member NSG is comprised of nuclear-supplier states that have agreed to coordinate their export controls governing

transfers of civilian nuclear material and technology to prevent nuclear exports intended for commercial and peaceful

purposes from being used to make nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, in contrast, the administration of President George W Bush plans to develop a new generation of low-yield nuclear

weapons, sending the message that nuclear weapons are a viable tool of war, and refuses to join the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty.
The US position on new mini-nukes has not escaped Chinese notice. During the first week of the 2004 preparatory committee for

the 2005 review conference of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons held from April 26 to May 7, China's

ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament, Hu Xiaodi, said: "In this situation, such moves as adopting pre-emptive

strike strategy, explicitly listing other states as targets and development of new types of easy-to-use nuclear weapons, and

shortening the time of preparation for nuclear tests not only run counter to international trend, but also do harm to

international non-proliferation efforts, which is in the interests of no state."
China explores joining missile-control group
Earlier this year, China began talks exploring possible membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The 33-

member MTCR is an export-control regime that aims to limit the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles. China agreed in 1991

to abide by the key parameters of the MTCR, but it continued to exploit loopholes and ambiguities in its commitments to the

US to export missile components and missile production technology to countries such as Pakistan and Iran. China exported 34

complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan in 1991-92, its last known transfers of complete MTCR Category I-class missile systems.
Even before this, China, in response to US urging, had moved over the past several years to bring its national export

controls into line with those of MTCR members. In November 2000, Beijing declared that it would not assist other states in

acquiring missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. That pledge was defined as applying to missiles capable of

delivering a 500-kilogram payload 300 kilometers or more - the same formulation that appears in MTCR guidelines. Then, in

August 2002, China published a list of missile-related and dual-use goods that required government approval before being

exported.
China is also very interested in the Proliferation Security Initiative, a US-led multilateral effort formally announced in

May 2003 to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. State Department spokesperson Richard

Boucher said on February 17 that "we have seen progress by China" on proliferation issues and that China is "very interested

in the Proliferation Security Initiative".
On April 12 Beijing issued a white paper on China's non-proliferation policy and measures. It specified many of China's

actions in the areas of nuclear, chemical and biological nonproliferation, including:
Joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, and voluntarily placing its civilian nuclear facilities under

IAEA safeguards;
Acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992;
Taking an active part in the negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on

Disarmament in Geneva and being among the first countries to sign CTBT in 1996;
Signing the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between China and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in China in 1998,

and in early 2002 formally completing the domestic legal procedures necessary for the entry into force of the additional

protocol, thus becoming the first nuclear-weapon state to complete the relevant procedures;
Participating constructively in the missile field in the work of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on

Missiles, as well as the international discussions on the draft of the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic

Missile Proliferation and the proposal of a Global Control System.
Chinese strengthens export controls
In recent years China has passed the following laws and regulations to strengthen its export control system:
Circular on Strict Implementation of China's Nuclear Export Policy, May 1997;
Regulations on Nuclear Export Control, September 1997 (Note: The control list included in the 1997 regulations is identical

to that used by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which China joined this month.)
Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Nuclear Goods and Related Technologies, June 1998;
Nuclear export control list as amended, June 28, 2001.
Of course, like that of every other country, China's record is not spotless. Towards the end of the 1980s, revelations of

Chinese nuclear and missile transfers to countries in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and South Asia raised serious

proliferation concerns and were a contributing factor in the "China threat" debate in the US. Among the controversial Chinese

arms transfers were the sale of the Dong Feng 3 (CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, HY-2 (

Silkworm) anti-ship missiles to Iran, the nuclear reactor deal with Algeria, and missile-related transfers to Pakistan.
Still, its actions to date tend to confirm the analysis of a past evaluation by the Center for International Trade and

Security at the University of Georgia, which found that China's nonproliferation export controls continue to become more

compatible with emerging multilateral standards, especially in the area of nuclear export controls.
The analysis also found that China had become more willing to adopt policies that impose real costs on its enterprises in

order to meet its international nonproliferation commitments. In recent years, China has moved beyond the symbolic acts of

treaty ratification to implement its nonproliferation obligations. It has, among other actions, halted sales of some

sensitive items, imposed new systems of licensing with considerable administrative costs, and placed its military industries

under more civilian control.
Tomorrow: Part 3: Pointing fingers
David Isenberg, a senior analyst with the Washington-based British American Security Information Council (BASIC), has a wide

background in arms control and national security issues. The views expressed are his own.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales

and syndication policies.)
No material from Asia Times Online may be republished in any form without written permission.
Copyright 2003, Asia Times Online, 4305 Far East Finance Centre, 16 Harcourt Rd, Central, Hong Kong
Privacy and Legal Policies






Part 3: Pointing fingers
Proliferation is in the eye of the beholder. Or, put another way, it is relative, meaning that before one passes judgment on

a state for what it has done in proliferating nuclear weapons exports, or not done in stemming such exports, one would be

well advised to look at what other states have been doing, or not doing.
For some, China's actions are worrisome. The second annual report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,

released on June 15, stated, "China's continued failure to adequately curb its proliferation practices poses significant

national security concerns to the United States."
That may be, but China is hardly alone. Consider Pakistan, for example. For years it's been the world's worst kept secret

that Pakistan helped develop nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea and probably in Libya.
After September 11, 2001, the news media reported that two Pakistani scientists had direct contacts with Osama bin Laden

while he was operating in Afghanistan. Investigators later alleged that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear

program, had traveled almost a dozen times to North Korea to help Pyongyang develop a uranium-enrichment program. And

International Atomic Energy Agency officials reported that uranium-enrichment equipment inspected in Iran was identical to

that found in Pakistan.
Though it now seems like years ago, it was only last February 4 that Khan gave a speech, broadcast on Pakistan television, in

which he apologized for having transferred nuclear secrets to other countries.
The recent investigation was ordered by the government of Pakistan consequent to the disturbing disclosures and evidence by

some countries to international agencies relating to alleged proliferation activities by certain Pakistanis and foreigners

over the last two decades. The investigation has established that many of the reported activities did occur, and that these

were initiated at the behest of this writer.
In interviews with the concerned government officials, this writer was confronted with the evidence and the findings and

voluntarily admitted that much of it was true and accurate. Khan's revelations that he operated a huge black market in

nuclear materials and technology and supplied uranium-enrichment technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea confirmed

everyone's worst fears: that a huge arsenal of nuclear material and technology is diffused without control.
In October 2002 North Korea reportedly admitted it had a clandestine uranium-enrichment program and the press reported that

Pakistan had exchanged centrifuge enrichment technology for North Korean help in developing longer range missiles. But last

November the Washington Post reported that the administration of US President George W Bush had evidence that Pakistan aided

North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program as recently as last August.
Publicly, the United States has said that while Pakistan aided North Korea's nuclear weapons efforts in the past, Islamabad

had cut off assistance after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US. The White House is said to believe,

however, that Pakistan continued to exchange technical nuclear information, and possibly materials, in exchange for missile

components until last summer.
According to the US Congressional Research Service, by the time Pakistan probably needed to pay North Korea for its purchase

of medium-range No Dong missiles in the mid-1990s (upon which its current Ghauri missiles are based), Pakistan's cash

reserves were low. With its nuclear tests in 1998 Pakistan could offer North Korea a route to nuclear weapons using highly

enriched uranium (HEU) that would circumvent the plutonium-focused 1994 Agreed Framework signed with the United States and

would be difficult to detect.
Given how loudly the United States sounds the alarm about proliferation, it is worth noting that its own record on

proliferation is far from spotless.
In December 2002, The Associated Press stated, dozens of suppliers, most in Europe, the United States and Japan, provided the

components and know-how Saddam Hussein needed to build an atomic bomb, according to Iraq's 1996 accounting of its nuclear

program.
Iraq's report says the equipment was either sold or made by more than 30 German companies, 10 American companies, 11 British

companies and a handful of Swiss, Japanese, Italian, French, Swedish and Brazilian firms. It says more than 30 countries

supplied its nuclear program.
And in late 2002, Iraq delivered a report to the United Nations, pursuant to a Security Council resolution, in an attempt to

avert a US invasion. US officials intercepted the report and removed certain sections, based on claims of "national security

". It turned out that the deleted sections involved the delivery of those weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components and

equipment by the United States and other Western countries to Saddam Hussein. A February 3, 2003, Sunday Morning Herald

article reported, "What is known is that the 10 non-permanent [Security Council] members had to be content with an edited,

scaled-down version. According to the German news agency DPA, instead of the 12,000 pages, these nations - including Germany,

which this month became president of the council - were given only 3,000 pages."
So what was missing? The Guardian reported that the nine-page table of contents included chapters on "procurements" in Iraq's

nuclear program and "relations with companies, representatives and individuals" for its chemical weapons program. This

information was not included in the edited, scaled-down version.
On nuclear arms control initiatives, the US has also proven itself an obstructionist. Last December, when the UN General

Assembly voted on resolutions on disarmament and security, the United States consistently voted against the most important

resolutions on nuclear disarmament:
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The US cast the only vote against this resolution calling for bringing the CTBT into force. It

was adopted by a vote of 173-1, with four abstentions;
Path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons: The US and India were the only countries to vote against this resolution.

Sponsored by Japan, it called for compliance with the program for transparent, verified, and irreversible reduction and

elimination of nuclear forces agreed by all states (including the United States) participating in the 2000 Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. It was adopted by a vote of 164-2, with 14 abstentions;
New agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world: Sponsored by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South

Africa, this resolution centered on a call for compliance with the 2000 NPT program and also addressed missile defenses,

weaponization of outer space, and reduction of non-strategic weapons. It was adopted by a vote of 128-6, with 41 abstentions.

The negative votes were cast by the United States, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and the United Kingdom;
Obligation of nuclear disarmament: Paragraph one of the resolution on follow-up to the 1996 opinion of the International

Court of Justice underscores the court's unanimous conclusion that there is an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring

to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. In a separate vote, the paragraph was approved by a

vote of 165-4, with three abstentions. The four countries voting "no" were the United States, France, Israel and Russia.
This concludes the three-part report
David Isenberg, a senior analyst with the Washington-based British American Security Information Council (BASIC), has a wide

background in arms control and national security issues. The views expressed are his own.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales

and syndication policies.)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Venezuela's Battered Democracy Needs Outside Help
by Stephen Johnson
WebMemo #525

June 24, 2004
The June 3 concession by Venezuela's president Hugo Ch?vez that his opponents had collected enough signatures to trigger a recall referendum on his rule might seem miraculous. But a fair vote is far from certain, and Ch?vez may still destabilize Venezuela and create havoc for neighboring nations.
To preserve regional stability, the United States and other Western democracies should help defend what remains of Venezuela's battered democracy and discourage the growing internal conflict that Ch?vez has inspired. The United States and fellow Organization of American States (OAS) member-nations should insist that impartial outside observers be allowed to monitor and report on the vote. But the democratic community must also be ready to declare Venezuela's democracy broken if Ch?vez continues to manipulate the electoral process and consolidate his power.
Why a Recall?
Over the last two decades, oil-rich Venezuela became heavily indebted and its population impoverished because of runaway social spending and the unwillingness of elites to let ordinary citizens compete in commerce or politics. In 1998, voters elected Hugo Ch?vez--a cashiered army officer who once tried to overthrow a president--to lead their nation, clean house, and reduce poverty.
A throwback to the military strongmen who once ruled Venezuela, Ch?vez fashioned a more concentrated version of the welfare state that already existed. He promoted a new constitution to enhance his tenure and powers and began to constrain the business community, civil society, and rival politicians.
When massive public protests erupted in April 2002, Ch?vez reportedly ordered troops to fire on marchers. Top generals convinced him to resign and replaced him temporarily with a makeshift junta of businessmen. Two days later, loyal officers brought Ch?vez back. Since then, growing numbers of opponents have sought to remove him using the recall provisions in Ch?vez's own constitution.
Electoral Follies
In June 2002, the government invited former U.S. president Jimmy Carter and later the OAS to broker talks between the administration and the opposition, leading to an agreement to allow a binding referendum. Meanwhile, Ch?vez loyalists packed the National Electoral Council (CNE) with cronies and applied hazy criteria to disqualify the signatures being collected for a recall. After the CNE allowed an official period for gathering names, it changed the rules and then dragged out a review process.
In May 2004, under pressure from the OAS and Carter Center, Ch?vez allowed re-examination and reconfirmation of nearly a million signatures previously thrown out by the partisan CNE. As a result, petition organizers had more than the 100,000 names needed to trigger a recall vote.
Rocky Road Ahead
While the government has set an August 15 date for the recall, a number of hurdles remain:
On May 18, a slim majority of pro-Ch?vez deputies in the National Assembly passed a law expanding the Supreme Justice Tribunal from 20 to 32 justices and made it possible to approve nominees and remove incumbents by simple majority vote. A subsequent "packed" court could concoct reasons to stop the recall or allow Ch?vez to manipulate the results.
The CNE-designed ballot appears to favor President Ch?vez. According to the Miami Herald, it asks voters if they think their popular and democratically elected leader should "leave office early," with a "no" box placed above "yes."
Fraud is possible with the government's purchase of electronic voting machines from a company of which the government is now part-owner. The decision to replace the old system was reportedly made in a secret meeting of the three pro-Ch?vez CNE members. Similar paperless machines have come under fire in the United States for software that can be rigged and weak audit trails.
Unfair distribution of identification cards could deflate the number of opponents who can vote while increasing the ranks of Ch?vez supporters. Electoral officials reportedly have delayed or denied new credentials to voters who signed the recall petition, while credentialing teams in military trucks circulate in neighborhoods where Ch?vez is popular.
Ch?vez continues to intimidate opponents. Government police claim they found fake ID cards, computers, and printers in raids on offices of an opposition party this month, but witnesses say they saw the police carry in suspicious bundles. The government has charged referendum organizers with conspiracy for accepting a grant from the U.S.-funded National Endowment for Democracy, even though the Ch?vez administration has accepted thousands of doctors, teachers, and intelligence officers from Cuban dictator Fidel Castro.
Ch?vez commands huge state resources. He has earmarked $1.7 billion to spend on the poor. Oil income has been diverted to an account in a state-owned bank where it allegedly funds the president's campaign. Ch?vez can command radio and TV stations to broadcast his speeches without equal time for opponents. And in June, he revealed plans to enlist millions of "patriotic" electoral patrols to surveil neighborhoods, under the authority of a campaign committee made up of high government officials.
Curbing a Budding Dictatorship
Before the referendum is held on August 15, the Bush Administration, allies in the OAS, and the "Group of Friends of Venezuela" (foreign ministers of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain convened by the United States last year to encourage the Venezuelan leader to follow his own constitution) should press President Ch?vez to allow a vigorous international observer presence to guard against an unfair campaign, fraudulent referendum, and shenanigans in any resulting presidential election. Criteria for a fair contest should include
Freedom of all voters from partisan intimidation;
Equal party representation among poll workers and local observers;
Fair access to broadcast and print media by all sides;
Equal access to draw on state resources for the campaign;
Freedom for observers to monitor and openly report on all aspects of the electoral process; and
An independent audit or paper trail for any machines used in the contest.
Moreover, they should consider a June 2004 report by the international organization Human Rights Watch that is critical of Ch?vez's attempt to pack the Supreme Court. It called on the OAS to invoke Article 18 of its Democratic Charter to consult with Venezuela to reverse the measure. And it advocated suspending World Bank loans supporting justice sector projects in order to persuade the government to halt the consolidation of power in the president's hands.
In fact, the United States should encourage the World Bank to suspend all loans to the Venezuelan government unless it abides by democratic principles, while Latin American allies should invoke Article 20 of the OAS Charter authorizing the body to take steps toward suspending Venezuela's membership in the event of an alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs democratic order.
Conclusion
Although tragic for most Venezuelans, the situation would have little consequence for the United States and hemispheric allies except that Venezuela is the world's fifth largest oil producer and President Ch?vez has given behind-the-scenes support to Colombia's largest rebel group and other leftist movements in the hemisphere. He opposes the U.S.-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas and would like to unite Latin America in a campaign against U.S. policies, following the lead of his mentor, Fidel Castro.
To give Venezuela's citizens a chance to determine their own future and reduce the chances that Ch?vez will inflict damage on neighboring countries, the United States and its hemispheric allies must help guarantee broad suffrage by insisting on comprehensive electoral observation by international bodies, by developing criteria for what constitutes an unfair referendum and follow-on election, and by taking steps to suspend Venezuela's international privileges if its democracy finally runs off the rails.
Steven Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
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Big Men Are Back
By Roger Bate Published 06/25/2004
Africa's despots are saber rattling again. Last week Sam Nujoma, the Namibian President, called white people 'snakes', and then Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's disgraceful dictator, called the almost saintly Archbishop Desmond Tutu an 'evil and embittered little bishop'. Zimbabwe under Mugabe has been a lost cause for years, and the Archbishop's complaints about Mugabe's disregard for the law were likely to fall on deaf ears. But that the disease is spreading to Nujoma's Namibia is a rather worrying development. Collapsing or genocidal regimes, including Sudan's, are rife for providing cover for, if not directly encouraging, terrorism. Remember that Osama bin Laden lived and 'worked' in Sudan for years.
Africa has always been home to the 'big man' phenomenon, with its roots in tribal leadership -- being tough, and standing up to outside pressures (especially white ex-colonialists) has always been a vote winner. Mobuto Sese Seko, the former head of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), once infamously said that 'democracy was not for Africa'. But more African states are heading towards democracy -- in the 1970s there were no peaceful handovers from first black African rule to a democratically-elected government. But by the 1990s there were several, notably Zambia and South Africa. It is worrying, however, that some nation states are heading in the other direction, back to big man tribal leadership.
Nujoma has followed Mugabe's lead of late in several distasteful ways. He cryptically said that he did not want a fourth term in office, something no one really believes, but that he would stand "if it was requested by the people". Namibia's constitution was amended to allow Nujoma to serve a third term in 1999.
Nujoma, who has headed the South West African People's Organisation (Swapo) since 1962 and led its armed struggle against South African rule, was elected president at independence in 1990, and was re-elected in 1994 and 1999 with more than 75 percent of the vote.
Like its peaceful and democratic neighbor, Botswana, Namibia is reliant on diamonds and farming. But unlike Botswana, the poor do not see the real benefit of diamond sales. Allegations of illegal sales and Swiss bank accounts are rife. Some insiders even think Nujoma dislikes white westerners enough to tolerate terrorism in his country.
The mines at least continue to pump out the diamonds, but Nujoma's violent threats and his obvious desire to emulate Mugabe's land grabs are more worrying, because they would destabilize the country and prevent inward investment. The threats and action deflect attention from his failed socialist policies onto a racist battle few Europeans and Americans feel comfortable debating.
Nujoma, shouting from a Lutheran Church pulpit, announced last month that he would expropriate land to punish white farm owners who "dumped" their workers by the roadside. Speaking at May Day celebrations at Karibib, Nujoma issued an unequivocal declaration that expropriation of farms would not only target underused land but would serve as a punitive measure. "My Government will not, tolerate insults in that way," he said after singling out "some white farmers" who had legitimately dismissed some of their farm hands. Nujoma later called these white farmers 'snakes'. But he denied he was a racist, claiming the whites were the racists, and would be removed from the land.
And the process has begun. Two weeks ago Namibian Land Minister Hifikepunye Pohamba sent letters to about 10 white farm owners urging them to "make an offer to sell their property to the state and to enter into further negotiations in that regard".
The farmers were given 14 days to respond. The commercial farmer's representative I spoke with said they did not know what they were going to do. But do something they must. Since Nujoma will take silence as weakness. He says his "Government will expropriate this land as an answer to the insult to my Government. We want peace in this country."
Robert Mugabe also claims he wants peace. But as the people of Zimbabwe have come to realize, his brand of peace is not worth the price Mugabe expects them to pay. With the west largely impotent to act, or even denounce the despots, it is time South Africa's leaders criticized both Mugabe and Nujoma. Without condemnation it's possible we will see the revival of the big man syndrome. That would be a disaster for the rest of Africa slowly escaping its debilitating influence, and it will be a threat to those fighting terrorism, by potentially providing another safe haven for evil-doers.
Roger Bate is a visiting fellow of the American Enterprise Institute and director of health advocacy group Africa Fighting Malaria
Copyright ? 2004 Tech Central Station - www.techcentralstation.com
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What is the Earth's 20th Century Temperature Trend?

By Willie Soon Published 06/24/2004
The following important comments were made by Kary B. Mullis in his autobiography, "Dancing Naked in the Mind Field."
"Science appeared in the seventeenth century. Robert Boyle, who was a Christian and a friend of the English monarch Charles II, made a vacuum pump in the seventeenth century and showed that he could extinguish a candle by pumping air out of the jar wherein the candle was burning. According to Boyle, whatever was left in the jar after the candle went out constituted a vacuum. In the common vernacular, it meant that absolutely nothing was there. Whether God was in there or not was not something Boyle addressed. The Catholics seriously disagreed. But the candle went out. Boyle didn't care whether God was there or not because he couldn't measure God. The religious issue was not as interesting as the issue of what he could measure. That's when science started to take off. Computer modelers of ... the next thousand years of climate could take a lesson from Sir Robert Boyle and his Royal Society. If you can't actually measure something, or make an accurate prediction from a theory, and present it to a group of your fellows, be good enough not to disturb us about it."
Who is Kary Mullis?
Mullis is the scientist and chemist that brought the world the gift of "all the DNA you wanted" by allowing copies to be made through "his invention of the polymerase chain reaction method." For that he was awarded 1/2 of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1993.
Mullis's comments have important ramifications for those of us involved in the scientific enterprise of investigating global warming by CO2. Not only that we should be good enough to resist spreading unfounded fears (which is what I infer by merely browsing over what has been published over the last 10 years or so) of a globally warm Earth; but we better be sure that what we say and publish -- our scientific results -- are accurate and at least can be subjected to the minimal scientific standard of being reproducible.
I have not met Kary Mullis but I sense that Dr. Mullis would be appalled and perhaps even saddened and angered by the misuse of science I will describe below.
The discussion and focus here is on a paper entitled "Estimation and representation of long-term (>40year) trends of Northern-Hemisphere-gridded surface temperature: A note of caution." It is a paper that I wrote with my colleagues, Dr. David Legates and Dr. Sallie Baliunas for the Geophysical Research Letters (GRL) that was printed February 14, 2004.[1] You can download a copy of the actual paper here.
Figure 1: The comparison of the 40-year smoothed Northern Hemisphere temperature series reported by Mann (2002), Mann et al. (2003) and Mann and Jones (2003) [red solid curves in panels a, b and c] with our best attempts to replicate some of these results (panel d). We failed specifically in replicating Mann and Jones (2003) curve in panel c and concluded that the rather alarming change of 1 to 2.5 ?C per decade suggested by the trend curves produced in the short interval of one to two years in these previously published papers are physically implausible but rather they most likely represent artifacts of methodology and procedure of trend smoothing (see further discussion in the text).
Figure 1 illustrates the basic issue for your own inspection. The first three panels in Figure 1 show charts that had been recently published on global warming within the span of a calendar year. The fourth panel summarizes my best attempt to use the same data to recover what I saw.
Figure 1 makes the obvious point that the warming trend represented in the three successive charts had somewhat inexplicably shown warmer and warmer temperature values near the year 2000. That is what prompted my closer look into the issue of defining a temperature trend.
I will now summarize the three key issues we raised in our GRL paper.
First, we wanted to determine what is the 40-year or longer trend in the global ― or for the case of current discussion, the Northern Hemisphere ― averaged temperature?
Figure 2: Various methods of smoothing or filtering the annual temperature changes in order to present the 40-year or longer trend in the record. We note that the trend estimates are not as secure as one would think: for example, the approach used by United Nations IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001) or TAR (2001) involved the subjective padding in of data values from 2001-2020 in order to define the trend values at year 2000 (panel b). We strongly disagree with such an approach and call further caution despite being publicly accused that our work constitutes "an intellectually dishonest approach ... The researcher [referring to Willie Soon] had produced very poor work in the past, and isn't taken very seriously in the climate community. This sounds like another in their installation of bad work. I'm amazed this paper got into print." (see Whipple's January 26, 2004's United Press International article at http://www.upi.com/print.cfm?StoryID=20040125-032918-8891r)
Figure 2 shows the results for the 40-year smoothed temperature series from various smoothing or filtering methods. The main point I wish to emphasize in Figure 2 is that to confidently define the 40-year trend value centered at 2000 one will need to know future values and tendencies of the temperature data starting from 2001 till 2020 [i.e., almost full half of the data in the 40-year averaging window is not yet known]. To visualize such a smoothing methodology: consider that fact that when one defines the 40-year smoothed trend at 1980 from the annual temperature record, one is already using up annual values from 1960 to 2000 -- which is the 40-year duration for this averaging or smoothing procedure. So if one wants to define the 40-year trend value centered at 2000, one need to average annual data from 1980 to 2020 (again the 40-year averaging or smoothing interval) but the later chunk of data from 2004-2020 are obviously not available for the operation.
This is why the most conservative estimate (since it does not depend on data outside the realm of actual measurements) of the 40-year smoothed trend for the currently available annual time series from 1856-2002 is given by the top panel (the red curve in panel a) of Figure 2 which starts at 1876 and ends at 1982 or so.
Figure 3: Four successful replications of previously published results. This is why it is particularly significant that we had failed to reproduce Fig. 2a of Mann & Jones (2003) [see Figure 1 panel c above] and Fig. 2.21 of IPCC TAR (2001) [see Figure 4 below]
The second issue we raised in our GRL paper is that even though we were successful in replicating several published series (see Figure 3) including some of those in IPCC TAR (2001), we disagree with the very subjective data-padding procedures commonly adopted within the global warming research community. The IPCC TAR actually recommended padding artificial data series in order to display the trend values of the Northern Hemisphere temperature record continuously from 1856 to 2000 or so. In other words, arbitrary temperature values from 1836 to 1855 and 2003-2020 were introduced artificially in the temperature trend calculation. We disagree firmly with such a procedure.
The primary author of the curves shown in Figure 1, Professor Michael Mann, admitted to the arbitrary treatments of missing data points in the extensive quote below (Dan Whipple's January 26, 2004's United Press International article at here):
"Mann said he agrees with Soon about the degree of uncertainty, but added his work is based on techniques that have been used by time-series experts over the past decade or more."There are three different ways you can smooth a time series," he said. "Or put another way, the smoothing is non-unique because you don't know what happens to the series outside of the interval where you have data." When a moving-average series bumps into the end of the data, Mann said, "there are additional constraints, called an inverse problem. You don't know exactly what happens, but you can invoke various constraints" to estimate the continuing trend. Such constraints include:
n Setting the missing data points at zero;
n Setting the missing data points at the mean of the available points, and
n Allowing the missing points to preserve some characteristics of the earlier trend. ...
"In past published work, I and other people have described methods where you can use each of these constraints," Mann said. "What you're trying to do is minimize the misfit with the raw data. You can try each of these constraints and see which one minimizes the misfit of the smooth series from the raw series. And the method in the paper -- Mann and Jones 2003 -- where (Soon and colleagues) couldn't figure out which method we used, that's the method we used ... It's an objective method. It finds which of those three choices minimizes the misfit." "
Despite Mann's assertion, no amount of math or "constraints" will allow the highly presumptuous confidence in giving the long-term trend values at the year 2000. Such an open admission and circular explanation by the author strengthens the case for our original concerns discussed in our scientific research paper.
The third and final points we raised in our GRL paper concern our failures in replicating both the smoothed temperature curves shown in Figure 2.21 of the United Nations IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001) or TAR (2001) [see Figure 4 here] and in Figure 2a of Mann and Jones (2003) [see panel c in Figure 1 above]. The failure in reproducing the latter curve for the Northern Hemisphere in Mann and Jones (2003) is especially puzzling since we were able to reproduce the smoothed curve for the Southern Hemisphere (as Figure 2b in Mann and Jones, 2003) from that same paper simultaneously (see the successful replication # 2 shown in Figure 3 above). This fact serves as a strong support that the very high value of > 0.5?C at year 2000 for the smoothed Northern Hemisphere curve by Mann and Jones (2003) [again see panel c in Figure 1 above] is not a mere typographical error.
We therefore conclude that the quantification of the late 20th century Northern Hemisphere temperature trend is highly sensitive to the choice of methodology, the treatment of data, and the choice of data presentation (i.e., the size of the window of the smoothing filter). We emphasized that padding additional data at the endpoints or the "missing data points" (as done in IPCC TAR, 2001, or in panel b of Figure 2 above) is unphysical and can be misleading and thus should be avoided.
Figure 4: Fig. 2.21 of IPCC TAR (2001) failed the replication test.
What lesson do I take away from this? For that I like to return to Kary Mullis's view of the scientific method. It is clear that a scientific statement or claim does not end with published or peer-reviewed papers. But it is extremely important that a scientific statement or claim can be subjected to replication. I am mindful of what Mullis meant when he suggested that all scientists should be self-restrained especially in offering unsubstantiated claims or results. My small effort was indeed only trying to discuss what I do not understand and was not meant to confront anyone, including the authors of those cited research papers. I simply do not understand how the smoothed temperature curve in Mann and Jones (2003) can indicate a value of 0.55?C at the 2000 endpoint but the same variable was only showing a value of 0.3 to 0.4?C less than a year earlier? As in Mullis's world of DNA biochemistry, I would presume that no purpose is served (i.e., no lives saved) when someone along the chain of reasoning makes claims that have no basis in reality. This is why the scientific tenet of replication must be insisted.
[1] Actually the paper was not off to a good start, it was first scheduled to appear on January 27 after being approved by two reviewers and the editor in charge. But upon not seeing our paper appearing as planned and promised and after several rounds of my persistent inquiries, I found out that the publication of our paper was being delayed and the paper may not be printed because of a presumed copyright violation issue. The misunderstanding about and the attempt (indicated below) to prevent the publication of our paper is both alarming and sad but the raw fact is that I had obtained all the necessary copy-right permissions for the purpose of this academic research work prior to the submission of our scientific manuscript to the Geophysical Research Letters (GRL) around November 2003. The matter is now resolved and our paper was published two-and-a half weeks later. Upon my satisfactory resolution with the GRL production office by presenting all the proofs, the GRL production person I spoke to said: "We should not have taken Michael Mann's word for it."
Copyright ? 2004 Tech Central Station - www.techcentralstation.com

Nine missing Pakistani scientists believed working on uranium enrichment in N. Korea
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Iran escalates rhetoric, deploys 4 divisions and missiles near Iraq border
The suicide recruitment effort which has enlisted 10,000 volunteer, is being directed by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, loyal directly to Khamenei. Officials said the IRGC wanted the first target to be the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. "We will burn the roots of the Anglo-Saxon race," Hassan Abbasi, director of the Center for Doctrinal Studies, said. Meanwhile, Arab diplomatic sources said Iran's military has moved troops to the southern Iraqi border over the last week

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OUR FRIENDS...

A capital idea to move the capital?
By Aidan Foster-Carter
Your starter for 10. What does South Korea's president, Roh Moo-hyun, regard as "the most important task facing the nation" at this juncture?
He has plenty to choose from. De-fanging North Korea, of nukes and more, surely tops anyone's list. Or relatedly, handling increasingly tetchy ties with the United States - whose new plan to withdraw one-third of its 37,000 troops from the peninsula by end-2005 means Roh's avowed quest for a more independent defense stance had better get into gear, fast.
Then there's the economy. How to get consumers spending again, after being burned in the recent credit card debt crunch? Or longer-term (but the clock is ticking): How to beat off Chinese competition and make the tough leap into services and top-end manufacture?
All these are weighty tasks. More than enough, you might think, to keep South Korea's newly restored leader occupied for the four more years in office,which the Constitutional Court's rejection in May of an opposition impeachment motion has vouchsafed to him.
But Roh Moo-hyun has other priorities. For him, "the most important task facing the nation is to ensure regional uniformity through decentralization." Forget Kim Jong-il; never mind the economy. The real problem is Seoul. It's gotten way too big for its boots.
A political outsider who plays up his provincial underdog roots, Roh Moo-hyun wants a more equal South Korea: be it socially, or between regions. To this end, he plans to move the capital, no less. By 2012, the whole government - the Blue House, national assembly, supreme court, all ministries, and more - is to relocate to a new site, some 100 kilometers further south. Four towns in the Chungchong region are vying to become the new Seoul.
Moving the capital could cost $100 million
This won't come cheap. Roh's airy first figure of US$4 billion, when he campaigned for this shift in 2002, has since ballooned 10-fold - officially. Independent critics reckon the real bill could top $100 billion. No one really knows: with no site yet, there are no blueprints.
Nor have there been any public hearings or consultation exercises for so vast a change. In his campaign Roh pledged a referendum - but is now backtracking, saying parliamentary approval suffices. That came last December, when the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), which then controlled the assembly, backed the bill - pressed, it now admits, by its Chungchong legislators, who feared losing their seats if the party opposed it. In the event, Chungchong votes were crucial in Roh's narrow win. (Is that smell pork-barrel?)
True, Seoul has long been likened to a vortex relentlessly sucking resources to the center. Greater Seoul, including Kyonggi province and Inchon port, is home to 40% of South Korea's 48 million people. But as this sprawl spreads, one fear is that Chungchong is too close - and would merely become the southern tip of a vast lozenge-shaped megalopolis.
At least four questions arise. One is how shifting the capital meshes with other policies. The slogan of making Korea east Asia's business hub is hard to pin down, but its major manifestation so far - New Songdo City, a planned $190 billion regeneration project near Inchon - involves heading west, not south. Nearby Inchon International Airport is already a long haul from downtown Seoul; it would be a whole lot further from Chungchong.
Second, can South Korea really afford this? Surging growth and fiscal discipline have left public finances healthy - for now. But many calls on the exchequer loom: $103 billion to compensate farmers for market opening; $21 billion extra on defense in the next decade, to make up for the US force drawdown; a pension system that will go bust without more infusions; and above all, the trillion-dollar question of eventual Korean reunification.
More sense to move the capital north for reunification
Whereby hangs a third objection. Seoul's mayor, Lee Myung Bak - a potential GNP presidential contender in 2007, not too late to scrap the move - is clearly no neutral. Yet it's hard to disagree when he notes that, come unification - "not so far away", in his view - a capital south from Seoul would be politically absurd. If anything, since the northern economy will need boosting, it makes more sense to build a new capital in the old north.
All this apart, Roh's stated motive is itself misconceived. "Uniformity," as a professed goal, is as depressing as it is utopian - so last century, so Korean. All development is unequal, but South Korea's (like Taiwan's) has in fact been much more egalitarian than most. Yet that proven fact cuts little ice with Koreans; many itch to hammer any nail that sticks out. Inequality, comrade? Look at China, India, Brazil, the US - or North Korea, whose regions really are ripped off so a small elite can lord it in a Potemkin Pyongyang.
Vox populi? Public opinion is predictably split. Chungchong is keen (surprise!), while Seoul, Kyonggi and Inchon are all lobbying hard against the move. Nationwide, pros and cons each have around 40% support - but 70% there should be a referendum first.
Despite denying one now, a referendum may be Roh Moo-hHyun's best way forward - or way out. (Last year, months after taking office, he called one on his own stewardship; this would have been unconstitutional, and it was dropped.) Otherwise, his not-so-capital idea threatens to become yet another long-running bone of contention in an already divided society - and a big distraction from South Korea's real security and economic challenges.
Aidan Foster-Carter is honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea, Leeds University, England.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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Report: N. Korea, Iran to jointly test nuke detonators
Japan report says U.S. worried Koizumi 'over-optimistic' on N. Korea
Russia calls Japanese fears of N. Korea missile threat 'exaggerated'
This satellite image collected on Sept. 3, 2002 shows the 200-megawatt nuclear reactor in Taechon located near the 50-megawatt unit at Yongbyon plant in North Korea.
Kim Jong-Il's brother-in-law under house arrest as succession struggle rages
Witness in N. Korea reports 'hundreds' of executions over rail blast
Chinese general likens U.S. to 'whore,' Bin Laden for statement on Taiwan war plans

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Clinton Abandoned Trip to Pyongyang Due to Arafat
Former U.S. President Bill Clinton
Former U.S. President Bill Clinton abandoned his plan to visit North Korea in December 2000 at the end of his term because the peace process in the Middle East was tensely developing then. He revealed this in his autobiography "My Life," released Tuesday.
He wrote in the book that after returning from North Korea, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was sure that a visit by Clinton to North Korea would lead to a missile agreement. He said he wanted to visit the North, but could not take the risk of traveling that far away because the peace in the Middle East was close to being realized, and especially Yasser Arafat, president of Palestinian Council, begged him not to go. He also wrote that when he handed over the presidency to newly elected President George Bush in 2000, he said the North needed to be more urgently dealt with than Iraq.
Concerning the crisis where North Korea refused the IAEA inspection in 1994, Clinton said he was determined to stop the North's nuclear weapon development even at the risk of war. To let the North know that the U.S. were serious about that, then Defense Minister William Perry told the North that the U.S. did not exclude the possibility of a preemptive military attack, and after that, negotiating were difficult for three days. In relation to this, he added in the book that at the same time, the U.S. clearly delivered its message of "right balance" by having Jim Laney, then U.S. Ambassador to Korea, express our position on the North of prudence, firmness and perseverance, while having then Secretary of State Warren Christopher clarify that the U.S. prioritized a peaceful resolution.
(Park Hae-hyun, hhpark@chosun.com )
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Six-Party Talks to Make Nuclear Dismantlement Ultimate Goal
BEIJING -- States participating in the six-party talks in Beijing agreed to make nuclear dismantlement of North Korea the ultimate goal, a South Korean delegate said. Delegates have concluded to hold specific discussions related to the first stage of the nuclear dismantlement, with their goal being to verifiably freeze the North Korean nuclear weapons program during the six-party talks on Wednesday, South Korean delegate said.
Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi exchange greetings before holding three-party talks at the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) in the eastern Chinese port city of Qingdao on Monday night.
North Korean chief delegate Kim Kye-Gwan and U.S. chief delegate James Kelly are to meet for bilateral talks on Wednesday.
(Lee Ha-won, may2@chosun.com )
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North Korea Nuclear Talks: If at First You Don't Succeed, Meet Again
Paul Kerr
A U.S. official called a working group meeting of midlevel officials held May 12-15 in Beijing "useful," but there is scant evidence that the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is closer to being resolved. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao noted May 13 that the parties expressed "major differences" during the talks. Department of State spokesperson Adam Ereli acknowledged May 17 that the talks produced no "breakthroughs." The North Koreans expressed frustration.
The officials agreed to hold another working group meeting before the next round of six-party talks, to be held before the end of June, but no dates have been set for either session. Besides the United States, North Korea, and China, the working group meeting included representatives from Japan, South Korea, and Russia.
The crisis began in October 2002 when the United States reported that North Korea admitted to pursuing a covert uranium-enrichment program. As the crisis escalated, Pyongyang also restarted a plutonium-based nuclear program that had been frozen since 1994. Both programs can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Two rounds of six-party talks have made little apparent progress. (See ACT, April 2004.)
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson said May 15 that North Korea at the mid-May talks repeated its offer to "freeze its nuclear facilities as the first-phase action and displayed utmost flexibility" but that the United States refused to discuss compensation until North Korea committed to dismantling all of its nuclear facilities. Another Foreign Ministry official described the U.S. position as "humiliating," Agence France Presse reported May 14.
North Korea has issued detailed proposals to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a series of steps in return for U.S. concessions. Washington has not responded publicly with a similar counterproposal.
Still, the meeting may have made some marginal progress. A State Department official told Arms Control Today May 18 that the U.S. delegation, led by U.S. Special Envoy Joseph Detrani, "clarified its position [on the nuclear issue] quite a bit" during bilateral contacts held during the meeting. Additionally, Liu stated that there were "new contents in the statements of all parties," although he noted that "parties still have different views on the scope of denuclearization and the ways of verification."
U.S. officials have repeatedly asserted that the United States and other participants are united against North Korea in pressuring it to give up its nuclear programs, but there are differences among the parties as to the extent to which they should engage North Korea.
The View from Pyongyang
North Korea's UN ambassador, Han Song Ryol, implied in a May 12 interview that his government would address the "nuclear issue" in the six-party talks and reiterated North Korea's past proposals to freeze its plutonium-based program. (See ACT, March 2004.)
However, Han said Pyongyang first wants to conduct bilateral talks with Washington "within the context of the six-party talks" to conclude a "peace treaty." South Korea could also participate in such talks, he implied.
Han said a treaty is needed to end the U.S. "hostile policy" toward North Korea, which he said has motivated his government to develop nuclear weapons. Only when such a treaty has been concluded, he argued, can North Korea "negotiate disarmament issues" because otherwise the United States can "reverse" any other security assurances while North Korea is disarming. All other issues of bilateral concern could also be addressed at that point, he said.
The U.S. delegation informed North Korea during the last round of six-party talks that it "might" be willing to negotiate a "permanent peace mechanism" after resolution of the nuclear issues, the State Department acknowledged May 3.
Pyongyang has repeatedly argued that Washington plans a pre-emptive nuclear attack on North Korea and said it wants Washington to offer some sort of security assurance, although it has not always specified a peace treaty. (See ACT, January/February 2004.) The United States has repeatedly denied any intention of attacking North Korea and has offered to conclude a multilateral security agreement once North Korea achieves unspecified "benchmarks" in dismantling its nuclear programs. Undersecretary of State John Bolton suggested in a May 8 interview with Jiji Press Service that such assurances would take effect when North Korea has nearly finished disarming.
Han also discussed the contentious issue of North Korea's suspected uranium-enrichment program. The United States, Japan, and South Korea want North Korea to acknowledge the program, but Pyongyang denies it has one. North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed irritation that the U.S. delegation raised the issue of the program during the working group talks, calling the U.S. charges a "fabrication."
In the interview, Han also denied that North Korea has such a program but said that his government was willing to discuss the matter once the United States has shared evidence that the program exists. The United States has not yet done so, he claimed.
The State Department official stated that Pakistan has provided intelligence to the United States and other participants in the talks indicating that a clandestine network operated by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan provided North Korea with uranium-enrichment technology. (See ACT, March 2004.)
On May 19, Ereli reiterated Washington's policy of pressuring North Korea to commit to the "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement" of its nuclear programs without offering North Korea "inducements" to do so. (See ACT, May 2004.) Washington has said that it "could" normalize relations with North Korea once Pyongyang has taken action to resolve the nuclear dispute and rein in other military activities, such as its large conventional forces and long-running missile program.
Some administration officials, however, have recently been somewhat more explicit in articulating the steps that Pyongyang must take, as well as the possible benefits it might reap.
For example, Bolton told the House International Relations Committee in March that "complete and irreversible dismantlement" means the removal of "all elements" of both North Korea's uranium- and plutonium-based nuclear programs. He added that some of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council would dismantle any nuclear weapons and "[extract] all weapons design information," as well as work with the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify dismantlement of the nuclear programs and remove "critical items."
In March, State Department Director for Policy Planning Mitchell Reiss issued the administration's most specific articulation of the benefits North Korea might receive through its compliance with U.S. requests. Reiss did not specify, however, which North Korean actions would be sufficient to realize these benefits and added little to previous U.S. suggestions that it would normalize diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. (See ACT, April 2004.)
The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based organization.

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North Korea Nuclear Talks: If at First You Don't Succeed, Meet Again
Paul Kerr
China
China, the host of the six-party talks, maintains close economic and political ties with North Korea and appears intent on serving as an honest broker between Pyongyang and Washington. Although there are indications that Beijing has exerted pressure on Pyongyang to participate in the talks, it has withstood American attempts to isolate Pyongyang and has urged all sides to be flexible.
China has opposed U.S. efforts to raise the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program in the UN Security Council and is not a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led effort to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction and related goods to and from terrorists and countries of proliferation concern.
China has also supported efforts to offer North Korea incentives for cooperation. For instance, it backed South Korea's offer to provide energy assistance to North Korea if it freezes its nuclear program.
China has also expanded ties with North Korea over the course of the dialogue, agreeing in April to increase bilateral economic cooperation and hosting a visit by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.
Japan
Japan has publicly been the most supportive of the tough U.S. line on North Korea, but Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's May 22 visit to Pyongyang also indicates its willingness to engage Pyongyang directly. North Korea released five children of Japanese citizens that had been abducted during the Cold War, but the talks did not appear to resolve completely the outstanding issues surrounding the abductions.
Koizumi had hoped that would happen nearly two years after a September 2002 summit with Kim. During that summit, the two sides agreed to meet again the next month to discuss normalizing diplomatic relations and undertaking economic cooperation initiatives. Those efforts were set back after the Japanese public became outraged by fresh information about the abductions and U.S. accusations that Pyongyang had a secret uranium-based nuclear program. (See ACT, November 2002.)
A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson told reporters May 21 that the two countries must resolve the abductions issue before resuming normalization talks but added that "normalization of...relations is one of the most important agenda items" for Japan. The spokesperson did not say that resolution of the nuclear crisis is a prerequisite for resuming normalization talks and also suggested that Tokyo would confine discussion of the nuclear issue to the six-party talks.
The Foreign Ministry spokesperson also said that Japan wants "reconfirmation" of Kim's pledge, made during his 2002 meeting with Koizumi, to extend indefinitely North Korea's moratorium on testing ballistic missiles.
Japan will consider economic aid to North Korea, but only after relations are normalized, a Japanese embassy official told Arms Control Today May 18.
Although Japan belongs to the PSI and has shown an interest in stemming North Korea's trade in illicit goods, such as illegal drugs, there is no public indication that Japan has committed to direct interdictions of North Korean vessels.
South Korea
South Korea has repeatedly expressed its opposition to a nuclear-armed North Korea but has pressed for a negotiated solution to the issue. Despite the strain that the crisis has placed on the countries' bilateral relationship, Seoul and Pyongyang have continued discussions about various bilateral issues for some time.
Most recently, North and South Korea held high-level military talks May 26, the first such discussions since the end of the Korean War.
South Korea has proposed a step-by-step negotiating strategy with Pyongyang to resolve the nuclear issue. For example, Seoul issued a proposal at the February round of six-party talks to provide energy assistance to the North in return for a freeze of the North's nuclear program and a promise to dismantle it. Moreover, President Roh Moo-hyun said in August 2003 that South Korea "will take the lead" in promoting North Korean economic development if Pyongyang gives up its nuclear weapons.
Russia
Russia, which had close ties to North Korea during the Cold War, has repeatedly expressed its support for a negotiated resolution of the crisis. Russian representatives also backed South Korea's energy proposal during the February round of six-party talks.
The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based organization.

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Bush Administration Talks With North Korea
Paul Kerr
April 23-25, 2003
The United States, North Korea, and China hold trilateral talks in Beijing. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly goes to Pyongyang with strict instructions not to have any bilateral contact with the North Koreans.
The North Korean delegation, however, still manages to tell the U.S. delegation that it possesses nuclear weapons--the first time that Pyongyang makes such an admission. In addition, North Korea threatens to transfer the weapons to other countries or "display them," Secretary of State Colin Powell tells the Senate Appropriations Committee April 30. The North Koreans also tell the U.S. delegation that they have completed reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel from the five-megawatt reactor frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework, Powell adds.
Furthermore, the North Korean delegation tells their U.S. counterparts that Pyongyang "might get rid of all their nuclear programs...[and] stop their missile exports," State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher states April 28. Sun Joun-yung, South Korea's ambassador to the United Nations, states May 15 that, in return, North Korea has a number of demands. These include the "normalization of relations" between the two countries and an "assurance of non-aggression," as well as the resumption of heavy-fuel oil deliveries, and completion of the nuclear reactors promised under the Agreed Framework.
May 12, 2003
North Korea accuses the United States of violating the spirit of the 1992 Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, calling the agreement a "dead document" in a Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) statement. Yet, Pyongyang does not explicitly repudiate the agreement.
May 24, 2003
Pyongyang indicates in a KCNA statement that it will accept multilateral talks, but adds that it first wants to hold bilateral talks with Washington "for a candid discussion of each other's policies."
July 15, 2003
Boucher tells reporters that North Korean officials at the UN have told the United States that North Korea has completed reprocessing the spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor.
August 27-29, 2003
The first round of six-party talks is held in Beijing. The talks achieve no significant breakthroughs.
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi states Aug. 29 that the participants "share a consensus" on several items: a "peaceful settlement" of the crisis through dialogue, the need to address North Korea's security concerns, the continuation of dialogue and the six-party talks, the need to avoid actions that would escalate the situation, and a plan to solve the nuclear issue "through synchronous and parallel implementation." The same day, North Korea issues an explicit denial for the first time that it has a uranium-enrichment program.
A U.S. official tells reporters that the U.S. delegation "made clear that we are not seeking to strangle North Korea...we can sincerely discuss security concerns in the context of nuclear dismantlement, and...we are willing to discuss a sequence of denuclearization measures with corresponding measures on both sides."
North Korea proposes a step-by-step solution, calling for the United States to conclude a "non-aggression treaty," normalize bilateral diplomatic relations, refrain from hindering North Korea's "economic cooperation" with other countries, complete the reactors promised under the Agreed Framework, resume suspended fuel oil shipments, and increase food aid. Pyongyang states that, in return, it will dismantle its "nuclear facility," as well as end missile testing and export of missiles and related components.
The North Korean delegation also threatens to test nuclear weapons or "demonstrate the means that they would have to deliver" them, according to a senior State Department official. Additionally, North Korea issues a statement Sept. 1 that it does not intend to sell its nuclear weapons or provide them to terrorists.
Wang tells reporters the same day that Washington's policy is the "main problem" preventing diplomatic progress.
October 2-3, 2003
North Korea repeats a statement that it has completed reprocessing the spent fuel rods in June and "made a switchover in the use" of the spent fuel "in the direction increasing [sic] its nuclear deterrent force." North Korea also states that it will continue to produce and reprocess additional spent fuel when deemed necessary.
October 16, 2003
North Korea suggests that it may test nuclear weapons, stating that it will "take a measure to open its nuclear deterrent to the public as a physical force" if the United States refuses to change its negotiating stance.
October 19, 2003
President George W. Bush states during a trip to Asia that the United States is willing to provide a written, multilateral guarantee that the United States will not attack North Korea, but makes it clear that a formal nonaggression pact is "off the table." Powell had made a similar statement Aug. 1.
November 21, 2003
The Executive Board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) announces that it will suspend construction of two light-water nuclear reactors for one year beginning Dec. 1.
KEDO says the project's future "will be assessed and decided by the Executive Board before the expiration of the suspension period," but the Bush administration believes there is "no future for the project," Department of State spokesperson Adam Ereli says Nov. 5.
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2004
January 8, 2004
North Korea allows an unofficial U.S. delegation to visit its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and displays what it calls its "nuclear deterrent." North Korean officials allow delegation member Siegfried Hecker--a senior fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory--to handle a jar containing what appears to be plutonium metal. North Korean officials claim that it came from reprocessing the spent fuel rods from its five-megawatt reactor.
The delegation also visits the pond that had contained the spent fuel rods that had been monitored under the Agreed Framework, and observes that the rods are no longer there. The North Korean officials tell the delegation that Pyongyang reprocessed all of the spent fuel rods between January and June 2003.
Hecker later tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he does not know for certain that the substance was plutonium and that he could not determine when it was produced.
February 25-28, 2004
A second round of six-party talks takes place in Beijing. Little progress is made, although both sides agree to hold another round of talks before the end of June 2004, as well as a working group meeting to be held beforehand.
According to Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang, North Korea reiterates that it is willing to give up its nuclear programs if the U.S. abandons its "hostile policies toward the country" and offers to "freeze its nuclear activities as the first step" if other participants take "corresponding actions."
Additionally, South Korea's deputy foreign minister, Lee Soo-Hyuck, issues a proposal--which China and Russia both support--to provide energy assistance to the North in return for a freeze of its nuclear program, along with a promise to dismantle it.
Wang, however, states afterwards that "sharp" differences remain between Washington and Pyongyang. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, two specific issues divide North Korea and other participants. The first is that the United States, Japan, and South Korea want all of North Korea's nuclear programs to be dismantled, but North Korea wishes to be allowed to retain one for "peaceful purposes." The second is that Washington and the other two governments want Pyongyang to acknowledge that it has a uranium-enrichment program.
May 12-15, 2004
A working group of midlevel officials from South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Russia, China, and the United States meets in Beijing. No breakthroughs are reported and Chinese officials say "major differences" persist. But officials agree to hold another working group meeting before the next round of six-party talks, scheduled for later this month.
The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based organization.
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Part 1: The 'arch-proliferator'

China has been widely reviled as the world's arch-proliferator, opening a Pandora's Box of weapons of mass destruction, and helping Pakistan, Iran and Algeria. The truth, as usual, is more complex, with valid arguments on both sides. China's record is mixed and at times decidedly unsavory, but its recent moves and noises are positive, and those who point fingers at Beijing have records that are far from spotless.
So, is China a proliferator or a nonproliferator, a one-time proliferator who has seen the light and now is a nonproliferator, or still something of both? Those are some of the questions asked as China, in this post-Cold War age of existential angst is hardly the only country often cited in regard to proliferation of "weapons of mass destruction". But it is the world's largest and a favorite whipping boy for military planners and political ideologues.
So, what is China's record? Any honest appraisal has to acknowledge that China has come a long way towards nonproliferation, certainly in word, and to a significant extent in deed.
By the definition of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, following its first nuclear test in 1964, China is one of the five de jure nuclear-weapon states because it declared and tested a nuclear weapon before 1967.
During its early years as a nuclear weapons state, China's rhetoric favored nuclear weapons proliferation, particularly in the Third World, as a rallying point for anti-imperialism. Through the 1970s, China's policy was not to oppose nuclear proliferation, which it still saw as limiting United States and Soviet power. But after China began to open up to the West in the 1970s, its rhetorical position gradually shifted to one opposing nuclear proliferation, explicitly so after 1983.
But China's years of isolation and disengagement from the rest of the world were costly, in terms of demonstrating its nonproliferation credentials. In particular its nuclear practices did not conform to international non-proliferation regime standards, and major efforts over 20 years were required to persuade China to bring its nuclear trade practices into alignment with the policies of the other nuclear supplier states.
Do as I say, not as I do
But it has been an uphill slog for China, since it has had to cope with a "do as I say, not as I do" situation. For example, consider that China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, but it did not join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) until 1992. During this period, the non-proliferation regime, at US urging, was itself raising the bar with stiffer export control requirements, making the standards applied to China today higher and stricter than those most Western states themselves lived by during the Cold War. Ironically, nowadays those higher standards are considered indispensable for nonproliferation regime effectiveness and Western states continue to pressure China to comply with them.
Bear in mind that after joining IAEA, China has declared that it conducts its nuclear trade according to the following three principles:
All exports should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes;
All exports should be subject to IAEA safeguards;
No exports should re-transferred to a third country without prior Chinese approval.
Most recently, on May 31, China was accepted into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at a meeting in Sweden. The NSG is made up of 40 nuclear-capable nations that work with each other to control the trade of nuclear materials and technology for business purposes.
According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC, in the past, "China posed challenges to the international non-proliferation regime because of the role of Chinese companies in supplying a wide range of materials, equipment and technologies that could contribute to NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] weapons and missile programs in countries of proliferation concern. Specifically, China disregarded international norms during the 1980s by selling nuclear materials to countries such as South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Argentina, without requiring that the items be placed under IAEA safeguards."
While China's record has been improving during the 1990s, especially since it acceded to the NPT in 1992, questions still are raised about its role in weapons proliferation. Since taking office, the administration of President George W Bush has imposed sanctions at least eight times on entities of the People's Republic of China, but not on the government itself, for transfers relating to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and cruise missiles to Pakistan and Iran.
China gave nuclear aid to Pakistan for 15 years
In regard to nuclear proliferation, the most serious charges center on the following: Chinese assistance to Pakistan over the past 15 years is considered crucial to Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons. According to the Carnegie Endowment, in the early 1980s China was believed to have supplied Pakistan with the plans for one of its earliest bombs and possibly to have provided enough highly enriched uranium for two such weapons.
China also assisted Pakistan's civilian nuclear program by helping to build a 300-megawatt (MW) power reactor, thus enabling Islamabad to circumvent a nuclear trade embargo.
Back in 1996 some in the US Congress called for sanctions against Beijing after reports that China sold non-safeguarded ring magnets to Pakistan, apparently in violation of both the NPT and various US laws. Specifically, a Chinese state-owned company transferred to the Abdul Qadeer Khan Laboratory in Pakistan 5,000 ring magnets that can be used in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. Khan is considered the father of Pakistan's nuclear program and admitted to selling nuclear technology to other countries.
What tends to be overlooked in discussions of Chinese assistance to Pakistan is its motivation. Chinese transfers derive largely from Chinese concerns about the regional balance of power: specifically China's effort to pursue a containment policy in regard to India.
Also, back in 1995, at US urging, China suspended a sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. China also built an electromagnetic isotope separation system for enriching uranium at the Kkarja nuclear facility.
Before that China had provided Iran with three zero-power research reactors and one very small, 30-kilowatt reactor.
China gave nuclear aid to Iran - with safeguards
China did continue until 1997 to assist Iran in constructing a plant near Esfahan to produce uranium hexafluoride, the material fed into gas centrifuges for enrichment. Chinese technicians also assisted Iran with uranium mining and processing and fuel fabrication. Yet these activities were carried out in accordance with NPT and IAEA safeguards.
China has also pursued a continuing nuclear export relationship with Algeria, dating back to 1983 when it was involved in the secret construction of the Es Salem 15-MW research reactor at Ain Oussera. Shortly after the reactor was discovered and publicized in April 1991, Algeria agreed to place it under IAEA safeguards, and a safeguard agreement for this purpose was signed in February 1992. Thus the reactor has been subject to IAEA inspections since its inauguration in December 1993. Although Algeria later acceded to the NPT, its interest in plutonium reprocessing and the possibility that China may have helped Algeria with this activity have kept Algeria on the watch-list.
China has signed agreements with Algeria covering nuclear cooperation between the two countries. China is apparently helping to construct the Algerian Center of Nuclear Energy Research, which will be placed under IAEA safeguards.
Earlier this year, Chinese nuclear weapons designs were reportedly discovered at Libyan facilities, probably the result of Pakistani proliferation according to the Washington, DC-based Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Still overall, while there are still frictions, when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation, China and the United States are increasingly finding areas of convergence, moving from Washington's condemnation of China and India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998 to cooperation in defusing the North Korean nuclear weapons program.
Tomorrow: All the right noises
David Isenberg, a senior analyst with the Washington-based British American Security Information Council (BASIC), has a wide background in arms control and national security issues. The views expressed are his own.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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Putin Reshuffles Atomic Ministry Again
Christopher Madison
Two months after Russian President Vladimir Putin buried the former Ministry of Atomic Energy within the Ministry of Industry and Energy, he signed a new decree May 20 reshuffling the nuclear boxes once more, pulling the agency out of the bureaucracy and putting it directly under the executive's supervision, most likely through the prime minister's office. (See ACT, April 2004.)
Although many of the operational details remain unclear, the proposal won a warm reception from the head of the Atomic Energy Agency, Alexander Rumyantsev, who commented in Russian news reports, "I think it's very positive."
Putin's earlier decision to move the agency to the larger ministry caused some concern in Washington that it would affect bilateral nuclear threat reduction programs, particularly U.S. access to Russian nuclear facilities. It also worried analysts because U.S.-Russian cooperation had been improved through the close relationship between U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Rumyantsev.
This latest reorganization has raised hopes that the previous diplomatic channels and arrangements will be resumed.
Minatom, the predecessor agency of the Atomic Energy Agency, was in charge of producing and storing civilian and defense nuclear materials, as well as the development and testing of nuclear weapons and the elimination of excess warheads and munitions.
The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based organization.
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Private Contractors
As early as December 2000 the Army was aware of the risks of calling on the private sector for intelligence work
WASHINGTON, June 13, 2004 -- Reports on the use of contractors in Iraq have disclosed that private-sector employees have been performing sensitive intelligence work in and around combat zones. What's more, the report by Major General Antonio Taguba on the alleged abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib Prison noted the involvement of civilian contractors at the Baghdad facility.
These revelations have raised questions about the efficacy and permissibility of using private contractors to perform military intelligence functions, but a three-and-a-half-year-old memorandum shows that the Army has been well aware of the risks of calling on contractors for intelligence work. On December 26, 2000, Patrick T. Henry, assistant secretary of the Army, dispatched a memo to the Army's assistant deputy chief of staff for intelligence declaring a policy that not only restricted the use of contractors, but also cautioned against the threats to national security posed by reliance on such workers in sensitive intelligence functions.
"At the tactical level," the memo declared, "the intelligence function under the operational control of the Army performed by military in the operating forces is an inherently Governmental function barred from private sector performance." In addition, Henry's memo noted, the "oversight exerted over contractors is very different from the command and control exerted over military and civilian employees. Therefore, reliance on private contractors poses risks to maintaining adequate civilian oversight over intelligence operations."
Even at the "operational and strategic level," the memo notes, "the intelligence function ... should be exempted from private sector performance on the basis of risk to national security from relying on contractors to perform this function. ...
"Private contractors may be acquired by foreign interests, acquire and maintain interests in foreign countries, and provide support to foreign customers. The contract administration oversight exerted over contractors is very different from the command and control exerted over military and civilian employees. Therefore, reliance on private contractors poses risks to maintaining adequate civilian oversight over intelligence operations."
The memo was issued in compliance with a 1998 law--the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act--requiring that government agencies inventory the work officials perform and separate what is "inherently governmental" from what is commercial and may be contracted out.
According to Dan Guttman, a government contracting expert who serves as a consultant to the Center for Public Integrity, the memo confirms that, long before the Iraq war, the Army seriously thought about the use of contractors in intelligence roles, particularly in and around war zones. "The memo shows that the Army was well aware of the perils of calling on contractors for intelligence work, and barred or broadly counseled against their use except in certain defined circumstances," Guttman says. "In any case, the Army made clear that contractors should not be employed in intelligence activities where there is no assurance that they will be well supervised."
"If the decision was made to use contractors in intelligence functions notwithstanding the restrictions of the 2000 determination, what was done to protect against the risks to security?" Guttman asks.
? 2004, The Center for Public Integrity. All rights reserved.
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Indonesian tanker deal greases old wheels
By Gary LaMoshi

DENPASAR, Bali - Entering the home stretch of Indonesia's first direct presidential election on July 5, there are only a couple of sure bets. One is that all the candidates promise to fight corruption. You may find that hard to believe since the candidates are or recently were in leading positions to address this problem and neglected to act.
The fate of a tanker order from state oil company Pertamina will help set the betting line on whether the next presidential administration will take a different attitude toward corruption. Don't bet on any candidates racing to seize the opportunity to take the lead on this issue.
The tanker case illustrates the pervasiveness and persistence of KKN - korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme - in Indonesian business, particularly in the areas where it intersects directly with government. The chronology indicates how quickly the window for seriously combating corruption opened and how fast it can slam shut. The required marathon effort to reduce corruption seems to have been cut to a dash that's already been run.
Perky Pertamina
Pertamina has occupied a special place among Indonesia's state companies. Founded in 1968 just after Suharto's election to the presidency from oil companies formerly controlled by the military, Pertamina quickly became a cash cow for the connected. The monopoly ran up foreign borrowing of US$10 billion by the mid-1970s, much of it for projects that had no connection to the energy business, then prompted the New Order's first economic crisis when it tried to renege on some of that debt. While the methods and tactics changed over the years, Petramina produced steady gushers of graft.
In 2000, president Abdurrahman Wahid appointed an outsider, Baihaki Hakim, from petroleum rival Caltex Indonesia, as Pertamina's new top executive with a mandate to clean up the company. The appointment followed a special audit of Pertamina's books that turned up startling abuses.
Auditors counted losses of more than $6 billion in a period of just two years. That's more than a $250 million per month, $8.2 million a day, including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. One leading driver of abuse was Pertamina's sweetheart contracts to transport oil. Pertamina paid about one-third above market to charter tankers, and a small circle of local operators comprised winning bidders. Those grateful shipping magnates could share the wealth with the Pertamina executives greasing the skids for them.
Hakim acted to remove the distortions and limit the drain on company - in this case, public - cash. He opened bidding to foreign shippers and applied greater oversight to the process. Hakim also persuaded the company's board to beef up Pertamina's own transport capabilities. Cutting down on tanker leasing would be the surest way to cut down on corruption.
In 2002, Pertamina signed a $130 million contract to buy two new tankers in the Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) class from South Korea's Hyundai Heavy Industries. Each tanker measures 330 meters long - it could fit the Eiffel Tower and a 747 or two in its hold - with a capacity for 2 million barrels of oil. The first tanker is due to be delivered within weeks. The question now is whom to deliver it to.
Outsider out
While Hyundai was building the tankers, the old guard was rebuilding its influence at Pertamina. Like many other New Order interests, it found renewed sympathy when Megawati Sukarnoputri replaced Wahid as president.
Megawati's regime backed a management overhaul at Pertamina last September. Hakim was ousted as president in favor of Pertamina lifer Ariffi Nawawi, and Megawati loyalists took seats on the firm's oversight boards. One of their top priorities - while Indonesia was sliding from net oil exporter to importer - was scuttling the tanker deal. That would bring back the good old days of exorbitant profits for all.
Pertamina's new managers don't say that, of course. Nawawi argues that owning two VLCC tankers is a luxury that Pertamina cannot afford. He also claims leasing will save money and increase flexibility for the state company.
Even assuming Pertamina's assertion that it could negotiate charter contracts like a normal business instead of charity for the wealthy, outside experts dispute those savings estimates and other claimed benefits. With the impending end of its monopoly, many industry analysts assert that owning tankers could give Pertamina advantages on the home front to help it weather the transition.
Frontline report
Pertamina has reportedly reached an agreement to sell the tankers to oil-transport specialists Frontline Ltd for $184 million. (Pertamina has declined to confirm the agreement.) In the event of a sale, given the lack of VLCCs available at the moment, there's a strong chance Pertamina could lease back one of the tankers. The apparent premium in the price reflects that current supply gap - it takes about two years from order to delivery for a VLCC tanker - but it's not much after factoring in Pertamina's financing costs, as well the commission to investment bank Goldman Sachs for brokering the sale. (Nice to see how globalization lets Wall Street get a piece of Indonesian graft.)
In connection with the deal, 15 key legislators from the energy and mining committee of the House of Representatives went on a junket to Hyundai's shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea, and to the Goldman Sachs conference room in Hong Kong. They came away persuaded to support the sale. However, House Speaker Akbar Tanjung, who knows a thing or two about corruption cases himself (see Tanjung acquittal: Verdict against reform, February 14), has passed the decision to President Megawati, in the midst of campaigning for re-election.
After her party's lousy showing in the April legislative election with 49% fewer votes than in 1999, Megawati's campaign has taken to waving the reformasi banner once again. She's pledging to stamp out corruption, even promising to put Suharto on trial.
The Pertamina tanker deal would be a good place to start her war on corruption, if she is serious. Explanations from Nawawi about the advantages of selling aren't fooling anyone. Throughout the economy, the voters know what's going on. Foreign investors know - they cut their new investments in Indonesia by 41% in the first five months of 2004. It's time for politicians to show they're not getting fooled, or taking the public for fools, either.
It's a good bet that Megawati's government won't announce a decision before July 6, three days ahead of the first tanker's scheduled delivery date and one day after balloting in the presidential election. It's an even better bet that players with big bankrolls will know the answer in time to place their wagers before election day.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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In Iran, Terrorism Remains A Matter of Perspective
Tehran Tries to Shed Radical Image as 'Army of Martyrs' Forms

By Karl Vick
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, June 22, 2004; Page A09
ALAMUT, Iran -- One man's terrorist is another man's herbalist, Ali Reza Safari said, leaning against a wall of the ancient castle that illustrates his point.
From the daunting fortification that looms over the valley here, a ruler named Hassan Sabah 900 years ago dispatched young men who believed so ardently in his vision of Islam that they gave up their own lives in order to snuff out those of their enemies. Hassan Sabah's sect first defined the word "assassin."
But in recent years, scholars have seized on the way Hassan Sabah managed to make fear a weapon in itself. Using stealth, discipline and patience, his small group of fanatics spooked governments into restricting the entry of camel caravans, among other immigration barriers.
"They may well be the world's first terrorists," wrote Bernard Lewis, a Middle East scholar and Princeton University professor emeritus.
"I am illiterate," said Safari, 75, gazing diplomatically at the ground before him. "I haven't read any books. What I know I heard from my father and grandfather.
"Hassan Sabah was a good man," he declared. "He helped the poor. He planted herb gardens. And because he was a saint, he could make the medicine himself. He treated everybody."
When it comes to terrorism, perspective is almost everything in Iran.
The Islamic government that rules this country routinely rates as the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism in the State Department annual report. Iran rejects the label and insists the organizations that it supports, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, are resistance groups.
And if that distinction often ends up lost in the bloody debris, in recent years Iran has nonetheless taken conspicuous pains to shed its radical image. It arrested al Qaeda operatives from neighboring Afghanistan who had found refuge here, discontinued attacks on U.S. targets and, earlier this year, erased from street signs the name of the man who assassinated President Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1981.
So heads turned this month when the Army of Martyrs of the International Islamic Movement made its public debut.
The group, which claims to be private, began gathering the signatures of Iranians who would be willing to become suicide bombers. So far, the group says, 15,000 people have completed a one-page form headed "Preliminary Registration for Martyrdom Operations." The form has space for a phone number and asks applicants to indicate whether they would prefer to explode themselves against U.S. forces in sacred Shiite Muslim cities in Iraq or Israeli forces in the Palestinian territories, or to kill Salman Rushdie, the author who went into hiding for years after a religious edict demanded his death for mocking Islam in his book "The Satanic Verses."
Mohammad Ali Samadi, the group's spokesman, said he believed the number of volunteers "could rise to a million, and we have serious concerns about our capacity to support that many people."
The gravity of this threat is widely questioned here.
Diplomats, Iranian analysts and -- when pressed -- even Samadi acknowledge that the Army of Martyrs movement exists chiefly for public relations. The group solicited news coverage when U.S. troops were pursuing insurgents in the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala, the two most sacred cities in Shiite Islam, the official religion of Iran. But as the troops receded, so did what Samadi called the "sensitivity" of the Iranian public.
"By threatening them, we wanted to remind the Americans of the potential we have against them," Samadi said from behind a desk in Tehran where he was, at times, clearly bored to be giving yet another interview. Three young associates sat in, occasionally suggesting talking points.
"The core of this organization," Sadami said, "is writers."
Still, the group's public emergence was widely noted in Iranian political circles, where it was taken as particularly vivid evidence that religious conservatives were in firm control once again.
"There's no way this could have happened six months ago," said Saeed Laylaz, a reform economist and analyst.
Since reformist candidates were disqualified from parliamentary elections last February and hard-liners swept to power, the only question has been how hard of a line they will adopt. The Army of Martyrs is seen as a sign, having thrust itself onto a public stage already featuring a revival of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The Revolutionary Guard has long been the primary bastion and incubator of hard-line resolve here. Formed by the Muslim clerics who came to power in the 1979 Islamic revolution distrusting the army left behind by the monarchy, it has its own divisions, intelligence branch, prisons and responsibilities ranging from disaster response to, according to diplomats here, supervision of Iran's shadowy nuclear program.
It is also increasingly visible in politics.
Several dozen former pasdaran, as the Revolutionary Guards are known in the Persian language, were sworn into parliament last month on the slate approved by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who as supreme leader holds ultimate authority in Iran's theocratic system. Khamenei recently named a retired Revolutionary Guard chief to head state television and radio, one of the most powerful positions in government.
Last month, the Revolutionary Guard took over a new international airport near Tehran only hours after it opened. A public statement had called the hiring of a Turkish firm to operate Imam Khomeini International Airport a threat to "the security of the country as well as its dignity." The airport has remained shuttered.
"I think the airport thing was very significant," a foreign diplomat here said. "It had the form of a coup. I think it was the IRGC saying publicly, 'We can do what we want.' . . . The question is whether they're pressing their own agenda or doing Khamenei's bidding."
Others are more sanguine. Calling the Revolutionary Guard a "maturing" organization, another diplomat noted the restraint it had shown in Iraq, where it is the lead Iranian agency. But at a June 2 public conference, a brigadier in the guards lauded the effectiveness of "martyrdom operations," citing the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States as tactical operations that produced far-reaching strategic results, according to Iranian media accounts. But any formal link between the Revolutionary Guard and the Army of Martyrs is denied by both the government and Samadi.
Samadi said the Army of Martyrs was formed to protest a visible slackening in revolutionary zeal. A photo of flag-draped U.S. coffins decorates his office wall, beside a portrait of a Palestinian suicide bomber and her infant daughter. A third photo shows Khaled Eslamboli firing an automatic weapon at Sadat's reviewing stand during a military parade on Oct. 6, 1981. Samadi said the group's first act was a protest against dropping Eslamboli's name from street signs.
"We realized this was the initial step toward creating a gap between the revolutionary Iranians and other Muslims in other parts of the world, especially those fighting the Israelis in Palestine," he said.
Like many Islamic militants, Samadi describes suicide bombings as asymmetrical warfare, a military tactic that levels the battlefield between a technologically superior army and an oppressed population. He lamented that Iran is rarely credited with pioneering the form by sending car and truck bombs against the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon in the early 1980s. When a reporter observed that Iran appeared to have forsaken the practice since a truck bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996 was traced to Iranian agents, the spokesman smiled.
"The U.S. has not really recognized that we have successfully transferred a good method of resistance to other countries," he said. "We do not have to mount foreign operations ourselves."
And yet, he said, Osama bin Laden threatens to give martyrdom operations a bad name. "What's the point of blowing up a civilian train in Spain, or the U.S. embassies in Africa where a lot of Africans are killed?"
The Army of Martyrs wants nothing to do with Hassan Sabah's Assassins, either. "The nature of the things they did is quite in line with what Osama bin Laden is carrying out," Samadi said.
No such talk is heard in Alamut, northwest of Tehran. "If Hassan Sabah was the ruler, it would be excellent," Safari said. "God bless him.
"Really. God bless him."
? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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Death Stalks An Experiment In Democracy
Fearful Baghdad Council Keeps Public Locked Out
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, June 22, 2004; Page A01
Last of three articles
BAGHDAD -- The weekly meeting of the Rashid district council began last Wednesday with a prayer for two of the group's 33 members. One was in critical condition at a U.S. military hospital after being shot seven times in an assassination attempt. Another was in hiding after gunmen attacked her house and killed her brother.
"Let us remember our martyrs," Sami Ahmed Sharif, the council chairman, intoned as his fellow members stood, turned their palms to the ceiling and bowed their heads.
There were no other residents of the Rashid district to observe the moment of silence or the rest of the proceedings. Council members voted to close the meeting to the public because of fears that assassins would slip in and mark members for death. To enforce the decision, U.S. and Iraqi soldiers surrounded the council building and stationed snipers on the roof.
The nascent political institutions designed to replace the U.S. administration of Iraq are beset by challenges to their popular legitimacy and effectiveness, and by grave risks to Iraqis who have joined the experiment in representative government. As Iraqis prepare for their country to regain sovereignty, it is uncertain how much their political future will be shaped by the $700 million program in democracy-building that has been at the core of the U.S. occupation.
Inside the U.S.-run Coalition Provisional Authority, which will dissolve with the handover on June 30, some officials express doubts that Iraq's political system will conform to the American blueprints. "Will this develop the way we hope it will?" a CPA official involved in promoting democracy said. "Probably not."
New political institutions to replace Saddam Hussein's Baath Party dictatorship are among the chief legacies of the U.S. occupation. Every city and province has a local council. New mayors, provincial governors and national cabinet ministers have been chosen. The Shiite Muslim majority, shut out of power in Hussein's government, is widely represented, as are religious minorities and women. Hundreds of political parties have formed, and thousands of people have participated in seminars on democracy.
But Iraqis criticize the local councils and the interim national government as illegitimate because their members were not elected. The country's top Shiite cleric has repudiated the interim constitution drafted by the U.S.-appointed Governing Council. In several recent meetings about the country's political future, Iraqis who favor a Western-style democracy have been drowned out by calls for a system governed by Islamic law.
The cabinet, appointed by a U.N. envoy three weeks ago, has had little time to prepare to govern. Local councils, whose authority had been restricted for months by U.S. military commanders, are also stepping into uncharted areas, uncertain about their responsibilities and powers under a system whose inauguration is a week away.
Yet these uncertainties are overshadowed by the imminent threat of violence. Local council members who once welcomed constituents into their homes now keep armed guards at the front gate. Leaders of the national government travel in armored vehicles and work inside Baghdad's fortified Green Zone, an area off-limits to ordinary Iraqis. Many foreign contractors hired by the U.S. government to promote democracy have either relocated to Kuwait or hunkered down in protected compounds.
Despite those precautions, more than 100 Iraqi government officials have been killed during the occupation, including two members of the Governing Council. Over the past two weeks, the deputy foreign minister and a senior official in the Education Ministry have been assassinated. On Sunday, masked gunmen shot and killed the council chairman of Baghdad's Rusafa district and his deputy as they sat in a cafe.
Teaching Iraqis about democracy has also been risky. Scott Erwin, a 22-year-old CPA staff member, was critically wounded in an ambush this month as he drove away from a Baghdad university where he was teaching a class on democracy. Two CPA employees who worked on civic education initiatives, Fern Holland and Robert Zangas, were shot to death in March near the city of Hilla.
"Iraq may get to a semi-democratic outcome. But the more-democratic outcomes that were possible a year ago are much more difficult to imagine now because of the security situation," said Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution who worked on democracy issues for the CPA before leaving Iraq this spring, in part because of concerns about safety. "This is the biggest tragedy of Iraq."
The Central Mission
The transformation of Iraq from dictatorship to democracy was the central mission of the CPA. Everything else -- the efforts to rebuild infrastructure, train police, revise the school curriculum -- was aimed at building a democratic government that would be a model for the rest of the Middle East.
The U.S. administrator of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, initially planned to supervise the entire process. He wanted the CPA to oversee the drafting of a constitution and the convening of general elections. Bremer insisted last summer that the United States would relinquish sovereignty only to a stable, independent, democratically elected Iraqi government.
When escalating violence and dissent by Iraqis led the Bush administration to abandon that plan in November and accelerate the handover, Bremer ordered the CPA to advance democratic goals as far as possible by June 30. He promulgated an interim constitution that included a bill of rights and a commitment to hold elections by January. Local councils whose members had been chosen by the military were authorized to select new members through caucuses. Bremer augmented the $30 million set aside by Congress for democracy promotion with another $700 million to fund political parties, nongovernmental organizations and civics programs to advocate such political values as the separation of church and state, women's rights and federalism.
A key component of the U.S. strategy, starting at the beginning of the occupation, was to create effective grass-roots government. When Hussein was in power, governors, mayors and even municipal police chiefs were appointed by Baghdad. The CPA wanted to change that, starting in the capital city.
The CPA's plan for Baghdad envisioned three tiers of local government: a city council, eight district councils and dozens of neighborhood councils. The councils were limited to advising U.S. officials about reconstruction needs in the city. They had neither the power to enact legislation nor budgets for municipal improvements.
Despite calls from Iraqi politicians for the participants to be chosen by popular vote, the CPA deemed municipal elections too risky last summer. They worried that religious extremists and Baathists would manipulate the process. Instead, the CPA asked the Research Triangle Institute, which had a U.S. government contract to promote democracy in Iraq, to organize neighborhood caucuses to select the councils.
Participants in the caucuses were screened by Americans who supervised the entire process. As a result, the councils were filled with people who owed their jobs more to the CPA than to the public. "The community saw us as tools of the Americans," said Ali Aziz, the secretary of the Rashid council. "It was the beginning of our problems."
Nurturing New Leaders
American officials hope local council members, almost all of whom lived in Iraq while Hussein was in power, will emerge as prominent political figures and potential challengers to the clique of national politicians who opposed Hussein from exile.
"The councils have been a very successful experiment in democracy," said Andrew Morrison, a U.S. diplomat who speaks Arabic and has served as the CPA's governance coordinator for Baghdad.
The composition of the Rashid district council would seem to bear out that assessment. The council, responsible for a large swath of Shiite-dominated southern Baghdad, includes several members with doctoral degrees. Others have important tribal and business connections. Four of the 33 members are women.
Despite their aspirations to seek an elective seat in an eventual national parliament, several council members said that the CPA's limits on their authority had kept them from building the respect they needed to earn the trust and respect of their constituents.
"How can we win the support of the people if we have no money?" said Sharif, the council chairman, a voluble real-estate broker who was encouraged to participate in politics by his friends and neighbors. "If we cannot help them, they will not support us."
When not focused on security, the council's meetings are devoted to discussing work they want the Americans to perform, instead of work they can accomplish themselves. Although they will shed their advisory status to the Americans after June 30, members worry that their limited influence could weaken because there will be fewer U.S.-funded projects and they will have no budget of their own. Over the past four months, the CPA has consulted with the council in allocating more than $56 million for public works projects in the district.
Members faulted the CPA for not keeping a commitment to give a large share of power to local officials. The Rashid council has no control over police officers or many other government employees because they report to national ministries.
Morrison said the division of power between national and local officials would be decided when Iraqis write a permanent constitution. "The Iraqis are going to debate this out over the course of the next year," he said. "We tried to give them the building blocks, but it's one area I'm not sure where it's going to come out."
Among the things the Rashid council plans to do after June 30 is assert its independence from its American sponsors. It has politely disinvited U.S. civilian and military officials, who have attended every council meeting so far, from sessions after that date.
Council members said they envisioned a democracy different from what they have read about the United States, suggesting that many of the concepts Americans have been preaching here have not been accepted. For instance, many said that a separation between religion and the state makes little sense in Iraq.
"We can't act this way," insisted Murthada Younis, the deputy chairman. Outside the room in which he was speaking, several photocopied pictures of a deceased Shiite cleric were taped to the wall. "Religion is part of our life and it should be part of government," he said.
Men on the council said they supported allowing women to vote and hold elective office, but several scoffed at the notion of giving women the same personal freedoms they enjoy outside the Arab world. "In the West, women have absolute freedom to do what they want," said Abbas Taie, an X-ray technician who has attended several U.S.-sponsored democracy workshops. "The Iraqi women refuse such kinds of freedom."
Sharif, the Rashid chairman, said one of the most important items before the council after June 30 will be scheduling local elections. "Right now, many people do not think we are legitimate," he said. "That would change if we were elected by the people."
But Sharif said he recognized that holding an election before the end of the year would be impossible because of the security situation. Campaigning for a January national election will be hard enough, he said. Right now, he said, only a fool would attempt to go door to door or hold a community meeting to meet with constituents. "It's far too dangerous," he said.
Asked who he thought his chief rival would be, he did not pause.
"Terrorism," he said.
'We Need Protection'
After the prayer and the approval of the previous week's minutes, the Rashid council got down to work. The first order of business was to hand out military permits to each member allowing them to carry handguns.
"Our lives are in jeopardy," Sharif said as he distributed the laminated cards.
The U.S. Army had given council members .38-caliber pistols for their protection. But the licenses had expired on April 30, exposing members to arrest if they were searched at a military checkpoint. Sharif said he had continued to pack his pistol, as well as carrying two unlicensed AK-47 assault rifles in his car.
"I'm the chairman, but I violate the law so I can protect myself," he said.
For months, the Rashid district council avoided the violence that had plagued other groups. In the district as a whole, five neighborhood council members have been assassinated this year. In Sadr City, a large Shiite slum, the chairman of the district council was killed and strung from a pole. A sign hanging from his neck accused him of being an American spy.
Rashid council members learned to live with threats and close calls. Yacoub Youssef, the chairman of the education committee, said he had received 14 threats, some written and others by telephone, accusing him of collaborating with U.S. forces. Younis, the deputy chairman, said he was almost gunned down on his way to work last month. "We had been very lucky," he said.
This month, the luck ran out. On June 5, gunmen opened fire on council member Ali Ameri, a professor at Baghdad University, as he drove to work, killing two of his bodyguards and leaving him near death. On June 11, assailants sprayed bullets into the house of a colleague, biologist Nisreen Haider, killing her brother and forcing her into seclusion.
"Serving on this council has become very risky," said Adel Fahdil, a contractor. Although Fahdil insisted he was not worried because he had 20 guards, all armed with AK-47s, other members were not as confident. Most cannot afford a large security detail and are forced to rely on one or two relatives with weapons. They have asked for protection, but U.S. officials answered that they did not have the resources to guard more than 1,200 district and neighborhood councilors across the capital.
"We need someone to help us," said council member Majid Mamouri, who said he could not pay for guards with his salary as a professor of veterinary science. "We need bodyguards. We need protection."
At Wednesday's meeting -- held at a former hunting lodge once run by Hussein's son, Qusay -- only 18 of the council's 33 members were in attendance.
Reached in hiding, Haider said in a telephone interview that she had no intention of returning to the council. "I will not work there anymore," she said. "The people do not deserve to be served."
She said she could no longer live in the Rashid district and planned to move elsewhere in Iraq. "They are watching me, and I expect to be killed," she said.
Ideals and Necessities
Despite the threats, some council members said they were uneasy about excluding the public from their meetings.
"We're working in the name of the citizens," said Youssef, who also serves as a senior official in the Education Ministry. "The public should be able to attend even if we're afraid of them. The citizens have a right to hear what we're doing. We should not be having secret meetings."
But Sharif, a trim man with close-cropped hair and large glasses, argued that the safety of the members was more important. "We must protect the council," he said. "This is not ideal but it is necessary."
These days, he said, "we must do what is necessary for democracy, not what is ideal."
Sharif said he expected the threats to abate after June 30, when the occupation ends and the council assumes greater authority in southern Baghdad. He said he hoped residents and the insurgents would change their opinions of the members when they are working without Americans in the room.
"I don't have any trust in the Americans anymore," Younis said. "I trust my nation to achieve democracy despite terrorism. People know what they want."
While the threats and attacks have scared off some members, they have strengthened the resolve of at least a quorum on the council. With the CPA dissolving and U.S. troops assuming a lower profile, they regard themselves as front-line fighters for democracy.
"If we quit now, the terrorists win," said Youssef, who has been threatened 14 times and was shot at on his way to work last month. Each attempt at intimidation, he said, "gives me the strength to be more determined."
Special correspondent Huda Ahmed Lazim contributed to this report.
? 2004 The Washington Post Company

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Cutting Through the Fog
From the June 22, 2004 Los Angeles Times: Did the 9/11 commission staff statement really say that there was no connection between Saddam and al Qaeda?
by Stephen F. Hayes
06/23/2004 12:00:00 AM
LAST WEDNESDAY, the September 11 commission issued a staff "statement" that further complicated an already confusing issue: the nature of the relationship between the former Iraqi regime and al Qaeda.
On the one hand, the statement confirmed several contacts between Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda terrorists, including a face-to-face meeting between a senior Iraqi intelligence official and Osama bin Laden in 1994. Then, calling into question its own findings, the statement reported that two al Qaeda terrorists denied the existence of any ties whatsoever. Finally, in very sloppy language, the statement seemed to conclude that there had been "no collaborative relationship" between Iraq and al Qaeda. The media took that nuanced and self-contradictory analysis--which, by the way, constituted only one paragraph in a 12-page report--and found certainty where none existed. "Panel Finds No Qaeda-Iraq Tie," blared a four-column headline in the New York Times. An editorial flatly declared that the commission had "refuted" any connection.
Nonsense. The staff statement was a model of muddle, but this much is clear: There is nothing in it that reliably or categorically "refutes" a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda. What's more, in the days since its release, members of the 9/11 commission--including co-chairmen Lee Hamilton and Tom Kean--have appeared eager to distance themselves from the statement issued by their staff.
"Members do not get involved in staff reports," Kean cautioned, promising more on the subject in the commission's final report.
So was there or wasn't there a "collaborative relationship" between Iraq and al Qaeda?
CIA Director George Tenet certainly believes so. "Credible reporting states that al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities," he wrote to the Senate Intelligence Committee on Oct. 7, 2002. "The reporting also stated that Iraq had provided training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs." When Tenet testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb. 12, 2003, he said that although his agency could not show "command and control" between al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime--something the Bush administration never claimed--it could demonstrate "contacts, training and safe haven."
Top Clinton administration officials also suggested a "collaborative" relationship. On Aug. 7, 1998, al Qaeda terrorists bombed U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, killing 257 people--including 12 Americans. The Clinton administration struck back 13 days later, hitting a pharmaceutical plant, an al Qaeda-linked facility in Sudan. On Aug. 24, 1998, a "senior intelligence official" made available by the White House told reporters that U.S. intelligence had found "strong ties between the plant and Iraq." Among that evidence: telephone intercepts between top officials at the plant and the head of Iraq's chemical weapons program. In all, six top Clinton administration officials argued that Iraq had provided the chemical weapon know-how to the plant demolished in response to the al Qaeda attacks.
TODAY, top Clinton officials are still not backing down from these claims. William Cohen, former secretary of Defense, defended the strikes as recently as March 23, 2004, in testimony before the September 11 commission. Cohen said an executive from the Sudanese plant had "traveled to Baghdad to meet with the father of [Iraq's] VX [nerve gas] program."
Other recent intelligence, including communications intercepts and interviews with Iraqi intelligence detainees, indicates that Iraq provided funding and weapons to Ansar al Islam, an al Qaeda affiliate in northern Iraq.
These connections seem pretty compelling--Tenet's testimony, the intelligence surrounding the 1998 Sudan strikes and the Iraqi support for Ansar al Islam. But the September 11 commission's staff statement didn't deal with any of them.
The September 11 commission cannot be expected to write the definitive history of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. But having contributed greatly to the confusion with one paragraph in Staff Statement 15, the commissioners owe it to the American people to give it a thorough and sober examination in their final report.
Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard and author of The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration With Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America, (HarperCollins).
? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved
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Enemies Together
Clinton was right: Saddam and al Qaeda had numerous connections.
BY ROBERT L. POLLOCK
Tuesday, June 22, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
Last fall I spoke on a panel at a Washington think tank. The topic was Iraq, and the moderator wanted my reaction to what he termed Americans' "misperceptions" about the war. Among those he cited was a poll showing that 48% of Americans believed there had been a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda.
I responded by saying that the American people were perhaps wiser than the pundits who mock them. But hadn't President Bush just said there was no link? No, I replied, he had said that there was no evidence, so far, of a link between Iraq and 9/11, which was a very different thing. At least one of the audience members whose minds I didn't succeed in changing serves on the staff of the 9/11 Commission, which last week released an interim report attempting to muddle the same issue.
Editorialists and headline writers seized on the report as evidence that the Bush administration had exaggerated the Iraq-al Qaeda link. Some even demanded an apology. They didn't get one. "The reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and al Qaeda," the president responded, is "because there was a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda."
A reader wanting to make sense of all this couldn't do better than Stephen Hayes's "The Connection." In this balanced and careful account, Mr. Hayes describes dangerous liaisons so numerous that, it is clear, leaving Saddam in power was not a responsible option after 9/11. Mr. Hayes also shows how most Democrats and much of the Washington media and foreign-policy establishment have studiously avoided the evidence of such ties, lest they be forced to concede a justification for what they'd rather write off as Mr. Bush's war.
It is often claimed that the "secular" Saddam would never have worked with the fundamentalist Osama bin Laden, and vice versa. But Mr. Hayes shows how Saddam increasingly turned to Islam as a legitimizing force for his regime--adding, for example, allahu akhbar ("God is great") to the Iraqi flag. In any case, Saddam and bin Laden found mutual hatred of the U.S. reason enough for an extensive array of contacts stretching over a decade. These include, among much else, Saddam's sending emissaries to bin Laden when the terrorist was holed up in Sudan and later in Afghanistan. Far from exaggerating the evidence linking Iraq and al Qaeda, the Bush administration has soft-pedaled two of the most suggestive connections between Saddam's regime and the 9/11 plot itself.
One of these goes by the name of Ahmed Hikmat Shakir and is the subject of Mr. Hayes's first chapter. On Jan. 5, 2000, the Iraqi was photographed welcoming one Khalid al Mihdhar to the airport in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Shakir, it is true, was employed as an airport "greeter." But he then proceeded to hop into a car with Mihdhar and drive to a condo owned by a known al Qaeda associate. The CIA would later conclude that over the following three days al Qaeda planned the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole and the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Also believed to have been present were Nawaf al Hazmi and Ramzi bin al Shibh. Mihdhar and al Hazmi were both 9/11 hijackers. Bin al Shibh later boasted of being "coordinator of the Holy Tuesday operation."
Shakir told associates that he had obtained his airport job via connections at Iraq's Malaysian Embassy. It isn't known whether he was present at the January 2000 meeting at the behest of the Iraqi government or as a freelance Islamist. But we appear a bit closer to an answer since Mr. Hayes's book went to press. Last month the Journal's Review & Outlook column broke the news that multiple Iraqi documents now in U.S. custody list someone named Ahmed Hikmat Shakir as having been an officer of the Saddam fedayeen.
Then there's the matter of lead hijacker Mohamed Atta's possible April 2001 meeting in Prague with an Iraqi intelligence agent/diplomat named Ahmed Ibrahim Samir al Ani, who was later expelled from the Czech Republic in connection with a plot to bomb Radio Free Iraq/Radio Free Europe. The establishment media have gone to great lengths to discredit the story, and the 9/11 Commission staff dismisses the possibility on the grounds that someone made calls in the U.S. from Atta's cell phone during the period in question. But the fact remains that Atta undoubtedly visited the Czech Republic under suspicious circumstances in 2000 and that the Czech officials who know best about their surveillance of al Ani stand by their story of a 2001 meeting. As Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross put it: "I believe the counterintelligence services more than I believe journalists."
But of course no such explosive links to 9/11 need be shown for one to reasonably conclude that it would have been impossible "to wage a serious Global War on Terror," as Mr. Hayes puts it, "leaving the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in power." Saddam's long history of sheltering terrorists, including Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas--as well as 1993 World Trade Center bomber Abdul Rahman Yassin--is a matter of undisputed public record. So is his funding of Palestinian terror and his attempt to assassinate President George H.W. Bush--not to mention numerous smaller attempts at anti-American terror abroad following the first Gulf War.
Damningly, Mr. Hayes reminds us that Saddam's connections to terrorism and al Qaeda were taken as a given before the 2000 election by both the establishment media and former officials--such as Richard Clarke and Al Gore--who are now at pains to deny them. The connection was even cited in the Clinton administration's 1998 indictment of bin Laden. Surely the former president will want to remind Americans of this fact as he embarks on his book tour.
Mr. Pollock is a senior editorial page writer at The Wall Street Journal.
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Al Qaeda Link To Iraq May Be Confusion Over Names

By Walter Pincus and Dan Eggen
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, June 22, 2004; Page A13
An allegation that a high-ranking al Qaeda member was an officer in Saddam Hussein's private militia may have resulted from confusion over Iraqi names, a senior administration official said yesterday.
Former Navy secretary John Lehman, a Republican member of the commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, said Sunday that documents found in Iraq "indicate that there is at least one officer of Saddam's Fedayeen, a lieutenant colonel, who was a very prominent member of al Qaeda." Although he said the identity "still has to be confirmed," Lehman introduced the information on NBC's "Meet the Press" to counter a commission staff report that said there were contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda but no "collaborative relationship."
Yesterday, the senior administration official said Lehman had probably confused two people who have similar-sounding names.
One of them is Ahmad Hikmat Shakir Azzawi, identified as an al Qaeda "fixer" in Malaysia. Officials say he served as an airport greeter for al Qaeda in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, at a gathering for members who were to be involved in the attacks on the USS Cole, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Iraqi military documents, found last year, listed a similar name, Lt. Col. Hikmat Shakir Ahmad, on a roster of Hussein's militia, Saddam's Fedayeen.
"By most reckoning that would be someone else" other than the airport greeter, said the administration official, who would speak only anonymously because of the matter's sensitivity. He added that the identification issue is still being studied but "it doesn't look like a match to most analysts."
In an interview yesterday, Lehman said it is still possible the man in Kuala Lumpur was affiliated with Hussein, even if he isn't the man on the Fedayeen roster. "It's one more instance where this is an intriguing possibility that needs to be run to ground," Lehman said. "The most intriguing part of it is not whether or not he was in the Fedayeen, but whether or not the guy who attended Kuala Lumpur had any connections to Iraqi intelligence. . . . We don't know."
Allegations that Ahmad Hikmat Shakir Azzawi was under Iraqi intelligence control were raised last year in an article in the Weekly Standard by Stephen F. Hayes, and later discounted by U.S. intelligence officials. No such tie was indicated in the commission report.
The commission staff report, released Wednesday, prompted a vigorous response from the Bush administration, which had cited since 2002 an al Qaeda-Hussein link as one reason for going to war. Just last week, Vice President Cheney said in a television interview he "probably" knew intelligence about Iraq's ties to terrorists that the commission had not received, but added, "I don't know what they know."
On Sunday, Lehman said, "The vice president was right when he said that he may have things that we don't yet have."
Commission Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton have asked the administration to provide any additional information it has. Commission spokesman Al Felzenberg said no new requests for information have been sent, but the panel has long-standing requests for documents. Cheney's spokesman, Kevin Kellems, said that, to his knowledge, the vice president has received no new requests.
? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Learning the Hard Way
The oil market is trying to teach policymakers a lesson. While they learn it before it's too late?
by Irwin M. Stelzer
06/22/2004 12:00:00 AM
WHEN MARKETS TALK, politicians would do well to listen. The oil markets are doing more than mere talking--they are shouting for the attention of policymakers who seem determined not to listen.
First, we have the recent run-up in crude oil prices, which fluctuate around $40 per barrel. That rise was in part due to the fabulous growth of the U.S. and Chinese economies, which sent demand for oil soaring. But a further driver is OPEC's manipulation of the market, creating a situation in which rising demand cannot elicit the increased supplies that would flow in a competitive market.
Lesson number one for policymakers: It is no longer prudent to ignore the OPEC cartel, or to rely on it for mercy. Trust busters have had time to worry about less important price conspiracies--the commissions charged for selling old master paintings is less likely to affect the economy than is a conspiracy to fix oil prices--but have shied away from attacking the OPEC cartel. Now would seem to be the time for the voice of the Antitrust Division to be heard above that of the State Department, ever-eager to avoid a diplomatic row with the house of Saud.
The markets are also saying something about the state of the gasoline market. The margin between crude oil prices and gasoline prices has doubled in the United States, driving refining profits up several hundred percent. Yet, refining capacity has not increased. Oil industry executives with whom I have spoken say that environmental and other restrictions make it virtually impossible to build new refineries. Lesson number two for policymakers: Restrictions that were appropriate when crude oil was selling for $10 per barrel and gasoline for $1 per gallon are not economically sensible at current price levels. Revise them to allow more refineries to be built.
These are important messages from the market. But not as important as the persistence of the so-called risk premium of between $5 and $10 per barrel that seems to be built into crude oil prices. Part of that premium is a response to the continued disruption of supplies from important producers. Terrorists in Iraq periodically sabotage that nation's pipelines. Unrest and violence in Nigeria, Africa's largest producer, make that country an unreliable source of oil. Islamic terrorism casts doubt about the reliability of supplies from Kazakhstan.
Add self-inflicted wounds by important producers. In Russia, which rivals Saudi Arabia as the world's largest producer, Vladimir Putin and his old KGB buddies have frightened foreign investors by jailing the country's richest oil baron, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Venezuela's Castro-loving president, Hugo Ch?vez, has replaced the nation's skilled oil industry managers with political appointees, causing a loss of 500,000 barrels per day of production from that important supplier of the low-sulfur oil most suitable for use in U.S. refineries. Iran's mullahs have stifled the foreign investment that Iran's oil industry so desperately needs.
Yet even these multiple threats to a steady flow of oil pale by comparison with developments in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom sits on 25 percent of the world's known reserves, but that figure understates its importance. The Saudis can tap their reserves for over 80 years without slowing output. And it is well known that the Saudis haven't really attempted to explore for new reservoirs because they already know precisely where some 260 billion barrels are located. "You don't plant potatoes when you have a cellar full of spuds," a grizzled denizen of America's "oil patch" once told me. Not only are the Saudis sitting on the largest known reserves, and on the cheapest, most easily discovered as-yet "unknown reserves," they are also the only country in a position to increase production quickly should some other supplier be knocked out of action.
But Saudi Arabia is no longer the stable rock in a turbulent Middle East sea. Terrorists funded by the Saudis have turned on their benefactors, and are killing foreigners to cause a flight of oil-industry and other trained personnel. They are winning because they seem immune to capture, because many top Saudis insist that it is the Zionists, rather than al Qaeda, who are causing the mayhem, and because hundreds of thousands of unemployed youths see no future for them so long as the royal family siphons off the nation's wealth to support its opulent lifestyle.
Whatever the reason, it is far from certain that the corrupt geriatrics who run the country will be able to head off the threat to the Saudi industry's ability to produce a steady flow of oil. True, the production facilities are well protected, but by troops of uncertain loyalty. And pipelines are difficult to protect, as are port facilities.
A final lesson for policymakers: Prepare for the day when bin Laden and associates are in a position to topple the Saudi regime and withhold supplies of oil, causing a major economic trauma in industrialized countries and a humanitarian catastrophe in the undeveloped world. That means continuing to build strategic reserves, but much more. Alternative sources of energy for transportation uses cannot be available in the relevant time frame, if ever; places such as Alaska take a long while to develop, and anyhow don't have enough oil to matter; renewables such as solar and wind power are not replacements for gasoline; conservation can be useful when prices rise gradually, giving consumers time to adjust to higher prices, but not when there is a price explosion.
I was asked many years ago at a gathering of government and industry experts to lay out an energy policy for America, to cope with a supply interruption. Two words: "aircraft carriers." That remains true today. Iraq is not a war for oil. The next U.S. intervention in the Middle East may well be.
Irwin M. Stelzer is director of economic policy studies at the Hudson Institute, a columnist for the Sunday Times (London), a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard, and a contributing writer to The Daily Standard.
? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
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Unfairenheit 9/11
The lies of Michael Moore.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, June 21, 2004, at 12:26 PM PT
Moore: Trying to have it three ways
One of the many problems with the American left, and indeed of the American left, has been its image and self-image as something rather too solemn, mirthless, herbivorous, dull, monochrome, righteous, and boring. How many times, in my old days at The Nation magazine, did I hear wistful and semienvious ruminations? Where was the radical Firing Line show? Who will be our Rush Limbaugh? I used privately to hope that the emphasis, if the comrades ever got around to it, would be on the first of those and not the second. But the meetings themselves were so mind-numbing and lugubrious that I thought the danger of success on either front was infinitely slight.
Nonetheless, it seems that an answer to this long-felt need is finally beginning to emerge. I exempt Al Franken's unintentionally funny Air America network, to which I gave a couple of interviews in its early days. There, one could hear the reassuring noise of collapsing scenery and tripped-over wires and be reminded once again that correct politics and smooth media presentation are not even distant cousins. With Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11, however, an entirely new note has been struck. Here we glimpse a possible fusion between the turgid routines of MoveOn.org and the filmic standards, if not exactly the filmic skills, of Sergei Eisenstein or Leni Riefenstahl.
To describe this film as dishonest and demagogic would almost be to promote those terms to the level of respectability. To describe this film as a piece of crap would be to run the risk of a discourse that would never again rise above the excremental. To describe it as an exercise in facile crowd-pleasing would be too obvious. Fahrenheit 9/11 is a sinister exercise in moral frivolity, crudely disguised as an exercise in seriousness. It is also a spectacle of abject political cowardice masking itself as a demonstration of "dissenting" bravery.
In late 2002, almost a year after the al-Qaida assault on American society, I had an onstage debate with Michael Moore at the Telluride Film Festival. In the course of this exchange, he stated his view that Osama Bin Laden should be considered innocent until proven guilty. This was, he said, the American way. The intervention in Afghanistan, he maintained, had been at least to that extent unjustified. Something--I cannot guess what, since we knew as much then as we do now--has since apparently persuaded Moore that Osama Bin Laden is as guilty as hell. Indeed, Osama is suddenly so guilty and so all-powerful that any other discussion of any other topic is a dangerous "distraction" from the fight against him. I believe that I understand the convenience of this late conversion.
Recruiters in Michigan

Fahrenheit 9/11 makes the following points about Bin Laden and about Afghanistan, and makes them in this order:

1) The Bin Laden family (if not exactly Osama himself) had a close if convoluted business relationship with the Bush family, through the Carlyle Group.

2) Saudi capital in general is a very large element of foreign investment in the United States.

3) The Unocal company in Texas had been willing to discuss a gas pipeline across Afghanistan with the Taliban, as had other vested interests.

4) The Bush administration sent far too few ground troops to Afghanistan and thus allowed far too many Taliban and al-Qaida members to escape.

5) The Afghan government, in supporting the coalition in Iraq, was purely risible in that its non-army was purely American.

6) The American lives lost in Afghanistan have been wasted. (This I divine from the fact that this supposedly "antiwar" film is dedicated ruefully to all those killed there, as well as in Iraq.)

It must be evident to anyone, despite the rapid-fire way in which Moore's direction eases the audience hastily past the contradictions, that these discrepant scatter shots do not cohere at any point. Either the Saudis run U.S. policy (through family ties or overwhelming economic interest), or they do not. As allies and patrons of the Taliban regime, they either opposed Bush's removal of it, or they did not. (They opposed the removal, all right: They wouldn't even let Tony Blair land his own plane on their soil at the time of the operation.) Either we sent too many troops, or were wrong to send any at all--the latter was Moore's view as late as 2002--or we sent too few. If we were going to make sure no Taliban or al-Qaida forces survived or escaped, we would have had to be more ruthless than I suspect that Mr. Moore is really recommending. And these are simply observations on what is "in" the film. If we turn to the facts that are deliberately left out, we discover that there is an emerging Afghan army, that the country is now a joint NATO responsibility and thus under the protection of the broadest military alliance in history, that it has a new constitution and is preparing against hellish odds to hold a general election, and that at least a million and a half of its former refugees have opted to return. I don't think a pipeline is being constructed yet, not that Afghanistan couldn't do with a pipeline. But a highway from Kabul to Kandahar--an insurance against warlordism and a condition of nation-building--is nearing completion with infinite labor and risk. We also discover that the parties of the Afghan secular left--like the parties of the Iraqi secular left--are strongly in favor of the regime change. But this is not the sort of irony in which Moore chooses to deal.
He prefers leaden sarcasm to irony and, indeed, may not appreciate the distinction. In a long and paranoid (and tedious) section at the opening of the film, he makes heavy innuendoes about the flights that took members of the Bin Laden family out of the country after Sept. 11. I banged on about this myself at the time and wrote a Nation column drawing attention to the groveling Larry King interview with the insufferable Prince Bandar, which Moore excerpts. However, recent developments have not been kind to our Mike. In the interval between Moore's triumph at Cannes and the release of the film in the United States, the 9/11 commission has found nothing to complain of in the timing or arrangement of the flights. And Richard Clarke, Bush's former chief of counterterrorism, has come forward to say that he, and he alone, took the responsibility for authorizing those Saudi departures. This might not matter so much to the ethos of Fahrenheit 9/11, except that--as you might expect--Clarke is presented throughout as the brow-furrowed ethical hero of the entire post-9/11 moment. And it does not seem very likely that, in his open admission about the Bin Laden family evacuation, Clarke is taking a fall, or a spear in the chest, for the Bush administration. So, that's another bust for this windy and bloated cinematic "key to all mythologies."
A film that bases itself on a big lie and a big misrepresentation can only sustain itself by a dizzying succession of smaller falsehoods, beefed up by wilder and (if possible) yet more-contradictory claims. President Bush is accused of taking too many lazy vacations. (What is that about, by the way? Isn't he supposed to be an unceasing planner for future aggressive wars?) But the shot of him "relaxing at Camp David" shows him side by side with Tony Blair. I say "shows," even though this photograph is on-screen so briefly that if you sneeze or blink, you won't recognize the other figure. A meeting with the prime minister of the United Kingdom, or at least with this prime minister, is not a goof-off.
The president is also captured in a well-worn TV news clip, on a golf course, making a boilerplate response to a question on terrorism and then asking the reporters to watch his drive. Well, that's what you get if you catch the president on a golf course. If Eisenhower had done this, as he often did, it would have been presented as calm statesmanship. If Clinton had done it, as he often did, it would have shown his charm. More interesting is the moment where Bush is shown frozen on his chair at the infant school in Florida, looking stunned and useless for seven whole minutes after the news of the second plane on 9/11. Many are those who say that he should have leaped from his stool, adopted a Russell Crowe stance, and gone to work. I could even wish that myself. But if he had done any such thing then (as he did with his "Let's roll" and "dead or alive" remarks a month later), half the Michael Moore community would now be calling him a man who went to war on a hectic, crazed impulse. The other half would be saying what they already say--that he knew the attack was coming, was using it to cement himself in power, and couldn't wait to get on with his coup. This is the line taken by Gore Vidal and by a scandalous recent book that also revives the charge of FDR's collusion over Pearl Harbor. At least Moore's film should put the shameful purveyors of that last theory back in their paranoid box.
But it won't because it encourages their half-baked fantasies in so many other ways. We are introduced to Iraq, "a sovereign nation." (In fact, Iraq's "sovereignty" was heavily qualified by international sanctions, however questionable, which reflected its noncompliance with important U.N. resolutions.) In this peaceable kingdom, according to Moore's flabbergasting choice of film shots, children are flying little kites, shoppers are smiling in the sunshine, and the gentle rhythms of life are undisturbed. Then--wham! From the night sky come the terror weapons of American imperialism. Watching the clips Moore uses, and recalling them well, I can recognize various Saddam palaces and military and police centers getting the treatment. But these sites are not identified as such. In fact, I don't think Al Jazeera would, on a bad day, have transmitted anything so utterly propagandistic. You would also be led to think that the term "civilian casualty" had not even been in the Iraqi vocabulary until March 2003. I remember asking Moore at Telluride if he was or was not a pacifist. He would not give a straight answer then, and he doesn't now, either. I'll just say that the "insurgent" side is presented in this film as justifiably outraged, whereas the 30-year record of Baathist war crimes and repression and aggression is not mentioned once. (Actually, that's not quite right. It is briefly mentioned but only, and smarmily, because of the bad period when Washington preferred Saddam to the likewise unmentioned Ayatollah Khomeini.)
That this--his pro-American moment--was the worst Moore could possibly say of Saddam's depravity is further suggested by some astonishing falsifications. Moore asserts that Iraq under Saddam had never attacked or killed or even threatened (his words) any American. I never quite know whether Moore is as ignorant as he looks, or even if that would be humanly possible. Baghdad was for years the official, undisguised home address of Abu Nidal, then the most-wanted gangster in the world, who had been sentenced to death even by the PLO and had blown up airports in Vienna* and Rome. Baghdad was the safe house for the man whose "operation" murdered Leon Klinghoffer. Saddam boasted publicly of his financial sponsorship of suicide bombers in Israel. (Quite a few Americans of all denominations walk the streets of Jerusalem.) In 1991, a large number of Western hostages were taken by the hideous Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and held in terrible conditions for a long time. After that same invasion was repelled--Saddam having killed quite a few Americans and Egyptians and Syrians and Brits in the meantime and having threatened to kill many more--the Iraqi secret police were caught trying to murder former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait. Never mind whether his son should take that personally. (Though why should he not?) Should you and I not resent any foreign dictatorship that attempts to kill one of our retired chief executives? (President Clinton certainly took it that way: He ordered the destruction by cruise missiles of the Baathist "security" headquarters.) Iraqi forces fired, every day, for 10 years, on the aircraft that patrolled the no-fly zones and staved off further genocide in the north and south of the country. In 1993, a certain Mr. Yasin helped mix the chemicals for the bomb at the World Trade Center and then skipped to Iraq, where he remained a guest of the state until the overthrow of Saddam. In 2001, Saddam's regime was the only one in the region that openly celebrated the attacks on New York and Washington and described them as just the beginning of a larger revenge. Its official media regularly spewed out a stream of anti-Semitic incitement. I think one might describe that as "threatening," even if one was narrow enough to think that anti-Semitism only menaces Jews. And it was after, and not before, the 9/11 attacks that Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi moved from Afghanistan to Baghdad and began to plan his now very open and lethal design for a holy and ethnic civil war. On Dec. 1, 2003, the New York Times reported--and the David Kay report had established--that Saddam had been secretly negotiating with the "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il in a series of secret meetings in Syria, as late as the spring of 2003, to buy a North Korean missile system, and missile-production system, right off the shelf. (This attempt was not uncovered until after the fall of Baghdad, the coalition's presence having meanwhile put an end to the negotiations.)
Thus, in spite of the film's loaded bias against the work of the mind, you can grasp even while watching it that Michael Moore has just said, in so many words, the one thing that no reflective or informed person can possibly believe: that Saddam Hussein was no problem. No problem at all. Now look again at the facts I have cited above. If these things had been allowed to happen under any other administration, you can be sure that Moore and others would now glibly be accusing the president of ignoring, or of having ignored, some fairly unmistakable "warnings."
The same "let's have it both ways" opportunism infects his treatment of another very serious subject, namely domestic counterterrorist policy. From being accused of overlooking too many warnings--not exactly an original point--the administration is now lavishly taunted for issuing too many. (Would there not have been "fear" if the harbingers of 9/11 had been taken seriously?) We are shown some American civilians who have had absurd encounters with idiotic "security" staff. (Have you ever met anyone who can't tell such a story?) Then we are immediately shown underfunded police departments that don't have the means or the manpower to do any stop-and-search: a power suddenly demanded by Moore on their behalf that we know by definition would at least lead to some ridiculous interrogations. Finally, Moore complains that there isn't enough intrusion and confiscation at airports and says that it is appalling that every air traveler is not forcibly relieved of all matches and lighters. (Cue mood music for sinister influence of Big Tobacco.) So--he wants even more pocket-rummaging by airport officials? Uh, no, not exactly. But by this stage, who's counting? Moore is having it three ways and asserting everything and nothing. Again--simply not serious.
Circling back to where we began, why did Moore's evil Saudis not join "the Coalition of the Willing"? Why instead did they force the United States to switch its regional military headquarters to Qatar? If the Bush family and the al-Saud dynasty live in each other's pockets, as is alleged in a sort of vulgar sub-Brechtian scene with Arab headdresses replacing top hats, then how come the most reactionary regime in the region has been powerless to stop Bush from demolishing its clone in Kabul and its buffer regime in Baghdad? The Saudis hate, as they did in 1991, the idea that Iraq's recuperated oil industry might challenge their near-monopoly. They fear the liberation of the Shiite Muslims they so despise. To make these elementary points is to collapse the whole pathetic edifice of the film's "theory." Perhaps Moore prefers the pro-Saudi Kissinger/Scowcroft plan for the Middle East, where stability trumps every other consideration and where one dare not upset the local house of cards, or killing-field of Kurds? This would be a strange position for a purported radical. Then again, perhaps he does not take this conservative line because his real pitch is not to any audience member with a serious interest in foreign policy. It is to the provincial isolationist.
I have already said that Moore's film has the staunch courage to mock Bush for his verbal infelicity. Yet it's much, much braver than that. From Fahrenheit 9/11 you can glean even more astounding and hidden disclosures, such as the capitalist nature of American society, the existence of Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex," and the use of "spin" in the presentation of our politicians. It's high time someone had the nerve to point this out. There's more. Poor people often volunteer to join the army, and some of them are duskier than others. Betcha didn't know that. Back in Flint, Mich., Moore feels on safe ground. There are no martyred rabbits this time. Instead, it's the poor and black who shoulder the packs and rifles and march away. I won't dwell on the fact that black Americans have fought for almost a century and a half, from insisting on their right to join the U.S. Army and fight in the Civil War to the right to have a desegregated Army that set the pace for post-1945 civil rights. I'll merely ask this: In the film, Moore says loudly and repeatedly that not enough troops were sent to garrison Afghanistan and Iraq. (This is now a favorite cleverness of those who were, in the first place, against sending any soldiers at all.) Well, where does he think those needful heroes and heroines would have come from? Does he favor a draft--the most statist and oppressive solution? Does he think that only hapless and gullible proles sign up for the Marines? Does he think--as he seems to suggest--that parents can "send" their children, as he stupidly asks elected members of Congress to do? Would he have abandoned Gettysburg because the Union allowed civilians to pay proxies to serve in their place? Would he have supported the antidraft (and very antiblack) riots against Lincoln in New York? After a point, one realizes that it's a waste of time asking him questions of this sort. It would be too much like taking him seriously. He'll just try anything once and see if it floats or flies or gets a cheer.
Trying to talk congressmen into sending their sons to war
Indeed, Moore's affected and ostentatious concern for black America is one of the most suspect ingredients of his pitch package. In a recent interview, he yelled that if the hijacked civilians of 9/11 had been black, they would have fought back, unlike the stupid and presumably cowardly white men and women (and children). Never mind for now how many black passengers were on those planes--we happen to know what Moore does not care to mention: that Todd Beamer and a few of his co-passengers, shouting "Let's roll," rammed the hijackers with a trolley, fought them tooth and nail, and helped bring down a United Airlines plane, in Pennsylvania, that was speeding toward either the White House or the Capitol. There are no words for real, impromptu bravery like that, which helped save our republic from worse than actually befell. The Pennsylvania drama also reminds one of the self-evident fact that this war is not fought only "overseas" or in uniform, but is being brought to our cities. Yet Moore is a silly and shady man who does not recognize courage of any sort even when he sees it because he cannot summon it in himself. To him, easy applause, in front of credulous audiences, is everything.
Moore has announced that he won't even appear on TV shows where he might face hostile questioning. I notice from the New York Times of June 20 that he has pompously established a rapid response team, and a fact-checking staff, and some tough lawyers, to bulwark himself against attack. He'll sue, Moore says, if anyone insults him or his pet. Some right-wing hack groups, I gather, are planning to bring pressure on their local movie theaters to drop the film. How dumb or thuggish do you have to be in order to counter one form of stupidity and cowardice with another? By all means go and see this terrible film, and take your friends, and if the fools in the audience strike up one cry, in favor of surrender or defeat, feel free to join in the conversation.
However, I think we can agree that the film is so flat-out phony that "fact-checking" is beside the point. And as for the scary lawyers--get a life, or maybe see me in court. But I offer this, to Moore and to his rapid response rabble. Any time, Michael my boy. Let's redo Telluride. Any show. Any place. Any platform. Let's see what you're made of.
Some people soothingly say that one should relax about all this. It's only a movie. No biggie. It's no worse than the tomfoolery of Oliver Stone. It's kick-ass entertainment. It might even help get out "the youth vote." Yeah, well, I have myself written and presented about a dozen low-budget made-for-TV documentaries, on subjects as various as Mother Teresa and Bill Clinton and the Cyprus crisis, and I also helped produce a slightly more polished one on Henry Kissinger that was shown in movie theaters. So I know, thanks, before you tell me, that a documentary must have a "POV" or point of view and that it must also impose a narrative line. But if you leave out absolutely everything that might give your "narrative" a problem and throw in any old rubbish that might support it, and you don't even care that one bit of that rubbish flatly contradicts the next bit, and you give no chance to those who might differ, then you have betrayed your craft. If you flatter and fawn upon your potential audience, I might add, you are patronizing them and insulting them. By the same token, if I write an article and I quote somebody and for space reasons put in an ellipsis like this (...), I swear on my children that I am not leaving out anything that, if quoted in full, would alter the original meaning or its significance. Those who violate this pact with readers or viewers are to be despised. At no point does Michael Moore make the smallest effort to be objective. At no moment does he pass up the chance of a cheap sneer or a jeer. He pitilessly focuses his camera, for minutes after he should have turned it off, on a distraught and bereaved mother whose grief we have already shared. (But then, this is the guy who thought it so clever and amusing to catch Charlton Heston, in Bowling for Columbine, at the onset of his senile dementia.) Such courage.
Perhaps vaguely aware that his movie so completely lacks gravitas, Moore concludes with a sonorous reading of some words from George Orwell. The words are taken from 1984 and consist of a third-person analysis of a hypothetical, endless, and contrived war between three superpowers. The clear intention, as clumsily excerpted like this (...) is to suggest that there is no moral distinction between the United States, the Taliban, and the Baath Party and that the war against jihad is about nothing. If Moore had studied a bit more, or at all, he could have read Orwell really saying, and in his own voice, the following:
The majority of pacifists either belong to obscure religious sects or are simply humanitarians who object to taking life and prefer not to follow their thoughts beyond that point. But there is a minority of intellectual pacifists, whose real though unacknowledged motive appears to be hatred of western democracy and admiration for totalitarianism. Pacifist propaganda usually boils down to saying that one side is as bad as the other, but if one looks closely at the writing of the younger intellectual pacifists, one finds that they do not by any means express impartial disapproval but are directed almost entirely against Britain and the United States ...
And that's just from Orwell's Notes on Nationalism in May 1945. A short word of advice: In general, it's highly unwise to quote Orwell if you are already way out of your depth on the question of moral equivalence. It's also incautious to remind people of Orwell if you are engaged in a sophomoric celluloid rewriting of recent history.
If Michael Moore had had his way, Slobodan Milosevic would still be the big man in a starved and tyrannical Serbia. Bosnia and Kosovo would have been cleansed and annexed. If Michael Moore had been listened to, Afghanistan would still be under Taliban rule, and Kuwait would have remained part of Iraq. And Iraq itself would still be the personal property of a psychopathic crime family, bargaining covertly with the slave state of North Korea for WMD. You might hope that a retrospective awareness of this kind would induce a little modesty. To the contrary, it is employed to pump air into one of the great sagging blimps of our sorry, mediocre, celeb-rotten culture. Rock the vote, indeed.
Correction, June 22, 2004: This piece originally referred to terrorist attacks by Abu Nidal's group on the Munich and Rome airports. The 1985 attacks occurred at the Rome and Vienna airports. (Return to the corrected sentence.)
Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair. His latest book, Blood, Class and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American Relationship, is out in paperback.
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Confronting the Biological and
Chemical Weapons Challenge:
The Need for an
"Intellectual Infrastructure"
Michael Moodie
.:  
International efforts to address the challenges posed by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and the threat of terrorist use of such weapons are at a loss regarding where to go next. The effort to negotiate a legally binding compliance protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) ended in 2001 without producing an acceptable outcome. The Action Plan agreed upon at the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC in December 2002 is a minimalist agreement that might produce useful results, but results that can hardly be called dramatic in light of the severity of the challenge. Similarly, the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 2003 provided a distinctly undramatic outcome that suggested little interest in new initiatives to address a profound challenge. It is incumbent on the international community to explore novel ideas-- both substantively and operationally--that might yield concrete actions nations and others can take to strengthen efforts to address the challenge that chemical and biological weapons pose in the hands of states or terrorists. The need for new thinking is especially strong in the community of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Governments are likely to spend most of the next several years focused on the issues that were addressed at their review meetings. While potentially useful, these measures are likely to be limited in terms of the policy outcomes they produce. This makes it incumbent on the NGO community to be the source of Michael Moodie is president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute in Washington, DC and a former Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He is the co-author of "Alternative Routes to the Cemetery," which was the lead article in the very first issue of The Fletcher Forum.

new thinking with respect to both substance and operations for addressing the complex CBW challenges. Many NGOs, however, invested considerable effort in traditional arms control and nonproliferation approaches to these problems in recent years, and they have few, if any, alternatives in the wake of these unsuccessful efforts. It is now time to move beyond those failed exercises and to push new conceptual and operational paths that can lead to concrete government action.
  
On July 25, 2001, the United States announced that it would not support the draft protocol negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of states that are parties to the BWC as presented in the "composite text" offered by the AHG Chairman.1 The U.S. statement made clear that further negotiation of specific language in the draft would not address the major concerns it had with the proposed protocol, which it felt was based on a fundamentally flawed conceptual approach and unwarranted assumptions. Five months later, the Fifth BWC Review Conference suspended its efforts in light of a U.S. demand that the Ad Hoc Group be brought to an end. This last-minute standoff was the culmination of three weeks of sometimes bitter disputes over how best to strengthen the BWC and to carry forward the fight against biological weapons proliferation. Between these two events, the United States was the victim of unprecedented anthrax attacks in the wake of the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. The anthrax attacks transformed what had been a theoretical concern for some people into a very real security threat for the entire country. In doing so, they created a fundamentally new context within which the challenge of chemical and biological weapons had to be addressed.
Fifteen years ago, these challenges were primarily the province of a small group of technical experts. The policy community, including government policymakers and the broader strategic community, had little familiarity with--and less understanding of--the security problems created by the use of chemicals and living organisms as instruments of violence.
However, a number of developments emerged in the early 1990s that
began to change the situation including:
* Iraqi use of chemical weapons in its war with Iran in the mid-1980s and, more important to policymakers, the fact that coalition forces confronted a chemically- and biologically-armed Iraq during the first Gulf War. This confrontation transformed what had been a rather uninteresting potentiality for many members of the coalition into a concrete security problem.
* Emerging intelligence about a massive illicit biological weapons program in the Soviet Union. Information provided by defectors described a program
     
.:  

involving dozens of facilities, tens of thousands of people, and billions of rubles that was previously unknown to Western intelligence sources.
* Ongoing concerns about North Korea, which was believed to have had a chemical and biological weapons program for decades.
These events combined to create an impetus for bringing the negotiations of the CWC to a successful conclusion in 1992. The treaty was opened for signature in early 1993 and entered into force in April 1997. At the same time, efforts were also made to strengthen the BWC, both through new confidence-building measures and through agreement on a process for supporting these measures that would bolster confidence in compliance with the convention. Throughout the 1990s, a litany of events continued to push CBW issues further up the post-Cold War security agenda. These included continuing discoveries about the Iraqi CBW program by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), the difficulties of getting the new Russian government to address problems left behind by the Soviet CBW program, and the March 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway. This last event in particular transformed the security landscape. Occurring soon before the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, it created a new mentality among policymakers and the public alike that the United States was not invulnerable to terrorism, that such terrorism could entail the use of chemical or biological weapons, and that the United States was not prepared. This mentality triggered the initial efforts that became the foundation for what is now the government's focus on homeland security--an orientation reinforced by the anthrax experience in the autumn of 2001. Because of these anthrax attacks, the threat of bioterrorism--nearly overnight--crashed its way into the national consciousness through the most mundane of daily events, delivery of the mail. As a result, in contrast to the last half of the twentieth century when nuclear weapons were the paramount concern, public opinion polls today report that what scares Americans most is the threat of biological or chemical attacks. CBW issues--and biological challenges in particular--are now near the top of the nation's security agenda. Despite this ascendance, understanding of the issues among policymakers and the public remains limited. This limited understanding translates into an absence of innovative approaches to deal with these demanding challenges, whether they relate to the state proliferation or to nonstate terrorism dimensions of the problem.
Despite increased recognition of the CBW problem, the security community
is not prepared to address it, especially in conceptual terms. The situation
      :
    " "
.:  

Throughout the 1990s, a
litany of events continued
to push CBW issues further
up the post-Cold War
security agenda.
regarding chemical and biological weapons stands in strong contrast to efforts directed at the challenge of nuclear weapons when it first emerged. From the onset of the nuclear age, the strategic studies community recognized that the world was confronted by a potential future of unspeakable horror. In response, it created an intellectual infrastructure to live in that world and deal with its problems. It developed new concepts and new analytical tools, fostered new ways of conceptualizing issues and defining the world so that governments and their publics could cope with the realities that nuclear weapons had created. Indeed, it was largely through its work on nuclear weapons issues that modern strategic studies and the security community were defined. Nothing similar emerged with respect to chemical and biological weapons. To the extent that they were considered at all during the Cold War, CBW were often assessed in the same category as--yet of lesser importance than--nuclear weapons, with the argument that anything that is useful for dealing with the challenge of nuclear weapons would have the additional benefit of managing chemical and biological challenges. That may have been true in a Cold War context, but once the nuclear standoff ended, it became an unwarranted assumption. Limited experience yielded a limited range of tools to address them. At a time when the world had changed and priorities had shifted, governments--and the broader community--were not prepared. Today, confronting a situation in which the old conceptual, analytical, and policy tools have been found wanting in their ability to manage the CBW challenge, the policy community is largely empty-handed.
    
The case for needing new thinking and new approaches to CBW rests on
four rather simple arguments:
* First, the old ways and old tools have not worked--at least not very well--in recent times. What might be called the "Geneva process"--formal multilateral negotiations by governments of legally binding agreements with inputs from NGOs and others--has not yielded major results since the conclusion of the CWC negotiations. Equally, the system of using the UN as the last resort to deal with problems of noncompliance, which is a key feature of these agreements, is not satisfactory. Members of the Security Council, and the five permanent members in particular, have done almost
     
.:  

The situation regarding chemical and biological weapons stands in strong contrast to efforts directed at the challenge of nuclear weapons when it first emerged.
nothing to give content to the declaration at the 1992 Security Council
Summit that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to
international peace and security.
* Second, there is no reason to believe that the ongoing contentious political disputes that were obstacles to progress in the past will not continue to seriously hinder any new attempts based on the usual practices and procedures. One of the most destructive elements in this regard has been the dispute carried by radical members of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) over security requirements in treaties on one hand and demands for cooperation and assistance in the peaceful uses of technologies covered by these agreements on the other.
* Third, old methods fail to accommodate inputs from important players who should now be making contributions to solving the problems. Industry, in particular, was not well integrated into past efforts, yet it stands at the cutting edge of the application of remarkable advances being witnessed in chemistry and the life sciences that are shaping the environment within which these issues must be addressed.
* Finally, old methods sometimes confuse intermediate goals with the ultimate objectives of global efforts. In particular, strengthening the BWC or CWC through the Geneva process seemed to become more important than effectively dealing with CBW proliferation or terrorism using such weapons. By emphasizing what is in essence an intermediate goal, the international community tended to lose sight of the full range of tools needed to address the challenge. This is not to argue that the BWC and CWC are not important or that they should not be strengthened. They are and they should be, but focusing exclusively on that objective arbitrarily limits the potentially useful efforts. Beyond these specific challenges, a range of other issues reinforces the need for new thinking and novel approaches.
The Terrorists' Arrival
The events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks suggest that the connections between the state proliferation and terrorism dimensions of the unconventional weapons challenge are more important than ever before. This linkage is especially acute with respect to biological weapons. In the past, analysts have tended to conceptualize and address the two dimensions along separate tracks. This split approach has produced different strategies and different policy tools for dealing with what were considered distinct aspects of the problem, if not separate problems altogether. In the world after September 11, such a stovepipe approach will no longer suffice.
      :
    " "
.:  

The distinction between war and terrorism and terrorists and the state has become increasingly blurred and the concepts are now inextricably linked. Confronting this complex challenge, the United States and the international community must implement a response that is strategic in nature and multifaceted in action. A range of tools must be exploited. Arms control is important in this context, but classic multilateral arms control is unlikely to yield significant results on its own. Nor does it provide a sufficiently wide perspective to facilitate all of the varied actions that will be required by the necessary actors--from both the public and private sectors--to deal effectively with the new realities that the convergence of state and non-state challenges present. The combination of politics, science and technology, and the treaty language of the CWC and BWC ensures that these conventions will be insufficient on their own. What is needed is an approach that goes beyond the traditional modalities of arms control to new ways of thinking about how to strengthen the conventions and the norms against CBW that these conventions embody.
Advancing Science and Technology
Both chemistry and the life sciences have produced incredibly rapid scientific and technological advances in recent years, and, if anything, the pace of change is likely to accelerate. Today's Nobel Prize-winning experiment is tomorrow's high school science fair project. Classic arms control will have difficulty in capturing this dynamism in the underlying science and technology, which has the potential for contributing to remarkable advances in the human condition but which could also be used for malign purposes.
Rapid changes in science and technology will shape new scientific and business methods and practices far removed from those of today. Moreover, many of the breakthroughs in science and technology are likely to be achieved by combining them with other technologies such as nanotechnology, cutting-edge information technologies, and new materials science. Creative scientists and technologists could find new ways of putting such things together to advance their CBW capabilities. In essence, advancing science and technology will allow future proliferators to enter the CBW game with a more solid scientific and technological base on which to build their efforts.
The potential injury to mankind resulting from the exploitation of advancing science and technology is almost inconceivable, but conceive it we have, from stealth viruses to ethnic weapons to behavioral modification techniques.2 They are all now deemed to be in the realm of the possible.
Government bureaucracies are notoriously slow to adapt. International organizations are no less so. Because of the vastly different rates of scientific advancement and government adaptation a broader approach is required that
     
.:  

facilitates an ongoing appreciation of the evolving scientific and technological landscape in as close to real-time as possible.
Another key issue related to science and technology is the pace at which this knowledge is spreading around the world. Scientific activity in chemistry and biology is a genuinely international endeavor, as is the development of chemical and biotechnology industries. Developing countries such as Singapore and India are looking to such advanced technology industries to facilitate their economic development. Singapore, for example, has committed itself to becoming a biotechnology hub in East Asia, and it has already succeeded in attracting foreign companies. The drive of developing countries to exploit advanced technology is another dimension of the chemical and biological challenge that complicates efforts to apply old approaches and, likewise, demands new thinking. Casting the issue as one of managing technology diffusion changes the perspective of both policymakers and analysts whose traditional approach would emphasize controlling exports. Nonproliferation export control regimes have their origin in the Cold War's emphasis on nuclear weapons, for which access to fissile material is the critical factor. Looking at the problem as one of technology diffusion, economic development promotion, and risk management, however, leads to the conclusion that controlling material and equipment is becoming less important than managing the risks of transferring knowledge. The commercial, medical, or agricultural ubiquity of the material and equipment needed to develop at least a limited chemical or biological weapons capability makes technical know-how the essential element. In such a world, it is obviously not realistic to suggest that flows of knowledge can be strictly controlled, especially with so many means of direct communications with global reach.
It is not the knowledge per se that is important, however, but the people with that knowledge. Therefore, in managing the potential risks greater attention should be given to what people do with the knowledge they acquire, especially in academic and industry settings. CBW scientists in places like Iraq received at least some of their training in the West. It is impractical, however, to try to track every foreign student or scientist studying or conducting research in the life sciences or chemistry at European and North American universities. Restricting research is no less difficult. Despite the difficulties, some sensitivity to the issue of managing the risks associated with people involved in such research should be promoted.
      :
    " "
.:  

Casting the issue as one of managing technology diffusion changes the perspective of both policy makers and analysts whose traditional approach would emphasize controlling exports.
Engaging Industry More Productively
Those involved in industries based on science and technology that can also yield chemical and biological weapons emphasize the vast contributions their rapidly advancing capabilities make to improving the quality of life for many people, and they are right to do so. Not everyone shares the view, however, that this science and technology, especially biotechnology, is an unalloyed positive. Unscrupulous drug companies or other biotechnology enterprises, for example, have recently become the villains in popular novels and movies. Although such depictions exist in the domain of fiction, the fact that advanced science is portrayed negatively in the popular culture captures a sentiment among the public that reflects uncertainty and uneasiness with issues generated by the advancing life sciences and related technology.
The issues involved, including cloning, gene patents, eugenics, genetically modified food, genetic testing, and privacy are many and difficult. The public perception of industry "fiddling around with nature" suggests a view that advanced science and technology could contribute to a more serious threat to public safety and security. As the drivers of much of the critical science and technology developments, industry must be made to understand its stakes in the challenge and be fully integrated into the necessary strategic response. The direct contribution that industry can make to dealing with the problem is obvious. It should be the source of some of the more technical tools that could be deployed to help manage the risks associated with CBW, including sensors for detection and identification, new medical treatments, or improvements in passive and active protective gear. The indirect contributions of industry, however, should not be overlooked. Even companies that have no direct relationship to the security sector engage in activities with risks attached, and managing the risks associated with advances in chemistry, biology, and the associated specialties is an increasingly vital element of future action. A device for the needle-less application of medical treatments, for example (involving absorption of the drug through the skin), could be of great medical value, but in some contexts it might also be useful for terrorists.
The rapid movement of personnel in a highly volatile industry could create opportunities for those who want to do wrong to operate without close observation (just as participants in national proliferation programs such as those in Iraq received their training in European and North American universities). Given the growing public and governmental concerns over developments in biotechnology, it would also be very much in the interest of the biotechnology industry to cooperate in promoting proper, safe, and ethical practices around the world.
Increasing awareness within industry of the risks associated with critical develop-
     
.:  

ments in the relevant sciences and their commercial application is an area in which industry and government could work closely together. A similar effort to raise awareness of security-related concerns should be pursued with the scientific community. From the beginning of the nuclear age, with the active participation of Einstein himself, physicists have understood that they must think about the negative implications of atomic power to avoid the catastrophic consequences of the knowledge they uncover. That recognition has been lacking in the life sciences community. Their single-minded focus on the good they are trying to do for humanity or scientific discovery for its own sake too often blinded life scientists to the risks that stood alongside the benefits they were seeking. Security issues were kept at arm's length.
While attitudes within the life sciences community appear to be changing in this regard, they still have a long way to go before they can provide the requisite strong leadership and sustained engagement. Life scientists should now help strengthen the norms against chemical and biological weapons research, acquisition, and use. Codes of conduct, peer reviews and panels, and self-regulation that defines appropriate restrictions in scientific research are all ways in which the scientific community can contribute to an environment that does everything possible to foster the apposite use of the biological and chemical sciences in the service of public safety and security.
  :
   
As has been argued, there is no intellectual infrastructure that provides a common framework for understanding the chemical and biological challenge similar to the one that evolved with respect to nuclear weapons in the second half of the twentieth century. In and of itself, such a framework will not generate answers, but the development of reasonable policy must begin with shared understandings, a common language, and useful conceptual tools. This conceptual infrastructure is important because concepts shape our constructs of reality, and they can prompt a sense of new opportunities with respect to what can be done to address major challenges. In other words, it both opens up new policy options and promotes either the identification of new policy tools or the application of existing tools in novel ways.
Threat Assessments
The process of constructing an intellectual infrastructure must begin with a shared appreciation of the problem. Today, a common view of the threat does not exist. Are chemical and biological weapons strategic or tactical? What is their
      :
    " "
.:  

military utility on the battlefield, against operational in-theater targets, or against an adversary's home base? Do states or terrorists pose the greater threat? Is such a dichotomy even useful, or does the relationship between the state and non-state dimensions of the problem require recasting how we think about both? What are the best ways to classify the critical components of an effective response? How are those components related and how do they interact? These are only some of the questions on which it would be hard to reach a consensus let alone a shared set of concepts or common language for addressing them.
The first requirement of an intellectual infrastructure, then, must be better threat assessments. Such assessments today often explain the chemical or biological threat in terms of a single factor such as the agent (whose potential lethality is emphasized in most vulnerability assessments), or the actor seeking to use such weapons (which historical assessments usually stress). Single factor analyses, however, are inadequate. The CBW threat is the product of a complex interaction among several categories of factors--actors, agents, targets, and operational considerations--each of which includes many variables. Taken together, these variables can produce a large set of combinations and permutations, some of which will yield significant results and some of which will not. Examining so many variables together and integrating their interaction into a meaningful analysis is not easy. Better threat assessment methodologies, therefore, should be one of the building blocks of this intellectual infrastructure and a valuable tool to promote new thinking.
Risk Assessment
Threat is not the same as risk; however, better risk assessments, particularly in the biological arena, are as badly needed as better threat assessments. The biological weapons challenge--that is, the deliberate misuse of the life sciences-- should be seen as one end of a spectrum of risks associated with the life sciences. This spectrum begins with natural developments such as the outbreak of disease, continues through accidents and "misadventure," as in the unforeseen negative consequences of what are otherwise beneficial activities such as medical research, to deliberate use at the other extreme. Public safety and security risks emanating from developments in the life sciences are converging. The growing realization of the links between infectious disease and biological weapons or the potential implications of scientific research (advanced genomics, for example) for shaping the biological weapons problem are examples of why it is more difficult to draw a clear dividing line between safety and security risks. Casting risks associated
     
.:  

The process of constructing an intellectual infrastructure must begin with a shared appreciation of the problem.
with the life sciences across the full spectrum--from those that occur naturally to those that are the result of deliberate human choice--not only better reflects reality, but it also creates a means for identifying the critical cost-benefit tradeoffs associated with particular courses of action. Cost-benefit analysis is a crucial part of the risk assessment process. Considering the full risk spectrum facilitates an appreciation of costs and benefits in a way that merely doing threat assessments does not. A cost-benefit analysis of applying strict regulations to the publication of contentious research, for example, might deem such limitations sensible if one were only concerned about the security implications of such research. But when the broader spectrum of affected activities is considered, including the need for sharing knowledge generated by new research for medical, commercial, or other legitimate reasons, the cost-benefit calculation is likely to yield a different policy outcome.
Impact Assessments
In addition to better threat and risk assessments, a useful contribution to the intellectual infrastructure would come from elaboration of alternative measures of the impact of breaches of biological or chemical security. Developing such measures could contribute to a better and more widely shared view among policymakers of just how serious biological and chemical risks and threats are. They could also foster a better appreciation of the full range of how such capabilities could be used.
The most obvious measure of impact is casualties, which is useful because it is quantifiable, but the level of casualties is a useful indicator of impact only if the goal of using chemical or biological weapons is to kill people. If killing people is a means to some other objective, such as disrupting military operations or inciting widespread public panic, then casualty levels are at best an indirect indicator of the utility of such weapons. In some cases, killing people may be neither the objective nor the outcome. The economic cost of biological weapons use is probably the next easiest impact to measure, again because it is quantifiable. Models can be developed, for example, which assess the costs of various attack scenarios against agricultural targets or business operations.
A particularly helpful impact metric would address the psychological effect of biological or chemical weapons threats and use under a variety of conditions. Biological weapons, in particular, seem to be especially distressing to people, perhaps because of the prospect of an unpleasant death from an infectious disease or because biological weapons are viewed as a result of manipulating nature. Whatever the reason, a better understanding of the potential psychological impact of chemical or biological weapons use could have important benefits. In urging the development of better metrics for assessing the impact of
      :
    " "
.:  

breaches of biological or chemical security, one should not expect a high degree of precision or a predictive capability. Casualties or economic costs are attractive metrics because they can be quantified, but other results do not lend themselves to numerical representation. Working on better impact assessment methodologies, however, would yield yet another set of tools for understanding the nature of the problem and pointing toward potentially useful responses.
Infrastructure is defined as "the underlying foundation or basic framework" of a system or the "resources required for an activity."3 Physical infrastructure makes a particular way of life possible in a given natural environment. In the same way, a new conceptual and policy environment within which to address chemical and biological security requires an intellectual infrastructure. The components of such an infrastructure discussed here--better threat assessment methodologies, risk assessments based on cost-benefit analyses, development of impact metrics--are obviously not exhaustive. Other components are also needed. These three are each important because they address some of the most basic needs on which other capabilities can be based. Some hope should be taken from the nuclear experience. It was not until after the elaboration of that intellectual infrastructure that breakthroughs in nuclear arms control became possible. Likewise, in the chemical and biological arena, we must be sure we are thinking about the problem and the potential solutions in the right way before the best routes for dealing with it can be determined.
Developing an intellectual infrastructure to support a conceptual and policy environment that stresses the proper role of science and technology in the service of safety and security requires contributions from many more actors than diplomats in Geneva or government policymakers and bureaucrats in national capitals. Through this more universal effort, the task of building bridges to the industrial and scientific communities can be advanced by acknowledging the value of their contributions and through involving them early in the process. The challenge in confronting the potential catastrophes inherent in the use of chemical and biological weapons--whether by states or non-states--is not to prevent those international actors from acquiring the capabilities to exploit chemistry and the life sciences for malign purposes. That is not possible. Rather, that challenge is, as UK Ministry of Defense analyst Paul Schulte put it, "to keep it out of their behavioral repertoires."4 The job is to shape the behavior of those who might be interested in such capabilities. We will only be successful in doing so if we have the right tools, not only in policy terms but in conceptual and analytical terms as well. Developing the right tools will not be easy. It is difficult to break out of familiar and comfortable ways of thinking about problems and to replace them with ideas that may not be refined and whose value remains unproven. It is also hard to combine the requisite insights from politics, economics, science, and technology, as well as security, which will be required for dealing with this problem.
     
.:  

Yet if there is to be success, both of these difficulties must be overcome. Changing the way we think can be the most difficult problem of all.

1 Donald Mahey, "Statement by the United States to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," delivered July 25, 2001 in Geneva, Switzerland, available at (accessed November 20, 2003).
2 Ethnic weapons are weapons using biological materials or the life sciences (such as growing knowledge of the human genome) to attempt to target genetic differences between ethnic groups with the goal of developing a capability that would have an impact on one ethnic group but not others. A debate exists within that scientific community about how close the ability for developing such a weapon is.
3 This definition is according to Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition (Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster International, 1995.)]
4 Comment made during a presentation at a conference at Wilton Park on "Chemical and Biological Weapons: The Threats of Proliferation and Use." Schulte's presentation was on "Revising the CBW Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Agenda: Essential in the New International Security Environment."
      :

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Ukraine's missing missiles
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jid/jid040617_1_n.shtml
Since March, Ukraine's defence minister, Yevhen Marchuk, has been searching for missing missiles and other weapons that could have fallen into terrorist hands or been sold to rogue states. JID investigates why this potentially catastrophic situation is only now being brought to light.
Marchuk raised a domestic storm when he publicly revealed that the Defence Ministry had no unified accounting system. Nor has a comprehensive inventory of military equipment in Ukraine ever been carried out. It is unknown what weapons the Defence Ministry actually possesses or what it inherited from the former Soviet Union.
When Marchuk became defence minister in June 2003 he ordered two inventories that indicated US$170m of military stock was probably missing. These results were so shocking that Marchuk ordered a new team of investigators to conduct an additional check using different methods. They uncovered that additional equipment, worth $20m, was missing.
Ukraine's officially declared revenue from the sale of military equipment is $3bn. This, according to JID's inside sources, only represents a small fraction of the real volume of Ukraine's military exports. Meanwhile, Marchuk has complained that there is no data available to him regarding the quantity of military equipment Ukraine inherited after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The sheer scale of what appears to be missing equipment is astounding, as demonstrated by just one example. In 1990-1991, on the eve of the break up of the Soviet Union, 1,942 S-185 rockets were delivered to the Zhytomir military base, west of Kiev. These rockets were to be dismantled.
In fact, only 488 of the 1,942 rockets can actually be accounted for. The missiles could have been sold to unknown groups or countries. Or their scrap metal, gold, platinum and silver could have been sold separately with the proceeds being transferred to offshore accounts.
"We are looking for several hundred missiles. They have already been decommissioned, but we cannot find them," complained Marchuk.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unaddressed Proliferation
Preemption, take II.
John Kerry finally got something right. In a recent speech in Florida, he said, "...the greatest threat we face today [is] the possibility of al Qaeda or other terrorists getting their hands on a nuclear weapon." But how he proposed to deal with this threat demonstrated an ignorance of the jihadist threat and a naive faith in the U.N. that are simply breathtaking.
Kerry's plan boils down to three points. He proposed a Gorian "lockbox" for nuclear weapons and materials, established and enforced through the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency. Second, he would create an international coalition to halt all production of enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, including presumably future American production. Third, Kerry would buy "legitimacy" for this initiative by reducing America's nuclear arsenal, and by stopping President Bush's initiative to build new small tactical nuclear "bunker busters" that have the ability to reach deeply buried terrorist WMD.
Kerry said that a "nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable." But he -- and the Blixiecrats of the IAEA -- aren't sure that the Iranians are really trying to produce nuclear weapons. This despite more than two decades of crude lies and deceptions by Tehran. Kerry wants to "call [the Iranians'] bluff" by offering to provide them with all the "...nuclear fuel they need for peaceful purposes and take back the spent fuel so they can't divert it to build a weapon." If they refuse, he thinks, we'll know they're up to no good. We already know that. And what Kerry doesn't understand is that Iran isn't bluffing: It's deceiving.
Kerry is ignorant -- willfully or otherwise -- of the deep roots of nuclear jihadism. Zulfiqar Ali-Bhutto, Pakistan's leader in the early 1970s, created the foundation for today's nuclear jihad. Bhutto considered it his mission to provide the Islamic world with a counterweight to what he described as the nuclear power of the Christians, Jews, and Hindus. Pakistan never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and developed its nuclear weapons outside its restrictions. Throughout the 1980s and '90s, Pakistan has been the world's worst proliferator of nuclear weaponry.
Since Ali-Bhutto's time, the jihadist movement -- of which the Tehran regime is a prime mover -- has adopted his dogma that achieving nuclear weaponry is a religious obligation. Osama bin Laden has said just that, as have some Iranian leaders. When the "father" of the Pakistani bomb, scientist A. Q. Khan, was revealed to have clandestinely helped Iran, Iraq, and Libya with their nuclear programs, he was pardoned by President Musharraf and allowed to keep the wealth he amassed by helping rogue nations pursue their nuclear ambitions. According to a report from the London-based Asia Pacific Foundation think tank, "Khan could not have acted alone, or without the knowledge of the Pakistani military." The APF report goes on to say, "Ever since Pakistan embarked on its military nuclear program in the 1970s, the entire project has been closely controlled by the military, and Pakistan intelligence agency the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had been handling many clandestine transactions relating to the acquisition of nuclear and missile capabilities...." One report said that the Iranian nuclear-weapons program has been -- and still is -- supervised by Pakistani military and intelligence officers. (President Bush's failure to do more with Musharraf -- to open the Pak nuclear program to inspection and to take control of his so-far uncontrolled intelligence and army factions -- is a much more important failure than anything Kerry has pointed out.)
The diplomatic maneuvering Kerry proposes has already been tried by the Bush administration, and it has failed. Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but has thwarted the IAEA's half-hearted efforts to inspect its nuclear sites. Just last year, the mullahs agreed to a tough inspection regime, which the IAEA touted as a great success. But the Iranian kakistocracy was violating the accord before the ink was dry. Russia continues to help construct the Iranian nuclear plant at Bushehr, while other nuclear facilities at Arak and Netanz (where uranium enrichment is probably going on) as well as other deeply buried and hardened sites are all apparently engaged in developing and building nuclear weapons. Just last week, the IAEA retreated again, admitting to having accused Iran falsely of hiding its acquisition of 150 magnets used in uranium enrichment. Meanwhile, Iran has -- according to another statement by IAEA head Mohamed el-Baradei -- sought to acquire about 100,000 such magnets clandestinely. (Other reports last week indicate that Iran's nuclear facilities are -- again -- greater in number than disclosed, and hidden from inspectors). The only thing the U.S. can count on is that the IAEA will remain inert while Iran joins the ranks of nuclear powers.
Kerry's ideas are dangerously wrong. First, because the Islamist nations have adopted the theory that obtaining nuclear weapons is a religious obligation, no treaty or voluntary inspection plan will prevent them from pursuing their nuclear ambitions. (And making another deal with Stalinist North Korea, as Kerry also proposes, must fail. Who ever heard of a Stalinist regime living up to a treaty obligation?) Moreover, by preventing the development of deep-penetrating tactical nuclear weapons, Kerry would give up the best military means of destroying the weapons and the places where they are being built. All of the terrorist nations learned the lesson of the 1981 Israeli strike on the Iraqi Osirak reactor: None will leave its nuclear sites open to easy air attack.
Were we to follow Kerry's path, we would trust the U.N. and the IAEA to prevent Islamic terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons. By trusting the U.N., and attempting to make more treaties to talk Iran and North Korea out of their nuclear-weapons programs, we would give them more time to achieve their goals. The IAEA has proven itself a watchdog that never barks. Treaties and diplomacy that aren't based on military compulsion are useless against these rogue states. North Korea has already announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran has threatened to as well.
The latest reports on Libya's nuclear disarmament demonstrate another huge hole in Kerry's plan. Though Libya is cooperating in its own disarmament, a shipment to Libya of nuclear materials has disappeared. From where it was coming or of what it was composed, no one seems certain. But it's a fair guess that those who are helping the jihadists achieve their dream of nuclear power would know.
There is, in truth, little likelihood that anything will stop the advent of nuclear terrorism. But President Bush has a policy that has a better chance of succeeding than any other. His Proliferation Security Initiative in which eleven nations (even France) have joined to interdict shipments of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is diplomacy founded upon military force. It is succeeding, one seizure at a time, in many parts of the globe. Underlying it is the policy of preemption -- which we need to implement now, not later, to prevent Iran from graduating from the status of terrorist regime to nuclear terrorist regime.
-- NRO contributor Jed Babbin is the author of Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe are Worse than You Think.
http://www.nationalreview.com/babbin/babbin200406210910.asp

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UN slams US over spending Iraq funds
By Gareth Smyth in Baghdad and Thomas Catan in Washington
Published: June 21 2004 22:00 | Last Updated: June 21 2004 22:13
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1087373157793&p=1012571727088
United Nations-mandated auditors have sharply criticised the US occupation authority for the way it has spent more than $11bn in Iraqi oil revenues and say they have faced "resistance" from coalition officials.
In an interim report, obtained by the Financial Times, KPMG says the Development Fund for Iraq, which is managed by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority and channels oil revenue into reconstruction projects, is "open to fraudulent acts".
The auditors criticise the CPA's bookkeeping and warn: "The CPA does not have effective controls over the ministries' spending of their individually allocated budgets, whether the funds are direct from the CPA or via the ministry of finance."
The findings come after US complaints about the UN's administration of the oil-for-food programme under Saddam Hussein.
According to the CPA, the Development Fund for Iraq has taken in $20.2bn since last May and has disbursed $11.3bn, with $4.6bn left in outstanding commitments.
One adviser to a member of the recently disbanded Iraqi Governing Council said the report raised the fear that no audit of the CPA's work would ever be completed. "If the auditors don't finish by June 30, they never will, because the CPA staff are going home," he said. "I lament the lack of transparency and lack of involvement by Iraqis."
The KPMG auditors are answerable to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board, set up by the UN Security Council in May last year to oversee coalition spending from the development fund. The account contains oil revenues, frozen assets and money left over from the UN's oil-for-food programme.
The watchdog comprises representatives of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. It spent much of last year battling with occupation administrators over the watchdog's remit. Officials said they were able to begin working in earnest only in April.
In their first interim report, KPMG said it had "encountered resistance from CPA staff". CPA staff told KPMG they were overworked and had given them a "low priority".
The UN decided this month that responsibility for the Development Fund for Iraq will pass to the Iraqi interim government and be monitored by the the IAMB. The panel also intends to widen its scrutiny of past CPA spending by examining reports and audits by the Pentagon's inspector general and the General Accounting Office, an official said.
IAMB officials were meeting in Paris on Monday and were not available for comment.
Some of KPMG's most damning criticisms were of the State Organisation for Marketing Oil, responsible for the sale of Iraq's most crucial asset. Oil sales, which go into the US-controlled fund, have topped $10bn since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Somo's only record of barter transactions was "an independent database, derived from verbal confirmations gained by Somo staff", the report found.
The CPA declined to address the KPMG report, saying only that it "has been and will continue to discharge its responsibilities under the Iraqi Development Fund".
One Iraqi minister due to take office on June 30 told the FT he and many colleagues felt "let down by how the CPA has controlled resources".
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http://www.humaneventsonline.com/downloads-pdfs/9-11_commission_statement_outline.pdf

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North Korea Must Show Progress at Six-Nation Talks, Powell Says
June 22 (Bloomberg) -- North Korea must take steps to make progress at this week's third round of six-nation talks aimed at dismantling the communist country's nuclear arms program, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said.
``The United States will want to see performance on the part of the North Koreans,'' Powell said, according to an e-mailed statement by the State Department. ``We will enter these talks as we have entered previous talks, with flexibility and with an attitude to trying to solve the problem, not for the purpose of continuing the problem and not finding a solution.''
The two previous rounds of talks in Beijing failed to make any progress. North Korea is seeking security guarantees and economic aid in return for freezing its nuclear program while the U.S. wants the program dismantled before talks start on normalizing ties or providing assistance.
The talks at ministerial level, involving the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, will begin tomorrow in Beijing. U.S. insistence on a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the program is ``a demand which can be forced on a defeated country only,'' North Korea's government said last week.
``We've made clear to the North Koreans what it will take to solve the problem and the benefit that will ultimately await North Korea when the problem is resolved,'' Powell said. The North Korean government must ``fully divulge and fully turn over and fully dismantle, in a way that the whole world can see and there is no question about it.''
The standoff over the nuclear program began in October 2002 when North Korea acknowledged to the U.S. it was developing nuclear weapons, violating a 1994 international agreement.
No Compensation
The U.S. government has consistently said North Korea won't be compensated for scrapping an illegal program, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said at a Washington briefing yesterday.
President George W. Bush has ``made clear that he's willing to enter into multilateral security guarantees so that the North Koreans don't have to worry about their security,'' Boucher said.
Discussions between the six nations at lower level began in Beijing yesterday.
To contact the reporter on this story:
Paul Tighe in Sydney at ptighe@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Paul Tighe at ptighe@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: June 21, 2004 20:41 EDT

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from the June 22, 2004 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0622/p01s04-woap.html

Ranks breaking over North Korea
South Korea and China move away from the US negotiating position as six-party talks reconvene Wednesday in Beijing.
By Robert Marquand and Donald Kirk
BEIJING AND SEOUL - Since confronting the Kim Jong Il regime with evidence of a secret uranium nuclear program two years ago, the White House has demanded a "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of all nuclear activity in North Korea. Known by the acronym "CVID," and hewed to by the Bush team closely for a year of multiparty talks, the US position requires a full-scale retreat by Pyongyang before it can expect to receive loans, aid, and security guarantees.
Yet Wednesday, as the next round of six-nation talks on Korea's nuclear crisis commences in Beijing, Chinese and South Korean delegates are expected to break ranks, join forces, and politely challenge the practicality of American insistence on CVID.
As the states closest to North Korea both geographically and diplomatically, China and South Korea will ask the US to rethink what one high-level source in Beijing calls an "unrealistic" position. Both Beijing and Seoul are even prepared to discuss allowing Kim Jong Il to pursue a nuclear-energy program that is "peaceful," sources say.
"We agree with CVID in principle, but we question whether it will allow talks to be productive," says Jin Linbo, director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing. "China feels that CVID is a final goal, not something that needs to be complete right now."
Since February, differences between China and the US have widened in the nuclear-talks process, sources in both Washington and Beijing confirm. Last month China's deputy foreign minister suggested for the first time that Beijing had no convincing evidence that North Korea had or is pursuing the uranium program that sparked the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. The claim has been made at times in South Korea as well, to the frustration of US officials.
Some Korean affairs experts both in Asia and the US have said for months that the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" formula is problematic. North Korea has never accepted the principle of CVID and has always balked at agreeing to that as a solution, including in the first round of six-nation talks last August. It has been clear for months that Kim Jong Il is waiting for the outcome of US elections in November before deciding what strategy to pursue, experts say.
Some analysts say the new request to Washington by Seoul and Beijing is mainly aimed at keeping the highly sensitive Kim engaged as the process waits for the elections. The move ensures that Kim is not "ganged up on in the talks" until the next diplomatic round, as a Beijing source put it. In exchange for the US backing off its CVID demand, the Beijing-Seoul plan would secure a freeze by the North on its nuclear weapons program, and a promise to allow inspections of the Yongbyon nuclear facility.
Monday a preliminary "working group" convened in Beijing prior to Wednesday's opening of talks.
South Korea's new approach emerged in talks and seminars over the past week, marking the fourth anniversary of the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang between North Korea's Kim, and Kim Dae Jung, then president of South Korea.
"We hope the talks in Beijing will make a breakthrough," says Moon Jung In, the Yonsei University political science professor who organized the Korean conference.
"The United States should allow the peaceful use of atomic energy," says Mr. Moon. The formula, he said, would be "a freeze" on North Korea's program for developing nuclear warheads and "inspection of all nuclear weapons."
Moon's views summarize the ambition of an increasingly influential liberal elite in South Korea to get the US to tone down its insistence on CVID while accepting the notion of a freeze as an interim step on the way to that final goal.
The Bush administration's position is intended to end what it sees as the North's perpetual use of the diplomatic process to gain money and attention.
The Korean nuclear crisis emerged in Oct. 2002 when US envoy James Kelley, in Pyongyang, confronted North Korean officials with evidence of a secret highly enriched uranium program, or HEU.
North Korea at the end of 2002 expelled inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency from Yongbyon where some 8,000 spent plutonium fuel rods were sealed and under video surveillance as part of the 1994 Geneva framework agreement negotiated by the Clinton administration. In early 2003 the North removed those nuclear rods from the Yongbyon cooling pond and restarted the five-megawatt experimental reactor there. That reactor is suspected to have produced one or two warheads before the 1994 agreement was signed. US intelligence analysts believe the North may have fabricated several more warheads over the past year.
North Korea, having acknowledged the HEU program to Mr. Kelley, has since steadfastly denied its existence. The denials contradict evidence of North Korean transactions with Pakistan as well as the word of Abdul Qadeer Khan, "father" of the Pakistan atomic bomb, who has said he saw facilities for HEU development during a visit to North Korea.
Chinese questioning of the existence of HEU, which broke in an interview in the New York Times last month, is thought to be mainly a public position. China insists that it has not received enough evidence from the US to make a conclusive determination on the existence of a uranium program in the North. But this does not mean Chinese officials have ruled out a uranium program by Kim. When pressed, a senior Chinese source in Beijing pointed out that "we don't have complete belief in what North Korea has said. They [North Korean officials] have made a great deal of contradictory statements."
Along with the US, North and South Korea, and China, the six-party talks hosted include Russia and Japan. They are expected to last from three to five days and to be resumed next fall. While the North Korean crisis burned hotly in 2003, the US presidential election and events in the Middle East have drawn attention from the issue. Little intelligence is available on how or whether Kim has continued to reprocess the plutonium fuel rods.
The Asian partners of the six-party talks, particularly South Korea and China, insist that the talks will continue regardless of whether or not the current round yields any breakthroughs.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------North Korea Pursuing Two Paths Toward Nuclear Weapons
Stephanie Ho
Washington
21 Jun 2004, 20:43 UTC
Listen to Stephanie Ho's report (RealAudio)
Ho report - Download 788k (RealAudio)

A 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea led to a freeze of the North's plutonium-based nuclear-weapons program. As part of the agreement, the United States promised to help North Korea build reactors that relied on nuclear technology that could not be used to make weapons. But not long after, North Korea began pursuing another path to produce nuclear weapons, acquiring technology from Pakistan to process highly enriched uranium.
The bilateral agreement, known as the 1994 Agreed Framework, froze North Korea's plutonium-based nuclear-weapons program, but did not lead to the country abandoning its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
One person who has intimate knowledge of Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions is Hwang Jang Yop, a high-ranking North Korean defector. He left the country in 1997 after serving as secretary of international affairs for the ruling Labor, or Communist, Party.
In a recent interview with VOA's Korean Service, Mr. Hwang said chief North Korean negotiator, First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-Ju, told him Pyongyang intentionally drew out negotiations with the United States.
"When I asked the first vice foreign minister why we have dragged in negotiations with the United States, he said it is because we want to produce even one more weapon," he said.
Mr. Hwang says the party's secretary of military industry initially asked him to try to buy plutonium from the then-Soviet Union, to supplement what North Korea already had. But by the fall of 1996 the secretary told Mr. Hwang North Korea had resolved its so-called "nuclear problem," not through help from Russia or China, but by concluding a uranium-based nuclear-weapons agreement with Pakistan.
"I heard that a technical delegation from Pakistan visited North Korea," he said. "North Korea had researched the possibility of using enriched uranium, instead of plutonium, to produce nuclear weapons. The problem was resolved in one stroke by Pakistan. I heard indirectly that North Korea agreed to transfer missiles in exchange for an enriched-uranium program."
Mr. Hwang said he began hearing about a complex of caves at Kumchangri, about 160 kilometers north Pyongyang, which is where he believes the highly enriched uranium program was hidden.
The caves also aroused U.S. suspicions. The negotiator who signed the 1994 Agreed Framework for the U.S. side, Robert Gallucci, points to two American inspections of the caves at Kumchangri in 1999.
"There was a thought that the cave, the cavern, might contain either a centrifuge operation," he said. "It could have contained a small nuclear reactor. It could have contained a small chemical separation or reprocessing facility. In other words, some nuclear-related activity. It could have been a storage place for separated plutonium or for nuclear weapons. I do not know that the United States government came to a view on what was to be there. But it was certainly a very well-secured site by the North Koreans. And there was reason to believe it was somehow related to nuclear activity of some kind."
Mr. Gallucci says Washington was able to make the visits only because the two sides were talking under the 1994 agreement, but that inspectors found nothing to corroborate the suspicion that Kumchangri was a secret nuclear site.
But U.S. concerns over a North Korean uranium-based nuclear weapons program have since been confirmed by Pakistani nuclear-scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who recently admitted that his international proliferation ring transferred uranium-enrichment equipment and technology to North Korea.
"I think the United States probably has extremely good evidence that the North Koreans acquired centrifuge components and technology from Pakistan," said Mr. Gallucci. "We know that, I think, from our own sources. But also, we all should be aware that A.Q. Khan, the Pakistan father of the enrichment program and sometimes called the father of the bomb in Pakistan, has admitted transferring centrifuge technology, selling it, to North Korea. So, I do not think there is really much question about this. I do not know why the North Koreans insist on refusing to admit this."
Chief U.S. negotiator James Kelly first confronted North Korea with this knowledge in October 2002, before A.Q. Khan's confessions. American officials say North Korea acknowledged having a highly enriched uranium program then, although Pyongyang subsequently denied it.
Mr. Gallucci says there is no question that North Korea has the technology. What is not so clear, he adds, is whether the program is producing nuclear weapons.
"There is a big difference between having rotors, end-caps, inverters and a lot of the components that go to make up a gas centrifuge machine, on the one hand, and having those components put together, not only in a machine, but thousands of machines piped together, running effectively, enriching uranium," he said. "I do not know that North Korea has accomplished all that. I do not know that it has not, but I do not know that it has. I think it has sufficient components to construct a centrifuge cascade, which, if they were to accomplish this, would produce highly enriched uranium in a matter of some few years."
Mr. Gallucci says he is not sure how far along North Korea is in assembling or operating the gas centrifuge cascade it needs for uranium reprocessing. He estimates that Pyongyang could produce enough uranium for at least one nuclear weapon, in about three to five years.
This uranium program, whatever its development phase, is in addition to the North's plutonium program, which international experts say may have already produced five or six nuclear weapons.
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Pakistan report (3:00)
The Chair of the September 11, 2001 commission said last week that there is a connection between al-Qaeda and Pakistan. The World's Mary Kay Magistad gets the reaction from Pakistan.
http://theworld.org/latesteditions/20040621.shtml
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Otto Reich interview
Produced on 06/18/04
Listen to the interview
Statement of Marvin East, Spokesman for Senator Dodd on comments of Otto Reich:
"There is very little to say about Mr. Reich's remarks except to say it is rather sad that Mr. Reich has never come to grips with the fact that he was the issue not Senator Dodd. It is clear that he doesn't know very much about how the Senate works if he thinks that Senator Dodd single handedly could block Mr. Reich's nomination. The silence was deafening with respect to other Senators's support for Mr. Reich's first nomination or for his renomination once his recess appointment expired.
Part of Mr. Reich's problem was that he was never fully forthcoming in turning over information requested about his previous tenure in government which may have made a hearing more likely. In addition he gave non-responsive answers to questions submitted to him in connection with business relationships prior to being nominated.
Mr Reich has once again demonstrated that he lacks the temperament to be an effective diplomat."
http://theworld.org/edpick/reich.shtml

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Nuclear crisis over North Korea
Published: June 22 2004 5:00 | Last Updated: June 22 2004 5:00
For once, it is possible to sympathise with the Bush administration on a matter of foreign policy. North Korea, even for those who dislike President George W. Bush's "axis of evil" label, is certainly a tyranny and a regional menace. Kim Jong-il's regime has reneged on a previous agreement with the US and is either making or trying to make nuclear weapons. It must be stopped.
The Bush administration, however, is allowing Mr Kim to proceed almost unhindered with his nuclear plans. On the eve of the latest round of six-nation talks in Beijing aimed at resolving the issue, US officials have again insisted that they will be satisfied with nothing less than complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement. This sounds forceful, but has led nowhere. Burying one's head in the sand is no substitute for a sensible diplomatic strategy.
Mr Kim knows the US, distracted by Iraq and Afghanistan, is in no mood for another military conflict. The North Koreans, their economy in desperate straits, have played a weak negotiating hand extraordinarily well because they have so little to lose. They have demanded concessions. Washington has refused. US allies Japan and South Korea fear that further progress will now be postponed until after the US elections in November - while Mr Kim stealthily builds his arsenal.
The US should start to listen to the suggestions of its friends and interlocutors. Almost every other party involved in trying to denuclearise the Korean peninsula - China, South Korea, Japan, the UN and the US Democrats who conducted previous talks with Pyongyang - favour an interim agreement in order to keep the negotiations moving. China has even applied crude diplomatic pressure on the US by casting doubt on its assertion that North Korea has a secret uranium enrichment programme as well as a plutonium-based route to atomic weapons.
The deal sketched out by South Korean officials would require North Korea to "freeze" its nuclear plans in exchange for desperately needed energy supplies and some kind of security guarantee from its enemies. This would be only a temporary compromise. Junichiro Koizumi, the Japanese prime minister, and Maurice Strong, the UN special envoy, are among those who believe Mr Kim knows he will have to abandon nuclear weapons entirely in a final agreement.
Mr Bush's negotiators are suspicious, and rightly so. They are also right to insist that a freeze is meaningless unless it is a step towards dismantling the programmes altogether. Therein lies the key to an interim agreement: North Korea should be made to accept publicly that giving up the nuclear option is the final aim. Such a solution is not ideal, and it may be unpalatable to President Bush when he is trying to look resolute in an election year. But it is surely preferable to the alternative: a disgruntled China, alienated US allies in north-east Asia and North Korean scientists working undeterred to produce nuclear bombs and missiles.
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Iran again gets off with warning, no deadline despite findings
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Sunday, June 20, 2004
LONDON - Iran has again succeeded in avoiding international sanctions despite new findings that Teheran concealed its nuclear program from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Iran has reported to the IAEA it possesses "design drawings" of the P-2 centrifuge and that it enriched uranium to 54 percent, far beyond the level required to produce bomb-grade fuel, according to the June 22 edition of Geostrategy-Direct.com.
The IAEA board of governors decided not to sanction Iran or refer its lack of cooperation to the United Nations Security Council. Instead, the 35-member board again warned Iran to provide a complete picture of its nuclear program.
The resolution did not stipulate a deadline for Iranian compliance with the agency. The resolution said Iran must deal with outstanding issues of cooperation and compliance "within the next few months," Middle East Newsline reported.
Still, the United States said it was pleased with the IAEA resolution.
U.S. officials said the resolution advanced the Iranian case to the next level and could eventually refer Teheran's compliance to the Security Council.
"The results will keep Iran's nuclear program and its efforts to deceive and obstruct IAEA inspectors at the center of international attention for quite some time," U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said in a statement.
"Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been," the IAEA resolution said.
"The resolution underlines that, with the passage of time, it's becoming ever more important that Iran work proactively to enable the IAEA to gain a full understanding of Iran's enrichment program by providing all relevant information," a UN statement said. "The resolution also calls on Iran to urgently take all necessary steps to help resolve all of the IAEA's outstanding questions."
The IAEA resolution did not contain a so-called "trigger mechanism," or clause that would refer the Iranian case to the Security Council. The United States has sought a clause to ensure that the council would consider whether Iran was violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Still, the United States said it was pleased with the IAEA resolution.
U.S. officials said the resolution advanced the Iranian case to the next level and could eventually refer Teheran's compliance to the Security Council.
"The results will keep Iran's nuclear program and its efforts to deceive and obstruct IAEA inspectors at the center of international attention for quite some time," U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said in a statement.
In response to the resolution, Iran again threatened to end its cooperation with the IAEA. Iran also warned of a reassessment of its decision to suspend uranium enrichment activities, a major element in the assembly of nuclear weapons.
"Iran will reconsider its decision about suspension and will do some uranium activity in the coming days," Iranian National Security Adviser Hassan Rowhani said.
IAEA officials said the agency's next step would be to examine a restricted military area in a Teheran suburb where uranium enrichment was believed to have been secretly conducted. Officials said the agency planned to inspect Lavizan Shiyan over the next two months. The board plans to meet next in September 2004.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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Iran satellite images raise nuclear questions
12:25 21 June 04
NewScientist.com news service
The top image was taken 11 August 2003, the lower image on 22 March 2004 (Image: DigitalGlobe/ISIS)
Nuclear inspectors are expected to visit a site in the Iranian capital, Tehran, following evidence from satellite photographs that it was scraped clean earlier in 2004.
The Lavizan Shiyan Technical Research Centre, in a north-eastern suburb of the city, has been under mounting suspicion of harbouring secret military activities since it was named by an Iranian opposition group in 2003.
Now two commercial satellite images, the first on 11 August 2003 and the second on 22 March 2004, show that the site's buildings have been razed, its features obliterated and its ground cleared.
"The images show that Iran has taken dramatic steps that make it difficult to discover what was happening there," says Corey Hinderstein from the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington DC. It was the institute which found and released the photographs.
Independent nuclear experts regard the satellite photographs of Lavizan Shiyan as important new evidence. "Iran is clearly trying to hide something - and there is suggestive, though not conclusive, evidence that the something is nuclear," says Matt Bunn, a nuclear policy adviser to former US President Bill Clinton, now at Harvard University. "Iran clearly owes the world an explanation."
John Pike, director of globalsecurity.org, a defence policy group based in Alexandria, Virginia, agrees: "The images suggest that there are important elements of Iran's nuclear program that have not been disclosed by Iran, and may not be reflected in the IAEA's current understanding of Iran's nuclear efforts."
Radiation monitor
The National Council for Resistance of Iran claimed in May 2003 that Lavizan Shiyan was a research facility for biological weapons. But since then investigations by the US government, the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other countries have uncovered evidence that the site had imported a radiation monitor and bought spare parts for it.
This does not prove that nuclear weapons were being developed on the site, Hinderstein points out. But the monitor was "out of place" at a location which Iran had not declared as having any nuclear activities.
The IAEA told New Scientist that it had only just seen the satellite images. "We have asked for clarification from Iran and will visit if we deem it important," said an agency spokeswoman. "At the moment, we do not know whether it is nuclear related."
Hossein Mousavian, Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA in Vienna, told reporters that inspectors would be able to visit the site. "There is nothing there," he said. If it has been thoroughly cleaned up, inspectors may have difficulty detecting residual radioactivity or chemicals.
Iran has consistently denied that is developing nuclear weapons, but insisted on its right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to expand its civil nuclear power programme. One of the technologies it has been developing has been uranium enrichment, which can be used to make fuel for power stations or bombs.
At a meeting in Vienna last week, the IAEA's 35 governors approved a resolution deploring Iran's lack of "full, timely and proactive" co-operation in disclosing its nuclear activities. In response Hasan Rowhani, head of the country's Supreme National Security Council, warned that it might restart uranium enrichment, suspended in October 2003 at the request of the UK, France and Germany.
Rob Edwards


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US To Recosider Iran Sanctions Bid in September
David Gollust
Washington
21 Jun 2004, 22:40 UTC
Listen to David Gollust's report (RealAudio)
Gollust report - Download 424k (RealAudio)
AP
Secretary of State Colin Powell
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says the Bush administration will reconsider in September the question of whether to pursue U.N. sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. Mr. Powell discussed the issue Monday with the International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed el-Baradei.
The Bush administration is hoping that Iran will comply with IAEA resolutions for disclosing its nuclear activities.
But it is signaling that its patience with the IAEA process is limited, and that it will reconsider its position on possible sanctions after the U.N. agency's next meeting in September.
In a resolution Friday, the 35-nation IAEA board, which includes the United States, declared that Iran had broken promises of complete disclosure, and called on Tehran to answer outstanding questions about its nuclear ambitions on an urgent basis.
The issue dominated a meeting Monday between Secretary Powell and Mr. el-Baradei. In a talk with reporters afterward, the Secretary expressed satisfaction with the new resolution. But he also suggested the Bush administration will review its approach to the process if Iran is found, at the next IAEA meeting, to still be less than fully cooperative:
"They have been put on notice, once again rather firmly and strongly, in this new resolution that the international community is expecting them to answer its questions and to respond fully. And in due course, we will have a chance to examine their response in September and at that time judgments can be made as to what action might be appropriate."
U.S. officials have maintained that Iran's nominally-peaceful nuclear program conceals an ambitious effort to develop nuclear weapons.
But the administration has not pressed for an IAEA referral of the matter to the U.N. Security Council for sanctions, partly in deference to efforts by European allies to persuade Tehran to end uranium enrichment activities.
In his remarks here, Mr. el-Baradei said the IAEA shares the United States' interest in seeing full cooperation from Tehran and an early conclusion to its long-running probe of the Iranian nuclear program:
"I repeated to Secretary Powell the commitment of the Agency that we need to bring this issue to a close as soon as we can; that I have been asking, as the Board also have been asking Iran to become proactive, to become transparent and to be fully cooperative. And I hope I see that mode of cooperation in the next few months. I think the international community is urgently seeking assurance from the Agency that Iran program is exclusively for peaceful purpose."
The IAEA board used strong language in Friday's resolution, saying it "deplores" the limits on Iranian cooperation with the agency.
Iranian officials have responded angrily to the criticism, saying concerns about the country's nuclear program are baseless and that the IAEA acted under U.S. pressure.
A top Iranian nuclear official also said Tehran's pledge to European envoys last year to stop enriching uranium would be reviewed, though the Foreign Ministry in Tehran said Sunday no decision to resume enrichment activity had been made.
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Kerry to Return Cash From Arrested Korean
NewsMax.com Wires
Monday, June 21, 2004
WASHINGTON - Stung during the 1990s Democrat fund-raising controversy, John Kerry is returning a $2,000 check from the son of South Korea's disgraced ex-president after learning the donor was charged with tax evasion.
Kerry's presidential campaign also acknowledges that some of its fund-raisers met with a South Korean government official who was trying to organize a Korean-American political group. That official has been sent home amid questions he was involving himself in American politics.
Kerry's campaign said it did not know about the $2,000 donation from Chun Jae-yong or his background until informed by The Associated Press. "We are sending the check back," spokesman Michael Meehan said.
Chun Jae-yong was arrested in February by South Korean authorities on charges of evading taxes on $14 million in inheritance money. His father, former president Chun Dooh-hwan, was convicted in 1997 on bribery charges.
Chun Jae-yong was a business partner with Rick Yi, one of Kerry's major fund-raisers in the Asian-American community. Yi acknowledged soliciting the donation from Chun last summer before learning of his legal problems.
'Probably Would Not Have Taken the Money'
"I didn't think anything wrong of it," said Yi, who has raised more than $500,000 for Kerry and Democrat causes and is listed as one of the campaign's fund-raising vice chairmen. "If I had known who he was at the time I probably would not have taken the money."
Yi, a former military attache in the Clinton White House, said he and Chun were business partners for about six months last year in a Duluth, Ga., company called OR Solutions Inc. When making his donation Aug. 11, Chun listed himself as the company's president and chief operating officer.
The same day, Yi also made a $2,000 contribution to Kerry, listing himself as chairman and chief executive of OR Solutions. Yi said Chun had asked him to help set up the company and that he ended his affiliation late last fall.
Yi said Chun showed him a Social Security card before making the donation to prove he was a legal U.S. resident allowed to donate to political campaigns. By law, the maximum individual donation is $2,000.
Yi confirmed that while on Kerry fund-raising trips to California, he met at least three times with Chung Byung-man, the South Korean government's vice consul in Los Angeles and that they discussed forming a political group to organize influential Korean-Americans that would be called The Korean-American Leadership Council.
"It generically was being called a political action committee for the Korean-American community," Yi told The Associated Press. "He [Chung] asked me to spearhead this council. I rejected his proposal. I don't have time."
South Korean-U.S. relations have been strained over North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the Bush administration's decision to reduce the number of U.S. troops in South Korea.
Yi said his conversations with Chung never centered on fund raising and that many of the people the counsel was suggesting for the group were Republicans. He said, however, he found it odd that a South Korean diplomat was trying to organize an American political group.
'Appropriate for a Diplomat?'
"I asked him that, 'Is this appropriate for a diplomat to do?' He said he was only starting this up because there was no Korean-Americans to do it. Once two or three candidates were identified, he would hand it over."
Yi said that he and Chung never discussed using the group to help Kerry and that he never solicited donations for the candidate in Chung's presence. But he acknowledged that Chung introduced him to some in California as one of Kerry's main fund-raisers.
"I don't doubt somewhere down the line, Chung said, 'This is Rick Yi; he is one of the persons helping John Kerry.' That is normal in their culture, but that never led to Chung or I asking for money."
Yi wasn't the only Kerry fund-raiser approached by Chung.
California lawyer David K. Lee said he was asked to dinner by one of Yi's fund-raising deputies and was surprised when Chung showed up. He said Chung talked to him and others present about creating a group modeled after the Group 100, which has become a strong political voice for Chinese-Americans.
"Whatever agenda that he had, whether it was political or personal or governmental, I really don't know," Lee said. "I just thought the most basic assumption for me was that he was doing something good for the community."
The South Korean government said Friday that Chung returned home on May 16 as part of a regular rotation.
The Los Angeles consulate has heard "speculation" that Chung was supporting the Democratic Party and Kerry but hasn't investigated and doesn't believe Chung violated a prohibition against foreign involvement in politics or any U.S. law, spokesman Min Ryu said.
So Sensitive
Lee said there is heightened sensitivity in the Asian-American community after the 1996 fund-raising scandal involving it and the Clinton White House.
"I think the people who are experienced in this field know the repercussions and the impact that that had on the Chinese-American community and overall on the Asian-American community, and they don't want to repeat that mistake," Lee said.
Bruce Lee, a top Democratic National Committee fund-raiser who helped organize a major Asian-American fund-raising event Friday night for Kerry, said he, too, began to hear concerns in the community, looked into them and concluded nothing wrong had occurred.
Bruce Lee dismissed the allegations as rumors among rival camps of fund-raisers. "I treated it as gossip. And I didn't think much more of it," he said.
Renting the Lincoln Bedroom
The Democratic Party markedly increased its vetting of fund-raisers and donors in the late 1990s after the fund-raising scandal centered mostly on Asian-Americans. More than a dozen Democrat fund-raisers or donors were convicted of federal crimes, and then-President Bill Clinton and his wife, Hillary, acknowledged they used White House coffees and overnight stays in the Lincoln bedroom as rewards to lure large donations.
Kerry has been raising record amounts of money for his presidential campaign as he tries to level the playing field with President Bush, who has collected an unprecedented $218 million for his re-election. Kerry's campaign checks the backgrounds of all fund-raisers and requires non-citizens to show proof they are legal residents allowed to donate.
The U.S. senator has been forced on several occasions to answer questions or return donations after news reports that he accepted money from donors with unsavory backgrounds.
For instance, Kerry received $10,000 in donations in the 1990s through Democrat fund-raiser Johnny Chung after his Senate office arranged a tour for Chung at the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Chung later pleaded guilty to making illegal donations, including some to Kerry.


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Halliburton feels financial strain of Iraq work
By Joshua Chaffin in Washington
Published: June 21 2004 19:23 | Last Updated: June 21 2004 19:23
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1087373156487&p=1012571727102
Halliburton executives are concerned about the financial burden that Iraq contracts have placed on the company.
The oilfield services group has become the largest foreign contractor in Iraq, largely through a wide-ranging Pentagon contract known as "Logcap".
Under the deal, the company has tackled about $4.5bn (?3.7bn, ?2.4bn) in Iraq-related assignments, such as building forward bases for troops and delivering fuel and other supplies.
But although Halliburton has committed more than $1bn in its own capital to carrying out such tasks, it has been slow to receive payment because of billing disputes with military auditors.
The biggest financial hit from Iraq has come from a contract to feed troops. The company has been forced to withhold about $186m in billings for its dining facilities in Iraq and Kuwait amid complaints from the defence contract auditing agency.
Although Halliburton is guaranteed a slim profit on top of its expenses as part of the "cost-plus" contract, those earnings have been whittled away by the cost of borrowing money, according to a person familiar with the matter.
The financial strain of the Iraq work grew so severe this year that some Halliburton executives examined whether the company could legally extricate itself from the Logcap contract, the source said. They quickly concluded that they could not, and abandoned the idea.
The company insists that the matter was never under formal consideration. "We never even thought about leaving the Logcap contract," said Charles Dominy, Halliburton's vice-president of public affairs in Washington.
However, Mr Dominy acknowledged concern about the financial challenges of supporting the military in Iraq. "How do you continue to work the system so that we're not out $1.2bn on one project?" he asked. "That concerned us."
Such sentiments challenge the conventional wisdom that the Iraq war has been a bonanza for large foreign contractors. In addition to the financial strain, the companies have endured dozens of casualties among workers, and faced public accusations of profiteering.
"More than one of the major contractors has looked at whether their work in Iraq specifically was going to be of net-benefit to the company," said a Washington lobbyist who is working with several companies operating in Iraq.
Halliburton maintains that it will ultimately be reimbursed for the disputed meal costs. The company has argued that many of its critics are politically motivated, since from 1995 to 2000 the company was headed by Dick Cheney, now vice-president.
Halliburton has also succeeded in gaining some financial flexibility by prevailing on the government to delay a DCAA recommendation that 15 per cent be withheld from each Halliburton bill until government auditors could verify costs. That measure, which was supposed to have gone into effect in April, has been delayed until August 15.
Even so, a person who has worked for the company on its Iraq portfolio concluded: "It hasn't turned out to be a good deal for them."

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Democratic Revolution in Iraq?
By Reuel Marc Gerecht
Posted: Monday, June 21, 2004
ON THE ISSUES
AEI Online (Washington)
Publication Date: June 21, 2004
The Iraqi interim government must confront the frustrations of the Sunnis, the Shia, and the Kurds--the country's three main population groups, which share memories of suffering under Saddam Hussein and impatience to take responsibility in the longer-term government of a new Iraq.
It is hard not to be pessimistic when looking at Iraq. Critical areas of the country--Baghdad, the Shiite holy towns of Najaf and Karbala, the northern city of Mosul, the major highways, the oil pipelines, the national electrical grid--all lack elemental security. Like all peoples of the Middle East, Iraqis are night owls: they need to play after sunset to maintain a sense of equanimity, fun, and social cohesion. In the hot summer months before us, this aspect of daily life is especially critical.
Fear, especially anxiety about the safety of female relatives, feeds the worst inclinations in us all. In Iraq, it nourishes anti-Americanism and the widespread belief that Iraqi authorities appointed by foreigners are incompetent. The incidence of violence probably does not have to be too high-and in most of Iraq, even in its most dangerous zones, if you are an ordinary Iraqi the chances of encountering violence are small--before fear psychologically poisons the political landscape. Since World War I, the Iraqis have been on the cutting edge of mixing brutality with politics in the Arab world. The democratic experiment in Mesopotamia would certainly have better odds if it were not born in such violence.
Winning Sunni Support
Irrespective of security, the Arab Iraqi inclination to think poorly of Iraqi officials associated with American officials is pronounced. For the Arab Sunnis, who are only around 20 percent of Iraq's population, the United States overturned a centuries-old Sunni dominion over the country. Even for Sunnis who hated Saddam Hussein (probably an overwhelming majority), even for Sunnis who sincerely want democracy and not another, more humane Sunni dictatorship (perhaps a majority), the new world is enormously unsettling. The Sunnis will in all probability follow the Arab Shiite lead--the cultural bonds that bind the two are probably greater than their differences--but they will not do so happily, and they will likely dislike, if not detest, the national authorities who create the new Iraq.
The new president, Sheikh Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, a prominent Sunni from Mosul and the influential Sunni-Shiite Shammar tribe, will no doubt help the interim government gain traction among Sunnis and Shiites (we should be thankful that the unreconstructed Sunni pan-Arabist, Adnan Pachachi, a State Department and United Nations favorite, failed to secure the ceremonial, but probably rhetorically powerful, presidential office). Nevertheless, the "legitimacy" of Mr. al-Yawar's selection, like that of other Sunni Arabs in the upper reaches of the interim government, will likely be hammered in the coming months by Arab Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds who are frustrated or angered by the new Iraq.
It will be fascinating to watch whether these Sunni officials can keep their balance without recourse to ever-more severe anti-Americanism--a tried-and-true approach for rousing Sunni Arabs. If the legitimacy of the Sunni members of the interim government evaporates completely before January 2005, the date for the first round of national elections, it will be difficult for a Sunni center to hold. And without this lodestone, the preparation and execution of elections throughout the Sunni triangle will be daunting. Especially since Fallujah and after the transfer of sovereignty on June 30, a vocal Sunni minority can probably check U.S. counterinsurgency operations that could offer protection to those who do not want insurrectionists dictating the politics of their towns.
Sunni clerics, a force very much under-appreciated by the Americans, will be key in using their bully pulpits to encourage just enough forbearance to see this process through. Unfortunately, the Sunnis have discovered Islamic militancy (this process started under Saddam, who encouraged a more devout Sunni religious identity in the last decade of his rule, and it has gained speed since his fall). A spiritual tug-of-war is going on among faithful Arab Sunnis--between traditionalists and those who have imbibed the Saudi-inspired and -financed Wahhabist creed--and it is unclear how this competition will play out.
Shiite Political Goals
The Shiite clergy led by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has been consistently ecumenical toward the Sunnis and their clerics. With rare exceptions, the ayatollah has fought the repatriation of Shiite mosques that Saddam gave to Sunnis after the Shiite-led rebellion of 1991. Sistani's commentary about governance and democracy has been free (in Sunni eyes) of insulting Shiite historical allusions. So, too, has been Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sayyid al-Hakim, the number two Shiite cleric who is the only "pure" Iraqi Arab (Sistani is of Iranian birth) among Najaf's four grand ayatollahs. Contrary to much "accepted wisdom," the increasing religious identity on both the Sunni and Shiite sides is likely to fortify, not weaken, the fraternal and nationalist bonds between the two Arab communities.
Though vastly more tolerant and appreciative of American actions, the Arab Shiites, too, have diminishing patience and curiosity about Americans and the Iraqi authorities whom Washington has placed over them. The desire for elections among the Shiites is enormously powerful-Sistani's pro-democracy broadsides, which knocked America's MacArthur-like proconsul, L. Paul Bremer, to his knees and sent the Bush administration reeling toward the UN, have had such force precisely because his statements reflect widespread sentiment throughout the Shiite community. It is by no means clear whether the Shiites view this new interim government as a step closer to democracy, which will finally give the Shiites the social prominence and political power equal to their numbers (they are at least 60 percent of the population).
Ayatollah Sistani has given the new government a tepid blessing, while emphasizing that real legitimacy can only come from the ballot box. The Shiites have already noted--particularly those who are more religious and politically define themselves in terms of their faith--that this new interim government actually gives less to them than did the Iraqi Governing Council. The Shiite prime minister Iyad Allawi is a thoroughly secularized fellow who appears to be more comfortable with Sunnis than with Shiites. His former organization, the Iraqi National Accord, was a well-known repository for fallen though not necessarily democratically inclined Sunni Baathists. Sistani did not veto his selection, and the Grand Ayatollah certainly could have. The cleric surely realizes that Mr. Allawi has no political base in Iraq--if Mr. Allawi has a political future, he must build it among the Shiites, which means he must be sensitive to the preferences and concerns of the clergy. If he tries to use his office except as an instrument to prepare for national elections, then he runs the serious risk of making himself politically irrelevant very quickly. The Central Intelligence Agency, which has backed Mr. Allawi for years, and the White House would be well advised not to believe they have gotten the better of Ayatollah Sistani with the selection of Mr. Allawi, who was not the cleric's first choice. The ayatollah continues to control the destiny of a democratic Iraq.
It is certain that the ayatollah and the Shiite community as a whole will view the new interim government with profound suspicion until it proves that elections are its first and overwhelming priority. If it does not do this, if it even intimates that the January 2005 date for constituent elections may be too soon (and many "experts" in the United States and the United Nations believe this), then it is conceivable that Sistani will view the American presence in Iraq as harmful to the advance of democracy. This would be a terrible conclusion, but it is certainly possible. The Bush administration could find itself being asked to leave Iraq right around November 2004.
Kurdish Independence?
And the Kurds are for very good reasons going to cause everybody major headaches. Given the regular pummeling of the Kurds by Sunni Arabs in modern Iraq, the Kurdish desire for considerable autonomy is sensible and morally compelling. There has been no bad blood between Arab Shiites and the Kurds, but the latter are well aware that a centralized Iraqi state will empower Arabs. And the Shiites have probably been the staunchest defenders of Iraqi nationalism. Sistani will not allow the Kurds to retain the authority that the Transitional Administrative Law, the interim constitution, would give them. If they vote as a bloc, the Kurds would have an unchallengeable right to veto any aspect of a new constitution. The Kurds want this right and are threatening--de facto, if not de jure--to withdraw from Iraq if they do not get it.
There is no easy answer to this. Ultimately, the Kurds have to weigh the risks and gains of independence. Washington ought not to abandon them. But it should encourage them to seek political compromises and constitutional protections that circumscribe but do not nullify the principle of one-man, one-vote. The Kurds are unlikely to find a more thoughtful Shiite Arab counterpart than Ayatollah Sistani, who in the history of Shiism can only be called a democratic revolutionary.
Common Bonds
Which brings us again to why, despite all of the bad news and troublesome history, we should have real hope. Since 1921, Iraqis have known violence more devastatingly than any other people in the Middle East. Psychologically, Shiites and the Kurds are indeed defined by slaughter and defeat. The mosques plastered with the pictures of thousands of lost loved ones, the mass graves, and the great religious schools nearly destroyed by spies demonstrate the effects of extreme tyranny on Iraq. But this experience has also given the Iraqi people--and especially the Shiite clergy--terrifying memories that have encouraged a profound interest in modern political theory and practice. Though Ambassador Bremer might disagree, Iraqis probably do not need to be tutored as much as Westerners might think on the virtues, responsibilities, and sacrifices necessary to sustain democracy. They may well fail, but an enormous number of Iraqis now want representative government. We will soon know whether they are going to be able to see this through, or whether the dark side of their history will resurface. George Bush has put their fate, as well as his own, in their hands.
Reuel Marc Gerecht is a resident fellow at AEI.


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Arabie saoudite : le salaire de la peur
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Rester ou partir ? La question hante les expatri?s non musulmans, confront?s au terrorisme islamiste. Certains quittent le pays. D'autres vivent en vase clos, dans des r?sidences plus coup?es que jamais de la soci?t? saoudienne.
Apr?s une succession de chicanes form?es de blocs de b?ton, la voiture doit s'arr?ter ? un premier poste de contr?le. Des militaires saoudiens sont avachis derri?re une mitrailleuse. Le v?hicule est fouill?, son ch?ssis inspect?, l'identit? des passagers relev?e.
Apr?s un no man's land d'une centaine de m?tres, voici maintenant une autre barri?re et un nouveau contr?le. La voiture arrive ensuite face ? une imposante porte m?tallique devant laquelle stationne un char. Le visiteur doit ?tre attendu pour p?n?trer dans cette r?sidence des environs de Riyad (Arabie saoudite). Quand la porte s'ouvre enfin, sous la surveillance de cam?ras, il d?couvre un ?den.
Autour d'une vaste piscine s'ordonne un ensemble de villas cossues, ? l'ombre des palmiers. Des gazelles, des paons gambadent sur le terrain de golf. Un haras, des courts de tennis, une salle de gymnastique, un restaurant au menu tr?s am?ricain, un magasin d'alimentation, un service de chauffeurs et m?me un tailleur sont ? disposition. Pour 40 000 euros par an, des entreprises occidentales et asiatiques offrent ainsi une vie de r?ve ? leurs employ?s expatri?s. Mais cette tranquillit? n'est qu'illusion : quand passe une voiturette de golf ?lectrique, les images de la s?rie t?l?vis?e "Le Prisonnier" viennent ? l'esprit. "Nous vivons dans une cage dor?e", confirme une habitante.
Il existe dans la capitale saoudienne et sa p?riph?rie des dizaines de ces complexes r?sidentiels, baptis?s "compounds". Ils affichent des tarifs et des niveaux de confort in?gaux, comme autant de cat?gories de clubs de vacances, mais l? n'est pas la principale pr?occupation des locataires. L'essentiel, ? leurs yeux, est d?sormais la s?curit?. L'organisation d'Oussama Ben Laden, Al-Qaida, n'a-t-elle pas promis de "nettoyer la p?ninsule Arabique des m?cr?ants" et annonc? des "rivi?res de sang" aux "crois?s" ?
Depuis un peu plus d'un an, les attaques visant les Occidentaux se sont multipli?es. Dans la nuit du 12 au 13 mai 2003, ? Riyad, trois actions simultan?es contre des compounds font 35 morts. Le 8 novembre, toujours ? Riyad, une autre r?sidence est vis?e : 18 morts, la plupart musulmans. Plus r?cemment, le 30 mai, une op?ration conduite contre un ensemble de compounds, ? Al-Khobar (Nord-Est), fait 22 victimes. Des attaques sont ?galement perp?tr?es sur les lieux de travail : le 1er mai, cinq Occidentaux et un Saoudien sont tu?s ? Yanbou, dans l'ouest ; le 22 mai, un Allemand est abattu ? la sortie d'un centre commercial de Riyad ; le 6 juin, toujours dans la capitale, un cameraman irlandais est tu? et un journaliste anglais bless? ; le 8 juin, ? Riyad encore, un Am?ricain est abattu de neuf balles dans son garage. Le 19 juin, le corps d'un ing?nieur am?ricain enlev? une semaine plus t?t est retrouv? ? Riyad : Paul Johnson, 49 ans, a ?t? ?gorg? et d?capit? (Le Monde dat? dimanche 20-lundi 21 juin).
Dans les r?sidences, les conversations tournent autour d'un dilemme : partir ou rester. "Tout le monde se pose la question", admet une Fran?aise qui, comme la plupart des personnes rencontr?es ? Riyad, requiert l'anonymat. Dans ce monde vivant en vase clos, la violence des raids a choqu?. Les sc?nes d'?gorgement, de chasse ? l'homme dans les villas, de tri cynique entre musulmans et non-musulmans, de cadavre tra?n? par une voiture, d?crites par les survivants et r?p?t?es ? l'infini dans les discussions, ont atteint leur but : cr?er la psychose. Dans la communaut? fran?aise, on se raconte ainsi comment, ? Al-Khobar, un employ? de Total est rest? cach? des heures sur le toit de sa maison pendant que les islamistes retournaient chaque pi?ce ? sa recherche.
"L'ambiance est tr?s bizarre, confie un jeune coop?rant, au sortir d'une partie de tennis. On se sent bien, dans une vie normale, et puis soudain on apprend qu'il y a eu un autre attentat." "A chaque nouvelle attaque, on se demande quel sera le coup suivant", confirme une Anglaise. Alors, les trajets deviennent longs, les embouteillages semblent des sourici?res, les messages de vigilance des ambassades accroissent le stress. Dans son bulletin no 48, la repr?sentation fran?aise conseille ainsi de modifier sans cesse ses trajets et ses horaires.
Les expatri?s souffrent aussi de ne plus comprendre la soci?t? saoudienne. Certes, les t?moignages de sympathie sont nombreux, mais, aux feux rouges, des jeunes d?s?uvr?s mettent parfois leur main sous la gorge ou simulent une rafale de mitraillette. Et puis, il y a l'attitude de la police, que l'on dit "infiltr?e", ces assaillants qui s'?chappent trop facilement au go?t des expatri?s...
Les rumeurs, et elles sont nombreuses, assurent que, dans la p?riode de succession qui s'ouvre, certains membres de la famille royale auraient une attitude ambigu?. Dans ce contexte, les d?clarations de fermet? du gouvernement saoudien, la multiplication des morts parmi les forces de l'ordre, l'emprisonnement de 700 suspects, la d?nonciation des attentats par des dignitaires religieux ne suffisent pas ? rassurer. Beaucoup de familles ont d?j? fui. En mai, l'ambassade des Etats-Unis a fermement invit? ses ressortissants ? partir. Celle de Grande-Bretagne vient de faire de m?me avec les personnels "non essentiels". Chaque fois, c'est un d?fil? de valises et de cartons, d?primant pour ceux qui restent. Dans les compounds, les cris d'enfants se font de plus en plus rares.
A l'approche des vacances scolaires d'?t?, l'exode s'est acc?l?r?. L'?cole fran?aise, qui comptait 1 050 ?l?ves en septembre 2003, n'a enregistr? que 650 inscriptions pour la prochaine rentr?e. Le bilan est tout aussi inqui?tant dans l'un des ?tablissements britanniques : alors que les effectifs sont pass?s de 1 150 ?l?ves ? 700 en neuf mois, ses responsables se demandent si l'?cole pourra rouvrir ? la rentr?e, m?me entour?e, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui, de sacs de sable, de herses et de soldats. Les professeurs, eux aussi, commencent ? manquer. "J'ai appris que deux de mes coll?gues ont donn? leur d?mission hier, cinq sont d?j? partis en cours d'ann?e", raconte une enseignante anglaise.
En 2003, les diverses ambassades avaient recens? 35 000 Am?ricains, 30 000 Britanniques et 4 500 Fran?ais dans le royaume. Mais il faudra sans doute revoir ces chiffres ? la baisse en septembre. Restent surtout les hommes, contraints d'honorer leurs contrats, voire de les prolonger, faute de rempla?ants.
Kim, elle, lutte pour ne pas succomber ? la morosit? ambiante. Voil? un peu plus d'un an que cette Am?ricaine d'une quarantaine d'ann?es est en Arabie saoudite avec son mari v?t?rinaire et ses deux enfants adolescents. Tout en admettant sentir les tueurs "plus pr?s de nous maintenant", elle s'efforce de conserver une vie normale, de sortir faire ses courses, de fr?quenter des Saoudiens. "Je sens cette hyst?rie, ces rumeurs permanentes, explique-t-elle. J'essaye de ne pas user mon souffle vainement ? parler de ?a." Elle tente de raisonner. "Vous savez, ? Philadelphie, dans le quartier que nous habitions, nous ne pouvions pas non plus sortir le soir."
Jean-Serge Nicolas essaie ?galement de raison garder. Ce baroudeur a v?cu dix-sept ans en Afrique. Il a ?t? enlev? deux fois au Nigeria. Il habite le royaume depuis la fin 1996, dans une villa, comme d'autres expatri?s qui ne peuvent se faire ? l'atmosph?re confin?e des compounds. "Les probl?mes vont crescendo. Cela tourne ? la guerre urbaine", constate-t-il cependant.
Dans trois mois, il partira. Non par peur, mais parce que sa soci?t? va fermer la filiale saoudienne, faute de contrats. Le climat politique affecte en effet le commerce, m?me si un autre entrepreneur affirme que le taux de croissance de son chiffre d'affaires reste de 20 % par an. "Il y a toujours du business ? r?aliser ici", confirme un diplomate. Dans tous les secteurs, les candidats sont peu nombreux et souvent d?sign?s d'office, comme cet homme, rencontr? ? Riyad, qui a subi pendant six mois la pression de son employeur pour venir.
Contrairement aux personnels envoy?s en Irak en ayant connaissance des risques encourus, les familles occidentales ont le sentiment d'avoir ?t? "pi?g?es" en Arabie saoudite. Comment imaginer une telle violence dans un pays qui, il y a encore deux ans, passait pour l'un des plus s?rs du monde ? C'?tait le temps de l'Arabie heureuse. "Vous ne pouvez pas savoir la vie agr?able qu'on avait", estime Monique Amour, pr?sidente de l'Union des Fran?ais de l'?tranger. Il y avait les sorties dans le d?sert, les emplettes dans le souk ou les centres commerciaux. "On venait pour l'argent, on restait par go?t", r?sume une Anglaise. Install?e ici depuis douze ans, elle n'a pas de mots assez durs contre Tony Blair, "son" premier ministre, qui, dit-elle, a "g?ch?" son bonheur.
M?me si des attentats l'avaient pr?c?d?e, visant principalement les militaires am?ricains bas?s en terre sainte d'islam, les civils situent en effet le d?but de leurs ennuis au moment de l'invasion de l'Irak, en mars 2003. Un an plus tard, l'affaire des tortures inflig?es ? certains prisonniers irakiens par des soldats am?ricains n'a fait qu'exacerber les ranc?urs. "Faut-il que des jeunes soient frustr?s pour en arriver ? cette extr?mit?", soupire une Anglaise.
R?trospectivement, de nombreux expatri?s reconnaissent toutefois que la d?gradation de la situation est ant?rieure au printemps 2003. Simplement, ils ne l'avaient pas sentie. Depuis quelques ann?es, les mutawas - les membres de la police religieuse -, jusque-l? laxistes avec les Occidentaux, s'?taient raidis. Le port de l'abaya, la tenue noire des femmes, est devenu peu ? peu obligatoire. Le port du voile est aujourd'hui plus que recommand?. "Un mutawa a oblig? une Occidentale ? se d?maquiller en public", raconte une expatri?e.
Autre ?volution dans ce pays richissime : les mendiants, les marchands ? la sauvette sont apparus aux carrefours sans qu'on y pr?te attention. Les Occidentaux ne fr?quentaient gu?re les quartiers populaires d'Al-Souwa?di ou de Bata, ces poches de mis?re patiemment travaill?es par l'int?grisme.
Dans un univers profond?ment religieux, les expatri?s n'ont pas vu non plus que les compounds, construits ces trente derni?res ann?es, ?taient consid?r?s comme des kystes, voire un affront. A l'origine, il s'agissait de m?nager aux ?trangers des zones o? vivre ? l'occidentale. Mais ces hauts murs ont coup? les locataires des r?alit?s saoudiennes. Ils ont aliment? les fantasmes de la rue sur les turpitudes suppos?es de ces communaut?s d'exil?s.
Patrick Monneron a vu na?tre ces complexes r?sidentiels. Arriv? en Arabie saoudite en 1973, dans le cadre d'un programme de lutte contre la malnutrition, il a emm?nag? dans une maison en torchis. Riyad n'?tait encore qu'une cit? de 130 000 habitants o? l'?lectricit? arrivait un jour sur deux. Puis le boom p?trolier a fait la prosp?rit? du pays. "On est pass? brusquement du Moyen Age au XXIe si?cle : la transition a ?t? facile sur le plan ?conomique, mais plus difficile sur le plan psychologique, explique-t-il. Les gens ont peur aujourd'hui d'?tre absorb?s par le monde occidental. Mais je trouve plus d'optimisme dans la soci?t? saoudienne que dans le milieu occidental. "
Le royaume compte environ 7 millions d'?trangers pour une population totale estim?e entre 16 et 20 millions d'habitants. En m?me temps que d?barquaient en nombre toujours plus important les expatri?s, Patrick Monneron a vu s'op?rer le raidissement religieux, apr?s la r?volution iranienne, en 1979, puis quand les milliers de Saoudiens partis combattre en Afghanistan sont revenus. De retour au pays, ces "Afghanis" ont lentement impr?gn? la soci?t? locale et instill? le rejet des "infid?les".
Parmi les "m?cr?ants", tous n'ont pas droit ? une protection. Consid?r?s comme des citoyens de troisi?me zone, les millions de Philippins ou d'Indiens employ?s ici pour des salaires de mis?re (de 100 ? 500 euros) n'ont pas ?t? ?pargn?s par les attentats. Mais ces hommes et ces femmes n'ont d'autre choix que de rester : li?s par des contrats l?onins avec des agences de leurs pays, ils doivent les honorer ou rembourser les frais, notamment le billet d'avion. Sans compter le fait que leurs passeports sont fr?quemment confisqu?s par leurs employeurs. Pas de blindage pour ces immigr?s qui s'entassent ? quinze dans des chambres des quartiers populaires de Riyad. Jim, un chauffeur de Manille, mari? et p?re d'une petite fille, a encore un an ? faire. "Apr?s, j'essayerai de trouver un travail mieux pay? ailleurs. Si je n'y arrive pas, je resterai." Le jeune homme affiche cette s?r?nit? que conf?re la fatalit?. M?me la peur est un privil?ge qui lui est refus?.
Beno?t Hopquin
* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 22.06.04
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http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.844,filter.all/event_detail.asp
The Torturers of Saddam's Abu Ghraib and Their Place in the New Iraq
Start: Tuesday, June 8, 2004 10:30 AM
End: Tuesday, June 8, 2004 12:30 PM
Location: Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
Directions to AEI
Video of Iraqi torture victims [VERY GRAPHIC; NOT SUITABLE FOR CHILDREN] Note: the video listed in the event materials box (above right) covers the conference proceedings and does not contain the images found in this Pentagon videotape.
Video in MPEG4 format. Downloading Quicktime for Windows may help in the viewing of this version.
Video in Windows Media format.
For the last 30 years, Iraqis inside Iraq had little knowledge of the full extent of Saddam Hussein's oppressive tactics. Many Iraqis who have documented his regime's history argue that Coalition authorities have not done enough to make this history known to the Iraqi people, and proponents of more stringent de-Baathification argue that until this education is completed, Saddam-era officials cannot be trusted with the rule of the new state.
Much of the recent controversy surrounding Abu Ghraib has made only vague reference to the prison's nightmarish past. Under Saddam Hussein, some thirty thousand people were executed there, and countless more were tortured and mutilated, returning to Iraqi society as visible evidence of the brutality of Baathist rule instead of being lost to the anonymity of mass graves.
Seven of these victims were Baghdadi merchants whose right hands were amputated and presented to Saddam as proof of their punishment. They have recently received medical attention in the United States, and now have the use of modern prosthetic hands. Four of these victims will speak of their experiences before returning to Iraq. In addition to their presentations, an unedited video documenting acts of torture during Saddam's reign will be shown, and our Iraqi guests will identify persons conducting the torture who hold office in Iraq today.


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Push the Princes
From the June 19, 2004 New York Post: The beheading of Paul Johnson is another sign that it's time to get tough with Saudi Arabia.
by Stephen Schwartz
06/21/2004 12:00:00 AM
THE BRUTAL MURDER of Paul Johnson was just the latest atrocity by terrorist Wahhabis--extremist acolytes of the hate cult that's rooted in the heart of the Saudi state. And the lessons are simple:
* Terrorism terrorizes. Extremely vile terrorism that literally goes for the throat terrorizes most of all. Bombs go off and are forgotten in a week. The horrible deaths of Daniel Pearl, Nick Berg, and Paul M. Johnson Jr. stick in our minds.
* Beheading is low-cost, and flatters the Wahhabis' belief that they are imitating the Prophet Muhammad, who lived in the age of knives and swords, not firearms and bombs. The Saudi experiment in creating a "reactionary utopia"--in forcing millions of people to pretend that they are living in the 7th, rather than the 21st century--is less than 300 years old. But it has always been backed up by the sword that appears on the Saudi flag, and by public beheadings.
* When foreigners are beheaded, no jihadist needs to sacrifice his or her life. And not all jihadists love death more than life--many need the movement to push them into martyrdom. That is shown by the narratives left by some who have survived, as well as by defectors.
But those are technical lessons. What are the political lessons for Americans from this martyrdom of one of our own?
FIRST, the terror will continue. With the Coalition poised to hand over power in Iraq, the terrorists (and the Saudis) are terrified by the prospect of a successful, Shia-majority state on its way to democracy in the heart of the Arab world.
Wahhabis--the Saudi rulers and the terrorists--hate Shia Muslims more than they hate Jews and Christians. The Saudi royals are worried about their own restive Shia minority--who form the majority in the Eastern Province, where the oil is.
The Saudi hardliners who created al Qaeda did so to advance their scheme to take over the global Muslim community. But September 11--15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis--turned the world against Saudi Arabia, and brought a swell of demand for liberal reform.
And the Saudi royals are more afraid of democratic dissenters than of the terrorists. Exiled liberal Saudis--the only ones who can speak freely--believe the Saudi hardliners brought al Qaeda back into the kingdom as a warning to forward-looking Saudi subjects, and to external critics: If you try to force change in Saudi Arabia, you will get something worse.
We cannot accept this blackmail--and the fear of something worse must not paralyze us.
SAUDI ARABIA has the largest middle class in the Arab world, with many families owning satellite dishes and computers--but women can't drive. Can you imagine a bigger obstacle to a middle-class lifestyle?
Ordinary, sane, normal Saudi subjects are heartily sick of Wahhabism. Saudi Arabia is now surrounded by a crescent of Arab and Muslim states that may not be very much like America, but they are normal enough that women can drive and people are not whipped in the streets for missing prayer times. Every Saudi subject looks at Kuwait, Qatar, and Dubai and wonders when his country will catch up with the world.
In addition, something worse may not be conceivable, because the friends of al Qaeda already hold power in the kingdom. Al Qaeda & Co. have never directly targeted the Saudi rulers--they target the credibility of the Saudi state, but they cut the throats of American technicians and Filipino domestic servants.
Thousands of Saudi princes and princesses roam the world, spending and partying. Not one has ever been attacked. When bin Laden rants, he rails against us, but calls on his Saudi followers to send petitions, not bombs, to the palaces.
Meanwhile, Saudi financiers of al Qaeda walk the kingdom's streets with impunity. The Saudis promise action against the terrorists but drag their heels, or worse, allow the terrorists to escape.
Three years after September 11, they still claim to be shutting down the terror-funding charities--but the charities reorganize and keep operating their business as usual, and the schools continue indoctrinating children in hatred of other religions, and the Wahhabi imams preach the glory of jihad and martyrdom every Friday at the mosques--and every day on television. Saudis continue to go to Falluja to fight the Coalition.
The Council on Foreign Relations' Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing released a report last week that confirmed all these facts and more. And Saudi Arabia is one of the most repressive states in the world, where terrorism is only possible because a section of the state apparatus favors it.
The kidnappings and murders will certainly continue, and it is immoral of us to ask our citizens, or foreigners of any description, to risk a brutal death just to keep Saudi helicopters flying or Saudi palaces clean. All foreigners in the kingdom should consider whether they want to put themselves on the line.
THE OIL is no longer a meaningful pretext. A temporary rise in oil prices is a small sacrifice compared with the horrors inflicted by al Qaeda, from the '90s bombings in East Africa to the lonely death of Paul Johnson.
President Bush should present non-negotiable demands to the Saudis:
* Arrest and try the financiers of al Qaeda.
* Cut the links between the Saudi state and the Wahhabi ideology, and stop the campaign to spread Wahhabism around the world.
* Accept the need to make Saudi Arabia a normal country, through educational and other reforms.
Quiet diplomacy and pressure behind the scenes has not worked since September 11, and it won't work now. It's way past time to get tough with the desert rats who rule the Saudi kingdom.
Stephen Schwartz is the author of The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism.
? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.

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Reports: Al-Qaeda Cell Leader Trained by Saudi Military
NewsMax Wires &CNN
Tuesday, June 22, 2004
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia -- The man most likely to take over leadership of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia reportedly trained with the Saudi military and worked as a prison guard before joining Muslim militants in Afghanistan.
While set back by the death of previous leader Abdulaziz al-Moqrin, mastermind of the kidnapping and beheading of American engineer Paul M. Johnson Jr., Al Qaeda remains able to strike at the Saudi government because of men such as Saleh Mohammed al-Aoofi. According to Saudi newspapers and several terror analysts Monday, al-Aoofi is a logical choice to replace al-Moqrin.
Saud Musaibeeh, a public relations official at the Interior Ministry, refused to comment on the possibility Al Qaeda had a new leader in the kingdom.
Al-Aoofi is fifth on the Saudi government list of most-wanted terrorists. Two of those above him on the list, including No. 1 al-Moqrin, are dead. A third, Rakan Mohsin Mohammed al-Saikhan, was believed wounded and arrested in the shootout with Saudi security forces in which al-Moqrin was killed Friday, hours after his cell announced it had killed Johnson. The fourth, Kareem Altohami al-Mojati, may not be considered the right man to lead a Saudi cell because he is Moroccan.
According to reports in Saudi papers closely linked to the government, al-Aoofi, believed to be in his late 30s, received military training in Riyadh before joining the kingdom's prison guard unit. He worked as a guard in the prison in Medina, near his hometown, before he was fired in 1992, apparently for misconduct.
A Saudi expert, speaking on condition of anonymity, said al-Aoofi's military training and his reputation for devotion to Al Qaeda chief Usama bin Laden made him a particularly good candidate to take over from al-Moqrin.
Infiltration
Evan Kohlmann, a Washington-based expert on terrorism, said al-Aoofi would know the tactics and personnel of Saudi security forces. Kohlmann noted that Al Qaeda claims to have infiltrated the security forces and said that while Saudi officials reject that, al-Aoofi's background is evidence it is possible.
Al-Aoofi traveled to Afghanistan and joined Al Qaeda shortly after being fired, an indication he had had contacts with the group before leaving his prison job.
In Afghanistan, he met men who would later be his comrades in a Saudi terror network, according to Saudi newspaper reports. Among them was one of the nine suicide bombers in the May 12, 2003, car bombing of foreigners' housing compounds in Riyadh that killed 35 people.
Saudi experts on Islamic extremism, speaking on condition of anonymity, said al-Aoofi fought in Chechnya before returning to the kingdom in 1994 to open a car dealership in Medina that apparently was a cover for his terrorist activities. Some Saudi newspapers have reported that al-Aoofi was seriously injured in Chechnya and returned to Saudi Arabia for treatment.
He traveled again to Afghanistan shortly before Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States to meet bin Laden and Taliban leaders.
In an interview Monday with the Saudi daily Okaz, al-Aoofi's brother, Ali, called on him to surrender for his mother's sake, saying he would "not find anyone better or more just and merciful than the state."
"The path you have taken is wrong and leads to doom, and God accepts the repentance of he who repents," Ali al-Aoofi was quoted as saying.
Al-Aoofi's predecessor, al-Moqrin, is believed to have had a leading role in a campaign of bombings and gun attacks on foreigners in the kingdom in recent months.
Saudi security officials say al-Moqrin took over Al Qaeda operations in the kingdom after his predecessor was killed by security agents earlier this year. Khaled Ali Haj, a Yemeni, had succeeded Youssef al-Airi, who was killed in a clash with Saudi security forces in early 2003.
Saudi security officials say al-Moqrin trained with bin Laden in Afghanistan and later fought in Bosnia and Algeria. He also played a prominent role in videos designed to inspire fear in enemies and exhilaration among sympathizers.
? 2004 Associated Press. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed

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Al Qaida appoints Saudi to replace slain operations chief
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, June 21, 2004
ABU DHABI - Al Qaida has appointed a new Saudi operations chief.
Al Qaida said in a statement on the Voice of Jihad website that Saleh Al Oufi was appointed the new chief of the Islamic insurgency group in Saudi Arabia. The statement said Al Oufi replaced Abdul Aziz Al Muqrin, 31, who was killed in a gunbattle with Saudi security forces on late June 18 in Riyad.
Al Oufi was described as a former Saudi Interior Ministry prison guard and the fourth Al Qaida chief in the kingdom since 2003. He has been cited as the fifth most wanted insurgent on Saudi Arabia's list of 26 top fugitives.
The statement said Al Muqrin had prepared Al Oufi and others to continue the war against Saudi Arabia, Middle East Newsline reported. Al Muqrin was appointed insurgency chief after the death of Khaled Ali Al Haj in a shootout with Saudi security forces in eastern Riyad in March 2004.
Al Oufi was said to be one of numerous former Saudi security officers who joined Al Qaida over the last decade. Saudi sources and media reports said he was worked as a prison guard until 1992, when he was fired for lack of discipline. He was said to lack Al Muqrin's organizational and operational experience.
U.S. and Saudi officials have termed the killing of Al Muqrin and his three lieutenants a key blow to the Al Qaida network in Saudi Arabia. They said 12 Al Qaida operatives were also arrested, one of them said to be a leading fugitive.
A Saudi official said Al Muqrin's deputy, Faisal Al Dakheel, was being prepared to become the next chief of the Al Qaida network in the kingdom.
But Al Dakheel, as well as Turki Bin Fuheid Al Muteiry and Ibrahim Bin Abdullah Al Dreiham, were killed in the weekend shootout in Riyad hours after Al Qaida announced the execution of abducted Lockheed Martin engineer Paul Johnson.
But Western intelligence sources who monitor Al Qaida discounted the prospect that Al Muqrin's death would significantly hamper the organization's capabilities. The sources said Al Qaida has about 3,000 agents and informers in the kingdom, many of them in the Saudi police and security forces.
In its statement, Al Qaida maintained that its June 12 abduction of Johnson was aided by Saudi security forces. The statement said police officers donated uniforms and a patrol car to establish a bogus checkpoint that stopped the car Johnson was driving in near Riyad's airport.
"A number of the collaborators in the security agencies sincere to their religion donated these clothes and police cars," Al Qaida said.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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Sacked sergeant is new al-Qaida chief in Saudi Arabia

Brian Whitaker
Tuesday June 22, 2004
The Guardian
A former sergeant in the Saudi security forces has been appointed head of al-Qaida in the kingdom after the death of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, the previous leader, in a gun battle on Friday.
Paying tribute to Muqrin for "having prepared sincere men from among the combatants to succeed him and carry on the jihad", an internet statement signed by "al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula" named the terror group's new commander as Salih al-Oufi.
Oufi, 38, was allegedly among the 19 militants who started a wave of attacks just over a year ago with the bombing of housing compounds in Riyadh that left 35 people dead.
He is believed to be a cousin of Majed Moqed, one of five hijackers aboard the American Airlines plane that crashed into the Pentagon on September 11 2001.
Oufi grew up in the holy city of Medina and after his secondary education joined the Saudi national security defence training school. He later became a prison guard, rising to the rank of sergeant in 1989.
He was eventually dismissed for "unbecoming" conduct and in 1995 went to fight in Chechnya, but returned after receiving a serious head injury.
According to relatives, quoted in the Saudi daily Arab News, he went to Afghanistan and met Osama bin Laden.
After the fall of the Taliban regime he returned to Saudi Arabia, where he is said to have been in charge of al-Qaida's recruitment, logistics and training, including secret camps in the kingdom.
He was No 5 on a list of the 26 most-wanted suspects issued by the Saudi authorities last December.
"Oufi might be more dangerous than Muqrin because he comes from the security ranks and is a Hijazi from the holy city of Medina," said Ali al-Ahmad, director of the Saudi Institute, a pro-reform organisation in Washington.
"He might also be a more effective al-Qaida leader. He is older, spent more time in the country than Muqrin, and is more familiar with al-Qaida's network in Saudi Arabia, as he was one of those who built it."
The swift replacement of Muqrin by Oufi appears to confirm that despite numerous arrests and killings, the militant groups are able to regenerate themselves.
Tightened security in the kingdom has made it harder to carry out elaborate attacks such as the May 12 bombings last year, but random killings and abductions are no less effective, according to Kevin Rosser, an analyst at security consultants Control Risks.
"They are much more psychologically powerful than the earlier attacks."
The highly trained and organised militant groups are only part of the problem, he said. "There's a second type - mainly amateurs being drawn into these movements."
One example of the second type was the attack in Yanbu last month in which five westerners died, he said. Three of the four gunmen had no previous record of militancy.
After the beheading of the American hostage, Paul Johnson, on Friday, Saudi leaders reiterated their promise to deal firmly with terrorism.
"These people have followed the devil," said Prince Naif, who has run the interior ministry for almost 30 years.
But crackdowns alone may not work.
Despite promises of democratic reform, progress on the ground has been slow, and Prince Naif is widely regarded as one of the major obstacles.
A speech issued at the weekend in the name of King Fahd (who is largely incapacitated) again referred to plans for municipal elections, but did not say when they would be held - implying a retreat from the October date originally set.
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'No top terrorists at Guantanamo'
By David Rennie in Washington
(Filed: 22/06/2004)
Senior American intelligence and military officials directly contradicted the Bush administration yesterday, saying not a single detainee at Guantanamo Bay was a high-ranking terrorist.
The administration has consistently defended indefinite detention at Guantanamo - a legal black hole thanks to its status as a United States naval base on Cuban soil - by calling the 595 inmates "the worst of a very bad lot".
But commanders and intelligence operatives who have reviewed reports of interrogations and read CIA assessments of detainees told The New York Times none was a terrorist leader. At best, they said, between one and two dozen were sworn members of al-Qa'eda, or militants with knowledge of the organisation's inner workings.
The officials - who included dozens of high-level military, intelligence or law-enforcement officials in America, Europe and the Middle East - also denied claims by Pentagon and White House aides that Guantanamo interrogations foiled imminent terrorist attacks. They said some detainees had provided useful leads or confirmed information about plots in the earliest stages of planning - "a very small piece of the mosaic", one said.
A top-secret CIA assessment in 2002 concluded that the initial waves of captures in Afghanistan picked up many low-level aspiring holy warriors and innocents.


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Inside Al-Qaeda: a window into the world of militant Islam and the Afghani alumni
By Richard Engel, Cairo and Amman
The breeding grounds of militant Islamic terrorism span a host of different environments from the Afghan battlefields of the 1980s to places much closer to home. Richard Engel charts the careers of some of Bin Laden's converts and co-conspirators, offering an insight into Al-Qaeda's inner workings.
Sitting on a rooftop in a poor Cairo neighbourhood, 38-year-old Ibrahim recalled when he first met Osama bin Laden. It was 1983 and Ibrahim was one of the leaders of the Gamaa Islamiya (Islamic Group), one of Egypt's two main Islamic militant organizations centred largely in southern Egypt around the town of Assiout.
"I was one of the emirs (commanders) of the Gamaa Islamiya in southern Egypt at the time in Assiout. I was at the university of Assiout, the heart of the Islamic activism," said Ibrahim, who asked not to be further identified. Ibrahim had spent several months at one of Bin Laden's guerrilla training camps in Sudan learning how to use Kalashnikov assault rifles and other light weapons.
Now that his training was complete, it was time for Ibrahim to meet his benefactor, Bin Laden. He travelled to the Saudi Arabian capital, Riyadh, with a group of Islamic activists, most of them fellow university students.
"We met Osama ibn bin Laden on an Islamic pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia," said Ibrahim, using the traditional Islamic form of the Saudi exile's name. "He was a devoted young man who, like any young man, loved his religion. Then he changed and wanted there to be Islamic movements all over the world, and he fled Saudi Arabia and they stripped him of his citizenship." In a rare move, the Saudi government revoked Bin Laden's nationality in April 1994, despite the prominence of his wealthy family. His family, originally from the southern Yemeni province of Hadhramaut, also publicly disavowed him.
Ibrahim says he remembers bin Laden as both polite and well educated. Bin Laden talked a lot, Ibrahim says, and although he was prosperous, he dressed humbly and kept the company of people with no money.
"Osama bin Laden would help any Islamic group, in Sudan, in any Arab country. God blessed him with money, so he gave to Islamic groups," said Ibrahim.
As Ibrahim and the other students were leaving Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden gave him a bag stuffed with Egyptian currency. Ibrahim would not say how much, but it was clear that the idea was to use it to try to make Egypt an Islamic regime. He wanted to set up a military camp in the hills near Assiout, Ibrahim says. That's when Ibrahim lost his nerve.
"I saw my friends being arrested and being tortured and I didn't want to end up like them. So I made a plea bargain with the police and turned the money over to them," he said. Ibrahim served only one year in prison for his activities with the Gamaa Islamiya. He continues to be monitored by the Egyptian security authorities.
Ibrahim's story is typical of how Bin Laden has tried to align with local militant groups with country-specific grievances to increase his reach and influence. Bin Laden's methods and connections with local militant cells have expanded and become more sophisticated over the years, as exemplified by the case of confessed Jordanian militant Raed Hijazi.
Thirty-two-year-old Hijazi, a former Boston taxi driver and a US citizen, is on trial in Jordan for plotting to blow up a fully booked, 400-room Jordanian hotel and two Christian tourist sites on the border with Israel on the eve of the millennium in December 1999. He faces the death penalty and prosecutors say the Jordanian militant cell Hijazi helped create worked in co-ordination with bin Laden. Hijazi and other members of the Jordan militant group have confessed to many of the prosecution's accusations, but Hijazi's lawyers say he gave information under torture.
Speaking outside the state security court in Amman where Hijazi is being re-tried - he was already sentenced to death in absentia - his father Mohammed says his son is innocent. "No, he has no relation with Bin Laden at all. First of all he is poor. He has no funds. He lives on very little money and his apartment is a very little apartment near Amman. If you belong to Bin Laden you have to have some money," said Mohammed, an engineer of Palestinian origin.
Born in San Jose, California, to relative privilege, Raed Hijazi grew up travelling between the United States, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In 1986, he enrolled in California State University in Sacramento to study business administration, according to his father. Prosecutors say it was in the United States that he got his first taste of radical Islamic teaching.
A Fijian cleric at a Muslim prayer group near the university convinced Hijazi to travel to Afghanistan to join the mujahideen (Islamic fighters), who had been battling the Soviet Union since 1979. In addition to learning to use mortars and small arms in Afghanistan, Hijazi also formed alliances he would later allegedly use to build his own Jordanian terror cell, according to prosecutors. Hijazi was especially adept with mortars and earned the noms de guerre 'Abu Ahmed the Mortarman' and 'Abu Ahmed the American'. After the beleaguered Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan following a decade of fighting, many mujahideen became convinced that a force of devoted Muslim believers could defeat any army, even one belonging to a superpower like the Soviet Union. Some mujahideen made it their goal to bring their holy war from the mountains of Afghanistan to their home countries.
The Afghan alumni
While not all saw combat, some 5,000 Saudis, 3,000 Yemenis, 2,800 Algerians, 2,000 Egyptians, 400 Tunisians, 350 Iraqis, 200 Libyans and dozens of Jordanians served alongside the Afghani mujahideen in the war. Between 1,000 and 1,500 of them returned to Algeria and formed the backbone of the Islamic radicals who are continuing to fight against the government in what has been a nine-year civil war that has claimed more than 100,000 lives. Those who returned to Egypt became valued members of the Gamaa Islamiya and the Gihad group, but their success was severely limited by arrest campaigns and several mass trials in the 1990s under the title of 'the returnees from Afghanistan'. Some Egyptians, who saw that they would be imprisoned if they returned home, remained in Afghanistan or took refuge wherever they could. US authorities have said that as many as 200 Afghan alumni settled in the New York/New Jersey area, some of them congregating around the New Jersey mosque where Omar Abdel Rahman preached.
Largely at the request of Egypt and Algeria, Pakistan has cracked down on its Afghan veterans. Some so-called 'Afghani Arabs' also headed to Asia and joined up in the Philippines with the Abu Sayyaf group - named for a famous Afghan mujahid. Other Afghani Arabs continued to fight the Russians in Tajikistan while still others continued to participate in other conflicts where Muslims were involved, mainly participating in the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya.
Raed Hijazi was one of the Jordanian Afghan returnees who wanted to bring his battle home, according to the prosecution. In 1996, Hijazi met Hader Abu Hoshar, a fellow Afghan veteran who was also of Palestinian origin. Abu Hoshar was a longtime enemy of Jordan and, according to statements given to the court, it was during this meeting at a Palestinian refugee camp in Syria that the plot to carryout a massive attack against foreigners in Jordan was born.
After the plot was set, Hijazi moved back to the United States and worked for the Boston Cab Company. According to prosecutors, he used the job to send some $13,000 to his growing Jordanian terror cell. The group also raised money by selling false documents.
US federal investigators are currently examining a possible link between Hijazi and two of the suspected hijackers who boarded planes in Boston on 11 September and hijacked them for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Investigations say Hijazi is linked to suspects Ahmed Alghamdi and Satam al-Suqami. If proven, it would be a concrete link between the attacks against the United States and Bin Laden.
Jordanian court officials say Hijazi's cell contacted bin Laden's group Al-Qaeda ('The Base') in 1998, asking for help in explosives training. Through a key Al-Qaeda operative known as Abu Zubayida, Bin Laden's group arranged for four people, including Hijazi, to travel through Turkey to a training camp in Afghanistan. Hijazi, prosecutors say, learned to use explosives and remote-controlled triggering devices there.
Abu Zubayida is one of the men Washington has listed as wanted after the terror attacks in New York and Washington. He is believed to function as Al-Qaeda's foreign minister, setting up connections and maintaining relations with Islamic militant cells around the world.
By December 1999, Hijazi's Jordanian cell - now in co-operation with Al-Qaeda, which helped approve targets and coordinate timing - had stockpiled enough nitric and sulphuric acid to make a bomb equivalent to 16-tons of TNT. Jordanian police, who foiled the millennium attack, found the chemicals stockpiled in plastic barrels in a pit dug underneath a house outside of Jordan. A Jordanian intelligence official testifying against Hijazi said that authorities only learned by accident of the terror plot just weeks before it was set to take place.
Western diplomats have said the failed Jordanian plot is a blueprint of how Bin Laden currently operates, using a loosely tied network of local militant groups that operate with his blessing and support, but which cannot be easily traced directly back to him. It is also this loose structure that makes it so difficult for intelligence and police agencies to disrupt the network.
A former Egyptian militant interviewed described the structure of radical Islamic groups as having been modelled after "a bunch of grapes". "Each group operates independently with its members not knowing who the others are. That way, if one member of the group is plucked off by police, the others remain unaffected," he said.
Major players
While there were many heroes and martyrs in the Afghan war, which was supported by US intelligence as part of its battle against communism, many of the mujahideen rallied around three main people: charismatic Saudi financier Osama bin Laden, blind cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and intelligent technocrat Dr Ayman al-Zawahari.
Egyptian-born Sheih Omar Abdel Rahman is currently serving a life sentence in a Minnesota prison after being convicted of conspiring with a group of his followers to destroy the World Trade Center and New York City bridges and tunnels in 1993.
Abdel Rahman's son, Abdullah, says there are both similarities and differences between Bin Laden and his father, the blind imam of Muslim guerrillas. "Sheikh Omar and Osama bin Laden are both Muslims and involved in the Afghani cause and followed the path of the mujahideen in Afghanistan," said Abdullah, who is studying like his father at Cairo's al-Azhar university, the world's oldest centre of Muslim teaching. "Osama bin Laden also donated much of his money to the Afghani cause. The differences between the two are in the level of religious study. Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman is a man who all of his life was dedicated to Islamic study. He was a graduate of al-Azhar University and also holds a doctorate, which he received with highest honours in Koranic studies. He is an Islamic cleric able to issue fatwas (Islamic rulings) saying what is a sin and what is a blessing. On the other hand, Osama bin Laden's education was in engineering and he is a military person with expertise in military training," said Abdullah.
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman continues to be revered by radical Muslims around the world who view him as their spiritual leader. Both Bin Laden and al-Zawahari, who is now his deputy, have vowed to take revenge against the United States if Abdel Rahman, a diabetic, dies while in a US jail.
Ayman al-Zawahari, 50, has more experience in radical Islamic politics than even Bin Laden. Interpol has listed al-Zawahari among its most wanted men. He is described by Western officials as Bin Laden's right-hand man and heir apparent to his organisation. Hailing from a long line of prominent politicians, doctors and religious leaders, his full name is Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahari, although he has used the code names Abu Mohammed and Abu Fatima.
A surgeon, al-Zawahari has been described as a private, intelligent and vindictive person. "He was first arrested in 1966 when he was just 15 years old for belonging to the then-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's oldest radical Islamic group. During the 1970s, al-Zawahari remained involved with militant Islamic organisations and emerged as a leader of Egypt's Gihad group, which, in conjunction with the Gamaa Islamiya, carried out the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
After Sadat's murder, al-Zawahari was arrested, but police were never able to tie him directly to the assassination. Instead, al-Zawahari was sentenced to three years in prison on a weapons charge. A former friend suggests that al-Zawahari was set up by an enemy who threw an assault rifle into the garden of his family's villa in the affluent Maadi district of Cairo. It was during his incarceration, says the friend, that al-Zawahari snapped, the torture he was subjected to in prison sending him over the edge.
After his release from prison in 1984, al-Zawahari left Egypt for good. Mamoun Hodeibi, the deputy leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, says many members of his organisation went to Afghanistan. "Some of them went there to be doctors. Others worked for charities and Islamic societies," said Hodeibi at the Muslim Brotherhood's Cairo office.
Al-Zawahari was one of these and supported the mujahideen's medical personnel. After the war, al-Zawahari moved to Europe, residing in Switzerland and Denmark, according to Egyptian security officials. Al-Zawahri supposedly carries Egyptian, French, Swiss and Dutch passports, although Switzerland denies he was ever issued a Swiss passport. Egyptian officials say his French and Swiss passports are under the name Amin Othman and that his Dutch passport, number 513116, is in the name Sami Mahmoud.
By the 1990s, al-Zawahari had emerged as the leader of the military wing of the Egyptian Gihad group, known as the Vanguards of Conquest. In the mid-1990s, he returned to Afghanistan to join forces with Bin Laden: a move that caused a rift in his Gihad group.
Diaa Rashwan, a senior researcher of Islamic militant groups at Egypt's al-Ahram centre for strategic studies, says al-Zawahari and Bin Laden have become very close since the announcement in 1998 of the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Other key members of the front are Egyptians Mustafa Hamza, 43, and Rifie Ahmed Taha, 47, aa well as Mohammed Islambouli, 46, the brother of Khaled Islambouli, Sadat's assassin. Egyptian intelligence officials say Mohammed Islambouli holds two Egyptian passports, a Qatari passport and an Algerian passport in the name Mahmoud Youssef.
"Ayman al-Zawahari from the beginning was as all the other ordinary Islamists," said Rashwan. "He had his own project to establish an Islamic state here in Egypt, but over the last three years, he has gone closer to the Osama bin Laden theory. It means to fight the enemies of Islam, the Americans and Israelis, but not to build an Islamic state."
Until two weeks ago, rhetoric from men like Ayman al-Zawahari about fighting the enemies of Islam wasn't taken as seriously as it is today. Now, Washington is presumably re-examining statements from al-Zawahari that it may previously have considered bluster. Two years ago, for example, his Gihad group said it had chemical and biological weapons that it intended to use against the United States and Israel.
Defining the terrorists
In 1998, the 22-member Arab League gave its approval to a pan-Arab counter-terrorism treaty. Since then, the nations have in varying degrees been co-operating to extradite and crack down on militants in the Middle East. The Arab pact requires countries to deny support to groups that launch attacks on other nations in the region, share intelligence and extradite suspects. Extraditions between Arab states, which have been frequent but rarely made public, operate according to bilateral treaties: a condition that has been problematic because extradition accords do not exist between all of the Arab League's member nations. Opponents of the treaty also fear that undemocratic Arab governments could use anti-terrorism legislation to target political dissidents.
Since the 11 September attacks against the United States, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak has renewed a call he has consistently made since the late 1990s to hold an international conference against terrorism. While the conference may be vital to close loopholes that allow militant groups to operate in Europe and the United States under the guise of human rights organisations or charities, the overall effectiveness of such a global conference is questionable.
As evidenced from statements made at the Arab League's interior and justice ministers' meetings that established the Arab wide anti-terrorism treaty, there is a deep desire in the Arab world for Israel to be sanctioned for what Arab nations consider its 'state terrorism' against the Palestinians. Furthermore, Arab states do not consider groups like the Lebanese Hizbollah or Palestinian Hamas to be terrorist groups, although they are listed as such by the US State Department. Therefore, one of the toughest steps in battling terrorists, like the vast array of Afghani alumni who operate across borders, may be coming to terms with the age-old question of who is a terrorist.

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Partisan Media Ignores Saddam's Atrocities
June 16, 2004
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/weekend_sites/week_in_review_061404___061804/content/partisan_media_ignores_saddams_atrocities.guest.html
Listen to Rush...
(...challenge the press, and the left, to confront the horrors we ended in Iraq)
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
RUSH: Deborah Orin has a piece today in the New York Post that is going to make you mad. Made me mad. Even though it doesn't surprise me, it made me mad. Permit me to read excerpts. The column title is, "Reporting For the Enemy." Deborah Orrin of the New York Post. "The video only lasts four minutes or so -- gruesome scenes of torture from the days when Saddam Hussein's thugs ruled Abu Ghraib prison. I couldn't bear to watch, so I walked out until it was over. Some who stayed wished they hadn't. They told of savage scenes of decapitation, fingers chopped off one by one, tongues hacked out with a razor blade -- all while victims shriek in pain and the thugs chant Saddam's praises.
"Saddam's henchmen took the videos as newsreels to document their deeds in honor of their leader. But these awful images didn't show up on American TV news. In fact, just four or five reporters showed up for the screening at the American Enterprise Institute think tank, which says it got the video via the Pentagon. Fewer wrote about it. No surprise, since no newscast would air the videos of Nick Berg and Wall Street Journal reporter Danny Pearl getting decapitated, or of U.S. contractors in Fallujah getting torn limb from limb by al Qaeda operatives. But every TV network has endlessly shown photos of the humiliation of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. troops at Abu Ghraib. Why?
AEI scholar Michael Ledeen says, "Because most [journalists] want Bush to lose." "The Pentagon has lots of Saddam atrocity footage -- but is loathe to release it, possibly for fear it would be taken as a crude attempt to blunt criticism of Abu Ghraib. So the world sees photos of U.S. interrogators using dogs to scare prisoners at Abu Ghraib. But not the footage of Saddam's prisoners getting fed -- alive -- to Doberman pinschers on Saddam's watch. (That video's been described by former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik.) Former Pentagon official Richard Perle raps 'faint hearts in the administration,' saying they've bought into the idea that it's 'politically incorrect' to show the horrors of Saddam's regime.
"But he also faults the media -- after all, AEI's briefings on Iraq have been standing-room-only, but the room was half empty for the screening of the Saddam torture video. But part of the issue is simply that Saddam's tortures, like al Qaedas tactics, are so awful that they're unbearable to watch. If I couldn't watch them myself, I'm hardly arguing that others should have to. Yet it raises a very complex problem in the War on Terror. It's worse than creating moral equivalence between Saddam's tortures and prisoner abuse by U.S. troops. It's that we do far more to highlight our own wrongdoings precisely because they are less appalling.'" (Italics in original)
We are able to show the videos and pictures out of Abu Ghraib because they are "not that bad." I mean, they're not unwatchable, but we can't show what happened under Saddam's watch because that would repulse us and make us sick. So, we can watch and show videos and beat ourselves to shreds, but we can't see what we got rid of. (Orrin:) "In this era, a photo is everything. We highlight U.S. prisoner abuse because the photos aren't too offensive to show. We downplay Saddam's abuse precisely because it's far worse -- so we can't use the photos. And that sets the stage for remarks like Sen. Ted Kennedy's claim that Saddam's torture chambers have reopened under 'U.S. management.' Terrorism is sometimes called asymmetric warfare -- America had to adjust to new tactics to deal with small bands of terrorists who were able to turn our airplanes into weapons against us. Now it turns out that we also face asymmetric propaganda -- where the terrorists gain a p.r. advantage precisely because what they do is so horrific that our media aren't able to deal with it. The U.S. military hasn't figured out a strategic way to deal with this problem. But neither has the press."
Her column goes on a little bit more, but the reason I'm juxtaposing this story along with the president's sound bite is that I think that there is a lot that the administration -- and I don't mean just the White House, but the Pentagon, the CIA -- could be doing that would more adequately, properly explain our actions; what we are encountering; how we're overcoming it, and the absolute sheer horror and terror that we dispatched and got rid of. You know, they're finding weapons of mass destruction all over the Middle East now. (story | story | story | story) They're finding remnants of Saddam's weapons.
Factories that were dismantled and moved and shipped to Jordan, Syria and other places, and it's another story that the media is not really onto, just as they are not paying much attention to what went on in Saddam's prison when this American Enterprise Institute has this little newsreel of footage yesterday. Normally they get standing O's. There are only four or five journalists who showed up for this one and fewer than those four or five reported on it. Look it, yesterday I went back. I went on my website last night which I always do. I always check the website, and I relived the Bill Schneider segment from Judy Woodruff. I'm sitting there laughing myself silly. It was one of the funniest things.
Bill Schneider, he's a member of the media, and he's doing a story on how a media analyst company has discovered the media is not reported the truth about the economy, (story) and I'm saying, "Here's a guy in the media who can't look at what he's doing to judge whether something's being done or not. He has to wait for some analyst group to tell you what the media is doing." Yes, Judy, the economy's recovery is a big secret, and you know why? It's not being reported! Well, this is one thing if they were saying it at a homeless shelter in San Francisco, but this is Bill Schneider the political guru at CNN saying it. It's the same thing going on with the weapons of mass destruction find. (story) The World Tribune and others are writing all about this. It just doesn't seem to interest the large elite media right now, because it just doesn't fit the agenda.
The agenda is still the Abu Ghraib prison photos, and the agenda is still making sure the economy doesn't get reported. Now there's a new item added to the agenda: Bill Clinton's book. Editor & Publisher has a story by, an interview with, Dan Rather. There's an interview with Dan Rather about his interview with Clinton on their website, and Rather says, I've never read a memoir like this. Why, this is great! Who knew he could write this well? He was so forthcoming and honest. I tell you what, in a five-star rating system, I'm giving this five stars. Dan Rather, reviewing Bill Clinton's book. So that's the partisan media's agenda for the summer here, and meanwhile, there's some interesting developments and news and evidence about the war with Iraq that is just being ignored -- just like the economy (story | story | story)-- is not being ignored but it's being pushed aside and not really highlighted. We all know why. Andrew in Flint, Michigan. I'm glad you waited. Welcome to the EIB Network, sir.
CALLER: How you doing, Rush? I wanted to comment a little bit on the article that you were reading just a few minutes ago, the crux of it being that why -- why aren't the photos of Saddam Hussein torturing Americans [sic] being pushed as much as the --

RUSH: No, no, no. Not "torturing." Hold it. Hold it. Hold it -- not "torturing Americans." Torturing Iraqis.

CALLER: I'm sorry, Iraqis. My fault.
RUSH: Yes.
CALLER: There's a simple reason for it. The reason is, it's expected from Saddam Hussein. That's not news. The news is: we aren't supposed to do what we did. That is news. We report on the news. You don't report on everyday happenings. That's the biggest difference.
RUSH: Um, no, but, the point of her column is to show a lack of proportion in the reporting. You know, we are doing a good thing. We have liberated a people, and that is what these photos and movies of Saddam's torture indicate, and it proves that we are not the bad guys and we're not horrible and we're not rotten. We had some people who made a mistake. In fact, Rich Lowry had a great piece at NRO, National Review Online, about this guy. Garner, I think his name. The fianc? and father of Lynndie England, the woman in these photos. The two perps. This guy apparently has a long history of abuse. He's been a prison guard for a long time. He's got a long history of abusing other people, human beings who are in captivity, and it appears that in much of these, the first batch of Abu Ghraib photos we got this guy was the ringleader and may have been acting is an independent contractor.

I know they're trying to make the case that (sinister voice) "the orders came from the top," but believe me, this guy was doing this kind of stuff long before he ever got sent to Iraq and long before he was an MP -- you know, contractor, MP, prison guard -- in Iraq. But aside from that, the sense of proportion is being lost. You know, we have some people over there that have made some mistakes and gone way beyond the bounds that we Americans consider as right. But we're using this, some are using this to try to destroy the entire effort we've undertaken and to defeat the mission by saying we're not worthy as a country, and that's what I resent -- and if there is a way to show that what happened over there has been far worse than what's taking place now, then it's worth it to me. I don't have an innate disgust with my own country, and I'm not looking, therefore, for evidence that we ought to hate America.
END TRANSCRIPT

http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=91551
A Combustible Mix: Politics, Terror, Oil and the Future of the U.S.-Saudi Relationship
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Six-party talks: Strike 3
By David Scofield
With the third installment of the six-party drama set to play out in Beijing from June 23-26, all sides have begun telegraphing their positions as a prelude to talks, with continued US insistence on complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of all facets of North Korea's weapons program increasingly out of sync with the rest of the region.
China, the host of this and the previous two rounds of talks, stated last week that US claims concerning North Korea's highly enriched uranium (HEU) project are, in Beijing's view, unfounded. Last week senior Chinese official Zhou Wenzhong was emphatic that his government had not been privy to any "smoking gun" intelligence indicating North Korea's uranium program.
This is crucially important, as it is the HEU project and not the far more transparent, plutonium-based nuclear-weapons initiatives that pose the greatest threat to regional and, potentially, global security. Plutonium enrichment is a difficult procedure and the process involves the release of krypton-85, a gas that can be monitored and tracked by the United States remotely. While North Korea's strangely public primary reactor site at Yongbyon is easier to monitor and inspect, the plutonium program seems designed to allow maximum visibility - a distraction from the country's secret HEU facilities thought to be buried under a mountain somewhere in the country's northeast. Though the exact location, scope and scale of the HEU project are still mysteries, the North Koreans themselves acknowledged its existence in meetings with US assistant secretary of state James Kelly in 2002, and testimony from Pakistan's nuclear godfather Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, confirms the long-term involvement of Pakistan in the development of this project.
But China seems ready to ignore the growing mountain of evidence, and North Korean's own admission, and focus only on the plutonium issue - a chip North Korea has demonstrated it is quite interested in bargaining away. North Korea would like to negotiate some sort of freeze to its high-profile plutonium program in return for iron-clad security guarantees and massive energy assistance, allowing the HEU program to continue adding atomic weapons to North Korea's arsenal while creating the opportunity for highly lucrative HEU sales to interested buyers around the Middle East.
Meanwhile, the South Koreans have made no secret of their intention to offer "bountiful infrastructure, industrial and energy" aid to North Korea, as South Korea too is more than willing to look the other way concerning North Korea's clandestine nuclear development in the spirit of rapprochement and reconciliation. South Korean officials have made it known that even the most tentative steps toward CVID of the North's plutonium project, not the HEU project, will more than suffice and be rewarded with even greater South Korea largess. Indeed, the state-run Export-Import Bank has started a program using public money to offset losses South Korean companies may incur through their investments in North Korea - more Southern tax dollars (investments in North Korea cannot be made in South Korean currency) sent north in a bid to buy reconciliation.
Though Russia shares a short border along the Tumen River with North Korea, its attention is focused thousands of kilometers away. The threat of North Korea selling weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, for example, to domestic terror groups is small in the minds of Russian policymakers. Historically, North Korea has been careful not to offend the Russians, well aware of the importance of maintaining good relations with both Moscow and Beijing, its key benefactors. Russia's concerns about fissile material falling into the hands of domestic terror organizations do not center on North Korea but rather the relative abundance of such material on offer in former Soviet republics in Central Asia. As far as Moscow is concerned, nuclear black-marketeers within the borders of its former empire pose a far greater threat to Russian security than Kim Jong-il's stockpile.
The staunchest US ally in the region is undoubtedly Japan, but here too we see a shift. The Japanese certainly have no trust in Pyongyang and definitely recognize the inherent threat of the North Korean state, but Japan's view of the threat is increasingly divergent from that held by the United States. The Japanese are more concerned with North Korea's delivery systems, its missiles, than its nuclear program. Japan believes, perhaps rightly, that the chances of North Korea launching a preemptive nuclear strike are slim given the immediate and overwhelming reaction it would elicit and the crushing blow to Kim's rule it would no doubt usher. For Japan it is North Korea's force-projection platforms - its missiles - that are a greater menace.
And it was perhaps with this in mind that the North Koreans conducted an above-ground missile-engine test this month. The engine tested is believed to be the thrust behind the Taepodong-2, a long-range missile capable of reaching not only all of Japan, but potentially the western seaboard of the US, including Alaska, home to 25% of the United States' proven oil reserves.
The Taepodong-2 can carry a larger payload a greater distance that the Taepodong-1, the missile North Korea test fired over Japan in 1998.
The tests this month came only two weeks after Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's May 22 meeting with Kim Jong-Il in which he brokered the release of five Japanese family members kidnapped and held by North Korea for decades. The one-day summit included a pledge by North Korea to maintain the moratorium on missile-flight tests, though US officials believe North Korea is testing its missiles in Iran, a shrewd maneuver that keeps North Korea within the word, if not the spirit, of the moratorium. Though Japan was eager not to appear to be rewarding Pyongyang for releasing the Japanese captives, it was quick to pledge an additional 250,000 tons of food aid and US$10 million worth of medical equipment immediately after the release.
The United States is looking increasingly isolated in its demand for CVID of all components of North Korea's nuclear program and, to make matters worse, politically motivated election-year divisions are forming within the US. Previous policy architects such as Bill Clinton-era energy secretary Bill Richardson, a proponent of the now-failed 1994 Agreed Framework, declared at this week's World Economic Forum's Asia Strategic Insight Roundtable that the US needs to be more conciliatory toward North Korea, and make a deal (no matter how flawed and unworkable) focusing only on "short-term reprocessing and weaponization of plutonium fuel rods rather than broader uranium-enrichment issues".
This, of course, is the same logic that underpinned the now-defunct Agreed Framework, an agreement that called for North Korea to freeze its nuclear program in return for heavy-oil shipment and the construction of two light-water reactors. The North Koreans admitted in 2002 to what had long been suspected by regional policy experts, that they had reneged on their promise, extracted as much as they could from the agreement in the interim, all the while furthering their offensive-weapons capacity. Now, voices from the past sensing blood in US political waters (Richardson is considered a strong candidate for vice president should Democrat John Kerry win the presidency this November) are coming forth again armed with the same failed policy solutions.
Given regional divisions coupled with more immediate threats in the Middle East - including growing concern among US officials concerning the other surviving member of the "axis of evil", Iran, and its nuclear program - it's no wonder North Korea feels secure, unflinching in its demands for a comprehensive security guarantee before any movement on nuclear programs will be discussed. As the alliance strains and fractures, North Korea will use the lack of consensus to create further distance between the United States and the region, offering individual bilateral "agreements", appearing conciliatory while extracting what it can bilaterally, leaving the US very much alone on its side of the table.
The US declared that real progress at this round is crucial, but it seems any progress that does emerge from the meeting will likely be bilateral in nature, not multilateral as Washington had originally hoped. The United States could use another failure in Beijing, the third strike, as the excuse it needs to move the whole matter to the United Nations Security Council, but given the political relationship and geographical proximity of North Korea to two permanent members of the council (China and Russia), it is highly unlikely a resolution with teeth would be forthcoming. As the non-US members of the six-party confab continue to focus on more narrow, domestic agendas in their dealings with Pyongyang, a six-party solution to the North Korean problem seems as remote as ever.
David Scofield, former lecturer at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, is currently conducting post-graduate research at the School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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The Malaysia-Sudan Oil-For-Look The Other Way Program
The Malaysian Government regularly rails against Western misconceptions of Islam, and the mistreatment of Muslims by non-Muslims wherever and whenever it happens.
But Muslims are not being oppressed by non-Muslims only; Muslims kick around their fellow believers too. Often, the mistreatment is worse, and in some cases, it borders on madness:
Here's New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof reporting on what's happening in Sudan:

The world has acquiesced shamefully in [Sudan's] Darfur genocide, perhaps because 320,000 deaths this year (a best-case projection from the U.S. Agency for International Development) seems like one more boring statistic. So listen to [Magboula Muhammad] Khattar, multiply it by hundreds of thousands, and let's see if we still want to look the other way.
[...] the Sudanese government [has] resolved to crush a rebellion in Darfur, a region the size of France in western Sudan.
Sudan armed and paid a militia of Arab raiders, the Janjaweed, and authorized them to slaughter and drive out members of the Zaghawa, Masalit and Fur tribes.
On March 12, Ms. Khattar was performing her predawn Muslim prayers about 4 a.m. when a Sudanese government Antonov aircraft started dropping bombs on Ab-Layha, which is made up of Zaghawa tribespeople.
Moments later, more than 1,000 Janjaweed attackers rode into the village on horses and camels, backed by Sudanese government troops in trucks.
"The Janjaweed shouted: `We will not allow blacks here. We will not let Zaghawa here. This land is only for Arabs,' " Ms. Khattar recalled.
[...] The attack was part of a deliberate strategy to ensure that the village would be forever uninhabitable, that the Zaghawa could never live there again.
The Janjaweed poisoned wells by stuffing them with the corpses of people and donkeys.
They also blew up a dam that supplied water to the farms, destroyed seven hand pumps in the village and burned all the homes and even the village school, the clinic and the mosque.
In separate interviews, I talked to more than a dozen other survivors from Ab-Layha, and they all confirm Ms. Khattar's story.
By most accounts, about 100 people were massacred that day in Ab-Layha, and a particular effort was made to exterminate all men and boys, even the very young. Women and girls were sometimes allowed to flee, but the prettiest were kidnapped.
Most of those raped don't want to talk about it. But Zahra Abdel Karim, a 30-year-old woman, told me how in the same attack on Ab-Layha, the Janjaweed shot to death her husband, Adam, and 7-year-old son, Rahshid, as well as three of her brothers.
Then they grabbed her 4-year-old son, Rasheed, from her arms and cut his throat.
The Janjaweed took her and her two sisters away on horses and gang-raped them, she said.
The troops shot one sister, Kuttuma, and cut the throat of the other, Fatima, and they discussed how to mutilate her. (Sexual humiliation has been part of the Sudanese strategy to drive out the African tribespeople. The Janjaweed routinely add to the stigma by branding or scarring the women they rape.)
"One Janjaweed said: `You belong to me. You are a slave to the Arabs, and this is the sign of a slave,' " she recalled. He slashed her leg with a sword before letting her hobble away, stark naked.
Other villagers confirmed that they had found her naked and bleeding, and she showed me the scar on her leg. [The New York Times Online]


Yes, I know shit happens. And you can't expect Malaysia to get involved in every sad case. I understand that.

But what I don't understand is how we can completely separate our commercial interests from our humanity.

Oil seems to have helped to numb our senses to what's happening in Sudan -- and I'm not talking about "minyak angin Cap Kapak" here.

This is a list of Government-owned Petronas' extensive operations in Sudan, taken from the company's website:

UPSTREAM
Exploration & Production

1.Interest in Blocks 1, 2 and 4.

Partners: China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sudan's National Oil Company Sudapet under joint operatorship.

Status: Integrated development of oil field and construction of 1,504 km pipeline from the fields to Port Sudan. Reserves estimated at 600 million barrels. Production started in June 1999.

2. Interest in Block 5A.

Partners: Lundin, OMV and Sudapet.

Status: Exploration

3. Interest in Block 5B

Partners: IPC Sudan Ltd, OMV, Sudapet

Status: Exploration

4. Interest in Blocks 3 & 7

Partners: CNPC, Gulf Petroleum Corp., Al-Thani, Sudapet.

Status: Exploration

5. Interest in Blocks 8

Partners: Sudapet, High Tech Group

Status: Exploration

DOWNSTREAM

Product retailing & marketing

1. Operates service stations and markets petroleum products.
2. Owns and operates bulk terminals, depots, aviation depots and bunkering facility.

The other day, the governor of Khartoum was in town for a tour of Putrajaya, at the invitation of Petronas.
Azizan Zainul Abidin, Putrajaya Corporation president and Petronas chairman, showed him around.
Azizan said that:
Petronas' decision to go to Sudan was a good one as it had now become one of the company's major centres of activities among the 32 countries where it operates. [Bernama]
Local private sector oil and gas companies are striking it rich in Sudan too:
Ranhill Bhd through its unit, Ranhill International Inc and Petroneeds Services International of Sudan has secured an oil and gas contract in Sudan worth US$239.4 million (RM909.72 million).
The contract for the "Melut Basin Oil Development -- Upstream Facilities" project was awarded by PetroDar Operating Co Ltd, a co-venture entity that holds the rights for exploration and development in South East Sudan.
Malaysian national oil corporation Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) unit Petronas Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd holds a 40 percent stake in PetroDar, while China National Petroleum Company International (Nile) Ltd (CNPCI) holds 41 percent.
Sudan, the largest country in the African continent is going to be a major player in the oil and gas sector as it currently produces 300,000 barrels of oil per day.
[...]
"With the Melut Basin coming up it will contribute another 300,000 barrels of oil per day. In the future, we foresee Sudan will hit about 1.5 million barrels of oil per day," said Ranhill deputy chief executive Datuk Zahari Wahab. [Bernama]
Woohoo! 1.5 million barrels! Ranhill is one slick company.
And Iraq? You know, the country that the US invaded to protect its oil interests? It seems Ranhill has similar interests there as well:
Zahari said Ranhill International Inc looked at Petronas as the guiding light to venture overseas but at the same time it had also made its foray into Iraq and Qatar.
In Iraq, Ranhill International Inc has made bids for two projects worth US$325 million.
And it's not just Ranhill. Companies like Scomi Group [where have you heard that name before?] also have operations in Sudan.
For me, it all boils down to this: We scream for blood when the Israelis kill Palestinians, Americans kill Iraqis, Russians kill Chechens.
But we look the other way and let the Sudanese government get away with murder -- the murder of thousands of Muslims by other Muslims; killed simply for the colour of their skin.
Why are we ignoring it? It damn well (pun intended) looks like it's because of oil.
The saddest thing is that unlike Iraq, we can do something about it -- the Malaysian oil industry is one of the largest foreign players, if not the largest, in Sudan. We have a considerable degree of influence in this regard.
And we have to use it, because this is not some one-off clash we are talking about here. They are driving whole villages off the land. They are killing, raping and mutilating the adults; and the children as well.
It is ethnic-cleansing; it is genocide.
And we need to do whatever we can to stop it.
Posted at 02:09 PM in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack (0)

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Israel, Russia arms sales to China concern U.S.
June 15, 2004 Posted: 10:23 Moscow time (06:23 GMT)
The United States would face an increasingly lethal Chinese army modernized by Washington's friends and allies if it had to defend Taiwan in a war with Beijing, said a U.S. study released on Tuesday. Russia's arms exports to China are more sophisticated than ever, and Israel - recipient of some of America's most advanced technology - has an increasingly worrisome defense relationship with Beijing, the report said.
Moreover, if the European Union lifts its arms embargo on China as some members want, that could "dramatically enhance China's military capability," added the report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Echoing a recent Pentagon study, the commission said China's military capabilities "increasingly appear to be shaped to fit a Taiwan conflict scenario and to target U.S. air and naval forces that could become involved." China views Taiwan as a rebel province that must be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary.
The commission expressed concern political attitudes across the Taiwan Strait had "hardened" and recommended the United States take a fresh look at its "one China" policy, which recognizes the mainland and Taiwan are part of one China, but leaves the meaning ambiguous. The commission, created by the U.S. Congress in 2000, said a key to China's modernization had been "extensive" acquisitions of foreign military technologies, with Russia as the top supplier and Israel as No. 2.
Compared with the early 1990s, recent Russian arms exports showed an "alarming increase in lethality and sophistication," the report said. As for Israel, Commission Vice Chairman Dick D'Amato told Reuters that while Washington had made "strenuous" efforts to restrain it from selling to China, "there's still not the level of cooperation and assurance that has relieved our concerns. We're very worried about this relationship."
Israel annually receives $3 billion in U.S. aid, including advanced technology. Criticism of Israel is sensitive in the United States, its leading ally. The report said Israel in 2003 assured Washington it would not sell items to China that could harm U.S. security.
But the commission "understands that Israel has offered training facilities, including one for urban warfare, to train China's security forces for the Olympics." In the past year, "reports indicate Israeli firms have discussed a range of projects with China, including export of sensor and observation systems, security fences, microwave and optics, training, metal detectors and packages for airport and vital facilities security," the commission said.
Israel also provided China with HARPY unmanned aerial vehicles, radar systems, optical and telecommunications equipment, drones and flight simulators. The commission recommended the government restrict foreign defense contractors that sell sensitive military technology or weapons systems to China from participating in U.S. defense-related cooperative research.
D'Amato said that should not include Israel. Instead, the United States should deal with concerns about Israel's defense ties to China separately. In 2000, under U.S. pressure, Israel suspended the sale to Beijing of four $250 million-a-copy advanced early warning Phalcon aircraft, similar to U.S. AWACS planes. The proposed deal alarmed the Pentagon and angered some members of Congress. GAZETA.RU
Source URL: http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=44212

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Libya still has some explaining to do about its nuke program
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Thursday, June 17, 2004
LONDON -- Libya pledged six months ago to eliminate all elements of its nuclear weapons program. However, U.S. officials said Libya was receiving shipments from the Pakistani nuclear network of Abdul Qadeer Khan as late as March 2004.
The International Atomic Energy Agency continues to seek information on Libya's nuclear weapons program, Middle East Newsline reported.
The IAEA said Libya has yet to supply sufficient details on its procurement of a range of materials and equipment required for the production of bomb-grade uranium.
The IAEA assessment matched that of the United States, which has also sought information on a range of issues regarding Libya's nuclear weapons program.
Libya did report the March shipment to Britain, the United States and the IAEA.
IAEA director-general Mohammed El Baradei told the agency's board of governors that Libya has been working closely with international nuclear inspectors. El Baradei said the agency has been working with Tripoli to obtain what he termed a "complete picture" of Libya's nuclear program.
"We are making good progress in understanding Libya's past nuclear activities but some aspects still need to be assessed, and it is important that Libya provide the necessary information to enable that assessment to be made," El Baradei said.
The IAEA chief cited a series of examples where Libya would be required to demonstrate additional cooperation. They included confirmation of the origin of the uranium hexafluoride, or UF6, Libya received in 2000 and 2001.
UF6 has been described as a key element in the assembly of nuclear weapons. El Baradei also called for verification of Libya's planned capabilities for UF6 production. He also said the agency required understanding of the source of high-enriched and low-enriched uranium contamination on gas centrifuge equipment in Libya.
"Libya has proactively cooperated with the agency by providing information and prompt access to all locations requested," El Baradei said.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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Iran to develop joint oil fields whatever the new Iraq thinks
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Friday, June 11, 2004
Iran does not plan to wait for Iraqi stability until Teheran develops joint oil reserves.
Iranian Deputy Oil Minister Hadi Nejad Hosseinian said Iran was prepared to develop oil fields shared with Iraq without Baghdad's permission.
Hosseinian said that despite the establishment of a joint panel, Baghdad has not responded to Iran's appeals for joint energy development. "Iran and Iraq share a few joint oilfields," Hosseinian told the Iranian daily Sobh Eqtesad. "We cannot wait and see what government takes power in Iraq, and if it is about to cooperate with us or not. We are ready to cooperate with the Iraqis through mutual coordination or even joint exploitation once they are prepared."
[On Wednesday, the Iraqi Oil Ministry reported an explosion at a key oil pipeline that feeds an Iraqi power station, Middle East Newsline reported. Officials said the blast, attributed to insurgents, forced the ministry to reduce electricity output around the country by 10 percent. They said Iraqi oil exports were not immediately affected.]
The two countries share the oil fields of Azadegan, Dehloran, Kushk-Hosseinieh, NaftShahr and West Paydar. Officials said Iran still intends to pursue joint energy projects with Iraq even if Baghdad awards oil and natural gas contracts to U.S. companies.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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Iran pulls out of EU uranium deal, says it will enrich again
DPA , TEHRAN
Sunday, Jun 20, 2004,Page 6
Iran proclaimed yesterday that it was no longer committed to the agreements made last October with the EU trio of Britain, France and Germany and would resume uranium enrichment.
"We made an agreement with the European Union trio last October in Tehran, which also included a temporary halt to uranium enrichment, but as the Europeans were not committed to the Tehran Declaration, therefore we also lift the temporary halt to uranium enrichment," Hassan Rowhani, Iran's chief negotiator on nuclear issues, told reporters.
Rowhani gave a press conference yesterday morning after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a resolution on Friday criticizing Iran for failing fully to disclose the extent of its nuclear program.
"Details on Iran's new uranium enrichment program will be announced in the coming days," said Rowhani, who is also secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
"We do not pay much attention to the new resolution as the whole issue has once again been politicized with the final aim to deprive Iran of peaceful nuclear technology," he said.
He blamed the IAEA for poisoning the atmosphere in Vienna against Iran with false information, referring to IAEA charges that Iran had not informed the IAEA about its importation of 150 magnets for gas centrifuges used in uranium enrichment.
The IAEA later admitted that its initial claim about the importation of magnets was not correct and Iran in return demanded a change to the critical resolution.
"We however continue cooperation with the IAEA but stress settling the dispute over Iran's nuclear program at the earliest term and without politicization," said Rowhani, who is also a potential candidate to succeed Iranian President Mohammad Khatami next year.
Rowhani also said Iran would not withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Iran had even agreed on further IAEA inspections in Arak and Isfahan in central Iran, where a heavy water reactor is planned and where nuclear pollution had been reported by the inspectors, he said.
"The new resolution has not created any new commitment for Iran and there will also be no halt to the heavy water reactor plan in Isfahan," he said, referring to an earlier demand by the EU trio.
The cleric reiterated that, contrary to US claims, Iran had no secret plans for nuclear weapons, adding "the IAEA acknowledgement of this fact has left only a few pages left from the rather very thick Iranian nuclear file at the beginning."
The IAEA unanimously passed a resolution on Friday criticizing Iran for failing to fully disclose the extent of its nuclear program.
International investigators from the Vienna-based UN watchdog had been given contradictory and incomplete information, the agency said.
The strongly worded resolution is a stinging rebuke to Tehran but stops short of threatening Iran with UN Security Council sanctions.
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Demolitions Raise Concern Of Nuclear Coverup in Iran
By Karl Vick
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, June 20, 2004; Page A14
TEHRAN, June 19 -- Construction cranes stipple the skyline of Iran's capital. A city of 10 million, Tehran has been in a building boom for years.
But in the northeast corner of this sprawling, smoggy metropolis, something was torn down a few months ago, something behind a 20-foot concrete wall.
"It was a municipal sports complex," said a grizzled man who came to the door of the guard house, shrugging and sliding into a camouflage fatigue coat without losing the ash from the cigarette clenched in his lips.
"It wasn't big enough," he said, declining to be identified. "So they demolished it and they want to rebuild it bigger."
The yellow sign posted at the front gate -- clean and new, in contrast to the graffiti-scarred walls -- told the same story: "Sport Cultural Complex of Kowsar."
But in a few days inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency will ask to see for themselves. The now-vacant acres facing Shian 7th Alley have raised suspicions that Iran may be building nuclear weapons. Iran insists it harbors no secret weapons program, but fellow members of the IAEA board issued a resolution Friday condemning the country for failing to cooperate with an inquiry into its activities.
Satellite images of the site show that between August 2003 and March at least a half-dozen buildings were pulled down. The IAEA is investigating the images, which suggested to U.S. government analysts that Iran was concealing nuclear activities. Iranian officials have denied that claim and said inspectors are welcome to survey the site.
According to the Institute for Science and International Security, an organization based in Washington that monitors nuclear proliferation, a layer of topsoil was also carted away from the area. A machine that detects radiation, called a whole body counter, was then brought to the site, according to the institute.
"The whole body counter itself is not a clear indication of a nuclear weapons program," said David Albright, president of the institute.
But the site was not included in a list of atomic research facilities Iran was obliged to provide last year to the IAEA, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, he noted. And by the time inspectors arrive, all they may be able to confirm is a vague sense of unease.
"It'll be hard to do sample work at that site," Albright said. "People will try. But these are the changes you make if you want to defeat the environmental sampling techniques of the IAEA."
Iran has pledged to continue working with the inspectors, who expect be in Iran at least through the summer. But the theocratic government appeared to be still absorbing the impact of the slap by the IAEA -- its second since March for Iran's lack of candor.
On Saturday, the state-run Tehran Times newspaper carried 10 articles on its first two pages about the nuclear issue. But at a news conference, Iran's official on the issue, Hassan Rowhani, declared that the IAEA resolution "does not have much significance."
Rowhani, secretary of Supreme National Security Council, said Iran had not yet decided whether it would resume enriching uranium -- a process that produces fuel for energy or for weapons. Iran agreed last year to suspend enrichment activities after it acknowledged a nuclear program it had kept secret for 18 years.
European diplomats who insist that Iran's cooperation has been erratic, have said they want Iran to give up enriching uranium permanently and back away from plans for a heavy water reactor, which could produce plutonium for a bomb.
Rowhani pledged to continue talks with France, Germany and Britain, the three European countries that coaxed Iran last year to cooperate with the IAEA, but he also implied that the resolution would have unwelcome consequences.
"Since the Europeans have not met their commitment, we may take new decisions and announce them in the coming days," Rowhani said.
? 2004 The Washington Post Company


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Move over Tiger: N. Korea's Kim shot 38 under par his 1st time out
Special to World Tribune.com
EAST-ASIA-INTEL.COM
Wednesday, June 16, 2004
Tiger Woods couldn't hold a candle to North Korea's Kim Jong-Il, if nation's government-controlled media reports are to be believed.
South Korea's Pyeonghwa (Peace) Motors Corporation plans to stage an inter-Korean golf game next month in the North's capital city, Pyongyang, company officials say.
"We have agreed with North Korean authorities to hold a friendly golf competition between the two Koreas from July 30 to Aug. 5 at a golf course in Pyongyang," said an official at Pyeonghwa Motors, which has started a business venture in North Korea.
Fortunately for all entrants, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il will not be playing. If the official government media is to be believed, Kim is easily the greatest golfer, the world has ever seeen.
Pyongyang media say North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il enjoys golf, having shot multiple holes-in-one during his first try at the game. He reportedly aced five holes and finished 38 under par on the golf course. The "Great Leader" routinely shoots three or four holes-in-one per round, the government-controlled media reported.
The event, to be dubbed a "golf game for peaceful unification of Korea," will be attended by South Korea's top 15 female golfers, including LPGA players, 30 businesspersons and 20 singers and movie stars, the official said.
From the North's side, eight female amateur players and dozens of government officials as well as foreign diplomats in Pyongyang would also take part in the friendly game, he said. "They will compete in a 36-hole [competition] for the prize money of 100 million Won ($86,000)," the official said. Park Sang-Kwon, the company's president, was in Pyongyang to work out the details, he said.
North Korea has only one 18-hole golf course in Pyongyang. The North's media have said the 7,000-meter (7,700-yard) course is "in full line with international standards." The course, built in the mid-1980s by North Korean businessmen based in Japan, "bustled with Pyongyang citizens, overseas Koreans and foreigners," the North's official Korean Central News Agency said. Surrounded by a forest and a scenic lake, golfers can enjoy collecting plants and boating during breaks, it said.
"The course is not bad. North Koreans seemed to keep it well-managed," said a Pyeonghwa Motors official who has frequently traveled to the North.
Kim Dong-Wook, general secretary at South Korea's Golf Association, said golf is almost nonexistent in the North. "We believe there are no professional golfers," he said. Outside their country, North Korean golfers have yet to make a mark.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.
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Pyongyang uses advanced tech to extend range of No-Dong missile
Special to World Tribune.com
EAST-ASIA-INTEL.COM
Tuesday, June 8, 2004
North Korea has extended the range of its No-Dong missile in a move that could benefit Pyongyang's clients in the Middle East, Iran in particular.
The No-Dong intermediate-range missiles was said to have been extended over the last year in a North Korean research and development effort, Asian intelligence sources said. They said North Korea appeared to have employed advanced technology to reduce the weight of the warheads to extend the range of the No-Dong.
The Japanese business daily Nikkei Shimbun said North Korea extended the range of the No-Dong by reducing the weight of warheads and improving technology. The daily, in a report on June 2, did not elaborate.
Iran's Shihab-3 began as a copy of the No-Dong, but was said to have been enhanced over the last two years to reach a range of 1,380 kilometers, Middle East Newsline reported.
The intelligence sources said Iran was said to have transferred missile expertise that was used in its Shihab-3 intermediate-range missile program.
North Korea's No-Dong was believed to have a range of 1,200 to 1,500 kilometers. But the only test of the No-Dong was in 1991 and the missile was said to have reached a range of 565 kilometers.
U.S. officials said North Korea was certain to offer for export its improved No-Dong. They said the most interested clients would be Iran and Syria.
"It seems to me they've demonstrated a willingness to export anything," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told an Asian security conference in Singapore on June 5. "And so to the extent they have the capabilities that they have indicated they have, reasonable people in the world have to assume they'd be willing to sell or use most of those capabilities."
Iranian officials said the Shihab-3 was now capable of reaching a range of 1,700 kilometers.
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.



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Chavez Tightening Grip on Judges, Critics Charge
Venezuelan President's Reforms Called Threat to Rule of Law, Attempt to Undermine Recall Effort
By Kevin Sullivan
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, June 20, 2004; Page A24
CARACAS, Venezuela -- Judge Miguel Angel Luna said he was sitting in his courtroom on Feb. 28, when prosecutors brought in two beer-truck drivers, who had been parked near an anti-government demonstration, and demanded that they be jailed.
But there were no charges against them, Luna recalled. So he set the two men free. Three days later he was fired by the Supreme Court president, without explanation.
"The regime of President Hugo Chavez has turned our democracy into an autocracy," said Luna, 58, who has returned to his private law practice and believes that his only offense was to defy the political wishes of the president and his supporters. "Judicial autonomy has been lost, and that is the foundation of democracy."
Luna's case illustrates how politics has eroded the judicial system, threatening the rule of law in one of the world's most important oil-producing nations. The loss of judicial autonomy could affect an Aug. 15 national referendum on whether to recall Chavez, according to political and legal analysts in Venezuela and a report released last week by the New York-based organization Human Rights Watch.
The Chavez government presides over a judicial system where most judges can be fired at will. The National Assembly has also just passed a law that will allow Chavez and his allies to pack the supreme court with sympathetic justices who could end up deciding any challenges to the recall election, analysts said.
The government argues that it is cleaning up a corrupt and inefficient judiciary it inherited when Chavez was elected in 1998, and trying to reign in the anti-Chavez groups who backed a coup in April 2002 and a strike at the national oil company last year that cost the country billions of dollars. The justice system in Venezuela has historically been corrupt and Chavez fired hundreds of judges immediately after his election, a purge that was widely seen as necessary.
But critics said Chavez, a former paratrooper who led a failed coup in 1992, had gone beyond the changes needed to reform the judiciary. They said he was trying to silence dissent and create an authoritarian government in the style of Fidel Castro's Cuba.
"This is a political assault on the judicial system," said Pedro Nikken, a constitutional lawyer in Caracas. "It's making the judiciary a branch of the executive. They are going to use this to attack the dissidents and guarantee the impunity of any abuses of human rights or acts of corruption by the government."
In its report, Human Rights Watch said the "most brazen" challenge to the rule of law in Venezuela was a new statute pushed through the National Assembly by Chavez allies last month that expands the Supreme Court from 20 to 32 justices and allowed the Chavez-dominated assembly to fire and hire justices with a simple majority vote. Previously, firing a justice required a two-thirds majority.
The report said the new law amounted to a "political takeover" of the court. It said the law would allow Chavez and his allies to "pack and purge the country's highest court," which is currently split 10 to 10 between judges seen as loyal to Chavez and those viewed as his opponents. The report called on the Organization of American States to investigate.
"We are not talking about what could happen, we are talking about what is already happening," Jose Miguel Vivanco, head of the group's Americas division, said at a news conference. He noted that on Wednesday pro-Chavez legislators voted to fire one Supreme Court justice and to begin proceedings to suspend two more. All three were widely seen as opponents of Chavez and had ruled against his wishes in recent high-profile cases.
Only 20 percent of Venezuela's 1,732 judges have tenure and job security; the rest are either provisional or temporary judges who can be fired at will by the Supreme Court's six-member administrative council, the report noted.
The Chavez government responded to the report with ferocious rhetoric.
The National Assembly's leadership said it would consider declaring Vivanco a "persona non grata" and demand his immediate departure from the country. Assembly President Francisco Ameliach Orta, quoted in local media, said the report reflected "total and absolute ignorance" and accused Human Rights Watch of "open and unpardonable meddling in the internal affairs of our country." He said the Supreme Court overhaul was passed by the National Assembly and represented the will of the majority of the Venezuelan people.
Tarek William Saab, a key Chavez ally in the Assembly and head of the Foreign Relations Commission, said in an interview that critics failed to give the government credit for its efforts to "create an autonomous and independent judicial branch" and put an end to the "enormous impunity" that existed before Chavez took office.
Saab said it was wrong to say that Chavez controlled the judiciary. If he did, Saab said, the leaders of the 2002 coup against Chavez and those who led the oil company strike would be in jail. "They have not been put in jail because of the lack of ethics on the part of judges linked to the opposition," Saab said.
Still some analysts, including Alberto Arteaga Sanchez, a noted criminal attorney in Caracas, said Chavez and his allies were "using criminal law against their political adversaries."
One of Arteaga's clients is an army general who was involved in the 2002 coup against Chavez. Arteaga said the Chavez government had proposed an overhaul of Venezuela's criminal code that called for up to six years in jail for "publicly or privately instigating disobedience of the laws or hatred among citizens." Arteaga said even a private discussion among friends could result in prison time.
The reform calls for up to five years in jail for "causing panic" by disseminating "false information," even by e-mail. And it would jail anyone who "simply intimidates" or "pressures" public servants. Arteaga and Nikken said that would include the habit of harassing public officials by "casseroling" them: annoying them by banging a spoon loudly against a pot.
"This government is starting to show signs, like we saw in Cuba, of criminalizing political dissidence," said Nikken, noting that last year the Cuban government sentenced 75 non-violent dissidents, including journalists and librarians, to long prison terms.
Potential political influence in the judicial system is especially critical now because of the recall referendum scheduled for Aug. 15. After years of trying to oust Chavez, first by coup and then through the oil strike, his opponents finally managed to gather enough signatures on petitions to force the recall vote.
Noting that Venezuela is deeply and passionately divided between those who support and those who oppose Chavez, Vivanco predicted that the referendum could be so close that it may ultimately de decided by the country's high court, just as the U.S. presidential election in 2000 was by the Supreme Court. Vivanco said it was critical that the court not be stacked with justices acting solely for political reasons.
Luna, the fired judge, filed a written appeal and he was reinstated on April 15. But three weeks later he presided over a procedural hearing involving the case of another Chavez opponent. Following standard practice, Luna granted the man's request to allow two new attorneys to represent him. A week later, he was again fired.
Luna said he was one of nine children of a small-town merchant and the only person in his family to graduate from college. He said he worked as a lawyer for almost 25 years before becoming a judge four years ago. He said he had never been an opponent of Chavez. A soft-spoken man with gray hair and glasses, Luna said he was sad that his career on the bench had ended because of "pure revenge."
"We are waiting for the recall election to change our direction," he said, "to take us toward a horizon of peace and democracy in Venezuela."
? 2004 The Washington Post Company
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Russia takes North Korea's side in nuclear crisis talks

Oops: State Dept. reports record drop in terrorism
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Sunday, June 13, 2004
WASHINGTON - The U.S. State Department has been embarrassed by glaring errors in its report on global terrorism.
The report which was released on April 29, stated that global terrorism had dropped to its lowest level since 1969.
Critics in Congress and in the counter-terrorism community were stunned by the State Department's assertion. They cited statistics that terrorism was at its highest level since the early 1980s.
Officials said the State Department agreed with critics in Congress and the counter-terrorism community and admitted that its annual report, entitled "Patterns of Global Terrorism," was a serious distortion of the global terrorist threat. Revisions are forthcoming, they said.
''Very embarrassing, Sec. of State Colin Powell said this morning on NBC's "Meet the Press."
" I am not a happy camper over this. We were wrong,'' he said.
"We got phone calls from people who were going through our report and who said to themselves, as we should have said to ourselves: 'This doesn't feel right. This doesn't look right,'" State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said on Thursday. "And who started asking us questions."
Officials said Terrorist Threat and Integration Center, which obtains data from the CIA, FBI, Defense Department and Homeland Security Department, would review and revise the statistics for terrorist attacks during 2003. They said the corrections, which officials blamed on the new center, could be issued over the next few weeks.
"We didn't check it or verify it sufficiently," Boucher said. "We took the numbers We did an analysis and we gave you what our assessment was. That analysis and assessment will obviously change with the numbers."
The review and revision of the report marked the first time that the State Department acknowledged deficiencies in its annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism." Critics have accused the department of playing down or ignoring insurgency attacks described as terrorist strikes that take place in non-U.S. allies or by organizations and entities that cooperate with the State Department.
"It is deplorable that the report would claim that terrorism attacks are decreasing when in fact significant terrorist activity is at a 20-year high," Rep. Henry Waxman, the ranking Democrat on the House Government Reform Committee, said in May 17 letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell.
On June 1, the Congressional Research Service urged the State Department to review the structure and content of its latest global terrorism report.
The department report was said to have ignored acts regarded as terrorist after Nov. 11, 2003 as well as Chechen strikes in Russia.
The report also ignored a Nov. 15 suicide bombing in Istanbul attributed to Al Qaida. That attack killed 61 people and injured more than 300.
The department did not say what would be revised in the report. But a senior State Department official told the Washington Post that corrections in the global terrorism review could fill eight pages.
"I can assure you it had nothing to do with putting out anything but the most honest, accurate information we can," Secretary of State Colin Powell said. "Errors crept in that frankly we did not catch here."
Copyright ? 2004 East West Services, Inc.

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More Saudi Vandalism
The Wahhabis keep tearing down Muslim holy places in Saudi Arabia.
by Stephen Schwartz
06/08/2004 12:00:00 AM
SAUDI ARABIA, in which Wahhabism is the state form of Islam, has a long history of vandalizing and demolishing historical monuments. Wahhabi doctrine holds that raising gravestones or tombs or maintaining graveyards constitutes idolatry, known in Arabic as shirk, a grievous sin. So does preserving buildings--including religious structures such as mosques. To Wahhabis, a beloved building, the tomb of a saintly figure, or a gravestone is an idol. In Wahhabism, prayers to the Prophet are forbidden--above all because Wahhabis see in them a parallel with Christian worship of Jesus.
Thus, the Saudis followed their conquest of Mecca and Medina in the mid-1920s with an orgy of destruction. They leveled the "Jannat al-Baqi" or "Heavenly Orchard" at Medina that included graves of the Prophet Muhammad's son Ibrahim, as well as numerous of the Prophet's relatives and original companions. They also looted the Prophet's Shrine in Medina and demolished the cemetery in Mecca that included the graves of Muhammad's mother and grandfather. They completely destroyed mausoleums, mosques, and other honored sites, including Muhammad's own house. It was even said that they wished to uproot the grave of Muhammad himself and tear down the Kaaba, the stone temple at the center of Mecca. They were prevented from this last act by pressure from Muslims in India.
WAHHABI VANDALISM continues today, and its appearance is typically the first sign of aggressive Saudi penetration of Muslim lands. Saudi agents uprooted graveyards in Kosovo even before the war began there in the late 1990s, and Wahhabi missionaries have sought to demolish Sufi tombs in Kurdistan. Late in 2002, the Saudi government tore down the historic Ottoman fortress of Ajyad in Mecca, causing outrage in many Muslim countries.
And now the Saudi authorities are at it again, according to reports from enraged Saudi subjects, who as in earlier instances have requested anonymity. The city planning authorities in Medina, known for their Wahhabi extremism, have ordered the leveling of five of seven mosques built in the city by Muhammad's daughter and four of his companions. These structures are the Mosque of Sayyida Fatima bint Rasulillah, Salman al-Farsi Mosque, Abu Bakr Mosque, Umar ibn al-Khattab Mosque, and Mosque of Ali ibn Abi Talib. The latter three were constructed by figures among the four "righteous caliphs" who immediately succeeded Muhammad in the leadership of Islam. The structures in question are unique cultural assets whose historic value is literally incalculable, to say nothing of their religious symbolism.
Protestors against the decision say the ancient buildings have been covered with black tarpaulins to hide the demolition work going on inside the revered shrines. Other recent actions of the same kind by the Medina authorities have also been reported.
Wahhabi desecration of Islamic sacred relics clash notably with the claims of bin Laden and other ultra-Wahhabis, who argue that the Hijaz, the territory including Mecca and Medina, is "holy Muslim territory" on which no non-Muslim should set foot. Indeed, al Qaeda propaganda would have the West believe that all of Saudi Arabia belongs to this category. That would presumably include Riyadh, where Saks Fifth Avenue and The Body Shop maintain branches.
THE TRUTH is quite different. Hajj pilgrimages to Mecca are a prerogative of Muslims alone, and Muhammad did say that there should not be two religions in Arabia. The caliph Umar ordered the expulsion of Jews and Christians from Arabia. Wahhabis interpret these edicts to forbid adherents of other faiths from practicing their religion within the borders of the Saudi kingdom. But traditional Muslims interpret Muhammad's opinion to mean that monotheism and paganism could not coexist in the country, and Umar's order was never completely carried out.
Indeed, until the Wahhabi takeover in the 1920s, local Christians maintained a church in Jeddah. Thousands of Jews lived in Yemen until the 1950s. The closure of Mecca and Medina to non-Muslims is subject to debate in the Islamic world with regard to its history as well as its appropriateness. At present, Christian churches and Hindu temples function openly in Oman, a country with a more conservative Islamic tradition than Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, the Emirates, and Bahrain also permit open Christian worship--the latter island even boasts a synagogue as well as a Hindu temple.
All of which illustrates that Saudi Islam, or Wahhabism, is not about faith, but about power. And nothing better illustrates the power of the state, in the mind of the Saudi rulers, than the desecration of holy places--including Islamic sites dating from the time of the Prophet Muhammad himself.
Stephen Schwartz writes frequently on Islamic subjects for The Weekly Standard.

? Copyright 2004, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
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Iraqi dinar: Speculators beware
By Cam McGrath
CAIRO - Speculators who stashed away "Bremer dinars" earlier this year in the hope their value would skyrocket are suffering enormous losses as the official Iraqi currency plummets. Hit particularly hard are a high number of Egyptians, who had earlier raced to pick up the currency.
"Many people sold anything they could to buy Iraqi dinars," Mohammed al-Abyad, chairman of the Egyptian Foreign Exchange Association told IPS. "When the dinar went down these people lost a lot of money."
The Iraqi dinar was trading at one Egyptian pound (16 cents) per 50 dinars on the black market before its value dropped sharply earlier this year on news of escalating insurgency in Iraq. The pound is now worth 210 dinars on the black market.
"The black market has narrowed and the currency has no liquidity now," said Shady Sharaf, head of market research at Cairo-based al-Shorouk Brokerage. "The people cannot sell the dinars they bought, which presses on demand."
The new Iraqi dinar banknotes introduced by the US command last October replaced old banknotes bearing images of deposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Speculators believed the value of the "Bremer dinar" - named after the US civilian administrator of Iraq, L Paul Bremer - would rise as the economy of war-devastated Iraq recovered.
But that recovery has yet to take place, with daily reports of further violence, deaths and insurgency making the headlines. In the latest, a car bombing attack hit an Iraqi police car and a civilian vehicle carrying foreigners in the city of Ramadi, some 110 kilometers west of Baghdad on Wednesday, killing at least four people. On the same day in Kirkuk, Iraqi security forces said gunmen ambushed and killed the top security official for the state-run Northern Oil Company, dealing another blow to the country's already battered oil industry.
But months ago, unaware the instability would continue to plague Iraq even as the handover date draws near, thousands of investors working in the Gulf region brought bags stuffed with the new Iraqi dinars. They stashed away the currency or sold it for quick profits to other speculators on the black market.
"They remembered what happened in Kuwait, and believed the same thing would happen in Iraq," al-Abyad said.
The value of the Kuwaiti dinar fell to less than 10 cents during the country's occupation by Iraqi forces in 1990, but climbed steeply after its liberation by coalition forces the following year. It now trades at US$3.50.
"The situation in Iraq and Kuwait is very different," said al-Abyad. "Kuwait recovered in little time because its [infrastructure] remained intact."
The speculation was based on credibility, says Alaa al-Shazly, economics professor at Cairo University. "The dinar is backed by the US and people wouldn't have thought the US would get into something that would turn out to be a failure."
Although many countries do not trade the Iraqi currency, Western traders have been doing so through websites. When trading began last October, a dollar bought 420. Now it buys 555 - a 32% drop. The currency has declined 11% against the dollar in the past five weeks alone, and this while the dollar itself has fallen. In downtown Baghdad, though, the exchange rate is 1,400 to the dollar.
Many foreigners in Iraq are also buying up dinars in the hope that it will recover strongly. One analyst commented that the word in Iraq is that at the low end, a dinar could be worth $1. At the top end, more than $4 - many people will become very rich overnight. In its April report, the Economist Intelligence Unit forecast a 60% gross domestic product growth for 2004 and 25% for the following year.
But speculators should perhaps heed the advice of another anlayst: "The only thing the Iraqi dinar is likely to hit is a wall." Perhaps he was thinking of Iraq's huge whopping $120 billion foreign debt, which few countries are interested in writing off.

(Asia Times Online/Inter Press Service)
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Despite Bush speech, U.S. planning long stay in Iraq
May 28, 2004
BY TED GALEN CARPENTER Advertisement
In his speech at the Army War College, President Bush asserted repeatedly that Iraq would receive "full sovereignty" on June 30. But the president seems to have a peculiar definition of that concept. The United States and its coalition partners plan to give Iraqis nothing more than nominal sovereignty, and the ''handover of power'' is little more than an exercise in symbolism.
True, the Coalition Provisional Authority will officially go out of business on June 30. But the interim Iraqi government will exercise few prerogatives of sovereignty. According to earlier congressional testimony by Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman, that government will have no authority over coalition military forces operating in Iraq and only limited authority over Iraq's own security forces. Indeed, the United States and its allies intend to be responsible for Iraq's security for the indefinite future.
Grossman also indicated that the interim government would have no power to pass new laws or rescind edicts that the CPA issued. Other U.S. officials confirm that the interim government will not have authority over current or future reconstruction contracts. Even the Iraqi news media will continue to be governed by rules promulgated by U.S. military authorities, not the interim government.
The resolution that the United States and Britain just presented to the U.N. Security Council also provides little indication that Iraq will enjoy real sovereignty anytime soon. There is no date certain for the departure of coalition military forces. The only requirement is that the mandate for the peacekeeping force must be reviewed by the Security Council after one year. And although the resolution officially gives the Iraqi government control over the country's oil revenues, an ''international advisory board'' is to make certain that the revenues are used ''properly.'' That provision suggests more than a little foreign control over the decision-making process.
Washington's plans and actions indicate that the United States is preparing for a long stay in Iraq. The appointment of a four-star general to replace a three-star general as commander of U.S. forces in Iraq suggests that U.S. leaders regard the Iraqi deployment as a critically important mission for the foreseeable future. America's embassy in Baghdad is going to be one of the largest U.S. embassies in the world -- again suggesting that the United States intends to exercise a great deal of influence in that small country.
These actions raise serious questions about how much real authority even a permanent Iraqi government, scheduled to be chosen in national elections in January 2005, will have. Angry Iraqis, including some previously friendly members of the Governing Council, are openly criticizing the transfer of sovereignty on June 30 as a charade. They have a point. Truly sovereign countries have governments that are able to pass and rescind laws. Those governments, not foreign military commanders, control the security forces operating in their territory. And the governments of sovereign countries certainly are not relegated to the sidelines while foreign entities dictate key elements of public policy.
Bush missed an important opportunity to articulate a new and more sustainable Iraq strategy. He needed to emphasize that the United States intended to transfer the substance, not just the form, of sovereignty to the Iraqi people on June 30. At a minimum, that would require setting a date certain for the withdrawal of all coalition military forces. It also would require allowing the interim government to exercise meaningful authority over the entire range of public policy.
According to the current plan, the Iraqi government after June 30 will have about as much power as the typical 21st century European monarch -- that is to say, not much. The occupation of Iraq will continue in all but name. That is a huge disservice to the Iraqi people, and it threatens to entangle the United States in a thankless mission of indefinite duration. The president owed both Iraqis and Americans a better strategy than he outlined in his Army War College address.
Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and author or editor of 15 books on international affairs.
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Iraq as the 51st state

"He was a patron of terrorism ... He had long-established ties with al-Qaeda." - Vice President Dick Cheney on Saddam Hussein, June 14

"I have not seen smoking-gun, concrete evidence about the connection." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, June 10

"We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al-Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States." - 9-11 Commission, June 16

ANN ARBOR, Michigan - Juan Cole, professor of history at the University of Michigan, has positioned himself as a virtually indispensable voice in the Iraq debate. His Internet weblog, Informed Comment, offers a stark contrast to the cacophony of uninformed armchair punditry on Iraq, not to mention talk-show hosts babbling about "wacky Iraqis". Professor Cole lived in Lucknow, India, and also in Beirut. He's a fluent Arab speaker. The blog is uploaded daily, by himself (no staffers), and also offers extensive quotes from the Arab press. He gets as many as 200,000 fresh hits a week. Cole received this Asia Times Online correspondent in his fourth-floor office at the university's International Institute in Ann Arbor.

ATol: Let's start with the credibility of the Iraqi caretaker government vis-a-vis the Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds, more than vis-a-vis the US and the UN. Virtually everyone in the Sunni triangle and also in the Shi'ite south used to refer to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) as "the imported government". Will the same happen again to this American face of an Iraqi government?

Juan Cole: Everybody knows it's an appointed government. It doesn't spring from the rule of the Iraqi people. Grand Ayatollah [Ali al-]Sistani has issued a fatwa recently in which he openly said that. His view in this matter will be widely shared. It's unfortunate that the Iraqi prime minister should have been a known CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] asset. I don't think that it changes anything. The IGC, as you said, was seen as a puppet council by many people. There's much more continuity between the IGC and this government than most people seem to realize. It's pretty much the same cast of characters - either with regard to people who actually sat at the council and persons who represent factions who had a seat in that council.

ATol: What are the implications of what you're saying for the Iraqi street?

JC: That nothing really has changed. These people are not getting anything like full sovereignty. I think it is a publicity stunt - without substance. The real question for a lot of Iraqis is not so much if it's credible or not, but if it can accomplish anything for them. Since the Americans dissolved the Iraqi army, since it's not entirely clear how do you get an Iraqi army back, one can be pessimistic ...

Army down, racism up
ATol: On the dissolution of the army: Do you think this was a blunder by proconsul Paul Bremer or was it carried out on purpose?

JC: On purpose in the sense of trying to make the Iraqis dependent on the Americans? Well, what Jay Garner said to the BBC [British Broadcasting Corp], I saw it with my own eyes, is that he believed one of the reasons the army was dissolved was that the Bremer team has as one of their primary goals in Iraq the imposition of Polish-style shock therapy. They wanted to transform Iraq into a capitalist state, as quickly as possible. This was part of the general plan to make Iraq a kind of model for the region.

ATol: This was the original neo-con plan?

JC: Yes, but the primacy of the economic policy is something that I don't think is generally recognized. One of the reasons for getting rid of the Ba'ath army, according to Garner, was that they were afraid that the survival of any large Ba'ath institution like that might be an obstacle to the extreme liberalization of the economy. You can just imagine a situation in which the Americans wanted to denationalize Iraqi companies. If you had kept the Ba'ath army, they would come to the coalition and say, "No, you can't sell off these companies, my cousin helps to run them"... They [the Americans] thought that the army would remain a power center able to intervene in policy debates, on the side of state control of the economy. So they dissolved it not based on security purposes, but to remove a potential obstacle to Polish-style shock therapy. They brought Polish economic advisers - that's the reason for the Polish military involvement in Iraq. They tried to replicate the Polish experience. I don't believe that the neo-cons at the Defense Department wanted to use the US military to supplant the Iraqi army. In fact, [Deputy Defense Secretary Paul] Wolfowitz had told Congress that it's likely the US would be back to having only one division in Iraq by October 2003. They thought they could dissolve the army and just use the police to maintain order, and then they could do whatever they wanted to do with the economy: sell it off, bring in the big companies, open Iraq to Western investment. They hoped that the Iraqi bourgeoisie would emerge, there would be productivity gains, the country would be rich, and everybody else - the Iranians, the Syrians - would want to follow them.

ATol: Was that a mix of arrogance and incompetence, plus lack of knowledge of society and culture in Iraqi and the Middle East?

JC: Certainly the plan was born out of enormous ignorance of the Middle East. Remember, people with training in economics and political science very frequently stay away from knowing details. They have a set of principles, they think they are physicists, so the people planning this out, most of them knew no Arabic or anything really about the history and culture and society of the Arab world. Except for Wolfowitz, who had some knowledge of Indonesia when he was there as an ambassador ...

ATol: But Islam in Indonesia and Southeast Asia has very little to do with Islam in the Middle East.

JC: I would say it's very substantially different. And Indonesia is not a sufficient background for planning out how to run Iraq ... And moreover Wolfowitz was the only one amongst them who had this kind of knowledge. So it's clear to me that first of all they were very ignorant, also extremely arrogant because they were playing with people's destinies. Some of the neo-cons of course are very close to the Likud Party in Israel, and I think that many of them have imbibed this kind of Israeli racism towards Arabs, that Arabs only respect force, that you can get them to inform on each other because of all the internal clan feuds ... People like Douglas Feith and Richard Perle have thought along these lines for a long time. Frankly, Israeli racism towards the Arabs is not a good guide to dealing with a society like Iraq, or with any society. Unlike the Palestinians, Iraq is a society that has not been dominated by a foreign power since 1932.

ATol: And the Iraqis expelled the British.

JC: The British were expelled and very decisively, in 1958. And there were many rebellions before that. This generation of young Iraqis grew up in Ba'ath schools, learning about nationalism, learning about anti-colonialism. What their identity really is about is asserting themselves vis-a-vis the West. The idea that they would be supine before a Western occupation was always crazy, and any of us who knew anything about the region predicted there would be a lot of trouble. Iraq was a modern, industrial society, with relatively high rates of literacy, run down in the 1990s very substantially but still not a society easy for foreigners to come and dominate.

Roads to hell
ATol: Assuming that the neo-con dream - the road to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad - is now in tatters, would it be the case that now the road through Baghdad leads back to Crawford, Texas?

JC: There's some question of whether that could cost [President George W] Bush the election. A year ago, it didn't seem likely to me that Iraq would be able to affect an election. But the steady drumbeat of violence, the mounting toll of dead and wounded, the miscalculations regarding the siege of Fallujah, provoking the uprising of Muqtada al-Sadr's militia, and then the Abu Ghraib scandal, the cumulative factor of all these events, according to opinion polls, really have taken a toll on Bush's standing. If he were to be re-elected it would be historic: no one has been re-elected with these kinds of poll numbers. I think Iraq has become an albatross for the Bush administration. This so-called turnover of sovereignty - they're hoping that the US press stops covering Iraq like it is doing now, very intensively, as though it is the 51st state, which essentially is being run by the American government. Everyone will have noticed that when Hamid Karzai was elected by the Loya Jirga, the very next day Afghanistan fell off the front page and went to page 17.

ATol: And now it has fallen off the papers entirely.

JC: Now you can have several American servicemen killed and they are not even reported. I discern an unwritten rule among American journalists, that the American public is not interested in places which have their own government. The real significance of the so-called handover of sovereignty is that the Bush administration and its political advisers are hoping that the American press will take this moment as a cue to turn to reporting about Laci Peterson and other nonsense stories, local murder mysteries.

ATol: Do you think this might work? With Fox News maybe, but what about the Washington Post and the New York Times?

JC: Actually, it might. It might push Iraq off the front page. I don't agree with you that it would work most of all with Fox News. Because of its militarism and its attempt to get viewers from the American right, Fox pays more attention to Iraq than most of the other networks do.

ATol: In terms of sensational images.

JC: Sensational images, but it's just inevitable that if the US military very largely votes Republican, and you want those people watching Fox programming, they're interested in what's going on in Iraq. I think capitalism in a way swings Fox towards doing more Iraq reporting than some of the other networks. If there's a firefight in Baqubah, it seems that Fox is more likely to report it than the other networks.

ATol: But they report only the Pentagon side of the story.

JC: I agree that Fox is very slanted, but the way mass media work can often be ironic. Although Fox thinks it is reporting news of interest to its right-wing viewers, reporting this firefight in Baqubah and the way the US is putting down those insurgents, anybody who actually watches this will come out with a double message: one is the Fox message, and the other message is "Jesus, a lot of trouble in Iraq".

ATol: We have learned from the resistance, from some former Saddam Hussein generals, that the resistance will actually increase after June 30, that the postwar had been planned for years, and that everyone associated in some form or another with the Americans and the new caretaker government will be a target. So there will be even more bloodshed. How will this bloodshed rebound on the US? And what about the media: will they report it?

JC: This is the problem: it's difficult for the insurgency to target the Americans. They can get some RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] against an American base, they do this every day, it usually results in some casualties, relatively light. They've mainly turned to soft targets, Iraqis, so they blow up a market in Baghdad, or police stations. They are attempting to just foment a feeling in the country that the Americans are not actually in control. That will continue and may as well increase. I read a lot about these incidents in the Arabic press - they never get reported in the Western press.

ATol: But the important point is that these incidents are reported on alJazeera and al-Arabiya and watched every night by millions in the Arab world.

JC: AlJazeera is excellent on Iraq news, and it reports all of these incidents where there are casualties. But as far as the American public is concerned, I think that it may well be that casualties among US servicemen in Iraq, that's going to be on page 17. But if you did have an increase in the number of incidents, it's possible that it would get more coverage. It's up to the journalists now. Are they going to take this bait, are they going to be manipulated in this way as they have been manipulated all along?

ATol: Maybe it's the case that everybody has been manipulated: the American press, and now also the United Nations, forced to approve a new Iraq resolution. For millions of Iraqis, the UN is synonymous with sanctions.

JC: This is different from the rest of the Arab world, where they associate the UN with peacekeeping and a more even-handed policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the UN itself is not unaware of this, and they don't want to get heavily involved in Iraq. The problem for the world community is that the US has presented them with a fait accompli. It's not in anybody's interest in Europe, for instance, for Iraq to descend into chaos. Europe is heavily dependent on Persian Gulf petroleum, it could be deindustrialized if things get too bad. So when the Americans come and say, "If you pass a resolution of this sort, we'll set the process back to order," who's going to argue with them?

The Muqtada factor
ATol - Let's examine the move against Muqtada al-Sadr. Was it another blunder by the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority)?

JC: These things are not transparent. It's amazing to me, we supposedly live in a democracy in the United States. And yet, once the election has occurred, the public gives up a lot of right to know. And so the CPA has been run in a very untransparent way, we never know why they do anything, they never say, and they are constantly putting out those kinds of propagandistic statements, they're always trying to find demons to blame everything on, Saddam, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and then Muqtada al-Sadr. My own impression is that the Americans provoked this uprising by Muqtada, that he had not done anything in particular that might suggest he was a military threat. He had given strict orders to his militia not to fire on Americans. When the Americans came after Muqtada, he launched this uprising. I think the Shi'ite clerics made a decision to stay out of it, retreat from their positions and have the Mahdi Army have Najaf and Karbala. The Mahdi Army was not strong in those two places. I still think that it's plausible that it was Muqtada's reaction to the assassination of Sheikh [Ahmed] Yassin that caused the CPA to go after him. We must remember that the CPA is dominated by neo-conservatives, that twentysomething people like [neo-con pundit] Michael Ledeen's daughter [Simone Ledeen] have been running the Iraqi economy. Decision-making would be coming from people who are very close to the Likud Party and who were extremely alarmed when Muqtada al-Sadr said he was like the right arm of Hamas and would avenge the death of Sheikh Yassin.

ATol: Have you read any similar analysis in any of the Arab papers at the time?

JC: No. I haven't. But it's possible. I know Hezbollah called for revenge for the murder, and also did call for Iraqi solidarity about this. But this analysis, I have never seen it in the Arabic press.

ATol: You were arguably one of the few, if not the only one, in the West who wrote that the Shi'ites would never forgive America for the bombing of Karbala, and you also cared to explain why.

JC: Most Americans and Westerners don't understand what Karbala means. During the Iranian revolution there was a slogan that "every day is Ashura". Karbala is what an anthropologist called a paradigm in people's lives. The idea of American GIs firing tank missiles anywhere near the shrine of Imam Hussein in major battle with Shi'ites is unbearable, even considering that the Mahdi Army and Muqtada al-Sadr are not liked around Karbala, they are considered lower-class thugs. I compare them to gangster rappers. So I'm not saying they were popular. I'm saying that the Shi'ites look at them as their own problem. And if there is a choice between them and the Americans, symbolically at least, regardless of what they actually do, they could never make that choice for the Americans. People are very upset all over the Shi'ite world that there was this desecration of the shrine cities. The amount of rage among the Shi'ites towards the Americans now is greater than I've seen since the Iranian revolution. It's a cost of these kinds of frankly stupid policies the Bush administration has been pursuing in Iraq. I don't believe the general American public is even aware of this. They keep asking things like "Why do they hate us?" ...

ATol: What about the role of Iran in this new Iraqi configuration?

JC: They have been behind Ayatollah Sistani. But the Iranians are badly split - between the hardliners and the reformists. For the reformists, Sistani is a godsend. He rejects the theory of clerical rule, the velayat-e-faqih. And in Iran it is illegal to reject it. Ayatollah [Hossein Ali] Montazeri was put under house arrest for rejecting it. From that point of view, Sistani is much more like the reformists. He's not a Khomeinist. There have been reports of some of the reformists actually declaring themselves as followers of Sistani - because you can choose, in Shi'ite Islam, which ayatollah to follow. So I think this is a problem for [Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei and the hardliners if Iraq becomes an alternative center of religious authority and undermines their position. From this point of view, they're nervous about Sistani. On the other hand, he is part of the club, he's got excellent credentials, training, he speaks their language. What he wants for Iraq is something they can live with; he wants a parliamentary government, which would be Shi'ite-dominated, in which the Shi'ite clergy could intervene to shape legislation by their fatwas, by appealing to the consciousness of the Shi'ite legislators. I'd compare this vision of Sistani's for Iraq with 1950s Ireland and the position of the Catholic Church there. There was a secular, elected parliament. If the parliament took up any issue like divorce, the bishops would state their position and put enormous pressure on the representatives to vote their way.

ATol: So it would be nothing like a Khomeinist system.

JC: Nothing like that. On the other hand, from the point of view of the hardline Iranians, it would not be a terrible system either. It would be a Shi'ite-dominated state, it would be friendly to Tehran inevitably, the Shi'ite clergy would have a great deal of influence. And you probably could not get Khomeinism in Iraq because of the 40% of the population which is Sunni. So actually Sistani's vision is the best Iran can hope for. It would be much better than, say, a return of the Ba'ath. Moreover, Sistani wants to eliminate the presence of American troops, and this also pleases the Iranians. These are status quo people: they don't like a lot of trouble. Although the Americans keep depicting Iran as a source of trouble in the world, they haven't gone around beating their neighbors. They've been a much less turbulent revolutionary country than one might have expected, or that Saddam was. What I'm saying about them being status quo is that Muqtada makes them nervous. He's clearly a revolutionary of some sort. He's clearly got in mind to cause a lot of trouble.

The al-Qaeda factor
ATol: Wildly disparate estimates of the presence of al-Qaeda in Iraq range from 600 to 7,000. Do you discern any pattern, any strategy of al-Qaeda in Iraq? And do you buy the myth of al-Qaeda as this major SPECTRE-like, all-enveloping evil organization?

JC: First of all you have to begin with the definition of what al-Qaeda is. There's a technical definition of al-Qaeda: fighters who gave their loyalty to Osama bin Laden. Those are very few: a few hundred, maybe a few thousand. Then you could say people oriented towards bin Laden's way of thinking who have been Arab-Afghans, who had fought in Afghanistan: this is a much larger group, like 5,000. I've seen an estimate of 15,000, when you include groups such as the one responsible for the attacks in Casablanca. Relatively few of those had any links with Osama bin Laden - they were local, radical salafi groups. If we're talking about radical, violent salafis, they might reach 15,000. But then again there are 1,2 billion people in the Muslim world. These are small local networks, you cannot talk of an organization. Bin Laden has a general policy of not putting resources into situations that are already in turmoil. He's never done anything in the West Bank. He'd be much more interested in getting something going on in Indonesia or Malaysia. My information is that bin Laden is not interested in Iraq. I don't think there are even 600 al-Qaeda fighters in Iraq. There are foreign fighters but they are not technically al-Qaeda: rather Muslim Brotherhood types. The vast majority of the resistance is composed by Iraqis: not only ex-Ba'athists, but Sunni nationalists, salafis ... I suspect there are 25,000 or so insurgents in Iraq, doing something at least occasionally. Even if there were 400 or 500 foreign fighters, they would be a drop in the bucket.

ATol: How could the neo-cons engineer a victory next November, by using this period of illusion of the next four months in Iraq? Supposing it goes terribly wrong, as it might, how could they still get Bush re-elected?

JC: I know they are upset and depressed by Ahmad Chalabi being sidelined. And there is pressure from the Republican Party: it wasn't a wise thing to drag the president into another war that would then spill over into the election year. However you look at this thing it is a political disaster: even if Bush survives it. Some of the neo-cons at the Pentagon are now thinking of putting the Sunnis and the Kurds together and playing them off against the Shi'ites - as if the Kurds would cooperate with ex-Ba'ath Sunnis ... There is going to be a Shi'ite-dominated Iraq. The neo-cons assumed that the Sh'ites in Iraq might not be so sympathetic towards the Palestinians. Looking at your question, what they may try to do is this: they have managed to get Iyad Allawi as prime minister - although he wasn't the United States' first choice. These last few weeks Bremer has reversed the de-Ba'athification policy, there are a number of ex-Ba'athists in this new government. And they may attempt in some way to bring back the Ba'ath army, as a security instrument for the government to establish control.

ATol: But most of these generals are part of the resistance. They would never work for the Americans.

JC: If you gave them their jobs back to work for Allawi they might not be part of the resistance anymore. Allawi for the past 15 years has been organizing ex-Ba'ath generals. If anybody could handle them, it could be him. I'm not, by the way, saying this would be a bad thing. I think the extreme de-Ba'athification program, pursued apparently at the insistence of the Chalabi clique, was itself a mistake. It wasn't what the US military had planned on doing.

ATol: In sum, another total blunder by the CPA - a Pentagon decision implemented by Bremer.

JC: Yes, I think it was a decision by the Pentagon. I think it was done for many reasons. Initially the Pentagon planned on turning Iraq over to the Chalabi clique. For Allawi to reverse it somewhat, and to succeed in getting back some semblance of a military, three divisions, 60,000 men, this could be a good thing, it could contribute to order. The danger, of course, is that the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI], the Da'wa party, the Shi'ite forces which have spent the last 35 years fighting the Ba'ath, they're not going to like this. It could even cause more trouble.

ATol: So is there a risk of civil war in Iraq?

JC: No, not civil war. I lived in Beirut during the early years of the civil war there, and you had these militias which set pitched battles and so forth - I don't think that can happen in Iraq because the Americans are still powerful enough through their air force to stop it. What the Americans wouldn't be very good at stopping would be if you had mass urban turmoil. If you had Sunni-Shi'ite riots between Adhamiya and Kazamiya for instance, in Baghdad. You can't send attack helicopters to stop that. Or Kirkuk, which seems to me to be a tinderbox. If there is urban turmoil in the country, this is something I think the United States cannot deal with. That seems to me to be the real nightmare scenario.

Iraq as Bush's nightmare
ATol: There's a more realistic scenario of the resistance increasing in the next few months.

JC: It will, but the Americans are hard targets. I don't expect the insurgency to be able to hit the Americans and make a difference. Whether Iraq has a big impact on the election will depend very much on what's going on in Iraq in September and October, because people have short memories in elections. I think the Bush administration will be very careful not to provoke another Fallujah this fall. You could have a low-level guerrilla [war] going on, not terribly well reported in America, Iraq could well fall off the front page, it might not be a big issue in the election, so Bush may get away with it. But if he's re-elected, it's still going to be there. You simply cannot have a big, important oil producer at the head of the Persian Gulf in a state of turmoil. In a way, if Bush is re-elected, it would be poetic justice that he continues to spend a lot of energy [on] putting Iraq back together. If [Democratic presidential candidate John] Kerry were elected, he would have the same problem. Kerry being elected is not a solution.

ATol: Do you detect any Iraq policy at all from the Kerry side?

JC: Well, he says he wants to internationalize, and the real question is whether it's not too late. If Kerry is elected in November and he goes back to France and Germany and says, "OK, it's a new ball game, won't you come in with me?" are the French and German governments really going to be eager to send their troops? By then also, as the Sistani fatwa makes clear, all traces of the occupation should have been erased. There may be a building demand from the Iraqi side that foreigners just get out of their country. So Kerry's internationalization will not even be welcomed in Iraq by that point. The question is: has Bush ruined the situation beyond repair so that Kerry's policy is difficult to implement?

ATol: What would you say?

JC: I think it is very difficult for Kerry to have his policy implemented.

ATol: Finally: Will Osama be captured next October?

JC: If the Bush administration knew how to capture Osama, he would have been captured. If they could do it now, they would do it. It would become a campaign slogan. They don't have good intelligence, and even the Pakistanis don't have good intelligence. So I don't think there will be an October surprise.

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COMMENTARY
Is the US clever enough to rule the world?
By Ian Williams
Will the Iraq debacle cure, or at least ameliorate, the megalomania that has infected the foreign policy of the United States?
During the Cold War, the US often tended toward a position of primus inter pares, first among equals, with its allies. However, the past two years have seen both the culmination and, in Iraq, the catastrophic failure of a trend toward being solus sine paribus, alone without equals. The rest of the world is aware that the US is not equal to the task of ruling the world. In the light of Iraq, is Washington aware?
That the administration of President George W Bush even made the attempt is a demonstration that being a military and economic giant does not necessarily translate into diplomatic or intellectual acuity. We should also point out that this administration is not alone in its hubris; it took a unilateralist trend well established during the two administrations of president Bill Clinton and pursued it to a reductio ad absurdum et tragediam, reduced to absurdity and tragedy.
The overdose of Latin is a partial tribute to the imperial role model that set the standards - of decline and fall as well as triumphalism.
Former United Nations secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who unsuccessfully tried to teach US secretary of state Madeleine Albright the art of statecraft, once noted that neither the Roman Empire nor the US had any patience for diplomacy, which is "perceived by an imperial power as a waste of time and prestige and a sign of weakness".
However, as the Goths, Huns and Vandals, among others, demonstrated soon enough, this was a dangerous misperception for the Romans and is currently proving equally dangerous for the Americans.
Even if Bush is defeated for the chaos and casualties that his unilateralism has wrought, a John Kerry administration is at best likely to revert to the Clintonian norm of remaining unilateral in its formation of foreign policy, albeit with a more cosmopolitan and sophisticated attempt at multilateral execution.
There is no doubt that, short of some science-fiction-style cataclysm of the kind that Hollywood is so good at showing, the US is, and will remain, a world power. Whether it will be the world power, capable of independent unilateral action regardless of the views of the rest of the world, is another story completely.
Regardless of the opinions of the rest of the world, we really have to question whether such an ambition is even consonant with the views of most Americans, especially in view of the sacrifices such ambitions may entail.
We are used to a certain cynicism in world affairs, in which national interest often tempers morality. For example, while then French foreign minister (now Interior Minister) Dominique de Villepin's UN speech against the proposed Anglo-American invasion of Iraq was in the best traditions of Cartesian logic, we would need to be very naive indeed not to accept that the interests of Total-Elf-Aquitaine had much to do with French policy on the subject.
Indeed, it would be good if France had practiced in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Western Sahara and West Africa the lofty principles that it was recommending to the US and Britain on this occasion.
However, no one would accuse either the Bush or even the Clinton administration of Cartesian logic in its recent policy formulations. Indeed, what makes recent US foreign policy so anomalous is how often it is in violation of any rational national interest, let alone of abstract moral and legal principles.
In this less than perfect world, real powers with real problems will occasionally bend and stretch the rules, but this administration has gone further. It has challenged the rules themselves, and denied their normative power.
The doctrine of preemptive strikes and unilateral action, and the scorn for the United Nations and its Charter, represented a fundamental threat to the very global order that the US did so much to bring about in 1945.
In 1990, George Bush Sr spoke of a New World Order, which he presented as a revival and continuation of the 1945 settlement that the Cold War suspended. By 2003, Bush Jr was presiding over a Hobbesian disorder, in which his ideologues were telling the world that rules did not apply to the US, and in fact only applied to others when Washington deemed it appropriate.
This scofflaw tendency applies not only to existing normative rules but, in a profoundly disruptive and self-defeating way, to new and developing international conventions and normative rules that the rest of the world considers essential to cope with the growing challenges, military, social, economic and environmental, that threaten global prosperity and even survival.
For example, a small group of conservative ideologues has succeeded in delaying the US signature of the Law of the Sea. It is a hopeful sign that among the factions that want it ratified are Senator Richard Lugar, the chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the US Navy. The distressing thing is that a small group of fundamentalists obsessed with sovereignty can stall participation in a treaty that is so self-evidently in the interests of the US.
It reinforces the messages sent by the refusal to honor the Kyoto conventions, to sign the landmines treaty, and to control the small-arms trade. Similarly, the US has expended huge diplomatic capital across the world to sabotage the International Criminal Court. All across the world, US envoys bullied small countries into signing bilateral treaties protecting Americans from a non-existent threat - in the process getting a very bad lesson in international ethics.
One of the major problems with US foreign-policy formulation is that the democratic process of checks and balances does not function effectively, not least because far too many Americans have neither the information about nor the interest in what happens elsewhere, which leaves the field open to obsessive interest groups.
Indeed, there is a satirical dictionary definition of "war" as "God's way of teaching Americans geography". Sadly, it has much truth in it, except that it seems that with the current teaching aids of Fox TV, MSNBC and talk radio, the curriculum does not get beyond Geography 101. It does not bode well for democratic debate of foreign policy, and leaves the field open even more to the lobbyists and fundamentalists.
That is why, for example, while it may seem to much of the Arab world that the invasion of Iraq was an imperial enterprise, we should bear in mind that to most Americans, and certainly to a majority of those reservists drafted to staff the prisons of Abu Ghraib, this was an exercise in self-defense, payback for September 11, 2001. They would not have supported an overtly imperial agenda.
Sadly, not only ordinary Americans are geographically challenged. In many ways, the ideologues of unlimited US hegemony who contrived the Iraq invasion had as little awareness of the realities of the world as those many Americans misled by a potent combination of White House spin and cable-TV collusion.
In the end, the USA is indeed powerful, but in reality, it could not exercise the sole hegemony that the more visionary planners in the Pentagon imagined.
Imperial over-reach
Despite spending as much on defense as the next 10 largest military powers, the US armed forces are hard-pressed to maintain the occupation of Iraq, let alone to attack other countries such as Syria and Iran that seemed to be very seriously in the sights of the Pentagon planners a year ago.
One of the more obvious lessons was that military power could not be effective without "soft" moral factors, such as diplomacy, which in turn are helped by moral legitimacy.
In over-reaching, the US has shown its weaknesses. US abilities to wage conventional war across the globe depend on willing allies abroad and a public at home prepared to make sacrifices. All those military bases are on sufferance from other countries, which have often imposed restrictions on their use for purposes that they disagree with. The Turks and Saudis, for example, severely disrupted US plans to attack Iraq when they refused to host the invasion forces.
Money, and credit, said Daniel Defoe, are "the sinews of war". Paradoxically, in relation to the rest of the world, the US is economically weaker than at any time since the end of World War II. The combination of ideologically motivated tax-cutting and increasing military spending has made the US more vulnerable than ever before. Domestically, it is politically impossible for a US administration to increase taxes.
In a little-reported report it published on the US budget at the beginning of January, the International Monetary Fund hints at a rapidly undeveloping country, whose fiscal irresponsibility is compounded by a political immaturity that tends to ignore geopolitical and economic reality.
Ironically, the globalization that some have denounced as an instrument of US global domination has actually made the United States more vulnerable than ever before. Once a relatively autarkic, self-contained trade system, the US economy is now integrated into world trade systems.
One simple basis of the "Bush boom" is that China is recycling its US$100 billion-plus trade surplus with the United States back into dollars, and especially into Treasury bonds. Almost half of US Treasury bonds are now owned by Asian countries.
Among Asian countries, the Pentagon dreamers have identified China as the major future threat. Yet if Taiwan, for example, became a major crisis, those Chinese T-bonds could do more damage than H-bombs. All Chinese Prime Minister Hu Jintao has to do is shout "sell" down the phone in order to devastate the US economy more than any Chinese nuclear strike.
The US refusal to take the measures necessary to reduce its oil consumption has also made it extremely vulnerable to creeping measures of readjustment, such as a decision by oil states to price their product in euros rather than dollars. There are very good economic and political arguments for them to do just that: why take payment in a depreciating currency from a country such as the US where your holdings are vulnerable to strange tort actions and arbitrary political decisions? In that light, the mystery is really why the oil states still accept dollars.
Globalization, even as it makes the US more vulnerable, also gives it some measure of protection, since anyone who pulls the plug on the dollar would get very wet himself in the resulting splash. Nevertheless, even with that qualification, the fact is you cannot be a solo superpower on borrowed money.
Apart from military and economic power, there is a power of leadership. Opinion polls worldwide show that almost no other country in the world would elect George W Bush.
At one time, the US had high moral stature, certainly in much of the world, although we should remember the trend represented even by Franklin Roosevelt, an undoubted hero, who is on record as calling Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza a "son of a bitch" but excusing him as "our son of a bitch".
Going further, there has been a strong and increasing tendency in US thought toward Manichaean binary thinking, to see the world in terms of absolute good and evil, indeed, one might say, cowboys and Indians. Allegedly in the Levant they say that "my enemies' enemy is my friend", but in the US they take it a stage farther and consider that my enemy's enemy must necessarily be morally superior, a saint.
There is also an adage about knowing people by the company they keep. Support for the Saudi and Uzbek regimes, let alone Israeli practices, does not cover the US with glory.
Above all, to attack Iraq, allegedly for its violation of UN resolutions, in defiance of the wishes of most UN members and the UN Charter is a sin for which the US is now paying penance as it implores the international community to relieve it of its burden there. It will take a long time for Washington to regain international credibility.
Can anything be done?
At the time of the tragic and murderous attacks on New York's World Trade Center, the one consolation was that it would focus the American public on what its government was doing abroad in their name. After all, perhaps for the first time since the British burned the White House in 1813, Americans had foreign policy happening to themselves, rather than it being something that their rulers inflicted on others.
Sadly, that was clearly not the case. There was little or no public debate on the origins of al-Qaeda, no realization that expedient and ad hoc US policies had brought about and indeed financed the organization, that it was a US ally, Pakistan, that with general US support had put the Taliban in power in Afghanistan.
The rest of the world was much more aware of that, and despite that, it was the soon-to-be-hated French who quickly moved the resolution in the Security Council expressing solidarity for September 11, shortly followed by another that in effect provided legal cover for the US to attack Afghanistan in "self-defense".
The rest of the world watched with puzzlement as the US gave up on Afghanistan and finding Osama bin Laden while the American public were, almost subliminally, persuaded that the battleground for the "war on terror" should be Iraq.
It took not much more than a year for the Bush administration to boil away nearly all the unprecedented international support it had immediately after the September 11 attack.
Of course, there are different trends in US foreign policy, with the State Department, which has the unenviable task of explaining it to the rest of the world, much more able to see the benefits for the US from a general support of a normative global structure of law and order, and a predisposition to go along with it principle.
Indeed, it is more likely to recall that the US was the main sponsor of the United Nations and in its drafting of the Charter, and throughout the decades, from Korea to Suez, has invoked its authority whenever it can - and sometimes, as in Iraq, when it really could not.
It is not surprising that for past few years, the leaders of the United Nations and most of the major powers have had as the first item in their bedtime prayers a plea that Secretary of State Colin Powell would stay on at the State Department, and much of their diplomacy has been directed at boosting his position inside the Bush administration.
It is not always successful, since the Pentagon-Powell dualism sometimes looked like a planned good-cop-bad-cop routine. On the other hand, the State Department's attempts to keep some vestiges of multilateralist faith have occasionally been pathetically touching, like the attempt to pull together a list of states that supported the "coalition", most of whom were so vulnerable and weak that initially the department was too embarrassed to name them. However, we should take the attempt as a signal that even in the darkest days of triumphal unilateralism from the Pentagon civilians, there was a flicker, or at least a smolder, of multilateralism in the State Department.
The conundrum is that the US needs counterbalancing, as traditional political theory would suggest, but the question is whether that can be achieved without reverting to some form of antagonistic great power system. However, it is possible if we take into account one of the Anglo-Saxon inventions in domestic politics: the concept of a "loyal opposition". We often forget that for most of history, and across much of the globe even now, this is an oxymoron. Sadly, that is also true of some sections of the US body politic who have shown difficulty in accepting opposition at home or abroad as anything but starkest treachery. Last year's rabid francophobia was very embarrassing to any sophisticated American.
However, a loyal opposition is still a useful concept. If it stood together, the European Union is big enough to insist on a hearing in Washington, and even more so if it teams with Russia and China, although it has to beware of expediency in joining with, let us say, incompletely democratic societies. In conjunction with countries such as India, and many states in Latin America, it could indeed assemble a loyal opposition.
In this connection, perhaps the British were almost as important as Prime Minister Tony Blair thinks they are. Harold Macmillan had fond paternalistic hopes of London playing the role of Athens to Washington's Rome, perhaps forgetting that the Athenians who taught the Romans were often literally slaves.
However, for some years now the British have indeed played a special role with the US. It has been surprising how little contumely the British have attracted over the years for their role as amanuensis for successive US administrations - like Colin Powell, they have functioned at once as a bridge and a fudge between the more outrageous US wants and the realities of the world and norms of international law.
Other countries I suspect saw it as on a par with cleaning sewers: it's a dirty job, but someone has to do it, and much better someone else than us. It also has to be said that the British have done a reasonable job of it most of the time. Their constructive engagement as a reliably loyal ally did indeed give them an occasional hand on the steering wheel, as Tony Blair said.
It seems fairly certain that President Bush would not have gone to the UN at all if were not for the British prime minister's blandishments. Nevertheless, in the end it became clear that what Blair thought was the steering wheel in a car was just the whistle on a runaway locomotive. All he could do was warn that the train was rattling down the tracks and would not stop until it hit Iraq.
Confronted with the realities of the US style of occupying Iraq, and the reaction of the occupied, the British have reverted to their former role. In the various drafts of the resolution to end the Iraq occupation, they have been assiduously supporting a much more sovereign sovereignty for Iraq, even as they draft the successive resolutions.
The British invented the special relationship for their own reasons, once they realized that the empire thing was a dead duck. As they put it at the time, the British foreign minister in the 1945 Labour government wanted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to keep "the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out".
I would question whether that historical basis still exists, and would urge the Europeans, particularly the French and Germans, to work hard on the British, to suborn and turn the British Trojan Horse so that instead of being a source of unilateralist US infiltration into the EU, it takes multilateralism into Washington. That is always assuming that Blair survives his election and that Kerry overlooks the British prime minister's somewhat promiscuously rapid switch from Clinton to Bush.
Will things change if Bush loses?
Returning to the point at the beginning, the present US policy has much continuity with the previous administration's. Remember the conversation between Madeleine Albright and her British counterpart, Robin Cook, over Kosovo, in which Cook cited problems "with our lawyers" over using force in the absence of UN endorsement. Albright's response was, "Get new lawyers."
Certainly, a Kerry policy has to be an improvement over Bush's - but it may be a more marginal improvement than most of us would wish. There is the dreadful possibility that his fudging on foreign policy, his support for Ariel Sharon, is not just a cynical electoral maneuver, it may be the real thing.
However, no amount of internal argument or external exhortation can do as much to change US policy as has now been done by the over-reachers in the Pentagon, whose hubris has reduced the US to begging for international help to get out of the hole they dug in Iraq. Ironically, our best hope for a change of policy is the effect of the cold shower of reality on their fevered apocalyptic visions.
Whoever is elected has to pay the bills for this war, for the tax cuts, for the energy policy and all the other enormities of this administration. In the world councils where it will need help and indulgence, the next president is going to need a lot of forbearance and indulgence from other countries, since bullying has failed so egregiously.
The real battle is to get that message across to US legislators, opinion formers and indeed the electorate to maintain a continuing interest in foreign policy, what it does to others and, most tellingly, what the cost will be to them. Since the US is a world power, this is a global task, an essential task for everyone in the world. Stop pandering. Be firm but friendly. Real allies do not applaud your every move. They shout "Stop!" when you want to run over a cliff edge. Next time Gerhard Schroeder offers a US president advice, the latter should listen.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

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The Fate of European Populism




by Ren? Cuperus






In recent years, anti-establishment and anti-immigration populism has unsettled Western and Central Europe. Leaders such as Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, J?rg Haider in Austria, Silvio Berlusconi and Gianfranco Fini in Italy, Christoph Blocher in Switzerland, and the late Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands pushed themselves onto center stage in politics. For longer or shorter periods, some were in power. Movements once lodged securely on the far right were thus able to engage a mass electorate and challenge a political establishment that seemed unable to address the fears of ordinary Europeans. Although the political success of right-wing populist parties has ebbed over time-and especially after their failing performances in government-their impact on "intellectual" discourse and the political-cultural climate of Europe remains.

This unprecedented impact of right-wing populism derives from a political identity crisis across Europe. The disruptive effects of globalization and the retrenchment of welfare states have been accompanied by fundamental changes in the party systems. The older mass parties that have ruled most of the region since the end of the Second World War-the Christian or Conservative Democrats and the Social Democrats-have lost members, voters, ?lan, and a monopoly on ideas. Because they are in most countries the pillars of the parliamentary system and the welfare state, their slow but steady decline affects European societies as a whole. At the same time the classical ideological left/right cleavage gave way to unprecedented and unexpected coalitions and cohabitation of former political enemies. This produced political spaces for outsiders who railed against the political establishment.

Another complicating factor might be called the paradox of the Holocaust trauma. Europeans seem unable to cope with ethnic diversity. Intellectual discourse was long characterized by a species of political correctness that praised "the foreigner" for enriching society while turning a blind eye to the de facto segregation of many new immigrants and the stresses they placed on social welfare systems. These circumstances did much to provoke populist-xenophobic reactions. Consequently, Europe faces two dilemmas: how to maintain communitarian welfare states under conditions of ongoing immigration and whether the ethnic future of Europe will be characterized more by multiculturalism or assimilation.

There is also widespread unease over the process of European integration. What should have been a proud achievement of cosmopolitan cooperation between nations has become, instead, a cause of insecurity and alienation. Despite the claims of Eurocrats in Brussels, many people see the European Union not as the shield against, but as the "ugly face" of globalization because of its one-sided market liberal approach. Ten states, mostly from the ex-Soviet bloc, are about to join, and their impact on the European Project as a whole in terms of power shifts and socioeconomic imbalances is uncertain. "Old" Europe is nervous. Nervousness, discontent, and loss of national identity are easily channeled through right-wing populist movements. They tap into xenophobia, express protests against the difficulties of contemporary representative democracy, and chastise the "political correctness" of elites.

Populists present "the people" as a homogeneous entity facing a closed, technocratic, "corrupt elite" that has betrayed the interest of the majority. Their protest can be read as a fever signaling that problems are not being dealt with effectively. This explains the popularity of sound bites such as, "We are down-they are up." "We should be in, they should be out." These statements are from Austria, but you can find similar ones in Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark in right-wing movements that claim to represent "the people" and to defend and shield national, cultural, or ethnic identity against "outsiders" and stress leadership, law and order, and nostalgia for a "lost world."

Some of these populist movements originated on the extreme right or contain neo-Nazis and fascists. Many of them tried to transform themselves into "normal" democratic organizations. The Italian Alleanza Nazionale of Gianfranco Fini, with roots in fascism, has tried to become something more "responsible" by serving as a governing party (in coalition) in contrast to the French Front National split over such "responsible" prospects. Some parties developed out of older parties (for example, Haider's FP?, Pia Kjaersgaard's People's Party in Denmark). Others are new creations, such as Berlusconi's Forza Italia, Fortuyn's List in the Netherlands, or Carl Ivar Hagen's Progress Party in Norway.

Populist movements are almost by definition unstable. The best example is the meteoric rise and fall of the Front National in the elections of 2002. To everyone's surprise, Le Pen finished second in the first round of presidential elections, surpassing Socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin. This may have been due to electoral fragmentation on the left, but it caused political shock waves and led the mainstream left to support tacitly the re-election of Gaullist president Jacques Chirac. This led to a remarginalization of Le Pen on the national level, although he has regional support.

A somewhat similar story of "climax and anti-climax" took place in both the Netherlands and Austria. After Fortuyn was murdered, his party served disastrously in the government. Internal struggles between cabinet ministers and within the beheaded party led to a governmental crisis after eighty days and then to elections, which produced a new government. In Vienna, Haider's party was ravaged by internal struggles and splits resulting in electoral losses, even though the FP? returned to government as the shaky junior partner of the Christian Democrats.

These patterns suggest that populist movements are poorly equipped for institutional longevity. Their aversion to traditional party structures deprives them of political machines built around "cadres" that enable a degree of continuity and consistency in programs. Instead, populists often rely on charismatic and authoritarian leaders. "The empty heart of populism," writes social scientist Paul Taggart, "the lack of key values, means that it is particularly liable to the politics of personality. . . . Populism prefers the simple solution of leadership itself over the complex process of politics to resolve problems." Ironically, leadership conflicts are endemic to populist parties as the splits in Haider's and Le Pen's parties show. Fortuyn's murder sapped what had been the fastest growing political force in the Netherlands. These parties are far better at sounding alarms than at becoming partners in a stable government. They are able to affect the political debate and can propagate themselves without sustaining powerful and normal party structures. Mainstream parties are forced to adopt or even internalize parts of their populist agenda.

The right-wing populists push a litany of themes to the forefront of public debate. They challenge the "illusion" of a multicultural society and link it to crime and insecurity. They call for the restoration of standards and values, for order and authority. They chastise abuses by governing elites and the established "cartel" of political parties. They denounce the shortcomings of representation in today's parliamentary democracies, and they rail against the apparently unstoppable unification of Europe. They complain about tolerance of immigrants and libertine behavior. They object to upheaval caused by neoliberal globalization and the linked "crisis" in the public sector. And they have a simple solution to all problems: halt all new immigration and compel "old" immigrants to adapt or to assimilate.

A cruel sociology helps to explain the appeal of this populism of disenchantment. The rise of a "knowledge society" has alienated those who have been unable to keep up with the change, the so-called "losers of the modernization process." Mass media proclaiming continual crisis and social drama have also increased mass insecurity and encouraged a cynical view of institutions, especially those of the struggling welfare state. Additional factors contributing to the grief of the less educated include a decline of manufacturing jobs, the increasing market value of those who accumulate cultural "capital," the evaporation of the "socialist" dream of a more egalitarian world, the rise of "multiculturalization," and accompanying "ethnocultural" tensions on the micro-level.

Elites in the academy and state bureaucracies generally ignored these rumbles, assumed that everyone accepted cosmopolitan, relativist norms, and paid no attention to the growing desire to preserve familiar ways of life and forms of identity. Where does all this leave European social democrats? In difficult straits. The "revolt of the little man" (and, to a lesser degree, woman) highlights an old-but often unadmitted-divide in the democratic left between the well educated and less educated, between "postmateralists" and "materialists." In a sense, right-wing populism is the cultural revenge of the "working class" against the intellectual elites who run "workers' parties." This friction between the "chattering Establishment" and the common man is the Achilles' heel of contemporary social democracy.

A major reason for the "populist momentum" of the 1990s was the decline of ideological confrontation. Consider what happened when the Italian political system imploded and disrupted both the Christian Democrats and the parties of the left. Space opened for Silvio Berlusconi's media-populist domination of public life. In other countries-Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, France-the moderate, mainstream right and left "cohabitated" in governments, retrenching and reshaping the arrangements of the European welfare states. The new populists did fill the new vacuum of left/right-depoliticization. Their target seemed to be the worried working classes, but they also sought support from segments of the middle-class and "nouveaux riches" who don't feel represented by today's political system.

If social democrats still regard themselves as champions of a solidaristic liberal democracy, then they must pay far more attention to the darker aspects of the "modernization" processes that are now sweeping the world. They must learn how to keep in touch again with its "less educated constituents" and recognize that it must begin to make demands that may be at the expense of the more powerful group of the left-the intellectual "knowledge class." Right-wing populism is wrong, but it articulates real problems and insensitivities that the left has not faced adequately.

This means a reorientation of social democratic policy. Social democrats must focus on the less educated and the displacement on poorly qualified workers. They must reconsider how profoundly crime injures working-class communities and, most controversially, social democrats must begin to appreciate the disruptive impact of immigration when there is no serious program for integrating newcomers. How much anti-populism can a mass social democratic party allow itself? How long can a social democratic party that depends on the support of educationally deprived voters continue to favor liberal penal policies? Can European social democracy be both cosmopolitan and culturally relativist (as the defender of minority cultures) at the same time? Can it retain its allegiance to a European supranationalism that undermines the vitality of democratic representative politics and thereby invites right-wing populists to be the defenders of national identity against cosmopolitan elites?

I am not making an argument for "Haidering" the left, that is, adopting the rhetoric and program, let alone the anti-democratic and anti-humanistic solutions of right-wing populism. I am suggesting that the left had better take seriously the underlying causes for the rise of populism in contemporary Europe. "The desire to transcend populism is shortsighted," Michael Kazin observes. "It is only when leftists and liberals themselves talked in populist ways-hopeful, expansive, even romantic-that they were able to lend their politics a majoritarian cast and help markedly to improve the common welfare." He is thinking of America, but this is also true of Europe. A civilized democracy can only survive in the long term when moderates sing more appealing tunes, and keep on doing so. European social democracy cannot allow populist discontent to become a monopoly of the right.

Ren? Cuperus is senior research fellow and director of international relations at the Wiardi Beckman Foundation, think tank of the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA), and editor-in-chief of the review Socialisme & Democratie. He is co-editor and author of Multiple Third Ways, European Social Democracy facing the Twin Revolution of Globalisation and the Knowledge Society.



? 2004 Foundation for Study of Independent Ideas, Inc

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Clinton Friendship With Corrupt Union Boss

by Linda Chavez
Posted Jun 17, 2004

Bill Clinton's memoir will hit bookstores later this month, but one story you're not likely to read in its pages involves Clinton's friendship with Arthur A. Coia. The debonair former president of the Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA) was one of the Democratic Party's biggest contributors when Clinton was in office. In the first four years of the Clinton administration alone, LIUNA gave $4.8 million to Democrat candidates and the Democratic Party. Although Clinton had contact with Coia no fewer than 120 times, their association is an awkward memory for the former president given the latter's ties to organized crime and that of the union he once headed.

In 1986, President Reagan's Commission on Organized Crime identified LIUNA as one of the "bad four" -- the most corrupt unions in the nation -- along with the Teamsters, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Workers, and the International Association of Longshoremen. According to Congressional testimony by the FBI, each of these union's presidents at the time had been "handpicked by La Cosa Nostra." Angelo Fosco, who served as LIUNA president from 1975-1993, won reelection while he was under federal indictment for union racketeering -- a victory won through "the use of force and threats of violence against potential competitors," according to the Reagan Crime Commission.

And Coia was no exception. He became secretary treasurer of LIUNA in 1987, the No. 2 job in the union, with the blessings of the Chicago mob, according to Coia's own admissions in sworn testimony. When Clinton tried to reward Coia for his political contributions by appointing him to a prestigious presidential commission, the Council on Competitiveness, the appointment set off alarm bells at the FBI. In a memo, investigators doing a background check wrote, "Coia is a criminal associate of the New England Patriarca organized crime family." The bureau also warned the White House that "within the next several weeks" the Department of Justice "will accuse Coia of being a puppet of the LCN (La Cosa Nostra)." Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis even tried calling the White House to warn officials not to get too close to the alleged mob-controlled union boss -- to no avail.

Although Clinton dropped plans to name Coia to the Council on Competitiveness, he continued to meet with the union leader, exchanged expensive gifts and frequent notes with him, and invited him to travel aboard the presidential aircraft on a trip to Rhode Island. All of this went on while the Justice Department was preparing a racketeering complaint against Coia and his union. On Nov. 4, 1994, the Justice Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section served Coia with a 212-page draft complaint.

"Then something strange happened," noted the liberal muckraking magazine Washington Monthly at the time. Instead of indicting Coia, the Justice Department worked out a sweetheart deal that allowed Coia to avoid prosecution and keep his job, while a federally appointed investigator pursued lower-level mobsters within the union. Just days before the Justice Department offered the deal, Hillary Clinton traveled to Miami to address the annual LIUNA conference on Feb. 6, 1995, despite warnings from the Justice Department that the trip was ill advised.
The decision not to move forward with its complaint shocked everyone, except perhaps Coia himself. The Justice Department had previously filed racketeering charges in 15 other union cases, taking over the corrupt unions' operations. But Clinton couldn't protect his union benefactor forever -- especially when Coia himself couldn't keep his hands out of the union cookie jar. In January 2000, Arthur Coia pled guilty for failing to pay taxes on the purchase of three Ferraris from a Rhode Island car dealer who held a million-dollar leasing agreement with the union. As part of his plea agreement, Coia stepped down as LIUNA president but was allowed to keep his $250,000 yearly salary for life.
If the Clinton administration's dealings with Arthur Coia and the Laborers Union were an isolated incident, it would be bad enough, but the corrupting nexus between union money and Democratic political power was especially tight during the Clinton years. But the unions' role in financing Democrats didn't end when Bill Clinton left office.
This election cycle, unions will spend an estimated $800 million, much of it hidden in the form of salaries for union officials assigned to work on political campaigns, member communications, get-out-the-vote efforts, and other unregulated contributions that go overwhelmingly to elect Democrats. But don't expect to read about it on the front page of the New York Times or in Clinton's memoir.
Copyright ? 2003 HUMAN EVENTS. All Rights Reserved.
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http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040705&s=ireland
Dick Cheney and the $5 Million Man
by DOUG IRELAND
[posted online on June 18, 2004]
The Securities and Exchange Commission has finally opened a formal investigation into allegations that Halliburton (in partnership with French petro-engineering company Technip) funneled $180 million into a slush fund to pay bribes in the construction of a $6 billion Nigerian gas refinery--a scandal that French authorities have been probing for a year (for background, see Doug Ireland, "Will the French Indict Cheney?" December 29, 2003).
The energy conglomerate formerly headed by Dick Cheney disclosed the SEC probe (as it was required to do by law for any legal action potentially affecting the company's stock) on June 11. The timing of the disclosure was no accident--it was a Friday, the last day of the interminable Reagan funeral ceremonies, and Wall Street was thus closed. The national press corps focused on little else but the burial, so the SEC investigation got scant attention in the weekend papers (even the New York Times ran only a brief AP dispatch on its website).
Although the US media have shown little interest in the story, the investigation of the Halliburton Nigeria scandal by France's most celebrated investigating magistrate, Judge Renaud Van Ruymbeke, has continued making headlines in Paris--where the latest revelations bring the scandal right to the front door of Halliburton's Houston headquarters.
The Journal du Dimanche (JDD, a large Sunday paper) revealed on June 13 that Judge Van Ruymbeke's investigation has uncovered how Albert "Jack" Stanley, the president of huge Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) at the time of the alleged bribery, received so-called "commissions" of 3 percent of the deal from the slush fund. The total amount Stanley received is some $5 million, according to reports in the International Herald Tribune and elsewhere. The Nigerian oil minister at the time, Dan Entete, got $2.5 million, reported the JDD. The slush fund was set up with Halliburton money by a London lawyer, Jeffrey Tesler--who worked for Halliburton at the same time he was financial adviser to the notoriously corrupt late Nigerian dictator Gen. Sani Abacha--as a shell-company front called TriStar, which Tesler established in the British tax haven of Gibraltar. Stanley, the 5 Million Dollar Man, is a close friend and associate of Dick Cheney.
In mid-May, after Judge Van Ruymbeke threatened to issue an international warrant to bring Tesler to France to testify, Tesler "voluntarily" came to Paris for two days of testimony under oath. Confronted by Van Ruymbeke with documents obtained through international search warrants targeting banks in Switzerland, Monaco, Madeira and elsewhere, Tesler admitted having made the highly unusual payments from the slush fund to then-KBR president Stanley, which Stanley had sent to a numbered bank account in Zurich baptized "Amal" (according to the French weekly Le Canard Enchaîné). Another huge payment of $350,000 was made to a top KBR executive, William Chaudran, which Chaudran had routed to an anonymous bank account in the island fiscal paradise of Jersey, Tesler testified. (Stanley, who is retired from KBR but maintains an office and secretary in Halliburton-KBR's Houston headquarters, did not return calls requesting comment, and neither did Halliburton-KBR's flack, Wendy Hall.)
The obvious question is: If the payments to the KBR execs were legitimate, why route them through secret foreign bank accounts? And where did the rest of the $180 million go? To the dictator Abacha, whose money adviser Tesler was, and other Abacha cronies?
Statements given by Halliburton to Le Figaro and other French papers covering the scandal claim the conglomerate had no knowledge of the payments to the KBR execs--and appear to be setting up Stanley as the fall guy. Is this to keep the scandal from touching Cheney?
The final contract for construction of the Nigeria refinery, one of the world's largest, was signed in 1999, on Cheney's watch (Cheney was CEO of Halliburton from 1995 to 2000). Bribes of the sort under investigation by the SEC and the French are illegal under statutes of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, of whose international conventions both the United States and France are signatories-members; and under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In disclosing the SEC investigation, Halliburton said it did not believe it had violated the FCPA, while adding, "There can be no assurance that government authorities would not conclude otherwise."
Indeed.
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Halliburton sacks KBR chairman as probe continues
AFP , WASHINGTON
Sunday, Jun 20, 2004,Page 11
Oil services giant Halliburton said Friday it sacked a consultant and former chairman of one of its subsidiaries after a probe into a Nigeria project revealed he got "improper personal benefits."
The company, once headed by US Vice President Dick Cheney and facing criticism for its contracts in Iraq, said it was "terminating all of its relationships with Mr. A. Jack Stanley."
Stanley had been a consultant and previously had served as chairman of Halliburton's Kellogg Brown and Root engineering subsidiary.
Stanley had served in several management capacities since joining M.W. Kellogg, which was acquired by Dresser Industries Inc, a firm that became part of Halliburton in 1988.
Halliburton said one additional consultant and former employee, whose name was not disclosed, was terminated due to "violations of ... codes of business conduct that, to Halliburton's knowledge, involve the receipt by these persons of improper personal benefits."
Halliburton had previously acknowledged a probe by US and French authorities into possible bribes of as much as US$180 million paid in connection with a multibillion dollar Nigeria natural gas project.
"Halliburton continues to cooperate with the United States Department of Justice and the SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] in connection with these matters, and its own internal investigation is continuing," the statement said.
The statement added that Halliburton "does not believe it has violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" -- which bans bribes to foreign officials -- but could not guarantee that the probe would show otherwise.
The investigation is believed to be focused on whether a Halliburton joint venture broke US anti-bribery laws in order to win construction contracts for the gas plant.
A French investigating magistrate has uncovered evidence of payments to KBR executives.
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Copyright ? 1999-2004 The Taipei Times. All rights reserved.


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L'enqu?te sur Halliburton s'approche de M. Cheney
LE MONDE | 16.06.04 | 13h52 * MIS A JOUR LE 16.06.04 | 14h27
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Le vice-pr?sident am?ricain aurait favoris? l'entreprise parap?troli?re qu'il avait dirig?e.
New York de notre correspondant
Le directeur de cabinet du vice-pr?sident am?ricain Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby, et d'autres membres de l'administration seraient impliqu?s dans l'attribution ? la soci?t? Halliburton, ? la fin de l'ann?e 2002, d'une ?tude pr?liminaire secr?te sur la remise en ?tat des infrastructures p?troli?res irakiennes.
Ces accusations sont port?es par le repr?sentant d?mocrate Henri Waxman. Il demande au vice-pr?sident, dans une lettre rendue publique le 13 juin, de remettre tous les documents et enregistrements en sa possession li?s aux contrats irakiens de Halliburton. M. Cheney a ?t? PDG de cette soci?t? d'octobre 1995 ? ao?t 2000.
"Les derni?res r?v?lations, ?crit M. Waxman, semblent contredire vos affirmations selon lesquelles vous n'?tiez pas inform? des contrats de Halliburton. Elles semblent ?galement contredire les d?clarations r?p?t?es du gouvernement selon lesquelles des politiques n'ont jamais ?t? impliqu?s dans l'attribution de march?s ? Halliburton." La commission des r?formes administratives de la Chambre des repr?sentants, ? laquelle appartient M. Waxman, a interrog? ? huis clos, la semaine derni?re, des fonctionnaires du d?partement de la d?fense sur les contrats d'Halliburton.
En novembre 2002, un groupe constitu? au Pentagone pour pr?parer l'avenir ?conomique de l'Irak en cas de guerre sollicite Halliburton afin d'?tablir un plan secret de remise en ?tat de l'industrie p?troli?re de ce pays. Il verse pour cela 1,9 million de dollars ? la soci?t? texane. Le 8 mars 2003, le corps du g?nie de l'arm?e de terre am?ricaine choisit KBR (Kellogg Brown & Root, filiale de Halliburton) pour r?parer les infrastructures p?troli?res irakiennes selon les modalit?s que sa soci?t? m?re a d?finies trois mois auparavant. Le march? est confi? ? l'issue d'une proc?dure discr?tionnaire sans appel d'offres ou mise en concurrence. Un courrier ?lectronique du 5 mars 2003, ?manant d'un directeur r?gional du corps de g?nie, Stephen Browning, laisse entendre que l'attribution du contrat est "coordonn?e" avec le cabinet de Dick Cheney. Ce march? s'est av?r? ?tre une excellente affaire pour Halliburton. Sa valeur est pass?e de 71,3 millions de dollars en mars ? 2,4 milliards en d?cembre 2003.
L'administration a r?v?l? l'existence du contrat ? la fin du mois de mars 2003, mais elle l'a alors d?crit comme consistant seulement ? ?teindre les puits en feu. Elle a reconnu plus tard qu'il ?tait d'une tout autre ampleur et s'est engag?e alors ? ce qu'il soit temporaire. De nouveaux contrats ont ?t? attribu?s ? l'issue d'une proc?dure concurrentielle, le 16 janvier, ? raison de 800 millions de dollars ? la soci?t? californienne Parsons et 1,2 milliard ? Halliburton.
M. Cheney nie avoir jou? le moindre r?le dans le choix de Halliburton. "En tant que vice-pr?sident, je n'ai absolument aucune influence, aucune implication et aucune connaissance d'aucune sorte sur les contrats du corps du g?nie", avait-il d?clar?, fin 2003, sur la cha?ne de t?l?vision NBC. Selon le Pentagone, le sous-secr?taire ? la d?fense, Douglas Feith, responsable de la planification de l'apr?s-guerre en Irak, a averti des membres du cabinet de M. Cheney de l'attribution, en mars 2003, du march? ? Halliburton.
Tout aussi g?nant pour le vice-pr?sident, Halliburton fait l'objet d'enqu?tes judiciaires sur d'?ventuelles malversations ayant eu lieu pendant la p?riode o? il dirigeait l'entreprise. Elle a inform? ses actionnaires, la semaine pass?e, de l'ouverture d'une proc?dure officielle par la SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), l'autorit? am?ricaine des march?s financiers, au sujet de paiements douteux effectu?s dans le cadre de la construction d'un important complexe gazier au Nigeria.
L'op?ration de 4 milliards de dollars a ?t? r?alis?e entre 1995 et 2002 par un consortium comprenant KBR, le groupe fran?ais Technip, l'italien ENI et le japonais Japan Gasoline Corp. Le juge fran?ais Renaud Van Ruymbeke et le minist?re de la justice s'int?ressent notamment ? un paiement de 180 millions de dollars effectu? ? la soci?t? Tristar, ? Gibraltar, appartenant ? l'avocat britannique Jeffrey Tesler. Selon le directeur financier de Halliburton, Christopher Gaut, M. Tesler ?tait l'agent du consortium au Nigeria et a re?u une commission "habituelle". Mais environ 5 millions de dollars provenant de cette somme ont ?t? retrouv?s sur un compte bancaire en Suisse appartenant ? Albert Stanley, ancien pr?sident de KBR et conseiller de l'entreprise.
Par ailleurs, une enqu?te a ?t? ouverte aux Etats-Unis sur de possibles surfacturations de KBR ? l'arm?e en Irak et dans les Balkans, o? cette soci?t? fournit une grande partie de la logistique aux troupes am?ricaines. Selon un audit du Pentagone fait en mai et rendu public par M. Waxman, le syst?me de facturation de la filiale de Halliburton est "inad?quat". KBR avait remport?, en d?cembre 2001, un contrat tr?s important aupr?s du Pentagone. Il concerne l'approvisionnement en nourriture et l'entretien des troupes am?ricaines ? l'?tranger, et donc, aujourd'hui, des 150 000 soldats dans le Golfe et 17 000 en Afghanistan. Ce contrat aurait rapport?, jusqu'? pr?sent, pr?s de 5 milliards de dollars.
Eric Leser

* ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 17.06.04
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Reducing Uninsurance by Reforming Health Insurance in the Small-Business Sector
by Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D.
Backgrounder #1769


June 17, 2004 | Executive Summary | |

Families lacking health insurance is a persistent problem in the United States. According to projections based on a sampling for the Kaiser Family Foundation, approximately 43 million non-elderly Americans were uninsured at any point during 2002.1 According to the Congressional Budget Office, based on survey figures for 1998, between 21 million and 31 million people lacked insurance for the entire year, while nearly 60 million were uninsured at some point during the year.2

For some of these people, a short spell without insurance poses no real hardship. Some are "voluntarily" uninsured, in that they consciously decide to forgo insurance that they can afford and take the financial risk. Many of these individuals pay directly for routine care and/or use the emergency room. But millions of others desire insurance, yet cannot afford it or otherwise obtain adequate coverage. For these Americans, a major illness or accident could mean financial ruin or going without necessary care.

According to the Kaiser survey, about two-thirds of the non-elderly uninsured are from low-income families (less than 200 percent of the poverty level, or approximately $29,000 for a family of three). Moreover, about 80 percent (including children) come from working families, and 70 percent have a family member working full-time.3


Small-Business Insurance Is Dysfunctional
While most uninsured people are in working families, they are not spread evenly across the workplace. Instead, they are heavily concentrated in the small-business sector. The Kaiser survey4 indicates that:

Almost half (48.7 percent) of all uninsured workers are either self-employed or work for firms with fewer than 25 workers.
The highest rates of uninsurance are also among these workers. Some 26.3 percent of self-employed workers are uninsured, as are nearly one-third (31.2 percent) of all workers in firms with fewer than 25 employees. Analysis by the Employee Benefit Research Institute underscores this general pattern: the smaller the firm, the higher the probability that workers will be uninsured.5
Meanwhile, just 12.6 percent of workers in firms with 1,000 or more employees lack insurance--typically low-paid individuals who decline offered coverage.


The concentration of uninsurance in small-business and lower-income households helps to explain the high level of uninsurance among non-managers in such occupations as agriculture (42.7 percent of non-managers uninsured), construction (37.8 percent), and services (34.6 percent), where small firms and lower-income households are disproportionately represented.

The preponderance of minorities in small firms also helps to explain the high levels of uninsurance among Hispanic workers (38.7 percent) and black Americans (23.7 percent), compared with relatively low rates among whites (13.2 percent).6
Thus, while uninsurance occurs in every stratum of American society, even among highly paid households, it is heavily concentrated in households in the small-business sector.

Less than 30 percent of low-income, full-time workers in firms with fewer than 25 employees have insurance.7
There are certainly weaknesses in using the large-business sector to provide insurance, but it does function as a workable system; however, for close to a majority of workers in small firms, the system of health insurance in the small-business sector is practically dysfunctional.

To address the inherent weakness of employer-sponsored coverage in the small-business sector, policymakers should not try to force or induce small employers to act like large-firm sponsors of insurance. That will never be effective. Instead, they should empower employees of small firms to make the same choices as employees of large firms while enabling small employers to facilitate those choices. Specifically, Congress should:

Create a refundable tax credit for workers in small firms in order to eliminate the bias against employees choosing their own coverage and to subsidize those who need the most help.
Create alternative pools for employees of small firms--including plans offered through churches, unions, and other intermediaries--so that these workers and their families can access a wide range of affordable plans.
Make it easier for employees of small firms to sign up for insurance at the workplace--even when the employer does not sponsor insurance--by removing tax and regulatory obstacles.
Why Small-Business-Based Insurance Is in Deep Trouble
Surveys indicate that working Americans generally prefer employer-based health coverage to other ways of acquiring health insurance, and many experts maintain that employment-based coverage has many advantages.8 However, most of the generic advantages of employment-based insurance apply far less, or not at all, to the self-employed and to workers in small firms.9

There are several reasons for the general popularity of employer-sponsored coverage and several reasons why small firms are the exception.

Employment-based coverage is the only way for most families to obtain a very large tax benefit for insurance costs. This tax benefit is smaller and less available for workers in small firms. When part of a worker's compensation is provided in the form of health insurance, the value of that compensation is exempt from all income taxes (state as well as federal) and all payroll taxes (i.e., Social Security and Medicare taxes). The total value of this "tax exclusion" in 2004 is projected by analysts at the Lewin Group to be about $188.5 billion in federal and state income and payroll taxes.10
But there are two snags with this form of tax subsidy:

It favors high-income households over low-income households. For an insured family with an annual income over $100,000, the average value of the tax benefit in 2004 is estimated by Lewin Group analysts at $2,780. For lower-income but insured families, the tax benefit is a small fraction of that amount because their marginal tax rate is lower. Families with household incomes of from $20,000-$30,000 receive a tax benefit averaging just $725.11



If the employer does not offer insurance (or affordable insurance) for a particular worker, the family typically does not receive a tax break or other subsidy to help purchase insurance. If the employer does not offer insurance, or if the worker cannot afford to enroll in the available plan, there is of course no tax subsidy. But if such an uninsured person considers buying coverage for himself and his family, he normally receives no tax benefits at all. The whole cost is in after-tax income.

A small firm is far less likely to offer insurance, which means employees of such a firm would receive no tax break, and lower-income workers are more commonly employed in smaller firms. According to a recent survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation, while 98 percent of firms with at least 200 employees offered insurance in 2003, only 65 percent of firms with fewer than 200 offered insurance. Not surprisingly, in 2001, some 64 percent of uninsured workers were not even offered insurance through their own job.12 According to a survey of firms in 1999, only 55 percent of firms with fewer than 10 employees offered insurance.13



Employment-based insurance is very convenient--if it is available. The workplace is a convenient location for many transactions. For instance, most Americans pay their income tax through withholding available at their workplace. Many employees also contribute to their own IRA-type pension savings plan--typically a 401(k) plan--by having their employer make a deduction from their paychecks.
Similarly, when an employer provides health coverage, an employee can easily participate in the plan, assuming the worker can afford it. Premiums are paid directly by the employer, and the worker does not even have to apply for a tax exclusion. The W-2 form, which indicates the worker's income for tax purposes, simply makes no mention of the employer's contribution to the worker's health insurance. Moreover, if the worker has to pay something toward the cost of the plan, this is usually done through a convenient payroll deduction during each pay period.

This "automatic" way of obtaining health insurance works well for larger firms; but because smaller employers are far less likely to offer insurance, they are also far less likely to set up a payroll deduction system for employees who wish to arrange their own coverage.

Large firms provide a large and stable insurance pooling. Small firms do not. A company with a large work force obviously also has a large pool for insurance purposes. This means that the insurance risk for healthier and sicker employees can be spread across the large group and that the insurer (sometimes the firm itself, functioning as a "self-insurer") can predict average usage more accurately. Thus, an insurer can estimate the expected total claims cost for the group fairly accurately.
Moreover, if a new employee poses particularly high--or low--insurance risk (and therefore incurs particularly higher or lower medical expenses), this will not significantly change the group's expected total cost, and an insurer can offer a group premium that will not change drastically over time (other than tracking the general growth rate for medical expenditures), despite possibly wide variations in medical risks among employees. Large companies also have the economies of scale and sophistication to provide insurance at a low administrative cost per employee.

Small firms, however, are by definition small insurance pools. A retail store with a handful of employees is a dismal pool for insurance purposes. Hiring a new employee with a disability, or the diagnosis of a chronic heart problem in an older worker, can dramatically change insurance costs for the employer from one year to the next. States and the federal government recognize this and are exploring various ways to group small firms together to form larger insurance pools. But the need for these efforts only underscores the fact that small firms are a poor basis for pooling employees' insurance risks.

Three criteria for risk pools. It is also important to recognize that the size of a risk pool is only one of three important criteria for a good insurance risk pool. The other two are randomness and stability, which also present problems for small employers and even groups of small employers. In other words, the group must be in line with the health risk associated with a random cross section of the population from which the employees are typically drawn, and the group's composition must not change frequently. Unfortunately, the employee turnover rate in small business is relatively high, as is the tendency of firm-owners to withdraw from multi-employer groups if they can obtain less expensive coverage somewhere else.

Advantages in bargaining and administration depend on firm size. Larger firms can bargain quite effectively with insurers and providers and thus are able to deliver cost-effective coverage that is often tailored specifically for their work force. Moreover, because they have a large group available to the insurer (or the plan administrator if they are self-insured), administrative costs per worker tend to be relatively low.
Again, this advantage does not exist with small firms. Small firms face relatively high administrative costs, and many small-business owners consequently do not see it as efficient to organize insurance. Precisely because they lack the economies of scale and the management resources of larger firms, small businesses tend to face high costs when administering plans. According to data collected by the Congressional Budget Office, overhead costs for providing insurance can be over 30 percent of premium costs for firms with fewer than 10 employees, compared with about 12 percent for firms with more than 500 employees.14

In addition to simple economies of scale, other things such as higher staff turnover contribute to this difference. Moreover, many small-business owners have little desire to engage in the demanding task of organizing health insurance to meet the often-varied needs of their employees.



The degree of choice is related to the size of the employer. Because of the size of their insurance pools and their sophistication, large companies can more easily provide a choice of health plans, making it more likely that their workers will be reasonably satisfied with their coverage. Small firms, however, can rarely offer a choice of plans. If a small employer provides coverage, it tends to be a single "one-size-fits-all" plan. While 61 percent of workers with insurance in firms of 5,000 or more employees had a choice of at least three plans in 2003, only 20 percent of covered workers in companies with fewer than 100 employees had a similar choice of at least three plans.15
Small firms cannot provide the same quality of benefits. Even if a small employer decides to offer a plan, that employer typically cannot offer the same quality of benefits as a larger employer. High administrative costs, low bargaining clout, small and unstable pools, and the other obstacles combine to reduce the quality of benefits that can be offered.
A recent study by Jon Gabel and Jeremy Pickreign for the Commonwealth Fund underscores this disadvantage. The study used 2002-2003 survey data from the Kaiser Family Foundation and other sources and found that, although premiums charged to firms were comparable between firms of different sizes, the premiums bought fewer benefits for the workers and their families in small firms.16

For example, only 38 percent of workers in firms with fewer than 25 employees were offered dental benefits, compared with 87 percent in firms of 200 or more. Meanwhile, 100 percent of employees in the large firms had access to prenatal care benefits, compared with 93 percent in the smaller firms. Moreover, employees of the small firms faced far higher deductibles for single or family coverage.

Goals for Addressing Uninsurance in the Small-Business Sector
With such a heavy concentration of the uninsured employed and their dependents in the small-business sector, it makes sense to focus efforts on addressing the obstacles facing families in that sector.

A good way to approach the task is first to consider the overarching goals that one would want to achieve, not just for these families, but also in the long term for all Americans.

Goal #1: Financial assistance to families for health insurance coverage should be based on need.

As noted earlier, many lower-paid employees in small firms face a subsidy double-whammy. Those who are offered insurance are paid less and thus get a much smaller tax benefit than upper-income employees through the exclusion from taxable income of employer-sponsored health benefits. Many have no employer-sponsored insurance at all, and if they purchase their own insurance, they typically receive no tax break.

A sensible reform would be to provide similar tax breaks or other assistance to families whether or not they obtained their insurance through the workplace. Rather than a tax exclusion or a tax decision, which gives the most help to those with the highest income, a more efficient and fairer approach would concentrate more help on lower-paid Americans, perhaps through a tax credit.

Goal #2: The available choices of health insurance should not depend on the place of employment.

Unlike the employees of large firms, workers in small business currently have little or no choice of coverage, even if they are offered tax-advantaged insurance.

A sensible reform would be to permit workers in small firms to use any tax break or other subsidy available to them to purchase a plan of their own choice, not just the one (if any) selected by their employer. This reform would allow workers in small firms to obtain insurance through large pools or organizations equivalent in size and sophistication to large employers. It would also mean that employees could retain their chosen coverage if they changed employers.

Goal #3: While workers would continue to sign up for coverage in the workplace and obtain tax subsidies through the workplace, employers should not have to sponsor health insurance for workers in order to be eligible for tax subsidies.

Changing the nature of today's tax subsidy and widening the choice of insurance plans for workers in small firms means rethinking the role of small employers in the provision of health insurance. Large firms typically both sponsor insurance (i.e., select the plans or self-insure) and facilitate insurance (i.e., arrange for employees to sign up and pay for insurance).

Given the obstacles that make it very uneconomic for small firms to offer coverage, divorcing the sponsor and facilitator roles--and leaving smaller firms with only the facilitator role--would reduce the burden and risk for many small employers and make it more likely that they would help their employees to select and sign up for coverage.

Three Steps to Increase Coverage for the Employees of Small Firms
The inherent weaknesses of small firms as sponsors of health insurance require policymakers to think differently about the role of small employers. Thinking of them as just small versions of large firms overlooks the different nature of the small-business workplace.

Instead, policymakers need to construct a health insurance infrastructure for workers in the small-business sector that achieves--or exceeds--the insurance advantages of large firms by altering the role of the small employer and changing how benefits are subsidized. (For an overview of the proposed changes, see Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the Appendix.) Congress needs to take three steps to do this:

Step #1: Create a refundable tax credit for workers in small firms in order to eliminate the bias against employees choosing their own coverage and to subsidize those who need the most help.

Unlike a tax deduction or tax exclusion, which favors upper-income workers, a tax credit provides either the same level of assistance to each recipient or even more help for lower-paid individuals. It can be designed in various ways. A credit can be in the form of a fixed dollar credit; a percentage of the premium and/or out-of-pocket, perhaps with a maximum credit amount; or a combination--a base fixed amount plus a percentage of the premium. Each has different effects and financial consequences.17

Making a credit refundable means that if the available credit exceeds the tax liability of an individual or family, the government would remit the difference. Hence, a refundable credit is in effect a health insurance voucher available through the tax system.

A refundable credit could be limited to workers who are not offered a plan by their employer. A criticism of this approach is that it might induce some small employers now offering insurance to end their plans in favor of allowing their employees to qualify for a credit. While, in most cases, this would actually make the employee better off, it remains a widely held criticism. On the other hand, giving the same tax credit to all workers in small firms--whether or not they are offered employer-sponsored coverage--means that workers with employer-sponsored coverage would enjoy "double-dip" tax relief in the form of the tax credit and the exclusion for their employer-directed compensation.

To avoid either situation, a "full" tax credit could be given to workers who are without sponsored insurance and a smaller tax credit to those who have a sponsored plan; the amount of the latter credit, when combined with the tax value of the exclusion, would be designed to be approximately equal to the full credit. In this way, the tax credit would not be biased either for or against an employer-sponsored plan.

Delivering the Credit Through the Withholding System
The simplest way to deliver the subsidy to workers would be through an adjustment in tax withholdings, much as deductions (such as mortgage interest) or credits (such as the child care credit) are typically handled today with the employer remitting tax payments to the government that are net of the credits. This means that workers would receive the tax benefit in increments throughout the year when they receive their paychecks.

Employers could also institute a system of payroll deductions for health premiums, perhaps through the existing rules for flexible benefit plans, so that the money would be available when premiums were due. Employers could pay premiums directly from these accounts on behalf of employees. In this way, the credit-premium transaction would be relatively simple for both employer and employee.

An Alternative: Assigning the Credit to a Health Plan
Another option would be to permit families to assign the value of their credit to their insurance plan in return for a lower premium. With the assignment, the employee signs a document allowing the insurer to claim the credit on his behalf and the insurer agrees to reduce premiums by the same amount. Insurers would normally obtain the credit through an adjustment in their tax payments to the government. Thus, rather than deal with the withholding system, a family would only have to establish its eligibility for a fixed or simple percentage credit.

This alternative would be particularly attractive to those lower-income families that do not even file tax returns and would address the concern that the tax subsidy might not be available when premiums are due. The process would mirror the premium payment system in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), under which Members of Congress and other federal employees are quoted premiums net of the government contribution.

Boosting Coverage Through Automatic Enrollment
Whether or not they sponsored insurance, employers could institute an automatic enrollment and payment system to make health insurance premium payments and obtain health-related tax benefits. This means that employees would automatically be enrolled in a health plan unless they explicitly declined to enroll, perhaps by signing a document indicating that they understood the possible consequences of not enrolling in a plan. Alternatively, a state could establish a default bare-bones health plan in conjunction with a private insurer, to which anyone not otherwise choosing a plan would be assigned.

Evidence from pension plans indicates that an automatic enrollment system for health insurance could sharply increase sign-up rates.18

Tax Credit Proposals in Congress
Several recently introduced legislative proposals are based on the health care tax credit concept. With some variation, the proposals focus primarily on providing tax credits to lower-income individuals and families without coverage.

These proposals have also garnered bipartisan and even tripartisan support. For example, Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) and Representatives Mark Kennedy (R-WI) and William Lipinski (D-IL) introduced similar legislation in the Fair Care for the Uninsured Act (S. 1570 and H.R. 583). Representatives Kay Granger (R-TX) and Albert Wynn (D-MD) introduced the Securing Access, Value, and Equality (SAVE) in Health Care Act (H.R. 1236). In 2001, Senator James Jeffords (I-VT) introduced S. 590, the Relief, Equity, Access, and Coverage for Health (REACH) Act, with the support of both Democrats and Republicans--including Senators Bill Frist (R-TN) and John Breaux (D-LA).

Some proposals have integrated tax credits with other health care initiatives. Both President George W. Bush and Democratic presidential candidate Senator John Kerry (D-MA) have integrated tax credits into their overall health care proposals. Representative John Shadegg (R-AZ) has introduced the Small Business Access and Choice for Entrepreneurs Act (H.R. 3423), and Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) and Representative Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) have introduced the Health Coverage, Affordability, Responsibility, and Equity Act (S. 1030 and H.R. 2402). All three combine the tax credit approach with an overall health reform proposal.



Step #2: Create alternative pools for the employees of small firms--including plans offered through churches, unions, and other intermediaries, as well as through the FEHBP--so that these workers and their families can access a wide range of affordable plans.

Providing a health insurance subsidy to employees who lack adequate help today is only one part of the solution to a lack of coverage. Affordable coverage that can be purchased with the help of a credit is the other part. For younger and healthier individuals and families, the individual insurance market offers affordable policies; but for many with poor health, obtaining affordable private coverage is difficult or impossible.

A solution to this problem is to construct forms of group insurance, in essence mimicking the large pools of employees available to the biggest employers. This would spread high risks across the pool so that sicker individuals and families would not face unaffordable premiums.

Enhancing the Stability of Groups
Creating such pools, however, poses a number of challenges that require careful design decisions. (Bringing several small employers together as a group poses similar challenges.) A major worry is the stability of voluntary insurance groups. The danger in bringing individuals together and establishing a group insurance premium--in effect, an average premium--is that healthier individuals would have the incentive to leave the group to get cheaper individual coverage reflecting their low risk. Meanwhile, sicker individuals would wish to join the group to get relatively inexpensive coverage. The group could then face a "death spiral" of ever-higher group rates.

Certain steps can reduce this problem to a degree. For example, some combination of higher rates, waiting periods, and pre-existing condition exclusions could be imposed on those seeking to join such a group who did not have prior coverage. Thus, individuals would be rewarded for buying and maintaining coverage when they are healthy and would be penalized if they sought coverage only when they needed medical care. Long-term contacts with penalties for dropping coverage could also make the group more stable.

A Reinsurance Pool with a Risk Adjuster
Although steps can be taken to improve the stability of pools, for long-term success and for equity reasons, an effective risk adjustment mechanism needs to be incorporated into group coverage for families in the small-business sector. A risk adjuster can take different forms, but the basic idea is to ensure that there are appropriate cross-subsidies between high-risk and low-risk enrollees within the pool, regardless of which insurance plan individuals choose.

An example would be a mandatory reinsurance pool in a state or other area, in which all insurers would pay a percentage of their premiums into a reinsurance pool and the member insurers would receive payments from the pool according to whether they had an above-average or below-average share of high-cost enrollees relative to the other carriers in that market. In this way, an insurer attracting a disproportionate share of high risks (perhaps because of good coverage for cancer) would be subsidized through the reinsurance pool by an insurer that attracted a disproportionate share of low risks (perhaps by offering a leaner policy with a lower premium).

Of course, if all carriers in the market were attracting about the same share of high-risk enrollees, then little--if any--cross-subsidy would occur through the reinsurance pool, since no single carrier or group of carriers was being disadvantaged in the market.

New Intermediaries in the Insurance System
Large firms are more effective than small firms in offering insurance not only because they can assemble large pools, but also because they are sophisticated negotiators and buyers of insurance. Insurance groups based on large organizations could achieve many of the marketing and administrative economies of scale that are normally available only to the employees of large firms. Typically, such organizations would not get into the business of insurance themselves, but would act much as a buyers club does by negotiating an arrangement with existing insurance companies. Organizations that might function in this way include groups of churches, trade unions, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), professional and trade associations, farm bureaus, and credit unions.

Some organizations (e.g., many farm bureaus) already offer plans, but working families who join these plans typically are not eligible for tax relief. Tax credits for health insurance would change that by making it more economical to offer insurance because far more potential enrollees would be able to afford premiums. For years, many African-American church congregations have organized various forms of insurance and other services for their members. Moreover, in many inner-city communities, these churches are typically larger, more stable, and more sophisticated--as well as more trusted--than the typical employer, making them a natural avenue through which many families armed with tax credits could obtain their health insurance.

The FEHBP System as a Possible Model
The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program could be another model of an alternative intermediary for workers in small firms. The FEHBP is an example of an insurance arrangement that offers group rates for individuals and also incorporates plans offered through voluntary associations, primarily employee organizations and unions. An FEHBP "look-alike"--organized by states and that has a separate risk pool--could be one way to provide an insurance infrastructure.

The FEHBP provides federal workers and their dependents (nearly 10 million covered individuals) with a wide choice of plans.19 There have been many proposals in recent years to open it up to non-federal workers under various conditions, typically using a separate insurance pool. To make the FEHBP available to non-federal workers using tax credits, Congress would need to amend federal law governing the FEHBP to permit a separate insurance pool for non-federal employees (so that premiums for federal employees would not be affected), with the exact structure in each state negotiated between the state and the federal government. Plans currently available in the FEHBP might be allowed to market to the new state pool if they wished, and other plans could market exclusively to the new pool provided they met the general requirements of the state-based version of the FEHBP.

Unions organize several of the leading FEHBP plans. For example, the Mail Handlers even offers associate membership to non-union members who wish to gain access to the health plan. These unions do not carry the insurance risk themselves; instead, they organize a group and negotiate an insurance package from an insurer for a fee. CNA Insurance organizes the Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, which has roughly 10 times as many enrollees as the union has regular union members. This "friendly society" role of unions has a long history in this and other countries.

Many union-sponsored plans also operate under the Taft-Hartley Act, where union-sponsored plans are a rational way to provide coverage when there is only a weak relationship between employer and worker. They flourish in markets that have fewer tax and regulatory obstacles to union-sponsored plans and where enrollees can receive tax or other subsidies--such as the FEHBP.

State governments could also charter FEHBP-style purchasing groups to act as intermediaries in their states, and a number of states are already experimenting along those lines with various purchasing group designs.

Step #3: Make it easier for employees to sign up for insurance in the workplace--even when the employer does not sponsor insurance--by removing tax and regulatory obstacles.

Most Americans pay their taxes through the workplace. This is a convenient system under which employers withhold income and Social Security taxes and send the money to the government. In addition, employees typically adjust their withholdings to take advantage of any tax breaks for which they may be eligible (e.g., the mortgage interest deduction). In a sense, the employers are actually operating the basic income tax system, but they do not in any sense design the tax code for their employees or "sponsor" the tax system. They could more appropriately be considered a clearinghouse for tax payments.

The place of employment is likewise particularly convenient and efficient for handling health insurance payments. Workers with employer-sponsored health insurance benefits typically sign up for the firm's plan when they take a job and arrange for a payroll deduction to cover premium costs for them and their families.

With individual tax credits for employees available, a small employer who is reluctant to sponsor coverage could instead carry out the critical clearinghouse role for the plan choices of his or her employees, making tax adjustments and premium payments. The employer might also decide to make a cash payment toward the plan chosen by the employee, as a fringe benefit.

Commonly, the payroll firm handling wages and benefits for the small firm would conduct these transactions. In this way, smaller employers could either directly or indirectly take responsibility for the mechanical aspects of arranging for payroll deductions and premium payments (similar to their role in the tax collection system) without having to sponsor a plan.

With tax credits, in principle, eligible employees could join any plan available in their area, not just one sponsored by their employer, and still obtain tax benefits. Thus, a small employer could play an important role in facilitating coverage without having to organize coverage by such things as providing information and making sign-up simple, instituting a payroll deduction and payment system (as many small firms do today for employee-directed savings plans), and making withholding adjustments to reflect available credits.

The government could spur the "facilitator" role of small firms that are disinclined to sponsor coverage themselves by clarifying the status of employer contributions to plans that are chosen by the employee and not sponsored by the employer. An employer wishing to set up such an arrangement today faces a dilemma. If the employer helps to pay for coverage chosen by the worker, that coverage is deemed to be an employer-sponsored plan under federal employee benefit law, and both the employer and the coverage issued to the worker by the insurer become subject to federal employer-sponsored plan regulations. To avoid such regulation, the employer must pay the worker taxable cash, which the worker can then use to purchase coverage. But that means the worker must forgo the tax benefit derived from his employer's making pre-tax contributions toward the cost of his coverage.

If the plan is interpreted as an employer-sponsored plan, the employer could face a regulatory nightmare under state insurance rules or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (the federal law affecting certain employers) since any plan chosen by the employee would embroil the employer in complex insurance rules. However, if the arrangement is not considered an employer-sponsored plan, both employer and employee lose favorable tax benefits.

Thus, to encourage smaller employers to play the role of insurance facilitator--with or without a tax credit available to employees--federal and/or state employee benefit law needs to make clear that favorable tax benefits are available at least to the employee for an employer's contribution toward coverage whether or not the insurance is deemed an employer-sponsored plan.

Conclusion
High rates of uninsurance among working families in small firms are a testament to the limitations of the employment-based health system in the small-business sector. Yet both the tax system and government insurance rules discourage other insurance arrangements for these uninsured working families.

Proposals for individual tax credits for health coverage would help to remove this barrier to alternative insurance arrangements. In addition, taking steps to build an insurance infrastructure with affordable choices would enable these families to have coverage that is similar to--or even better than--the insurance available to employees of large firms.
With these reforms in place, new forms of coverage--including plans offered through churches, large corporations, and the FEHBP--would become available to working Americans in the small-business sector. For this to occur, however, Congress must recognize that an important distinction exists between using the workplace as a convenient location to obtain insurance and making tax relief to families contingent upon employer sponsorship of their health insurance.

Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D. , is Vice President for Domestic and Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

Appendix
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1. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Health Insurance Coverage in America: 2002 Data Update (Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003), p. 6.
2. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, "The Uninsured and Rising Health Insurance Premiums," Congressional Budget Office testimony before the Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2004. See also Congressional Budget Office, How Many People Lack Health Insurance and for How Long, 2003.
3. Kaiser Commission, Health Insurance Coverage, pp. 9 and 10.
4. Ibid., pp. 19 and 34.
5. "Sources of Health Insurance and the Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2003 Current Population Survey," Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No. 264, December 2003.
6. Kaiser Commission, Health Insurance Coverage, pp. 19 and 34.
7. Ibid., p. 19.
8. For a summary of the advantages of employer-sponsored coverage, see William S. Custer, Charles N. Kahn III, and Thomas F. Wildsmith IV, "Why We Should Keep the Employment-Based Health Insurance System," Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 115-122.
9. For a summary of the pros and cons of employer-sponsored coverage, see Uwe E. Reinhardt, "Employer-Based Insurance: A Balance Sheet," Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 124-132.
10. John Sheils and Randall Haught, "The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004," Web exclusive, Health Affairs, February 25, 2004, at content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.106v1.pdf.
11. This figure averages workers with and without insurance, so the tax subsidy for an insured lower-income worker would be higher than this. Nonetheless, a worker in the lowest federal tax bracket would receive only just over half the subsidy for insurance received by an upper-income worker.
12. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, The Uninsured: A Primer (Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003), p. 13, at www.kff.org/uninsured/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=29345.
13. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Uninsured in America: A Chart Book (Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2000), p. 41, at www.kff.org/uninsured/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14629.
14. Congressional Budget Office, The Tax Treatment of Employment-Based Health Insurance, 1994, p. 8.
15. Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits, 2003 (Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004), at www.kff.org/insurance/ehbs2003-6-set.cfm. See also "Exhibit 2.6: Percentage of Employers Providing a Choice of Health Plans, by Firm Size, 2003," in Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care Marketplace, 2004 Update, Kaiser Family Foundation, April 2004, at www.kff.org/insurance/7031/ti2004-2-6.cfm.
16. Jon R. Gabel and Jeremy D. Pickreign, "Risky Business: When Mom and Pop Buy Health Insurance for Their Employees," Commonwealth Fund Issue Brief, April 2004, at www.cmwf.org/programs/insurance/gabel_riskybusiness_ib_722.pdf.
17. Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D., "Time for Bipartisan Action to Help Families Without Health Insurance," He
18. A recent study found that automatic enrollment for 401(k) plans boosted participation rates from 37 percent to 86 percent for such voluntary pensions, with even sharper increases for young and lower-paid employees. See Brigitte Madrian and Dennis Shea, "The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7682, May 2000, p. 51.
19. For descriptions of the FEHBP, see Harry Cain, "Moving Medicare to the FEHBP, or How to Make an Elephant Fly," Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4 (July/August 1999), pp. 25-39; Stuart Butler and Robert Moffit, "The FEHBP as a Model for a New Medicare Program," Health Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 1995); and Craig Caplan and Lisa Foley, Structuring Health Care Benefits: A Comparison of Medicare and the FEHBP (Washington, D.C.: AARP Public Policy Institute, May 2000).
? 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
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The Future of Ground Zero

By John Rosenthal
John Rosenthal has taught modern European philosophy and political philosophy at schools in the United States and France. He is presently writing a book on ethnic-national politics and the principle of "self-determination."

(Go to Print Friendly Version)

n architect from Berlin has received the commission for the most spectacular and surely also the most delicate building project in the world," a news anchor announces. The "architect from Berlin" is Daniel Libeskind, and his commission is "to put something new in the place of the World Trade Center." There follow the well-known images of the World Trade towers imploding. "It was a murderous visitation as on September 11, 2001 the twin towers of the World Trade Center were reduced to rubble," the voiceover explains in distinctly religious tones: "The limitless drive upwards, the optimistic vitality of this city seemed broken. Now it has a new vision -- thanks to Daniel Libeskind, the winner of the competition for the reconstruction of Ground Zero." The earlier scenes of destruction are replaced by images of glittering skyscrapers encircling a verdant field where happy families stroll -- this is no mere reconstruction, it would seem, but the veritable resurrection of New York. "The decision was made unanimously by the jury," the voiceover continues. The report dates from February 27, 2003, and it comes from the German public television channel zdf. It was recently shown in a continuous loop as part of the exhibition "Counterpoint: The Architecture of Daniel Libeskind" at the Jewish Museum in Berlin.

But there is one problem with the report: As most New Yorkers will recall, the decision in favor of Libeskind was hardly unanimous. Indeed, on February 25, just two days before the announcement of the selection of the Libeskind design, the site planning committee of the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, the body specifically created to oversee the reconstruction of downtown Manhattan in the aftermath of 9-11, decided against the latter and in favor of the rival proposal from Raphael Vi?oly and Frederic Schwartz's "think" architectural team. Despite a massive and sometimes sordid public relations effort by the Libeskind camp -- including a campaign to get a prominent critic in the press fired and an apparent attempt to pad support for the Libeskind entry in two high-profile web-based polls -- this choice seemed to reflect the tendency of public opinion, which the lmdc had been specifically tasked to canvas. Although neither of the two design competition finalists ever managed to generate much enthusiasm among New Yorkers, when, for instance, Jennifer Rainville of the local television news station ny1 reported from the opening of an lmdc-sponsored exhibition of the two models on February 4, she found a strong movement of support toward the think design and its lattice-work invocation of the old twin towers. Yet, belying repeated assurances about the "open" and "democratic" character of the process of deliberations on the future of Ground Zero, New York Governor George Pataki and Mayor Michael Bloomberg chose to ignore the lmdc recommendation and go with the Libeskind design anyway.

Why was there this misrepresentation in the zdf report, and why was it allowed to stand in the Libeskind exhibition at Berlin's Jewish Museum when the curators surely were aware of the controversy surrounding the selection? To answer that question is to consider the exalted status enjoyed by Daniel Libeskind in contemporary German public discourse. It was his work in Germany, after all, that established Libeskind's "worldwide renown," as Jewish Museum director Michael Blumenthal has put it. In fact, up until now Libeskind has been known, first and foremost, as the designer of the Jewish Museum itself. Before winning the design competition for the latter, Libeskind's designs had been widely regarded as unbuildable. Still today, his resume of built designs includes only museums or museum extensions and an artist's studio on Mallorca.

To reflect on the sources of Libeskind's German success might also help us understand how a supposed architectural "visionary" with no relevant experience in urban planning or skyscraper design should have been entrusted with devising the "master plan" for a massive complex of high-rise office buildings and pedestrian spaces upon which the revitalization of southern Manhattan and, to a certain extent, the future of New York itself will depend. The consequences of this odd choice have already been somewhat attenuated thanks largely to the interventions of developer Larry Silverstein, the leaseholder of the World Trade Center site. It was Silverstein who brought in architect David Childs of Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill to "give form" to Libeskind's "idea" for the so-called Freedom Tower, the soaring "skyline element" included in the Libeskind site plan in accordance with lmdc specifications. At the December 19, 2003 news conference unveiling the revised Freedom Tower model, Libeskind stated flatly (whether out of graciousness, as some have suggested, or in an outburst of spleen), "I'm not the architect of this building." Nonetheless, he has insisted that his signature remain visible on the tower in certain stylistic or ostensibly "symbolic" details: the off-center spire meeting the "need" for asymmetry, the sloping roof topping off the solid part of the structure, and, of course, the seemingly all-important and patriotic requirement that the building plus its spire measure out to exactly 1,776 feet in order to mark the year of the Declaration of Independence. "It's not a date," Libeskind has remarked cryptically, "a number that will ever be surpassed in world history." That an adequate proportion be maintained between the spire and the subjacent building structure is another point on which Libeskind has insisted: this too by reason of Libeskind's novel brand of esoteric Americana, since only thus can the off-center spire be regarded as mirroring the upraised arm of the Statue of Liberty.

In all these regards, Libeskind, not so subtly evoking the threat of legal action by bringing his lawyer to design meetings and with the apparently unwavering support of Governor Pataki, has had his way. Furthermore, casting himself in the role of defender of the common man, Libeskind has promised to continue to assert his authority as the "guardian" of the "master plan" for the World Trade Center site as a whole: "When the politicians and architects and developers have all gone home, I'll still be there making sure that everything that is built on this site is right because it is . . . Ground Zero."

There are numerous indications that the lmdc is prepared to indulge Libeskind's pretensions on this head. Thus, just days after his "Reflecting Absence" design was announced as the winner of the World Trade Center memorial competition last January, Michael Arad put in a visit to Libeskind's Rector Street office to discuss modifications of his proposal. The placement of the new downtown Path Station is even said somehow to reflect the requirements of the famous "Wedge of Light" where, Libeskind has promised, "Each year on September 11th between the hours of 8:46 am, when the first airplane hit, and 10:28 am, when the second tower collapsed, the sun will shine without shadow." Architect Eli Attia has long since demonstrated that the "Wedge" was a hoax and that, supposing the sun shines at all between the appointed times, the area demarcated in Libeskind's original model will be increasingly covered in shadow. But this fact seems not to have diminished the willingness of city officials to play along. Further compromises between Daniel Libeskind's "vision" and the real needs of downtown redevelopment are presumably yet to come.

It is, then, long overdue that New Yorkers and Americans generally come to know something about the sources of Libeskind's prestige in the country that made him famous. Along the way, we will also learn more about the "philosophy" ostensibly underlying his architecture. As we will see, the mystical or metaphysical bent that is so much celebrated by Libeskind's admirers and that recently has had him seeking some occult significance in shapes and numbers and angles in lower Manhattan also had him perceiving a cosmic significance in the 9-11 attacks themselves. In fact, the meaning that the "master planner" of the new World Trade Center finds in the destruction of the old is seemingly no different from the meaning that virtually all apologists for the attacks claim to have found therein.



The Jewish Museum in Berlin

t was berlin's Jewish Museum that created the Libeskind aura. He won the competition to design it in 1989, whereupon he moved to Berlin to oversee the project. It was thus that Libeskind, an American citizen who was born in Poland and whose only "architecture" consisted of sketches, became an "architect from Berlin." In fact, Libeskind's original brief was to design an extension to the already existing Berlin Museum. The extension was intended to house a museum division specifically devoted to Jewish history in Berlin. In the intervening years, however, the extension came to overshadow, with regard to both form and function, the original building. By the time Libeskind's extension was completed, the erstwhile Berlin Museum, a dignified specimen of Berlin baroque dating from 1735, had been downgraded to the entry hall for the Jewish Museum, and its contents had been shipped out.

The Jewish Museum opened for public viewing in January 1999 without any exhibition yet installed. Libeskind's building was supposed itself to be the attraction, and indeed over the next two years hundreds of thousands came to wander through its empty spaces. Many commentators in the German media pleaded for the building to be left empty, sometimes admitting that its irregular layout made it unsuitable for a museum but arguing that in its emptiness it nonetheless provided a fitting memorial to German-Jewish history and its violent consummation in the Holocaust. That Libeskind had not been commissioned to design a memorial seemed not to matter. The seriousness with which the suggestion was entertained at the outset revealed that the museum's management did not have any clear idea of how the building should be used -- or even any collection to put in it. In an architectural variation on Marshall McLuhan's famous dictum "the medium is the message," here the building was evidently supposed to be the function of the building -- or, more precisely, the building was the message.

Libeskind gave ample encouragement to the notion that his design meant something, which is not to say merely that it symbolized something, but rather that it was itself the crystallization of some profound historical meaning -- the crystallization of nothing less than the entirety of German-Jewish history. Calling the project "Between the Lines," as if it were an independent artwork requiring a title, Libeskind claimed to have sensed in the area of the Berlin building site "an invisible matrix . . . of relationships, which I discovered not only among German and Jewish figures, but also between the municipal history of Berlin and the history of Jews in Germany and in Berlin. I recognized that certain people, in particular certain scientists, composers, artists, and poets, were the links between Jewish tradition and German culture. I found these connections and I plotted an irrational matrix in the form of a system of right-angled triangles, which would yield reference to the emblematics of a compressed and distorted star: the yellow star that was so frequently worn on this very site."1 In order to uncover this "matrix," Libeskind claimed even to have sought out the Berlin addresses at which various "famous Germans" and "famous Jews" had once lived. Throughout, Libeskind employed the categories "German" and "Jew" as if they were mutually exclusive -- thus, in a macabre reflection of Nazi racial ideology, stripping figures like Heinrich Heine or Walter Benjamin, whose names he mentioned, of their "Germanness." "I was astonished," he says, "that it was not at all difficult to hear and to note the addresses of these people: they formed a wholly specific urban and cultural constellation of world history" -- which is apparently to say that the configuration of the physical locations of their addresses formed this constellation.

The outcome of this seemingly intricate procedure is the elongated, zigzagging structure of the Jewish Museum, which contains no recognizable right angles and which no one would know "yields reference" to a Star of David -- much less a "yellow" Star of David as worn by Jews under the Third Reich -- who had not been so informed by the architect or other cognoscenti. To the uninitiated the shape of the building will appear like a simple doodle: the product not of the careful "plotting" of an "irrational matrix," but of arbitrary scribbling. But this doodle is seemingly so revered by the members of Germany's cultural establishment that museum management has seen fit to elevate it to the status of the emblem for the museum itself. It is featured on the signposts leading to the museum, on the museum stationery, and on the museum homepage. It even serves as the motif on the red silk scarves worn by the youthful guides stationed throughout the museum (and which are also available to visitors in the Museum Shop starting at ?19,90). Inasmuch as it is the emblem of the "Jewish Museum Berlin," it is almost as if Daniel Libeskind's doodle had replaced the traditional symbol of Judaism to which it allegedly "yields reference" or, perhaps more precisely, had some sort of superior and runic significance all its own: presumably, the significance of German-Jewish history, which Libeskind himself claims to have "found" but does not pronounce.

The greatest irony is that virtually no one will ever actually see the celebrated shape of Libeskind's building first-hand -- unless, that is, by somehow hovering over it. Nothing expresses more clearly just how detached is the abstruse metaphysics of Libeskind's architecture from the ordinary requirements of building design -- which is to say from the practical needs of human beings, for whose purposes a building is ordinarily built, and their aesthetic sensibilities, to which its form would ordinarily be expected to respond. The shape of Libeskind's Jewish Museum constitutes an outright nuisance for visitors, who walk through seemingly interminable halls before retracing their steps, descending and ascending two enormous stairwells, to reach the exit. For passers-by, on the other hand, it is an irrelevance. Even admirers of Libeskind have conceded that from street level the building, with its boxish facades and drab grey-silver siding, resembles a bunker. The sliver-like windows, which like so many gun holes criss-cross the building, give further sustenance to this comparison. (Unlike the layout of the building as such, the pattern formed by the windows on the museum's most prominent surface on the Lindenstrasse does seem to "refer to" a Star of David.) Nonetheless, a more accurate comparison might be a warehouse, such as those one sees driving past the cargo area of almost any large municipal airport.

Libeskind's esoteric interpretation of spatial configurations is also on evidence in the interior of the Jewish Museum. The basement of the museum is arranged into three intersecting corridors, which are designated the "Axis of Holocaust," the "Axis of Exile," and the "Axis of Continuity." To help orient visitors, diagrams on the walls display the arrangement of the three axes with a red dot indicating "you are here." The "Axis of Holocaust" contains several display cases exhibiting personal artifacts of Jews who perished in the death camps. Under the title "The Number of Murdered Jews in Europe," a map of Europe hangs on a wall, on which is indicated how many Jews from each European country were killed. Strangely, one of the orientation maps of the museum basement hangs directly next to it and, more strangely, the outline of the arrangement formed by the three axes on the orientation map reappears dimly superimposed on the map of the "Murdered Jews in Europe" -- as if the former had something to do with the latter. Since indeed there is no other explanatory information given regarding the map of "Murdered Jews" (on its other side, there is a plaque concerning the fate of specifically German Jews), it would seem that Libeskind's system of "axes" is all the explanation required. This impression is reinforced by the fact that plaques found throughout the museum refer to "symbolic" features of the building itself and what, seemingly by the personal fiat of the architect, they should inspire visitors to "think about," as in "The Axis of Exile and the Axis of Holocaust cut across your path and lead to the Garden of Exile and the Holocaust Tower. [Here] Architect Daniel Libeskind asks us to think about the Holocaust and those people deported to their deaths."

The Jewish Museum's own blurb on the "Counterpoint" exhibition speaks of Libeskind as a "visionary" whose "philosophical approach connects architecture and urban planning with their social function and develops them in constant dialogue with the people" -- though the German reads "den Menschen," literally "human beings" and with the connotation here of "ordinary people." In light of his inexperience in the matter, the reference to "urban planning" is curious. The Jewish Museum is conspicuously located in a huge otherwise empty lot, such that there is no possibility of its winding design interfering with its environment as in any built environment it invariably would. Libeskind did submit a design proposal -- titled, characteristically, "Ten Thunderbolts of Absolute Absence" -- for the rebuilding of Berlin's central Potsdamer Platz, which, lying at the fault line between East and West Berlin, had fallen into disuse for over 40 years. But while Berlin's cultural elites may be thrilled that Libeskind won the competition to rebuild downtown Manhattan, Berlin's city planners knew better than to entrust him with an analogous responsibility in their own city.

Far from showing solicitude for the human occupants of built space, moreover, Libeskind's "philosophical approach" to architecture, precisely by so brazenly disdaining function in favor of "meaning," shows persistent contempt for them. Perhaps the most telling example of such contempt in the Jewish Museum is provided by the so-called Garden of Exile, to which the Axis of Exile leads. The Garden consists of 49 square concrete columns, six meters high and arranged into a closely packed 7x7 square grid. What appears from below like shrubbery -- in winter dead shrubbery -- juts out over the top of each column. The ground is paved in smallish cobblestones, and a narrow path goes around the perimeter of the Garden, itself partially enclosed by a low angular concrete barrier over which there is a drop onto another stone surface bordered by concrete walls. In case it was not already hazardous enough to have visitors walking outdoors on a cobblestone surface among concrete slabs or between them and something like a pit, Libeskind has placed the Garden on a dual set of inclines.

An informational plaque explains: "Here, architect Daniel Libeskind asks us to think about the disorientation that exile brings. The 49 columns are filled with earth in which willow oak grows. Forty-eight of the columns contain earth of Berlin and stand for 1948 and the formation of the state of Israel. The central and forty-ninth pillar is filled with earth from Jerusalem and stands for Berlin itself." The German version implies more strongly that it is the Garden itself that will induce us to "think about" the requisite topic, if not necessarily the associated numerology. Visitors will find some more immediately relevant practical advice on a paper sign posted directly in front of the door leading to the "Garden": "Enter the Garden of Exile at your own risk! Slippery underfoot. Please walk carefully."



Ground Zero

hatever inconveniences or worse may have been created by the architecture of Libeskind's Jewish Museum, they pale in comparison to the damage that New York and New Yorkers would suffer if his "master plan" for the World Trade Center site were ever to be implemented. The modifications to aspects of the Libeskind design that have been quietly made as planning advances, and the notably loose interpretation that has been given to others, suggest that city planners are not wholly insensitive to its practical failings and risks. Libeskind's original submission famously called for the excavated "bathtub" of the old World Trade Center to be left empty: a 70-foot-deep, 4.7-acre crater, replete with an exposed slurry wall flanking the Hudson on its western edge. The latter element was supposed to serve as a symbol for the resilience of American democracy, according to Libeskind, even though engineers warned that without the lateral support formerly provided by the basement levels of the World Trade Center it was destined to collapse. The morbidly permanent crater was Libeskind's response to the lmdc's requirement that submitted designs include an appropriate context for a World Trade Center memorial. Libeskind, however, spoke of it as if it were, without further ado, already such a memorial. Indeed, he titled his overall site design "Memory Foundations," as if the point of downtown reconstruction as a whole was eternally to remind people of the death and destruction caused by the 9-11 attacks -- to invite them to "think about" it, in the style of Libeskind's Jewish Museum -- rather than to rebuild and to revitalize a part of the city that had been decimated by the attacks. By the time the Libeskind proposal was anointed the winner of the design competition, the floor of the crater had been brought up to a "mere" 30 feet below ground level. But as critics pointed out, even at a more modest depth, Libeskind's crater would represent a massive obstacle to pedestrian flow on the southern tip of Manhattan and as such a permanent impediment to downtown redevelopment.

Mercifully, Michael Arad's winning design proposal for the World Trade Center memorial now brings the memorial site up to street level. The crater, however, continues to be invoked by the memorial itself, consisting of two reflecting pools embedded 30 feet below street level into the footprints of the twin towers. In a single gesture, Arad's design manages simultaneously to satisfy the lmdc's requirement that the tower footprints remain visible and to limit the harmful effects of Libeskind's original proposal. It can nonetheless be wondered how leaving any void where the towers once stood represents a tribute to the victims of the 9-11 attacks rather than to the perpetrators, who are, after all, the real architects of that void. Following World War ii, Poles did not leave the void created by the German Wehrmacht where Warsaw once stood. In defiance of their aggressors, they rebuilt their capital to its former condition. By contrast, the "absence" preserved in the World Trade Center memorial site suggests a certain indulgence toward the aggressor.

Arad has been compelled to make a more obvious concession to the cultish spirit of Libeskind's original design by adding a deep ravine along the site's western edge in order to permit viewing of the slurry wall. An adjacent stairwell will lead 70 feet down to a so-called interpretive center at bedrock level, where visitors will be able to "view many preserved artifacts from the twin towers: twisted steel beams, a crushed fire truck, and personal effects." Furthermore, whereas Arad's original submission included a long, thin "cultural building" along the site's western perimeter, the revised version made public after his consultations with Libeskind includes instead two squat angular buildings on the site's northeast quadrant. These rudely occupy almost half the space that Arad's original model had reserved for pedestrian use and they feature Libeskind's signature sloping roofs.

Like the Freedom Tower, the other four buildings in the so-called spiral of skyscrapers surrounding the memorial site in Libeskind's "master plan" are also supposed to have sloping roofs. Given the potential risks from sliding snow and ice in winter, this arrangement displays a remarkable callousness toward the well-being of pedestrians below. But there is a further consideration militating against the use of sloping roofs on high-rise structures that one could have imagined would be especially obvious to planners in this specific context. Flat roofs, unlike sloping ones, permit evacuations in the event of an emergency. Indeed, when the first attack on the World Trade Towers occurred in 1993, members of the nypd transported by helicopter entered the buildings and evacuated occupants from their roofs. Governor Pataki has stated, "All that we do in Lower Manhattan is in memory of those we lost on September 11th and in the 1993 bombing." If city and state officials permit fidelity to the "vision" of Daniel Libeskind to override basic safety considerations, there will be reason to doubt that this is in fact so.



More than mere museum

ddly enough, the Jewish Museum Berlin, now finally outfitted with an exhibition, was scheduled to have its opening on September 11, 2001. The opening was postponed on account of the attacks in the United States. Two days before, a "gala dinner" was held to mark the occasion. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, one of the few German papers willing to maintain a certain ironic reserve in its treatment of Libeskind and the museum project, ran a photo essay on the event under the title "The First General Assembly of a Happier World." The guest list of some 850 luminaries included German Chancellor Gerhard Schr?der, President Johannes Rau, Chief Justice of the German Supreme Court Jutta Limbach, and Interior Minister Otto Schilly, as well as prominent members of parliament from all of Germany's major parties and the ceos of leading German firms such as Siemens, Daimler-Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, and Bertelsmann. Having reportedly been personally urged to attend by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Henry Kissinger was also on hand. Munich's S?ddeutsche Zeitung, the daily paper of choice for Germany's Social Democratic establishment, identified him as one of "several very prominent representatives of American Jews" in attendance. The paper seemingly included under this heading several other people whose only apparent representative function vis-?-vis "American Jews" was that they are American and Jewish.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung described the event as "the unofficial founding act of the New Germany" and went on to explain, "Even if the museum portrays the entire history of Jews in Germany, its focal point is, nonetheless, the remembrance of the Holocaust. It is in this remembrance that the recovery of national sovereignty begins, of which the evening was supposed to provide a discreet but firm demonstration." In these words, the irony was gone. The unusually frank and dispassionate assessment accurately reflected the importance of the museum for the political ambitions of post-reunification Germany or, more precisely, its elites. Germany had not only to commemorate. Germany had to be seen to commemorate by the rest of the world. In the early 1990s, the museum project had in fact foundered and even seen its funding briefly cut by the financially strapped Berlin municipal government. Meanwhile, however, reports of mounting attacks on Turkish "guest workers" and foreign asylum seekers were again sullying Germany's image abroad, and class-action suits in American courts related to Nazi-era claims were threatening the balance sheets of German firms at home. The fate of the Jewish Museum could not be left to the parochial calculations of local Berlin politicians. Just as much as the "slave-labor fund" devised by the Schr?der government in an attempt to limit German corporate liability, and indeed in a certain measure as the symbolic counterpart to the latter, Berlin's Jewish Museum had become an affair of state.

The Jewish Museum did not only respond, however, to the political exigencies of the German elites. As attested by the hundreds of thousands of Germans who have flocked to it, with or without an exhibition, it also seemed to respond to an affective need of large segments of the German public. Whereas the Nazi past represented a political burden to German elites hoping for Germany again to play a forceful role in world affairs, it represented a psychological burden to many ordinary Germans hoping finally to be released from the sins of their parents' and grandparents' generation. By paying spectacular homage to Jews as the archetypal victims of Nazi crimes, the Jewish Museum held out the promise of the burden being lifted. "The Germans are crazy about this museum," an unnamed German scholar of anti-Semitism was quoted as saying in the Jewish Press. When asked why, he explained that it represented for them a "final act of absolution."

In remarks that were appreciatively cited in the German papers, museum director Michael Blumenthal spoke to the aspirations of his powerful guests at the opening ceremony: "Inasmuch as you face the past, attempt to make amends, support this museum and other similar institutions in the capital, you have given a sign and earned the moral right to figure among the leaders in the worldwide struggle against racism, for religious tolerance, for the rights of all minorities and human rights. I hope that the Federal Republic will assume this role with energy and determination." "The war," Blumenthal concluded, "has been over for more than 50 years; modest diffidence is no longer called for in this area."

Blumenthal, U.S. secretary of the Treasury in the Carter administration, was born in the Oranienburg suburb of Berlin and fled Germany with his parents after the 1938 Kristallnacht. Before being appointed director of the Jewish Museum, he had neither a curatorial background nor any particular expertise in German-Jewish history. But he had the right biography for the symbolism with which the project was being invested. Indeed, it was another former American secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, who on account of the so-called Morgenthau Plan -- denounced by Goebbels in a 1944 tirade as a plan to turn a conquered Germany into "one big potato farm" -- had long incarnated the role of the "avenging Jew" in German popular mythology. Now, however, Blumenthal was returning home not in a reprise of this latter role, but in a role which had hitherto been imagined only in the most extravagant of German fantasies: Absolution was wanted, and Michael Blumenthal was dispensing absolution.

Perhaps not coincidentally, only some two months and a day after the Jewish Museum building first opened for viewing in January 1999, German Tornado fighter jets were bombing Belgrade in the first deployment of German combat forces outside of Germany since the end of World War ii and in the name precisely of the "struggle for minority rights." Amidst so much state-sponsored "remembrance," the fact that German Jews had not by and large considered themselves a "minority," nor demanded any "minority rights," but struggled under the Third Reich quite simply to retain their rights as Germans seemed to have been forgotten. It was likewise forgotten that the defense of allegedly "oppressed minorities" -- notably, the ethnic German "minorities" of Czechoslovakia and Poland -- had also been a leitmotif of Nazi foreign policy and served as the major pretext for Nazi aggression.



The iconography of victimhood

t was the complex of political and affective expediency described above that assured the success of Libeskind's "commemorative architecture" in Germany. As in the case of Blumenthal, the assumed appropriateness of Libeskind's biography clearly contributed to the expiatory effect that the museum project was supposed to produce. The very first plaque a visitor sees upon entering the Jewish Museum is devoted to the building's architect and specifies that he lost most of his family in the Holocaust. The statement, which Libeskind himself frequently repeats, is rather puzzling, since he was born after the war. His parents were Polish Jews who escaped to Soviet territories and survived.

But while his identity imbued his ostensible work of commemoration with the aura of authenticity, it was the grandiose and mystifying character of the work itself that secured for Libeskind the adulation of so much of the German public. The pathetic iconography of victimhood he built into the Jewish Museum poses no uncomfortable questions about perpetrators. Indeed, the plaques installed along the "axes" of the museum's basement tactfully avoid using the word "Germans" in connection with the persecution of the Jews, speaking only of "Nazis" as if the latter had been alien to German society or only card-carrying party members were implicated in the actions of the Nazi state.

Above all, the mysticism involved in both the attribution of some transcendent "meaning" to the slaughter of European Jews and the pretense that this meaning could somehow be evoked by -- or even condensed into -- the physical contours of a building short circuits any effort at rationally grasping the direct political antecedents, historical roots, and ideological underpinnings of the Third Reich's exterminationist Jewish policy. In the absence of such an effort, the Holocaust gets sacralized into a kind of negative miracle whose very incomprehensibility leaves it perfectly sealed off from the rest of German history and even from all other aspects of the Nazi regime. By attributing "meaning" to the Holocaust, moreover, the sacred history which Libeskind substitutes for mundane history constitutes, in effect, a sort of divine justification for it. The convoluted symbolism of Libeskind's "Garden of Exile" -- with its 48 "Israeli" pillars filled with "earth from Berlin" and its 49th "and central" pillar "standing for Berlin" and filled with "earth from Jerusalem" -- seems to suggest finally that the Nazi persecution of the Jews served some sort of higher redemptive purpose, since without it, after all, Israel might never have been created.



The sacralization of 9-11

ut if the sacralization of the Holocaust in Libeskind's Jewish Museum offers expiation for the German public, the sacralization of the September 11 attacks on New York in his "master plan" for the new World Trade Center has very different implications for Americans. Americans were, after all, the targets of the September 11 attacks. If the attacks served some higher redemptive purpose, then it is the deaths of those who were trapped in the towers that is, in effect, provided a transcendent justification. On the other hand, it is precisely the members of al Qaeda, i.e. the perpetrators of the attacks, who must have worked here as the presumably unknowing instruments of some divine plan. The overwrought symbolism proposed by Libeskind for the World Trade Center site suggests just such a perverse metaphysical interpretation of 9-11. Why, after all, supposing Libeskind's "Wedge of Light" was what he said it was, should the sun be compelled to "shine without shadow" from 8:46 am to 10:28 am on every September 11? Why should New Yorkers -- or even nature itself -- be made to commemorate with such morbid precision the darkest moments in the city's history?

In his original submission, moreover, Libeskind proposed to include what he called a "museum of the event" at the "epicenter" of the World Trade Center site. The idea is retained in the revised site plan in the form of the underground "interpretive center," with its "crushed fire truck" and "personal effects." The stylization of the September 11 attacks into "the" event, singular and definitive, seems to elevate them to the status of a sort of New Age apocalypse, presumably possessed of some revelatory significance. But what could this significance be? Why should New Yorkers and Americans have required such a rude awakening?

An interview Libeskind gave to the S?ddeutsche Zeitung in June 2002 -- i.e., before the announcement of the World Trade Center design competition -- provides some clues. In it, the interviewer reminds Libeskind that he had elsewhere remarked that after September 11 "everything must change." A sort of muddled millenarianism has, of course, been extremely common in the aftermath of 9-11. It has been especially so among those who, either ignoring the stated motivations of the assailants or tacitly approving of them, locate what they call the "causes" of the attacks in some perceived iniquity of the world or the United States or, typically, both -- inasmuch as global order is assumed in this style of discourse to be merely an extension of American "empire." But commenting on what the interviewer called a "longing for spirituality," Libeskind also indicated wherein the iniquity of the world might be supposed to lie: "Materialist capitalist culture calls forth in human beings a demand for something different. The excesses of capitalism and globalization elicit a radical response. The spiritual is always tied to the political. It is always bound together with the emergence of totalitarian powers, which give the human soul the impulse to unveil itself and its forces."

Note that Libeskind here, some nine months after the 9-11 attacks, uses the expression "totalitarian" not in connection with Islamism, an ideology whose totalizing pretensions could hardly be more explicit, but rather in connection with "materialist capitalist culture" -- the very "materialist capitalist culture" which, according to the screeds of anti-globalization militants worldwide, is epitomized by America and is supposed to have been symbolized by the twin towers of New York's World Trade Center. The allusion to the "radical response" elicited by capitalist "excesses" is particularly chilling. Although the immediate context for the remarks is a discussion of "spirituality" in art, it should be noted that the interview closes with Libeskind, who has recently taken to directing opera, enthusing over the prospect of being able to stage a series of operas by the German composer Karlheinz Stockhausen -- the same Karlheinz Stockhausen who famously pronounced the 9-11 attacks "the greatest work of art there has ever been."2

It is perhaps clearer now why Daniel Libeskind wanted the sun "to shine without shadow" from 8:46 am to 10:28 am on every September 11, why he proposed to leave a crater in downtown Manhattan where the World Trade Center once stood, and why he insists that visitors to the new World Trade Center should view artifacts of the destruction wrought by the 9-11 attacks. These and other features of his "master plan" for the site suggest a special sort of memorialization that in German is called Mahnung, implying not just an incitement to remember, but to remember and take heed. A Mahnmal serves at once as reminder and warning: like the ruins of the Kaiser Wilhelm church on the Breitscheidplatz in downtown Berlin, which stand to this day as a reminder of the devastation that German militarism once brought down upon Germany itself. Stripped of the pseudo-patriotic packaging in which he sought to market it, the basic conception of Libeskind's World Trade Center "master plan" addresses a similar message to New Yorkers and Americans, implying that they were themselves responsible for the fate that befell them on September 11, 2001 and that they must atone for the wrongs which elicited the catastrophe. It is a tribute to America's enemies and an insult to the memory of those who were killed in the attacks.



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Notes

1 From a December 12, 1989 lecture at the University of Hannover, reproduced in Kristin Feireiss, ed., Daniel Libeskind: Erweiterung des Berlin Museums mit Abteilung J?disches Museum (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1992). Libeskind has used essentially the same formulation in numerous lectures and published works.

2 Symptomatically, when, in a more recent interview with the Neue Z?richer Zeitung (April 7, 2003) the interviewer remarked that "as the nodal point of global finance" the old World Trade Center "was certainly not a place of innocence," Libeskind did not protest, but merely noted that in his design he had tried to master "all the contradictions . . . of the site."



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